United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 19-2119

 19-2129

ROBERTO RAMOS PEREA,

Plaintiff, Appellee/Cross Appellant,

BEATRIZ LAGUERRE SAAVEDRA; BEATRIZ ALEXIA ALVAREZ LAGUERRE; 

RAFAEL ENRIQUE ALVAREZ LAGUERRE; GABRIEL ORTIZ LAGUERRE; FABIAN 

ANTONIO CHARRON ALVAREZ; CARLA VICTORIA CHARRON ALVAREZ,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

EDITORIAL CULTURAL, INC.,

Defendant, Appellant/Cross Appellee.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Pedro Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge] 

[Hon. Marcos E. López, U.S. Magistrate Judge]

Before

Thompson and Lipez, Circuit Judges, 

and Laplante,* District Judge.

Luz Yanix Vargas-Pérez, with whom Manuel Porro-Vizcarra was 

on brief, for appellant and cross-appellee Editorial Cultural, 

Inc.

José A. Hernández Mayoral, for appellee and cross-appellant 

Roberto Ramos Perea.

* Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.
Patricia Rivera MacMurray, for appellees Beatriz Laguerre 

Saavedra, Beatriz Alexia Álvarez Laguerre, Rafael Enrique Álvarez 

Laguerre, Gabriel Ortiz Laguerre, Fabián Antonio Charrón Álvarez, 

and Carla Victoria Charrón Álvarez.

September 13, 2021

 
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Thompson, Circuit Judge. In these cross-appeals the 

issue we must resolve is whether a publishing company, Editorial 

Cultural, Inc. ("Editorial" or "Editorial Cultural"), is liable 

for copyright infringement after it printed and sold 20,000 copies 

of the theatrical adaptations of two novels -- La Llamarada and La 

Resaca -- ("the Adaptations") written by prominent Puerto Rico 

author Enrique Laguerre. But first, we must resolve the 

determinative question: which party owns the publishing rights to 

the Adaptations. At the outset of this case, Laguerre's heirs and 

Roberto Ramos Perea (the playwright who adapted each novel for the 

stage) joined forces to sue Editorial Cultural. What followed was 

litigation which took a twisted course towards final resolution 

before landing here. Early on, the district court eliminated the 

playwright as the copyright owner and, following a jury trial, 

entered a judgment against Editorial Cultural awarding damages to 

Laguerre's heirs. For reasons explained below, we vacate the 

Opinion and Order entered on September 30, 2017, and part of the 

amended judgment entered on September 19, 2019, and we direct the 

entry of an amended judgment in favor of Ramos1 on his claim of 

1 We refer to the playwright by his first surname because, 

"[p]er 'Spanish naming conventions, if a person has two surnames, 

the first (which is the father's last name) is primary and the 

second (which is the mother's maiden name) is subordinate.'" 

United States v. Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th 1, 9 n.15 (1st Cir. 2021) 

(quoting United States v. Martínez-Benítez, 914 F.3d 1, 2 n.1 (1st 

Cir. 2019)).
- 4 -

copyright infringement. 

I. Background

A. Facts

Enrique Laguerre published the novel La Llamarada in 

1934 and the novel La Resaca in 1949. In September 2001, Laguerre 

and Producciones Teatro Caribeño, Inc. ("Caribeño") entered into 

a contract which expressly authorized Ramos (who was not a party 

to the contract) to create "an adaptation . . . for theatrical 

presentation" of La Resaca and allowed Ramos to retain the moral 

rights2 to this adaptation.3 The agreement authorized Caribeño to 

stage the theatrical adaptation in Puerto Rico at any time over 

the next four years. The agreement also specified that Laguerre 

2 "In Puerto Rico, [an] intellectual property right is 

composed of two rights: a moral right that protects the link 

between the author and her work, and a patrimonial right that 

grants her a monopoly over the exploitation of the work." Venegas 

Hernández v. Peer Int'l Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 207, 213 (D.P.R. 

2003) (citation omitted).

The patrimonial right is defined as the right to, inter

alia, reproduce and perform the work, as well as the 

right to create derivative works, and to receive 

benefits derived from these acts. The moral right 

protects the right to attribution of the work and the 

right to demand and protect the integrity of the work. 

This includes the right to prevent the alteration, 

truncation, and distortion of the work.

Id.

3 Strangely, the record is silent on Caribeño's legal 

relationship, if any, to Ramos as we'll further discuss later on 

in our analysis.
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retained the exclusive right to print the play scripts. Ramos 

completed the adaptation of La Resaca the same year. On April 29, 

2003, Laguerre and Caribeño signed an addendum extending the term 

of the original contract until 2010. On this same day, Laguerre 

and Caribeño entered into a similar agreement authorizing Ramos to 

create an "adaptation . . . for theatrical representation" of La 

Llamarada. Again, Ramos, a non-party, retained the moral rights, 

and Laguerre retained the printing rights, to the adaptation. 

