United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, House of Representatives

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 

MODERNIZATION 

Status of the Current 

Program and Planning for 

the Next Generation Air 

Transportation System 

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director 

Physical Infrastructure Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, June 21, 2006 

 

GAO-06-653T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 21, 2006

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 

MODERNIZATION 

Status of the Current Program and Planning 

for the Next Generation Air Transportation 

System

Highlights of GAO-06-653T, testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and

Infrastructure, House of Representatives 

The Federal Aviation 

Administration’s (FAA) effort to

modernize the nation’s air traffic 

control (ATC) system has been

listed by GAO as a high risk

program for more than a decade

now, due to systemic management 

and acquisition problems. Two 

relatively new organizations

housed within FAA—the Air Traffic 

Organization (ATO) and the Joint 

Planning and Development Office

(JPDO)—have been given the bulk

of the responsibility for planning 

and implementing these 

modernization efforts. Congress 

created ATO to be a performancebased organization that would 

improve the culture, structure, and

processes and improve 

accountability in the ATC 

modernization program. Congress

created JPDO, made up of seven 

partner agencies, to coordinate the 

federal and nonfederal

stakeholders necessary to plan a 

transition from the current air 

transportation system to the “next 

generation air transportation

system” (NGATS). This testimony 

is based on GAO’s recently 

completed and ongoing studies of

the ATC modernization program.

GAO provides information on (1) 

the status of ATO’s efforts to 

implement processes and other 

initiatives aimed at efficiently

managing and modernizing the

current ATC system and (2) the 

status of JPDO’s planning efforts 

and the key challenges that JPDO

faces in planning for NGATS. 

ATO has made significant progress toward the efficient management of the 

nation’s ATC system, but faces several challenges. ATO has implemented 

organizational and business process changes, and has taken steps to 

increase scrutiny of its acquisition decisions. ATO has met its acquisition 

performance goal for the second consecutive year—that is, 80 percent of its 

system acquisitions are on schedule and within 10 percent of budget. ATO 

has identified cost savings opportunities through consolidation of 

administrative activities and outsourcing. However, ATO faces several

challenges, including sustaining and institutionalizing its progress toward 

operating effectively as a performance-based organization, hiring and 

training thousands of air traffic controllers, ensuring stakeholder 

involvement in major system acquisitions, and keeping acquisitions on 

schedule and within budget. 

JPDO is making progress in its planning for NGATS, but faces several

challenges. JPDO is implementing a number of practices that our work has 

shown facilitates the federal interagency collaboration that is central to its 

mission and legislative mandate. However, JPDO is fundamentally a planning 

and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and 

technological resources needed to continue developing plans and system 

requirements for NGATS. Thus, a challenge may arise in leveraging the 

resources of the partner agencies. As part of its planning, JPDO is working to 

develop a cost estimate for NGATS through a series of workshops with 

various stakeholders. JPDO has taken several important first steps and is 

following effective practices in developing an NGATS enterprise

architecture—a blueprint for NGATS and one of the most critical planning 

documents in the NGATS effort. JPDO faces several challenges, including 

maintaining stakeholder support over the long term, defining roles and 

responsibilities and deciding how to coordinate the implementation of 

NGATS, and addressing several critical policy issues, such as the extent to 

which NGATS will accommodate visual flights versus instrument-only 

flights. 

Air Traffic Management 

Sources: GAO and PhotoDisc.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-653T.

To view the full product, click on the link 

above. For more information, contact Dr. 

Gerald L. Dillingham, at (202) 512-2834 or 

dillinghamg@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss 

the status of efforts by the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) and the Joint 

Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to modernize and transform the 

nation’s air traffic control (ATC) system. Both organizations are within the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and represent recent efforts by 

Congress to, among others things, ensure a national airspace system that 

is safe, efficient, and capable of meeting a growing demand for air 

transportation—a demand that is expected to triple by 2025. ATO has 

responsibility for operating, maintaining, and modernizing the current ATC 

system. ATO was authorized as a performance-based organization (PBO)1

in 2000 and includes 36,000 of FAA’s roughly 46,000 employees. JPDO, 

authorized in 2003, is responsible for planning and coordinating the 

broader and longer-term transformation (through 2025) to the “next 

generation air transportation system” (NGATS). JPDO is conducting its 

work with the assistance of seven partner agencies: the Departments of 

Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation; FAA; the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White 

House Office of Science and Technology Policy. 

In 1981, FAA began a program to replace and upgrade ATC facilities and

equipment, but encountered chronic cost, schedule, and performance 

problems, leading us to classify FAA’s ATC modernization program as high 

risk in 1995.2 We have issued a series of reports on these problems and 

made numerous recommendations over the years. Our reports focused on 

many aspects of the national airspace system, including the management 

of modernization projects; the management of the information technology 

that is at the heart of many modern ATC systems; the challenges FAA 

faces in increasing system capacity and reducing delays; and an 

acquisition workforce culture that lacked the mission focus, 

accountability, coordination, and adaptability needed for FAA to meet its 

cost, schedule, and performance targets. FAA has implemented many of 

our recommendations to varying degrees. 

 1

PBOs are discrete units, led by a Chief Operating Officer, that commit to clear objectives, 

specific measurable goals, customer service standards, and targets for improved 

performance. 

2

ATC Modernization has remained on our high-risk list since 1995. See GAO, High Risk 

Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

Page 1 GAO-06-653T 
System modernization, as envisioned in NGATS and being planned by 

JPDO, will be costly and will have to compete with other national 

priorities and demands for resources. ATO will be especially challenged to

maintain the current ATC system while simultaneously developing and 

transitioning to the future system. These tasks will require ATO to make 

the best and most efficient use of increasingly scarce resources. 

Additionally, the transition also involves the recognition that other nations 

are upgrading their aviation systems, creating a need for global 

harmonization to support international travel and commerce. 

My statement today focuses on two key questions. (1) What is the status of 

ATO’s efforts to implement processes and other initiatives aimed at 

efficiently managing and modernizing the current ATC system? (2) What is 

the status of JPDO’s planning efforts, and what are the key challenges that

JPDO faces in planning for NGATS? My statement is based on our recently

completed and ongoing studies of FAA’s ATC modernization program, 

together with updated information from ATO and JPDO officials and 

aviation stakeholders.3

 Later this year, we expect to issue two detailed 

reports related to the issues discussed in this statement. One report will 

provide our assessment of the status of JPDO’s efforts to plan for the 

development of NGATS. Another report will examine financial 

management issues at FAA, including options for cost savings and 

alternative funding mechanisms. We are performing our work in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

The following is a summary of our findings to date: 

• ATO has made significant progress toward the efficient management of the 

nation’s ATC system, but faces several challenges. ATO has implemented 

organizational and business process changes to improve management of 

the ATC modernization program. ATO has taken several steps to increase

its scrutiny of its acquisition decisions, in part by ensuring executive-level 

oversight of key decisions and improving understanding of system 

requirements to avoid delays and cost overruns. ATO has met its 

acquisition performance goal for the second consecutive year—that is, 80 

percent of its system acquisitions are on schedule and within 10 percent of

budget. ATO has identified cost savings opportunities through 

consolidation of administrative activities and outsourcing. However, ATO 

faces several challenges, including sustaining and institutionalizing ATO’s 

 3

Because ATO includes the majority of FAA employees, this statement will refer to ATO 

initiatives, even though some may apply FAA-wide. 

Page 2 GAO-06-653T 
progress toward operating effectively as a performance-based 

organization, hiring and training thousands of air traffic controllers, 

ensuring stakeholder involvement in major system acquisitions, and 

keeping acquisitions on schedule and within budget. 

