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USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 1 of 24 

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED

No. 22-5323

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

JOHN ANTHONY CASTRO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant-Appellee.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE

Lisa J. Stevenson Jacob S. Siler

Acting General Counsel Assistant General Counsel

lstevenson@fec.gov jsiler@fec.gov

Kevin Deeley Shaina Ward

Associate General Counsel Attorney

kdeeley@fec.gov sward@fec.gov

January 23, 2023 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

1050 First Street NE

Washington, DC 20463

(202) 694-1650
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 2 of 24 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................1

LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND.......................................................2

A. The FEC and FECA’s Administrative

Enforcement Process ..................................................................................2

B. Federal Election Commission Act Definition of a

Federal “Candidate”....................................................................................4

C. Appellant Castro’s Claims..........................................................................5

D. District Court Proceedings..........................................................................7

E. District Court Order Dismissing Castro’s Complaint and

Denying Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or

Preliminary Injunction................................................................................8

ARGUMENT..................................................................................................... 10

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW..................................................................... 10

II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED

CASTRO’S COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT

MATTER JURISDICTION..................................................................... 11

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................. 14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Ass’n of Civil Technicians, Inc. v. Federal Labor

Relations Auth., 283 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2002) .................................................. 11

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).................................................. 13

Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020) ................................................................ 11

Cascade Broad. Grp. Ltd. v. F.C.C.,

822 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1987)........................................................................... 10

Castro v. Trump, 9:23-cv-80015 (AMC) (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2023) ....................... 10

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)........................................................... 4

Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) ................................................................ 14

FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998)............................................................................. 4

FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm.,

470 U.S. 480 (1985)............................................................................................... 4

FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1986).......................................................... 3

In re Nat’l Cong. Club, 1984 WL 148396 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 1984)....................... 3

Jenkins v. District of Columbia,

2018 WL 3726280 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2018) ...................................................... 10

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ..................................................... 11

Sills v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 761 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1985)............................. 11

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)...................................................... 11

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83 (1998)............................. 14

Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley,

819 F.2d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1987)......................................................................... 1, 10

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USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 4 of 24 

Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 706........................................................................................................... 6

26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042 ......................................................................................... 13

26 U.S.C. § 9033..................................................................................................... 13

52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30126 ..................................................................................... 12

52 U.S.C. § 30101(2)............................................................................................ 4, 6

52 U.S.C. § 30101(2)(A)........................................................................................... 4

52 U.S.C. § 30101(2)(B)........................................................................................... 4

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)................................................................................................ 4

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i)....................................................................................... 4

52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)................................................................................................ 4

52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A)(i)....................................................................................... 4

52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(1).................................................................................. 5, 6, 13

52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(3)........................................................................................ 5, 6

52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(3)(b)....................................................................................... 5

52 U.S.C. § 30106..................................................................................................... 2

52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1) ........................................................................................... 2

52 U.S.C. § 30106(c) ................................................................................................ 3

52 U.S.C. § 30107..................................................................................................... 2

52 U.S.C. § 30109..................................................................................................... 6

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USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 5 of 24 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1)............................................................................................ 2

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2)............................................................................................ 3

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(3)............................................................................................ 3

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)............................................................................................ 3

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i) .................................................................................. 3

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)............................................................................................ 2

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(A)...................................................................................... 3

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A).................................................................................. 3, 7

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) .................................................................................. 3, 4

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A)...................................................................................... 5

52 U.S.C. § 30118..................................................................................................... 5

52 U.S.C. § 30119..................................................................................................... 5

52 U.S.C. § 30121..................................................................................................... 5

52 U.S.C. § 30122..................................................................................................... 5

Rules and Regulations

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ............................................................................................ 7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ...................................................................................... 7, 10

11 C.F.R. § 101.1 .................................................................................................... 13

11 C.F.R. § 101.1(a).................................................................................................. 5

11 C.F.R. § 111.4 ...................................................................................................... 2

