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BRAC AND BEYOND: AN EXAMINATION OF THE

RATIONALE BEHIND FEDERAL SECURITY

STANDARDS FOR LEASED SPACE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 27, 2005

Serial No. 109–54

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on July 27, 2005 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Moran, Hon. James P., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Virginia ...................................................................................................... 9

Williams, Dwight, Chief Security Officer, Department of Homeland Security; F. Joseph Moravec, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration; Get Moy, Director, Installation Requirements and Management, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, Department of Defense; and

John Jester, Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency, Department

of Defense ...................................................................................................... 20

Moravec, F. Joseph .................................................................................... 32

Moy, Get ..................................................................................................... 40

Williams, Dwight ....................................................................................... 20

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Virginia: prepared statement of ................................................................... 4

LaTourette, Hon. Steven C., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio, briefing notes .................................................................................. 50

Moran, Hon. James P., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Virginia, prepared statement of .............................................................. 13

Moravec, F. Joseph, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General

Services Administration: prepared statement of ........................................ 34

Moy, Get, Director, Installation Requirements and Management, Office

of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, Department of Defense, prepared statement of ............................... 42

Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Nevada, prepared statement of .................................................................... 79

Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 7

Williams, Dwight, Chief Security Officer, Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 23

(1)

BRAC AND BEYOND: AN EXAMINATION OF

THE RATIONALE BEHIND FEDERAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR LEASED SPACE

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2154,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman of the

committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Davis, Gutknecht, LaTourette, BrownWaite, Porter, Foxx, Waxman, Maloney, Kucinich, Watson, Higgins,

and Norton.

Also present: Representatives Moran of Virginia and Jones of

Ohio.

Staff present: David Marin, deputy staff director/communications

director; Keith Ausbrook, chief counsel; Rob White, press secretary;

Drew Crockett, deputy director of communications; Victoria Procter, senior professional staff member; Teresa Austin, chief clerk;

Leneal Scott, computer systems manager; Karen Lightfoot, minority senior policy advisor and communications director; Mark Stephenson, minority professional staff member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Cecelia Morton, minority office manager.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The committee will come to order. I am

going welcome everybody to today’s hearing on security standards

for Federal-leased space.

The Federal Government owns or leases approximately 3.4 billion square feet of space. As the Federal Government’s primary

property management, GSA is responsible for a large percentage of

that space, while other agencies, such as DOD have independent

land holding and leasing authorities. These agencies are responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the sites they own and

lease. In light of foreign and domestic terrorist attacks against U.S.

targets over the past 10 years, Federal agencies have been at a

heightened state of alert. In fact, the threat of terrorist attacks

against Federal facilities was one of several factors that prompted

GAO to include Federal property on its January 2003 high risk list.

We need to take every possible measure to secure and protect Federal facilities, employees and visitors.

Now, immediately following the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995,

the President directed the Department of Justice to assess the

vulnerabilities of Federal facilities to terrorist attacks and recommend minimum security standards for federally occupied space.

2

The result was the categorization of Federal buildings into five levels based on several factors such as building size, agency mission

and function, tenant population, and volume of public access. The

Department of Justice also published its vulnerability assessment

of Federal facilities report in June 1995, which proposed minimum

securities for Federal buildings, the first time government-wide security standards were established.

In 1995, the Interagency Security Committee [ISC], was established by Executive order and is currently chaired by the Department of Homeland Security. The ISC was tasked with developing

and evaluating security standards for Federal facilities and overseeing the implementation of appropriate security measures for

those sites. However, these standards weren’t readily applicable to

leased space. So the ISC established a committee to develop its security standards for leased space which was approved by OMB in

September 2004.

Meanwhile, the Department of Defense created the antiterrorism

force protection standards. These standards still apply to new construction and new leased space beginning October of this year, and

beginning in October 2009 they will apply to the rollover of existing

leased space. We are here today because it is unclear to many of

us why DOD needs its own security standards separate from those

developed by the ISC. I am concerned that DOD not only developed

leased space criteria that are inconsistent with the ISC standards,

but does not apply them appropriately. For example, DOD used its

standards to justify seemingly arbitrary recommendations to base

realignment and closure commission, including a recommendation

to vacate a significant percentage of its leased space in the National Capital region. I don’t think any of that was in my district,

for the record. I understand that other members of the committee

have similar concerns in their own districts arising from DOD’s inconsistent applications of its standards. DOD insists that leased

space security standards and the BRAC recommendations are unrelated issues. Frankly I disagree and I anticipate we are going to

hear from several members today who don’t share DOD’s stovepipe

outlook.

Technological advances have led to improvements in the procedures machines and devices that can be employed to protect employees and visitors in public buildings, to restrict access, and to

detect intruders. Part of the challenge of securing space comes from

the desire to balance critical security needs with cost efficiency.

While certain security technologies such as x-ray machines,

magnetometers, access cards and biometrics may help ensure protection of people and buildings, they may also prove inconvenient

or intrusive. Furthermore, none of these measures can be implemented in a leased site without the owner’s agreement.

Given the government’s reliance on leased space and the unique

challenges of securing privately owned sites, the committee is interested in learning more about the development and implementation

of security standards for leased space. Today we will evaluate the

rationale behind the different leased space standards and how they

are implemented by agencies. We are going to hear from Congressman Jim Moran and three agencies that have been actively inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:37 Jun 19, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23041.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
3

volved in the development and implementation of security standards for leased spaces, DHS, GSA and DOD.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today’s hearing will examine the differing security standards used by the Department of

Defense and by the General Service Administration for leased

space. Much of the space needed for Federal office buildings, particularly in the National Capital region, is in buildings leased from

the private sector. The Defense Department requires leased space

to meet the security requirements used for federally owned buildings. This includes the standards for setbacks and blast protection

required when the government is building new buildings.

GSA’s government-wide security standards for leased space do

not include the same setback and blast protection requirements.

We all want Federal employees adequately protected in their place

of work. While higher security standards for bases and other military installations are probably appropriate, creating separate minimum security standards for different agencies including the Defense Department civilian workforce could create unnecessary confusion. Today’s hearing will provide important information on our

efforts to assess the most appropriate security standards for our

Federal space and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses

today. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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8

9

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, thank you very much. Members will

have 7 days to submit opening statements for the record. We now

recognize our first panel. It is Congressman Jim Moran from the

8th district of Virginia. Jim, welcome. Thank you very much for

being with us. I know this is a hearing you have given a lot of

thought to and a lot of study, and this impacts, I know, a lot of

your constituents and mine in terms of convenience, cost. And you

sit on the Appropriations Subcommittee on DOD, so you are going

to have some say about this in the future, but we are very anxious

to hear your thoughts today and thanks for being with us.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. MORAN, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much, Chairman Davis and Ranking Member Waxman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today

and before this oversight hearing to examine DOD’s building security standards for leased space and the rationale behind using

those standards in the BRAC process. I would like to address the

problems I foresee with the Department of Defense’s approach in

both the BRAC process and the larger building security standards

for leased space. No. 1, the adoption of these standards were done

without any public process. Second, there is a strong bias against

leased space without supporting data and documentation.

And third, there is an arbitrary nature to the standards. What

the message these standards sends to the Nation is troubling. And

the lack, finally, unlike any other government agency of performance-based standards that would take advantage of the extraordinary wealth of innovation and technology that we have in northern Virginia and in other metropolitan areas, but particularly here

around the Pentagon, that we have this available to us the opportunity to provide incentives for producing better building security

methods that will make all Americans safer by using that innovation and technology, and I also say judgment because that is lacking in some of these prescriptive base standards that we are faced

with.

The Department of Defense’s minimum antiterrorism standards

for buildings and leased space, they represent a prescriptive-based

approach that deviates from the performance standards that most

government agencies follow today. The new standards overlook the

work of the interagency security committee security standards, it

is called the ISC. They have standards for leased space that were

approved less than a year ago and these DOD standards don’t

allow alternative means to achieve maximum security, at leased office space. They overlook how to prevent other forms of terrorist

threats such as suicide bombings and chem/bio contamination and

would have done nothing to prevent the attacks of September 11th.

These building standards are designed to protect against one primary threat, a truck bomb, basically a truck bomb that would hold

approximately 200 pounds of TNT. It is a prescription based standard requiring all DOD agencies, military command centers, and

even some private DOD contractors, to abandon their present locations in favor of new sites on military bases or in locations without

underground parking and that are set back at least 82 feet from

the street. It will be difficult, if not impossible, for military faciliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:37 Jun 19, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23041.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
10

ties in leased space in an urban area, such as Washington or its

heavily developed suburbs or any other major metropolitan area, to

meet this demand. It makes no economic sense and there are better

ways of doing it.

So what is at stake is more than the region’s economic wellbeing? Fighting international terrorism requires a far greater reliance on communications between the FBI, our intelligence community, the Defense Department and the new Department of Homeland Security. These installations are based in this region for military enhancement to ensure ready access to the Pentagon, the

White House and Congress, but also, to a growing public and private web of creative software development and intelligence that are

critical to the 21st century threats that this Nation confronts.

It is an extraordinary assumption to believe that the kind of intelligent minds critical to this new mission will want to relocate so

far from our countries high tech corridors as some of these recommendations require them to. Secured communication lines and

infrastructure will be disrupted and they will take years to re-establish at the new locations. Contractors will experience fewer opportunities to collaborate and work hand in hand with the military

and the weapons systems enhanced response capabilities and software innovation. Congress and key policy advisors throughout the

government will be denied the direct feedback and contacts that

have fostered a highly productive relationship between the military

and other parts of the Federal Government and private industry.