• JPDO is making progress in its planning for NGATS, but faces several 

challenges. JPDO is implementing a number of practices that our work has 

shown facilitates the federal interagency collaboration that is central to its

mission and legislative mandate. However, JPDO is fundamentally a 

planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human 

and technological resources needed to continue developing plans and 

system requirements for NGATS. Thus, a challenge may arise in leveraging 

the resources of the partner agencies—agencies with a variety of missions 

and priorities other than supporting NGATS. For example, NASA has 

reduced its aeronautics budget, raising questions about how the research 

and development efforts necessary for NGATS will be completed. As part

of its planning, JPDO is working to develop a cost estimate for NGATS 

through a series of workshops with various stakeholders. JPDO has taken 

several important first steps and is following effective practices in 

developing an NGATS enterprise architecture—a blueprint for NGATS and 

one of the most critical planning documents in the NGATS effort. In 

addition to the challenge of leveraging resources noted above, JPDO faces 

several other challenges, including maintaining stakeholder support over 

the long term, defining roles and responsibilities and deciding how to 

coordinate the implementation of NGATS, and addressing several critical

policy issues, such as the extent to which NGATS will accommodate visual 

flights versus instrument-only flights. 

The ATC system is composed of an array of largely ground-based 

subsystems, including radars; automated data-processing, navigation, and 

communications equipment; and ATC facilities. These subsystems work 

together to support all phases of flight for aircraft operating in U.S. 

airspace. The ATC system also includes the FAA employees who manage, 

operate, and maintain ATC equipment and facilities. 

In 1995, based on the premise that FAA would be better able to manage 

the ATC modernization if it were not constrained by federal personnel and 

acquisition laws, Congress passed legislation that exempted FAA from 

most federal personnel and acquisition laws and regulations.4

 In December 

Background 

 4

Pub. L. No. 104-50, Fiscal Year 1996 Department of Transportation Appropriations Act. 

Page 3 GAO-06-653T 
2000, President Clinton signed an executive order and a few months later 

Congress passed supporting legislation that, together, provided FAA with 

the authority to create ATO as a PBO to control and improve FAA’s 

management of the modernization effort. In February 2004, FAA 

reorganized, transferring 36,000 employees (most of who worked in air 

traffic services and research and acquisitions) to ATO. (See fig. 1.) 

Figure 1. Prior and Current Structure of Research and Acquistions and Air Traffic Services, and Free Flight Organizations

FAA 

Administrator

FAA Deputy 

Administrator

FAA 

Administrator

FAA Deputy 

Administrator

Research and 

Acquisition

Air Traffic 

Services

Free Flight COO

Safety

Communications

Operations

Planning

Finance

En Route and 

Oceanic

Terminal 

Service

Flight Services

System 

Operations

Acquisition and 

Business

Technical 

Operations

ATO Transition

temporary

Air Traffic Systems 

Development

Communications Navigation 

and Surveillance

System Architecture and 

Investment Analysis

Business Management

Competitive Sourcing 

Acquisition

William J. Hughes Technical 

Center

Operational Evolution Plan

Air Traffic System 

Requirements

Airway Facilities Service

System Capacity

Independent Operational 

Test 

Runway Safety

Terminal Business Unit

Operational Evolution Plan

Source: FAA.

Before ATO realignment After ATO realignment

Page 4 GAO-06-653T 
In late 2003, recognizing that the current approach to managing air 

transportation is becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally 

obsolete, Congress created JPDO5

 to plan NGATS, a system intended to 

accommodate what is expected to be three times more air traffic by 2025

than there is today. JPDO’s scope is broader than traditional ATC 

modernization in that it is “airport curb to airport curb,” encompassing 

such issues as security screening and environmental concerns. 

Additionally, JPDO’s approach will require unprecedented collaboration 

and consensus among many stakeholders—federal and nonfederal—about 

necessary system capabilities, equipment, procedures, and regulations. 

Each of JPDO’s partner agencies will play a role in creating NGATS. For 

example, the Department of Defense has deployed “network centric” 

systems,6

 originally developed for the battlefield, that are being considered

as a framework to provide all users of the national airspace system—FAA 

and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security—with a common 

view of that system. To incorporate the expertise and views of nonfederal 

stakeholders, the NGATS Institute was created by an agreement between

the National Center for Advanced Technologies and FAA. 

JPDO began its initial operations in early 2004. A Senior Policy Committee, 

chaired by the Secretary of Transportation and including senior 

representatives from each of the participating departments and agencies,

provides oversight to JPDO. JPDO is located within FAA and reports to the 

FAA Administrator and to the Chief Operating Officer within ATO. (See 

figure 2.) 

 5

Pub. L. No. 108-176, Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, December 12, 

2003. 

6

Network centric operations aim to exploit technical advances in information technology 

and telecommunications to improve situational awareness and the speed of decision 

making. 

Page 5 GAO-06-653T 
Figure 2: Organizational Chart of JPDO 

Page 6 GAO-06-653T 
ATO has implemented organizational and business process changes to 

improve management of the ATC modernization program. ATO has taken 

several steps to increase its scrutiny of its acquisition decisions and has 

met its acquisition performance goal for the second consecutive year. ATO 

has identified cost savings opportunities through consolidation of 

administrative activities and outsourcing. However, ATO faces several 

challenges, including sustaining and institutionalizing ATO’s progress 

toward operating effectively as a performance-based organization, hiring 

and training thousands of air traffic controllers, ensuring stakeholder 

involvement in major system acquisitions, and keeping acquisitions on 

schedule and within budget. 

ATO Has Made

Significant Progress 

Toward More 

Efficiently Managing 

ATC Modernization, 

but Challenges 

Remain 

ATO Has Implemented 

Organizational and 

Business Process Changes 

to Improve Management of 

the ATC Modernization 

Program 

In our past work, we noted that FAA’s acquisitions workforce operated in

an environment where accountability was not well defined or enforced 

and vertical lines of authority impaired productivity, communication, and 

decision-making across the organization. Our recent studies have shown 

that ATO is taking steps to break down those vertical lines of authority 

and organizational “stovepipes.” ATO has become a flatter organization,

with fewer management layers. Additionally, the Chief Operating Officer 

(COO), who heads ATO, is holding ATO’s vice presidents collectively 

accountable for the organization’s success, in addition to their areas of 

specific responsibility. The COO conducts daily meetings with the 

managers of ATO’s departments to review operations. According to the 

COO, these meetings have provided a more holistic perspective on the 

organization since, formally, some managers were only focused on and

responsible for their own departments. 

ATO is also in the early stages of involving the line staff in the efforts 

aimed at increasing organizational effectiveness and efficiency. For 

example, ATO surveyed the workforce to determine the extent to which 

employees and managers believe the organization exhibits managerial 

accountability, customer focus, and transformational leadership. The first 

survey established a baseline against which ATO plans to measure 

progress through future annual surveys. By analyzing the results, ATO 

expects to determine the underlying assumptions that drive employee 

behavior and decide where to target efforts for change. According to an 

ATO official, such a root-cause level of analysis has never been done 

before in FAA. FAA is also undertaking an initiative that includes creating 

a training framework and measures for the effectiveness of that training. 

These initiatives mirror effective human capital practices that we have 

identified in previous reports. 

Page 7 GAO-06-653T 
In addition to organizational efforts, ATO is moving forward with an 

improvement to its business processes with the development of a cost 

accounting system, which will eventually be implemented throughout FAA 

to improve its financial management. Ultimately, ATO plans to routinely 

incorporate the cost information generated by the cost accounting system 

into its investment decision-making. When implemented, this cost 

accounting system will address a long-standing GAO concern that FAA has 

not had the needed cost accounting practices in place to effectively 

manage software-intensive investments, which characterize many of the 

agency’s major ATC system acquisitions. This type of information can be

used to improve future cost estimates for these acquisitions. 

