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*********************************************** 
BETH LAZAR ET AL. v. JOSEPH P. GANIM ET AL.

(SC 20381)

Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Vertefeuille, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 9-329a [a]), ‘‘[a]ny (1) elector . . . aggrieved by a

ruling of an election official in connection with any primary . . . [or]

(2) elector . . . who alleges that there has been a mistake in the count

of the votes cast at such primary . . . may bring [a] complaint to . . .

the Superior Court for appropriate action.’’

Pursuant further to statute (§ 9-329 [b]), a court may order a new primary

if it finds that, ‘‘but for the error in the ruling of the election official,

[or] any mistake in the count of the votes . . . the result of [the primary

election] might have been different and [the court] is unable to determine

the result of such primary.’’

The plaintiffs, three electors in the 2019 Democratic primary election for

municipal office in the city of Bridgeport, brought an action pursuant

to § 9-329a (a), challenging the results of that election and seeking an

order directing a new primary election on the basis of, inter alia, various

alleged improprieties in the handling of absentee ballots. The plaintiffs

claimed that certain individuals associated with the defendants, who

are certain Bridgeport election officials and certain candidates for

elected office in the primary, had engaged in improper primary election

activity and violated certain state election laws by virtue of, inter alia, the

alleged misrepresentation of absentee voting eligibility and the improper

handling of absentee ballots. As a result of the alleged improprieties,

the plaintiffs claimed that they were aggrieved by the ruling of an election

official within the meaning of § 9-329a (a) (1) and that there had been

a mistake in the count of the votes within the meaning of § 9-329a (a)

(2). The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint, claiming,

inter alia, that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not

personally aggrieved by the ruling of any election official. The trial court

granted the motion as to the claims brought under § 9-329a (a) (1),

concluding that the plaintiffs were not aggrieved by any of the claimed

election violations because they had not suffered a personal or individual

injury that was different from that suffered by any other elector eligible

to vote in the primary. The court, however, denied the motion to dismiss

as to the claims brought under § 9-329a (a) (2). Following an expedited

trial to the court, the court concluded that, although there were certain

irregularities in the handling of absentee ballots, the plaintiffs had not

established that a mistake in the count of the votes cast in the primary

election entitled them to an order directing a new primary pursuant to

§ 9-329 (b) because it was unable to determine the extent to which the

improper conduct had affected the primary as a whole. Accordingly,

the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants. Thereafter, the

plaintiffs requested that the trial court certify two questions of law to

this court for review pursuant to statute (§ 9-325), and, upon the trial

court’s granting of the plaintiffs’ request, the plaintiffs appealed to this

court. Held:

1. The plaintiffs’ appeal challenging the result of the primary election, which

involved the selection of Democratic candidates for the general election,

was not moot, even though the general election had already occurred,

because this court could afford the plaintiffs practical relief by ordering

a new general election: if this court were to reverse the trial court’s

judgment, invalidate the results of the primary election, and deem its

decision effective as of the time this appeal was heard, which was before

the general election occurred, then the results of the general election

necessarily would be invalid because the candidates selected in the

invalidated primary election would not have been validly elected candidates for the general election; accordingly, this court concluded that

§ 9-329a (b), which does not place any time restrictions on when a court

may issue an order directing a new primary election, implicitly authorizes

a court to order a new general election if the earlier general election
was invalidated by operation of a court order invalidating the underlying

primary election.

2. The trial court correctly determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to

bring their claims pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1) and, accordingly, properly

dismissed those claims: in order to have standing to bring a claim

pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1), a party must establish that he or she has

a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the controversy, as opposed to a general interest that members of the community

share; moreover, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they had a

specific, personal interest that was affected by the improprieties in the

handling of absentee ballots, as the only harm they claimed to have

suffered was that the primary election was unfair as a result of those

improprieties, and an unfair election affects every voter and constitutes

an injury to the general interest shared by all members of the community,

which was insufficient to establish standing.

3. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court applied

an improper legal standard in determining that they had failed to establish that a mistake in the count of the votes cast in the primary election

entitled them to an order directing a new primary election under § 9-

329a (b): to be entitled to an order directing a new primary election under

§ 9-329a (b), a plaintiff must demonstrate that there were substantial

violations of § 9-329a (a) and that, as a result of those violations, the

reliability of the result of the election is seriously in doubt, and, when

the trial court’s memorandum of decision was read in its entirety, it

was clear that the trial court properly understood and applied the correct

standard; moreover, under that standard, the trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the reliability of

the result of the primary election was seriously in doubt, the plaintiffs

having failed to challenge any of the trial court’s factual findings or

legal conclusions as to which absentee ballots should have been counted,

and having failed to present any evidence that there was a serious risk

that any of the losing candidates in the primary election would have

won in the absence of the alleged improprieties.

Argued November 4—officially released November 29, 2019*

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, an order setting aside the

results of the Democratic primary election held by the

city of Bridgeport and directing a new special primary,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Stevens,

J., granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss;

thereafter, the case was tried to the court; judgment

for the defendants and certifying the results of the primary election, from which the plaintiffs appealed to

this court. Affirmed.

