What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2006

COAST GUARD

Status of Deepwater Fast Response 

Highlights of GAO-06-764, a report to Cutter Design Efforts 

congressional requesters. 

The Coast Guard has been pursing

a replacement vessel for its aging

and deteriorating patrol boats as

part of the Integrated Deepwater

System (or Deepwater) acquisition. 

Originally, all 49 of the Coast 

Guard’s 110-foot patrol boats were 

to be converted into 123-foot patrol 

boats as a bridging strategy until a 

replacement vessel, the 140-foot 

Fast Response Cutter (FRC) came

on line beginning in 2018. The 

initial conversions of the 110-foot 

patrol boats proved unsuccessful, 

though, and this prompted the 

Coast Guard to cancel further 

patrol boat conversions and

accelerate the design and delivery 

of the FRC from 2018 to 2007. 

Early design efforts called for the 

FRC’s hull, decks, and bulkheads to

be made from composite materials 

rather than steel. Recently, design 

problems with the FRC’s hull shape 

and weight have raised questions

about the viability of the FRC 

design and use of composite 

materials. 

This report examines (1) the

factors that went into the decision

to use composite materials for the 

FRC hull, (2) the types of 

composite materials that have been

selected for the FRC hull, (3) the 

extent of contingency plans

developed for use if the prototype

hull fails to meet Coast Guard 

performance requirements, and 

(4) the status of design efforts for 

the FRC. 

The Coast Guard concurred with 

the findings in this report.

The Deepwater system integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems, decided 

to use composite materials for the FRC’s hull because, according to 

contractor analyses, use of such materials instead of steel generally offers 

several advantages, including lower maintenance and life cycle costs, a 

longer service life, and reduced weight. Other potential advantages, 

according to the Office of Naval Research, include corrosion prevention and 

decreased damage from impacts. 

The current FRC design calls for the use of two types of composite 

materials: (1) a solid laminate form to be used for the hull and (2) a 

“sandwich” form which is to be used on decks and bulkheads. Composite 

materials are not commonly used for vessels with comparable naval 

operations and have not been used on any prior Coast Guard vessels. 

The Coast Guard does not have a formal, documented contingency plan 

should the FRC fail to meet performance requirements. However, Coast 

Guard officials said it plans to pursue certain mitigation strategies, such as 

repairing deteriorated hull structures and replacing obsolete or 

unsupportable equipment and systems, to keep the current patrol boats 

operating longer. 

The Coast Guard suspended FRC design work in late February 2006 because 

of design risks, such as excessive weight and horsepower requirements. To 

address these and other risks, the Coast Guard is pursuing three strategies. 

The first strategy involves the system integrator purchasing design plans for 

and building an off-the-shelf patrol boat that could be adapted for Coast 

Guard use as a way to increase patrol hours until the FRC design is finalized. 

The first of these replacement patrol boats is to be operational in late 2009. 

The second strategy is to revise the necessary capabilities of the FRC in 

order to allow for modifications to the current FRC design. The third 

strategy is to have a third party reassess the analyses used in the decision to 

use composite materials for the FRC to determine if the use of composite 

materials will, in fact, reduce total ownership costs. 

One of the Current Patrol Boats to Be Replaced by a Fast Response Cutter 

Source: Courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-764.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Stephen 

Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or 

caldwells@gao.gov. 

Contents 

Letter 1

Results 3

Concluding Observations 5 

Agency Comments 5 

Appendix I Briefing Section 7 

Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 27 

Related GAO Products 28 

Abbreviations 

FRC Fast Response Cutter 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

ICGS Integrated Coast Guard Systems 

RFI request for information 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page i GAO-06-764 Coast Guard

