United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

HURRICANES 

KATRINA AND RITA 

June 2006 

Coordination between 

FEMA and the Red 

Cross Should Be 

Improved for the 2006 

Hurricane Season 

GAO-06-712 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2006

HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA

Coordination between FEMA and the Red 

Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 

Hurricane Season 

Highlights of GAO-06-712, a report to 

congressional committees 

The Red Cross played a key role in 

providing relief to victims of 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 

mounting its largest ever disaster 

response. Under the National

Response Plan, and its emergency 

support function-6 (ESF-6), the Red 

Cross and FEMA are tasked with 

working together to coordinate 

federal mass care assistance in 

support of voluntary organizations, 

as well as state and local

governments, as they meet mass 

care needs—such as shelter, food, 

and first aid. Questions have been

raised about how the Red Cross 

and FEMA operated following the 

Gulf Coast hurricanes and what 

improvements can be made for the 

2006 hurricane season.

This report includes GAO’s interim

findings on the Red Cross and 

FEMA’s hurricane operations. GAO 

will continue to analyze federal and 

charitable hurricane relief efforts. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that 1) FEMA 

work with the Red Cross to reach 

agreement on 2006 hurricane 

season operating procedures, 2)

the Red Cross implement staffing

strategies that would improve 

working relationships and 

retention of institutional 

knowledge, and 3) that FEMA 

obtain the Red Cross’s input when 

developing its resource tracking 

system. FEMA had no comments 

on the recommendations. The Red

Cross endorsed or is taking actions, 

as applicable, to address the 

recommendations. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Red Cross—

working together for the first time as co-primary agencies for ESF-6 under 

the National Response Plan—disagreed about their roles and 

responsibilities, and this disagreement strained working relationships and 

hampered their efforts to coordinate relief services for hurricane victims. 

Specifically, FEMA and the Red Cross disagreed about the role of the ESF-6 

coordinator, a FEMA official charged with leading mass care, housing, and 

human services assistance. FEMA officials told us that the Red Cross should 

direct all requests for FEMA assistance through the ESF-6 coordinator, while 

Red Cross officials stated that the organization should be able to take 

requests directly to the FEMA Operations Section Chief—not the ESF-6 

coordinator. As a result, the two organizations spent time negotiating 

operating procedures, rather than focusing solely on coordinating mass care 

services in the early days of the hurricane response effort. FEMA and the 

Red Cross have noted that they are working to clarify their roles and 

responsibilities under ESF-6, but as of May 24, 2006, had not reached 

agreement on these responsibilities, including the role of the ESF-6 

coordinator. 

Red Cross staff assigned to perform ESF-6 functions, such as working with 

FEMA to coordinate federal mass care assistance in support of sheltering

and feeding, rotated frequently—often every 2 to 3 weeks—making it 

difficult for them to maintain strong working relationships and gain 

expertise. These short rotations hindered communications among staff, thus 

making it more difficult to mobilize resources. Additionally, government 

officials stated that these short rotations led to the loss of institutional 

knowledge about ESF-6 processes, such as how to collect shelter data 

correctly. Red Cross officials said that 2- to 3- week rotations are standard 

because most disasters do not require longer rotations, but acknowledged 

that short rotations were a problem. Red Cross officials also told us they are 

hiring permanent staff at the state level to help coordinate relief services, 

including mass care under ESF-6, and are also considering staffing options 

for national-level positions. However, as of May 24, 2006, the Red Cross has

not implemented policies that would address the issue at the national or 

local level. 

FEMA did not have a comprehensive system to track requests for 

assistance it received from the Red Cross on behalf of voluntary 

organizations and state and local governments for items such as water, 

food, and cots; the absence of such a system created more work for the 

Red Cross and slowed the delivery of relief services. These organizations

often did not know when, or if, they would be receiving needed supplies 

and, as a result, scaled back relief services in some instances. The Red 

Cross was only able to follow up on these requests informally—a process 

that took time and was often ineffective. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-712.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cynthia 

Fagnoni at (202) 512-7215 or 

fagnonic@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Disagreement about Roles and Responsibilities Strained Working 

Relationships between FEMA and the Red Cross 12

Short Rotations Made It Difficult for Red Cross ESF-6 Staff to 

Develop Effective Working Relationships and Gain Expertise 13

FEMA’s Inability to Track Requests Created More Work for the Red 

Cross and Slowed Relief Services 15

Conclusions 17

Recommendations for Executive Action 18

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 22 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 25 

Appendix III Comments from the Red Cross 26 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 31 

Related GAO Products 32 

Figures 

Figure 1: Comparison between the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes and 

the 2004 Hurricane Season 7

Figure 2: Comparison of Services Provided by the Red Cross: 

Hurricane Season 2004 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 8

Figure 3: Emergency Support Function-6 10

Figure 4: Standard Process for Requesting Assistance 11

Figure 5: Process for Submitting Action Request Forms 15

Page i GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Abbreviations 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

ESF emergency support function 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 

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Page ii GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 8, 2006 

Congressional Committees 

Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September 2005, the 

American National Red Cross (Red Cross) mounted its largest disaster 

response effort in its more than 100 year history. The Red Cross, which is 

chartered by Congress to provide volunteer aid to the military as well as 

relief services to the public in the event of a disaster, raised over $2 billion 

in private donations for its hurricane relief efforts. Following the Gulf 

Coast hurricanes, it opened nearly 1,100 shelters in 27 states and the 

District of Columbia and estimates that it will have provided financial 

assistance to more than 3.7 million hurricane victims. 

Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September 2005, the 

American National Red Cross (Red Cross) mounted its largest disaster 

response effort in its more than 100 year history. The Red Cross, which is 

chartered by Congress to provide volunteer aid to the military as well as 

relief services to the public in the event of a disaster, raised over $2 billion 

in private donations for its hurricane relief efforts. Following the Gulf 

Coast hurricanes, it opened nearly 1,100 shelters in 27 states and the 

District of Columbia and estimates that it will have provided financial 

assistance to more than 3.7 million hurricane victims. 

