(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 12–761. Argued April 21, 2014—Decided June 12, 2014 

This case involves the intersection of two federal statutes. The Lanham 

Act permits one competitor to sue another for unfair competition arising from false or misleading product descriptions. 15 U. S. C. §1125.

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) prohibits the misbranding of food and drink. 21 U. S. C. §§321(f), 331. To implement 

the FDCA’s provisions, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 

promulgated regulations regarding food and beverage labeling, including one concerning juice blends. Unlike the Lanham Act, which, 

relies in large part for its enforcement on private suits brought by injured competitors, the FDCA and its regulations give the United

States nearly exclusive enforcement authority and do not permit private enforcement suits. The FDCA also pre-empts certain state misbranding laws. 

Petitioner POM Wonderful LLC, which produces, markets, and 

sells, inter alia, a pomegranate-blueberry juice blend, filed a Lanham

Act suit against respondent Coca-Cola Company, alleging that the

name, label, marketing, and advertising of one of Coca-Cola’s juice 

blends mislead consumers into believing the product consists predominantly of pomegranate and blueberry juice when it in fact consists

predominantly of less expensive apple and grape juices, and that the

ensuing confusion causes POM to lose sales. The District Court 

granted partial summary judgment to Coca-Cola, ruling that the 

FDCA and its regulations preclude Lanham Act challenges to the 

name and label of Coca-Cola’s juice blend. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part. 

Held: Competitors may bring Lanham Act claims like POM’s challenging food and beverage labels regulated by the FDCA. Pp. 7–17.

(a) This result is based on the following premises. First, this is not 
 

2 POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO. 

Syllabus 

a pre-emption case, for it does not raise the question whether state

law is pre-empted by a federal law, see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 

555, 563, but instead concerns the alleged preclusion of a cause of action under one federal statute by the provisions of another federal 

statute. Pre-emption principles may nonetheless be instructive insofar as they are designed to assess the interaction of laws bearing on 

the same subject. Second, this is a statutory interpretation case; and

analysis of the statutory text, aided by established interpretation

rules, controls. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U. S. 84, 

94. While a principle of interpretation may be countered “by some

maxim pointing in a different direction,” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 

Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115, this Court need not decide what maxim 

establishes the proper framework here: Even assuming that CocaCola is correct that the Court’s task is to reconcile or harmonize the 

statutes instead of to determine whether one statute is an implied

repeal in part of another statute, Coca-Cola is incorrect that the best 

way to do that is to bar POM’s Lanham Act claim. Pp. 7–9.

(b) Neither the Lanham Act nor the FDCA, in express terms, forbids or limits Lanham Act claims challenging labels that are regulated by the FDCA. The absence of such a textual provision when the

Lanham Act and the FDCA have coexisted for over 70 years is “powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the

exclusive means” of ensuring proper food and beverage labeling. See 

Wyeth, supra, at 575. In addition, and contrary to Coca-Cola’s argument, Congress, by taking care to pre-empt only some state laws, if

anything indicated it did not intend the FDCA to preclude requirements arising from other sources. See Setser v. United States, 566 

U. S. ___, ___. The structures of the FDCA and the Lanham Act reinforce this conclusion. Where two statutes are complementary, it 

would show disregard for the congressional design to hold that Congress intended one federal statute nonetheless to preclude the operation of the other. See J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 

Int’l, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, 144. The Lanham Act and the FDCA complement each other in major respects, for each has its own scope and 

purpose. Both touch on food and beverage labeling, but the Lanham

Act protects commercial interests against unfair competition, while 

the FDCA protects public health and safety. They also complement 

each other with respect to remedies. The FDCA’s enforcement is 

largely committed to the FDA, while the Lanham Act empowers private parties to sue competitors to protect their interests on a case-bycase basis. Allowing Lanham Act suits takes advantage of synergies 

among multiple methods of regulation. A holding that the FDCA

precludes Lanham Act claims challenging food and beverage labels

also could lead to a result that Congress likely did not intend. Be-
 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Syllabus 

cause the FDA does not necessarily pursue enforcement measures regarding all objectionable labels, preclusion of Lanham Act claims

could leave commercial interests—and indirectly the public at large—

with less effective protection in the food and beverage labeling realm

than in other less regulated industries. Pp. 9–12.