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 23, 2006 

The Honorable Harold Rogers 

Chairman 

The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Harold Rogers 

Chairman 

The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Coast Guard has been pursuing a replacement vessel for its aging and

deteriorating patrol boats as part of the Integrated Deepwater System (or 

Deepwater) acquisition. The Deepwater program utilizes a system of 

systems acquisition strategy that would replace its deteriorating 

Deepwater aircraft and vessels with a single, integrated package of new or

modernized assets. This system of systems approach is designed to 

provide an improved, integrated system of aircraft, cutters, and unmanned 

aerial vehicles to be linked effectively through systems that provide 

command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance, and supporting logistics. As of May 2006, the Coast Guard 

had spent approximately $26.7 million on design and test efforts for a 

replacement vessel for its patrol boats. Under the original 2002 Deepwater

Implementation Plan, all 49 of the Coast Guard’s 110-foot patrol boats 

were to be converted into 123-foot patrol boats, with increased 

capabilities, as a bridging strategy until a replacement vessel, the 140-foot

Fast Response Cutter (FRC), came on line beginning in 2018. The initial 

conversions of the 110-foot patrol boats proved unsuccessful, though, 

prompting the Coast Guard to revise this part of the Deepwater program.1

The 2005 Revised Deepwater Implementation Plan reflected the fact that

the Coast Guard canceled further patrol boat conversions and accelerated

design and delivery of the FRC, with the first FRC scheduled to come on 

line in 2007—11 years earlier than originally planned. 

The Coast Guard has been pursuing a replacement vessel for its aging and

deteriorating patrol boats as part of the Integrated Deepwater System (or 

Deepwater) acquisition. The Deepwater program utilizes a system of 

systems acquisition strategy that would replace its deteriorating 

Deepwater aircraft and vessels with a single, integrated package of new or

modernized assets. This system of systems approach is designed to 

provide an improved, integrated system of aircraft, cutters, and unmanned 

aerial vehicles to be linked effectively through systems that provide 

command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance, and supporting logistics. As of May 2006, the Coast Guard 

had spent approximately $26.7 million on design and test efforts for a 

replacement vessel for its patrol boats. Under the original 2002 Deepwater

Implementation Plan, all 49 of the Coast Guard’s 110-foot patrol boats 

were to be converted into 123-foot patrol boats, with increased 

capabilities, as a bridging strategy until a replacement vessel, the 140-foot

Fast Response Cutter (FRC), came on line beginning in 2018. The initial 

conversions of the 110-foot patrol boats proved unsuccessful, though, 

prompting the Coast Guard to revise this part of the Deepwater program.1

The 2005 Revised Deepwater Implementation Plan reflected the fact that

the Coast Guard canceled further patrol boat conversions and accelerated

design and delivery of the FRC, with the first FRC scheduled to come on 

line in 2007—11 years earlier than originally planned. 

 1

The Coast Guard converted 8 of the 110-foot patrol boats to 123-foot boats, but 

discontinued further conversions because the patrol boats were experiencing technical 

difficulties, such as hull buckling on the Matagorda, and were not able to meet postSeptember 11, 2001 mission requirements. 

Page 1 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
During the early design efforts, the Deepwater program’s system 

integrator2

 proposed building the FRC’s hull, decks, and bulkheads out of

composite materials rather than steel. Composite materials, as used in 

shipbuilding, are typically fiber-reinforced plastic laminates consisting of 

plies of various reinforcing fabrics laminated together. While design 

problems with the FRC’s hull shape and weight have only recently been 

made public, Coast Guard engineering officials raised concerns about the 

viability of the FRC design beginning in January 2005. 

In response to your request, we have been reviewing and analyzing the 

design efforts for the FRC. This is part of a large body of work GAO has 

undertaken since 1998 regarding the Deepwater program.3

 On April 12, 

2006, we briefed your offices on four topics, as follows: 

• the factors that went into the decision to use composite materials for 

the FRC hull, 

• the types of composite materials that have been selected for the FRC 

hull, 

• the extent of contingency plans developed for use if the prototype hull 

fails to meet Coast Guard performance requirements, and 

• the status of design efforts on the FRC. 