In addition to providing hurricane relief services, the Red Cross also was 

tasked to perform another role in the aftermath of the hurricanes—

coordinating federal mass care assistance. In this role, the Red Cross takes 

requests for assistance from state governments to meet the needs of state 

or local governments or voluntary organizations and identifies resources 

to fill those requests or calls upon the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), a federal agency under the jurisdiction of the United 

States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to fill those requests with 

federal resources. This role is outlined in the National Response Plan—the 

purpose of which is to provide a single, comprehensive framework for the 

federal response to incidents of national significance, such as natural 

disasters and terrorist attacks. The plan—issued by DHS in December 

2004—identifies specific emergency support functions and names federal 

agencies and other entities responsible for meeting needs in those areas in 

the event of a natural disaster or other incident of national significance, 

such as a terrorist attack. Under the plan’s sixth emergency support 

function (ESF-6), the Red Cross is the primary agency responsible for 

coordinating federal mass care assistance in support of states and local 

governments and other voluntary organizations, as they meet needs, such 

as shelter, food, and emergency first aid. The Red Cross is the only 

voluntary organization named as a primary agency in the plan, although 

other voluntary organizations are included in the plan under an umbrella 

organization and given support responsibilities. The Gulf Coast hurricanes 

marked the first time the National Response Plan was activated and the 

first time that the Red Cross served in a primary agency capacity under the 

new, expanded version of ESF-6. 

In addition to providing hurricane relief services, the Red Cross also was 

tasked to perform another role in the aftermath of the hurricanes—

coordinating federal mass care assistance. In this role, the Red Cross takes 

requests for assistance from state governments to meet the needs of state 

or local governments or voluntary organizations and identifies resources 

to fill those requests or calls upon the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), a federal agency under the jurisdiction of the United 

States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to fill those requests with 

federal resources. This role is outlined in the National Response Plan—the 

purpose of which is to provide a single, comprehensive framework for the 

federal response to incidents of national significance, such as natural 

disasters and terrorist attacks. The plan—issued by DHS in December 

2004—identifies specific emergency support functions and names federal 

agencies and other entities responsible for meeting needs in those areas in 

the event of a natural disaster or other incident of national significance, 

such as a terrorist attack. Under the plan’s sixth emergency support 

function (ESF-6), the Red Cross is the primary agency responsible for 

coordinating federal mass care assistance in support of states and local 

governments and other voluntary organizations, as they meet needs, such 

as shelter, food, and emergency first aid. The Red Cross is the only 

voluntary organization named as a primary agency in the plan, although 

other voluntary organizations are included in the plan under an umbrella 

organization and given support responsibilities. The Gulf Coast hurricanes 

marked the first time the National Response Plan was activated and the 

first time that the Red Cross served in a primary agency capacity under the 

new, expanded version of ESF-6. 

Page 1 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
In preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, which officially began on 

June 1, this interim report focuses on how FEMA and the Red Cross 

fulfilled their responsibilities under ESF-6 and identifies immediate 

improvements both organizations can make to better coordinate federal 

mass care assistance in the event that another devastating hurricane hits 

the United States. This report—which builds on GAO’s previously issued 

work related to disasters, including a report about the coordination of 

voluntary assistance following the events of September 11, 2001—presents 

the initial findings of GAO’s ongoing work on how voluntary organizations 

coordinated with the government to provide mass care services following 

the Gulf Coast hurricanes. We issued preliminary observations in a 

December 2005 testimony, finding that voluntary organizations took steps 

following September 11 to improve coordination of relief efforts but still 

faced challenges coordinating service delivery following the Gulf Coast 

hurricanes.1

 We anticipate releasing a final report later in 2006. 

To gain a better understanding of how FEMA and the Red Cross worked 

together following the Gulf Coast hurricanes, we visited Mississippi, 

Louisiana, and Texas in January and March of 2006. During these site 

visits, we toured federal disaster operations centers and distribution 

centers that the Red Cross and other national and local voluntary 

organizations established to provide services to hurricane victims. We also 

met with representatives from federal, state, and local governments and 

held discussion groups with officials from both national and local 

voluntary organizations. In addition to conducting site visits, we analyzed 

FEMA and Red Cross documents, including documented requests for 

assistance that the Red Cross, as the primary agency for mass care under 

ESF-6, had placed to FEMA and the operating procedures that the Red 

Cross and FEMA said they used to carry out its ESF-6 responsibilities. We 

interviewed officials from DHS’s Office of Inspector General and FEMA’s 

national headquarters, as well as representatives from national voluntary 

organizations, including the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and the 

Southern Baptist Convention. Finally, we reviewed reports on the 

response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes issued by the DHS Office of 

 

1

GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance, GAO-06-297T 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Inspector General,2

 the House of Representatives,3 the White House,4 The 

International Committee of the Red Cross, the British Red Cross, and the 

American Bar Association.5

We conducted our work between October 2005 and June 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

FEMA and the Red Cross’s differing views about their roles and 

responsibilities under ESF-6 hampered efforts to coordinate federal mass 

care assistance. The two organizations differed in their understanding of 

the role of the ESF-6 coordinator, a key FEMA official tasked with 

providing strategic vision and leading efforts to coordinate federal mass 

care, housing, and human services assistance. FEMA officials said that the 

Red Cross should direct all requests for FEMA assistance through the ESF6 coordinator, while Red Cross officials stated that the Red Cross needed 

to communicate directly with the FEMA Operations Section Chief-–not the 

ESF-6 coordinator. This difference in expectations about the role of the 

ESF-6 coordinator created tension between FEMA and the Red Cross and 

affected the organizations’ working relationship. Although Red Cross and 

FEMA officials have stated they are working to clarify future roles and 

responsibilities, they had not reached agreement on these roles and 

responsibilities as of May 24, 2006. 

Results in Brief 

Red Cross staff assigned to fulfill specific ESF-6 functions rotated 

frequently, making it difficult for these staff to develop strong working 

relationships and gain specific knowledge about ESF-6 processes. In 

general, Red Cross staff who worked for ESF-6 rotated every 2 to 3 weeks. 

Officials from FEMA and state and local governments told us that these 

short rotations presented two problems during Gulf Coast hurricane relief 

 

2

 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. A Performance Review of 

FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina. OIG-06-32 

(Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 

3

 United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A Failure of Initiative. (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006). 

4

 The White House. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2006). 

5

 American Bar Association. In the Wake of the Storm: The ABA Responds to Hurricane 

Katrina. (Chicago, Illinois: 2006). 

Page 3 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
efforts. First, these short rotations hampered the ability of Red Cross staff 

to establish and maintain relationships with officials from FEMA and other 

government agencies. Maintaining strong relationships was particularly 

important following the hurricanes because normal communication 

channels were disrupted and staff needed to rely on personal contact to 

call upon needed resources. Second, these short rotations made it difficult 

for Red Cross staff to gain institutional knowledge about processes and 

procedures, such as data collection procedures, that were part of their 

ESF-6 roles. The International Committee of the Red Cross, in its review of 

various aspects of the American Red Cross’s response to the hurricanes, 

also cited short rotations as problematic, stating that rapid volunteer 

turnover resulted in the loss of knowledge volunteers had acquired on the 

job. Officials from the Red Cross said that 2- to 3- week rotations are 

standard because most disasters do not require longer rotations, but 

acknowledged that short rotations were a problem after the Gulf Coast 

hurricanes. In addition, Red Cross officials stated that they are hiring 

permanent staff at the state level to help coordinate relief services, 

including mass care under ESF-6, and are also considering staffing options 

to address this issue at the national level. However, as of May 24, 2006, the 

Red Cross had not yet implemented staffing strategies to address this issue 

at the national or local level. 

