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24–892 PDF 2005

INTERRUPTING NARCO-TERRORIST THREATS ON

THE HIGH SEAS: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH WIND

IN OUR SAILS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 29, 2005

Serial No. 109–99

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian/Senior Counsel

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

DIANE E. WATSON, California

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. MARC WHEAT, Staff Director

MALIA HOLST, Clerk

TONY HAYWOOD, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on June 29, 2005 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Utley, Ralph, Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator; Admiral Dennis

Sirois, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard; Admiral Jeffrey J. Hathaway, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South;

Charles E. Stallworth II, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air

and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and

Thomas M. Harrigan, Chief of Enforcement Operations, Drug Enforcement Agency .................................................................................................. 13

Harrigan, Thomas M. ................................................................................ 43

Hathaway, Admiral Jeffrey J. .................................................................. 27

Sirois, Admiral Dennis .............................................................................. 21

Stallworth, Charles E., II, ........................................................................ 37

Utley, Ralph ............................................................................................... 13

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 9

Harrigan, Thomas M., Chief of Enforcement Operations, Drug Enforcement Agency, prepared statement of .......................................................... 45

Hathaway, Admiral Jeffrey J., Director, Joint Interagency Task Force

South, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 29

Sirois, Admiral Dennis, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S.

Coast Guard, prepared statement of ........................................................... 23

Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Indiana, prepared statement of ............................................................... 5

Stallworth, Charles E., II, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air

and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 39

Utley, Ralph, Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 17

(1)

INTERRUPTING NARCO-TERRORIST THREATS

ON THE HIGH SEAS: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH

WIND IN OUR SAILS?

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,

AND HUMAN RESOURCES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, McHenry, Cummings, BrownWaite, and Norton.

Staff present: Marc Wheat, staff director and chief counsel; David

Thomasson and Pat DeQuattro, congresional fellows; Malia Holst,

clerk; and Tony Haywood, minority counsel.

Mr. SOUDER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Good afternoon and thank you all for coming. Today we are going

to examine how drugs make their way through the transit zone

prior to arriving in Mexico for shipment into the United States.

Let me begin by conveying my intense displeasure and frustration with the manner in which USSOUTHCOM has worked with

Congress and our subcommittee. Similar to the treatment Congress

receives from USCENTCOM, Southern Command has avoided responding to congressional oversight of its counterdrug responsibilities. The subcommittee asked five simple questions for the record

after a subcommittee visit to USSOUTHCOM’s headquarters in

January.

The answers to these simple questions were known by the Department of Homeland Security agencies months ago, yet

USSOUTHCOM has not chosen to share these answers with Congress—perhaps the decision was to wait until 6 months after today’s hearing before transmitting the answers to the subcommittee

questions, perhaps we will never get the answers. This lack of cooperation, combined with the commitment to control rather than

support Interagency counterdrug efforts leads me to question

DOD’s drug interdiction motivations.

That said, this hearing may serve to change the course of future

drug funding to enable the execution of transit zone drug interdiction operations. But let me say that the big picture in the transit

zone is disturbing. For the first time, our actionable intelligence exceeds our interdiction capabilities in the transit zone. In other

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words, the Federal Government knows of specific boatloads of

drugs heading north that we cannot intercept because of the lack

of interception assets in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific.

The intelligence breakthrough is a recent development resulting

from the very successful Operation Panama Express, an interagency intelligence-driven program managed by the Departments

of Justice and Homeland Security. Due to this impressive intelligence cuing, the Joint Interagency Task Force [JIATF], South

now has improved insight into where, when, and how much cocaine

will be smuggled through the transit zones. All of our Federal

agencies need a special ‘‘well done’’ from Congress for record cocaine seizures in 2004. The hearing today is not meant to criticize,

but rather look to improve on major successes in U.S. drug interdiction efforts.

Before I detail some more of these concerns, let me just add, I

have been going through this testimony the last couple of days,

part of our frustration, not just here with SOUTHCOM, with

CENTCOM, and multiple other agencies, is we understand

everybody’s intense budget pressures and OMB has put tremendous pressures on every agency. Those of us, like myself, who supported efforts in Afghanistan, in Iraq understand that the military

is stretched very thin.

But we represent the taxpayers. Appropriations come from this

body and are dependent upon having accurate facts upon which to

make those appropriations decisions; it is not an executive branch

decision. We cannot make intelligence decisions without correct information. It may mean we just do not have enough money to do

all this.

But that is what we are hired to do. And if we cannot get adequate information, we do not know how best to allocate anti-drug

resources and what our tradeoffs are; how many are dying in this

area. How can we do that if we do not have adequate data.

In most cases and in most agencies, bluntly put, we have not

found the problem with the individual agencies. The question is

what kind of systemic problem do we have right now sitting on information being released to Congress because many people perceive

that releasing the information to us may lead to increased spending, or pressures for spending, or be used for partisan advantage.

The fact is, I am a partisan for this administration and I cannot

get the adequate data, not only in narcotics, but in agency after

agency, and there is a building frustration that I have vented already this morning at the White House.

While the accomplishments of Panama Express should not go unnoticed, our asset shortfalls in the transit zone raise serious concerns about our ability to interdict known smuggling events. On

May 10, 2005 this subcommittee held a hearing entitled, ‘‘2006

DOD Counternarcotics Budget: Does It Deliver the Necessary Support?’’ In the hearing, Marybeth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Counternarcotics, testified that, ‘‘The Navy’s problem

with the P–3s, which affects not only the Department’s counternarcotics assets, but the availability of maritime patrol aircraft

worldwide, has been well documented and discussed.’’

Regrettably, the Navy failed to properly anticipate the inevitable

fate of an old airframe employed primarily in a corrosive, salty air

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environment. The Navy’s P–3 replacement is not projected to begin

service until 2012, with an uncertain date for employment in

counterdrug activities in the transit zone.

Through the insistence of the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator and

the JIATF-South commander, DHS has stepped up maritime patrol

aircraft flight hours to backfill the loss of DOD assets. With DHS

taking on a bigger role in transit zone interdiction operations, I

would like to focus our discussion today on the following five topics

that will affect future counterdrug operations in the transit zone.

First, while I support the increased transit zone flight hours

flown by the Coast Guard and Homeland Security’s Air and Marine

Operations [AMO], I question whether the extra hours are sustainable and am interested in the costs for the increased operational

tempo. According to JIATF-South figures, AMO flew a total of 578

hours in the transit zone in calendar year 2003. Now we are told

that AMO has increased this figure to over 800 hours per month

in 2005.

Similarly, the Coast Guard has also significantly increased their

flight hours to meet the loss of Navy P–3 counterdrug flight hours.

Like the Navy, both the Coast Guard and AMO fly old airframes

that have finite lives. The increase of flying hours significantly impacts the agency’s ability to operate in the future. Yet only the

Coast Guard has an improved comprehensive modernization plan

that addresses these future shortfalls.

Second, Section 124 of Title 10 states, ‘‘The Department of Defense shall serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.’’ The language for this

law was framed in the National Defense Authorization Act of

1990–91. Federal law enforcement’s ability to engage in

counterdrug operations has significantly matured since 1989, when

this legislation was passed.

Since then, DOD’s responsibilities have changed, and Congress

formed the Department of Homeland Security, combining the Federal law enforcement agencies that currently supply the bulk of the

aviation and maritime assets deployed in the transit zone. Consequently, I believe that it is now time that the Department of

Homeland Security should take on the primary responsibility for

counterdrug detection and monitoring from the Department of Defense.

Third, the push to make the Joint Task Force North a Joint

Interagency Task Force, another JIATF, will potentially place DOD

as an overseer of domestic law enforcement interdiction programs.

Lack of unity within the interagency has allowed DOD to take the

lead in areas that have traditionally been accomplished by law enforcement agencies. Therefore, it is imperative that DHS and the

Interagency should become more involved in the future JIATF

process.

In order to have an effective joint interagency program, Federal

law enforcement agencies must be willing to man JIATF South and

any future JIATFs with employees capable of filling critical command and operations specialist positions. Conversely, the JIATFs

must provide administrative and logistical incentives for Federal

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law enforcement agencies to assign qualified employees to their locations.

Fourth, the transit zone, like the southwest border, lacks a strategic, comprehensive, layered, interagency plan that incorporates

the operational demands of post-September 11th operations and

the recent actionable intelligence improvements. Without a national interdiction plan, agency roles and responsibilities are not

properly delineated resulting in a haphazard way of requesting national air and marine assets.