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Advisory Opinions

FEC Advisory Op. 2011-15 (Sept. 2, 2011) (Abdul Karim Hassan),

2011 WL 2011 WL 3917133 ......................................................................... 12, 13

Miscellaneous

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3 .................................................................................... 7

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 .................................................................................... 13

Price Index Adjustments for Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling

Disclosure Threshold,

87 Fed. Reg. 5822 (Feb. 2, 2022)........................................................................... 5

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GLOSSARY

Add. Addendum

FEC Federal Election Commission

FECA Federal Election Campaign Act

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USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 8 of 24 

INTRODUCTION

Appellee Federal Election Commission (“Commission” or “FEC”)

respectfully moves for summary affirmance because the parties’ positions are so

clear that further proceedings would offer no benefit. See Taxpayers Watchdog,

Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Appellant John Anthony

Castro’s appeal challenges the district court’s straightforward conclusion that the

Commission does not cause a redressable injury to an individual seeking a political

party’s nomination when a rival candidate files with the agency a preliminary

document merely announcing his intent to seek the same nomination. Acceptance

of that document does not grant the Commission’s imprimatur to the candidate’s

eligibility for the office sought, nor is it required before a candidate raises funds

that may be used to advance his election. Rather, that document simply notifies

the public that the individual is a candidate for office and identifies the principal

campaign committee associated with that candidate. The district court’s decision

that the only act attributable to the Commission — accepting former President

Donald J. Trump’s Statement of Candidacy — did not cause a redressable injury

was therefore inarguably correct.

Despite Castro’s claim, the Commission has no authority to conclude that a

candidate is constitutionally disqualified from holding Federal office pursuant to

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, also known as the

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USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 9 of 24 

“Disqualification Clause.” Neither the Constitution nor Congress has empowered

the Commission to be the arbiter of insurrection. Because the district court

correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Castro’s suit,

this Court should summarily affirm.

LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The FEC and FECA’s Administrative Enforcement Process

The Commission is a six-member independent agency of the United States

vested with statutory authority over the administration, interpretation, and civil

enforcement of FECA. See generally 52 U.S.C. §§ 30106-07. Congress

authorized the Commission to “administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and

formulate policy with respect to” FECA, id. § 30106(b)(1), and to investigate

possible violations of the Act, id. § 30109(a)(1)-(2). The Commission has

“exclusive jurisdiction” to initiate civil enforcement actions for violations of the

Act in the United States district courts. Id. §§ 30106(b)(1), 30109(a)(6).

This case initiated after Castro filed a judicial complaint alleging that the

FEC’s lack of public action on an administrative complaint was contrary to law.

FECA permits any person to file an administrative complaint with the Commission

alleging a violation of the Act. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1); see also 11 C.F.R.

§ 111.4. After reviewing the complaint and any response filed by the respondent

whose conduct is at issue, the Commission considers whether there is “reason to

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USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 10 of 24 

believe” that FECA has been violated. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2). If at least four of

the FEC’s Commissioners vote to find such reason to believe, the Commission

investigates the alleged violation. Id. §§ 30106(c), 30109(a)(2). To continue with

enforcement action, the Commission must then determine whether there is

“probable cause” to believe FECA has been violated. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(3)-(4).

If so, FECA then requires the Commission to attempt informal conciliation with

the respondent to remedy the apparent violation, after which the FEC may institute

a de novo civil enforcement action in federal district court. Id.

§ 30109(a)(4)(A)(i), (a)(6)(A). Each of these stages requires an affirmative vote of

at least four Commissioners. Id. §§ 30106(c), 30109(a)(4)(A)(i), (a)(6)(A).

Federal law also provides administrative complainants who are “aggrieved

by an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint” or “by a failure of the

Commission to act” a cause of action to challenge the FEC’s handling of their

complaint in federal court. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). If a court finds that a

Commission dismissal or failure to act was “contrary to law,” it may order the

Commission to conform to the court’s decision within 30 days. 52 U.S.C.

