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USCA Case #23-5216 Document #2026662 Filed: 11/13/2023 Page 1 of 27 

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED 

No. 23-5216 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

BARBARA W. PALMER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE 

Lisa J. Stevenson Shaina Ward 

Acting General Counsel Attorney 

lstevenson@fec.gov sward@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

Associate General Counsel 1050 First Street NE 

kdeeley@fec.gov Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

November 13, 2023 
 

 

USCA Case #23-5216 Document #2026662 Filed: 11/13/2023 Page 2 of 27 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 

LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ...................................................... 2 

A. The FEC and FECA’s Administrative 

Enforcement Process ....................................................................... 2 

B. FECA’s Limits on Contributions .................................................... 4 

C. Agency Proceedings Related to Palmer’s 

Administrative Complaint ............................................................... 5 

D. District Court Order Dismissing Palmer’s 

Complaint ........................................................................................ 8 

ARGUMENT..................................................................................................... 11 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW......................................................................11 

II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 

PALMER’S COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT 

MATTER JURISDICTION ..................................................................... 12 

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................. 18 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page(s) 

Cases 

Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ....................................... 14 

Arbitraje Casa de Cambio, S.A. de C.V. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 

297 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2003) ..................................................................... 15 

Ass’n of Civil Technicians, Inc. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 

283 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2002) .............................................................................. 12 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ........................................................................ 14 

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 31 F.4th 781 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ..................................11 

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 860 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ....................... 10, 15 

Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020) ................................................................. 14 

Cascade Broad. Grp. Ltd. v. F.C.C., 822 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1987) .................... 12 

Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ............................. 10, 14, 17 

Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) ........................................................................ 13 

Dufur v. U.S. Parole Comm., 314 F. Supp. 3d 10 (D.D.C. 2018) ...................... 15-16 

Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) ................................................................ 18 

FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) ........................................................................... 16 

FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 

470 U.S. 480 (1985) ............................................................................................... 3 

FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ........................................................... 3 

Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) ................................................................. 14 

In re Nat’l Cong. Club, 1984 WL 148396 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 1984) ....................... 3 

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Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. TSA, 429 F.3d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2005)............................ 13 

Jenkins v. District of Columbia, 

2018 WL 3726280 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2018) ........................................................11 

Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2009) .................................................................. 14 

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) ....................................................... 14 

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ...................................................... 12 

Public Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) ........................................................... 16 

Sills v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 761 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1985).............................. 12 

Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) ....................................... 13 

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) .................................................... 12, 16 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83 (1998) ............................. 17 

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) .............................................. 13 

Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 

819 F.2d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1987).................................................................... 1, 11, 12 

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) ............................................. 16 

Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 

964 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2020) .............................................................................. 16 

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ...................................................................... 14 

Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2001).............................................. 16 

Statutes 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8) ................................................................................................ 4 

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52 U.S.C. § 30101(9) ................................................................................................ 4 

52 U.S.C. § 30106 ..................................................................................................... 2 

52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) ........................................................................................... 2 

52 U.S.C. § 30106(c) ............................................................................................ 2, 3 

52 U.S.C. § 30107 ..................................................................................................... 2 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1) ........................................................................................ 2, 5 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2) ............................................................................................ 2 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(3) ............................................................................................ 3 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4) ............................................................................................ 3 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i) .................................................................................. 3 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6) ............................................................................................ 2 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(A) ...................................................................................... 3 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) ................................................................................ 3, 12 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) .................................................................................. 3, 4 

52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) ................................................................................................. 5 

52 U.S.C. § 30119 ..................................................................................................... 7 

52 U.S.C. § 30119(a)(1) ............................................................................................ 5 

52 U.S.C. § 30122 ................................................................................................. 4, 7 

Rules and Regulations 

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11 C.F.R. § 100.52(a) ................................................................................................ 4 

11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1) ........................................................................................... 4 

11 C.F.R. § 111.4 ....................................................................................................... 2 

