IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER and

DEMOCRACY 21,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION,

 Defendant,

RIGHT TO RISE SUPER PAC, INC. 

 Proposed Intervenor-Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 1:20-cv-00730

Hon. Christopher R. Cooper

/

DEFENDANT INTERVENOR RIGHT TO RISE SUPER PAC, INC.’S 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR CERTIFICATION FOR 

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

Right to Rise Super PAC, Inc., respectfully moves this Court under Rule 

60(b)(1) or, in the alternative, Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

to reconsider that portion of its February 19, 2021, Memorandum Opinion and Order 

holding that Plaintiffs have standing to sue under FECA. Alternatively, Right to Rise 

respectfully requests the Court amend its Memorandum Opinion and Order to make 

the certification findings necessary under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for the D.C. Circuit 

Court to consider the corresponding legal issues. A supporting memorandum of 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 1 of 23
2

points and authorities accompanies this motion, and a proposed order granting the 

motion to certify order for interlocutory appeal is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

Pursuant to Local Rule 7(m), counsel for Right to Rise conferred with 

Plaintiffs’ counsel on March 4, 2021. Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that Plaintiffs 

oppose the instant motion.

Dated: March 5, 2021 Respectfully Submitted, 

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

/s/ Charles R. Spies

Charles R. Spies, Bar ID: 989020

Jessica G. Brouckaert

1825 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone: (202) 466-5964

Facsimile: (844) 670-6009

cspies@dickinsonwright.com

jbrouckaert@dickinsonwright.com

Robert L. Avers

350 S. Main Street, Ste 300

Ann Arbor, MI 48104

(734) 623-1672

ravers@dickinsonwright.com

John J. Bursch

Bursch Law PLLC

9339 Cherry Valley Ave. SE, #78

Caledonia, MI 49316

(616) 450-4235

jbursch@burschlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant-Intervenor

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 2 of 23
3

REQUEST FOR HEARING

Intervenor-Defendant Right to Rise Super PAC, Inc., respectfully requests a 

hearing on its Motion for Reconsideration and/or Certification for Interlocutory 

Appeal.

/s/ Charles R. Spies

Charles R. Spies, Bar ID: 989020

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 5, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing document to be served upon all counsel of record registered with the 

Court’s ECF system by electronic service via the Court’s ECF transmission 

facilities.

/s/ Charles R. Spies

Charles R. Spies (Bar ID: 989020)

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 3 of 23
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER and

DEMOCRACY 21,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION,

 Defendant,

RIGHT TO RISE SUPER PAC, INC. 

 Proposed Intervenor-Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 1:20-cv-00730

Hon. Christopher R. Cooper

/

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 

RIGHT TO RISE SUPER PAC, INC.’S MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION AND/OR CERTIFICATION FOR

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 4 of 23
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................1

II. BACKGROUND..................................................................................................3

A. Procedural Background ........................................................................3

B. The Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order....................................4

III. ARGUMENT......................................................................................................5

A. This Court Should Reconsider its Memorandum Opinion and 

Hold that Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Pursue their FECA Claim. .......5

1. This Court Should Reconsider its Decision under the 

Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(1) and Hold that Plaintiffs 

have not Shown by a Preponderance of the Evidence that 

the Court has Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over the 

Remainder of Their FECA Claim..............................................6

2. The Court Should Reconsider its Decision and Hold that 

Plaintiffs have not Sustained Informational Injury 

because All Contributions and Spending at Issue Here 

were Publicly Disclosed in 2015. ..............................................8

3. Right to Rise’s Motion for Reconsideration is Timely............11

B. Alternatively, the Court Should Certify Its Order for 

Interlocutory Appeal...........................................................................11

IV. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................15

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 5 of 23
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009).......................................14

APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2003)

..........................................................................................................12, 13, 14

Blumenthal v. Trump, 382 F. Supp. 3d. 77 (D.D.C. 2019).....................................14

Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ...............................................7

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. CV 19-2336 (JEB), 2020 

WL 7059577 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2020)........................................................2, 10, 13

Carvajal v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 286 F.R.D. 23 (D.D.C.2012)...................11

Computer Professionals for Soc. Responsibility v. U.S. Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 

897 (D.C. Cir. 1996)............................................................................................9

Dist. of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 520 F.2d 451 (D.C. 