The U.S. interdiction coordinator laid the groundwork for this

strategy by forming the Interdiction Planning and Asset Group.

Unfortunately, the latest report for Interdiction Asset Requirements is out of date and does not truly reflect the current enhanced

intelligence capabilities, nor does it take into account a post-September 11th environment.

Fifth, DHS air responsibilities, like airspace security, potentially

take flight hours away from transit zone operations. Currently, it

is unclear which DHS agency will be responsible for airspace security in the National Capitol Region and special security events.

Both DHS candidates for the responsibilities are the major transit

zone asset providers; namely, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Office

of Air and Marine Operations. If the current air assets in the National Capitol Region were diverted to counterdrug operations in

the transit zone, DEA and DHS could perform interagency interdiction operations in places like Guatemala, where increasing

amounts of cocaine land from transit zone maritime and air smuggling ventures.

Today we have a panel of very experienced witnesses to help answer these and other questions posed by the subcommittee. We are

pleased to welcome Mr. Ralph Utley, Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator at DHS; Admiral Dennis Sirois, we have met many times

and I stumble over your name each time, U.S. Coast Guard’s Assistant Commandant for Operations; Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway,

Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South; Mr. Charles

Stallworth, Customs and Border Protection’s Acting Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine Operations; and Mr.

Thomas Harrigan, Drug Enforcement Administration’s Chief of Enforcement Operations.

We look forward to your testimony and insight into this important topic.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. As I mentioned earlier, I am going to turn the gavel

over to our committee’s vice chairman after the initial statements

because I have a markup going on in another committee and several floor votes; I will be kind of in and out of this hearing. I will

take all the statements with me to make sure I read it and will

be doing plenty of followup. You always can be assured to hear

from our office, probably more than you want many times.

Mr. Cummings, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. CUMMINGS. It will be very brief, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing to examine the

efforts to interdict illicit drug shipments bound for the United

States by way of maritime smuggling routes.

Southwest border States are primary points of entry for major illicit drug threats, such as Colombian and Peruvian cocaine, South

American and Mexican heroin, Mexican methamphetamines, and

Mexican and Colombian marijuana. Before drugs from South America reach the border, however, they must be transported to the

United States through maritime transit zones, which encompass

the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, the eastern Pacific Ocean.

The majority of drugs are transported by sea, by commercial

means, including high speed, go-fast boats capable of carrying up

to 2 tons of cocaine. The detection and apprehension of these vessels represents a difficult challenge for the Untied States and international interdiction agencies and requires the synergistic use of

actionable intelligence, interagency communication, and assets and

personnel capable of amounting an effective response.

The Department of Defense is the lead agency for detecting and

monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs through the

transit zone into Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and across the

U.S.’ southwest border into the mainland United States. Based at

the Naval Air Station in Key West, FL, Joint InterAgency Task

Force South conducts counter illicit drug trafficking operations to

detect, monitor, and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets,

promotes security, cooperation, and coordinates country team and

partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic.

In addition to DOD, the agencies that participate in the JIATFSouth are the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs

and Border Patrol, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Federal

Bureau of Investigations. Cooperation and intelligence sharing

among these agencies through JIATF-South and in other contexts

is critical to U.S. efforts to stop illegal drugs before they reach our

southern border and ports of entry through the country.

Today’s hearing offers a very valuable opportunity to hear from

key officials in agencies that play a vital role in U.S. interdiction

efforts concerning their successes, remaining or emerging challenges, and the need for additional or upgraded resources.

With that said, I want to welcome all of our witnesses and thank

all of them for their appearance here today. I look forward to the

testimony. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. Mr. McHenry, do you

have any opening comments?

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appreciate

you all being here today. I look forward to the panel discussion and

your testimony.

I think it is important that we look at the resources we have.

This is not a moment to necessarily rap you on the knuckles. It

looks as if we have had increased intelligence-gathering operations

and we actually have more intelligence to deal with, and so we

have a better opportunity to catch drug traffickers in the process.

We want to make sure that you have the resources and infrastructure in place so that we can actually catch those bad guys when

we have the opportunities. And so I look forward to hearing your

testimonies and your ideas in this regard.

I certainly appreciate your making the time to be here before us.

I am sure, looking at you and looking at your backgrounds, you

have done this a few times before and it certainly is as exciting as

it always is. So thank you so much for being here and we hope to

keep you awake for the remainder of the hearing. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative

days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing

record. That any answers provided by the witnesses also be included in the record. And without objection, it is so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents, and

other materials referred to by Members may be included in the

hearing record, and that all Members be permitted to revise and

extend their remarks. Without objection, it is so ordered.

As an oversight committee, it is our tradition to swear all the

witnesses. So if you will each stand and raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that each of the witnesses responded in the affirmative.

I am now going to turn the hearing over to our distinguished vice

chairman, Mr. McHenry. I will be in and out depending on how the

voting is going.

Mr. MCHENRY [presiding]. Mr. Utley, you may proceed.

STATEMENTS OF RALPH UTLEY, ACTING U.S. INTERDICTION

COORDINATOR; ADMIRAL DENNIS SIROIS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD; ADMIRAL

JEFFREY J. HATHAWAY, DIRECTOR, JOINT INTERAGENCY

TASK FORCE SOUTH; CHARLES E. STALLWORTH II, ACTING

ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE

OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION;

AND THOMAS M. HARRIGAN, CHIEF OF ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

STATEMENT OF RALPH UTLEY

Mr. UTLEY. Representative McHenry, Ranking Member

Cummings, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored

to appear before you today as the Acting U.S. Interdiction CoordiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:41 Jul 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\24892.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
14

nator. I also serve as the Acting Director of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security.

We have achieved record levels for transit zone cocaine interdiction, vessel seizures, and arrests in each of the past 2 calendar

years. Specifically, in the transit zone, we have removed 210 metric

tons of cocaine bound for the United States in 2003 and 248 metric

tons in 2004. Cocaine seizures and removals in 2004 were approximately twice the seizures and removals of 1999. Those record levels

of removals have occurred while our Nation is fighting two wars

overseas and has taken on new duties to stop terrorists from entering the United States. The credit for these achievements goes to

the entire counterdrug community who is working closer together

and synergistically attacking the traffickers where they are most

vulnerable. Let me discuss a few of the key factors that have improved interdiction.

First, the Department of Defense’s leadership through Joint

Interagency Task Force South has been key. In addition, the rest

of the U.S. interdiction community has invested in this Task force

which is producing great dividends. For more than 15 years the

counterdrug community has worked to build this Task Force which

has become a worldwide model for joint interagency and international cooperation. There have been many changes along the

way, the most recent being the establishment of the Joint Operating Area. The Joint Operating Area has improved synergy, unity

of command, and operational efficiency. Joint Interagency Task

Force South now has total responsibility for the primary south to

north drug trafficking threat vectors from South America. Establishing the Joint Operating Area makes sense, and I applaud those

who made it happen.

We have long realized the value of actionable intelligence. For

years, our ships and aircraft patrolled vast expanses of ocean, usually without the benefit of good intelligence. Today our forces often

have real-time, actionable intelligence so that they may narrow

their focus and improve their probability of detection. The intelligence community, working in close concert with the law enforcement investigators, has made remarkable strides toward understanding trafficking organizations, patterns, and activities.

In particular, Operation Panama Express, a combined OCDETF

task force with representatives from the Departments of Justice,

Homeland Security, and Defense, has become a model of interagency partnering. Panama Express-led investigations are developing intelligence leads that support more interdictions. JIATF-South

has become a full partner with founding members FBI, ICE, and

DEA. At the same time, interdictions are leading to the successful

prosecutions of both maritime transporters and higher level drug

traffickers. Enhanced drug intelligence has allowed interdictions,

investigations, and prosecutions to support each other like never

before.

In years past, when we successfully detected a smuggling vessel,

we often could not stop them or find the drugs. Today, front-line

interdictors have better equipment and capability. The Coast

Guard’s armed helicopters and over-the-horizon boat programs

have dramatically improved end-game results. The French and

British helicopters are also now armed, and the U.S. Navy, in conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:41 Jul 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\24892.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
15

junction with the Coast Guard, is working to arm their sea-based

helicopters. We have also improved boarding tactics and equipment

that increase the odds of finding drugs on fishing vessels.

