J-S50040-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DARNELL WHITE

Appellant No. 2957 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 8, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012882-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 10, 2015

Appellant Darnell White appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following his open guilty plea to firearms not to be carried without a 

license1and possession of firearms prohibited.2 After careful review, we 

affirm.

We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history as follows. 

On the afternoon of April 12, 2012, Appellant and his cohort, Hakeem 

Burley, engaged in a gunfight with another individual, Shekinah Williams, 

which resulted from a perceived insult uttered by Burley with respect to 

Williams. After the insult, Williams produced a 9 mm handgun and fired 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
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eleven (11) shots at Appellant and Burley. Appellant produced a 9 mm 

handgun of his own and fired ten (10) shots at Williams. The firefight left 

Burley with a bullet wound to the arm. Additionally, a bullet from Williams’ 

gun shot and killed Clarice Douglas, a 41-year-old innocent bystander.

The night of the gunfight, a confidential informant told police that 

Appellant had been involved in the shooting. Later, at approximately 7:30 

p.m. on May 9, 2012, police located Appellant and transported him to the 

homicide unit at police headquarters for an interview. After waiving his 

Miranda3rights, Appellant spoke with police and ultimately remained in the 

interview room that evening and throughout the following day.4 At 

approximately 7:00 p.m. on the evening of May 10, 2012, Appellant again 

waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement wherein he admitted his 

possession of the 9 mm gun and his involvement in the firefight, although he 

explained he had not killed anyone. Police released Appellant after he 

provided the statement.

Police arrested Appellant in October 2012 on gun charges stemming 

from the firefight. On July 18, 2013, Appellant filed a motion seeking 

suppression of his statements made to police on May 9-10, 2012, which he 

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3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).

4 Appellant was not handcuffed, and was allowed to sleep, eat, drink, and go 

to the bathroom upon request.
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claimed were involuntary. The suppression court conducted a hearing and 

denied Appellant’s motion on August 22, 2013.

On March 24, 2014, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to firearms 

not to be carried without a license and possession of firearms prohibited 

subject to an agreement between Appellant and the Commonwealth that 

Appellant would be allowed to challenge the denial of his suppression motion 

on direct appeal. On July 8, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 

three (3) to six (6) years of incarceration on the firearms not to be carried 

without a license conviction, followed by two (2) years of probation on the 

possession of firearms prohibited conviction.

On July 16, 2014, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion for 

reconsideration of sentence, which the trial court denied on October 2, 2014. 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on October 9, 2014. Appellant and the trial 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.5

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

A. Did the suppression court improperly deny [Appellant’s] 

motion to suppress his inculpatory statements where the 

detectives unnecessarily delayed his arraignment following his 

arrest to conduct unnecessary investigation and extended his 

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5

The certified record contains two Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinions: one filed by 

the trial court judge on February 2, 2015 (“trial court 1925(a) opinion”), and 

a second filed by the suppression court judge on March 16, 2015 

(“suppression court 1925(a) opinion”) in response to the trial court’s 

December 12, 2014 request that the suppression judge file a separate 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion addressing the suppression motion, the hearing 

on the motion, and the resulting order. 
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detention for the sole purpose of obtaining incriminating 

statements?

B. Did the suppression court improperly deny [Appellant’s] 

motion to suppress his inculpatory statements where police 

arrested him without a warrant and without probable cause, and 

detained him in the homicide unit overnight?

Appellant’s Brief, pp. 2-3 (all capitals removed).

Both of Appellant’s claims concern alleged error regarding the 

suppression court’s ruling. This Court’s well-settled standard of review of a 

denial of a motion to suppress evidence is as follows:

[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth 

prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only 

the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence 

for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court 

is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s 

legal conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not 

binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if

the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. 

Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to [] 

plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.2010) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

Appellant first claims that improper police interrogation tactics, 

specifically detaining him at the police station for over 24 hours without 
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arrest, coerced him into confessing involuntarily. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 

13-27. He is incorrect.

When a court is called upon to determine whether a 

confession is voluntary and, hence, admissible at trial, it 

examines the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 

confession to ascertain whether it is the product of an essentially 

free and unconstrained choice by its maker. In making this 

inquiry, a court is not concerned with the issue of whether the 

substance of the confession is true. Rather, a court is 

constrained to examine only whether an individual’s confession 

was the product of coercion, duress, or the use of other 

measures by interrogators deliberately calculated to overcome 

his or her free will.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A.3d 530, 537-38 (Pa.Super.2014). “By the 

same token, the law does not require the coddling of those accused of crime. 