Cir.1975)..............................................................................................................6

Douglas v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 306 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2014)......................................6

Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1980)..............8

Green v. AFL–CIO, 811 F.Supp.2d 250 (D.D.C. 2011)...........................................6

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Grp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 16 

(D.D.C. 2002) ....................................................................................................12

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ...............................................7

Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018).....12, 14

Montesa v. Schwartz, 836 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2016)................................................12

Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2011) ..............1, 7

Stanford v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., No. CIV.A. 104-1461RBW, 2006 WL 

1722329 (D.D.C. June 21, 2006).........................................................................8

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 6 of 23
iii

Twelve John Does v. D.C., 841 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1988)....................................6

United States v. 8 Gilcrease Lane, 668 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2009)..................8

Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-197 TFH, 2000 WL 33142129 (D.D.C. Nov. 

22, 2000) ............................................................................................................13

Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2001)...................................5, 10, 13

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)........................................................................................ passim

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A)......................................................................................4

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)................................................................................... passim

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).................................................................................1, 4, 6, 7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(3).............................................................................................11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) .......................................................................................5, 6, 11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)...............................................................................1, 5, 6, 11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)...........................................................................................11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)...........................................................................................11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).................................................................................2, 5, 8, 9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)................................................................................................11

Miscellaneous

16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris § 3929 (3d ed. 2017)...................................................12

16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris § 3931 (3d ed. 2017)...................................................12

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 7 of 23
I. INTRODUCTION

Right to Rise Super PAC, Inc. (“Right to Rise”) seeks reconsideration of that 

portion of the Court’s February 19, 2021, Memorandum Opinion and Order holding 

that Plaintiffs have standing to sue under the Federal Election Campaign Act 

(“FECA”). Alternatively, Right to Rise requests the Court amend its February 19, 

2021, Memorandum Opinion and Order to make the certification findings necessary 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for the D.C. Circuit Court to consider the corresponding 

legal issues on appeal.

Reconsideration is appropriate on two grounds. First, under Rule 60(b)(1), the 

Court mistakenly relied on the wrong legal standard in holding that Plaintiffs 

sufficiently alleged informational injury such that they have standing to proceed on 

limited aspects of their FECA claim. Specifically, the Court relied on the Rule 

12(b)(6) legal standard for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), while 

determinations regarding subject matter jurisdiction generally—and standing 

specifically—are made under Rule 12(b)(1) and involve different legal standards 

and burden of proof. As this Court has explained, “the court must scrutinize the 

plaintiff’s allegations more closely when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” 

Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011). And 

Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court has 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 8 of 23
2

subject-matter jurisdiction over their FECA claim because the facts alleged in their 

Complaint are inconsistent with the public record, which shows that Governor John 

Ellis “Jeb” Bush disclosed all his testing-the-waters activities through his 

presidential campaign’s first campaign finance report.

Second, under Rule 60(b)(6), the Court’s holding that Plaintiffs alleged a 

limited informational injury is based on a misconception of the facts—specifically, 

the inaccurate premise that Plaintiffs would obtain disclosure of additional 

information if they prevail on their FECA claim. In fact, Governor Bush disclosed

all his testing-the-waters activities on his presidential campaign’s first campaign 

finance report. So even if Plaintiffs were to succeed on their FECA claim, they would 

not obtain a scintilla of additional information. As a result, they could not have 

suffered an informational injury necessary for standing. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs have 

no cognizable interest in a legal determination from the Federal Election 

Commission (“FEC”) that Right to Rise’s expenditures were “coordinated” with 

Governor Bush and should be reported differently.

As another decision in this District recognized only a few months ago, to seek 

a determination of coordination (or, here, candidate status) is to seek a legal 

conclusion in which there “is no ‘constitutionally cognizable’ interest.” Campaign 

Legal Ctr. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. CV 19-2336 (JEB), 2020 WL 7059577, at 

*1 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2020). The same is true here.

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 9 of 23
3

Alternatively, Right to Rise requests the Court certify its February 19, 2021 

Memorandum Opinion and Order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(b). The question of Plaintiffs’ standing is a controlling question of law, that 

question has divided judges in this District over the last several months, and the D.C. 

Circuit’s resolution of the question would substantially advance the termination of 

this litigation. There is little sense in litigating this case if the D.C. Circuit ultimately 

agrees that the dispute should have never left the starting line.