(c) Coca-Cola’s arguments do not support its claim that preclusion

is proper because Congress intended national uniformity in food and 

beverage labeling. First, the FDCA’s delegation of enforcement authority to the Federal Government does not indicate that Congress

intended to foreclose private enforcement of other federal statutes.

Second, the FDCA’s express pre-emption provision applies by its

terms to state, not federal, law. Even if it were proper to stray from

that text, it not clear that Coca-Cola’s national uniformity assertions

reflect the congressional design. Finally, the FDCA and its implementing regulations may address food and beverage labeling with

more specificity than the Lanham Act, but this specificity would matter only if the two Acts cannot be implemented in full at the same

time. Here, neither the statutory structure nor the empirical evidence of which the Court is aware indicates there will be any difficulty in fully enforcing each statute according to its terms. Pp. 13–15. 

(d) The Government’s intermediate position—that a Lanham Act

claim is precluded “to the extent the FDCA or FDA regulations specifically require or authorize the challenged aspects of [the] label,”

and that this rule precludes POM’s challenge to the name of CocaCola’s product—is flawed, for the Government assumes that the

FDCA and its regulations are a ceiling on the regulation of food and

beverage labeling when Congress intended the Lanham Act and the

FDCA to complement each other with respect to labeling. Though

the FDA’s rulemaking alludes at one point to a balance of interests, it

neither discusses nor cites the Lanham Act; and the Government 

points to no other statement suggesting that the FDA considered the

full scope of interests protected by the Lanham Act. Even if agency

regulations with the force of law that purport to bar other legal remedies may do so, it is a bridge too far to accept an agency’s after-thefact statement to justify that result here. An agency may not reorder

federal statutory rights without congressional authorization. Pp. 15– 

17. 

679 F. 3d 1170, reversed and remanded. 

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other

Members joined, except BREYER, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–761 

POM WONDERFUL LLC, PETITIONER v. THE 

COCA-COLA COMPANY 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 12, 2014] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 

POM Wonderful LLC makes and sells pomegranate

juice products, including a pomegranate-blueberry juice

blend. App. 23a. One of POM’s competitors is the CocaCola Company. Coca-Cola’s Minute Maid Division makes 

a juice blend sold with a label that, in describing the contents, displays the words “pomegranate blueberry” with

far more prominence than other words on the label that 

show the juice to be a blend of five juices. In truth, the 

Coca-Cola product contains but 0.3% pomegranate juice 

and 0.2% blueberry juice.

Alleging that the use of that label is deceptive and 

misleading, POM sued Coca-Cola under §43 of the Lanham Act. 60 Stat. 441, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §1125. 

That provision allows one competitor to sue another if it 

alleges unfair competition arising from false or misleading 

product descriptions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit held that, in the realm of labeling for food and 

beverages, a Lanham Act claim like POM’s is precluded by 

a second federal statute. The second statute is the Federal 

Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which forbids the 
 

2 POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

misbranding of food, including by means of false or misleading labeling. §§301, 403, 52 Stat. 1042, 1047, as 

amended, 21 U. S. C. §§331, 343.

The ruling that POM’s Lanham Act cause of action is 

precluded by the FDCA was incorrect. There is no statutory text or established interpretive principle to support

the contention that the FDCA precludes Lanham Act suits

like the one brought by POM in this case. Nothing in the

text, history, or structure of the FDCA or the Lanham Act

shows the congressional purpose or design to forbid these 

suits. Quite to the contrary, the FDCA and the Lanham 

Act complement each other in the federal regulation of 

misleading food and beverage labels. Competitors, in their

own interest, may bring Lanham Act claims like POM’s 

that challenge food and beverage labels that are regulated 

by the FDCA. 

I 

A 

This case concerns the intersection and complementarity of these two federal laws. A proper beginning point is a 

description of the statutes.

