CSI REPORT

No. 2

A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT AIR-GROUND SUPPORT

DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE IN WORLD WAR II

COMBAT

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

( IIWN=

*- a

OF R 91-00051
CSI REPORTS are short-term research papers prepared in response to official inquiries.

REPORTS are based mainly on secondary sources and provide basic information on

the subject under consideration. The views expressed in a CSI REPORT are those of

the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department

of Defense.

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE

Missions

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a departmentlevel activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the following missions:

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of the

Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for the Active Army and

Reserve Components.

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist other

USACGSC departments in integrating military history into their instruction.

3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's executive agent for the

development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military

history instruction in the TRADOC service school system.

I · I ·-r I L_

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No. 2

A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT AIR-GROUND SUPPORT

DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE IN WORLD WAR II

with an appendix on

Current Soviet Close Air Support Doctrine

by LTC Kenneth A. Steadman

Combat Studies Institute

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE COMMANDER, COMBINED ARMS CENTER

1 September 1982

91-0051
A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT AIR-GROUND SUPPORT

DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE IN WORLD WAR II

This study summarizes the air-ground support doctrine and systems

employed by both the Allies and their adversaries in World War II.1 It is

intended to identify similarities and differences in the doctrinal and procedural systems employed by the combatants; it is in no sense a complete

historical study of air-ground operations during the war. The value of the

study lies in its narrow focus on a specific application of air power and in

its comparative examination of this application. This approach helps us to

understand that, as of 1939, close air support for ground combat forces was

a tactic universally discussed by the military powers but not universally

accepted and practiced until after the war.

At the onset of the war, only the Germans had developed a doctrine and a

procedural system for close air support.2 The Russians and the Japanese

had a doctrinal base, but lacked the integrating procedures necessary to

convert doctrine into practice. Italy and France had neither doctrine nor

procedures for substantive close air support.3 In the case of the US and

Great Britain, prewar debate and doctrine tended to inhibit development of

close air support. Once the war began, battlefield requirements forced

change.

Despite their different starting points, by war's end all major belligerents employed air-ground systems with some remarkably similar features.

All had organized tactical air forces and had accepted the idea that a

senior airman should command these forces. Universally, the air-ground systems relied upon Army and Air Force liaison officers, dedicated request

nets, and the use of forward deployed controllers to insure the close integration of air and ground forces. Lastly, an air-ground control center at

the ground force corps level was widely used, except in the Russian case, as

the integrating center for joint air-ground operations.

It is apparent, however, that there were major differences between the

US and British systems and the German version. In German doctrine little

distinction was made. between close air and interdiction targets. Both were

selected by the ground commander, and target priority shifted according to

phases in the battle and the contribution each kind of target would make to

the ground force effort. US and British doctrine maintained this distinction in order to insure that selection of intersection targets and missions

remained under Air Force control. Also, the Germans decentralized and

delegated joint planning authority at a much lower echelon than did the

Allies. While the theater army, army group, or army was the focal point for

Allied air-ground planning, the German effort focused on army, corps, and

division levels. A final major difference appears in the manner in which

Allied and German forces achieved unity of effort. The Germans achieved

unity of effort by dedicating selected air and ground forces to the same

WPC6917E/NOV82

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mission and objective. In the Allied version, unity of effort was realized

by centralizing control of air assets under command of the senior airman,

who was responsive only to the theater commander.

Finally, it should be noted that the German air and ground forces were

well-trained prior to and during the early war years in their standardized

air-ground system. US and British forces had very little training prior to

the war, and wartime training was assimilated from various battlefield

experiences, with a resulting lack of standardization.

German Air-Ground System in WW II

The German air-ground system evolved from the experience of German air

units and officers who participated in the Spanish Civil War. Prior to the

Spanish experience, air doctrine focused on Douhet's theory of strategic

bombardment (achieving victory by the psychological and industrial collapse

of the opponent). This doctrine could not be fully implemented, however,

because German aircraft technology had not perfected a long-range bomber and

because Douhet's theory conflicted with Germany's traditional view of itself

as a land power. This conflict was resolved when the Spanish Civil War

revealed that air attacks against ground targets in the path of a projected

advance contributed to overcoming enemy resistance.4

. Because most German air commanders had served in World War I as ground

commanders or had been detailed from the army to staff the fledgling air

force in the eary 1930s, they were receptive to the use of air power to

achieve ground objectives. An air-ground effort and the close interaction

of these forces soon evolved. Ironically this doctrine and the system that

was to employ it appear to have developed independently of the highly mobile

armor operations popularly known as Blitzkrieg.

The doctrinal goal of air power was to assist the advance, or to support

the defense, of the ground forces that would achieve the national war aim.

Mindful of the principle of concentration, which was the very core of German

military art, the developers of doctrine held that a concentration of air

power should weight the main attack (or the most threatened defensive

sector) and that for both offensive and defensive operations, a common main

point of effort should be designated for the air and ground forces.

Doctrine also stated that, to insure a unity of effort, supporting air

forces should be assigned the same objectives as the ground forces.6 The

doctrine did not differentiate between close air support and battlefield

interdiction, as each was believed valuable at different phases in the

battle. Just as close air support was valuable for blasting through enemy

front line defenses during the breakthrough phase, interdiction became valuable at preventing the movement of enemy reserves during the exploitation

phase.7

WPC6917E/NOV82

2
To support this doctrine, the German Air Force (GAF) organized close air

support (CAS) squadrons in the late 1930s and employed them in conjunction

with ground units in field exercises. The field experience led them to

organize larger units capable of performing multiple support roles for the

ground force. By the time of the German invasion of France (May, 1940),

specific close air support divisions and corps (Nahkampfverbande) included

reconnaissance, fighter, and transport aircraft in addition to those designated for close support. Air reconnaissance units were task-organized, with

strategic reconnaissance forces remaining under the air commander's control

and tactical reconnaissance aircraft assigned exclusively to the ground

commanders. Fighter aircraft, which remained under the air commander's

control, were available to protect both close air missions and ground forces

from hostile air attack. Lastly, transport aircraft were added to insure

the rapid displacement and resupply of air force units and to resupply

forward ground forces. The flexibility of these multi-mission formations

was further enhanced by a doctrine which recognized the importance of being

able to shift air forces rapidly from one sector to another.9 This

enabled German commanders to concentrate air power at different points at

various phases in an operation and to take timely advantage of unforeseen

opportunities.

Integration with the ground force was assured by assigning CAS divisions

and corps to the ground force conducting the main effort. Operational

planning was conducted jointly at collocated headquarters which were well

forward and mobile. At the national level, joint planning consisted of

designating the common point of the main effort and assigning missions and

forces. Army group, army, and numbered Air Force staffs jointly designated

objectives and assigned them to specific air and ground forces. At the air

and ground corps and division level, detailed planning combined both maneuver and fire support and outlined the type of air missions, targets, and

timetables for each phase of the operation.10

The Air Force routinely assigned its tactical reconnaissance aircraft to

the infantry and armored corps and divisions making the main effort.

In-flight reports were radioed to Air Liaison Officers at ground command

posts and were monitored by the collocated Air Force CP. These aircraft

also transported commanders around their sector, provided messenger and

radio relay service, and adjusted artillery fire.11 Curiously, however,

it appears the GAF never recognized the potential of observation aircraft

for controlling air strikes; this role remained undeveloped until the Fifth

US Army established airborne air controllers in 1944.

During the operational planning phase, CAS missions were "preplanned"

missions. Once the operation commenced, however, other types of missions

were used. One variant was referred to as "independent commitment," in

which the air commander could order additional sorties to attack preplanned

or newly acquired targets on the basis of the monitored in-flight reconnaissance reports.12 Another mission commonly applied on the Eastern Front

WPC6917E/NOV82

3
was the "free commitment" of sorties by the air commander. Once ground

forces had broken through, the air commander could launch additional sorties

to strike targets of opportunity at the front and flanks of the ground force

spearheads. This had the effect of providing a combat air patrol above the

advancing ground forces during the exploitation phase.13 Both ground and

air commanders noted that this enabled ground combat forces to place timely

air support on unexpected targets and to maintain air superiority over the

vital main point of the effort. 14

In the crucial defensive battles on the Eastern Front in 1942 and 1943,

"free commitment" missions were often used. Once German intelligence identified the threatened sector (always referred to as the main point), CAS

units were positioned in depth to react quickly. The moment the Soviets

achieved a breakthrough, the air commander would (freely and continually)

commit his force to slow or halt the penetration. Often this was successful

in gaining time for the ground forces to seal off and counterattack the

penetration. 15

Linking the ground combat force with its air support were Air Signal

Liaison and Ground Attack Teams provided by the German Air Force. Each team

was normally led by a GAF officer or NCO who had served on extended detail

with a ground unit as part of his training. In order to provide the

supporting air commander with continuous reports about the ground situation

and about the ground commander's intentions, Air Signal Liaison Teams were

sent to each army corps and division engaged in the main effort. These

teams neither advised the ground commander nor directed air strikes, but

were responsible solely for keeping the air commander informed of the ground

battle.1 6 Ground Attack Teams, who were assigned down to regimental

level, were responsible for directing close air support strikes (note insert

sketch). The teams employed colored panels, artillery smoke, and pyrotechnics to identify targets for the aircraft. Like the Air Signal Liaison

Teams, they used GAF radios and frequencies, but were provided transport and

supplies by the Army.1 7

The German air-ground system remained in effect, albeit with modifications, throughout World War II. The system was successfully employed in the

mountains and plains of Europe as well as the deserts of North Africa. In

the early years of World War II, it was the most advanced system of its kind

and made a major contribution to German military success. To some extent it

established the standard that the Allies strove to achieve. That the German

Air Force was ultimately defeated was less a result of its failures in

air-ground operations than of its failures in other applications of air

power.