11 C.F.R. § 114.2 ....................................................................................................... 7 

11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b) .................................................................................................. 5 

11 C.F.R. § 114.2(d) .................................................................................................. 5 

11 C.F.R. § 115.2(a) .................................................................................................. 5 

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ............................................. 9 

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GLOSSARY 

Add. Addendum 

FEC Federal Election Commission 

FECA Federal Election Campaign Act 

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INTRODUCTION 

Appellee Federal Election Commission (“Commission” or “FEC”) 

respectfully moves for summary affirmance because the parties’ positions are so 

clear that further proceedings would offer no benefit. See Taxpayers Watchdog, 

Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Appellant Barbara W. 

Palmer’s appeal challenges the district court’s straightforward conclusion that 

Palmer failed to identify a concrete injury flowing from the Commission’s 

dismissal of her administrative complaint, and therefore failed to establish Article 

III standing. Palmer’s administrative complaint alleged that a non-profit 

organization violated campaign finance laws during the 2020 federal election 

cycle. After the Commission dismissed this administrative complaint, Palmer filed 

suit alleging that the FEC had failed to “properly” investigate it, and that she was 

injured as a result. However, Palmer’s desire to see federal law enforced is not a 

concrete and particularized injury sufficient to establish Article III standing. 

Furthermore, to the extent Palmer attempted to allege an informational injury 

resulting from the Commission’s dismissal of her administrative complaint, the 

bare allegations in her judicial complaint also fail to confer standing. Because the 

district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 

Palmer’s suit, this Court should summarily affirm. 

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LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

A. The FEC and FECA’s Administrative Enforcement Process 

The Commission is a six-member independent agency of the United States 

vested with statutory authority over the administration, interpretation, and civil 

enforcement of FECA. See generally 52 U.S.C. §§ 30106-07. Congress 

authorized the Commission to “administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and 

formulate policy with respect to” FECA, id. § 30106(b)(1), and to investigate 

possible violations of the Act, id. § 30109(a)(1)-(2). The Commission has 

“exclusive jurisdiction” to initiate civil enforcement actions for violations of the 

Act in the United States district courts. Id. §§ 30106(b)(1), 30109(a)(6). 

This case initiated after Palmer filed a judicial complaint alleging that the 

FEC’s dismissal of her administrative complaint was contrary to law. FECA 

permits any person to file an administrative complaint with the Commission 

alleging a violation of the Act. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1); see also 11 C.F.R. 

§ 111.4. After reviewing the complaint and any response filed by the respondent 

whose conduct is at issue, the Commission considers whether there is “reason to 

believe” that FECA has been violated. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2). If at least four of 

the FEC’s Commissioners vote to find such reason to believe, the Commission 

investigates the alleged violation. Id. §§ 30106(c), 30109(a)(2). To continue with 

enforcement action, the Commission must then determine whether there is 

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“probable cause” to believe FECA has been violated. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(3)-(4). 

If so, FECA then requires the Commission to attempt informal conciliation with 

the respondent to remedy the apparent violation, after which the FEC may institute 

a de novo civil enforcement action in federal district court. Id. 

§ 30109(a)(4)(A)(i), (a)(6)(A). Each of these stages requires an affirmative vote of 

at least four Commissioners. Id. §§ 30106(c), 30109(a)(4)(A)(i), (a)(6)(A). 

Federal law also provides administrative complainants who are “aggrieved 

by an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint” or “by a failure of the 

Commission to act” a cause of action to challenge the FEC’s handling of their 

complaint in federal court. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). If a court finds that a 

Commission dismissal or failure to act was “contrary to law,” it may order the 

Commission to conform to the court’s decision within 30 days. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(C); see FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re 

Nat’l Cong. Club, Nos. 84-5701, 84-5719, 1984 WL 148396, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 

24, 1984) (per curiam). If the Commission fails to conform within that time, the 

administrative complainant may bring a civil action to remedy the alleged 

violation. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C); see FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political 

Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 488 (1985). 