FEMA did not have a comprehensive system to determine the status of 

official requests for assistance it had received, which slowed service 

delivery and required the Red Cross to expend resources trying to 

determine when and if mass care service providers would receive 

promised goods. As the DHS Office of Inspector General noted in its 

review of FEMA’s response to Katrina, FEMA did not have a system in 

place to track requests for assistance, including those requests it received 

from the Red Cross in its ESF-6 capacity. FEMA officials therefore were 

often unable to provide the Red Cross with accurate information about 

when expected items would be delivered, or if FEMA would be able to 

fulfill a request, causing many requests to go unfilled or be filled too late to 

be of use. The unreliability of FEMA’s supply systems required the Red 

Cross to try to follow up on requests through other informal channels—a 

process the Red Cross reported as being inefficient and only marginally 

effective. Other voluntary organizations also told us that in many cases the 

unreliability of FEMA’s supply systems challenged their attempts to 

provide mass care services, and as a result they had to scale back on their 

service provision. 

To clarify roles and responsibilities within ESF-6 for the 2006 hurricane 

season, we are recommending that FEMA work with the Red Cross as 

Page 4 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
soon as possible to reach agreement on the operating procedures that they 

will both use in the event of an incident of national significance. We are 

also recommending that the Red Cross implement ESF-6 staffing strategies 

that would enable them to better facilitate the development of working 

relationships and retain institutional knowledge. In addition, to help 

ensure that FEMA’s resource tracking system will meet the needs of those 

requesting FEMA assistance, we are recommending that FEMA obtain 

input from the Red Cross to aid in the system’s design. 

In comments on a draft of this report, DHS officials indicated that they had 

no comments on the draft, except for a few technical clarifications, which 

we incorporated as appropriate in this report. The Red Cross also 

provided comments on the draft and expressed general agreement with 

our conclusion that coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross could 

be improved for the 2006 hurricane season. The Red Cross highlighted 

actions it is taking with respect to our first two recommendations, and 

said that it heartily endorsed our third recommendation. Additionally, the 

Red Cross provided important contextual information about its role under 

the National Response Plan and the length of its ESF-6 staff rotations. We 

incorporated this information into the final report. Finally, the Red Cross 

maintained that our draft report’s characterization of problems pertaining 

to the operating procedures used by FEMA and the Red Cross following 

the hurricanes was not fully accurate, and specifically that the versions of 

procedures used by FEMA and the Red Cross were the same in every 

relevant respect. In response to the Red Cross’s comments, we again 

requested FEMA’s operating procedures, which we received. We 

compared the operating procedures FEMA and the Red Cross said they 

used and determined the wording was the same in relevant respects. 

Specifically, the versions stated that the Red Cross would not be 

precluded from taking priorities directly to the FEMA Operations Section 

Chief, as necessary, but that the Red Cross would coordinate with other 

designated FEMA officials. Subsequently, we modified the report to focus 

on disagreements between FEMA and the Red Cross regarding their roles 

and responsibilities during the relief efforts, rather than specific versions 

of operating procedures. Even though the wording of the operating 

procedures the Red Cross and FEMA said they used during hurricane 

relief efforts was the same, it is clear that they disagreed about their roles 

and responsibilities, and specifically the role of the ESF-6 coordinator, 

following the hurricanes. Additionally, our evidence indicates that this 

disagreement strained FEMA and Red Cross working relationships and 

may have led to breakdowns in the provision of mass care services. Both 

FEMA and Red Cross officials have confirmed they are working to finalize 

a memorandum of understanding to clarify ESF-6 roles and 

Page 5 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
responsibilities for future incidents of national significance. As both 

organizations work to finalize this memorandum, they need to clearly 

define key terms pertaining to their roles and responsibilities that may be 

ambiguous to avoid future confusion resulting from differing 

interpretations of the same document. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused extensive human suffering and 

damage in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Hurricane Katrina made 

landfall in Mississippi and Louisiana on August 29, 2005, and alone caused 

more damage than any other single natural disaster in the history of the 

United States. Hurricane Katrina destroyed or made uninhabitable an 

estimated 300,000 homes—more than three times the total number of 

homes destroyed by the four major hurricanes that hit the continental 

United States in August and September 2004. Hurricane Rita followed on 

September 24, 2005, making landfall in Texas and Louisiana and adding to 

the devastation. Hurricane Katrina alone caused $96 billion in property 

damage, more than any other natural disaster in the history of the United 

States. (See fig. 1.) 

Background 

Page 6 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Figure 1: Comparison between the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes and the 2004 Hurricane Season 

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

400,000

Hurricane Katrina

season

2004

Homes destroyed or made uninhabitable

Source: GAO analysis of Red Cross documents and the White House report The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:

Lessons Learned.

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

Katrina

and

Rita

Hurricane 

season

2004

Deaths

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Hurricane Katrina

season

2004

Property damage (in billions of dollars)

Note: Hurricane season 2004 refers to the four major hurricanes that struck the continental United 

States in August and September 2004: Charley, Francis, Ivan, and Jeanne. Regarding the 2005 Gulf 

Coast Hurricanes, we were unable to obtain comparable home and property damage for Hurricane 

Rita. 

The Red Cross provides relief services after disasters, such as hurricanes 

or terrorist attacks, and is the nation’s largest disaster relief organization. 

Since its founding in 1881, the Red Cross has offered humanitarian care to 

the victims of war and devastating natural disasters. The organization is 

unique in that it is a private nonprofit entity but, since 1905, has had a 

congressional charter. The congressional charter requires that the 

organization provide volunteer humanitarian assistance to the armed 

forces, serve as a medium of communication between the people of the 

United States and the armed forces, and provide disaster prevention and 

relief services. Eight of the 50 members of the Red Cross Board of 

Governors are appointed by the President of the United States, and 7 of 

these individuals must be federal officials. 

The Red Cross 

Following an incident of national significance, the Red Cross serves as a 

direct service provider to disaster victims. In this capacity, the 

organization provides services that include 

Page 7 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
• feeding, 

• sheltering, 

• financial assistance, and 

• emergency first aid. 