WPC6917E/NOV82

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The British Air-Ground System in WW II

Prewar British air doctrine was firmly rooted in Douhet's theory of

strategic bombing and gave limited consideration to the establishment of an

air-ground system. However, the British experience in World War I and the

possibility that Douhet might be applied by another hostile military power

led the Royal Air Force (RAF) to recognize the importance of air defense.

In time air defense formed the major link with the ground forces and the

foundation for air-ground cooperation.1 8

When the RAF deployed to France in 1940, it consisted of two separate

commands, the Advanced Air Striking Force, which was to carry out Douhet's

strategic bombing, and the RAF component of the British Expeditionary

Force. The RAF component was organized to provide air defense and reconnaissance for the ground forces, but it lacked either a communications or a

liaison system to link the two except at the highest echelon.1 9 Soon

after the German attack, the RAF strategic bombers were ordered to attack

the lines of communications supporting the German armored spearheads. The

strikes were uncoordinated (with ground forces), often unescorted, and

largely ineffective. Without inflicting serious damage to either German

plans or forces, the bombing squadrons suffered high losses from the German

Air Force combat air patrols and the AAA accompanying the Armor.2 0

Taking advantage of the lesson thus learned, the RAF established an Army

Cooperation Command in December, 1940, to develop, with Army colleagues, the

doctrine, techniques, and procedures for close support of ground forces.

Unfortunately, because of its operational commitments, the RAF could provide

little support for the command and was compelled to develop procedures without the benefit of testing them.21 While the command was abolished in

1943, some of the techniques and procedures it pioneered were adopted and

further refined by the Desert Air Force and Montgomery's Eighth Army in

North Africa and formed the basis for both British and US air-ground

systems .22

Following prewar precepts, centralized control of air power remained in

the hands of the air commander, who was to employ the force to support the

goals of the theater commander. It was believed that centralized control

and the inherent flexibility of air power would permit air power to be

rapidly concentrated in any sector of the theater. The primary task of air

forces was to prevent the enemy air force from interfering with friendly

operations. If air superiority was assured, then ground and air forces

would gain freedom of action. Once attained, the air forces could fulfill

their secondary task of assistance in the land battle.23

To facilitate cooperation, when practical, the air command headquarters

and the theater army (or army group) headquarters were collocated and information was exchanged between the staffs. In 1943, these theater air components were renamed Tactical Air Forces and organized into tactical air

WPC6917E/NOV82

6
groups, with one group allotted for each army in the theater. Additionally,

the Tactical Air Force retained control of a light or medium bomber group, a

strategic reconnaissance wing, and an airbase defense group. The Tactical

Air Groups, composed primarily of fighters for air and ground attack and

some reconnaissance aircraft, were collocated with and operated in coordination with an army. The Theater Army-Tactical Air Force focused on the

strategic direction of the air-ground effort, while the Army-Tactical Air

Group was responsible for joint operational planning. Only for amphibious

and airborne operations was this responsibility delegated to subordinate

levels.

Because air power was under centralized control, targets nominated by

ground commanders had to be reviewed by the air commander in the light of

his strategic and/or operational guidance. This established the requirement

that air support had to be prearranged as often as possible. If, after

meeting strategic/operational requirements, additional air sorties were

available, the air and ground commanders (or staffs) would draw up a

priority list of close air support targets. While prearranged missions

dominated joint air-ground operations, a system for requesting and

controlling immediate missions was firmly established by early 1944.

Mobile Air Support Control Units were established and sent to each Army

corps headquarters. These units would review, prioritize, and relay immediate mission requests between the ground combat force and the Tactical Air

Group. Staffed by the RAF and a small army contingent assigned by the

supported corps, these units maintained communication with ground combat

forces (an army responsibility), airborne aircraft, airfields, and the headquarters of the Tactical Air Group.24 When an immediate mission was

requested, the RAF staff determined if a prearranged mission could be

adjusted; simultaneously, the request was prioritized by the Army element.

If Corps assigned a high priority to the request, the RAF transmitted the

request to the airfields and to Group headquarters. This enabled the

squadrons to plan for the mission while awaiting approval from Group. If

the request was rejected by Group, the air support control unit was

notified. If approved, the control unit was alerted by the airfield and

informed of the number of sorties and the time over target. Ground units

were then informed to mark the target and/or their positions by smoke, panel

markers, or pyrotechnics, and the aircraft were guided to the target by the

control unit.2 5

Reconnaissance mission requests were processed through the same system.

In order to reduce duplication, missions were consolidated at Group and

prioritized after consultation with the Army staff. Reconnaissance pilots

were not allowed to transmit directly to ground commanders. Instead,

following a debriefing, the information was provided by Group to its

adjacent headquarters for relay down to the requesting unit.26

7

91-0051
By the end of the war, this system had been further refined by assigning

Army liaison officers at all levels of the Tactical Air Force, by maintaining armed reconnaissance sorties continually over the battle area, and

by employing forward air controllers. The controllers accompanied ground

combat units in an armored vehicle equipped with VHF radio to communicate

with and call down the armed reconnaissance aircraft. In these instances,

the Air Support Control Unit was responsible for monitoring the request

between the Forward Air Controller and the aircraft. Unless the control

unit verbally denied the request, its silence was considered approval of the

request.

The British air-ground system was the fi.rst successful Allied adoption

of close air support for ground forces. As such it became the early model

for the US Army Air Force in World War II. Its adoption by US forces during

the North African Campaign represented the point of departure in the US

effort to forge an effective air-ground weapon.

US Army Air-Ground System in WWII

The development of a US air-ground system was impeded by the prewar

controversy over the role of air power. Army Air Corps officers lined up

behind the strategic role of bombing, while Army officers insisted that

World War I's experience supported the tactical role. So persistent was the

debate that Army aviators entered World War II believing autonomy was the

only way the role of strategic bombardment could be secured.27 During

this period, air-ground doctrine suffered from having to "satisfice" the two

extremes. Field Service Regulations, while supporting the ground commander's demand for direct support, accepted the aviators' position that interdiction offered the best means of providing that support.28

German successes with tactical aviation renewed US interest in it, and

by 1942, a limited accommodation of opposing viewpoints was reached. The

new doctrine declared both roles to be vital and stated that close cooperation with ground forces was to be given the same weight as strategic

bombing. Unfortunately, the doctrine did not judge the relative importance

of strikes on the immediate front and flanks of ground forces and strikes on

other targets more distant from the front line.29

By the time Allied forces invaded Northwest Africa, an air-ground system

had been organized to implement this doctrine. An air force consisting of

strategic and tactical aircraft was assigned to each theater. One component

of this force was an Air Support Command under control of an Air Corps

officer, but made available to support a field army. The command would be

composed of fighters, bombers, and observation aircraft. The air support

commander was to collaborate with the Army commander, who was to determine

the level of air support required and plan its allocation. Air Support

Control units were to be collocated at corps command posts, and air support

parties were to be dispatched to divisions that had received air

allocations.30

WPC6917E/NOV82

8
This system was abandoned after the disastrous Battle of Kasserine Pass

when, at the insistence of senior US airmen, the methods and organizations

of the RAF's Desert Air Force were adopted.31 US airmen charged that air

power under control of ground commanders had been wasted on countless small

(and poor) targets during this critical period.32 The solution they

demanded was centralized control under a senior airman. Under the reorganization, air-ground cooperation hit bottom during the seizure of Sicily. The

participating air forces refused to coordinate their plans with the other

services, spent their time searching for a meager enemy air force, and

provided a maximum of only 18 missions a day to Patton's Seventh Army.33

In the midst of this poor performance, the Army Air Corps published

FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, in July 1943. The new

doctrine, published without the concurrence of the Chief of Army Ground

Forces, centralized command and control in the hands of the air commander

and set priorities for the employment of tactical aircraft. These priorities relegated close air support missions to last priority behind air

superiority and isolation of the battlefield (interdiction). Air strikes

against targets within range of ground weapons, the manual maintained, were

ineffective and wasteful.34 The larger and more profitable air targets,

which would be selected by the air commander, were to be found along

rearward lines of communication.35

After these failures, air-ground cooperation finally got on track during

the Fifth US Army's campaign in Italy. Largely because of the personal

intervention of the Army and Air commanders, a field expedient air-ground

system was devised and implemented through local training directives. The

directives allowed the Air Corps to follow the doctrinal priorities, but,

ignoring the first two air priorities, detailed techniques and procedures

for close air support.36

Army and Air Corps headquarters were collocated so that plans could be

separately developed, but integrated at daily commanders' conferences. G-3

(air) sections were established at army, corps, and division levels, and air

liaison officers were made available for temporary duty down to divisions.

