ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED

No. 20-5159

_______________________________________________

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

_______________________________________________

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

_______________________________________________

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

_______________________________________________

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Acting General Counsel

lstevenson@fec.gov

Kevin Deeley 

Associate General Counsel

kdeeley@fec.gov

October 14, 2020

Jacob S. Siler

Acting Assistant General Counsel

jsiler@fec.gov

M. Elise Holman

Attorney

eholman@fec.gov

FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION

1050 First Street NE

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650

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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), defendant-appellee Federal Election 

Commission (“Commission” or “FEC”) hereby certifies as follows:

(A) Parties and Amici. Campaign Legal Center is the plaintiff in the 

district court and the appellant in this Court. The FEC is the defendant in the 

district court and the appellee in this Court. There were no amici curiae in the 

district court. GEO Corrections Holdings has informed the FEC that it intends to 

participate as amicus in this Court. 

(B) Ruling Under Review. Plaintiff-appellant appeals the May 26, 2020

final order and judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia (Chutkan, J.), which granted the FEC’s motion to dismiss. The 

Memorandum Opinion is available at Campaign Legal Center v. FEC, Civ. No. 

18-0053, 2020 WL 2735590 (D.D.C. May 26, 2020). 

(C) Related Cases. The FEC is not aware of any related cases at this time. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................1

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 

PRESENTED FOR REVIEW...............................................................................2

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS....................................................................2

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE..........................................................3

I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND .........................3

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.....................................................................5

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY .......................................................................6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ...................................................................7

STANDARD OF REVIEW..................................................................................9

ARGUMENT..................................................................................................... 10

I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 

COMPLAINANT LACKED ARTICLE III STANDING ...................... 10

A. The Commission’s Mere Failure to Act on an 

Administrative Complaint within 120 Days is 

Not a Sufficient Injury under Article III ....................................... 11

1. Section 30109(a)(8)(A) Does Not Create 

a Substantive Right to Commission 

Action within 120 Days...................................................... 12

2. Neither Common Cause nor 

Section 30109(a)(8)(A) Creates Different Rights 

for Dismissal and Failure to Act Claims............................. 16

3. The Cases Complainant Relies on Are Inapposite ............. 19

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B. Complainant Does Not Have Informational Standing 

Because the Commission Has Not Deprived It of 

Any Information to Which It Is Entitled....................................... 22

1. Complainant Already Has in Its Possession All 

Facts FECA Requires to be Disclosed................................ 22

2. FECA and the Commission’s Policy of 

Disclosing Decision-Making Documents 

Do Not Support Informational Injury ................................. 24

II. COMPLAINANT’S REQUESTS FOR EXPEDITION, 

MERITS CONSIDERATION, AND ORDERING 

THE DISTRICT COURT’S DOCKET ARE IMPROPER..................... 29

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................. 31

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168 (D.C. Cir. 2003)................................................4

Alliance for Democracy v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2004)................ 17

Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2000)............................... 19

Citizens for Percy ’84 v. FEC, No. CIV. A. 84-2653, 

1984 WL 6601 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1984)....................................................... 15

Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337 

(D.C. Cir. 2007)...................................................................................... 22, 23

Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 

(D.C. Cir. 1997)....................................................1, 2, 7, 12-16, 19, 20, 23-29

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) ........................ 20

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. FEC,

No. CIV. A. 95-0349 (JHG), 1996 WL 34301203 

(D.D.C. Apr. 17, 1996)................................................................................. 14

Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016)..................................................... 29, 31

Doe, 1 v. FEC, 920 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2019).....................................................5

FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).......................................................... 18, 22, 29

FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1986)............................................. 12, 14

Free Speech for People v. FEC, 442 F. Supp. 3d 335 

(D.D.C. 2020) ......................................................................................... 22, 24

Hagelin v. FEC, 332 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2004).......................................... 27

Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015)......................9

In re American Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413 

(D.C. Cir. 2004)............................................................................................ 20

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In re Nat’l Cong. Club, No. 84-5701, 1984 WL 148396 

(D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 1984) .............................................................................. 14

Jareki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303 (1961)............................................ 19

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2003)...................... 17

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .......... 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 21

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) ................................................ 19-20

Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisers, 762 F.2d 1038 

(D.C. Cir. 1985)....................................................................................... 20-21

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)..................................... 10, 11, 12

Stockman v. FEC, 138 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1998) ......................................... 14, 21

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009)......................................... 12

Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015).......................................................3

Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2001)............................ 22, 24, 25

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) ..................................................... 30

Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 444 F.3d 614 (2006)....................................... 20

Statutes and Regulations

2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A)......................................................................................1

5 U.S.C. § 552b(g)............................................................................................. 21

52 U.S.C. § 30104.......................................................................................... 3, 23

52 U.S.C. § 30106.................................................................................................3

52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) .......................................................................................3

52 U.S.C. § 30106(c) ............................................................................................4

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52 U.S.C. § 30107.................................................................................................3

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1)........................................................................................3

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2)................................................................................... 3, 4

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)........................................................................................4

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)..................................................................................4

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(B) ..................................................................................4

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(A)..................................................................................4

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)........................................................................................1

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A)......................................................1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11-18

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) ..................................................................... 5, 11, 18

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(12)......................................................................................4

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) ............................................................................................3

