2018 IL App (1st) 170067 

FIRST DIVISION 

April 16, 2018 

KENRICK ROBERTS, ) Appeal from the 

) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. 

) 

v. ) 

) No. 15 L 9430 

BOARD OF TRUSTEES COMMUNITY ) 

COLLEGE DISTRICT NO. 508 d/b/a ) 

City Colleges of Chicago, ) Honorable 

) James Snyder, 

Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Pierce and Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Plaintiff-appellant, Kenrick Roberts, filed this action against defendant-appellee, Board 

of Trustees Community College District No. 508 d/b/a City Colleges of Chicago, alleging causes 

of action for common law retaliatory discharge, violations of the Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 

174/20 (West 2016)), and wrongful termination. After engaging in motion practice, the circuit 

court dismissed the retaliatory discharge claim and whistleblower claim with prejudice. 

¶ 2 On appeal, plaintiff contends the circuit court erred in dismissing those two counts. He 

contends his claim for retaliatory discharge successfully alleges a violation of Illinois public 

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policy. He also claims the second amended complaint properly alleges he refused to participate 

in defendant’s unlawful conduct so as to fall within the protection of the Whistleblower Act. 

¶ 3 For the reasons stated more fully below, we reverse the dismissal of plaintiff’s retaliatory 

discharge claim but affirm the dismissal of his claim brought under the Whistleblower Act. 

¶ 4 JURISDICTION 

¶ 5 On October 25, 2016, the circuit court dismissed with prejudice count I (retaliatory 

discharge) and count II (Whistleblower Act) of plaintiff’s second amended complaint. According 

to the record, plaintiff made an oral motion for Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) language, 

which the circuit court denied. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). On November 22, 2016, 

the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the denial of Rule 304(a) language. On December 15, 

2016, the circuit court granted the motion to reconsider. In granting the motion, the circuit court 

made an express finding under Rule 304(a) that there was no just reason to delay the appeal of 

the October 25 dismissal of counts I and II. Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on January 5, 

2017. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the Illinois Constitution and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 and 304(a). Ill. Const. 1970, art. 

VI, § 6; Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). 

¶ 6 BACKGROUND 

¶ 7 In March 2013, plaintiff began working for the defendant as the clinical coordinator of 

the physician assistant program at Malcolm X College (Malcolm X). In June 2014, plaintiff was 

promoted to the position of program director of the physician assistant program.

1 In November 

2014, plaintiff was promoted to the position of director of medical programs. 

1

Malcolm X College is a community college located in the City of Chicago and is operated by 

defendant. 

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¶ 8 As the director of medical programs, plaintiff reported directly to and worked closely 

with Dr. Micah Young, the dean of health sciences and career programs at Malcolm X and Dr. 

Mario De La Haye, the associate dean of health sciences and career programs at Malcolm X. As 

part of his job duties and responsibilities as the director of medical programs, plaintiff was 

responsible for vetting potential instructors for teaching various courses and curriculum. This 

responsibility included ensuring instructors assigned to teach various courses, including but not 

limited to HeaPro 101, met the appropriate accreditation standards and had the correct 

qualifications to teach the assigned course and curriculum. 

¶ 9 HeaPro 101 includes the instruction of phlebotomy2 and electrocardiograms (EKG). The 

National Accrediting Agency for Clinical Laboratory Sciences (NAACLS) states that in order for 

a course or curriculum to be accredited and approved for phlebotomy, the class must have 

qualified faculty. Under NAACLS, in order to be qualified to teach phlebotomy within the 

phlebotomy or health care basic certificate program, the faculty needs to be a certified 

professional in that field, must demonstrate knowledge and proficiency in that field, and must 

demonstrate the ability to teach effectively at the appropriate level. A professor can be certified 

in phlebotomy by the National Phlebotomy Association or through the American Society of 

Clinical Pathologists. 

¶ 10 On or about January 15, 2015, plaintiff alleges that he became aware of complaints that 

the instructor assigned to teach HeaPro 101 was unqualified to teach the course and curriculum. 

As a result of the complaints, plaintiff met with the HeaPro 101 instructor and questioned her 

qualifications to teach HeaPro 101. The instructor informed plaintiff that she had never taught 

phlebotomy before, she was unfamiliar with the requirements and certifications necessary to 

become a phlebotomist, phlebotomy was not her area of expertise, and she did not have any 

2

Phlebotomy is the practice of drawing blood from a patient for clinical testing. 

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certifications in phlebotomy. After meeting with the instructor, plaintiff found her unqualified to
 

teach HeaPro 101. 

