Rel: May 24, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

CL-2023-0254

_________________________

Ronald Jay Cieutat 

v. 

Angela Cates Cieutat

Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court

(DR-15-900749.02)

PER CURIAM.

Ronald Jay Cieutat ("the father") appeals from an order entered by 

the Baldwin Circuit Court ("the trial court") that modified his visitation 

schedule with W.B.C. ("the child"). We dismiss the appeal. 
CL-2023-0254

2

On November 30, 2016, the trial court entered a final judgment 

divorcing the father from Angela Cates Cieutat ("the mother"). The 

judgment incorporated a settlement agreement between the parties that 

provided in pertinent part:

"3. ... [The child born, in January 2007,] is a severely 

autistic special needs child and requires special schooling 

and attention.

"4. The parties agree that they shall share joint legal 

custody and physical custody of [the child]. [The child] will 

stay with the mother during the weekdays with the father 

exercising parenting time every weekend, alternating 

holidays, and alternating full weeks during the children's 

summer vacation."

On April 5, 2021, the mother filed a petition to modify the divorce 

judgment.1 In her petition, the mother alleged that the father's visitation

schedule needed to be modified because, she said, the needs of the child 

were not being met during the father's visitations. She asked the trial 

court to modify the divorce judgment to provide that, during his 

visitations with the child, the father provide a more "protective 

arrangement." On April 14, 2021, the father filed his answer. In his 

1The mother also filed a petition for a rule nisi. However, because 

we conclude, infra, that we must dismiss this appeal for reasons involving 

modification of the father's visitation schedule, we pretermit discussion 

of the contempt portion of the action.
CL-2023-0254

3

answer, the father alleged that "if any change need[ed] to be made to the 

current parenting schedule, [he] should receive more time with [the child] 

as such would be in the child's best interest." 

On December 8, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing. The 

record reflects that the child was nine years old when the divorce 

judgment was entered and that, although the parties both wanted what 

was best for the child, they disagreed on how to take care of the child. 

The mother testified that the child at the time of the final hearing was 

15 years old, 6 feet 6 inches tall, and weighed 250 pounds. He was 

completely nonverbal, considered severely autistic, and engaged in selfabusive behaviors when he was upset or stressed by a disruption in his 

routine. According to the mother, the child was a very sweet, gigantic 

toddler, who required 24-hour care because he did not understand the 

difference between harmful and nonharmful conduct. The mother 

explained that because of the child's size, his inability to cope with 

disruptions in his routine, and his inability to differentiate between 

harmful and nonharmful conduct, he required a routine and special 

accommodations, including shatterproof windows, doors with locks, and 
CL-2023-0254

4

constant monitoring, assistance, and care to prevent his self-abusive 

behaviors. 

The mother acknowledged that the divorce judgment provided that 

the parties share joint legal and physical custody of the child and that 

she had terminated the father's visitation in March 2021. According to 

the mother, since the entry of the divorce judgment, the father had never 

exercised joint physical custody of the child but instead had exercised 

weekend visitation sporadically with the child. She explained that after 

the child had visited with the father, the child returned tired, agitated, 

unruly and would not sleep for several days. For example, the mother 

explained that after one visit, the child, during the night, had knocked a 

hole in his bedroom wall and several days passed before the child 

returned to his unagitated self. The mother testified that she attributed 

the child's stressed condition and self-abusive behaviors after visits with 

the father to the father not providing the child with a regular schedule, 

the necessary accommodations, and the required assistance. She stated 

that after the child's visits with the father ceased and the child's schedule 

became consistent, the child's behaviors had improved, and the child had 

not engaged in similar self-harming conduct. The mother admitted that 
CL-2023-0254

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she had not been inside the father's house; however, she insisted that 

based on the child's cuts and bruises when he was returned to her custody 

and the child's self-abusive behaviors after visits with the father, the 

father's house did not provide adequate accommodations for the child's 

special needs and safety requirements. The trial court admitted into 

evidence, without objection from the father, a care plan for the child that 

identified various maladaptive behaviors, their triggers, and antecedent 

interventions.

The father disputed the mother's testimony, stating that when the 

child had been in his custody, he had never placed the child in physical 

or emotional danger. He insisted, however, that the mother was 

uncooperative and refused to communicate "in a reasonable adult way" 

about the child's care. He admitted that he owned regular houses 

without special accommodations but insisted that he provided adequate 

safety measures for the child. According to the father, the child, while in 

his care, had never escaped from any of his residences and had never 

been injured, more than a few scratches. The father admitted that while 

the litigation had been pending (approximately 22 months), despite 

having the ability to do so, he had not visited the child at his school or 
CL-2023-0254

6

asked the trial court for visitation with the child. He testified that he 

wanted to continue his every weekend overnight visitation with the child, 

and that he was willing to maintain a routine for the child. 

On January 5, 2023, the trial court entered an order. In the order, 

the trial court made "the legal conclusion" that the parties had not been 

exercising joint custody of the child; rather, the mother had had custody 

and the father had had "parenting time." The trial court modified the 

father's visitation schedule by awarding him visitation with the child for 

one day each weekend with no overnight stay. The trial court also 

ordered the father to have his house evaluated to determine how the 

house may need to be modified to accommodate the child's physical and 

emotional needs. The trial court provided in its order that after the 

father had informed the court that he had made the necessary safety 

accommodations for the child, it would consider reinstating the father's 

overnight visitation. 

