### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 70013

JUSTEN HALL,

Petitioner

− Appellant

versus WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department o f Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
Respondent

− Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:10

- CV

- 135

Before DAVIS , SMITH , and PRADO , Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM : *

Justen Hall , found guilty of capital murder in 2004, moved in federal
district court for relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks a c ertificate of a ppealability (“COA”) from

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined th at this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED August 27, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-70013 Document: 00512748457 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/27/2014No. 14

- 70013
denial of that motion

. This court reviews the denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion under an abuse

of

- dis cretion standard. Because reasonable jurists would not find debatable that the district court did not abuse its discretion, we deny a COA. Diaz v. Stephens , 731 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir.) , cert. denied , 134 S. Ct. 48 (2013). “ I t is not enough that the gra nting of relief might have been permissible, or even
warranted

. . . [the] denial must have been so unwarranted as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi , 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981)). A movant is required “to sh ow ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby , 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)). “Such circumstances will rarely
occur in the habeas context.” Gonzalez , 545 U.S. at 535.
From H all’s application for a COA, it is not remotely evident what “extra

ordinary circumstances” he believes justif y the unusual award of Rule 60(b) relief from a final judgment. The vast majority of his brief mere ly reurges the merits of an inadequate

- assista nce
- of

- counsel (“IAC”) claim that was long ago rejected on the merits by the district court and this court 1 before the Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari. 2 A Rule 60(b) motion is not a proper mech

anism to re

- litigate the merits of the IAC claim and surely not a proper vehicle for doing so when the judgment from which Hall seeks relief has been con

firmed on appeal (on the merits). See Gonzalez , 545 U.S. at 532; Adams v. Thaler , 679 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2012); Hernandez v. Thaler , 630 F .3d 420, 427 (5th Cir. 2011). Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Hall’s two

- year delay in filing his Rule 60(b) motion was
unreasonable.

1 See Hall v. Thaler , 504 F. App’x 269 (5th Cir. 2012).

2 See 134 S. Ct. 385 (2013). 2 Case: 14-70013 Document: 00512748457 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/27/2014No. 14

- 70013 Opaquely, Hall alludes to Martinez v. Ryan , 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) , and
Tre vino v. Thaler , 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) , as “extraordinary circumstances” jus tifying Rule 60(b) relief. Th at notion is without merit. We have alread y rejected the theory that tho se changes in decisional law constituted a kind of “extraordinary circumstan ce” that warrants relief under Rule 60(b). See Diaz , 731 F.3d at 376 (as to Trevino ); Adams , 679 F.3d at 320 (as to Martinez ). In any event, Hall has already received that to which Trevino would entitle him: consideration of his IAC claims, which both th e district court and this court rejected on the merits

. See Hall v. Thaler , 504 F. App’x 269 (5th Cir. 2012). Finally, Hall’s explanation as to the necessity o f relief from a final judg

ment is puzzling. He claims that he needs this relief because two re cent Texas
state

- court decisions relating to his former lawyer have opened an avenue for him fo r habeas corpus rel ief in state court. Yet, he has provided no explanation or authority for why we would have to vacate a final judgment of a district
court (affirmed on appeal) before Texas would consider his state petition. The application for a COA is DENIED.

3 Case: 14-70013 Document: 00512748457 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/27/2014