Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023 Page 1 of 26

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

William W. Gooden

Mt. Vernon, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

Courtney Staton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Peggy Sue Higginson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 28, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

22A-CR-2634

Appeal from the Posey Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Craig S. Goedde, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

65C01-1806-MR-293

Opinion by Judge Riley.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur.

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023 Page 2 of 26

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Peggy Sue Higginson (Higginson), appeals her sentence 

after pleading guilty to voluntary manslaughter, a Level 2 felony, Ind. Code § 

35-42-1-3.

[2] We affirm. 

ISSUES

[3] Higginson presents a single issue on appeal, which we restate as the following 

two issues: 

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing; and 

(2) Whether her sentence is appropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and her character. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Higginson and Troy Higginson (Troy) got married in May 2011. On October 

23, 2013, Troy called 911, claiming that Higginson “had gone crazy and 

attacked him with a whiskey bottle and that he was bleeding.” (Appellant’s 

App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 77) (internal quotation marks omitted). The State 

charged Higginson with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery the next day. 

As part of a pretrial diversion agreement, Higginson agreed to attend anger 

management and all recommended services, which she successfully completed. 

Accordingly, on April 28, 2014, the charge against Higginson was dismissed.
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[5] On March 13, 2018, at about 4:09 p.m., Posey County Sheriff’s Department 

(PCSD) was dispatched to the Higginson’s residence at 1000 Wade Road, 

Wadesville, Indiana. Troy, who had called 911, reported that Higginson had 

“lost it” and torn “everything up in the residence.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. 

Vol. II, p. 101). Troy claimed that Higginson had a history of violence. 

(Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 101). At approximately 4:11 p.m., an officer 

from Mount Vernon Police Department arrived at the residence and detained 

Higginson. PCSD arrived shortly thereafter. Troy informed PCSD that he was 

afraid Higginson would attack him and that she was “unstable and he was not 

sure what she might do[.]” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 101). PCSD 

advised Troy to go somewhere else for the night and to file a protective order 

the next day. PCSD also informed Troy that there was nothing they could do 

since he and Higginson were married and that either one of them could destroy 

anything in the house and face no criminal repercussions. Before the officers 

left, Higginson assured them that she would stay in a separate bedroom from 

Troy that evening and that there would be no further issues. Both were advised 

to call 911 if things got out of hand. The next day, on March 14, 2018, Troy 

petitioned for an order of protection and a request for a hearing in which Troy 

claimed that he had been a victim of domestic violence. Troy claimed that 

Higginson had destroyed their house on November 23, 2014, and March 13, 

2018, and had hit him in the face with a liquor bottle in October 2013. The trial 

court issued an ex parte order for protection on the same day. The ex parte order 

expired, and neither Troy nor Higginson appeared for the hearing set by the 

court.
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[6] Troy filed for divorce on April 30, 2018,

1 and the final dissolution hearing was 

scheduled for June 29, 2018. In that petition, Troy claimed that he had been 

living separately from Higginson since April 28, 2016. Shortly after filing for 

divorce, Troy filed another petition for an order of protection and a request for 

a hearing, offering the same examples of abuse he offered in his prior petition. 

Due to the parties’ impending divorce, Troy’s petition for an order of protection 

was denied on May 2, 2018.

[7] About a month later, on June 20, 2018, at around 10:24 p.m., Indiana State 

Trooper Zack Fulton (Trooper Fulton) and Deputy Jacob Melliff (Deputy 

Melliff) of the PCSD were dispatched to the Higginson’s marital home due to 

another domestic violence complaint. Higginson was identified as the 

“aggressor in the altercation.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 132). When asked 

what had happened, Troy reported that Higginson had wanted to leave in his 

expensive vehicle. When he refused, he offered to give her a ride to her

stepdaughter’s house in Evansville, which led to a verbal argument. Troy 

denied hitting Higginson. Higginson reported that there was no physical 

altercation, but Troy had attempted to take the vehicle keys out of her hands. 

Deputy Melliff observed no injuries on Higginson’s exposed arms and hands, 

and to avoid further issues in the night, Deputy Melliff offered Higginson a ride 

to her stepdaughter’s house in Evansville. Later that evening, Higginson posted 

1 The record shows that in July 2015, Troy filed for divorce, but the trial court dismissed the matter in March 

2016 “due to lack of prosecution pursuant to Trial Rule 41(E).” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 163). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023 Page 5 of 26

pictures of bruises on her arms and hands on Facebook alleging that Troy had 

physically hurt her that night. 