Congress enacted the Lanham Act nearly seven decades 

ago. See 60 Stat. 427 (1946). As the Court explained

earlier this Term, it “requires no guesswork” to ascertain

Congress’ intent regarding this federal law, for Congress 

included a “detailed statement of the statute’s purposes.” 

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 

U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 12). Section 45 of the 

Lanham Act provides: 

“The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce 

within the control of Congress by making actionable 

the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such 

commerce; to protect registered marks used in such 

commerce from interference by State, or territorial 

legislation; to protect persons engaged in such com-
 

 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

merce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud 

and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations 

of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting 

trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.” 15 U. S. C. §1127. 

The Lanham Act’s trademark provisions are the primary 

means of achieving these ends. But the Act also creates a 

federal remedy “that goes beyond trademark protection.” 

Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 

U. S. 23, 29 (2003). The broader remedy is at issue here.

The Lanham Act creates a cause of action for unfair 

competition through misleading advertising or labeling.

Though in the end consumers also benefit from the Act’s 

proper enforcement, the cause of action is for competitors, 

not consumers. 

The term “competitor” is used in this opinion to indicate

all those within the class of persons and entities protected 

by the Lanham Act. Competitors are within the class that

may invoke the Lanham Act because they may suffer “an 

injury to a commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused by [a] defendant’s misrepresentations.” Lexmark, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 22). The 

petitioner here asserts injury as a competitor. 

The cause of action the Act creates imposes civil liability 

on any person who “uses in commerce any word, term, 

name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or 

any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, 

which . . . misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s

goods, services, or commercial activities.” 15 U. S. C. 

§1125(a)(1). As the Court held this Term, the private 
 

 

4 POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

remedy may be invoked only by those who “allege an

injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales. A 

consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing product may well have an injury-in-fact cognizable under Article III, but he cannot invoke the protection 

of the Lanham Act.” Lexmark, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 

at 13). This principle reflects the Lanham Act’s purpose of 

“‘protect[ing] persons engaged in [commerce within the 

control of Congress] against unfair competition.’” Id., at 

___ (slip op., at 12). POM’s cause of action would be 

straightforward enough but for Coca-Cola’s contention

that a separate federal statutory regime, the FDCA, allows it to use the label in question and in fact precludes 

the Lanham Act claim. 

So the FDCA is the second statute to be discussed. The 

FDCA statutory regime is designed primarily to protect 

the health and safety of the public at large. See 62 Cases 

of Jam v. United States, 340 U. S. 593, 596 (1951); FDCA, 

§401, 52 Stat. 1046, 21 U. S. C. §341 (agency may issue 

certain regulations to “promote honesty and fair dealing in

the interest of consumers”). The FDCA prohibits the 

misbranding of food and drink. 21 U. S. C. §§321(f), 331.

A food or drink is deemed misbranded if, inter alia, “its 

labeling is false or misleading,” §343(a), information required to appear on its label “is not prominently placed 

thereon,” §343(f), or a label does not bear “the common or 

usual name of the food, if any there be,” §343(i). To implement these provisions, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) promulgated regulations regarding food and

beverage labeling, including the labeling of mixes of different types of juice into one juice blend. See 21 CFR 

§102.33 (2013). One provision of those regulations is 

particularly relevant to this case: If a juice blend does not 

name all the juices it contains and mentions only juices 

that are not predominant in the blend, then it must either

declare the percentage content of the named juice or 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

“[i]ndicate that the named juice is present as a flavor or 

flavoring,” e.g., “raspberry and cranberry flavored juice 

drink.” §102.33(d). The Government represents that the 

FDA does not preapprove juice labels under these regulations. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in 

Opposition 16. That contrasts with the FDA’s regulation

of other types of labels, such as drug labels, see 21 U. S. C.

§355(d), and is consistent with the less extensive role the 

FDA plays in the regulation of food than in the regulation 

of drugs.

