Illinois Official Reports 

Supreme Court

People v. Price, 2016 IL 118613

Caption in Supreme

Court:

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 

DAMEN PRICE, Appellee.

Docket No. 118613

Filed

Rehearing denied

December 30, 2016

March 27, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that 

court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. 

Steven J. Goebel, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Appellate court judgment reversed.

Circuit court judgment affirmed. 

Counsel on

Appeal

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, 

State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Michelle Katz, 

Veronica Calderon Malavia, Eric Leafblad, and Annette Collins, 

Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy 

Defender, and Todd T. McHenry, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the 

Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellee.
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Justices JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, and 

Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Kilbride specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Damen Price, filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment under section 

2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)), arguing that his 

natural life sentence for first degree murder was void. The trial court dismissed the petition. 

The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded for resentencing. 2014 IL App (1st) 

130037-U, ¶ 31. In light of our decision in People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, in which we 

abolished the so-called “void sentence rule,” we reverse the judgment of the appellate court 

and affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing defendant’s petition.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 In November 1996, following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant 

was convicted of aggravated arson and the first degree murder of 4-year-old Curtis Jones, Jr., 

who died in the fire. Defendant had requested separate verdict forms for the various theories of 

murder charged by the State (intentional, knowing, and felony murder), but the trial court 

denied that request. The jury thus returned a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder and 

aggravated arson. The same jury found defendant death-penalty eligible but determined he 

should not be sentenced to death. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of natural life 

imprisonment for murder and a consecutive term of 30 years’ imprisonment for aggravated 

arson. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. People v. Price, 303 

Ill. App. 3d 1101 (1999) (table) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 4 In April 2000 and again in February 2003, defendant unsuccessfully pursued relief under 

the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)). Thereafter, in 

September 2010, defendant sought relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of 

Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)), again without success. Defendant did not 

challenge, on direct review or on collateral review, the trial court’s denial of his request for 

separate verdict forms. 

¶ 5 In February 2012, defendant filed his second pro se petition under section 2-1401, which is 

the subject of this appeal. Defendant recognized that section 2-1401 petitions must be filed 

“not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment” (735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 

2012)) but asserted that the statutory time bar did not apply because he was seeking relief from 

judgment on “voidness grounds.” See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2012). Defendant argued 

that under People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1 (2009), the trial court erred in denying his request for 

separate verdict forms and therefore “lacked the power and authority to render judgment.” 

Defendant maintained that the appropriate remedy was to interpret the jury’s general verdict as 

a verdict on felony murder and remand for resentencing. Although the trial court appointed 

counsel for defendant, the court allowed him to proceed pro se, upon defendant’s request. The 
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trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s petition, agreeing with the State 

that the underlying judgment was not void and Smith did not apply retroactively on collateral 

review. 

¶ 6 The appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing on felony murder alone. 2014 

IL App (1st) 130037-U, ¶ 31. The appellate court first rejected the State’s argument that 

defendant’s section 2-1401 petition was time-barred. The appellate court explained that 

defendant claimed “his sentence of natural life imprisonment was not authorized by statute and 

is therefore void” and “[w]hen a defendant challenges a void judgment, the two-year limitation 

does not apply.” Id. ¶ 15. On the merits, the appellate court held that the rule regarding special 

verdict forms announced in Smith was reaffirmed in People v. Bailey, 2013 IL 113690, and 

the rule applied retroactively on collateral review. 2014 IL App (1st) 130037-U, ¶¶ 18-19, 25. 

¶ 7 We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). 

¶ 8 Shortly after the State filed its opening brief in this court, we announced our decision in 

Castleberry, abolishing the void sentence rule. At oral argument, questions arose as to the 

applicability of Castleberry. We subsequently ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs 

addressing two issues: whether Castleberry “should apply retroactively [to] matters on 

collateral review” and, if so, “what impact would that have on the instant case.” 

¶ 9 As discussed below, we hold that, in light of Castleberry, defendant’s section 2-1401 

petition was untimely and properly dismissed. 