FECA expressly limits the scope of relief available to a plaintiff challenging 

an FEC dismissal decision or alleging that the Commission has failed to act on an 

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administrative complaint. The reviewing court may only (a) declare that the 

Commission’s failure to act or dismissal was “contrary to law” and (b) order the 

Commission to “conform with” the court’s declaration within 30 days. 52 U.S.C. § 

30109(a)(8)(C). 

B. FECA’s Limits on Contributions 

FECA defines a “contribution” as any “gift, subscription, loan, advance, or 

deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of 

influencing any election for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8); accord 11 

C.F.R. § 100.52(a). The term “anything of value” includes in-kind contributions, 

such as “the provision of any goods or services without charge or at a charge that is 

less than the usual normal charge.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1). The Act defines an 

expenditure as “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift 

of money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing 

any election for Federal office. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9). 

FECA prohibits any person from making a contribution in the name of 

another person or knowingly allowing his or her name to be used to make such a 

contribution. 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(a). FECA and the Commission’s regulations 

also prohibit contributions during certain time periods by any person who enters 

into a contract with the United States or its departments or agencies for “furnishing 

any material, supplies, or equipment,” if payment on such contract “is to be made 

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in whole or in part from funds appropriated by Congress.” Id. § 30119(a)(1); 11 

C.F.R. § 115.2(a). Finally, FECA prohibits corporations from making 

contributions to federal candidates, and likewise bars candidates, political 

committees (other than independent expenditure-only political committees and 

committees with hybrid accounts), and other persons, from knowingly accepting or 

receiving corporate contributions. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b), (d). 

FECA also provides that “any officer or any director of any corporation” shall not 

“consent to any [prohibited] contribution or expenditure by the corporation.” 52 

U.S.C. § 30118(a). 

C. Agency Proceedings Related to Palmer’s Administrative 

Complaint 

On November 7, 2021, Palmer filed an administrative complaint with the 

Commission which was designated Matter Under Review (“MUR”) 7946. Palmer 

supplemented her complaint on January 3, 2022. (Add. 3, Compl., Palmer v. FEC, 

22-2876 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2022) (“Compl.”) ¶ 8.) See also Compl., MUR 7946, 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7946/7946_01.pdf (“Admin. Compl.”); 

Addendum to Complaint, MUR 7946, 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7946/7946_06.pdf. Palmer’s administrative 

complaint alleged that grants distributed during the 2020 election by the Center for 

Tech and Civic Life, (“CTCL”), a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, which were 

made to state and local election administrators ostensibly for the purpose of 

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assisting with the administration of elections during the COVID-19 pandemic, 

were, in fact, made for the purpose of increasing the turnout of Democratic voters, 

and therefore constituted contributions to various Democratic candidates or 

committees. (Admin. Compl. at 2 ¶ 6 (alleging that the grants were “designed with 

the intent to tilt the 2020 federal elections toward” Democratic candidates).) The 

administrative complaint points to the distribution of the grants, asserting that they 

were targeted at “urban cities . . . to turn out the progressive vote.” (Id. at 9 ¶ 46.) 

In addition to CTCL, Palmer’s administrative complaint requested that the 

Commission seek action against one CTCL employee, the Election Assistance 

Commission, (“EAC”), an independent federal agency, and two employees of the 

EAC. (Id. at 20.) 

The administrative complaint alleged that there was an effort to “funnel 

funds from a wealthy individual and their related and/or controlled entities, 

through a federal contractor,” which Palmer alleges that CTCL was in the 2020 

election. (Id. at 3 ¶ 8.)1

 The complaint further alleged that the EAC was also a 

source of the grants and that “taxpayer funds” were effectively “funnel[ed] . . . to 

assist with the 2020 election cycle campaigns of specific candidates and/or 

The text of Palmer’s administrative complaint identified two sources of 

funding for the grants as Mark Zuckerberg, the founder and CEO of Meta 

(formerly Facebook), and his wife Dr. Pricilla Chan. (Admin. Compl. at 44 ¶¶ 58-

64.) 