Unlike the Lanham Act, which relies in substantial part 

for its enforcement on private suits brought by injured

competitors, the FDCA and its regulations provide the 

United States with nearly exclusive enforcement authority, including the authority to seek criminal sanctions in 

some circumstances. 21 U. S. C. §§333(a), 337. Private 

parties may not bring enforcement suits. §337. Also 

unlike the Lanham Act, the FDCA contains a provision

pre-empting certain state laws on misbranding. That 

provision, which Congress added to the FDCA in the

Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, §6, 104 

Stat. 2362–2364, forecloses a “State or political subdivision of a State” from establishing requirements that are of 

the type but “not identical to” the requirements in some of

the misbranding provisions of the FDCA. 21 U. S. C. 

§343–1(a). It does not address, or refer to, other federal 

statutes or the preclusion thereof. 

B 

POM Wonderful LLC is a grower of pomegranates and 

a distributor of pomegranate juices. Through its POM

Wonderful brand, POM produces, markets, and sells a 

variety of pomegranate products, including a pomegranateblueberry juice blend. App. 23a.

POM competes in the pomegranate-blueberry juice

market with the Coca-Cola Company. Coca-Cola, under 
 

 

6 POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

its Minute Maid brand, created a juice blend containing 

99.4% apple and grape juices, 0.3% pomegranate juice,

0.2% blueberry juice, and 0.1% raspberry juice. Id., at 

38a; Brief for Respondent 8. Despite the minuscule

amount of pomegranate and blueberry juices in the blend,

the front label of the Coca-Cola product displays the words

“pomegranate blueberry” in all capital letters, on two 

separate lines. App. 38a. Below those words, Coca-Cola 

placed the phrase “flavored blend of 5 juices” in much 

smaller type. Ibid. And below that phrase, in still smaller 

type, were the words “from concentrate with added ingredients”—and, with a line break before the final phrase— 

“and other natural flavors.” Ibid. The product’s front 

label also displays a vignette of blueberries, grapes, and 

raspberries in front of a halved pomegranate and a halved 

apple. Ibid.

 Claiming that Coca-Cola’s label tricks and deceives 

consumers, all to POM’s injury as a competitor, POM

brought suit under the Lanham Act. POM alleged that 

the name, label, marketing, and advertising of Coca-Cola’s

juice blend mislead consumers into believing the product 

consists predominantly of pomegranate and blueberry

juice when it in fact consists predominantly of less expensive apple and grape juices. Id., at 27a. That confusion, 

POM complained, causes it to lose sales. Id., at 28a. POM 

sought damages and injunctive relief. Id., at 32a–33a. 

The District Court granted partial summary judgment

to Coca-Cola on POM’s Lanham Act claim, ruling that the

FDCA and its regulations preclude challenges to the name 

and label of Coca-Cola’s juice blend. The District Court 

reasoned that in the juice blend regulations the “FDA has

directly spoken on the issues that form the basis of Pom’s 

Lanham Act claim against the naming and labeling of ” 

Coca-Cola’s product, but has not prohibited any, and 

indeed expressly has permitted some, aspects of CocaCola’s label. 727 F. Supp. 2d 849, 871–873 (CD Cal. 2010). 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in 

relevant part. Like the District Court, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Congress decided “to entrust matters 

of juice beverage labeling to the FDA”; the FDA has promulgated “comprehensive regulation of that labeling”; and 

the FDA “apparently” has not imposed the requirements

on Coca-Cola’s label that are sought by POM. 679 F. 3d 

1170, 1178 (2012). “[U]nder [Circuit] precedent,” the

Court of Appeals explained, “for a court to act when the

FDA has not—despite regulating extensively in this area—

would risk undercutting the FDA’s expert judgments and

authority.” Id., at 1177. For these reasons, and “[o]ut 

of respect for the statutory and regulatory scheme,” the 

Court of Appeals barred POM’s Lanham Act claim. Id., at 

1178. 

II
 

A 

This Court granted certiorari to consider whether a

private party may bring a Lanham Act claim challenging a

food label that is regulated by the FDCA. 571 U. S. ___ 

(2014). The answer to that question is based on the following premises.

First, this is not a pre-emption case. In pre-emption

cases, the question is whether state law is pre-empted by a 

federal statute, or in some instances, a federal agency 

action. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 563 (2009).