Prerna Rao, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

James J. Healy, with whom were John P. Bohannon,

Jr., deputy city attorney, and John F. Droney, Jr., for

the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

ROBINSON, C. J. This appeal, which comes before

this court pursuant to the expedited review procedure

provided by General Statutes § 9-325, involves a claim

that certain improprieties in the handling of absentee

ballots for the 2019 Democratic primary election for

municipal office (primary election) in the city of Bridgeport (city) rendered the result so unreliable that it must

be set aside. The plaintiffs, Beth Lazar, Annette Goodridge and Vanessa Liles, who are registered Democrats

residing in the city, brought this action against the

defendants1 pursuant to subdivisions (1) and (2) of General Statutes § 9-329a (a).2 The plaintiffs alleged that

extensive absentee ballot abuse and other improprieties

leading up to the primary election rendered its result

unreliable. Accordingly, they asked the trial court to

set aside the results and to order a new, special primary

election for all candidates pursuant to § 9-329a (b). The

defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of

aggrievement. The trial court granted the motion to

dismiss with respect to the plaintiff’s claims brought

pursuant to subdivision (1) of § 9-329a (a) but denied

the motion with respect to the claims brought pursuant

to subdivision (2). After a trial to the court, the court

concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish that

the result of the primary election might have been different but for the alleged improprieties and rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs then requested

that the trial court certify the following two questions

to this court pursuant to § 9-325: (1) ‘‘Did the trial court

err in finding that no plaintiff . . . has standing to challenge the [primary] election results under § 9-329a (a)

(1) . . . ?’’ And (2) ‘‘Did the trial court apply the wrong

legal standard when declining to order a new primary?’’

Upon the trial court’s grant of their request, the plaintiffs filed this appeal. In their brief to this court, the

plaintiffs raised the additional issue of whether this

court is able to grant any relief to the plaintiffs or,

instead, the appeal is moot in light of its timing, which

implicates this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. We

conclude that the appeal is not moot. We further conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the

plaintiffs lacked standing to invoke § 9-329a (a) (1)

because they were not aggrieved and that the plaintiffs

failed to establish that they were entitled to an order

directing a new primary election under § 9-329a (a) (2).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts, which were

found by the trial court or are undisputed, and procedural history. The primary election took place on September 10, 2019. The mayoral candidates were Joseph

P. Ganim and Marilyn Moore. There were 4337 walk-in

ballots cast for Ganim and 4721 for Moore. In addition,

967 absentee ballots were cast for Ganim and 313 for

Moore. Thus, Ganim won the election with 5304 votes,
as against 5034 votes for Moore, by a margin of 270

votes.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs, who voted in the primary

election, brought this action pursuant to § 9-329a, alleging that certain individuals associated with the defendants or the city’s Democratic Town Committee

engaged in improper primary election activity, including

the misrepresentation of absentee voting eligibility in

violation of General Statutes § 9-135, the improper handling of absentee ballots in violation of General Statutes

§ 9-140b, attempts to influence the speech of any person

in a primary in violation of General Statutes § 9-364a,

and improprieties in the application and distribution

process for absentee ballots in violation of General

Statutes § 9-140. The plaintiffs claimed that, as the result

of these allegedly improper activities, they were

aggrieved by the ruling of an election official within the

meaning of § 9-329a (a) (1) and that there had been a

mistake in the count of the votes within the meaning

of § 9-329a (a) (2). They sought a court order setting

aside the result of the primary election, directing a

new Democratic primary election for all candidates and

requiring supervised voting in locations where a disproportionately large percentage of voters use absentee

ballots.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on

the ground that the plaintiffs were not personally

aggrieved by the ruling of any election official for purposes of § 9-329a (a) (1). In their opposition to the

motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs contended that they

did not have to establish that they were classically

aggrieved, that is, that they had (1) ‘‘demonstrate[d] a

specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter

of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest,

such as is the concern of all the members of the community as a whole,’’ and (2) ‘‘establish[ed] that the specific

personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 266 Conn. 531, 539, 833 A.2d 883

(2003). Rather, they claimed that they were required to

establish only that they had statutory standing, which

‘‘concerns the question [of] whether the interest sought

to be protected by the complainant[s] is arguably within

the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by

the statute . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v.

Planning & Zoning Commission, 285 Conn. 381, 393,

941 A.2d 868 (2008). The plaintiffs also argued that § 9-

329a (a) (2) required them to allege only that there had

been a mistake in the count of the vote.

The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs were not

aggrieved for purposes of § 9-329a (a) (1) because they

had not ‘‘suffered a personal or individual injury that

was different from any other elector eligible to vote in
the primary.’’ Accordingly, the court granted the motion

to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to subdivision

(1) of § 9-329a (a). The trial court also concluded, however, that the plaintiffs were not required to establish

that they were personally aggrieved under § 9-329a (a)

(2) but only that there had been a mistake in the count

of the vote. In addition, the court concluded that subdivision (2) was broad enough to encompass not only a

mechanical miscount but a mistake arising from the

counting of votes that legally should not be counted,

such as absentee ballots cast by voters who were not

eligible to cast them. Accordingly, the court denied the

motion to dismiss the claims pursuant to subdivision

(2).

