United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION 

EPA-State 

Enforcement 

Partnership Has 

Improved, but EPA’s 

Oversight Needs 

Further Enhancement 

July 2007 

 

GAO-07-883 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-883.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact John B. 

Stephensonj at (202) 512-6225 or 

stephensonj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-07-883, a report to 

congressional requesters 

July 2007

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

EPA-State Enforcement Partnership Has 

Improved, but EPA’s Oversight Needs 

Further Enhancement 

Overall funding to regions and authorized states increased from 1997 

through 2006, but these increases did not keep pace with inflation and the 

growth in enforcement responsibilities. Over the 10-year period, EPA’s 

enforcement funding to the regions decreased 8 percent in inflation-adjusted 

terms. Regional officials said they reduced the number of enforcement staff 

by about 5 percent. EPA’s grants to states to implement federal 

environmental programs also declined by 9 percent in inflation-adjusted 

terms while enforcement and other environmental program responsibilities 

increased. According to state officials, reductions in grant funds have 

limited their ability to meet EPA’s requests to implement new requirements. 

For example, according to New York State officials responsible for the 

hazardous waste program, a reduction in EPA grants between 1997 and 2006 

has meant a 38 percent reduction in the full-time state staff supported by 

federal funding for this program. However, EPA information on the 

workload and staffing needs of its regions and the states is incomplete, and, 

thus, it is not possible with existing data to determine their overall capacity 

to meet their enforcement responsibilities. 

EPA has made substantial progress in improving priority setting and 

enforcement planning with states through its system for setting national 

enforcement priorities and the EPA/state National Environmental 

Partnership System (NEPPS), which have fostered a more cooperative 

relationship. For example, on states’ recommendation, OECA accepted as a 

priority ensuring that facilities handling hazardous substances, such as lead 

or mercury, have the financial resources to close their facilities, clean up 

contamination, and compensate communities and individuals affected by the 

contamination. EPA and states have also made some progress in using 

NEPPS for joint planning and resource allocation. State participation in the 

partnership grew from 6 pilot states in fiscal year 1996 to 41 states in fiscal 

year 2006. 

EPA has improved its oversight of state enforcement programs by 

implementing the State Review Framework (SRF) as a means to perform a 

consistent approach for overseeing the programs. Moreover, EPA can make 

additional progress by addressing weaknesses that the SRF reviews 

identified and by implementing other improvements to ensure oversight that 

is more consistent. For example, the SRF reviews show that EPA has 

limited ability to determine whether the states are performing timely, 

appropriate enforcement and whether penalties are applied to 

environmental violators in a fair and consistent manner within and among 

the states. In addition, GAO noted that EPA could make further use of the 

SRF to (1) determine the root causes of poorly performing programs; (2) 

inform the public about how well the states are implementing their 

enforcement responsibilities; and (3) extend the use of the SRF methodology 

to assess the performance of EPA’s regions, which have been inconsistent in 

their enforcement and oversight efforts. 

The Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) enforces the nation’s 

environmental laws through its 

Office of Enforcement and 

Compliance Assurance (OECA). 

OECA sets overall enforcement 

policies and through its 10 regions 

oversees state agencies authorized 

to implement environmental 

programs consistent with federal 

requirements. GAO was asked to 

(1) identify trends in federal 

resources to regions and states for 

enforcement between 1997 and 

2006, and determine regions’ and 

states’ views on the adequacy of 

these resources; (2) determine 

EPA’s progress in improving 

priority setting and enforcement 

planning with states; and (3) 

examine EPA’s efforts to improve 

oversight of states’ enforcement 

programs and identify additional 

actions EPA could take to ensure 

more consistent state performance 

and oversight. GAO examined 

information from all 10 regions and 

10 authorized states, among other 

things. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that EPA (1) 

develop an action plan to address 

problems identified in state 

programs, (2) evaluate the capacity 

of state programs to enforce 

authorized programs, (3) publish 

findings of state enforcement 

program reviews, and (4) assess 

the performance of its 10 regions. 

EPA generally agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations, but stated it will 

decide whether to publish future 

state reviews when it evaluates the 

review process in fiscal year 2008. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 7

Background 9

Increases in EPA Funding Have Not Kept Pace with Inflation and 

Enforcement Responsibilities 12 

EPA and States Have Taken Steps to Improve Planning and Priority 

Setting for Enforcement, but Results Are Uneven 23 

State Review Framework Has the Potential to Provide More 

Consistent Oversight 28 

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 34 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37 

Appendix II Development and Implementation of the State 

Review Framework 40 

Appendix III Comments from the Environmental Agency 45 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46 

Table 

Table 1: EPA’s Candidate and Final National Enforcement 

Priorities for Fiscal Years 2005-2007, in Rank Order 24 

Figures 

Figure 1: EPA’s Enforcement Funding in Real Terms, in Total, and 

by Headquarters and Regional Offices, Fiscal Years 1997-

2006 13

Figure 2: OECA Headquarters and Regional Total FTEs, Fiscal 

Years 1997-2006 14 

Figure 3: OECA Regional Offices FTEs, Fiscal Years 1997-2006 15 

Page i GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Figure 4: EPA’s Real Total Funding and Real Total Grant Funding 

to States and Tribes, Fiscal Years 1997 through 2006 16 

Abbreviations 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

ECOS Environmental Council of the States 

FTE Full-Time equivalent 

NEPPS National Environmental Partnership System 

NYSDEC New York State Department of Environmental 

 Conservation 

OECA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 

PPA Performance Partnership Agreement 

PPG Performance Partnership Grant 

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

SRF State Review Framework 

UST Underground Storage Tank 

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Page ii GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

July 31, 2007

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks 

Chairman 

The Honorable Todd Tiahrt 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Interior, Environment 

 and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks 

Chairman 

The Honorable Todd Tiahrt 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Interior, Environment 

 and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable James M. Inhofe 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Environment and Public Works 

United States Senate 

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in partnership with state 

agencies, oversees compliance with 44 separate environmental programs. 

These programs regulate facilities—such as sewage treatment plants, 

petroleum refineries, and power plants—whose operations could pollute 

the air, water, and land, and thereby endanger public health and the 

environment. EPA and its regulatory partners are responsible for ensuring 

that these regulated facilities comply with program requirements and 

taking enforcement action in instances of noncompliance. These 

enforcement efforts are important for ensuring a level playing field 

because, among other things, facilities that do not comply with program 

requirements might have a competitive economic advantage over facilities 

that take environmental requirements seriously and thereby incur 

additional operational costs. 

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in partnership with state 

agencies, oversees compliance with 44 separate environmental programs. 

These programs regulate facilities—such as sewage treatment plants, 

petroleum refineries, and power plants—whose operations could pollute 

the air, water, and land, and thereby endanger public health and the 

environment. EPA and its regulatory partners are responsible for ensuring 

that these regulated facilities comply with program requirements and 

taking enforcement action in instances of noncompliance. These 

enforcement efforts are important for ensuring a level playing field 

because, among other things, facilities that do not comply with program 

requirements might have a competitive economic advantage over facilities 

that take environmental requirements seriously and thereby incur 

additional operational costs. 

Many federal environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean

Water Act, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act, direct EPA to approve or 

authorize qualified states to implement and enforce environmental 

programs consistent with federal requirements. EPA expects its 10 

regional offices to take a systematic, consistent approach in overseeing 

the state enforcement programs and, in doing so, to follow EPA’s 

regulations, policies, and guidance. EPA outlines, by policy and guidance, 

its oversight expectations for regional offices with regard to ensuring the 

state approaches include the elements of an acceptable state enforcement 

program, such as the type and timing of the actions that should be taken 

for various violations, and track how well the states comply. 

Many federal environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean

Water Act, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act, direct EPA to approve or 

authorize qualified states to implement and enforce environmental 

programs consistent with federal requirements. EPA expects its 10 

regional offices to take a systematic, consistent approach in overseeing 

the state enforcement programs and, in doing so, to follow EPA’s 

regulations, policies, and guidance. EPA outlines, by policy and guidance, 

its oversight expectations for regional offices with regard to ensuring the 

state approaches include the elements of an acceptable state enforcement 

program, such as the type and timing of the actions that should be taken 

for various violations, and track how well the states comply. 

Page 1 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
This model of state enforcement of environmental laws, accompanied by 

EPA’s regional oversight, allows the level of government closest to 

environmental conditions to assume primary responsibility for 

implementing programs. But it requires that states acquire and maintain 

adequate capacity to enforce state environmental programs that are 

consistent with federal requirements and act in a timely and appropriate 

manner to ensure violators come into compliance. EPA establishes by 

regulation the requirements for state enforcement authority, such as the 

authority to seek civil and criminal penalties and injunctive relief.1

 EPA 

grants authorization to the states on a program-by-program basis. EPA 

policy and guidance outline, with greater specificity, the elements of an 

acceptable state enforcement program—such as the necessary legislative 

authorities and the type and timing of the enforcement actions for various 

violations—and track how well states comply. 

Most states have responsibility for multiple EPA programs. EPAauthorized states monitor the compliance of regulated facilities by 

conducting inspections, performing evaluations, and reviewing records to

verify facilities’ compliance with programs regulating the discharge of 

pollutants into surface water or the air and the storage and disposal of 

hazardous waste. States are expected to pursue enforcement actions 

against those facilities found in noncompliance and to report their actions 

to EPA. 

EPA administers its environmental enforcement responsibilities through 

its headquarters Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 

(OECA). OECA monitors the compliance of regulated facilities, identifies 

national enforcement concerns and sets priorities, and provides overall 

direction on enforcement policies. While OECA headquarters occasionally 

takes direct enforcement action, much of EPA’s enforcement 

responsibilities are carried out by its 10 regional offices. These offices are 

responsible for carrying out core program activities under each of the 

major federal environmental statutes, as well as significant involvement in 

implementing EPA’s national enforcement priorities and taking direct 

enforcement action. The regions are also responsible for overseeing 

authorized states’ enforcement programs, implementing programs in 

 1

Such injunctive relief includes the authority to order a party that is violating a provision of

the law to refrain from further violation and to take action to abate or correct the 

noncompliance.

Page 2 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Indian country2

 and states that are not authorized for particular programs. 

OECA also expects regions and authorized states to establish enforcement 

priorities and expectations and reach agreement on their respective roles 

and responsibilities. Authorized states may also receive EPA grants to 

assist in implementing and enforcing authorized programs. In fiscal year 

2006, grants to states and tribes totaled $3.2 billion, or about 42 percent of 

EPA’s total budget. 

Over the years, states have increased their inspection and enforcement 

activities. As a result, EPA regional offices are now more actively involved

in conducting oversight and providing states with guidance, training, and 

technical assistance to assure consistent performance of state

enforcement programs. If EPA finds a state is not adequately 

administering or enforcing authorized programs, individual environmental 

statutes may authorize EPA to take certain actions, including providing 

additional technical assistance, conditioning the receipt of grant funds on 

compliance with EPA guidance, or withdrawing state authorization. In 

addition, when EPA finds a specific state enforcement action to be 

inadequate, the agency may take federal enforcement action against the

violator. 