Ramos completed the adaptation of La Llamarada the same year. He 

registered copyrights for the Adaptations in 2015. 

Meanwhile, in January 2002, Laguerre entered into a 

contract with Editorial Cultural purportedly giving it the right 

to print "one edition" of "the dramatic adaptation of . . . La 

Resaca" for seven consecutive years from the first printing date. 

Then on April 29, 2003, Laguerre, on the same day he contracted 

with Caribeño, entered into an agreement with Editorial Cultural 

which, again, purportedly gave Editorial the right to print up to 

25,000 copies of La Llamarada in exchange for royalties. According 

to Editorial, both agreements were intended to provide it with the 

exclusive right to publish the Adaptations of La Llamarada and La 

Resaca (even though the agreement about printing La Llamarada did 

not specifically mention the theatrical adaptation). 

Laguerre died in June 2005. Editorial Cultural 

published print versions of the Adaptations a few times, most 
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recently -- and most relevant for this litigation -- in 2013, after 

receiving a purchase order from Puerto Rico's Department of 

Education. 

B. Procedural History 

In 2015, Ramos and Laguerre's daughter, Beatriz Laguerre 

Saavedra, initiated this suit against Editorial Cultural, their 

complaint evolving over a few iterations. The Corrected Second 

Amended Complaint was filed by Ramos and Laguerre's other heirs,4

who had been joined as plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged Ramos 

owned the copyrights to both Adaptations and claimed Editorial 

infringed the copyrights when it printed and sold the publications 

to the Puerto Rico Department of Education in 2013.5 In Editorial's 

4 Laguerre's other heirs are Beatriz Alexia Álvarez Laguerre,

Rafael Enrique Álvarez Laguerre, Gabriel Ortiz Laguerre, Fabián 

Antonio Charrón Álvarez, and Carla Victoria Charrón Álvarez.

5 The Corrected Second Amended Complaint included two other 

counts; one claim requesting cancellation of the 2010 copyright 

registrations Editorial Cultural had filed for revised editions of 

each novel completed by Laguerre prior to the theatrical 

adaptations, and one claim for an accounting of Editorial 

Cultural's sales of each novel. Editorial Cultural responded with 

a counterclaim for unjust enrichment and fraud, alleging Laguerre 

knew his works were in the public domain when he entered into the 

publishing contracts with Editorial Cultural in 2002 and 2003. By 

the time the district court entered final judgment, the parties 

had settled the cancellation of copyright claim, the district court 

had dismissed the accounting claim and the unjust enrichment 

counterclaim on the plaintiffs' and Editorial's respective 

motions, and a jury found for the plaintiffs on Editorial's fraud 

counterclaim. None of these claims are a subject of the crossappeals before us or have any bearing on Ramos's copyright 

infringement claim.
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answer, it admitted Ramos held the Adaptations' moral copyrights 

but "affirmatively alleg[ed]" Laguerre "reserved" the publication 

rights.

Both sides moved for partial summary judgment on the 

infringement claim. In its motion, Editorial Cultural repeated 

its assertion that, pursuant to the Laguerre-Caribeño contracts, 

Laguerre reserved the printing rights to the Adaptations to himself 

exclusively, and Ramos was therefore not entitled to damages for 

infringement.6 The plaintiffs claimed that Ramos owned the 

copyrights over the Adaptations, and thus was entitled to recover 

for infringement because 1) Laguerre authorized Ramos to create

the Adaptations, therefore those creative works belonged to him, 

or, alternatively, 2) La Resaca and La Llamarada were in the public 

domain when the Adaptations were written (meaning they were 

available for public use) and as such Laguerre's authorization was 

not required.7

6 Editorial Cultural was also moving for summary judgment on 

the plaintiffs' accounting claim, arguing its 2002 and 2003 

contracts with Laguerre for printing the works were null and void 

because each novel was in the public domain at the time the 

contracts were formed. The district court denied this part of 

Editorial's motion, concluding the court did not have sufficient 

information from which to consider entering judgment as a matter 

of law on this claim. 