The trial court conducted a trial over the course of

two weeks, during which the plaintiff presented the

following evidence: testimony by five witnesses that

they had been solicited to submit absentee ballots, even

though they did not satisfy the criteria for doing so

under § 9-135; testimony by six witnesses that their

completed absentee ballots were taken from them by

canvassers associated with political campaigns, rather

than mailed, in violation of § 9-140b (a); evidence that

electors had filed multiple absentee ballot applications,

some of which were missing signatures or were otherwise questionable; evidence that the absentee ballot

moderator had violated procedures intended to protect

ballot secrecy; evidence that the town clerk had modified the addresses on multiple absentee ballot applications in violation of § 9-140 (g); evidence that certain

campaign workers had been paid exclusively to distribute absentee ballot applications in violation of § 9-140

(j); and evidence that numerous individuals had

received applications for absentee ballots for distribution and failed to return a list to the town clerk’s office

identifying the electors to whom they gave the applications in violation of § 9-140 (k) (2). The trial court

acknowledged that the conduct of the individuals who

were paid exclusively to distribute absentee ballots and

those who failed to return a list to the town clerk’s office

identifying the electors to whom they had distributed

applications was ‘‘illegal and disturbing,’’ an observation that, in our view, was warranted in light of the

history of improper handling of absentee ballots in the

city. See, e.g., Keeley v. Ayala, 328 Conn. 393, 427–28,

179 A.3d 1249 (2018) (trial court correctly determined

that new special primary was required as result of

improper handling of absentee ballots). The court was

unable to determine, however, ‘‘the extent to which

such conduct may have affected the primary as a

whole.’’ Accordingly, the trial court found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that, ‘‘but for the . . . mistake in the count of the votes . . . the result of [the

primary election] might have been different . . . .’’

General Statutes § 9-329a (b). The court therefore rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.
This expedited appeal pursuant to § 9-325 followed.

The appeal was filed on Friday, November 1, 2019, and

we ordered an expedited hearing of the appeal, which

took place on Monday, November 4, 2019, the day

before the general election was held. The plaintiffs

claim on appeal that the trial court incorrectly determined that they lacked standing to bring a claim pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1) and that it applied an improper

legal standard in determining that the plaintiffs had

failed to establish that they were entitled to an order

directing a new primary election. The plaintiffs also

contend that the appeal was justiciable at the time that it

was filed because this court could order relief, namely,

a new primary before the general election occurred.

They further contend that, even if the general election

were to occur before this court could decide the appeal,

and even if that event rendered moot their claim that

the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when

it denied their request for an order directing a new

election because no relief could be granted, we still

could address their standing claim under the capable

of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine. In response, the defendants dispute the

plaintiffs’ claims challenging the rulings of the trial

court, and they do not address the justiciability issue.

We conclude that the appeal is not moot because a

new general election could be held if this court concludes that the trial court improperly denied the plaintiffs’ request for an order directing a new primary

election. We further conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiffs did not have standing to assert a claim pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1) and

that the plaintiffs had not established that they were

entitled to a new primary election.

I

Because it implicates this court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we first address the plaintiff’s claim that this

appeal is justiciable. As we indicated, the plaintiffs contended in their brief to this court that this appeal was

not moot at the time that it was filed because this

court could order a new primary election before the

general election occurred. Neither party has addressed

the issue of whether this court can void a general election that has already occurred and order a new one

after invalidating the primary election at which the candidates for the general election were chosen. Nevertheless, because the issue implicates this court’s jurisdiction, we address it.

This court has never directly addressed the issue of

whether a primary election contest becomes moot after

the general election has taken place. Cf. Caruso v.

Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 624–25 n.5, 941 A.2d 266

(2008) (Caruso II) (declining to address issue of

whether this court has authority ‘‘to overturn a general
election and order a new one based on the voiding of

a primary election’’ at which candidates were chosen).

We held in Caruso v. Bridgeport, 284 Conn. 793, 804,

937 A.2d 1 (2007) (Caruso I), however, that the courts

have no authority to order a postponement of a general

election in an action brought pursuant to § 9-329a. In

Caruso I, the plaintiff brought a certified appeal to this

court pursuant to § 9-325, challenging the trial court’s

ruling in an action brought pursuant to § 9-329a denying

his motion to postpone the general election pending

the resolution of a separate appeal from other rulings

by the trial court. Id., 795–97. We held that ‘‘§ 9-329a

does not authorize the courts under any circumstances

to order the postponement of a general election in an

action brought pursuant to that statute’’ because ‘‘the

judge may go no further in extending relief than that

outlined in the statute’’; id., 804; and, in a proceeding

pursuant to § 9-329a (a), the statute authorizes the judge

only to ‘‘[1] determine the result of such primary; [2]

order a change in the existing primary schedule; or

[3] order a new primary.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.

It does not follow, however, from the fact that a

general election must go forward while a challenge

to the primary election at which the candidates were

selected is pending—thereby preserving the special

‘‘snapshot’’ character3 of the election in the event that

the challenge is unsuccessful—that the courts cannot

order a new general election if the plaintiff prevails in

his challenge to the validity of the primary election after

the general election has taken place. If the invalidation

of the primary results were given nunc pro tunc effect—

that is, if this court reversed the trial court and that

decision was deemed to be effective as of the time that

the appeal was heard before the general election—that

necessarily would mean that the candidates for office

who ran in the primary were not validly elected candidates for the general election.4 Thus, with respect to

those candidates, the general election also would have

been treated as invalid as a matter of pure logic. A valid

general election could not be held without first holding

a valid primary election to select the candidates. We

conclude, therefore, that the provision of § 9-329a (b)

authorizing the court to order a new primary election

if it finds that the result of the primary might have

been different but for the improprieties complained of,

without any limits on the timing of such an order, implicitly authorizes the judge to order a new general election

if the first general election is invalidated by operation

of the judge’s order invalidating the primary election.

