U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Five-Fatality Highrise 

Office Building Fire

Atlanta, Georgia

USFA-TR-033/June 1989

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

Arlington, Virginia, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the USFA in carrying 

out the Fire Reports Program.

The USFA appreciates the cooperation and assistance received from Chief Tom Perrin, Deputy Chief 

D.M. Chamberlin, Assistant Chief D.E. Sparks, and many other members of the Atlanta Bureau of Fire 

Services. USFA also thanks O.H. Brantley of the Atlanta City Attorney’s Office and Normal Koplon 

of the Bureau of Buildings. Thomas Davis, Henry Singer, and personnel of the U.S. General Services 

Administration, Robert Erikson of the U.S. Forest Service, and Nick Arroyo of the Atlanta Constitution 

also contributed to the report.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Five-Fatality Highrise Office Building Fire

Atlanta, Georgia

Investigated by: Charles Jennings

This is Report 033 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-88-C-2649 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Table of Contents

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE BUILDING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

INCIDENT COMMAND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

FIRE BEHAVIOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

OCCUPANT BEHAVIOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

OCCUPANT EVACUATION PLAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

APPENDIX A: Peachtree 25th Building Site Drawing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

APPENDIX B: Sixth Floor Plan Showing Location of Victims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

APPENDIX C: Post-fire Statement of Electrician. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

APPENDIX D: Occupant Emergency Plan For Peachtree 25th Building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

APPENDIX E: Memorandum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

APPENDIX F: General Services Administration (GSA) Fire Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

APPENDIX G: Toxicological Reports on the Fire Victims. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

APPENDIX H: Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

APPENDIX I: List of Slides/Photographs in Master Report File. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

1

Five-Fatality Highrise Office Building Fire

Atlanta, Georgia

Local Contacts: D. M. Chamberlin, Sr., Deputy Chief

D. E. Sparks, Assistant Chief

Bureau of Fire Services

46 Courtland Street, S.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30335

OVERVIEW

At 1029, June 30, 1989, in Atlanta, Georgia, an electrical fire originating on the sixth floor of a 10-

story office building killing five people, and injuring 23 civilians and six firefighters. One woman 

had jumped from a sixth floor window prior to the fire department’s arrival and was seriously 

injured. Firefighters removed approximately 14 people over aerial ladders and rescued five others 

from the interior of the building.

The electric closet where the fire started opened directly onto the exit corridor. When the fire 

erupted, it immediately blocked the corridor, keeping most victims away from the two exits serving 

the floor.

This fire was reported to be the first multiple death U.S. highrise office building fire in over 10 years. 

The fire demonstrates the need for automatic sprinkler protection for highrise buildings and illustrates the impact that occupant behavior can have on survival in fire situations.

All of the trapped survivors broke windows to offices and waited for rescue. Four of the people who 

died were overcome by smoke and toxic gases in the corridor or in offices where windows weren’t 

broken. The fifth fatality was an electrician who was seriously injured by the initial electrical arc, 

then died from the effects of the fire.

The 10-story fire resistive office building was constructed in 1968 and was not required to be 

equipped with automatic sprinklers. The building evacuation plan, which had been practiced regularly, was credited with the successful evacuation of occupants on floors other than the fire floor. The 

building was occupied by a large number of Federal workers who were required to practice evacuations, and also several private firms who were not obligated to and only occasionally participated in 

these evacuation drills.
2

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

The Fire Confined to sixth floor of 10-story fire resistive office building.

Casualties Five fatalities; 29 injured, including six firefighters and one occupant who jumped prior to fire 

department arrival.

Fire Protection Features No sprinklers or detection systems present on floor of origin. Fire reported on manual fire alarm 

system via Master Box to Atlanta Municipal Fire Alarm System. Standpipes with occupant use 

hoselines were provided at each stairwell. Selected floors had smoke detectors installed during 

renovations.

Fire Cause/Origin Electrical arcing started fire in electrical closet that opened onto exit corridor.

Incident Command Incident Command System (ICS) was effective; normal radio frequencies were supplemented 

with cellular phones, additional frequencies.

Occupant Behavior People trapped broke windows to survive and were rescued by firefighters – mainly over aerial 

ladders.

Fire Drills Experience from fire drills enabled most occupants to escape quickly.

Arrangement of Exits The electric closet was located such that when the fire started, access to both exits was blocked 

for several offices that were located at the end of a dead-end corridor.

THE BUILDING

The building at 1720 Peachtree Street was known as the “Peachtree 25th” building. The 10-story 

200 by 200 foot building was comprised of two separate tower structures. Each tower was 19,000 

square feet per floor. The tower structures were built atop a three-level parking garage with spaces 

for 840 vehicles. The parking garage was topped by a parking deck that surrounded three sides of 

the building. The site sloped downward from Peachtree Street so that the three-story parking structure was at grade level to the rear (see Appendix A). The buildings, known as the North and South 

Towers, were each served by two exit stairways, one at the front and one at the rear of the rectangular 

shaped building (see Appendix B) and four passenger elevators. Construction of the Peachtree 25th 

Building was typical of that used in highrises built in the 1960’s.

The two towers were arranged in symmetrical fashion. The North Tower, built in 1962, was of fire 

resistive construction and had an exterior masonry finish with fire canopies (“eyebrows”) running 

the length of every floor.

The South Tower, where the fire occurred, was completed in 1969. It was of fire resistive concrete 

construction and had panel walls of black glass held together with aluminum mullions. Windows 

ran from approximately two feet above the floor to slightly below the ceiling line. The spaces above 

the ceiling and below the windows were covered with opaque black glass panels to create a uniform 

façade. The front of the structure was finished in black glass and gave the appearance of a single 

building (see photo 7 in Appendix H).

The arrangement of floors was such that in some cases, depending on tenant requirements, there 

was interconnection between the North and the South Towers on the corridor serving the elevator lobbies (see Appendix B). On the sixth floor, where the fire started, there was no connection 

between the North and South Towers. In all cases, there was no separation of elevator lobbies from 

the corridor. 
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 3

The principal vertical penetration floor to floor in the South Tower was an electrical bus duct which 

ran the height of the building and was inside electrical closets. Each electric closet opened onto the 

central hallway which served both exits. Other vertical penetrations were incidental.

Interior partitions ran from the floor to the underside of a suspended ceiling assembly. The suspended ceiling assembly created an undivided ceiling area that encompassed the entire floor.

An individual air handling unit was located on each floor, and there were no penetrations between 

floors for air handling purposes. The supply air was directed from the air handler to air transfer 

grilles in the suspended ceiling via flexible duct connectors. Return air was routed through the 

plenum that was created above the suspended ceiling. There was no smoke detection incorporated 

in the air handling system.

Interior finish on the fire floor was reported to include carpeting and vinyl wall covering. Information 

on their exact nature was not available.