In another change to its business processes, FAA has stated that its 

management will provide additional information to decision makers to 

better illustrate the rationale behind its budget requests. This information 

is helpful to decision makers when budget constraints do not allow all 

system acquisitions to be fully funded at their planned and approved 

levels, leaving FAA to decide which programs to fund and which to cut,

according to its priorities. Those that are cut may fall behind schedule,

requiring FAA to continue operating and maintaining the older equipment

and possibly delaying the realization of benefits from the new system. To 

address this issue, we recommended that FAA identify and annually report 

on programs that have had funding deferred, reduced, or eliminated, and 

the impact of those decisions on ATC modernization.7

 Such information 

would make clear how constrained budgets will affect modernization of 

the national airspace system and how FAA is working to live within its 

means. In its formal written response to our recommendation, FAA stated 

its intent to better inform Congress in the future by providing information 

in its capital investment plan, submitted to Congress annually with the 

President’s Budget, that will identify changes from the preceding year. We 

have not yet verified whether FAA’s action fully responds to our 

recommendation. 

ATO Has Increased

Scrutiny of Its Investment 

Decisions 

ATO has taken several steps to increase its scrutiny of its acquisition 

decisions, both with initial investment decisions and as part of acquisition 

oversight. Since 2004, the ATO executive council has been reviewing the 

 7

GAO, The National Airspace System: FAA Has Made Progress but Continues to Face

Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic Control Systems, GAO-05-331 (Washington,

D.C.: June 10, 2005). 

Page 8 GAO-06-653T 
mission need and readiness for decisions for all proposed investments. 

Furthermore, to ensure executive-level oversight of all key decisions, FAA 

plans to incorporate key decision points in a knowledge-based product 

development process by June 2006, as we have recommended; however, 

we have not yet independently assessed the sufficiency of this change.

FAA has also issued guidance on how to develop and use investment 

pricing, including guidelines for disclosing the levels of uncertainty and 

imprecision that are inherent in cost estimates for major ATC systems. 

To improve its understanding of system requirements, FAA has developed 

a software acquisition process improvement model.8

 When a system’s 

requirements are not fully understood at the start of an acquisition, 

requirements must often be redefined or unplanned work performed, 

which takes time and can be costly. In addition, unplanned work may 

occur when the agency misjudges the extent to which a commercial-offthe-shelf or nondevelopmental item, such as one procured by another 

agency, will meet the agency’s needs. To address these issues, FAA has 

developed and applied a process improvement model that assesses the 

maturity of FAA’s software and systems capabilities. As we reported, this

approach has resulted in enhanced productivity, higher quality, greater 

ability to predict schedules and resources, better morale, and improved 

communication and teamwork.9

 However, FAA did not mandate the use of 

the model throughout the organization. In response to our 

recommendation that FAA institutionalize the model’s use throughout the 

organization, FAA has begun developing a requirement that acquisition 

projects have process improvement activities in place before seeking 

approval from FAA’s investment review board. 

With regard to acquisition investment oversight, ATO has increased the 

use of an earned value approach to program oversight.10 In fiscal year 2000,

only 4 programs used an earned value approach, compared to 19 major 

active programs in fiscal year 2006. Going forward, all new acquisitions 

will use an earned value approach. ATO has also conducted business case 

 8

FAA’s process improvement model, titled “Integrated Capability Maturity Model,” is a tool 

to assess the maturity of the agency’s software acquisition capabilities. 

9

GAO, Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities Improved, but More Can Be

Done to Institutionalize Improvements, GAO-04-901 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004). 

10An earned valued management system measures performance by comparing the value of

work accomplished with work scheduled and thereby provides early warning of schedule 

delays and cost overruns. 

Page 9 GAO-06-653T 
reviews for facilities and equipment- and operations-funded programs. 

Based on these reviews, ATO terminated funding for three projects. One 

was cancelled because the prototype lacked demonstrable benefits, 

another due to a poor business case, and the third due to weaknesses in its 

business case as well as schedule and performance issues.11

Additionally, FAA has implemented, or is in the process of implementing, a 

number of recommendations that we have made to improve acquisition 

investment management. For example, FAA is now considering all 

information technology investments as a complete portfolio. In 2004, we 

pointed out that FAA was not evaluating projects beyond the first 2 years 

of service to ensure alignment with organizational goals.12 Consequently,

the agency could not ensure that projects with a longer service history 

(which at the time totaled about $1.3 billion per year) were still aligned 

with FAA’s strategic plans and business goals and objectives. We 

recommended that FAA include these projects in its investment portfolio 

management for review. In response to this and other recommendations 

we have made, FAA is making revisions to its Acquisition Management 

System. FAA has modified its Acquisition Management Policy to require 

periodic monitoring of in-service systems to collect and analyze 

performance data to use as the basis for sustained deployment. In a similar 

vein, ATO has committed to basing future funding decisions for system 

acquisitions on their contribution to reducing the agency’s operating costs

while maintaining safety. ATO is also requiring that acquisition planning 

documents be prepared in a format consistent with that prescribed by the 

Office of Management and Budget for use in justifying all major capital

investments. 

 11The Medium Intensity Airport Weather System (MIAWS), intended to provide a real time 

display of storm positions and estimated storm tracks, was terminated for lack of 

demonstrable benefit. The Mode Select (Mode S) program, intended to provide enhanced 

radar surveillance information, was terminated due to a poor business case. The Asset and 

Supply Chain Management Program, intended to assist in asset and logistics management,

was terminated due to business case weaknesses and schedule and performance issues. 

12GAO, Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management Capabilities in 

Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems Is Needed, GAO-04-822 (Washington,

D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004). 

Page 10 GAO-06-653T 
FAA has met its acquisitions performance goal 2 years in a row. The goal 

for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 was to have 80 percent of its system 

acquisitions on schedule and within 10 percent of budget. The goal 

gradually increases to 90 percent by fiscal year 2008. The increase will 

make FAA’s acquisition performance goal consistent with targets set in the 

Department of Transportation’s strategic plan and will comply with the 

Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994.13

FAA Met Its Acquisition 

Performance Goal for the 

Second Consecutive Year, 

but Use of Revised 

Milestones Does Not 

Provide Consistent 

Benchmarks 

Having such a goal is also consistent with the President’s Management 

Agenda, which calls for a commitment to achieve immediate, concrete, 

and measurable results in the near term, and meeting this goal shows 

progress toward better acquisition management. However, because the 

milestones for certain acquisitions have changed over the years to reflect 

changes in cost and schedule, using those revised milestones may not 

provide a complete picture of the acquisition’s progress over time. For 

example, the milestones for 3 of the 16 major system acquisitions that we 

reviewed in detail during 2004 and 2005 were being revised to reflect cost 

or schedule changes during 2005. These revised milestones, together with 

revised targets for meeting them, will become the new milestones for 

fiscal year 2006. While revising milestones and targets that are no longer 

valid is an appropriate management action, using revised targets for 

measuring performance does not provide a consistent benchmark over 

time. The extent to which an acquisition meets its annual performance 

targets is one measure of its performance and should be viewed together 

with other measures, such as its progress against original and revised 

baselines. The variance reports provided to the FAA Administrator and to 

Congress may also be useful in evaluating an acquisition’s performance.14

Since fiscal year 2003, the number of acquisition programs measured by 

FAA has varied from 31 to 42. According to FAA, the number varies from 

year to year, in part, because some programs reach completion and others

are initiated. The programs that are selected each fiscal year represent a 

cross section of ATO programs, including investments in new capabilities 

and others that are ready for use without modification. FAA’s Portfolio of 

Goals, which provides supplementary information on the agency’s 

performance goals, asserts that no bias exists in the selection of 

 13Pub. L. No. 103-355. 

14According to FAA, the agency tracks acquisition program performance from its original 

baseline or any subsequently approved baselines approved by the Joint Resource Council 

and reports variances to the Administrator and to Congress as required. 

Page 11 GAO-06-653T 
milestones for performance review, but does not state the basis for this 

conclusion. The portfolio also states that the milestones selected represent 

the program office’s determination of the efforts that are “critical” or 

important enough to warrant inclusion in the acquisition performance goal 

for the year. However, we have not conducted a detailed examination of 

the reliability and validity of FAA’s metrics for its acquisition program 

performance. 