6 

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political parties.” (Id. at 3 ¶ 7.) Based on these allegations, Palmer claimed that 

the CTCL, EAC, and associated personnel violated a variety of FECA provisions. 

Palmer alleged that the CTCL grants were actually in-kind contributions, which 

CTCL was prohibited from making either because it is a corporation or because it 

was a federal contractor. (Id. at 3 ¶ 9 (citing 52 U.S. § 30119; 11 C.F.R. § 114.2).) 

Palmer further claimed that CTCL knowingly permitted its name to be used to 

make a contribution in the name of another, and that CTCL’s grants constituted 

contributions in excess of the limit. (Id. at 3 ¶ 10 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30122).) 

Palmer requested that the Commission (1) “investiga[te]” CTCL’s alleged 

payments to the EAC; and (2) investigate all respondents for violations of 52 

U.S.C. §§ 30119 and 30122 and 11 C.F.R. § 114.2. (Id. at 19-20.) 

On July 26, 2022, after considering Palmer’s complaint and responses from 

persons referenced in the complaint, the Commission determined by a vote of 6-0 

that there was no reason to believe a violation of FECA had occurred and 

dismissed the administrative complaint. (Add. 9, Mem. Op., Palmer v. FEC, 22-

2876 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2023) (“Mem. Op.”) at 2.) The Commission notified 

Palmer on August 8, 2022, regarding the dismissal of her complaint and provided a 

Factual and Legal analysis that explained the Commission’s findings. (See id.) 

The Commission explained that there was no reasonable basis to conclude that the 

respondents funded or awarded grants for the purpose of influencing a federal 

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election or to increase votes for Democratic candidates. (See id.) Further, the 

Commission found that there was no indication that the respondents coordinated 

with any candidate or committee, and that therefore the grants were neither 

contributions nor expenditures under FECA. (See id.) The Commission’s 

findings, responses, and certifications are all publicly available on the FEC’s 

website. See generally Closed Matters Under Review, MUR 7946, 

https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/7946/. Additional information 

about the CTCL grants Palmer challenges, including the amount and recipient 

information of CTCL’s donations to local election officers, are disclosed in 

CTCL’s IRS Form 990 that Palmer submitted to the FEC with her administrative 

complaint. (Addendum to Compl., MUR 7946, 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7946/7946_06.pdf.) 

D. District Court Order Dismissing Palmer’s Complaint 

On September 21, 2022, Palmer filed a judicial complaint in the district 

court. (See generally Add. 1-6, Compl.) Palmer alleged that the Commission, 

“wholly failed to address the issues raised in Plaintiff’s Administrative 

Complaint,” or “make proper referral as required by law.” (Add. 4, ¶ 14.) She 

sought the following relief: (1) a declaration “that the FEC failed to properly 

investigate Plaintiff’s Administrative Complaint,” (2) an order that “the FEC [] 

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conform with such declaration within 30 days,” and (3) an award of attorney’s 

fees. (Add. 5.) 

On January 3, 2023, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss Palmer’s 

complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

(FEC’s Mot. To Dismiss, Palmer v. FEC, 22-2876 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2023) (Docket 

No. 6).)2

 The Commission asserted that because Palmer only sought a general 

desire to see the law enforced, she failed to establish a concrete and particularized 

injury sufficient for Article III standing. 

On August 29, 2023, the district court granted the FEC’s motion to dismiss, 

denied the FEC’s motion to defer the transmission of the administrative record as 

moot, and dismissed Palmer’s complaint in its entirety for lack of standing. (Add. 