¶ 11 On or about January 15, 2015, plaintiff sent an e-mail to Dr. Young and Dr. De La Haye
 

complaining about the unqualified instructor. The e-mail stated:
 

“In compliance with the City Colleges of Chicago policy and the College of 

Health Science credentialing standards and requirements it is my responsibility as 

Program Director of HeaPro 101 to review, evaluate and approve the 

recommendation of each faculty member that is approved to teach in the program 

which I am director. Taking into consideration I had no input into the department 

decision to appoint a nurse to teach HeaPro 101 without my review of the 

credentials and necessary certifications and licenses put our programs and 

students at risk. Please note this is a breach of the standards that were developed 

to ensure that the students obtain the best outcomes moving forward with their 

education in the medical field. Please note I am very concerned about the 

direction in which we are traveling and wish to address this matter.” 

After receiving the e-mail from plaintiff, Dr. Young sent an e-mail to the president and provost 

of Malcolm X College stating his concerns about the unqualified instructor and asked how it 

should be addressed. 

¶ 12 Following his January 15, 2015 e-mail, plaintiff made verbal complaints to Dr. Anthony 

Munroe, president of Malcolm X College, regarding the appointment of an unqualified professor 

to teach HeaPro 101. He informed Dr. Munroe that he had been intentionally excluded from the 

hiring process of the unqualified instructor and he refused to support the assignment. On 

February 4, 2015, without prior notice, Dr. Young was unexpectedly terminated from his 

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position with defendant. On February 5, 2015, Dr. De La Haye was unexpectedly placed on paid 

administrative leave. Dr. De La Haye remained on leave until his termination on April 20, 2015. 

¶ 13 On February 25, 2015, plaintiff sent an e-mail to the president, vice president, and 

associate provost again complaining about the unqualified instructor assigned to teach HeaPro 

101. In addition to what plaintiff had previously learned from his interview with the instructor, 

plaintiff had learned that the instructor had abandoned the class. Plaintiff found out another 

individual was assigned to complete instruction in the course, but this individual was not 

properly certified to teach EKG. 

¶ 14 Upon receipt of plaintiff’s February 25, 2015, e-mail, Dr. Christopher Robinson-Easley, 

vice president of Malcolm X College, requested that plaintiff meet with her regarding the 

complaints in the e-mail. After receiving the request from Dr. Robinson-Easley, plaintiff sent an 

e-mail to Aaron Allen, executive director of labor and employee relations. Plaintiff told Allen 

that he felt uncomfortable about Dr. Robinson-Easley’s request considering his complaints 

regarding the instructor. Dr. Robinson-Easley was the individual who selected and assigned the 

unqualified instructor to HeaPro 101. At the meeting, plaintiff found Dr. Robinson-Easley upset 

about his complaints and unwilling to address his concerns. 

¶ 15 Plaintiff continued to complain and question the appointment of the unqualified instructor 

and the college’s failure to address the situation to Dr. Munroe. Following the meeting with Dr. 

Robinson-Easley, plaintiff was excluded from important meetings, decisions, and discussions 

regarding programs that were under his responsibilities as director of medical programs. 

¶ 16 On June 15, 2015, Roy Walker, the associate dean of health sciences and career programs 

at Malcolm X College, informed plaintiff that Dr. Robinson-Easley “has an axe to grind with 

you” because of the HeaPro 101 complaints. On June 28, 2015, Dr. Munroe instructed plaintiff 

to file an equal employment opportunity complaint against Dr. Robinson-Easley for retaliation in 

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connection with plaintiff’s complaints. On August 7, 2015, plaintiff was advised that he was 

terminated from his position as director of medical programs at Malcolm X College. 

¶ 17 Plaintiff filed his original complaint on September 15, 2015. Plaintiff brought three 

causes of action: retaliatory discharge, violation of the Whistleblower Act, and wrongful 

termination. Defendant brought a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of 

Civil Procedure (Code). 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016). The circuit court granted the motion 

with respect to the retaliatory discharge claim and whistleblower claim but granted plaintiff an 

opportunity to replead. On February 24, 2016, plaintiff filed his amended complaint containing 

the same three counts. Defendant filed another section 2-619.1 motion to dismiss, and the circuit 

court dismissed the same two counts, again with leave to replead. 