After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Red Cross estimated that it will 

have provided more than 3.7 million hurricane victims with financial 

assistance, 3.4 million overnight stays in almost 1,100 shelters, and more 

than 27.4 million hot meals and 25.2 million snacks for survivors of the 

Gulf Coast hurricanes. According to the Red Cross, its efforts after 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were larger than for any previous disaster 

relief effort. For example, the Red Cross provided more than six times the 

number of shelter nights after Katrina and Rita than it did in the entire 

2004 hurricane season. (See fig. 2.) 

Figure 2: Comparison of Services Provided by the Red Cross: Hurricane Season 2004 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

3,000,000

3,500,000

4,000,000

Katrina 

and 

Rita

Hurricane

season

2004

Shelter nights provided by Red Cross

Source: GAO analysis of Red Cross documents.

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

1,400,000

Katrina 

and 

Rita

Hurricane 

season

2004

Number of families provided with 

financial support by Red Cross

0

10,000,000

20,000,000

30,000,000

40,000,000

50,000,000

60,000,000

Katrina 

and

Rita

Hurricane

season

2004

Meals and snacks provided by Red Cross

Note: Hurricane season 2004 refers to the four major hurricanes that struck the continental United 

States in August and September 2004: Charley, Francis, Ivan, and Jeanne. 

National Response Plan The National Response Plan is designed to provide the structure for the 

coordination of federal support for disaster response, including support 

Page 8 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
for voluntary organizations providing shelter, food, and other mass care 

services. Major federal government agencies, the Red Cross, and an 

umbrella organization of voluntary organizations are signatories to the 

plan. DHS released the plan in December 2004, and Hurricane Katrina was 

the first time the plan was used in response to an incident of national 

significance. The plan incorporates and replaces several previous plans for 

disaster management, including the Federal Response Plan, which was 

originally signed in 1992. The Red Cross is the only voluntary organization 

named as a primary agency under both the Federal Response Plan and the 

National Response Plan. One way the National Response Plan changed 

the Federal Response Plan was by incorporating the services of other 

voluntary organizations under an umbrella organization, National 

Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. 

The National Response Plan is designed on the premise that disaster 

response is generally handled by local jurisdictions. In the vast majority of 

disasters, local emergency personnel, such as police, fire, public health, 

and emergency management personnel, act as first responders and identify 

needed resources to aid the community. Local jurisdictions can also call 

on state resources to provide additional assistance. If an incident is of 

such severity that it is deemed an incident of national significance, DHS 

and FEMA coordinate with other federal agencies to provide the affected 

state and local governments with additional resources and supplemental 

assistance. In these instances, state and local governments can request 

federal assistance for needed items. 

Emergency Support 

Function-6 

In addition to outlining the organizational structure used to respond to 

disasters, the National Response Plan designates 15 emergency support 

functions that address specific disaster response needs. ESF-6, the 

function most relevant to voluntary organizations involved in disaster 

relief, creates a working group of key federal agencies and voluntary 

organizations to coordinate federal assistance in support of state and local 

efforts to provide 

• mass care, including sheltering, feeding, and emergency first aid; 

• housing, both short- and long-term; and 

• human services, such as counseling, processing of benefits, and 

identifying support for persons with special needs. 

Under the Federal Response Plan, ESF-6 included only the mass care 

function. The National Response Plan marks the first time these three 

functions were included under one emergency support function. 

Page 9 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
FEMA and the Red Cross both serve important leadership roles in ESF-6. 

FEMA—an agency within DHS—serves as both the ESF-6 coordinator and 

as the primary agency for housing and human services. (See fig. 3.) In its 

role as ESF-6 coordinator, FEMA oversees the implementation of ESF-6 

and ensures coordination among mass care, housing, and human services. 

In its role as primary agency for housing and human services, FEMA has 

responsibility for leading and coordinating federal efforts to provide these 

services to the victims of disasters. 

Figure 3: Emergency Support Function-6 

Emergency Support Function-6 coordinator: FEMA

Mass care primary agency: Red Cross

Overall coordination of federal assistance to 

support sheltering, feeding, and other activities

to support the emergency needs of victims

Housing primary agency: FEMA

Address the housing needs of victims in 

affected areas

Human services primary agency: FEMA

Provide recovery services to victims such as

counseling or processing benefit claims.

Source: GAO analysis of the National Response Plan.

In addition to its role as a direct service provider, the Red Cross serves as 

the primary agency for mass care under ESF-6, which includes sheltering, 

feeding, and the provision of emergency first aid. In this role, the Red 

Cross is responsible for coordinating federal mass care assistance in 

support of state and local efforts. Red Cross staff work at FEMA 

headquarters and field offices to help coordinate ESF-6 relief efforts 

across organizations. In this role, the Red Cross takes requests for 

assistance from state governments to meet the needs of state or local 

governments or voluntary organizations. The Red Cross then identifies 

resources to meet those needs or calls upon FEMA to meet those needs 

with federal resources. (See fig. 4.) In addition to being the only voluntary 

organization to serve as a primary agency in the National Response Plan, 

the Red Cross also has responsibilities under other emergency support 

functions, such as providing counseling services under ESF-8, Public 

Health and Medical Services. 

Page 10 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Figure 4: Standard Process for Requesting Assistance 

Page 11 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
The Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and 

Emergency Assistance Act 

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 

(Stafford Act) specifies additional roles for the Red Cross—and other 

voluntary organizations—after a disaster. 6

 The Stafford Act authorizes 

FEMA—under a delegation from the President—to coordinate the relief 

activities of government and private disaster assistance organizations 

(including the Red Cross). These organizations agree to operate under a 

federal coordinating officer, who coordinates relief following major 

disasters and emergencies declared by the President. The Stafford Act also 

specifies that in providing relief and assistance, FEMA may use—with 

consent—the personnel and facilities of disaster relief organizations in the 

distribution of medicine, food, supplies, or other items, and in the 

restoration, rehabilitation, or reconstruction of community services 

housing and essential facilities. Specifically named in the statute are the 

Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and the Mennonite Disaster Service. 

Before the hurricanes made landfall, FEMA and the Red Cross—working 

together under ESF-6 for the first time—disagreed about their roles and 

responsibilities under the National Response Plan. This disagreement 

strained working relationships both before and during the response effort. 

Immediately following the hurricanes, each organization had a different 

understanding of certain ESF-6 operating procedures, according to both 

FEMA and Red Cross officials. This disagreement was primarily about the 

role of the ESF-6 coordinator, a FEMA official tasked with providing 

strategic vision and leading efforts to coordinate mass care, housing, and 

human services assistance. FEMA officials told us that according to their 

understanding of the operating procedures, the Red Cross should direct all 

requests for FEMA assistance through the ESF-6 coordinator. The Red 

Cross maintained that the operating procedures permitted it to take 

priorities directly to the FEMA Operations Section Chief—not the ESF-6 

coordinator. 