[8] The next day, on June 21, 2018, Higginson’s stepdaughter dropped Higginson 

at Troy’s home. According to Higginson, she was there to do laundry. When 

Troy arrived later that day, the two began arguing. Troy eventually locked 

himself in the main bedroom while Higginson locked herself in a second 

bedroom, and they communicated via text. Higginson issued provocative 

statements, which included that she had been sleeping with other men during 

their marriage and that she was searching for new partners such as “young fuck 

buddies.” (Exh. Vol. II, p. 70). Troy requested that Higginson leave the 

premises peacefully and “not to make this ugly.” (Exh. Vol. II, p. 66). 

Higginson responded by referencing Troy’s statement of wanting to reconcile 

and asking her to stay the previous night while Deputy Melliff and Trooper 

Fulton were present. Although Higginson finally agreed to leave Troy’s home, 

she demanded to leave on Troy’s motorcycle and asked for the keys. Troy 

refused per his attorney’s instructions and stated that he would give her the keys

after their divorce finalized in the coming week. Troy, instead, offered to drive 

Higginson to her stepdaughter’s house in Evansville. When the two got inside 

Troy’s vehicle, they continued to argue. As they left Troy’s house, Higginson 

texted her stepdaughter, “dickhead is bringing me home.” (Exh. Vol. II, p. 75). 

The specifics of what occurred in the vehicle remain unclear, as Higginson 

offered various versions; however, what is clear is that she fatally shot Troy in 

the chest with her gun.
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[9] At approximately 9:31 p.m., Higginson contacted 911 and reported that she had 

shot Troy. Before making the call, Higginson consumed “25 Seroquel pills” in 

an attempt to alleviate her anxiety before the police arrived. (Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II, p. 60). Soon after, Deputy Bryan Hicks (Deputy Hicks) of the PCSD 

arrived at 1200 Wade Road, which was not too far from Troy’s home, to 

investigate the incident. Deputy Hicks identified a black BMW, which he 

confirmed belonged to Troy, and found Higginson seated on the side of the 

road, while Troy was found unresponsive in the driver’s seat of the vehicle. 

Troy died at the scene from a gunshot wound in the upper chest area. After 

detaining Higginson and placing her in the police vehicle, Higginson explained 

that her firearm was on the passenger side floorboard. When Deputy Hicks 

attempted to question2 Higginson about the shooting, Higginson appeared to be

under the influence of “narcotics given her manner of speech”, and she did not 

offer any information at that point. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 60). 

Higginson was transported to the hospital for an evaluation, and Deputy Melliff 

accompanied Higginson in the ambulance. Although Deputy Melliff did not 

observe any injuries on Higginson from the prior evening when he responded to 

the domestic disturbance, he observed bruising on Higginson’s arms and thigh. 

[10] Four days after the shooting, Deputy Fortune advised Higginson of her Miranda

rights during his visit to the hospital. Higginson stated that Troy was pulling 

2 There is no indication in the record as to whether Higginson had received her Miranda warnings at this 

point, but she did not make any self-incriminating statements when questioned.
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her hair while they were driving on Wade Road, and she responded by 

retrieving her .357 caliber revolver from her purse and placing it on top of the 

purse. Higginson reported that when she asked Troy to stop pulling her hair, he 

refused and asked, “what are you going to do about it?” (Appellant’s App. Vol. 

II, p. 65). In response, Higginson shot Troy in the chest.

[11] After being discharged from the hospital, Higginson had a second interview

with Deputy Fortune, during which she was reminded of her Miranda rights. 

During this conversation, Higginson stated that she asked Troy to stop pulling 

her hair while driving on Wade Road, but he refused, called her a “bitch,” and 

pushed her head toward the floorboard, knowing that would upset her. 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 65). Higginson added that she retrieved her 

revolver from her purse and shot Troy before he could react. She also disclosed 

to Deputy Fortune that she and Troy had experienced fewer than five physical 

altercations but concealed them from the public to protect their car racing 

business. However, Deputy Fortune confronted Higginson with a Facebook 

post showing her injuries and another post written one hour before the shooting 

in which she suggested that Troy needed “some good old-fashioned ass 

whooping to knock some of the air out of his swollen ego[-]filled head.” 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 66).