We do not stop with a successful interdiction. In fact, interdiction

directly supports new investigations and prosecutions. Under the

leadership of the Justice Department, traffickers are being convicted with stiff sentences which in turn facilitates better intelligence and awareness as to how the traffickers are operating.

The support provided by our international partners is also critical to transit zone interdiction successes. JIATF South has fulltime liaisons from 10 countries in the hemisphere and communicates and coordinates transit zone operations directly with host

nations operations centers. Currently, France and the United Kingdom deploy and use their surveillance aircraft, armed helicopters,

and surface ships in counterdrug missions. The British NIMROD,

a highly capable four-engine, long-range maritime surveillance aircraft, has been especially effective in detecting and tracking drug

smuggling vessels. Our Dutch allies continue to provide strong support in the Caribbean. The Canadian government is working with

the U.S. Southern Command and Joint Interagency Task Force

South to coordinate future Canadian P–3 aircraft deployments to

the Caribbean.

This committed international and interagency effort is essential

to transit zone operational success. International cooperation also

has been critical in eliminating seams that traffickers once exploited. The United States now has 26 maritime bilateral agreements that have put the smuggler on the defensive. The smugglers

now have less time to react to and avoid law enforcement, and we

are able to board in time to find contraband and evidence to support prosecutions.

Maritime patrol aircraft [MPA], are key to transit zone interdiction operations. MPA are currently the only persistent wide-area

surveillance platform that we can covertly detect, monitor, and

track smugglers and support maritime end-game operations. In calendar year 2004, MPA participated in 73 percent of the cocaine removal events from noncommercial maritime conveyances in the

transit zone. In the fourth quarter of last year, these figures rose

to 91 percent.

Last year we suffered from a reduction in long-range MPA capability. Available MPA flying hours were significantly reduced due

to unexpected wing corrosion in the U.S. Navy’s P–3 fleet and the

withdrawal of Netherlands P–3s from the Caribbean. Today the situation has improved. Customs and Border Protection P–3 hours

have been funded to allow a 400 hour per month increase to transit

zone operations; the Coast Guard has several initiatives in the

President’s fiscal year 2006 budget that will significantly increase

C–130 hours in support of JIATF-South; and the U.S. Air Force has

deployed E–3s to support the Air Bridge Denial program, freeing

CBP aircraft for maritime patrol operations; DOD is supporting

British NIMROD operations in Curacao; the U.S. Navy has improved the operational on-station time of their P–3s; and DOD is

working to add Canadian Auroras to the effort. Looking forward,

we need strong support from all of the force providers, and I am

encouraged that they will deliver.

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Let me conclude by saying that we must sustain the pace of

these past 2 years and find ways to increase pressure on the traffickers. I have placed a priority on seeking alternatives that will

further increase protection, monitoring, tracking, and interdiction

capabilities in the transit zone. The USIC will continue to engage

the entire interdiction community and find innovative and aggressive ways to improve our capabilities and operational effectiveness.

We will support those strategies and operations that are working

and keep the pressure on all fronts. We will continue to asses our

efforts and report our progress to Congress.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your

questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Utley follows:]

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Mr. MCHENRY. Gentlemen, just to let you all know, your full testimony will be entered into the records. Going forward, if we could

try to stick with about a 5-minute time limit and you can summarize your testimony and hit the highlights.

Mr. Utley, my apologies for not giving you that guidance before.

We certainly appreciate your testimony. I just want to make sure

that the other gentlemen are aware of it as well so we can get to

questions. Thanks so much.

Admiral Sirois.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS SIROIS

Admiral SIROIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished

Members. It is an honor to represent the Coast Guard men and

women before you here today. I do have a written statement that

I would like to summarize very shortly.

The Coast Guard’s counterdrug mission is the interdiction and

seizure of illegal drugs in the transit zone. Although the Coast

Guard seizes annually almost 54 percent of all cocaine seized by

Federal agencies, this record could not have been attained without

our interagency partners and international partners and the specific competencies each one of those agencies bring. Working closely

with our interagency and international partners, we provide a continuous, coordinated, sustained law enforcement presence in the 6

million square mile transit zone and maritime approaches to the

United States.

In fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard and our partners seized or

removed over 350,000 pounds of cocaine from the illegal drug trade,

plus 108,000 pounds were lost to smugglers due to jettisoning. This

includes the seizure of the fishing vessel LINA MARIA and its load

of 33,000 pounds of cocaine, the Coast Guard’s single event record

to date. I would like to note that as of today the Coast Guard has

seized 191,933 pounds of cocaine, again working with our great

interagency partners.

STEEL WEB is the Coast guard long-range strategy to advance

the national goal of attacking the economic basis of the drug trade

and is an important part of the coordinated, comprehensive interagency effort supporting the National Drug Control Strategy supply reduction goal. This comprehensive approach to drug interdiction is summarized in three pillars: First, effective presence, which

is a strong and agile presence informed by intelligence and law enforcement information; second, a regional engagement with the

interagency and international law enforcement partner nations

which has resulted in 26 bilateral agreements and a number of

combined operations with these countries; and third, an end-game

must exist. The phenomenal success of our HITRON helicopters in

stopping the go-fast threat is key, but the smugglers are flexible

and adaptive. To have an effective end-game, the Coast Guard

must obtain and field the latest technologies, and develop new

techniques to counter this ever changing threat.

What is troubling to the Coast Guard is the recent House Budget

recommendation for the Coast Guard. Any reduction in Deepwater

funding jeopardizes the Coast Guard’s integrated recapitalization

strategy by not providing adequate funding to recapitalize or modernize the Coast Guard’s aging and obsolete cutters, aircraft, and

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command and control, information, and surveillance and reconnaissance systems while sustaining legacy assets in the interim. At a

minimum, the recommended funding levels will delay delivery of

new assets. If held to the House recommended funding levels, operational capacity will go away faster than it can be replaced, and

this resource problem will persist. If held to the $500 million funding level, the Coast Guard cannot complete necessary legacy asset

sustainment which is necessary to reverse the downward trend in

readiness and availability of our assets.

The Coast Guard appreciates your support over the years and we

ask for your continued support as our funding is discussed. We are

working our assets and our crews harder than ever, and the wear

is beginning to show. The President addresses capacity and capability improvements for the Coast Guard in his budget request

which includes maritime patrol hours for counterdrug operations,

which I ask you to support. Deepwater, our plan for major asset

recapitalization has never been more relevant, and I ask for your

funding support for the President’s request.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Sirois follows:]

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Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral Hathaway.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JEFFREY J. HATHAWAY

Admiral HATHAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings,

good to see you both again. I am Rear Admiral Jeff Hathaway. I

have the honor of presently serving as Director of JIATF-South, the

Joint InterAgency Task Force South in Key West, FL. I am here

representing U.S. Southern Command and, more importantly, the

450 men and women that comprise Joint Interagency Task Force

South, which I will add, I truly have become a believer that it is

the best of joint DOD interagency and international cooperation

that I have seen and, quite frankly, a great example of good governance.

Chairman Souder mentioned that in 1991 DOD was given the

lead for detection and monitoring in the transit zone. I would submit I believe that was a very good decision on the part of the Congress to cause that to happen. What it did was it brought core competencies from DOD into the counterdrug game. They are just as

germane today as they were then. JIATF-South’s heartbeat is driven by three core competencies that are DOD core competencies.

The first one is the ability to fuse vast amounts of all source intelligence. We have built the systems primarily on a DOD background, we have the analysts, most of them DOD but lots of them

from our interagency partners, most of which are represented at

the table with me. Most importantly, that backbone allows us to

fuse, analyze, and push that intelligence out in a tactically actionable way so that it can be used.

No. 2 is, again a core competency of DOD, to exert command and

control across vast distances. Our joint operating area is 42 million

square miles. It is only DOD systems that have allowed us to fuse

together DOD assets, U.S. interagency assets, and our international partners into one team and be able to talk with them realtime and to coordinate across those vast distances. Again, as germane today as it was many, many years ago.

And finally, again a core competency of DOD, is deliberate planning. We brought deliberate planning to the counterdrug game. We

are able to synchronize operations in a way that the Department

of Defense has been able to do for years and years. Again, we make

that work for us on a daily basis.

We have put together in JIATF a standard operating procedure.

Everyone leaves their own standard operating procedure at the

door when they become part of the JIATF team. Everyone was part

of building today’s current operating procedure and it continues to

renew itself on a daily basis. This weekend was a great example.