The Air Corps flew at least one photo reconnaissance mission every day

(weather permitting) and the photos were distributed down to division G-3

air sections within 24 hours. Using the photos and other information, G-2s

and G-3s, using dedicated radio nets, requested preplanned air strikes up

through corps to army. Army presented the prioritized preplanned requests

to the Air commander at a daily operations conference. After weighing his

other air requirements, the Air commander would approve or disapprove the

requests, and the units would be notified by Army.

For call (immediate) missions, G-3 air sections were expanded to include

one or more ground liaison officers. Nicknamed "Rover Joes," because they

traveled between front line battalions with a jeep mounted VHF radio, the

GLOs developed procedures for directing close air support missions. Call

WPC6917E/NOV82

9
mission requests were relayed from front line battalions through G-3 air

nets to army level where the request was handed to the collocated Air Corps

CP. If approved, a GLO (division level) was sent to the requesting unit and

told the frequency, call sign, and time the mission would be flown. Using

the most convenient observation point, the GLO contacted the aircraft and

identified the target (using smoke), enemy air defenses, and friendly force

locations (using panel markers).37

Directing air strikes in the mountainous Italian terrain produced many

accidents, which were partly reduced by use of Air Corps controllers and the

prewar concept of a bomb line. In June, 1944, Fifth Army experimented with

Air Corps controllers flying in Army observation aircraft. The experimental

use of airborne controllers, nicknamed "Horseflys," continued until the war

ended, but this arrangement was too little known to be widely used in the

campaign across France.38

Following D-day, US forces in France adopted the "Rover Joe" and the

Fifth Army--XII Tactical Air Force organization for their air-ground

system. Since the Fifth Army--XII TAC field expedients had not become doctrine, procedures between armies varied. For instance, First, Third and

Ninth armies relied upon Air Force communication channels, while Seventh

Army relied upon Army Communications. Consequently when Third and Seventh

armies were fighting side-by-side, their air ground systems were not

co-mpatible.39

After the war, attempts were made to streamline and standardize the

air-ground system based upon the lessons learned in Europe. These efforts

were less than successful until the Korean War underlined the requirement

for a commonly agreed upon air-ground doctrine. However, despite the

appearance of a harmonic doctrine in Vietnam, periodic evaluations of the

state of the art suggest the doctrine remains a contested issue between the

US Army and US Air Force.

Soviet Air-Ground System in WW II

Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union had a firm doctrinal base to

build upon in World War II. The Russians attempted an air-ground system

which would succeed in integrating both air and ground forces.

Soviet military doctrine on the eve of the war sought the achievement of

combined arms operations involving full coordination of air and ground

forces. The 1939 Field Service Regulations stressed that aviation should

"act in close operational-tactical contact with ground forces" as well as

conduct attacks on deep objectives and air superiority missions.4 0 The

Field Regulations of 1940 underscored this requirement. However, in 1941

there existed a considerable gap between theory and reality. The relatively

small size of the Soviet ground attack aviation force (eleven regiments of

WPC6917E/NOV82

10
obsolete 1-15 and 1-153 aircraft), the general shortage of equipment

(radios), the inexperience of aviation personnel, and the awkward organization of air assets hindered achievement of those theoretical arms. The

German attack of June, 1941, compounded those difficulties by destroying the

bulk of the Soviet air fleet. 4 1 (In the western Military District, 800

of 1,200 aircraft were destroyed on the ground.42 )

After June, 1941, the Soviets were forced to rebuild their ground

support system. During the first period of the war (June 41-Nov 42), they

concentrated on reconstructing their ground attack force and perfecting its

organization. Initially, ground armies controlled aircraft assets. Ground

attack aviation regiments with a TO&E strength of 20 aircraft (IL-2), but

with an actual strength of 4-5 planes, were scattered throughout the ground

force structure. (In December, 1941, there were nine regiments with a total

of 42 IL-2 aircraft.)43 This dissipation of effort, combined with a lack

of radios, made ground support ineffective. The Soviets limited such

support to the first phase of offensive operations (air preparation), to the

repulse of counterattacks, and to covering intervals between ground

formations. Pilots seldom attacked targets within 10-15 kms of friendly

forces .44

During the first period of war, the Soviets used crude, improvised

methods to designate targets and provide for mutual recognition by ground

and air forces. They designated the "forward edge" by use of visual signal

panels, smoke charges, colored signal rockets, tracer bullets, and vehicle

headlights. When rockets, smoke charges, and signal panels were unavailable, ground forces often resorted to field expedients to mark their

positions (in one instance the use of underwear).4 5 In addition, ground

forces were untrained in aircraft identification and in the use of the few

available radios, and no system of forward command posts existed to control

aircraft.

During the second period of war (Nov 42-Dec 43), the air-ground system

improved somewhat. Air assets were centralized at front level (one Air Army

per front), and in November, 1942, the Soviets adopted the concept of the

"aviation offensive" which provided a purpose and set of procedures for air

operations. To realize the aims of the "aviation offensive" the Soviets

deployed a larger number of radios to air and ground units and built an air

control system. Air command posts were located close to the front lines in

contact with ground units. The CP of Air Armies deployed near the CP of the

front commander, 7-8 kms from the front lines. The CP of the Fighter and

Assault Aviation Corps were located near the OP of the army commander, 2-3

kms from the front lines. At the CP of each rifle or tank corps, aviation

units provided a group of aviation officers with radios. Rifle divisions on

the main attack axis often received aviation representatives to coordinate

use of aircraft. Aviation commanders at the CPs of rifle or tank formations

kept track of troop locations and guided pilots by radio to both airborne

and ground targets.46

WPC6917E/NOV82

11
Improvements in recognition and target designation were slow, and in

1943 and 1944 the General Staff issued a series of specific instructions on

the subject.47 In particular, coordination of aircraft with artillery,

tank, and mechanized forces evolved slowly due to the difficulty in distinguishing friendly and enemy positions. Ultimately units used rockets,

turret markings, and radios to distinguish between units. Beginning in

1943, tank and rifle battalions created trained teams with signal equipment

to designate the line of contact with the enemy and guide aircraft to their

targets. Besides using radios, units designated the "forward edge" by

signal rockets (pre-assigned color and angle of fire). At aviation units

the front line trace was marked on the maps of pilots just prior to their

missions.48

During the third period of war (1944-45), the network of air representatives and guidance officers at ground units expanded. Operations involved

increasingly detailed planning for air support, and air control increased in

efficiency (assisted by addition of radios to tanks and a higher percentage

of aircraft). In conjunction with, or in lieu of, radios a wide variety of

recognition and guidance methods evolved, including use of colored smoke

fired by Control Identification Points spaced evenly along the front,

tracers and artillery smoke shells to mark targets, pyrotechnic devices,

prearranged aircraft maneuvers (dipping of wings), tank shrapnel fire, and

intersecting searchlight beams to illuminate targets at night. During night

operations in built-up areas, the Soviets guided aircraft to targets by

setting fire to houses with artillery fire. 49

The extreme fluidity and depth of ground operations in the latter stages

of the war made air-ground coordination more complex. The large scale of

operations often required coordination of two air armies (2,000-3,000

aircraft) in a single front area. Soviet inability to master this problem

was evidenced by several instances of aircraft attacks on friendly

troops.50

Throughout the course of the war, the Soviets made vast improvements in

air-ground coordination. Those improvements were tied directly to the

development and deployment of radio equipment and trained personnel. While

radios proliferated in the force structure by war's end, the Soviets supplemented radios with a wide range of visual techniques. Yet, although an

air-ground control system evolved, it was never able to control complex

air-ground operations adequately. The achievement of an efficient system

using sophisticated equipment became a goal of the postwar period.