On February 2, 2023, the father filed a motion, arguing, among 

other things, that the trial court had exceeded its discretion by limiting 

his parenting time and ordering an evaluation of his house. On March 

20, 2023, the trial court entered an order that amended its January 5, 
CL-2023-0254

7

2023, order to provide that "a therapist who regularly works with autistic 

children/adults will be the one to assess the father's home for any 

modifications necessary to meet the needs of [the child]." On April 24, 

2023, the father filed his notice of appeal.

Before we can address the merits of the father's appeal, we must 

determine whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

" '"It is a well-established rule that, with limited 

exceptions, an appeal will lie only from a final judgment which 

determines the issues before the court and ascertains and 

declares the rights of the parties involved."' Powell v. Powell, 

718 So. 2d 80, 82 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), quoting Taylor v. 

Taylor, 398 So. 2d 267, 269 (Ala. 1981). 'A ruling that relates 

to fewer than all the parties in a case, or that determines 

fewer than all the claims, is ordinarily not final as to any of 

the parties or as to any of the claims.' Powell, at 82. See Rule 

54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. 'A "final judgment is a 'terminal decision 

which demonstrates there has been a complete adjudication 

of all matters in controversy between the litigants.'"' Powell, 

at 82, quoting Dees v. State, 563 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Ala. Civ.

App. 1990). 'The question whether an order appealed from is 

final is jurisdictional, and the reviewing court, on a 

determination that the order is not final, has a duty to dismiss 

the case on its own motion.' Powell, at 82.

"... 'The question of finality of the order may be phrased 

as whether there is "something more for the trial court to do."' 

Id., quoting Wesley v. Brandon, 419 So. 2d 257, 258 (Ala. Civ.

App. 1982)."

Hinson v. Hinson, 745 So. 2d 280, 281 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
CL-2023-0254

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After carefully reviewing the record and the trial court's order, we 

conclude that the trial court did not enter a final judgment that will 

support an appeal; rather it entered a pendente lite order that requires 

additional proceedings. In its order, the trial court conditionally modified 

the father's visitation schedule subject to an inspection of the father's 

house by a qualified therapist and an assurance from the father that he 

will provide a safe, stable environment for the child during the visits. 

The order implies that once those conditions have been satisfied, the

father's visitation schedule will be finally modified. However, until the 

father addressed the safety concerns and assured that those concerns had 

been remedied, the trial court provided a temporary visitation schedule 

that modified the father's visitation schedule to exclude overnight visits. 

Thus, the order contemplates further proceedings for the trial court to 

review the results of the inspection and to consider any assurances that 

the father may provide. In Ex parte J.P., 641 So. 2d 276, 278 (Ala. 1994), 

our supreme court explained that "[p]endente lite orders are generally 

entered only during the pendency of the litigation and are usually 

replaced by a final order or judgment that is entered at the end of the 

litigation. Sims v. Sims, 515 So. 2d 1 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987)." Because 
CL-2023-0254

9

the trial court's order clearly envisioned that additional proceedings 

would occur to address the father's ability to protect the child during 

visitations, the order is not a final judgment. Therefore, we dismiss the 

father's appeal for the trial court to conduct further proceedings to 

ascertain whether the conditions set forth in its January 5, 2023, order 

have been satisfied and to enter a final judgment. See Wesley v. 

Brandon, 419 So. 2d 257, 259 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982)("An order which does 

not contain the essentials of a final judgment necessary to support an 

appeal must be dismissed.")

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Moore, P.J., and Fridy and Lewis, JJ., concur.

Edwards, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

Hanson, J., dissents, with opinion.
CL-2023-0254

10

HANSON, Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's dismissal of this appeal. 

"A final judgment is one that disposes of all the claims and controversies 

between the parties." Heaston v. Nabors, 889 So. 2d 588, 590 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2004). My review of the record and the January 5, 2023, order 

entered by the Baldwin Circuit Court ("the trial court") leads me to the 

conclusion that the trial court entered a final judgment. 

Initially, I note that the trial court opened the December 8, 2022, 

hearing by stating "[t]his is a final trial." At the conclusion of the 

evidence, the trial court stated:

"I know firsthand the difficulty, emotional and physical 

difficulties in dealing with an adolescent or an adult child 

with autism and I understand its frustrations. I don't 

understand a parent simply walking out of a child's life, 

regardless of the difficulty; I don't understand that at all.

"It's one thing to walk out of their life in general.

"It's another to walk out of their life when there is a case 

pending. So there is a remedy available any day of the week 

to come before me and get parenting time. Any day of the 

week. No filing fee to be paid. No extra effort that has to be 

made. Nothing. Just a motion to say I want parenting time 

and it's never been done.

"You haven't seen your own child in two years, Mr. 