¶ 10 ANALYSIS 

¶ 11 I 

¶ 12 As a preliminary matter, we consider defendant’s forfeiture argument. Defendant contends 

that, even if Castleberry could apply retroactively to his case, the State forfeited any argument 

that his section 2-1401 petition was untimely. We disagree. The issue is not simply whether 

defendant’s petition was untimely, an issue the State pursued in the courts below. The issue is 

whether defendant’s petition was untimely based on retroactive application of our decision in 

Castleberry. The State could not have addressed that issue until Castleberry was decided, 

which did not occur until after the State filed its opening brief. The State did, however, 

recognize the potential significance of Castleberry when it noted in both its petition for leave 

to appeal as well as its brief that whether a statutorily nonconforming sentence is void or 

voidable was then pending before this court in Castleberry. The State suggested that we hold 

its petition for leave to appeal in abeyance pending our decision in Castleberry, but we elected 

to allow the State’s petition. After we announced our decision in Castleberry abolishing the 

void sentence rule, this court had the discretion to order the parties to brief the impact of 

Castleberry on this case. Under these circumstances, we reject defendant’s forfeiture 

argument. 

¶ 13 We also note that while this case was pending before this court, our appellate court 

considered the retroactivity of Castleberry but did not come to a uniform conclusion. Compare 

People v. Smith, 2016 IL App (1st) 140887, ¶ 30 (holding that Castleberry did not announce a 

new rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion) and, thus, cannot be 

applied retroactively on collateral review), pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 121060 (filed 

Jul. 18, 2016), with People v. Stafford, 2016 IL App (4th) 140309, ¶ 33 (holding that because 

Castleberry did not establish a new rule under Teague, its holding does apply retroactively), 
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pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 121393 (filed Oct. 4, 2016), and People v. Cashaw, 2016 

IL App (4th) 140759, ¶¶ 35-40 (holding that Teague does not control and Castleberry applies 

retroactively to collateral proceedings), pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 121485 (filed 

Oct. 26, 2016). To the extent it could be argued that the State failed to pursue the timeliness 

issue, we have the authority to “overlook any forfeiture in the interest of maintaining a sound 

and uniform body of precedent.” Klaine v. Southern Illinois Hospital Services, 2016 IL 

118217, ¶ 41. For this further reason, we reject defendant’s forfeiture argument and consider 

the retroactivity issue that we directed the parties to brief. 

¶ 14 II

¶ 15 In People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995), we held that a “sentence which does not 

conform to a statutory requirement is void,” and the appellate court has the “authority to 

correct it at any time.” Thus, in Arna, we rejected the defendant’s argument that the appellate 

court was without authority to correct his sentence, sua sponte, on direct review. Id. at 112-13. 

So began the history of the “void sentence rule.”

¶ 16 Arna implicitly relied on the then-prevailing view that a court which lacks the “inherent 

power” to enter the particular judgment involved renders that judgment void. Id. at 113 (citing 

People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1 (1987)). Although we anticipated that, as a general rule, the State 

and the courts, rather than defendants, would be raising Arna errors (People v. Garcia, 179 Ill. 

2d 55, 75 (1997)), defendants embraced Arna’s void sentence rule because it allowed them to 

attack a statutorily nonconforming sentence at any time, in any court, either directly or 

collaterally (see People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 27 (2004)). Thus, as to defendants, the 

void sentence rule functioned as a judicially created exception to the forfeiture doctrine. 

People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 302 (2011) (“challenge to an alleged void order is not 

subject to forfeiture”); Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d at 27 (“argument that an order or judgment is 

void is not subject to waiver”).

¶ 17 Castleberry abolished the void sentence rule because it was constitutionally unsound. 

Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 1, 19. Specifically, Castleberry determined that the “inherent 

power” view of jurisdiction, on which the rule was based, could not be reconciled with the 

constitutional grant of jurisdiction and was at odds with opinions from this court rejecting that 

view of jurisdiction in the civil context. Id. ¶ 18. Thus, pursuant to Castleberry, a statutorily 

nonconforming sentence is not void; it is merely voidable and subject to the usual rules of 

forfeiture or other procedural restraints. Id. ¶¶ 11-18. In addition to our constitutional 

jurisprudence, Castleberry relied on the policy favoring finality of judgments. Id. ¶ 15 (citing 

LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129). After Castleberry, a reviewing court may no 

longer, sua sponte, correct a statutorily nonconforming sentence (id. ¶¶ 20-24), the State may 

no longer seek to correct such a sentence on direct review but must seek a writ of mandamus to 

do so (id. ¶¶ 26-27), and a defendant may no longer rely on the void sentence rule to overcome 

forfeiture of a claimed sentencing error or to challenge a statutorily nonconforming sentence in 

perpetuity (id. ¶¶ 17-19). See also People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 33 (stating that after 

Castleberry, it is “no longer valid” to argue that a sentence that does not conform to a statutory 

requirement is void). 

