0 6

- 5 6 5 2

- c r ( L ) , 0 7

- 0 1 1 2

- c r ( C ON) , 0 7

- 0 1 9 6

- c r ( C ON) , 0 7

- 0 2 9 4

- c r ( C ON)

Uni t ed St at es v . Nee dham

1 1 2 UN ITED STA TES COURT OF AP P EA LS 3 F OR THE SECOND CI RC UI T 4

_____________________ 5 6 August Term, 2007 7 8 (Argued: May

22, 2008 Dec ided: May 14, 2010) 9 10 Docke t Nos. 06-5652-c r (L ), 07-0112- cr ( CON), 07-0196- cr ( CON), 07-0294- cr ( CON) 11 12

_____________________ 13 14 U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA , 15 Appellee , 16 17 — v .— 18 19 20 D ER R I L YN N EE DHAM , J A V I ER R OBL ES , C OR EY T HOMPS ON , 21 22 Defendants-A ppellant s, 23 24 J OE Y F I GUE R OA , C HR I S TI AN Q UI NON ES , 25 26 De fe nd an ts

. 27 28 29 B e fo re : C ABRANES , K ATZ MANN , AND B.D

. P ARKE R , Circuit Judges

. 30 31

___________________ 32 33 Appea l from convictions for Hobbs Act robbe ry

and Hobbs Ac t conspirac y , challeng ing jur y 34 instructions that robbery of illeg al drugproce eds, if prove n, satisfied the interstate commer ce 35 element of

the Hobbs Ac t as a matter of law. See 18 U. S.C. §§ 19 51 , 1 95 2. Af fi rm e d in pa rt , 36 reve rsed a

nd rema nded in par

t. Cabrane s, J. , d iss e nti ngin p a rt and c on c ur ri ngin p art

. 37

___________________ 38 39 40 Eliz abeth E. Ma cedonio, B ay side, NY, for 41 Defendant- Appellant Derrilyn Nee dham

.2 1 2 David L . L ewis, L ewis & Fiore , New Y ork, NY, for 3 Defendant- Appellant Javie r Robles

. 4 5 Sanf or d N . T a lki n, Ta lki n, Mu c c ig ro sso & Rob e rt s, 6 L L P, for Defendant-Appe llant Corey Thompson

. 7 8 David S. L eibowitz, Assis tant United States 9 Attorney , for Michae l J . Gar cia, United States 10 Attorney , Southern District of Ne w York ( Kather ine 11 Polk Failla, Assistant United States Attorney , on the 12 brief ), Ne w York, N Y, for Appellee United States of 13 America

. 14

________________________________________________________________________ 15 16 B AR R I NGTON D. P ARKE R , Circuit J udg e: 17 18 Def

endants-a ppellants Der

rily n Nee dham, J avier Robles, and C orey Thompson appea l from 19 judgme nts of conviction in the United States Dist rict C ourt for the Southern District of Ne w York 20 (Ly

nch, J .) for Hobbs Act robbe ry

and re lat ed off

enses. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 1952. They 21 challeng e their c onvictions based on an instruc tion that forec losed the jury ’s consider ati o n of an 22 essential jurisdictio n al element of Hobbs Act robbe ry : whether the robbe ries, which ta

rg eted the 23 proce eds of dr

ug traff icking , aff

ecte d interstate c ommerce . 24 This case prese nts a situ at i o n that is highly unlikely to rec ur, as it ar ises from Hobbs Ac t 25 c on vic tio ns ob ta ine d w hil e the law o f thi s Cir c uit wa s in fl ux. A ft e r d e fe nd ants ’ t

ri a l, o ur Cou rt he ld 26 in United St ates v. Parke s , 497 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2007), that the jurisdictional eleme nt of the Hobbs 27 Act must be found by a jury beyond a re asonable doubt, even whe re the underlying r obbery involved 28 ill e g a l na

rc oti c s. Un de r t

his su pe rv e nin g ru le , the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jur y ins tr uc tio ns we re e rr on e ou s. 29 But this err or af

fec ts only those counts of c onviction f or which we are unable to identify evidenc e 30 in the rec ord satisfying the interstate element beyond a rea sonable doubt. Cf. Neder v. United States ,Park es , w e no te, w as ap prov ed unanim ously by the activ e m em

bers o f this Court throu g h o ur 1 “m ini en ban c” p rocess, bec ause it represe nted a ch ang e in controllin g lawat th e tim e. See 497 F.3 d at 230 n.7

. 3 1 527 U.S. 1 ( 1999). Acc ording ly , we f ind that the interstate e lement was pr oven with re spect to the 2 defe ndants’ conspirac y convictions, which encompa ssed coca ine and heroin robbe ries – substance s 3 that ne c e ssa

ri ly or ig inate out- of

-s tate

. We ca

nn ot co nc lud e the same , how e ve r, fo r t he de fe nd ants ’ 4 sub s ta

nti v e r o b b e r

y c o nv ic tions. These individual robber ies involved only the proc eeds of

marijuana 5 traff

icking , a drugthat may be grown, proce ssed, and sold entirely within New York. Beca use the 6 g overnme nt presente d the jury with no evidence that the m arijuana robber ies at issue her e af fec ted 7 int e rs tate c omm e rc e in a ny fa sh ion , th e se c on vic tio ns c ann ot be su sta ine d. Con se qu e ntl y , w e va c a te 8 defendants’ c onvictions for Hobbs Ac t robbery , as we ll as Nee dham’s convic tion for attempted 9 Hobbs Act robbe ry . 10 The dissent conte nds, in eff ect, that ever

y robber y involving marijuana satis fies the Hobbs 11 Act’s jurisdictional ele ment as a matter of law . We rejec ted that proposition in Pa rk es itself. Yet

1 12 our collea gu e’ s reasoning w ould reinstate this presumption, in the fac e of c lear prec edent to the 13 c on tr ary , b y

e ff e c tiv e ly putti ngwo rd s in

the ju ry ’s mouth. In th is e ff or t, t he dis se nt d

ra ws a fa lse 14 equivalenc e betwe en Cong ress’s broad power t o regulate activities affe cting interstate c ommerce , 15 and the spe cific jury finding that a par

ticular off ense a ffe cted inter state commer ce, which is require d 16 by

the Hobbs Ac t. I n so doing, our colleague would turn near ly ever y robber y into a fede ral off

ense. 17 Whil e the dissent c oncede s that its approac h would transfor m the jury rig ht into a mere “ formalism,” 18 we be lie ve tha

t th e g ov e rnme nt m

us t pr ov e an effect on int e rs tate c omm e rc e , h ow e ve r s lig ht, in 19 e ve ry Ho bb s Ac t pro se c uti on . Ab se nt pr oo f be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t, thi s Cour

t c ann ot s ub sti tut e 20 its own s pe c ulatio n f or the jur y fi nd ingre qu ir e d b y

our p re c e de nt.The rem ainingissue s raised on this appea l are resolv ed in a contem poran eously

issue d 2 sum m ar y o rd er . 4 1 We emphasize that with the l aw firmly established af

ter Parkes , 4 97 F .3 d 2 20 , d istri c t c ourt s 2 have c lear

g uidance about how they

should instruct juries in Hobbs Act prosec utions goingforwa rd, 3 and

the sit uatio n p re se nte d h e re is unli ke ly to re c ur . No ne the le ss, in t his c a se the g ov e rnme nt d id 4 not offer

any proof that would de monstrate an inter state nexus, however slight or subtle, for

the 5 marijuana

robber ies. As a result, the defe ndants’ robber y convictions must be reve rsed. The district 6 c ourt ’s jud g me nts are a ff ir me d in a ll o the r r e sp e c ts. 2 7 8 I. BACK GR OUND 9 The a

ppellants wer e prose cuted f or their r oles in a ser ies of violent ro b b erie s targ eting 10 na

rc oti c s d e a le rs in t

he Ne w Y or

k Ci ty are a . T he y be lon g e d to a con sp ir a c y inv olv inga

pp ro ximate ly 11 ten individuals who, in va rious combinations, committed more than a dozen robberie s and attempted 12 robber ies over a

two-y ear period. These robber ies ordinar ily involved home invasions of suspec ted 13 drugdeale rs in which the participants, ac ting on inside infor mation, ga ined entry

by impersonating 14 police off

icer s and then robbed t he inhabitants of drugs and the proc eeds of drugsales. In addition 15 to the conspirac y

char g e, the indictment conta ined substantive counts cha rg ing the appellants for

the 16 various role s they play ed in sever al of the underly ing robber ies. Ultimately , the jury convicted the 17 defe ndants of thre e of the robber ies and conspirac y to commit Hobbs Act robber y . I t acquitted the 18 appellants a

nd a four th defe n d ant, L

uis Sanchez, on a var iety of additional cha

rg es ra ng ing f rom 19 Hobbs Act robbe ry to firea rms possession.5 1 Def

endants Ne edham a

nd Robles were convicted for a Dece mber 13, 2001 robbe ry at 4434 2 B ay c h e s te r A v e nu e in B r o n x, N e w Y o r k

. T h e tr ia l t e s ti mo n y

s h o w e d th a t R o b le s h e lp e d

to o r g an iz e 3 the ro bb e ry , o ff

e ri ng his ho us e a s a sta g ing loc a tio n and su pp lying fo ur

oth e r c o- c on sp ir a tor s w ith 4 g un s, po lic e ba dg e s, bu lle t- pr oo f ve sts , and a po lic e sc ann e r. Ne e dh am pr ov ide d inf or matio n a s to 5 the location of dr

ugproce eds in the house, thoug h she did not participate in the robber y itself. 6 Preten d i n g t o be police of fice rs, the cr ew g ained a cce ss to the house, subdued the oc cupants at 7 g unpoint, searc hed the pr emises, and ulti mately left with a ba g containing$600,000 from mar ijuana 8 sa le s. 9 Nee dham was a lso convicted of an attempted robber y at 22 Short St ree t in Mount Vernon, 10 New Y ork, in late 2003. The re, she provided information about a mar ijuana dea ler ope ratingout of 11 the location, includingdetails about how to g et inside and who to e x p ec t t here . Two of he r 12 counter

parts, ag ain equipped w ith police wea pons, badg es, and ve sts, ga ined entry and handc uffe d 13 one of the occupa nts before sear chingthe apartment. Finding no drug s or m oney , howeve r, the c rew 1 4 l ef

tt h e s ce n e e mp t y -h an d ed

. I mp o rt an t l y , n o t es t i m o n y i n th e re co rd i n d i ca t ed wh at am o un to f d ru gs 15 or

mon e y the ro bb e ry

c re w e xpe c te d to take fr om t he pr e mis e s. 1 6 Finally , T h o mp s o n w a s c o n v ic te d o f a r o b b e r y a t 2 6 1 5 G r an d Co n c o ur s e in B r o n x, New 1 7 Y o r

k , c o m m i t t e d i nD e c e mb e r 2 0 0 3

. N e i th e r

N e e dh amn o r

R o b l e s w e r e i mp l i c a t e d

i nt h i s r o b b e r

y, 18 howeve r seve ral other member s o f t he same cre w par ticipated and T hompson provided inside 19 information about the marijuana dealing conducte d from the tar g eted a ddress. After knockingat theA s no ted, bey ond these offenses , th e g ov ernm ent p resented ev idence of n early

a doz en o ther 3 robbe ries or attem

pted robbe ries in whic h the defe ndan ts w ere alleg edly inv olv ed, either d irectly

or as co - co ns pi ra to rs . O n ap pe al , th e g ov er nm en t argue s as th ou g h th is e v id en ce w as f ul ly c re di te d by

th e jury at trial. This w as n ot the case . While the g ov ernm ent o btained conv ictions on the o ffenses describe d abov e, as w ell as Hob bs A ct con spiracy , th e juryacq uitted th e de fendan ts on

a wide rang e of charg es related to the se o ther ro bberies and firearm s po ssession

