NOT YET SCHEDULED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND 

ETHICS IN WASHINGTON and 

MELANIE T. SLOAN, 

Appellees, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Appellee, 

AMERICAN ACTION NETWORK, 

Appellant. 

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No. 18-5136 

 

APPELLANT AMERICAN ACTION NETWORK’S OPPOSITION 

TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 

American Action Network respectfully opposes the motion of Citizens for 

Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and Melanie Sloan (collectively, 

“CREW”) to dismiss this appeal as premature. American Action Network has 

twice persuaded the Federal Election Commission to dismiss an administrative 

complaint filed by CREW, but twice the district court has set the dismissals aside 

as “contrary to law.” In April, the Federal Election Commission attempted again 

to conform to the district court’s judgment, but one controlling Commissioner 

announced that the Federal Election Commission will take no further action in 

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response to the district court, much less act within the thirty days set by the Federal 

Election Campaign Act, as amended (“FECA”), and specified by the district court. 

Invoking the two district court judgments and the Federal Election 

Commission’s refusal to take further action, CREW has now filed a so-called 

“citizen suit” directly against American Action Network, attacking its core 

First Amendment activities. With this appeal, American Action Network contends 

that the two district court judgments are themselves contrary to law and provide no 

legal basis for CREW’s private action against American Action Network. The 

issues presented by this appeal thus turn entirely on the validity of the two 

judgments below, and there is no prospect that the Federal Election Commission 

will take further action to alter those issues. 

This appeal is thus critically different than the case when it was last before 

the Court. Then, while cross-appeals were pending, the Federal Election 

Commission took action within the allotted time to conform to the district court’s 

first judgment, and CREW filed additional district court proceedings that could 

have affected the issues then on appeal. Now, even CREW agrees that “all 

available evidence indicates” that there is no longer any “ongoing and active FEC 

investigation” that could result in post-judgment filings. Opp. to Mot. to Stay at 

14, No. 18-945 (D.D.C. June 22, 2018) (Dkt. 12). The issues decided by the 

district court have crystalized and are ready for decision. 

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CREW’s motion to dismiss should, therefore, be denied. This Court has 

authority over the district court’s “final decisions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which are 

“judgment[s] of a district court” subject to FECA’s appeal provision, 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(9). The judgments should be reviewed before American Action 

Network is subjected to a citizen suit that depends on their validity. 

I. BACKGROUND 

This dispute began in 2012 when CREW filed an administrative complaint at 

the Federal Election Commission alleging that American Action Network violated 

FECA during the 2010 election cycle. See CREW v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 209 

F. Supp. 3d 77, 83 (D.D.C. 2016). CREW’s allegations have been back and forth 

between the Federal Election Commission and the district court, but there is now 

no prospect of any further action before the Federal Election Commission or 

review of such action by the district court. 

1. The Federal Election Commission’s First Review. CREW’s 2012 

administrative complaint alleged that American Action Network was an 

unregistered political committee between July 2009 and June 2011. But American 

Action Network is a not-for-profit social welfare organization with an issue-centric 

purpose, and precedent has long protected issue advocacy groups from political 

committee regulation. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976); Fed. 

Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252 n.6 (1986). 

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In June 2014, the Commission did not have sufficient votes to open an 

investigation into CREW’s allegations, and so dismissed the complaint. CREW, 

209 F. Supp. 3d at 83; see also CREW v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 892 F.3d 434, 437 

(D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[U]nder FECA, the Commission may pursue enforcement only 

upon ‘an affirmative vote of 4 of its members’”) (citations omitted). In accordance 

with Circuit precedent, the three Commissioners who voted against proceeding 

supplied the reasons for the Commission’s dismissal. CREW, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 

83. They explained that they did not think the charges were supported by fact or 

precedent and believed the case was appropriate for a dismissal based on 

prosecutorial discretion. See id. at 84, 88 n.7; see also Mot. for Summ. Reversal, 

Ex. 3, No. 18-5136 (D.C. Cir. June 25, 2018) (Dkt. 1737659). 