For these reasons, and as further explained below, Right to Rise respectfully 

requests that this Court partially reconsider its Order granting standing to Plaintiff, 

or in the alternative, certify its decision for interlocutory appeal.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

In March 2015, Plaintiffs filed an FEC complaint alleging that Governor Bush 

and “Right to Rise PAC” violated FECA by failing to comply with FECA’s “testingthe-waters” disclosure requirements, candidate-contribution limits, and candidate 

registration and reporting requirements. Compl. Ex. B. Mar. Admin. Compl., ECF 

No. 1-2. Two months later, Plaintiffs filed a second FEC complaint, this time 

alleging that Governor Bush and Right to Rise violated FECA by failing to comply 

with the “testing-the-waters” restrictions, candidate-contribution limits, and socalled “soft money” prohibitions. Plaintiffs also alleged that Governor Bush 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 10 of 23
4

established, financed, maintained, and controlled Right to Rise in violation of FECA. 

Compl. Ex. A., May Admin. Compl. ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiffs’ two FEC complaints 

were collectively designated by the FEC as Matter Under Review (“MUR”) 6927.

Plaintiffs then filed the present action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief 

to compel the FEC to take up their complaints under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A). 

Compl. ¶ 2. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the FEC’s inaction has deprived them of 

information regarding the extent of coordination between Right to Rise and the Bush 

campaign, id. ¶ 9, and the extent of Governor Bush’s campaign spending, id. ¶ 10. 

Plaintiffs also alleged organizational injuries from the inaction, claiming the allegedly inadequate disclosure of those same campaign finance activities caused Plaintiffs 

to divert funds and resources from other organizational needs. Id. ¶¶ 19, 22. 

The FEC has not publicly acted on MUR 6927 and has not appeared in this 

action. Right to Rise moved to intervene in June 2020, which this Court promptly 

allowed. Right to Rise then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of 

standing under Rule 12(b)(1) and, with respect to Plaintiffs’ Administrative 

Procedure Act (“APA”) claim, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

B. The Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order

On February 19, 2021, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order 

granting most of Right to Rise’s motion to dismiss. ECF No. 17. Specifically, the 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 11 of 23
5

Court concluded Plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a claim under the APA. Id. 18-

19. As for Plaintiffs’ FECA claims, the Court held that Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 

1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001), precluded holding that Plaintiffs had standing to pursue 

their FECA claim as it relates to any alleged coordinated spending between 

Governor Bush and Right to Rise. Id. 12-15.

But the Court reached a different conclusion regarding Plaintiffs’ claim that 

Governor Bush “failed to disclose months of spending stemming from the testingthe-waters period of his nascent candidacy.” Id. 10-12. There, the Court said that 

Plaintiffs’ do have Article III standing due to informational injury sustained during 

the five-month period from January 2015 to June 2015, while Governor Bush was 

testing-the-waters. The Court reasoned that “[w]hether Bush did, in fact, begin 

testing the waters in January 2015 is a merits issue,” and that “[d]eprivation of the 

disclosures that FECA requires for that disputed period constitutes an informational 

injury to sustain Article III standing.” Id. 11 (emphasis added). It is this holding for 

which Right to Rise seeks reconsideration or, in the alternative, certification of the 

Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order for interlocutory appeal.

III. ARGUMENT

A. This Court Should Reconsider its Memorandum Opinion and Hold 

that Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Pursue their FECA Claim.

Rule 60(b) authorizes a court to grant relief from an order based on “mistake,” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), or, “any other reason that justifies relief,” id. 60(b)(6).

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 12 of 23
6

While the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating it is entitled to relief,

Green v. AFL–CIO, 811 F.Supp.2d 250, 254 (D.D.C. 2011), the court “is vested with 

a large measure of discretion in deciding whether to grant a Rule 60(b) motion.” 

Twelve John Does v. D.C., 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

1. This Court Should Reconsider its Decision under the Legal 

Standard for Rule 12(b)(1) and Hold that Plaintiffs have not Shown 

by a Preponderance of the Evidence that the Court has SubjectMatter Jurisdiction over the Remainder of Their FECA Claim.

Relief under Rule 60(b)(1) is appropriate where an order contains a mistake 

or “obvious error.” Dist. of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 520 F.2d 451, 

451–53 (D.C. Cir.1975). Accord, e.g., Douglas v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 306 F.R.D. 1, 5 

(D.D.C. 2014). And the February 19th Order regarding Plaintiffs’ standing satisfies 

that standard because it erroneously applies the legal standard and burden of proof 

that apply to Rule 12(b)(6) motions for failure to state a claim, rather than the legal 

standard and burden of proof that must be applied to standing challenges under Rule 

12(b)(1) like that raised here by Right to Rise. Applying the proper standard, it is 

clear that Plaintiffs lack standing.