Disagreement about 

Roles and 

Responsibilities 

Strained Working 

Relationships 

between FEMA and 

the Red Cross 

Tensions resulting from this disagreement negatively affected the working 

relationship between FEMA and the Red Cross. Because of the lack of 

clarity about roles and responsibilities, the agencies spent time during the 

response effort trying to establish operations and procedures, rather than 

focusing solely on coordinating services. For example, FEMA and the Red 

Cross debated if the Red Cross would attend and present information at 

daily FEMA policy meetings. Specifically, Red Cross officials reported that 

 

6

 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5201. 

Page 12 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
in the early days of the response effort, the ESF-6 coordinator informed 

the Red Cross that she would represent all components of ESF-6 at FEMA 

policy meetings. Under this model, the Red Cross attended but did not 

present information. Red Cross officials expressed concern with this 

model because they indicated that it undermined their authority as the 

primary agency for mass care. The Red Cross additionally told us that 

FEMA’s vision of the ESF-6 coordinator did not best use the Red Cross’s 

expertise in mass care service provision. FEMA officials have argued that 

the ESF-6 coordinator role is important because the coordinator can 

provide a broad vision for all of ESF-6, which includes housing and human 

services as well as mass care. Additionally, FEMA officials have reported 

that confusion about the role of the ESF-6 coordinator may have led to 

breakdowns in service provision. 

In its review of operations following the Gulf Coast hurricanes, the DHS 

Office of Inspector General also noted that FEMA and the Red Cross held 

different expectations of their responsibilities. To address this issue, the 

Inspector General recommended that the FEMA director establish an ESF6 working group to define the explicit roles and responsibilities of FEMA 

and the Red Cross, develop standard operating procedures, and implement 

a concept of operations plan. FEMA and the Red Cross have stated they 

are working to clarify future roles and responsibilities, but as of May 24, 

2006, had not reached agreement on these responsibilities, including the 

role of the ESF-6 coordinator. 

Red Cross staff assigned to perform ESF-6 functions rotated frequently, 

often working from several different locations in the aftermath of the Gulf 

Coast hurricanes. These staff—who were responsible for coordinating 

federal mass care assistance in support of state and local efforts to provide 

shelter and food to evacuees—generally rotated every 2 to 3 weeks. For 

example, one Red Cross employee told us that in a 3 1/2-month period, 

which began immediately before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, he 

rotated on seven occasions to different ESF-6 offices in Washington, D.C., 

Atlanta; New Orleans; and Baton Rouge. During this time, he also worked 

for short periods at Red Cross headquarters on five separate occasions. 

Short Rotations Made 

It Difficult for Red 

Cross ESF-6 Staff to 

Develop Effective 

Working 

Relationships and 

Gain Expertise 

Short rotations made it difficult for Red Cross ESF-6 staff to develop and 

maintain effective working relationships with staff from other 

organizations, which were critical to relief efforts. Specifically, FEMA 

officials told us that short rotations hindered coordination by requiring 

that Red Cross ESF-6 staff members develop new working relationships 

every time they rotated. For example, when rotating into a new state, ESFPage 13 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
6 staff would have to form new working relationships with the FEMA 

officials in that state, state and local government officials, and officials 

from various local voluntary organizations. These short rotations were 

problematic because strong relationships between ESF-6 workers and 

other organizations facilitate communication between workers and ensure 

that individuals are aware of the roles and capacities of other disaster 

response organizations. In addition, officials told us that following the 

hurricanes, strong relationships were particularly important because usual 

communication channels were often not functioning and people needed to 

rely on personal relationships to mobilize resources. 

Short rotations also limited Red Cross ESF-6 staff members’ knowledge of 

ESF-6 processes. For example, FEMA officials said that frequent rotations 

resulted in Red Cross staff sometimes not knowing how to correctly fill 

out forms and collect shelter data. FEMA officials said that inconsistencies 

in data collected by Red Cross ESF-6 staff made it difficult to track trends 

in mass care and identify where additional services were needed. Red 

Cross officials noted that FEMA processes and procedures were not 

always clear and required time to learn. Although not specifically 

addressing ESF-6, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a 

humanitarian nongovernmental agency based in Geneva, Switzerland, also 

found that short rotations by Red Cross volunteers in various positions 

were problematic. According to an ICRC review of the American Red 

Cross’s overall response to the hurricanes, “the volunteers remain 

normally for a period between 2-3 weeks...Due to the rapid change-over 

training is difficult and acquired knowledge is lost.” 

Red Cross officials gave several reasons for using short rotations after the 

Gulf Coast hurricanes. Officials told us that short rotations for ESF-6 staff 

are standard because most disasters are not large enough to require an 

ESF-6 role for more than 2 or 3 weeks. In contrast, the Gulf Coast 

hurricanes required that Red Cross staff fill ESF-6 functions from August 

27, 2005, until December 16, 2005, a period of approximately 3 1/2 months. 

In addition, Red Cross officials said that short rotations made it easier to 

fill ESF-6 staff positions because volunteers were more likely to accept 

work for a short time period than for a long period. 

Officials from the Red Cross have recognized the problems posed by short 

rotations by ESF-6 staff—who included both paid employees and trained 

volunteers—and stated that they are working to resolve the problem. The 

Red Cross told us that it is hiring 14 additional employees at the state level 

who will work with state emergency management agencies to help 

coordinate relief services, including mass care under ESF-6. Red Cross 

Page 14 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
officials also told us that they are considering hiring reserve staff that 

could fill ESF-6 positions at the national level for longer periods. However, 

as of May 24, 2006, no new staffing policies had been implemented to 

resolve the problem of frequent rotations at the national or local levels. 

FEMA did not have a comprehensive system to track the requests for 

assistance that the Red Cross submitted—in its official ESF-6 role—on 

behalf of state and local governments and other voluntary organizations. 

(See fig. 5.) Red Cross records indicate that it submitted 16 requests to 

FEMA headquarters and dozens more to field offices in Atlanta, Georgia; 

Denton, Texas; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Jackson, Mississippi; and Austin, 

Texas during the response effort. According to the Red Cross, FEMA 

approved the majority of these requests for assistance such as requests for 

water, fuel, and cots for shelters, but did not have a system in place to 

determine whether 

FEMA’s Inability to 

Track Requests 

Created More Work 

for the Red Cross and 

Slowed Relief 

Services 

• the appropriate FEMA unit received the request, 

• the requested items had been located, 

• these items had been loaded and shipped to the intended location, and 

• these items had been delivered. 

Figure 5: Process for Submitting Action Request Forms 

A mass care service provider such as a

voluntary organization or a state or local 

government identifies a need it cannot meet 

itself or fill elsewhere and requests assistance. 