52 U.S.C. § 30118.................................................................................................3

52 U.S.C. § 30119(a) ............................................................................................3

52 U.S.C. § 30119(a)(1)................................................................................. 3, 23

52 U.S.C. § 30121.................................................................................................3

52 U.S.C. § 30122.............................................................................................. 24

11 C.F.R. § 111.20(a)......................................................................................... 27

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Miscellaneous

Americans for Job Sec., Matter Under Review 6538R 

(signed Aug. 28, 2019 & Sept. 9, 2019), 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6538R/19044477418.pdf.................. 27

D.C. Circuit, Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 

(Dec. 1, 2019) ......................................................................................... 30, 31

Disclosure of Certain Documents in Enforcement and Other Matters, 

81 Fed. Reg. 50,702 (Aug. 2, 2016) ............................................... 4, 5, 26, 27

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GLOSSARY

APA Administrative Procedure Act

FEC Federal Election Commission

FECA Federal Election Campaign Act

J.A. Joint Appendix

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INTRODUCTION

The Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) provides that “any party 

aggrieved by an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint filed by such 

party . . . or by a failure of the Commission to act on such complaint” within 120 

days of filing “may file a petition with the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A).1 In Common Cause v. FEC, 

this Court concluded that provision “does not confer standing” under Article III, 

but rather “confers a right to sue upon parties who otherwise already have 

standing.” 108 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Therefore, “absent 

the ability to demonstrate a ‘discrete injury’ flowing from the alleged violation of 

FECA,” administrative complainants “cannot establish standing merely by 

asserting that the FEC failed to process its complaint in accordance with law.” Id. 

Despite this precedent, Appellant Campaign Legal Center (“Complainant”)

argues that section 30109(a)(8) creates a “substantive right” to “timely FEC 

action” on its administrative complaint, the purported violation of which confers 

Article III standing. (Br. at 23.) But that argument closely parallels the one

Common Cause rejected: that section 30109(a)(8) “embod[ies] ‘a statutory promise 

1 In 2014, FECA was moved from Title 2 to Title 52 of the United States Code. 

See Editorial Reclassification Table,

http://uscode.house.gov/editorialreclassification/

t52/Reclassifications_Title_52.html. Cases decided before that recodification cite 

section 30109(a)(8)(A) as 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A).

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to the complainant that the FEC [will] act on a complaint in a reasonable period of 

time.’” 108 F.3d at 418. 

Nor do Complainant’s allegations that it has suffered informational injury 

suffice under Article III. Any information regarding the conduct underlying 

Complainant’s administrative complaint is already in its possession, and 

administrative complainants suffer no informational injury under Article III when 

the only purported information that has not been disclosed is merely the 

Commission’s legal determinations based on known facts.

Complainant’s true goal is to prompt the Commission to undertake 

enforcement action against an administrative respondent. But Article III does not 

grant standing to sue to prompt an Executive agency to “get the bad guys.”

Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418. The district court correctly concluded that 

Complainant lacked standing. Accordingly, this Court should affirm.

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the district court correctly held that Complainant lacked Article III 

standing to sue the Commission for failing to act on its administrative complaint.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

All applicable statutes and regulations are contained in the addendum to the 

Brief of the Appellant. 

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COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

The FEC is a six-member, independent agency responsible for the 

administration and interpretation of FECA. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30106-07. Congress 

authorized the FEC to investigate possible FECA violations and gave the FEC 

“exclusive jurisdiction” to initiate civil enforcement actions for those violations. 

52 U.S.C. §§ 30106(b)(1), 30109(a)(1)-(2), (6).

FECA establishes disclosure and reporting requirements related to federal 

campaign expenditures and contributions. 52 U.S.C. § 30104. FECA also limits 

the amounts and permissible sources of campaign contributions that candidates, 

political parties, and political committees may receive. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a), 

30118-19, 30121. One such limit is the prohibition on contributions from federal 

contractors. 52 U.S.C. § 30119(a); see generally Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015) (en banc) (upholding the constitutionality of FECA’s ban on federal 

contractor contributions).

FECA permits “any person” to file an administrative complaint with the 

Commission alleging a violation of the Act. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1). After 

considering these allegations and any response, the Commission determines 

whether there is “reason to believe” that the respondent violated FECA. 

Id. § 30109(a)(2). If the Commission so finds, then it conducts “an investigation of 

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such alleged violation” to determine whether there is “probable cause to believe” 

that a FECA violation has occurred. Id. § 30109(a)(2), (4). If the Commissioners 

find that there is probable cause, the Commission must first attempt to remedy the 

violation informally and enter a conciliation agreement with any persons involved. 

Id. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i). If the Commission is unable to reach a conciliation 

agreement, the Commission may institute a civil enforcement action in federal 

district court. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(A). Each of these stages requires the affirmative 

vote of at least four Commissioners for the agency to proceed. Id. §§ 30106(c), 

30109(a)(2), (a)(4)(A)(i), (a)(6)(A).

Disclosure of information relating to Commission consideration of an 

administrative complaint is governed by FECA and Commission regulations. 

While the matter is pending with the Commission, FECA generally requires that 

any investigation must not be made public. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(12); see AFLCIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 174 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Upon the closing of a matter, 

however, FECA requires the Commission to make public any conciliation 

agreement or “determination that a person has not violated the act.” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(4)(B). The Commission also places on the public record specified 

categories of documents integral to its decision-making in the matter, including the 

Office of General Counsel’s analysis of the administrative complaint. Disclosure 

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of Certain Documents in Enforcement and Other Matters, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,702 

(Aug. 2, 2016); see Doe, 1 v. FEC, 920 F.3d 866, 869-70 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

FECA provides a cause of action for administrative complainants to seek to

challenge the Commission’s handling of their complaints in two limited 

circumstances. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). First, a party who has filed an 

administrative complaint may sue the Commission in the event of “a failure of the 

Commission to act on such complaint during the 120-day period beginning on the 

date the complaint is filed.” Id. Second, an administrative complainant may seek 

judicial review of “an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint filed by 

such party.” Id.

