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[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 106 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. J. RES. 106

To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against the Islamic 
 Republic of Iran for threatening the national security of the United 
           States through the development of nuclear weapons.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 31, 2024

 Mr. Graham introduced the following joint resolution; which was read 
        twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against the Islamic 
 Republic of Iran for threatening the national security of the United 
           States through the development of nuclear weapons.

Whereas, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
        engaged in acts of international terrorism and continuously threatened 
        the United States, Israel, and partners and allies;
Whereas, on January 19, 1984, the United States designated the Islamic Republic 
        of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism for repeatedly providing support 
        for acts of international terrorism;
Whereas, on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had 
        enriched uranium for the first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at 
        the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz, Iran;
Whereas, on December 23, 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
        Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed sanctions with respect to the 
        Islamic Republic of Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment 
        activities;
Whereas, the United Nations Security Council subsequently adopted Resolutions 
        1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010), all of which targeted the 
        nuclear program of and imposed additional sanctions with respect to the 
        Islamic Republic of Iran;
Whereas, on February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had 
        launched its first satellite, which raised concern over the 
        applicability of the satellite to the ballistic missile program;
Whereas, in September 2009, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France 
        revealed the existence of the clandestine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant 
        in the Islamic Republic of Iran, years after construction started on the 
        plant;
Whereas, on January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted a test of a 
        medium-range ballistic missile, which traveled an estimated 600 miles 
        and provides the Islamic Republic of Iran the capability to threaten 
        military installations of the United States in the Middle East;
Whereas, in 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the nuclear archive of 
        the Islamic Republic of Iran, which contained tens of thousands of files 
        and compact discs relating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, 
        development, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of Iran;
Whereas, on September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the existence of a secret 
        warehouse housing radioactive material in the Turquz Abad district in 
        Tehran, and an inspection of the warehouse by the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency (IAEA) detected radioactive particles, which the 
        Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to adequately explain;
Whereas, on June 19, 2020, the IAEA adopted Resolution GOV/2020/34 expressing 
        ``serious concern... that Iran has not provided access to the Agency 
        under the Additional Protocol to two locations'';
Whereas, on April 17, 2021, the IAEA verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        had begun to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity;
Whereas, on August 14, 2021, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Hassan 
        Rouhani stated that ``Iran's Atomic Energy Organization can enrich 
        uranium by 20 percent and 60 percent and if one day our reactors need 
        it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity'';
Whereas, on April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed the 
        relocation of a production facility for advanced centrifuges from an 
        aboveground facility at Karaj, Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz 
        Enrichment Complex;
Whereas, on April 19, 2022, the Department of State released a report stating 
        that there are ``serious concerns'' about ``possible undeclared nuclear 
        material and activities in Iran'';
Whereas, on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms, equivalent to 95.5 pounds, 
        of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, roughly enough material for a 
        nuclear weapon;
Whereas, on June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned off surveillance 
        cameras installed by the IAEA to monitor uranium enrichment activities 
        at nuclear sites in the country;
Whereas, in the July 14, 2022, joint declaration entitled ``The Jerusalem U.S.-
        Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration'', the United States 
        stressed its commitment ``never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear 
        weapon, and that it is prepared to use all elements of its national 
        power to ensure that outcome'';
Whereas, on July 22, 2022, Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, stated 
        that the IAEA had ``very limited visibility'' into the nuclear program 
        of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is ``galloping ahead'';
Whereas, on July 27, 2022, the Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 
        Mohammad Eslami announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran is building 
        a new nuclear reactor at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, one of 
        the largest nuclear facilities in the country;
Whereas, on September 7, 2022, the IAEA reported that the stock of 60 percent-
        enriched uranium of the Islamic Republic of Iran had increased to an 