The National Capital region has more than 8.3 million square

feet of leased space, 3.9 million square feet of which is in Arlington

County alone. That will be affected by these proposed BRAC recommendations. More than 8 million square feet are affected by the

BRAC recommendations, and most of that is in my congressional

district in northern Virginia. The BRAC recommendations on

leased space approved will reduce total DOD leased space within

our region by 80 percent, virtually gutting entire buildings in our

region. An additional 4 million square feet of leased office space in

northern Virginia that is not affected by BRAC but will also be affected though by DOD’s minimum antiterrorism standards for

building security.

These combined proposals represent a double punch to our region

that will not only reduce available Federal lease space, but will

have a devastating impact on our region’s government workforce

and the tens of thousands of contractors and businesses that are

collocated near these agencies. The symbiotic relationship that has

been created in this region has helped make our military the

strongest, most technically innovative in the world. The irony is

that the Defense Department’s master plan for its own headquarters affirms that the Pentagon cannot meet the prescriptive

building standard it seeks to impose on its satellite offices and facilities.

Its setback is not sufficient and a metro public transit center, although it was recently moved, is still less than 148 feet from the

building. DOD’s proposed changes will also adversely affect our

military readiness if our highly trained personnel do not move with

their agencies and leave the Federal workforce. Chairman Davis

and I did some surveys and we found that in some cases, 50 to 75

11

percent of the workforce has said they will not move out of this

area. Their wives are employed in other jobs here, their children

are in the school system and they want to stay here.

In light of the costs and minimum added security offered by

these standards, it is difficult to understand why the Department

of Defense would unilaterally impose such standards and then expect the Congress and the country to foot the bill which is going

to come to billions of dollars. At a meeting that Chairman Davis

and I convened last week with representatives from northern Virginia’s business community, and Ralph Newton, who is the principal deputy of Washington headquarters, serves as the Director of

Defense Facilities, we raised several concerns with DOD’s minimum antiterrorism building security standards.

And it was clear from this briefing that many questions remain

unanswered concerning the Department’s rationale behind its

stand and why such limited criteria were used over other methods

of achieving maximum building security. So I hope that today’s officials will be able to shed some much needed light on the development of these standards and why they were applied to the BRAC

process, which never included building security standards among

its criteria.

The DOD building security standard was unfairly applied in the

BRAC process in a manner that disadvantaged leased space. It

seemed to be a back-door attempt by the Secretary of Defense to

eliminate leased space in the National Capital region, a move

which is not going to produce cost savings and could result in the

loss of thousands of our most talented personnel if they do not

move when their agencies relocate outside the metro corridor.

So Mr. Chairman, as you and your colleagues on this committee

examine possible legislative measures, I would like to call to your

attention that report language that you alluded to that I put in the

2006 Defense appropriations bill that will require DOD to issue a

report by the end of the year on the cost for implementing the

antiterrorism standards and which compare DOD and GSA

antiterrorism standards for buildings. As a member of that subcommittee on defense, we required the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to ‘‘explain differences in criteria used by the two

agencies and propose alternatives for reconciling any conflicts between the standards to ensure that managers have one set of rules

for meeting Federal Government antiterrorism criteria.’’

I encourage this committee to also consider legislation that will

further underscore this congressional intent and to examine alternative security approaches and technologies that are available to

help achieve enhanced security consistently across government

agencies in leased buildings.

So in conclusion, I believe the Secretary of Defense’s process set

out to eliminate leased space in northern Virginia. It failed to collect and compare actual data and as a result, is neither sufficiently

accurate—it is not accurate in fact, nor sufficient to meet the requirements of the law. And similarly, Defense Department’s minimum antiterrorism standards reflect narrow approaches to building

security and do not consider the kind of technology and performance-based criteria that is readily available and could bring many

more agencies into compliance for a fraction of the cost that DOD

12

will incur if agencies are moved out of leased space in the National

Capital region.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I applaud your committee for holding today’s hearings. I am happy to respond to any questions. I know

that you know a great deal about this, that the two of us have

worked to understand the process, understand the motivation and

to represent our constituencies, many of whom are very adversely

affected by this. So thanks again, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. James P. Moran follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thanks for being here and sharing your

thoughts. Let me ask a question. As I understand the DOD guidelines, underground parking is a taboo; is that correct? Is that an

absolute, as far as you’re concerned?

Mr. MORAN. Well, it has to be very limited as I understand it,

so that—of course, you can’t have public access for underground

parking. And while some employees, I believe, would be able to go

through a screened process to use that underground parking, it

substantially reduces the amount of parking that would be available in a metropolitan area.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I mean, we have underground parking

here in the Rayburn Building. We have it in Cannon. We have it

in Longworth. And you can screen it perfectly well. But I am not

sure that DOD allows this kind of flexibility. It just seems very

prescriptive in its nature instead of taking a look at the overall

safeguarding of the building.

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for making that, pointing

that fact out with regard to our own security here at the Capitol

which is, you would think, would be ground zero in terms of a possible threat from terrorists.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, let me ask you this: You look at

Rayburn, which trucks can drive right by currently. Under DOD,

if we were DOD employees, they would be getting rid of Rayburn

at the end of this lease, and we would have to find other space, just

to draw the analogy in this case.

Mr. MORAN. We have employed judgment. You can’t move the

Capitol. You can’t move the House offices.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. How about the Supreme Court? You can

drive by the Supreme Court. But the brass gets a different standard.

Mr. MORAN. These are very important observations, Mr. Chairman, and I don’t blame the professionals in the Department of Defense who are carrying this out. They are doing what they are

asked to do and they are trying to provide for as much judgment

and flexibility as they can. But their orders, I think, are too limiting.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, let me just ask another thing. I

mean, you have limited amounts of dollars. If you had unlimited

amounts of dollars, I guess you could say we can go ahead and do

this. But when you’re spending money on this, and if you take a

look at the terrorist attacks that have happened in other places

and so on, and like it, I mean, you have to put everything into an

appropriate context. These are dollars that you can’t spend on getting, you know, protective gear for our troops in Iraq, that you can’t

spend on getting the best scientific equipment in some other areas,

that you can’t use for military pay. I mean, this is, to some extent,

a zero sum gain. It’s not like we have a lot of additional dollars.

So you have to be prudent. And what concerns me about this is

by being so prescriptive they are basically saying just in northern

Virginia and in other parts of the country, 4 million square feet has

to be re-leased, obviously at higher rents. And over the long term

this is billions and billions of dollars.

Mr. MORAN. It is going to be extraordinarily expensive to build

these new buildings, to set aside the amount of land that will be

18

required for the setbacks. And they will have no use subsequently,

because no private owner is ever going to want to use these buildings because of the construction premium. I don’t know how long

we are going to be fighting this war on terrorism, but we do need

to look to the future and be cost conscious. And you made a very

good point. Specifically, the money for this construction is going to

have to come from the Veterans Affairs Subcommittee, the Military

Quality of Life Appropriations Subcommittee.

So, in effect, it is going to be coming from compensation for our

military enlistees and veterans. And I have to say it is going to be

difficult for the Congress to justify spending billions on new buildings when we have a less expensive alternative. And again, what

we are dealing with is only one form of terrorism, the possibility

of a truck bomb. Now the General Services Administration has to

build buildings in metropolitan areas. They have just built a building for the American delegation to the United Nations in New York

City. New York City, you can’t have an 82-foot, let alone 148-foot

setback. But they built a building that, where the perimeter

around it was used as a lobby, but it—they understood that a blast

might go through that. But the interior was hardened with few

windows, the sensitive activities were in the core of the building.

The traffic management was organized so that trucks couldn’t stop

in front. They exercised judgment and technology and they come up

with approaches that are cost efficient, but are pragmatic and nevertheless achieve the desired objective of security.

And that is what we are asking. We think that a combination of

GSA’s approach and DOD’s concern, they are working together, the

professionals themselves, if you put aside some of the people that

may be—well, let me just say the professionals. If the professionals

were to sit down together, the folks from DOD, who are terrific and

the people from GSA I think they would come up with standards

that we could not argue with. But right now, I think we have arbitrary prescriptive standards that don’t accomplish a whole lot for

DOD and they certainly cause very adverse economic consequences

for the metropolitan Washington region.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, thank you. I mean, what you end up

with are buildings that are going to have the thickness and maybe

the longevity of the pyramids, but it’s also going to have about the

same occupancy rate over the long term. I mean, you are not going

to have anybody there.

Mr. MORAN. I wish I would have thought of that. I would have

put it in my statement if it had occurred to me.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. I want to thank Mr. Moran for his presentation.

I think you have given us many issues to consider quite carefully.

Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Moran, I want

to thank you too. And I want to reference a hearing that happened

over in the Senate when your Senator and Mr. Davis’ Senator, Senator Warner, testified on this issue. And my understanding from

reading the newspaper is that he was one of the authors of the

BRAC legislation. And he opined that giving a bias, DOD giving a

19

bias to get out of leased space violated at least the spirit of the law

if not the intent. Do you agree with that assessment?

Mr. MORAN. I strongly agree with that, Mr. LaTourette. I appreciate the fact of your bringing it up. Senator Warner said before

the BRAC Commission that as an author of the legislation, he believed that the implementation as it is, as it affects leased space

in northern Virginia, is inconsistent with the underlying BRAC

law, the authority that they had. Basically they were carrying out

a directive they were given, but it was not a directive consistent

with BRAC’s objectives which are to save money and enhance military operations to effectiveness.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I happen to agree with you. And when we receive our second panel, we have actually discovered a document

from February of this year where the answer is given by the BRAC

red team that yes, there was a specific DOD directive to get out

of leased space. And I will have some questions about that. The

other thing that I just want to comment on, I don’t want to hold

you. I agree completely with you and Chairman Davis.