§ 30109(a)(8)(C); see FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re

Nat’l Cong. Club, Nos. 84-5701, 84-5719, 1984 WL 148396, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct.

24, 1984) (per curiam). If the Commission fails to conform within that time, the

administrative complainant may bring a civil action to remedy the alleged

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violation. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C); see FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political

Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 488 (1985).

B. Federal Election Commission Act Definition of a Federal

“Candidate”

FECA defines the term “candidate” to mean “an individual who seeks

nomination for election, or election, to Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(2). An

individual is “deemed to seek nomination for election, or election” if they receive

“contributions” or make “expenditures” aggregating in excess of $5,000, of if the

individual has “given his or her consent to another person” to do so on his or her

behalf. Id. § 30101(2)(A)-(B). “Contribution” and “expenditure” are defined

terms of art. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8), (9). Those terms cover only those receipts

and disbursements that are made “for the purpose of influencing any election for

Federal office.” Id. § 30101(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i); see also FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S.

11, 15 (1998).

Consistent with First Amendment principles, there are few limits on a

person’s ability to raise or spend money related to politics independent of

candidates or parties, though in certain circumstances those activities are required

to be publicly reported. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310

(2010). Once an individual becomes a candidate, however, they are subject to

comprehensive registration and reporting requirements. Candidates must designate

in writing a principal campaign committee within 15 days of becoming a candidate

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by filing a Statement of Candidacy on FEC Form 2. 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(1); 11

C.F.R. § 101.1(a). Those committees must then file periodic campaign finance

disclosure reports reporting receipts and disbursements. Id. § 30104(a)(3), (b).

Candidates and their committees are also required to comply with FECA’s source

and amount limitations on contributions. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A); FEC

Price Index Adjustments for Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling

Disclosure Threshold, 87 Fed. Reg. 5822 (Feb. 2, 2022) (establishing inflation

adjusted $2,900 per election limit on contributions to candidates); see 52 U.S.C.

§ 30118 (prohibiting corporate contributions to candidates); id. § 30119

(prohibiting contributions by government contractors); id. § 30121 (prohibiting

contributions by foreign nationals); id. § 30122 (prohibiting contributions in the

name of another).

C. Appellant Castro’s Claims

Castro is a declared candidate for the 2024 Republican nomination for

President of the United States. (Add. 3, Compl., Castro v. FEC, 22-2176 (D.D.C.

July 25, 2022), ¶ 8.) Castro alleges that he filed an administrative complaint with

the FEC on March 23, 2022. (Add. 4, ¶ 11.) On July 25, 2022, Castro filed a twocount judicial complaint with the district court against the Commission alleging

that the Commission failed to act on his administrative complaint. (Add. 4, ¶ 12.)

Castro purported to assert a cause of action “under the Federal Election Campaign

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Act . . ., 52 U.S.C. § 30109, and the Administrative Procedure Act . . ., 5 U.S.C. §

706, for unlawful agency delay against the Commission.” (Add. 2, ¶ 2.)

The first count of Castro’s judicial complaint alleged that Trump “raised”

and “expended” funds in excess of $5,000 to promote his candidacy in the 2024

presidential election, and the Commission must therefore must “declare [Trump] a

candidate who must . . . fully comply with federal and state campaign finance

laws.” (Add. 4, ¶ 11); see also 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101(2), 30102(e)(1), 30104(a)(3).

Castro further asserted that the Commission’s regulation exempting funds raised to

‘“test[] the waters”’ of federal candidacy from the definition of a contribution

cannot prevent Trump from meeting the statutory thresholds because it is invalid.

(See Add. 8, ¶¶ 23-30.) For this count, Castro sought an order compelling the

Commission to require Trump to file a Statement of Candidacy for the 2024

Republican presidential nomination. (See Add. 1, ¶ 1.)

