UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

1101 14TH St., NW, Ste. 400

Washington, D.C. 20005

CATHERINE HINCKLEY KELLEY

1101 14TH St., NW, Ste. 400

Washington, D.C. 20005

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

1050 First St., NE

Washington, D.C. 20463,

Defendant

and

HILLARY FOR AMERICA

P.O. Box 5256

New York, NY 10185-5256

CORRECT THE RECORD

455 Massachusetts Ave., NW

Ste. 600

Washington, D.C. 20001

Proposed 

Defendant-Intervenors.

Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-02336-JEB

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HILLARY FOR AMERICA’S AND CORRECT THE 

RECORD’S MOTION TO INTERVENE

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 1 of 27
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

- i -

I. HFA and CTR Plainly Meet the Requirements to Intervene As of Right............................. 4

A. Federal Policy Favors Broad Participation By Those Who May Be Affected By Litigation

.............................................................................................................................................. 4

B. HFA and CTR Have Demonstrated an Injury-in-Fact and a Legally Protected Interest in 

this Litigation ....................................................................................................................... 6

C. No Existing Party to the Litigation Adequately Represents HFA’s or CTR’s Interests..... 7

D. CLC’s Specific Arguments Against HFA’s and CTR’s Standing Fail ................................ 8

II. CLC’s Novel Policy Arguments Cannot Override the Plain Text of Rule 24 and Binding 

Precedent; FECA’s Statutory Framework In No Way Prohibits CTR and HFA From 

Intervening .......................................................................................................................... 10

A. Rule 24 Presumptively Allows Intervention When a Judicial Review Statute is Otherwise 

Silent on the Right to Intervene, and Intervention by the Target of an FEC Complaint is 

Hardly Unprecedented........................................................................................................ 11

B. Courts Have Permitted Intervention When the Named Defendant Fails to Defend And the 

Intervening Defendant Can Demonstrate Standing............................................................ 12

C. By Intervening, HFA and CTR Are Not Stepping Into the Shoes of the FEC................... 14

D. The Doctrine of Prudential Standing Has No Bearing on HFA and CTR’s Standing ...... 16

E. Potential Merits Arguments that HFA and CTR May Offer at Later Stages of the 

Litigation Provide No Reason to Deny Intervention.......................................................... 17

III. In the Alternative, the Court Should Grant HFA’s and CTR’s Request for Permissive 

Intervention ......................................................................................................................... 18

IV. Amicus Status is No Substitute for Full Participation as Intervening Defendants, and 

Cannot Be Justified when the Requirements of Rule 24 Are Otherwise Satisfied ............. 19

V. The FEC’s Failure to Certify the Administrative Record Has No Bearing on HFA’s and 

CTR’s Ability to Intervene.................................................................................................. 19

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................. 20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 21

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 2 of 27
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

- ii -

Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Veneman,

200 F.R.D. 153 (D.D.C. 2001)...................................................................................................5

Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,

326 F. Supp. 3d 128 (E.D. Va. 2018) ......................................................................................13

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC,

No. 16-752 (D.D.C. June 30, 2016)...................................................................................19, 20

Center for Individual Freedom v. Van Hollen,

694 F.3d 108 (D.C. Cir. 2012)...........................................................................................13, 14

Chamber of Commerce v. FEC,

69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995)...................................................................................................16

Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. FEC,

No. 16-259 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2016).........................................................................................19

Common Cause v. FEC,

842 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1988)...........................................................................................15, 16

Cont’l Transfert Technique, Ltd. v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria,

No. CV 08-2026 (PLF), 2019 WL 3562069 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2019).......................................12

CREW v. Am. Action Network,

No. 18-CV-945 (CRC), 2019 WL 4750248 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2019) .......................................3

CREW v. FEC,

243 F. Supp. 3d 91 (D.D.C. 2017)...........................................................................................18

Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. FEC,

788 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir. 2015)......................................................................................... passim

Ctr. For Individual Freedom v. Van Hollen,

No. 12-5118 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 2012), Doc. No. 1379891 ....................................................13

Dave Drilling Envtl. Eng’g, Inc. v. Gamblin,

No. 14-CV-02851-WHO, 2015 WL 4051968 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2015)..................................12

Davis v. Zhou Liang,

No. C17-849-MJP, 2018 WL 6082903 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2018) ....................................12

Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

831 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1987)...............................................................................................17

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. FDIC,

717 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 2013).............................................................................................9, 10

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 3 of 27
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

- iii -

Diamond v. Charles,

476 U.S. 54 (1986)...................................................................................................................13

Didrickson v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,

982 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992) .................................................................................................13

DSCC v. FEC,

660 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir. 1980) rev’d on other grounds, 454 U.S. 27 (1981) ..........................11

Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton,

322 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2003)...............................................................................................4, 5

Galliano v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

836 F.2d 1362 (D.C. 1988)......................................................................................................16

Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Lehman,

959 F. Supp. 539 (D.D.C.1997)...............................................................................................18

Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of Am.,

473 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1972)...................................................................................................5

Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt,

58 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995) ...................................................................................................13

In re Carter-Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc.,

642 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam)............................................................................11

Indus. Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc. v. Town of Alton, N.H.,

646 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2011)......................................................................................................12

Jones v. Prince George’s Cty., Md.,

348 F.3d 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2003).................................................................................................5

Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman,

313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................13

NL Industries, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Interior,

777 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1985) ...................................................................................................13

Public Citizen et al v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n,

No. 14-5199 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 2015)....................................................................................17

Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Allendale Co.,

226 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (en banc).................................................................................11

Thomas v. Henderson,

297 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (S.D. Ala. 2003)......................................................................................5