If the court finds a reviewable dismissal decision or failure to act to be

“contrary to law,” the court may order the Commission to conform to the court’s 

decision within 30 days. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C). If the Commission fails to 

conform within the time period, the administrative complainant may bring a civil 

action to remedy the violation alleged in the administrative complaint. Id.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In its litigation complaint, Complainant alleged that it and another individual 

jointly filed an administrative complaint against GEO Corrections Holdings, Inc. 

and Rebuilding America Now (collectively, “Administrative Respondents”) on 

November 1, 2016. (J.A. 10.) According to Complainant, that administrative 

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complaint alleged that GEO Corrections Holdings, Inc. was a federal contractor 

that violated FECA’s prohibition on contributions by federal contractors when it 

donated $225,000 to Rebuilding America Now, an independent-expenditure-only 

political committee or “super PAC” supporting Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential 

campaign. (J.A. 5, 10-11.) Complainant alleged that the Commission 

acknowledged receipt of the administrative complaint on November 4, 2016. (J.A. 

10.) Complainant further alleged that it supplemented its complaint on December 

20, 2016, with additional purported evidence of FECA violations. (J.A. 11.) 

Finally, Complainant pleads on “information and belief” that the Commission has 

“failed to act on [its] administrative complaint to date.” (J.A. 11.)

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 10, 2018, just over a year later, Complainant filed suit in the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia claiming that the FEC’s 

“failure to act on” Complainant’s “administrative complaint within 120 days” of its 

filing was contrary to law under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). (J.A. 11.)

Complainant also claimed that the Commission violated the Administrative 

Procedure Act (“APA”) by unlawfully withholding and unreasonably delaying 

agency action on its complaint. (J.A. 12.) For relief from these alleged violations, 

Complainant requested that the district court order the FEC to act on its complaint 

within 30 days. (J.A. 12.)

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The district court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted. (J.A. 13-16.) First, the district court concluded that Complainant lacked 

standing to sue under Article III because it had not alleged a sufficiently concrete 

and particularized injury. Relying on this Court’s decision in Common Cause v. 

FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the district court rejected Complainant’s 

argument that FECA “creates a substantive right to FEC action within 120 days” of 

the filing of an administrative complaint, the violation of which confers standing. 

(J.A. 14-15.) Instead, the district court concluded that section 30109(a)(8)(A) 

“does not confer standing; it confers a right to sue upon parties who otherwise 

already have standing.” (J.A. 15 (quoting Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 419)

(internal quotation marks omitted).) Second, the district court dismissed 

Complainant’s APA claim for failure to state a claim, holding that FECA provided 

“an adequate mechanism for judicial review” and precluded APA review.

(J.A. 15-16.) Complainant has abandoned this latter claim on appeal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Complainant does not have a justiciable interest in the enforcement of FECA 

against third parties. Nor does it have a substantive right to agency action on its 

administrative complaint within 120 days of it being filed. This Court’s opinion in 

Common Cause v. FEC is controlling here. In Common Cause, the Court found 

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that section 30109(a)(8)(A) creates a procedural right to sue the FEC for either 

dismissal or failure to act on a complaint. The statute did not create a substantive 

right; plaintiffs must still demonstrate that they have suffered a discrete, underlying 

injury separate and apart from any mere procedural violation stemming from a

dismissal or failure to act. The fact that the Commission did not pursue

enforcement against a third party within a specified time period does not itself 

constitute an injury in fact.

Nor does Complainant’s argument that it has been deprived of information 

to which it is entitled suffice to establish injury in fact for Article III. The 

information over which it claims a right to receive — which includes information 

regarding possible agency findings and staff analysis — is not the type of 

information that courts have held may form the basis for Article III injury in fact.

Rather, what Complainant seeks is the Commission’s legal conclusions about the 

factual allegations alleged in its administrative complaint; it seeks no new factual 

information related to its underlying FECA allegations. The matter documents are 

also prohibited from disclosure until the administrative proceedings end and, even 

assuming it did prevail in this case, Complainant can only speculate that it would 

receive them soon after a remand. 

Complainant lacks Article III standing and this Court need not consider its 

improper requests to consider the merits, belatedly expedite this appeal, or override 

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the district court’s right to manage its own docket. The district court did not 

consider the merits of Complainant’s delay claim, and the merits are not before this 

Court in this appeal regarding standing. Moreover, Complainant’s argument 

regarding likelihood of success is based solely on its own, untested allegations and 

without the benefit of a chronology of any events before the agency. To achieve 

expedition of the question that is before the Court, Complainant was required to 

file a procedural motion within 30 days of docketing and it failed to do so. And 

even if this Court did consider the request to direct the district court to expedite, 

Complainant has not presented any basis to believe that court could not adequately 

handle scheduling in the normal course.

Because Complainant failed to demonstrate injury in fact, this Court should 

affirm. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing de 

novo. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The 

Court “accepts facts alleged in the complaint as true,” but plaintiffs “must state a 

plausible claim that [they have] suffered an injury in fact fairly traceable to the 

actions of the defendant that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision on the 

merits.” Id.

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ARGUMENT

This Court should affirm the district court’s dismissal of Complainant’s 

complaint for lack of Article III standing. Accordingly, the Court need not 

consider Complainant’s subsequent request for this Court to intervene in the 

district court’s management of its own docket. 