7, Order, Palmer v. FEC, 22-2876 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2023); see also Add. 8-13, 

Mem. Op.) In granting the FEC’s motion to dismiss, the Court first concluded that 

Palmer’s complaint appears to allege only a procedural injury, namely “that the 

FEC[] failed to properly investigate [her] Administrative Complaint.” (Add. 10, 

Mem. Op. at 3.) Although Palmer alleged that FECA allows her to file suit under 

its citizen-suit provision, the district court explained that “FECA’s citizen-suit 

The Commission also filed a motion to defer transmission of the 

administrative record concurrently with its motion to dismiss, pending the district 

court’s disposition of the Commission’s motion to dismiss. FEC’s Mot. To Defer 

Transmission of Admin. Record, Palmer v. FEC, 22-2876 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2023) 

(Docket No. 7.). 

9 

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provision “‘confers a right to sue upon parties who otherwise already have 

standing.’” Id. (citing Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 

1997).) Accordingly, the court stated that Palmer “thus must show she suffered a 

‘discrete injury’ flowing from the supposed FECA violation she alleged in her 

administrative complaint.” (Id.) 

 Turning next to Palmer’s alleged injury, the district court found the 

allegations plainly insufficient to establish standing. Palmer stated that she was a 

“registered as a voter in the State of Texas” and “representative of all United States 

citizens . . . that seek to protect their most basic right to have meaningful 

participation in electing their political leaders.” (Id. (quoting Compl. ¶ 5).) 

Palmer failed to allege “any personal stake affected by, or a close relationship to 

any harm resulting from,” the Commission’s dismissal of her administrative 

complaint. (Add. 11, Mem. Op. at 4.) As such, her mere interest in “proper 

administration of the laws,” was not a concrete injury for Article III purposes. Id. 

(citing Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 860 F. App’x 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2021)). 

Finally, the court held that Palmer’s informational theory of standing, raised 

for the first time in her opposition brief, was deficient as well. Although Palmer 

claimed an entitlement to the disclosure of information relating to certain 

transactions, she “fail[ed] to specify any omitted disclosures in her present 

complaint,” and the allegations contained solely in her opposition were untimely in 

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any event. (Add. 11-12, Mem. Op. at 4-5.) Furthermore, the Court noted that 

even if it were to consider Palmer’s alleged informational injury, the assertions in 

the brief were insufficient as well. Palmer failed to explain “how she has been hurt 

in any way by the purported lack of disclosures or how the undisclosed information 

is ‘related to [her] informed participation in the political process.’” Add. 12, Mem. 

Op. at 5 (citing Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 31 F.4th 781, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2022)). 

Moreover, to the extent Palmer sought disclosures about transactions between 

CTCL and others, that information contained in CTCL’s IRS Form 990, a required 

disclosure form for certain 501(c)(3) organizations, was included in Palmer’s own 

administrative filings. 

Having concluded that Palmer failed to establish standing, the district court 

dismissed the Complaint. On September 26, 2023, Palmer appealed the district 

court’s order. 

ARGUMENT 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“Summary affirmance is appropriate where the merits are so clear as to 

justify summary action.” U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Handbook of 

Practice and Internal Procedures at 35-36; see also Jenkins v. District of Columbia, 

No. 18-5021, 2018 WL 3726280, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2018) (citing Taxpayers 

Watchdog, Inc., 819 F.2d at 297). In circumstances where the merits are so clear, 

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“no benefit will be gained from further briefing and argument of the issues 

presented.” Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc., 819 F.2d at 298; Cascade Broad. Grp. Ltd. 

v. F.C.C., 822 F.2d 1172, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“[S]ummary 

disposition will be granted where the merits of the appeal or petition for review are 

so clear that ‘plenary briefing, oral argument, and the traditional collegiality of the 

decisional process would not affect our decision.’” (quoting Sills v. Fed. Bureau of 

Prisons, 761 F.2d 792, 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1985))). 

This Court reviews a district court dismissal of a complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Ass’n of Civil Technicians, Inc. v. Federal 

Labor Relations Auth., 283 F.3d 339, 341 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PALMER’S 

COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

This Court should summarily affirm the district court’s order dismissing this 

action in its entirety because Palmer’s Article III standing is so clearly lacking as 

to warrant summary disposition. No further briefing or argument would cast doubt 

on this decision. To demonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate 

that she has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 

challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a 

favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016) 

(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). 