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 4 of 27
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

- iv -

Turn Key Gaming, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,

164 F.3d 1080 (8th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................................5

United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,

642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir 1980)..............................................................................................6, 7

United States v. Marsten Apartments, Inc.,

175 F.R.D. 265 (E.D. Mich. 1997) ............................................................................................5

Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,

139 S.Ct. 1945 (2019)................................................................................................................4

Van Hollen v. FEC,

1:11-cv-00766 (D.D.C. entered Aug. 1, 2011) ..................................................................11, 14

Van Hollen v. FEC,

No. 11-766 (D.D.C. July 11, 2011), ECF No. 22 ....................................................................14

Wilderness Soc’y v. Babbitt,

104 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2000).............................................................................................5

Windsor v. United States,

797 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)..................................................................................1, 13

Yniguez v. State of Ariz.,

939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991) ...................................................................................................13

STATUTES

52 U.S.C. § 30109................................................................................................................1, 11, 15

52 U.S.C. § 30109(8)(a)...................................................................................................3, 8, 11, 17

52 U.S.C. § 30109(8)(c).......................................................................................................1, 2, 3, 7

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8).................................................................................................................15

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1)..................................................................................................................11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B) ............................................................................................................18

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 5 of 27
- v -

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

CLC Campaign Legal Center and Catherine Hinckley Kelley

CTR Correct the Record

FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

FEC Federal Election Commission

FECA Federal Election Campaign Act

HFA Hillary for America

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 6 of 27
- 1 -

INTRODUCTION

Proposed Defendant-Intervenors Hillary for America (“HFA”) and Correct the Record 

(“CTR”) are plainly entitled to intervene in this action, which threatens their interest in keeping in 

place the favorable Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) dismissal order, and could clear the 

way for Plaintiffs Campaign Legal Center and Catherine Hinckley Kelley (collectively, “CLC”) 

to bring a civil action directly against HFA and CTR pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(8)(c) of the 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended (“Section 30109 of FECA”). CLC has 

essentially conceded that HFA and CTR have met three of the four requirements for intervention 

as of right. Response, ECF No. 11, at 11. However, CLC takes the remarkable position that CTR 

and HFA are not threatened with an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing (and by extension, 

also lack the legally protected interest required by Rule 24) solely because the FEC has so far 

failed to defend this litigation. Id. CLC’s position has no basis in law. Neither Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 24 nor Article III standing doctrine contain an exception to the established 

standards for intervention when a named defendant does not appear or fails to actively mount a 

defense.

To the contrary, where, as here, an existing party to litigation fails to defend an agency 

action that threatens the proposed intervenors’ interests, the existing defendant is clearly 

inadequately representing the proposed intervenors, which supports intervention under the D.C.

Circuit’sfour-part intervention test. See Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. FEC, 788 F.3d 

312, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (discussing adequacy of representation factor); see also Windsor v. 

United States, 797 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the fourth prong of the 

intervention test was satisfied because “[t]he DOJ has made clear that it will not defend the 

constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA in any way, while such a defense is precisely what [the 

proposed intervenor] wishes to undertake here”). Put differently, the fact that the FEC is not 

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 7 of 27
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defending this litigation actually counsels in favor of allowing CTR’s and HFA’s intervention

under applicable law, not against it.

Moreover, the idea that CTR and HFA are somehow no longer threatened with an injuryin-fact because the FEC is not defending this litigation and lacks a quorum is illogical. HFA’s and 

CTR’s asserted injury-in-fact is both obvious and nearly identical to the injury recognized by the 

D.C. Circuit in Crossroads as more than sufficient to confer standing. Here, as in Crossroads, 

HFA and CTR currently claim a significant benefit from the FEC’s dismissal order: as long as it 

stays in place, HFA and CTR face no further exposure to enforcement proceedings before the FEC, 

nor are they exposed to civil liability via private lawsuit. Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 318. Losing the 

favorable order would be a significant injury in fact. See id. at 317. 

To the extent that this case differs from Crossroads, as CLC insists, the injury with which 

HFA and CTR are threatened is even more severe than the injury to the defendant intervenors in 

Crossroads. This is because the FEC’s current lack of quorum presents CLC with an unusual 

opportunity to attempt an end-run around the FEC’s established role as a gatekeeper for private 

enforcement actions brought under FECA. Where, as here, the FEC has dismissed an 

administrative complaint brought by a private complainant like CLC, that private complainant 

cannot bring a private enforcement action against the target of their complaint unless a) this Court 

finds that the FEC’s dismissal of the administrative complaint was contrary to law, and b) the FEC 

fails to conform with the Court’s declaration after this Court remands the complaint back to the 

FEC. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(8)(c). Under normal circumstances, the FEC would have 30 days to 

conform with a contrary-to-law declaration issued by this Court at the conclusion of this litigation. 

Id. Once remanded, the FEC could—as it did previously in this case—again decline to take 

enforcement action, at which time CLC could again choose to appeal the FEC’s declination 

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 8 of 27
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decision under the same “contrary to law” standard applicable to this case. It is only if the FEC

decided not to act at all that CLC could bring a private civil suit against the alleged violators. See 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(8)(c).

1 In so doing, FECA affords the FEC the role of a gatekeeper for private 

civil enforcement actions. 

But CLC apparently believes that this statutorily-imposed gatekeeping function goes out 

the window when the FEC lacks a quorum. According to CLC, if this Court remands CLC’s 

administrative complaint back to the FEC, the FEC cannot “presently take any other dispositive 

action” on the remanded complaint because it lacks a quorum. Resp., ECF No. 11, at 8.