¶ 18 As directed by this court, both parties filed supplemental briefs addressing whether 

Castleberry applies to matters on collateral review. Although both parties rely on the 
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retroactivity analysis set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), adopted by this court in 

People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 (1990), they come to different conclusions. The State argues 

that the rule announced in Castleberry is akin to a substantive rule as defined in Teague and, 

thus, applies retroactively to matters on collateral review. Defendant argues that the rule 

announced in Castleberry does not qualify as a new substantive rule or a watershed rule of 

criminal procedure under Teague and, thus, does not apply retroactively to matters on 

collateral review. We disagree with the parties that Teague controls the retroactivity question. 

¶ 19 The Supreme Court’s decision in Teague is a refinement of its earlier retroactivity 

jurisprudence that arose largely in response to the expansion of the rights of criminal 

defendants in the 1960s. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Harlan, J., 

concurring in the judgments in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that the Court’s 

retroactivity doctrine, which came into being in 1965, was the “product of the Court’s 

disquietude with the impacts of its fast-moving pace of constitutional innovation in the 

criminal field”); Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane

Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of 

the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. Rev. 161, 166-67 (2005). Having expanded the constitutional 

rights of criminal defendants, the Court was faced with the question of which defendants 

should receive the benefit from those changes in the law. Entzeroth, supra, at 166-67. 

¶ 20 The Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence distinguished between (i) cases on direct review at 

the time a new rule is announced, i.e., those cases in which the conviction is not yet final, and 

(ii) cases on collateral review at the time a new rule is announced, i.e., those cases in which the 

conviction is final. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004). Teague addressed the 

latter situation, clarifying and limiting the circumstances under which a defendant whose 

conviction was final could claim the benefit of a new rule. Id.; Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. 

¶ 21 Underlying the application of the Teague analysis is the notion that the new rule, had it 

been in effect at the time of trial, could have made a difference in the outcome. In Teague, for 

example, the defendant, who was convicted by an all-white jury, sought to benefit from the 

Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which was decided after his 

conviction became final. 

¶ 22 Here, the rule we adopted in Castleberry can make no difference in the outcome of a 

criminal trial. We simply eliminated the void sentence rule. Neither the void sentence rule nor 

its elimination impacts the accuracy of a defendant’s conviction, the accuracy or 

constitutionality of a sentence, or the fundamental fairness of a defendant’s trial. In short, 

Castleberry did not change any rule affecting the conduct of criminal prosecutions. 

Castleberry comes into play, if at all, only after judgment is rendered in the criminal trial. 

Thus, the Teague analysis is simply not triggered here. 

¶ 23 This conclusion finds support in Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1257 

(2016). There, the Supreme Court explained that the Teague retroactivity framework creates a 

balance between the need for finality in criminal cases and the countervailing need to ensure 

that criminal punishment is only imposed when authorized by law. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 

1266. This balance depends “on whether the new rule itself has a procedural function or a 

substantive function—that is, whether it alters only the procedures used to obtain the 

conviction, or alters instead the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes.” Id.

at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1266. Castleberry does neither. 
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¶ 24 Although defendant recognizes that Castleberry, like Arna, “does not create or affect the 

underlying error” (here, defendant’s allegedly unlawful sentence), defendant nonetheless 

argues that Teague controls the retroactivity issue. Application of Teague to our decision in 

Castleberry, in the manner defendant urges, would turn Teague on its head. Defendant would 

use Teague to prevent the application of a new rule (Castleberry’s abolition of the void 

sentence rule) to his section 2-1401 petition and to benefit from application of an old rule 

(Arna’s void sentence rule). This is not how Teague functions. See Cashaw, 2016 IL App (4th) 

140759, ¶ 39 (“defendant cannot rely on the framework of Teague to argue that a new rule 

should not apply, when the defendant is seeking to overturn an old judgment”). 