[12] On June 25, 2018, the State filed an Information, charging Higginson with 

murder, a felony. The State later filed its notice of intent to seek a sentencing 

enhancement for Higginson’s use of a firearm while committing the offense. 

On October 3, 2018, Higginson filed a notice of intent to raise a claim of self-
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defense under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11(b)(2) (effects-of-battery-statute) 

through Dr. Polly Westcott’s (Dr. Westcott) testimony. The trial court granted 

the State’s motion to exclude Dr. Westcott’s testimony and Higginson moved 

to certify the trial court’s order for an interlocutory appeal. We accepted 

jurisdiction and conducted an oral argument. We, however, reversed the trial 

court’s order and determined that on remand, “Dr. Westcott may testify as to 

the objective component of a person’s reasonable belief that they were under 

threat of imminent harm, given their PTSD, but not [to Higginson’s] specific 

subjective belief” that her PTSD, which resulted from domestic violence, led 

her to use justifiable force. See Higginson v. State, 183 N.E.3d 340, 346 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2022). 

[13] On August 23, 2022, Higginson entered into a plea agreement with the State in 

which she agreed to plead guilty to Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter, and 

the State dismissed the murder and firearm sentence enhancement charges. 

Sentencing was left open to the trial court. A guilty plea hearing was conducted 

on the same day, and the trial court accepted Higginson’s plea. The trial court 

then directed the preparation of a presentencing report (PSI) ahead of the 

sentencing hearing. 

[14] The PSI established that, along with the current charge, Higginson’s criminal 

history includes a Class A misdemeanor battery charge committed in 2013 but 

was dismissed in 2014 after her successful completion of a pretrial diversion 

program. In her account of the events leading up to Troy’s death, Higginson 

provided additional statements that she had not previously disclosed. 
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Specifically, she informed the probation department that on the day she shot 

and killed Troy, she had engaged in a physical altercation with him earlier. She 

explained that Troy grabbed her hand and repeatedly slammed it on the 

nightstand to obtain her key. Higginson also reported that when she argued 

with Troy inside the BMW, she feared that he would take her gun and use it 

against her since he was a skilled shooter. She explained that she accidentally 

fired the weapon while holding it with her non-dominant hand. Furthermore, 

Higginson claimed that the protective orders and ongoing divorce proceedings 

initiated by Troy were part of his manipulative tactics to portray her as the 

abuser. Ultimately, the probation department noted that Higginson’s version of 

events during the interview significantly differed from what she had once told 

law enforcement. 

[15] During the sentencing hearing on October 6, 2022, Dr. Westcott testified that 

based on her evaluation, she diagnosed Higginson with Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder (PTSD). Although Higginson had experienced a number of traumatic 

events throughout her life, including a molestation incident when she was five 

years old, as well as physical, sexual, and verbal abuse during her previous 

marriage, which had lasted for ten years, Dr. Westcott concluded that none of 

those events directly contributed to her present PTSD symptoms. Instead, 

Higginson’s PTSD symptoms arose “as a result of her marriage to Troy.” (Tr. 

Vol. II, p. 26). Dr. Westcott explained that people diagnosed with PTSD are 

susceptible to extreme reactions, including the use of deadly force, to seemingly 

minor triggers that mimic past abuse. 
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[16] Higginson then made a statement in allocution in which she expressed remorse 

and requested forgiveness from Troy’s family. However, most of her statement 

focused on the extensive physical and emotional abuse she had endured at the 

hands of Troy. Higginson explained that Troy had been the main perpetrator of

domestic violence and a skilled manipulator who played the victim while 

physically and emotionally abusing her. She also criticized Troy’s family and 

society for failing to recognize the warning signs of domestic violence. Finally, 

Higginson urged the trial court to recognize her as a victim and to treat her with 

the same level of empathy and understanding as it would for Troy.

[17] Ahead of the sentencing hearing, each party submitted a memorandum on 

sentencing. Higginson’s memorandum focused on presenting at least ten 

mitigating factors, while the State’s memorandum focused on the aggravating 

factors. The State’s memorandum also included several exhibits, including Dr. 

Gregory Hale’s (Dr. Hale) evaluation of Dr. Westcott’s assessment of 

Higginson’s PTSD diagnosis. Dr. Hale’s report exposed weaknesses in Dr. 