Fire protection features of the building included manual fire alarm stations located at each exit, a 

Class III standpipe system with 6-inch standpipe risers located in each stairwell, and occupant use 

hose stations in the interior corridors at each stairway. Two floors had been equipped with smoke 

detection in the course of renovations, but there was none on the fire floor. Elevators in the South 

Tower had no automatic recall or firefighter service features, although one elevator in the older 

North Tower was so equipped. Emergency power was provided for the fire alarm and emergency 

lighting in stairways.

The building was constructed under the City of Atlanta Building Code, which is a modified version 

of the Southern Building Code. Minimum fire resistance ratings for a building of this type were two 

hours for concrete floors, with three-hour ratings for columns. There were no significant fire code 

violations at the time of the fire.

THE FIRE

June 30, 1989, fell on the Friday that immediately preceded the July 4th weekend. The Peachtree 

25th Building had about 60 percent of its normal occupancy present. On the sixth floor of the South 

Tower there were approximately 40 people working in five separate offices. A localized power outage had occurred sometime prior to 1030, and several electricians were working to replace a fuse 

that had blown. Occupants of the sixth floor remained in their offices. Apparently there was limited 

power on the floor. Three electricians were working in the electric closet, apparently attempting to 

replace a fuse on a live conductor, when arcing occurred. When the first part of the fuse was inserted 

there apparently was some sparking and the other two workers moved down the hall from the electric closet. When the electrician continued to insert the fuse there was an apparent uncontrolled and 

sustained arc. One witness described it as “a light so bright it lit up the hallway and blinded me. I 

couldn’t see anymore after that.” (See Appendix C.)

Occupants of the building reported three explosions in rapid succession on the sixth floor. The two 

workers accompanying the electrician were driven back due to the intensity of the arc in the electric 

closet. This arc created extreme heat and smoke and began a self-sustaining fire in the electrical 

closet. When occupants of the sixth floor opened doors to the corridor, they were greeted by heavy 

smoke and heat. Conditions were so severe in the sixth floor corridor that the injured electrician, 

crying for assistance and apparently having suffered an electrical shock, could not be reached by his 

co-workers. Occupants from the sixth floor reported that the heat and smoke were so intense that 

they too could not reach the man.
4

On the seventh floor, the floor above the fire, workers reported a problem with the electricity immediately following the explosions. The VDT screens started flickering and behaving erratically. Workers 

from the seventh floor wandering to the corridor to investigate discovered fire coming from around 

the doors of their electric closet. A member of the seventh floor staff activated the fire alarm and 

alerted other workers on that floor to evacuate immediately. By the time workers attempted to exit 

via the front stairway they reported that it was impassable due to heavy smoke. The approximate 

time elapsed between the explosion and their attempted egress was less than a minute. Workers from 

the seventh floor then proceeded to the rear stairway where they were able to evacuate the building. 

Workers from upper floors reported that the rear stairway was also filling with smoke and several 

workers reported difficulty making it out of the building. Nevertheless, all workers above the sixth 

floor were able to evacuate under their own power.

It appears that at least two occupants of the sixth floor were overcome while attempting to seek refuge or evacuate via the stairwell. Others workers on the sixth floor sought shelter in offices. Those 

who did this were primarily located on the end of the corridor closest to the electric closet. Their 

egress was undoubtedly blocked. One occupant of the sixth floor did seek refuge in an office on the 

opposite end of the floor, after rescuing a worker who was overcome in the hallway.

On arrival of the fire department the sixth floor occupants had assembled into four distinct areas 

of refuge. At the front of the building facing Peachtree Street approximately 12 to 14 workers had 

gathered in an office and broken a window to attract attention and ventilate some of the smoke that 

was filtering into their office.

A worker who was directly across the hall from the electrical closet (Suite 676) remained in his 

office and did not break a window. This worker was found dead after the fire.

Adjacent to this worker’s office approximately seven people sought refuge in another office (Suite 

680), where they broke out the window (see Photo 2, Appendix J). They suffered severe exposure 

to smoke and heat. Five of these occupants were rescued over fire department ladders. A sixth member of this group succumbed to smoke before reaching the office. She was later removed from the 

building and died three days after the fire. The seventh occupant who sought refuge with the group 

jumped from the sixth floor shortly before the fire department’s arrival and landed on a driveway 

serving the rear of the building (see Photo 9, Appendix J). She was seriously injured but survived.

The final group that took refuge was at the rear of the building in an area not accessible by aerial 

apparatus. This group consisted of one worker and a companion he had rescued from the corridor. 

The worker broke the window to his office and waited approximately 30 minutes before the fire 

department to remove him and his unconscious companion from the office via the south interior 

stairwell. The companion, who was not breathing and had no heart beat, did not respond to resuscitation attempts (see Photo 5, Appendix J).

FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE

The Atlanta Bureau of Fire Services originally received the call at 1029 as an automatic alarm originating at 1720 Peachtree Street, Northwest, and dispatched a normal assignment of three engines 

and two trucks, an emergency medical services (EMS) unit, and a battalion chief. However, they 

soon received approximately 20 phone calls in succession reporting a serious fire on the sixth floor 

and dispatched an additional rescue unit and a staffing squad. The temperature was about 90 degrees 

and humidity was 90 percent.
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 5

On arrival the Atlanta Fire Bureau was faced with one victim who had already jumped to the ground, 

approximately 19 people in need of immediate rescue, heaving smoke and heat conditions on the 

sixth floor with fire extension to the seventh and possibly other floors, elevators that did not automatically return to the ground floor of the building, and people still evacuating as attack crews were 

attempting to enter the building.

The first two truck companies were assigned to make rescues over ladders of those occupants at 

windows in the front of the building. Rescue units were assigned the job of triage and treatment of 

those victims coming down who had suffered smoke inhalation and burns, and caring for the victim 

who had jumped. The second alarm was transmitted six minutes after the first, at 1035, followed by 

a third alarm at 1043.

Because recovery of the victim who had jumped blocked the driveway and the decision to rescue the 

five seriously threatened occupants on the side of the building, vehicle access to the rear of the building was impossible. A complicating factor was that the roof deck was rated at 50 pounds per square 

foot, which required a judgment call as to whether the operation of aerial devices on the structure 

was safe. Ultimately, an aerial was put into operation in the rear. Engine companies started up the 

front stairwell with hose packs and encountered heavy smoke at the fourth floor. These companies 

donned their breathing apparatus and continued to the sixth floor where they made an attack on the 

main body of fire centered about the electrical closet.

At the rear of the building the fire department observed two men at a broken window who were 

exposed to a fairly heavy smoke condition. Firefighters on the parking deck attempted to calm these 

men while other firefighters went upstairs to attempt the rescue. Heat conditions were so severe on 

the fire floor that the truck company assigned to the rescue pulled a “hoseline” to reduce the intense 

heat before completing the rescue. Additional hoselines were put into service on the fourth, the 

fifth, and ultimately the seven floors.