ATO Is Reviewing Its 

Infrastructure and 

Operations for Cost 

Savings, but Lacks 

Consistent Processes for 

Determining Savings 

ATO is seeking cost savings by reviewing its operations and infrastructure. 

It has begun to decommission ground-based navigational aids, such as 

compass locators, outer markers and nondirectional radio beacons, as it 

begins to transition to a satellite-based navigation system. In fiscal year 

2005, ATO decommissioned 177 navigational aids, claiming a savings of 

$2.9 million. In addition to the savings generated from decommissioning, 

one expert with whom we spoke noted that these sites could be converted 

to revenue-generating uses, such as leasing the sites for warehouses or cell 

phone towers. ATO also expects to reduce costs through streamlining its 

operations. For example, it is consolidating its administrative activities, 

currently decentralized across its nine regions, into three regions, and 

anticipates an annual savings of up to $460 million over the next 10 years. 

Our work analyzing international air navigation service providers has 

shown that additional cost savings may be possible by further 

consolidating ATC facilities such as terminal radar approach control 

(TRACON) facilities and air traffic control centers. According to one 

estimate, consolidating the existing 21 air route traffic control centers into

6 centers could save approximately $600 million per year. 

ATO also expects to reduce costs through outsourcing. For example, it 

reduced costs by outsourcing its automated flight service stations to a 

private contractor and expects to achieve savings of $1.7 billion over ten 

years. Additionally, $0.5 billion in savings are expected to be realized by 

staffing reductions of 400 that occurred between the time the outsourcing 

began and the new contract was actually implemented. The agency 

expects to receive $66 million—the first installment of these cost 

savings—in fiscal year 2007. 

However, we have found that ATO lacks a consistent process for 

identifying the costs and benefits associated with some of its cost control 

efforts. For example, ATO did not offset its reported savings from 

decommissioning navigational aids with the costs likely to accompany 

such activities, such as real property disposition (including buildings or 

real property leases, standby power systems, and fuel storage tanks), site 

Page 12 GAO-06-653T 
cleanup, and restoration. Without a transparent and verifiable process for 

determining the savings, as well as the offsetting costs, the true savings 

remain unclear. As ATO proceeds with these efforts, stakeholders also 

caution that decommissioning navigational aids should entail 

comprehensive risk mitigation to ensure that ATO retains adequate safety

levels. 

However, while facility consolidations could offer additional savings, an 

FAA official noted that there are practical limits to these efforts. For 

example, consolidated facilities would need to handle higher volumes of 

communication, but as the volume of communication increases, so does 

“latency”—the delay in transmission that occurs between sending and 

receiving messages. According to FAA, studies of telecommunications 

centers in the private sector suggest that 15 facilities that combine the 

approximately 180 existing en route and oceanic air traffic control centers

and terminal radar approach control facilities might be appropriate. 

Security concerns, such as the need for redundancy, also come into play in

consolidation decisions. Consequently, if FAA decides to procede with 

facility closures, it is important that it do so within the context of a logical, 

well-documented, and risk-based process in consultation with 

congressional oversight committees. 

ATO Faces Human Capital 

Challenges in 

Institutionalizing Its 

Performance-based 

Organization and Hiring 

and Training Thousands of 

Air Traffic Controllers 

ATO faces a challenge in sustaining and institutionalizing its efforts to 

operate as a PBO. Our work has shown that successful transformations 

and the institutionalization of change in large public and private 

organizations can take 5 to 7 years or more to fully implement.15 Longterm, high-level management attention will be needed to assess ATO’s 

transformation on a continuing basis.

FAA also faces the challenge of hiring and training thousands of air traffic 

controllers during the coming decade. According to its controller staffing 

plan, FAA expects to lose about 11,000 air traffic controllers due to 

voluntary retirements or mandatory retirements at age 56, as well as other 

reasons.16 These retirements stem from the 1981 controller strike, when 

President Ronald Reagan fired over 10,000 air traffic controllers, and FAA 

then had to quickly rebuild the controller workforce. From 1982 through 

 15GAO-03-669. 

16Federal Aviation Administration, A Plan for the Future: The Federal Aviation 

Administration’s 10-Year Strategy for the Air Traffic Control Workforce (Dec. 21, 2004). 

Page 13 GAO-06-653T 
1991, FAA hired an average of 2,655 controllers per year. These controllers 

will become eligible for retirement during the next decade. 

To replace these controllers, as well as those who will leave for other 

reasons, and to accommodate forecasted changes in air traffic, FAA plans 

to issue annual air traffic controller staffing plans based on the agency’s 

air traffic forecast. FAA’s December 2004 Air Traffic Controller Work 

Force Plan called for hiring 12,500 new controllers over 10 years, based on

the agency’s 2004 air traffic forecast.17 FAA informed us that its 2006 

staffing plan update, which it expects to issue shortly, will reflect the need 

to hire fewer controllers over the next few years, compared to the 2004 

plan, because FAA’s 2006 air traffic forecast predicts less air traffic during

this time frame. In fiscal year 2005, FAA hired 438 controllers—three more 

than its target, which was constrained that year due to budget

considerations. According to an FAA official, FAA plans to hire 930 

controllers in fiscal year 2006 (FAA had hired 637 controllers through May 

2006). 

Adequately involving stakeholders in a system’s development is important 

to ensure that the system meets users’ needs. In the past, air traffic 

controllers were permanently assigned to FAA’s major system acquisition 

program offices and provided input into air traffic control modernization 

projects. In June 2005, FAA terminated this arrangement because of 

budget constraints and other reasons. According to FAA, it now plans to 

obtain the subject-matter expertise of air traffic controllers or other 

stakeholders as needed in major system acquisitions. It remains to be seen

whether this approach will suffice for stakeholder involvement. Our past 

work has indicated that a lack of stakeholder involvement both early on 

and throughout a system’s development was a systemic factor contributing 

to acquisitions missing their cost, schedule, and performance targets. 

FAA Faces Challenges in 

Ensuring Stakeholder 

Involvement in Major 

System Acquisitions 

FAA Faces Challenges in 

Keeping Acquisitions on 

Schedule and within

Budget 

Three systems—all communications-related—missed their fiscal year 2005

acquisition performance goals for schedule. According to FAA, the $310

million FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) acquisition, which 

is replacing costly existing networks of separately managed systems and 

services by integrating advanced telecommunications services, was behind 

 17According to FAA, since issuing its controller staffing plan, it has achieved productivity 

gains that have reduced the need to hire about 460 air traffic controllers. 

Page 14 GAO-06-653T 
schedule because the program was unable to ramp up its activities to the 

level specified in its plan. To complete the installations in the first quarter 

of fiscal year 2008 as originally scheduled, FAA initiated a plan to put the

program back on schedule and has met the plan’s milestones since August 

2005. 

To the extent that delays in FTI persist, FAA will not accrue the full extent 

of the $672 million in cost savings that the program was expected to 

produce. The Department of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector 

General has reported that FAA did not realize $32.6 million in anticipated 

operating cost savings in fiscal year 2005 because of the limited progress 

made in disconnecting legacy circuits. The office also reported that 

without a nearly tenfold increase in its rate of transferring service to FTI 

and disconnecting legacy circuits, FAA stands to miss out on an additional 

$102 million in cost savings in fiscal year 2006. FAA has informed us that 

since the Inspector General made this assessment, the program has 

achieved a significant increase in the rates of transferring over services 

and disconnecting legacy circuits. As an alternative to continuing the 

current FTI program, some experts have suggested that FAA consider 

outsourcing this activity, as it did for its flight service stations.18

Two other communications acquisition programs also missed their 

acquisition performance goals for schedule in 2005—the $325 million Next 

Generation Air-to-Ground Communication system, segment 1A, which 

replaces analog communication systems with digital systems, and the $85 

million Ultra High Frequency Radio Replacement, which replaces aging 

equipment used to communicate with Department of Defense aircraft. 