The second count of his complaint asserted that after ordering the

Commission to declare Trump a candidate, the Court “must enjoin the Commission

from accepting” Trump’s candidacy filings because his alleged actions related to

the January 6, 2021 attack on the United States Capitol disqualify him from

holding the office of the presidency under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment

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USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 14 of 24 

to the United States Constitution.1 (Add. 9 ¶ 31; see also Add. 24-25, ¶¶ 85-88.)

Castro sought a declaration that, “contrary to law,” the Commission “failed to act

within the prescribed 120-day period” under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) & (C).

(See Add. 4 ¶ 12.)

D. District Court Proceedings

On October 31, 2022, the Commission filed a partial motion to dismiss

count two of Castro’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or alternatively Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (FEC’s Mot. To Dismiss, Castro

v. FEC, 22-2176 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2022) (Docket No. 14).) The Commission

asserted that because FECA does not authorize the Commission to reject a

candidate’s declaration based on his supposed constitutional ineligibility for office,

Castro lacked Article III standing to assert this claim, or alternatively, failed to

state a claim on which relief can be granted. (See id.)

On November 15, 2022, Trump announced his candidacy for nomination for

the office of the presidency in 2024, and filed a Statement of Candidacy with the

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o person shall be a

Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President,

or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,

who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of

the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or

judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall

have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort

to the enemies thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3.

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FEC. (See Donald J. Trump, Statement of Candidacy (Nov. 15, 2022),

https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/forms/C00828541/1661552/.) One day later, on

November 16, 2022, plaintiff filed a “emergency” motion for temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction. (Pl’s Mot. for Temp. Restraining Order, Castro

v. FEC, 22-2176 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2022) (Docket No. 17).) In his motion, Castro

again sought an order from the district court to enjoin the FEC from accepting the

Statement of Candidacy from Trump based on his alleged constitutional

ineligibility for office, which he asserted would block Trump’s ability to fundraise

as a candidate. (See id.) Given that Trump had now filed the document Castro

sought to compel the Commission to require, Castro agreed that count one of his

judicial complaint was “moot.” (Id. at 3.)

E. District Court Order Dismissing Castro’s Complaint and Denying

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary

Injunction

On December 6, 2022, the district court granted the FEC’s motion to

dismiss, denied Castro’s motion for a temporary restraining order and/or

preliminary injunction, and dismissed Castro’s complaint in its entirety for lack of

standing. (Add. 27-32, Order, Castro v. FEC, 22-2176 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2022).)

First, the Court concluded that “Mr. Castro’s alleged injury—having to compete

with Mr. Trump—is not traceable to the Commission.” (Add. 30.) It found that

“this erroneous idea—upon which Mr. Castro’s entire case turns—is completely

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lacking in support.” (Id.) The Court explained that “[n]othing in the statement of

candidacy, FEC Form 2, lends credence to Mr. Castro’s belief that it plays a role in

determining Mr. Trump’s eligibility to run for office.” (Id.) Second, the Court

held that “Mr. Castro’s alleged injury is not redressable. Because “the

Commission has no jurisdiction to reject Trump’s candidacy filings,” the Court

“has no authority to order the agency to violate the law.” (Add. 31.)

Furthermore, the Court noted that even if the Court were “somehow able to

force the Commission to reject Mr. Trump’s Statement of Candidacy, Mr. Castro

has not shown how this would cure his alleged injury.” (Id.) Because “the FEC

cannot confer constitutional legitimacy to Mr. Trump’s candidacy by accepting his

Statement of Candidacy, the Court fails to see how rejection of the same would

stop Mr. Trump from running his campaign and competing against Mr. Castro.”