. I n p articular, the jury acq uitted R obles of thre e al le g ed r ob be ri es , a id in g a nd

a be tt in g f ir earm s po ss es si on , a nd

c on sp ir ac y

to d is tr ib ut e narc ot ic s (C ount s 3- 5, 8- 10, 13 ). I t acqu itted N eedham of one alleg ed ro bbery , a idingand abe tting firearm s po ssession , and consp iracy

to distribute narcotics (Counts 5 , 1 1, 13). A nd it acqu itted Thom psonof weap ons posses sion and consp iracy

to distribute narcotics (Counts 1 2 & 13 ). A fourth defend ant, Luis Sanc hez , w as acquitted of all charg es. These re sults su g g est tha t the j ury had reserv ations about sig nificant portion s of the g ov ernm ent' s case . 6 1 door, the four

arme d men stormed in and que stioned a fe male occupant at g unpoint. Ultimately , they 2 stole $15,000 to $30,000 found in a shoe box in one of the bedr ooms. This appea l followed. 3 3 4 II. DI SCU SSIO N 5 Of

fe ns e s u n d e r t h e H o b b s A c t r e qu i r e th e g o v e r n m e n t t o p r o v e , a s an e l e m e n t , t h a t a 6 defe ndant’s conduc t affe cted inter state commer ce. See 18 U. S.C. § 1 95 1; Un it e d S ta te s v. W ilkerson , 7 361 F.3d 717, 726 (2d C ir. 2004) (“ I n a Hobbs Ac t prosecution, proof that commerc e wa s aff

ecte d 8 is critical since the Fe dera l Governme nt’s jurisdiction of this crime re sts only on that interfe renc e.”) 9 (interna l quotation marks and alter ations omitted). Whil e this int erstate eff ect may be “ve ry slight,” 10 it mus t be pr ov e n to the jur y be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. Un ite d S

tates v . A nge lil li , 660 F.2d 23, 35 11 (2 d Ci r. 19 81 ); see U nited States v. Parke

s , 497 F.3d 220, 226- 27 (2 d C i r. 2 0 0 7 ). At the time of 12 tr ia l, t

he law of thi s c ir c uit

pr e sume d th a t a ll d

ru g tr a ff ic kin g a c tiv ity

ha d a n e ff e c t on int e rs tate 13 c omm e rc e su ff

ic ie nt to me e t the jur isd ic tio na l r e qu ir e me nts of the Ho bb s A c t. See U

nited States v. 14 F abian , 3 1 2 F

. 3 d 5 5 0 , 5 5 5 ( 2 d C i r . 2 0 0 2 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y , th e d i s tr i c t c o urt i n s tr u c t e d th e j u r y, 15 c on sis te nt w iththe law at th e tim e , th a t:7 1 Under t h e l aw , al l illega l drugactivity , even if it is purely

local in nature , has an 2 eff

ect on inter state commer ce. There fore , if y ou find that the objec t of the robbe ry 3 a t is su e wa s to ob ta in i lle g a l dr ug s o r m on e y

e arn e d f ro m th e sa le of ill e g a l dr

ug s, 4 this element is satisfied. 5 6 The law , howeve r, has since chang ed. P ro o f of dr ug traff icking is no longe r re g arde d as 7 automatically

aff ectinginterstate c ommerce ; instead, eve n in dr ug case s, the jury

must find such an 8 eff ect a s part of its ver dict. See Parkes , 49 7 F .3 d at 22 9- 30 ; United States v. Gom ez , 580 F.3d 94, 9 100 (2d Cir. 2009). The appellants c orre ctly contend that the jury never had an opportunity to make 10 this crucial jurisdictional findingbeca use of the district c ourt’s instructions. 11 A. Stand ard of Review 12 Normally , we would revie w t he failure to charg e an e lement of a crime f or har mless error

. 13 See Ne der v. U

nited States , 527 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1999) ( applyi n g h ar m l es s-er ror a naly sis where an 14 e le me nt o f t

he of fe ns e wa s w ithhe ld f

ro m the jur

y ov e r d e fe nd ant’ s o bje c tio n) ; Monsanto v. United 15 States , 3 48 F .3 d 3 45 , 3 49 -5 1 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 3) . B ut wh e re , a s in thi s c a se , a

de fe nd ant h a s f

a ile d to 16 timely

object, we g ener ally

revie w for pla in error . This analy sis requires “(1) err or, (2) that is plain, 17 and (3) that aff

ects t h e def

endant’ s substantial rights. I f all three conditions are me t, we may 18 e xer c ise our d iscreti on to n oti c e the e rr or , p ro vid e d th a t th e e rr or se ri ou sly a ff e c ts the fa ir

ne ss, 19 integ rity , or public reputation of judicial proce eding s.” United States v. Carter , 489 F.3d 528, 537 20 (2d Cir. 2007) (inter nal citation omitted). 21 I n a

fu rt he r t wi st, ho we ve r, we have tr a dit ion a lly a pp lie d a “ mod if ie d” pla in e rr or

ana ly sis 22 in case s “whe re, a s here , the s ource of pl ain er ror is a supe rveningdecision.” Un ite d S tates v . H e nr y , 23 325 F.3d 9 3 , 1 0 0 (2d Cir. 2003) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). In these instance s, the 24 g overnme nt, not the defe ndant, “be ars the burden to de monstrate that the err or . . . wa s harmless.”8 1 Id . (interna l quotation marks omitted). Yet, as a number of pa

nels have noted, it is unclear whether 2 this standard re mains in force following the Supreme Court’s de cision in Johnson v. U nited States , 3 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997), which a pplied a plain err or standar d despite a supe rveningchang e in law. 4 No ne the le ss, the se pa ne ls have of

te n fo un d it

unne c e ssa

ry to s qu are ly

a dd re ss t he iss ue , b e c a

us e it 5 did not affe ct the outcome, a nd we r eac h the same c onclusion here

. See, e .g. , United States v. Lee , 6 549 F.3d 84, 89 n.2 ( 2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Thomas , 274 F.3d 655, 668 (2d Cir. 2001). The 7 Court need not resolve this open question beca use, whether plain er

ror or some modified appr oach 8 is applied, our conc lusions would be the same. 9 I n deter

mining whe ther e rror

occur red, this Court examines the jury instructions based on 10 “the law

exis ting at the time of the appe al.” See United States v. Ballistrea , 101 F.3d 827, 835 (2d 11 Cir . 1 99 6) . T hu s, wh ile the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ins tr uc tio ns we re c on sis te nt wi th the law o f t his c ir c uit 12 at the time, they

are measure d here ag ainst the curr ent state of our law. 13 B. Ana lys is 14 Since the def endants’ tr ial, we have re jected the view that an inter state ef fec t can be 15 presumed where ver the object of a robber y was to obtain illega l dr

ug s or drugproce eds. Instead, we 1 6 have held that

th is e le me n t m

u s t b e f o un d b y a ju r y b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b le d o u b t, e v e nw h e r e the 17 robber

y targ ets a drug traffic king ope ration. See Parkes , 497 F.3d at 230. More re cently , in United 18 S t ates v. Gom ez , 5 8 0 F

. 3 d 9 4 ( 2 d Ci r . 2 0 0 9 ) , w e a g a in r e c o g n iz e d th a t th e inte r s ta te eleme nt of 19 Hobbs Act robbe ry require s a jury

finding , and that this element c annot b e p resumed in na rcotics 20 ro bb e ri e s. Se e id

. at 100 (identify ing e rror in instructions’ ref

ere nce to c ong ressional finding s, which 21 may

have misled the jury into be lieving that those finding s were binding upon it as a trier of fac t).9 1 I n this case, the inte rs t at e i nstruction provided by the district court for eclose d any jury 2 deter

mination on the j urisdictional element. The district court cha rg ed the jury , and later

repe ated 3 i na p o s t -t ri al o rd er , t h at i f th e ob j ec t o f th e r o b b ery

“w as t o o b t ai ni l l ega l dru gs o r m o n ey ea rn i n gs 4 from the sa le of illeg al drug s,” the interstate element was established as a matter of law. U nder our 5 interveningdecisions in Parkes and Gomez , this instruction improperly supplanted the re quired jury 6 finding

. 7 The re maining que stion, then, is whether this err or af fec ted substantial ri ghts. “An er ror 8 aff ects a defe ndant’s substantial r ights if it is prejudicia l a nd it a ffe cted the outc ome of the district 9 court proc eeding s.” United States v. Thomas , 274 F.3d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 2001) (interna l quotation 10 marks omitted). B eca use the instructi o n in question involved an eleme nt on which fe dera l 11 jur isd ic tio n d e pe nds, we c on c lud e that it ha d th e po te nti a l to a ff

e c t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pr oc e e din g s. 12 Wit hout an interstate ne x us, the district court would have been de prived of c riminal jurisdiction over 13 t h es e o ff

en s es altog ether

. See U

nited States v. Arena , 1 80 F .3 d 3 80 , 3 89 (2 d Ci r. 19 99 ); U n ited 14 Sta te

s v . Le sli e , 1 03 F .3 d 1 09 3, 11 03 (2 d Ci r. 19 97 ) ( “ Th e re is no thi ng mor e c ru c ia l, y e t so str iki ng ly 15 obvious, as the nee d to prove the jurisdictional e lement of a crime.” ). Only this “jurisdictional nex us 16 transfor

ms the quintessential state cr imes of robbe ry and extortion int o fede ral crimes.” United 17 Sta te

s v . P e rro tta , 313 F.3d 33, 37 ( 2d Cir. 2002). 18 The ultimate issue in this case, the n, is whether the err or was prejudicial. See G omez , 580 19 F .3 d at 10 2 ( c on c lud ingtha t in str uc tio n w a s n ot p re

judici al even if

g ive n in e rr or ); cf. Neder v

. 20 United States , 527 U.S. 1, 10 (1999) (apply ing ha rmless-er ror a naly sis). I n United States v. J ackson , 21 196 F.3d 383, 386- 87 (2d Cir. 1999), we interpre ted the Supreme Court’s deci s ion in Neder , 22 descr ibing the a

naly sis a revie wing court must undertake to deter mine whether

the omission of an10 1 element wa s harmless. I n so doing, we held that “if the e vidence supporting the omitted element was 2 c o n t r o v e rt e d , h ar