I had a Federal employee come up to me. We have a DFAS facility in the Cleveland area near Congressman Kucinich’s district and

mine. And it is scheduled for closure; 1,100 jobs scheduled to go.

But the Federal worker that came up to me works for the Social

Security Department and the question is, why, if we have these

minimum terrorism standards, is it OK for the accountants that

are issuing paychecks and payroll checks for members of the Defense, a very important function, why do we have to have force protection for them, but for the Social Security, Coast Guard, Department of Labor and Veterans Affairs, they can be in this ‘‘dangerous

building?’’ I find that to be hypocritical and I assume you would as

well.

Mr. MORAN. I do. I think that is an important observation, the

inconsistencies here, and the assumption that terrorists are going

after bureaucrats who are doing their lives—we don’t refer to them

as bureaucrats, but I think they would see them as bureaucrats.

I don’t see that there is a whole lot accomplished by going after

some of these leased office buildings. In fact, I can’t imagine many

terrorists knew where they were located until the BRAC Commission reported on their addresses. But it is much to do about very

minimum security enhancement as far as I can say. That’s an important observation, the inconsistency across the government.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I appreciate that. We just have one more piece

of leverage in Cleveland, Congressman Kucinich and Tubbs Jones

and I, and that is that apparently President Bush’s paycheck is cut

in Cleveland, and so we are thinking of stopping payment after

September 8. We’ll see how that works. I thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank Mr. Moran and associate myself

with Congressman LaTourette’s remarks. One of the things I think

we will need to get into in the next panel is this question of the

relationship between BRAC’s objective of saving money, and since

BRAC has determined to spread out so many functions into relatively new areas, it will be interesting to see if they took into account the increased costs of securing those areas as compared to

what the costs were in the first locations.

20

So I want to thank my colleague for expressing his concern about

the security issues involved. But security issues inevitably have a

price tag, and so we have to see where the price tag comes into

play on a security factor with respect to BRAC. And of course, that

is what this hearing is about. So thank you, Mr. Moran.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Any questions, Ms. Brown-Waite?

Ms. BROWN-WAITE. No.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Porter, any questions? Ms. Norton.

Jim, thank you very much. You’ve laid a good predicate here for

the hearing and we’ll take about a 1-minute recess as we move our

next panel forward.

OK. Our second panel, we have Mr. Dwight Williams, the Chief

Security Officer of the Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Joe

Moravec, who is the Commissioner of Public Buildings Service at

the General Services Administration. I just want to thank Mr.

Moravec for appearing today. I am going to—I’d say congratulate

you on your retirement. Let me congratulate you on a job well

done. I just wish you well as you leave GSA. You have been a very

bright star over there. We are going to miss you. Dr. Get Moy, the

Director, Installations Resource Management, Office of the Deputy

Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Environment at

the Department of Defense. And John Jester, the Chief of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, Department of Defense. Mr. Jester

testified before the subcommittee, which I chaired in 2002, and we

want to thank you for being here as well. As you know it is our

policy to swear in witnesses before you testify so if you would just

rise and raise your right hands with me.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Williams, we will start with you.

STATEMENTS OF DWIGHT WILLIAMS, CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; F. JOSEPH

MORAVEC, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE,

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION; GET MOY, DIRECTOR, INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS AND MANAGEMENT,

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FOR INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE; AND JOHN JESTER, DIRECTOR, PENTAGON

FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF DWIGHT WILLIAMS

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Waxman and

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today and for your ongoing support for the Department

of Homeland Security. My name is Dwight Williams. I am the

Chief Security Officer of the Department, and as such, I am also

the new Chair of the Interagency Security Committee. Prior to this,

I spent 4 years at Customs and Border Protection as the Director

of the Security Programs Division, and I was director of the Office

of Professional Responsibility at the Washington, DC, Metropolitan

Police Department. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the ISC security standards for leased space. Following the

bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April

1995, the President established the Interagency Security CommitVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:37 Jun 19, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23041.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tee to enhance the security of Federal facilities for non-military activities. The ISC has 21 primary members, including the Departments of Justice, Defense, State, the General Services Administration, as well as 14 associate members and officials from other key

agencies.

The President also directed DOJ at the time to conduct a vulnerability study assessing Federal office buildings. This study set forth

specific security requirements regarding perimeter entry and interior security as well as general security planning considerations. In

1997, GSA drafted security criteria based on the DOJ study and

these criteria were updated in 2001. This document, however, primarily applied to new buildings and construction. Although the

DOD standards were intended for use in all federally occupied facilities, they were not readily adaptable to most leased facilities.

Building owners were often reluctant to make the significant alterations in order to comply with stringent security standards.

The situation led to a double standard for owned buildings and

leased buildings. As a result, the ISC established a lease security

subcommittee that combined the expertise of security specialists,

design professionals, engineers, architects and fire and safety specialists from member agencies. To maintain consistency, the subcommittee started with the 1995 DOJ study and the 2001 ISC

standards as the basis for compiling standards for leased space.

The ISC subcommittee also sought input from the real estate private sector. Subsequently, the subcommittee issued a proposed

draft in July 2003. Following an analysis of the costs involved, the

full committee approved the lease standards and they were issued

in February 2005. It is important to recognize that the security

standards for leased space establish the recommended minimum

security requirements for protecting Federal facilities while providing the agency the ability to tailor security to their mission as well

as threats and vulnerabilities. They do not prohibit an agency from

imposing more stringent security requirements.

The ISC security standards do not establish a single one-size-fitsall standard for every leased Federal facility. Our goal is to ensure

that we have an effective program for securing lease space utilizing

a risk management approach based on three primary factors as recently articulated by the Secretary. That is threat, vulnerability

and consequences. The ISC recognized that resources are limited

within the government and therefore, the ISC aimed to strike a

balance between security and feasibility. One purpose is to educate

Federal agencies regarding what minimum standards are prudent

in order to make informed security decisions. They are not intended to substitute ISC’s judgment for the agency’s own. These security standards represent a living document that will be reviewed

regularly at ISC meetings and updated as threats evolve and additional issues are identified.

Further, DHS is pursuing ways to implement these standards at

its own facilities. The Department is working with other stakeholders to communicate these standards, and the Federal Protective

Service is already using the lease standards in conducting vulnerability assessments of Federal buildings.

In closing, I would like to thank the committee, again, for the opportunity to appear before you today. The security of Federal emVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:37 Jun 19, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23041.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ployees is of paramount importance to the Department of Homeland Security, and we will continue to ensure that every effort is

made to provide them with government facilities that are designed

and constructed with their security in mind. I would now be

pleased to answer any questions that you may have.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Moravec.

STATEMENT OF F. JOSEPH MORAVEC

Mr. MORAVEC. Good morning, Chairman Davis and members of

the committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your gracious acknowledgment of my service. It has been my high honor to serve

our President and our country. My formal statement has been previously submitted, and I would ask that it be entered into the

record of these proceedings. If I may, I would like now to highlight

its salient points. The mission of the Public Building Service is to

provide a superior workplace for the Federal worker and superior

value for the American taxpayer. A superior workplace obviously

means a safe and secure workplace including one that is as secure

as we can make it against a terrorist attack. The Oklahoma City

bombing changed forever the way in which we design, build and

operate Federal buildings in the face of such threats to Federal

workers and the millions of Americans who visit our buildings

every day to do business with their government.

While the best defense against a terrorist attack is foreknowledge, provided by coordinated criminal intelligence sources, we are

also committed to taking every feasible precaution to defend

against and mitigate the effects of terrorism at every building

under our control. In doing so, we attempt to achieve a balance between security countermeasures and the other elements that constitute a superior workplace supportive of the missions of our customers’ agencies. These elements would include location, accessibility to other agencies and the public, functionality, aesthetics, energy efficiencies, sustainability and integration with the life of surrounding communities at a cost that represents good value for the

American taxpayer.

For example, to avoid creating an impressive climate of fear at

Federal buildings, we try to design buildings whose architecture

first welcomes and then challenges visitors. And because it is possible to spend lavishly on building security without necessarily reducing the threat, we try to tailor security counter measures that

address a particular building’s perceived vulnerabilities to craft a

package of physical upgrades and operational procedures that will

actually reduce the threat to that particular building and its occupants.

Because the value of innocent human life is beyond measure,

whether it is an owned or leased Federal space, GSA led the effort,

under the auspices of the Interagency Security Committee, to develop security criteria for leased Federal space based as closely as

possible on the 1995 Department of Justice vulnerability study and

the ISC’s security design criteria for Federal construction.

The effort was also, in part, in response to requests from the

commercial industry to establish a reliable and consistent security

baseline for landlords competing for Federal leases. This is critical

to government in that we rely on the private sector to house nearly

half of the civilian Federal workforce. Just as for their own Federal

space, the ISC standards for leased space which have been circulating in draft form for the past 2 years and which were formalized

in February of this year require respondents to government solicitations for office space to meet an escalating hierarchy of security

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requirements, levels one through four, based on square footage,

size of tenant population, intended use and the security profile of

the tenant agency.

While the security of our people was and, of course, is the paramount consideration, the ISC subcommittee which drafted the

leased space standards did not want to produce a prescriptive onesize-fits-all document that would be impossible for the private sector to respond to. The committee consulted extensively with industry to develop standards that could both be tailored to an agency’s

particular needs and that could be applied in the real market place

in a way that was consistent with procurement law.