2. The First District Court Case: CREW v. Federal Election 

Commission, No. 14-1419 (D.D.C.), now on appeal. CREW challenged the 

dismissal decision pursuant to FECA’s judicial review provision, and in September 

2016, the district court entered summary judgment for CREW. See CREW, 209 

F. Supp. 3d at 95. The district court acknowledged that the Commission had relied 

on its prosecutorial discretion, but found that reliance irrelevant, stating: 

“[A]n agency’s decision not to take enforcement action . . . is only 

presumptively unreviewable,” and that “presumption may be rebutted 

[by the relevant] substantive statute.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 

821, 832 (1985). Here, FECA’s express provision for the judicial 

review of the FEC’s dismissal decisions, as well as a particular 

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standard governing that review, 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C), is just 

such a rebuttal. 

Id. at 88 n.7. As explained in American Action Network’s pending Motion for 

Summary Reversal, this reasoning was just rejected by this Court, which found that 

“[n]othing in the substantive statute overcomes the presumption against judicial 

review” in this context. CREW, 892 F.3d at 439, 440-41. 

As a result, even though the Commission’s decision was not subject to 

“judicial review for abuse of discretion, or otherwise,” id., the district court 

reviewed the decision and found it “contrary to law,” CREW, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 

92. In so doing, the district court acknowledged that the Commission’s decision 

was consistent with Seventh Circuit precedent, but reasoned that the Seventh 

Circuit was “out of step with the legal consensus.” Id. at 90-92. The district court 

ordered the Commission to conform with its decision within thirty days. Id. at 95. 

3. The Federal Election Commission’s Second Review. The 

Commission quickly and comprehensively reconsidered the record using a new 

standard devised by the district court, and again dismissed in a deadlocked vote. 

See CREW, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 90-92; see also Mot. for Summ. Reversal, Ex. 4, 

No. 18-5136 (D.C. Cir. June 25, 2018) (Dkt. 1737659). The Commissioners who 

voted to dismiss explained that, even under the district court’s new standard, they 

could not find that American Action Network was a political committee during the 

2010 election cycle. Id. 

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4. The Cross-Appeals: CREW v. Federal Election Commission, Nos. 16-

5300 and 16-5343. Before learning of the Federal Election Commission’s decision 

to again dismiss the enforcement matter, American Action Network filed an appeal 

of the district court’s decision. CREW responded by cross-appealing and 

challenging the second dismissal in district court. 

All parties acknowledged that the dismissal of the underlying enforcement 

proceeding affected the timing of the cross-appeals. For purposes of efficiency, 

CREW and American Action Network asked this Court to place the cross-appeals 

in abeyance until the district court could consider the propriety of the second 

dismissal in CREW’s new district court filings. See Mot. to Hold in Abeyance, 

No. 16-5300 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 2016) (Dkt. 1646225). The Federal Election 

Commission also asked the Court to wait for the district court to consider the 

second dismissal, but argued that a dismissal of the appeal (rather than a stay) was 

appropriate. See, e.g., Mot. to Dismiss at 2, 12, Nos. 16-5300, 16-5343 (D.C. Cir. 

Dec. 8, 2016) (Dkt. 1650065). This Court granted the Federal Election 

Commission’s motion to dismiss. See Order, Nos. 16-5300, 16-5343 (D.C. Cir. 

Apr. 4, 2017) (Dkt. 1669311). 

5. The Second District Court Case: CREW v. Federal Election 

Commission, No. 16-2255 (D.D.C.), now on appeal. CREW’s challenge to the 

second dismissal proceeded in district court, where the court again entered 

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summary judgment for CREW in March 2018. See CREW, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 101. 