Despite the interdependence between EPA and the states in carrying out 

enforcement responsibilities, effective working relationships have 

historically been difficult to establish and maintain, as we, EPA’s Office of 

Inspector General, the National Academy of Public Administration, and 

others have reported.3

 The following three key issues have affected EPAstate relationships: 

 2

“Indian country” includes all land within the limits of an Indian reservation under the 

jurisdiction of the United States government and all dependent Indian communities within 

the borders of the United States. 

3

GAO, Environmental Protection Agency: Protecting Human Health and the 

Environment Through Improved Management, GAO/RCED-88-101 (Washington, D. C.:

Aug. 16, 1988); GAO, Environmental Protection: Collaborative EPA-State Effort Needed to

Improve New Performance Partnership System, GAO/RCED-99-171 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 21, 1999); EPA Office of Inspector General, EPA Needs Better Integration of the 

National Environmental Performance Partnership System, No. 2000-M-000828-000011 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2000); National Academy of Public Administration,

Environment.Gov: Transforming Environmental Protection for the 21st Century

(Washington, D.C.: November 2000); GAO, Environmental Compliance and Enforcement: 

EPA’s Effort to Improve and Make More Consistent Its Compliance and Enforcement 

Activities, GAO-06-840T (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).

Page 3 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
• EPA’s funding allocations to the states have not fully reflected the 

differences among the states’ enforcement workload and their relative 

ability to enforce state environmental programs consistent with federal 

requirements. In this regard, EPA lacks information on the capacity of 

both the states and EPA’s regions to effectively carry out their 

enforcement programs, because the agency has done little to assess the 

overall enforcement workload of the states and regions and the number 

and skills of people needed to implement enforcement tasks, duties, and 

responsibilities. Furthermore, the states’ capacity continues to evolve as 

they assume a greater role in the day-to-day management of enforcement 

activities, workload changes occur as a result of new environmental 

legislation, new technologies are introduced, and state populations shift. 

• Problems in EPA’s enforcement planning and priority setting processes 

have resulted in misunderstandings between OECA, regional offices, and 

the states regarding their respective enforcement roles, responsibilities, 

and priorities. States have raised concerns that EPA sometimes 

“micromanages” state programs without explaining its reasons for doing 

so and often does not adequately consult the states before making 

decisions affecting them. 

• OECA has not established a consistent national strategy for overseeing 

states’ enforcement of EPA programs. Consequently, the regional offices 

have not been consistent in how they oversee the states. Some regional 

offices conducted more in-depth state reviews than others, and states in 

these regions have raised concerns that their regulated facilities are held 

to differing standards of compliance than facilities in states located in 

other regions. 

EPA and leaders of state environmental programs have tried over the 

years to establish new mechanisms to address each of these long-standing

problems in order to strengthen the EPA-state partnership. For example, 

EPA has linked its budgeting and allocation process to its strategic goals 

and objectives, and makes strategic decisions in developing its budget for 

its enforcement workforce to reflect shifting priorities. Nonetheless, 

according to OECA officials, shifts in funding and staff years made as a 

result of changing priorities are generally marginal. In this regard, in July 

2005 we reported that an effective workforce strategy is needed, 

particularly during times of fiscal constraint, so that OECA can tailor 

Page 4 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
workforce changes to reflect actual conditions in the regions and states 

and minimize potential adverse impacts on EPA’s programs.4

To better clarify roles, responsibilities, and priorities between EPA and the 

states, the agency established the National Environmental Performance 

Partnership System (NEPPS) in 1995 to give states demonstrating strong 

environmental performance greater flexibility and autonomy in planning 

and operating their environmental programs. Under this system, a state 

and EPA may enter into a Performance Partnership Agreement (PPA) that 

identifies the state’s environmental goals and priorities, and spells out how 

EPA and state officials are to address them. States may also ask to 

combine EPA grants into a Performance Partnership Grant (PPG), which 

is intended to allow the state greater flexibility in targeting limited 

resources to meet its priorities. In 2003, OECA revised its process for 

setting national enforcement priorities to better consider the views of 

states and regions and to more effectively target enforcement resources. 

Under the new process, OECA headquarters evaluates the overall 

environmental performance of individual industrial sectors, and solicits 

views about those sectors from states and regions, the representatives of 

the industrial sectors, and the public. OECA uses this information to 

identify priorities that are best addressed through focused federal 

attention. OECA issues guidance to the regions and states for 

implementing the national enforcement priorities, as well as guidance for 

deterring noncompliance among all regulated sectors. 

Likewise, OECA implemented a new oversight program in 2004, known as 

the State Review Framework (SRF), to more uniformly and objectively 

measure the performance of states’ enforcement programs. Under SRF, 

regions evaluate the extent to which state performance in managing three

major programs complies with specific legal requirements, policy, and 

guidance, while OECA headquarters manages the overall review process.5

In conducting this evaluation, the regions use 12 review elements, such as 

the degree to which states complete planned inspections, accurately 

identify significant violations, and take timely and appropriate

enforcement action. As of January 2007, EPA had conducted SRF reviews 

 4

GAO, Clean Water Act: Improved Resource Planning Would Help EPA Better Respond to

Changing Needs and Fiscal Constraints, GAO-05-721 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005). 

5

These three programs are the Clean Water Act—National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 

System; Clean Air Act—Stationary Sources Program; and Resource Conservation and 

Recovery Act—Subtitle C Hazardous Waste Program. 

Page 5 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
in 33 states and expected to complete its assessment of the remaining 

states by the end of fiscal year 2007. EPA plans to evaluate the 

implementation of SRF in fiscal year 2008. Appendix II contains a detailed

description of the development of the SRF. 

In this context, you asked that we (1) identify trends in the federal 

resources provided to regions and states for enforcement between 1997 

and 2006, and determine regional and states’ views on the adequacy of 

these resources to implement their activities; (2) determine EPA’s 

progress in improving priority setting and enforcement planning with its 

regions and authorized states; and (3) examine EPA’s efforts to improve its 

oversight of state’s enforcement and compliance programs and identify 

additional actions that could be taken to ensure more consistent state 

performance and more consistent oversight of state programs. 

To address these issues, we reviewed EPA’s strategic plans and national 

strategy, and its policy and guidance for planning and implementing its 

enforcement programs and for establishing performance partnerships with 

authorized state agencies.

6

 We also examined the budgets for EPA and 

OECA for fiscal years 1997 through 2006. We discussed the development 

and implementation of national strategy, policy, guidance, and resource 

allocation with officials of OECA, EPA’s Office of Congressional and 

Intergovernmental Relations, EPA’s Office of Chief Financial Officer, and 

officials responsible for state program oversight in each of EPA’s 10 

regional offices. In each region, we examined regional strategic plans, 

partnership agreements with authorized states, and state oversight 

reviews. We used semi-structured interviews to elicit, organize, and 

evaluate narrative responses from officials at the 10 regional offices and 10

authorized state agencies. We selected one state from each region: five

states that had performance partnership agreements with EPA (Iowa, 

Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, and Utah) and five that did not 

(Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, New York, and West Virginia). At these state 

agencies, we reviewed strategic plans and strategy, and policy and 

guidance for planning and implementing enforcement programs. We were 

not able to assess the workload and capacity of states to meet their 

programs because, as mentioned previously, EPA does not have a system 

to collect information needed for such an assessment, including consistent 

and complete information from the states or regions on their workload 

 6

For purposes of this report, state agencies include those of the District of Columbia, 

Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Pacific Islands. 

Page 6 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
and the number, type, and skills of staff needed to carry out these 

responsibilities. Appendix I contains a detailed description of our scope 

and methodology. We performed our work from October 2005 through 

July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards, which included an assessment of data reliability and internal 

controls. 

Overall funding to regions and authorized states increased from fiscal 

years 1997 through 2006. However, these increases did not keep pace with

inflation and the growth in enforcement responsibilities. Both EPA and 

state officials told us they are finding it difficult to respond to new 

requirements while carrying out their previous responsibilities. Over the 

10-year period, EPA’s enforcement funding to the regions increased from 

$288 million in fiscal year 1997 to $322 million in fiscal year 2006, but 

declined in real terms by 8 percent. In response, regional officials said, 

they reduced the number of enforcement staff by about 5 percent. EPA’s 

grants to states to implement environmental programs consistent with 

federal requirements also increased over the 10-year period, from $2.9 

billion in fiscal year 1997 to $3.2 billion in fiscal year 2006, but declined in 

real terms by 9 percent. In addition, grant funding dropped substantially 

between fiscal years 2004 and 2006, from $3.9 billion to $3.2 billion. These 

reductions in funding occurred during a period when statutory and 

regulatory changes increased enforcement and other environmental 

program responsibilities. As we reported in July 2005, EPA’s 

implementation of amendments to the Clean Water Act (1) increased the 

number of regulated industrial and municipal facilities by an estimated 

186,000 facilities and (2) added hundreds of thousands of construction 

projects to states’ and regions’ workloads for the storm water program. 

For example, Arkansas officials said that, for the storm water program in 

their state, the number of inspections and storm water permits issued 

increased by 512 percent from 2003 to 2005. In addition, other state 

officials told us that reductions in grant funds have limited their ability to 

meet EPA’s requests for their states to carry out new requirements. As a 

result, as these officials focus on priority enforcement work, they have 

accumulated a backlog of work in other areas, such as renewing permits 

for regulated facilities. However, EPA does not collect sufficient 

information on enforcement workload and staffing to permit an

independent assessment of the capability of either regions or states to 

meet their enforcement responsibilities. 

EPA has made substantial progress in improving priority setting and 

enforcement planning with states through its system for setting national

Results in Brief 

Page 7 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
enforcement priorities and NEPPS, which have fostered a more 

cooperative relationship. With respect to setting national priorities, for 

example, stakeholders recommended, and OECA accepted, a focus on 

ensuring that facilities handling hazardous substances, such as lead and 

mercury, have the financial resources necessary to close their facilities, 

clean up any contamination, and compensate communities and individuals

affected by the contamination. Because financial assurance is now a 

national priority, EPA will provide training to state inspectors, who often 

do not have a financial background, on how to assess the adequacy of 

documented financial resources. EPA and states have also made progress

in using NEPPS for establishing enforcement responsibilities and 

allocating resources. State participation in the partnership grew from 6 

pilot states in fiscal year 1996 to 41 states in fiscal year 2006, although the 

extent of participation in the partnership varies. Of the 41 states, 31 had 

both Performance Partnership Agreements and Performance Partnership 

Grants; 2 had agreements only; and 8 had grants only. Participation has 

been uneven, according to state officials, because the benefits expected

from this partnership—flexibility in managing their programs and 

directing grant funds—have only been partially realized. For example, 

Minnesota and Massachusetts officials said they have been able to achieve 

some flexibility from EPA to target state priorities and allocate grant 

resources to those priorities. Other states, such as Florida and New York, 

reported that they did not see significant benefits from participation in 

NEPPS. For example, Florida officials told us that state appropriation 

procedures restrict their ability to shift resources among programs. 