Extreme heat on the sixth floor required frequent rotation of crews. The initial company on the fire 

floor extinguished the bulk of the fire but had to leave because their air was running out. The first 

victim of the fire was discovered at this time in the hallway. However, because of the extensive nature 

of his injuries, he was not removed. Of the five fire victims who did not survive, three were removed 

from the building and resuscitation efforts were attempted.

The search for victims and survivors was complicated by the confusing layout of the open plan 

offices and the fact that almost all doors were locked, which required extensive forcible entry.

Ventilation was accomplished with fans and by removing windows on the sixth floor. One stairway 

was kept clear of smoke using positive pressure ventilation.

Six firefighters were injured. Four suffered heat exhaustion, one had chest pains, and the last suffered a cut arm.

INCIDENT COMMAND

Incident Command was established by the first-due engine officer and passed from Battalion Chief 

3 to Assistant Chief D.E. Sparks to Deputy Chief D.M. Chamberlin. Acting Fire Chief Perrin provided 

information to the media.

Chief officers were assigned to sectors for interior command, the rear of the building, medical, 

lobby control, safety, motorized apparatus, and air supply. Other sides of the building were assigned 
6

to captains, and a lieutenant was responsible for rotating companies from combat to rehabilitation. 

Other sectors were established for medical transportation, staging, investigation, and information for 

inquiries about building occupants.

Communications were effective, though the communications system was stretched to its limits. 

Standard radio fire channels were supplemented with cellular telephones, 800 megahertz “trunking” radios, and use of EMS frequencies. All command vehicles in Atlanta are equipped with cellular 

phones and portable facsimile machines.

Outside agencies on the scene included the Atlanta Police, Atlanta Fulton County Emergency 

Management Agency, the transit authority (MARTA), Georgia Power (electric), Red Cross, five ambulance company representatives, Department of Public Works, an elevator company representative, and 

the Department of Public Safety psychologist.

FIRE BEHAVIOR

While many of the outcomes of the Peachtree 25th fire were similar to those expected in serious 

highrise fires, the origin and nature of the fire was unusual. The fire originated due to sustained 

electrical arcing that took place in the electric closet. Apparently the arc lasted for some period of 

time, since approximately 10 linear feet of bus bar and duct was not found after the fire and were 

assumed to have been vaporized. According to reports from building occupants, it would appear that 

the electrical arc produced an immediate drastic rise in temperature and an instantaneous sustained 

fire in the electric closet. Post-fire analysis suggested that the electrical arcing produced pressure 

which resulted in damage to the electric closet metal door frame.

Since the door to the electrical closet was open and the ceiling tiles in the electric closet were probably displaced, smoke, heat, and toxic gases spread rapidly from the closet down the corridor and 

into the plenum. Smoke damage was extensive throughout the entire sixth floor of the South Tower. 

Heat damage had an erratic pattern. In some offices, equipment such as typewriters and telephones 

were completely melted and the interior contents of the offices incinerated. In other offices there 

was minimal heat damage. The variance in heat damage did not depend on the distance from the 

fire and did not correlate completely with smoke damage. For example, the office directly across the 

hall from the electric closet showed no signs of heat damage, though the occupant died from smoke 

inhalation.

Aside from the corridor, the plenum apparently served as the principal route for the travel of smoke 

and heat in this fire. The flexible ducts which supplied air to the tenants’ space were completely 

burned away in some cases. The air transfer grilles were selectively damaged; in offices that suffered 

severe heat damage the air transfer grilles were in most cases completely destroyed. A good correlation could be found between the condition of the air transfer grilles and the amount of damage to the 

office space. Other floors were contaminated primarily through fires in electrical closets and smoke 

spreading through cracks around the doors separating the electrical closets from the corridors. On 

floors were the North and South Towers were connected, smoke traveled throughout the floor.

Firefighters reported seeing relatively small amounts of actual fire upon entrance to the sixth floor. 

They did encounter very heavy heat and smoke conditions; however, firefighters arriving on the sixth 

floor reported that the knob on the door from the stairway to the elevator lobby was “glowing red.” 

When firefighters arrived the fire apparently was in a fuel rich condition, and they reported that well 

into the operation, when ceiling tiles were removed, a “whoosh” would be heard and flames would 
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 7

appear in the plenum space. This would indicate that a large amount of fuel material had accumulated in the plenum area and had not burned for want of oxygen.

Fire damage to other floors was confined to the electrical closet area. Minor fire damage occurred on 

the fourth, fifth, and seventh floors with major fire damage on the sixth floor. Smoke spread from 

the fourth to the tenth floor in the South Tower, and there was lighter smoke damage on the seventh 

and eighth floors of the North Tower.

Conditions on the fire floor and reports from firefighters and survivors would clearly indicate that an 

untenable atmosphere was created within moments of the fire’s outbreak. Any unusual toxicological ramifications associates with the electrical arcing have not been documented to date, although 

several of the victims apparently were overcome very rapidly. Contamination with smoke of the sixth 

floor South Tower stairway is thought to be attributed to the stairway door being opened shortly 

before or during the initial stages of the fire.

OCCUPANT BEHAVIOR

There were several modes of action undertaken by occupants of the sixth floor. Some were trapped 

in offices, and, due to either their inability to travel past the electrical closet or fire conditions in the 

hallway, they were unable to leave the floor. Of the approximately 40 occupants on the sixth floor 

of the South Tower on the day of the fire, one jumped, five died, and approximately twelve were 

removed by fire department aerial apparatus. All the occupants of the fire floor who had not exited 

by the time of the fire department arrival either had to be assisted out of the building by firefighters 

or died on the fire floor.

Panic did not appear to play any negative role in the outcome of this fire. Surviving occupants 

ultimately assembled into three groups where they broke out windows and, with the exception of 

the woman who jumped, were rescued by the fire department either over aerial apparatus or via the 

interior stairwell with the fire department’s assistance.

The one occupant who remained in his office throughout the fire without breaking a window died 

from smoke inhalation. Heat apparently never reached an excessive level in this office – there was 

no damage to plastic items stored on bookshelves near the ceiling.

Breaking windows seemed to be the most successful occupant survival strategy for those trapped in 

this fire. Of the four who died, one remained in a closed office without breaking a window and the 

others were overcome by combustion products while attempting to escape the floor.

OCCUPANT EVACUATION PLAN

The Peachtree 25th building housed a large number of Federal workers. The largest number worked 

for the U.S. Forest Service, whose Regional office was located in the building. Because the Forest 

Service was the most populous Federal agency, and because of their responsibility and expertise 

in emergency planning, they administered the occupant emergency plan for the Peachtree 25th 

building.