¶ 18 A second amended complaint alleging the same causes of action as the prior complaints 

was filed on June 27, 2016. This time defendant moved to dismiss the retaliatory discharge claim 

and whistleblower claim pursuant to section 2-615(a) of the Code. Id. § 2-615(a). On October 25, 

2016, the circuit court granted the motion with prejudice. At the time, plaintiff made an oral 

motion for the inclusion of Rule 304(a) language, but this request was denied. Plaintiff moved to 

reconsider the denial of Rule 304(a) language, and on December 15, 2016, the circuit court 

granted plaintiff’s motion to reconsider. The circuit court then entered an order finding no just 

reason to delay the appeal. Plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal. The wrongful termination 

claim remains pending before the circuit court and is not before us. 

¶ 19 ANALYSIS 

¶ 20 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing his common law 

retaliatory discharge claim and his whistleblower claim. Both counts are before us after being 

dismissed pursuant to section 2-615(a) of the Code. Id. 

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¶ 21 A motion brought pursuant to section 2-615 tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint 

based on defects apparent on its face. Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of 

Directors, 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 15. A section 2-615 motion presents the question of whether the 

facts alleged in the complaint, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and taking all 

well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts as true, are 

sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Id. ¶ 16. “[A] cause of 

action should not be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set 

of facts can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery.” Marshall v. Burger King 

Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006). In ruling on a section 2-615 motion, the court considers only 

(1) those facts apparent on the face of the pleadings, (2) matters subject to judicial notice, and (3) 

judicial admissions in the record. Gillen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 

2d 381, 385 (2005). We review the grant of a section 2-615 motion de novo. Doe-3, 2012 IL 

112479, ¶ 15. Under this standard of review, we are not bound by the circuit court’s reasoning or 

decision. See State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Habitat Construction Co., 377 Ill. App. 

3d 281, 291 (2007). 

¶ 22 Illinois follows the at-will employment rule, which means “a noncontracted employee is 

one who serves at the employer’s will, and the employer may discharge such an employee for 

any reason or no reason.” Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 32 (1994). 

Illinois recognizes an exception to the general at-will employment rule when the discharge 

violates a clear mandate of public policy. Turner v. Memorial Medical Center, 233 Ill. 2d 494, 

501 (2009). This exception to the general rule acknowledges that under the common law “parties 

to a contract may not incorporate in it rights and obligations which are clearly injurious to the 

public.” Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 129 (1981). This exception 

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represents the common law cause of action known as retaliatory discharge. Fellhauer v. City of 

Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 505 (1991). 

¶ 23 In order to state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, an employee must allege (1) 

the employer discharged the employee, (2) in retaliation for the employee’s activities, and (3) the 

discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court has 

continuously cautioned the tort of retaliatory discharge is narrow in scope and the at-will 

employment rule remains the law of Illinois. Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 501. This tort seeks to achieve 

“a proper balance *** among the employer’s interest in operating a business efficiently and 

profitably, the employee’s interest in earning a livelihood, and society’s interest in seeing its 

public policies carried out.” Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 129. 

¶ 24 Before this court, the only issue concerning plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim is 

whether it states a violation of a clear mandate of Illinois public policy. The existence and 

ascertainment of public policy is a question for the court to decide. Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 501-02. 

In Palmateer, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the meaning of “clearly mandated public 

policy”: 

“There is no precise definition of the term. In general, it can be said that 

public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the 

State collectively. It is to be found in the State’s constitution and statutes and, 

when they are silent, in its judicial decisions. [Citation.] Although there is no 

precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policies 

from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other States involving 

retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen’s 

social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed.” 

Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 130. 

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Our court recognizes the tort is meant to prevent employers from “effectively frustrat[ing] a 

significant public policy by using its power of dismissal in a coercive manner.” Fellhauer, 142 

Ill. 2d at 508. The purpose of the tort is “to deter employer conduct inconsistent with [the public] 

policy.” Id. Because the tort is concerned with the protection and enforcement of public policy, a 

complaining party “must only show that the conduct complained of contravenes a clearly 

mandated public policy, not necessarily a law.” Stebbings v. University of Chicago, 312 Ill. App. 

3d 360, 369 (2000). 

¶ 25 In the case before us, plaintiff’s position at Malcolm X required him to ensure instructors 

in classes like HeaPro 101 were qualified to teach the course and curriculum. Plaintiff alleges 

that despite his position and responsibilities, Dr. Robinson-Easley appointed unqualified 

individuals to teach HeaPro 101 without consulting with plaintiff. After a meeting with the 

phlebotomy instructor of HeaPro 101, plaintiff learned she had never taught phlebotomy, was 

unfamiliar with the requirements and certifications necessary to become a phlebotomist, 

phlebotomy was not her area of expertise, and she did not have any certifications in phlebotomy. 