Because this court could provide this form of relief, we

conclude that this appeal is not moot.

II

We next address the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial

court incorrectly determined that they lacked standing
to bring a claim pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1). ‘‘As a

preliminary matter, we address the appropriate standard of review. If a party is found to lack standing, the

court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine

the cause. . . . A determination regarding a trial

court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law.

When . . . the trial court draws conclusions of law,

our review is plenary and we must decide whether its

conclusions are legally and logically correct and find

support in the facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy,

LLC v. New London, 282 Conn. 791, 802, 925 A.2d

292 (2007).

‘‘Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep

aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to

ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits

brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that

judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others

are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and

vigorously represented. . . . These two objectives are

ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant

makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered

or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative

capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the

controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of

concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. . . . The

requirement of directness between the injuries claimed

by the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also

is expressed, in our standing jurisprudence, by the focus

on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert

the claim at issue. . . .

‘‘Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement

exist, classical and statutory. . . . Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must

demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in

the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to

a general interest that all members of the community

share. . . . Second, the party must also show that the

[alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected

that specific personal or legal interest. . . .

‘‘Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not

by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case.

In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim

injury to an interest protected by that legislation.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 802–803.

‘‘The fundamental aspect of [statutory] standing . . .

[is that] it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before [the] court and not on the issues he wishes

to have adjudicated. . . . When standing is put in issue,

the question is whether the person whose standing is

challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication

of the issue and not whether the controversy is otherwise justiciable, or whether, on the merits, the plaintiff
has a legally protected interest that the defendant’s

action has invaded. . . . The concepts of standing and

legal interest are to be distinguished. The legal interest

test goes to the merits, whereas standing concerns the

question whether the interest sought to be protected

by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Mystic Marinelife

Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 491–92, 400 A.2d

726 (1978).

In the present case, the plaintiffs contend that the

trial court incorrectly determined that, to have standing

to bring a claim pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1), which

authorizes ‘‘[a]ny . . . elector . . . aggrieved by a ruling of an election official’’ to bring an action pursuant

to the statute, they had to show that they had ‘‘a specific,

personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the

[controversy], as opposed to a general interest that all

members of the community share.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v.

New London, supra, 282 Conn. 803. Rather, the plaintiffs

contend, they were required to show only that ‘‘the

interest sought to be protected by [them] is arguably

within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated

by the statute . . . in question.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission,

supra, 285 Conn. 393–94.

The plaintiffs have cited no authority, however, for

the proposition that, whenever the legislature enacts a

statute protecting a specific zone of interests, any person who is a member of the class of persons who are

statutorily authorized to invoke the statute may bring

an action to protect that zone of interests. Although

the legislature has, on occasion, dispensed with the

requirement that a plaintiff establish the elements of

classical aggrievement in order to have standing to

invoke a statute by conferring presumptive or automatic

standing on a particular class of persons; see, e.g., Jolly,

Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 237 Conn. 184, 201,

676 A.2d 831 (1996) (under General Statutes § 8-8 [a],

landowners living within 100 foot radius of land

involved in zoning decision have presumptive standing

to appeal from decision); id. (taxpayers have automatic

standing to appeal from zoning decisions involving sale

of liquor under § 8-8 [a]); proof of a specific, personal

and legal interest that has been injured by the defendant’s conduct ordinarily is required to establish statutory standing. See id., 203 (taxpayers do not have

automatic standing under § 8-8 [a] to appeal from zoning

decisions involving ‘‘dangerous businesses, such as

adult video and bookstores, adult entertainment clubs,

X-rated movie theaters, massage parlors, pool halls, gun

dealers, pawn shops, and all-night convenience stores,’’

but must establish aggrievement); see also Tremont
Public Advisors, LLC v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 333 Conn. 672, 711, 217 A.3d 953 (2019)

(‘‘to have standing to bring an antitrust action [pursuant

to General Statutes § 35-24 et seq.], a plaintiff must

adequately allege not only that it is a member of the

class of persons that is statutorily authorized to bring

such an action, but also that [1] it suffered an antitrust

injury and [2] it is an acceptable plaintiff to pursue the

alleged antitrust violations’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]); Handsome, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 317 Conn. 515, 527, 119 A.3d 541 (2015) (to

have standing to appeal from zoning decision pursuant

to § 8-8, ‘‘a party must have and must maintain a specific,

personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the

appeal throughout the course of the appeal’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]); Schwartz v. Town Plan &

Zoning Commission, 168 Conn. 20, 25, 357 A.2d 495

(1975) (under § 8-8, ‘‘[e]xcept in cases involving the

sale of alcoholic beverages, aggrievement requires a

showing that the plaintiffs have a specific, personal and

legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as

distinguished from a general interest such as is the

concern of the community as a whole, and that the

plaintiffs were specially and injuriously affected in their

property or other legal rights’’); McDermott v. Zoning

Board of Appeals, 150 Conn. 510, 513, 191 A.2d 551

(1963) (‘‘[a] person is aggrieved within the meaning

of [General Statutes] § 14-324 [which allows aggrieved

persons to appeal from decisions involving licensing

for the sale of gasoline] if he has a personal or property

interest which will be substantially and adversely

affected by a finding of the board that the location is

suitable and that its use for a gasoline station will not

imperil the safety of the public’’).