Westcott’s assessment of Higginson. While he agreed with Dr. Westcott’s 

diagnosis of PTSD, he raised some concerns about the evaluation process. 

Specifically, Dr. Hale pointed out that Dr. Westcott’s report failed to mention 

the mutually combative relationship between Troy and Higginson during their 

marriage. He also criticized the report for relying too heavily on self-reported 

information provided by Higginson when making the diagnosis. Dr. Hale’s 

report further stated, in part, that:
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The PTSD diagnosis does not explain Ms. Higginson’s actions 

nor is it an explanation for killing [Troy]. Individuals with PTSD 

are more a danger to themselves than others. Discomfort with 

their symptoms is usually something they want to avoid and is 

used as justification for suicide. Also, there is no discussion 

regarding other causal factors for the psychological condition 

identified by Ms. Higginson’s actions. Ms. Higginson has had 

exposure to multiple trauma events in her lifetime. Any of these 

events could be a casual factor for the symptoms attributed to 

PTSD. It is unreasonable to assume [Troy’s] violent behavior in 

the relationship with Ms. Higginson is the factor causing PTSD. 

That is not to say that the PTSD diagnosis is inaccurate, but that 

is not an explanation for Ms. Higginson shooting her husband. 

I am concerned the context of this event is not being properly 

explored. That is, Mr. Higginson was shot one week prior to the 

dissolution of their marriage. A postnuptial agreement was filed 

on May 30, 2018, and signed by Ms. Higginson. Obviously, her 

life circumstances were going to change significantly once 

divorced. Thus, the reason for the June 2018 deadly encounter 

might not be related to a history of interpersonal violence but, 

rather, to external factors connected to the current circumstance.

Finally, another issue not addressed thus far is why Ms. 

Higginson would kill her soon to be ex-husband. In evaluating 

women involved in violent relationships, a critical precursor to 

killing the violent partner is a belief that the victim is in imminent 

danger. As I understand the sequence of events at the time of the 

shooting [Troy] was driving Ms. Higginson to his daughter’s 

home. Ms. Higginson had previously stayed with [her] 

[step]daughter the night before when law enforcement drove her 

from their [marital] home to his [step]daughter’s home. As told 

by Ms. Higginson, they were once again engaged in behavior 

common for them. Interesting to me, given her concern about 

Mr. Higginson behavior, Ms. Higginson went back to their house 

the next day to “do laundry.” It is highly unusual for a woman 
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who believes she is in imminent danger to return to a dangerous 

situation and risk an encounter with her abuser. This choice is 

contrary to the behavior of a woman experiencing the effect of 

[battered woman syndrome] and believes she is in imminent 

danger.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 184-85). 

[18] After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court analyzed 

all thirteen mitigating circumstances outlined in Indiana Code section 35-38-1-

7.1. First, the trial court declined to find that the crime did not cause or 

threaten serious harm to persons or property, as Troy died due to Higginson’s 

actions. Secondly, the trial court rejected the argument that the crime resulted 

from circumstances unlikely to recur, as it could not be sure that Higginson 

would not react violently in the future given her criminal history and PTSD 

diagnosis. The trial court also evaluated whether Troy had induced or 

facilitated the offense and concluded that Higginson had caused it by putting 

herself back in a highly charged environment after being safely removed. The 

text messages between Higginson and Troy further supported this finding, as 

they showed that Higginson instigated the altercation while Troy attempted to 

diffuse the situation by asking her to leave peacefully. The trial court then 

considered whether there were substantial grounds to excuse or justify the crime 

and whether Higginson acted under strong provocation, and it found that 

Higginson’s inconsistencies with law enforcement made it difficult to believe 

her version of events or that her PTSD caused her to react as she did. 

Regarding Higginson’s criminal history, the trial court rejected the argument 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023 Page 13 of 26

that she had no history of delinquent or criminal activity and instead found that 

she had a history of criminal conduct involving Troy as the victim. The trial 

court also declined to find that Higginson would respond affirmatively to 

probation or short-term imprisonment, nor that her character and attitude 

indicated she was unlikely to commit another crime. The trial court reasoned 

that it could not definitively say that Higginson would not commit a similar 

crime in the future. Additionally, the trial court rejected the argument that a 

period of incarceration would pose an undue hardship on Higginson’s 

dependents, stating that imprisonment inevitably involved some form of 

hardship. The trial court then evaluated Higginson’s PTSD diagnosis, and it 

ultimately found that the evidence presented did not support a conclusion that 

Higginson’s PTSD caused her to respond with deadly force to Troy’s alleged 

words, actions, or behaviors. Finally, the trial court considered whether to give 

mitigating weight to Higginson’s plea agreement. The trial court determined 

that Higginson had derived a substantial benefit from pleading guilty because 

the State had agreed to dismiss the firearm sentence enhancement and allowed 

her to plead to voluntary manslaughter, a lesser-included offense of murder.