7 The plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment on Editorial 

Cultural's two counterclaims, arguing Editorial's counterclaim for 

deceit or fraud was barred by the applicable statute of limitations 

and its counterclaim for unjust enrichment was not available to 

the defendant as a distinct claim because this claim was simply 
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In granting Editorial's summary judgment motion on 

Ramos's infringement claim, the district court's ruling relied 

exclusively on the language of the Laguerre-Caribeño contracts and 

did not directly address the legal status of Laguerre's original 

novels at the time the contracts were signed.8 In so relying, the 

court concluded the Laguerre-Caribeño contracts unequivocally 

demonstrated Ramos was not the owner of the right to publish the 

theatrical adaptations he'd created because Laguerre had expressly 

retained this right in his contract with Caribeño: 

If Ramos-Perea had any right over printouts of [the] 

adaptations, he would prevail in case of infringement. 

But the agreements authorizing him to prepare theatrical 

adaptations for stage performance grant him rights over 

the theatrical representations, not the right to 

authorize printouts of the adaptations, which 

corresponds to Laguerre. That being so, it was up to 

Laguerre, not Ramos-Perea, to authorize the sale of the 

theatrical adaptations.

Following summary judgment, some additional procedural 

wrangling ensued and eventually a third amended complaint was 

filed. In it, the plaintiffs added an allegation that in addition 

to Ramos not authorizing the 2013 printing of the Adaptations 

repackaging the claim for deceit. The district court denied the 

plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety, 

concluding (as it had with the accounting claim) that the record 

was insufficiently developed to permit judgment to enter on these 

counterclaims.

8 The court acknowledged the parties had made arguments about 

the novels being in the public domain but, when it addressed one 

of Editorial Cultural's counterclaims, concluded it could not 

resolve this question based on the record before it. 
- 9 -

neither had Laguerre or the Laguerre heirs. And it repeated the 

allegation that Ramos owned the copyrights over the Adaptations.9

The third amended complaint also acknowledged the district court's 

summary judgment conclusion that, based on the Laguerre-Caribeño 

contracts, Laguerre had the sole authority to allow the publication 

and sale of the Adaptations but, nonetheless, the pleading 

continued to allege that Editorial Cultural had engaged in

copyright infringement in 2013 pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 106.

Although this third amended complaint did not explicitly 

substitute Laguerre's heirs for Ramos as the alleged owners of the 

Adaptations' copyrights, the heirs did contend they owned the 

copyrights to Laguerre's original and revised works because, as 

his testate heirs, they had ownership rights to these works. Based 

on the district court's summary judgment finding, Laguerre's heirs 

took up the mantle of the infringement claim and brought it to a 

jury to decide who owned the patrimonial right to the Adaptations 

and whether Editorial Cultural had infringed this right when it 

printed and sold the Adaptations to the Department of Education in 

2013. After a three-day trial held in February 2019, a jury 

returned a verdict for the heirs and against Editorial on the 

9 The plaintiffs dropped a footnote in this third amended 

complaint that its allegations with respect to Ramos remained in 

the pleading to preserve his right to appeal the court's order 

granting summary judgment in Editorial Cultural's favor on his 

copyright infringement claim. As we'll explain later, this was 

not necessary.
- 10 -

infringement claim and awarded them damages in the amount of 

$266,350.10 

A couple of days later, Editorial Cultural renewed its 

Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law (originally argued 

at the close of the Laguerre heirs' case but held in abeyance)

primarily asserting that Laguerre's heirs had failed to introduce 

sufficient evidence at trial to demonstrate that Laguerre 

transferred the right to publish the Adaptations to them. 

Convinced by Editorial's argument the district court granted 

Editorial's motion and vacated the jury verdict as to the heirs' 

copyright infringement claim. Down but not out, Laguerre's heirs 

filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, which

caused the court to rethink its ruling. Concluding Editorial's 

argument that Laguerre could have bequeathed the printing rights 

to someone other than the Laguerre heirs should have been raised 

at trial and thus was waived, the district court granted the 

10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)(2) tells us that an 

"issue not raised by the pleadings [but] tried by the parties' 

express or implied consent . . . must be treated in all respects 

as if raised in the pleadings." While there is no explicit 

allegation in the third amended complaint -- the operative pleading 

at trial -- that Laguerre's heirs owned the copyrights to the 

theatrical adaptations, the parties clearly tried the copyright 

infringement claim based on the heirs claiming ownership and the 

verdict form expressly asked the jury to decide whether the heirs 

were the owners of the right to publish the adaptations. 
- 11 -

plaintiffs' motion and reinstated the jury verdict.11 These crossappeals followed.

Before us, Editorial Cultural challenges the district 

court's order granting the Laguerre heirs' Rule 59(e) motion 

reinstating the infringement verdict. For his part, Ramos 

challenges the district court's order granting summary judgment to 

Editorial on his copyright infringement claim. The determinative 

question in these cross-appeals continues to be which party owned 

the publishing rights to the Adaptations when Editorial Cultural 

sold them to the Department of Education in 2013. To find the 

answer, we take a fresh look at the parties' cross-motions for 

partial summary judgment and the exhibits each submitted to support 

their respective positions. 