The district court found that the Commission’s second dismissal decision was 

consistent with its prior decision, but decided it was “contrary to law” for a new 

reason. Id. at 92. The district court again directed the Commission to conform 

with its decision within thirty days, and quoting FECA’s citizen suit provision, 

stated that “[i]f the FEC does not timely conform with the Court’s declaration, 

CREW may bring ‘a civil action to remedy the violation involved in the original 

complaint.’” Id. at 101 (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C)). 

6. The Federal Election Commission Concludes Its Review. Exactly 

thirty days after the district court’s judgment, Federal Election Commission Vice 

Chair Ellen Weintraub issued a statement that she had decided to prevent further 

agency action so that CREW could sue American Action Network directly. See 

Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 2 (“Weintraub Statement”). Commissioner Weintraub had 

voted on each of the two prior occasions to proceed with the enforcement matter, 

and she still believed an investigation was appropriate. Id. But she saw an 

opportunity in the two vacancies now at the Commission: as one of four sitting 

Commissioners, she could prevent the Commission from taking further 

enforcement action by abstaining, thereby depriving the Commission of the legally 

necessary fourth vote to proceed. 

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Commissioner Weintraub issued her statement via Twitter, explaining that 

she was precluding further Commission action because she wanted CREW to 

“pursue its complaint directly against American Action Network” “unimpeded by 

[the] commissioners” who previously voted to dismiss. Id.; see also 

@EllenLWeintraub, available at https://twitter.com/EllenLWeintraub/ 

status/987101164775919622. The two current Commissioners that had previously 

voted to dismiss responded with a statement that they had conformed to the district 

court’s judgment in spite of their disagreement with the district court’s legal 

conclusions. See Statement of Chair Hunter and Commissioner Petersen at 1, 14 

(Apr. 26, 2018), available at https://www.fec.gov/resources/cmscontent/documents/3117_001_v2.pdf (“Hunter and Petersen Statement”). 

7. CREW’s Citizen Suit Against American Action Network, No. 18-945. 

Commissioner Weintraub’s statement marked the effective end of enforcement 

proceedings at the Federal Election Commission. Four days later, CREW filed a 

complaint directly against American Action Network in district court, relying on 

the two prior district court judgments (now on appeal) and the Federal Election 

Commission’s inability to “conform” to them within thirty days. See, e.g., Compl. 

¶¶ 3-7, No. 18-945 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2018) (Dkt. 1). According to CREW, the 

judgments, combined with the Federal Election Commission’s inaction, triggered 

the citizen suit provision of FECA, which states that certain private parties may 

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seek to “remedy the violation involved in the original [administrative] complaint” 

in limited circumstances. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C). 

8. This Appeal. After learning of Commissioner Weintraub’s decision to 

preclude further agency action, American Action Network filed its Notice of 

Appeal. See Notice of Appeal, No. 16-2255 (D.D.C. May 4, 2018). The appeal 

challenges the district court’s two prior judgments, and argues that each should be 

vacated as contrary to law. 

The Federal Election Commission has not appealed, apparently also due to 

Commissioner Weintraub’s recalcitrance. See Hunter and Petersen Statement 

at 1, 14; see also Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 3. But unlike last time (when the Federal 

Election Commission also did not have sufficient votes to appeal), the Federal 

Election Commission has not argued that this appeal is premature. CREW has 

instead adopted that argument, asking this Court to deny review of the district 

court judgments on which its citizen suit depends. 

II. ARGUMENT 

CREW argues that this appeal should be dismissed because an “identical” 

prior appeal was dismissed. But the facts could not be more different now. When 

that appeal was pending, the Federal Election Commission conformed with the 

district court’s judgment, new district court proceedings ensued, and all parties 

agreed that such litigation could affect the issues on appeal. See Mot. to Dismiss at 

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2, 9, 11, 12, Nos. 16-5300, 16-5343 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 8, 2016) (Dkt. 1650065). It 

was thus apparent that a dismissal could “‘promote[] judicial economy and 

efficiency by avoiding the inconvenience and cost of two appeals: one from the 

remand order and one from a later district court decision reviewing the proceedings 

on remand.’” Id. at 10-11 (quoting Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 716 F.3d 

653, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). 