[19] As for aggravating factors, the trial court found that the victim suffered 

significant harm as he lost his life, Higginson’s criminal history, which included 

the dismissed misdemeanor battery charge, the protective order that Troy had 

obtained against Higginson, Higginson’s prior threats against Troy, and her 

dishonest character depicted through the conflicting reports she provided to the 

police and the probation department. After considering all the factors, the trial 
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court determined that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. 

The trial court found that a maximum sentence was appropriate and ordered 

Higginson to serve thirty years in the Department of Correction. 

[20] Higginson now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[21] Higginson asserts that her thirty-year sentence for her voluntary manslaughter

conviction is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her

character. Although Higginson claims to challenge the appropriateness of her 

sentence and her standard of review is limited on this basis, her argument on 

appeal is entirely focused on whether the trial court abused its discretion at 

sentencing. “As our Supreme Court has made clear, inappropriate sentence 

and abuse of discretion claims are to be analyzed separately.” King v. State, 894 

N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 

491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). Therefore, if a

defendant fails to develop an independent discussion to support an 

inappropriate sentence claim, the defendant waives the issue for review. See 

Allen v. State, 875 N.E.2d 783, 788 n. 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Waiver 

notwithstanding, we will address the independent sentencing arguments 

separately.

I. Abuse of Sentencing Discretion 

[22] Sentencing decisions “rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are 

reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d 
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490. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, 

probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. When imposing a 

sentence for a felony, a trial court must enter a sentencing statement including 

reasonably detailed reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Id. at 491. A 

trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to issue a sentencing statement, 

gives reasons for imposing a sentence that are not supported by the record, 

omits reasons clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, 

or considers reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. 

Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to weigh aggravating and 

mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, a trial court 

cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to properly weigh 

such factors. Id.

A. Aggravating Factors 

[23] Higginson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in crafting her 

sentence by: (1) using an element of the charged offense as an aggravating 

factor; (2) considering the facts surrounding the commission of the crime as an 

aggravating factor; (3) improperly considering her criminal history based on a 

dismissed charge; and (3) allocating too much weight to a certain aggravator.

3

 

3 Higginson argues that the trial court afforded too much weight in her attempt to conceal information 

regarding the shooting incident, we, however, need not address these argument as it was a proper aggravator, 

and it is not a cognizable claim on appeal. See Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995) (holding that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023 Page 16 of 26

i. Element of the Charged Offense

[24] Higginson argues that the trial court improperly relied on an element of her 

charged offense as an aggravating factor. As noted, Higginson pleaded guilty to 

Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter. Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1(1)

provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human 

being commits murder. However, a person who knowingly or intentionally 

kills another human being while acting under “sudden heat” commits voluntary 

manslaughter. I.C. § 35-42-1-3(a). While “a trial court may not use a material 

element of the offense as an aggravating circumstance, it may find the nature 

and circumstances of the offense to be an aggravating circumstance.” Plummer 

v. State, 851 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); See also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-

7.1(a)(1) (permitting the trial court to consider the harm, injury or damage 

suffered by the victim as an aggravating factor where it is significant and greater 

than the elements of the offense). “[T]o enhance a sentence using the nature 

and circumstances of the crime, the trial court must detail why the defendant 

deserves an enhanced sentence under the particular circumstances.” Plummer, 

851 N.E.2d at 391. This aggravator is thought to be associated with particularly 

heinous facts or situations. See Vasquez v. State, 762 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind. 2001).

a trial court may consider a defendant’s effort to interfere in the investigation of a crime by concealing 

information to be an aggravating circumstance). To the extent it is not a cognizable claim on appeal, as 

noted, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion by failing to properly weigh aggravating 

and mitigating factors. Anglemyer, 868 N.E .2d at 491.
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[25] After the sentencing court reiterated the provision of Indiana Code section 35-

38-1-7.1(a)(1), its preceding statement was, “as I indicated earlier, obviously 

[][Troy] lost his life in this matter. Uh, I don’t know what damage or loss could 

be suffered by a victim in a particular matter greater than the loss of life. . . .” 