II. Standard of Review

"We review an order granting summary judgment de novo." 

Irobe v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 890 F.3d 371, 377 (1st Cir. 2018) 

(citing DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 2005)). 

"A court may grant summary judgment only if the record, construed 

in the light most amiable to the nonmovant, presents no 'genuine 

issue as to any material fact and reflects the movant's entitlement 

to judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting McKenney v. 

11 The court also rejected Editorial's claim that the verdict 

form should have required specific findings as to each plaintiff,

concluding that, too, should have been raised at trial.
- 12 -

Mangino, 873 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2017); then citing Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a)). "Cross motions for summary judgment do not change the 

standard." Latin Am. Music Co. v. Archdiocese of San Juan of Roman 

Cath. & Apostolic Church, 499 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2007). This 

standard also remains in place when we review a summary judgment 

decision after a trial occurred on the remaining issues. Segrets, 

Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., 207 F.3d 56, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2000) 

(reviewing summary judgment rulings de novo in a copyright 

infringement case in which trial issues had also been appealed).

III. Discussion

Before us, Ramos argues primarily (as he did below) that 

he owns the full copyrights to the Adaptations because both of 

Laguerre's novels were in the public domain when he created the 

theatrical adaptations and, because the district court failed to 

take the public domain status of each work into account when it 

considered its summary judgment ruling, it erred. Ramos further 

claims the district court was wrong to premise its findings on the 

plain language of the Laguerre-Caribeño contracts because,

according to Ramos, they neither show nor support the court's 

finding that he transferred his patrimonial copyright interests to 

Laguerre. In consequence of these errors, the court was wrong not 

to conclude, as a matter of law, that Ramos owned the copyrights 

to the Adaptations, including the right to print and distribute 
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them.12,13

Curiously, Editorial Cultural first responds that we 

should not seriously consider Ramos's arguments at all. If Ramos 

truly believed he was the owner, then, according to Editorial, he 

"should have insisted on an expedited appellate review." By not 

requesting entry of final judgment on his infringement claim 

immediately after his summary judgment loss, Editorial contends 

Ramos waived appellate review of his claims. 

Regarding Editorial Cultural's retort, it is clear to us 

Editorial is forgetting that we rarely allow interlocutory 

appeals. While Ramos could have sought an entry of partial 

judgment under civil procedure rule 54(b), he was not required to 

do so in order to preserve his appellate claims. Indeed, we have 

long discouraged "piecemeal appellate review[,] . . . warn[ing] 

time and again[] that Rule 54(b) should be used sparingly." 

12 Alternatively, we understand Ramos to be arguing that 

Laguerre's contracts with Caribeño were unenforceable because 

Laguerre did not own the copyrights of the novels at the time he 

signed these contracts purporting to give his authorization to 

write, produce, and print the Adaptations.

13 Helpfully, Laguerre's heirs conceded during oral argument 

before us that Ramos is the rightful owner of the full copyrights 

to the Adaptations. They stated that Ramos, as the true owner, 

should win this case and that they would accept the court's 

reversal of the summary judgment order. During oral argument, 

Laguerre's heirs were clear that they took up the claim of 

ownership for purposes of the copyright infringement claim only 

after the district court issued its decision on the cross-motions 

for partial summary judgment concluding Laguerre had effectively 

reserved the printing rights to the Adaptations. 
- 14 -

Nichols v. Cadle Co., 101 F.3d 1448, 1449 (1st Cir. 1996); see 

also Estate of Barrett v. United States, 462 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 

2006) (a district court's decision disposing of some but not all 

claims is usually not an appealable judgment unless partial 

judgment is certified under Rule 54(b)). We have also previously 

noted that "[w]e are perfectly capable of reviewing a pretrial 

grant of partial summary judgment after a full trial on the merits 

of the remaining issues." Mandel v. Bos. Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 

198, 204 n.2 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 

812, 817 (1st Cir. 1985) (per curiam)).14 

Editorial Cultural also complains here about what the 

plaintiffs alleged and argued after the district court decided the 

cross-motions for summary judgment, criticizing them for shifting

legal positions after the district court issued its decision (i.e., 

claiming they owned the copyrights to the Adaptations rather than 

Ramos).15 But at this stage of our discussion what happened after 

14 One more thing: we note Editorial Cultural appears to 

concede that its waiver argument is not a winning one; it wrote in 

the concluding paragraph of its reply brief that "regardless of 

the fact that the district court did not enter judgment on the 

dismissal of Ramos Perea's cause of action, and thus, the issue 

remained open for review as the case continued towards trial with 

the remaining parties, . . . ."