According to an FAA official, as the agency assessed its priorities for fiscal 

year 2005, a decision was made that these programs would receive fewer 

resources. The resources that were then available were not sufficient to 

allow the programs to meet established milestones. 

In summary, ATO has made a number of promising moves toward 

operating effectively as a PBO, and we view ATO’s efforts to improve its 

management and acquisitions processes as positive steps. However, ATO 

has been established for only slightly more than 2 years. Work remains to 

ensure that these processes become institutionalized and that continuing 

challenges are addressed. Although it is still too early to evaluate the 

effectiveness of many of these steps, we are monitoring ATO’s progress. 

 18In February 2005, FAA awarded a contract for the operation of its flight service stations. 

Page 15 GAO-06-653T 
Moving forward, ATO will play a key role in implementing NGATS, as 

planned by JPDO. I will now discuss the status of JPDO’s planning efforts. 

JPDO has implemented several effective practices to facilitate 

collaboration among its partner agencies, but faces challenges in 

continuing to leverage resources. JPDO is working to develop a cost 

estimate for NGATS through a series of workshops with various 

stakeholders. JPDO is taking a reasonable approach to technical planning, 

but some key tasks are yet to be completed. However, JPDO faces several

challenges, including maintaining stakeholder support over the long term, 

defining roles and responsibilities as well as deciding how to coordinate 

the implementation of NGATS, and addressing several critical policy 

issues. 

JPDO Has Made 

Progress in Planning 

for NGATS, but Faces 

Challenges in Several 

Areas 

JPDO Is Working to 

Facilitate Collaboration 

among Federal Agencies, 

but Faces Challenges in 

Continuing to Leverage 

Resources 

Our work to date shows that JPDO is implementing a number of practices

that our work has shown facilitates the federal interagency collaboration

that is central to its mission and legislative mandate. According to our 

research, agencies must have a clear and compelling rationale for working 

together to overcome significant differences in their missions, cultures, 

and established ways of doing business. In developing JPDO’s integrated 

plan,19 the partner agencies agreed to a vision statement and eight 

strategies that broadly address the goals and objectives for NGATS. These 

strategies formed the basis for JPDO’s eight integrated product teams 

(IPT), and various partner agencies have taken the lead on specific 

strategies. Our research has also shown that it is important for 

collaborating agencies to leverage the human, technological, and physical 

resources needed to initiate or sustain their collaborative effort. To 

leverage human resources, JPDO has staffed the various levels of its 

organization with partner-agency employees, many of whom work part 

time for JPDO. To leverage technological resources, JPDO conducted an

interagency program review of its partner agencies’ research and 

development programs to identify work that could support NGATS. 

Through this process, JPDO identified early opportunities that could be

pursued during fiscal year 2007 to produce tangible results for NGATS, 

 19The Vision 100 Act called for JPDO to create and carry out an integrated plan for NGATS. 

This integrated plan was developed by the partner agencies and submitted to Congress on 

December 12, 2004. 

Page 16 GAO-06-653T 
such as the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)20

program at FAA. 

However, while JPDO’s legislation, integrated plan, and governance 

structure21 provide the framework for collaboration among multiple 

federal agencies, JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body 

that lacks authority over the key human and technological resources 

needed to continue developing plans and system requirements for NGATS. 

Consequently, the ability to continue leveraging resources of the partner 

agencies will be critical to JPDO’s success. Beginning around 2008, JPDO 

expects a significant increase in its IPTs’ workloads. JPDO officials told us 

that although the partner agencies have not yet expressed concerns over 

the time that their employees spend on JPDO work, it remains to be seen 

whether agencies will be willing to allow their staff to devote more of their 

time to JPDO. In addition, JPDO anticipates needing more agency 

resources to plan and coordinate demonstrations of potential technologies 

to illustrate some of the early benefits that could be achieved from the 

transformation to NGATS. 

This challenge of leveraging resources arises, in part, because the partner 

agencies have a variety of missions and priorities other than supporting 

NGATS. NASA, for example, while conducting key aeronautical and safety 

research and development relevant to NGATS, nonetheless has other 

competing missions. NASA has recently reduced its aeronautics budget

and plans to focus its efforts on foundational research.22 This decision 

raises two important questions. First, what research needed for NGATS 

will NASA perform or not perform? Second, for the foundational research 

that will be performed, who will perform the development steps—the 

validation and demonstration of new technology—that must take place 

 20ADS-B is a surveillance technology that transmits an aircraft’s identity, position, velocity,

and intent to other aircraft and to ATC systems on the ground, thereby enabling pilots and 

controllers to have a common picture of airspace and traffic. By providing pilots with a 

display that shows the location of nearby aircraft, the system enables pilots to collaborate

in decision making with controllers, safely allowing reduced aircraft separation and 

thereby increasing capacity within the national airspace system. 

21Some of JPDO’s governance structure was determined by Vision 100, which directed the

Secretary of Transportation to establish a Senior Policy Committee and set forth the 

membership of this committee. In addition, JPDO has established a Board of Directors, a 

Master IPT, and several divisions. 

22NASA uses the term foundational to refer to research that explores core science, but does 

so with a view toward how the research will be applied.

Page 17 GAO-06-653T 
before a new technology can be transferred to industry and incorporated 

into a product? JPDO and FAA officials told us that not enough is 

understood about what NASA plans to do and not do and, therefore, the 

impact of NASA’s action on NGATS remains unclear at present. 

However, many experts with whom we spoke believe that NASA’s new 

focus on foundational research creates a gap in the technology 

development continuum. Some believe that FAA has neither the research 

and development infrastructure nor the funding to do this work. FAA’s 

Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee (REDAC),23

in a draft report, estimates that FAA would need at least $100 million 

annually in increased funding to perform this research and development 

work, and that reestablishing the infrastructure within FAA to accomplish 

this work could delay NGATS implementation by 5 years. An official of the 

working group that produced the draft report stated that a significant 

amount of research and development is needed to create NGATS. For 

example, the official stated that more research is needed to understand 

wake vortex, which could be a limiting factor in airspace capacity and 

would impact aircraft sequencing for landing or departure.24 The official 

also stated that intermediate-level technology development is important in 

establishing “product proof,” meaning that technology needs to be 

validated, demonstrated, and certified before beginning the systems 

acquisition process. 

JPDO officials view leveraging partner agency resources as one of their 

most significant near-term challenges. JPDO officials stated that they feel

the process has worked sufficiently well so far. For example, JPDO 

successfully requested that FAA pursue funding in its fiscal year 2007 

budget request to accelerate development of ADS-B and System Wide 

Information Management (SWIM),25 which are two key systems identified 

 23FAA’s Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee, established in 1989,

advises the FAA Administrator on research and development issues and coordinates FAA’s

research, engineering, and development activities with industry and other government

agencies. The committee considers aviation research needs in air traffic services, airport 

technology, aircraft safety, aviation security, human factors, and environment and energy. 

24Wake vortex is air turbulence that occurs behind an aircraft and was a cause in the 2001 

American Airlines accident in which 265 people died. 

25SWIM is expected to help in the transition to network-centric operations by providing the 

infrastructure and associated policies and standards to enable information sharing among 

all authorized system users, such as the airlines, other government agencies, and the 

military. 

Page 18 GAO-06-653T 
for NGATS. However, as noted, our past work on FAA’s national airspace

modernization program has shown that receiving fewer resources than 

planned was one factor that contributed to delays in implementing 

technologies and significant cost increases. Thus, continuing success in 

leveraging partner agencies’ resources will help avoid program delays and 

reduction in the benefits-to-cost ratio. 

To further leverage resources for NGATS, JPDO has issued guidance to its 

partner agencies identifying areas that JPDO would like to see emphasized 

in the agencies’ fiscal year 2008 budget requests and expects to follow this 

process annually in the years to come. JPDO officials have informed us 

that they have held face-to-face discussions with partner agency managers 

about the guidance and are currently in the process of reviewing partner 

agency responses to the guidance and identifying whether gaps exist. Such 

gaps will be presented to the Senior Policy Committee for discussion at its 

July meeting, according to these officials. 