We had intelligence from one of our allies, I cannot mention the

country, we were able to use that information, fuse it with some

of our technical reporting, and it cued us to a Sao Tomean vessel,

a small West African country. Sao Tome finally refuted the claim

of registry for that country.

But most importantly, we were able to take a Dutch frigate

working for JIATF at the time with a U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachment on board, move them into an intercept position, hand the case over to the Coast Guard, board the vessel, with

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the special intelligence we had, it allowed the Coast Guard to very

quickly find the secret compartment on board, find 1.8 tons of

drugs, seize the drugs, arrest the crew, and it all happened within

our standard operating procedures.

Everyone knew exactly what was going to happen across the

interagency, across DOD, with our international partners. It happens every day. Unity of command, a common vision, and unity of

effort is what we strive for in JIATF.

Finally, I know this hearing is all about level of effort in the

transit zone. I will be very honest with you, I look at this as a cup

half full at this point. Last year, I will be very honest, we saw 331

go-fast cases, most of them in the Western Caribbean. Three years

ago my predecessors could not have sat here and told you that we

had the granularity of intelligence to know that we had that number of go-fast smuggling events. Mr. Cummings, you said each one

of those carries about two tons. That is exactly right. The fact of

the matter is, out of those 331, we only interdicted slightly less

than 100. Out of those we interdicted, three out of four we were

actually able to stop. Do we want to do better across this table? Absolutely. Do we have the resources today across the administration? I think we are working on them. So from a cup half full, we

know where the enemy is, we know where we have to go to engage

him, and all of us I know want to do that more robustly.

Let me just say that our counterdrug ship is sound, it is wellbuilt, it has the right mix of crew, they are well-trained and motivated, and they are making the best use of the wind that they have

in their sails today. But we are very confident that we could make

even more effective use of greater winds, if they come. Thank you

very much.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Hathaway follows:]

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Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Admiral Hathaway.

Mr. Stallworth.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. STALLWORTH II

Mr. STALLWORTH. Good afternoon. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished members of this subcommittee,

it is my honor to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs

and Border Protection interdiction efforts in the transit zone. My

name is Charles Stallworth and I am the acting Assistant Commissioner for the CBP’s Office of Air and Marine Operations. In the

interest of time, I would like to summarize my prepared remarks

which have been submitted for the record.

CBP is the Nation’s unified border agency and as such is responsible for interdicting all people and conveyances that seek illegal

entry. Our priority mission is preventing terrorists or terrorist

weapons from entering our country, and includes our efforts to

close our borders to illegal activity such as the smuggling of people

and drugs. We do this while simultaneously enhancing the legal

movement of people and trade. Our strategies reflect the operational reality that for the purpose of the border security the

threats are converged and have converged.

AMO supports these homeland security and counterdrug efforts

with more than 1,000 personnel who support and employ our fleet

of advanced aircraft, marine vessels, and sensors. We tie this system of systems effort together at our Air and Marine Operations

Center in Riverside, CA. Created by the 1994 National Interdiction

Command and Control Plan, the NICCP, AMOC is a home to the

Department of Homeland Security’s common operational picture for

air.

Our contribution in interdiction in the transit zone continues to

increase. Since January 1, 2004, CBP is the single largest contributor of on-station flight hours in an effort that includes the U.S.

Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Air Force, and our international

allies. From a contribution of 200 hours per month in recent years

to a commitment of more than 600 hours per month, averaging

over 700 hours per month this year, CBP’s fleet of dedicated P–3

aircraft continue to score impressive interdictions against a maritime threat, made possible because of the outstanding cuing and intelligence support that we have heard about here earlier, most of

it contributed by our interagency partners.

We support this effort with a capable but aging fleet of P–3 aircraft that is increasingly costly and difficult to maintain. We are

rapidly approaching a decision point in the lives of these aircraft.

Specifically, to maintain this level of effort in the transit zone, we

will either have to significantly overhaul these planes or replace

them altogether. In the interim, we are trying to make them as effective as possible by equipping them with sensors that will help

boost the detection in maritime surface targets at greater ranges.

Throughout our 2003 departure from the U.S. Customs Service,

our 2004 tenure as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

and our move in 2005 in integration with CBP, the men and

women of CBP’s AMO have continued to deliver interdiction results

against the drug trade and other threats to our borders. On behalf

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of them and our Commissioner Robert C. Bonner, thank you for

your support and interest in our mission.

I would be pleased to answer your questions when the time

comes.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stallworth follows:]

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Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Mr. Stallworth.

Mr. Harrigan.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS M. HARRIGAN

Mr. HARRIGAN. Good afternoon, sir. Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Cummings, on behalf of the Administrator of the DEA

Karen Tandy, I wish to thank you for your continued support for

the men and women of the Drug Enforcement Administration as

well as the opportunity to testify today to discuss drug trafficking

throughout the transit zones. As DEA’s Chief of Enforcement Operations, I am acutely aware of the challenges we face in combating

drug trafficking organizations throughout the region.

DEA’s primary function as an investigative law enforcement

agency is to identify and dismantle the world’s most significant

drug trafficking organizations. DEA’s role in interdiction efforts is

crucial since the intelligence gained from these operations often

provides information needed to unveil the depth and magnitude of

a drug trafficking organization’s abilities and intentions. Law enforcement, intelligence, and interdiction agencies all play an integral role in disrupting the most sophisticated drug trafficking operations.

As you know, most of the major illegal drugs abused in the

United States are produced in Latin America. While production levels have generally declined over the last few years, traffickers continue to use a variety of smuggling methods to move their product

out of Latin America, including maritime and air conveyances.

When focusing on those drugs destined for the United States, two

general corridors stand out—Mexico/Central America and the Caribbean.

Historically, Colombian drug traffickers have utilized the MexicoCentral American corridor as well as the Caribbean corridor as a

transshipment route to smuggle cocaine and heroin into the United

States. Cocaine is smuggled into Mexico via maritime, land, and air

conveyances, and over the years Colombian traffickers have exploited the Caribbean corridor for their smuggling purposes as the

region provides them with increased flexibility and anonymity because of its vast geographic territory, numerous law enforcement

jurisdictions, and fragmented investigative resources.

Through interagency collaboration, DEA has taken part in developing a multifaceted investigative strategy that is designed to combat the trafficking problem by employing a coordinated regional attack on the entire trafficking organization simultaneously, from the

sources of supply in Colombia, to the transportation cells in the

Caribbean corridor, to the distribution cells throughout the United

States, and finally on to their financial operations. Perhaps no better operation exemplifies the level of the interagency cooperative effort evident in both corridors as the Panama Express. Panama Express represents a multi-agency Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF], investigation that began in the mid1990’s with personnel from DEA, ICE, JIATF, FBI, IRS, and the

U.S. Coast Guard. JIATF-South, in particular, utilizes the information shared to better direct air and naval assets toward the goal

of interdicting vessels smuggling cocaine through the transit zones.

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The multi-agency El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC], also participates in sharing information that increases the effectiveness of

Panama Express. By passing real-time, actionable intelligence information on smuggling operations to JIATF-South, transit zone

interdictions can be made more precise. As Assistant Administrator

for Intelligence Anthony Placido testified to this committee on June

14, 2005, the cooperative efforts of EPIC, JTF-North, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Air and Maritime Operations Center,

and JIATF-South contribute greatly to our interdiction effectiveness.

In conclusion, drug trafficking organizations today have the capacity to overwhelm the defenses of individual nations. These traffickers have adopted a global approach to their operations, consequently amassing billions of dollars in illicit profits, weakening

national economies and democratic institutions, spreading violence

and destruction, and producing some of the most powerful and corrupting organizations in the world.

The DEA recognizes that interagency cooperation and coordination is fundamental to increasing the efficiency of our operation in

the transit zones. The DEA is committed to maintaining an effective relationship with its partners in domestic and international

law enforcement, as well as its operational counterparts in other

agencies. Having said this, we must and will continue to synchronize the resources and capabilities of operational enforcement

agencies to collectively put forth the strongest effort to combat drug

trafficking in the transit zones.

Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Cummings, I thank you

once again for the opportunity to testify and look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harrigan follows:]

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Mr. MCHENRY. I thank the panel for your opening statements. At

this time, I would like to recognize Ranking Member Cummings for

his series of questions.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of

all, I want to thank all of you for your efforts in what you do everyday to make our world a safer world.