15 Editorial Cultural spilled significant ink comparing 

Ramos's appellate arguments to those from Laguerre's heirs, 

pointing out the contradictions in their positions. Given 

Laguerre's heirs' concession, we need not address Editorial 

Cultural's concerns. We simply note that Ramos's appellate 

arguments were clearly focused on the case as it stood at the 
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summary judgment is unimportant since we are laser-focused on the 

summary judgment record and the arguments based thereon. And as 

we explain below, we conclude the record at the time the district 

court ruled on the cross-motions undisputedly showed the public 

domain status of Laguerre's original works. Accordingly, the 

copyright owner of Ramos's theatrical adaptations should have been 

determined as a matter of law by appropriate reference to the

statutes governing copyrights.16 

We start then by laying out the essential legal 

principles that govern. 

A. Applicable copyright principles

Under the Copyright Act, "[c]opyright . . . vests 

initially in the author or authors of the work." 17 U.S.C. 

§ 201(a). "The Act confers on a copyright owner certain exclusive 

rights, including the rights to reproduce and distribute the work 

and to develop and market derivative works." Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 668 (2014) (citing 17 U.S.C. 

§ 106). A derivative work is "a work based upon one or more 

preexisting works, such as a . . . dramatization . . . or any other 

summary judgment stage of the litigation, and the heirs' arguments 

were clearly focused on what happened after the summary judgment 

motions in the time leading up to trial, during the trial itself, 

and litigating the posttrial motions.

16 As a result, we will not need to reach whether the LaguerreCaribeño contracts were enforceable.
- 16 -

form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 

U.S.C. § 101. Derivative works receive copyright protection to 

the extent the author of the derivative work contributed material 

to the new work as opposed to the material that existed in the 

original work. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).

"The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole 

or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law 

. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1). Moreover, "[a]ny of the exclusive 

rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any 

of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred . . . 

and owned separately." Id. § 201(d)(2). "A transfer of copyright 

ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an 

instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, 

is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or 

such owner's duly authorized agent." Id. § 204(a).

"The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right 

under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any 

infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is 

the owner of it." Id. § 501(b); see also Motta v. Samuel Weiser, 

Inc., 768 F.2d 481, 483-84 (1st Cir. 1985). "To establish 

copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove two elements: 

'(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent 

elements of the work that are original.'" Latin Am. Music Co. 

Inc. v. Media Power Grp., Inc., 705 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2013) 
- 17 -

(quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 

340, 361 (1991)). 

Works created before January 1, 1978 retained copyright 

protection for 28 years. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 212 

(1990) (explaining that "[t]he Copyright Act of 1909 . . . provided 

authors a 28-year initial term of copyright protection" (citing 17 

U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.)); 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 

Nimmer on Copyright § 9.08 n.13 (2021) (hereinafter Nimmer on 

Copyright) ("The courts . . . interpreted Section 24 of the 1909 

Act as meaning that the first term expired 28 years from 

publication or registration, whichever first occurred." (emphasis 

in original) (citations omitted)); Shoptalk, Ltd. v. Concorde-New 

Horizons Corp., 168 F.3d 586, 587 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that the 

1909 Act "governs works published before 1978" (citation 

omitted)). Works whose initial term expired before January 1, 

1978, were eligible for a renewal period of 28 years. See Nimmer 

on Copyright at § 9.08 (explaining that "the 1909 Act provided, 

upon satisfaction of the requisite procedures, for a renewal term 

. . . [of] 28 years" (footnote omitted)); see also Stewart, 495 

U.S. at 212 (stating that the 1909 Act provided for "28-year 

renewal term" (citing 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.)). "Once the 

copyright expires, the work enters the public domain and is freely 

subject to copying and performance without the owner's 

permission." Phoenix Entm't Partners v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817, 825 
- 18 -

(7th Cir. 2016) (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 

Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003)); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. 

Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); see also Golan v. Holder, 

565 U.S. 302, 331-32 (2012) ("Once the term of protection ends, 

the works do not revest in any rightholder. Instead, the works 

simply lapse into the public domain. . . . Anyone has free access 

to the public domain, but no one, after the copyright term has 

expired, acquires ownership rights in the once-protected works."). 

"In the case of a derivative work based on an underlying work that 

is in the public domain, only the material added to the underlying 

work is protected by copyright." Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, 

Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing 1 Nimmer on Copyright

§ 3.07[C]).

B. The novels were in the public domain

To determine when Laguerre's novels passed into the 

public domain, we must simply do the math. From the exhibits 

submitted in support of the cross-motions for summary judgment, La 

Llamarada, as noted, was published in 1935 and La Resaca was 

published in 1949. Both works were governed by the 1909 Copyright 

Act and were therefore entitled to 28 years of copyright protection 

after publication, plus an additional 28 years if properly renewed. 