This case, however, concerns the alleged preclusion of a 

cause of action under one federal statute by the provisions 

of another federal statute. So the state-federal balance 

does not frame the inquiry. Because this is a preclusion

case, any “presumption against pre-emption,” id., at 565, 

n. 3, has no force. In addition, the preclusion analysis is

not governed by the Court’s complex categorization of the 

types of pre-emption. See Crosby v. National Foreign 

Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372–373 (2000). Although 
 

 

 

 

8 POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

the Court’s pre-emption precedent does not govern preclusion analysis in this case, its principles are instructive 

insofar as they are designed to assess the interaction of

laws that bear on the same subject. 

Second, this is a statutory interpretation case and the 

Court relies on traditional rules of statutory interpretation. That does not change because the case involves

multiple federal statutes. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 137–139 (2000). Nor 

does it change because an agency is involved. See ibid. 

Analysis of the statutory text, aided by established principles of interpretation, controls. See Chickasaw Nation v. 

United States, 534 U. S. 84, 94 (2001). 

A principle of interpretation is “often countered, of 

course, by some maxim pointing in a different direction.” 

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115 

(2001). It is thus unsurprising that in this case a threshold dispute has arisen as to which of two competing maxims establishes the proper framework for decision. POM 

argues that this case concerns whether one statute, the 

FDCA as amended, is an “implied repeal” in part of another statute, i.e., the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Carcieri v. 

Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 395 (2009). POM contends that in 

such cases courts must give full effect to both statutes 

unless they are in “irreconcilable conflict,” see ibid., and 

that this high standard is not satisfied here. Coca-Cola 

resists this canon and its high standard. Coca-Cola argues

that the case concerns whether a more specific law, the

FDCA, clarifies or narrows the scope of a more general 

law, the Lanham Act. See, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 

484 U. S. 439, 453 (1988); Brief for Respondent 18. The 

Court’s task, it claims, is to “reconcil[e]” the laws, ibid., 

and it says the best reconciliation is that the more specific 

provisions of the FDCA bar certain causes of action authorized in a general manner by the Lanham Act.

The Court does not need to resolve this dispute. Even 
 

 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

assuming that Coca-Cola is correct that the Court’s task is

to reconcile or harmonize the statutes and not, as POM 

urges, to enforce both statutes in full unless there is a

genuinely irreconcilable conflict, Coca-Cola is incorrect 

that the best way to harmonize the statutes is to bar 

POM’s Lanham Act claim. 

B 

Beginning with the text of the two statutes, it must be

observed that neither the Lanham Act nor the FDCA, in 

express terms, forbids or limits Lanham Act claims challenging labels that are regulated by the FDCA. By its

terms, the Lanham Act subjects to suit any person who

“misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or 

geographic origin” of goods or services. 15 U. S. C. 

§1125(a). This comprehensive imposition of liability extends, by its own terms, to misrepresentations on labels, 

including food and beverage labels. No other provision in

the Lanham Act limits that understanding or purports to

govern the relevant interaction between the Lanham Act

and the FDCA. And the FDCA, by its terms, does not

preclude Lanham Act suits. In consequence, food and 

beverage labels regulated by the FDCA are not, under the

terms of either statute, off limits to Lanham Act claims. 

No textual provision in either statute discloses a purpose

to bar unfair competition claims like POM’s.

This absence is of special significance because the Lanham Act and the FDCA have coexisted since the passage

of the Lanham Act in 1946. 60 Stat. 427 (1946); ch. 675, 

52 Stat. 1040 (1938). If Congress had concluded, in light

of experience, that Lanham Act suits could interfere with 

the FDCA, it might well have enacted a provision addressing the issue during these 70 years. See Wyeth, supra, at 

574 (“If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the 
 

 

 

10 POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

FDCA’s 70-year history”). Congress enacted amendments 

to the FDCA and the Lanham Act, see, e.g., Nutrition 

Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 2353;

Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, §132, 102 Stat. 

3946, including an amendment that added to the FDCA an

express pre-emption provision with respect to state laws

addressing food and beverage misbranding, §6, 104 Stat.