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 145). We agree with Higginson that the trial court’s statement, 

reiterating an essential element of the offense (i.e., the loss of life), cannot be 

used as an aggravator to enhance Higginson’s sentence unless the trial court 

provides additional clarification regarding how Higginson’s participation in the 

crime surpasses the scope of the offense’s elements. 

[26] Nevertheless, we need not remand for resentencing, as here, if we can say with 

confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence if it had 

considered proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances. McCain v. State, 

148 N.E.3d 977, 984 (Ind. 2020). As we will continue to discuss below, there 

were other valid aggravating factors upon which the trial court relied on 

imposing Higginson’s sentence. Thus, we are certain that the trial court would 

have rendered the same sentence irrespective of this aggravator.

ii. Circumstances Surrounding the Crime 

[27] Next, Higginson argues that the trial court improperly considered the 

circumstances surrounding the crime, i.e., the 24 hours leading up to the 

commission of the crime. The State responds by arguing that the trial court was 

permitted to consider the 24 hours prior to the commission of the crime 

“because it goes to the nature and circumstances of the crime and belies 

Higginson’s account that Troy initiated the violence against her and that she 
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was an innocent victim of violence who was pushed to respond with deadly 

force.” (Appellees’ Br. p. 23). 

[28] “‘Generally, the nature and circumstances of a crime is a proper aggravating 

circumstance.’” Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)

(quoting Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 853 (Ind. 2014)). “[T]o enhance a 

sentence using the nature and circumstances of the crime, the trial court must 

detail why the defendant deserves an enhanced sentence under the particular 

circumstances.” Plummer, 851 N.E.2d at 391.

[29] As noted, despite having a safe place to stay following the previous night’s 

domestic complaint episode, Higginson returned to Troy’s residence the next 

day and argued with Troy. In an attempt to further aggravate Troy, she sent 

him text messages threatening to find new partners and confessed to cheating 

on him while they were married. Troy’s response was kind and considerate and 

he requested her to peacefully leave. When Troy refused to give Higginson the 

keys to his motorcycle and offered to drive her, another argument ensued, but 

Higginson agreed to leave. Higginson then shot Troy on the drive home. The 

trial court noted in its sentencing statement that Higginson gave at least three 

varying accounts of how she retrieved her firearm and shot Troy, and while not 

entirely discounting her PTSD diagnosis as the reason for her violent reaction, 

the trial court found that Higginson put herself in a “very volatile situation, 

after having been removed from it” the night before. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 148). Here, 

we find no error in the trial court’s consideration of the circumstances 

surrounding the commission of the offense as an aggravating factor. See Ousley 
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v. State, 807 N.E.2d 758, 760, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that the 

trial court may consider the nature and circumstances of a crime when 

sentencing a defendant).

iii. Criminal History 

[30] Higginson’s criminal history is limited to one misdemeanor charge for the 

domestic battery that was disposed of through a pre-trial diversion program in 

2014. Higginson challenges the trial court’s use of that dismissed charge as an 

aggravating factor. Our supreme court has stated:

Charges that do not result in convictions may be considered by 

the sentencing court in context, but something more than mere 

recitation unaccompanied by specific allegations should be 

shown. We have held that “[i]n order to enhance a criminal 

sentence based, in whole or in part, on the defendant’s history of 

criminal activity, a sentencing court must find instances of 

specific criminal conduct shown by probative evidence to be 

attributable to the defendant. A bare record of arrest will not 

suffice to meet this standard.” 

McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 591 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Tunstill v. State, 568 

N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ind. 1991). Despite Higginson’s successful completion of the 

pre-trial diversion program in 2014, which included her participation in an

anger management program and ultimately leading to the dismissal of the 

domestic battery charge, Higginson continued to engage in acts of violence and 

aggression. In identifying Higginson’s dismissed charge as an aggravating 

factor, the trial court noted that Higginson’s dismissed charge was not a 

conviction but was a “history of behavior” toward Troy and considered the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023 Page 20 of 26

behavior to be “significant” as she was the “aggressor” in that past domestic 

incident and had not been deterred from engaging in further “anti-social 

behavior.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 145). In the given context, the trial court properly

determined Higginson’s record of arrest for battery to be significant because 

Higginson has not been deterred from engaging in additional domestic violent 

episodes despite her arrest. See Belcher v. State, 138 N.E.3d 318, 328 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2019) (where trial court at sentencing considered the fact that Belcher had 

been given prior opportunities to rehabilitate himself through anger 

management and domestic violence classes, but Belcher had continued to 

commit battery offenses), trans. denied.