Federal Property Management Regulations require that Federal workers organize and practice building evacuation exercises. This evacuation planning included fire drills every three to four months. 

The drills consisted of sounding the alarm and having all building occupants walk down the nearest stairway and assemble at designated areas outside the building. (A complete emergency plan is 

included in Appendix D.) There were no injuries reported among Federal workers.
8

Building management cooperated in performing these fire drills, but participation among private 

firms in the building was optional. Building occupants report that with some exceptions, most 

private companies did not participate in the building evacuation plan or fire drills. The sixth floor of 

the South Tower was occupied entirely by private companies.

The emergency plan has components for fire, bomb threat, and natural and manmade disasters. The 

occupant emergency plan at the Peachtree 25th Building appeared to be well organized and successful in that there were no significant casualties among occupants not on the sixth floor of the South 

Tower.

ADDENDUM: On December 28, 1989, the Peachtree 25th Building was cited by the Atlanta Area 

Office of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The charges were for inadequate egress 

facilities and improper interior finish in the sixth floor South Tower corridor. Other citations were 

directed to the electrical facilities in the building and work practices on the day of the fire.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Highrise buildings need automatic sprinklers.

Due to the unusual nature of this fire, there are those who might argue that sprinklers would 

not have helped. But is the opinion of the fire department and this investigator that even if the 

sprinklers had not extinguished the fire, their activation would have reduced the intense heat 

and at a minimum, would have facilitated a less stressful and more rapid removal of victims by 

the fire department.

The code community should require sprinklers in all highrise buildings – particularly modern, 

open plan offices, where experience has shown that even where compartmentation exists, serious fires and threats to life safety are to be expected.

2. Evacuating buildings under fire conditions may take longer than evacuation during drills.

While this seems evident, there may be an assumption on the part of those planning evacuation 

for highrise buildings that the urgency of an actual emergency would result in faster evacuation. 

In this fire, evacuation took approximately one and a half minutes longer than during drills, 

which normally took six minutes.

3. It is unrealistic to assume that occupants of the fire floor will always activate the building 

fire alarm system.

In this fire, occupants of the fire floor were unable to activate the fire alarm. The alarm system 

was activated by an occupant of the seventh floor. Without fire detection systems, it is conceivable that reporting a severe fire could be delayed if occupants of the floor above do not 

investigate or if the floor is vacant, such as during renovations or after hours. Delayed notice 

to building occupants could trap those people above the fire if stairways fill with smoke or are 

needed for fire attack.

4. Fire alarm activations in highrise structures deserve an immediate, full response from the 

fire service.

The first report of this fire was through an automatic alarm signal via the municipal fire alarm 

system. The Atlanta Bureau of Fire dispatches three engines, two trucks, and rescue unit, and a 

battalion chief on automatic alarms from highrise buildings. Many cities, for reasons of conve-
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 9

nience or economy, send reduced responses to such automatic alarms in the absence of phone 

calls confirming an actual fire. Although many calls subsequently were placed to the fire department, the first notification and initial dispatch here was for an automatic alarm. Any less than 

the full dispatch that Atlanta made would have delayed arrival of firefighters and equipment, 

resulting in delayed rescues.

5. Fire drills work; they should be required for highrise office buildings.

The Peachtree 25th Building practiced fire drills. The Federal tenants were required to formulate 

occupant emergency plans. The opportunity to practice evacuation and the heightened awareness of fire safety from participating in the plan were cited by Federal workers as preventing 

additional casualties in this fire.

6. Hazardous areas should be separated from the exit corridor by fire resistive construction.

Separation of hazardous areas such as electrical rooms should be considered as a retrofit item in 

structures where a fire or similar situation could be expected to cause an immediate threat to the 

ability of occupants to reach exits.

7. The arrangement of exits in highrise office buildings is often such that the contamination 

of a single area by fire products can render multiple exits unusable.

The design of egress in highrise office buildings should reflect this reality. Provisions should be 

made for access to exits without having to use the central corridor. Provisions are being considered to add additional crossovers from the North to the South Towers in the Peachtree 25th 

Building.

8. Breaking windows was an effective strategy in this fire.

Breaking windows is generally discouraged in highrise office buildings. In this fire, breaking 

windows was clearly associated with survival. It let smoke escape over the heads of people 

trapped at windows and gave them enough air to breath. In cases where occupants can be 

reached by fire department aerial equipment, breaking windows may be an effective strategy 

when trapped in an office.

In consideration of this fire, and the other considerations such as differing window materials 

and air movement patterns in highrise buildings, the fire service should attempt to issue more 

definitive guidance on windows to those who work in highrise offices.

9. Being in reach of fire department ladders is no guarantee of safety.

While fire department access was critical to limiting the number of deaths in this fire, the 

outcome might not have been significantly less deadly if the fire had occurred on the second 

floor. In fact, it could be argued that a fire on a lower floor could have created more problems 

by threatening more occupants on upper floors.
10

Appendices

A. Peachtree 25th Building Site Drawing

B. Sixth Floor Floor Plan Showing Location of Victims

C. Post-fire Statement of Electrician

D. Occupant Emergency Plan For Peachtree 25th Building

E. Atlanta Department of Public Safety Report on the Fire

F. General Services Administration (GSA) Fire Report

G. Toxicological Reports on the Fire Victims

H. Photographs (used with permission of Nick Arroyo of the Atlanta Constitution)

I. List of Slides/Photographs in Master Report File
11

APPENDIX A

Peachtree 25th Building Site Drawing

APPENDIX A 

Peachtree 25th Building 
12

APPENDIX B

Sixth Floor Plan Showing Location of Victims
13

APPENDIX C

Post-fire Statement of Electrician
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

APPENDIX C (CONTINUED)
15

aPPenDIX D

Occupant Emergency Plan For Peachtree 25th Building

APPENDIX D

United States Forest R8 G - A 2 3 8 5 z 2

Department of Service

Agriculture Atlanta, GA

Reply To: 6400 Property Management Date: September 29, 1988 

Subject: Occupant Emergency Plan 

To: All Government Agencies,

Peachtree-25th Building

Directors. NFS

Here are copies of the Occupant Emergency Plan for Federal Employees in the

Peachtree-25th Building. This plan is required under FPMR 101-20.504-2.

and GSA Bulletin FPMR D-179 Public Buildings and Space, dated November 18,

1980.

Each unit should schedule a safety meeting to discuss this plan in detail

with their employees. A copy should also be posted on your unit bulletin

board.

When Control Personnel listed in Exhibit "D" are transferred, reassigned,

resign. etc., contact USDA-Forest Service, Procurement and Property Unit.

Property Group. 347-2609. It is very important that we have personnel

designated to fill positions at all times.

Your attention is called to Section II of the plan on evacuation of the

handicapped. Please furnish a current list of handicapped persons in your

unit, along with the designated persons giving assistance.