Accordingly, CLC apparently intends to seek a contrary-to-law declaration by default judgment, 

wait 30 days after remand to a quorum-less FEC, and then file a lawsuit against CTR and HFA 

directly. See id. at 10, n.1.

Given this context, CLC’s eagerness to exclude CTR and HFA from this action is all the 

more understandable. The sooner that CLC obtains a remand to the FEC, the greater the chance 

that the remand will come before a quorum-less FEC, providing CLC with an excuse to file a 

private civil suit directly against HFA and CTR within 30 days of remand. As a result, CLC 

understandably prefers to sidestep the serious problems with its own standing raised in HFA’s and 

CTR’s proposed motion to dismiss, and instead quickly move for a default judgment without being 

inconvenienced by the procedural rights and protections ordinarily afforded defendants under the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

 1 See also CREW v. Am. Action Network, No. 18-CV-945 (CRC), 2019 WL 4750248, at *16 

(D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2019) (explaining that if the FEC dismissed complaint for a second time, 

complainant could file another Section 30109(8)(a) suit, but could not sue the alleged violators 

directly). 

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 9 of 27
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As such, HFA and CTR are threatened with at least the same injury as the intervenors in 

Crossroads. See Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 317-18. Their injury is made even more imminent and 

concrete because the FEC lacks a quorum, which under CLC’s theory, would significantly increase 

the likelihood that CLC could bring a lawsuit directly against HFA and CTR. This is more than 

enough to show an injury-in-fact sufficient to support intervention. See id.

As discussed in detail herein, HFA and CTR plainly meet the requirements for intervention

as of right. In the alternative, CTR and HFA request permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 

24(b). 

ARGUMENT

I. HFA and CTR Plainly Meet the Requirements to Intervene As of Right

A. Federal Policy Favors Broad Participation By Those Who May Be Affected 

By Litigation

As CLC acknowledges, a four-factor test governs the standard for intervention as a matter 

of right in the D.C. Circuit: (1) whether the intervenor-movant’s motion is timely; (2) whether the 

movant has a “legally protected” interest in the action; (3) whether the action threatens to impair 

the movant’s proffered interest in the action; and (4) whether an existing party to the action will 

adequately represent the movant’s interests. Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 320. In addition, the D.C. 

Circuit requires a movant for intervention as of right to demonstrate standing.2 “To establish 

standing under Article III, a prospective intervenor—like any party—must show: (1) injury-infact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.” Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 732-

33 (D.C. Cir. 2003). However, injury is the key inquiry: the D.C. Circuit has held that if the party 

 2 The Supreme Court has recently cast doubt on the requirement that parties seeking to intervene 

as defendants demonstrate standing, stating that when intervention occurs in a “defensive posture,” 

the intervenor “d[oes] not need to establish standing” because it is not seeking to invoke the court’s 

jurisdiction. Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S.Ct. 1945, 1952 (2019). In any event, 

HFA and CTR have both standing and a legally protectible interest in this litigation.

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 10 of 27
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against whom an FEC administrative complaint was dismissed can prove injury, then it can 

establish causation and redressability. See Crossroads, 788 F.3rd at 316 (citation omitted). The 

D.C. Circuit has also repeatedly held that a proposed intervenor that demonstrates constitutional 

standing also sufficiently establishes “an interest relating to the property or transaction which is 

the subject of the action” for purposes of Rule 24. See Fund for Animals, Inc., 322 F.3d at 735 

(citation omitted); Jones v. Prince George’s Cty., Md., 348 F.3d 1014, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2003).3

Rule 24 has been construed liberally by this Court to advance the federal policy that favors 

broad participation by interested parties in litigation. See, e.g., Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Veneman, 

200 F.R.D. 153, 157 (D.D.C. 2001) (Rule 24 provides a “liberal and forgiving standard”); 

Wilderness Soc’y v. Babbitt, 104 F. Supp. 2d 10, 18 (D.D.C. 2000) (explaining that “the D.C. 

Circuit has taken a liberal approach to intervention” and “the purposes of Rule 24 [will be] best 

served by permitting the prospective intervenors to engage in all aspects of this litigation”). Indeed, 

this policy requires that all “doubts [be] resolved in favor of the proposed intervenor.” Turn Key 

Gaming, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 164 F.3d 1080, 1081 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Thomas v. 

Henderson, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1326 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (Rule 24 requires doubts to be resolved 

in favor of the proposed intervenor); United States v. Marsten Apartments, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 265, 

267 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (same). 

Rule 24(a)(2) implements “the basic jurisprudential assumption that the interest of justice 

is best served when all parties with a real stake in a controversy are afforded an opportunity to be 

heard.” Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of Am., 473 F.2d 118, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1972). By providing 

a liberal procedure for non-parties to assert their interests in litigation, Rule 24(a) fixes “the 

 3 CLC does not contest that the analysis for standing and a legally protectible interest overlap. See, 

e.g., Resp., ECF No. 11, at 14 (discussing “Article III injury [. . . and] the analogous requirements 

of Rule 24(a)”). 

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 11 of 27
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obvious injustice of having [an outsider’s] claim erased or impaired by the court’s adjudication 

without ever being heard. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C. Cir 

1980) (citation omitted). 

Against these background principles, it is clear that HFA and CTR, both of which have a 

vital interest in this case, should be permitted to intervene and participate as parties to this

litigation. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Intervene, ECF. No. 10-1. 