See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 212; Nimmer on Copyright, at § 9.08. A 

copyright for La Llamarada was registered in 1936, and the parties 
- 19 -

agree that there is no evidence that the registration was renewed.17

Thus, the work passed into the public domain in 1964. As for La 

Resaca, this work may have always been in the public domain because 

this novel was never registered in the Copyright Office. Even if 

we assume Laguerre had complied with the requirements in place at 

the time to secure copyright protection, however, the novel would 

have passed into the public domain by 1977.18 See Stewart, 495 

U.S. at 212. There is no doubt, therefore, that both novels were 

in the public domain by 1977, a long time before Laguerre and 

Caribeño purported to contract for the theatrical adaptation of 

17 Editorial Cultural submitted documents in support of its 

motion for summary judgment showing that the copyright registered 

to La Llamarada was not renewed or assigned. 

18 Editorial Cultural also submitted evidence that no 

copyright was ever registered as to La Resaca. Under § 10 of the 

1909 Copyright Act, however, a work could also receive copyright 

protection if it was published with the word "copyright" or the 

familiar "©", the name of the copyright owner, and the year of 

publication printed on the title page or the first page following 

the title page, or evidence of substantial compliance with this 

so-called "notice requirement." Robert A. Gorman and Jane C. 

Ginsburg, Copyright: Cases and Materials 470 (Foundation Press 7th 

ed. 2006) (citing §§ 10, 19 of the 1909 Copyright Right Act); see 

also Brown v. Latin Am. Music Co., 498 F.3d 18, 23-24 (1st Cir. 

2007). The first edition of La Resaca shows "[r]ights reserved in 

accordance to law" printed within the first pages of the 

publication. We need not decide whether this was substantial 

compliance with § 10 of the 1909 Act because, even if this 

statement did qualify as substantial compliance so that the novel 

was protected by the initial 28-year term of copyright protection, 

La Resaca was in the public domain long before any of the contracts 

or adaptations at issue here were under consideration.
- 20 -

each work in the early 2000s.19 

When Ramos adapted the novels into the play scripts in 

2001 and 2003, respectively, Laguerre had no copyright interest in

either of these novels (or any work derived from them) and Ramos 

became the owner of the derivative works -- the Adaptations -- he 

created,20 with the exclusive power to authorize the printing and 

sale of them. See Petrella, 572 U.S. at 668; 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 

201(a). As we discuss next, there is nothing in the summary 

judgment record to suggest Ramos transferred his ownership or any 

rights associated with this ownership (i.e., the printing rights) 

to any other party. 

C. Laguerre-Caribeño contracts

Ramos asserts that because Laguerre did not hold any 

rights over the two novels at issue when he signed the contracts 

with Caribeño, the documents had no legal effect because "Laguerre 

19 Editorial Cultural also asserts, without clear explanation, 

that Ramos's argument on appeal that he is the true owner of the 

copyrights because the original works were in the public domain 

when Ramos adapted them would require "a giant leap of faith" on 

our part as well as some impermissible assumptions about why the 

jury found in favor of Laguerre's heirs. But as we've just 

explained, the summary judgment record and the plain language of 

the copyright statutes support Ramos's argument.

20 The parties do not contest the status of the Adaptations 

as "derivative works" pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 101; indeed, each 

acknowledges the Adaptations as derivative works.
- 21 -

was attempting to exercise rights he did not have."21 Editorial 

Cultural responds by asserting that Ramos "voluntarily transferred 

the right to reproduce" the Adaptations to Laguerre via the 

Caribeño contracts, which were "instrument[s] of conveyance signed 

by [his] authorized agent . . . Caribeño." The problem with 

Editorial Cultural's take on this point is that the plain language 

of the contracts does not support its position. 

Pursuant to Puerto Rico law, "where the terms of a 

contract are clear, leaving no doubt as to the contracting parties' 

intentions, such contract will be observed according to the literal 

sense of its stipulations." Almeida-León v. WM Cap. Mgmt., Inc., 

993 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Markel Am. Ins. 

Co. v. Díaz-Santiago, 674 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2012) which was 

quoting P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3471) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). On the face of the documents, each Caribeño contract is 

between Laguerre and Caribeño. Ramos's name does appear twice in 

each document; first when Laguerre purports to authorize Ramos's

creation of the Adaptations and second when Ramos is identified as 

having the moral rights over the Adaptations. But Ramos is not 

identified as a contracting party. Ramos is not a signatory to 

21 Editorial neither questions nor defends the district 

court's conclusions at summary judgment that these contracts 

governed the rights regarding the Adaptations, that the plain 

language meant Laguerre had authorized Ramos to write the 

Adaptations, and that Laguerre expressly retained the printing 

rights to those Adaptations.
- 22 -

the contract, in either a personal or representative capacity. 