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs contend that the legislature must have intended that all electors, or at least

the class of electors that is entitled to vote in a particular

election, would have standing to bring a claim pursuant

to § 9-329a (a) (1), even if the elector did not have a

specific personal interest that was substantially

affected by the improper ruling because, otherwise, an

elector could bring an action pursuant to the statute

only ‘‘if the margin of victory was one or on a tie vote.’’

This is so, according to the plaintiffs, because the

improper ruling ‘‘would not make a difference in the

outcome’’ if the margin were larger. See General Statutes § 9-329a (b) (‘‘judge may . . . order a new primary

if he finds that but for the error in the ruling of the

election official, [or] any mistake in the count of the

votes . . . the result of such primary might have been

different’’). We note, however, that § 9-329a (b) also

authorizes the judge to ‘‘determine the result of such

primary . . . .’’ Accordingly, if an elector were improperly denied his right to vote, the elector would have

standing to bring an action pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1)

and could ask the court to correct the results to include
his vote. Moreover, we find it unlikely that the legislature intended to create the situation in which, after

every primary election, thousands of potential plaintiffs

would have standing to seek a new primary based on

the rulings of an election official that did not personally

affect them. It is more likely that the legislature intended

that the proper party to seek that particular form of

relief would be a losing candidate who could establish

that the improper ruling of an election official had rendered the results unreliable.

The plaintiffs also contend that this court previously

has held that § 9-329a (a) (1) should be interpreted

broadly. In Caruso II, this court reviewed the legislative

history and genealogy of § 9-329a (a) (1) and concluded

that, ‘‘although statutes governing election contests

generally are construed strictly, nothing in the language,

genealogy or legislative history of § 9-329a (a) suggests

that the legislature intended for the phrase ‘ruling of

an election official’ to have a narrow, technical meaning. Cf. Bortner v. Woodbridge, [250 Conn. 241, 267, 736

A.2d 104 (1999)] (nothing in legislative history of [General Statutes] § 9-328 gives ‘any indication that it was

intended to have some specialized meaning’). Indeed,

it appears that the legislature considered an improper

action to be a type of ruling.’’ Caruso II, supra, 285

Conn. 646.

We disagree with the plaintiffs’ reliance on Caruso

II. In that case, there was no claim that the plaintiff,

who was the losing mayoral candidate, did not have a

specific personal interest in the outcome of the election

that had been affected by the conduct at issue. Rather,

the only issue that was before this court was whether

the conduct complained of constituted a ruling of an

election official. See id., 644 (defendants claimed that

‘‘the trial court improperly had determined that the

alleged conduct constituted rulings by an election official’’). Thus, it does not follow from our conclusion in

Caruso II that the legislature intended that that particular phrase should be interpreted broadly such that

the legislature intended to eliminate the requirement

that plaintiffs establish that they have a specific personal interest that was affected by the conduct at issue.

In other words, lack of standing under § 9-329a (a) (1)

can be found either when the plaintiff was not

‘‘aggrieved’’ because he did not have a specific personal

interest that was affected by the conduct at issue or

when the plaintiff may have had a specific personal

interest that was affected by the conduct complained

of but the claim is not within the zone of interests that

the statute was intended to protect because the conduct

did not constitute a ruling of an election official. Only

the latter issue was before this court in Caruso II.

The plaintiffs also rely on this court’s decision in

Bauer v. Souto, 277 Conn. 829, 896 A.2d 90 (2006), to

support their contention that a plaintiff bringing a claim
pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1) is not required to establish

a specific personal interest that was substantially

affected by the ruling of an election official. In Bauer,

the plaintiff, David P. Bauer, who was a losing candidate

for the common council of the city of Middletown,

brought an action pursuant to § 9-328, challenging the

results of the election. Id., 830–33. All of the candidates

for the common council, which consisted of twelve

members, ran at large. Id., 834. Bauer received the thirteenth highest number of votes. Id. After finding that

one of the voting machines used in the election had

malfunctioned, resulting in an undercount of the votes

for Bauer, the trial court ordered a new election in the

district where the malfunctioning machine had been

located, with all of the candidates participating. Id.,

836–37. On appeal, this court agreed that a new election

was required but concluded that the relief should be a

new citywide election with all candidates participating.

Id., 843. The plaintiff in the present case contends that

Bauer shows that a plaintiff in an election contest can

raise claims that are outside the scope of his or her

specific personal interest.

We disagree. This court’s conclusion in Bauer that a

new citywide election with all candidates participating

was required was not driven by the determination that

the plaintiff could raise claims on behalf of the other

candidates or electors but by the determination that

the best way to remedy the undercount of the votes

cast for Bauer, a common council candidate, was to

conduct an election that would approximate as closely

as possible the at-large conditions of the invalidated

election. See id., 843–44. In any event, it appears that

Bauer claimed that there had been a mistake in the

count of the vote, not that he was aggrieved by the

ruling of an election official. See id., 836–37 (trial court

found that, as result of malfunctioning machine, ‘‘all

those who voted for [the plaintiff] in district eleven

did not have their vote[s] counted’’ [internal quotation

marks omitted]). Under § 9-328, as under § 9-329a (a)

(2), there is no requirement that a plaintiff establish

aggrievement before the court may entertain a claim

that there has been a mistake in the count of the votes.

See General Statutes § 9-328 (‘‘any elector or candidate

claiming that there has been a mistake in the count of

votes cast’’ may bring complaint pursuant to statute).