B. HFA and CTR Have Demonstrated an Injury-in-Fact and a Legally 

Protected Interest in this Litigation 

CLC has acknowledged that HFA and CTR “may meet some of the requirements for 

intervention,” but contends without explanation that “the FEC’s affirmative decision not to 

authorize a defense of this action, and its corollary decision to default, deprives them of a legally 

protectable interest in this case,” and means that they lack standing. Resp., ECF No. 11, at 11.

Quite the contrary. The FEC’s failure to defend this litigation only amplifies HFA’s and CTR’s 

threatened injury-in-fact, strengthening their standing and the other arguments in favor of their 

intervention. HFA’s and CTR’s ability to intervene in this case is governed by Crossroads. Just as 

the intervenors in Crossroads, HFA and CTR currently claim a significant benefit from the FEC’s 

dismissal order: as long as it remains in place, HFA and CTR face no further exposure to 

enforcement proceedings before the FEC, nor are they exposed to civil liability via private lawsuit. 

Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 318. Under Crossroads, the risk of losing the favorable order alone is a 

significant injury in fact sufficient to confer standing upon HFA and CTR because it “would 

extinguish the current barrier to enforcement,” private or otherwise. Id. at 319. CLC never 

explains, because it cannot, how HFA’s and CTR’s injury—losing the favorable dismissal order—

is at all lessened by the FEC’s failure to defend this action or lack of quorum.

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In fact, given the FEC’s lack of quorum and failure to defend this litigation, HFA and CTR 

will be exposed to an even more imminent injury: a private lawsuit brought against them by CLC

pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(8)(c) just 30 days after remand. As explained supra at 2-4, CLC 

believes that if the Court remands this complaint to a quorum-less FEC, the FEC will necessarily 

fail to take action to conform to the Court’s declaration within 30 days after remand, as required 

by Section30109(8)(c) of FECA. See Resp. at 15, n.1. Accordingly, CLC believes it will have a 

green light under FECA to sue HFA and CTR directly in federal court 30 days after remand. Id.

This injury—facing a private lawsuit in which HFA and CTR are the named defendants just 30 

days after remand—constitutes an even more concrete and imminent harm to HFA and CTR, 

further confirming HFA and CTR’s Article III standing. See Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 318. 

C. No Existing Party to the Litigation Adequately Represents HFA’s or CTR’s 

Interests 

The FEC’s failure to enter an appearance to date only strengthens the conclusion that the 

FEC does not adequately represent HFA’s or CTR’s interests. The D.C. Circuit has recognized 

that the fourth requirement for intervention—that the existing parties to the litigation do not 

adequately represent the intervenors’ interest—is “not onerous,” and that a movant “ordinarily 

should be allowed to intervene unless it is clear that the party will provide adequate 

representation.” See Crossroads GPS, 788 F.3d at 321 (citing Fund for Animals, 322 F.3d at 735); 

Am. Tel & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d at 1293). In this case, the FEC’s interests are apparently so misaligned 

with HFA and CTR that it could not muster four Commissioner votes to authorize defense of its

own dismissal of this action. Yet, CLC oddly contends that this factor favors against intervention 

because HFA and CTR cannot represent the FEC’s interests. See Resp., ECF No. 11, at 18. But 

that misconstrues the inquiry before the Court. The inquiry under Rule 24 is whether the existing 

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 13 of 27
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parties to the litigation can represent the proposed intervenors’ interests, not the other way around.

That the FEC made the decision not to defend its dismissal has no bearing on the Rule 24 analysis. 

D. CLC’s Specific Arguments Against HFA’s and CTR’s Standing Fail 

CLC flings various arguments against HFA’s and CTR’s standing upon the wall, hoping 

that one will stick. But each is meritless. First, CLC erroneously argues that CTR and HFA have 

not identified “any particularized or legally protected interest in continuing this case without the 

FEC’s participation.” Resp., ECF No. 11, at 14. But that is clearly not true. CTR and HFA stand 

to suffer the same injury regardless of whether the FEC participates in this litigation: the loss of a 

favorable dismissal order, the risk of future FEC enforcement action against them, and the risk of 

a direct lawsuit brought against them by CLC. As explained above, that injury is only heightened 

by the FEC’s current lack of defense.

Second, CLC contends that because the only remedy available in this action is a declaration 

that the FEC acted “contrary to law,” CTR and HFA will not be “ordered . . . to do or refrain from 

doing anything” as a result of this action, and therefore can suffer no immediate injury. Resp. ECF 

No. 11, at 15. But CLC is simply wrong on the law. Taken seriously, CLC’s logic would prohibit

all administrative respondents from intervening in any section 30109(8)(a) suit, because only the 

FEC is ordered to do something in these actions; administrative respondents are not directly 

ordered by a court to do or stop doing anything as a result of a section 30109(8)(a) suit. But as 

CLC itself recognizes, the remedy in a section 30109(8)(a) suit poses no barrier to intervention by 

defendants. See Resp., ECF No. 11, at 11 (noting that “Crossroads GPS, in many circumstances, 

supports intervention by administrative respondents”). Indeed, the D.C. Circuit in Crossroads was 

clear that “even if the district court cannot command the precise enforcement route the [FEC] must 

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take on remand, invalidating the dismissal order would extinguish the current barrier to 

enforcement,” which would result in an injury to HFA and CTR. Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 319. 

Third, CLC appears to argue that because the FEC currently lacks a quorum, there is no 

“practical threat” that the FEC will seek to regulate HFA and CTR. Resp., ECF No. 11, at 15 n.1. 