[31] As a final note, Higginson relies on Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2007) in support of her argument that her dismissed offense, which 

occurred approximately four years before the current offense, should not have 

been considered as an aggravating factor because of its lack of “gravity and 

proximity” to the instant offense. (Appellant’s Br. p. 10). In Douglas, we 

reversed Douglas’ thirty-month sentence because his criminal history consisted 

of convictions that were over ten years old, and the remaining traffic infractions 

were not similar in nature to his offense, i.e., Douglas’ failure to register as a sex 

offender. Douglas, 878 N.E.2d at 877. We find Douglas inapplicable to 

Higginson’s case because her past arrest for domestic battery involved violent 

acts against Troy, the same victim in the current offense. Therefore, we 

conclude that Higginson’s dismissed charge, while only appearing as a record of 

arrest, was relevant, and a proper aggravating factor.
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B. Mitigating Factors 

[32] When a defendant claims a trial court abused its discretion by failing to find a 

mitigating circumstance, the defendant must establish the claimed mitigator is 

both significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 

493. Although a failure to find mitigating circumstances clearly supported by 

the record may imply that the trial court improperly overlooked them, the trial 

court “is not obligated to explain why it has chosen not to find mitigating 

circumstances. Likewise, the court is not obligated to accept the defendant’s 

argument as to what constitutes a mitigating factor.” Id. Higginson argues that 

the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the following 

mitigating factors, namely, (1) that the crime was the result of circumstances 

likely to recur; (2) that the crime was induced or facilitated due to her PTSD 

diagnosis; and (3) that there are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify 

the crime due to her PTSD diagnosis. 

[33] Turning to Higginson’s first contention, that the circumstances that led to the 

crime are unlikely to recur since Troy is “regrettably deceased” and “[t]here is 

no evidence of [her] bad behavior toward other persons” other than Troy, this is 

an argument that the trial court expressly rejected. (Appellant’s Br. p. 12). For 

this proffered mitigator, the trial court determined that it could not “necessarily 

say what would or would not happen” in the future, given Higginson’s PTSD 

diagnosis. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 141). Stated differently, the trial court gave limited 

mitigating weight to this factor since it could not be certain that Higginson 

would not react violently in the same way in case of another incident. 
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[34] As for mitigating factors two and three, which we understand as claims that the 

trial court failed to consider her PTSD diagnosis as it related to those factors, 

our supreme court has held that “mental illness at the time of the crime may be 

considered a significant mitigating factor.” Castor v. State, 754 N.E.2d 506, 509 

(Ind. 2001). With that said, our supreme court has emphasized that evaluating 

the validity of a claim that mental illness deserves mitigating weight requires the 

exercise of “a high level of discernment.” Covington v. State, 842 N.E.2d 345, 

349 (Ind. 2006). The following considerations are relevant when the trial court 

determines the significance of a defendant’s mental illness for sentencing: (1) 

the extent of the defendant’s inability to control his or her behavior due to the 

disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on functioning; (3) the duration 

of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or 

impairment and the commission of the crime. Id.

[35] Dr. Westcott’s testimony was that a victim of domestic abuse might enter into 

“fight or flight mode” based on a triggering event, and it was not “uncommon” 

for such a victim to use deadly force “to try to survive” the abuse. (Tr. Vol. II, 

p. 19). According to Dr. Westcott, the domestic abuse Higginson experienced 

during her eight years of marriage to Troy led to her PTSD symptoms, and she 

suggested that incidents that resemble past domestic abuse may prompt a victim 

who suffers from such trauma to resort to the use of deadly force. While the 

trial court expressed its overall concern with Dr. Westcott’s reliance on using 

“subjective information” solely provided by Higginson to diagnose her with

PTSD, it nevertheless accepted that diagnosis. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 148). 
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[36] Based on our review of the record, we find that, notwithstanding the trial 

court’s acceptance of Higginson’s PTSD resulting from the domestic abuse she 

endured during her lengthy marriage to Troy, other evidence strongly suggests 

that Higginson deliberately engaged in violent behavior, demonstrating the 

ability to control her actions without limitation. As noted, the trial court had 

the opportunity to review Dr. Hale’s report, which provided that Higginson’s 

behavior of returning to a home where she had endured abuse after having been 

removed from it the day before was inconsistent with a person who has PTSD. 