Cieutat. In two years. I can't even fathom that. And I don't 

believe that when you did see him, that you did what you 
CL-2023-0254

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needed to do to accommodate his needs. I don't believe that, 

except for write a check. You at least did that and that, I 

know, has gone a long way to at least pay for some schooling 

and education.

"It does not appear, from the testimony and evidence 

presented, that when the parenting arrangement was 

whatever it was before, that it was something that benefited 

[the child]. It is not working if a child is putting his body 

through a wall and having to be treated medically for injuries 

... related to that.

"One thing that I do know for certain, and you do not 

have to be ABA certified to know, is that autistic children need 

routine and stability. And one thing I see is that that child 

has had that over the past two years and has benefitted, at 

least from that routine.

"Now, has he benefited from not seeing his dad? I don't 

believe that. I want you to see your son, but if you want to see 

him, you have to make special accommodations for him.

"Wanting him or hoping that he can simply live in a 

regular home environment is not realistic; it's just not.

"....

"So if you want to see your son and you can, then you 

need to do whatever is necessary to accommodate his needs 

physically in your home, if you want him there. Whatever the 

plan directs, be able to accommodate that plan fully. If there 

is a therapist that can specifically delineate what may be 

necessary for him as far as a physical environment, that will 

need to be accomplished and there will need to be some way 

to ensure that that has been done. I am going to modify the 

parenting time right now, not to allow any overnight until 

there is some assurance that those things have been 

accomplished ....
CL-2023-0254

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"So in that regard, that will be the modification of the 

parenting schedule based on what I've just said. Again, I'm 

not changing the time.

"If you want to see him every weekend and during the 

summer, you can. Except that I'm not -- I would modify that 

to one day over the weekend so that there's no overnight and 

then the summer would necessarily need to change as well. I 

think what we'll probably just do is to stay consistent year 

round with that schedule, with accommodations being made 

for holidays and things that don't fall on a weekend. If there's 

a holiday, y'all need to try to accommodate that. But I think 

that will give him much more stability and consistency in his 

routine."

On January 5, 2023, the trial court entered an order, entitled "final 

order," that stated in pertinent part:

"3. [The father] shall have someone specifically 

delineate what is necessary for him in his home to be able to 

physically accommodate [the child] with his special needs. 

That needs to be done and needs to occur before the next 

visitation.

"4. The court will modify the parenting time not to allow 

any overnight visits until there is assurance by [the father] 

that the accommodations have been accomplished and the 

child is not locked up during the day. [The father] will be 

allowed to have parenting time no more than one day during 

the weekend so long as there is no overnight stay. The 

summer visitation will be modified from prior orders to 

maintain the consistency of no more than one day every 

weekend. The visitation will accommodate holidays that do 

not fall on the weekend. If there is a holiday, then the parties 

need to accommodate that in order to give the child as much 

routine consistency as possible." 
CL-2023-0254

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I admit that the trial court's order modifying the father's visitation 

schedule is ambiguous and subject to interpretation. However, my 

reading of the trial court's statements at the close of the "final trial" and 

its subsequent "final order" lead me to the conclude that the trial court 

issued a final judgment that permanently modified the father's visitation 

schedule.2 The trial court's modification of the father's visitation 

schedule is not pendente lite, i.e., one pending a review hearing or a 

further hearing on the matter that was before the court at the time of the 

judgment; rather, it settles the visitation-schedule issue. The trial court 

awarded the father with visitation of only one day per weekend. The trial 

court then stated that that visitation award would remain until the 

father assures the court that he has made a change in his circumstances 

2I recognize that that the character of a pleading is determined and 

interpreted from its essential substance, and not from its title. See Pharo 

v. Pharo, 199 So. 3d 93, 95 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). Likewise, the 

character of an order should be derived from its substance, not its title. 

However, in circumstances like those presented in this case, when this 

court concludes that the character of a trial court's order is determined 

to be implicit, I believe that because a trial court is presumed to know the 

law, see Horne-Ballard v. Ballard, 308 So. 3d 503, 515 (Ala. Civ. App. 

2020), the trial court's choice of the word "final" to describe its hearing 

and its order indicates the trial court's intent for the character of its 

order. 
CL-2023-0254

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to ensure that the child, if allowed to stay overnight, is safe. In other 

words, the trial court informed the father of his right to modify the 

visitation schedule in the future and what concerns must be addressed to 

prove a change in circumstances to support a modification of his 

visitation schedule of one-day visitation each weekend. If the trial court 

had intended for its modification of the father's visitation schedule to be 

temporary and had considered additional proceedings necessary, the trial 

court would not have addressed visitation during the summer and 

holidays in its order issued in early January and would have provided 

some timelines in its order for the father's completion of the evaluation 

of his house and a subsequent hearing. The trial court, however, did not 

set a timeline or indicate a need for future hearing; therefore, I read the 

trial court's order as constituting a final determination that modified the 

father's visitation schedule. 

Because I believe the trial court permanently, not temporarily, 

modified the father's visitation schedule and, in so doing, "dispose[d] of 

all the claims and controversies between the parties," see Heaston, supra, 

I conclude that the trial court entered a final judgment, and, 
CL-2023-0254

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consequently, that this court has jurisdiction over the father's appeal. 

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.