One such need not be protected against his own innate desire to unburden 

himself.” Commonwealth v. Templin, 795 A.2d 959, 966 (Pa.2002) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Graham, 182 A.2d 727, 730–31 (Pa.1962)). 

As our Supreme Court has explained:

The mere fact that there is some passage of time between when 

an accused is arrested and when he or she gives an inculpatory 

statement does not constitute grounds for suppression of the 

statement. Numerous factors should be considered under a 

totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a 

statement was freely and voluntarily made: the means and 

duration of the interrogation, including whether questioning was 

repeated, prolonged, or accompanied by physical abuse or 

threats thereof; the length of the accused’s detention prior to 

the confession; whether the accused was advised of his or her 

constitutional rights; the attitude exhibited by the police during 

the interrogation; the accused’s physical and psychological state, 

including whether he or she was injured, ill, drugged, or 

intoxicated; the conditions attendant to the detention, including 

whether the accused was deprived of food, drink, sleep, or 
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medical attention; the age, education, and intelligence of the 

accused; the experience of the accused with law enforcement 

and the criminal justice system; and any other factors which 

might serve to drain one’s powers of resistance to suggestion

and coercion.

Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 724-25 (Pa.2014), cert. denied 

sub nom. Martin v. Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 201 (2015) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Perez, 845 A.2d 779, 785-787 (Pa.2004)) (internal 

citations omitted).

“The Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the defendant confessed voluntarily.” Commonwealth v. 

Harrell, 65 A.3d 420, 434 (Pa.Super.2013), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 

(Pa.2014). “The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a 

conclusion of law and, as such, is subject to plenary review.” 

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 969 A.2d 594, 599 (Pa.Super.2009).

The suppression court summarized the suppression hearing evidence 

as follows:

The Commonwealth called as their only witness Detective 

Philip Nordo[6] who testified regarding his investigation of the 

homicide of Clarice Douglass which occurred on April 20, 2012. 

Detective Nordo interviewed [Appellant] based upon information 

that he had received that [Appellant] had been involved in a 

gunfight which led to the victim’s death. He was placed in an 

interview room at approximately 7:30 p.m. on May 9, 2012.

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6 The suppression court “determined Detective Nordo’s testimony to be 

credible and consistent throughout both direct and cross-examination and no 

bias or prejudice was elicited which would bring any aspect of his testimony 

into doubt.” Suppression Court Opinion, p. 5.
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According to Detective Nordo, he advised [Appellant] of his 

Miranda rights and began interviewing him within an hour of his 

arrival. [Appellant] volunteered information about his 

whereabouts at the time of the incident and the names of others 

involved. Detective Nordo then worked on an unrelated 

homicide investigation and also attempted to verify the 

information that [Appellant] had initially provided, none of which 

he was able to substantiate. 

Detective Nordo returned his attention back to [Appellant] 

at approximately 11:30 p.m. At that time, [Appellant] provided 

no further information to either Det. Nordo or his partner, other 

than stating he felt nervous. [Appellant] then stayed the night 

in the interview room. [Appellant] was not handcuffed and the 

door was not locked.

Detective Nordo and his partner, Detective Jenkins, after 

further investigating the homicide returned the next day to meet 

with [Appellant]. They again gave [Appellant] his Miranda

rights and resumed the interview process with him in the early 

evening. At this point, [Appellant] voluntarily provided further 

information which resulted in a 15-page formal statement signed 

by [Appellant] on May 10, 2012. The statement was provided to 

the officers after [Appellant] had spent approximately 24 hours 

in police custody.

In his statement, [Appellant] acknowledged that he had 

been given and understood his constitutional rights. He also 

acknowledged that he had been given food, the ability to use the 

bathroom and had been permitted to sleep while there. 

[Appellant] also acknowledged that he has not been promised 

anything in return for or coerced by the officers in giving his 

statement. The detectives did inform him that if he possessed a 

gun, he could be charged for that crime. In regard to 

[Appellant’s] unsubstantiated statements from May 9, 2012, 

[Appellant] admitted to Det. Nordo that he had not wanted to be 

involved and was nervous.

