2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-13-2009

USA v. Joe Mensah

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-2921

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Joe Mensah" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1024.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1024
 Honorable Nora Barry Fischer, United States District Judge for the Western District *

of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-2921

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JOE MENSAH,

AKA Kwabena Mensah,

JOE MENSAH,

Appellant

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Criminal Action No. 3-02-cr-00455-001)

District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper

 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 13, 2009

Before: AMBRO and ROTH Circuit Judges and FISCHER , District Judge *

(Opinion filed: July 13, 2009)

 

OPINION

 

AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 1

under 28 U.S.C § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). “We review the District Court’s

sentence for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir.

2008).

2

In March 2003, Joe Mensah was convicted in the District of New Jersey

of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms

of cocaine (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(ii)) and

conspiracy to export more than five kilograms of cocaine (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 953

and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)). In October 2003, he was sentenced to 240 months’

imprisonment. We affirmed his conviction on appeal, but vacated his sentence and

remanded for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). See United States v. Oppong, 165 F. App’x.

155 (3d Cir. 2006). In May 2008, Mensah was again sentenced to 240 months’

imprisonment. He now appeals that sentence, and we affirm.1

We require a district court to follow a three-step sentencing procedure. United

States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). First, the Court must calculate the

defendant’s Guidelines sentence. Next, it must formally rule on both parties’ motions and

indicate whether a departure from the Guidelines is being granted. Finally, the Court

must exercise its discretion by considering the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in

imposing its sentence. A district court’s consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors

must be “rational and meaningful.” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir.
 Section 3553(a)(1) instructs a court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the 2

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” in imposing a sentence. 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

3

2007) (en banc). That is, “[m]erely reciting the § 3553(a) factors, saying that counsel’s

arguments have been considered, and then declaring a sentence, are insufficient to

withstand . . . reasonableness review.” United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 842 (3d

Cir. 2006).

Mensah’s sole argument on appeal is that his sentence was procedurally

unreasonable because the District Court failed to give meaningful consideration to

whether he warranted a lower sentence under § 3553(a) based on his “history and

characteristics.” More specifically, he argues that the Court failed to address adequately 2

his family circumstances, his lack of prior convictions, and his postconviction

rehabilitative conduct.

We disagree. The record demonstrates that the District Court extensively

addressed each of the potentially mitigating factors raised by Mensah. It noted that his

family situation (three school-aged children being raised by his wife), while poignant,

was “not at all unusual” and was “the common plight of the families of those convicted of

federal crimes,” found that his lack of prior convictions was fully accounted for in the

calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range, and described Mensah’s postconviction

efforts at rehabilitation (in particular, his effort to overcome his alcohol dependency) as

“laudable and to be encouraged,” but not “outside of the heartland of the types of
responsible behavior that we would hope to see.”

Mensah contends, however, that this was insufficient, as the Court addressed the

factors he raised in the context of his motion for a departure from the Guidelines, not his

request for a variance under § 3553(a). We are not persuaded that this distinction makes

any difference in these circumstances. At his sentencing hearing, Mensah acknowledged

that he was requesting a departure and a variance on exactly the same grounds. The

District Court indicated explicitly that it was going to consider the mitigating factors

raised by Mensah “in both lights” (i.e., as grounds for either a departure or a variance). 

Thus, the Court’s later statement that, in imposing the 240 months’ sentence, it had

considered the “history and characteristics of the defendant,” was sufficient, in light of

that prior discussion, to satisfy the Court’s obligation to give meaningful consideration to

the § 3553(a) factors raised by the defendant.

Accordingly, we affirm the sentence of the District Court.