After each evacuation. a critique will be held in Room 162 ten minutes

after the all clear is sounded. The Floor Monitor and Alternates are urged

to attend this meeting.

A meeting will be held in Room 162 on October 13, at 1:00 P.M. to review

the plan and to familiarize control personnel with it. The following

should attend the meeting:

Coordinator

Floor Team Coordinator

Floor,Monitor

One Representative from each Government Agency

Stairwell Monitors

Bullhorn Team

Medical Team
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

aPPenDIX D (COnTInUeD)

Appendix D (co

Occupant Emergency Plan Page 2

If any of the above are unable to attend, they should be represented by

their Alternate. Each Agency will be responsible for the training of their

Area Monitors.

You are urged be represented at this meeting.

nt'd)

Deputy Regional Forester

Designated Official,

Evacuation Plan
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 17

APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

Occupant Emergency Plan For Peachtree 25th Building

Table of Contents

 I Evacuation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18 
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

APPENDIX D (CONTINUED) 

Occupant Emergency Plan

Peachtree 25th Building

I. Evacuation Plan

The plan provides for actions to be taken for the protection of life and property during all types 

of emergency situations. In the event of evacuation the following (fire, bomb, or civil defense) 

plan will be used.

1. All stairwells, front and rear, will be used for evacuation of the building. The elevators will not 

be used. When the alarm is sounded, personnel will use the exit nearest them. Evacuation 

floor plan, Exhibit “A” is the same for all floors.

2. The evacuation alarm is a loud horn, signal. (Do not confuse this with the alarm ring on 

the elevator doors).

3. When the horn sounds, evacuate the building quickly, but do not run. Do not panic.

4. Persons who walk slowly or have difficulties with stairs should walk to the right.

5. Leave the vicinity of the building so that the firefighters will have access to the building. 

Complete evacuation process to designated area even though alarm signal ceases to sound.

6. The designated evacuation area is the parking lot behind Woolworth on north side of 25th 

street.

7. Evacuation of the building will be as follows:

a. Front stairwell – (See Exhibit B)

North Tower - Go downstairs and exit on P-3 level in the garage and cross 25th street 

to Woolworth’s parking area.

South Tower - Go downstairs and exit on P-4 in the garage and cross 25th street to 

Woolworth’s parking area.

b. Back stairwells – (See Exhibit B)

North and South Towers – Go down rear stairs and exit on P-2 level in the garage and 

cross 25th street to Woolworth’s parking area. In the event severe smoke or fire prohibits your egress 

to P-2 level return to either the third, sixth, or ninth floor, re-enter the building and proceed to front stairwell.

II. Evacuation of Handicapped

a. Handicapped people who are not capable of negotiating a stairway in a fire emergency 

should proceed to a point adjacent to the nearest front exit stairway of each tower and await 

further instructions. If the fire emergency is at the front of tower handicapped person is 

located, they should proceed to exit on other tower or to the rear stairway exit.
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 19

b. Elevators will not be used to evacuate the handicapped until the fire department determines that they are safe for use. If the fire department recommends evacuation prior to its 

arrival, or when a unilateral decision is made by the Designated Official of the Occupant 

Emergency Plan to evacuate, the elevators will be used only with the assistance of the 

Building Management personnel.

c. Each agency shall assign a sufficient number of employees to stay with the handicapped to 

give special help and assistance as needed. It may be necessary for each agency to carry 

their handicapped down the stairwells in an extreme emergency. It will not be necessary 

to carry down unless instructed to do so by the Designated Official. The communications 

team will notify the handicapped when the all clear is given.

d. In order to evacuate the handicapped as quickly as possible, it will be necessary for the 

coordinator of the Occupant Emergency Plan to maintain a current list of handicapped 

employees. Each agency is responsible for furnishing this list along with the persons giving 

assistance and keeping this list up-to-date.

This list shall be sent to Donald L. Ratcliff, U.S. Forest Service, Room 1099.

Handicapped’s Names __________________________________________________

Name of person giving assistance _________________________________________

Location in Building ___________________________________________________

A list of the handicapped will be given to the Floor Team Coordinator and each Floor 

Monitor.

e. During any evacuation of the building, the Floor Monitor shall determine if any 

handicapped persons are present on their floor and report any to the Floor Team 

Coordinator.

f. If an agency is being visited by a handicapped person, that agency will be responsible for 

assigning sufficient employees to assist in evacuation when necessary.

III Evacuation for Tornados or Severe Weather

This section is to establish procedures for employees protection in the event a tornado or severe 

weather threatens.

The Forest Service fire dispatcher will monitor the Weather Service Broadcast Station for a tornado watch or other emergencies. The fire dispatcher has a receiver that is electronically turned 

on by the tone used by the weather service when they broadcast an alert. The dispatcher on duty 

will notify the Occupant Emergency Plan Coordinator who, in turn, will notify the Designated 

Official of the conditions. If the conditions warrant, the Designated Official will give the coordinator instructions to evacuate the building.

EVACUATION PROCEDURES

a. The Occupant Emergency Coordinator (OEC) will notify each government agency to evacuate the building.

b. Each agency will be responsible for spreading the word to everyone in their unit.
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

c. The fire alarm will not ring.

d. Proceed immediately to Parking Level 1 by stairs.

e. Stay away from windows and glass doors.

f. Remain in P-1 until all clear is given.

g. Do not go outside.

h. The OEC will establish radio communication to keep the Designated Official informed of 

local weather conditions.

Remember: No fire alarm will ring. We are heavily dependent upon word-of-mouth to 

spread the news.

IV. Bomb Threat Plan

In the event of a bomb threat, the following plan will be used.

Should any employee receive a bomb threat telephone call, the following actions should be 

taken:

1. Listen carefully and record the exact words as they are spoken.

2. Attempt to fix, as closely as possible, the caller’s age, race, education, sex, etc.

3. Try to obtain other information from the caller such as time the bomb is set to go off, type 

of bomb, location of bomb in the building, etc.

4. After above steps have been taken, call Designated Forest Service Official or alternate as 

shown below:

Robert B. Erickson Tel. No.

Marvin C. Meier Tel. No.

Leroy Jones Tel. No.

5. The Designated Official will determine what action is to be taken and will notify the Forest 

Service Coordinator or alternate as shown below:

Donald L. Hatcliff Tel. No.

George P. Stevens, Alternate Tel. No.

David D. Trull, Alternate Tel. No.

6. If it is decided to evacuate the building, the coordinator will notify the building manager to 

sound the evacuation signal. When signal is heard, follow instructions in evacuation plan.

V. Control Personnel and Duties

This part of the plan will be distributed only to each person listed as control personnel. Also, 

copies shall be sent to each unit for posting on bulletin boards.