Cost was definitely a consideration. It’s one thing for government

to incorporate setbacks and obstructions to vehicular access, hardened curved walls and add a progressive collapse structural design

in buildings that it owns. It’s another for the private sector to do

so in a speculative building and still be competitive. The lease

standards are meant, as Mr. Williams has testified, to be minimums to be incorporated into solicitations for offers. Landlords not

meeting the criteria are considered to be nonresponsive. Any customer agency, including the Department of Defense may, upon consultation with us, request that higher standards be established in

response to perceived particular vulnerabilities and in build-to-suit

competitions, new buildings designed for lease, exclusively for the

government, must achieve the same security design criteria required for Federal construction.

In preparation for a lease solicitation the GSA realty specialists,

in consultation with the customer, craft a program of requirements.

The Department of Homeland Security represented by the Federal

Protective Service provides threat assessment input based on its

security evaluation. GSA provides, at that time, information about

what is available in the marketplace and then the appropriate ISC

level of security is established for the purposes of the solicitation.

Although the ISC standards are just now being incorporated into

lease solicitations, it’s anticipated that the market will be able to

respond well and competitively to level one through three acquisitions.

Level four, which requires full security control by government

and dedicated heating ventilating and air conditioning for lobbies,

mailrooms and loading docks, will present, we think, some challenges in most markets. Fortunately, level four requirements represent a very small percentage of our anticipated lease procurements in the years ahead. This concludes my prepared oral statement. I am, of course, prepared to answer whatever questions you

may have of me.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moravec follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Dr. Moy, thank you for being with us.

STATEMENT OF GET MOY

Dr. MOY. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, we appreciate the opportunity to present the Department of

Defense’s antiterrorism force protection standards for leased

spaces. We have a written statement and with your permission, we

will submit it for the record. I’ll just spend the next few minutes

to highlight the issues that we’re going to discuss today. I also

would like to recognize three members of the DOD team here that

participated in those standards and worked with the rest of the

Federal Government.

John Jester who is the Director for Pentagon Force Protection,

Ralph Newman, who is the Deputy Director for Washington Headquarters Services, and Joe Hartman who is the structural and security engineering team leader at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Force protection is an extremely important subject matter

for all of us at all times. Back in the—with the terrorist threat and

bombing at Khobar Towers in 1996 after that the Department renewed its emphasis on developing criteria on how it could protect

its mission and its personnel against terror threats.

As a result, it issued a series of documents, first in 1999, a document focusing on construction. In 2002, it issued what we now call

the Unified Facilities Criteria. Included in that issue was the

standards for leased spaces, and the current issue was last put out

in 2003. In comparison, the Interagency Security Committee guidelines for federally owned facilities, were put out in 2001 and for

leased facilities was recently signed out in February of this year,

2005. In terms of the discussion of the ISC guidelines versus the

Unified Facilities Criteria, I would submit to the committee to go

back to the roots of these documents. The ISC was established by

Executive order in 1995 with a basic focus on buildings and facilities for Federal employees for non-military activities. And it covers

a great range of security issues in the guidelines.

The Unified Facilities Criteria, however, was specifically developed in response to protect personnel as a mission against terrorist

threats. And it is very specific in terms of application for lease

spaces in the case of where we have more than 11 people, 11 DOD

employees in a building or any part of a building, and where the

DOD components of that building is 25 percent or more of the population, so it is very specific in terms of its application.

The specific focus in terms of contrast between ISC guidelines

and Unified Facilities Criteria has to do with the set-off distances

and the blast mitigation. The Department feels that vehicle-borne

threats are very much a security threat to the Department that

must be considered in any security plan. And that is why there is

such a heavy emphasis on design and construction and setback distances. There is allowances in the Unified Facilities Criteria to deal

with alternative ways of meeting that setback distance and the

blast mitigation using the technologies.

Implementation of the UFC requirements is fairly straightforward for new construction. It is difficult for existing construction. While there are many challenges we have, the Department

has had a number of developers approach us in terms of offering

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different ways in which they can provide the blast mitigation, the

setback distances and provide solutions for the Department, meeting the Department’s requirements. I appreciate the opportunity in

addressing the subject. We look at the ISC standards and guidelines as addressing those concerns for Federal employees that are

doing non-military activities. The UFC specifically focused on protecting the mission and personnel against terrorist threats, the professionals from both communities continue to work with each other,

talk with each other. We extend our efforts and our partnership in

working with the ISC professionals as well as the private industry

in enhancing, making better risk based assessments, analyses, mission assessments, capability enhancement as well as protecting our

people. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Moy follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Jester, you are here for questions, is

that to answer questions? Do you want to make any statement?

Mr. JESTER. No, sir. It was a joint statement.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Thank you very much. Mr.

LaTourette, you served on the Transportation and Infrastructure

Committee. You actually served as subcommittee chairman on

building consulting. Why don’t we start the questioning with you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the

courtesy, and Mr. Moravec, I’d add to the congratulations the chairman lauded on you, and I want you to know I’m sorry for taking

your Federal building fund money in the transportation bill. A couple of observations. I mentioned when Congressman Moran was

here that we are having a little bit of a problem with understanding what it is the Department of Defense did relative to the city

of Cleveland. It is clear to me, at least, and I think to my colleagues from Cleveland, that from internal BRAC documents I

don’t think Cleveland ever stood a chance because it was penalized

for not meeting these minimum antiterror standards 4 years before

they need to be implemented.

And it is also clear to me that I don’t think Cleveland received

a fair break relative to how its lease was evaluated. I want to talk

to you a little bit about that Mr. Moravec, if I could start with you.

The staff at GSA has informed us that GSA operating cost, not the

shell rate that you charge, and it includes maintenance utilities

and janitorial services, is that correct?

Mr. MORAVEC. That is correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Do GSA operating costs, not the extra cost but

the actual operating costs ever include things like joint use of

space, parking, or antennae? Are those part of your operating costs

that you pass along to your tenants?

Mr. MORAVEC. I am not sure whether they are included as part

of our operating cost, but they’re certainly included as part of the

rent.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Do operating costs ever include overtime

or communications?

Mr. MORAVEC. Communications.

Mr. LATOURETTE. But not overtime?

Mr. MORAVEC. I would have to research that before giving you

an answer.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. The difficulty that we have in this process

is that my understanding of the cost of the space is about 20 percent of the BRAC calculation that was used. And a new lease was

signed in Cleveland, and you can throw in all of the extra cost. It’s

$19 a square foot and change. It’s competing against Indianapolis.

And in 1996, somebody, we could speculate who the powerful people are in Indiana secured a $123 million to rehab the former, I

think, Fort Benjamin Harrison.

And now GSA, even though that is a GSA building because it

was a closed DOD building after the last round of BRAC, is charging it a suppressed level of rent under something called an ISA, an

interservice. Can you tell me how that—isn’t rent rent?

Mr. MORAVEC. Well basically, occasionally we will make arrangements with a customer agency who provides their own funding for

the rehabilitation, and in this case of the Bean Building in IndianVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:37 Jun 19, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23041.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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apolis, we adjust the rent to reflect their economic contribution to

the building.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I would assume that there are many Federal

buildings in your inventory that don’t currently meet the DOD

minimum antiterror standards that we are talking about today.

Mr. MORAVEC. That is correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And then, Dr. Moy, maybe you are not the

right guy from DOD, but the building that we are talking about in

Indianapolis, meets the new stringent antiterror standards, but it

doesn’t have the best terror assessment rating and it doesn’t appear to be, it’s ninth in terms of military value. Are you aware of

the Indianapolis facility at all?

Dr. MOY. Sir, I did not participate in any of the BRAC discussions or deliberations.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Well, let me ask you two questions that

maybe you can help me with. I think you have in front of you a

document that is dated February 21, 2005. And that document is

from the headquarters and support activities joint cross service

group briefing from that particular date. And anybody is welcome

to jump in if you can give me an explanation. If you look down on

the second page, under the bold heading, Informal Observations

provided at the briefing, the eighth bullet point, it says DFAS could

be your Achilles heel since you close installation with the highest

military value and keep the lowest. The explanation for doing so

needs to be strengthened, at least to make sure it’s closely tied to

the discussion about optimization models. Can anybody help me

understand what that means in DOD language? Can anybody help

me with that one?

Dr. MOY. No, sir. I can try to get a response for the record, but

I am not aware of that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. If you could, I would appreciate it. And then

again further down, three more bullet points down, it says that

HSA, which is headquarters, support activities, and then the code

for DFAS justification needs to be linked to strategy. You need to

say up front that closing highest military value location, because

otherwise, the MILCON costs would have been huge. Does anybody

have any light that they can shed on that particular? No?

Dr. MOY. No, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, let me just ask a final question then that

I was talking to Congressman Moran about. I assume most of you

saw or read about Senator Warner’s testimony over in the Senate

and his opinion that it was not appropriate for the BRAC process

to give a bias toward getting people out of leased space. Again, on

that same page of the same document, under the bold questions

that arose, the question was as follows. Was it DOD guidance to

get out of leased space? The answer, yes, but there is no supporting

documentation. And to me that means yes, but we didn’t want to

write it down so people would find out about it.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me just say, I’d ask unanimous consent that the gentleman’s time be extended.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you. And I’ll try and make this my last

question. I thank you. And then it goes on to say there was a general sense that being in the NCR is not good. Most space in the

NCR is leased. So the connection was made that vacating leased

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space is favorable. This is something that was attributed to the

former Acting Secretary and Secretary of the Navy. And I guess my

question is, can anybody help me with or express an opinion as to

how much the desire to get out of leased space shaped the BRAC

recommendations, not just in the National Capital region, but all

across the country? Anybody give me a hand with that?

Mr. MORAVEC. I don’t have any insight into that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Dr. Moy.