JPDO is currently working with the Office of Management and Budget to 

develop a systematic means of reviewing partner agency budget requests 

so that the NGATS-related funding in each request is easily identified. This 

includes a review of budgets submitted by the Department of Homeland 

Security for efforts by the Transportation Security Administration and the 

Department of Commerce for efforts by the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration. Such a process would help the Office of 

Management and Budget consider NGATS as a unified federal investment, 

rather than as disparate line items distributed across several agencies’ 

budget requests. 

JPDO Is Working to 

Develop a Cost Estimate 

for NGATS 

Important to the planning of NGATS is the development of realistic cost 

estimates for the entire NGATS. To assist in developing such estimates, 

JPDO is holding a series of investment analysis workshops with 

stakeholders to obtain their input. The first workshop, held in April 2006, 

was for commercial and business aviation, equipment manufacturers, and 

systems developers. The second workshop is planned for early July for 

operators of lower performance aircraft used in both commercial and noncommercial operations, including general aviation personal and business 

flying, flight training, piston and turbine rotorcraft as well as public users 

of the system including civil and military aircraft operated by local, state, 

and federal governments. The third workshop, planned for late July or 

early August, will focus on airports and other local, state, and regional 

planning bodies. JPDO plans to use the combined information from these 

Page 19 GAO-06-653T 
three workshops to begin to develop a range of the potential costs of 

NGATS. 

Preliminary estimates of NGATS’ cost, developed by REDAC and ATO, 

could also provide input into JPDO’s cost estimate. REDAC and ATO 

officials emphasized that their estimates are preliminary and not yet 

endorsed by any agency. A draft study by REDAC’s Financing the NGATS 

Working Group estimated that to implement NGATS and continue 

operating the national airspace system through 2025, the combined costs 

of FAA’s four appropriation accounts—operations, facilities and 

equipment, research, engineering and development—and grants-in-aid for 

airports (commonly known as the Airport Improvement Program)—would 

average about $15 billion per year, or about $900 million more than FAA’s 

fiscal year 2006 appropriation. The estimate assumes that (1) the general 

fund contribution will be 20 percent, using the current trust fund revenue

model and (2) between 2011 and 2025, productivity increases will offset 

the increased operating costs of additional demand.26

ATO has developed a preliminary estimate of the increased facilities and 

equipment cost that NGATS would require. ATO estimates that the 

cumulative additional facilities and equipment cost between fiscal years 

2006 and 2025 would be about $15.3 billion, or about $800 million per year, 

on average, from fiscal year 2007 through 2025. According to an ATO 

official, the ATO facilities and equipment cost estimate is the same as the 

facilities and equipment component of REDAC’s cost estimate. The only 

difference is that ATO’s estimate accounts for inflation, while REDAC 

expresses its estimate in constant 2005 dollars. 

In addition to being preliminary, it is important to note the limitations of 

these estimates. First, ATO’s estimate does not include any costs other 

than those for facilities and equipment. However, an ATO official 

acknowledged that there would likely be additional costs within FAA, such 

as for safety certification or making operational changes to respond to 

NGATS’ new technologies. Additionally, ATO’s facilities and equipment 

cost estimate assumes that the intermediate technology development 

work, which NASA has historically performed, has been completed. As I 

 26The $15 billion estimate is based on the working group’s “base case” scenario. The

working group also calculated a lower cost “best case” scenario, in which FAA achieves an

annual 2 percent productivity increase beyond the cost of increased demand; and a higher

cost “worst case” scenario, in which costs grow with the increase in operations with no 

productivity increases. 

Page 20 GAO-06-653T 
previously stated, REDAC believes that the cost of intermediate 

technology development could be substantial. Furthermore, neither 

estimate includes other partner agencies’ costs to implement NGATS, such

as those that the Department of Homeland Security might incur to develop 

and implement new security procedures. Also, these estimates treat 

NGATS’ development and implementation period as an isolated event.

Consequently, the costs drop dramatically toward 2025. In reality, officials 

who developed these estimates acknowledge that planning for the 

subsequent “next generation” system will likely be underway as 2025 

approaches and that actual operations and modernization costs could be 

higher in this time frame than these estimates indicate. 

In addition, several unknown factors will drive the cost of NGATS. 

According to JPDO, one of these drivers is the technologies expected to be

included in NGATS. Some of these are more complex and thus more 

expensive to implement than others. A second driver is the sequence in 

which NGATS technologies will replace the technologies now in use. A 

third driver is the length of time required to transition to NGATS, since a 

longer transition period would impose higher costs. Later this year, JPDO 

expects to issue a first draft of its enterprise architecture, or blueprint for 

the NGATS, which could reduce these variables, thereby allowing 

improved, albeit still preliminary, estimates of NGATS’ cost. 

JPDO Is Taking a 

Reasonable Approach to 

Technical Planning, but 

Some Key Tasks are Yet to 

Be Completed 

To conduct the technical planning for NGATS, JPDO has formed separate 

divisions to perform system modeling and create the NGATS enterprise 

architecture, but has not yet completed key activities. JPDO has formed an 

Evaluation and Analysis Division (EAD), composed of FAA and NASA 

employees and contractors, to assemble a suite of models that will help 

JPDO refine its plans for NGATS and iteratively narrow the range of 

potential solutions. For example, EAD has used modeling to begin 

studying how possible changes in the duties of key individuals, such as air 

traffic controllers, could affect the workload and performance of others, 

such as airport ground personnel. 

As I previously noted, NGATS could shift some tasks now done by air 

traffic controllers to pilots. According to JPDO officials, the change in

roles of pilots and controllers is the most important human factors issue 

involved in creating the NGATS. JPDO officials noted that the Agile 

Airspace and Safety IPTs contain human factors specialists and that 

JPDO’s chief architect has a background in human factors. However, EAD 

has not yet begun to model the effect of the shift in roles on pilots’ 

performance because, according to an EAD official, a suitable model has

Page 21 GAO-06-653T 
not yet been incorporated into the modeling tool suite. According to EAD, 

addressing this issue is necessary, but will be difficult because data on 

pilot behavior are not readily available to use in creating such models. 

Furthermore, EAD has not yet studied the training implications of various 

NGATS-proposed solutions because further definition of the concept of 

operations for these solutions has not been completed. As the concept of

operations matures, it will be important for air traffic controllers and other 

affected stakeholders to provide their perspectives on these modeling 

efforts. In addition, as the concept of operations and plans for sequencing 

equipment matures, EAD will be able to study the extent to which new air 

traffic controllers will have to be trained to operate both the old and the 

new equipment. 

To develop an enterprise architecture—a blueprint for NGATS and one of 

the most critical planning documents in the NGATS effort—JPDO has 

taken several important first steps and is following several effective

practices that we have identified for enterprise architecture development. 

However, JPDO’s enterprise architecture is currently a work in progress 

and many of JPDO’s future activities will depend on the robustness and 

timeliness of its architecture development. The enterprise architecture will 

describe FAA’s operation of the current national airspace system, JPDO’s 

plans for the NGATS, and the sequence of steps needed to transition 

between them. The enterprise architecture will provide the means for 

coordinating among the partner agencies and private sector 

manufacturers, aligning relevant research and development activities, and

integrating equipment. And as I noted earlier, the enterprise architecture 

will also be a key tool in developing cost estimates for NGATS. 

To date, JPDO has formed an Enterprise Architecture Division and has 

established and filled a chief architect position. JPDO has also established 

an NGATS Architecture Council composed of representatives from each 

partner agency’s chief architect office to provide the organizational 

structure and oversight needed to develop the enterprise architecture. 

JPDO is using a phased “build a little, test a little” approach for developing

and refining its enterprise architecture that is similar to a process that we 

have advocated for FAA’s major system acquisition programs. In addition,

this phased development process will allow JPDO to incorporate evolving 

market forces and technologies in its architecture and thus better manage

change. JPDO plans to have an early version of the architecture by the end 

of fiscal year 2006. 