This is no longer true. There is no prospect of further agency action that 

could affect the issues raised in this appeal, and there is nothing to be gained from 

delaying the Court’s review. CREW’s motion to dismiss should be denied, as 

(1) this Court has regularly permitted judicial review where there is no prospect of 

further agency action, and (2) review now follows from FECA, which authorizes 

appellate review of all judgments—including the judgments below. 

A. This Case Is Final Under Circuit Precedent. 

CREW relies solely on the “general rule” that “a district court order 

remanding a case to an agency for significant further proceedings is not” a final, 

appealable order. Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, 231 F.3d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

But that rule “is not absolute,” In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax 

Refund Litig., 751 F.3d 629, 633 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and whatever its application to 

typical remand orders, this case does not fit the traditional mold. It instead falls 

squarely within the “unusual circumstances” that have justified a departure from 

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the general rule and permitted judicial review—i.e., circumstances of agency 

“recalcitrance” and inaction in response to a district court order. Id.; id. at 637 

(Brown, J. concurring and dissenting). Indeed, were there ever an appeal 

warranted under the “unusual circumstances” exception, it is this one. The Federal 

Election Commission cannot take further action because one Commissioner 

announced that she would not comply with the judgments below in order to trigger 

a citizen suit. That suit, which was filed under a unique, FECA-specific 

enforcement provision, depends on the validity of the judgments below and seeks 

to subject American Action Network to further litigation over core First 

Amendment conduct that the Federal Election Commission has twice found wholly 

proper. 

This case is thus far afield from the typical remand scenario, in which a 

delayed appeal can “prevent[] duplicative appeals from both a district court’s 

remand order and an agency’s later action.” Id. at 633. There is no prospect of 

any further agency action, much less any agency action within the long-expired 

thirty-day deadline set by the district court. The Court’s “pragmatic” and 

“flexible” approach to finality amply permits review in these circumstances. 

Carter/Mondale Pres. Comm., Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 711 F.2d 279, 285-86 

(D.C. Cir. 1983); see also U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 

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1807, 1815 (2016) (reaffirming the Court’s long-standing “‘pragmatic’ 

approach . . . to finality”). 

This Court has regularly authorized judicial review where “administrative 

reconsideration of the ruling seems quite unlikely,” Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. U.S. 

Envtl. Proc. Agency, 801 F.2d 430, 438 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal citation 

omitted), or “the agency has not even suggested that any further [developments] 

could be expected,” Capitol Tech. Servs., Inc. v. F.A.A., 791 F.2d 964, 969 (D.C. 

Cir. 1986); see also Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ 

Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 721 F.2d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[I]f the 

proceedings on remand are pretty certain not to generate new appealable issues, the 

appeal need not be postponed to await the outcome of those proceedings.”). 

And here, it is more than “quite unlikely” that there will be no further 

agency proceedings in response to the district court order. See Ciba-Geigy, 801 

F.2d at 438. Commissioner Weintraub has announced that she will prevent further 

action, and she is in a position to do so. As a result, judicial review now “certainly 

could not disrupt the FEC’s decisionmaking.” Carter/Mondale Presidential 

Comm., 711 F.2d at 289. Instead, “judicial review now will hasten, not delay, 

resolution of the ultimate question.” Ciba-Geigy Corp., 801 F.2d at 438. It will 

also help eliminate “uncertainty for the parties.” Pub. Citizen Health Research 

Grp. v. Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., 740 F.2d 21, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 

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Judicial review is thus particularly appropriate now. CREW’s citizen suit 

depends on the validity of the judgments below. This Court’s review should 

significantly hasten the resolution of this dispute by eliminating the basis for 

CREW’s citizen suit. And, even if it does not void that suit, review now will 

eliminate uncertainty about the standards adopted in the judgments below, which 

CREW seeks to apply to the same allegations now presented in its citizen suit. 