        estimated 55.6 kilograms, equivalent to 122.58 pounds, which is an 
        amount that if enriched further could be sufficient enough to produce a 
        nuclear bomb;
Whereas, on December 2, 2022, Director General Grossi stated ``Iran informed us 
        they were tripling, not doubling, tripling their capacity to enrich 
        uranium at 60 percent, which is very close to military level, which is 
        90 percent'';
Whereas, on January 25, 2023, Director General Grossi stated, ``One thing is 
        true: They [the Islamic Republic of Iran] have amassed enough nuclear 
        material for several nuclear weapons'';
Whereas, on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of 
        Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7 percent, which is just short of the 90 
        percent threshold for weapons-grade fissile material;
Whereas, on September 4, 2023, an IAEA report estimated the total uranium 
        stockpile of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be 3795.5 kilograms, 
        equivalent to 8367.65 pounds, and that the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
        enough fissile material, that if further enriched, would be sufficient 
        to produce several nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on October 18, 2023, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 
        (2015) lapsed and many proliferation-related penalties and restrictions 
        were lifted, meaning the Islamic Republic of Iran is legally permitted 
        to test or transfer ballistic missiles, which may contribute to the 
        further development of a nuclear weapon delivery system;
Whereas, on November 13, 2023, the quarterly report published by the IAEA on the 
        uranium enrichment program of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that 
        due to the amount of stockpiled enriched uranium and centrifuge 
        capacity, the Islamic Republic of Iran could produce its first quantity 
        of 25 kilograms, equivalent to 55.11 pounds, of weapons grade uranium in 
        as little as 7 days;
Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the governments of the United States, France, 
        Germany, and the United Kingdom released a joint statement in response 
        to the report by the IAEA, which stated, ``The production of high-
        enriched uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification [and 
        these] decisions demonstrate Iran's lack of good will towards de-
        escalation and represent reckless behavior in a tense regional context. 
        . .Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA to enable it to provide 
        assurances that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.'';
Whereas, on February 27, 2024, a spokesperson for the Department of State 
        stated, ``We remain seriously concerned about Iran's continued expansion 
        of its nuclear program in ways that have no credible civilian purpose, 
        including its continued production of highly enriched uranium'';
Whereas, on March 4, 2024, Director General Grossi stated ``Iran's stockpile of 
        enriched uranium continues to increase, including that enriched up to 
        60%. The agency has lost continuity of knowledge about the [Islamic 
        Republic of Iran's] production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and 
        bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate'';
Whereas, on April 23, 2024, Director General Grossi stated the Islamic Republic 
        of Iran is ``weeks rather than months'' away from having enough enriched 
        uranium to develop a nuclear bomb;
Whereas, on June 3, 2024, Director General Grossi stated, ``Many countries have 
        said if Iran gets nuclear weapons, they will do the same. Adding nuclear 
        weapons to the cauldron of the Middle East is a very bad idea.'';
Whereas, on June 5, 2024, by a vote of 20 to 2, the United States joined other 
        nations in formally censuring the Islamic Republic of Iran for advances 
        in their nuclear program and failure to cooperate with the IAEA;
Whereas, on June 18, 2024, news agencies reported that intelligence agencies of 
        the United States and Israel were looking into information that the 
        Islamic Republic of Iran may have developed a computer model that could 
        be used for research and development of nuclear weapons; and
Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
        published an assessment, in accordance with Iran Nuclear Weapons 
        Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; 
        Public Law 117-263), which stated, ``Iran continues to increase the size 
        of its uranium stockpile, increase its enrichment capacity, and develop, 
        manufacture, and operate advanced centrifuges. Tehran has the 
        infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, 
        at multiple facilities, if it chooses to do so.'': Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE 
              ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN.

    The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against the Islamic Republic of Iran if the President determines 
that the Islamic Republic of Iran--
            (1) is in the process of possessing a nuclear weapon that 
        threatens the national security interests of the United States; 
        or
            (2) possesses uranium enriched to weapons-grade level, 
        possesses a nuclear warhead, or possesses a delivery vehicle 
        capable of carrying a nuclear warhead that threatens the 
        national security interests of the United States.

SEC. 2. WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) Specific Statutory Authorization.--Consistent with section 
8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1547(a)(1)), the 
Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific 
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War 
Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)).
    (b) Applicability of Other Requirements.--Nothing in this 
resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution (50 
U.S.C. 1541 et seq.).
                                 <all>
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