2362. Yet Congress did not enact a provision addressing

the preclusion of other federal laws that might bear on

food and beverage labeling. This is “powerful evidence

that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the 

exclusive means” of ensuring proper food and beverage

labeling. See Wyeth, 555 U. S., at 575. 

Perhaps the closest the statutes come to addressing the 

preclusion of the Lanham Act claim at issue here is the 

pre-emption provision added to the FDCA in 1990 as part 

of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act. See 21 

U. S. C. §343–1. But, far from expressly precluding suits 

arising under other federal laws, the provision if anything

suggests that Lanham Act suits are not precluded. 

This pre-emption provision forbids a “State or political

subdivision of a State” from imposing requirements that 

are of the type but “not identical to” corresponding FDCA

requirements for food and beverage labeling. Ibid. It is 

significant that the complex pre-emption provision distinguishes among different FDCA requirements. It forbids 

state-law requirements that are of the type but not identical to only certain FDCA provisions with respect to food 

and beverage labeling. See §§343–1(a)(1)–(5) (citing some

but not all of the subsections of §343); §6, 104 Stat. 2362–

2364 (codified at 21 U. S. C. §343–1, and note following).

Just as significant, the provision does not refer to requirements imposed by other sources of law, such as federal statutes. For purposes of deciding whether the FDCA 

displaces a regulatory or liability scheme in another statute, it makes a substantial difference whether that other 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

statute is state or federal. By taking care to mandate 

express pre-emption of some state laws, Congress if anything indicated it did not intend the FDCA to preclude

requirements arising from other sources. See Setser v. 

United States, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 6–7) 

(applying principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius).

Pre-emption of some state requirements does not suggest 

an intent to preclude federal claims.

The structures of the FDCA and the Lanham Act reinforce the conclusion drawn from the text. When two statutes complement each other, it would show disregard for 

the congressional design to hold that Congress nonetheless intended one federal statute to preclude the operation 

of the other. See J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer HiBred Int’l, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, 144 (2001) (“[W]e can plainly 

regard each statute as effective because of its different

requirements and protections”); see also Wyeth, supra, at 

578–579. The Lanham Act and the FDCA complement

each other in major respects, for each has its own scope 

and purpose. Although both statutes touch on food and 

beverage labeling, the Lanham Act protects commercial 

interests against unfair competition, while the FDCA

protects public health and safety. Compare Lexmark, 572 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12–13), with 62 Cases of Jam, 340 

U. S., at 596. The two statutes impose “different requirements and protections.” J. E. M. Ag Supply, supra, at 144. 

The two statutes complement each other with respect to

remedies in a more fundamental respect. Enforcement of 

the FDCA and the detailed prescriptions of its implementing regulations is largely committed to the FDA. The 

FDA, however, does not have the same perspective or

expertise in assessing market dynamics that day-to-day

competitors possess. Competitors who manufacture or

distribute products have detailed knowledge regarding 

how consumers rely upon certain sales and marketing 

strategies. Their awareness of unfair competition prac-
 

12 POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

tices may be far more immediate and accurate than that of 

agency rulemakers and regulators. Lanham Act suits 

draw upon this market expertise by empowering private

parties to sue competitors to protect their interests on a

case-by-case basis. By “serv[ing] a distinct compensatory 

function that may motivate injured persons to come forward,” Lanham Act suits, to the extent they touch on the 

same subject matter as the FDCA, “provide incentives” for

manufacturers to behave well. See id., at 579. Allowing

Lanham Act suits takes advantage of synergies among 

multiple methods of regulation. This is quite consistent 

with the congressional design to enact two different statutes, each with its own mechanisms to enhance the protection of competitors and consumers. 

A holding that the FDCA precludes Lanham Act claims

challenging food and beverage labels would not only ignore

the distinct functional aspects of the FDCA and the Lanham Act but also would lead to a result that Congress 

likely did not intend. Unlike other types of labels regulated by the FDA, such as drug labels, see 21 U. S. C.