Review at this time is also consistent with this Court’s recognition that, 

where “administrative inaction” impacts the rights of a party, “an [entity] cannot 

preclude judicial review” by hiding behind that agency inaction. Envtl. Def. Fund, 

Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Disputes are sufficiently 

final for purposes of review when an “agency either refuses to take particular 

requested actions or fails to act entirely before a deadline.” Coal. for Sustainable 

Res., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 259 F.3d 1244, 1251 (10th Cir. 2001); see also 

Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Costle, 617 F.2d 851, 853 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per 

curiam) (observing that “an agency’s [timely] failure to act becomes, in effect, a 

final decision to reject a proposed course of action, which is reviewable”). In such 

cases, failure “to act constitutes, in effect, an affirmative act” that warrants judicial 

review. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 

It is undisputed that the Commission did not meet the thirty-day deadline set 

by the district court. CREW, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 101. Nor did it again dismiss the 

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complaint, even though FECA “compels [the] FEC to dismiss complaints in 

deadlock situations.” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 839 

F.3d 1165, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 2016). It simply did not act. And by not acting within 

the time period required, the Commission ensured that the judgments below reflect 

the final judicial analysis of the issues now on appeal. 

CREW claims that so long as the enforcement matter remains open at the 

Federal Election Commission, the district court’s judgments cannot be final. See

Mot. to Dismiss at 11, Ex. 3. But finality does not require the formal closure of an 

agency proceeding. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Envtl. Proc. Agency, 

22 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario v. 

Envtl. Proc. Agency, 912 F.2d 1525, 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1990). “Were it otherwise, 

agencies could effectively prevent judicial review of their policy determinations by 

simply refusing to take final action.” Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1095. 

Moreover, even if CREW were correct and the open enforcement proceeding 

precluded this appeal, then it would preclude CREW’s citizen suit as well. Under 

FECA’s linear enforcement structure, the Federal Election Commission must stand 

down before a private party can stand up to pursue enforcement allegations. 

Otherwise, entities like American Action Network could be forced to defend 

themselves—and risk being penalized—in two separate proceedings about the 

same protected First Amendment activity. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. 

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Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (Robert, C.J.) (explaining how FECA 

can result in “chilling speech through the threat of burdensome litigation”). 

CREW’s filing of its citizen suit thus confirms that agency proceedings have 

concluded, and that judicial review is appropriate here and now. 

Indeed, CREW’s citizen suit also establishes that this appeal is timely under 

cases that recognize that orders are sufficiently “final” where they have “legal 

consequences,” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Fed. Labor Relations Authority, 

754 F.3d 1031, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2014), or a “direct and immediate effect” on a 

party, Ciba-Geigy Corp., 801 F.2d at 436 (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 

Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239 (1980)). CREW relied on the judgments 

below, and agency inaction in response, to file a citizen suit that is designed to 

deny American Action Network the protection of each of the Federal Election 

Commission’s two prior dismissals. American Action Network has thus been 

denied the protection of a favorable legal ruling shielding it from adverse legal 

consequences, see Scenic Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 836 F.3d 42, 56 (D.C. 

Cir. 2016), and is currently exposed to the possibility of civil penalties in a 

separate proceeding, Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023, 1027, 1032 

(D.C. Cir. 2016). This is the time for an appeal. 

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B. FECA Confirms That This Appeal Is Ripe. 

Under FECA, an appeal is statutorily authorized for “[a]ny judgment of a 

district court under this subsection.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(9). The judgments 

below are necessarily included in this broad appellate authorization. See Norfolk S. 

Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 31 (2004) (“[T]he word ‘any’ has an expansive 

meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’”) (citation 

omitted). 

CREW points out that the district court had just two options below: it could 

have affirmed the Federal Election Commission’s dismissal, or it could have found 

the decision “contrary to law” and remanded for further proceedings. See Mot. to 

Dismiss at 5. CREW’s argument that remand orders can never be appealed thus 

has broad ramifications that directly contradict FECA’s right to appeal “any 

judgment.” 