This report summarizes the findings we addressed at that briefing, as well

as provides more current information on the Coast Guard’s FRC design 

efforts to supplement the detailed briefing slides that we presented to your

offices. Appendix I provides a copy of those slides. 

In addressing the four topics, we reviewed and analyzed a variety of Coast 

Guard and contractor documents, briefings, and studies. We supplemented 

these document reviews by holding discussions with officials from the 

Coast Guard, the Office of Naval Research, and the Naval Surface Warfare

Center. We conducted our work from February 2006 through May 2006 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 2

Under the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard is relying on a prime contractor—called 

the system integrator—to identify and deliver the assets needed to meet Coast Guard 

mission requirements. 

3

Please see the Related Products section for a list of prior GAO products on the Deepwater 

program. 

Page 2 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
The Deepwater system integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS)4

decided to use composite materials for the FRC’s hull form after an 

analysis of alternatives found that the use of such materials instead of 

steel generally offers several advantages, such as lower maintenance and 

life cycle costs, a longer service life, and reduced weight. While these were 

the main reasons given for considering composites, the Coast Guard and 

ICGS have also leveraged information from research performed by the U.S. 

Navy’s Office of Naval Research, which shows other potential advantages, 

such as corrosion prevention and decreased damage from impacts. 

Results 

The current FRC design calls for the use of two types of composite 

materials: (1) a solid laminate form consisting of layers of glass-reinforced 

plastic and (2) a “sandwich” form consisting of two thinner layers of glassreinforced plastic surrounding a core of either balsa wood or synthetic 

foam. The solid laminate form is to be used for the hull, which is to be 

constructed from a mold in a single process. The sandwich form, which 

weighs less than the solid form, is to be used on decks and bulkheads. 

Composite materials are not commonly used for vessels with comparable 

U.S. naval operations and have not been used on any prior Coast Guard 

vessels. 

Even though composite materials are not commonly used in the 

construction of U.S. naval vessels used in military operations, the Coast 

Guard does not have a formal, documented contingency plan should the 

FRC fail to meet performance requirements. However, according to Coast 

Guard officials, the Coast Guard plans to pursue certain mitigation 

strategies to keep the current patrol boats operating longer, such as 

repairing deteriorated hull structures and replacing obsolete or 

unsupportable equipment and systems. Coast Guard officials also stated 

that they are pursuing the option of selecting design plans for a patrol boat

that is already on the market that could be adapted for Coast Guard use as

an interim measure until the FRC design is finalized. In addition, according 

to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard has taken steps designed to help

ensure the FRC’s reliability. First, because the FRC is to employ composite 

materials for the hull, the Coast Guard undertook a series of risk 

mitigation efforts, which are often part of a naval shipbuilding program, 

during the FRC’s preliminary design phase. These efforts included fatigue

 4

In 2002, the Coast Guard awarded a contract to ICGS as the system integrator for the 

Deepwater program. ICGS is a joint venture between two contractors—Lockheed Martin 

and Northrop Grumman—that in turn contract with other subcontractors. 

Page 3 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
testing of composite material panels and joint configurations, as well as 

testing a scale model of the hull, and conducting a third-party design 

review. Second, the Coast Guard intends to conduct a 12-month 

performance evaluation when the first FRC is delivered, though there are

currently no detailed plans as to what the evaluation will entail. 