EPA has improved its oversight of state enforcement programs by 

implementing the SRF to provide a consistent approach for overseeing the 

programs. Moreover, EPA can make additional progress by addressing 

weaknesses that the SRF reviews identified and by implementing other 

improvements to ensure oversight that is more consistent. With its 

implementation of the SRF, EPA has, for the first time, a consistent 

approach for overseeing states’ compliance and enforcement programs. 

The SRF reviews have also identified several significant weaknesses in 

how states enforce program requirements. For example, the reviews 

frequently found that states are not properly documenting inspection 

findings or penalties, as directed by EPA’s enforcement policy and 

guidance. While recognizing that these findings are useful, EPA has not 

developed a plan for how it will uniformly address them in a timely 

manner. Nor has the agency identified the root causes of the weaknesses, 

although some EPA and state officials attribute the weaknesses to causes 

such as increased workloads concomitant with budgetary reductions. 

Until EPA addresses enforcement weaknesses and their causes, it faces 

Page 8 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
limitations in determining whether states perform timely and appropriate

enforcement and apply penalties to environmental violators in a fair and

consistent manner within and among the states. The SRF is still in its early 

stages of implementation and offers additional uses that EPA has not yet 

considered, such as using the SRF’s structured approach to (1) provide 

consistent information to the public on how well the states are 

implementing their enforcement responsibilities and (2) serve as a basis 

for assessing the performance of EPA’s regions, which have been 

inconsistent in their enforcement and oversight efforts in the past. 

In order to enhance EPA’s oversight of regional and state enforcement 

activities consistent with federal requirements, we are recommending that 

the Administrator of EPA use the results of the SRF to (1) identify lessons 

learned and develop an action plan to address significant problems; (2) 

address capacity issues, such as state staffing levels and workload 

requirements, of state programs that perform poorly; (3) publish the 

results of the SRF so that the general public and others will know how 

well state regulators are enforcing authorized programs; and (4) for 

regional enforcement programs, conduct a performance assessment 

similar to the SRF. In commenting on the draft report, EPA generally 

agreed with GAO’s recommendations and stated that the agency is taking

action to address the issues we raised. With respect to our 

recommendation to publish the results of the SRF findings, EPA said that 

it had agreed with the Environmental Council of the States that the first 

round of state enforcement reviews would not be published. However, 

EPA said it would consider whether to publish future reviews when it 

evaluates the implementation of the SRF in fiscal year 2008. 

Since its creation in 1970, EPA has generally been responsible for ensuring 

the enforcement of the nation’s environmental laws. This responsibility 

has traditionally involved monitoring compliance by those in the regulated

community (such as factories or businesses that release pollutants into the 

environment or use hazardous chemicals), ensuring that violations are 

properly identified and reported, and ensuring that timely and appropriate

enforcement actions are taken against violators when necessary. 

Because states historically had primary responsibility for addressing 

environmental pollution, including taking the lead role in enforcement 

under federal environmental legislation of the 1950s and 1960s, many 

states were dissatisfied with the new enforcement powers Congress 

granted to EPA. Referring to his first term as EPA Administrator during 

the 1970s, William Ruckelshaus described relations between EPA and state 

Background 

Page 9 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
governments as “terrible,” largely because EPA itself represented a 

repudiation of what the state regulators had been doing. The states felt, he

believed, that in the face of very little public or political support, they had 

made considerable progress and were getting no credit for it. The very 

existence of EPA symbolized to state environmental agencies the lack of 

appreciation the public had for their efforts and accomplishments. 

Furthermore, because EPA was now responsible for ensuring the 

implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, states needed to 

demonstrate to EPA that they had acquired and were maintaining 

adequate authority to enforce program requirements consistent with 

federal law before EPA would “authorize” and continue to allow states to 

assume the day-to-day administration of new environmental programs. 

This federal oversight contributed to a very difficult period between EPA 

and the states. The states thought EPA dictated too much and was too 

intrusive. 

Difficulties in the EPA-state relationship manifested themselves from the 

1970s through the 1990s and, to some degree, have continued to the 

present day. In 1980, we described the failings of the EPA-state 

partnership.7

 In a 1988 comprehensive management review of EPA, we 

reported that while some progress had been made in improving the 

EPA/state relationship, the goal of a truly effective EPA-state partnership 

remained elusive.8

 Many state officials expressed concerns about having

limited flexibility, too much EPA control, and excessively detailed EPA 

oversight. 

In 2003, OECA officials said that environmental commissioners in several 

states and members of the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS)

9

called for OECA to develop and implement a consistent and objective 

mechanism for measuring state performance. Specifically, ECOS wanted 

EPA’s oversight of state programs to be consistent between EPA regions 

and states in the same region. ECOS also wanted EPA oversight to be 

predictable, repeatable, and unbiased. In December 2003, OECA began 

jointly developing the SRF with input from EPA regions, associations 

 7

GAO, Federal-State Environmental Programs—The State Perspective, CED-80-106 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 1980). 

8

GAO/RCED-88-101. 

9

ECOS is the national nonprofit, nonpartisan association that represents state and

territorial environmental commissioners. 

Page 10 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
representing state pollution control agencies,10 ECOS and state officials to 

evaluate the extent to which state performance in three major programs 

complies with specific legal requirements, policy and guidance.

11 The SRF 

measures state performance using 12 required elements and an optional 

13th element. The elements include five categories: (1) review of state 

inspection implementation; (2) review of state enforcement activity; (3) 

review of state enforcement commitments; (4) review of state data 

integrity; and (5) for the optional 13th element, a review of additional 

programs of the state’s choice to insure consideration of state activities 

that support the overall evaluation. Regions prepare a draft report of the 

findings and conclusions of each review, jointly discuss with the state how 

major recommendations will be addressed, and provide the draft reports 

to OECA headquarters. OECA reviews the draft reports and provides 

comments on the regions’ analyses and recommendations. A more detailed 

description of the SRF is included in appendix II.

The relationship between EPA and state environmental agencies varies 

substantially from state to state and program to program. Staff in EPA’s 

regional offices operate programs in those states that have elected not to 

seek authorization and in those states that EPA has concluded are not 

prepared to manage the programs effectively. In some cases, where EPA 

has denied a state with program authorization, state personnel may do 

most of the work as if they had the authority to grant permits, with EPA 

employees handling only the final step of formally issuing the documents. 

In other states or programs, EPA may approve a “partial delegation” of 

authority, under which a state operates part of a program that can be 

delegated and EPA operates the remainder. 

Just as EPA can authorize a state to conduct day-to-day program 

management, environmental statutes may allow EPA to withdraw 

authorization if a state fails to meet certain conditions, including 

 10State pollution control associations are national, nonpartisan professional organizations 

representing state and local pollution control officials. They include, for example, the

Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials (ASTSWMO), 

Association of State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators (ASIWPCA), 

and the National Association of Clean Air Agencies—formerly known as State and

Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators, and Association of Local Air Pollution 

Control Officials (STAPPA/ALAPCO). 

11The review elements are based upon compliance and enforcement policies that have been 

in place for many years, such as EPA’s national enforcement response policies, compliance 

monitoring policies, civil penalty policies, and similar state policies (where in use and 

consistent with national policies). 

Page 11 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
maintaining the capacity to effectively manage the program and adopting 

and properly exercising the legal authorities to enforce program 

compliance consistent with federal laws and regulations. In practical

terms, however, EPA’s ability to directly manage state programs is limited 

because of its staffing levels and other resources. 

Overall funding to regions and authorized states increased from fiscal 

years 1997 through 2006. However, these increases did not keep pace with

inflation and the growth in enforcement responsibilities. Both EPA and 

state officials told us they are finding it difficult to respond to new 

requirements while carrying out their previous responsibilities. However, 

EPA does not collect sufficient data on enforcement workload and 

staffing, which it needs to assess the capacity of the regions and states to 

effectively implement their responsibilities for enforcing environmental 

laws consistent with federal requirements. 

According to our analysis of EPA’s budget and workforce for fiscal years 

1997 through 2006, EPA’s total budget increased from $7.3 billion to $7.7 

billion—a decline of 13 percent in real terms.12 At the same time, total 

funding for EPA enforcement increased from $455 million to $522 

million—a decline of 5 percent in real terms. For the regions, which 

command the bulk of enforcement resources, funding increased from $288 

million to $322 million—a decline of 8 percent in real terms, while 

headquarters enforcement funding increased from $167 million to $200 

million—a decline of 1 percent in real terms. Figure 1 shows the changes 

in EPA enforcement funding in real terms, in total, and by headquarters 

and regional offices. 

Increases in EPA 

Funding Have Not 

Kept Pace with 

Inflation and 

Enforcement 

Responsibilities 

Resources for EPA 

Regions and the States 

Have Declined in Real 

Terms

 12When we refer to “real terms,” we mean after subtracting out the effect of inflation, i.e., 

growth in prices. Trends in spending of nominal amounts (also called current dollar or

then-year values) may reflect changes in both price and quantity. To evaluate real spending 

trends, it is necessary to remove the effect of changes in prices. The effect of inflation is 

removed by deflating the series, a process that requires dividing the nominal value by an 

appropriate price index. The resulting series can be labeled real, inflation-adjusted, or

constant dollars. This report used the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price index to deflate 

the nominal dollar amounts of budget authority amounts and arrive at inflation adjusted (or

real) dollars in 2007 dollars. 

Page 12 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Figure 1: EPA’s Enforcement Funding in Real Terms, in Total, and by Headquarters 

and Regional Offices, Fiscal Years 1997-2006 

Note: In nominal terms, funding enforcement in EPA regions increased from $288 million in fiscal year

1997 to $322 million in fiscal year 2006. 

According to officials in OECA and EPA’s Office of the Chief Financial

Officer, OECA headquarters absorbed decreases in OECA’s total 

enforcement funding in recent years to prevent further reductions to the 

regions. According to our analysis, enforcement funding for OECA 

headquarters increased from $197 million in fiscal year 2002 to $200 

million in fiscal year 2006—a 9 percent decline in real terms. During the 

same time, regional enforcement funding increased from $279 million to 

$322 million—a 4 percent increase in real terms. 

EPA reduced the size of the regional enforcement workforce by about 5 

percent over the 10 years, from 2,568 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff in 

fiscal year 1997 to 2,434 FTEs in fiscal year 2006. In comparison, the OECA 

headquarters workforce declined 1 percent, and the EPA total workforce 

increased 1 percent during the same period. Figure 2 shows the changes in

headquarters and regional FTEs from fiscal years 1997 through 2006. 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

2007 Dollars in millions

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data.

Fiscal year

EPA total

Regions

Headquarters

Page 13 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Figure 2: OECA Headquarters and Regional Total FTEs, Fiscal Years 1997-2006 

As figure 3 shows, the change in FTEs was not uniform across the 10

regions over the period. For example: 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

FTEs

Source: EPA Office of Budget.

Fiscal year

OECA total

OECA regions

OECA headquarters

• Two regions—Region 9 (San Francisco) and Region 10 (Seattle)—

experienced increases in their workforce: Region 9 increased 5 percent,

from 229 to 242 FTEs, and Region 10 increased 6 percent, from 161 to 170

FTEs. 

