[Cite as State v. Montgomery, 2020-Ohio-513.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

DARYL A. MONTGOMERY 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 28404 

Trial Court Case No. 2018-CRB-4179 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Municipal Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 14th day of February, 2020. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

STEPHANIE COOK, Atty. Reg. No. 0067101, Prosecuting Attorney, City of Dayton 

Prosecutor’s Office, 335 West Third Street, Room 372, Dayton, Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

MICHELLE M. MACIOROWSKI, 7333 Paragon Road, Suite 170, Dayton, Ohio 45459 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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HALL, J. 
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{¶ 1} Daryl A. Montgomery appeals from his conviction following a no-contest plea 

to one count of criminal trespass, a fourth-degree misdemeanor.

{¶ 2} Montgomery advances three assignments of error. First, he challenges the 

trial court’s denial of a suppression motion prior to his plea. He argues that unlawful 

detention and questioning by a Dayton police officer led to the discovery that he had been 

“trespassed” from the apartment complex where he was found. Second, he contends the 

trial court erred in precluding testimony about an alleged pattern of police conduct 

involving stopping people at apartment complexes “which trains citizens to believe that 

their encounters with police * * * are not consensual.” Third, he claims the trial court erred 

in not considering the “current culture surrounding citizens’ interaction with police officers, 

not recognizing that the very presence of police may imply to citizens that they have been 

detained[,] and by not acknowledging that a private citizen may put himself at risk of harm 

by attempting to walk away from a police officer.” 

{¶ 3} The record reflects that Dayton police officer Thadeu Holloway and his 

partner were patrolling the Limestone Court Apartments around 10:00 p.m. on July 11, 

2018. While doing so, they heard loud music outside of an apartment where seven or 

eight people were congregated in a common area. Holloway approached the group on 

foot and advised one of the residents to turn the music down. The resident said she 

understood and agreed to do so. At the suppression hearing, Holloway described this 

brief exchange as “cordial.” 

{¶ 4} After addressing the music issue, Holloway separately asked each of the 

people outside the apartment if they would mind providing him with their name, birthday, 

and Social Security number. Once again, he described this request as a “cordial” one 
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made in a “conversational” tone. He testified that Montgomery was cooperative and orally 

provided the information without objection. Holloway’s partner processed the information 

at the police cruiser and discovered that Montgomery had been “trespassed” from the 

property. As a result, the officers arrested him for criminal trespass. On crossexamination, Holloway denied demanding information or identification from anyone at the 

scene. He also denied telling any of the people outside that they could not leave. When 

asked specifically what he said, Holloway responded: 

 I believe I walked up and said, “Good evening. Can you guys please 

turn down your music? It’s very loud.” The apartment owner said, “Of 

course.” I said, “What’s going on tonight?” She said, “We are just hanging 

out drinking and trying to listen to some music and trying to relax.” I then 

asked, “Would you guys [mind] providing me your information?” 

(Suppression Tr. at 23.) 

{¶ 5} The only other witness at the suppression hearing was Montgomery. He 

testified that the two officers approached on foot with their hands on their holsters and 

told him to give them his identification. Montgomery then clarified that the officers 

approached the group and said, “We need to see all your I.D.s, identification cards.” (Id. 

at 28.) According to Montgomery, he responded by attempting to leave the porch and go 

into the apartment, but Holloway touched a taser and stopped him, saying, “Don’t you go 

in that house.” (Id. at 29.) Montgomery testified that he came back and sat down because 

he did not want to get shot or tased. (Id. at 29-30.) He stated that he was “scared” and 

did not feel free to leave. (Id. at 30-31.) 

{¶ 6} Defense counsel then attempted to question Montgomery about whether 
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similar incidents had occurred in the past where police officers had confronted a group of 

people outside an apartment. The prosecutor raised a relevance objection. Defense 

counsel then responded: 

 It’s a pattern your honor. When there’s a group of individuals at 

Dayton Premier Management or DMHA it is common for police to basically 

stop the group and I.D. everybody. This trains individuals who happen to 

have to live there because they have no place else that they can reasonably 

afford to comply. When we have an individual such as this then we try to 

just narrow the scope: Oh, it’s only this particular time here and the courts 

go right along with allowing yeah this time it was just consensual when, in 

fact, there is a pattern of this occurring where people are stopped routinely 

just to see if they are doing anything wrong and let’s I.D. them and let’s run 

their names. Let’s see if they are on the trespass list when there is no 

objective reason to do so. Then it’s always characterized as well in this 

particular single instance it was all just consensual. 