Red Cross ESF-6 staff complete an Action 

Request Form, on behalf of a mass care service 

provider and submit it to FEMA.

FEMA reviews the Action Request Form to 

ensure that the requested service is:

• beyond the capabilities of the state 

and local government,

• not under the authority of another 

agency, and

• eligible under applicable legal 

 requirements.

If the request meets these criteria, FEMA 

commits to filling the need and tasks a

federal agency to meet the need or 

purchases the resource from a private or 

voluntary organization.

 

Source: GAO analysis of FEMA and Red Cross interviews.

Without a comprehensive system to keep track of requests for assistance, 

many requests were lost before FEMA could fill them. For example, FEMA 

officials were only able to provide us with records of less than one-third of 

the 16 requests that Red Cross documents indicate were submitted to 

FEMA headquarters. Additionally, other voluntary organizations and state 

Page 15 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
and local government officials have told us that because of FEMA’s 

inability to track requests, they did not know when, or if, they would 

receive the supplies that they needed to continue providing mass care 

services. The DHS Office of Inspector General noted this problem in its 

report, indicating that FEMA’s inability to monitor requests for assistance 

often resulted in requests being lost or filled too late. In some instances, 

lost requests resulted in duplicate requests being submitted to FEMA. The 

DHS Office of Inspector General has recommended that FEMA develop a 

means to standardize and streamline the resource ordering and tracking 

process as well as develop and implement a resource-tracking system that 

is capable of documenting whether resources were delivered and the 

efficiency with which the resource was provided. The Under Secretary for 

Preparedness of DHS has stated that FEMA is working on the 

development of a resource-tracking system. However, FEMA officials told 

us they would not be able to create such a system before the 2006 

hurricane season. 

Red Cross officials have reported that often, the only way for them to 

determine the status of previously submitted requests was through 

informal channels, a situation that created more work for Red Cross staff. 

Because there was no comprehensive system in place to formally track the 

status of requests, Red Cross staff followed up on requests primarily 

through telephone calls, a procedure that was particularly challenging 

because the Gulf Coast hurricanes compromised communication systems. 

Furthermore, when the Red Cross officials were able to follow up on 

requests by telephone, FEMA officials were often not able to provide the 

needed information, according to Red Cross officials. 

State and local governments that submitted requests for assistance to 

FEMA through the Red Cross and ESF-6 reported service delivery 

problems as a result of FEMA’s inability to track and meet requests. For 

example, the city of Austin, Texas, had difficulties meeting the needs of 

evacuees when FEMA did not fill its request for 6,000 cots as expected. 

According to Austin officials, FEMA had indicated that it had processed 

the request and shipped the cots, which would arrive the same day. 

However, the cots did not arrive until much later in the response effort, 

and in the interim, FEMA was unable to determine where they were. As a 

result, the city of Austin needed to develop alternate sheltering strategies 

and later had to redirect the cots, which arrived too late to be of use to the 

city. An official from the state of Texas reported similar fulfillment and 

reliability problems with FEMA’s system and stated that in preparation for 

the next hurricane season, the state is developing alternate plans with the 

Page 16 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
private sector to reduce its dependency on FEMA to meet its mass care 

needs. 

Voluntary organizations also reported that, in many cases, the unreliability 

of FEMA’s supply systems challenged their attempts to provide mass care 

services. For example, the Southern Baptist Convention submitted several 

requests to FEMA through the Red Cross on September 1, 2005, for items 

such as refrigerated vehicles, forklifts, and hand washing stations to 

establish 13 large-scale kitchens that would serve Southern Baptist 

Convention and Red Cross shelters in Mississippi. A Southern Baptist 

Convention official told us that FEMA was unable to provide information 

about these requests after the requests had been submitted. Consequently, 

the organization’s ability to continue providing food for hurricane 

evacuees was compromised because most of the supplies it requested did 

not arrive until approximately September 10—a week and a half after 

placing the requests. 

In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita brought widespread devastation and 

challenged all levels of government and voluntary organizations to help 

thousands of victims get food, medical help, shelter, and other assistance. 

As we and others have reported, the agencies responsible for disaster 

relief after the Gulf Coast hurricanes were clearly overwhelmed, and there 

was widespread dissatisfaction with the level of preparedness and the 

collective response. The Red Cross and FEMA—the two organizations 

responsible for working together to coordinate federal mass care 

assistance under the National Response Plan—also faced challenges 

coordinating with each other to ensure that critical aid and resources from 

the federal government reached workers on the ground in Louisiana, 

Mississippi, and Texas. 

Conclusions 

As the 2006 hurricane season begins, these two organizations, with their 

access to vast resources and long histories of providing disaster relief 

services, are uniquely positioned to improve the level of care provided 

following a disaster. But this partnership cannot function efficiently in the 

aftermath of a disaster without improved working relationships. 

Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross will continue to be 

difficult unless they reach agreement on their respective roles and 

responsibilities and find ways to ensure that staff in critical positions serve 

at sites long enough to make contacts and retain on-the-job experience. 

Furthermore, as FEMA works to develop a system to track requests for 

assistance, it has an opportunity to improve service delivery by engaging 

the Red Cross. As the primary agency for mass care under the National 

Page 17 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Response Plan and the entity charged with submitting mass care-related 

requests to FEMA, the Red Cross could provide valuable input in 

identifying end user needs of a resource-tracking system and aiding in the 

design of system capabilities. The DHS Office of Inspector General has 

made longer-term recommendations for improving ESF-6 processes. 

However, changes are needed to enable this partnership to function more 

effectively as the 2006 hurricane season is beginning. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

To clarify roles and responsibilities within ESF-6 for the 2006 hurricane 

season, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct FEMA to work 

with the Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of the Red Cross as 

soon as possible to reach agreement on the operating procedures that they 

will both use in the event of an incident of national significance. Given the 

lack of progress FEMA and the Red Cross have made thus far in reaching 

agreement on the operating procedures and that the new hurricane season 

is beginning, they may wish to use mediation to speed the agreement. 

We recommend that the Interim President and Chief Executive Officer of 

the Red Cross implement ESF-6 staffing strategies that better facilitate the 

development of working relationships and retain institutional knowledge. 

For example, such strategies might include lengthening ESF-6 staff 

rotations in incidents of national significance or primarily using permanent 

staff to fill ESF-6 positions. 