§355(d), it would appear the FDA does not preapprove food 

and beverage labels under its regulations and instead 

relies on enforcement actions, warning letters, and other 

measures. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 

in Opposition 16. Because the FDA acknowledges that it 

does not necessarily pursue enforcement measures regarding all objectionable labels, ibid., if Lanham Act claims 

were to be precluded then commercial interests—and

indirectly the public at large—could be left with less effective protection in the food and beverage labeling realm

than in many other, less regulated industries. It is unlikely that Congress intended the FDCA’s protection of 

health and safety to result in less policing of misleading

food and beverage labels than in competitive markets for 

other products. 
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

C 

Coca-Cola argues the FDCA precludes POM’s Lanham

Act claim because Congress intended national uniformity 

in food and beverage labeling. Coca-Cola notes three 

aspects of the FDCA to support that position: delegation of

enforcement authority to the Federal Government rather

than private parties; express pre-emption with respect to 

state laws; and the specificity of the FDCA and its implementing regulations. But these details of the FDCA do 

not establish an intent or design to preclude Lanham Act 

claims. 

Coca-Cola says that the FDCA’s delegation of enforcement authority to the Federal Government shows Congress’ intent to achieve national uniformity in labeling. 

But POM seeks to enforce the Lanham Act, not the FDCA 

or its regulations. The centralization of FDCA enforcement authority in the Federal Government does not indicate that Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement of other federal statutes. 

Coca-Cola next appeals to the pre-emption provision

added to the FDCA in 1990. See §343–1. It argues that

allowing Lanham Act claims to proceed would undermine

the pre-emption provision’s goal of ensuring that food and 

beverage manufacturers can market nationally without

the burden of complying with a patchwork of requirements. A significant flaw in this argument is that the preemption provision by its plain terms applies only to certain state-law requirements, not to federal law. See Part 

II–B, supra. Coca-Cola in effect asks the Court to ignore

the words “State or political subdivision of a State” in the 

statute. 

Even if it were proper to stray from the text in this way,

it is far from clear that Coca-Cola’s assertions about national uniformity in fact reflect the congressional design.

Although the application of a federal statute such as the 

Lanham Act by judges and juries in courts throughout the 
 

14 POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

country may give rise to some variation in outcome, this is

the means Congress chose to enforce a national policy to 

ensure fair competition. It is quite different from the

disuniformity that would arise from the multitude of state

laws, state regulations, state administrative agency rulings, and state-court decisions that are partially forbidden

by the FDCA’s pre-emption provision. Congress not infrequently permits a certain amount of variability by authorizing a federal cause of action even in areas of law where 

national uniformity is important. Compare Bonito Boats, 

Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 162 (1989) 

(“One of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and 

Copyright Clauses of the Constitution was to promote 

national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property”),

with 35 U. S. C. §281 (private right of action for patent 

infringement); see Wyeth, 555 U. S., at 570 (“[T]he [FDCA] 

contemplates that federal juries will resolve most misbranding claims”). The Lanham Act itself is an example of 

this design: Despite Coca-Cola’s protestations, the Act is

uniform in extending its protection against unfair competition to the whole class it describes. It is variable only to 

the extent that those rights are enforced on a case-by-case

basis. The variability about which Coca-Cola complains is

no different than the variability that any industry covered

by the Lanham Act faces. And, as noted, Lanham Act 

actions are a means to implement a uniform policy to

prohibit unfair competition in all covered markets. 

Finally, Coca-Cola urges that the FDCA, and particularly its implementing regulations, addresses food and beverage labeling with much more specificity than is found 

in the provisions of the Lanham Act. That is true. The 

pages of FDA rulemakings devoted only to juice-blend 

labeling attest to the level of detail with which the FDA

has examined the subject. E.g., Food Labeling; Declaration of Ingredients; Common or Usual Name for Nonstandardized Foods; Diluted Juice Beverages, 58 Fed. Reg. 
Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

2897–2926 (1993). Because, as we have explained, the 

FDCA and the Lanham Act are complementary and have

separate scopes and purposes, this greater specificity

would matter only if the Lanham Act and the FDCA cannot be implemented in full at the same time. See RadLAX 

Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U. S. ___, 

___ (2012) (slip op., at 5–7). But neither the statutory

structure nor the empirical evidence of which the Court is

aware indicates there will be any difficulty in fully enforcing each statute according to its terms. See Part II–B, 

supra. 