(Id. at 32-33.) 

{¶ 7} The trial court sustained the objection and refused to allow defense counsel 

to question Montgomery about other similar incidents. 

{¶ 8} On cross-examination, the prosecutor then engaged in the following 

exchange with Montgomery: 

Q. Mr. Montgomery, this officer never pulled his gun out on you, correct? 

A. No ma’am. 

Q. He never pulled his taser out on you? 
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A. No ma’am. 

Q. Never pulled pepper spray out on you? 

A. No ma’am. 

Q. Didn’t curse at you or yell at you that night? 

A. (Inaudible) 

Q. Asked for your identification and you provided it to him, correct? 

A. Yes ma’am. 

Q. You didn’t tell him no? 

A. No—well I told him I didn’t have my I.D. but— 

Q. But you didn’t say, “I’m not gonna tell you who I am”? 

A. (Inaudible) Everybody else was saying that but I— 

Q. You didn’t say that? 

A. Yeah I didn’t—I didn’t want to get shot. 

(Id. at 36-37.) 

{¶ 9} Based on the evidence presented, the trial court overruled Montgomery’s 

suppression motion. In a March 28, 2019 decision and entry, the trial court found that 

neither officer prevented anyone from leaving the scene. (Doc. #18.) The trial court held 

“that suppression of the statements of the Defendant is not justified based on the 

testimony presented[.] (Id. at 2). Following the trial court’s ruling, Montgomery entered a 

no-contest plea. The trial court accepted the plea and found him guilty. It imposed a 30-

day jail sentence with credit for two days served and the remainder suspended. It also 

ordered him to pay a $50 fine and court costs. Finally, the trial court ordered Montgomery 

not to return to any Greater Dayton Premiere Management properties while he is on the 
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trespass list. 

{¶ 10} In his first assignment of error, Montgomery contends he did not voluntarily 

disclose his identifying information to police. In support, he cites his own testimony that 

Holloway instructed him not to leave the area as the officers rested their hands on their 

tasers or gun belts. Montgomery also professes to have had a limited understanding of 

his rights and his ability to refuse to cooperate. He notes the absence of evidence that 

either officer explained his rights or told him that his cooperation was not mandatory. He 

asserts that the trial court erred in not properly considering his “particular education, 

intelligence and experience with police” when assessing whether the encounter was 

consensual. For these reasons, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his 

suppression motion. 

{¶ 11} When ruling on a motion to suppress, “ ‘the trial court assumes the role of 

trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the 

credibility of witnesses.’ ” State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 548, 679 N.E.2d 321 (2d 

Dist.1996), quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 653, 645 N.E.2d 831 (4th 

Dist.1994). We must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by 

competent, credible evidence in the record. State v. Isaac, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

20662, 2005-Ohio-3733, ¶ 8, citing State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 639 

N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994). Accepting those facts as true, we then must determine as a 

matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s legal conclusion, whether the 

applicable legal standard is satisfied. Id. 

{¶ 12} With the foregoing standards in mind, we see no error in the trial court’s 

ruling. “Consensual encounters occur when the police merely approach a person in a 
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public place and engage the person in conversation, and the person remains free not to 

answer and to walk away.” State v. Lewis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22726, 2009-Ohio158, ¶ 21, citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 

L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Consensual encounters are not seizures, and Fourth Amendment 

guarantees are not implicated. State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 747-749, 667 

N.E.2d 60 (2d Dist.1995), citing Mendenhall at 554. “A request for identification, in and of 

itself, is not unconstitutional, and is ordinarily characterized as a consensual encounter[.]” 

State v. Morgan, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18985, 2002 WL 63196, *2 (Jan. 18, 2002). 

