[Cite as W.P.C. v. S.R., 2020-Ohio-3178.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

W.P.C., : 

 

 Petitioner-Appellee, : 

 No. 108613 

 v. : 

 

S.R., : 

 Respondent-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 4, 2020

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CV-17-885870 and CV-17-885888 

 

Appearances: 

W.P.C., pro se. 

David M. Leneghan and K. Scott Carter, for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

Respondent-appellant S.R. appeals the decision of the trial court to 

issue a civil stalking protection order (“CSPO”) against him. Upon review, we affirm 

the trial court’s decision and uphold the CSPO and its terms. 
Background 

On September 13, 2017, petitioner-appellee W.C. filed a petition to 

obtain a CSPO on behalf of himself, his wife, and his two minor children. A 

temporary, ex parte protection order was issued and was extended during the 

pendency of the matter. The parties agreed to a continuance, and the trial court 

conducted a full hearing in April 2019. 

The transcript reflects petitioner and his family lived across the street 

from respondent in Broadview Heights before they moved away from the 

neighborhood. Testimony was presented regarding a number of incidents involving 

menacing conduct by respondent that was directed at petitioner and his family 

members. 

In September 2017, an incident occurred in which petitioner and 

respondent were involved in a verbal and physical altercation and the police were 

called. Petitioner and respondent provided different accounts of what transpired. 

Officer Kevin Pozek testified that he conducted an investigation, determined 

respondent was the primary aggressor, and arrested respondent. Officer Pozek also 

testified that respondent stated to “make sure I tell that [expletive] I will break his 

arm next time.” Evidence was presented of physical harm caused to petitioner. 

Petitioner stated that respondent returned in front of his house and threatened “do 

you want to play some more.” 

Petitioner testified to another incident that occurred about a month 

prior to the assault in which respondent made a threat to the effect of “I will knock 
your teeth — or send you to the dentist.” He testified that about a week thereafter, 

petitioner made the comment “any time you’re ready, [expletive].” 

Petitioner’s wife testified to respondent’s intimidating conduct 

toward her and her children. She testified to an incident where respondent was 

wagging his finger at her children on the sidewalk and was very angry. Respondent 

threatened her husband while in her and their children’s presence. She also testified 

that after the assault incident, respondent began standing in the middle of his yard 

staring at her house, and he also started “pacing up and down in front of the house.” 

She testified to other intimidating behavior in which respondent would follow her 

out whenever she took her dog for a walk in the neighborhood, and respondent 

would stare at her from the street corner. She testified that if she were behind 

respondent in her car while driving into the subdivision, “he would hit his brakes” 

and she had to proceed at “three miles an hour.” She further testified that 

respondent began videotaping her children, which she witnessed. She testified that 

her youngest daughter started sleeping with her because she was having nightmares 

about respondent. Ultimately, the family decided to move away from the 

neighborhood because of respondent. 

Respondent and his wife testified and provided their accounts of what 

transpired. Respondent maintained that at best a couple of conditional threats were 

made to defend himself and that there was no showing of physical harm or mental 

distress. 
On April 30, 2019, the trial court granted the petition and issued a 

CSPO against respondent for a period of four years. The protected persons include 

petitioner, his wife, and their two children. In the journal entry, the trial court found 

as follows: 

The court found the testimony of petitioner [W.C.], Broadview Heights 

Police Officer Pozek, and [petitioner’s wife R.C.] to be credible. After 

review of all testimony and evidence in this matter, the court hereby 

finds by a preponderance of evidence that the respondent has 

knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused petitioner and 

his family to believe that the respondent will cause physical harm or 

cause or has caused mental distress. Evidence of the pattern of conduct 

was supported by testimony as to the following: The physical 

altercation with petitioner (which resulted in respondent’s assault 

conviction); the respondent videotaping the petitioner’s children; 

testimony that respondent was watching or acting in an intimidating 

manner toward the petitioner and his family; the verbal threats to 

petitioner and his spouse [R.C.]; and testimony that after the 

respondent was arrested for the incident with petitioner, he was back 

on or near petitioner’s property shouting “do you want to play some 

more,” the evidence supports that petitioner believed the respondent 

will cause physical harm (and has caused physical harm with the 

assault of [petitioner W.C.]) and also has caused mental distress to 

petitioner and his family. 

Respondent timely appealed the trial court’s decision. The matter is 

now before us for review. 

Law and Analysis 

Respondent raises two assignments of error. Under his first 

assignment of error, respondent claims the trial court erred when it granted the 

CSPO because he believes it was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 

R.C. 2903.214 allows a person to seek a civil protection order by filing 

a petition alleging that the respondent engaged in a violation of R.C. 2903.211, 
menacing by stalking. The petitioner may seek relief on behalf of any other family 

or household member. R.C. 2903.214(C). However, it must be established, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent committed a violation of R.C. 