To help ensure that FEMA’s resource tracking system will meet the needs 

of those requesting FEMA assistance, we recommend that the Secretary of 

DHS direct FEMA to ensure that it obtains input from the Red Cross as it 

develops a resource tracking system. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security. DHS officials indicated that they had no comments on 

the draft, except for a few technical clarifications, which we incorporated 

as appropriate in this report. DHS did not provide a response to our 

recommendations, noting that FEMA was actively preparing for the 

hurricane season. DHS’s written comments are reproduced in appendix II 

at the end of this report. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

We also provided a draft of this report to the Interim President and Chief 

Executive Officer of the Red Cross. The Red Cross’s written comments on 

the draft are reproduced in appendix III. Overall, the Red Cross agreed 

with our conclusion that coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross 

Page 18 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
could be improved for the 2006 hurricane season. The Red Cross also 

highlighted actions under way with respect to our first two 

recommendations. For example, the Red Cross said it has been working 

closely with FEMA in recent months to develop and finalize a 

memorandum of understanding that outlines areas of mutual support and 

cooperation with respect to response and recovery in presidentially 

declared disasters and emergencies. With respect to our recommendation 

about staffing strategies, the Red Cross said that it is in the process of 

hiring ESF-6 reservists who will be deployed for extended periods of time 

to perform Red Cross ESF-6 mass care functions at the federal level. 

Additionally, the Red Cross said that it heartily endorsed our third 

recommendation about FEMA’s resource tracking system. 

In its response, the Red Cross also provided additional information to help 

clarify the Red Cross’s role under the National Response Plan and its ESF6 operations. Specifically, the Red Cross maintained that in several places 

in the draft, our characterization of its role under the National Response 

Plan and ESF-6 was too broad. In response, we revised the report to clarify 

that under the National Response Plan, the Red Cross is responsible for 

coordinating federal mass care assistance in support of state and local 

mass care efforts. The Red Cross also provided additional information 

about the length of ESF-6 staff rotations, which we incorporated into the 

final report. 

Finally, in its written comments, the Red Cross maintained that in our 

draft report the manner in which we characterized problems pertaining to 

the operating procedures used by FEMA and the Red Cross following the 

hurricanes was not fully accurate. FEMA and Red Cross officials had 

previously told us that the organizations used different versions of the 

operating procedures. However, in its comments on our draft report, the 

Red Cross said that statements we made in the draft regarding differences 

in the versions of the operating procedures it and FEMA used were not 

accurate, as the versions were the same in every relevant respect. Further, 

the Red Cross stated that that the use of two different versions of 

operating procedures by FEMA and the Red Cross—if it ever occurred—

did not result in negative consequences, as our draft reported. In response 

to the Red Cross’s comments, we again requested the version of the 

operating procedures used by FEMA during hurricane relief efforts. We 

subsequently received a version of the operating procedures from FEMA; 

our review of this document indicated that the versions the Red Cross and 

FEMA said they used were the same in relevant respects. Specifically, the 

versions stated that the Red Cross would not be precluded from taking 

priorities directly to the FEMA Operations Section Chief, as necessary, but 

Page 19 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
that the Red Cross would coordinate with other designated FEMA 

officials. As such, we modified the report to focus on disagreements 

between FEMA and the Red Cross regarding their roles and 

responsibilities during the relief efforts, rather than specific versions of 

operating procedures. Even though the wording of the operating 

procedures the Red Cross and FEMA said they used during hurricane 

relief efforts was the same, it is clear that FEMA and the Red Cross 

disagreed about their roles and responsibilities following the hurricanes 

and specifically the role of the ESF-6 coordinator. Further, our evidence 

indicates this difference strained their working relationships. High-ranking 

officials from both the Red Cross and FEMA confirmed to us on numerous 

occasions that there was confusion and differing views over how the 

agencies should operate under ESF-6 and specifically how the role of the 

ESF-6 coordinator should be defined. After reviewing our draft, FEMA 

officials did not disagree with our characterization that disagreement over 

the operating procedures and the role of the ESF-6 coordinator may have 

led to breakdowns in the provision of mass care services. Further, both 

FEMA and Red Cross officials have confirmed they are working to finalize 

the aforementioned memorandum of understanding to clarify ESF-6 roles 

and responsibilities for future incidents of national significance. As both 

organizations work to finalize this memorandum, they need to clearly 

define key terms pertaining to their roles and responsibilities that may be 

ambiguous to avoid future confusion resulting from differing 

interpretations of the same document. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Red Cross, appropriate congressional committees, 

and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me at (202) 512-7215 

if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Other major contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix IV. 

Cynthia M. Fagnoni 

Managing Director, Education, Workforce 

 and Income Security Issues 

Page 20 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
List of Committees 

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 

Chairman 

The Honorable Max Baucus 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Finance 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Michael B. Enzi 

Chairman 

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Susan Collins 

Chairwoman 

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Peter T. King 

Chairman 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable William M. Thomas 

Chairman 

The Honorable Charles B. Rangel 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Ways and Means 

House of Representatives 

Page 21 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

As part of GAO’s ongoing body of work examining the response of the 

federal government and others to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we 

conducted a review of how Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) and voluntary organizations operated in concert with one another 

after the Gulf Coast hurricanes. To obtain information about coordination 

between FEMA and the voluntary organizations during the response to the 

Gulf Coast hurricanes, we interviewed officials from FEMA’s national 

headquarters and from national offices of voluntary organizations, 

including the Red Cross, National Voluntary Organizations Active in 

Disaster, the Salvation Army, the United Way, Habitat for Humanity, the 

Southern Baptist Convention, and Louisiana Association of Nonprofit 

Organizations. Additionally, to better understand two key tools used in 

coordination, we observed a National Voluntary Organizations Active in 

Disaster conference call in November 2005. These conference calls took 

place daily after the Gulf Coast hurricanes and included representatives 

from local and national voluntary organizations, as well as federal 

agencies, such as FEMA. We also observed the Coordinated Assistance 

Network database, a database that allowed multiple organizations to 

access information about the services provided to evacuees. To coordinate 

efforts with other oversight entities, we met in person and by telephone 

with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector 

General, Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Office, 

the Urban Institute, and the RAND Corporation. Finally, we reviewed 

reports on the response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes issued by the DHS 

Office of Inspector General, the House of Representatives, the White 

House, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the British Red 

Cross, and the American Bar Association. 

We conducted our work between October 2005 and June 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Site Visits To learn about the operations of voluntary organizations in the field, we 

conducted site visits to Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana, as well 

as Biloxi and Jackson, Mississippi, in January of 2006. Additionally, we 

visited Austin and Houston, Texas, in March of 2006. We toured damage 

caused by the hurricanes in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Biloxi, 

Mississippi. Additionally we toured the FEMA Joint Field Offices that were 

located in Baton Rouge, Biloxi, and Austin; local emergency operations 

centers in Baton Rouge and Austin; as well as distribution centers 

established by the Red Cross and the Salvation Army. 