{¶ 13} We are unpersuaded by Montgomery’s argument that his encounter with 

Holloway was non-consensual. Although Montgomery claimed he did not feel free to 

leave or to refuse to cooperate when Holloway spoke to him, “the test we apply is an 

objective one.” State v. Wehner, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27217, 2017-Ohio-2788, ¶ 10, 

citing State v. Jirac, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 15-CR-756, 2016-Ohio-8187, ¶ 10. “The

focus is on the officer’s conduct, not the defendant’s subjective state of mind.” Id.; see 

also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991)

(“Mendenhall establishes that the test for existence of a ‘show of authority’ is an objective 

one: not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, 

but whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable 

person.”). Factors that might indicate a non-consensual encounter “include the 

threatening presence of several police officers, the display of a weapon, some physical 

touching of the person, the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance 

with the officer’s request might be required, approaching the person in a nonpublic place, 

and blocking the citizen’s path.” State v. Cosby, 177 Ohio App.3d 670, 2008-Ohio-3862, 
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895 N.E.2d 868, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 14} Having reviewed the suppression-hearing transcript, we see nothing either 

officer did that would support an objective belief that Montgomery was not free to decline 

Holloway’s request for identifying information. The trial court assessed witness credibility 

and plainly credited Holloway’s version of events, including the officer’s denial that he told 

any of the people present that they could not leave. As set forth above, the record reflects 

that Holloway approached the group of people gathered outside the apartment and asked 

a resident to turn down the music. He then asked each of the people present outside if 

they would mind providing him with their name, birthday, and Social Security number. 

Holloway characterized his request as “cordial” and “conversational” in tone. He testified 

that Montgomery was cooperative and provided the information without objection. The 

officer testified that he did not yell at or threaten Montgomery and that he remained 

several feet away. In his own testimony, Montgomery acknowledged that Holloway did 

not yell, curse, or pull a weapon. In light of the trial court’s rejection of Montgomery’s claim 

that Holloway instructed him not to leave, we see nothing either officer did that would 

cause a reasonable person to believe he was not free to refuse the request for 

information. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 15} In his second assignment of error, Montgomery challenges the trial court’s 

evidentiary ruling precluding his testimony about an alleged pattern of police conduct 

involving stopping people at apartment complexes “which trains citizens to believe that 

their encounters with police * * * are not consensual.” Montgomery argues that he 

personally did not feel free to leave when he encountered Holloway because of this 

pattern of prior police encounters. (Appellant’s brief at 9.) 
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{¶ 16} “The admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion of a trial court, 

and a reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions in the absence of an abuse 

of discretion that has created material prejudice.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Noling, 98 

Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 43. The issue is “whether the trial court 

acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably” in sustaining the State’s objection to 

the proposed testimony. Id. We see no abuse of discretion here for at least two reasons. 

First, as set forth above, the focus is on the officer when determining whether policecitizen interaction is a consensual encounter. The question is whether the officer did 

anything that reasonably might be construed as a show of force requiring obedience. 

Whether police officers have a history of checking the identification of apartment residents 

has no bearing on what Holloway did in this case. Second, if what police officers did in 

prior instances involved merely approaching residents and asking to see the residents’ 

identification, then those instances, like the present one, involved consensual encounters 

no matter how many times they occurred. On the other hand, if the prior instances 

involved a coercive show of force, then they are dissimilar to what occurred in 

Montgomery’s case. Either way, the trial court reasonably precluded testimony about the 

prior incidents. The second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 17} In his third assignment of error, Montgomery contends the trial court erred 

in not considering the “current culture surrounding citizens’ interaction with police officers, 

not recognizing that the very presence of police may imply to citizens that they have been 

detained[,] and by not acknowledging that a private citizen may put himself at risk of harm 

by attempting to walk away from a police officer.” Montgomery argues that the existing 

consensual-encounter standard focusing on the officer’s actions is inadequate because 
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it does not sufficiently consider the fear that some citizens have of police or the possibility 

that citizens may put themselves in danger by attempting to walk away. 

{¶ 18} We are unpersuaded by Montgomery’s argument. Again, case law instructs 

that “[t]he focus is on the officer’s conduct, not the defendant’s subjective state of mind.” 

Wehner, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27217, 2017-Ohio-2788, at ¶ 10. The question is “not 

whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but 

whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable 

person.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690. We decline to 

adopt a standard that “the very presence of police” is tantamount to detention whenever 

a citizen believes it to be so. Such a standard would extinguish the consensual encounter, 

as all police-citizen interaction, by definition, requires the “very existence of police.” We 

also reject the notion that a consensual encounter does not exist where a citizen 

subjectively fears being shot in the absence of objective evidence to support such a fear. 

The third assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 19} Based on the foregoing reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the Dayton 

Municipal Court. 

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TUCKER, P.J. and WELBAUM, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Stephanie Cook 

Michelle M. Maciorowski 

Hon. Daniel G. Gehres