Dr. MOY. Sir, I can’t address the specific issue in terms of the

National Capital region, but I would say that there were a number

of factors that entered into the developing of the BRAC recommendations command and control putting, trying to gain efficiencies of putting similar units together, trying to take a look at

how the command and control with operational units, security was

a factor. But it was one of many factors that entered into the decision, all ending up with military value.

So I would say it is correct to say that getting out of leased space

was not, that I know of, a factor in and of itself. There were many

factors that entered into the deliberations.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Again, just to make this my last observation, the Honorable H.T. Johnson, who was the former Acting Secretary, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was a member of the

BRAC red team and in response to a question, was it DOD guidance to get out of leased space, his answer was yes. And you can’t

enlighten me anymore about that?

Dr. MOY. No, sir, I can’t.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LATOURETTE. Sure.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Where is Mr. Johnson now?

Dr. MOY. Mr. Johnson has left his position as being the Assistant

Secretary of the Navy for installations.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Is he still in the Department of Defense?

Dr. MOY. I do not know.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Could you get that information to this

committee? Or is this guy—he comes in as a cowboy, makes his recommendations and leaves and goes on to whatever. Do you agree

with the observation here that being in the National Capital region

is not good, Dr. Moy?

Dr. MOY. No, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You don’t agree with that. How about you,

Mr. Jester, do you agree with that?

Mr. JESTER. No, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Mr. Moravec, do you agree with that?

Mr. MORAVEC. No, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Mr. Williams, do you agree with that?

Mr. WILLIAMS. No, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. We don’t know if Mr. Johnson is even

with us anymore, but that seems to be the basis for some of these

recommendations.

Mr. LATOURETTE. It does. And again, I’d ask unanimous consent

that this document go into the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Is there objection? Without objection, so

ordered. Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Moravec, I also want to join in thanking you

for your public service. It’s been one of dedication and professionalism and I wish you all the very best as you leave the GSA.

Mr. MORAVEC. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. WAXMAN. I wanted to raise with you an issue in Los Angeles,

in my district, GSA has proposed to significantly expand a federally

owned property at 11000 Wilshire Boulevard, so the FBI can modernize and consolidate its resources and operations. The Federal

building sits between two of the busiest intersections, not just in

Los Angeles, but in the Nation, Wilshire and Westwood Boulevards

and Wilshire Boulevard and Veterans Avenue. The 405 Freeway,

the second most congested freeway in the Nation, has an on ramp

and an off ramp within 1 block of the building. The largest VA

medical center in the country, the 388-acre greater Los Angeles

health care system, is directly across the street from the Federal

building, and UCLA is just over a mile away. The Los Angeles Department of Transportation rates the level of service at the location

as an F, the worst possible grade. There is a bus, but no transit

service in the area.

Traffic is terrible for many hours every day, including weekends.

And peak hour traffic volumes are extreme. The infrastructure simply cannot support the plans GSA and the FBI have for the property. I have asked GSA a number of times to provide me with specific alternative sites it may be studying for this project. And the

most recent letter I received from the regional administrator in

April 2005 indicated that GSA had received suggestions for about

25 sites from community members and the L.A. economic development corporation, but was ‘‘not in a position to identify those 25

sites as serious potential alternatives.’’

He further indicated that the process was still in a very early

stage and the GSA had not yet started evaluation of the alternative

sites. Yesterday, my staff learned from the Washington GSA office

that the draft EIS should be ready in October 2005, and it will include an analysis of alternative sites, if any such sites have been

identified. In addition to the severe infrastructure problems that

expansion would cause, there are serious security concerns. First,

it’s difficult to understand how the FBI could deploy in an emergency in the middle of this densely populated area with some of the

worst gridlock in the Nation. And I understand the FBI’s need to

better secure its facilities but the surrounding community believes

that while the Federal Government will make an effort to harden

a potential target against attack, there doesn’t seem to be sufficient

concern that the FBI’s consolidated presence at this location would

leave the residents more vulnerable to attack with an infrastructure further burdened as a result of the expansion.

The community’s also worried that during a national emergency,

requiring the deployment of the FBI, its residents would not be

able to reach the trauma center at UCLA or the VA Medical Center

to receive care. And when you realize how close both of these facilities are, that’s quite a concern. They just wouldn’t even be able to

get to that place. Well, I am saying all of this to you to express my

very strong concern about the process. It just seems to me there

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hasn’t been a willingness to look at alternative sites. It looks like

there is a predetermined decision to go ahead with this.

I don’t like the process, but I have to tell you that I think this

is a mistake to locate the FBI in this particular place and to go

through the kind of building that is imagined for that area, the

original GSA proposal called for a two-phased project, renovation

of the existing building, construction of two additional buildings,

construction of a 470,000-square foot building, plus parking to be

completed by 2016.

And there are a number of groups that are just strongly opposed

to this, Veterans Park Conservancy, West L.A. Chambers of Commerce, Westwood Hills Property Owners Association, Bell Air Association, Holmby Westwood Property Owners Association, South

Brentwood Homeowners, Westwood Home Owners Association,

Friends of Westwood, Westwood South of Santa Monica, Brentwood

Community Council, West Side Neighborhood Council, and I want

to include on that list their representative, the ranking member of

this committee, myself.

So I want to bring this to your attention. I don’t know if you’re

prepared to discuss it now.

Mr. MORAVEC. Well, I would say I’m sorry that you have lost confidence in the process. I will say I have no information that the outcome the environmental impact study has been predetermined. We

believe we are proceeding in good faith. I know it’s taking a little

longer than many people would have liked. We anticipate its

issuance in October.

I think one of the reasons I’ve been told for the delay is that we

have attempted to cast a very wide net in a search of alternative

sites and to expand community involvement. As you may know, we

have advertised in the L.A. Times. We have run notices on

FedBizOpps. We have had meetings with the mayor. We have had

meetings with the community. We have formed an informal voluntary group called the traffic working group, which has now met

a number of times. And I know that an invitation has been extended to your staff to attend those meetings.

The next meeting is on August 9th, and of course, your input is

welcome. At this point we are fulfilling our responsibilities under

the environmental impact study process.

I would hope that all of the factors that you have raised would

be taken into consideration in terms of our analysis of what that

study reveals.

Mr. WAXMAN. I hope so too. And I thank you for that suggestion

that there is going to be some input from all of these other leaders

in the community.

When I first raised the issue, I got a bureaucratic blowoff letter

thanking me and ‘‘so long.’’ We have gotten a little bit more of a

response, but it doesn’t really—it seems to me that this is not a

good site. And I don’t know if they are looking at alternatives seriously, because if this is not a good site there ought to be an alternative.

So we will continue to work with the GSA and with you and others and see what we can do to solve this problem.

Mr. MORAVEC. Thank you, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Dr. Moy, the Department of Defense

building standards rely on setbacks, preferring setbacks of 148 feet.

Is that correct?

Dr. MOY. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. This is a distance that can’t be met in this

congressional office building, at any airport in the Nation or in

most urban areas.

Could you tell us what setback requirements were in place in

London, Tel Aviv, Madrid or other cities that have far greater experience in terrorist attacks? And do you know what precautions they

take to protect their government facilities?

Dr. MOY. Sir, I can’t address specifically as to what offset standards are being used in other countries and other cities or other locations.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Do you know if anybody looked at those?

Dr. MOY. My expectation is that after the Khobar bombing we

did an analysis of what was being used in other locations by other

countries, and we also looked at developing tests ourselves through

our various laboratories and determining what types of threats,

what types of damage, because this goes back to taking a look at,

it is not just setting that distance. And there is nothing else other

than that distance that must be satisfied. We take a look at what

types of blast mitigation, what types of progressive collapse has

been built in the building. We take a look at parking or traffic control that is around the building. There are a number of issues that

enter into the adequacy of the security of a facility, not just the offset distance.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Of course. But unlike the ISC, DOD’s solution is very prescriptive.

Dr. MOY. We have determined that the vehicular bomb is the significant threat and must be considered in any security plan for the

facilities where we have DOD employees in, sir, yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I understand that. But when you take a

look around the world and you take a look at cities that have gone

through a lot of different bomb blasts, we have different population

makeups, you can’t tell me what their standards are. I can tell you

for a fact that they are not as strict as yours, and yet they are very

deterrable. And I am very concerned.

Look, I am not faulting you, because if what your job is is to protect the buildings and the people working in the buildings, I can

draw you something that is foolproof. I will put you underground

bunkers out in the desert surrounded by barbed wire and troops

and they will be safe. You won’t be able to hire anybody and get

the job done, but you will have other problems. But if that is your

only public policy purpose, that works.

But what I am concerned about, and I think other members of

the committee are as well, is balance. This is a lot of money. Yeah,

it has impact economically and some of this stuff can be mitigated

and some can’t. But even under the language by the ISC, there is

going to have to be some changes. But they are not nearly as prescriptive. They are much more general in their nature. They allow

for flexibility to meet certain standards.

And I am very concerned when I see a memo from the Department of Defense, from somebody we don’t even know if he is there

66

now or not, when he talks about, makes a comment on a—by the

way a memorandum that says not to release under FOIA. They

don’t want us to see it, but it is obviously a part of DOD making

a decision on this—where they said that being in the National Capital region is not good.

We have some of the best educated workers in the country here,

a concentration of them, that has produced DARPA, the Internet.

They’ve produced some wonderful things that keep our defense No.

1 in the world. And when you move outside this region, there is

some assumption that people are going to follow you, in an area

where there is a 1.4 unemployment rate with a great school system, and they don’t necessarily follow. They go across the street

and make more money than you pay over at DOD. Nobody even

looks at that. They want to be in this region.

Frankly, I find it very, very short-sighted. If DOD would just face

up to this instead of trying to hide in these documents, I might feel

a little bit better about the decision. But I will tell you something

right here. Mr. Moran said it earlier, and I am going to say it.