And Caribeño is not identified as either Ramos's agent or in any 

other way legally related to Ramos. Moreover, Editorial Cultural 

does not point to any evidence in the record (summary judgment or 

otherwise) where any relationship between Caribeño and Ramos is 

fleshed out.22 While the language in the contracts is clear with 

respect to Laguerre and Caribeño's intentions, the contracts are 

equally clear that Ramos had not authorized either contractual 

party to agree to any terms on his behalf. As a result, the 

Laguerre-Caribeño contracts have no legal effect on Ramos's status 

as owner of the copyrights over the theatrical adaptations he 

wrote. 

D. Infringement of the copyright

Having determined Ramos to be the true owner of the 

copyrights, we move on to the second prong of a claim for copyright 

infringement: "copying of constituent elements of the work that 

22 Editorial Cultural also argues that Ramos is "estopped" from 

asserting before us that he is the owner of the copyrights to the 

theatrical adaptations because he argued at summary judgment that 

he was the owner, then, in the post-summary judgment amended 

pleading, took the "contradictory position[]" that Laguerre owned 

these copyrights, "voluntarily decid[ing] to exchange hats with 

Laguerre's heirs for trial." Editorial doesn't elaborate this 

point, but we note that, contrary to Editorial's statement in its 

brief, Ramos did not affirmatively allege in the third amended 

complaint that the heirs were the owners of the copyrights to the 

Adaptations. There is no indication he switched his hat to 

Laguerre's heirs. We therefore disagree that Ramos is in any way 

estopped from his appellate arguments before us.
- 23 -

are original." Feist Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. at 363. "A 

plaintiff who owns a copyrighted work has the ultimate burden to 

prove that (1) the defendant 'actually copied the work as a factual

matter' and (2) the 'copying . . . rendered the infringing and

copyrighted works substantially similar.'" Cortés-Ramos v.

Martin-Morales, 956 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting T-Peg,

Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 108 (1st Cir. 2006)).

Editorial Cultural's publication and sale of the 

Adaptations in 2013 was not in dispute at the time of summary 

judgment (or after). Editorial also does not contend that Ramos 

provided consent or authorization for the 2013 printings. (Instead 

it simply holds firm in its assertion, as we've previously noted,

that Ramos's permission was not required because Editorial

operated with contractual authorization from Laguerre.)

Therefore, in conducting our de novo review we conclude that 

Editorial, in distributing Ramos's adaptations, is liable to him

for copyright infringement.23 See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 501.

23 We pause here for a moment to acknowledge a development in 

the interpretation of the Copyright Act which occurred while this 

litigation was pending. 17 U.S.C. § 411 provides that "no civil 

action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work 

shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the 

copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title." The 

Copyright Office registered Ramos's copyrights to the theatrical 

adaptations on October 14, 2015, nine days after he initiated this 

cause of action. Ramos submitted copies of these certificates in 

support of the plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment. 

On March 4, 2019 (long after the district court resolved the crossmotions for summary judgment and almost a month after the jury 
- 24 -

Regrettably, the district court's erroneous conclusion 

that Laguerre retained the right to print the Adaptations 

fundamentally altered the course of this case. Our decision today 

vacates the grant of summary judgment in Editorial Cultural's favor 

as against Ramos and we direct the entry of summary judgment for 

Ramos. Necessarily, we vacate the portion of the amended judgment 

finding in favor of the heirs on the copyright infringement claim 

and substitute Ramos as the prevailing plaintiff on that claim.24

rendered its verdict in this case), the Supreme Court issued an 

opinion holding, for the first time, "that registration occurs, 

and a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit, when 

the Copyright Office registers a copyright," not when the 

application is filed. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. WallStreet.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 886 (2019). This decision 

resolved a circuit split about "when registration occurs in 

accordance with § 411(a)." Id. at 887. Editorial Cultural did 

not raise a § 411 timing issue either before the district court or 

before us on appeal and, even if it had, Ramos would have been in 

the clear because, at the time he filed the initial complaint, 

"registration" pursuant to § 411 had not been definitely decided 

to mean the Copyright Office's registration of the copyright. 

24 Editorial Cultural raises several other arguments in its 

attempt to defeat Ramos's claim of copyright ownership, which we 

acknowledge but for various reasons find unpersuasive.