• Two regions—Region 1 (Boston) and Region 2 (New York) experienced 

the largest declines: Region 1 experienced a 15 percent decline, from 195 

to 166 FTEs, and Region 2 had a 13 percent decline, from 291 to 254 FTEs. 

Page 14 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Figure 3: OECA Regional Offices FTEs, Fiscal Years 1997-2006 

As EPA’s real total funding declined, EPA’s real total grant funding to 

states and tribes declined, as shown in figure 4. States and tribes use these 

grant funds, combined with their own resources, to implement and 

enforce environmental programs consistent with federal requirements. 

EPA’s grants to authorized states and tribes increased from $2.9 billion to 

$3.2 billion from fiscal years 1997 through 2006—a decline of 9 percent in 

real terms. However, grant funding to states and tribes dropped 

substantially between fiscal years 2004 and 2006, from $3.9 billion to $3.2 

billion—a 22 percent decline in real terms. 

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

FTEs

Source: EPA Office of Budget.

Region

Fiscal year 1997

Fiscal year 2006

Page 15 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Figure 4: EPA’s Real Total Funding and Real Total Grant Funding to States and 

Tribes, Fiscal Years 1997 through 2006 

Note: In nominal terms, funding for grants to states and tribes increased from $2.9 billion in fiscal year

1997 to $3.2 billion in fiscal year 2006. 

For the programs we examined, EPA provides states with federal 

resources through grant programs. In addition, under the Clean Air Act, 

states must collect fees from permitted facilities to help fund the program. 

The following are some of the funding sources for the programs we 

examined: 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

2007 Dollars in billions

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data.

Fiscal year

EPA

Grants to states and tribes

• Clean Water Act Section 106 Grants. The Office of Water provides annual 

Water Pollution Control grant funds to the states under the Clean Water 

Act for, among other things, enforcement of point source pollution 

requirements. 

• Clean Air Act Section 105 Grants. States finance enforcement of air 

quality laws with fees paid by permitted facilities (e.g., electric utilities and 

chemical manufacturers), in accordance with title V of the Clean Air Act. 

States assess fees based on tons of pollution emitted. The fee must be at 

least $25 per ton (as adjusted for inflation) of regulated pollutants 

Page 16 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
(excluding carbon monoxide). EPA provides grants to states to help fund 

programs that prevent and control air pollution or to implement national 

ambient air quality standards, including programs that may address 

smaller sources that do not have to obtain permits (e.g., dry cleaners and

gasoline stations). 

• Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Section 3011 Grants. 

The Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response provides annual 

grants to states under section 3011 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act to 

support, among other things, state enforcement of the RCRA Subtitle C 

Hazardous Waste Management programs.13 EPA’s financial assistance 

covers up to 75 percent of a state’s total costs for managing hazardous 

waste. 

• Underground Storage Tank (UST) Grants. The Office of Underground 

Storage Tanks provides grants to states under subtitle I of RCRA to 

support state UST programs, including inspections and enforcement 

activities. 

Given the real reductions in funding and personnel, regional and state 

enforcement officials noted states are finding it difficult to respond to new 

enforcement requirements in the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and 

RCRA, which have greatly increased the number of regulated pollutants 

and sources.14 However, as we reported in June 2006, EPA’s data collection

system for state and regional enforcement activities does not provide 

consistent and complete data on the workload of the states or the regions,

and on their capacity to meet their workload, including the enforcement of 

environmental programs consistent with federal requirements.15 Thus, we 

EPA Regions and States 

Find It Difficult to 

Respond to New 

Requirements under 

Current Resource 

Constraints 

 13The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795, 

amends the Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, tit. II, 79 Stat. 997 (1965), the first 

federal law regulating solid wastes—a broad category of materials including such materials

as garbage from treatment plants and discarded materials resulting from industrial, 

commercial, or agricultural activities. 

14Precise information about the overall changes in region and state enforcement workload 

associated with the implementation of new requirements—such as information on changes 

in the numbers of regulated entities—is not available. However, we and others have 

reported over the years on the impact of changes in the federal environmental programs to

the requirements for EPA’s and authorized states’ enforcement programs. GAO-05-721; 

Congressional Research Services, RL30798, Environmental Laws: Summaries of Statutes 

Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (updated Mar. 31, 2005). 

15GAO-06-840T. 

Page 17 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
were not able to independently assess their capabilities to meet their 

responsibilities under environmental programs with their existing 

resources. 

In 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act,16 Congress expanded the 

scope of the act by regulating storm water runoff from rain or snow as a 

discharge from point sources, such as industrial facilities and municipal 

separate storm sewer systems. We reported in 2005 that that the new 

storm water regulations increased the number of industrial and municipal 

facilities subject to regulation by an estimated 186,000 facilities. In that 

same year, the EPA Office of Inspector General reported that the new 

requirements added hundreds of thousands of construction projects to 

states’ and regions’ workloads related to storm water pollution sources. In 

2005, EPA established storm water as a national enforcement priority. 

According to state water quality enforcement officials, it is difficult to 

meet these new requirements while still meeting older requirements to 

periodically inspect large municipal and industrial point sources. For 

example, Minnesota officials told us that there are a huge number of 

facilities and locations that require inspection and permits in that state. 

The Minnesota storm water officials provided us a performance report that 

indicated noncompliance with storm water requirements was so pervasive 

that the state’s water enforcement program was not meeting its timeliness 

targets for closing enforcement cases where it has the authority to issue a 

penalty. The report said that the situation threatened to undermine earlier 

success in implementing the state’s storm water permit program. 

According to the Arkansas director of the state’s water quality program, 

storm water enforcement work in the fast-growing northwestern corner of 

the state has overwhelmed the program. According to state data, the 

number of storm water permits issued grew by 512 percent—from 427 to 

2,616—between 2003 and 2005. At the same time, the number of permits 

Arkansas officials issued to traditional point sources increased by 19

percent, from 190 to 227 facilities. However, the state is beginning to fall 

behind in issuing the traditional permits because it has had to redeploy 

inspectors to work on storm water enforcement. 

Regional officials told us they have provided assistance to some states to 

meet enforcement requirements for storm water, such as helping states 

complete a specified number or percentage of state inspections. For 

Clean Water Act 

 16Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7. 

Page 18 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
example, Region 8 (Denver) enforcement officials said they share the 

inspection workload with Montana officials because that state’s permit 

program is chronically underfunded, and this partnership enables state 

officials in Montana to focus on reducing their backlog of regulated 

facilities that require permit renewals. 

In 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act,17 Congress created significant 

new enforcement requirements for both EPA regions and states.18 Title III 

of the 1990 amendments required EPA to control emissions of 189 air 

toxics by, among other things, developing technology-based emissions 

limits for major stationary sources.19 By 2006, there were an estimated 

84,000 major stationary sources within 158 major source categories such 

as incinerators and chemical plants to which these standards applied. Title 

III of the amendments also directed EPA to develop a list of categories of 

small stationary sources, such as dry cleaners and gas stations—so-called 

“area sources”—sufficient to represent 90 percent of emissions from small 

stationary sources of listed hazardous air pollutants. EPA and authorized 

states were then to implement strategies to control toxic emissions from 

these sources. EPA developed a list of 70 categories, but, as we reported in

2006, it had issued standards for only 16.20

Under title V of the 1990 amendments, Congress directed EPA and 

authorized states to implement a comprehensive permit program for 

Clean Air Act 

 17Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). 

18GAO, Clean Air Act: EPA Should Improve the Management of Its Air Toxics Program, 

GAO-06-669 (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006).

19Title III of the 1990 amendments directs EPA to impose technology-based standards, or 

Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards, on industry to reduce

emissions. These technology-based standards require the maximum degree of reduction in

emissions that EPA determines achievable for new and existing sources, taking into

consideration the cost of achieving such reduction, health and environmental impacts, and 

energy requirements. 

20The agency faces court-ordered deadlines to complete standards for all of the remaining

54 source categories of small stationary sources by June 15, 2009. 

Page 19 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
sources emitting regulated air pollutants.21 The new requirement 

significantly expanded an earlier permit program that applied only to 

major new construction or modifications of existing major sources of 

pollution. As of April 2001, EPA had authorized all 50 states and 63 local 

governmental units to act as clean air regulatory agencies and issue Title V 

operating permits. The 1990 amendments also required states to collect 

fees from regulated facilities sufficient to cover program costs. We 

reported in 2001 that 19,880 major sources had already received, or could 

be expected to obtain or comply with the conditions of, Title V permits;22

furthermore, federal and state regulators performed about 17,800 routine 

inspections each year in fiscal years 1998 and 1999. 

State air enforcement officials said that reductions in federal air quality 

grants and EPA restrictions on how states can use the permit fees limit 

their ability to meet new Clean Air Act requirements. For example, 

enforcement officials in Arizona and West Virginia told us that reductions 

in section 105 grants have made it difficult to meet EPA’s push for states to 

identify and regulate air toxic emissions from small stationary sources, 

such as dry cleaners. According to the director of West Virginia’s air 

quality program, while his office has identified these sources and provided

this information to Region 3 (Philadelphia), it does not have the resources 

to regulate these sources. Title V rules restrict states from using permit 

fees for enforcement of air toxic emission standards for small stationary 

sources. 

Several state officials said they also face difficulties keeping up with Title 

V requirements to issue operating permits and inspect facilities. For 

example, according to West Virginia’s Director of Air Quality, the state

program is spending more than it generates in revenues from Title V 

permit fees. Furthermore, the state is drawing down a reserve fund that it 

established in 1993, when it was operating a preliminary Title V program 

 21Under Title V of the Clean Air Act, sources emitting pollutants above certain thresholds

are classified as “major sources” and must obtain Title V operating permits. In addition,

most major sources must report their aggregate annual emissions to their state air quality 

agency and pay fees based partly or entirely on their level of emissions. Sources that emit 

pollutants below major source thresholds are called “minor sources” and do not have to

obtain a Title V permit. Some minor sources, called “synthetic minors,” have the potential 

to emit pollutants at major source levels but choose to limit their operations and emit 

below these thresholds. 

22GAO, Air Pollution: EPA Should Improve Oversight of Emissions Reporting by Large 

Facilities, GAO-01-46 (Washington, D.C.: April 2001). 

Page 20 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
before it was authorized to administer this program. West Virginia’s Title V 

fee is around $21 per ton, which is below the national average fee of $28 

per ton paid by major sources in 2001.23 The Director of Arizona’s Air 

Quality Division said that as a result of new standards and new types of 

performance testing, the Title V permitting workload has increased faster 

than staff levels. 

The 1984 amendments to RCRA24 required EPA and authorized states to 

regulate small-quantity hazardous waste generators—those producing 

between 100 and 1,000 kilograms of waste per month. Before the 1984 

amendments, EPA only required generators who produce more than 1,000 

kilograms of hazardous waste to comply with regulations concerning, 

among other things, record keeping and reporting. In addition, the 1984 

amendments required EPA and authorized states to ensure that owners 

and operators of treatment, storage and disposal facilities comply with 

new prohibitions for disposing of untreated hazardous wastes on land. 