I want to go to you, Admiral Hathaway, and something that you

said that I just found very interesting. When you were talking

about the resources needed and the fast boats, you said we are

working on it. I am just wondering, explain exactly the process. In

other words, we know about a certain number of fast boats, we cannot catch up with them.

Can you just elaborate a little bit on that, and then tell me what

resources you would need to get to the level that you would like

to. It sounds like there may be a level of frustration. I am trying

to picture this fast boat going past me and I am not able to catch

up with it. I am just wondering what is it that we need.

Admiral HATHAWAY. The greater intelligence that we have today,

and much of that comes from the Panama Express operation that

has been described to you by some of my colleagues, gives us better

knowledge on departure times, departure locations of drug movements. Many of those are interdicted by host nations, primarily Colombian forces, and many, many are not.

We do not have precise data that allows us to track those vessels,

these go-fast vessels that sometimes move at 30, 40 knots depending on weather conditions. What we need is to put eyes on them

and we have to have surface assets to get in place to be able to

effect an interdiction.

Not having perfect knowledge, you need some sort of maritime

patrol aircraft to find the target, you need a surface asset and most

ideally equipped with an armed helicopter to stop that asset so that

it can be compelled to have law enforcement come on board and to

find out if, in fact, they are committing an illegal act. Because of

the great knowledge that we have, we know that there are many

events that occur that we are not able to physically get either the

aircraft or surface assets on scene. We have a terrific track record

of being able to effect an end-game, get what we call in JIATF a

disruption, either seize the drugs or cause the drugs to be jettisoned, they never get to a world market. That is great news. That

is the cup half full. But we also know that the level of information

and detail that we have today would allow us to do better.

What would it take, quite frankly, today is a greater level of aircraft support, maritime patrol aircraft, as we call it, persistent coverage in those areas. What we have to do today is I have to go at

risk. In order to go after intelligence in one area, I have to vacate

another area of the ocean, quite frankly, most often. We go where

we have the best intelligence and I can make the best use of the

assets that I have. I think working collaboratively we have come

up with estimates of what it would take to be able to interdict certain percentages of drugs. We do not have a national goal in terms

of what we should be doing in the transit zone; we try to do the

best that we can with what we have. But we also have some very

good estimates of what it would take to perform even better. What

I do know is we can make much greater and effective use of the

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assets that we have assigned to us today than we could have 5 or

6 years ago.

Mr. CUMMINGS. How many would you estimate that we are missing, the go-fast boats?

Admiral HATHAWAY. Well, sir, our estimates are, as I said in my

opening statement, I used as an example the interagency documented 331 go-fast events in 2004 through our primary operating

area. Most of those were transiting in the Western Caribbean but

some were in the Eastern Pacific, some were in the Eastern Caribbean. Out of those, we actually were able to put eyes on about 93

of those, and three-quarters of those we were actually able to get

an interdiction, which meant people were arrested, drugs were disrupted and were taken out of the system.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So we know pretty much that drugs are on those

boats?

Admiral HATHAWAY. The intelligence we have is, yes, they were

drug movements.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just one other question. Do you think that the

administration’s budget request is sufficient for you to accomplish

what you want to accomplish? I wish the people in my neighborhood could understand the difficulty that you all have. Because a

common question that I am asked in my neighborhood, which is

only about an hour away from here in the inner-city of Baltimore,

is that we don’t have any boats, no planes. People have this feeling,

because they do not know, they think that this is a very easy task

to keep the drugs from coming in. I try to explain it to them as

best I can that there are a lot of folks who are trying to get these

drugs in. So what you are telling me then is that we have a whole

slew of fast boats coming through at one time. That is a major,

major problem; am I right? You just said you had to take resources

from one place and take them over to the other. So I imagine that

if they had some kind of coordinated effort, there would be a real

big problem.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Well the effort that we have in coordinating

what we have——

Mr. CUMMINGS. I am talking about if these drug smugglers had

a coordinated effort.

Admiral HATHAWAY. What we do know about the transportation

industry is there is a vague amount of coordination amongst a variety of those who transport drugs through our primary joint operating area. The fact of the matter, if you have 331 go-fast events,

that is slightly less than one per day moving through our joint operating area. Trying to figure out whether it is leaving from Venezuela, the North coast of Colombia, the west coast of Colombia, or

out of Panama is the trick. The intelligence we have allows us to

do a much better job at that.

It is a vast, vast area and obviously we could do a better job. My

job is to make the most effective operation out of what we have.

And we are very proud of the effectiveness that we do have given

the level of assets that we have. The administration’s budget takes

us another step down the road, quite frankly. Cooperation with our

international partners, our traditional allies, we know that some of

these drugs are coming over to Europe, has never been better. I

think they are going to step up to the plate in even greater numVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:41 Jul 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\24892.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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bers, although they suffer from some of the same problems that

U.S. military does in that the high usage rate of their assets is

causing them in many cases to have to retire them earlier than

they hoped for. That has been the case with the Navy P–3 aircraft,

for example, which was a backbone for a long time for JIATF-South

maritime patrol ops.

As it has been pointed out, the Coast Guard and CBP have been

able to step up to the plate. DOD has been able to provide E–3s,

our most sophisticated AWACS aircraft that I will be able to use

in air bridge denial operations over Colombia and free up Customs

and Border Protection P–3 domes to move into the maritime world.

So we will be able to plus-up a very capable asset in the maritime

world while the Air Force takes over the air bridge denial role for

us, which is very good.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. If I may take my

time now. Admiral Hathaway, I want to continue with Mr.

Cummings line of thought here. You said 331 known go-fast events,

that is known. Those are actually hard numbers that we are aware

of of these events. Of those, 238 were not detected. Now can you

describe the difference between known and not detected? We know

that it is leaving Venezuela, we cannot detect that it has left Venezuela. Can you explain the measurement tool there?

Admiral HATHAWAY. The interagency group that documented

those 331 cases have a level of reliability that they adhere to that

a smuggling event occurred, each one of those 331, it is more than

single source reporting. In many cases, we may not have even

known the event was occurring until after the drugs arrived but

sources told us that, in fact, the drugs arrived. So that is where

we get the 331 number. It is intelligence.

Not detected means that we never saw those events as they occurred. We never had laid eyes on them in a detection and monitoring mode. I never had the opportunity to be able to——

Mr. MCHENRY. So you know they arrived, for instance, you know

they arrived or you know they departed, the two events you know.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Correct.

Mr. MCHENRY. Maybe I am not directing this in the right way,

but Mr. Cummings had this line of questioning to you and I

thought it was interesting. Maybe Mr. Stallworth or if anyone else

would like to chime in. So you know that it left, or you know that

it arrived, and perhaps some you knew both that it left and that

it arrived, and others you just knew one side or the other. All right.

Now you said 93 detected. That means you saw it move; which is

it left, it is in transit, it arrives. So 93 you saw in transit, detected.

Of those 93, you caught 73. Pretty good when you actually see it

move. OK.

First, let us commend you on actually having good intelligence.

If it is 331, there had to be many more out there. Now that is another question. But it seems to me that if you are detecting 331

events yet you are only seeing in action 93 move, we have a real

issue of actually seeing it move. I may be new around here, but it

seems like a very basic concept that something is missing. Is it

boats, is it airplanes, is it technology; what is the problem?

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Mr. UTLEY. May I jump in on that because I own the data base.

It is a CCDB, consolidated counterdrug data base. The point that

Admiral Hathaway was making is that we have a pretty good idea

that this event took place because we knew it left and we knew it

arrived, but we might not know, I am going to reiterate what Admiral Hathaway said, that the event took place until after it took

place. So there is another dimension and it is a time dimension in

there, that had he known he may have been able to do something.

Mr. MCHENRY. This sounds like back to the future, time travel.

Mr. UTLEY. Well, not really. It is actually just a matter of a lot

of times you do not know about an event until after it has taken

place. I guess that is what I am trying to say.

Mr. MCHENRY. What I am asking for is this is an opportunity to

say what are we missing. Admiral Sirois, I certainly appreciate

your stepping forward and saying the Coast Guard may need some

better equipment to compete with the go-fast. I certainly appreciate

you stepping forward on that. Mr. Stallworth, you mentioned aircraft, we have to make a decision on are we going to keep repairing

these aircraft or are we going to move forward with technology. I

appreciate that instead of like being in la la land and not actually

taking on the meat of the issue, the center part of this is the interdiction part, the actual catching those people in action. I certainly

appreciate the time issue. But it seems to me that if know it left

and you know it arrived, where is it in the middle? What can we

do to catch the middle? Am I making any sense to you all? Everybody seems quiet.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Let me help you out a little bit here with the

dynamics so you will understand a little bit better that it is not

just a straight line, two points and it is a straight line between

those. We have about 6 million square miles between us and the

source. So we may know something is leaving Cartagena but you

do not know necessarily what its destination is. So there is a little

bit of time that you can use Colombian forces in their territorial

waters to try and intercept that, find something that matches the

description that you have. You may not have a direction, you may

not know where it is going.