I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 

COMPLAINANT LACKED ARTICLE III STANDING.

A federal court’s jurisdiction is limited to cases and controversies, and “the 

core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560 (1992). Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing “the ‘irreducible 

constitutional minimum’ of standing [which] consists of three elements.” Spokeo, 

Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). 

Plaintiffs must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 

challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a 

favorable judicial decision.” Id. Here, Complainant bore the burden of

establishing that it has standing, but it failed to demonstrate that it suffered injury 

in fact. 

A plaintiff is injured for standing purposes if it has suffered “‘an invasion of 

a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or 

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting 

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Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). A concrete injury is one that “actually exist[s]” and is 

“not abstract.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An injury is particularized 

if it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. 

Complainant argues that the FEC’s inaction injured it in two respects: 

(1) section 30109(a)(8)(A) creates a substantive right to FEC action, which 

Complainant was denied when the FEC did not act on its administrative complaint 

within 120 days; and (2) the delay in FEC action deprived Complainant of 

information to which it is entitled when the Commission closes a matter. Neither 

of these theories, however, is sufficient to establish injury in fact under Article III.

A. The Commission’s Mere Failure to Act on an Administrative 

Complaint within 120 Days is Not a Sufficient Injury under 

Article III.

Section 30109(a)(8)(A), (C) allows “[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of the 

Commission dismissing a complaint filed by such party . . . or by a failure of the 

Commission to act on such complaint during the 120-day period beginning on the 

date the complaint is filed” to file a lawsuit arguing that the Commission’s 

dismissal or delay is “contrary to law.” Complainant argues that this language

grants administrative complainants a “substantive statutory right” to “a 120-day 

timeframe for agency action,” and that the violation of that “right” creates

standing. (Br. at 17, 24.) But Complainant is wrong on both counts: section 

30109(a)(8)(A) creates a procedural right the violation of which does not satisfy 

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the injury-in-fact requirement absent some concrete injury, Common Cause, 108 

F.3d at 419, and section 30109(a)(8)(A) does not set a timeframe for FEC action, 

FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

1. Section 30109(a)(8)(A) Does Not Create a Substantive Right 

to Commission Action within 120 Days.

“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a 

statutory violation.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Although Congress has the power 

to “define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or 

controversy where none existed before,” that power “does not mean that a plaintiff 

automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a 

person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate 

that right.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a plaintiff seeking to 

enforce a procedural right must demonstrate “a separate concrete interest” that will 

be impaired by “the disregard of” that requirement. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572; see 

also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (finding that plaintiffs cannot “allege a bare 

procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-infact requirement of Article III”); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 

(2009) (“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is 

affected by the deprivation — a procedural right in vacuo — is insufficient to 

create Article III standing.”). 

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Applying these principles, this Circuit has held that FECA’s provision for 

judicial review of the Commission’s handling of administrative complaints “does 

not confer standing; it confers a right to sue upon parties who otherwise already 

have standing.” Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 419. Just as Complainant argues 

here (Br. at 17-25), Common Cause argued that section 30109(a)(8)(A) created “a 

statutory promise to the complainant that the FEC will act on a complaint in a 

reasonable period of time and will do so in a manner not contrary to law.” 108 

F.3d at 418 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Common Cause 

similarly argued that “when the FEC violates the complainant’s right to a prompt 

and lawful resolution of the complaint, the Commission deprives the complainant 

of a statutorily promised benefit that is personal to the complainant.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

This Court squarely rejected these arguments, holding that such allegations 

merely amounted to a “procedural injury” insufficient to support Article III 

standing. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-72). “[A]bsent the ability to 

demonstrate a discrete injury flowing from the alleged violation of FECA, 

Common Cause [could not] establish standing merely by asserting that the FEC 

failed to process its complaint in accordance with law.” Id. at 419 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, contrary to Complainant’s argument, the mere 

assertion “that the FEC failed to process [a] complaint in accordance with law” is 

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14

insufficient. Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 419. “To hold otherwise,” this Court has 

found, “would be to recognize a justiciable interest in having the Executive Branch 

act in a lawful manner . . . [which] is not a legally cognizable interest for purposes 

of standing.” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573).

Furthermore, this Court has “unequivocally rejected” Complainant’s 

contention that section 30109(a)(8)(A) creates a substantive entitlement to 

Commission action on an administrative complaint within a specified period of 

time. Rose, 806 F.2d at 1092; see also In re Nat’l Cong. Club, No. 84-5701, 1984 

WL 148396 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 1984) (summarily reversing the district court’s 

ruling that the FEC was required to resolve an administrative complaint within two 

years); Stockman v. FEC, 138 F.3d 144, 152 (5th Cir. 1998) (“While the Campaign 

Act grants the FEC power to conduct investigations and hearings expeditiously, the 

Act does not create a deadline in which the FEC must act or create a private cause 

of action to enforce this provision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Every district court agrees. E.g., Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. 

v. FEC, No. CIV. A. 95-0349 (JHG), 1996 WL 34301203, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 

1996) (“Congress did not provide the FEC with a specific statutory timetable 

within which it must act on administrative complaints . . . [and] [c]ourts have 

construed the 120-day period of [section 30109(a)(8)(A)] as jurisdictional in nature 

and not as a time period in which the FEC is required to complete final action.”);

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15

Citizens for Percy ’84 v. FEC, No. CIV. A. 84-2653, 1984 WL 6601, at *2 (D.D.C. 