This expansion of responsibility, combined with a reduction in resources, 

has made it difficult to carry out responsibilities, according to state 

hazardous waste enforcement officials we spoke with. For example, data 

provided to us by New York State officials showed that the state’s grant 

for hazardous waste management dropped in real terms by 19 percent 

between fiscal years 1997 and 2006. As a result of this decline in funding,

New York State officials said that the grant supports fewer full-time staff. 

The officials provided us data that showed New York State’s grant for 

hazardous waste management supported 38 percent fewer full-time staff in 

the state’s RCRA program in fiscal year 2006 than in fiscal year 1997. 

Furthermore, while it continues to focus on EPA’s national priorities for 

enforcement, the state has accumulated a backlog of permits that must be 

renewed. Renewing these hazardous waste permits is critical to protecting 

the environment and public health because EPA and authorized states can 

enforce new hazardous waste standards only when they are specified in a 

permit. According to these officials, EPA has issued new standards during 

the life of the old permit and these new standards are not enforceable until

the permit is renewed. 

Several states identified an emerging challenge: verifying that owners and 

operators of hazardous waste facilities have the financial resources to 

Resource Conservation and 

Recovery Act 

 23GAO-01-46. 

24The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221. 

Page 21 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
clean up their sites, as RCRA requires, rather than leaving site cleanup to

the taxpayer. As we reported in 2005, EPA’s Office of Inspector General 

concluded that required cleanups at some sites could exceed $50 million. 

EPA made enforcement of the financial assurance requirement a national

enforcement priority in 2005. However, state officials told us, and EPA’s 

regional officials agreed, that they do not have the personnel with the 

necessary skills to evaluate the financial assurances provided. For 

example, New York State officials told us that they have only one person 

trained to review the adequacy of a facility’s financial assurance. 

The Energy Policy Act of 200525 also expanded states’ enforcement 

workload by requiring, among other things, (1) EPA and any state 

receiving federal funding to inspect by August 8, 2007, all regulated tanks

that were not inspected since December 22, 1998, and (2) EPA or the state 

must generally inspect regulated tanks once every 3 years and complete 

the first 3-year inspection cycle within 3 years of completing inspections of 

underground storage tanks that had not been inspected by December 22, 

1998.

26 We reported in February 2007 that according to EPA data there 

were 645,990 active federally regulated underground storage tanks 

registered with state underground storage tank programs.27

To carry out these additional inspections, the act, as amended, allows 

states to use Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund 

appropriations, and authorizes substantial appropriations from the trust 

fund during fiscal years 2006 through 2011. These new appropriations 

were to be in addition to State and Tribal Grant funds EPA provides to 

states for underground storage tank programs, which historically have 

been about $187,000 annually. These additional funds were not 

appropriated in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. As a result, some state officials 

told us, they do not have sufficient resources to meet the new inspection 

requirements. For example, Minnesota officials said they have sufficient 

resources for inspecting underground storage tanks only once every 9 

 25Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. 

26The act allows EPA to extend the first 3-year period for up to 1 additional year if an 

authorized state demonstrates that it has insufficient resources to complete all inspections

within the first 3-year period. 

27The Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund, as established in 1986, provided

funds to states specifically for cleaning up contamination from tanks (i.e., releases or 

leaks). Prior to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, states could not use the money for 

inspections or enforcement of leak detection and prevention requirements. 

Page 22 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
years. Regional officials acknowledged that many states need additional 

inspectors for meeting these new underground storage tank inspection 

requirements and said they provide support to states facing fiscal 

constraints. For example, the Region 3 Chief of RCRA enforcement and 

compliance said the region helped state officials in West Virginia by 

inspecting small and midrange gas stations in the state. Region 9 (San 

Francisco) has also been working with UST officials in Arizona to meet 

the new inspection requirements. 

EPA has made substantial progress in improving priority setting and 

enforcement planning with states through its system for setting national

enforcement priorities and NEPPS, which have fostered a more 

cooperative relationship. For example, on states’ recommendation, OECA 

accepted as a priority ensuring that facilities handling hazardous 

substances, such as lead or mercury, have the financial resources to close

their facilities, clean up contamination, and compensate communities and 

individuals affected by the contamination. EPA and states have also made 

some progress in using NEPPS for joint planning and resource allocation.

State participation in the partnership grew from 6 pilot states in fiscal year 

1996 to 41 states in fiscal year 2006. 

Since the late 1980s, EPA’s top agency executives have set priorities for 

improving agency management. To develop more collaborative 

relationships among EPA’s headquarters and regions, and the states, 

OECA created the Planning Council in 2003 to direct OECA’s strategic and 

planning processes, including selecting national enforcement priorities. 

The council includes both EPA headquarters and regional officials. In the 

summer of 2003, OECA asked officials representing state environmental 

agencies, tribal governments, and air, water, and solid waste pollution 

control associations to recommend priorities for consideration as national 

priorities for fiscal years 2005 through 2007. Considering these 

recommendations, as well as those from EPA’s media program managers, 

OECA developed a list of potential national priorities that it published in 

the Federal Register in December 2003. OECA asked for public comments 

on candidate priorities and suggestions for new national enforcement 

priorities. In January 2004, OECA hosted a meeting with headquarters and 

regional officials, and representatives from 10 state environmental 

agencies, four tribal governments, and three pollution control associations

to discuss and rank their choices of potential priorities. OECA then 

selected the final national enforcement priorities for fiscal years 2005 

through 2007 based on the following criteria: 

EPA and States Have 

Taken Steps to 

Improve Planning and 

Priority Setting for 

Enforcement, but 

Results Are Uneven 

EPA Implemented a More 

Collaborative Process for 

Setting National Priorities 

for Enforcement 

Page 23 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
• Significant environmental benefit. In what specific areas can the federal

enforcement and compliance assurance programs make a significant 

positive impact on human health and/or the environment? What are the

known or estimated public health or environmental risks? 

• Noncompliance. Are there particular economic or industrial sectors, 

geographic areas, or facility operations where regulated entities have 

demonstrated serious patterns of noncompliance? 

• EPA responsibility. What identified national problem areas or programs 

are better addressed through EPA’s federal capability in enforcement or 

compliance assistance? 

Table 1 shows the potential national priorities, and those that were 

selected. 

Table 1: EPA’s Candidate and Final National Enforcement Priorities for Fiscal Years 

2005-2007, in Rank Order 

Potential priorities Priorities selected

Clean Air Act

Air toxics • 

New source review/prevention of significant deterioration • 

Clean Water Act 

Effects of wet weather on 

concentrated animal feeding operations, 

combined sewer overflows, 

sanitary sewer overflows, and

storm water runoff 

• 

Petroleum refining •

a

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

Financial assurance/financial responsibility • 

Mineral processing • 

Tribal environmental issues • 

Federal facilities 

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

Leaking underground storage tanks 

Ports of entry 

Asbestos in schools

Auto salvage yards 

Environmental justice 

Miscellaneous plastics 

Page 24 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Potential priorities Priorities selected

Safe Drinking Water Act 

Microbials

Fuels management 

Significant noncompliance oversight

Source: EPA. 

a

EPA’s national petroleum refining priority addresses air emissions from the nation’s petroleum 

refineries. EPA reached its goal of addressing 80 percent of the domestic refining capacity through 

settlements or filed civil actions. As a result, OECA removed it from the national priority list at the end 

of fiscal year 2006. 

According to state and regional officials, OECA’s approach for selecting 

national priorities has fostered a more collaborative working relationship, 

and they pointed to the financial assurance national priority under RCRA 

as a case in point. This priority focuses on ensuring that owners and 

operators of facilities handling hazardous substances, such as lead or 

mercury, provide assurance that they have the financial resources 

necessary to close their facilities, clean up any contamination, and 

compensate communities and individuals affected by any contamination 

they cause. Stakeholders—EPA regions, states, pollution control 

associations,28 and the public—told OECA that financial assurance should 

be a national priority. EPA and state supporting investigations confirmed 

that (1) there are significant noncompliance issues relating to the financial 

assurance requirements; (2) the issues are of national importance and deal 

with several environmental laws and regulatory programs; and (3) areas of 

noncompliance were not isolated to a specific sector, industry, or 

geographic location. In selecting financial assurance as a national priority, 

OECA stated that an effective national enforcement and compliance 

strategy would help address many of the problems created by the 

regulated facilities’ failure to fulfill their financial responsibility 

obligations. In this regard, EPA is providing training to state inspectors—

who often do not have expertise in financial management—on how to 

assess the adequacy of financial documentation provided by regulated 

facilities. 

 28Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials also received a 

collective recommendation from the Northeast Waste Management Officials’ Association 

(NEWMOA), a nonprofit, nonpartisan interstate association that has a membership 

composed of the hazardous waste, solid waste, waste site cleanup and pollution prevention 

program directors for the environmental agencies in eight New England States

(Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode

Island, and Vermont) 

Page 25 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
While state and regional officials told us the priority setting process is 

more collaborative, some state officials raised a number of issues about 

how EPA considered their comments about national priorities. For 

example, Massachusetts and Oregon officials told us that they did not 

understand why OECA ranked some of their priorities lower than the 

national priorities that were selected and would like to have feedback on

how their views were considered when selecting national enforcement 

priorities. In addition, while Minnesota, Utah, and Arizona officials agree 

that the planning and priority setting has improved, they would prefer 

earlier involvement in the decision-making process, that is, in developing 

the candidate list. On the other hand, New York and Arkansas said that 

they preferred to provide input on the national enforcement priorities 

through the pollution control associations and/or ECOS. They said, by 

doing so, OECA will receive states’ collective views on the candidate 

priorities in a more representative and compelling way. 

After OECA selects the national enforcement priorities, it uses the 

National Program Managers guidance to inform its stakeholders of the 

national priorities and required elements of all environmental laws. The 

managers establish overall national goals for their respective programs 

based on a variety of factors, including underlying statutory mandates, 

congressional directives, administration/administrator priorities, and their

own view of programs and policies that the programs should focus on. 

EPA regions and states use this guidance to negotiate agreements based 

on (1) which environmental problems will receive priority attention within 

state programs, (2) what EPA’s and the states’ respective enforcement 

roles and responsibilities will be, and (3) how the states’ progress in 

achieving program objectives will be assessed. The results of these 

negotiations are documented primarily in PPAs and/or PPGs. According to

EPA, NEPPS allows regions and states to negotiate agreements that vary 

in content and emphasis to reflect regional and state conditions and 

priorities. 

State participation in NEPPS grew from 6 pilot states in fiscal year 1996 to

41 states in fiscal year 2006. Of these 41 states participating in NEPPS in 

fiscal year 2006, 31 had both PPAs and PPGs; 2 had agreements only; and 8 

had grants only. Twelve states did not participate at all in NEPPS. 

Regional officials and states participating in NEPPS said it contributed to 

improvements in their planning and priority setting process by helping 

identify enforcement priorities, roles, and responsibilities. The states we 

spoke with that had a PPA—Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, and

Extent of States’ 

Participation in the 

Planning and Priority 

Setting Process Varies 

Page 26 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Utah—also had a PPG and generally agreed that EPA’s planning and 

budget process fostered collaboration in setting joint priorities, roles, and 

accountability for each party. In addition, Minnesota and Massachusetts 

officials told us that they have been able to use grant resources to address 

other state priorities. However, these officials noted that EPA guidance

continues to call for a specific number of enforcement activities, which 

does not allow for as much flexibility as envisioned. 