You’re not going to get it funded. You’re not going get it funded

through this House. You’re not going to get it funded through the

Senate.

If you think it is more important to protect your brass and these

buildings than it is to provide housing for troops—because it comes

out of that budget—housing for troops out there in the field and

their families and enlisted men, you have another thing coming,

because that is not what this Congress is about. And I think being

so prescriptive puts you out of work with ISC and other government agencies and don’t think you’re so special that you’re better

than the intelligence agencies and other Federal workers working

around that you need something different.

Why are you so different than everybody else that you moved

ahead instead of coordinating with these other agencies under the

Executive order that calls for coordination?

Dr. MOY. Sir, we believe we have tried to coordinate with the——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But you have different standards.

Dr. MOY. Yes, sir, and that is specifically because we have taken

the approach that we want to protect the mission as well as the

personnel against a terrorist threat.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I understand this is not your problem, but

in protecting one group, it is a limited amount of money here. It

is a limited amount of money. This means fewer money for housing

for military personnel on bases because it comes out of the same

pot. I will let you answer. Go ahead.

Dr. MOY. I would also submit, sir, that if we were to take a look

at other practices, if we look at the State Department that is allowed to—under the ISC guidelines, does put a lot into the protection of the embassies around the world.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That is around the world. This is Washington, DC, which is a much safer haven where we can to some extent, through immigration and visa policy and everything else,

doesn’t have the track record that you have in some of these other

cities. And that is why I asked, looking at other cities that we coordinated, see what they do routinely in Madrid, what they do routinely in London, what they do routinely in Tel Aviv, where you

67

have—these are far greater occurrences. But I understand. And

look, nobody here is faulting giving flexibility. But what your

standards do is not give flexibility.

Dr. MOY. It still boils down to the commanding officer, installation commander, if they elect to accept that the threat, that the

risk assessment, that the mission does not require the UFC specific

requirements, there is leeway for relaxing the requirement.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, there is no leeway in the BRAC recommendations. These are recommendations that have come out

that Senator Warner thinks they are illegal, but that will be determined later on. But this is a BRAC discussion that just says that

being in the National Capital region is not good. That certainly—

that policy is not something that has been subject to any kind of

public comment. It was in a secret meeting that is not subject to

FOIA by a guy we don’t even think is still in DOD, and it just

doesn’t give me a high level of confidence, but maybe other Members have different opinions.

Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the Chair for calling this meeting

because members of this panel have information that I think is relevant to a BRAC process that has unfairly affected our community

in Cleveland. I would like to ask Dr. Moy some questions.

When the Department of Defense analyzes the security threats

for U.S. installations, I assume it takes into account who works

there, correct? You take into account who works at a particular installation, who works there or who would work there?

Dr. MOY. It takes into account the mission that’s there, the criticality. Yes.

Mr. KUCINICH. And the likelihood of a facility being a target for

attacks?

Dr. MOY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. Would you describe for this committee what, according to your criteria, do you consider high value targets? What

are high value targets?

Dr. MOY. High value targets we would consider those that are involved in the intelligence gathering, communications, those that

are very necessary in the global war on terrorism. We take a look

at those facilities that have a large number of personnel that could

very well be subject to mass casualties in the event of a terrorist

attack.

Mr. KUCINICH. So it is not simply the function, it is how many

people are in the building?

Dr. MOY. That enters into the picture, yes, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. Go ahead. What else is involved in high value targets?

Dr. MOY. It basically comes back to focusing on what the mission

of that facility is and its criticality to accomplishing the mission of

the Department of Defense, taking a look at the number of people

that are in that facility. I would say that those are two major components to the high value of the facility.

Mr. KUCINICH. Now, the military value rankings, are they based

on supposed threats? Are they based on actual threats? What are

they based on?

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Dr. MOY. Sir, I cannot address the determined military value in

that context.

Mr. KUCINICH. The high value targets, what is the underlying assumption there? Is that based on information that the Department

of Defense has or is it speculation or what?

Dr. MOY. The high value goes back to the impact that facility has

to accomplishing the mission of the Department of Defense.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, let me ask you specifically. The Defense Finance Administration. You’re familiar with that?

Dr. MOY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. Are the Defense Finance Administration functions

considered to be high value targets?

Dr. MOY. I cannot comfortably give you a yes or no answer to

that.

Mr. KUCINICH. Why not?

Dr. MOY. The function of making sure our folks are paid, the

function of making sure that our contractors are paid, I personally

would judge that as being a high value for our service members.

But in terms of considering that alongside a facility that is supporting the global war on terrorism, there is a difference in, of what

a high value is. So I can’t arbitrarily say, yes, it is high value, period.

Mr. KUCINICH. I understand. But what I am trying to determine,

I think it would be helpful for this committee, is to be able to—

so much of the work that you seem to be doing is quantifiable.

Do you have a listing like a matrix? Does anyone on this committee have any kind of a matrix—on the panel—have a matrix where

you list the building, who is in the building, the threat assessment

based on real or supposed threats, the ranking as to what the value

is with respect to the—from high to low value target and where

would accountants and other civilian defense employees fall into

that kind of a matrix? Do you have any kind of documents like that

in your possession?

And if you do, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be useful for this

committee to ask for those documents.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, we’ll ask for them. And if not, we

can subpoena them.

Dr. MOY. Sir, I don’t believe that we have any documents, either

individually or in one place, that would array the 500,000-some facilities in the Department of Defense ranking them from one to

zero.

Mr. KUCINICH. I guess the question then becomes, how do they

come to that conclusion whether something is a high value target

or not?

We are told that enters into a decision as far as BRAC. Now, if

that enters into the decision and we have the person who is

charged with——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I guess the question is how is that conclusion reached if there is not a ranking?

Dr. MOY. With the specifics of, again, relating to how you reach

that decision according to BRAC, I would have to say I cannot answer that question. But in terms of addressing specific facilities,

what I was trying to answer the question is, I don’t know what inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:37 Jun 19, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\23041.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ventory that we have that—a comprehensive inventory that we

have for all of our facilities.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You don’t have a listing. But do you have

general guidelines?

Dr. MOY. We have, JSSEWG teams that go out and inspect installations, inspect key facilities. They come back and——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Do you have anything on this particular

facility Mr. Kucinich is asking?

Mr. KUCINICH. I appreciate the indulgence of the Chair here and

the assistance, because the question that comes, you know, since

we had this as a general discussion, and you don’t—you would

rather be specific, so would I.

In the draft analysis we have a site—and Mr. LaTourette is familiar with this because he has been leading this effort—the Defense Bratenahl site was ranked, was rated as the 6th highest in

terms of military value, which compares to Denver at 3rd, Columbus at 9th, Indianapolis at 12, and Cleveland downtown at 13, but

the Bratenahl site was eliminated from the final rankings, and I

am wondering why, speculating here as to why DOD didn’t offer a

scenario site to include DFAS to a site down the street which

would save 1,200 jobs.

So, again, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that this committee can

perform a service by trying to pin down the Department of Defense

on this criteria, because there is something about the criteria that

seems nebulous and its application which seems arbitrary.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Dr. Moy, you didn’t make the BRAC decisions though, is that right? You’re not in that loop?

Dr. MOY. No, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. I understood that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But you would be, or could get us information in the loop in terms of how this was ranked, how someone

came out and looked at this and evaluated this and decided somehow this is a high value target, couldn’t you?

Dr. MOY. I could certainly take that for the record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. If you could get back to us for the record,

which is what we want to look at. And if you can’t do that, I know

the record is somewhere. You just tell us you don’t feel we can have

it, and then we can proceed from there to see what we might need

to do. I understand—this isn’t meant personally, you just happen

to be the flack guy they sent out here today and you have some

knowledge about how this stuff happens. And we are just trying to

get some answers. But there’s obviously some disagreement among

Members about some of the individual decisions that have come out

of the agency. And we are just trying to get answers and to the extent you can give it to us, we will try to get it. Any other questions?

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your participation in helping to get some answers. Thank you, Mr.

LaTourette.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. LaTourette, do you have any questions?

Mr. LATOURETTE. If I could followup on what Congressman

Kucinich is asking and if we are asking Dr. Moy to find the former

Under Secretary Johnson, I do have one more question I would like

to ask him for the record.

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But Mr. Williams, not to ignore you, I think Congressman

Kucinich has asked a good series of questions and I keep reading

in the newspaper that the Department of Homeland Security is interested in chatter. We want to see what people are talking about

and what sites are at risk. When we go about allocating our scarce

homeland security money there is a real argument to be made that

the lion’s share should go to places like Washington, DC, and New

York City.

Are you aware of any chatter that has targeted the accountants

at DFAS that indicates that they are particularly at-risk members

of our Defense Department? The reason I ask you is that I think

this is the first BRAC round that has put the accountants in with

the soldiers, the warfighters. And I think it is a little bit like trying

to take a square peg and put it into a round hole. But are you

aware of any chatter that the accountants are in danger?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I don’t have any specific information, no.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you for that.

And Dr. Moy, the other thing I would ask you just if you can find

out, one of the successful sites is the Buckley Annex, which is in

Denver. And again the Air Force member at another—I don’t know

if it was a secret meeting but it was another meeting not subject

to FOIA, that occurs and it is listed on January 19. And it is the

second of the two documents that I provided to you. The Air Force

member asked if the Buckley annex is the best place for DFAS to

be located considering the high labor rates in Denver, and aside

from the issue of terrorism, cost is something that is of interest to

us. And I think, again, to be parochial, Cleveland was just labeled

the most impoverished city in America. And it has a workforce that

is substantially lower labor rates than Denver. And if you could

ask whoever you’re going to ask to get back to us and they can

make a comment on what is 6(a) on the second document from January 19, I would appreciate that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And Dr. Moy when we say, ‘‘get back to

us’’ again, this is not directed to you personally.

