In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-1532

In re Richard C. Barnes,

Debtor.

Appeal of Thomas J. VanKirk

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 00 C 453--William C. Lee, Chief Judge.

Argued September 28, 2001--Decided January 9, 2002

 Before Posner, Easterbrook, and Kanne,

Circuit Judges.

 Posner, Circuit Judge. The question

presented by this bankruptcy appeal is

whether Indiana permits an involuntary

lien to be obtained in a liquor license.

The appellant, VanKirk, was an employee

of a bar owned by the debtor, Barnes

(actually a predecessor of Barnes, but we

can ignore that detail). VanKirk had

filed a notice of employee’s lien on "any

and all assets" of Barnes for unpaid

wages and later had obtained from an

Indiana court a default judgment against

Barnes foreclosing his lien. VanKirk

asked the court to appoint a receiver to

operate the bar for his benefit and that

of the bar’s other creditors, but before

the receiver could be appointed Barnes

declared bankruptcy. The trustee in

bankruptcy sold the bar’s liquor license.

VanKirk then brought this adversary

proceeding to enforce his lien. He seeks

so much of the proceeds of the sale of

the license as are necessary to pay his

claim, subject to the rights of any

lienors who are senior to him. The

bankruptcy court, seconded by the

district court, ruled that a liquor

license is not property under Indiana law

and therefore VanKirk could not obtain a

lien on it.

 Indiana’s alcoholic-beverages statute

and the cases interpreting it are indeed

explicit that liquor licenses are not

"property." Ind. Code sec. 7.1-3-1-2;

State ex rel. Harris v. Superior Court,

197 N.E.2d 634, 640 (Ind. 1964); Vanek v.
Indiana National Bank, 540 N.E.2d 81, 84

(Ind. App. 1989), aff’d, 551 N.E.2d 1134

(Ind. 1990) (per curiam); Dagley v.

Incorporated Town of Fairview Park, 371

N.E.2d 1338, 1341 (Ind. App. 1978). Yet

Barnes’s liquor license was treated as

property of his estate by the trustee,

who sold the license and is treating the

proceeds as property of the estate too.

This treatment is clearly correct, as

well as not contested by any party.

Property is broadly defined by the

Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. sec.

541(a)(1), and certainly includes a

valuable, marketable asset. "[E]very

conceivable interest of the debtor,

future, nonpossessory, contingent,

speculative, and derivative, is within

the reach of sec. 541." In re Carousel

Int’l Corp., 89 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir.

1996); see also Westmoreland Human

Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 F.3d

233, 241 (3d Cir. 2001). True, a liquor

license may not be transferred without

the approval of the state’s Alcoholic

Beverage Commission, Ind. Code sec. 7.1-

3-24-1; 905 Ind. Admin. Code 1-17-4, and

can be revoked upon proof of misconduct.

Ind. Code sec. 7.1-3-23-2; Indiana

Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Dowland, 580

N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. App. 1991); Indiana

Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. State ex

rel. Harmon, 355 N.E.2d 450, 454 (Ind.

App. 1976). But these are not unusual

conditions on property; the sale of many

goods require government approval and of

course property can be taken away from a

person for various reasons, for example

because it has become a public or private

nuisance. It is no surprise, therefore,

that the few cases to address the issue

hold that a liquor license, provided it

is salable, is indeed property within the

meaning of section 541 of the Bankruptcy

Code. In re Nejberger, 934 F.2d 1300,

1302 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Terwilliger’s

Catering Plus, Inc., 911 F.2d 1168, 1171-

72 (6th Cir. 1990); In re Benz, 218 Fed.

50, 54 (3d Cir. 1914); Fisher v. Cushman,

103 Fed. 860, 864-65 (1st Cir. 1900).

None is an Indiana case, but the trustee

does not argue that Indiana’s liquor law

is atypical.

 Two Indiana cases say that, in addition

to requiring approval to transfer and

being revocable, liquor licenses may not

be used to secure a loan. Cole v. Loman

& Gray, Inc., 713 N.E.2d 901, 905 n. 3

(Ind. App. 1999); Vanek v. Indiana
National Bank, supra, 540 N.E.2d at 84;

see also In re Eagles Nest, Inc., 57 B.R.

337, 340 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986). The

only reason given for this conclusion,

and it is given only by bankruptcy

judges, see id. at 341; In re Ratcliff

Enterprises, Inc., 44 B.R. 778, 781

(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), is that the

state wants to limit the distribution of

liquor (which is in fact a stated policy

of Indiana, see Ind. Code sec. 7.1-1-1-

1(b)) by making it more difficult for

owners of establishments at which liquor

is served to expand their business by

borrowing. This would be an exceedingly

odd method of regulating the liquor

business, especially since the owner of

such an establishment is free to pledge

his accounts receivable to secure a loan,

though there is the difference that the

license may capitalize future expected

earnings as well as current receivables

and so may secure a larger loan. No

Indiana court has endorsed the reasoning

of the bankruptcy judges, and the Indiana

Supreme Court has not endorsed the

conclusion (that a voluntary lien cannot

be obtained in a liquor license) reached

in Cole or Vanek. (Its summary affirmance

of Vanek does not necessarily imply

adoption of Vanek’s dictum.) Nor is there

anything in the statute to support such a

conclusion.