(Id.) Having concluded that Castro failed to establish standing, the Court

determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, dismissed count two, and

denied Castro’s motion for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary

injunction. (Add. 32.) Because Trump had filed his Statement of Candidacy since

the pendency of Castro’s Complaint, it was “undisputed” that Count one was now

moot, and the Court accordingly dismissed the Complaint in its entirety. (Id.) The

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district court did not assess the merits of Castro’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6). On

December 7, 2022, Castro appealed the district court’s order.2

ARGUMENT

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary affirmance is appropriate where the merits are so clear as to

justify summary action.” U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Handbook of

Practice and Internal Procedures at 35-36; see also Jenkins v. District of Columbia,

No. 18-5021, 2018 WL 3726280, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 20, 2018) (citing Taxpayers

Watchdog, Inc., 819 F.2d at 297). In circumstances where the merits are so clear,

“no benefit will be gained from further briefing and argument of the issues

presented.” Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc., 819 F.2d at 298; Cascade Broad. Grp. Ltd.

v. F.C.C., 822 F.2d 1172, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“[S]ummary

disposition will be granted where the merits of the appeal or petition for review are

so clear that ‘plenary briefing, oral argument, and the traditional collegiality of the

Since the filing of his appeal in this case, Castro has filed a lawsuit against

Trump directly in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida.

See Amended Compl., Castro v. Trump, 9:23-cv-80015 (AMC) (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19,

2023) (Docket No. 7). In it, he makes similar allegations as he has asserted here,

namely seeking an order from that court determining Trump’s “constitutional

ineligibility to pursue public office and appear on state ballots for the nomination

for election to the Presidency of the United States due to his provision of aid or

comfort to the January 6 insurrections.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Castro further seeks an order

“to enjoin any further fundraising or campaigning, and to ensure the prevention of

his inauguration in the event the Republican Party is unable to prevent his

nomination and subsequent election.” (Id. ¶14.)

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decisional process would not affect our decision.’” (quoting Sills v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 761 F.2d 792, 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1985))).

This Court reviews a district court dismissal of a complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Ass’n of Civil Technicians, Inc. v. Federal

Labor Relations Auth., 283 F.3d 339, 341 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED CASTRO’S

COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

This Court should summarily affirm the district court’s order dismissing this

action in its entirety because Castro’s Article III standing is so clearly lacking as to

warrant summary disposition. No further briefing or argument would cast doubt

on this decision. To demonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that he has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the

challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a

favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)

(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). An injury in fact

“must be ‘concrete and particularized,” and “a grievance that amounts to nothing

more than an abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in the proper

application of law does not count.” Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 498 (2020)

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).

Even assuming his complaint alleged a constitutionally sufficient injury in

the form of illegal competition for the Republican Party nomination, Castro failed

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USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 19 of 24 

to allege that his injury was caused by anything the Commission did or not do and

no court order directed to the Commission could redress it. FECA does not grant

the Commission authority to reject a Statement of Candidacy because the candidate

is constitutionally ineligible for office. FECA regulates only the financing of

federal campaigns, that is, the organization of campaign committees; the raising,

spending, and disclosing of campaign funds; and the receipt and use of public

funding for qualifying candidates. See generally 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30126.

Castro does not cite any FECA provision or other authority that would grant the

Commission unilateral authority to disqualify a person from running for federal

office. Nor could he, because Congress has not granted the Commission the power

to refuse to accept candidates’ statements of candidacy on the basis that plaintiff

has asserted.