Nov. 19, 1984) (holding “the 120 day period is jurisdictional and does not impose 

a deadline for final action”). FECA’s legislative history is consistent with these 

cases. Complainant noted Senator Claiborne Pell’s statement that section 

30109(a)(8)(A) provides for a court action after 120 days to ensure “that the 

Commission does not shirk its responsibility” to act on administrative complaints.

(Br. at 21 n. 6) (quoting 125 Cong. Rec. S19099 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1979) 

(statement of Sen. Pell)). But this comment merely confirms that an administrative 

complainant has a cause of action after 120 days. It does not suggest that a 

complainant has a substantive right to action within that timeframe. The 120-day 

time period is simply a limitation on the cause of action Congress provided to 

administrative complainants that otherwise have standing to sue.

Indeed, Complainant’s brief undermines its own argument. Complainant

admits that “Congress did not impose specific time constraints upon the 

Commission to complete final action.” (Br. at 39.) But if Congress did not impose 

a time constraint on the Commission to complete final action, then Complainant

does not have a substantive right to agency action within 120 days of filing its

administrative complaint. Because Complainant failed to allege a discrete injury 

flowing from the Commission’s inaction, the district court correctly concluded that 

Complainant failed to satisfy the injury in fact requirement for Article III standing. 

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2. Neither Common Cause nor Section 30109(a)(8)(A) Creates

Different Rights for Dismissal and Failure to Act Claims. 

Complainant’s attempt to distinguish Common Cause falls short. 

Complainant endeavors to differentiate between the Commission’s action 

dismissing the administrative complaint in Common Cause from the Commission’s 

inaction on Complainant’s administrative complaint here. But neither Common 

Cause nor the statute support separate treatment of dismissal and failure to act 

claims under Article III. 

Section 30109(a)(8)(A) provides a cause of action against the Commission 

for two categories of potential plaintiffs: (1) a party aggrieved by the 

Commission’s dismissal of their administrative complaint; and (2) a party

aggrieved by the “failure of the Commission to act on such [a] complaint” after 

120 days have elapsed. As the district court recognized, Common Cause did not 

distinguish between these two classes of plaintiffs. (J.A. 15.) Rather, the Common 

Cause court directly addressed the argument that section 30109(a)(8)(A) creates a 

right to a “prompt and lawful resolution” of its administrative complaint. 108 F.3d 

at 418 (emphasis added). In rejecting that argument, the Court referred to 

section 30109(a)(8)(A) as a whole. Id. at 419. As the Court explained, an 

administrative complainant “cannot establish standing merely by asserting that the 

FEC failed to process its complaint in accordance with law.” Id. (emphasis 

added). Complainant is simply incorrect to assert that Common Cause did not 

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have occasion to address a claim asserting that the Commission’s delay in acting 

on an administrative complaint was sufficient to satisfy Article III. See Alliance 

for Democracy v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 39, 48 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[U]nder Article 

III, it is not enough for [a plaintiff] to allege that it was injured because the 

Commission unlawfully delayed the investigation; plaintiffs must show a discrete 

injury flowing from such alleged delay.” (internal quotation marks omitted));

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41, 48 (D.D.C. 2003) (“The [D.C. 

Circuit] made clear that while the FEC’s failure [to] act within the 120-day period 

of [section 30109(a)(8)(A)] conferred a right to sue, it did not also confer 

standing.”).

The plain language of the statute also does not support the strict parsing 

Complainant suggests. It argues that Congress specifically determined that an 

administrative complainant is “aggrieved” by a failure to act within 120 days 

because “that is the point at which the complainant did not get what the statute 

entitled [it] to receive.” (Br. at 33.(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)) 

The statute, however, uses the same statutory language to define both classes of 

plaintiffs that may sue to challenge the Commission’s handling of their 

administrative complaint.

Section 30109(a)(8)(A) begins with the subject “[a]ny party” and the verb 

“aggrieved,” a term historically associated “with a congressional intent to cast the 

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[prudential] standing net broadly.” FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998).

Following “aggrieved” are two adverbial phrases separated by the coordinating 

conjunction “or”: (1) “by an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint,” and

(2) “by a failure of the Commission to act on such complaint.” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(A). These equal phrases modify the verb “aggrieved” and identify 

two types of parties that may file suit. Contrary to Complainant’s argument, both 

phrases define how a plaintiff may be “aggrieved.” See § 30109(a)(8)(A), (C).

The statute does not say a party may be aggrieved by a dismissal of their 

complaint, but a party is aggrieved if the Commission does not act on their 

complaint within 120 days. Because these are two equal phrases creating, in the 

same manner, causes of action related to processing administrative complaints, it

would be inconsistent to find that one cause of action confers a procedural right 

while the other confers a substantive right. 

FECA’s text otherwise treats delay and dismissal claims identically in all 

relevant respects. Both delay and dismissal claims must be filed in the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). 

Both are subject to the same “contrary to law” standard of review. Id.

§ 30109(a)(8)(C). And the only statutory remedy available for either claim is an 

order “direct[ing] the Commission to conform . . . within 30 days.” Id. Given this 

statutory similarity, it would be odd for Congress to have intended one statutory 

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19

clause to confer a substantive right when the immediately preceding clause was a 

merely procedural requirement. Cf. Jareki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 

307 (1961) (“[A] word is known by the company it keeps . . . .”). 

Because neither the statute nor case law can be read as creating different 

rights for dismissal and failure to act, the Court should find that Common Cause is 

controlling. Accordingly, Complainant’s mere allegation “that the FEC failed to 

process its complaint in accordance with [the] law,” without “demonstrat[ing] a 

‘discrete injury’ flowing from the alleged violation of FECA,” is insufficient for

standing. See Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 419.