How far the Soviets have advanced toward their goal of developing an

efficient air-ground system can be judged by appraising the explanation of

current Soviet doctrine described in the appendix to this study. It

suggests that while there are similarities, the differences between the US

(and NATO) and the Soviet (and Warsaw Pact) systems apparently stem from the

different developmental backgrounds of each.

WPC6917E/NOV82

12
The Japanese Air-Ground System in WW II

World War II Imperial Japanese Army air doctrine stated that the Army

Air Force would make the "greatest contribution to general operations,"

presumably by reducing the fighting strength of the opposing Air Force.

After destroying the main strength of the enemy air, Japanese air would seek

a favorable chance to destroy the remainder of the enemy's air power. If

the conditions of the battle permitted, the Army Air Force would provide

strategic and tactical reconnaissance for the ground forces. The keynote

was "Air Superiority: A Must Over the Battlefield."

An air division was sometimes assigned to support an infantry division,

if air superiority had been achieved. To provide liaison, a wireless platoon (two air-ground radios, one truck) was attached to division headquarters. Air units could only support ground troops in the initial stages

of an engagement because, as the Japanese troops moved forward, the air

squadron commanders had absolutely no idea where they were. The ground

forces wanted CAS support at critical points, but this was not available.

CAS was, as an account used at the Japanese Command and Staff College today

notes, the ideal, but the emphasis on the air superiority role was

natural.51

WPC6917E/NOV82

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ENDNOTES

1. For this study, air-ground operations deals only with Close Air Support,

which is defined as: "Air action against ground targets in close

proximity to friendly (ground) forces." The definition is taken from

USAF Manual TACM 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, 15 April 1978. The terms

air-ground and close air support are used interchangeably in the study.

2. The German Air Force was often criticized for its close air doctrinal

focus which, commentators have noted, excluded strategic bombing and air

defense.

3. Alvin Coox's fine work on prewar French military doctrine describes

French air doctrine as suspended between its tactical and strategic

application. The equivocal result was an air force that could accomplish neither. Alvin David Coox, "French Military Doctrine, 1919-1939:

Concepts of Ground and Aerial Warfare" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University,

1951).

4. W. H. Tantum, IV, and E. J. Hoffschmidt, The Rise and Fall of the German

Air Force, 1933 to 1945 (Old Greenwich Conn: WE, Inc., 1969), pp. 7-17.

5. Of the many sources on prewar German air and armor doctrine, none indicate that close air support and mechanized combined arms warfare

developed in conjunction with one another. Indeed the lack of such

evidence suggests the two doctrines developed independently, albeit on

parallel tracks and were merged only in the opening phases of the war.

6. US: Department of the Army. "The Collaboration Between the Army and

the Luftwaffe Support of the Army by the Luftwaffe on the Battlefield."

Translation of POW report of General Karl Heinrich Schulz, dated 12 Dec

1947; translated by Charles E. Weber, MS #B791 (CARL, Fort Leavenworth,

KS), pp. 5-6; also, B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk

(New York: William Morrow & Co., 1948), p. 95.

7. As Schulz reports, German air and ground commanders felt that close air

attack, when coupled with a ground attack, had a greater psychological

effect against the will to resist of frontline defenders than against

enemy troops along rearward lines of communication not under ground

attack.

8. These Nahkampfverbande also had AAA and maintenance units attached so

that they could operate from bases well forward. Airbases were sometimes so far forward that AAA, specifically the 88mm gun units, were

employed by ground forces.

9. Schulz, pp. 8-12; and Paul Deichmann, German Air Force Operations in

Support of the Army (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Historical Division, Research

Studies Institute, Air University, June 1962), pp. 72-82.

WPC6917E/NOV82

14
10. Schulz, pp. 7-10, 5-16, 33-34.

11. Schulz, p. 10.

12. Schulz, pp. 15-18, 26-28.

13. Schulz, pp. 26-28.

14. Tantum and Hoffschmidt, pp. 240-47; and Deichmann, pp. 164-65.

15. Schulz, pp. 26-28.

16. A large amount of the intercept intelligence credited to the strategic

success of ULTRA may have come from the intercept of the Air Signal

Liaison teams who frequently used relatively simple codes to transmit

information about the ground forces. See Ralph Bennett, Ultra in the

West: The Normandy Campaign 1944-45 (New York: Charles Scribnar's Sons,

1980), p. 7.

17. Deichman, pp. 69-82; and Schulz, pp. 12-17, 22.

18. Denis Richards, The Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vol 1, The Fight at Odds

(London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1953), pp. 26-30.

19. Norman Macmillan, The Royal Air Force in the World War, Vol I,

1919-1940 (London: George G. Harrap & Co., LTD, 1942), pp. 143-56.

20. Richards, pp. 107-27.

21. Richards, p. 26.

22. Denis Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders, The Royal Air Force

1939-1945, Vol II, The Fight Avails (London: Her Majesty's Stationary

Office, 1954), pp. 159-63. Also, Roderic Owen, The Desert Air Force

(London: Hutchinson & Co., LTD, 1948), pp. 56-66, 109-13.

23. Bernard L. Montgomery, "Some Notes on the Use of Air Power in Support

of Land Operations and Desert Air Support" (Holland: 1944); also,

unpublished manscript, "The Employment of Air Forces in Support of Land

Operations," in document entitled, "Operations in North West Africa"

(CARL, Fort Leavenworth, KS), MS# N3497.

24. Separate wire lines were laid to each ground brigade in the corps

sector. The RAF was responsible for wire lines to the airfields and

Group Headquarters. Initially the only radios in the control units

were the VHF sets used to communicate with airborne aircraft. By 1945

radios began to replace the wire lines.

WPC6917E/NOV82

15
25. Owen, p. 143.

26. Owen, p. 111.

27. USAF Historical Division, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army

Air Arm 1917-1941, USAF Historical Studies: No 9 (Manhattan, KS: MA/AH

Publishing, Sep. 1955), pp. 44-75. Also, Kent Robert Greenfield, Army

Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team including Organic Light

Aviation, Study No. 35 (Historical Section--Army Ground Forces, 1948),

p.1.

28. Greenfield, pp. 2-4.

29. Greenfield, p.4.

30. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World

War II, Vol II, Europe Torch to Point Blank, August 1942 to December

1943 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 53-136.

31. Craven and Cate, pp. 53-136.

32. In fact, the system was never applied as outlined. Until after the

Kasserine Pass battle, no ground combat commander had command or

authority over US Air Forces. More important, less than 10 percent of

the ground commander's requests for close air support were flown by the

Air Force. The failure of close air support may be part of the reason

for the poor US performance at Kasserine Pass. See Memorandum for All

Ground General and Special Staff Section, Headquarters Army Ground

Forces, 11 June 1943. Subject: Report of Visit to the North Africa,

Theater of Operations (CARL, Fort Leavenworth, KS).

33. Albert W. Garland, Howard McGaw Smyth, and Martin Blumensen, United

States Army in World War II: Mediterranean Theater of Operations,

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy (Washington, D.C.: US Government

Printing Office, .1965), pp. 105-8.

34. Greenfield, pp. 47-50.

35. It appears the Germans maintained the opposite view, i.e., that the

more profitable targets were those whose destruction/neutralization

aided ground combat forces.

36. Craven and Cate, pp. 544-45; and Greenfield, pp. 76-83.

37. Ibid.

38. Greenfield, pp. 87-92.

WPC6917E/NOV82

16
39. Greenfield, pp. 87-92. Also note that Seventh Army employed the airborne air controller, "Horsefly," while the other US armies did not.

40. M. Kozhevnikov, "Sovershenstvovanie Aviatsionnogo Nastupleniia"

(Perfection of the Aviation Offensive). Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal

(hereafter cited as VIZH), May 1971, p. 14.

41. N. Dagaev and V. Chernitskii "Tendentsii pazvitiia organizatsionnykh

form frontovoi i dal'nei aviatsii v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny"

(Tendencies in the Development of Organizational Forms of Frontal and

Long Range Aviation in the Years of the Great Patriotic War), VIZH,

October 1981, pp. 19-20.

42. A. M. Nekrich, June 22, 1941, (Moscow: Nawka, 1965). Translated by V.

Petrov, Univ of S. Carolina Press, 1968, p. 222.

43. S. Chepaliuk, "Pazvitic taktiki shturmovoi aviatsii v velikoi

otechestvennoi Voine" (The Development of the Tactics of Assault

Aviation in the Great Patriotic War), VIZH, January 1970, p. 25.

44. I. Timokhovich "Vzaimodeistvie aviatsii s sukhoputnymi voiskami vo

frontovoi nastupatel'operatsii" (The Cooperation of Aviation with

Ground Forces in Frontal Offensive Operations), VIZH, July 1977, p. 20.