Thus, Bauer does not support the plaintiffs’ position

here. Accordingly, we conclude that, to have standing

to bring a claim pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1), the plaintiff

must establish that he or she has ‘‘a specific, personal

and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort

Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, supra,

282 Conn. 803.

The plaintiffs have made no claim that, if they are

required to establish that they had a specific personal

interest that was affected by the improprieties in the
handling of the absentee ballots, they are able to do

so. The only harm that the plaintiffs have claimed is

that the election was unfair as a result of the improprieties, and an unfair election affects every voter. Although

we are not unsympathetic to the desire to ensure the

fairness of the city’s election, particularly given that

this is not the first time that there have been challenges

to the handling of absentee ballots in the city, it is well

established that a claim of injury to ‘‘a general interest

that all members of the community share’’ is not sufficient to establish standing. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.; see also Crist v. Commission on Presidential Debates, 262 F.3d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 2001) (‘‘a

voter fails to present an [injury in fact] when the alleged

harm is abstract and widely shared or is only derivative

of a harm experienced by a candidate’’); Kauffman v.

Osser, 441 Pa. 150, 156, 271 A.2d 236 (1970) (electors

did not have standing to challenge validity of statutes

governing absentee ballots on ground that statutes operated to dilute their votes because ‘‘a person whose

interest is common to that of the public generally, in

contradistinction to an interest peculiar to himself,

lacks standing to attack the validity of a legislative

enactment’’). But see Committee for an Effective Judiciary v. State, 209 Mont. 105, 112, 679 P.2d 1223 (1984)

(voters had standing to challenge constitutionality of

statutes requiring district court judge or Supreme Court

justice to resign from office before running for another

elective judicial office because electorate was intended

to be beneficiary of state constitutional provision

allowing judge to run for another judicial office without

first resigning). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial

court correctly determined that the plaintiffs lacked

standing to bring a claim pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1)

because they had no specific personal interest that was

affected by the improprieties complained of.5

III

Finally, we address the plaintiffs’ contention that the

trial court applied an improper legal standard when it

determined that the plaintiffs had not established that

a mistake in the count of the votes cast in the primary

election entitled them to an order directing a new primary election. We disagree.

We begin with a review of the general principles governing our review of election contests. ‘‘We previously

have recognized that, under our democratic form of

government, an election is the paradigm of the democratic process designed to ascertain and implement the

will of the people. . . . [E]lection laws . . . generally

vest the primary responsibility for ascertaining [the]

intent and will [of the voters] on the election officials

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Caruso II, supra, 285 Conn. 637.

When considering whether to order a new election,

the court must engage in a ‘‘sensitive balance among
three powerful interests, all of which are integral to

our notion of democracy, but which in a challenged

election may pull in different directions. One such interest is that each elector who properly cast his or her

vote in the election is entitled to have that vote counted.

Correspondingly, the candidate for whom that vote

properly was cast has a legitimate and powerful interest

in having that vote properly recorded in his or her

favor. When an election is challenged on the basis that

particular electors’ votes for a particular candidate were

not properly credited to him, these two interests pull

in the direction of ordering a new election. The third

such interest, however, is that of the rest of the electorate who voted at a challenged election, and arises from

the nature of an election in our democratic society, as

we explain in the discussion that follows. That interest

ordinarily will pull in the direction of letting the election

results stand.

‘‘An election is essentially—and necessarily—a snapshot. It is preceded by a particular election campaign,

for a particular period of time, which culminates on a

particular date, namely, the officially designated election day. In that campaign, the various parties and candidates presumably concentrate their resources—

financial, political and personal—on producing a victory on that date. When that date comes, the election

records the votes of those electors, and only those electors, who were available to and took the opportunity

to vote—whether by machine lever, write-in or absentee

ballot—on that particular day. Those electors, moreover, ordinarily are motivated by a complex combination of personal and political factors that may result in

particular combinations of votes for the various candidates who are running for the various offices.

‘‘The snapshot captures, therefore, only the results

of the election conducted on the officially designated

election day. It reflects the will of the people as recorded

on that particular day, after that particular campaign,

and as expressed by the electors who voted on that

day. Those results, however, although in fact reflecting

the will of the people as expressed on that day and no

other, under our democratic electoral system operate

nonetheless to vest power in the elected candidates for

the duration of their terms. That is what we mean when

we say that one candidate has been elected and another

defeated. No losing candidate is entitled to the electoral

equivalent of a mulligan.

‘‘Moreover, that snapshot can never be duplicated.

The campaign, the resources available for it, the totality

of the electors who voted in it, and their motivations,

inevitably will be different a second time around. Thus,

when a court orders a new election, it is really ordering

a different election. It is substituting a different snapshot of the electoral process from that taken by the

voting electorate on the officially designated election
day.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Bortner v. Woodbridge,

supra, 250 Conn. 255–56.

With these general principles in mind, we turn to the

plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court applied the

wrong legal standard when it determined that the plaintiffs had not established that they were entitled to an

order directing a new primary election pursuant to the

portion of § 9-329a (b) providing that, in a proceeding

pursuant to that statute, the trial court judge may ‘‘order

a new primary if he finds that but for [the] . . . mistake

in the count of the votes . . . the result of such primary

might have been different and he is unable to determine

the result of such primary.’’ Specifically, the plaintiffs

contend that they were not required to establish that

a different candidate would have prevailed but for the

improprieties in the absentee ballot process, but only

that ‘‘(1) there were substantial violations of the requirements of [§ 9-329a (a)], such as errors in the rulings of

an election official or officials or mistakes in the counts

of the votes]; and (2) as a result of those [errors or

mistakes], the reliability of the result of the election is

seriously in doubt.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bauer v. Souto, supra, 277 Conn.