¶ 25 We emphasize that when we ask whether a new rule or decision of this court should apply 

to “matters on collateral review,” the “matter” to which we are referring is defendant’s 

underlying conviction or sentence. Thus, when we conclude, based on Teague and its progeny, 

that a new rule should apply retroactively to “matters on collateral review,” what we mean is 

that we will treat the new rule as if it were in existence at the time of, and applied to, the trial 

proceeding being challenged by the defendant in his or her collateral pleading. In this respect, 

the issue we directed the parties to brief—whether Castleberry “should apply [to] matters on 

collateral review”—was misleading. The issue assumed that Castleberry “could” be applied to 

a defendant’s conviction or sentence and the only question was whether, under Teague, it 

“should” be applied where the conviction and sentence were final and were challenged on 

collateral review. This assumption was incorrect because, as discussed above, Castleberry has 

no application to criminal trials to begin with, rendering the Teague analysis inapplicable. 

¶ 26 The question yet remains whether the rule announced in Castleberry should apply to 

defendant’s section 2-1401 petition, which was pending before this court when Castleberry

was decided. The answer is “yes.”

¶ 27 Unquestionably, Castleberry applies not only to the parties in that case but also 

prospectively. As we recognized in Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 33, after our decision in 

Castleberry, it is “no longer valid” to argue that a sentence that does not conform to a statutory 

requirement is void. As to defendant’s case, in which his section 2-1401 petition was pending 

in the appellate pipeline at the time Castleberry was announced, we turn to our general rule of 

retroactivity. Under this rule, our decisions apply to “all cases that are pending when the 

decision is announced, unless this court directs otherwise.” People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 

358, 365 (1996); accord People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 75 (1999). This rule applies where, as 

here, the Teague retroactivity analysis does not apply. See Granados, 172 Ill. 2d at 365. 

¶ 28 In Castleberry, we did not limit the reach of our decision, and defendant offers no equitable 

or other reason that militates against applying Castleberry to his pending section 2-1401 

petition. Indeed, not applying Castleberry would thwart the very policy espoused in that 

decision—preserving the finality of judgments—by permitting defendants to continue to argue 

that a statutorily nonconforming sentence is void. See Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 15 

(citing LVNV Funding, 2015 IL 116129). 

¶ 29 Defendant argues, however, that Castleberry is irrelevant because it only dealt with one 

type of void judgment. According to defendant, a judgment is also void “where it was imposed 

in violation of a substantive new rule,” as defined by Teague and its progeny. Defendant 

maintains that his sentence was imposed in violation of a substantive new rule—the rule 
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announced in Smith and Bailey regarding special verdict forms—and is void, allowing his 

late-filed section 2-1401 petition to proceed. 

¶ 30 Void judgments occupy a “unique place” in our legal system. (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Id. When we say that a judgment is void, that judgment may be challenged “at any 

time, either directly or collaterally, and the challenge is not subject to forfeiture or other 

procedural restraints.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Therefore, only the most 

fundamental defects warrant declaring a judgment void. Id. 

¶ 31 This court has recognized only three circumstances in which a judgment will be deemed 

void: (1) where the judgment was entered by a court that lacked personal or subject-matter 

jurisdiction, (2) where the judgment was based on a statute that is facially unconstitutional and 

void ab initio, and (3) where a judgment of sentence did not conform to a statutory requirement 

(the void sentence rule). Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 31-33. Castleberry eliminated the 

third type of void judgment, thus narrowing the universe of judgments subject to attack in 

perpetuity. 

¶ 32 Defendant would have us reverse course and expand our voidness doctrine by declaring as 

void all judgments of conviction and sentence that do not conform to a later announced 

substantive rule, although the judgment conformed to constitutional standards at the time of 

trial. We decline to do so. If a new rule qualifies as a “substantive rule” under Teague, then 

defendants whose convictions are final may seek the benefit of that rule through appropriate 

collateral proceedings. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729 

(2016) (“when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the 

Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule”). 

Declaring the underlying judgments “void” is not warranted. 