When there is planned absence of both the primary and alternate control personnel, the last to 

leave should designate someone to fill the position during their absence.
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 21

It will be the responsibility of each Forest Service Unit and other agency offices to notify the 

Forest Service Regional Property Management Officer when there are personnel changes affecting the assigned control personnel. The Property Management Officer is located in Room 1099, 

telephone 347-2609.

Duties of Control and Floor Personnel

a. Designated Official – The highest ranking official of the primary occupant agency or an alternate high ranking official selected by agreement of occupant agency officials. The Designated 

Official is responsible for developing occupant protection plan, coordinating staffing and 

training for the protection organization, and execution of the plan as well as deciding the 

course of action to be taken during emergencies.

b. Occupant Emergency Coordinator – The OEC is responsible for implementing the overall plan 

of action. The OEC coordinates the plan to include: selecting, training, and organizing an 

adequate staff for conducting emergency operations; and for directing and supervising the 

activities of the Occupant Emergency Organization during the emergency. The coordinator 

reports to the Designated Official and keeps the person apprised of events.

c. Floor Team Coordinator – The Floor Team Coordinator supervises and expedites the planned 

controlled movement of all building occupants, monitors the staffing of personnel for the 

Occupant Emergency Organization and coordinates employee bomb search of occupant 

space. The Floor Team Coordinator supervises the activities of the Floor Monitors.

d. Floor Monitor – The Floor Monitor has, on the floor to which assigned, the same responsibilities as the Floor Team Coordinator. In carrying out these responsibilities, the Floor 

Monitor supervises the activities of the following members of the Occupant Emergency 

Organization. The floor monitor determines if there are any handicapped persons on their 

floors and if so, reports this to Floor Team Coordinator.

1. Area Monitor – Coordinates the evacuation of the area assigned and will secure and lock 

all exit doors when rooms are cleared.

2. Handicapped Monitor – The Handicapped Monitor ensures that handicapped persons are 

safely evacuated and attended to during the emergency period.

3. Stairway Monitor – The Stairway Monitor ensures that stairway routes are safe for purposes 

of evacuation.

4. Elevator Monitor – The Elevator Monitor ensures that elevators are restricted to evacuating 

handicapped persons from the building.

e. Medical Coordinator – The Medical Coordinator is responsible for training and equipping personnel assigned to perform medical assistance or first aid services in an emergency and for 

supervising emergency first aid or medical self help operations within the building during 

an emergency until local emergency personnel arrive.

f. Damage Control Coordinator – The Damage Control Coordinator is responsible for turning off 

appropriate utilities when required by the emergency situation.

g. Damage Control Team – Under the direction of the Damage Control Coordinator, the Damage 

Control Team is responsible for controlling utilities during an emergency. During emergencies they report to the Damage Control Coordinator in the basement or other predesignated location.
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

h. Communications – A system of communications will be extremely important during emergencies. Designated Officials will need time and accurate information upon which to 

decide what course of action to implement and communicate this plan to members of the 

organization. Consequently, existing means of communication in a facility will have to be 

analyzed to determine how it can be used for emergency notification.

VI. General Information

a. Room 162, Forest Service Communication Room, first floor, is designated as Command 

Post. The OEC will remain in room 162 until control personnel arrive.

b. A critique will be held in the Command Post, Room 162, ten minutes after all clear is 

sounded. Designated Official, OEC, Floor Team Coordinator, Floor Monitors, GSA representatives, and building manager will attend.

c. The Medical Team will report to Room 162 when alarm sounds.
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 23

Appendix D (Continued)

VII. Occupant Emergency Organizational Chart

Occupant Emergency Organizational Chart 
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

Exhibit “A” – Evacuation Points Appendix D (cont'd)

- 9 -
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 25

APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

Exhibit “B” – Evacuation Route
26

aPPenDIX e

Memorandum

M E M O R A N D U M

APPENDIX E

Tom Weyandt,

Department of Commu 

TO: Shirley Clarke Franklin 

Chief Administrative Officer 

FROM: George Napper, Commissioner 

Department of Public Safety

SUBJECT: Report on Fire at 1718-20 Peachtree Street, N.E.

June 30, 1989

DATE : August 17, 1989

On June 30,' 1989 one of the worst fires in the history

of Atlanta occurred at 1718-20 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta,

Georgia (hereinafter Peachtree 25th Building). Five people died.

However, other lives were saved by the prompt and professional

response of over 120 firefighters and over 20 support personnel.

The details of the fire and the City's response to it are

outlined below.

Over the last several weeks, staff from the Bureau of

Fire Services of the Department of Public Safety and the Bureau

of Buildings of the Department of Community Development have

searched records for documentation of building permits, building

plans and inspection reports. Th ese documents and the analysis

of the building history,are summarized here. The documents themselves have been consolidated for inspection in the appropriate

offices.
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 27
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

aPPenDIX e (COnTInUeD)

MEMO

August 8, 1989

Page Three

5th Alarm 6th Alarm 7th Alarm

(Cont'd) (Cont'd) (Cont'd)

RESCUE: R-9

LIGHT UNIT

CHIEF

Others responding included the Atlanta Bureau of Police Services;

Atlanta Gas Light Company; Georgia Power Company; George Napper,

Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety; from the Bureau

of Fire Serivces: Chief T. M. Perrin, Acting Fire Chief; W. L.

Minor, Assistant Chief in Charge of Communications: H. B.

Thornton, Chief of Inspections; J. A. Haynie, Chief of

Investigations; A. D. Bell, Assistant Chief in charge of Fire

Safety Division; William Tucker, Chief of Communications; and

Mercer Wade, Liaison over Motorized Equipment. Also present were

Dr. Guy Seymour, Director of Psychological Services for the

Department of Public Safety; Sandra Walker, Chief of

Communications, Department of the Mayor; and Personnel from the

Public Affairs Office of the Department of Public Safety. in

addition, staff from the Bureau of Buildings who responded to

begin the post-incident evaluation included Norman Koplon,

Director of Buildings; Leon Dover, Chief Electrical Inspector;

Mike Scott, Chief Building Inspector; and Frank McKinney, Area

Building Inspector.

Appendix E (cont'd)
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 29

aPPenDIX e (COnTInUeD)

MEMO

August 16, 1989

Page Four

CAUSE OF FIRE

It appears that the fire was started when an electrician employed

by Lite Tech Electric Company attempted to replace a 200 amp fuse

in the bus duct while the electrical system was on. The building

superintendent reported that the building experienced "brown Outs”

earlier the morning of the fire. "Brown outs" are defined as

lights dimming, low voltage, computers malfunctioning, etc.

While the electrician was in the process of changing the fuse, a

short in the electrical system occurred causing an explosion

which generated intense heat and dense smoke. The electrician

was killed.