Let me give you a little bit of the life of a logistics move of drug

trafficking. We get intelligence from people that may know about

the time that it is leaving, the method that it is going, etc. Sometimes you do not know when but you know what the name is. But

sometime between its departure and its arrival, that is where you

have to do a detection, monitor it, find out if it is the right one,

sort it out, and then put something on the surface down there. We

do not have airplanes with grappling hooks to reach down there

and just pull a fast boat out of the water, so we have to get someone down there. So sometimes we will observe something but none

of the good guys are in a position to catch it or intercept it. So now

you give information out to those people that may be at the port

that it is likely going to, etc. And at the same time, Admiral Hathaway has international forces and our own domestic forces that are

out there positioned as best they can be geographically, none of

them sitting still, some do sit still, but most with an area of operations to try and cutoff a corridor.

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So even if you knew, even with the 331, if you had time to do

it, you are still going to have to sort through those. The numbers

that he gave you, out of the 93 there were 73 that actually were

real, it is just like being a policeman and there are speeders out

there, here are 93 of them, how many are actually speeding. Well

you can do that with an indicator. For us, you have to stop them,

get inside, and then try and find it. These people are in business

and their business is to get their product to market. It is very difficult for us, and that is why the cooperation is necessary throughout the interagency, both from the intelligence all the way through

the investigation once you do catch someone, trying to feed the intelligence so that we can go back into the infrastructure and the

organizations and the financial underpinnings of the drug trafficking.

Mr. MCHENRY. OK. Admiral Sirois.

Admiral SIROIS. Mr. Chairman, I know you are looking for a solution, and I can give you a short-term and a long-term. The 25

percent of the go-fast boats, and there is more than just go-fast,

there are sailboats and merchant ships, fishing boats, but the 25

percent of the go-fast boats, if we had armed helicopters on every

ship we could catch that 25 percent of the boats that we see go by.

We have a plan that is in the budget to arm all Coast Guard helicopters so every ship will be deploying with an armed Coast Guard

helicopter. So that will take care of that 25 percent. We hope to

complete that over the next 3 to 4 years.

Also in the Deepwater plan, many of our legacy assets are being

upgraded—better sensors, better communications suites, our new

Deepwater cutters, for many, it is 2, 3 years before they come off

the waves, but we can leverage better capabilities on our old cutters that will provide Admiral Hathaway with better assets in the

fight down in the transit zone.

We have a large initiative, supported by the President, for maritime domain awareness, which is knowing what is going on out

there, and it is an integrated network system of sensors, satellites,

communications, unmanned aerial vehicles, all these things that

will be networked in the system. When they come to full production

that is when I think we are really going to show some successes

in the transit zone.

Mr. HARRIGAN. Sir, if I may followup also just to sort of close the

loop I believe on this. To give you a little background, we keep alluding to Operation Panama Express and that is based upon we

have a cadre of sources of informants throughout the region,

throughout the transit and the source zones. We obtain information

from these sources of information. It may not be specific but we go

with it. Again, just solely based on any information they may have,

they feed back to Panama Express, we then feed it to JIATF, and

obviously JIATF does the best they can with the available resources they have.

Mr. MCHENRY. I have gone significantly over my time. I guess

that is the luxury of having the gavel at the moment. But I certainly appreciate you all going through this range of thought here.

The idea of this hearing is to actually get ideas to help you do your

jobs better. And I certainly appreciate your willingness to come forward and explain this process so we can look at ideas to actually

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do what we are supposed to be doing, and that is to give you all

the resources to achieve those goals. That is why we have these

hearings on a regular occasion is to keep driving that process forward.

It seems to me that we need to make sure we have the resources

and the technology in place so that we can actually do the job on

the ground, in the water, and make this process easier for you. And

if it is a question of resources, we would like to hear that. If it is

a question of policy, we need to hear that too. That is the purpose

of this committee.

Furthermore, we actually had a hearing back in January I believe, Admiral Hathaway, and I think Chairman Souder had some

questions that he submitted and is still looking forward to receiving your response from that. We are now about 5 months or 6

months after that hearing, so we would like to hear from you on

that.

At this time I will yield to Mr. Cummings for a second round of

questions, and yield the Chair to my good friend, the gentlelady

from Florida, Ms. Brown-Waite.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Gentlemen, I want to reiterate that we do appreciate what you do. I want to just go on that subject of appreciation.

Admiral Sirois, you just talked about bringing some new equipment

to certain Coast Guard vessels; is that what you were saying?

Admiral SIROIS. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. What did you say? Say that again, please.

Admiral SIROIS. Our legacy fleet, our older cutters, we are putting new sensors on them, communications suites so that they are

more effective in the job they are doing.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. And when we interdict, how dangerous is it?

What do we usually find with regard to weapons?

Admiral SIROIS. Fortunately, very few weapons. We do find them

from time to time. Most of the time we find that the crews will dispose of the weapons before our boarding team goes aboard. It is

pretty imposing to have a large Navy ship or Coast Guard ship in

close proximity to a 50 foot boat and that presence there dissuades

them.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So going back to what you said, Mr. Stallworth,

the whole thing of timing. I take it that the timing is very significant in that if you get the information—in other words, I am not

trying to figure out who your informants are, but I imagine sometimes they can have some difficulty getting the word to you all in

a timely fashion. Is that a reasonable assumption?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sometimes. And I defer to the DEA on that.

Mr. HARRIGAN. Absolutely. Yes. That is an accurate assessment.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And that can be a real problem.

Mr. HARRIGAN. Absolutely.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So it could be some guy down at the docks somewhere and he sees something happening and then he has to go

through 50 million changes, he has also got to protect his own safety and make sure he is safe and does not want to give away the

fact that he is a source or he will not be a source very long. Is that

reasonable?

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Mr. HARRIGAN. Yes, sir. It sounds like you could give the Panama Express briefing, to be quite honest. You hit the nail right on

the head.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So then you get the word. But the interesting

thing is it sounds like most of the time this information is pretty

reliable. Is that safe to say? In other words, reliable that there are

drugs on the vessels.

Mr. HARRIGAN. Suffice it to say that the information that we receive is typically—again the cadre of sources that we have out

there are fairly reliable, we have worked with them in the past,

and they know exactly what to look for: the types of ship, the types

of different maneuvers that they may employ, certain dock hands,

that type of thing, sir. So this cadre of sources that we have are

pretty well-versed in watching out for specific things.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. So I guess what I am trying to figure out

is that let us say we see the go-fast boats and one of you all implied there are instances where we get there but maybe we do not

have the necessary equipment at that moment. Was it you, Mr.

Stallworth?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes. There are a number of dynamics as opposed to doing operations on land and a policeman pulling you over

to the side of the road. It is called the end-game. For us, we can

detect a suspect vessel, but if we do not have anyone on the surface

in a position to actually stop them, go inside the vessel, and then

inspect to see if there is a concealed compartment or if there are

drugs there, we do not know. Sometimes we will se an open boat,

a fast boat, but there is no one in the region on the surface that

is going to be able to take them down. We just have to document

the fact that it is there and where it is and give information and

a heads-up to the local authorities of the areas that it may go to.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Would any kind of aerial operation help with

that, like helicopters or——

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sure, if you had land-based helicopters that

were on the islands, for instance, in the Caribbean. But you have

a lot of water out there and the range of a helicopter and even the

vessels that you put helicopters on have to be so close to that target vessel before the helicopter can take off because it has to have

the ability to go out there, stop, if the vessel stops the helicopter

has to stay there and monitor it until the ship or other surface assets get there. So there is a lot more to being successful with the

end-game than just you see them, you know they have drugs, and

now you got them. You actually have to catch them.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Were you going to say something, Admiral

Sirois?

Admiral SIROIS. Just that the area that we operate in, the transit

zone, it is like finding a needle in a haystack.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Thank you all.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE [presiding]. The gentleman yields back his

time.