¶ 33 Finally, defendant argues that even if this court applies Castleberry to his pro se section 

2-1401 petition, its only theoretical relevance concerns whether he chose the proper vehicle in 

which to challenge his sentence, i.e., whether he correctly labeled the pleading a petition for 

relief from judgment or whether he should have labeled it a motion for leave to file a 

successive postconviction petition. Citing People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45 (2005), 

defendant contends that not addressing the merits of his underlying claim would be unduly 

harsh where he used the wrong heading on his petition. Thus, defendant seeks to have this 

court recharacterize his section 2-1401 petition as a successive postconviction petition that 

satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test. 

¶ 34 In Shellstrom, we reaffirmed, in conformity with our precedents, that the circuit court may 

treat a pro se petitioner’s pleading, alleging a deprivation of a constitutional right, as a 

postconviction petition although the pleading was not labeled as such. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d at 

51-53. Shellstrom does not support defendant’s argument for recharacterizing a pro se

pleading for the first time on appeal before this court. We also agree with the State that 

defendant should not be permitted to avoid satisfying the cause-and-prejudice test for 

successive postconviction petitions by appealing to the “spirit” of Shellstrom. 

¶ 35 For the reasons stated above, we hold that Castleberry applies to defendant’s section 

2-1401 petition that was pending at the time Castleberry was decided. Accordingly, defendant 

cannot rely on the void sentence rule, which Castleberry eliminated, to escape the two-year 

statutory time bar. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c), (f) (West 2012). Defendant’s petition was 

untimely. We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of 
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the trial court dismissing defendant’s petition.

¶ 36 Appellate court judgment reversed. 

¶ 37 Circuit court judgment affirmed. 

¶ 38 JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring: 

¶ 39 Although I agree in principle with the majority’s conclusion that our decision in People v. 

Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, should apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, I do not 

believe that defendant’s claims should be resolved under Castleberry. Instead, I would address 

the issue actually raised by the State and presented by the parties in their original briefs to this 

court. See People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 323-24 (2010) (observing the well-established 

principle that a reviewing court should honor the parties’ presentation of the issues on appeal 

and should not raise new issues). 

¶ 40 In 2012, defendant filed an untimely pro se section 2-1401 petition seeking relief from his 

natural life sentence under the rule on special verdict forms in murder cases announced in 

People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1 (2009). Subsequent to the filing of defendant’s petition, Smith

was reaffirmed in People v. Bailey, 2013 IL 113690, ¶ 57. In Bailey, this court expressly 

“reaffirm[ed] our holding in Smith that ‘where, as here, specific findings by the jury with 

regard to the offenses charged could result in different sentencing consequences, favorable to 

the defendant, specific verdict forms must be provided upon request and the failure to provide 

them is an abuse of discretion.’ ” Bailey, 2013 IL 113690, ¶ 57 (quoting Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 

23). When a trial court violates that rule, “ ‘the appropriate remedy is to interpret the general 

verdict as a finding on felony murder’ and to impose sentence accordingly.” Bailey, 2013 IL 

113690, ¶ 61 (quoting Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 28). 

¶ 41 Relying exclusively on Smith, defendant argued that his section 2-1401 petition was 

exempt from the ordinary two-year filing deadline because his challenge constituted an attack 

on a void judgment. The State moved to dismiss defendant’s petition, asserting two grounds: 

(1) the judgment was not void and therefore defendant’s petition was untimely, and (2) Smith

did not apply retroactively to defendant’s 1996 conviction. The trial court granted the State’s 

motion to dismiss, finding that defendant had failed to advance a claim or defense that would 

entitle him to relief because Smith announced a new rule of criminal procedure and that 

decision did not apply retroactively to defendant’s case.

¶ 42 The appellate court reversed, rejecting the State’s challenge to the timeliness of the 

petition, holding that “[w]hen a defendant challenges a void judgment, the two-year time 

limitation does not apply.” 2014 IL App (1st) 130037-U, ¶ 15. The appellate court explained, 

“[i]t is well established that a sentence entered without statutory authorization is void and may 

be attacked at any time, even on collateral review.” 2014 IL App (1st) 130037-U, ¶ 16. On the 

merits, the appellate court held that Smith announced a “new” and “substantive” rule that thus 

had retroactive application to defendant’s case. 2014 IL App (1st) 130037-U, ¶¶ 24-25. We 

granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal from that decision.