m l e s s e r r o r an a l ys i s r e qu i r e s th e a

p p e l l a t e c o urtt o c o n d

u c ta tw o - p arti n qu i r

y, 3 sear chingthe re cord in orde r to deter mine (a) whether

there was suff

icient evidenc e to per

mit a jury 4 to fi nd in favo r of the de fe nd ant on t he omi tte d e le me nt, and , if the re wa s, (b ) whe the r t

he jur y wo uld 5 nonetheless have re turned the same ver dict of guilty .” Jack son , 196 F.3d at 386. Bu t se e Mo ns an to 6 v. United States , 3 48 F .3 d 3 45 , 3 50 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ) ( e xpre ssi ngc on c e rn that Jack son is inconsistent 7 with Neder); Un ite d S tates v . B ro wn , 202 F.3d 691, 701 n.19 ( 4th Cir. 2000) (same) . Although w e 8 revie w for pr ejudice he re, a simil ar a n al y s i s i s require d. Compare Johnson , 520 U.S. at 470 with 9 Neder , 527 U.S. at 18-19. 10 I n this case, the g overnme nt offe red lit tle or no direc t evidenc e supporting t he jurisdictional 11 e le me nt –

a pa rt fr om t he me re fa c t th a t th e ro bb e ri e s ta rg e te d d ru g tr a ff ic kin g pr oc e e ds . As a r e su lt, 12 the de fe nd ants ha d n oth ingto c on tr ov e rt . In s ho rt , n e ith e r s ide pr e se nte d e vi dence dir e c tly 13 addre ssing t h e j urisdictional issue we now c onsider. B ut, of course “[i] t is ax iomatic that, in a 14 c ri min a l c a se , th e g ov e rnme nt m us t pr ov e e a c h a

nd e ve ry e le me nt o f t

he c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble 15 doubt.” Un ite d S tates v . M ac k lin , 671 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1982)

. Under these c ircumstance s, which 16 include a supe rveningchang e in the law, w e close ly examine the rec ord to deter mine wh et her the 17 jury , had it been pr operly instructed, would have found the jurisdictional ele m en t satisfied, or 18 wh e the r t

he g ov e rnme nt f

a ile d to pr ov e thi s e le me nt b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. 19 1. Hobb s Act C onsp iracy 2 0 Be ca

u s e th e go v e r

n m e n tp r o v e d

a s i n g l e c o n s p i r a c y

e n c o mp a s s i n g r o b b e r i e s o f v ar i o u s d ru gs 21 and drugproce eds, including coca ine and he roin, we f ind the interstate e lement satisfied for eac h 22 defe ndant’s conspira cy conviction. The indictment c harg ed – and the jury found – a sing le Hobbs11 1 Act cons p i ra cy i n which ea ch of the defe ndants participated. In support of this char g e, the 2 g overnme nt prese nted evidenc e of multiple robber ies targ eting coca ine and he roin, including one 3 netting eig ht kilog rams of coca ine outside J ohn F. Kenne dy International A i rp o rt , an attempted 4 rob bery

a t an a pa rtme nt at 13 9th

Str e e t and

Am ste rd am A ve nu e in M anh a tta n, and tw o s e pa rate 5 attempts at an a ddress on Webb Ave nue in the B ronx. R obles himself participated in at least thre e 6 of the se ro bb e ri e s, tho ug h n e ithe r N e e dh am no r T ho mps on wa s d ir e c tly

imp lic a te d. B e c a

us e thi s 7 evidenc e sugg ested the possibili ty of m ultiple conspirac ies, the di strict court properly instructed the 8 jur y that, i n o rd e r t o c on vic t, it wa s re qu ir e d to fi nd the sin g le c on sp ir a c y

a lle g e d in

the ind ic tme nt. 9 The jury did so, cre diting the g overnme nt’s alleg ation that the def endants c ommonly

belong ed to a 10 conspirac y

to steal drug s and drugproce eds. Se e Un ite d S tates v . M ald on ad o-Ri v e ra , 922 F.2d 934, 11 963 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A] sing le conspirac y is not transformed into multiple conspirac ies mere ly by 12 vir

tue of the fa c t th a t it

may inv olv e tw o o r m or e ph a se s or sp he re s of op e ratio n, so lon g a s th e re is 13 sufficie nt p ro o f o f mutual depe ndence and assistanc e.”) . Thus, if the over all conspirac y targ eted 14 products moving in interstate commer ce, as t h e co caine and her oin robberie s sugg est, all three 15 defe ndants are liable. 16 To e sta

bli shthe jur isd ic tio na l e le me nt f or Ho bb s A c t c on sp ir a c y , “ a ll that ne e d b e sh ow n is 17 the possibili ty or potential of an eff ect on interstate commerc e, not a n actua l effe ct.” United States 18 v. Jone

s , 3 0 F .3 d 2 76 , 2 85 (2 d Ci r. 19 94 ); see U nited States v. Arena , 1 8 0 F. 3 d 3 8 0 , 390 (2d Cir. 19 19 99 ). A c on sp ir a c y that ta rg e ts c oc a ine and he ro in, and the pr oc e e ds fr om the ir sa le , und ou

bte dly 20 meets this standard. These narc otics cannot be produc ed in New York, a nd thus nece ssarily

trave l 21 in inters t at e commerc e. De fenda nts do not sugg est otherwise . Whil e the g overnme nt did not 22 pr od

uc e any e xpe rt te sti mony on

thi s su bje c t, o ur Court ha s h e ld a s r e c e ntl y

a s Gomez

that a jur y is12 1 c a pa ble of c on c lud ing , b a se d on it s la y kn ow le dg e , th a t c oc a ine is i mpo rt e d into t he Un ite d St a te s. 2 See5 8 0 F. 3 d

at 1 0 2 (c i t i n g W

ills v. Amerada He

ss Corp. , 379 F.3d 32, 46 ( 2d Cir. 2004)). We have 3 no rea son to take a diff ere nt view her e. F inding the juri s d i ctional eleme nt satisfied beyond a 4 rea sonable doubt, we aff irm the defe ndants’ Hobbs Ac t conspirac y convictions. 5 2. Hobb s Act R obbery and Attem pted Robbery 6 We rea ch a dif fer ent conc lusion with re s p ect to the defenda nts’ substantive robber

y and 7 attempted robbe ry convictions: we c onclude that the district court’s e rror was pre judicial and thus 8 aff ecte d the def

endants’ substantial r ights. While Hobbs Act jurisdiction must be proven be y ond a 9 rea sonable doubt, just a s any other element, we rec og nize that the effe ct on interstate c ommerce need 10 only

be slig ht or subtle. Se e Un ite d S tates v . A nge lil li , 6 60 F .2 d 2 3, 35 (2 d Ci r. 19 81 ); United States 11 v. Jamison , 2 9 9 F

. 3 d 1 1 4 , 1 1 8 ( 2 d Ci r . 2 0 0 2 ) ( “ We h av e lo n g r e c o g n iz e d th a t th e r e quirement of 12 sh ow ingan e ff

e c t on c omm e rc e inv olv e s on ly

a min ima l bu

rd e n o f p ro vin g a

c onne c tio n to int e rs tate 13 commerc e, and is satisfied by conduct that aff ects commerc e in a

ny way or deg ree . ” (internal 14 quotation marks omitted)). None theless, the evide nce r elating to these individual robber ies did not 15 me e t e ve n th is m od e st thr e sh old be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. 16 Eac h of the substantive robbe ries cha rg ed involved o n l y m ar i

juana a nd the proc eeds f

rom 17 its sale. The robbe ry at 4434 B aycheste r Ave nue netted a pproxi mat el y

$600,000 in marijuana 18 traff

icking proce eds, Thomps on’s robbe ry at 2615 Gra

nd Concourse br oug ht in $15,000 to $30,000 19 of

the same , an d no est imate wa s e ve r o ff e re d f or Ne e dh am’ s atte mpt e d r ob be ry a t 22 Sho rt

Str e e t. 2 0 Ap artf

r o mt h e s i mp l e am o u n to f m o n e y o b t a i n e d , th e g o v e r

n m e n to f f e r e d n o e v i d e n c e to 21 su

pp or t an inte rs tate ne xus f

or the c omp le te d r ob be ri e s. I t pre se nte d no pro of that the mari jua na so ld 22 by

the vic tim s h a d o ri g inate d o ut o f s tate , th a t it wa s so ld to o ut- of

-s tate c us tom e rs , th a t th e vic tim sSee, e. g. , Nation al D rug I ntellig ence Cen ter, Natio nal C anna bis C

ultivation Tren ds (2 00 8) , 4 http://www.

j ustice. g ov/ndic/pu

bs37 /3703 5/nation al.htm#Table1 (rep ortingthe seiz ure o f m ore th an 14, 000 m arij uana plants in N ew York state in 20 08); U .S. D rug En forcem ent A dm inistration, New York Fact Sheet

( 20 08 ), h tt

p: //w w w . just ic e. g ov

/d ea/p ub s/ st at e_ fa ct sh ee ts /n ew y or k

. htm l ( no ti ngth at

w hi le m ost m arij uana is pro duced out of state, “[i]ndoo r m arij uana g rows are becom ing m ore p rev alent in the N ewY or k C ity a re a. S om e of

th es e in do or

g ro w s ar e hi g hl y

s op hi st ic at ed

a nd a re d es ig ne d to y ie ld substan tial quantities o f hig h p otency m arij uana. ”); John E lig on, F ir ef ig ht er A cc us ed o f R ol e in Marijuana -Gro wing

Rin g , N .Y . Tim es, Feb. 26 , 2 009 (describin g 10 0 m arij uana plants discov ered g rowin g in a Q ueens bas em ent, with an e stim ated v alue o f $5 00, 000); Larry C elona & And

y G eller, High T im es fo r U

. S. B iz , N .Y . P ost, Apr. 13 , 2 009 (reportingthat “[s]ince Oct. 1, [20 09, ] the Drug E nf or ce m en t A dm in is tr at io n ha s br ok en u p ei g ht h y dr op on ic p ot

