UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4148

MARK GERARD SPAULDING,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Peter J. Messitte, District Judge;

James E. Kenkel, Magistrate Judge.

(CR-95-467-PJM)

Argued: April 9, 1998

Decided: May 26, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN, WILKINS, and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Gary Allen Ticknor, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.

John Vincent Geise, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt,

Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Lynne A. Battaglia, United

States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Mark Gerard Spaulding appeals his convictions on two counts of

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, see 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 922(g)(1) (West Supp. 1998), arguing that the district court erred in

refusing to exclude the firearms as fruits of unconstitutional searches

and in invalidating one of his peremptory challenges. Spaulding also

appeals his 240-month sentence, contending that the district court

erred in concluding that his prior Maryland conviction for reckless

endangerment qualified as a "crime of violence" for the purpose of

determining his base offense level, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 2K2.1(a)(2) (1995), and in imposing a four-level enhancement for possessing the firearms in connection with another felony

offense, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

Spaulding first alleges that the district court erred in refusing to

suppress the firearms as the fruits of unconstitutional searches of a

house in which he was staying and in which he was storing some possessions. We conclude that the factual findings of the district court

that the owner of the house had not given Spaulding the right to

exclude her from any area of her home and that she voluntarily consented to the searches undertaken by the police are not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31 (4th Cir. 1997)

(stating that factual findings supporting ruling on suppression motion

by the district court are reviewed for clear error). Accordingly, we

determine that the firearms--which were discovered during a search

conducted pursuant to a search warrant obtained on the basis of evidence seized during the consent searches of the house--do not constitute the fruits of unconstitutional searches. See Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); see also United States v.

Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1974) (holding that consent may be

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validly given by one with common authority over the premises to be

searched). We therefore affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.

II.

Spaulding next contends that the district court erred in invalidating

one of his peremptory challenges on the basis that it was used in a

racially discriminatory manner. After Spaulding exercised eight of his

ten strikes on white venire members, the district court required him

to proffer the reasons for the strikes. Although the district court found

six of the strikes to be legitimate, it found two were made with the

intent to discriminate, only one of which is at issue here. Because the

reason offered by Spaulding for the strike in question was factually

unsubstantiated and inconsistent with his decision not to strike certain

minority venire members, we cannot say that the district court clearly

erred in finding that the reason offered was a pretext for purposeful

discrimination. See Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995)

(explaining that finding by the district court that strikes were made

discriminatorily is reviewed for clear error).

III.

Spaulding also maintains that the district court erred in determining

that his prior Maryland conviction for reckless endangerment qualified as a "crime of violence" pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1) for the

purpose of determining his base offense level for sentencing. Because

the Maryland reckless endangerment statute under which Spaulding

was convicted proscribed "conduct that creates a substantial risk of

death or serious physical injury to another," Md. Code Ann. art. 27,

§ 120(a) (1992), reckless endangerment is a"crime of violence" for

purposes of § 4B1.2(1). See United States v. Kirksey, 138 F.3d 120,

124 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining that an offense is a"crime of violence" as defined by § 4B1.2(1) when the elements of that offense

involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical

injury to another); U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment. (n.5) (providing that

the term "crime of violence" is defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2).

IV.

Spaulding finally argues that the district court clearly erred in

enhancing his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) for pos-

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sessing a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense. The

district court heard testimony that Spaulding was a convicted drug

dealer, that he had continued to sell cocaine base and marijuana and

to carry firearms after his drug conviction, and that he possessed

$20,000 in currency at a time when he was not gainfully employed.

From that testimony, the court concluded by a preponderance of the

evidence that Spaulding was involved in large-scale drug transactions

and was carrying firearms to facilitate those transactions. Because we

do not find this conclusion to be clearly erroneous, we affirm the

imposition of the enhancement. See United States v. Turner, 102 F.3d

1350, 1357 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that factual findings underlying

the determination of an appropriate sentence will be affirmed unless

clearly erroneous).

V.

In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying

Spaulding's motion to suppress, invalidating one of his peremptory

strikes, finding that his previous conviction for reckless endangerment

constituted a crime of violence, or enhancing his sentence for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense. Accordingly,

Spaulding's convictions and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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