Page 22 GAO-06-653T 
JPDO has structured itself to involve federal and nonfederal stakeholders

throughout its organization, but maintaining their long-term support will 

be a challenge. Our work has shown that involving stakeholders can, 

among other things, increase their support for a collaborative effort. 

Federal stakeholders from the partner agencies serve on JPDO’s Senior 

Policy Committee, board, and IPTs. Nonfederal stakeholders may 

participate through the NGATS Institute (the Institute). Through the 

Institute, JPDO obtained the participation of over 180 stakeholders from 

over 70 organizations for the IPTs. The NGATS Institute Management 

Council, composed of top officials and representatives from the aviation 

community, oversees the policy and recommendations of the Institute and 

provides a means for advancing consensus positions on critical NGATS 

issues. 

Maintaining Stakeholder 

Support Will Be a LongTerm Challenge for JPDO 

Although JPDO has developed the mechanisms for involving stakeholders

and brought stakeholders into the process, it faces challenges in sustaining 

nonfederal stakeholders’ participation over the long term. Much as with 

the federal partner agencies, JPDO has no direct authority over the human, 

technical, or financial resources of its nonfederal stakeholders. To date, 

these stakeholders’ investment in NGATS has been through their part-time, 

pro bono participation on the IPTs and the NGATS Institute Management 

Council.27 The challenge for JPDO is to maintain the interest and 

enthusiasm of these nonfederal stakeholders, which will have to juggle 

their own multiple priorities and resource demands, even though some of 

the tangible benefits of NGATS may not be realized for several years. For 

example, stakeholders’ support will be important for programs such as 

SWIM, which is a prerequisite to future benefits, but may not produce 

tangible benefits in the near term. 

In the wake of past national airspace modernization efforts, JPDO also 

faces the challenge of convincing nonfederal stakeholders that the 

government is financially committed to NGATS. While most of FAA’s 

major ATC acquisition programs are currently on track, earlier attempts at 

modernizing the national airspace system encountered many difficulties. 

In one instance, for example, FAA developed a datalink communications 

system that transmitted scripted e-mail-like messages between controllers

and pilots. One airline equipped some of its aircraft with this new 

 27Nonfederal stakeholders’ participation varies from approximately 10 percent to 25 

percent of their time per week on the IPTs and involves approximately one meeting per 

month for members of the council. 

Page 23 GAO-06-653T 
technology, but because of funding cuts, among other things, FAA ended 

up canceling the program. In a similar vein, we have reported that some 

aviation stakeholders expressed concern that FAA may not follow through 

with its airspace redesign efforts and are hesitant to invest in equipment 

unless they are sure that FAA’s efforts will continue. One expert suggested 

to us that the government might mitigate this issue by making an initial 

investment in a specific technology before requesting that airlines or other 

industry stakeholders purchase equipment. 

In addition to maintaining stakeholder involvement, JPDO faces 

challenges in obtaining the participation of all stakeholders. In particular,

JPDO does not involve current air traffic controllers, who will play a key 

role in NGATS. The current air traffic control system is based primarily on 

the premise that air traffic controllers direct pilots to maintain safe 

separation between aircraft. In NGATS, this premise could change and,

accordingly, JPDO has recognized the need to conduct human factors 

research on such issues, including how tasks should be allocated between

humans and automated systems and how the existing allocation of 

responsibilities between pilots and air traffic controllers might change. 

The input of current air traffic controllers who have recent experience 

controlling aircraft is important in considering human factors and safety 

issues. 

However, as mentioned, no current air traffic controllers are involved in

NGATS. In June 2005, FAA terminated its labor liaison program based on

its determination that program was not providing sufficient benefit 

compared to the program’s cost. The liaison program assigned air traffic

controllers to major system acquisition program offices, as well as to 

JPDO. Since that time, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association 

(NATCA), the labor union that represents air traffic controllers, has not 

been a participant in planning NGATS. Although the NGATS Institute 

Management Council includes a seat for the union, a NATCA official told 

us that the union’s head had been unable to attend the council’s meetings. 

According to JPDO officials, the council has left a seat open in hopes that

the controllers will participate in NGATS as the new labor-management 

agreement between NATCA and FAA is implemented. 

Finally, some of the benefits of NGATS’ are contingent on users of the 

system—airlines and general aviation—equipping their aircraft with 

NGATS-compatible technologies. This is particularly important concerning

ADS-B, a new air traffic surveillance system that JPDO has determined will

be one of the early core technologies for NGATS. The first phase of ADS-B 

implementation, known as “ADS-B out,” will allow FAA to replace many 

Page 24 GAO-06-653T 
ground radars that currently provide aircraft surveillance with less costly 

ground-based transceivers. Aircraft would be equipped with ADS-B out, 

which broadcasts a signal to these transceivers. FAA anticipates 

significant cost savings from this phase and, according to trade association 

officials, regional and large commercial airlines are largely supportive of 

this initial phase. But implementing ADS-B out is just the first step to 

achieving the larger benefits of ADS-B, which would be provided by “ADSB in.” ADS-B in would allow aircraft to receive signals from ground-based 

transceivers or directly from other ADS-B equipped aircraft—this could 

allow pilots to “see” nearby traffic and, consequently, take on some 

responsibility for maintaining safe separation from those aircraft. 

However, before airlines can establish a business case that supports an 

investment, several unknowns concerning ADS-B in must be resolved. For 

example, the cost of installing ADS-B in must be determined. Also, human 

factors considerations need further exploration to determine whether 

pilots can safely use ADS-B in to maintain separation of aircraft. Finally, it

is unclear whether air carriers will be willing to equip with the second 

frequency that ADS-B would require.28 How these issues are resolved will 

be an important factor in airlines’ decisions on whether to equip with ADSB in. Given the breadth and complexity of NGATS, issues involving 

equipage decisions by nonfederal stakeholders are likely to arise again and 

can impact the extent and speed to which the benefits envisioned by 

NGATS will be realized. 

As NGATS Moves Toward 

Implementation, Defining 

Roles and Responsibilities 

and Deciding How to 

Coordinate 

Implementation Are 

Challenges 

JPDO also faces the challenge of clearly defining its partner agencies’ roles 

and responsibilities. Our work has shown that collaborating agencies 

should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and 

responsibilities, including how the collaboration will be led. JPDO has 

operated thus far with no formal, long-term agreement on partner 

agencies’ roles and responsibilities in creating NGATS. JPDO officials 

informed us that they are working to establish a memorandum of 

understanding (MOU) signed by the heads of the partner agencies that will 

broadly define partner agency roles and responsibilities at a high level. 

JPDO officials said they hope to have the MOU signed and released next 

 28In 2002, FAA established a policy whereby commercial air transport, regional, and

military fleets operating in the nation’s higher airspace would use the 1090 MHz frequency. 

The policy also prescribed the use of 978 MHz, known as the “universal access transceiver” 

or UAT, for general aviation operating in lower airspace. Uplinking weather and national 

airspace status information is only possible on the 978 MHz frequency. 

Page 25 GAO-06-653T 
month. JPDO is also developing more specific MOUs with partner agencies 

that lay out expectations for support on NGATS components, such as 

information sharing through network-enabled operations. 

Defining roles and responsibilities is particularly important between JPDO 

and ATO, because both organizations have responsibilities related to 

planning the national airspace system’s modernization. ATO has primary 

responsibility for the ATC system’s current and near-term modernization, 

while JPDO has responsibility for planning and coordinating a 

transformation to NGATS over the next 20 years. The roles and 

responsibilities of each office are currently being worked out. ATO now 

plans to expand its Operational Evolution Plan so that it applies FAA-wide

and represents FAA’s piece of JPDO’s overall NGATS plan.29 ATO is also 

prioritizing its facilities and equipment investments to support the NGATS. 

As the roles and responsibilities of the two offices become more clearly 

defined, there is also a need to better communicate these decisions to 

stakeholders. 