¶ 43 After oral argument, this court issued an order sua sponte directing the parties to file 

supplemental briefs addressing two issues: whether our recent decision in Castleberry

“ ‘should apply retroactively [to] matters on collateral review’ ” and, if so, “ ‘what impact 

would that have on the instant case.’ ” As the majority itself now concedes, the issues we 
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directed the parties to brief were “misleading.” Supra ¶ 25. Indeed, I believe our sua sponte

order for supplemental briefing unwisely raised entirely new issues with arguable relevance to 

this appeal. 

¶ 44 In my opinion, Castleberry has limited, if any, application to this case and is certainly not 

dispositive. Our holding in Castleberry, the abolition of the void sentence rule, has practically 

nothing to do with this appeal. The void sentence rule originated in People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 

107 (1995), a decision that preceded the filing of defendant’s pro se petition by approximately 

17 years. If defendant sought to rely on Arna’s “void sentence rule,” he certainly would have 

raised such a claim in his petition. He did not. That is, of course, perfectly understandable. The 

now-abolished void sentence rule held that a “sentence which does not conform to a statutory 

requirement is void.” Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113. Because the void sentence rule depends on the 

construction of a sentencing statute, it presents a completely different challenge than that 

presented under the distinct rule articulated in Smith and reaffirmed in Bailey. The rule from 

Smith hinges on the omission of separate verdict forms in cases involving multiple murder 

charges. Although defendant’s pro se section 2-1401 petition is inartfully written, a close 

reading shows that defendant sought “relief from judgment on voidness grounds *** that the 

judgment or order is void,” and, relying on Smith, claims that “[b]ecause the Court rejected 

[his] request for separate verdict forms, it lacked the power and authority to render judgment in 

this case.” Castleberry only addressed one type of void judgment challenge—a sentence that 

violates a statute. Defendant has never claimed that his sentence was void because it did not 

conform to a statutory requirement; rather, he claimed a void judgment challenge based on the 

rule from Smith. 

¶ 45 Despite the distinction between these two types of challenges, the majority determines that 

our abrogation of the void sentence rule in Castleberry not only applies to a defendant’s 

petition that never relied on the void sentence rule but also requires its dismissal. The majority 

even goes so far as to state that “defendant cannot rely on the void sentence rule, which 

Castleberry eliminated, to escape the two-year statutory time bar.” Supra ¶ 35. This statement 

is unfair to defendant. 

¶ 46 As I have already noted, defendant has never relied on Arna’s void sentence rule. Instead, 

defendant alleged that his natural life sentence constituted a void judgment under the rule from 

Smith. The majority seems to imply, with no explanation, that Castleberry, a decision limited 

to overruling the Arna void sentence rule, now controls all allegations of void judgments in 

section 2-1401 petitions. The problem with the majority’s approach is that Arna’s void 

sentence rule is not the only type of voidness challenge historically recognized by this court. 

See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 31-33 (explaining the types of voidness 

challenges recognized by this court in section 2-1401 proceedings). 

¶ 47 More troubling, the majority’s approach has the potential to cause confusion on the 

application and proper scope of our decision in Castleberry. As the majority explains, “the rule 

we adopted in Castleberry can make no difference in the outcome of a criminal trial” and 

“[n]either the void sentence rule nor its elimination impacts the accuracy of a defendant’s 

conviction, the accuracy or constitutionality of a sentence, or the fundamental fairness of a 

defendant’s trial.” Supra ¶ 22. The same statements cannot be made about the rule from Smith. 

That rule requires, in the appropriate circumstances, the interpretation of a general verdict as a 

finding of felony murder and commensurate sentencing. Bailey, 2013 IL 113690, ¶ 61 (citing 
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Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 28). Thus, in stark contrast to the void sentence rule and Castleberry, the 

Smith rule potentially impacts the outcome of a criminal trial. 

¶ 48 Unlike the majority, I would not graft Castleberry and the void sentence rule onto this 

appeal. Instead, I would address the original threshold issue raised in the State’s petition for 

leave to appeal—whether an alleged violation of the Smith rule on special verdict forms results 

in a “void judgment” for purposes of excusing the untimeliness of a defendant’s section 2-1401 

petition. This was the first issue considered by the appellate court (2014 IL App (1st) 

130037-U, ¶ 15) and was extensively argued by the parties in their initial briefs to this court. 