I have a question for Admiral Hathaway. I understand that the

chairman and staff came down to visit you and see the operation

and posed some followup questions. Those questions were submitted—the visit was January 13th, and the questions were submitted

January 28th.

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Chairman Souder is much more patient than I would be. The

questions were submitted in writing and then told that the questions would only be answered if they were under the chairman’s

signature. The bureaucracy in getting a Member of Congress’ questions answered seems to me an offense. I find it offensive, I am

sure the chairman found it offensive, and I would like to know why

it takes 6 months to get some answers to some questions that a

Member of Congress who Chairs this subcommittee asks.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Madam Chairman, I certainly apologize for

the tardiness of the answers to those questions. I have seen the

questions, they were worked on diligently in JIATF, they were very

good questions, and I will take back to the administration the subcommittee’s dismay that they have not received the appropriate answers.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Well, taking that back is real good, but the

question is how many more 6 month periods are we going to have?

I understand that the answers were actually submitted and then

taken back this past Monday. Is that accurate?

Admiral HATHAWAY. I am not sure exactly where the answers to

the questions are within the administration in terms of the clearing process.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Sir, I think the questions were directed to

you.

Admiral HATHAWAY. The original questions were directed to myself as the Director of Joint Interagency Task Force South.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. So therefore you are the administration, sir.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Yes, ma’am. And as you know, at my level,

when those questions are answered, they are ultimately transmitted to Congress but via my chain of command. And so I will find

out where they are and certainly convey the dismay of the subcommittee. We will try to expedite getting those to you just as

quickly as possible.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. I think perhaps even more interesting is why

they were submitted and then withdrawn. I think an explanation

needs to be given for that also. I believe in deadlines, sir.

Admiral HATHAWAY. As do I, Madam Chairman.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. I do not think a 6-month delay is acceptable.

So how about within 3 weeks, because you already will have had

the questions for almost 6 months. So how about 2 weeks? Could

we have a commitment on that? I am sure those bureaucratic

wheels can move a whole lot faster.

Admiral HATHAWAY. I will certainly take that back and try to expedite getting the answers to you. And if this subcommittee desires

those within 2 weeks, I will make sure that everyone is aware of

that. I can promise you that.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you, sir. I have a couple of questions

for the representative from DEA. First, thank you all for being

here. I apologize I was not here earlier. It is very frustrating when

you serve on the Veterans Committee and they simultaneously are

holding a hearing and you run from hearing to hearing.

I apologize, I did read part of the testimony though earlier in the

day, but I apologize for not being here earlier. I want you to know

that any other Members who are not here are facing the exact

same situation of committee meetings being held simultaneously

59

and/or constituents, because this is the time to visit Washington,

DC, constituents being in their office. So I apologize for not being

here sooner.

Mr. Harrigan, I just have a question for you. Despite the good

drug movement intelligence in the transit zone, we lack apparently

similar knowledge in Mexico and Central America. So what agency

has had the lead in developing logistic support bases that are located near the transit zones? And second, has DEA considered renewing operations in Guatemala?

Mr. HARRIGAN. It is probably very good timing, ma’am. The Chief

of Operations Mike Braun, who I am sitting here in place of, is actually in Guatemala as we speak meeting with Ambassador Hamilton and the president of Guatemala over that issue. So hopefully

we will have our bases covered down in Guatemala.

As far as the initial question, ma’am, you are correct. The problem when we see these go-fast boats and fishing vessels leave from

the source countries, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, once they get into

Mexico/Central America, to be quite honest with you, we are not

quite sure what happens. It is literally once it goes into Mexico

they break these loads down to considerably smaller loads and it

is almost like an army of ants coming across the Southwest border.

I believe CBP puts estimates of seizures average about 20 kilos per

seizure along the Southwest border.

So we are in the process of developing, along with the other gentlemen here on the panel, DEA has a drug flow prevention strategy

that we are turning into a plan. We are looking at targeting the

vulnerabilities of these drug organizations and certain choke points

where we will be able to identify them before they get to Mexico

and Central America. It is certainly an issue.

We have several offices in Mexico, ma’am, our main office in

Mexico City, and we are doing what we can with the resources we

have down there. We have a good relationship with the Mexican

police, with some of the vetted units, and we are doing the best we

can to try and identify those areas where these huge loads are coming into both Mexico and Central America.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Let me ask you two other questions. First of

all, were you with Customs before it was taken over by Homeland

Security?

Mr. HARRIGAN. No, ma’am. No. DEA, Department of Justice, yes.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. OK. We have heard about the tremendous

success of the Panama Express intelligence cuing. Our reliance on

this kind of intelligence sources should not be our only avenues of

information on the drug trade. What other exploitable sources on

this kind of information do you have in the transit zone operations

area?

Mr. HARRIGAN. Right now, ma’am, we rely almost exclusively on

human intelligence. That is the bread and butter, to be quite honest with you. We have some great assets out there, whether they

be technical in nature, but again, as Admiral Hathaway and Admiral Sirois alluded to earlier, we may have particular information

they may be out in a particular zone, but it’s like finding a needle

in a haystack.

So without human intelligence, it is an uphill battle. So it is with

that human intelligence that we can perhaps sort of close the area

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a bit more for the JIATF and DOD assets to interdict those ships

before they get to Mexico and Central America.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. So you are really relying a lot on the human

intelligence?

Mr. HARRIGAN. Absolutely.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. On a scale of 1 to 10, how reliable is the information that you get?

Mr. HARRIGAN. It depends, obviously, on who it is coming from.

But the success of Panama Express again is based on human intelligence and our sources in the area. So for the most part, if we get

information, if it is gleaned through the Interagency folks, we take

a hard look at it, as does every other agency sitting at this table,

and we have a pretty good idea if there is a certain movement that

is going to occur.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. One other question, and that is, does the

DEA feel that the Joint Interagency Task Force South has optimized their airborne and maritime patrol efforts?

Mr. HARRIGAN. I would have to defer, ma’am, to Admiral Hathaway. But we have an outstanding relationship. We have agents and

intelligence analysts as well as support personnel assigned to

JIATF-South. They have every request that has come from DEA,

any tasking, it has always been acted upon. Other than that, I

would really have no comment to that particular question.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. So you are not at liberty to say whether you

believe that they have optimized the airborne and maritime patrol?

Mr. HARRIGAN. I believe they have. I believe they have. From the

information that we pass along to them, absolutely.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. OK. Is it true that about 90 percent of all

drugs come into the U.S. through the Mexican border?

Mr. HARRIGAN. Those are the estimates, ma’am. Right now, the

IACM, Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, put the figures in 2003 at approximately 77 percent of the cocaine coming

into the U.S. transited Mexico/Central America, and they had the

remaining 23 percent going through the Caribbean. In 2004 there

was tremendous movement, where estimates put it at 92 percent

of the cocaine coming from South America would transit the Mexico/Central America corridor, while 8 percent would transit the

Caribbean. OK. Now again, these are estimates that this IACM put

together.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. When I first moved to Florida, I moved to a

coastal area and kind of the local chatter was that there was a lot

of drug smuggling going on through the fishing boats, small fishing

boats. Tell me, has that changed? Has it gotten better? Has it gotten worse? This is along the west coast of Florida.

Mr. HARRIGAN. I will answer in part, ma’am, and then I will

defer to perhaps Admiral Hathaway. Again, we have seen a decline

over the last year or so of shipments going through the Caribbean.

Again, they are simply estimates, nothing more, nothing less. We

do see the vast majority of the drugs that are smuggled into the

United States obviously come via maritime vessels, whether it be

go-fast, whether it be containerized vessels, whether it be small

fishing vessels. So based upon the IACM, we have seen a decline

in the Caribbean.

61

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Anybody else care to respond to

that? Admiral Hathaway. Mr. Stallworth.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, ma’am. To answer your question specifically about the west coast of Florida, it is difficult to say specifically. What I can say is regionally in South Florida, especially with

the post-September 11th Department of Homeland Security’s efforts down there in south Florida, where the Coast Guard, Air and

Marine Operations, and the Border Patrol essentially produce one

flying schedule so we deconflict all of our assets and we utilize

them in probably the most effective and efficient way possible with

the assets that we have, and with some of the operations down

there, which included taking back the Miami River which was a

Joint Interagency, investigative, etc., State and local, and Federal.

That operation has been I think very successful, and what happens is it has a tendency to impact the whole region. So when law

enforcement and the Department got our act together down there

and started acting in a cooperative manner, what we did has really

had an impact on the total of south Florida, both maritime and air.

