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No. 95-2549

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Moorish Science Temple of *

America, Inc.; Frank Applewhite; *

Curtis Owen, *

 *

Appellants, * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

v. * District of Minnesota.

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Dennis Benson, Warden; Steve *

Hokonson, Chaplain, *

 *

Appellees. *

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 Submitted: May 20, 1996

 Filed: May 29, 1996

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Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs, a branch temple of the Moorish Science Temple of America,

Inc. (MSTA), an inmate religious group at the Minnesota Correctional

Facility at Stillwater (MCF), and two inmate members of the group

(collectively, the Moors), appeal the district court's grant of summary

judgment to defendants, MCF Warden Dennis Benson and MCF Chaplain Steve

Hokonson, in the Moors' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We affirm in part and

reverse and remand in part. 

The Moors' claims relate to defendants' name-change policy, and to

defendants' closure of their group account. We discuss these claims

separately.
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I. Name-change policy

The Moors claimed defendants violated their rights under the First

Amendment and Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb

to 2000bb-4, by refusing to allow inmates to append the suffix El or Bey

to their names unless an inmate legally changes his name pursuant to

Minnesota statutory procedure. The Moors alleged that their religion

dictates the use of the suffixes and forbids them from going to court to

change their names accordingly. They sought injunctive relief, requesting

only that they not be punished for signing their name with the El or Bey

suffix in conjunction with their prison number without first obtaining a

legal name change. Along with an affidavit detailing their religious

tenets regarding the use of the El or Bey suffix, the Moors submitted

documentation from the national MSTA, which stated: 

A member is not to go into court to have a name

change, because you are not changing your name.

You are proclaiming something you always have been

by being born a Moorish American. One is not to

change any existing records, but do all new

business in the name of El or Bey, and put your

nationality down or make it known, when and where

it is called for. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment and submitted evidence showing

that MCF recognizes all court-approved name changes and that an inmate's

failure to use his correct legal name constitutes misrepresentation, a

violation of MCF disciplinary rules. The associate warden in charge of

operations attested that requiring inmates to use only their legal names

furthered institutional operating and security interests such as conducting

inmate counts; taking attendance at work areas, group meetings, the law

library, and for medical services; ensuring accurate inmate identification

cards; preventing compatibility problems between inmates; and
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monitoring the mail system. The associate warden also attested that having

to change institutional records to recognize an inmate's new name whenever

the inmate demanded it would burden defendants. 

The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding

that the Moors had not shown that the prohibition on obtaining a legal name

change was a requirement of their faith. The court concluded that the name

change policy did not substantially burden the Moors and that even if it

did, the policy was the least restrictive means for fulfilling a compelling

governmental interest. 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standard as the district court. Earnest v. Courtney, 64 F.3d 365, 366-67

(8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). We conclude that summary judgment was

improper. The Moors produced unrebutted evidence that their religion

forbids them from going to court to obtain a legal name change before using

the El or Bey suffix. See In re Young, No. 93-2267, slip op. at 20-21 (8th

Cir. May 6, 1996) (threshold inquiry of RFRA claim is whether governmental

action substantially burdens religious practice; definition of substantial

burden); Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 69-70 (8th Cir. 1994) (policy

restricts free exercise if it coerces inmate into violating religious

belief); see also Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1990)

(noting importance of personal name), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026 (1991);

cf. Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1297, 1300 (7th Cir. 1986) (no

evidence that use of "committed" name until statutory name change completed

violated inmates' religious beliefs).

Further, defendants' evidence failed to show how accommodating the

Moors' request would implicate the security and administrative concerns

defendants identified. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b); Turner v. Safley, 482

U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987); O'Lone v. Estate of
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Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). Although we give deference to prison

officials' judgments regarding security concerns, see, e.g., Goff v. Nix,

803 F.2d 358, 361-63 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 835 (1987),

the associate warden's attestations do not explain how allowing inmates to

append suffixes to their committed names--when signing them in conjunction

with their prison numbers--would create identification problems. We note

that the Moors did not request that defendants employ the suffixes or

change prison records, so defendants' evidence regarding administrative

burden is inapposite. Cf. Salaam, 905 F.2d at 1169-70, 1173-75 (defendant

misconstrued scope of inmate request, which did not include request prison

cease using inmate's committed name; prison required to add changed name

to clothing, prison records, and mailroom list); Barrett v. Commonwealth

of Virginia, 689 F.2d 498, 503 (4th Cir. 1982) (prison authorities not

required to change and reorganize records, but could not condition receipt

of benefits and services on inmates not using changed names); Akbar v.

Canney, 634 F.2d 339, 340 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (prison officials

not required to change all records to reflect changed name, and no evidence

of denial of any prison benefit because of use of changed name), cert.

denied, 450 U.S. 1002 (1981). 

Thus, summary judgment on this claim was improper as to defendant

Benson. Summary judgment was proper as to defendant Hokonson, however, as

the Moors have offered no evidence connecting him to the name-change

policy. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985); see

also Dicken v. Ashcroft, 972 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1992) (court of

appeals may affirm district court on any basis supported by the record).

II. Group Account

The Moors claimed that defendants wrongfully closed the MSTA group

account and transferred the money in the MSTA group account to the prison

chaplain's fund, violating their First Amendment,
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RFRA, and due process rights. The Moors also claimed, with a supporting

affidavit, that their equal protection rights were violated because a

Native American group was allowed a group account, which it used to pay for

a "sweat lodge, Pipe & Drums ceremony" used for religious purposes. They

sought the reinstatement of their group account and the return of the

money. Subsequently, the Moors moved for an order compelling discovery,

indicating that they sought information on why the Native American group

was allowed to use a group account to pay for its religious needs. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment, noting that all inmate

religious group accounts were closed and arguing that the Moors were not

similarly situated to the non-religious, cultural Native American group,

which was allowed to maintain a group account. 

The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. As to the

Moors' equal protection claim, the court concluded that closing the Moors'

group account did not violate their rights because all religious group

accounts were closed and the Moors had offered nothing to support their

contention that they were similarly situated to the Native American group.

The court also denied the Moors' discovery motion.

The district court correctly concluded that defendants' closure of

the Moors' account did not violate their First Amendment, RFRA, or due

process rights. Summary judgment was improper, however, on the Moors'

equal protection claim. The Moors offered undisputed evidence that the

Native American group uses its account for religious purposes. Defendants'

representation that the Native American group is "cultural" rather than

"religious" does not resolve the question whether the two groups are

similarly situated with respect to the maintenance and use of group

accounts for religious purposes. Cf. Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032,

1037 (8th Cir. 1991) (summary judgment on equal protection claim
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appropriate where undisputed that all inmates denied permission to make

religious contributions from their inmate accounts), cert. denied, 504 U.S.

930 (1992). Accordingly, the district court should not have denied the

Moors' motion to compel discovery. See Kinkead v. Southwestern Bell Tel.

Co., 49 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1995) (standard of review). 

III. Conclusion

With respect to the Moors' claims regarding the name-change policy,

we affirm as to Hokonson and reverse and remand as to Benson. We affirm

with respect to the Moors' First Amendment, RFRA, and due process claims

regarding the closure of their group account. As to the Moors' equal

protection claim regarding the closure of their group account, we reverse

and remand. We also recommend the district court consider the standing of

each of the three named plaintiffs with respect to each of the remaining

claims. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.