The underlying issue is Governor Bush’s testing-the-waters spending. 

Plaintiffs claim that Governor Bush “failed to disclose months of spending stemming 

from the testing-the-waters period of his nascent candidacy,” that Bush “was 

required to record and disclose all testing-the-waters spending in his first disclosure

report,” and that Plaintiffs “have been deprived of over five months of information 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 13 of 23
7

that is statutorily required to be disclosed.” ECF No. 17 at 11. Recognizing what a 

casual observer might characterize as a factual dispute, the Order applied the classic 

12(b)(6) standard, reasoning that the Court “must accept plaintiffs’ factual 

allegations as true,” and that “the Court assumes that plaintiffs are correct that Bush 

was testing the waters as of January 2015.” Id.

But motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 12(b)(1)

are subject to a different standard and burden of proof. It is the plaintiff who “bears 

the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court has subjectmatter jurisdiction over her claims,” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

561 (1992). What’s more, “the court must scrutinize the plaintiff’s allegations more 

closely when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would 

under a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police 

Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011). While a court must accept a plaintiff’s 

factual allegations, the court may not “accept inferences unsupported by the facts,” 

and may “consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to 

resolve the question whether it has jurisdiction in the case.” Id. Accord, e.g., 

Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Here, Plaintiffs cannot show—much less by a preponderance of the 

evidence—that they have suffered an informational injury. That is because the public 

record, which Plaintiffs notably omit from their allegations, reveals that Governor 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 14 of 23
8

Bush reported $386,020.15 of testing-the-waters activity for the period January 2015 

through June 2015 in his presidential campaign’s first disclosure report. Plaintiffs’ 

allegations, which cite nothing more than beltway gossip columns, do not make it 

more likely than not that a favorable ruling will result in additional, non-disclosed 

spending. That information has already been disclosed to Plaintiffs and the public.

Plaintiffs do not meet the stringent Article III standing requirements for informational injury under the Rule 12(b)(1) legal standard and burden of proof. Right to 

Rise respectfully requests the Court reconsider and dismiss what remains of 

Plaintiffs’ FECA claim on the ground that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing.

2. The Court Should Reconsider its Decision and Hold that Plaintiffs 

have not Sustained Informational Injury because All Contributions 

and Spending at Issue Here were Publicly Disclosed in 2015.

Alternatively, Rule 60(b)(6) grants a district court “discretion to vacate or 

modify [orders] when it is appropriate to accomplish justice.” United States v. 8 

Gilcrease Lane, 668 F. Supp. 2d 128, 131 (D.D.C. 2009), aff'd sub nom. United 

States v. 8 Gilcrease Lane, Quincy, Fla. 32351, 638 F.3d 297 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This 

Court has recognized such circumstances exist when an order is “based on a 

‘fundamental misconception of the facts’ which entitled [the movant] to relief from 

the court’s judgment.” Stanford v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., No. CIV.A. 104-

1461RBW, 2006 WL 1722329, at *3 (D.D.C. June 21, 2006) (quoting Good Luck 

Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (cleaned up).

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 15 of 23
9

Here, the February 19th Order reasoned that “[t]o the extent that Bush was 

either a de-facto candidate or testing the waters at some point prior to June 2015, 

then plaintiffs have alleged an informational injury because further disclosures 

would be required.” ECF No. 17 at 12. Not so. All the information that must be 

disclosed under FECA was timely reported by the Bush campaign, and it is all

publicly available in campaign finance reports on FEC.gov. There can be no 

informational injury because there is simply no more to disclose under FECA.

Starting with the unrebutted premise that there can be no further disclosures 

required under FECA, Right to Rise is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 

Accordingly, this Court should reconsider that aspect of its Order. See Computer 

Professionals for Soc. Responsibility v. U.S. Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 903 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996), amended (Feb. 20, 1996) (“it was incumbent on the court to examine the 

[papers] in order to determine whether its ruling on the Exemption 7(D) issue had 

been based on a correct understanding of the underlying facts. We are confident that 

had it done so, it would have taken the necessary corrective action.”).