States without a PPA can still participate in NEPPS through a PPG, which 

allows them to combine individual categorical grant funds into a 

consolidated grant. Once the funds are consolidated, they lose their 

category-specific identity and can be used with greater flexibility. We 

found that states that had a PPG, but not a PPA, had mixed views on 

NEPPS. For example, according to the New York State Department of 

Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC), which currently has a 

performance grant only for water programs, it experimented with a 

performance agreement in the mid-1990s but dropped the endeavor 

because of difficulties in drafting an agreement that combined multiple 

agency divisions. NYSDEC officials said the amount of work involved 

outweighed the benefits to individual programs. Furthermore, even with a 

performance grant for water programs, NYSDEC officials told us, EPA still 

maintains requirements for how the money is used and attempts to steer 

the state toward EPA’s priorities, which are not necessarily NYSDEC’s 

priorities. In contrast, the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality,

which has a performance grant but not a performance agreement, said it 

has a “fantastic relationship” with Region 9 that is characterized by 

extensive coordination and communication. Because of its grant, Arizona 

officials told us, the state has realized administrative efficiencies and has 

more flexibility to move money among programs. 

States that do not participate in NEPPS were generally satisfied with the 

amount of joint planning and coordination in their work plan agreements 

(i.e., memorandum of agreement and annual work plans). For example, 

West Virginia and Florida told us that their work plan agreements with 

their EPA regions provided them with much of the same opportunities for 

joint planning, flexibilities, and priority setting as NEPPS participants. 

Officials from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection 

said they did not participate in NEPPS because they did not wish to 

transfer grant funding among media programs. They said state programs 

rely heavily on revenue generated through fees and penalties; therefore, 

program managers are reluctant to share resources. According to officials

from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, they have not

participated in NEPPS since 1999 because their work plan agreements 

Page 27 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
provide the benefits of NEPPS—good dialogue with the region in planning 

and priority setting. Moreover, Florida officials said they cannot use the 

flexibility allowed under NEPPS to redirect resources between programs 

because state appropriation procedures place restrictions on their ability 

to shift resources among programs. 

With its implementation of the SRF, EPA has—for the first time—a 

consistent approach for overseeing authorized states’ compliance and 

enforcement programs and has identified several significant weaknesses in 

how states enforce their environmental laws in accordance with federal 

requirements.29 For example, the SRF reviews found that states are not 

properly documenting inspection findings or penalties, as directed by 

EPA’s enforcement policy and guidance. While recognizing that these 

findings are useful, EPA has not developed a plan for how it will uniformly 

address them in a timely manner. Nor has the agency identified the root

causes of the weaknesses, although some EPA and state officials attribute 

the weaknesses to causes such as increased workloads concomitant with 

budgetary reductions. Until EPA addresses enforcement weaknesses and 

their causes, it faces limitations in determining whether states perform 

timely and appropriate enforcement, and whether they apply penalties to 

environmental violators in a fair and consistent manner within and among 

the states. Moreover, the SRF is still in its early stages of implementation 

and offers additional uses that EPA has not yet considered. In this regard,

its structured approach provides consistent information that would be 

useful to (1) inform the public about how well the states are implementing 

their enforcement responsibilities and (2) serve as a basis for assessing the 

performance of EPA’s regions, which have been inconsistent in their 

enforcement and oversight efforts in the past. 

As of January 25, 2007, OECA had conducted SRF reviews in 33 states and 

expected to complete its assessment of remaining states by the end of 

fiscal year 2007. OECA reported good performance in most aspects of 

state compliance and enforcement programs. However, it also reported 

that the reviews found several weaknesses in state programs that will 

require focused attention to correct. EPA officials said the following four 

weaknesses were the most frequently identified: 

State Review 

Framework Has the 

Potential to Provide 

More Consistent 

Oversight 

SRF Findings Demonstrate 

the Value of a Uniform 

Approach to Evaluating 

State Enforcement 

Programs 

 29As we reported in June 2006, EPA has long experienced difficulties in providing oversight 

of state enforcement programs with sufficient consistency. 

Page 28 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
• States are not adequately documenting the results of facility inspections 

in order to determine the significance of violations. EPA policy states 

that complete and accurate documentary evidence is needed to determine 

the nature and extent of violations, particularly the presence of significant 

violations, and to support timely and appropriate enforcement actions. 

EPA policy also states that a quality program should maintain accurate

and up-to-date files and records, and report this information to EPA to 

support effective program evaluation and priority setting. EPA and state 

officials suggested that some of the causes of inadequate state 

documentation and reporting of facility inspections can be traced to a lack

of staff expertise, inadequate training, increasing workload, and 

reductions in staff and budgetary resources in recent years. 

• States are not adequately entering significant violations noted in their 

inspection reports into EPA databases. GAO, EPA’s Office of Inspector 

General, and OECA have reported that the lack of complete and accurate

national enforcement data has been a long-term problem. OECA needs 

accurate and complete enforcement data to help it determine whether 

core enforcement requirements are being consistently implemented by 

regions and states and whether there are significant variations from these 

requirements that should be corrected. In addition, accurate and complete 

enforcement data helps OECA more efficiently and effectively oversee 

states and regions. According to EPA regional and state officials, the SRF 

is helping them recognize the reasons for discrepancies between state and 

EPA databases and improve the quality of data in these databases. 

• States lack adequate or appropriate penalty authority or policies. 

Penalties play a key role in environmental enforcement by deterring 

potential violators and ensuring that members of the regulated community 

cannot gain a competitive advantage by violating enforcement regulations.

To qualify as an authorized state for administering environmental 

programs, states must, among other things, acquire and maintain adequate

authority to enforce program requirements consistent with federal 

requirements. For example, to obtain EPA’s approval to administer the 

Clean Air Act’s Title V permitting requirements for major air pollution 

sources, states must have, among other things, authority to recover civil 

penalties and provide appropriate criminal penalties. EPA’s policy 

provides that all penalties should include two components. First, penalties 

should include an “economic benefit” component that reflects the benefit

achieved by avoiding compliance. This component is considered important 

to “leveling the playing field” among companies within an industry and 

eliminating any economic advantage violators gain through delayed or 

avoided compliance costs. The second component—the “gravity-based

Page 29 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
component”—reflects the seriousness of the violation, the actual or 

possible harm it causes, and the size of the violator. 

• States are not documenting how they implement EPA’s policies for 

calculating and assessing penalties. According to EPA policy, states need

to maintain sufficient documentation so that the regions can evaluate (1) 

the state’s rationale for obtaining a penalty and (2) where appropriate, the 

calculation of the economic benefit and gravity-based components. If a 

state has not assessed a penalty or other appropriate sanction against a 

violator, EPA may take direct enforcement action to recover a penalty. 

However, regional and state offices we interviewed said applying this 

policy places strains on the EPA/state working relationship because states

generally prefer that EPA not take direct enforcement action against 

regulated entities in their states. For this reason, EPA generally does not 

take direct enforcement action solely to recover additional penalties 

unless a state penalty is determined to be grossly deficient. 

Regional and state officials said states vary as to whether their 

environmental program administrators have the authority to assess 

penalties. If program administrators lack this authority, they must pursue

judicial remedies through their state attorney general. Judicial actions 

generally result in penalties and court orders requiring correction of the 

violation. However, this route is more time-consuming and resourceintensive than having the environmental program office assess the penalty 

and can significantly delay obtaining penalties and achieving a return to 

compliance.

The initial SRF findings provide the basis for discussions between EPA 

and the states on how to address deficiencies in state compliance and 

enforcement programs, many of which have been well known and longstanding. According to OECA officials, EPA will have completed an SRF 

review in all states by the end of 2007 and will perform an evaluation of 

the SRF in fiscal year 2008. The proposed evaluation methodology states 

that EPA will address the effectiveness of implementing the SRF by 

surveying the state environmental agencies that participated in the reviews 

and the pollution control associations. However, this proposed evaluation

may not yield the results EPA will need to better ensure more consistent 

state performance and more consistent state program oversight. In this 

regard, the proposed evaluation methodology does not specify how EPA 

plans to use the results of the SRF to begin determining the causes for 

cited deficiencies and to identify strategies for uniformly and 

expeditiously implementing potential corrective actions. 

Modifications to the SRF 

Could Improve EPA’s 

Enforcement Oversight 

Process 

Page 30 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
While EPA’s proposed evaluation may prove to be useful in obtaining 

views on the success of the SRF and on areas needing improvement in 

performing the reviews, the proposal is still in its early stages of 

development, and specific details have not been laid out on whether and 

how certain potential issues will be addressed. EPA could better ensure 

more consistent state performance and more consistent oversight of state 

enforcement programs by (1) developing and implementing corrective 

actions for the major deficiencies identified through the SRF and (2) 

assessing the capacity of poorly performing state programs to determine 

whether they possess the staff, financial, and other resources to effectively 

implement enforcement programs consistent with federal requirements. 

Region 8’s experience in using the findings of its Uniform Enforcement 

Oversight System may prove to be useful for OECA in addressing the 

findings of the SRF on a nationwide basis. This oversight system was 

designated a “best practice” in the area of state agency oversight by EPA’s 

Office of Inspector General.30 The region evaluated states’ enforcement 

programs using uniform review criteria that had been previously agreed to

by each state agency. The region then used the evaluation findings to 

develop an improvement strategy tailored to the particular weakness 

identified in each state’s enforcement program. In order to hold the states 

accountable for correcting the weaknesses identified, Region 8 also used 

the improvement strategy in arriving at annual agreements with the states.

For example, because of the findings from its oversight review of 

Colorado’s hazardous waste program, Region 8 officials became 

concerned about the adequacy of the authorized program’s ability to 

protect human health and the environment or to take on new program 

responsibilities. On the basis of these concerns, the region conducted an 

in-depth “capability assessment” of Colorado’s hazardous waste program 

beginning in 1998, covering items such as the state’s levels of resources 

and staff skills; professional development and training programs; and the 

efforts to resolve legal and institutional limitations in its program. Over the 

next 4 years, regional and state officials worked with state government 

leaders to increase program funding, staff, and training, and to implement 

new penalty policies. Region 8 also directly implemented compliance 

monitoring and enforcement activities at selected Colorado hazardous 

waste facilities while the state program developed and implemented its 

 30EPA Office of Inspector General, Water Enforcement: State Enforcement of Clean Water 

Act Dischargers Can Be More Effective, Audit Report No. 2001-P-00013 (Washington, D.C.: 

Aug. 14, 2001). 

Page 31 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
enhanced capabilities. Region 8 conducted another capability assessment 

in 2001 and concluded that the state had made the improvements 

necessary to implement a fully authorized program. 