As NGATS moves forward, JPDO and FAA must address how to define 

roles and responsibilities for managing its implementation. JPDO, FAA, 

and other aviation experts consider NGATS to be a task of unprecedented 

complexity, with each partner agency having responsibility for developing

and implementing portions of NGATS, while JPDO maintains a 

coordinating role. Recognizing the complexity involved in implementing 

NGATS, FAA and JPDO officials are considering several different 

approaches, one of which is to contract with a lead systems integrator 

(LSI). Generally, an LSI is a prime contractor that would help to ensure 

that the discrete systems used in NGATS will operate together and whose 

responsibilities may include designing system solutions, developing 

requirements, and selecting major system and subsystem contractors. 

The government has used LSIs before for complex programs that require

system-of-systems integration. Our research indicates that, while LSIs 

provide certain advantages, such as the ability to know, understand, and 

integrate functions across various systems, they also entail certain risks. 

For example, because the degree of responsibility held by the LSI may be 

significantly greater than that usually held by a prime contractor, careful 

 29Currently, FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan monitors how NAS capacity will change over

a rolling 10-year planning horizon depending on numerous variables, such as the demand 

for air travel, the completion of new runways, and the availability of new ATC systems. 

Page 26 GAO-06-653T 
oversight may be necessary to ensure that the government’s interests are 

protected and that conflicts of interest are avoided. Consequently, 

selecting, assigning responsibilities, and managing an LSI could pose 

significant challenges for JPDO and FAA. 

JPDO Must Address a 

Variety of Policy Issues 

JPDO also faces critical policy issues as NGATS moves toward 

implementation. Some stakeholders have noted that addressing the policy 

issues needed to implement NGATS technologies will be even more of a 

challenge for JPDO than determining the technologies for NGATS. JPDO’s 

Concept of Operations—a document that provides a textual operational 

description of the transformations needed to achieve NGATS’ overall 

goals—has been used to identify key research and policy issues for 

NGATS. For example, the Concept of Operations identifies several issues 

surrounding the automation of the air traffic control system, including the 

need for a backup plan in the event that automation fails, the 

responsibilities and liabilities of different stakeholders in the event of 

automation failure, and the level of monitoring needed by pilots when 

automation is ensuring safe separation from surrounding aircraft. 

JPDO officials said that most policy decisions, when they occur, will be 

tied to the requirements of the enterprise architecture. However, some 

decisions will involve input from several entities and stakeholders. For 

example, it is likely that decisions on concepts and policies relating to 

general aviation would be made in concert among FAA, JPDO, and the 

Senior Policy Committee, with significant input from the general aviation

community, to address concerns such as visual flight rules versus 

instrument flight rules. Flowing from broad policy decisions, FAA or other 

partner agencies would have to start developing regulations to implement 

the new technologies so that they would be ready at the appropriate time. 

In addition, JPDO has limited control over some of the factors affecting

NGATS-related policy issues. For example, the consolidation of ATC 

facilities could provide cost savings that could in turn be used for NGATS

technologies. However, facility consolidations can often run into political 

hurdles that are outside of JPDO’s control. Similarly, while JPDO’s Airport 

IPT is considering how airport capacity can be expanded, a JPDO official 

told us that the ability of JPDO to enhance airport capacity is still limited 

because enhancement decisions are made at the state and local level. The

official also noted that JPDO cannot channel federal funds from the 

Airport Improvement Program to airports where capacity expansion is 

most needed to achieve the goals of NGATS. 

Page 27 GAO-06-653T 
Another key policy area is how JPDO will work toward global 

harmonization. For example, concurrent with JPDO’s efforts, the 

European Commission30 is conducting a project to harmonize and 

modernize the European air traffic management systems. Known as the 

Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research Programme 

(SESAR), the project is overseen by the European Organization for the 

Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol).31 Eurocontrol has contracted out 

the work of SESAR to a 30-member consortium of airlines, air navigation

service providers, airports, manufacturers, and others. The consortium is 

receiving 60 million euros ($73 million)32 to conduct a 2-year definition 

phase and produce a master plan for SESAR. 

JPDO officials said they recognize the need for global harmonization of 

systems and have met with officials from various parts of the world—

including Europe, China, and East Asia—to assess the potential for 

cooperative NGATS demonstrations. JPDO has a Global Harmonization 

IPT, led by managers from ATO’s International Operations Planning 

Services International and FAA’s Office of International Aviation. The 

IPT’s mission is to harmonize equipment and operations globally and

advocate the adoption of U.S.-preferred transformation concepts, 

technologies, procedures, and standards. The Harmonization IPT finalized 

its charter in March 2006 and is working to develop an international 

strategy and outreach plan. In addition to external efforts, the 

Harmonization IPT plans to work as a crosscutting IPT that will raise 

awareness of global interoperability and standards issues within the other 

IPTs as they consider system performance requirements. 

According to several European officials with whom we spoke, global 

harmonization (and harmonization with the U.S. system specifically) is 

considered to be a key ingredient for the success of SESAR. Several of 

these officials said that although the European organization invited JPDO 

to participate as a full member in SESAR and the organization has 

indicated its willingness to have reciprocal participation with the United

 30The European Commission is a politically independent institution that prepares and

implements legislative instruments. 

31Eurocontrol is an autonomous organization established in 1963 with the intention of 

creating a single upper airspace in Europe. 

32A portion of this funding is in-kind services from Eurocontrol. To convert euros to U.S.

dollars, we used 1.2098, the foreign exchange rate for March 21, 2006, as published in The 

Washington Post. 

Page 28 GAO-06-653T 
States, personnel exchanges are just beginning to occur. JPDO officials 

recognize the importance of cooperative efforts and noted that if Europe 

and the United States were to implement different and incompatible 

standards and technologies, there could be a major adverse impact on 

airlines that serve international markets. Nonetheless, these officials point

out that JPDO, as a U.S. government entity, could not participate as a 

member in a private industry effort like the SESAR consortium. FAA is, 

however, a member of the European Commission’s Industry Consultation 

Body, which provides advice to SESAR. 

According to an FAA official, negotiations are currently underway to 

complete an MOU between FAA and the European Commission that will 

commit both parties to cooperation in information sharing and the 

development of a seamless air traffic management system. JPDO officials 

noted that personnel exchanges and other cooperative activities, such as 

information exchanges and a joint working group on technical standards, 

are already occurring under a memorandum of cooperation between FAA 

and Eurocontrol. 

While FAA and JPDO’s Harmonization IPT are planning cooperative 

activities, our research has identified several other areas where 

cooperation does not appear to be fully developed. For example, the 

SESAR and NGATS initiatives, despite their similarities, do not have 

coordination activities such as peer reviews of relevant research, 

cooperation on safety analysis (such as through the pooling of accident 

data), or validation of technologies. It is possible that greater cooperation 

and exchange between NGATS and SESAR might develop once planning

has progressed to the development and validation stage. 

Transforming the national airspace system to accommodate what is 

expected to be three times the current amount of traffic by 2025, providing 

adequate security and environmental safeguards—and doing these things 

seamlessly while the current system continues to operate—will be an 

enormously complex undertaking. Both ATO and JPDO have been given 

difficult tasks in a difficult budgetary environment. Going forward, efforts 

to control costs and leverage resources will become ever more critical. 

Success also depends on the ability of ATO and JPDO to define their roles 

and form a collaborative environment for planning and implementing the 

next generation system. 

Concluding 

Observations 

Page 29 GAO-06-653T 
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at 

this time. 

For further information on this statement for the record, please contact 

Gerald Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals

making key contributions to this statement include Nabajyoti Barkakati, 

Christine Bonham, Colin Fallon, Carol Henn, David Hooper, Heather 

Krause, Elizabeth Marchak, Edmond Menoche, Faye Morrison, Richard 

Scott, Sarah Veale, and Matthew Zisman. 

Page 30 GAO-06-653T 

Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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