Moreover, the question of when Governor Bush became a candidate, just like 

the question of whether Right to Rise coordinated with Governor Bush, has nothing

to do with standing or informational injury. Even if the FEC determined that 

Governor Bush was a candidate prior to when Right to Rise argues that occurred, or 

even if the FEC determined that Right to Rise and Governor Bush had indeed 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 16 of 23
10

coordinated in a way impermissible under FECA, no additional information stands 

to be disclosed. As this Court explained just 14 days ago, “plaintiffs’ attempt to 

construe their request as being one for facts (rather than legal determinations) is 

precluded by Wertheimer [v. FEC], 268 F.3d 1070 at 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001).” ECF 

No. 17 at 14. “[I]t is well-established that a plaintiff has no legally cognizable 

interest in a legal conclusion that carries certain law enforcement consequences, nor 

in forcing the FEC to get the bad guys.” Id. (cleaned up).

In sum, the remaining portion of Plaintiffs’ FECA claim relating to Governor 

Bush’s testing-the-waters activities must be dismissed, just like that portion of 

Plaintiffs’ FECA claim alleging coordination, id. at 14-15, and so many others 

before that. E.g., Campaign Legal Ctr., CV 19-2336 (JEB), 2020 WL 7059577 at *9

(D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2020) (concluding, on second review, that plaintiffs lacked standing

to determine whether expenditures were coordinated with candidate). Plaintiffs have 

not been deprived of any information that must be disclosed under statute because 

all such information has been publicly available for years.

1

 1 The February 19th Order does not address Plaintiffs’ argument that they have 

standing based on organizational injury and FEC delay. ECF No. 17 at 9 n.1. But if 

the Court corrects the Order and holds that Plaintiffs have not suffered an 

informational injury, the same would be true of the purportedly organizational 

injury: if all FECA-required information has been publicly disclosed, there is no 

injury and no Article III standing.

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 17 of 23
11

3. Right to Rise’s Motion for Reconsideration is Timely.

A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for 

requests under sub-rules 60(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), “no more than a year after the 

entry of the judgment or order” at issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Only 14 days have 

passed since this Court issued the Memorandum Opinion and Order. As a result, this 

motion is timely. See Carvajal v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 286 F.R.D. 23, 26-27 

& n. 4 (D.D.C.2012) (collecting cases). 

B. Alternatively, the Court Should Certify Its Order for Interlocutory 

Appeal.

Alternatively, Right to Rise seeks certification of the Court’s February 19th

Order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The issue at the heart 

of this motion is dispositive, has been decided differently by different members of 

this Court, and would substantially advance the litigation if resolved now by the D.C. 

Circuit. Accordingly, this Court should amend its Order, consistent with Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(3), to include the findings necessary for certification.

Interlocutory appeal from a non-final order may be taken only after the district 

court’s certification of the order. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Under § 1292(b), the district 

court’s order must certify that the order: (1) “involves a controlling question of law”; 

(2) “as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion”; and (3) “that 

an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination 

of the litigation.” Id. Section 1292(b) “is not limited by its language to ‘exceptional’ 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 18 of 23
12

cases,” but rather is characterized by its flexibility. 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 

ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3929 (3d ed. 2017). The 

February 19th Order easily satisfies all three factors here.

First, it cannot be disputed that the Order involves a controlling question of 

law: subject-matter jurisdiction. Under § 1292(b), a controlling question of law is 

“one that would require reversal if decided incorrectly or that could materially affect 

the course of litigation with resulting savings of the court’s or the parties’ resources.” 

Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting

Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Grp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 

(D.D.C. 2002)). “Controlling questions of law include issues that would terminate 

an action if the district court’s order were reversed.” APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint 

Commc’ns Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2003). Thus, issues of subject matter 

jurisdiction—such as standing to sue—are controlling questions of law because 

“reversal of the district court’s order would terminate the action.” Id. (citations 

omitted); accord, e.g., Montesa v. Schwartz, 836 F.3d 176, 194 (2d Cir. 2016)

(reviewing on § 1292(b) interlocutory appeal whether plaintiffs had standing to bring 

an Establishment Clause challenge); 16 Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3931 (rulings rejecting 

challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction and justiciability are among those “that may 

be obviously suited for interlocutory appeal”) (citations omitted).