This approach has the added benefit of not injecting potential confusion on the future 

applicability of Castleberry or the Smith rule on special verdict forms in murder cases. 

¶ 49 As the majority correctly observes, this court has already explained what constitutes a void 

judgment for purposes of avoiding the two-year bar applicable to a section 2-1401 petition. In 

Thompson, this court acknowledged that our case law previously demonstrated three types of 

voidness challenges. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 31-33. 

¶ 50 The first type of challenge is jurisdictional. A petitioner raises a jurisdictional voidness 

challenge by alleging that the underlying judgment is void because the court that entered the 

judgment lacked personal or subject-matter jurisdiction. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 31. A 

section 2-1401 petition alleging voidness based on lack of jurisdiction is not subject to the 

two-year limitations period and may be raised at any time. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 31. 

¶ 51 The second type of section 2-1401 voidness challenge is constitutional. In a constitutional 

voidness challenge, the petitioner claims a final judgment is void based on a facially 

unconstitutional statute that is void ab initio and, therefore, unenforceable. Thompson, 2015 IL 

118151, ¶ 32. A facially unconstitutional voidness challenge may be raised at any time. 

Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 32. 

¶ 52 The third type of voidness challenge formerly available under section 2-1401 involved a 

challenge to a sentence that does not conform to the applicable sentencing statute. Thompson, 

2015 IL 118151, ¶ 33. Thompson acknowledged that this type of voidness challenge was based 

on the “void sentence rule” established in Arna and recognized that this court recently 

overruled Arna and abolished the void sentence rule in Castleberry. Consequently, Thompson

stated that voidness challenges based on the former “void sentence rule” are no longer valid. 

Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 33. 

¶ 53 Thompson’s explanation of the limited types of void judgment challenges is entirely 

consistent with this court’s recognition that void judgments occupy a “unique place” in the 

legal arena. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 15. Because of the drastic consequences of 

labeling a judgment as void, we have explained that “ ‘only the most fundamental defects’ ” 

justify a determination that a judgment is void. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 15 (quoting 

LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 38). 

¶ 54 In Bailey and Smith, this court did not hold that a violation of the rule from those decisions 

resulted in a void judgment or sentence.1 Nor did we find that the trial court lacked jurisdiction 

 

1This point further illustrates the majority’s error in equating a challenge under Arna’s void 

sentence rule to a challenge under the Smith rule. Unlike the Smith rule, a violation of the 

now-abolished void sentence rule resulted in a void judgment or sentence that could be challenged at 
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or that any statute was facially unconstitutional. See Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 31-33 

(recognizing those two types of void judgment challenges as appropriate voidness challenges 

in section 2-1401 challenges after Castleberry.) In fact, no discussion or analysis on the issue 

of voidness appears in either Bailey or Smith. Instead, this court held only that it was an abuse 

of discretion not to issue special verdict forms in specific circumstances in murder cases. 

Bailey, 2013 IL 113690, ¶ 57 (citing Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 23). Under those decisions, the error 

is remedied by “ ‘interpret[ing] the general verdict as a finding on felony murder’ and to 

impose sentence accordingly.” Bailey, 2013 IL 113690, ¶ 61 (quoting Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 28). 

¶ 55 Because a violation of the Smith rule constitutes an abuse of discretion and is remedied by 

sentencing on felony murder, it cannot be said that a violation of that rule results in a void 

judgment. In other words, a violation of the rule from Smith cannot render a judgment void for 

purposes of section 2-1401. See Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 31-33 (detailing the types of 

voidness challenges, none predicated on a finding of an abuse of discretion). Accordingly, 

defendant cannot avoid the two-year filing limitation in section 2-1401, and his untimely 

petition is barred. On this basis, I agree with the majority that the appellate court’s judgment 

should be reversed and the circuit court’s judgment dismissing defendant’s petition should be 

affirmed. 

¶ 56 For these reasons, I specially concur.

 

any time. See Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 13 (describing “void sentence rule” (citing Arna, 168 Ill. 

2d at 113)).