45. N. Ostroumov "Vzaimnoe opoznavanie i tseleukazanie voisk i aviatsii"

(Mutual Identifications and Target Designation of Troops and Aviation),

VIZH, August 1980, p. 34.

46. L. Mikriukov and G. Briukhovskii, "Opyt boevogo primeneniia aviatsii

pri proryve oborony protivnika" (The Experience of the Combat Use of

Aviation during the Penetration of an Enemy Defense), VIZH, February

1981, pp. 30-31.

47. Ostroumov, p. 35.

48. Ibid, pp. 36-37; Mikriukov, pp. 32-34.

49. Mikriukov, pp. 37-41.

50. Ibid, p. 37.

51. Boei kenshujo senshibu (Military History Department, National Defense

College), ed., Nomonhan jiken kokusakusen no kyosatsu (Considerations

of the Air War During the Nomonham (Khalkhin Gol) Fighting) (Tokyo:

1975); and Akiyama Monjiro and Mitamura Kei, Rikugun kokushi (A History

of the Japanese Army Air Force) (Tokyo: 1981).

WPC6917E/NOV82

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APPENDIX

NOTES ON SOVIET CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

1. Trends in Soviet Fire Support

In the past decade, the Soviets have tried to improve the integration of

air support into the total fire support effort. Major field exercises

almost invariably feature joint air and ground operations. In addition,

over the past 5 to 10 years, Soviet firepower capabilities have been

enhanced by increasing both the quantity and quality of fire support means

available to the commander.

a. Air Support

The size of helicopter forces has been expanding at a constant

rate. There are now about 5,200 in the Soviet inventory.

Older Mi24 HIND-D combat helicopters are being replaced with the new

AT-6 SPIRAL-equipped HIND-E which has greater standoff range and the freedom

to maneuver after launching its missile.

The Soviet Union has in production or development precision-guided

munitions (PGM) similar to those deployed by US forces.

The Soviets have deployed the AS-9, an anti-radar guided missile

with a range of 80 kilometers, and AS-10, an electro-optically guided

missile with a range of approximately 9 kilometers. The AS-X is expected to

have a range of approximately 40 kilometers with electro-optical guidance,

and a firing capability from an altitude as low as 150 meters.

2. Air Support of Ground Forces

a. General

In addition to the air operation which marks the onset of

theater-level hostilities, Soviet doctrine calls for air support of ground

forces in a given offensive operation. The Soviets recognize three stages

of air support within an offensive operation: air preparation

(aviatsionnaya podgotovka), air support (aviatsionnaya podderzhka), and air

accompaniment (aviatsionnoye soprovozhdeniye). The major delineating

criterion for these phases is their chronology, though there are some

differences in targeting, command, and aircraft used.

b. Air Preparation (Aviatsionnaya Podgotovka)

Air preparation takes place prior to the onset of ground force

action in a given sector of a front and is used in preparation for a variety

of offensive operations, including the crossing of water obstacles, penetration operations, amphibious and airmobile assaults, and counterattacks.

WPC6917E/NOV82

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When it occurs simultaneously with the preparation fire of both artillery

and missile units, it requires close, detailed coordination with respect to

targeting and timing. Air operations in the preparation phase generally

extend no farther than the enemy's immediate operational depth (i.e., enemy

corps rear area). Depending on the combat situation, the duration of air

preparation can be from 10 minutes to over an hour. The targets are those

which conventional artillery and missiles cannot destroy due to the targets'

distance, mobility, or their "hardened" quality. In special situations,

such as amphibious assaults, Long-Range Aviation and/or Naval Aviation may

participate in air preparation attacks. Air preparation is an integral part

of the fire preparation (ognevaya podgotovka) phase.

c. Air Support (Aviatsionnaya Podderzhka)

The distinction between air support and air accompaniment is primarily one of chronology and proximity of targets. The air support stage

begins when the ground forces start an offensive. Its targets are at the

tactical and immediate operational depths, and include enemy nuclear

weapons, command and control systems, and enemy reserve forces close to the

front line. On-call air attack missions against centers of resistance are

made at the request of ground force commanders within the limitations of

their allocated resources. The air support phase closely follows the operational plan prepared prior to the onset of the offensive, and is an extension of the strong artillery support associated with Soviet offensive

operations. AS in the air preparation stage, the targets are generally

those beyond the capabilities of artillery and missiles to destroy. Air

support is an integral part of the fire support (ognevaya podderzhka) phase.

d. Air Accompaniment (Aviatsionnoye Soprovozhdeniye)

Air accompaniment, the final stage of air support of ground forces,

occurs as Soviet ground units penetrate deeply within enemy defenses. The

specific point at which air accompaniment begins is not clear, but it is

during the advanced stage of offensive operations when the progress of the

ground forces has outstripped the prepared air support plan, and reassessment and reallocation of air resources is necessary. It is significant to

note that, after allocating air resources prior to an offensive, the front

commander plays little further direct role in the conduct of air support

operations, unless large reallocations are required. However, in the air

accompaniment phase, the role of the front commander is again emphasized,

indicating the probability that significant reallocations of air resources

supporting ground force armies will be made in adjusting to the developments

in the combat situation.

Obviously, air cover for airborne and airmobile operations is a very

demanding and important air accompaniment mission which might take place

concurrently with the preparation phase or support phase over the Forward

Line of Own Troops (FLOT).

WPC6917E/NOV82

19
e. Rotary-Wing Aircraft

Fixed-wing aircraft and combat helicopters are used in the three

stages of air support for offensive ground operations. The increasing

numbers of combat helicopters deployed enable them to play a greater role in

the support of ground forces within the immediate battle area, thereby

freeing fixed-wing aircraft for missions against fixed targets, such as

nuclear weapons depots and airfields.

The Soviets perceive combat helicopters as fulfilling four basic air

support missions: preplanned air support missions, on-call missions, armed

reconnaissance, and ambushes. The reduced logistical requirements of combat

helicopters, compared to those of fixed-wing aircraft, very often enable

deployment close to the main battle area. This enhances their ability to

respond to on-call missions. Given the Soviet emphasis on rapid offensive

operations and the consequent anticipation of the meeting engagement as the

most frequent type of combat encounter, the Soviets see great potential in

the combat helicopter's ability to respond rapidly to requests for air

support. In a meeting engagement, combat helicopters can screen and support

Soviet units as they maneuver into position.

In pursuit operations, helicopters harass withdrawing units through

armed reconnaissance missions and in ambushes along retreat routes, impeding

the- enemy's attempts to establish defensive positions. Conversely, helicopters support rear guard units in disengagement and withdrawal operations

by harassing advancing enemy units from ambush and by laying minefields.

Combat helicopters can also be assigned to support the operations of advance

or independent units outside the range of artillery support.

3. Command and Control

a. Organization

The command and control structure of Frontal Aviation (FA) is

integrated with that of the ground forces to insure close and continuous

coordination in a combined-arms offensive (see Figure A1).

In wartime the front commander has direct command of some aviation

resources. He normally exercises this command in consultation with the

tactical air army commander, who serves as chief of aviation on the front

staff.

At the ground force army and division level, an Air Task Group (ATG)

normally is assigned to the staff of the army commander. At army, this Air

Task Group generally consists of about seven officers, including a deputy

commander of the tactical air army, an air controller, an intelligence

officer, a liaison officer, a decoder, and a chief of the communications

team. The ATGs assigned to the combined arms or tank divisions are usually

headed by deputy air division commanders or deputy air regiment commanders,

and are similar to the ATG assigned to the combined arms or tank army CPs,

only smaller (about five officers).

WPC6917E/NOV82

20
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The Air Task Group is similar in nature to the US air liaison section and advises on the use of air resources, transmits air support requests

from the army commander to air divisions or independent air regiments, maintains communications and control with aircraft in the battle area, and

advises the army commander of aerial reconnaissance information. At the

division, the Air Task Group is separated into two sections, each with a

radio-equipped BTR-60. One section is collocated with the commander and the

other with the chief of staff.

While it is rare to find an air representative in a ground force

battalion, a forward air director may be assigned when combat helicopters

are providing air support in a particularly important or difficult

operation. Normally, however, a battalion commander has no direct communications with air support resources.

For mutual recognition and target designation, radio-electronic

means, such as radio beacons, are widely used by the air directing officers;

however, when there is visual contact, the use of signal flares, colored

smoke, beacon lights, and even cloth panels is possible. When aircraft are

operating against objectives which cannot be observed by ground troops or

air directing officers, target designation is carried out mainly on the

basis of reconnaissance information obtained by the aircraft crews

themselves. The crews use flares, aircraft maneuvers, and radio-electronic

means of signalling, passing communications, and mutual identification.

b. Problems and Progress

Judging from the Soviet military press, coordination between the air

and ground forces, especially at lower level, is not always successful. The

documents worked out by air and ground force commanders prior to the launch

of combat air missions often inhibit flexibility in mutual cooperation and

once the missions get underway, prevent changes required by the evolving

situation.