Furthermore, clear agency precedent establishes that FECA does not permit

the Commission to prohibit even an acknowledged unqualified candidate from

raising funds or campaigning for office. See FEC Advisory Op. 2011-15 (Hassan),

2011 WL 3917133 (Sept. 2, 2011). In Hassan, the Commission concluded that

FECA did not prohibit a naturalized citizen “from becoming a ‘candidate’ as that

term is defined in” the Act even though the Constitution provides that only “‘a

natural born Citizen . . . shall be eligible for the Office of President.’” Id. at *1-2

(quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5). As the Commission concluded, FECA’s

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“definition of ‘candidate’ does not turn on whether an individual is a natural born

citizen or a naturalized citizen, so long as that person meets the other criteria that

define a ‘candidate.’” Id. at *2. FECA “does not prevent [a person] from holding

himself out as a candidate because the statutory definition does not turn on a

person’s eligibility to be seated for the office he or she seeks.” Id. at *2.3

As the district court correctly held, “[n]othing in the statement of candidacy,

FEC Form 2, lends credence to Mr. Castro’s belief that it plays a role in

determining Mr. Trump’s eligibility to run for office. The statement of candidacy

is a two-page form that an individual must file with the FEC for the purposes of

designating a principal campaign committee within ‘15 days after becoming a

candidate.’” (Add. 30) (citing 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(1); 11 C.F.R. § 101.1).) As

such, Castro “failed to meet his burden to show the Court how the Commission’s

handling of Mr. Trump’s statement of candidacy has any bearing on Mr. Castro’s

alleged injury.” (Add. 31.) Furthermore, even assuming the district court could

force the Commission to reject Trump’s Statement of Candidacy, the district court

The Commission also concluded in Hassan that “[c]lear and self-avowed

constitutional ineligibility for office” was a basis for denying a prospective

candidate’s entitlement to public funds under the Presidential Primary Matching

Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042. See FEC Advisory Op. 2011-15

(Hassan), 2011 WL 3917133, at *3. Unlike FECA, however, that act calls upon

the Commission to make eligibility determinations, 26 U.S.C. § 9033, in a context

with a different constitutional standard, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 95-96 (1976)

(per curiam). Even then, Hassan does not indicate such a finding would be

appropriate where eligibility was contested.

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USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 21 of 24 

rightly noted that Castro failed to show how this would cure his alleged injury.

Because “the FEC cannot confer constitutional legitimacy to Mr. Trump’s

candidacy by accepting his statement of candidacy, the Court fails to see how

rejection of the same would stop Mr. Trump from running his campaign and

competing against Mr. Castro.” (Id.)

In sum, Castro’s alleged injuries under this claim cannot be redressed by the

Commission, and by extension the Court. Castro asserts no other plausible basis to

establish constitutional standing. And because the district court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over Castro’s claim, it correctly denied his motion for

emergency and injunctive relief. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ.,

523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“‘Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in

any cause . . . and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court

is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’” (quoting Ex Parte

McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868)).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should summarily affirm the district

court’s order granting the Commission’s motion to dismiss Castro’s complaint.

Respectfully submitted,

Lisa J. Stevenson Jacob S. Siler

Acting General Counsel Assistant General Counsel

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USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 22 of 24 

lstevenson@fec.gov jsiler@fec.gov

Kevin Deeley

Associate General Counsel

/s/ Shaina Ward

Shaina Ward

kdeeley@fec.gov

January 23, 2023

Attorney

sward@fec.gov

FEDERAL ELECTION

COMMISSION

1050 First Street NE

Washington, DC 20463

(202) 694-1650

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USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 23 of 24 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMIT,

TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE-STYLE REQUIREMENTS

I hereby certify, on this 23rd day of January, 2023, that:

1. This document complies with the word limit of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(7) because, excluding the parts of the document exempted by Fed. R. App.

32(f) and Circuit Rule 32(e), this document contains 3,352 words.

2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R.

App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. 32(a)(6) because

this document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using

Microsoft Word 2013 in a 14-point Times New Roman font.

/s/ Shaina Ward

Shaina Ward
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

USCA Case #22-5323 Document #1982622 Filed: 01/23/2023 Page 24 of 24 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of January, 2023, I electronically filed

the foregoing document with the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for

the D.C. Circuit by using the Court’s CM/ECF system. All participants are

registered CM/ECF users and will be served by the appellate CM/ECF system.

/s/ Shaina Ward

Shaina Ward