As the trial court pointed out, notwithstanding her PTSD diagnosis and her 

claim that Troy had consistently engaged in domestic violence against her for 

the past eight years, it could not “objectively” understand why Higginson chose 

to return to Troy’s house the next day and put herself in “a very volatile 

situation”. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 148). Based on the trial court’s statement, it is clear

that it considered Higginson’s PTSD diagnosis at sentencing. Despite the 

possible connection between her PTSD and the crime, we conclude that 

Higginson had the capacity to control her behavior, without limitation, at the 

time of the offense. Therefore, as in Covington, we are not persuaded that the 

trial court “erred in assigning some, but not determinate, weight” to 

Higginson’s PTSD diagnosis. Covington, 842 N.E.2d at 349.

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[37] Higginson claims that her thirty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and her character. Although a trial court may have acted 

within its lawful discretion in imposing a sentence, Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023 Page 24 of 26

provides that an appellate court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, 

after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the court finds that the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character 

of the offender.” The primary role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to 

leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and 

those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a 

perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 

(Ind. 2008). 

[38] Whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our 

sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage 

done to others, and a myriad of other considerations that come to light in a 

given case. Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), 

trans. denied. An appellant bears the burden of persuading this court that his 

sentence is inappropriate. Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014). 

[39] The sentencing range for a Level 2 felony is between ten and thirty years, with 

the advisory being seventeen and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. The 

trial court sentenced Higginson to the maximum sentence of thirty years. 

When reviewing the nature of the offense, we look at the details and 

circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s participation therein. Madden 

v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Higginson shot and killed 

Troy while being offered a ride home. 
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[40] Finally, we turn to the character of the offender. It is well settled that, when 

considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the defendant’s 

criminal history. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

Higginson’s sole criminal charge was dismissed in 2014 due to a pretrial 

diversion agreement. However, it as a record of arrest, and it reflects poorly on 

her character. See Zavala v. State, 138 N.E.3d 291, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“A 

record of arrests reflects on the defendant’s character in part because such 

record reveals that subsequent antisocial behavior by the defendant has not 

been deterred even having been subject to police authority and having been 

made aware of its oversight.”), trans. denied. Higginson’s character is further 

diminished by the fact that an hour before she shot Troy, she issued a threat to 

him on Facebook, stating that he needed a “good old-fashioned ass whooping

to knock some of the air out of his swollen ego[-]filled head.” (Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II, p. 66). Although the trial court indicated that such threats would 

typically be ignored, in Higginson’s case, her “threats came to life.” (Tr. Vol. 

II, p. 143); See McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (holding that a 

defendant’s “Facebook posts showing a desire for violent conflict” reflected 

poorly on his character). Finally, even though Higginson pleaded guilty to 

voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense to murder, she blamed Troy 

for her actions, and she provided multiple inconsistent accounts of how she shot 

Troy to various parties, including the police, Dr. Westcott, the probation 

department, and also in her allocution statement. By doing so, she attempted to 

shift the blame away from herself and undermine her own responsibility for the 

crime, which reflects poorly on her character. See Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 
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1055 1061-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (defendant placing blame on victim showed 

poor character and allowed for aggravated sentence). 

[41] In sum, Higginson has failed to meet her burden of persuading us that her 

overall thirty-year sentence, which we do not find to be an outlier, is 

inappropriate in light of her character and the nature of her offense. See e.g., 

Eversole v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1111, 1113-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (upholding a 

thirty-year sentence for voluntary manslaughter, without a firearm 

enhancement, as appropriate under 7(B) even though defendant, who killed his 

wife’s lover with a single gunshot, had no criminal record and possessed “good 

character”), trans. denied. 

CONCLUSION 

[42] For the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

sentencing Higginson, and the sentence is not inappropriate in light of the 

nature of Higginson’s offense and her character. 

[43] Affirmed

[44] Altice, C. J. and Pyle, J. concur