EPA could also use the SRF to inform the general public and others about 

the extent to which states effectively implement environmental 

enforcement programs consistent with federal requirements. EPA has not 

yet determined whether or how the results of the SRF reports will be made 

available to the general public, congressional committees, environmental 

interest groups, state environmental organizations, local community 

groups, and other interested groups and organizations. Many of these 

groups have expressed deep interest in and concern over the years about 

the consistency, fairness, and effectiveness of environmental enforcement. 

A common criticism has been that variation in environmental compliance 

and enforcement among the states has resulted in the lack of equitable

public health and environmental protection and the lack of a “level playing 

field” for business from one state to another. EPA’s Office of Inspector 

General also recommended that regional evaluations of state programs 

should be made easily accessible to the public as an important means for 

holding states accountable for their environmental performance. ECOS 

and several states officials we interviewed expressed concern that public 

dissemination of the SRF reports would be used inappropriately to 

compare or rank state performance. However, the SRF reports have the

potential to convey useful information to both EPA managers and to the 

public on the extent to which the enforcement program is being 

implemented consistently and fairly nationwide.

In addition to the usefulness of the SRF in evaluating state enforcement 

programs, the SRF provides a model that OECA could use to evaluate

progress being made by EPA’s regions in addressing inconsistencies in 

enforcement actions and oversight. Although we focused our review on 

EPA’s oversight of state enforcement programs, rather than on the 

enforcement programs of EPA’s 10 regional offices, we testified in June 

2006 based on reviews on EPA’s enforcement program that the regions 

vary substantially in the actions they take to enforce environmental 

requirements, such as the number of inspections performed at regulated 

facilities and the amount of penalties assessed for noncompliance with 

environmental regulations.31 In addition, past EPA Inspector General and

OECA evaluations found variations among regions regarding issues such 

 31GAO-06-840T. 

Page 32 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
as sufficiently encouraging states to consider economic benefit in 

calculating penalties, taking more direct federal actions where states were 

slow to act, and requiring states to report all significant violators. 

In our June 2006 testimony, we stated that broad agreement exists among 

EPA and state enforcement officials on the key factors contributing to 

variations among regions including (1) differences in philosophy among 

regional enforcement staff about how best to secure compliance with 

environmental requirements, (2) differences in state laws and enforcement 

authorities and the manner in which regions respond to these differences, 

(3) variations in resources available to both state and regional

enforcement offices, (4) the flexibility afforded by EPA policies and 

guidance that allow states a degree of latitude in their enforcement 

programs, and (5) incomplete and inadequate enforcement data that 

hamper EPA’s ability to accurately characterize the extent to which 

variations occur.32

Although EPA has noted that some variation in environmental 

enforcement is necessary to take into account local environmental 

conditions and concerns, it has acknowledged that similar violations 

should be met with similar enforcement responses to ensure fair and 

consistent enforcement and equitable treatment for regulated businesses, 

regardless of geographic location. Our testimony noted that the SRF was 

among the initiatives that could make a positive contribution to EPA’s 

efforts to ensure consistent approaches in regional enforcement activities, 

although it is too early to tell whether the initiative will create a level 

playing field for the regulated community across the country.

The SRF initiative provides EPA with a potential means to ensure 

consistent and effective enforcement among the states, thereby addressing

a difficult and long-standing challenge to the agency. EPA’s plan to 

evaluate the SRF in 2008 will provide the agency with an opportunity to 

obtain information from the regions and the states regarding what does 

and does not work well in these SRF reviews and to make appropriate 

corrections to its review methodology. However, the proposed evaluation

methodology does not describe how EPA will examine the causes of the 

significant deficiencies noted during the SRF reviews and develop a 

strategy for addressing them. If these deficiencies are not addressed in a 

Conclusions 

 32GAO/RCED-00-108. 

Page 33 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
uniform and timely manner, EPA and the states will not gain the full 

benefit of the SRF. 

Regardless of the extent and effectiveness of oversight reviews to 

determine the consistency and effectiveness of enforcement programs, 

corrective actions will not be feasible if states lack sufficient funding, staff 

levels, expertise, and other resources that are vital to carrying out their 

enforcement responsibilities. On the basis of the audits it has conducted,

the EPA’s Office of Inspector General has endorsed the practice of having 

regions follow up on the deficiencies noted in their reviews of state 

programs and making their findings public. Likewise, Region 8 

demonstrated the value of performing a capacity assessment to 

understand why deficiencies exist in a state program to demonstrate to 

decision makers and the public what needs to be improved. Such 

assessments would provide an improved basis for a truly collaborative 

approach between the regions and the states during their annual 

deliberations on partnership agreements and grants in order to address the 

root causes of problems identified in state enforcement programs. 

EPA has not determined whether or how it will share the results of the 

SRF reviews with the general public and others, including Members of 

Congress who over the years have raised questions and expressed 

concerns about the way the enforcement program has been implemented. 

If Members of Congress and the public fully understand the deficiencies 

and their significance, then they would be better informed about how to 

assist EPA and the states in ensuring that public health and the 

environment are protected and a level playing field is established for 

regulated facilities. 

Although the SRF thus far has been focused on reviewing state 

enforcement programs, the process could be extended to include the 

enforcement programs of EPA’s regions. As we have previously reported, 

the regions have long been inconsistent in their oversight of states within 

their jurisdiction and the enforcement actions they take in order to 

provide a level playing field for regulated facilities across the nation. 

To enhance EPA’s oversight of regional and state enforcement activities to 

implement environmental programs consistent with the requirements of 

federal statutes and regulations, we recommend that the Administrator of 

EPA take the following actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 34 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
• include, in EPA’s fiscal year 2008 evaluation of the SRF, an assessment of 

lessons learned and an action plan for determining how significant 

problems identified in state programs will be uniformly and expeditiously 

addressed; 

• evaluate the capacity of individual authorized state programs, where the 

SRF finds the state appears to lack sufficient resources (e.g., funding, staff, 

and expertise), to implement and enforce authorized programs and then 

develop an action plan to improve that state’s capacity; 

• publish the SRF findings so that the public will know how well state 

regulators are enforcing authorized programs and protecting public health 

and the environmental conditions in their communities; and

• conduct a performance assessment similar to SRF for regional 

enforcement programs. 

In commenting on the draft report, EPA generally agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations and stated that the agency is taking action to address 

the issues we raised. With respect to our recommendation to publish the 

results of the SRF findings, EPA said that it had agreed with the 

Environmental Council of the States that the first round of state 

enforcement reviews would not be published. However, EPA said it would 

consider whether to publish future reviews when it evaluates the 

implementation of the SRF in fiscal year 2008. EPA also provided detailed

technical and clarifying comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

EPA’s letter is included in appendix III. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Administrator of EPA; and other interested parties. We 

will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 35 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix IV.

John B. Stephenson 

Director, Natural Resources and Environment 

Page 36 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 

authorized state agencies work together to deploy resources, plan, set 

priorities, and define roles and responsibilities for enforcement of and 

compliance with environmental programs consistent with federal 

requirements, we (1) identified the federal resources provided to EPA 

regions and states for enforcement between 1997 and 2006, and obtained 

EPA regional and states’ views on the adequacy of these resources to 

implement their activities; (2) determined EPA’s progress in improving 

priority setting and enforcement planning with its regions and authorized 

states; and (3) examined EPA efforts to improve its oversight of states’ 

enforcement and compliance programs. 

For the purpose of this review, we conducted semistructured interviews 

with officials at the 10 EPA regions and at 10 authorized state agencies. To 

construct questions for the interviews, we analyzed policies, procedures, 

and guidance materials EPA has developed and implemented. We 

synthesized the findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in

reports by us, EPA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG), the National 

Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), and the Environmental 

Council of the States (ECOS). We also met with officials from EPA Region 

4, the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, South Carolina 

Department of Health, and the New Jersey Department of Environmental 

Protection to obtain a more thorough understanding of how state agencies 

work together to plan, set priorities, define roles and responsibilities, and 

deploy resources for enforcement and compliance of environmental laws. 

We used a nonrandom sample of 10 states, which consisted of 1 state from

each region:

• Five had a Performance Partnership Agreement (PPA) and Performance 

Partnership Grant (PPG) with EPA (Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 

Oregon, and Utah). These states incorporated an enforcement program 

into their PPA, along with other essential elements that EPA and state 

leaders considered important (e.g., jointly agreed priorities, defined 

roles/responsibilities, and processes for resource deployment). 

• Five states did not have a PPA (Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, New York, and 

West Virginia), but had either a PPG or an alternative working relationship 

with EPA.1

 1

For the purposes of this report, state agencies include those of the District of Columbia, 

Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Pacific Islands. 

Page 37 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Our evaluation of 10 selected states cannot be generalized to the other 

states with authorized programs. However, we met with EPA officials 

representing all 10 regions, who provided their perspectives about all state 

programs within their geographic region. In addition, we examined other 

sources of state involvement, such as information available from ECOS 

and pollution control associations (e.g., Association of State and 

Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials, Association of State and

Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators, State and Territorial Air 

Pollution Program Administrators, and the Association of Local Air 

Pollution Control Officials, now known as the National Association of 

Clean Air Agencies). 

We also limited our review to the environmental agencies within each

selected state that implement the major EPA programs (Clean Water Act,

Clean Air Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act) and did not include state departments or agencies that 

implemented other programs, such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 

and Rodenticide Act. 

To determine if there were any trends in the federal resources provided to

EPA regions and states for enforcement from 1997 to 2006, and assess 

EPA regional and state views on the adequacy of these resources to 

implement their activities, we reviewed the budgets for EPA and the Office 

of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA) for fiscal years 1997 

through 2006. We also reviewed our prior reports and those from the 

Congressional Research Service (CRS), Congressional Budget Office 

(CBO), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), EPA, and the EPA OIG, 

for information on the distribution of federal resources. We met with 

officials from the EPA’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer and OECA, 

ECOS, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, and administered 

structured interviews to officials in all 10 EPA regions and the selected 

state in each region. In each region and state, we obtained perspectives on

the deployment of resources. However, we were not able to assess the 

workload of the states and regions and their overall capability to meet 

federal enforcement requirements because EPA’s data collection system 

does not collect sufficient information needed to make such an 

assessment. In this regard, EPA lacks information on the capacity of both 

the states and EPA’s regions to effectively carry out their enforcement 

programs, because the agency has done little to assess the overall 

enforcement workload of the states and regions and the number and skills 

of people needed to implement enforcement tasks, duties, and 

responsibilities. Furthermore, the states’ capacity continues to evolve as 

they assume a greater role in the day-to-day management of enforcement 

Page 38 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

activities, workload changes occur as a result of new environmental 

legislation, new technologies are introduced, and state populations shift. 

To determine EPA’s progress in improving priority setting and 

enforcement planning with its regions and authorized states, we reviewed 

EPA’s strategic plans and national strategy, its policy and guidance for 

planning and implementing its enforcement programs, the process for 

implementing National Environmental Performance Partnership 

agreements with authorized state agencies, and Federal Register notices. 