840.

This court previously has had occasion to construe

the phrase ‘‘the result of such primary might have been

different’’ as used in § 9-329a (b). In Penn v. Irizarry,

220 Conn. 682, 688, 600 A.2d 1024 (1991), this court

observed that the word ‘‘might,’’ as used in this provision, was ambiguous because of ‘‘the various gradations

of meaning that lexicographers attribute to the word,

which include ‘probability’ as well as ‘possibility.’ ’’ We

then stated that ‘‘[t]he ambiguity inherent in the use

of ‘might’ in the first condition cannot be allowed to

obfuscate the relative clarity of the second condition,

inability to determine the outcome of a primary election.’’ Id. Because the trial court in Penn had ‘‘concluded

that [it] was able to determine the result of the contested

primary, because [it] found that the various irregularities relied upon had not affected the outcome,’’ and

because ‘‘[t]he plaintiff [had] not challenged that factual

finding except by pointing to the possibility of a different result,’’ this court concluded that the trial court

correctly determined that the plaintiff was not entitled

to a new primary. Id.

In Caruso II, supra, 285 Conn. 649, the plaintiff contended that this court in Penn had ‘‘too literally construed the language in . . . § 9-329a, so that basically

[the plaintiff’s] burden became showing that but for the

irregularities there would have been a different result

. . . .’’6

(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted.) The plaintiff contended that this court should

adopt the standard that the court had applied in Bortner

v. Woodbridge, supra, 250 Conn. 241, when construing
a similar provision of § 9-328. In Bortner, this court

held that, to be entitled to an order for a new election,

the plaintiff was not required to show that he would

have prevailed in the election but for the alleged irregularities. Id., 258. Rather, the plaintiff must show that ‘‘(1)

there were substantial violations of the requirements

of the statute . . . and (2) as a result of those violations, the reliability of the result of the election is seriously in doubt.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id.

We agreed with the plaintiff in Caruso II that our

interpretation of § 9-328 in Bortner should guide our

interpretation of § 9-329a (b). See Caruso II, supra, 285

Conn. 649–50 n.25. We then observed that the trial court

in that case repeatedly had stated ‘‘that the plaintiff

could not prevail unless he established that, but for

[the conduct complained of], the result of the primary

election ‘might have been different.’ ’’ Id., 650. In addition, the trial court had indicated that the plaintiff must

establish that ‘‘the result of the election [was] seriously

in doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We

concluded, therefore, that the trial court had applied

the proper standard. Id. Thus, we clearly held in Caruso

II that the phrase ‘‘the result of [the] primary might

have been different,’’ as used in § 9-329a (b), means

that the reliability of the election result is seriously in

doubt due to substantial violations of § 9-329a (a) (1)

or (2).

In the present case, the trial court stated three times

in its memorandum of decision that it would be authorized to order a new primary if it found that the result

of the first primary ‘‘might have been different.’’ The

court, quoting Bortner v. Woodbridge, supra, 250 Conn.

263, also observed that the plaintiffs were required to

prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that ‘‘ ‘(1)

there were . . . substantial mistakes in the count of

the votes; and (2) as a result of those errors or mistakes,

the reliability of the result of the election . . . is seriously in doubt.’ ’’ Thus, although the trial court stated

at one point in its memorandum of decision that the

plaintiffs had failed to establish that the ‘‘the result of

the primary would have been different’’ but for the

mistake in the count of the votes, when the memorandum is read in its entirety, it is clear that the trial court

properly understood and applied the ‘‘might have been

different’’ standard. See Caruso II, supra, 285 Conn.

650 n.26 (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that single reference

to ‘‘would have been different’’ standard showed that

trial court applied that standard when it repeatedly cited

correct ‘‘might have been different’’ standard [emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]).

To the extent that the plaintiffs contend that the

requirement under Bortner v. Woodbridge, supra, 250

Conn. 263, that they establish that ‘‘the reliability of the

result of the election . . . is seriously in doubt’’ does

not require them to establish that there is a significant
risk that the result would have been different but for

the conduct complained of, but only that there were

significant improprieties in the election process, we

expressly held to the contrary in Caruso II, supra, 285

Conn. 618. We stated in that case that, ‘‘[a]lthough we

are mindful of the difficulties that plaintiffs face in

meeting [the heavy burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that any irregularities in the election process actually, and seriously, undermined the

reliability of the election results] in light of the statutory

time constraints on election contests and the magnitude

and complexity of the election process, our limited statutory role in that process and our need to exercise

great caution when carrying out that role compel the

conclusion that proof of irregularities in the process

is not sufficient to overturn an election in the absence

of proof that any of the irregularities actually affected

the result.’’ (Emphasis altered.) Id., 653. It is also clear

that the phrase ‘‘reliability of the result’’ means the

reliability of the voters’ choice of candidate and not the

reliability of the precise vote count. For example, if an

election result were 1000 votes for candidate A and

1200 votes for candidate B, the fact that the plaintiff

established that candidate A actually received 1010

votes and candidate B actually received 1190 votes

would not entitle the plaintiff to a new election on the

ground that the initial count was unreliable because it

would still be clear that candidate B was the winning

candidate. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court

applied the proper legal standard.