So I think the impact has been there. The focus on the Miami

River project, and the focus in the other regions down there, the

threat of mass migration from Cuba and other areas, has resulted

in team work that has resulted in a much safer environment down

there for south Florida. I think what you are seeing is just that.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Anyone else wish to comment?

Yes?

Admiral SIROIS. The area along the coast we call the arrival

zone, and that is the responsibility of CBP, Coast Guard, and many

other State and local agencies. You mentioned the fishing fleet, certainly fishing fleet is suspect. I would have to ask my local folks

in Florida what information they have, but any conveyance, and of

course there are hundreds of thousands if not millions of boats in

Florida, are opportunities.

The problem off the coast of Florida or any coastal area is those

small boats carry small amounts of drugs. That is why it is most

important that what JIATF-South does is get the large loads. As

difficult as it is to get the large loads, it is much easier to do that

than get the small loads in close to home.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Mr. Cummings, I believe you

have some questions?

Mr. CUMMINGS. I will be very brief, Madam Chairlady. I just was

wondering, to you Admiral Hathaway, is there a diversion of assets

when the code levels go up? In other words, are we seeing a movement with regard to trying to deal with other priorities, particularly after September 11th and what have you? And if there are,

does that call for a movement of your forces? And how does that

affect what you do? Do you follow me? Maybe somebody else can

answer that too.

Admiral HATHAWAY. Yes, sir. I will provide a comment and then

I would turn to both my Coast Guard and my Customs and Border

Protection colleagues. In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, there is no doubt that at JIATF-South both Coast Guard and

what is now Customs and Border Protection assets were pulled

back in fairly large numbers. Both of those organizations have matured greatly since that time.

62

As security levels go up in the United States, our assessment

today as today’s JIATF-South Commander, is that both the Coast

Guard and Customs and Border Protection are able to handle both

missions almost simultaneously. I no longer see a wholesale movement of assets from those two Interagency partners away from

JIATF-South. We are able to maintain our level of operations while

both these organizations flex in their homeland security duties.

That is my assessment from the JIATF-South perspective. But I

will ask both of them for theirs.

Admiral SIROIS. After September 11th the Coast Guard did draw

back many of its major cutters in close to our ports and shores.

Since that time, with the administration’s budget and the support

of Congress, we have added hundreds of new boats and patrol boats

to our inventory. Those boats are doing things along our coastal

ports that the major cutters were doing after September 11th. So

now if the threat level is increased, we are pretty much able, as

Admiral Hathaway mentioned, to do that mission without calling

cutters back from his mission.

However, having said that, there are other things that we do

that could cause us to pull back our cutters—mass migration from

Cuba, mass migration from Haiti. All our cutters are multi-mission, so there are more things than the elevated Homeland Security threat alert level that could cause a disruption in the allocation of assets.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Anyone else? Mr. Stallworth.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, sir. From the perspective of CBP, our

counterterrorism mission is just as important as our counternarcotics, you almost cannot separate them. The Commissioner of

Customs has a defense in depth strategy that includes the transit

zone. So we would look at the facts and what the issue is because

we know that the threat vector can come from the South just like

it can from the North. So the decision is based on the threat and

the situation as it is. There would not be just an immediate withdrawal of assets.

Mr. CUMMINGS. To Admiral Hathaway, I was just sitting here

thinking about all you have been through today. I would imagine

that if I were trying to put together one of those Southwest Airlines commercials, this would be the ideal time for you—you just

want to get away. [Laughter.]

But I wanted to say, I hope you can understand the urgency. Believe me, I am not going to pile on; believe me. I understand Chairman Souder’s concern about getting the information. I am assuming, based upon what you have said, that if it were up to you, and

you do not have to answer this because I know you have a chain

of command and all that kind of thing, that I guess we would have

these answers.

But I am just asking you, as the Chairlady has said, and I agree

with her, that we only have a limited amount of time to operate

in this Congress and we do have a sense of urgency. Sometimes the

public may not believe that, but we do. We have a limited amount

of time to get some things done.

So I would hope that you would do the best you can. It is simply

not good enough to say you will try. We kind of need answers. And

63

if there are problems, you need to let us know. We are human

beings and we understand problems.

So I just could not leave this room without saying that to you because I want you to have a decent evening, and I really mean that.

I have sat on the general committee for now 91⁄2 years and I have

seen people come before this committee and leave just simply devastated. I do not want you to leave feeling that way, and I am saying that very sincerely. You all do so much for us and you affect

all of our neighborhoods and I know you do the best you can with

what you have.

I know that when you are a military person there are certain

things that you just do not say because there are chains of command and all that kind of thing. But I hope you will give it everything you have. I think the Chairlady asked for it in 2 weeks, if

you could do that for us, please do that. And if for any reason that

is in any way impossible, and I am sure it is not impossible, but

if it is, please let us know. I hope that my statement helps you get

through the evening. We thank you for your service, we really do.

Thank you.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. And I thank Mr. Cummings for that question. One of the things that he said is I think he said he wants you

to do the best you can with what you have. The reason why the

chairman wanted those questions answered is to see what the

shortfalls are, what additional equipment you need to better do

your job to help interdict the drug trafficking to make our streets

safer and our children safer. I do not think that there was any hidden agenda. It was not going to be a gotcha. It was how can we

help you get better equipment, more equipment, whatever you

need.

Sometimes in any administration their priorities are not always

the priorities of the Members of Congress. Like Mr. Cummings and

the other members of this committee, I go home every weekend, I

see the broken-hearted parents whose kids are hooked on drugs. I

have taught in college the caseworkers who work with those who

are addicted to drugs. I know the heartache. I know the broken

families.

So the chairman’s intentions were to help you. As you know, the

appropriations process is speeding along much quicker than ever

before, and that was his goal, to help you get what you need, to

make sure that what you got is a lot better to do your job better.

Before we end the meeting, I would like to hear from everybody

here on the panel, and I want to thank you for being here today.

Do any of the agencies represented here today support the idea of

a maritime oiler to refuel interdiction assets in the Eastern Pacific?

How about if we start down here with Mr. Utley.

Mr. UTLEY. I think it would be an excellent idea. It is having to

do with the art of the impossible. Right now, the Navy does not

have a spare oiler to donate to the Eastern Pacific, unfortunately,

and it would be cost-prohibitive, it is somewhere around $25 million, to bring one out of mothballs.

I will let some of my colleagues obviously talk about this, they

have more granularity than I do. Approach other countries in the

region, it is almost like a bridge too far away, with the Colombian

ones in pretty bad shape, the Peruvian is in pretty bad shape,

64

Chile is too far away. So, oh, yes, that would be really great. But

it is the getting there that is very difficult.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Admiral Sirois.

Admiral SIROIS. Definitely. The number of days lost to cutters

and Navy ships transiting back and forth to get fuel is troubling.

I think last year one of our commanders estimated that in the Pacific we lost 100 patrol days because the ships were transiting back

and forth.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you.

Admiral HATHAWAY. In U.S. Southern Command, we have been

working with our partner nations, as Mr. Utley noted, Peru, Columbia. We have been aggressively pursuing options other than

U.S. assets.

The frustration to me I can tell you, and this is the granularity

of information we have today, that an on-scene day for one of our

ships in the Eastern Pacific, whether it is Coast Guard, whether

it is U.S. Navy, is worth about 100 kilograms of cocaine seized.

When we lose that ship off-station, that is an opportunity lost. As

Admiral Sirois simply said, by some estimates we lost about 100

ship days last year because we had to send cutters and U.S. Navy

ships to shoreside refueling.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Mr. Stallworth.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, ma’am. From the air and Marine operations perspective, we are the guys who go out there and detect

them. We would like for somebody to be on the surface to do the

end-game so that the time that we spend out there flying comes to

fruition and we protect our neighborhoods. So I am in support of

that.

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Thank you. Mr. Harrigan.

Mr. HARRIGAN. Well, ma’am, that is a bit out of the area of

DEA’s expertise. But for what it is worth, I fully concur with my

panelists. [Laughter.]

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. You know, I am from New York and it is so

good to hear a New York accent.

Mr. HARRIGAN. How did you guess?

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. Because I am from New York.

I want to thank each and every one of you for being here. We

appreciate your testimony and certainly look forward to having a

copy of the response to the chairman. Like you, we are from the

Government; we are here to help, we really are. I want to thank

you all for being here.

This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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