Some exercises carried out jointly by air and ground units demonstrate that the specifics of mutual cooperation result from subjective

factors and interpretations. There are ground force commanders who do not

have in-depth knowledge of the combat capabilities of aviation, and in turn,

some aviators are unable to judge the development of the battle on the

ground in anything but general terms. Ground force unit commanders sometimes hesitate to call for air support unless the support has been planned

beforehand. As one commentator stated recently: "The aviators fight

according to their rules, and the combined-arms troops according to

theirs." The plans for mutual cooperation worked out prior to the actions

WPC6917E/NOV82

22
are often incomplete, accounting only for that situation when aircraft

approach the FLOT. Also they do not always inform lower level ground force

commanders of the fighter-bomber and combat helicopter resources allocated

for "on-call" missions. The combined-arms commanders do not always know the

location and condition of aviation during the battle, the readiness of

aviation to commit reserves, or the types of air strikes available. The

lack of damage assessment data supplied to ground commanders can cause

unnecessary firing at previously destroyed targets.

In order to resolve the problems of mutual cooperation successfully,

Soviet military experts suggest wider adoption of automated control systems

to speed up and simplify collecting, transmitting, and processing information on all levels of command and control. More frequent joint tactical

briefings, technical conferences, and meetings between lower ground force

and air commanders are also suggested in Soviet military publications.

At present, the Soviets are stressing the importance of increasing

the effectiveness of air support in complex weather conditions and at

night. Soviet FA operations under these conditions slacken considerably

because of inadequate aircraft and ground-based equipment, and shortcomings

in flight personnel training. The mutual identification and target designation systems used during complex weather conditions and for night flying

also do not always meet modern requirments. Evidently the Soviets are

making efforts to correct these shortcomings. It is believed that about 20

percent of the third-generation fixed-wing aircraft introduced in the 1970s

and a similar percentage of FA's combat helicopters are equipped with the

type of radio-electronic and infrared instruments that will enable pilots to

carry out sorties at night and at low altitudes, to search for and detect

targets, and to destroy them with guided munitions. However, even when

modern sophisticated equipment is used, the Soviets believe that for air

support of ground troops it is important to train pilots to navigate by

landmarks, to search for targets visually, and to determine the distances to

targets without technical aids.

Effective FA operations in support of advancing troops depend a

great deal upon providing appropriate airfields. Some restored enemy airfields could also be utilized by FA. In this respect, the increase in

operational range and load capability of the third-generation aircraft

enables the Soviets to provide air support to the ground forces advancing at

high speed. The Soviets, on the other hand, have been actively seeking an

effective type of aircraft, which operating from small, unpaved airfields,

would insure reliable air support to their ground forces. In at least a

partial response to this need, the combat helicopter has emerged as a

weapons system that can provide adequate support with the required

flexibility.

WPC6917E/NOV82

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c. Planning and Preparation of Air Support in an Offensive

Planning of preparatory air strikes prior to an offensive begins

with the front commander's issuance of orders to the air army commander(s)

and the combined-arms/tank army commander(s). The order specifies the air

units to be committed, the ground armies to be supported, and the timing of

the offensive.

Receiving this information, the ground force army commander and his

Air Task Group reconcile the air resources allocated by the front commander

with the air support requirements of the ground force divisions. A ground

force division commander, in consultation with his Air Task Group, develops

his requirements by determining the targets to be attacked in his sector and

estimating his on-call missions. Available air support is divided among

predesignated targets, on-call missions, and reserves. An on-call mission

is one in which the target may be predesignated, but the timing of the

strike remains at the discretion of the ground force commander. If combat

helicopters are to be employed, air support is specifically divided between

fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft. The division is based on the nature of the

targets, flight distances, and the disposition of enemy anti-aircraft

defenses. On approval and integration of these determinations with the

front fire support plan, the air army commander issues specific orders to

his air divisions and regiments concerning targets, numbers of sorties, air

approach, corridors, communications codes, and mission timing. The air

representatives at army, division, and regiment then confirm, for their

respective ground force commanders, the air resources allocated to them.

Normally, the air army commander holds a percentage of his forces in reserve

to meet unforeseen demands of division commanders. Division commanders, in

turn, can withhold a percentage of their allocated air assets as reserves.

When a regiment has been assigned specific air support, the regiment

commander explains his objectives to the commander of the supporting air

unit and the forward air director assigned to his regiments, and seeks their

recommendations.

Both front and army commanders pay particular attention to the

coordination of artillery and missile fire with preplanned and on-call air

strikes, enabling the artillery and missile fire to neutralize or suppress

enemy anti-aircraft defenses prior to the arrival of attack aircraft.

Coordinating the delivery of nuclear strikes is an important function for the ground and air commanders and their staffs. It is considered

best for the commander of combined arms forces to decide immediately the

question of nuclear weapons employment within the zone of advance, to the

depth of the range of his tactical missiles. He has to determine the target, and the type, method, and time of delivery of nuclear strikes, both for

his own missiles and for the carrier aircraft operating in the zone of

advance. Aviation missions for delivery of nuclear strikes beyond the range

of ground force missiles have to be assigned by the commander in charge of

the entire operation (usually the front commander or above).

WPC6917E/NOV82

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The Soviets normally maintain strict centralization in controlling

air support resources. In some instances, the supporting aviation will not

be surbordinated to the operational control of the combined arms commander.

Instead, air support resources will be apportioned into regiment-flights

(polks-vylety), aircraft sorties, and the required quantity of munitions.

These resources can be used by the ground force commander for the destruction of selected objectives. It is possible that the ground force commander

will not even know which specific Air Force unit or formation will accomplish the missions he requested.

Under a rapidly changing combat situation, such centralized control

makes possible a more rapid reallocation of air support resources to accomplish the most important missions that suddenly arise during combat operations, such as destruction of enemy nuclear weapons, aviation, and

reserves. At times, Air Force units which are not originally assigned for

ground support may take part in delivering air strikes against ground

objectives. Obviously, decentralized employment of aviation (especially

combat helicopters) will be used when combat operations are being waged on

separate and disconnected axes. In such cases aviation assigned for air

support will be transferred to the operational control of the combined arms

commander, who will employ it according to his own needs.

d. Missions Planning and Execution

(1) Predesignated Air Support Missions (Udary na Zaraneye

Zaplanirovanym Tselyam).

As predesignated target assignments are received by air regiments

and squadrons, they are studied closely to determine the best tactical

approach. Large-scale maps and, in some cases, scale models of the terrain

and targets are used to familiarize pilots with their assignments and to

demonstrate the desired flight path and approach maneuvers. Deviation from

the determined flight plan without ground control approval is not permitted.

In anticipation of being diverted from predesignated targets on

later on-call missions, pilots attempt to familiarize themselves with key

terrain and important fixed targets within their area of operations.

Approach flight paths and maneuvers for potential targets are discussed and

determined, subject to later ground control confirmation.

Coordination between helicopter crews and ground personnel is

improved when helicopters are able to land near the ground force units to be

supported. Fixed-wing air crews often have less opportunity for coordination because airfields are farther to the rear. When a regiment is

assigned helicopter support and the combat situation allows, pilots confer

on the ground with the regiment commander and the forward air director to

coordinate air strikes and confirm communication codes to be used during the

mission.

WPC6917E/NOV82

25
Once airborne, the aircraft proceed to a designated checkpoint

behind friendly lines, where they confirm their target assignment with

ground control. The emphasis placed on strict adherence to predetermined

timing and flight paths indicates the probable use of "safe" corridors

through friendly anti-aircraft defenses. Though radio traffic is minimized,

Air Task Groups and forward air directors maintain communications with

attack aircraft either directly or through radio relay aircraft.

As the aircraft approach the target area, forward air directors

establish communications and insure that targets are correctly identified by

the attack pilots. Radio communications, pyrotechnics, flags, and marker

panels can be used. Having gained sight of the target and having had it

confirmed by the forward air director, the flight leader assigns individual

targets or target areas to his pilots and gives the order to attack.

Regrouping of the aircraft following an attack and designation of a path

through friendly anti-aircraft defenses follows the premission flight plan

unless countermanded by ground control.