Indeed, if ever an appeal were warranted under FECA, it is to ensure the 

validity of district court judgments used to justify a citizen suit. There is no 

freestanding “private right of action to enforce the FECA against an alleged 

violator.” Perot v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 97 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

Instead, the Federal Election Commission has the “sole discretionary power ‘to 

determine’ whether or not a civil violation has occurred or is about to occur, and 

consequently whether or not informal or judicial remedies will be pursued.” 

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Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113 n.153 (1976). That means the Federal Election 

Commission has the right to “determine in the first instance whether or not a civil 

violation of the Act has occurred.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Dem. Senatorial 

Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981) (emphasis added). Before a private 

party pursues allegations that the Federal Election Commission already dismissed, 

an appeal should be available to confirm whether the Federal Election 

Commission’s dismissals were lawful and appropriate. 

On appeal, the statute expressly gives this Court authority to eliminate the 

basis for the citizen suit, as it may “affirm[] or set[] aside, in whole or in part, any 

such order of the district court.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(9). And if it sets aside the 

district court’s judgment, there is no basis for a citizen suit. For where “a district 

court judgment is reversed on appeal, the effect of the appellate court ruling is that 

the judgment was never correct to begin with.” Balark v. City of Chicago, 81 F.3d 

658, 663 (7th Cir. 1996). This means that “[i]f a judgment has been paid 

immediately, it must be refunded.” Id. It also means that if a citizen suit was filed, 

it must be dismissed. 

CREW, as a result, cannot insulate from appellate review the district court 

judgments that could eliminate the statutory basis for its citizen suit.1 FECA 

 

1

 There is just one prior known citizen suit in the forty-four year history of the 

Federal Election Commission, and it was stayed pending an appeal to this Court. 

See Order, Dem. Sen. Campaign Comm. v. Nat’l Republican Sen. Comm., Civ. No. 

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extends appeal rights to “any judgment,” recognizes this Court’s authority to 

vacate district court orders that could trigger citizen suits, and requires action by 

the Federal Election Commission within thirty days of a remand so parties will 

know within the sixty-day appeal window whether the Commission has acted—or 

has finalized the judgment for purposes of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B); 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C). In these circumstances—where a sitting 

Commissioner on the Federal Election Commission has announced that the agency 

will not conform to the district court’s order—American Action Network has the 

right to appeal. 

CONCLUSION 

This Court should deny CREW’s motion to dismiss. The enforcement 

proceedings at the Federal Election Commission have come to an end. The 

judgments on appeal thus include the district court’s final decision on the issues 

now before this Court. This appeal should proceed.

 

97-1493 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 1997) (Dkt. 11). This Court did not reach the merits of 

the appeal, however, because of questions about the administrative claimant’s 

standing to pursue the charges that were not resolved before the matter settled. See 

Dem. Sen. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 139 F.3d 951, 952 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998). This Court did not question the finality of the judgment for purposes of 

that appeal. See id.

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 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Claire J. Evans 

Claire J. Evans 

Jan Witold Baran 

Caleb P. Burns 

Wiley Rein LLP 

1776 K Street NW 

Washington, DC 20006 

Tel.: 202.719.7000 

Fax: 202.719.7049 

July 5, 2018 Counsel for American Action Network

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT, 

TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE-STYLE REQUIREMENTS 

I hereby certify, on this 5th day of July, 2018, that: 

1. This document complies with the word limit of Fed. R. App. P. 

27(d)(2)(A) because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. 

App. 32(f), this document contains 4,059 words. 

2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. 

App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. 32(a)(6) because 

this document was prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft 

Word 2016 in a 14-point Times New Roman font. 

/s/ Claire J. Evans 

Claire J. Evans 

 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on July 5, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing 

document with the Clerk of Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the 

District of Columbia Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system, thereby 

serving all persons required to be served. 

/s/ Claire J. Evans 

Claire J. Evans 

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