- g ro w in g s et

- up s ar ound th e st at e – w ith fiv e in the B ig Apple”); J osephB . Treaster, Urb an Gro w-It-Yourselfers Cas h In on Marijuan a , N.Y. Tim es , A ug . 5 , 1 99 4, a t B 3 (d is cu ss in g th e ex te ns iv e pr ac ti ce o f in do or m ar ijuana

g ro w in g in

N ewY or k C ity ). 13 1 themselves cr ossed state lines in conduc ting their business, or that the robbe ry depleted a ssets that 2 would have pur chase d g oods in interstate commer ce. Similarly , in the case of Ne edham’ s attempted 3 robber

y , the g overnme nt offer ed no proof as t o the amount of m oney she ex pecte d to seize on Short 4 S t r e e t , t h e o r i g i n o f t h e m ar i j u an a , w h e th e r c u s t o m e r s h a i l e d f r o mo u to f

s t a t e , o r h o w th e r o b b e r

y, 5 if succe ssful, might have aff ecte d the business enter

prise. 6 Finally , the g overnme nt did not provide testimony of any kind about marijuana

production 7 and

tr a ff ic kin g in N e w Y or

k. Ye t un lik e c oc a ine or he ro in – but li ke many legal pr od uc ts – 8 marijuana may be g rown, proc essed, a nd sold entirely

within New Yor

k. See G omez , 580 F.3d at 9 1 0 2 n . 5 (r ec o gn i z i n g t h at m ar i j u an a can b e gro wn i n -s t at e, wh er ea s co ca i n e i s ex cl u s i v el y fo re i gn 10 in o ri g in) ; c

f. U n ite d S ta te s v . P eterson , 2 3 6 F. 3d 848, 855 (7th Cir. 2001) (findingthat the 11 g ov e rnme nt f

a ile d to de mon str a te vic tim ’s mari jua na tr a de inv olv e d dru g s ori g inatin g out of state 12 and

va c a tin g Ho bb s A c t c on vi cti on ). Re po rt s d oc ume nti ngthe fr e qu e nc y and sc a le of in- state 13 mari

jua na pr od uc tio n, of te n im pli c a tin g te ns or

hund re ds of tho us and s o f d oll ars , a

re a bund ant. 4 14 Reviewingfor pr ejudice, w e find that the erroneous instruction may very well have aff

ecte d 15 the outcome of

the district court proc eedin gs fo r ea ch of the defe ndants’ substantive robbe ry14 1 convictions. On the pre sent rec ord, the g overnme nt’s proof is simply too ba re to e stablish, without 2 more, the r equire d interstate ne x us. I n Hobbs Act c ases, a n interstate ne x us may

be demonstrated 3 wher e the g overnme nt introduces evide nce that the robber y was of a busi ness (leg al or illeg al) that 4 (1) se rves out-of

-state c ustomers, se e Un ite d S tates v . F arris h , 1 2 2 F. 3 d 1 46, 149 (2d Cir. 1997) 5 (i nte rs tate c omm e rc e e le me nt p ro ve n b y e vid e nc e that r ob be d g ara g e , lo c a te d n e ar i nte rs tate po rt a ls, 6 “re g ularly

serve d car s bear ing out- of-state license plates,” pe rmitting infe re n ce that the robber ies 7 mig ht d isc oura g e out- of -s tate bu sin e ss) ; ( 2) purc ha se s “ a c omm od ity

that tr ave ls in int e rs tate 8 commerc e,” s e e U n ite d S ta te s v . Jones , 3 0 F.3d 276, 285- 86 (2d Cir. 1994) (inter state commer ce 9 a ff e c te d b y ro bb e ry of $9 ,0 00 fr om n arc oti c s b uy e r, de ple tin g his a sse ts a nd the re by lim iti nghis 10 ability

to make future purcha ses of coc aine) ; or (3) pur chase s g oods in-state that orig inated out-of11 state, see U

nited States v. W

ilkerson , 361 F.3 d 717, 730-32 (2d Cir. 2004) ( finding Hobbs Act’s 1 2 jurisdicti o n al el em en ts at i s fi edwh er e d ef en d an tro b b edtwo m en wh o o wn eda l an d s cap i n g co mpany 13 that se rv e d o nly

in- state c us tom e rs and

that pu rc ha se d s up pli e s o nly fr om a n in -s tate re ta ile r, be c a

us e 14 the re ta ile r i n tu

rn purc ha se d s ome of the su

pp lie s fr om out of

state ); United States v. Elias , 285 F.3d 15 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2002) (“ [A] robber y of a local distribution or retail enter prise may be said to af

fec t 16 interstate c ommerce if the robbe ry impairs the ability

of the loca l enterpr ise to acquire – whether 17 from out-of-state or in-state suppliers – g oods orig inating out-of-state .”). This is not a hig h hurdle, 1 8 and on e th a t th e g o v e r n me n t li k e ly w o u ld h av e me t h a d it intr o d u c e d e v id e n c e r e g ar d in g the 19 int e rs tate natur e of the targ e te d d

ru g de a le rs ’ b us ine sse s. 20 But while a n i n t er s t at e effec t may

be “subtle” or “slig ht,” it must st ill be proven to a jury 21 beyond a re asonable doubt. Here , there was no proof whatsoever on the i nterstate issue. Moreover , 22 the jury ’s ac quittals on a variety of other c ounts sugg est that it had rea son to doubt asp ec t s of theI n o ne c rucial res pect, this ca se is different from the claim s rev iewed

in Park es , wher e we 5 uphe ld a Hob bs A ct conv iction fo r the attem pted robbe ry

of a dru g dea ler inv olv ing $4 ,00 0 an d a substan tial quantity

of m arij uana. See 49 7 F

. 3d a t 2 30

- 31

. U nl ik e th is c as e, th e de fe nd an ts th er e challeng ed th e su fficiency of the g ov ernm ent’s e v idence, after beingconv icted b y a prope rly

instruc ted j ury . See id. at 23 0. Arev iewingcou rt con sideringthe sufficiency of the ev idence applies one of the m ost g enerou s stan dards av ailable, ask ing w hether “if, d rawin g all in ferences in fav or o f the prosecution and v iewingthe ev idence in the lig ht m ost fav orable to the pro secution , anyr at io na l tri er o f fa ct c ou ld hav e found the es sential e lem ents o f the crim e be y ond a reaso nable doub t.” United States v. Sa ntos , 4 49 F

. 3d 9 3, 1 02 ( 2d

C ir

. 2 00 6) ; se e Ja ck

so n v. V ir gi ni a , 4 43 U. S. 307, 31 9 (1 979). B ased on the ev idence offered at trial, includin g exp ert testim ony abo ut the pred om inant sources of m arij uana, Park es ultim ately

cred ited the jury’s findin g that the in terstate elem ent h ad b een m et. See 497 F.3 d at 230- 31

. Here, there is no v alid juryfindin g on the interstate e lem ent th at secures fed eral jurisdiction, becau se the j ury w as n ot pro perly

instruc ted; h ence, a sufficiency of the ev idence standard is in applicab le. I nstead, we rev iew for pre

j udice as d escribed

abo v e. We n ot e th at

o ne o f th e in di v id

ua l r ob be ri es a t i ss ue , th e G rand C on co ur se r ob be ry , n et te d on ly 6 $1 5, 00 0 to $ 30 , 00 0. Th e di ss en t d oe s no t a dd re ss w he th er

th at a m ount w ou ld b e en ou g h to m ee t i ts te st , nor ev en where the critica l thresh old m ig ht be

. 15 1 g overnme nt’s case . For the Court, as opposed to a jur y , to find that the governme nt’s limit ed 2 evidenc e constitut es p ro o f of interstate ef fec t bey ond a re asonable doubt would cre ate a n 3 un a c c e pta

bly br oa d p re sumpt ion , o ne that is incons ist e nt w iththe Sixth a nd F ourt e e nth 4 Amendments. I n essenc e, it would treat any robber y involving $600,000 or more as a suf ficient 5 5 ba sis fo r f

e de ra l juri sd ic tio n as a

matte r o f l aw. We r e c og nize , o f c ours e , th a t $6 00 ,0 00 is a 6 6 substantial sum of money . But th e s h eer amount of mon e y , s tand inga lon e , d oe s n ot d e mon str a te 7 an interstate eff

ect. L ike the other

circ uits that have consider ed this ty pe of br igh t -l i n e rule , we 8 decline to a dopt suc h a presumption. See U nited States v. Turner , 272 F.3d 380, 387- 89 (6th Cir. 9 2001) (holdingthat the mere fac t a robbery targ eted ill eg al gambling proce eds of one to t wo million 10 do lla

rs did no t pr ov e int e rs tate ne xus) ; United States v. Mc Cormack, 371 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2004), 11 overturned on othe r grounds , 543 U.S. 1098 (2005) (“We decline to a dopt any brig ht-line rule that 12 an extortionate demand of a ce rtain sum from an individual ca n automatically

satisfy the commer ce 13 element of

the Hobbs Ac t.”). The fac t that the robber i es her e tar g eted the pr ocee ds of marijuana16 1 sales, as oppose d to some other produc t, does not alter this ana ly sis – despite our collea g ue’s view s 2 to the contra

ry . 3 The dissent ar g ues that we m ay fi n d federal jurisdiction simply beca use these r obberie s 4 inv olv e d ma

ri jua na . In th is v ie w, be c a

us e the c omm e rc e po we r “ e nc omp a ss es mar ijuana that is 5 g rown, proc essed, a nd sold entirely

within a single st at e, ” neither we nor a jury need look a

ny 6 further . Dissent at 5. Our C o u rt , o f course, has re jected this proposition befor e, in Pa rk es itself, 7 much a s it h a s e n te rta in e d an d d is c ar d e d th e v e r y r e a s o n in g th a t th e d is s e n t r e li e s o n h e r e . See 8 Parkes , 497 F.3d at 229. The dissent’s re asoning would eff ectively reinstate the presumption we 9 jettisoned in Parkes , by postulating a

rule that produc es the same result only using slig htly

differ ent 10 wo rd s. 11 I n part ic ula r, the dis se nt a

tte mpt s to bo ots tr a

p o ur Ho bb s A c t juri sp ru de nc e to t he Sup re me 12 Court’s interpre tation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. , in Gonzales 13 v. Raich , 5 45 U. S. 1 (2 00 5)

. Ye t, a s we have sa id be fo re , the se tw o statut or y sc he me s are c ru c ia lly 14 differ ent: the Hobbs Ac t contains a jurisdictional ele ment, requiring that the g overnme nt prove a n 15 eff

ect on inter state commer ce in eve ry case , while t he CSA does not. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), 16 with 2 1 U

. S. C. § § 8 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) , 8 4 4 ( a )

. T hus, while Raich fo un d th a t th e CSAc ou ld b e a pp lie d to 17 pure ly

int ra state c ult ivatio n and sal e of mari jua na , it c on sid e re d o nly

Con g re ss’ s b ro a d p ow e r t o 18 regulate drug offense s under the Commerce Clause. The Court did not purport to interpret the H obbs 19 Act, whe re Cong ress c hose to requi re p ro of of a n interstate ne x us in eac h individual case. The 2 0 d i f

f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o e n t e r

p r i s e s – C o n g r e s s ’ s a

b i l i ty t o r e g u l a t e a

c l a s s o f e c o n o m i c a c t i v i ty, 21 ve rs us the sp e c if ic int e rs tate e ff

e c ts of on e tr ansac tio n o r o ff e ns e – is ob vio us . A s th e Sup re me 22 Court put it i n Raich , “[w ]e have ne ve r re qu ir e d Congre ss to l e g isl a te wi th s c ie nti fi c e xac tit ud e ” inThe diss ent relies heav ily on our reiteration

in Park es th at th e re ac h of

th e H ob bs A ct

is 7 “coex tensiv e w ith that of the C om m erce C lause of the U nited States Con stitution, ” 49 7 F .3d at 2 30 n.8

. Yet our co ll eague ignor es an d om it s th e exp la nat ion that imm edi at el y fol lowe d tha t st at ement. As we said th ere, “this m eans only that a de m in im is s ho w in g o f an e ff ec t o n in te rs ta te c om

m er ce is s uf

fi ci en t t o satisfy this elem ent; it does no t obv iate the need for so m e sh owin g .” Id. (em phasis added ). I ndeed , Park es itself re fused to rest on the m ere fact that the rob bery in questio n inv olv ed m arij uana, looking for a sp ecific effec t on interstate c om m erce n otwith standin g the Sup rem e C ourt’s recent decision in Raich