 Moreover, all these are cases about

voluntary liens, and there is a

difference well recognized in bankruptcy

and secured-transactions law between a

voluntary and an involuntary lien. The

former, sometimes called a consensual

lien or a security interest, is the type

of lien that you give someone to secure

his extension of credit to you; the

latter, sometimes called a nonconsensual

lien and illustrated by the judicial lien

in this case, arises from your having de

faulted on an obligation to the tax

authorities, employees, or other

involuntary creditors. See 11 U.S.C.

sec.sec. 101(36), (51), (53); United

States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489

U.S. 235, 240 (1989); In re Gledhill, 164

F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (10th Cir. 1999);

Rankin v. DeSarno, 89 F.3d 1123, 1127 (3d

Cir. 1996); In re Brentwood Outpatient,

Ltd., 43 F.3d 256, 259 (6th Cir. 1994).

As these cases illustrate, they are not

identical legal interests. So what this

case comes down to is whether Indiana

permits an involuntary lien to be
obtained in a liquor license. (It may

well permit voluntary liens as well, if

Vanek and Cole are incorrect, as they may

well be; but we need not decide that in

this case.) If Indiana does permit an

involuntary lien to be obtained in a

liquor license, then the trustee in

bankruptcy could not avoid the lien by

selling his debtor’s license, e.g., In re

Merchants Grain, Inc., 93 F.3d 1347,

1352-53 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Florline

Corp., 190 B.R. 342, 344-46 (Bankr. S.D.

Ind. 1996), and VanKirk can, under

standard principles of equity, impress a

constructive trust on the proceeds of the

sale. Melloh v. Gladis, 309 N.E.2d 433,

438-39 (Ind. 1974); Estates of Kalwitz v.

Kalwitz, 717 N.E.2d 904, 912 (Ind. App.

1999); Rollins v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co., 912 F.2d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 1990)

(Indiana law); see also Harris Trust &

Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney

Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 250-51 (2000); WalMart Stores, Inc. Associates’ Health &

Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 401

(7th Cir. 2000); Beatty v. Guggenheim

Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 386 (N.Y.

1919) (Cardozo, J.).

 There are no cases on whether Indiana

permits an involuntary lien to be

obtained in a liquor license, and the

trustee’s lawyer was unable to give us

any reason why Indiana would not permit

this. The only rationale that has been

offered for not permitting voluntary

liens on liquor licenses (and that a

feeble one) is inapplicable, as it is

hardly plausible that immunity from

involuntary liens would significantly

increase liquor licensees’ access to

capital markets; and none other has been

suggested. Not to permit involuntary

liens in liquor licenses, rather than

discouraging liquor licensees from

borrowing, would give them a privileged

status; it would be harder, for example,

to collect taxes or enforce judgments

against them than against other

businessmen. Cf. In re Brentwood

Outpatient, Ltd., supra, 43 F.3d at 259-

60.

 It would be illuminating to know whether

Indiana permits involuntary liens on

other licenses, but neither the

bankruptcy judge nor the district judge,

nor the parties, address the question,

and our own research has disclosed no

applicable statutes or cases. The closest
is a case that declined to decide whether

a mechanic’s lien could be imposed on a

permit issued by the Indiana Department

of Transportation to operate a naturalgas storage field. McCartin McAuliffe

Mechanical Contractor, Inc. v. Midwest

Gas Storage, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 165, 168 n.

6 (Ind. App. 1997). The case law of other

states allows the imposition of

involuntary liens or lien-like interests

on liquor licenses (we have found no

cases involving other types of government

permit), under statutes similar to

Indiana’s. See Dodds v. Shamer, 663 A.2d

1318, 1326 (Md. 1995); In re What D’Ya

Call It, Inc., 730 P.2d 467, 468 (N.M.

1986); In re Kimura, 969 F.2d 806, 813

(9th Cir. 1992); In re Stone, 6 F.3d 581,

583-84 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Farmers

Markets Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th

Cir. 1986); 632 Metacom Associates v. Pub

Dennis of Warren, Inc., 591 A.2d 379,

383-84 (R.I. 1991); P.M.D. Corp., Inc. v.

Hyland-Helstrom Enterprises, Inc., 579

N.E.2d 779, 781 (Ohio App. 1990). These

cases are not elaborately reasoned, but

maybe that is because no one can think of

a good reason why, given that liquor

licenses are salable, they can’t be used

as security, especially for satisfying

the claims of involuntary creditors. If

the Indiana statute forbade such use,

well and good; but to interpolate such a

prohibition with no reason to do so and

no support in case law (apart from an

unelaborated assertion in the pair of

Indiana intermediate appellate opinions

that we cited, and a couple of bankruptcy

opinions--all distinguishable as

involving voluntary liens) for doing so

would make no sense that we can see.

Reversed.