The Coast Guard suspended FRC design work in late February 2006 

because of high technical risks associated with the emerging design. In 

particular, an independent design review by third-party consultants 

preliminarily demonstrated, among other things, that the FRC would be far 

heavier and less efficient than a typical patrol boat of similar length, in 

part, because it would need four engines to meet Coast Guard speed 

requirements. As a result, the Coast Guard is pursuing three strategies for 

moving forward with the FRC acquisition. The first strategy involves ICGS 

purchasing design plans for and building an “off-the-shelf” patrol boat as a 

way to increase patrol hours currently unmet by the patrol boat fleet. The 

first of these boats is projected to be ready for Coast Guard operations in 

2009. However, according to Coast Guard officials, the off-the-shelf patrol 

boat may not meet Coast Guard performance requirements. The Coast 

Guard issued a request for information (RFI) in April 2006 to assess the 

off-the shelf options. According to Coast Guard Deepwater Program 

Officials, in response to the RFI, the Coast Guard received 26 distinct 

patrol boat design submissions from 17 vendors and is currently in the 

process of reviewing these submissions. They further stated that its senior 

leadership plans to make a decision regarding the off-the-shelf design in 

September 2006. According to the Coast Guard, a second strategy it is 

pursuing is to revise the necessary capabilities of the FRC in order to 

allow for modifications to the current FRC design. Concurrent with the 

first two strategies, the Coast Guard’s third strategy is to have a third party 

reassess the analyses used in the decision to use composite materials for 

the FRC to determine if the use of composite materials will, in fact, reduce 

total ownership costs. The result of the Coast Guard pursuing these 

strategies is that the Coast Guard would end up with two classes of FRCs. 

The first class of FRCs to be built would be based on an adapted design 

from a patrol boat already on the market, to expedite delivery, and a 

follow-on class that would be based on revisions made to address the 

problems identified in the original FRC design plans. 

Pursuant to these three strategies, Coast Guard officials now estimate that 

the first FRC will likely not be delivered until late fiscal year 2009, at the 

earliest, rather than 2007 as outlined in the 2005 Revised Deepwater 

Implementation Plan. Coast Guard officials have not yet determined how 

changes in the design and delivery date for the FRC will affect the overall 

Page 4 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
system of systems approach. However, because the delivery of Deepwater 

assets are interdependent within this acquisition approach, schedule 

slippages and uncertainties associated with potential changes in the design

and capabilities of the new assets have increased the risks that the Coast 

Guard may not meet its expanded homeland security performance 

requirements within given budget parameters and milestone dates. 

A number of factors are tied to the uncertainty surrounding the FRC 

program. First, the unanticipated problems associated with the 110-foot to

123-foot patrol boat conversion program prompted the Coast Guard to 

accelerate the FRC program by more than a decade. In addition, the 

system integrator has chosen to use a relatively new technology, namely 

composite materials, for the FRC hull form. As of May 2006, the Coast 

Guard has spent approximately $26.7 million for design and test efforts on 

the FRC, although it has yet to produce a viable design. Because of this, 

the first FRC will not be delivered until late fiscal year 2009, at the earliest, 

rather than in fiscal year 2007 as outlined in the 2005 Deepwater Revised 

Implementation Plan. This means the Coast Guard will have to continue to 

rely on its aging and deteriorating patrol boats. Moreover, because of the 

schedule slippage and uncertainties associated with potential changes in

the design and capabilities of the FRC, the Coast Guard has increased the 

risks associated with the system-of-systems concept. 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of 

Homeland Security. The Department referred to the U.S. Coast Guard 

which generally concurred with the findings of the report and provided 

technical comments, which have been incorporated into the report as 

appropriate.

Concluding 

Observations 

Agency Comments 

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department 

of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, and 

interested congressional committees. This report will also be made 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be made 

available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 5 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
For information about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9610, or

caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Stephen L. Caldwell 

Acting Director, Homeland Security 

 and Justice Issues 

Page 6 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section Appendix I: Briefing Section 

This appendix contains the briefings slides presented to your staffs on 

April 12, 2006. While we have not modified the briefing slides, we have 

provided updated information in the accompanying letter regarding the

Coast Guard’s three strategies and cost information in an effort to provide

the most current information. For example, slides 17 and 18 provide 

information on the Coast Guard’s strategies to move forward with the FRC 

acquisition and associated program cost data but the letter provides 

updated information. 