TYPE OF BUILDING

The subject building contains ten (10) stories and four (4)

underground parking decks. The building construction is contemporary concrete/glass, with a flat tar/gravel roof. The

north tower of the building was permitted in 1962 and the south

tower in 1968.

BUILDING FIRE SAFETY FEATURE;

The building has a standpipe system, fire extinguishers located

throughout, and a fire alarm system, with pull stations on each

floor with an emergency generator supplying emergency systems.

Appendix E (cont'd)
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

aPPenDIX e (COnTInUeD)

Appendix E (cont'd)

MEMO

August 16, 1989

Page Five

The alarm system is connected to Fire Bureau Communications. The

alarm and fire protection/fire safety features were in compliance

with Code requirements at the time of the last inspection.

There is corridor smoke detection on the fifth floor and tenth

floor only, which was installed as required by the Director of

Buildings during specific tenant finish work on those floors.

An approved evacuation plan is on file. On September 22, 1980, a

conference was held with the building management on a plan for

evacuation. The evacuation plan was subsequently developed and

has been updated four times (03-31-82, 10-02-85, 09-29-87,

09-29-88). There were no deficiencies in the evacuation plan.

The Inspection Records reveal fire drills were conducted on

09-22-30 and 10-16-86. Also a fire safety education program was

conducted by the Fire Bureau on March 4, 1982,

The search of the building permit files at this time fails to

reveal the issuance of a permit for the construction of the

tenant spaces on the sixth floor in the vicinity of the fire.

Interior walls in this area appear to have been added sometime

between 1982, when the last plans for the sixth floor were

reviewed, and 1989, when the fire occurred. A review of
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 31

aPPenDIX e (COnTInUeD)

Appendix E (cont'd)

MEMO

August 16, 1989

Page Six

inspection records for the building reveals that there have Seen

violations of Various provisions of the fire code over time.

However, all appear to have been brought into compliance with the

applicable Code within reasonable times after citations were

made. Further, there were no outstanding citations at the time

of the fire.

DAMAGE: TO PROPERTY, INJURIES AND LOSS OF LIFE

The owners of the 25th Street Building have estimated their loss

at 2.1 million dollars to the building and 500 thousand dollars

to the contents.

Very dense smoke causing zero visibility and intense heat,

generated initially from the burning of the electrical system

itself, caused considerable damage to the 6th Floor area of the

south tower. Also, burning electrical insulation in the exit

corridor, burning wallpaper on the exit corridor walls and

burning carpet in the exit corridor, caused extensive damage to

the 6th floor... Very little Office furniture and ordinary combustibles were consumed. The far west end of the 6th floor was

unoccupied and contained no office furniture. Over 60 feet Of the

floor carpet in the hallway where the fire originated was consumed. Smoke traveling through the heating and air conditioning
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

aPPenDIX e (COnTInUeD)

MEMO

August 16, 1989

Page Seven

venting system caused smoke damage to adjacent floors. Water

damage occurred mainly on the 6th floor and light to moderate

damage on floors below. The electrical bus ducts were damaged on

the 4th, 5th, and 6th floors. Approximately ten feet of the buss

duct were completely consumed between the 5th and 6th floors.

Also, minor damage was sustained in parts of the lower bus duct.

It is estimated that forty (40) people were on the 6th floor at

the time of the fire. Nineteen (19) people were rescued by Bureau

of Fire Services personnel and received medical attention at area

hospitals. There were two (2) people dead on the fire scene (DOS)

on the east side of the building on the 6th floor, two (2) other

people were found unconscious on the 6th floor, west side of the

building and were transported to Piedmont Hospital where they were

pronounced dead. One (1) other person was also found on the east

side of the building and was transported to Piedmont Hospital and

died there on July 3, 1989. The total number of fatalities were

five (5).

Six (6) firefighters were injured combating the fire and implementing rescue procedures:

Appendix E (cont'd)
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 33

aPPenDIX e (COnTInUeD)

MEMO

August 16, 1989

Page Eight

AFTERMATH OF THE FIRE

The City required that certain conditions be met before the owner

of the 25th Street Building could reoccupy the North Tower of the

building. These conditions included the following: (1) certification from an electrical contractor regarding electrical

systems, exit signs and the emergency generator, (2) construction

of floor to ceiling barricades to prevent access to the South

Tower on certain floors, and (3) certification by an alarm company that the alarm system was completely operational. All of

these tasks have been completed. Authorization was given to

occupy the North Tower on July 3, 1989.

CONCLUSION

The City of Atlanta responded to the fire appropriately in all

circumstances. The team effort displayed as well as the bravery

of individuals helped greatly to minimize the loss of life. As

in any disaster there is a search for answers to understand why

it happened but more importantly, for ways to prevent a future

occurrence. In that regard, we offer the following suggestions

to minimize electrical fires: 

( 1 P)erform periodic maintenance of electrical

equipment including infrared scanning to

Appendix E (cont'd)
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

aPPenDIX e (COnTInUeD)

Appendix E (cont'd)

MEMO

August 16, 1989

Page Nine

locate hot spots in the system; 

(2) Increase safety training through a mandatory

electrical journeyman license program:

(3) Locate high temperature heat detectors on

buss duct in each electrical room that will

disconnect the down stream overcurrent device;

(4) Install ground fault detectors on the

electrical system.

(5) Install sprinkler systems, in that they

would be of significant value in the

overall control of such an incident and

would minimize injuries and deaths: though

installing sprinklers in the electrical

room, would be of questionable value.
35

aPPenDIX F

General Services Administration (GSA) Fire Report

APPENDIX F
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix F (cont'd)

II. Description of the Fire Incident:

On June 30, 1989, an alarm was received at the Atlanta Fire Department at

l0:28 a.m., having been transmitted by activation of a pull station at the

Peachtree 25th Building. 

The fire was located on the sixth floor of the south tower of the two tower

structure. The fire originated in the electrical closet while a fuse was

being replaced by an electrician. The electrical work appears to have been

performed on a “live” panel. The electrician was working on the electrical

closet trying to correct previously reported electrical problems. The

approximately twenty year old 480 volt panel is assumed to he original

building equipment. The panel served the vertical 3-phase bus bar and

contained 200 ampere fuses.

It appears that the removal of one fuse established an arc on the phase. The

arc was of sufficient power to ionize the air around the circuit. This may

have started the fire. The explosion of the fuse during replacement and

subsequent fuse explosions created a fire of such intensity to cause

structural failure of the electrical closet walls. It appears that the other

protective equipment (i.e., switch gear and switch panel) did not have

sufficient time to react prior to the fuse replacement and the ensuing

explosions.

The electrician was killed as were four others. One fatality was found in the

room directly across the corridor from the electrical closet. The victims,

other than the electrician, were overcome by smoke. Smoke infiltrated offices

where corridor doors, solid wood doors , were opened by the occupants during

the fire or just happened to he open. Generally, the corridor office doors

did not have closers.