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 19 of 23
13

Second, it cannot be disputed that there exists substantial ground for a 

difference of opinion as to the issue of Plaintiffs’ standing to proceed on their FECA 

claim. “Substantial ground for difference of opinion” under § 1292(b) may be 

established “where a court’s challenged decision conflicts with decisions of several 

other courts.” APCC Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 97–98. Here, the Order’s conclusion 

that Plaintiffs have standing despite all disclosures required under FECA having 

been made conflicts with decisions from other courts in this District and Circuit that 

have rejected the notion that plaintiffs have a cognizable legal interest in legal 

determinations—as that is all that Plaintiffs stand to gain here. E.g., Campaign Legal

Ctr., CV 19-2336 (JEB), 2020 WL 7059577 at *9 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2020) (plaintiffs 

lacked standing to seek determination whether expenditures were coordinated with 

candidate); Wertheimer, 268 F.3d at 1075.

Sensibly, a court may find a “substantial ground for difference of opinion” 

even where it is confident in the correctness of its ruling. In re Vitamins Antitrust 

Litig., No. 99-197 TFH, 2000 WL 33142129, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2000)

(“Although this Court firmly believes that the facts of this case warrant a ruling in 

favor of application of the Federal Rules to jurisdictional discovery, the Court 

recognizes that the arguments in support of the opposite conclusion are not 

insubstantial.”). Here, there is substantial ground for difference of opinion as to 

Plaintiffs’ standing to sue because the Order interprets and extends D.C. Circuit and 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 20 of 23
14

D.C. District Court precedent in a novel way that warrants immediate review in the 

Court of Appeals.

Finally, it cannot be disputed that an immediate appeal would advance this 

litigation’s ultimate termination. “To satisfy this element a movant need not show 

that a reversal on appeal would actually end the litigation;” the relevant inquiry “is 

whether reversal would hasten or at least simplify the litigation in some material 

way, such as by significantly narrowing the issues, conserving judicial resources, or 

saving the parties from needless expense.” Molock, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 6. Further, 

the Court should consider whether an immediate appeal “would likely and materially 

advance the ultimate determination of the litigation. Blumenthal v. Trump, 382 F. 

Supp. 3d. 77, 81 (D.D.C. 2019) (citation omitted).

Here, certification of the Court’s February 19th Order would likely and 

materially advance the termination of the litigation. “When there are substantial 

grounds for difference of opinion as to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, courts 

regularly hold that immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate 

termination of the litigation.” Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 

2009). Likewise, an immediate appeal in this instance—the heart of which rests on 

justiciability—could very well conserve judicial resources, which satisfies the third 

element in and of itself. APCC Services, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 100 (D.D.C. 2003).

(“[I]n the event that it is ultimately found that this Court lacks jurisdiction to litigate 

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 21 of 23
15

[this] case, it would be far better for all concerned, including plaintiff, to have these 

matters resolved now, as opposed to sometime in the distant future.”) (cleaned up). 

An immediate appeal and a D.C. Circuit ruling for Right to Rise would 

terminate this litigation for lack of subject matter jurisdiction immediately,

eliminating years of litigation and conserving the Court’s and parties’ resources.

Accordingly, certification for interlocutory appeal is appropriate.

IV. CONCLUSION

Right to Rise respectfully requests that the Court reconsider that portion of its 

February 19, 2021 Memorandum Opinion and Order holding that Plaintiffs have 

Article III standing to pursue the remainder of their FECA claim, or, in the 

alternative (or in addition to), certify the Order for interlocutory appeal under 28 

U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

Dated: March 5, 2021 Respectfully Submitted, 

DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC

/s/ Charles R. Spies

Charles R. Spies, Bar ID: 989020

Jessica G. Brouckaert*

1825 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 900

Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone: (202) 466-5964

Facsimile: (844) 670-6009

cspies@dickinsonwright.com

jbrouckaert@dickinsonwright.com

Robert L. Avers

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 22 of 23
16

350 S. Main Street, Ste 300

Ann Arbor, MI 48104

(734) 623-1672

ravers@dickinsonwright.com

John J. Bursch*

Bursch Law PLLC

9339 Cherry Valley Ave. SE, #78

Caledonia, MI 49316

(616) 450-4235

jbursch@burschlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant-Intervenor

*Pending Admission

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 5, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing document to be served upon all counsel of record registered with the 

Court’s ECF system by electronic service via the Court’s ECF transmission 

facilities.

/s/ Charles R. Spies

Case 1:20-cv-00730-CRC Document 19 Filed 03/05/21 Page 23 of 23