Page 7 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

U.S. Coast Guard’s Fast Response 

Cutter: Status of Design

Presented to House Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security

April 12, 2006

Page 8 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

2

Introduction

The Fast Response Cutter (FRC) is slated to replace the 110’ and

123’ patrol boats under the Deepwater system

The FRC is projected to provide greater speed, endurance, and 

operational hours than current patrol boats

As of the 2006 update submitted with the Administration’s fiscal year

2007 budget request, the Coast Guard plans to acquire 58 FRCs

Page 9 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

3

Researchable Questions

• What factors went into the decision to use composite 

materials for the FRC hull form?

• What types of composite materials have been selected for 

the FRC hull form?

• What contingency plans have been formulated should the 

prototype hull form fail to meet Coast Guard performance 

requirements?

• What is the status of the FRC design?

Page 10 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

4

GAO’s Approach

• Reviewed the decision to use composite materials for the FRC hull form, to

include:

• Relevant Coast Guard and contractor documents, trade studies, and briefings

• Discussions with staff from the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program and the

Engineering Logistics Center, the Office of Naval Research, and the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center 

• Reviewed the decision regarding the types of composites to be used on the 

FRC hull form, to include:

• Relevant Coast Guard and contractor documents and trade studies

• Discussions with staff from the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program, as well as

an Office of Naval Research official

• Discussed Coast Guard mitigation efforts and contingency plans with 

relevant Coast Guard Deepwater Program and test and evaluation officials

Page 11 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

5

GAO’s Approach

• Reviewed the current status of the FRC design effort, to include:

• Coast Guard documents, studies, briefings; contractor documents and 

briefings; and independent design review materials

• Discussions with Coast Guard Deepwater Program and Engineering 

and Logistics Center officials

• We conducted our work between February and April 2006 in

accordance with generally accepted governmental auditing 

standards

Page 12 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

6

Briefing Overview

• Decision to use composite materials for the FRC hull form

• Types of composite materials planned for use on the FRC 

hull form

• Risk mitigation and contingency plans should the first hull 

form fail to meet Coast Guard’s performance requirements

• Recent history of FRC design concerns

• FRC re-design options

• FRC program costs to date

Page 13 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

7

Decision to use Composite Materials for the 

FRC

In July 2004, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) decided to use 

composite materials for the FRC hull form

• ICGS’s analysis of alternatives for the FRC found that the use of 

composite materials instead of steel offered advantages such as:

• Reduced Total Ownership Costs

• Increased operational availability (extended time between depot-level

maintenance, decreased maintenance requirements)

• Increased performance through weight savings (higher speed, extended 

range)

An official with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) also cited 

additional advantages such as:

• Corrosion prevention

• Impact damage – less likely than steel to result in a hole in the cutter

Page 14 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

8

Decision to use Composite Materials for the 

FRC 

• According to ONR, some examples of successful use of 

composite material hulls include:

• European naval vessels including British, Dutch, Swedish 

• U.S. Navy Minesweepers

• However, a Naval Surface Warfare Center official also cited 

the following disadvantages of using composite versus steel 

materials:

• Far less stiff than a steel hull, thereby making it more likely to bend

under weight

• Level of confidence in performance and service experience less than

that of steel

Page 15 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

9

Planned Use of Composite Materials on the 

FRC

Two types of composite 

materials are to be used

on the FRC:

• A solid laminate form

consisting of layers of glass- reinforced plastic for the hull

• A “sandwich” form consisting

of two thinner layers of glass- reinforced plastic surrounding a 

core of either balsa wood or

synthetic foam for deck and 

bulkhead

Photos courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard

Page 16 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

10

Planned Use of Composite Materials on the 

FRC

Solid laminate

• Solid, single-skin glassreinforced plastic hull shell with 

attached stiffeners

• Entire hull would be molded

into form in one process

• Low maintenance and life cycle 

costs, longer service life, lower

weight than comparable steel 

hulls

Solid laminate

Graphic & photo courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard

Page 17 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

11

Planned Use of Composite Materials on the 

FRC

Sandwich form

• Thin glass-reinforced plastic 

“skins” separated by a core

material

• Core material will consist of either

synthetic foam or balsa wood, 

depending on location

• Reduced structural weight with 

built-in insulation due to core

material

Sandwich material

Graphic & photo courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard

Page 18 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

12

Risk Mitigation and Contingency Plans

Risk mitigation efforts during the Preliminary Design Phase (January 2005—February 2006) included:

• Model testing of the current design

• Independent Design Review (IDR) of the FRC design

• Testing of proposed composite material panels and joint configurations

Because of potential use of composite materials, Coast Guard intends to 

conduct a 12-month performance evaluation on the first FRC before

ordering follow-on cutters

• Although the first FRC was to be delivered in 2007, per the revised 2005

Deepwater plan, there are currently no detailed plans as to what this

evaluation will entail

While there is no documented contingency plan, according to a Coast 

Guard Deepwater Program official, should the first FRC fail to meet 

performance requirements, the Coast Guard would pursue further 

sustainment of the current 110-ft patrol boat fleet while reviewing other alternatives to reduce risk by exploring existing designs

Page 19 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

13

Recent History of FRC Design Concerns

Concerns about the FRC design have been raised since January 2005

• January 2005 • Coast Guard Engineering Logistics Center (ELC) provided significant 

comments to ICGS’s initial Concept Design Report, outlining concerns about 

the hull form, potential speed, and propulsion plant studies, among others

• April 2005 • Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office and ICGS held a Systems 

Requirements Review 

• Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office focused on weight reduction

strategies, with little to no attention on design concerns

• May 2005 • Coast Guard ELC published a white paper formally outlining design concerns, such as the design process, estimated weight increases, hull form and 

propulsion

• According to Deepwater Program officials, they acknowledged ELC’s concerns

and determined further testing was necessary to validate them

Page 20 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

14

Recent History of FRC Design Concerns

• August 2005

• Due to its continued design concerns, Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office

asked for an IDR

• ICGS contracted with John J. McMullen & Associates to perform an IDR

• September 2005

• Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office and ICGS held a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and ICGS was authorized to award a contract for detailed design

• PDR considered by Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office to be “successful” because ICGS met contractual requirements

• October 6, 2005

• After PDR, Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office sent a letter to ICGS 

highlighting design concerns such as the hull design and inconsistent total 

ownership cost data, to be addressed prior to Critical Design Review

Page 21 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

15

Recent History of FRC Design Concerns

• January 2006 • Due to preliminary model test observations ICGS identified cavitation

(which can lead to engine inefficiencies and potential structural damage)

as a concern with the FRC’s hull form and presented an issue paper and 

briefing to Coast Guard officials

• Coast Guard authorized additional testing to explore potential cavitation

problems

• February 14, 2006 • John J. McMullen & Associates provided a briefing on preliminary IDR 

results that, among other things, noted:

• FRC preliminary design was unlike those typically found for patrol

boats. For example, at 330 tons, FRC is 52% heavier than a standard

patrol boat of similar length; thereby driving hull proportions, required 

power, structural design, fuel load and costs.

• IDR preliminary results validated concerns raised in ELC’s May 2005 white 

paper, as well as the initial concerns raised in early 2005

Page 22 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

16

Recent History of FRC Design Concerns

• February 28, 2006

• According to Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office, FRC design

work has been temporarily suspended because of high technical risks 

associated with current design

• Risks include excessive weight, excessive horse power, and the likelihood 

of additional problems

• According to the Coast Guard Deepwater Program Office, ICGS

maintains that its FRC design has met contractual requirements and is

withholding any judgment about the design until final IDR and model 

test results are available

Page 23 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

17

FRC Re-design Options

The Coast Guard is pursuing three strategies to mitigate FRC design technical risks 

• Market survey • ICGS would purchase an “off-the-shelf” patrol boat design and if necessary, 

make modifications to meet Coast Guard requirements

• The Coast Guard recently released a request for information to obtain data

about the state of the market for proven patrol boat designs

• Modify current design • Coast Guard would revise planned FRC capabilities to allow for alterations to

the FRC design

• Re-assessment of the composite versus metal business case analysis • Coast Guard would have a third party reassess the composite v. metal 

business case analysis to determine if the use of composite materials is still

appropriate in terms of Total Ownership Cost

Estimated delivery date of first FRC: 4th quarter fiscal year 2009 or 4th

quarter fiscal year 2010

* Please see pages 1 and 4 for updated information.