3. The Cases Complainant Relies on are Inapposite. 

None of the cases Complainant cites suggests that FECA creates a 

substantive right to action within a set time period, the violation of which may 

support injury in fact. Complainant first points to cases in which plaintiffs that 

filed rulemaking petitions had standing to sue administrative agencies when the

agencies failed to respond to the petitions within a certain time period. (See Br. at 

15-16.) In such a case, however, a plaintiff may demonstrate injury in fact by 

asserting a “substantial probability” that an agency’s rules, or an agency’s refusal 

to promulgate rules, will cause them discrete harm. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 

216 F.3d 50, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 

522-26 (2007) (finding that Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA for 

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20

denying a rulemaking petition). In the context of a request for an administrative 

agency to enforce the law against a third-party, however, parties have no 

“justiciable interest in having the Executive Branch act in a lawful manner” for 

purposes of standing. Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 419.

Complainant’s reference (Br. at 16-17) to other statutes through which 

Congress has created a substantive right to certain government action is similarly 

misplaced because, as explained above, FECA creates no such substantive right, 

see, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 444 F.3d 614, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(concluding that a plaintiff had standing to sue because he had a colorable claim 

that a federal statute entitled him to have Jerusalem listed as his birthplace).

Complainant cites this Court’s decisions in In re American Rivers & Idaho Rivers 

United, 372 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2004) and Rushforth v. Council of Economic 

Advisers, 762 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1985) to support its standing claim. (Br. at 18-

19.) But standing was uncontested in those cases, and neither court addressed it. 

“Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the 

court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to 

constitute precedents.” Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170 

(2004) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

In any event, Rushforth involved a claim that an agency had failed to 

promulgate Sunshine Act regulations within a 180-day deadline set by statute, 762 

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21

F.2d at 1038-39; in other words, the Sunshine Act created a right to agency action 

and a specific deadline for that action. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(g). FECA does not. 

Stockman, 138 F.3d at 152 (FECA “does not create a deadline in which the FEC 

must act or create a private cause of action to enforce this provision”). 

As the Supreme Court noted in Lujan, “when the plaintiff is not himself the 

object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not 

precluded, but it is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish.” Lujan v., 

504 U.S. at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted). Complainant attempts to argue 

that it is the object of government inaction because the FEC failed to act on its 

complaint within 120 days. (Br. at 22-23.) But unlike the plaintiffs in the cases 

cited in its brief, Complainant is not the object of government action or inaction 

because it does not have a substantive right for the FEC to act on its administrative 

complaint within that timeframe. The real interest Complainant seeks to advance 

lies in the FEC’s inaction with regard to enforcing FECA against the 

Administrative Respondents. Complainant’s administrative complaint, litigation

complaint, and appellate brief all underscore that Complainant’s goal is 

enforcement. Given that Complainant is not the object of government inaction and 

that it does not have a cognizable interest in law enforcement, the Court should 

find that Complainant lacks standing. 

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B. Complainant Does Not Have Informational Standing Because the 

Commission Has Not Deprived It of Any Information to Which It 

Is Entitled.

Complainant alternatively argues that it has informational standing because 

FECA and the Commission’s regulations require the FEC to disclose certain 

information upon the closing of an enforcement matter. It is true that a plaintiff’s 

failure “to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to” FECA

may constitute injury in fact. Akins, 524 U.S. at 20-21. Here, however, 

Complainant already has in its possession all of the factual information it seeks, 

and the additional information it identifies merely reflects the Commission’s legal 

determinations regarding facts known to Complainant. Neither approach 

establishes injury in fact.

1. Complainant Already Has in Its Possession All Facts FECA 

Requires to be Disclosed.

A plaintiff has no injury in fact when it has the information it seeks in its 

possession and merely desires to obtain “the same information from a different 

source.” Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Free 

Speech for People v. FEC, 442 F. Supp. 3d 335, 343 (D.D.C. 2020). Furthermore, 

plaintiffs lack standing when the information at issue “would add only a trifle to 

the store of information about the transaction already publicly available.” Citizens 

for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

Here, Complainant cannot establish that it has been deprived of information related

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23

to the transaction underlying its administrative complaint because it already 

possesses that information.

As described in its litigation complaint, Complainant’s administrative 

complaint alleged only that the Administrative Respondents violated the federal 

ban on contractor contributions. (J.A. 7-10 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30119(a)(1).) It 

made no allegation that the Administrative Respondents violated FECA’s separate 

provisions requiring disclosure. See generally 52 U.S.C. § 30104. That was 

because all of the allegedly unlawful contributions were fully disclosed pursuant to 

FECA’s requirements. (See J.A. 8 (citing disclosure reports filed by Rebuilding 

America Now with the FEC).) Complainant’s allegations thus reveal that it is 

already aware of all the information that must be disclosed under FECA: the 

identity of the contributor; the amount of those contributions; the purpose of the 

contributions; and the dates of the contributions. (Id.) Complainant can, like 

anyone else, “learn the details of the transaction” by visiting the Commission’s 

website. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 475 F.3d at 339.

A violation of FECA’s ban on federal contractors does not result in the 

public being deprived of information that must be disclosed under FECA unless 

the recipient fails to disclose it. That provision merely prohibits federal contractors 

from making contributions; it does not itself mandate disclosure. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30119(a)(1). “Nothing in the FECA requires that information concerning a 

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24

violation of the Act as such be disclosed to the public.” Common Cause, 108 F.3d 

at 418. As a result, Complainant cannot use it to prove informational injury.