But as discussed supra at 2-4, even if the FEC does not regulate HFA and CTR as a result of this 

action, HFA and CTR would still be at risk of being sued directly by CLC. Further, CLC’s 

argument relies on the unsupported and unjustified assumption that no new appointments to the 

FEC will made in the near future. The FEC last lacked a quorum in 2008, and that lasted for 

approximately six months. Upon the appointment of new commissioners, the FEC returned to 

normal operations, including fulfilling its enforcement responsibilities.4

Finally, CLC apparently claims that HFA and CTR lack standing because their injury is 

too attenuated and depends on the independent action of an absent third party. Resp., ECF No. 11, 

at 15. But again, the D.C. Circuit in Crossroads rejected this exact argument in the specific context 

of an appeal of a dismissal of an FEC administrative complaint to this Court: “even where the 

possibility of prevailing on the merits after remand is speculative, a party seeking to uphold a 

favorable ruling can still suffer a concrete injury in fact.” Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 318. And as the 

D.C. Circuit noted, the case that CLC relies upon for this argument—Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co.

v. FDIC, 717 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 2013) —is readily distinguishable. In that case, holders of notes 

issued by a failed bank sought to intervene as defendants in litigation between Deutsche Bank and 

the FDIC, which was acting as the failed bank’s receiver. In deciding whether the intervenors had 

standing, the district court had to first reach and resolve a particular legal conclusion in a particular 

 4 See Congressional Research Serv., Federal Election Commission: Membership and 

Policymaking Quorum, In Brief at 7 (Sept. 5, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45160.pdf.

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 15 of 27
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way—that the receiver retained the underlying liability at issue—before the intervenors’ interest 

would even be at stake. Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 318; see also Deutsche Bank, 717 F.3d at 193. In 

this case, just like Crossroads, HFA and CTR’s interests are already at stake, given that CLC’s 

action is an appeal from a direct enforcement proceeding already initiated against HFA and CTR. 

“Unlike Deutsche Bank, there is no threshold legal determination that might obviate [HFA and 

CTR’s] interest in upholding the dismissal order.” Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 318; see also id.

(holding that when the agency action at issue involved potential direct regulation of intervenor, 

threatened injury was “even greater than injuries we found sufficient in our previous cases”). 

II. CLC’s Novel Policy Arguments Cannot Override the Plain Text of Rule 24 and 

Binding Precedent; FECA’s Statutory Framework In No Way Prohibits CTR and 

HFA From Intervening 

Perhaps realizing that Rule 24 and Article III standing doctrine all but compel the 

conclusion that HFA and CTR are entitled to intervene as a matter of right, CLC advances what 

amounts to policy arguments—wholly unrelated to the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2)—that it 

contends counsel against HFA’s and CTR’s intervention. Indeed, the bulk of CLC’s response 

attempts to convince the Court to create a new exception to the established legal test for 

intervention that applies only to appeals of a dismissal of an FEC administrative complaint when 

the FEC does not enter an appearance in the case. This proposed exception is based solely on 

CLC’s beliefs about the “delicate equilibrium of competing objectives” reflected in Congress’s 

design of the overall FECA statutory scheme. Resp., ECF No. 11, at 16. It has absolutely no basis 

in applicable law or precedent—much less the plain text of Rule 24(a)(2)—and should be rejected 

out of hand.

To the extent that the Court does consider CLC’s policy arguments, HFA and CTR address 

why each is inapposite below. 

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A. Rule 24 Presumptively Allows Intervention When a Judicial Review Statute 

is Otherwise Silent on the Right to Intervene, and Intervention by the Target 

of an FEC Complaint is Hardly Unprecedented

CLC posits that the overall design and structure of FECA provides limited mechanisms for 

private involvement, and that intervening defendants are not specifically included in any role in 

FECA’s judicial review provision under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(8)(a). This, CLC contends, counsels 

against intervention here. Resp, ECF No. 11, at 16. But FECA’s silence on intervention does not 

have nearly the significance CLC assigns to it. Intervention under Rule 24(a)(2) assumes that the 

relevant statute underlying the cause of action does not otherwise provide for the intervenor’s 

involvement; indeed, Rule 24(a)(2) applies only when the intervenor has no independent “right to 

intervene by a federal statute.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). In other words, intervention under 

Rule 24 applies whenever a case is in federal district court, and FECA does not somehow displace 

Rule 24 in cases brought pursuant to Section 30109 of FECA. Section 30109 merely “creates the 

right of action which brings the case into court.” Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Allendale Co., 

226 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (en banc). “Once there, the case is governed by the principles

which control the course of all litigation in the District Court,” including Rule 24. Id. Accordingly, 

it would be “untenable” to conclude that “the absence of any reference to intervention” in FECA

“must be construed to preclude intervention in such review by persons who would be 

commensurately aggrieved if the [FEC] determinations were set aside.” Id.

Against this background principle, courts have routinely allowed the targets of private FEC 

complaints to intervene in judicial review litigation. See DSCC v. FEC, 660 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir. 

1980) rev’d on other grounds, 454 U.S. 27, 42 (1981); In re Carter-Mondale Reelection Comm., 

Inc., 642 F.2d 538, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam); see also Minute Order, Van Hollen v. FEC, 

1:11-cv-00766 (D.D.C. entered Aug. 1, 2011). This Circuit has not construed intervention as an 

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effort “to litigate . . . outside the statutory regime” or as “inappropriate interference with the FEC’s 

responsibilities.” Resp., ECF No. 11, at 17 (citations omitted). The same result should obtain here.

B. Courts Have Permitted Intervention When the Named Defendant Fails to 

Defend And the Intervening Defendant Can Demonstrate Standing

Defendant-intervenors who meet Article III standing requirements are commonly 

permitted to intervene in lawsuits filed against a named defendant who has either never appeared 

in the action, or who has effectively abandoned any defense of the action. For example, courts 

grant intervention motions filed by proposed defendant-intervenors seeking to oppose default 

judgment motions against absent named defendants. See, e.g., Davis v. Zhou Liang, No. C17-849-

MJP, 2018 WL 6082903, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2018); Dave Drilling Envtl. Eng'g, Inc. v. 