. See Park es , 4 97 F.3 d at 231. C ong ress, of co urse, reg ulates thousands of g oods and serv ices p ursuan t to its com m erce p owe r. 8 Raich ’s h ol di ngw ith re sp ec t t o m ar ijuana r el ie d di re ct ly

o n a ca se a ff

irm in g C on g re ss ’s autho ri ty to reg ulate h om eg rown

w heat. See Raich , 5 45 U. S. at 17

- 20; W ickard v. Filbur

n , 3 17 U. S. 111, 12 8- 29 (1 94 2) ( co ns id er in g th e in te rs ta te e ff ec ts o f do m es ti c w he at

p ro du ct io n)

. Y et

b y th e di ss en t’ s lo g ic , if Con g ress h as the auth ority to reg ulate a

pro duct writ larg e, then any rob bery inv olv ing that produ ct 17 1 order

to satisfy the Commerce Clause. Raich , 5 45 U. S. at 17 ; se e Un ite d S tates v . Na sc im e nto , 491 2 F.3d 25, 41- 43 (1 s t C i r. 2007). W hat matters, instea d, is that the overa ll class of ac tivity has the 3 requisite interstate eff ects. See U

nited States v. Morales- de Je sús , 372 F.3d 6, 18 ( 1st Cir. 2004). 4 So long as “ a g ener al re g ulatory statute bea

rs a substantial rel at i o n to commerc e,” the fac t that 5 ind ivi du a l tr ans a c tio ns have a ne g lig ibl e imp a c t on int e rs tate c omm e rc e “ is o f n o c on se qu e nc e ” in 6 deter

mining Cong ress’s c ommerce power . Raich , 545 U.S. at 17 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed). 7 Yet Cong ress ha s chosen to re quire ex actly this kind of prec ision in prosecutions under the 8 Hobbs Act. In ever y case , the g overnme nt must prove that the alleg ed off ense ha d some eff

ect on 9 interstate c ommerce – not simpl y that the g ener al ac tivity , taken in toto , has such an ef fec t. See 18 1 0 U

. S

. C

. § 1 9 5 1 ( a ); Parkes , 49 7 F .3 d at 23 0 n .8

. Th e purp os e of thi s r e qu ir e me nt i s to avo id 7 11 tr ans fo rm inge ve ry ro bb e ry and e xtor tio n, wh ic h a

r e q u i nt e s s e nt i a l s t a

t e c r i m e s , i nto fe de ra l of

fe ns e s. 12 SeePe rro tta , 3 1 3 F

. 3 d a t 3 7

. Y e t t h a t i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t th e d i s s e n t ’ s r u l e w o u l d a c c o mp lis h. I ts 13 re a so nin g wo uld

e xten d n ot o nly

to ro bb erie s invo lvi ngmari jua na but any product Cong ress may 14 regulate, leg al or il leg al, in any amount. Indeed, it is hard to imag ine a r obbery that would not be 1 5 a f e d e r a l c r i m e i f

t h e d i s s e n th a d

i t s w ay. 8affects in terstate co m m erce p er se, and

the j ury sho uld b e so instruc ted. Arob bery targ eting $1 00 from th e sa le o f w he at , g ra v el , o r pr es cr ip ti on dru g s w ou ld

a ll b ut aut om at ic al ly

m ee t the H ob bs A ct ’s j urisdiction al elem ent, ev en if the p roduc ts at issue orig inated entirely in- state. See W

ickard , 3 17 U. S. at 12 8- 29 ; D. A.S

. S and & G ravel, Inc. v. C

hao , 3 86 F.3 d 4 60, 46 3- 64 (2d Cir. 2004 ) (com m erce p owe r extend s to reg ulation of g rav el sold entirely intrastate). We hav e rep eatedly said that es tablishingH obbs Act j urisdiction

requ ires a “case- by

- case inquiry ” into a robbe ry ’s effects on interstate c om m erce. Park es , 4 97 F.3 d at 231 n.1 1. That prin ciple runs d irectly con trary to the ca teg orical ru le that the d issent seek s to im

port fro m the Con trolled S ubstan ces A ct. The g ov ernm ent w ould be re liev ed fro m pro v ing th at th e of fe ns e ac tu al ly

a ff ec te d in te rs ta te c om

m er ce , a s th e H ob bs A ct

r eq ui re s, a nd c ou ld s im pl y g esture toward C ong ress’s p owe r to reg ulate th e ov erall class of activ ity at is sue. B ased on our preced ent, we canno t em brace this p ropositio n. 18 1 The dissent ar g ues th at i t s ru l e is consistent with our dec ision in Pa rk es beca use the jury 2 would still be called upon to make a f inding, a lbeit one with a pre deter mined result. Our c olleague 3 conce des that this approa ch may seem “ formalistic,” be caus e the outcome is “virtually cer tain.” 4 Dis s en t at 11. But the dissent’s r ule is not a forma lism, i t is a fiction. In eff ect, the pr oposed 5 instructions would tell a jury that all robber ies involving narc otics – or any thing e lse Congr ess has 6 the power

to regulate – af

fec t interstate commer ce a s a matter of law. The jury ’s findingwould not 7 d e p e n d

o nan y fac ts demonstratingan ef fec t on interstate commerc e. Although the dissent appea rs 8 to think otherwise, this is precisely what it means to say

something is esta

blished as a matter

of law, 9 and it is prec isely the rule we reje cted in Parkes

. To pr e ss h is p oint, o ur c oll e a g ue g oe s so fa

r a s to 10 pu

bli shmod e l jury

ins tr uc tio ns te lli nga

jur y ho w t o r e so lv e a fact ual iss ue so lid ly wi thi n it s 1 1 p r o v i n c e . B e c a

u s e t h e s e i n s t r

u c t i o n s m i s a

p p l y R a ich , substitut ing its holding for the r equire d fac tual 12 fi nd ing , w e do no t vi e w the m as pr op e r g uid anc e fo r a jur y c on sid e ri ng c ha

rg e s und e r t

he Ho bb s A c t. 1 3 Ma ri

juan a , a s n o t e d , m ay

b e e n t i r e l y

g r o w n , p r o c e s s e d , an d

s o l d i n - s t a t e . U n d e r

th e se 14 circ umstances, f

inding jurisdiction simply beca use the robbe ries involved a substance r egulated by 15 Congr ess would eff ectively undo the j ury rig ht rec og nized in Parkes

. See 49 7 F .3 d at 22 6- 30 ; see 16 also Peterson , 236 F.3d at 855 (vac ating Hobbs Act robbe ry conviction involving marijuana wher e19 1 the g ov e rnme nt f

a ile d to a dd

uc e any satis fa c tor

y pr oo f o f a

n inte rs tate nex us ). Al though th is 2 interstate nexus nee d be only slight, it c annot be reduc ed to the point of vanishing altog ether , as the 3 g overnme nt and the dissent would do her e. 4 5 IV . CO NC LU SION 6 F o r t h e f

o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , w e h e r e b y RE VE RSE Robles’s and Nee dham’s convic tions for 7 Hobbs Act robbe ry (Count 2), Thompson’s conviction for Hobbs Act robbe ry

(C ount 7), and 8 Nee dham’s convic tion for Hobbs Ac t attempted robbe ry (Count 6), and we VA CA TE the jud g me nts 9 of the district cour t. The def

endants’ c onvictions are AF F IRM ED in a ll other respe c ts

. We 10 REMAND the ca se to the district court f or fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion. 11 12In Parkes , f or exam pl e, we r ejec te d al mo s t the e xact in s truct io n that J ud ge L ync h ga ve h er e, 1 as we h eldth at the dis tr

ict cou r t i n that

cas e “p r op erly r ef

us ed the g ov er nm ent ’s r equ es t t o i ns truct the jury that ‘if the object of the robbery is to obtain illega l drugs or money ea rned from the sale of dr ugs , the r equ

ir eme nt of an ef fe ct onin te r s tat e co mm er ce is s ati s fi ed. ’” 4 97 F .3dat 2 30.

1 1 J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge , dissenting in part and concurring in part: 2 T hr ou gh r eas onin g t hat can o nly be des cr

ib ed as r ema r kab le, th e ma jo r it y vacates tho se 3 Hobbs Act convictions in this case that involved mari juan a pr o ce eds even though it aff

ir ms tho se 4 Hobbs Act convictions in this case that involved co cai ne and he ro in pr

o ce eds . T he b as is fo r

this 5 distinction is the majority’s cla im that “unlike c ocaine or heroin . . . marijuana [c an] be grown, 6 processed, and sold entirely within NewYork.” Majority Op. 13. From that claim the ma jority 7 r eas on s th at apr op erly i ns tr uct ed j ur y inthis cas e co ul d h ave c on clu dedth at the alleg ed 8 robberies—netting over $600,000 in ma rijuana procee ds—did not “affect . . . commerce” and thus 9 di d n ot

vio lat e t he H ob bs Act

. See 18 U .S. C. § 1 951 (a) (ap plyin g t o “[ w]h oev er inany w ay or

degr ee 10 obstr ucts, delays, or affects commerce . . . by robbery”). 11 T o b e cle ar , I agr ee wi thth e ma jo r it y t hat this cas e in

vo lve d aner r on eou s ju ry in s truct io n. 12 In 2006, then-Distr ict Judge Gerard E. Lync h applie d the lawof our Circuit as it s tood at the time 13 andgave th e f

ollo win g in s truct

io n r egar di ng the “ com mer ce” e lem ent of th e Ho bb s Act , 18 U.S .C. 14 § 19 51: “[

I]f you fi nd th at the o bj ect

of th e r ob ber

y at is s ue w as to ob tai n i lle gal d r ugs or mo ney 15 earned from the sale of illega l drugs, this eleme nt is s atisfied.” Roble s App. 265-66. I agree with the 16 majority that, following our dec isions in United Sta tes v. Parke s, 497 F.3d 220 (2d C ir. 2007), and 17 United Sta tes v. Go mez , 58 0 F .3d94 (