The only potentially undisclosed fact Complainant identified was its 

suggestion that the Commission may have uncovered the “‘true source’ of the 

funds contributed by GEO Corrections Holdings, Inc., and whether those funds can 

be directly or indirectly traced to its parent, GEO Group.” (Br. at 28-29.) But that 

speculative suggestion appears nowhere in Complainant’s litigation complaint.

(See J.A. 7-12.) Nor does Complainant claim to have alleged any violations of 

FECA’s separate provision prohibiting contributions in the name of another by 

serving as a conduit for a corporate parent. J.A. 5-12; see 52 U.S.C. § 30122. If 

the Commission had acted on the only allegation that Complainant did make —

that the Administrative Respondents violated the federal contractor ban — FECA 

would not have required any additional information to be disclosed. The 

Commission’s lack of final action on Complainant’s enforcement complaint has, 

therefore, not deprived it of any information that FECA would require to be 

disclosed. See Wertheimer, 268 F.3d at 1075; see also Free Speech for People, 

442 F. Supp. 3d at 343.

2. FECA and the Commission’s Policy of Disclosing DecisionMaking Documents Do Not Support Informational Injury.

Complainant also argues that the FEC’s failure to act has deprived it of 

certain information that the Commission releases at the conclusion of its 

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25

enforcement process, including the staff report analyzing the allegations and the 

result of any Commissioner votes related to the matter. (Br. at 26-27.) The nature 

of the information Complainant argues it has been deprived of, however, merely 

reflects the legal determinations that the Commission and staff have made 

regarding facts that have otherwise been disclosed. 

Complainant specifically argues that the Commission must release the 

results of any Commission votes, as well as its legal determinations as to whether it 

found “reason to believe” or “probable cause to believe” that FECA had been 

violated or alternatively whether it had made the “determination that a person has 

not violated” FECA. (Br. at 26-27.) A plaintiff, however, cannot “establish injury 

in fact merely by alleging that he has been deprived of the knowledge as to 

whether a violation of law has occurred.” Wertheimer, 268 F.3d at 1074 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 417 (holding that 

“[i]f the information withheld is simply the fact that a violation of FECA has 

occurred,” then the plaintiffs have not suffered injury in fact).

Complainant may be curious to learn how the Commission would vote on its 

administrative complaint, but a party suffers no informational injury when it 

“do[es] not really seek additional facts but only [a] legal determination” regarding 

known facts. Wertheimer, 268 F.3d at 1075. To allow a plaintiff to “establish 

injury in fact merely by alleging that he has been deprived of the knowledge as to 

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26

whether a violation of the law has occurred would be tantamount to recognizing a 

justiciable interest in the enforcement of the law,” which this Court has said it 

cannot do. Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418-19. These allegations more properly 

reflect a plaintiff’s “desire[] for the Commission to ‘get the bad guys,’ rather than 

disclose information. [Plaintiffs have] no standing to sue for such relief.” Id.

Simply put, Complainant suffers no informational injury when the only 

information withheld is the Commission’s legal determination regarding known 

facts. 

That Complainant’s true interest is in compelling the Commission to pursue 

enforcement action, and not additional information, is underscored by its request 

for expedition in the district court. (Br. at 35-41.) There, Complainant argues that 

the matter must be expedited because of the “rapidly approaching statute of 

limitations.” (Br. at 40.) The expiration of any statute of limitations, however, 

would not affect Complainant’s interest in obtaining the information the 

Commission releases at the termination of an enforcement matter. That 

information would be disclosed in the normal course regardless of any limitations 

period. Complainant also contends that it is entitled to receive “investigative” 

materials (Br. at 9-10), but those are not disclosed. 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,703. The 

only possible impact the expiration of a statute of limitations could have would be 

on the Commission’s ability to pursue civil enforcement against the Administrative 

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27

Respondents. Complainant has no justiciable interest in the enforcement of FECA 

against others. See Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418-19.

Moreover, even assuming Complainant has a concrete and particularized 

interest in the file released when the administrative matter concludes, it is only 

speculative that a release would occur soon after the conclusion of the litigation.

The Commission’s disclosure regulations and policies related to its enforcement 

matters trigger only upon the closure of a matter. See 11 C.F.R. § 111.20(a) 

(requiring the FEC to “make public” findings of no reason to believe or no 

probable cause to believe or when it otherwise terminates its proceedings “no later 

than thirty (30) days” after closure); 81 Fed. Reg. at 50,703 (setting policy of 

disclosure of reports from the Office of General Counsel and other enforcement 

documents “as soon as practical” after closure). Following a remand, the agency 

would still be required to “follow the statutorily-required process in dealing with 

administrative complaints” and, should it determine to proceed with the matter,

mandatory time periods would in most cases make complete resolution of a matter 

within 30 days impossible. See Hagelin v. FEC, 332 F. Supp. 2d 71, 82 (D.D.C. 

2004). If an investigation, briefing, and/or conciliation were involved, there would 

be no immediate case closure and file release would not follow a remand. E.g.,

Americans for Job Sec., Matter Under Review 6538R at 1 n.1 (signed Aug. 28, 

2019 & Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6538R/

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28

19044477418.pdf (conciliating matter three years after a remand). The matter 

would be closed at a later point irrespective of a remand, and the proximity to the 

remand would be dependent on the manner in which post-remand events unfolded.

Because the FEC has not deprived Complainant of any information to which 

it is entitled, and because Complainant does not have a cognizable interest in

seeing the law enforced, the Court should find that Complainant has not 

demonstrated an informational injury. 