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These three components of the Article III “case or controversy” requirement 

are designed to ensure that the “plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the 

outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal court 

jurisdiction and to justify [the] exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his 

behalf.” Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “standing is not dispensed in gross” and “a 

plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each 

form of relief that is sought.” Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

Where a plaintiff asserts a procedural right, she must show that she has 

suffered a personal and particularized injury that impairs one of her concrete 

interests. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. TSA, 429 F.3d 1130, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

Despite the fact that Congress passed section 30109(a)(8)(A)’s judicial review 

provision, “[i]t makes no difference that the procedural right has been accorded by 

Congress.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009). 

“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected 

by the deprivation — a procedural right in vacuo — is insufficient to create Article 

III standing.” Summers, 555 U.S. at 496. Particularized means that “the injury 

must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 560 n.1. And 

when, as here, “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly 

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unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else,” standing is 

“substantially more difficult” to establish. Id. at 562; accord Common, 108 F.3d at 

417; see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private 

citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution 

of another.”) 

Standing “focuses on the complaining party to determine ‘whether the 

litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular 

issues.’” Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting 

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Thus, “a grievance that amounts to 

nothing more than an abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in the 

proper application of law does not count.” Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 498 

(2020) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). A plaintiff must demonstrate “that he has 

‘a personal stake in the outcome,’ . . . distinct from a ‘generally available grievance 

about government.’” Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (quoting 

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) and Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 

(2009)). 

Palmer fails to establish the required elements for Article III standing. As 

the district court correctly held, “the main gripe in Palmer’s suit is that the FEC 

failed to properly investigate and take action on her administrative complaint.” 

(Add. 13, Mem Op. at 6.) Palmer alleged no personal injury from the alleged 

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USCA Case #23-5216 Document #2026662 Filed: 11/13/2023 Page 22 of 27 

CTCL grants or from any other alleged FECA violation. Indeed, Palmer failed to 

explain how the Commission’s decision to dismiss her administrative complaint 

caused her any concrete injury. Rather, Palmer relies on her statements that she 

has standing as a “representative of all United States citizens, regardless of 

political party affiliation, that seek to protect their most basic right to have 

meaningful participation in electing their political leaders.” (Add. 2, Compl. ¶ 5). 

These generalized grievances are simply a desire to see the law enforced rather 

than a concrete injury necessary to establish Article III standing. 

Furthermore, as the district court correctly determined, Palmer’s assertion 

that she has standing to seek “additional information” is similarly unavailing. As 

an initial matter, Palmer only belatedly raised this allegation in her opposition brief 

rather than her judicial complaint, and therefore it was appropriate for the district 

court not to consider these allegations. See Campaign Legal Ctr., 860 F. App’x at 

5–6 (rejecting the plaintiff’s alleged informational injury on appeal because neither 

the administrative complaint nor the federal court complaint contained allegations 

that the plaintiff was injured by asserted non-disclosure); see also Arbitraje Casa 

de Cambio, S.A. de C.V. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. Supp. 2d 165, 170 (D.D.C. 

2003) (“It is axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in 

opposition to a motion to dismiss.”); Dufur v. U.S. Parole Comm., 314 F. Supp. 3d 

15 
USCA Case #23-5216 Document #2026662 Filed: 11/13/2023 Page 23 of 27 

10, 23 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that the plaintiff’s arguments raised for the first time 

in his opposition were not “properly before the Court”) (collecting cases). 

But even if Palmer’s allegations are considered, they are nonetheless 

insufficient. It is well-established that the denial of information may create an 

injury in fact. See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998); Public Citizen v. DOJ, 

491 U.S. 440 (1989). The Supreme Court has clarified, however, that an “asserted 

informational injury that causes no adverse effects cannot satisfy Article III.” 