(2) On-Call Support Missions (Udary po Vyzovu)

A request for immediate on-call air support is submitted by the

ground commander to the next higher headquarters and then forwarded through

the chain of command. Aside from those elements which have combat helicopter units directly assigned, the division is the lowest Soviet ground

force unit which has direct communication with air support resources. An

exception occurs when a regiment commander has been allocated combat helicopters for air support missions at his discretion. Ordinarily, if a

request for air support does not exceed the division commander's allocated

on-call air resources, he can order the air strike through his Air Task

Group. Otherwise, army or front approval must be obtained depending on the

size of the air support request.

As with preplanned support, the Air Task Group at each command

echelon participates directly in the evaluation of each air support request

and the coordination of the strike mission.

Aircraft designated for on-call missions can be airborne in holding

areas or on the ground at airfields. Occasionally, an aircraft on armed

reconnaissance patrol can be directed to respond to an air support request

within its area of operations. The Soviets recognize three levels of combat

readiness for Frontal Aviation aircraft and crews (Figure A2). Aircraft in

categories one and two respond to ground force requests for immediate air

support. Prior to takeoff, pilots receive a short briefing indicating a

checkpoint, the pilots contact the air representative of the ground force

units being supported to receive target designation or confirmation, if this

was not given earlier. Approach, attack, and recovery air control procedures remain the same as in predesignated air support missions.

WPC6917E/NOV82

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(3) Armed Reconnaissance (Svobodnyy Okhot)

Armed reconnaissance within the battle area is an integral part of

Soviet air support, particularly in a fluid combat situation when the precise disposition of enemy forces is not known. Both fixed-wing and rotarywing aircraft, singly or in small formations, conduct armed reconnaissance

to exploit targets of opportunity. In poor weather conditions which

restrict fixed-wing aircraft operation, an increase in combat helicopter

armed reconnaissance can be expected. While on patrol, aircraft maintain

radio contact with ground control to report reconnaissance information and

to receive priority targeting assignments which may develop.

Searching for targets requires aircraft to operate at higher altitudes than when approaching predesignated targets. Depending on the terrain

and the density of the air defenses, this altitude varies between 275 meters

and 1,500 meters for fixed-wing aircraft. Upon detecting the target, the

aircraft dives to an approach altitude of approximately 60 meters; on

nearing the target, it climbs to an altitude of several hundred meters and

delivers fire. The senior pilot in the patrol formation has the authority

to attack without first gaining ground control approval.

Rotary-wing aircraft do not significantly alter their normal ground

attack tactics in armed reconnaissance patrols, though a small increase in

cruising altitude may be necessary to locate potential targets.

Armed reconnaissance would be most often employed during the accompaniment of ground forces pursuit operations. The primary targets of the

supporting combat aircraft would be the destruction of enemy nuclear delivery means and enemy counterattack forces. Should the patrolling aircraft

prove unable to destroy a given target, the target would be engaged and

additional air support requested from ground control, noting the location of

the target or the direction of its movement.

4. Tactics

a. Air Support and Interdiction

(1) Fixed-Wing Aircraft

Soviet ground-attack tactics strive to deliver the greatest amount

of firepower to the target, while presenting the least opportunity to enemy

anti-aircraft defenses. The first concern in a ground attack mission is

neutralization of enemy anti-aircraft weapon systems and their attendant

command and communications systems. If sufficient aircraft are available in

the attacking force, the first flight engages and attempts to destroy antiaircraft defenses in the target area.

WPC6917E/NOV82

28
The Soviets emphasize the importance of deception and surprise in

paralyzing hostile anti-aircraft defenses. Aircraft approach the target

area at the lowest permissible altitude, given weather and terrain

restrictions. Ideally, the approach altitude over enemy territory is 50 to

100 meters. Radio transmission is reduced to a minimum or prohibited

entirely. Detected gaps in enemy radar coverage are exploited, and decoy

flights in advance of attacking aircraft can be used to distract defending anti-aircraft systems. If more than one pass is necessary to destroy the

target, attacking flights approach the target from different directions to

minimize anti-aircraft effectiveness, or approach from the direction of

bright sunlight to minimize visual detection and recognition. Electronic

countermeasures (ECM), play a large role in neutralizing air defenses.

The Soviets prefer small formations of aircraft for ground attack

missions. Small formations reduce the probability of detection and provide

less profitable targets for air defense systems. Increased maneuverability

and simplification of ground control are additional advantages of small

attack formations. Though an exception to the rule, formations of squadron

strength or larger can be used against important area targets such as troop

assembly areas and airfields.

While the nature of the target or targets dictates the weapons payload of the attacking aircraft, generally each flight is armed with cannons

or machine guns and carries a mixed load of bombs and air-to-surface

missiles/rockets. If more than one pass is to be made over the target, the

first attacks are bombing runs, with strafing and rocket attacks following.

According to the Soviet press, the distance between friendly ground

troops and explosions of the ammunition released from the supporting aircraft during joint exercises varies between 200 and 700 meters. In real

combat conditions, the distance may well be less than that noted during

peacetime practicing. In order to avoid mutual interference and to prevent

damage to friendly forces, the air strikes are carefully coordinated and

closely integrated with the efforts of ground units.

In level bombing, aircraft climb from their approach altitude of 50

to 100 meters to deliver their bombs. Unless the bombs have delayed fuses,

climbing is necessary to prevent collateral damage to the aircraft. In some

circumstances, Soviet fighter-bombers use loft-bombing techniques to reduce

the possibility of damage to the attacking aircraft.

The accompanying diagrams (Figures A3-A6) depict the most common

Soviet tactical approach maneuvers for strafing and attacks on point

targets. Of these, an attack from the combat turn or chandelle is deemed

the most desirable by the Soviets in that it provides adequate aiming time

for the pilot, while presenting a difficult target or anti-aircraft

defenses. The time interval between attacking aircraft is generally 6 to 10

seconds. This interval may be increased during poor weather or periods of

low visibility.

WPC6917E/NOV82

29
F i gure A3 Comat Turn (Chande,) Maneuver.

i

Fi gure A4 Attack Fro the "Half Loop."

91-0051

O I -

- -%ba

,l

30
Figure As Attack From th "Loop."

105- 1i0

F g u re A6 Pitch.up Bombing

31

TARGET

91-00051

A-

'7 $ mw'c

.w i
As long as modern anti-aircraft defense relies on radio-electronic

equipment, neutralizing its operation through interference is considered by

the Soviets to be a major way to reduce aircraft losses. Soviet aircraft

possess radio-electronic jamming equipment, which the Soviets believe will

increase the aircrafts' capability for overcoming the enemy anti-aircraft

defenses. The Soviets also expect their aircraft losses would be reduced as

a result of the destruction of enemy anti-aircraft defense weapons by fire

delivered by the ground troops. The ground force radio-technical facilities

can also create interference in enemy systems of control.

5. Combat Role of Helicopters

a. General

The Soviets have produced large numbers of fire-support

helicopters. These rotary-wing aircraft, often referred to by the Soviets

as "combat helicopters," are praised as a formidable weapon no less effective than fixed-wing aircraft and, in certain tactical situations, virtually

indispensible. Using terrain masking to their advantage, these helicopters

could appear unexpectedly over the battlefield, showering the enemy with

bombs, guided missiles, unguided rockets, and machine gun fire.

Some Soviet military authorities believe that it is wasteful to use

Mikoyan (MiG) and Sukhoi (Su) designed supersonic combat aircraft pricipally

for close air support. General M. P. Odintsov, Air Force Commander in the

Moscow Military District, declared in the Soviet military press that it is

the task of artillery and combat helicopters to strike the enemy on the

FEBA. The concentration of high-performance modern aircraft for close air

support "cannot be justified." Instead, he stressed that "they must be

utilized in finding and destroying objectives deeper in the enemy's rear."

There seems to be no argument among Soviet military authorities that combat

helicopters have, to some extent, freed fixed-wing aircraft from the direct

support of ground troops on the battlefield.

The Soviets have trained extensively in the use of rotary-wing aircraft in antitank operations. Heavily armed combat helicopters have been

seen in every major Soviet military exercise. This type of helicopter is

able to attack tanks and other armored vehicles on the battlefield and in

the rear. It also can be used to lay mines, blow up bridges, and create

road obstacles aimed at stalling the movement of ground forces. Recent

Soviet helicopter modifications for antitank combat include the AT-6/SPIRAL

antitank missle with a much greater stand-off range than the existing

SWATTER. Newer Soviet helicopters will probably be fitted with navigational

equipment that gives them the capability of "contour flying during time of

darkness and reduced visibility."

WPC6917E/NOV82

32
b. Missions

The missions assigned to combat helicopters include the destruction

of enemy tanks and other armored vehicles, antitank means, personnel, artillery, and missiles. They are also considered to have some effectiveness

against enemy fire-support helicopters in the air and on the ground, and

against fixed-wing and vertical-takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) aircraft on the

ground.