***

Complainant’s ultimate interest is in seeing the FEC “get the bad guys.” See

Common Cause 108 F.3d at 418. None of Complainant’s allegations establish that 

the FEC deprived Complainant of any information to which it is entitled. Rather, 

Complainant merely sought enforcement of FECA against the Administrative 

Respondents.

In its brief, Complainant attempts to argue that it has suffered injury in fact 

because the Commission failed to act on its complaint within 120 days and because 

it has been deprived of information to which it is entitled. But at no point did 

Complainant demonstrate a concrete injury to its activities “with [a] consequent 

drain on [its] resources—constitut[ing] . . . more than simply a setback to the 

organization’s abstract social interests.” See Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 417 

(internal quotations omitted) (second alteration added). First, Complainant simply 

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29

does not have a substantive right to FEC action on its complaint within 120 days. 

Second, Complainant is not entitled to the information that it seeks because: (1) it

is not seeking information to facilitate its participation in the political process but 

rather a legal determination that the Administrative Respondents violated FECA; 

and (2) even after a remand it is speculative that the release of information would 

follow. It is apparent that Complainant’s aim is still enforcement. Neither of these 

alleged injuries are sufficient for standing. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 24; Common 

Cause, 108 F.3d at 418. Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of Complainant’s complaint for lack of standing.

II. COMPLAINANT’S REQUESTS FOR EXPEDITION, MERITS 

CONSIDERATION, AND ORDERING THE DISTRICT COURT’S

DOCKET ARE IMPROPER.

Complainant lacks Article III standing, and its requests for this Court to 

consider the merits of the delay claim and order expedition here and at the district 

court are inappropriate at this time. The only issue on appeal is Complainant’s 

standing, a determination courts must make first and without regard to merits 

considerations. To seek expedition in this Court, Complainant was required to do 

so by motion, but did not. And even if the Court were inclined to entertain 

Complainant’s request to order expedition at the district court, there is no need to 

override that court’s “inherent authority to manage [its own] docket[].” Dietz v. 

Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892-93 (2016). 

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30

As an initial matter, Complainant’s arguments regarding its chances of 

success on the merits have no place in this appeal. “It is well established . . . that 

before a federal court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking 

to invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish the requisite standing to sue.” 

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990). The Court’s “threshold inquiry 

into standing in no way depends on the merits of the [petitioner’s] contention that 

particular conduct is illegal.” Id. at 155 (alteration in original) (internal citation 

and quotation marks omitted). The only issue before the Court is standing. 

Because the merits of Complainant’s claim do not factor into the Court’s standing 

analysis, it would be inappropriate to analyze the merits at this stage.

Furthermore, the district court dismissed Complainant’s complaint on a 

preliminary standing motion. (J.A. 13-16.) As such, no chronology of events has 

been compiled that would bear on that claim or the Commission’s defenses, and 

the district court has had no occasion to consider the merits of Complainant’s delay 

claim.

Complainant also requests in its brief that the Court expedite its appeal (Br. 

at 40), but “counsel seeking expedited review must file a motion” and such 

motions “must be filed within 30 days of the date the case is docketed.” D.C. 

Circuit, Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures at 34 (Dec. 1, 2019). 

Complainant failed to file a motion to expedite and thus may not obtain expedition 

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31

at this juncture in contravention of this Court’s procedures. Even if it had filed 

such a motion, Complainant would have been required to “demonstrate that the 

delay will cause irreparable injury and the decision under review is subject to 

substantial challenge,” which it would have been unable to do. Id. As explained 

above, the expiration of the statute of limitations affects the Commission’s ability 

to seek civil penalties and does not irreparably injure Complainant; and the district 

court’s decision comported with directly controlling precedent. 

For similar reasons, Complainant does not establish that its purported 

likelihood of success warrants ordering the district court to expedite proceedings in 

this matter. The district court is best positioned to assess the needs of the many 

cases on its docket and to schedule its proceedings accordingly in order “to achieve 

the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Dietz, 136 S. Ct. at 1891

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). There is no need for this Court to 

override the district court’s discretion in ordering its docket.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court 

affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Complainant’s complaint due to a lack of 

standing.

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32

Respectfully submitted,

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Acting General Counsel

lstevenson@fec.gov

Kevin Deeley 

Associate General Counsel

kdeeley@fec.gov

October 14, 2020

Jacob S. Siler

Acting Assistant General Counsel

jsiler@fec.gov

/s/ M. Elise Holman

M. Elise Holman

Attorney

eholman@fec.gov

FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION

1050 First Street NE

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650

USCA Case #20-5159 Document #1866291 Filed: 10/14/2020 Page 41 of 43
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 14th day of October 2020, I electronically filed 

the foregoing document with the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the D.C. Circuit by using the Court’s CM/ECF system. All participants are 

registered CM/ECF users and will be served by the appellate CM/ECF system.

/s/ M. Elise Holman

M. Elise Holman

USCA Case #20-5159 Document #1866291 Filed: 10/14/2020 Page 42 of 43
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT, 

TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE-STYLE REQUIREMENTS

I hereby certify, on this 14th day of October 2020, that:

1. This document complies with the word limit of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7) 

because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. App. 

32(f) and Circuit Rule 32(e), this document contains 7,128 words.

2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 

32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. 32(a)(6) because 

this document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using 

Microsoft Word 2013 in a 14-point Times New Roman font.

/s/ M. Elise Holman

M. Elise Holman

USCA Case #20-5159 Document #1866291 Filed: 10/14/2020 Page 43 of 43