Once the interview was completed and the statement 

finalized, [Appellant] was given the opportunity to review his 

answers, which he did, and he then signed every page of the 

statement. [Appellant] also signed a non-consent form for 

having his interview video or audio recorded. 

On cross-examination, Detective Nordo testified that the 

decision to hold a witness in custody who was initially untruthful 
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is made by the investigator, in this case him, along with the 

district attorney’s office while other investigation is performed in 

order to pinpoint [a] defendant’s whereabouts and actions at the 

time of the crime. This particular investigation took time due to 

the detectives’ heavy workload involving multiple crimes during 

that time frame.

From the time of the crime occurring and the interviewing 

of witnesses, the detectives had received information about 

[Appellant’s] involvement in the shooting, his name, and the 

house where he had been hiding at the time. Detective Nordo 

confirmed that there were three witnesses that provided 

information to the police regarding [Appellant]. Two witnesses, 

Michelle Richardson and April Brown, had provided written 

statements and the third witness was a confidential informant. 

Ms. Richardson and Ms. Brown both identified [Appellant] in a 

photograph. Further, Ms. Brown stated that [Appellant] was an 

associate of another victim of the shooting, however, neither 

woman placed [Appellant] at the scene of the crime.

The other shooting victim, Hakeem Burley, also gave a 

statement to police relating that he had possessed the .45 

caliber handgun that was found at the scene, but he did not fire 

it. This statement was corroborated by a ballistics report which 

determined that the 21 shell casings found at the scene were 

from two different 9 millimeter firearms, not a .45 caliber. It 

was the confidential informant however, that had provided 

information to Officer Lai, who later, along with his partner, 

Officer Dougherty, found [Appellant] and brought him to the 

station for questioning.

Detective Nordo testified that [Appellant] was not 

handcuffed at any point during the interview process. While he 

was in the interview room for the approximately 24 hour period, 

he was free to exit and use the bathroom, but did have to ask 

permission of the officers in order to escort him to and from. 

Detective Nordo did take possession of [Appellant’s] cellphone as 

it was not permitted in the interview room.

[Appellant] had not been placed under arrest on May 9, 

2012 or even on the following day, as the detectives did not 

have sufficient evidence to charge him with homicide, despite 

him having implicated himself in the shooting. By 11:30 p.m. on 

May 9, 2012, when the detectives went home, [Appellant] had 

not been given any food or water that that point, as Detective 
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Nordo testified it would have been recorded if [Appellant] had 

asked for food or water. A chronology of the detention was not 

kept and it was not requested by the district attorney, as 

[Appellant] was only held for 24 hours which does not require a 

chronology. When Detective Nordo spoke again with [Appellant] 

on the evening of May 10, 2012, at no point did he indicate that 

[he] had been deprived of food or bathroom access. [Appellant] 

was also fed at that time.

Suppression Court Opinion, pp. 2-5 (record citations and footnote omitted).

Based on this evidence, the suppression court concluded that, under 

these circumstances “[t]he interrogation in and of itself was not overbearing, 

relentless or in any way coercive.” Suppression Court Opinion, p. 7. 

Further, the suppression court elaborated:

The evidence fails to show any other factors, aside from 

time, for this [c]ourt to consider in order to conclude, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the statement was 

involuntarily coerced. [Appellant] was aware he was being 

questioned in regard to a shooting. He was twice given his 

Miranda warnings, which he expressly agreed to waive. His 

statement cannot be said to have been anything other than 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Suppression Court Opinion, pp. 7-8. 

Our review of the record confirms the evidence supports the 

suppression court’s factual findings. Further, the suppression court’s legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Accordingly, Appellant’s first 

claim fails.

In his second claim, Appellant forwards the alternative argument that 

his detention by police amounted to an arrest affected without warrant or 

probable cause, and was therefore illegal. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 27-35. 
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Appellant argues that his statements should have been suppressed as fruit 

of the poisonous tree of this illegal arrest. Id. Appellant did not previously 

raise this claim in his motion to suppress or at the suppression hearing. 

Accordingly, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the 

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); 

Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 891 (Pa.2010) (“[The 

Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has consistently held that an appellate court 

cannot reverse a trial court judgment on a basis that was not properly raised 

and preserved by the parties.”).7

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/10/2015

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7 Appellant also failed to raise this alternative suppression theory in his 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement; 

see also Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa.2005) (issues 

not raised in 1925(b) Statements will be deemed waived).