Gamblin, No. 14-CV-02851-WHO, 2015 WL 4051968, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2015). Similarly, 

courts grant intervention motions filed by proposed defendant-intervenors when named defendants 

have stopped actively litigating a case. Cont’l Transfert Technique, Ltd. v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, 

No. CV 08-2026 (PLF), 2019 WL 3562069, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2019) (holding that defendants’

inadequate representation of proposed defendant-intervenor was “manifest” when “defendants 

have all but disappeared from this litigation and are not protecting [defendant-intervenor’s] interest 

in the” assets at issue). Indeed, courts have squarely held that defendant intervenors who \

demonstrate Article III standing can continue to litigate actions even after the named defendant 

has reached a negotiated settlement with the plaintiff and has been dismissed from the case. See 

Indus. Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc. v. Town of Alton, N.H., 646 F.3d 76, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).

CLC apparently takes the position that this case is distinguishable from other cases such as 

those enumerated above because it involves a federal agency in which the agency decided not to 

defend its own agency action. According to CLC, allowing intervention in such circumstances 

would interfere with the agency’s statutorily delegated responsibilities and override its ability to 

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set its policy agenda and enforcement priorities. See Resp., ECF No. 11, at 9, 11-14. But CLC’s 

position cannot be squared with ample precedent permitting defendant-intervenors from 

continuing to litigate challenges to government action, even when the government declined to do 

so.5 Nor can CLC’s position be squared with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Center for Individual 

Freedom v. Van Hollen, 694 F.3d 108, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2012), which allowed the defendantintervenors in that case to appeal an unfavorable district court decision against the FEC even 

though the FEC failed to garner the four Commissioner votes necessary to authorize an appeal,

and was thus absent from the appellate proceedings. Id. at 110; see also Opening Br. of Ctr. For 

Individual Freedom, Ctr. For Individual Freedom v. Van Hollen, No. 12-5118 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 

2012), Doc. No. 1379891, at 2-3 (noting failure to appeal due to 3-3 vote). 

 5 See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 139 (E.D. Va. 2018) 

(“Since [the time intervenors were granted intervention], the intervenors have borne the primary 

responsibility of defending the 2011 plan, with the state defendants joining the intervenors’ 

defense but declining to present an independent substantive defense”); Windsor, 797 F. Supp. 2d 

at 324. In addition, courts have routinely held that a defendant-intervenor has the right to appeal, 

even where a federal agency defendant chooses not to, so long as the intervenor can demonstrate 

standing. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (“[A]n intervenor's right to continue a 

suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a 

showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the [standing] requirements of Art. III.”); Kootenai Tribe 

of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2002) (intervenor defendants permitted to 

appeal district court decision that the Forest Service's Roadless Rule violated NEPA although 

Forest Service chose not to appeal); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1399 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (ruling that intervenor defendants had standing to appeal order setting aside listing of 

species under the Endangered Species Act although the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 

did not appeal); Didrickson v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 982 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(ruling that intervenor defendants had standing to appeal district court order invalidating federal 

regulations concerning sea otters although the federal agency that promulgated the regulations did 

not appeal); Yniguez v. State of Ariz., 939 F.2d 727, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1991) (ruling that intervenor 

defendants who sponsored state legislation had standing to appeal order ruling legislation 

unconstitutional although the state acquiesced in the order and did not appeal); NL Industries, Inc. 

v. Sec’y of the Interior, 777 F.2d 433, 437 (9th Cir. 1985) (ruling that intervenor defendant had 

standing to appeal order setting aside mining claim decision of Secretary of the Interior although 

the Secretary of the Interior did not appeal). 

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The defendant-intervenors in Van Hollen, who were motivated to intervene because they

anticipated that the FEC would not appeal,

6 were permitted to appeal in the absence of the FEC 

because the D.C. Circuit found that they demonstrated a cognizable interest, and ultimately, had 

standing. Van Hollen, 694 F.3d at 110. Thus, contrary to CLC’s contention, it is not 

“unprecedented” for a defendant-intervenor to continue litigation in the absence of the FEC’s 

participation due to its failure to garner four Commissioner votes to defend. HFA and CTR are not 

parties with some remote, tangential interest looking in on this litigation from the outside. By 

contrast, they have standing on their own—regardless of whether the FEC participates in the 

defense—and thus they should be permitted to intervene.

C. By Intervening, HFA and CTR Are Not Stepping Into the Shoes of the FEC

CLC incorrectly argues that if HFA and CTR are allowed to defend the appeal of a 

dismissal of an FEC administrative complaint in the absence of the FEC’s participation, HFA and 

CTR would step into the agency’s shoes by “usurp[ing] the [FEC’s] ‘exclusive’ civil enforcement 

authority,” and improperly override FEC’s policy choice not to defend its dismissal. Resp., ECF 

No. 11, at 14. CLC’s arguments are at odds with established precedent and do not provide any 

basis for this Court to deny intervention to HFA and CTR.7

CLC’s argument proceeds as though the FEC had spoken with a clear voice when it decided 

not to defend this action, such that HFA and CTR are overriding the Commission’s wishes and 

commandeering its authority by attempting to defend. In reality, the FEC’s position has been

 6 See Reply Br. of Ctr. For Individual Freedom Mot. to Intervene, Van Hollen v. FEC, No. 11-766 

(D.D.C. July 11, 2011), ECF No. 22, at 8 n.3.