One of the most important missions of combat helicopters involves

air support to friendly forces in meeting engagements. Current trends in

Soviet literature indicate a preference for the use of combat helicopters in

restricting the enemy's maneuvering room and supplying real-time reconnaissance data to the ground force unit commanders. They are also valuable in

the fire preparation phase prior to the offensive. They can knock out

armored antitank means such as self-propelled guns, infantry-carrying combat

vehicles equipped with antitank rockets, and tanks.

c. Ground Force Support

The employment of combat helicopters, in general, is similar to the

employment of fighter-bombers. They strike against preplanned targets, they

operate "on-call" for ground commanders, they undertake armed reconnaissance

(okhot) missions and, unlike fixed-wing aircraft, they are especially well

suited for ambush operations.

In their role of striking preplanned targets, combat helicopters

provide additional fire to support artillery during the fire preparation and

during tactical heliborne operations. In the later case, they escort troop

carrying helicopters and destroy enemy fire means en route to, and at, the

landing site.

While operating "on call" for ground commanders, combat helicopters

provide air support to ground troops on the battlefield and destroy newly

discovered targets. They can respond to the calls either while on the

ground or while patrolling in the air. They can also be called upon to

strike counterattacking enemy tanks, to reinforce artillery fire, and to

provide direct air support in meeting engagements and in pursuing the enemy.

The armed reconnaissance method is likely to be employed under

conditions of limited visibility, when information about targets is incomplete, and when the enemy's flanks are not protected. Among the objectives

sought by helicopters "hunting" behind enemy lines would be missiles on the

move and in firing position, radar, control and communications facilities,

antitank weapons, and enemy helicopters on the ground and in the air.

Combat helicopters could also support friendly sabotage and reconnaissance

units. A two-or-four-aircraft flight of helicopters is believed to be the

most efficient combat formation assigned to an armed reconnaissance

mission. In such a mission, the group's leader makes the decision to strike

the objectives.

WPC6917E/NOV82

33
Ambushes employing combat helicopters are set up in forest

clearings, on broken terrain, in heavily populated areas, and in river

deltas.

Soviet aviation specialists consider the following to be an effective method of ambush for combat helicopters. The helicopters would

approach the target, concealed behind masking terrain features, pop up

suddenly for 20 to 30 seconds, aim, strike, and quickly withdraw. After

firing on the target, a quick reduction in altitude by a sideslipping

maneuver is recommended, followed by withdrawal to a safe area. Soviet

combat helicopters practice attacking targets from horizontal flight, from a

gentle dive, from a pitch-up, from a hovering (pop up) positions, and from

the ground.

In employing these tactics, several launching positions could be

prepared ahead of time where the helicopters secretly mass. The helicopters

would rise up from behind their cover on the request of the combined-arms

commander, identify the targets, engage them, and then disappear behind

terrain masking. The HIND-E equipped with the AT-6/SPIRAL will afford the

Soviet pilot greater flexibility because of its greater stand-off range and

more sophisticated guidance system that allows the helicopter to maneuver

while the missile is on its way to the target.

6. Coordination Techniques Between Helicopters and Artillery

The appearance of combat helicopters as a direct support weapon system

has complicated the organization of tactical coordination between air and

ground forces. Helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and artillery usually are

not utilized simultaneously in the same fire zone; to do so would require

strict coordination. Attacks by fixed-wing aircraft and the artillery fire

sometimes coincide in time, but they are assigned separate target sectors.

Combat helicopters are normally employed after the completion of the artillery preparation. It is possible, however, to use the artillery and helicopters simultaneously. In such a situation, close, careful coordination is

required. It is planned in such a way as not to allow any pauses in artillery fire while the combat helicopters are carrying out this mission.

In the following illustrations (Figures A7 and A8), combat helicopters are assigned to strike an enemy tank company held in reserve while

the artillery fire suppresses air defenses. Hovering at about 30 meters, 1

to 2 kilometers from the FLOT, under an umbrella of artillery fire, the

helicopters can hit enemy targets up to 3 kilometers away. Five-hundred

meter-wide corridors are assigned parallel to the direction of friendly

artillery fire, allowing them to approach the forward line and to withdraw

safely.

WPC6917E/NOV82

34
FiuURE A7 HEL.IC.R'=U#.5 iEGAGi4G TA NKS OURIIG ART LLERY PREPARATiON--

STOE VIEW (ARTILLERY: 122-mm HOWITZER 0-30)

Altitude of trajectories ntf ArttllArv fire

HELICOPTERS' ALTITUDES Company

Situation a - Deep Targets

ua t.te ry

Fi re.

Di stance

Most distant artillery target 8 km (AA battery). Helicopters' most distant target 7 km (enemy reserve-tank company Heiqht of artillery trajectory at helicopters' turning point460 m.

Helicopter firing distance - 1,000 m.

Height of artillery trajectory at beginning of helicopters'

firing run. 780 m .

Situation b - Close Targets

Most distant artillery target 6 km.

Helicopters' target 4,500 m.

Height of artillery trajectory at Ihelicopters'turninq point340 m.

Height of artillery trajectory at beginning of helicopters'

firing run 380 m.

Helicopters' firing distance.

91-00051 35
iELLCQOTERS ER;GAGING !;ii$S OURING ARTILLERY PREFARATIO t--

TOP VIEW

Coordi nati on: Intense artillery preparatory fires suppress enemy

air defenses while combat helicopters engage enemy

reserve tank company.

91-00051

FIGURE A8

36
Helicopters are less vulnerable on the battlefield when they are

used in conjunction with other types of combat systems-fighter-bombers,

mortars, tanks, rockets, large-caliber machine guns. Brief, highly concentrated fire and the use of smoke along critical sectors of the helicopter's

flight path can improve survivability. The essential requirement of successful operations by combat helicopters is fighter cover. It is emphasized

that additional forces are not usually required for this, since fighters

will be covering ground troops anyway.

The survivability and effectiveness of combat helicopters in battle

depend also upon close and well-organized coordination with ground troops.

Helicopter crews must have a good understanding of the tactical situation in

the general battle and be able to evaluate the area and the enemy. The

commanders of ground force units, in their turn, must know the capabilities

of helicopters and the effectiveness of their weapons systems. The Soviets

are giving careful attention to the development of better methods of calling

for helicopter support, directing helicopters to targets, and maintaining

continuous communications.

Various methods of tactical coordination have been developed and

tried in joint air and ground force exercises in recent years. The crews of

combat helicopter squadrons prepare for exercises by polishing their

piloting skills and by attacking different kinds of targets under various

weather conditions--individually, in pairs, and in large groups. They often

practice low-altitude navigation and attack runs from different directions

using all weapons systems. Prior to joint exercises, a combat helicopter

squadron commander is assigned to support a particular ground force formation or unit. The squadron commander, together with his staff and flight

leaders, works out several tactical variants on how to provide air support.

The helicopter crews carefully study the terrain of the combat area on

large-scale maps and, considering both the ground and air situations,

develop detailed plans for alternative actions in case the original concept

should change.

During the preparation for such exercises, helicopter crews meet

with the forward air directing officer, an experienced pilot who is assigned

to the supported ground force units. They agree on communications, mutual

identification, and target designation techniques. Often a ground force

battalion commander will brief the helicopter crews on the tactics employed

by the ground troops. In the beginning of the exercise, the combat helicopter squadron takes off from its main base and lands at an auxiliary airfield near the command post of the supported ground force formation.

On the ground force commander's request, the helicopters take off

and head toward the initial point (IP), usually located about 15 kilometers

from the FLOT, which is easily distinguishable visually or electronically.

The helicopters maintain a low altitude, using terrain to mask their

presence when they reach the IP. From there the helicopters may be directed

WPC6917E/NOV82

37
by the forward air directing officer toward the target. The security of

communications between the helicopter crews and the air directing officer is

maintained by the use of brief coded messages.

The air directing officer communicates with the helicopter crews in

flight and may brief them on the target, the flight route, time of the

strike, and other matters related to the mission. He also may give a signal

to the helicopter crews to climb and identify the targets. The crews then

identify the targets visually and launch ordnance from a hovering position,

or make one attack run, and exit at low level.

Ordnance may be fired by an entire group of helicopters simultaneously or by an individual helicopter. The method is selected that affords

the minimum exposure time for the attacking helicopters, thereby reducing

the possibility of losing the aircraft to hostile gun or missile fire.

Should the ground situation dictate, several runs, or hovering pop-ups,

could be made.

The reaction time of air support could be shortened by locating the

helicopter groups closer to the FLOT. In this case, the flights or pairs of

helicopter will be launched from the forward sites, if the need is immediate, and will provide the ground commander with support within 15-30 minutes

after his request.

38

91-0051-CGSC-1000-16 Nov 90