Could you get back within 2 weeks from today and if you don’t

have it, at least tell us where you are on getting it? DOD, your

agency, sometimes works on things for years at a time and doesn’t

come up with it.

We just need to know what kind of response we are likely to get,

what manpower is involved and you can get back to us and we will

try to work through it and see what we can get or get the subpoena

out. But I think at this point if we could—just let us know how it

is working and what is involved with it. We will try to work it out.

We are not trying to be hard here. But obviously Members have

some issues.

Dr. MOY. Absolutely, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Any other questions, Mr. LaTourette?

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, before you get on to the next person, I just want to say all of us in the Cleveland area appreciate

the exceptional work that Congressman LaTourette has done on

this, and the information that he has produced is very important

to all of us.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

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Also, we are trying to find out where the missing Mr. Johnson

is, too.

If that is one of the questions, maybe you can find that out in

the next 2 weeks, too.

Dr. MOY. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Now, first I want to join in with those who have expressed congratulations to Mr. Moravec for his years of service. He has been

a first class professional. I have worked with him for 15 years in

the GSA. Regardless of administration, he sets standards. Sorry to

see you go.

Mr. MORAVEC. Thank you very much. That is very generous of

you, Congresswoman.

Ms. NORTON. Let’s look at what the DOD has done. I am tired

of the use of these letters. Let’s break it down here right now.

When people hear DOD, they think they are hearing things like

the Pentagon, you know, guys in uniforms, brass. So the word can

be used when it is used generically to the average American, let’s

see if it calls to mind the personnel and the agencies that would

be moved out of northern Virginia. Dr. Moy even evoked the State

Department standard in foreign countries of embassies. So you see

what we have here. We are trying to create an image of what is

being moved based on the kind of generic image that the public has

of what the DOD is.

I think it is only fair to ask our witnesses to break down for us

the agencies and the kinds of personnel we are talking about moving from northern Virginia to an army base, and I would like to

have the greatest specificity you can offer, and I should hope that

you did not come here without being able to go behind the word

‘‘DOD.’’

Speak up whoever wants to speak up first.

Dr. MOY. Ma’am, let me try to answer your question this way.

I am not going to be able to go through a line item description of

all the things that are being moved from one location——

Ms. NORTON. Just do your best. I know you’re not ignorant on

this score. Because given your title, I know you’re not ignorant. So

I am not asking for line-by-line item. I am asking for—to the best

of your ability, name me the agencies, name me the kinds of personnel that work in those agencies.

Dr. MOY. We have—the people that work in these agencies are

a mixture of uniformed and civilian personnel. And if we go back

to——

Ms. NORTON. What percentage are uniform and what percentage

are civilian personnel? Are most of these uniform? Are most of

these civilian? What kinds of work do they do in these agencies?

Dr. MOY. In answer to your question about the percentages, I

cannot give you an answer to that. The answer to your question

about what kind of work these folks do, they do a variety of work.

Some support the intelligence requirements for the Department.

Some support the acquisition of equipment, of weapon systems,

some support the facilities, business of the Department. There is a

variety of things that these folks provide for the Department of Defense.

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Ms. NORTON. Mr. Moravec, these are agencies that you have

been responsible for finding leased spaced for in northern Virginia.

Would you, to the best of your knowledge, tell me some of the

agencies involved? You found the space, and the kinds of personnel

that are found in those agencies, are they generals? Are they military personnel? Are they uniformed personnel for the most part?

Mr. MORAVEC. I would simply concur with Dr. Moy’s characterization. This is a diverse workforce consisting of uniformed and civilian personnel working on a very wide variety of Department of

Defense headquarters type functions, high administrative functions

for the most part.

Ms. NORTON. The figures I have been given are for civilian

15,754; military, which does not necessarily mean uniform, 6,199.

Now, I would like you to provide to the chairman of this committee the exact agencies and a rundown of the personnel functions

they do. It is my understanding that these are mostly people who

do the same kinds of things that are done for other agencies. You

know, the kinds of things that are located in northern Virginia, for

example, is inspector general, there are education and training facilities, there are researchers. But I think you have an obligation

to disaggregate for this committee what you’re talking about and

to rebut my assertion that we are talking about people that look

like the same people who are sitting all across the region doing the

same kinds of administrative tasks that they do, including contractors, who often are in some of these buildings side by side with

Federal workers, but not contractors working on some great big nuclear secret, not contractors like people in embassies, but contractors like people doing essentially the kind of head work that most

terrorists could care less about. I can understand their interest in

military facilities.

But I ask you to provide within 30 days to the chairman of this

committee, Dr. Moy, a breakdown of the line-by-line that you, of

course, do not have in your head, of the agencies involved.

I have been involved with the BRAC matter because there is a

facility here which raises wholly different concerns. And of course,

that is Walter Reed Hospital. And what I have tried to do is to understand what the BRAC calls for. So I said to my people who don’t

want Walter Reed to move, don’t want to hear what a nice thing

it is for the community. These are military folks, and the foremost

of the standards is military value.

So my question is—really goes to this. Weeks before BRAC ever

came out, the Defense Department announced that it wanted to

move these personnel from northern Virginia to an army base.

Then here comes BRAC. And BRAC says, guess what? We want to

move these people to an army base. In the law we would call this

protectoral, that the decision had been made quite apart from military value to move these facilities.

And I would like you, Mr. Williams, and you, Dr. Moy, to describe what the military value is to the U.S. taxpayer of moving

personnel specialists, researchers, many of whom simply have their

headquarters or offices there, training facilities and the like, into

a shuttered army base where for good reasons we make it very difficult to get in.

Yes, sir. Mr. Williams.

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Mr. WILLIAMS. I, for one, don’t feel that I am qualified to respond

to what the mission and the mission needs are of DOD. Again, as

a chairperson of the ISC, we are primarily concerned with non-military activities. So I have not been involved in that.

Ms. NORTON. Aren’t you on this 12-person agency—task force? I

am sorry.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Which——

Ms. NORTON. The interagency group that together is supposed to

consider all these matters so that you have at the table, for example, not the DOD making a decision by itself, oh no, but with the

input of GSA, God help us, of the Department of Homeland Security. Or is DOD out there by themselves and it doesn’t matter what

the standards are for everybody else?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, again, DOD was part of developing the ISC

standards. And we have set them minimum standards so there is

quite an array of missions between the many government agencies

that could require great elevation of those standards.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Williams, I would hope that these standards

meet the necessary flexibility, agency by agency. Are you saying

that no amount of flexibility or of thinking or of drawing in experts

was possible to avoid moving mostly civilian, non-military, administrative employees to an army base, that this was the last resort,

these personnel are so valuable to the terrorists, we look at so

many options for making sure that they were safe, cross them all

off, just couldn’t do another thing and finally said, ‘‘Golly, these

folks have to go to an army base because there is no way else to

protect them,’’ and we don’t know, and the private sector is not

able to help us provide ways to keep them where they are, we are

going to undertake this for that reason? You are saying all those

options were looked at?

Dr. MOY. Ma’am, I would like to add that the issue of moving the

subject people to an army base, that the unified facilities criteria

was not the only——

Ms. NORTON. What was not the only? I am sorry, what was not

the only criteria?

Dr. MOY. The Unified Facilities Criteria, the anti-terrorism force

protection criteria was not the decisionmaker for moving people.

Ms. NORTON. What was the major criteria then?

Dr. MOY. It always goes back to military value. But it takes a

look at—the intent was to try to gain efficiencies of placing like

functions together, trying to address command and control among

units, placing them in closer proximity, in terms of cost savings of

moving them to DOD or federally owned facilities. So there are a

number of things that entered into the decision, not just whether

they met the anti-terrorism force protection requirements of the

Department.

Ms. NORTON. Of course, although that is the primary point here.

Gentlemen, the carving out of the DOD almost entirely, it would

appear, regardless of the personnel, regardless of the function, calls

into question all you have done for Federal workers. You’ve taken

the largest number. Maybe Homeland Security now, Mr. Williams,

is the largest number. We cannot fail to believe that your standards are worthless because after DOD I don’t know why, Mr. Williams, you won’t be here saying, I am sorry, we have to move all

74

the personnel. Of course, they are all civilians, but somebody might

attack them, so we just have to move them as far as we can.

And I want you to tell me, Mr. Williams, what is the difference

between you and Dr. Moy when it comes to moving facilities based

on exposure to terrorism, and he says a whole bunch of other matters. I don’t see the distinction.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Again, the ISC, we have—there was a collaborative effort that I think involved many entities from National Capital Planning Commission on through. We have developed a set of

minimum standards that are very flexible. They can be tailored

based on the mission of the individual——

Ms. NORTON. But these are not—please answer my question.

They weren’t tailored. You gave up on the standards here and

moved them to a military base which is the most secure place you

can locate in our country. So they are outside of the standards.

Mr. MORAVEC. I am not sure I would agree with the characterization of the ISC standards as worthless. They are adequate for the

purpose for which they were intended, which was to establish a

minimum baseline of security upgrades to which private landlords

could respond. They provide a reasonable level of protection under

most circumstances. The ISC standards definitely reduce or mitigate the threat. They don’t eliminate it. And I would also——

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Moravec, if that were the case in your own testimony you mentioned level 4 standards. You yourself I am sure

are no small part, given your expertise, responsible for and you say

what some of these standards are and they can be very burdensome. You say it could involve control of common entrances, parking areas, some inspection, and the like. And then you go on to say

one solution may be to consolidate agencies with similar security

profiles, to secure efficient and cost effective building occupancy.