2d Cir . 20 09) , which chan ged th e law of ou r Cir cui t whi le thi s 18 appea l was pending , we must now regard Judge Lynch’s instruction as err or. 1 19 Un lik e t he m ajo r it y, h owe ver , I would no t, as r es ul t o f the e r r or , va cat e any of the Hobbs 20 Act convi ctions pres ented for our r eview . For each convi ction, I have no trouble conc ludingI con cur inth e r emain der

of th e ma jo r it y’s op inio n. 2 I ackn owl edg e, o f c ou r s e, that th er e was no exp er t w

it nes s te s ti mo ny i n thi s cas e. 3 No nethel es s , I thin k that

a r eas on abl e ju r or

can b e exp ect ed t o kno w, b as ed o n h is or her lay kn owl edg e andcom mo n s ens e, see Go mez , 58 0 F .3dat 1 02, th at the o ver whe lm in g m ajo r

it y of all ill egal dr ugs inNew

Yor k— in clu di ng m ar

iju ana— com es fr om ou t- of -s tat e. 2 1 “beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury woul d have returned the guil ty verdict eve n absent the 2 in s tr uct

io n that was giv en. ” Gomez

, 580 F.3d at 102. “For that r eason,” I would “hold tha t the error 3 inth e ju ry in s tr uct

io n was har ml es s .” Id

. Respec tfully, therefore, I dis sent insof ar as the majority 4 va ca te s the so-c a ll ed sub sta nti ve rob be ry a nd a tte mp te d ro bb er y H ob bs A ctco nv ic ti on s ( i.e. , Counts 5 Two, Six, and Se ven). 2 6 I. 7 I di sa gre e wit h th e m a jo rity’ s re a son in g o n tw o g rou nd s. Fi rst, I re je ctthe ma jo rity’ s pre mi se 8 th at ther e was any p os s ib ili ty th at the j ur

y inthis cas e co ul d h ave c on clu dedth at the r ob ber ies at 9 iss ue involve d marijuana that was “grown, processed, and sold entirely within New Y ork.” Majority 10 Op. 13. In Gomez we fac ed a similar situation and dete rmined that a “reasonable juror,” relying on 11 his or her

lay k nowledg e and c ommon sens e, wa s “sur ely c apabl e of drawing the c onclusion that a 12 r ob ber

y un der tak en w

ith the o bj ect

of s te ali ng f r om a dr ug d eale r

th r ee kilo s of

coc ain e . . . wo ul d 13 have the required de min imis ef fe ct onin te r s tat e co mm er ce.” 580 F. 3d at 1 02. I t i s no di ff er ent in 14 this cas e, wh er e t he r ob ber ies tar get ed m ar iju ana. Evenif

mar iju ana can be grown in NewYork, the 15 mar

iju ana s ol d i n N ew Yo r k is “alm os t e xcl us ive ly” im po r te d f r om abr oad

. Parkes

, 49 7 F .3dat 2 31 16 (quoting an expe rt witness ’s test imony). Thus it would take nothing short of divine intervention for 3 17 a r ob ber

y in vo lvi ng h un dr eds of

th ou s and s of

do lla r s of mar iju ana p r oce eds to fail t o r eco ver at 18 least so me

mo ney der ive d f r om th e in te r s tat e or

fo r eign d r ug tr ade. I am c on fi den t, mo r eov er , that 19 jurors could—and without question wo uld —reach that c onclusion based on their lay k nowledg e and3 1 com mo n s ens e. Gomez , 580 F.3d at 102. Thus I reject the majority’s premise that a reasonable jury 2 could hav e co ncl ud ed that th e r ob ber

ies inthis cas e in

vo lve d p r oce eds fr om excl us ive ly 3 “ho meg

r own ” m ar

iju ana. 4 Seco nd , I di s agr ee wi thth e ma jo r it y’s con clu s io n ev en ac cep ti ng i ts pr emi s e, f or I am 5 confident that a properly instructed jury in this case would have found the required effect on 6 com mer ce even

if t he jur y had as su med t hat t he mari juan a in q ue

st io n was “ gr o wn, pro ce ssed, and s o ld e nti

re ly 7 wi thi n New Yo rk .” Majority Op. 13 (emphasis added). To unders tand my vie w, one must examine 8 ou r

Ho bb s Act

ju r is pr ud enc e andcon s id er

exac tly wh at the j ur

y, “ hadit bee n p r op erly i ns truct ed, ” 9 Majority Op. 10, would ha ve bee n told about the “commerce ” ele ment of the Hobbs Act. 10 The Ho bb s Ac t pr ov id es a s fol lo ws: 11 Whoev er in an y way o r degree

obstructs, delays, or affects co mm erce o r the movement of 12 any article or commodity in comm erce , by robbery or extortion or attempts or 13 conspires s o to do, or commits or thr eatens physica l violenc e to any pe rs on 14 or proper ty in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in viola tion of 15 this s ection shall be fined under this tit le or imprisoned not mor e than twe nty 16 yea rs , or both. 17 18 U .S. C. § 1 951 (a) (e mp has is add ed) . T he A ct con tai ns an ex pan s ive def init io n o f “ com mer ce”: 18 The term “commerce” mea ns commerce within the District of Columbia, or 19 any Territory or Poss ession of

the United States; al l commerce be tween a ny 20 point in a State, Terr itory, Pos sess ion, or the Distr ict of Columbia and any 21 point outside thereof; all commerce be tween points within the same Sta te 22 through any plac e outside such State; and all other commerce ov er which the United 23 States has ju risdiction

. 24 Id

. § 19 51( b) (3 ) ( emp has is add ed)

. 25 A properly instructed jury, therefor e, would be told that, to convict on a Hobbs Ac t robbery 26 cou nt , it

mu s t f in d that th e r ob ber

y inqu es ti onhadan ef

fe ct on“co mm er ce o ver

whi ch the U ni te d 27 States has juris diction.” 18 U .S.C. § 1951(a )-(b) . Under Parkes and Gomez , the j ur y wo ul d b e t ol d4 1 that it is r equired to make a n “indepe ndent finding” about w hether there was an e ffect on 2 commerce; the j ury would not be told that an e ffect on commerce is automatica lly established if the 3 ju ry

fin ds th a t th e r ob be rie s ta rge te d d rug pro ce ed s. 4 T o ex pl ainth e me ani ng o f “ [e] ff ect ,” the j ur

y wo ul d b e t ol d, un der

ou r pr eced ent s , that 5 “on ly ‘ a ver

y s lig ht ef fe ct onin te r s tat e co mm er ce’ n eed be s ho wn. ” Gomez , 580 F.3d at 101 (quoting 6 United Sta tes v. Wilkerso n , 36 1 F .3d717 , 72 6 ( 2d Cir . 20 04) ); accord Parkes , 497 F.3d at 230 (“[T]he 7 re qu ire d sh owin g o f a n e ffe cton in te rsta te co mme rc e i s de min imis. ”). The jury would also be 8 instr ucted that, in order to convict, it nee d not find an act ual effect on commerce, for “‘[e]ve n a 9 po te nti

al

. . . ef fe ct oncom mer ce wi ll s uf

fi ce.’ ” Gomez

, 580 F.3d at 101 (e mphasis added) (quoting 10 Uni

te d St ate s v . A ng el ill i , 660 F.2d 23, 35 (2d C ir. 1981)). Finally, the j ury would be told that the 11 government ca n establish the required “effect” through any kind of proof—not only could direct or 12 in di r ect

evi den ce b e us ed t o es tab lis h anef fe ct oncom mer ce, b ut

“‘c ir cum s tan ti al ev

id enc e co ul d 13 [al s o] s uf

fi ce.’ ” Id

. (quo ti ng Parkes

, 497 F.3d at 231 n. 11). 14 T o ex pl ainth e me ani ng o f “ com mer ce,” th e pr es id in g ju dge would be m in df ul th at w e hav e 15 repeatedly

held that the Hobbs Act’s definition of “commerce” i s “coextensive wi th the full reachof 16 Congressio nal p ower

ove r commerce .” Id

. (e mp has is add ed) ; see also 18 U.S.C . § 1951(b) (defining 17 “co mm er ce” t o i ncl ud e “all . . . co mm er ce o ver whi ch the U ni te d S tat es has ju r is di ct io n”) ; Parkes

, 18 497 F. 3d at 2 30 n .8 ( “[ T ]h e r each of

th e Ho bb s Act

is ‘co ext ens ive with that

of th e Com mer ce 19 Clau s e of

th e Unit ed S tat es Con s ti tu ti on .’” (quo ti ng Uni te d St ate s v . El ias , 285 F.3d 183, 18 8 (2d Cir. 20 200 2) ). I f i t i s app r op r iat e, ther ef

or e, an d i f i t i s r equ es te d b y on e of th e par ti es , the p r es id in g ju dge 21 could exp lai n t o the j ur y s om e of th e bas ic co nce pt s of

Con gr es s ’s autho r

it y un der th e Com mer ce 22 Clau s e.Fu r th er mo r e, I am n ot att emp ti ng t o d r aw an“equi val enc e” b et

ween“Con gr es s ’s br oad 4 power to regulate a ctivities affecting interstate commerce” and “the speci fic jury finding that a particular offense affected interstate commerce, w hich is required by the Hobbs Act.” Majority Op. 3. Ra th er , I am ar

gui ng that a pr op erly i ns truct ed j ur

y wo ul d b e t ol d that

“co mm er ce” as def

in ed i n th e Ho bb s Act

in clu des pu r ely int

ra- state marijuana sale s. It would then be up to the jury to dec ide whe th er to mak e t he “ s pec if

ic j ur y f in di ng that

a par ti cul ar

of fe ns e af fe ct ed i nt er s tat e co mm er ce.” Id

. 5 1 T hat

would be p ar ti cul arly ap t i n a ca s e li ke thi s on e, wh er e, f ollo win g Parkes and Gomez , the 2 jury is required to make an indepe ndent finding about whe ther a robbery targeting marijuana 3 pr oce eds af

fe ct s “co mm er ce o ver

whi ch the U ni te d S tat es has ju r is di ct io n. ” 18 U.S .C. § 195 1( a)- (b ). 4 I nd eed , the l aw r egar di ng Co ngr es s ’s autho r it y un der th e Com mer ce Cla us e is par ti cul arly we ll 5 settled—and ea sy to explain to a j ury—with respect to commerce involving marijuana , as the 6 Su pre me C ou rt h a s he ld tha t C on gre ss’s a uth ori ty to r eg ul a te ma rij ua na un de r th e C om me rc e C la use 7 is vir tu ally un lim it ed. See Gonzales v. Ra ich , 54 5 U. S. 1 (2 005 ). Of par ti cul ar r elev ance to this cas e, a 8 pro pe rly

in stru ct ed ju ry

wo ul d b e t ol d th a t “ co mme rc e” for p urp ose s of t he Ho bb s Ac t—t ha t i s, 9 “co mm er ce o ver

whi ch the U ni te d S tat es has ju r is di ct io n, ” 18 U.S .C. § 195 1(

b) —en com pas s es 10 mar

iju ana that

is gr own , p r oce s s ed, ands ol d en ti r ely w ithi n a s in gle s tat e. See Raich , 54 5 U. S. a t 5 , 22 11 (h ol di ng that

“t he s cop e of

Con gr es s ’ au th or

it y un der th e Com mer ce Cla us e” i ncl ud es “the p owe r 12 to prohibit the local cultiva tion and use of marijuana” ). 13 I recognize, of course, that Ra ich add r es s ed the Co nt r olledSu bs tan ces Act (CS A) , 21 U.S .C. 14 § 80 1 et

seq. , wh ich di ff

er s fr om th e Ho bb s Act

inth at i t d oes no t c on tai n a j ur is di ct io nal 15 “commerce” eleme nt to be found by the jury. That does not mean, howeve r, that Ra ich has no 16 bear

in g onth e de fi ni ti onof

“co mm er ce” i n the H ob bs Act

. See M ajo r it y Op . 16 . T o the c on tr ary, 17 as I no te abo ve, we h ave r epe ate dly he ld th at “ th e r each of th e Ho bb s Act

is ‘co ext ens ive with that 18 of

th e Com mer ce Cla us e of

th e Unit ed S tat es Con s ti tu ti on .’” Parkes , 497 F.3d at 230 n. 8 (quoting 19 Eli

as , 2 85 F.3 d a t 1 88 ). The re fore , a ll de ci sio ns th a t de li ne a te the sco pe of t he C om me rc e C la use 4I n f act , the D is tr

ict Cou r t g ave anin s truct

io n t o the j ur

y t hat was s im ila r

to this

. See 5 Rob les App . 26 5. T he D is tr ict Cou r t e r r ed o nly wh en i t f ur th er s tat ed that