D 

The Government disagrees with both Coca-Cola and 

POM. It submits that a Lanham Act claim is precluded 

“to the extent the FDCA or FDA regulations specifically

require or authorize the challenged aspects of [the] label.” 

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. Applying

that standard, the Government argues that POM may not 

bring a Lanham Act challenge to the name of Coca-Cola’s

product, but that other aspects of the label may be challenged. That is because, the Government argues, the FDA 

regulations specifically authorize the names of juice

blends but not the other aspects of the label that are at

issue. 

In addition to raising practical concerns about drawing

a distinction between regulations that “specifically . . .

authorize” a course of conduct and those that merely 

tolerate that course, id., at 10–11, the flaw in the Government’s intermediate position is the same as that in CocaCola’s theory of the case. The Government assumes that 

the FDCA and its regulations are at least in some circumstances a ceiling on the regulation of food and beverage 

labeling. But, as discussed above, Congress intended the 

Lanham Act and the FDCA to complement each other with 

respect to food and beverage labeling. 
 

 

 

16 POM WONDERFUL LLC v. COCA-COLA CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

The Government claims that the “FDA’s juice-naming 

regulation reflects the agency’s ‘weigh[ing of] the competing interests relevant to the particular requirement in 

question.’” Id., at 19 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 

U. S. 470, 501 (1996)). The rulemaking indeed does allude, at one point, to a balancing of interests: It styles a

particular requirement as “provid[ing] manufacturers with 

flexibility for labeling products while providing consumers 

with information that they need.” 58 Fed. Reg. 2919–

2920. But that rulemaking does not discuss or even cite

the Lanham Act, and the Government cites no other 

statement in the rulemaking suggesting that the FDA

considered the full scope of the interests the Lanham Act 

protects. In addition, and contrary to the language quoted 

above, the FDA explicitly encouraged manufacturers to

include material on their labels that is not required by the

regulations. Id., at 2919. A single isolated reference to a 

desire for flexibility is not sufficient to transform a rulemaking that is otherwise at best inconclusive as to its 

interaction with other federal laws into one with preclusive force, even on the assumption that a federal regulation in some instances might preclude application of a 

federal statute. Cf. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 10–11). 

 In addition, Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 

U. S. 861 (2000), does not support the Government’s argument. In Geier, the agency enacted a regulation deliberately allowing manufacturers to choose between different options because the agency wanted to encourage 

diversity in the industry. A subsequent lawsuit challenged one of those choices. The Court concluded that the 

action was barred because it directly conflicted with the 

agency’s policy choice to encourage flexibility to foster

innovation. Id., at 875. Here, by contrast, the FDA has

not made a policy judgment that is inconsistent with 

POM’s Lanham Act suit. This is not a case where a law-
 

Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

suit is undermining an agency judgment, and in any event 

the FDA does not have authority to enforce the Lanham 

Act. 

It is necessary to recognize the implications of the United

States’ argument for preclusion. The Government asks 

the Court to preclude private parties from availing themselves of a well-established federal remedy because an

agency enacted regulations that touch on similar subject 

matter but do not purport to displace that remedy or even 

implement the statute that is its source. Even if agency

regulations with the force of law that purport to bar other 

legal remedies may do so, see id., at 874; see also Wyeth, 

555 U. S., at 576, it is a bridge too far to accept an agency’s after-the-fact statement to justify that result here. An 

agency may not reorder federal statutory rights without

congressional authorization. 

* * * 

Coca-Cola and the United States ask the Court to elevate the FDCA and the FDA’s regulations over the private

cause of action authorized by the Lanham Act. But the 

FDCA and the Lanham Act complement each other in the 

federal regulation of misleading labels. Congress did not

intend the FDCA to preclude Lanham Act suits like

POM’s. The position Coca-Cola takes in this Court that

because food and beverage labeling is involved it has no 

Lanham Act liability here for practices that allegedly 

mislead and trick consumers, all to the injury of competitors, finds no support in precedent or the statutes. The 

judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE BREYER took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case.