Page 22 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

We spoke with FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons in Louisiana, Mississippi, 

and Texas. Additionally, we met with local chapters of the Red Cross, the 

Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, and the United Way. In addition, we 

spoke with key officials from the East Baton Rouge Parish Office of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Office of Homeland 

Security and Public Safety: City of New Orleans, Texas Office of Homeland 

Security, Austin/Travis County Health and Human Services Department, 

City of Austin Office of Emergency Management, City of Houston Mayor’s 

Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security, the Harris County Citizen 

Corps, and the Harris County Judge’s office. We also met with 

representatives from the OneStar Foundation, a charitable organization 

established in coordination with Texas’ Governor Perry’s office. 

To gain additional perspectives on disaster response, we conducted 

discussion groups of voluntary organizations that responded to the 

hurricanes. We attended the January Board of Directors meeting for the 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. At this meeting, we 

observed the board members offering guidance to an organization that 

was new to disaster response and conducted a discussion group with 

board members, including representatives from the United Methodist 

Committee on Relief, America’s Second Harvest, and Lutheran Disaster 

Response. We held two additional discussion groups—one in Jackson, 

Mississippi, and one in Houston, Texas—to learn the perspectives of local 

voluntary organizations that provided disaster relief. At these discussion 

groups, we heard from representatives of local chapters of the United Way 

and Catholic Charities USA, the Houston Food Bank, Independence 

Heights Ministerial Alliance, community action agencies from two 

counties in Mississippi, and the Christian Outreach Center. 

To better understand the Red Cross’s responsibilities and response to the 

Gulf Coast hurricanes, we analyzed numerous documents provided to us 

by the Red Cross. These documents included an August 2005 draft of the 

Standard Operating Procedures for Emergency Support Function-6; the 

American Red Cross Responsibilities under the Federal Response Plan; a 

statement of understanding between FEMA and the Red Cross; key 

statements of understanding between the Red Cross and other voluntary 

organizations that pertain to the Gulf Coast Response—including 

memorandums with Catholic Charities and the Salvation Army; training 

materials for Red Cross Emergency Support Function-6 personnel and 

disaster operation summary reports; after-action report by the Red Cross; 

and a spreadsheet of all Red Cross shelters. We also reviewed a Red Cross 

Discussion Groups 

Analysis of Red Cross 

Documents 

Page 23 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

summary document that listed each action request form it, as a primary 

agency for Emergency Support Function-6, submitted to FEMA between 

August 29, 2005, and September 30, 2005. Red Cross officials told us that 

they created this document after the Gulf Coast hurricanes in response to 

inquiries by us and others about their role as the primary agency for mass 

care. Additionally, we reviewed documents that the Red Cross provided to 

the Senate Committee on Finance, including documentation of Board of 

Governors’ meeting agendas from the years 2001 through 2005 and 

communication from Red Cross executives to board members. As 

aforementioned, we also reviewed mission reports of the response to the 

Gulf Coast hurricanes by the International Committee of the Red Cross 

and the British Red Cross. 

Analysis of FEMA 

Documents 

To gain a better understanding of how FEMA worked with voluntary 

organizations after the Gulf Coast hurricanes, we reviewed documents that 

it provided to us. Specifically, we reviewed copies of the action request 

forms that FEMA had records of the Red Cross submitting to FEMA 

headquarters and a list documenting the status of these action request 

forms. We also reviewed FEMA maps of shelter locations. Following 

agency comments, we also reviewed a version of the ESF-6 standard 

operating procedures FEMA said it used during hurricane relief efforts and 

compared it to the version the Red Cross said that it used.

Page 24 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 

of Homeland Security 

Page 25 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Appendix III: Comments from the Red Cross Appendix III: Comments from the Red Cross 

Page 26 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Appendix III: Comments from the Red Cross 

Page 27 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Appendix III: Comments from the Red Cross 

Page 28 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Appendix III: Comments from the Red Cross 

Page 29 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Appendix III: Comments from the Red Cross 

Page 30 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

Acknowledgments 

Cynthia M. Fagnoni, (202)512-7215, fagnonic@gao.gov

Andrew Sherrill, Assistant Director, and Tamara Fucile, Analyst in Charge, 

managed this assignment and made significant contributions to all aspects 

of this report. Mallory Barg Bulman, Scott Spicer, and Matthew Kundinger 

also made significant contributions. Additionally, Norm Rabkin, Bill 

Jenkins, Gale Harris, Mike Brostek, Michael Zola, Brodi Fontenot, and 

Walter Vance aided in this assignment. In addition, Jessica Botsford 

assisted in the legal analysis, and Rachael Valliere assisted in the message 

and report development. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 31 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Lessons Learned for Protecting and Educating Children after the Gulf 

Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-680R. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster 

Recovery Contracts. GAO-06-622T. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed 

to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International 

Assistance. GAO-06-460. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure 

Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance. 

GAO-06-600T. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Status of the Health Care System in New Orleans 

and Difficult Decisions Related to Efforts to Rebuild It Approximately 6 

Months after Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-576R. Washington, D.C.: March 

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Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita. GAO-06-461R. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 

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March 8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

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D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of 

Hospitals and Nursing Homes Due to Hurricanes. GAO-06-443R. 

Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2006. 

Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: 

FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant 

Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-403T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2006. 

Investigation: Military Meals, Ready-to-Eat Sold on eBay. GAO-06-410R. 

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Page 32 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
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Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February 

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Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges for the National 

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Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee 

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Project. GAO-06-322T. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance. 

GAO-06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005. 

Tax Administration: IRS Improved Some Filing Season Services, but 

Long-term Goals Would Help Manage Strategic Trade-offs. GAO-06-51.

Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2005. 

Army Corps of Engineers: History of the Lake Pontchartrain and 

Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project. GAO-06-244T. Washington, D.C.: 

November 9, 2005. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Preliminary Observations on Contracting 

for Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO-06-246T. Washington, D.C.: 

November 8, 2005. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Recovery 

Efforts. GAO-06-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2005. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges Facing the National 

Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-174T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 

2005. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to 

Enhance Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance 

Program. GAO-06-119. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005. 

Army Corps of Engineers: Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane 

Protection Project. GAO-05-1050T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2005. 

Page 33 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
Related GAO Products 

Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation’s Preparedness, 

Response, and Recovery Activities. GAO-05-1053T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 28, 2005. 

September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable 

Organizations’ Contributions to Disasters. GAO-03-259. Washington, 

D.C.: December 19, 2002. 

Tax-Exempt Organizations: Improvements Possible in Public, IRS, and 

State Oversight of Charities. GAO-02-526. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 

2002. 

September 11: Interim Report on the Response of Charities. GAO-02-1037. 

Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2002. 

(130529) Page 34 GAO-06-712 Charitable Assistance for Hurricane Victims
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