We further conclude that the trial court properly

found that, under this standard, the plaintiffs had failed

to establish that the reliability of the result of the primary election is seriously in doubt. Indeed, they have

not expressly challenged any of the court’s factual findings or legal conclusions as to which absentee ballots

should have been counted, and they have not pointed

to any evidence that would compel a finding that there

is a serious risk that Moore or any of the other candidates who lost in the primary election would have won

in the absence of the improprieties in the handling of

the absentee ballots. Accordingly, we conclude that the

trial court correctly determined that the plaintiffs failed

to establish that they were entitled to an order directing

a new special primary election.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* November 29, 2019, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The defendants are Joseph P. Ganim, who, at the time that this action

was brought, was the mayor of the city and a candidate for reelection;

Charles D. Clemons, Jr., the city’s town clerk and a candidate for reelection;

Santa I. Ayala, the Democratic registrar of voters for the city; Patricia A.

Howard, the deputy Democratic registrar of voters for the city; James Mullen,

the head moderator for the primary election; Thomas Errichetti, the head

moderator of absentee ballots for the primary election; Lydia Martinez, who,

at the time that this action was brought, was the city clerk and a candidate
for reelection; and Jorge Cruz, the candidate for city council in the 131st

district of the city.

2 General Statutes § 9-329a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any (1) elector

or candidate aggrieved by a ruling of an election official in connection with

any primary held pursuant to (A) section 9-423, 9-425 or 9-464, or (B) a

special act, (2) elector or candidate who alleges that there has been a mistake

in the count of the votes cast at such primary, or (3) candidate in such a

primary who alleges that he is aggrieved by a violation of any provision of

sections 9-355, 9-357 to 9-361, inclusive, 9-364, 9-364a or 9-365 in the casting

of absentee ballots at such primary, may bring his complaint to any judge

of the Superior Court for appropriate action. . . .’’

3 See Bortner v. Woodbridge, 250 Conn. 241, 255, 736 A.2d 104 (1999)

(discussing importance of preserving ‘‘snapshot’’ character of election that

‘‘is preceded by a particular election campaign, for a particular period of

time, which culminates on a particular date’’).

4

‘‘Nunc pro tunc, [literally] now for then, refers to a court’s inherent

power to enter an order having retroactive effect. . . . When a matter is

adjudicated nunc pro tunc, it is as if it were done as of the time that it

should have been done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Connor,

152 Conn. App. 780, 799, 100 A.3d 877 (2014), rev’d on other grounds, 321

Conn. 350, 138 A.3d 265 (2016).

‘‘The underlying principle on which judgments nunc pro tunc are sustained

is that such action is necessary in furtherance of justice and in order to

save a party from unjust prejudice . . . caused by the acts of the court or

the course of judicial procedure. In other words, the practice is intended

merely to make sure that one shall not suffer for an event which he could

not avoid.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gary Excavating Co. v.

North Haven, 163 Conn. 428, 430, 311 A.2d 90 (1972); see also Feehan v.

Marcone, 331 Conn. 436, 488, 204 A.3d 666 (‘‘it is a [well established] prerogative of the [c]ourt to treat as done that which should have been done’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct.

144, L. Ed. 2d (2019). As the circumstances of the present case

show, because of the time constraints on elections and the complexity of

election contests, there is a significant risk that a plaintiff in a primary

election contest may, through no fault of his or her own, be unable to obtain

a final judgment, including the resolution of any appeal, before the general

election takes place.

5

In light of this conclusion, we need not address the plaintiffs’ contention

that the evidence that the trial court excluded on the ground that it was

relevant only to the plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (1) supports

the conclusion that the primary election result was unreliable. We note that

the plaintiffs do not claim on appeal that this evidence was relevant to their

claim pursuant to § 9-329a (a) (2), and they have not challenged the trial

court’s evidentiary rulings on any other grounds.

6 We stated in Caruso II that this court ‘‘did not conclude in Penn that a

plaintiff cannot prevail in an action under § 9-329a if the trial court is able

to determine the result of an election, regardless of how unreliable that

determination is. We concluded only that the plaintiff in Penn could not

prevail because the trial court had found that the official misconduct had

not affected the outcome and the plaintiff had not challenged that finding.’’

(Emphasis in original.) Caruso II, supra, 285 Conn. 649. We acknowledge

that the plaintiff in Penn contended on appeal that he was entitled to an

order directing a new primary because there was a possibility of a different

result. Penn v. Irizarry, supra, 220 Conn. 687–88. Thus, it is difficult to

reconcile our conclusion in that case that the trial court ‘‘was able to determine the result of the contested primary, because [it] found that the various

irregularities relied upon had not affected the outcome’’; id., 688; with our

acknowledgement that the ‘‘might have been different’’ language in § 9-329a

(b) could mean the mere possibility of a different result. In other words, if

‘‘might have been different’’ means that a new election should be ordered

if there is a mere possibility of a different result, it is difficult to see how

a court could, at the same time, both (1) be able to determine the result of

the contested primary so as to obviate the need for a new primary and (2)

conclude that there was a possibility of a different result. In any event, it

is clear from our analysis in Caruso that proof of a mere possibility of a

different result is not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to an order directing

a new primary. Rather, the plaintiff must establish that ‘‘the reliability of

the result of the election is seriously in doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Caruso II, supra, 649.