Page 24 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

18

FRC Program Costs To Date

• Costs of FRC design efforts to date 

• Costs of all FRC test efforts to date

• Fiscal Year 2007 budget request includes approximately $41.6 

million for production of the first FRC

Total $34,542,009 $24,319,056 30%

$1,441,036 $611,991 58%

Proposal preparation for contract & 

detail design

Contract & detail design $14,520,000 $6,390,000 56%

$76,380 $67,065 12%

Proposal preparation for Long Lead

Time Materials

Concept & preliminary design $18,504,593 $17,250,000 7%

FRC design efforts Total obligations Total expenditures Percent unexpended

Total $3,820,071 $685,000 82%

Hydrodynamic model testing $1,989,782 $230,000 88%

Composite material testing $1,830,289 $455,000 75%

FRC test efforts Total obligations Total expenditures Percent unexpended

* Please see page 3 for updated cost information.

Page 25 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Briefing Section 

19

Concluding Observations 

• The Coast Guard has expended about $25 million and does not have a 

viable FRC design to date

• Because the first FRC may not be delivered until fiscal year 2009 or fiscal

year 2010, the Coast Guard has lost time in acquiring the new capabilities 

it needs in a post 9/11 environment

• The longer it takes for the Coast Guard and ICGS to get an acceptable 

replacement for the 110-ft and 123-ft patrol boat fleets, the more the Coast 

Guard will have to rely on aging, deteriorating vessels

• The Coast Guard may have increased the risks associated with the

"system of systems" concept due to schedule slippages and uncertainties 

associated with potential changes in the design and capabilities of the 

replacement assets

Page 26 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Appendix II: 

A

GAO Contacts and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 27 GAO-06-764

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Steve Caldwell (202) 512-8777 or caldwells@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Steve Calvo, Assistant Director; 

Christopher Conrad, Adam Couvillion, Julie Leetch, and 

Stan Stenersen made key contributions to this report. 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Coast Guard
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in Management & 

Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition, GAO-06-623 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 31, 2006). 

Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program 

Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted,

GAO-06-546 (Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006). 

Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy 

Asset Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition 

Challenges Remain, GAO-05-757 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005). 

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater

Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, GAO-05-651T

(Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005). 

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater

Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges, GAO-05-307T

(Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005). 

Coast Guard: Observations and Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 

Budget Request, GAO-05-364T (Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005). 

Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed, 

GAO-04-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004). 

Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year

2005 and Beyond, GAO-04-636T (Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004). 

Coast Guard: Replacement of HH-65 Helicopter Engine, GAO-04-595

(Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2004). 

Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs 

Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, 

GAO-04-380 (Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004). 

Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of 

Homeland Security, GAO-03-594T (Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003). 

Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor 

Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions, GAO-03-544T 

(Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003). 

Page 28 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
Related GAO Products 

Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of 

Effort for All Missions, GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002). 

Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Mitigate Deepwater Project Risks, 

GAO-01-659T (Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001). 

Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Deepwater Project, but Risks 

Remain, GAO-01-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2001). 

Coast Guard: Budget Challenges for 2001 and Beyond, 

GAO/T-RCED-00-103 (Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2000). 

Coast Guard’s Acquisition Management: Deepwater Project’s 

Justification and Affordability Need to Be Addressed More Thoroughly, 

GAO/RCED-99-6 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 1998) 

(440512) Page 29 GAO-06-764 Coast Guard
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