7 Conveniently, CLC appears not to harbor similar concerns regarding its apparent plan to sidestep 

the FEC’s gatekeeping role and pursue private enforcement action against HFA and CTR if the 

dismissal order is invalidated and the quorum-less FEC is incapable of following a court order to 

act. 

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anything but clear: the FEC could not secure four votes to investigate CLC’s administrative 

complaint, unanimously voted to close the file, and then—due to a single holdout among the four 

commissioners—could not secure four votes to defend CLC’s appeal of the Commission’s 

dismissal of the administrative complaint. Under these circumstances, allowing intervention

permits HFA and CTR to protect their interests and defend the legality of their actions—actions 

that a controlling group of FEC commissioners declined to investigate further—while 

simultaneously respecting the single dissenting commissioner’s right to veto the use of agency 

resources and agency imprimatur on a defense of the controlling commissioners’ decision. 

Furthermore, CLC repeatedly misstates FECA’s limitations on those who may participate 

in judicial review actions, and draws the unsupported conclusion that defendant-intervenors may 

not participate in administrative review actions if the FEC is absent. CLC states that “52 U.S.C. § 

30109(a)(8) expressly limits participation in administrative review actions to complainants.” 

Resp., ECF No. 11, at 16. But that section only limits those persons who may bring an action for 

judicial review; it does not preclude intervenors from participating in the action after a complaint 

has been filed. 52 U.S.C. § 30109 (“[T]he complainant may bring . . . a civil action to remedy the 

violation involved in the original complaint.”). 

Similarly, FECA’s requirement that four Commissioners vote to authorize the FEC’s 

defense of a dismissal decision does not preclude intervention, contrary to CLC’s contention. 

Resp., ECF No. 11, at 17. CLC cites to Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436, 449 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 

1988) for this proposition, but that case provides no support for CLC’s argument. Common Cause

holds that Commissioners who decline to find reasons to believe are required to issue a statement 

of reasons. In so holding, the court mentioned the four-vote requirement in the context of noting 

that a statements of reasons issued by fewer than four Commissioners would not be considered an 

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“official Commission decision.” Id. However, Common Cause provides no basis whatsoever for 

CLC’s arguments that the four-vote requirement precludes HFA and CTR from intervening in this 

matter. While it may be true that the four-vote requirement prevents the FEC from defending itself

in certain litigation without the requisite votes, id. §§ 30106(c), 30107(a)(6), the requirement does 

not prohibit parties from intervening under Rule 24 to defend their own interests. 

Finally, the other authorities that CLC cites offer no support for its contention that FECA’s 

“delicate” design prohibits HFA and CTR from intervening in this matter. Resp., ECF No. 11, at 

16-18. Neither Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995) nor Galliano v. U.S. 

Postal Serv., 836 F.2d 1362 (D.C. 1988) address a situation as here, where the FEC failed to defend 

its actions and a party sought to protect its interests by intervening.

D. The Doctrine of Prudential Standing Has No Bearing on HFA and CTR’s 

Standing

CLC’s incomplete argument that HFA and CTR lack prudential standing, see Resp., ECF 

No. 11, at 9, should also be disregarded. The D.C. Circuit has considered and rejected analogous 

arguments that respondents to an FEC administrative complaint are foreclosed from intervening 

as defendants in an appeal of the dismissal by the doctrine of prudential standing. In Crossroads, 

the FEC argued that the prudential standing doctrine foreclosed the respondents from intervening 

as defendants, because the respondents’ interests “do not fall within the zone of interests FECA 

protects.” 788 F.3d at 319. The FEC’s arguments in Crossroads track closely to CLC’s arguments 

here: that the FEC is the only defendant expressly permitted to be sued in FECA’s judicial review 

provision; that the only private parties expressly permitted to participate are administrative 

complainants; and that the respondent’s interests were not among the broader interests FECA seeks 

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 22 of 27
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to protect.8 But the D.C. Circuit squarely rejected the FEC’s argument, holding that “where an 

intervenor-defendant establishes Article III standing and meets the dictates of [Rule 24], there is 

no need for another layer of judge-made prudential considerations to deny intervention.” 

Crossroads, 788 F.3d at 320. CLC does not mention—let alone distinguish—Crossroads in its 

brief discussion of prudential standing, and it offers no authority for the application of this doctrine 

to prevent HFA and CTR from intervening here. 

E. Potential Merits Arguments that HFA and CTR May Offer at Later Stages 

of the Litigation Provide No Reason to Deny Intervention

CLC’s contention that HFA and CTR should not be allowed to intervene because they may 

raise “irrelevant” legal arguments is also meritless. CLC argues that this Court’s review is limited 

to the controlling Commissioners’ stated rationale for the dismissal, and concludes that HFA and 

CTR should not be permitted to intervene because they may offer arguments that “add to, amplify, 

or amend” the Commissioners’ rationale, and that that any such arguments offered would be 

“legally irrelevant.” Resp., ECF No. 11, at 16. CLC’s argument is highly suspect as a matter of 

law, and its suggested prohibition of arguments that “add to, amplify, or amend” the 

Commissioners’ stated rationale appears to be invented out of whole cloth.

9 But at this stage, the 

Court is not required to decide what arguments may or may not be considered in deciding whether 

 8 Compare, e.g., Resp., ECF No. 11, at 11-12 with Suppl. Br. of FEC, at 7-9, No. 1536889, Public 

Citizen et al v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, No. 14-5199 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 2015).