Editorial Cultural contends that Ramos, through his conduct, 

created an implied license allowing Editorial Cultural to print 

the Adaptations. The implied license of a copyright "may occur 

without any particular formality, as by conduct manifesting the 

owner's intent." Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 

41 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester–

Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 2003)). Editorial 

Cultural asserts that Ramos acknowledged the Laguerre-Caribeño 

contracts, paid royalties to Laguerre for the performances, 

acquiesced to Editorial Cultural's publication of the Adaptations, 

and knew about the contracts between Laguerre and Editorial 

Cultural. First, Editorial Cultural's assertions here are not 

supported by any of the evidence or documents on the record --
- 25 -

E. Damages

The remedies for copyright infringement can take several 

different forms, including injunctions, impounding of the copied 

work, actual damages, and statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-

505. As we highlighted at the beginning of this opinion, a jury 

awarded $266,350 in monetary damages to Laguerre's heirs after it 

found them to be the owner of the right to publish the Adaptations 

and that Editorial Cultural infringed their right. This award was 

summary judgment or otherwise. Second, while Editorial Cultural 

mentioned the implied license in its answer to the Corrected Second 

Amended Complaint, it did not make any argument on this point until 

a surreply to the cross-motions for summary judgment. The district 

court did not address this argument and neither will we. See

Irizarry-Santiago v. Essilor Indus., 929 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 n.4 

(D.P.R. 2013) (citing D.R. Civ r. 7(c)) (arguments raised for the 

first time in a reply brief cannot be considered).

Editorial Cultural also suggests that because the respective 

lawyers who represent the Laguerre heirs and Ramos on appeal 

represented the plaintiffs together throughout the case in the 

district court, including the Laguerre heirs during trial, there 

is a conflict of interest. However, Editorial Cultural fails to 

set forth the relevant law regarding conflicts of interest and 

does not adequately explain how this conflict exists and serves to 

prejudice it in its appeal before us. We deem this argument waived 

for lack of development. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 

1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that "issues . . . unaccompanied by 

some effort at developed argumentation[] are deemed waived"). 

Finally, Editorial Cultural suggests that Ramos is attempting 

to convince us that the jury's attribution of copyright ownership 

does not matter, a purported violation of due process because 

Editorial Cultural defended itself against the Laguerre heirs' 

claim to copyright ownership at trial. Additionally, according to 

Editorial Cultural, by asking the court to transfer the judgment 

from the Laguerre heirs to him, Ramos is seeking to deprive the 

heirs of a jury verdict, which also violates due process. This 

argument is only perfunctorily presented and, to the extent it is 

not mooted by Laguerre's heirs' concession that Ramos is the true 

owner of the full copyrights, the argument is waived. See id.
- 26 -

clearly based on the purchase orders, invoices, and cancelled 

checks on the record, first introduced by Editorial itself in 

support of a second motion for summary judgment it filed prior to 

trial. Laguerre's heirs then entered these documents as trial 

exhibits. 

Ramos states that this court need not set aside the 

damages calculated by the jury because this dollar figure was based 

on the calculation of revenue Editorial Cultural received when it 

sold the infringing works minus its expenses, and this net total 

remains the same regardless of the prevailing plaintiff in this 

case. Ramos argues Editorial is liable to him for this same amount 

and suggests we transfer the award in the same amount to him. 

Editorial does not provide us with a reason why the damages award 

could not be summarily transferred to Ramos. Indeed, Editorial 

has waived any dispute it has with the damages amount because it 

did not challenge the award figure before the trial court nor does 

it do so here before us. We affirm this award without remanding 

to the district court because Ramos -- seemingly satisfied with 

this award as his damages -- encourages us to do so, the 

uncontroverted record of Editorial Cultural's profit from the 2013 

publication and sale of the theatrical adaptations is clear, and 

principles of judicial economy will not be served by remanding 

this case to the district court to determine damages. See Conde

v. Starlight I, Inc., 103 F.3d 210, 215 n.6 (1st Cir. 1997) 
- 27 -

(opting, "for reasons of judicial economy," to calculate loss 

figure using evidence that was before the jury); see also United 

States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2001) (determining 

the appropriate remedy for a Speedy Trial Act violation without 

remanding because to do so advanced "goals of judicial economy"); 

Free v. Landrieu, 666 F.2d 698, 702 n.9 (1st Cir. 1981) (declaring 

remand unnecessary for further development of record when no 

indication from the briefs that the factual underpinnings of issue 

were in dispute and when "time and money out of all proportion to 

the dollar amounts at stake" had been expended in the case which 

had little precedential value).

IV. Conclusion

Ramos's appeal is sustained and Editorial Cultural's 

appeal is dismissed. We remand this case to the district court 

for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. Costs to 

Ramos.