We also reviewed our prior reports and those from CRS, OMB, EPA, EPA

OIG, and NAPA for information on the planning and priority setting 

process. We met with officials from EPA’s Office of Congressional and 

Intergovernmental Relations, OECA, ECOS, and the Natural Resources 

Defense Council, and administered structured interviews to all 10 EPA 

regions and the selected state in each region. In each region and state, we 

examined regional and state strategic plans and state-EPA enforcement 

agreements, such as memorandums of agreement, PPAs, and PPGs. At 

state agencies, we also discussed the states’ perspectives on how EPA 

administered state-EPA agreements, regional plans, and national priorities. 

To determine EPA efforts to improve its oversight of state enforcement 

and compliance programs, we reviewed EPA’s policy and guidance for 

overseeing state agencies. We met with officials from EPA’s Office of 

Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations, OECA, ECOS, and the 

Natural Resources Defense Council, and administered structured 

interviews to all 10 EPA regions, and the selected state in each region. In 

each region, we examined strategic plans, state-EPA agreements, and 33 

state oversight reviews of the SRF. At state agencies, we reviewed policy 

and guidance and received perspectives on EPA’s oversight process. 

We performed our work from October 2005 through July 2007, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, which 

included an assessment of data reliability and internal controls. 

Page 39 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Appendix II: Development and 

Implementation of the State Review Appendix II: Development and Framework 

Implementation of the State Review 

Framework 

EPA’s criteria for assessing the performance of compliance assurance and 

enforcement responsibilities in authorized states can be traced back to the 

mid-1980s. In August 1986, the EPA Deputy Administrator issued a policy 

guidance memorandum entitled “Revised Policy Framework for State/EPA 

Enforcement Agreements.” The policy memorandum was intended to 

provide a framework for gathering information and making judgments 

about the effectiveness of state compliance and enforcement performance 

and providing guidance on when and how EPA would become involved in

enforcement actions in authorized states. Among other things, the 1986 

policy guidance discussed (1) EPA oversight criteria and the measures that 

the agency would use to define good state performance, (2) oversight 

procedures and protocols, and (3) criteria for direct federal intervention—

factors EPA would consider before taking direct enforcement action in a 

state and what states might reasonably expect of EPA in this regard. 

According to OECA officials, subsequent experience with the 1986 policy 

guidance revealed several implementation shortcomings that limited 

EPA’s ability to adequately and consistently oversee state compliance and 

enforcement programs. For example, the 1986 policy guidance did not 

clearly describe how EPA would oversee state enforcement programs, 

including what constituted “good program performance”. Moreover, EPA 

and authorized states did not agree on what uniform program information 

states needed to maintain and provide to EPA for performance 

measurement. This led to considerable inconsistency from region to 

region in overseeing state compliance and enforcement programs. 

By 2003, OECA officials said that environmental commissioners in several 

states and members of ECOS were in the forefront of the call for 

developing and implementing a more uniform and systematic process for 

EPA’s oversight and evaluation of state compliance and enforcement 

programs. Other factors also pointed to the need to develop a more 

consistent method of gauging state performance. These included EPA’s 

OIG audits of state programs, EPA’s internal assessments, and public 

petitions for withdrawal of program authorizations for some state 

programs. A common criticism was that variation in environmental 

compliance and enforcement among the states was directly attributable to

the lack of uniform EPA oversight and performance measurement and that 

the result was the lack of equitable public health and environmental 

protection and lack of a level playing field for business from one state to 

another. 

At an ECOS meeting in 2003, OECA officials said the Chairman of the 

ECOS Compliance Committee proposed to EPA’s then Deputy Assistant 

Page 40 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Appendix II: Development and 

Implementation of the State Review

Framework 

Administrator for OECA a method for systematically and uniformly 

assessing state performance. The assessment method, called the SRF, was 

patterned after a review process originally developed by EPA’s Region 8 to

assess the performance of state compliance and enforcement programs in 

that region (encompassing the states of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, South 

Dakota, North Dakota, and Montana and 27 sovereign tribal nations). The 

SRF was formally agreed to by EPA, ECOS, state media organizations, and 

state environmental agency officials in December 2003. 

The 12-point evaluation model used in Region 8, called the Uniform 

Enforcement Oversight System, became the basis for a review framework 

for evaluating state compliance and enforcement performance. These 12 

required elements for evaluation of state performance include the 

following: 

1. the degree to which a state program has completed the universe of 

planned inspections (addressing core requirements and federal, state 

and regional priorities); 

2. the degree to which inspection reports and compliance reviews 

document inspection findings, including accurate descriptions of what 

was observed to sufficiently identify violations; 

3. the degree to which inspection reports are completed in a timely 

manner, including timely identification of violations; 

4. the degree to which significant violations (e.g., significant 

noncompliance and high priority violations) and supporting 

information are accurately identified and reported to EPA national 

databases in a timely manner; 

5. the degree to which state enforcement actions include required 

corrective or complying actions (e.g., injunctive relief) that will return 

facilities to compliance in a specific time frame; 

6. the degree to which a state takes timely and appropriate enforcement 

actions, in accordance with policy relating to specific media;

7. the degree to which a state includes both gravity and economic benefit 

calculations for all penalties, appropriately using the economic benefit 

calculation model (BEN) or similar state model (where in use and 

consistent with national policy); 

Page 41 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Appendix II: Development and 

Implementation of the State Review

Framework 

8. the degree to which final enforcement actions collect appropriate 

economic benefit and gravity penalties in accordance with applicable 

penalty policies; 

9. the degree to which enforcement commitments in the PPA, PPG, 

and/or other written agreements to deliver a product/project at a 

specified time, if they exist, are met and any products or projects are 

completed; 

10. the degree to which the minimum data requirements are timely; 

11. the degree to which the minimum data requirements are accurate; and 

12. the degree to which the minimum data requirements are complete, 

unless otherwise negotiated by the region and state or prescribed by a 

national initiative. 

The SRF also includes a 13th “optional” element that is open for 

negotiation between regions and states. EPA and ECOS encourage the use

of the 13th element to ensure the review takes a measure of the full range

of program activities and results. These components can add meaningful 

input into a state’s overall performance and program. Topics could include 

program areas such as compliance assistance, pollution prevention, 

innovation, incentive or self-disclosure programs, relationships with state 

attorneys general, and outcome measures or environmental indicators that 

go beyond the core program activities covered in elements 1 through 12. 

The SRF was also seen by the parties as being consistent with the 

principles of the National Environmental Performance Partnership 

System, which provides a mechanism for joint planning and program 

management that takes advantage of the unique capabilities of each party 

in addressing pressing environmental problems. Also, the SRF considers 

commitments negotiated between EPA regions and states contained in 

PPAs, PPGs, and/or other agreements that may differ from national policy 

and guidance and evaluates state performance in terms of those 

commitments. In cases where states and regions have negotiated different 

state commitments (e.g., number of inspections) or other activities, states 

are held accountable for those commitments, although the SRF reviewers 

may provide feedback that those commitments need to be increased in the 

future to fully demonstrate an adequate enforcement program. 

After a review is completed, the regions prepare a draft report of the 

findings and conclusions, jointly discuss with the state how major 

Page 42 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Appendix II: Development and 

Implementation of the State Review

Framework 

recommendations will be addressed, and provide the draft report to OECA

headquarters. OECA reviews the draft reports and provides comments on

the regions’ analyses and recommendations. OECA expects regions to 

incorporate these recommendations into the next round of negotiated 

agreements, where OECA will track and manage the recommendations to 

conclusion.

Additional anticipated benefits of applying the SRF’s elements in a 

uniform manner included, among others, (1) more strategic resource 

allocation, (2) reduction of duplicative work, (3) consistent and 

predictable baseline oversight across states and regions with agreed-upon

thresholds for corrective action, (4) differential oversight of state 

programs based on performance,1

 (5) a level playing field for states in 

competition for business, and (6) improved public confidence in federal 

and state compliance and enforcement programs. In addition, the SRF is 

viewed as providing a basis to establish a dialogue on performance that 

will lead to improved program management and environmental results. 

OECA pilot-tested the SRF during fiscal year 2004 in at least one state in 

each of EPA’s 10 regions. The states that participated in the pilot were all 

volunteers. The pilot states included Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Rhode 

Island, New Jersey, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, 

and South Carolina. OECA also piloted the SRF in one EPA region, Region 

10 (Seattle), to test the approach on EPA’s direct implementation of the 

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Clean Water 

Act National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program in 

Alaska. EPA used the SRF to evaluate the enforcement performance of 

three media programs (both the pilot reviews and subsequent reviews): 

the Clean Air Act Stationary Sources program, the Clean Water Act 

NPDES program, and (RCRA) Subtitle C hazardous waste program. For 

each program, the SRF defined the essential elements and then, in a

companion Framework Implementation Guide more fully defined how 

each element is to be applied and measured. 

 1

The term “differential oversight” refers to a mechanism through which the compliance and 

enforcement program can offer differing levels of oversight based on EPA’s assessment of 

state performance. States demonstrating an adequate core compliance and enforcement

program would qualify for benefits while state performance not meeting minimum 

standards would result in enhanced oversight. This process does not negate EPA’s 

responsibility for oversight; it simply determines the level, intensity, and focus of the 

oversight. 

Page 43 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Appendix II: Development and 

Implementation of the State Review

Framework 

In February 2005, OECA contracted for an evaluation of the pilot review 

process to determine whether the SRF provides an accurate assessment of 

state compliance and enforcement activities. The evaluation sought to 

obtain answers to questions, such as the following: (1) Are the 12 review 

elements the right ones? (2) Are the right data metrics being used? (3) 

What barriers were encountered? The evaluation also addressed such 

implementation issues as whether the reviews could be streamlined and 

made more efficient; what barriers were encountered in conducting the 

reviews and how they could be reduced or eliminated; and the consistency 

of application across the country, specifically any need for and ways to 

improve consistency; problems with objectivity; and apparent gaps in 

capability or expertise that need to be addressed. 

The pilots were also evaluated to determine what they indicated about the 

performance of the states, whether corrective actions or differential 

oversight agreements get codified in grant agreements, and the best way to 

summarize and communicate the results of the review. The evaluation 

used the results of the pilots as well as discussions with key stakeholders

to support recommendations aimed at helping OECA improve the SRF 

before implementing it more broadly. For example, while OECA had 

allowed regions considerable discretion/flexibility on procedures for file 

selection, the evaluation identified a number of weaknesses in the file 

selection process and highlighted potential improvements to OECA’s file 

selection protocol. The consultant developed an improved sampling model 

that would yield representative file reviews across states and provide a 

more representative picture of enforcement and compliance assurance 

across states with varying levels of enforcement activity. 

Page 44 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Appendix III: Comments from the Appendix III: Comments from the Environmental Agency 

Environmental Agency 

Page 45 GAO-07-883 EPA-State Enforcement
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 46 GAO-07-883

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

John B. Stephenson (202) 512-3841 or stephenson@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Ed Kratzer, Assistant Director; 

Charles W. Bausell, Jr.; Kevin S. Bray; Brian M. Freidman; Carol M. Henn; 

Tom M. James; Ralph L. Lowry; Lynn M. Musser; Carol H. Shulman; John C. 

Smith; and Ignacio J. Yanes made key contributions to this report. 

EPA-State Enforcement

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360629) 
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