9 HFA and CTR note that the D.C. Circuit in Crossroads cited the fact that the defendant intervenor 

had a different legal strategy and would raise different arguments than the FEC in a section 

30109(8)(a) action as a reason supporting intervention. 788 F.3d at 321. The D.C. Circuit’s 

decision cannot be reconciled with CLC’s suggestion that any distinct legal arguments and 

strategies used by proposed Defendant Intervenors HFA and CTR are legally irrelevant to the 

issues before the Court. The sole contrary authority cited by CLC involved a judicial review action 

that lacked any stated rationale by the controlling Commissioners, which is not the case presented 

here. See Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1131, 1135, 

1135 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 

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the FEC’s dismissal was contrary to law. Instead, the Court must simply determine whether HFA 

and CTR’s motion was timely; whether HFA and CTR have legal interests in the case; and the 

adequacy of current representation of those interests. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Given the 

limited procedural question before the Court, it need not evaluate the strength or relevance of the 

potential legal arguments that HFA and CTR may make during later stages of this litigation.

III. In the Alternative, the Court Should Grant HFA’s and CTR’s Request for 

Permissive Intervention

Even if HFA and CTR do not meet the requirements to intervene as a matter of right, they 

are undoubtedly entitled to permissive intervention, as asserted in the Motion to Intervene. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B) (requiring proposed intervenors to show that their claim or defense and 

the main action have a question of law or fact in common, and that intervention will not unduly 

delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights); see also Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 

to Intervene, ECF. No. 10-1, at 10. And CLC provides no substantive objection to such 

intervention. 

At most, CLC argues that permitting HFA and CTR to intervene will delay the proceedings 

merely because they have filed a dispositive motion challenging CLC’s standing and the 

sufficiency of the complaint. Resp. ECF. No. 11, at 16, 19. However, nothing in Rule 24 nor the 

relevant case law precludes intervenors from filing a dispositive motion. See Hallmark Cards, Inc. 

v. Lehman, 959 F. Supp. 539, 541 n.1 (D.D.C.1997) (finding that “an intervenor may move to 

dismiss a proceeding”). Indeed, this Court has granted intervention and welcomed the intervenor’s 

dispositive motions in similar cases. See, e.g., CREW v. FEC, 243 F. Supp. 3d 91, 103 (D.D.C. 

2017) (modifying schedule to allow then intervenor to file a motion to dismiss, granting 

intervenor’s motion in part, and dismissing a portion of the complaint). In the alternative to 

intervention as of right, HFA and CTR should be permitted to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(b). 

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IV. Amicus Status is No Substitute for Full Participation as Intervening Defendants, 

and Cannot Be Justified when the Requirements of Rule 24 Are Otherwise Satisfied

As set forth above, HFA and CTR have met the requirements to intervene under Rule 24 

and should not be limited to being amici curiae. Relegation to amicus status would likely deny 

HFA and CTR the procedural rights and protections ordinarily afforded defendants under the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such as the ability to make motions to dismiss or to appeal 

decisions adverse to HFA’s and CTR’s interests. Moreover, amicus status would be inappropriate 

where, as here, HFA and CTR meet Rule 24’s requirements for intervention as of right; as the Rule 

makes clear, intervention is mandatory when its requirements are met. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) 

(“On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who [satisfies Rule 24(a)(2).]”) 

(emphasis added). 

V. The FEC’s Failure to Certify the Administrative Record Has No Bearing on HFA’s

and CTR’s Ability to Intervene 

CLC’s assertion that obtaining a copy of the certified administrative record from the FEC 

in compliance with Local Rule 7(n)(1) will likely require court action, has no effect on the Court’s 

ability to evaluate whether HFA and CTR meet the requirements to intervene under Rule 24. CLC

has not pointed to any authority even suggesting that certification of the administrative record will 

shed light on the pending Motion. Moreover, because the FEC has defaulted, the need to obtain a 

copy of the administrative record would likely require court action regardless of whether HFA and 

CTR are granted intervention. Finally, in the past, this Court has granted a party’s request to 

intervene prior to the FEC certifying the record.10

 10 See, e.g., Minute Order, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. FEC, No. 16-259 

(D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2016); Notice of Filing of Certified List of Administrative Record Documents, 

id., ECF No. 25 (FEC filing certified administrative record in May 2017); Minute Order, 

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, No. 16-752 (D.D.C. June 30, 2016) (granting motions to intervene); 

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 25 of 27
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, and in the Motion to Intervene, HFA and CTR respectfully 

request that the Court grant their Motion and issue an order permitting them to intervene as a matter 

of right under Rule 24(a)(2) or, in the alternative, under Rule 24(b).

October 29, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

PERKINS COIE LLP

By: /s/ Marc Erik Elias

Marc Erik Elias, Bar No. 442007

MElias@perkinscoie.com

700 Thirteenth Street, N.W., Suite 600

Washington, D.C. 20005-3960

Telephone: 202.654.6200

Facsimile: 202.654.6211

Attorney for Proposed Defendant-Intervenors

 

Notice of Filing of Certified List of Administrative Record Documents, id., ECF No. 28 (FEC 

filing administrative record in May 2017).

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 26 of 27
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 29, 2019, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

document to be served upon all counsel of record registered with the Court’s ECF system, by 

electronic service via the Court’s ECF transmission facilities. 

By: /s/ Marc Erik Elias 

Marc Erik Elias

PERKINS COIE LLP

700 Thirteenth Street, N.W., Suite 600

Washington, D.C. 20005-3960

Telephone: 202.654.6200

Facsimile: 202.654.6211

Email: MElias@perkinscoie.com

Case 1:19-cv-02336-JEB Document 14 Filed 10/29/19 Page 27 of 27