Plaintiff concluded the instructor was unqualified to teach HeaPro 101. 

¶ 26 In an e-mail to several higher ranking school officials, including Dr. Robinson-Easley, 

plaintiff expressed concern the appointments jeopardized the enrolled students’ ability to obtain 

the educational benefits HeaPro 101 was designed to provide. When this instructor abandoned 

HeaPro 101, another unqualified instructor was put in place. This new instructor was also 

unqualified and not properly certified in EKG. 

¶ 27 When plaintiff complained about the assignment of the unqualified instructors, he was 

terminated. Plaintiff then brought this suit containing a claim for retaliatory discharge. Plaintiff 

alleges his discharge for complaining about the unqualified instructors violated a specific public 

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policy: “the right to obtain the benefits of a post-secondary education through federal and state 

funded programs.” 

¶ 28 In support of his argument, plaintiff cites to Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 

(20 U.S.C §§ 1070-1099d (2012)), which establishes various loan and grant programs to assist 

students in obtaining a postsecondary education at places like Malcolm X. The funds must be 

used at eligible institutions. In order to be an eligible institution, defendant must sign and comply 

with a program participation agreement (PPA). The PPA requires defendant to “meet the 

requirements established by *** accrediting agencies or associations” (id. § 1094(a)(21)) and 

provide accurate information to these accrediting agencies. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges 

defendant breached the PPA when it asserted to the accrediting agencies that HeaPro 101 

instructors were properly qualified. Plaintiff also cites to section 1094(c)(3)(A), which subjects 

any eligible institution to suspension or termination if it has engaged “in substantial 

misrepresentation of the nature of its educational program, its financial charges, or the 

employability of its graduates.” Id. § 1094(c)(3)(A). 

¶ 29 While not cited to by the plaintiff, we take judicial notice of the Higher Education Loan 

Act (Act) (110 ILCS 945/0.01 et seq. (West 2016)). See Cruz v. Puerto Rican Society, 154 Ill. 

App. 3d 72, 75 (1987) (reviewing courts may take judicial notice of statutes of this state). 

Section 2 (“Declaration of Purpose”) of the Act states: 

“It is declared that for the benefit of the people of the State of Illinois, the conduct 

and increase of their commerce, the protection and enhancement of their welfare, 

the development of continued prosperity and the improvement of their health and 

living conditions, it is essential that this and future generations of youth be given 

the fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their intellectual and mental 

capacities and skills; that to achieve these ends it is of the utmost importance that 

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students attending institutions of higher education located in Illinois have 

reasonable alternatives to enhance their financial access to such institutions; that 

reasonable financial access to institutions of higher education will assist such 

youth in achieving the required levels of learning and development of their 

intellectual and mental capacities and skills; that it is the purpose of this Act to 

provide a measure of assistance and an alternative method to enable students and 

the families of students attending institutions of higher education located in 

Illinois to appropriately and prudently finance the cost or a portion of the cost of 

such higher education; and that it is the intent of this Act to supplement federal 

guaranteed higher education loan programs, other student loan programs, and 

grant or scholarship programs to provide the needed additional options for the 

financing of a student’s higher education in execution of the public policy set 

forth above.” (Emphases added.) 110 ILCS 945/2 (West 2016). 

Our General Assembly has concluded the purpose of providing public funds for higher education 

is to provide the fullest opportunity for recipients to learn and develop their “intellectual and 

mental capacities and skills.” Id. Based on the above, it is obvious to this court the purpose of 

establishing both state and federal loan programs is to ensure individuals without the private 

means of paying for a college education are given access to funds to better develop themselves 

intellectually so as to provide a greater contribution to our state and country. 

¶ 30 This is a case of first impression in this State. While the tort of retaliatory discharge is 

well established in our jurisprudence, none of the cases cited by the parties or uncovered in the 

court’s own research shows this claim has been brought in the circumstances presented in this 

matter. Courts in this state have limited the tort’s application. For most of its history, the tort was 

limited to (1) when the discharge stems from asserting a worker’s compensation claim (Kelsay v. 

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Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172 (1978)) or (2) where the discharge is for certain activities referred 

to as “whistle-blowing” (Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d 124 (1981)). Where a matter involves only a 

private and individual grievance, our courts have consistently refused to expand the tort of 

retaliatory discharge. See Geary v. Telular Corp., 341 Ill. App. 3d 694, 701 (2003) (collecting 

cases where Illinois courts have refused to expand the tort of retaliatory discharge). 