The electrical closet access opened into the corridor. The corridor wall

covering opposing the electrical closet ignited. The corridor wall covering

did not burn evenly but oscillated down the corridor length. The burn pattern

is to the floor opposite the electrical closet, moved upward as it passed the

elevator lobby, down again past the elevators and finally raises again toward

the end of the corridor. The carpet in the corridor was burned to the

concrete at the areas the wall covering burned to the floor.

The corridor walls were gypsum board with at least one layer of paint, covered

by a textured vinyl wall covering and again covered by a suede material. The

Fire resistance’ rating and smoke development rating of the interior finish is

being questioned. No federally occupied floors have similar interior

finishes.

The fire department arrival time was l0:31 a.m. (3 minutes). The fire

department extinguished the fire at the end of the corridor. Exterior fire

forces rescued occupants through windows using ladder trucks.

(2)
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 37

Appendix F (cont'.d)

III. Damages:

The Peachtree 25th Building consists of a north and south tower connected by

corridor and office space. ‘The building footprint resembles the letter “H”.

The fire was contained by fire resistive construction to- the south tower sixth

floor. Government tenants in the north tower were not subject to fire or

smoke damage. The damage to federally occupied space in the south tower was

as fo1lows :

Forest Service 7th, 8th, 9th & 10th Fl. Smoke Damage 

Forest Service 3rd Fl. Storage Water Damage 

Forest Service 1st Fl. Conference Rm. Water Damage 

ICC 3rd Fl. Water Damage 

The federal occupants of the south tower were relocated to the north tower

(doubled up) or to lessor provided space near the Peachtree 25th Building.

Some Federal occupants were put in travel status to complete field assignments.

No estimates of damage are available from the lessor. The damage to the sixth 

floor south tower will require complete reconstruction. The lessor is 

replacing the entire south tower electrical busway and switch gear to

eliminate fuses. The lessor will upgrade the fire alarm system and provide

automatic sprinklers throughout both the north and south towers.

(3)
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

aPPenDIX F (COnTInUeD)

IV. Summary of Recommendations:

Due to this property being lessor-owned, limited damage to Government tenant

space, and lessor retrofitting the building firesafety systems the number of

recommendations is few.

1. Regional Office should ensure that interior finishes are not stacked or

layering of finishes is limited.

2. Central Office may wish to evaluate, through the National Bureau of

Standards, the effect of layered interior finishes.

(4)

Appendix F (cont'd)
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 39
40

APPENDIX G

Toxicological Reports on the Fire Victims

Name Age Carbon Monoxide in Blood 

(Percent) Cause of Death

Guy Ahlstedt* 28 Negligible Asphyxia and Burns

Charles Chandler 29 65-70 Smoke Inhalation

Patsy Jones 37 35-40 Smoke Inhalation

Victor Tinubu 36 25-30 Smoke Inhalation

Eudora Rogers** 48 ------- Smoke Inhalation

**Electrician

**Died three days after the fire
41

APPENDIX H

Photographs

1. Rescue by aerial at front of building.

2. Victims awaiting rescue on south side of building, sixth floor.

3. Firefighter ascending aerial to rescue victims on south side.

4. Victim reacts after being rescued, note truck company at front of building.

5. Resuscitation attempt on victim removed from rear of sixth floor.

6. Firefighter rests after making rescues over ladder. (Note apparatus placement in background.)

7. Front of building.

8. Rear of building showing differing construction of North and South Towers.

9. South side of building, showing driveway, looking toward front of building (Peachtree Street). 

Woman who jumped landed on this driveway.

10. Typical exit arrangement at rear of floor, South Tower.

11. Fifth floor corridor looking toward rear of building. Electrical closet is in foreground. Elevator 

lobby and front stairway are around the corner to right.

12. Elevator lobby on fifth floor, elevators are to left, exit is to the right. Smoke detectors were not 

installed on the sixth floor.

13. Front stairway, South Tower looking at door to sixth floor.
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

1. Rescue by aerial at front of building.
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 43

2. Victims awaiting rescue on south side of building, sixth floor.
44 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

3. Firefighter ascending aerial to rescue victims on south side.
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 454. Victim reacts after being rescued, note truck company at front of building.
46 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

5. Resuscitation attempt on victim removed from rear of sixth floor.
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 47

6. Firefighter rests after making rescues over ladder. 

(Note apparatus placement in background.)
48 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

7. Front of building.
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 498. Rear of building showing differing construction of North and South Towers.
50 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

9. South side of building, showing driveway, looking toward front of building 

(Peachtree Street). Woman who jumped landed on this driveway.
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 51

10. Typical exit arrangement at rear of floor, South Tower.
52 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

11. Fifth floor corridor looking toward rear of building. Electrical closet is in foreground. 

Elevator lobby and front stairway are around the corner to right.
USFA-TR-033/June 1989 5312. Elevator lobby on fifth floor, elevators are to left, exit is to the right. Smoke detectors were not installed on the sixth floor.
54 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

13. Front stairway, South Tower looking at door to sixth floor.
55

APPENDIX I

List of Slides/Photographs in Master Report File

Numerous slides and photographs are included in the master report file for this fire at the USFA. The 

photographs appearing in Appendix H were produced from the items asterisked below.

(Provided by Nick Arroyo, Atlanta Constitution)

*1. Rescue by aerial at front of building (note smoke condition).

*2. Victims awaiting rescue on south side of building, sixth floor.

3. Close-up of victims on south side, sixth floor.

*4. Firefighter ascending aerial to rescue victims on south side.

*5. Victim reacts after being rescued, note truck company at front of building.

6. Victims react after descending aerial.

7-11. Victims treated by medical and fire department personnel.

*12. Firefighter rests after making rescues over ladder. (Note apparatus placement in background.)

*13. Resuscitation attempt on victim removed from rear of sixth floor.

(Provided by Author)

1. Front of building.

*3. Front of building.

4. Rear of building showing different construction of North and South Towers.

*5. Rear of building showing different construction of North and South Towers.

*6-7. Typical exit arrangement at rear of floor, South Tower.

8. Interior of occupant use hose cabinet, showing fire extinguisher and evacuation diagram.

12. Fifth floor corridor, looking toward front of building.

*14-15. Fifth floor corridor, looking toward rear of building. Electrical closet is in foreground. 

Elevator lobby and front stairway are around the corner to the right.

16. Mechanical and electrical closets.

*17-19. Elevator lobby on fifth floor, elevators are to left, exit is to the right. Smoke detectors were 

not installed on the sixth floor.

20-22. Arrangement of exit at front of fifth floor.

*23. Front stairway, South Tower looking at door to sixth floor.

*24. South side of building, showing driveway, looking toward front of building (Peachtree 

Street). Woman who jumped landed on this driveway.

25. Courtyard at rear of building.