“if [the j ur y] f ou ndth at 6 1 als o d eli neat e t he s cop e of th e Ho bb s Act

. Ra ich , in particula r, explains that Cong ress ’s authority 2 under the Commerce C lause include s the power to regulate marijuana that is grown, process ed, and 3 sol d e nti re ly

wi thi n a sin gl e st a te . A cc ord in gl y, the te rm “ co mme rc e” in the Ho bb s Ac t—w ho se 4 “r each ” is “co ext ens ive ” wi thth e Com mer ce Cla us e, Parkes , 49 7 F .3dat 2 30 n .8—

in clu des pu r ely 5 “ho meg

r own ” m ar

iju ana. 6 In s um, under Parkes and Gomez , a properly instructed jury in this case would not hav e be en 7 told, as the jury was erroneously told here, that “if [it] found that the object of the robbery at iss ue 8 was to obtain ille gal drugs or money earnings from the s ale of ille gal drugs, [the ‘commerce’ ] element 9 is s ati s fi ed. ” Rob les App . 26 5- 66. I ns te ad, th e go ver nm ent could hav e r equ es te d— andJ ud ge 10 Lynch could a nd should have give n—additional jury instr uctions that painted a fulle r picture of the 11 law r egar di ng the H ob bs Act “co mm er ce” e lem ent . T hu s J ud ge L ync h wo ul d h ave t ol d the j ur y, 12 amo ng o th er

thin gs , the f

ollo win g: 13 (1) In or der to convict on a substantive Hobbs Act robbery count, 14 you, the jury, must make a n independe nt finding that the robberies at iss ue 15 hadan “ ef fe ct ” on“co mm er ce.” 18 U .S. C. § 1 951 (a) ; Gomez , 58 0 F .3dat 16 100 ; Parkes , 49 7 F .3dat 2 30. 17 (2) The r equired “effect” on c ommerce nee d only be “ very slight” 18 andcan b e “p ot ent ial ” r ath er th an ac tu al. Gomez

, 58 0 F .3dat 1 01; Parkes

, 19 497 F. 3d at 2 30. 20 (3 ) “ Com mer ce” f or th es e pu r po s es in clu des “all

. . . com mer ce o ver 21 which the U nited States has jurisdiction.” 18 U.S.C . § 1951(b).

22 (4 ) T he U ni te d S tat es ’ ju r

is di ct io n o ver com mer ce en com pas s es 23 mar

iju ana that

is gr own , p r oce s s ed, ands ol d en ti r ely w ithi n a s in gle s tat e. 24 Ra ich , 54 5 U. S. a t 5 , 22

. 5the object of the robbery at issue was to obtain illeg al drugs or money earnings from the sale of

ill egal dr ugs , [ th e ‘co mm er ce’] elem ent

is s ati s fi ed. ” Id

. 265 -6 6. The majority chides me for “publish[ing] model jury instr uctions telling a jury howto 6 resolve a factua l issue s olidly within its pr ovince. ” Majority Op. 18. Ye t as I dis cuss in P art II below, the “commerce” eleme nt of the Hobbs Act is a so-called “ mixed question of law a nd fact” with r es pec t t o which th e “j ud ge m us t b e pe r mi tt ed t o i ns truct th e ju ry onth e law

andto in s is t that th e ju ry f ollo w hi s in s tr uct

io ns .” Uni

te d St ate s v . Ga udin , 515 U.S. 5 06, 513 (1995). Surely the majority is not claiming tha t the judge should decline to in s truct th e ju ry onth e law

. But w hi ch of m y “ mo de l j ury in stru ctio ns” is not

the law? I t i s the law t ha t (1 ) th e j ury mu st mak e an i nd epe nd ent

fi nd in g of

“co mm er ce” an d that

(2) the r equ

ir ed “ ef fe ct ” oncom mer ce n eed on ly b e “v ery s lig

ht ” or “po te nt ial .” Gomez

, 58 0 F .3dat 1 00- 01. I t i s als o the l aw that (3 ) “co mm er ce” i ncl ud es “all

. . . com mer ce o ver

whi ch the U ni te d S tat es has ju r is di ct io n. ” 18 U.S .C. § 19 51( b) ; see also Gomez

, 58 0 F .3dat 1 01 (

ho ld in g that

th e Ho bb s Act ’s def

init io n o f “ com mer ce” i s “coex tensive with the full reachof Congress ional p ower ove r commerce ” ( emp has is add ed) ). Andit is th e law th at ( 4) “t he s cop e of

Con gr es s ’ au th or

it y un der th e Com mer ce Cla us e” ( i.e. , the “ com mer ce o ver which the U nited States has jurisdiction”) includes “the power to prohibit the local c ultivation and us e of mar iju ana. ” Ra ich , 5 45 U. S. a t 5 , 2 2. I do no t un de rsta nd wh y t he ma jo rity t hi nk s tha t th ose es tab lis hedleg al p r

in cip les s ho ul d b e kep t f

r om th e ju ry.

7 1 I f the j ur

y inthis cas e hadbee n gi

venth os e in s truct

io ns —which ar e, af

te r all , n o m or e t han 6 2 a s um mar

y of well es tab lis hedlaw— I hav e no do ub t that it would hav e f

ou ndth at the r ob ber

ies 3 alle ged in C ounts T wo, Six, a nd Seven ha d the required effect on commerce. That is, contrary to 4 th e ma jo r

it y’s analys is , I am c on fi den t that th e ju ry wo ul d h ave f

ou ndan ef

fe ct oncom mer ce s im ply 5 by v

ir tu e of th e f act th at e ach o f the r ob ber

ies tar get ed the p r oce eds of

mar iju ana s ales

. 6 Even a cce pting the majority’s premise that the marijuana a t iss ue could ha ve bee n “grown, 7 processed, and sold entirely within NewYork,” Majority Op. 13, “the local cultivation a nd use of 8 mar

iju ana” fa lls withi n “the s cop e of Con gr es s ’ au th or

it y un der th e Com mer ce Cla us e,” Ra ich , 54 5 9 U.S . at

5, 2 2, a nd th us qu ali fi es as “co mm er ce” f or pu r po s es of

th e Ho bb s Act , Parkes

, 49 7 F .3dat 10 230 n.8 (“[T]he reach of the Hobbs Act is coextensive with that of the Commerce C lause of the 11 Unit ed S tat es Con s ti tu ti on .” ( in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) ). I f the j ur y hadbee n p r op erlyThe majority worries that if m y understanding of the law w ere correct, a “robbery targe ting 7 $100 from the sale of wheat, g ravel, or prescription dr ugs would all but a utomaticall y meet the Ho bb s Act ’s ju r

is di ct io nal elem ent , ev en i f the p r od uct s at i s s ue o r igi nat ed e nt

ir ely i n- s tat e.” Majority Op. 17 n.7. If that res ult is tr oubling, I submit that it is caused by the plain la nguage of a s tatut e with anexce edi ngl

y br oads cop e. See 18 U.S.C . § 1951(a )-(b) (extending the Hobbs Act to “[w]hoeve r in an

y way o r degree

. . . a ffe ct s co mme rc e . . . by rob be ry ” a nd de fin in g “ co mme rc e” a s “ all . . . commerce ove r which the Uni ted States ha s jurisdiction ” ( emp has is add ed) ); see also Parke s, 49 7 F .3dat 230

. I n an y eve nt , I am n ot argui ng that

“a r ob ber y t arget in g $1 00 f r om th e s ale o f wheat , gr avel , or pres cription drugs would all but automa tically mee t the H ob bs Act ’s ju r is di ct io nal r equ ir eme nt .” Majority Op. 17 n.7 (emphasis added). I am arguing tha t, if a jury were properly instructed about Congress’s author

ity to regulate e ven a c ertain type of int ra- state commerce, then w e could be confident that the jury would ma ke the required “inde pendent finding” of “c ommerce” simply by vir tu e of th e f act th at the r ob ber

y t arget ed thi s ty

pe o f c om mer ce. I t i s , f ur th er mo r e, h igh ly i mp r ob abl e t hat a f ede r al p r os ecu to r

would ever

br in g a H ob bs Act pros ecution ba sed on a robbery of $100 in grave l proceeds. The majority does not seem to understand that, given the ex tremely low showing required to demonstrate “commerce ” for pu r po s es of

th e Ho bb s Act

(e venun der

th e ma jo r it y’s con s tr ain ed r eadi ng o f o ur cas e law ), it is mai nly the discretion of federal prosecutor s (and a la ck of federal resources) that pr events countless petty rob be rie s from be in g p rose cu te d a s fe de ra l c rim es. 8 1 in s tr uct ed ab ou t that law, th er e canbe n o ques ti onth at i t w ould hav e f ou ndth e “co mm er ce” 2 elem ent

s ati s fi ed, evenif

it haddet er mi nedth at the m ar iju ana i n ques ti onwas excl us ive ly 3 homegrown. 4 Acco r di ngl y, I hav e no tr ou bl e co ncl ud in g “b eyo nda r eas on abl e do ub t that th e ju ry wo ul d 5 hav e r et ur nedth e gu ilt y ver di ct evenabs ent

th e in s truct

io n that was giv en. ” Gomez

, 58 0 F .3dat 1 02. 6 “F or

th at r eas on ,” I would “ho ld th at the e r r or inth e ju ry in s truct

io n was har ml es s ,” id. , an d I would 7 affirm the convictions on Counts T wo, Six, a nd Seven. 7 8 II. 9 I hasten to add that I am not arguing that our Court s hould overturn Parkes or Gomez , for I 10 do not think that we should “dispense with the need for a jury finding that e ach e lement of the 11 Ho bb s Act

has bee n p r ov en b eyo nd a r eas on abl e do ub t. ” Parkes , 49 7 F .3dat 2 29. Rath er , I agr eeOf cou r s e, as it

hap pen ed, th e go ver nm ent di d n ot r equ es t s uchan i ns truct

io n, andJ ud ge 8 Lynch did not give such an instruction. B ut this is only bec ause, under the lawof the Circuit at the ti me, s uchan i ns tr uct

io n wo ul d h ave b eens up er fl uo us inlig ht of th e no w- er r on eou s in s truct io n that to ld th e ju ry t hat

th e “co mm er ce” e lem ent

was aut om ati call

y s ati s fi ed b y a f

in di ng that

th e r ob ber

ies tar get ed d r ug p r oce eds

. 9 1 with Parkes

and Gomez

that a jury in a Hobbs Act pros ecution must make an i ndepende nt finding of 2 an effect on comme rce. My point is only that the jury would a lmost certainly make such a finding 3 even if it determined th at the m arijua na inquestion ha d been grown, processe d, a nd sold ina single state. 4 Agai n, fo llo win g Parkes and Gomez