¶ 31 On review, the question we are asked to answer “is whether the provisions ‘enunciate a 

public policy that plainly covers the situation to which the plaintiff objects.’ ” Carty v. The Suter 

Co., 371 Ill. App. 3d 784, 789 (2007) (quoting Stebbings, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 367). We conclude 

the public policy behind the federal Higher Education Act of 1965 and Illinois’s Higher 

Education Loan Act would be seriously undermined if defendant is allowed to act in the manner 

alleged in plaintiff’s complaint. The above-cited statutes demonstrate that in accepting public 

money, an institution of higher education should be able to assist those attending in “achieving 

the required levels of learning and development of their intellectual and mental capacities and 

skills.” 110 ILCS 945/2 (West 2016). 

¶ 32 Malcolm X is a public institution of higher learning whose mission and role in society is 

not to turn a profit but to educate and pass along knowledge to those students enrolled on its 

campus. In order to receive the benefits from attending classes at Malcolm X, many of its 

students take out loans under the above state and federal programs in order to subsidize, if not 

entirely fund, their tuition payments. It is axiomatic that in order to accomplish the mission of 

educating young men and women, defendant must staff its classes with competent individuals 

who actually possess the knowledge listed in the course syllabus. If defendant accepts loan 

money but uses it to hire incompetent and unqualified individuals who cannot properly instruct 

students who are enrolled in classes like HeaPro 101, defendant has essentially defrauded both 

the student and the taxpayer. The intent behind both the state and federal loan programs would 

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be thwarted because those receiving incompetent instruction would be unable to “develop their 

intellectual and mental capacities and skills.” Id. The benefit to the State would be nil. This is 

more than a personal matter but concerns “what is right and just and what affects the citizens of 

the State collectively.” Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 130. 

¶ 33 Defendant argues that Illinois lacks a clearly mandated public policy regarding the right 

to obtain public financial aid for a postsecondary education. This argument is disingenuous. 

There would be no point to enacting either a federal or state statute providing for public 

financing (through student loans) of higher education if the government did not want its citizens 

to utilize it. Simply put, if our government did not think providing all citizens with access to 

funds for higher education was a good idea, it would not have enacted the statutes in the first 

place. 

¶ 34 In making its argument, defendant cites solely to Turner, 233 Ill. 2d 494, a recent Illinois 

Supreme Court case. The plaintiff in Turner alleged that he was fired from his position as a 

licensed respiratory therapist after he informed a surveyor from the Joint Commission on 

Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (Joint Commission) that his hospital’s respiratory 

department did not conduct “immediate charting” after a patient had been seen in violation of the 

Joint Commission standard. Id. at 497-98. He alleged his discharge for making this report to the 

Joint Commission “ ‘violated public policy that encourages employees to report actions that 

jeopardize patient health and safety.’ ” Id. at 498. 

¶ 35 In rejecting the plaintiff’s claim, the court concluded plaintiff’s actions of informing the 

surveyor of the hospital’s charting practice fell short of the “ ‘supreme court’s public-policy 

threshold articulated in Palmateer.’ ” Id. at 506. The court found that neither Joint Commission 

standards nor section 3 of the Medical Patient Rights Act (410 ILCS 50/3 (West 2006)) 

established a clear public policy that plaintiff’s discharge violated. Turner, 233 Ill. 2d at 505-06. 

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¶ 36 We find Turner to be distinguishable from the current case before us. Unlike the statutes 

in Turner, this case does present a clear statutory scheme which defendant’s alleged actions 

sought to frustrate by terminating plaintiff. Both Illinois and the federal government have set up 

programs to help citizens attend schools of higher education so that those individuals may gain 

knowledge and better contribute to society. 20 U.S.C § 1070 et seq. (2002); 110 ILCS 945/2 

(West 2016). This policy is effectively frustrated when institutions of higher learning terminate 

those individuals charged with ensuring its instructors have the requisite knowledge to pass onto 

students. We find plaintiff’s complaint demonstrates a clear mandate of public policy and reverse 

the dismissal of plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge count. 