But you say, ‘‘may receive less interest from the market.’’ That is

to say, what you require, let’s say an already leased space, may receive less interest from the market and be less competitive.

I would like to know what is the evidence from the market in

northern Virginia that that leased space was unwilling to try to

meet standards—your standards—with some flexibility. What is

the evidence? Did you call them together? Have you drawn in the

development community, a very extensive community around the

National Capital area, sat them down at a table, told them what

you are up against, that your personnel specialists and DOD needs

to be in an army base unless they will, in fact, conform to some

of these more burdensome standards and if so, what did they say,

did they say, yeah, I guess you have to move them to an army

base?

Mr. MORAVEC. The private sector was very definitely extensively

involved in the creation of the ISC standards. There was extensive

consultation, not just in the National Capital region, but around

the country with private landlords as to how they would respond

to different kinds of security countermeasures that would be mandated as part of a solicitation for offer of space. So they were very

definite.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Moravec, please answer my question. I asked

you because the chairman wants me to go on. I asked whether the

private development sector here, which you say may be less willing

75

to conform with these standards, whether these people were told

this is likely to happen, you are likely to have agencies increasingly

moved to shuttered bases unless you think deeply and creatively

about whether you can meet these standards? If you have, I want

to know when and I want to know who.

Mr. MORAVEC. We didn’t tell anybody that as part of the ISC

process. Basically we developed the standards and thus far we really mostly have anecdotal evidence as to what the reaction is. Other

than level 4 protection, which requires pretty much complete control of access to the building and parking areas and segregated

heating, ventilating and air conditioning systems for big parts of

the public areas of the buildings, we don’t think that the private

sector is going to have a hard time responding competitively with

regard to the first three levels of security. The big difference between the DOD standards and the ISC standards have to do with

setback and blast protection. Basically the DOD standards are incorporating and actually enhancing what we call the security design criteria for Federal construction, and they are applying it to

leased space. So they are fairly consistent with the ISC; in other

words, the rest of the Federal community standards for security for

owned space. But they are applying it to leased space. So philosophically it is consistent. It is just requiring a much higher level

of security.

Ms. NORTON. Could I just ask, Mr. Chairman, could I ask you to

call a meeting of the development community in this area to put

before them what may face them, to begin to get them to think

about what you should get them to think about anyway, because

you know that you have owned space, space you own in the District

of Columbia and Maryland that you can’t begin to move anywhere?

So you should have had them coming in and talking about the Ronald Reagan Building down there. You own it. Yes, there are private

agencies there, but those agencies remain there, but you control

the parking. And you are in greater control of that building. The

fact is that you do not have open to you the option that has been

used with BRAC as a subterfuge and a pretext in order to try to

move things out of northern Virginia. You know you can’t move it

out of the District of Columbia. You know you can’t move the Pentagon. You know you can’t move the National Capital area.

And what this process reveals is that there is almost no innovative or creative thinking going on among those who are in charge

of the facilities in this area. If there were, we would have heard

some of that back. You already said that you have not called in the

development community. I am asking you specifically to do that.

Call them in. Lay it on the table. Do it not only because we want

to keep people from moving out, do it because you owe it to us because you have buildings in D.C. not only like the building that the

chairman brought to your attention, you have the Secret Service

here. You have the FBI here. And you have departments I won’t

even name here. And only when you begin to do that will you be

able to protect those who are here, much less running for cover—

and that is why I am ashamed of you—running for cover by essentially giving up when we are talking mostly about workers like

every other worker around here, not people who are attached to security at all, and every last one of you at the table know it.

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Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORAVEC. I may not be clear, but we have involved and will

involve the private industry in the evolution of the interagency security standards. This is a living document that will be adjusted

as we learn more.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that you ask the developer or at least perhaps as part of another hearing ask the development community to come before us and testify what they think

of——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We’ll certainly ask them. And I know we

had a meeting with DOD, and DOD, which is their restrictions are

far worse than I see from a development point of view. We have

had some meetings informing them of what would be helpful hearing from them. We can do that. But thank you very much.

Ms. Watson, and then Mrs. Tubbs Jones.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman. I think

this is a very critical hearing we are having this morning. I would

like to thank the panelists as well.

I was a U.S. Ambassador assigned to the Federated States of Micronesia. Our Secretary of State constantly informed us of the new

standards, this back in the late nineties. And so I brought my

packet to Washington, DC, to the State Department describing our

facility. They told me, sorry, I was No. 80. I would be No. 81 on

a list of 80 that were already there. So our attention is not going

to the needs of all of our embassies overseas. I was just turned

down flat. Because we were right on the road. If somebody wanted

to do us harm, all they would have to do is throw a canister up

on the roof and that would be it.

I say that to say we are all at risk. So I think I am going to address this question to Mr. Moravec.

You mentioned in your testimony that the ISC Security standards for leased space do not preclude the utilization of space in the

central business districts. And as a result of the Oklahoma City

bombing, the ISC was formed.

I want to know, do our offices that we lease as Federal employees

and as elected officials come within that standard? If not, why not?

We lease space. And let me go just a minute further. We got a

call—three calls from the FBI in Los Angeles that there had been

a threat made not only to my person, but to my office. I asked my

staff to find out more about it. So I called the agent that had called

our office, and I inquired. When I came here, I called the FBI. They

moved this guy out of my region.

And so I am saying, if we are threatened, then I should be able

to instruct my staff and my constituents when they come to my office what risk they are under when they come. I could never get

any information.

So let me know, Mr. Moravec, if you consider our federally leased

space within the standards. And I wrote down here, are we a high

value target or not? And if not, why not?

Mr. MORAVEC. Well, the ISC standards have just become formalized within the last 5 months. So it is clear that not all buildings

are in compliance with the ISC standards at this point. Every Federal agency, regardless of whether they are in owned or leased

space, is supposed to have an occupant emergency plan. There is

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supposed to be a building security committee chaired by the highest ranking member of the largest tenant in a Federal building,

whether it is owned or leased, that is responsible for developing an

emergency plan specifically for that building and in consultation

with the Department of Homeland Security and with the building

management with GSA.

Ms. WATSON. It is not happening. I am in Los Angeles and right

down the street from the freeway that Mr. Waxman mentioned and

our districts are. Whatever happens in his district impacts mine as

well. And I am right up to the airport. I don’t have the airport. But

I go right up to it. And we are not informed.

Mr. MORAVEC. Are you in a federally owned building or a multitenant?

Ms. WATSON. No. I am in leased space in a commercial building.

So my question to you is, do the regulations and the requirements

apply to Members, Federal employees who are in leased space?

Mr. MORAVEC. Absolutely they do.

Ms. WATSON. OK. Well, I haven’t seen any of that. And we then

asked the manager and the owners of the building to help us secure our property and then I asked the FBI for more details? You

know, are they going to try to get us in our cars, underground, my

staff that comes and goes on public transportation. You know, help

us reduce the risk and protect our people. I have not seen any of

that.

Mr. MORAVEC. Well, we will endeavor to do better.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. The standards are new. They

are brand new. It takes a long time. Even DOD standards are just

starting to kick in, when these leases are expiring and the like. But

thank you very much. Ms. Tubbs Jones.

Ms. TUBBS-JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity

to ask just a couple of questions. Good morning. Well, almost afternoon. I come from Cleveland, OH. You already heard from two of

my colleagues, Dennis Kucinich and Steve LaTourette, with respect

to a BRAC closing of a DFAS facility in our congressional district.

I guess what I am interested in is in the process of a BRAC,

what consideration is given to the existing facility that a group of

employees is working in as compared to a new facility, a facility

that they would be moved to for purposes of considering whether

the BRAC should take place? Are you understanding my question

or am I confusing you? I see the frown. That is I why I’m asking.

Mr. MORAVEC. I understand your question. I would have to take

that for the record, and I am not able to answer your question now.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. He was not part of the BRAC process formally. He was part of the group that formulated some of the security details of buildings.

Ms. JONES. So what I am interested in is to whomever this question will be directed, so it will be clear, so that they won’t be confused about what I am asking, is the DFAS employees who are currently in a Federal facility on 9th Street, the physical Federal

buildings?

Mr. MORAVEC. Celebrisi Building. It is a beautiful building from

the 1960’s. It has aged very well. We are very proud of that at the

GSA.

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Ms. JONES. Depends on who you ask. Regardless of that, what

consideration is given to the security of that facility as compared

to a facility that they would be moved to if they were moved to

Denver or Columbus or Indianapolis in terms of pointing and deciding where—what is the best place for this DFAS to be located?

That is what I am interested in knowing, and anything else that

my colleagues asked. And since I am at the end of this and the

chairman has been so kind, that will be the only question I will ask

today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

I am trying try to get back on all those issues. Dr. Moravec, you

just make sure you have a conversation with the staff so you know

what you are supposed to get back and just do your best to try to

get some of the information and let us know where we are. I know

some of these requests may seem fairly cumbersome, but you can

get back and work out what we need to answer some of the Members’ questions.

Dr. MOY. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I want to thank everybody. It has been 2

hours. Dr. Moy, you don’t get combat pay for coming up today. But

I would be happy to make that recommendation to your superior.

Dr. MOY. Sir, I enjoy being your constituent.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much and nothing from—

I don’t think is addressed to you personally, it is obvious that there

is frustration with some of the decisions and some of the decision

matrix coming out of the departments. And you are the guy that

is here. But we appreciate the job all of you are doing on this and

I just want to say, it isn’t always easy where we sit either. But

thank you, very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[NOTE.—DOD did not submit responses to committee members’

questions for the record.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jon C. Porter follows:]

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