, a j ur y will n o l on ger

be i ns truct ed that

th e “co mm er ce” 5 eleme nt of the Hobbs Act is automatica lly satisfied if the jury finds that the robberies at iss ue 6 targeted drugs or drug proceeds. Absent that instruction, however, it will be come nec essary for the 7 jury to have a fuller account of the mea ning of “commerce” under the Hobbs Act. In this case, for 8 exam pl e, b ecau s e t he g ov er nm ent hadin tr od uce d n o ev

id enc e t hat

th e ma r iju ana at is s ue h ad 9 tr avel ed o ut s id e Ne w Yor k, the g ov er nm ent could hav e r equ es te d— andJ ud ge L ync h s ho ul d h ave 10 giv en— an i ns tr uct io n ex pl ainin g t hat

th e “co mm er ce o ver

whi ch the U ni te d s tat es has ju r is di ct io n, ” 11 18 U .S. C. § 1 951 (b ), enc om pas s es “t he l ocal cul ti vat io n an d u s e of

mar iju ana, ” Ra ich , 54 5 U. S. a t 5

. 8 12 I f that

fulle r acco un t o f “ com mer ce” h ad b eengiv en t o the j ur y, I hav e no tr ou bl e co ncl ud in g that 13 the jury would ha ve found the “commerce ” ele ment satisf ied, ev en if the jury determined that the 14 mar

iju ana i n ques ti onhadbee n gr own , p r oce s s ed, ands ol d s ol ely i n N ew Yo r k. 15 I acknowle dge, furthermor e, that my rea soning does imply that in cases like this one—whe re 16 there was an e rroneous jury instr uction of the type identified i n Parkes and Gomez

—the erroneous 17 in s tr uct

io n will a lm os t al

ways be f ou nd to be h ar ml es s er r or . B ut I do no t thi nk

th at thi s r es ul t i s 18 inconsistent with Parkes or Gomez . The central holding of Parkes and Gomez

is that juries s hould not 19 be i ns tr uct ed that th e “co mm er ce” e lem ent

is aut om ati cally es tab lis hedif th e all egedr ob ber

ies 20 targeted drugs. That holding remains intact even i f the erroneous instr uction will be found to beGiven the fac t that the robberies in this case netted (or attempted to net) huge sums of 9 mo ney , f in di ng the r equ

ir ed e ff ect oncom mer ce was mo r e t hanju s t o ne am on g equally we igh te d in fe r enc es th at the j ur

y “ co uld ” m ake. See Parkes

, 49 7 F .3dat 2 31 n .10

. Rath er , t o r es tat e t he p oi nt , I hav e no do ub t that

a pr op er ly i ns tr uct ed j ur

y inthis cas e wo uld

have i nferred the required effect on interst ate comme rce, eve n if the jury assumed that the robber ies targeted “procee ds of a drug bu sin ess t ha t i s purely intrastate .” Id

. 10 1 har ml es s inth e vas t m ajo r it y of cas es , an d I am c on fi den t that di s tr ict ju dge s will f

ollo w Parkes and 2 Go mez evenif

it is un lik ely that

a Parkes- type error would ever lea d to a convic tion being va cated on 3 app eal. 4 Moreover, nothing in Parkes or Go mez is inconsis tent with the idea that the erroneous 5 in s tr uct

io n i den ti fi ed i n tho s e cas es will b e f ou ndto be h ar ml es s innear ly all cas es . Parkes

, af te r all , 6 suggested in dicta

th at “ a r ati on al j ur

y co uld con clu de that

th e in te r s tat e co mm er ce el eme nt is s ati s fi ed 7 by pro of t ha t a rob be ry

ta rge te d d rug s or p roc ee ds o f a dru g b usi ne ss tha t i s purely intrastate .” 9 8 Parkes

, 49 7 F .3dat 2 31 n .10

. Gomez , moreover, conclude d that “eve n the commercia l effect of 9 ho me- gr owndr ugs . . . has bee n d es cr ib ed b y t he S up r eme Cou r t as ‘vi s ib le t o the n akedeye, ’ s uch 10 th at w e wo ul d i nf er an ef fe ct onin te r s tat e co mm er ce from purely domestic production .” 5 80 F .3dat 1 02 11 (e mp has is add ed) (quo ti ng Ra ich , 54 5 U. S. a t 2 8- 29) . An d ev en u nd er th e ma jo r it y’s r eas onin g, w e 12 would find harmless err or in all Hobbs Act cases involving c ocaine or heroin, as the majority 13 re a son s tha t th ose dru gs must , b y t hei r natur e, t r avel

inin te r s tat e co mm er ce. M ajo r it y Op . 11

. 14 Fi nally, I r eco gni ze that my r eas onin g m akes th e ju ry’s in dep end ent fi ndin g of

com mer ce 15 seem formalist

ic. Unde r Parkes

and Gomez

, the j ur y may not be t ol d that

th e “co mm er ce” e lem ent

is 16 aut om ati cally es tab lis hedif th e r ob ber

ies at i s s ue i nv ol

vedill egal dr ugs . B ut

un der my r eas onin g, 17 af

te r th e ju ry is to ld to mak e an i nd epe nd ent fi ndin g onth e “co mm er ce” e lem ent , the j ur y s ho ul d 18 als o b e in s tr uct ed o n the l aw of “co mm er ce,” in clu di ng that th e Unit ed S tat es ’ ju r

is di ct io n o ver 19 com mer ce en com pas s es mar iju ana that

is gr own , p r oce s s ed, ands ol d s ol ely w ithi n a s in gle s tat e.11 1 T ho s e addit

io nal in s tr uct io ns onth e law

of “co mm er ce” m ake the j ur y’s in dep end ent

fi ndin g ap pear 2 to be a formalism, as the instructions make it virtually c ertain that a rationa l jury will find the 3 “c om me rc e” el em en t e sta bl ish ed in ev er y H ob bs A ctca se i nv olvi ng dru gs. 4 B ut

in s of ar as my r eas onin g m akes th e ju ry’s in dep end ent fi ndin g of

com mer ce s om ewh at 5 formalist

ic, such formalism is no more than a familia r and long-established feature of our jur y 6 s ys te m. Parkes

chan ged th e law

of ou r Cir cui t i n p ar t b ecau s e t he S up r eme Cou r t’ s dec is io n i n 7 Uni

te d St ate s v . Ga udin , 515 U.S. 5 06 (1995), “undid Se cond Ci rcuit precedent that treated the 8 in te r s tat e co mm er ce el eme nt of th e Ho bb s Act

as a mat te r

of law f or th e ju dge .” Parkes

, 49 7 F .3dat 9 227

. Gaudi

n held that the jury—not the judge —is required to make a finding on ea ch ele ment of a 10 cr

im e, i ncl ud in g t ho s e ele men ts , li ke the “ com mer ce” e lem ent of th e Ho bb s Act , that

invo lve a 11 “‘mixed que stion of law a nd fact.’” 515 U.S. at 512 . Nothing in Gaudi n , howeve r, implied that the 12 ju dge s ho ul d n ot

in s tr uct th e ju ry onth e law . I nd eed , Gaudi n r epe ate dly em ph as izedth at, fo r mi xed 13 qu estio ns o f la w a nd fa ct , “ the ju dg e m ust b e p er mi tte d to in stru ctthe ju ry on the law a nd to i nsi st 14 th at the j ur

y f ollo w hi s in s tr uct

io ns .” Id

. at 5 13; se e al

so id. at 5 14 (

tak in g guid ance fr om “the 1 807 15 tr eas ontr

ial of Aar onB ur r

inwhi ch Chief

J us ti ce M ar s hall ch arged th e ju ry t hat ‘le vyi ng w ar

is an 16 act

compound ed of law an d fa ct

; o f whi ch the j ur

y, ai dedby the c ou r t[ ,] mu s t j ud ge[ ,]

. . . [an d] hav [i ng] 17 no w he ar d the o pi ni onof th e co ur t o n the law of

th e cas e[,] [

t] hey will ap

ply that l aw to the facts, and 18 will find a v erdict of guilty or not guilty as their own conscienc es may direct’” (some quotation 19 marks omitt ed; most alterations and emphasis in original)). 20 A jury’s independe nt finding, therefore, appears form alistic in ca ses like this, where one 21 eleme nt of a crime is a mixed question of law a nd fact, and the l aw tha t the judge must explain to 22 the jury makes it virtually c ertain that the jury—if it follows the law—will find the ele ment satisf ied, 23 gi ve n a ce rta in fa ct ua l p re di ca te . H er e, for i nsta nc e, the “c om me rc e” el em en t of the Ho bb s Ac t i s a12 1 mi xedqu es ti onof

law an d f act , an d the l aw that

th e ju dge mu s t e xp lai n t o the j ur y ma kes it vir tu ally 2 cer tai n that

th e ju ry will f

in d the “ com mer ce” e lem ent s ati s fi ed, giv en a f

in di ng that

th e r ob ber

ies in 3 qu es ti oninvo lve d d r ugs . T hat do es no t m ean, of

cou r s e, that

th e ju dge may

tak e t he r equ

ir ed 4 finding awa y from the jury, for criminal defenda nts in our syst em have a “historical a nd 5 constitutionally gua ranteed right . . . to demand tha t the jury decide guilt or innocence on every 6 is s ue. ” Id

. at 513. But it also does not mean that the judge should refrain from f ully instructing the 7 ju ry abo ut

th e law

. 8 T hu s , infu tu r e Ho bb s Act cas es , the j ur

y may not be t ol d that

th e “co mm er ce” e lem ent

is 9 automa tically establish ed if th e r ob ber

ies at i s s ue t arget ed d r ugs . T hat would in fr

in ge o n a d ef

end ant ’s 10 right to have the jury “de cide g uilt or innocence ” with respect to the “commerce ” ele ment. But the 11 jury can a nd should be fully instr ucted about the la w of “commerce, ” and thus the jury can a nd 12 s ho ul d b e t ol d that th e Unit ed S tat es ’ ju r

is di ct io n o ver com mer ce, 1 8 U. S.C. § 19 51( b) , en com pas s es 13 mar

iju ana that

is gr own , p r oce s s ed, ands ol d en ti r ely w ithi n a s in gle s tat e, Ra ich , 54 5 U. S. a t 5 , 22

. 14 To s ummarize: If the jury in this case had bee n properly instructed rega rding the law of the 15 “co mm er ce” e lem ent of th e Ho bb s Act , I hav e no do ub t that it would hav e f

ou ndth e “co mm er ce” 16 eleme nt satis fied, eve n if it ass umed that the marijuana in question was exclusivel y homegrown. The 17 erroneous ins truction, therefor e, wa s harmless , and we should affir m the subs tantive robbery and 18 a tte mp te d ro bb er y H ob bs A ctco nv ic ti on s ( i.e. , Counts Two, Six, and Se ven). 19 For those reasons , I res pectfully dissent.