¶ 37 In his second issue, plaintiff argues the circuit court erred in dismissing his 

Whistleblower Act claim. The Whistleblower Act provides: “An employer may not retaliate 

against an employee for refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a violation of a 

State or federal law, rule, or regulation ***.” 740 ILCS 174/20 (West 2016). In order to sustain a 

cause of action under the Whistleblower Act, a plaintiff must establish (1) a refusal to participate 

in an activity that would result in a violation of a state or federal law, rule, or regulation and (2) 

the employer retaliated against the employee because of said refusal. Id.; Sardiga v. Northern 

Trust Co., 409 Ill. App. 3d 56, 61 (2011). Our courts have recognized the Whistleblower Act 

extends protection to “employees who call attention in one of two specific ways to illegal 

activities carried out by their employer. It protects employees who either contact a government 

agency to report the activity or refuse to participate in that activity.” Sardiga, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 

62. 

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¶ 38 Before us, plaintiff argues that the second amended complaint sufficiently alleges a 

“refusal to participate.”3 This court has previously analyzed the language of the Act regarding 

“refusal to participate” and concluded: 

“ ‘Refusing to participate’ means exactly what it says: a plaintiff who participates in an 

activity that would result in a violation of a state or federal law, rule, or regulation cannot 

claim recourse under the Act. 740 ILCS 174/20 (West 2004). Instead, the plaintiff must 

actually refuse to participate. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘refusal’ as ‘[t]he denial or 

rejection of something offered or demanded.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1394 (9th ed. 

2009). Indeed, the very title of section 20, ‘Retaliation for certain refusals prohibited,’ 

suggests that not every refusal qualifies for protection under the Act. 740 ILCS 174/20 

(West 2004). Furthermore, the Act protects employees who complain to a government 

agency about an activity that the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of 

a state or federal law, rule, or regulation. 740 ILCS 174/15 (West 2004). Thus, ‘refusing’ 

means refusing; it does not mean ‘complaining’ or ‘questioning ***.’ ” (Emphasis 

added.) Id. 

Even accepting the allegations in the second amended complaint as true and taking them in a 

light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no allegation in the second amended complaint that 

defendant offered or demanded plaintiff’s participation in the allegedly wrongful activity. 

Plaintiff pleads that he was “intentionally excluded” and allowed “no input” into the decision to 

hire or retain the unqualified instructors. While plaintiff alleges he refused “to cover things up,” 

“be quiet,” and “look the other way,” there is no allegation the defendant asked, requested, or 

demanded such action. 

3

There is no allegation in the second amended complaint that plaintiff contacted a governmental 

agency. 

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¶ 39 Plaintiff’s brief does not mention Sardiga and instead argues that under the Act, “a 

plaintiff does not need to plead that the defendant specifically asked the plaintiff to perform an 

unlawful act.” In support of this argument, plaintiff only cites to Robinson v. Morgan Stanley, 

No. 06 C 5158, 2011 WL 3876903 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2011). Federal cases interpreting Illinois 

law have no precedential value in this state (Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 182), and we decline to depart 

from this court’s prior holding in Sardiga. 

¶ 40 Other Illinois courts have reached similar conclusions regarding what is required to state 

a claim under the Whistleblower Act. In Young v. Alden Gardens of Waterford, LLC, 2015 IL 

App (1st) 131887, this court determined an employee adequately alleged a violation of the 

Whistleblower Act, where the employer asked its employee to falsify patient records in violation 

of the Nurse Practice Act (225 ILCS 65/70-5 (West 2010)). Young, 2015 IL App (1st) 131887, 

¶¶ 51-56 (employee alleged she was constructively discharged for her refusal to follow her 

supervisor’s request to falsify medical records). In Corah v. The Bruss Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 

161030, we found plaintiff’s whistleblower claim deficient, in part, because “plaintiff 

acknowledged that defendant never asked plaintiff to misstate where [the individual]’s injury 

occurred” in violation of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/4(h) (West 2012)). 

(Emphasis added.) Corah, 2017 IL App (1st) 161030, ¶ 19. 

¶ 41 We adhere to the line of cases cited above that in order to state a claim under the 

Whistleblower Act, there must be a request or demand by the employer that the employee engage 

in the illegal or unlawful conduct. In this case, plaintiff fails to allege the defendant ever made a 

request or demand he approve or sanction the hiring of the allegedly unqualified instructor. 

Accordingly, he does not state a claim under the Whistleblower Act.4 

4

Because plaintiff failed to establish the first element of a whistleblower claim, we decline to 

address whether the allege activity of the defendant constitutes “unlawful activity” as required to meet the 

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¶ 42 CONCLUSION
 

¶ 43 For the reasons stated above, we reverse the dismissal of plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge
 

claim but affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s whistleblower claim.
 

¶ 44 Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
 

¶ 45 Cause remanded. 

second element. 

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