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2214 (2021) (quoting Trichell v. 

Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 1004 (11th Cir. 2020)); see also 

Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 341. Palmer’s administrative complaint alleged that 

grants distributed during the 2020 election by the non-profit corporation CTCL 

were unlawful contributions. (Admin. Compl. at 2 ¶ 6.) The complaint further 

alleged that the EAC was also a source of the grants and that “taxpayer funds” 

were effectively “funnel[ed] . . . to assist with the 2020 election cycle campaigns of 

specific candidates and/or political parties.” (Id. at 3 ¶ 7.) 

The information that Palmer appears to seek is proof that the respondents 

named in her administrative complaint violated the law by distributing or receiving 

certain grants. Yet, as established precedent makes clear, a plaintiff lacks standing 

to require an administrative agency to label certain conduct illegal, absent some 

other allegation of personalized injury. See, e.g., Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 

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USCA Case #23-5216 Document #2026662 Filed: 11/13/2023 Page 24 of 27 

1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek a legal 

determination that certain transactions constitute coordinated expenditures). 

Moreover, the information Palmer seeks is already available from another 

source: the IRS 990 forms that plaintiff herself submitted to the Commission with 

her administrative complaint. (Add. 12, Mem. Op. at 5) (explaining that CTCL’s 

Form 990 attached to Palmer’s administrative filings “exhaustively lists every 

grant that CTCL provided in the 2020 tax year, by county and amount”). Thus, 

Palmer has not identified any information that is unavailable to her, and has no 

standing to sue on the basis that “the information withheld is simply the fact that a 

violation of FECA has occurred.” See Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 417. As such, 

all of this “dooms any claim of informational standing.” (Add. 12, Mem. Op. at 5.) 

In sum, rather than showing how the FEC’s dismissal of her administrative 

complaint affects her “in a personal or individual way,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1, 

Palmer has merely asserted a general interest in seeing the agency enforce the law 

against others in the way that she desires. This is insufficient to establish injury in 

fact for Article III standing. And because the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over Palmer’s claims, it correctly granted the FEC’s motion and 

dismissed the case. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 94 

(1998) (“‘Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause . . . and 

when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of 

17 
 

 

 

USCA Case #23-5216 Document #2026662 Filed: 11/13/2023 Page 25 of 27 

announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’” (quoting Ex Parte McCardle, 74 

U.S. 506, 514 (1868)). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should summarily affirm the district 

court’s order granting the Commission’s motion to dismiss Palmer’s complaint. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Acting General Counsel /s/ Shaina Ward 

lstevenson@fec.gov Shaina Ward 

Attorney 

Kevin Deeley sward@fec.gov 

Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION 

November 13, 2023 1050 First Street NE 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

18 
 

USCA Case #23-5216 Document #2026662 Filed: 11/13/2023 Page 26 of 27 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT, 

TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE-STYLE REQUIREMENTS 

I hereby certify, on this 13th day of November, 2023, that: 

1. This document complies with the word limit of Fed. R. App. P. 

27(d)(2) (A) because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. 

R. App. 32(f) and Circuit Rule 32(e), this document contains 4,001 words. 

2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. 

R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. 32(a)(6) 

because this document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface 

using Microsoft Word 2013 in a 14-point Times New Roman font.

 /s/ Shaina Ward

 Shaina Ward 

19 
 

USCA Case #23-5216 Document #2026662 Filed: 11/13/2023 Page 27 of 27 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 13th day of November, 2023, I electronically 

filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the D.C. Circuit by using the Court’s CM/ECF system. In addition, I certify 

that on the same date I caused to be served a copy of the same document by first 

class mail, postage prepaid to pro se plaintiff-appellant Barbara W. Palmer at the 

following address as listed on the docket: PO Box 1386, Princeton, TX 75407. 

/s/ Shaina Ward

 Shaina Ward 

20