2903.211 against each family or household member to be protected. M.J.W. v. T.S., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108014, 2019-Ohio-3573, ¶ 21, citing Prater v. Mullins, 3d 

Dist. Auglaize No. 2-13-04, 2013-Ohio-3981, ¶ 8. 

In relevant part, R.C. 2903.11 defines menacing by stalking as follows: 

“No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another 

person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person * * * 

or cause mental distress to the other person * * *.” R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). A person 

acts “knowingly” when “the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably 

cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22. 

A “[p]attern of conduct” is defined as “two or more actions or 

incidents closely related in time” regardless of a prior conviction. R.C. 

2903.211(D)(1). “‘[T]he temporal period within which the two or more actions or 

incidents must occur * * * [is a] matter to be determined by the trier of fact on a caseby-case basis.’” Elkins v. Manley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104393, 2016-Ohio-8307, 

¶ 16, quoting Ellet v. Falk, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-09-1313, 2010-Ohio-6219, ¶ 22. 

“Mental distress” is defined to include “[a]ny mental illness or 

condition that would normally require psychiatric treatment, psychological 

treatment, or other mental health services, whether or not any person requested or 

received psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health 
services.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(2)(b). Expert testimony is not required to establish 

mental distress, and the trier of fact can rely on its own knowledge and experience 

in determining whether mental distress has been caused. Smith v. Wunsch, 162 

Ohio App.3d 21, 2005-Ohio-3498, 832 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.). 

In this case, respondent claims that there was a lack of evidence to 

support granting a protection order as to petitioner and each of the family members. 

We recognize that “‘[a] court must take everything into consideration’” when 

determining whether the respondent’s conduct constitutes a pattern of conduct, 

even though certain actions, in isolation, may not seem particularly threatening. 

Guthrie v. Long, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-913, 2005-Ohio-1541, ¶ 12, quoting 

Miller v. Francisco, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2002-L-097, 2003-Ohio-1978. 

Furthermore, although a petitioner cannot obtain a CSPO protecting other family 

members “‘simply by presenting evidence as to one of the persons to be covered’” in 

the case of a pattern of conduct directed at multiple persons, “‘the same evidence 

may establish the elements of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) as to multiple persons to be 

protected under a CSPO.’” M.J.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108014, 2019-Ohio3573, at ¶ 21, quoting Prater, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-13-04, 2013-Ohio-3981, at ¶ 8. 

The record reflects that testimony and evidence was presented 

regarding the assault incident that led to respondent’s criminal conviction. 

Petitioner testified to multiple incidents in which he was threatened and intimidated 

by respondent. Not only did respondent cause petitioner physical harm during the 

assault incident, but he threatened physical harm such as to “knock your teeth out.” 
Petitioner’s wife testified to respondent’s intimidating behavior of 

staring at her house and pacing in front of her house, following her out on dog walks, 

staring at her from the corner of the street, and braking his car and slowing down in 

front of her vehicle. She also testified to conduct relating to her children. She 

testified to an incident involving respondent wagging his finger at the children and 

to respondent threatening petitioner in her and her children’s presence. She also 

witnessed respondent videotaping her children. She testified to her youngest child 

having nightmares. Ultimately, respondent’s conduct led the family to move from 

the neighborhood. The trial court was permitted to rely on its own knowledge and 

experience and could reasonably infer from the circumstances that mental distress 

was caused to the entire family. 

Our review reflects that competent, credible evidence was presented 

to establish respondent committed menacing by stalking against petitioner and each 

family member to be protected. Moreover, there is ample competent, credible 

evidence to support each element of menacing by stalking and the trial court’s 

finding “by a preponderance of evidence that the respondent has knowingly engaged 

in a pattern of conduct that caused petitioner and his family to believe that the 

respondent will cause physical harm or cause or has caused mental distress.” 

Accordingly, we uphold the trial court’s decision to grant the petition for a CSPO 

against respondent. The first assignment of error is overruled. 

Under the second assignment of error, respondent claims the trial 

court erred by issuing a civil stalking protection order for a period in excess of five 
years from the date the ex parte order was issued. He cites no legal authority for this 

claim, and a plain reading of R.C. 2903.214 dictates otherwise. 

R.C. 2903.214(D)(1) permits a court, upon request, to issue a 

temporary, ex parte protection order after a petition has been filed. Any protection 

order that is issued on the merits after a full hearing is a separate order. It is not a 

continuation of the ex parte order as respondent suggests. R.C. 2903.214(E)(2)(a) 

provides that “[a]ny protection order issued pursuant to this section shall be valid 

until a date certain but not later than five years from the date of its issuance.” The 

trial court complied with the statute and issued a CSPO for a period of four years 

from the date of issuance. Respondent’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment 

into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 _____ 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., and 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR