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FILED

APR 03 2014

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. MT-13-1412-KuPaJu

 )

DARREL LINN MOSS, ) Bk. No. 12-61093

 )

Debtor. )

_______________________________)

SHARON BOYCE; KYEANN SAYER, )

 )

Appellants, )

 )

v. ) MEMORANDUM*

 )

RICHARD JOSEPH SAMSON, Chapter )

7 Trustee; DARREL LINN MOSS, )

 )

Appellees. )

_______________________________)

Submitted Without Argument

on March 20, 2014**

Filed – April 3, 2014

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the District of Montana

Honorable Ralph B. Kirscher, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Appellants Sharon Boyce and Kyeann Sayer, pro se,

on brief; Richard Joseph Samson, Chapter 7

Trustee, pro se, on brief.

 

Before: KURTZ, PAPPAS and JURY, Bankruptcy Judges.

*This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

**By order entered January 9, 2014, the Panel determined

that this appeal was suitable for submission without oral

argument.
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INTRODUCTION

This appeal arises from a bankruptcy court order disposing

of two distinct matters.

In the first, Richard J. Samson, chapter 71 trustee,

objected to the proof of claim filed by Sharon Boyce and Kyeann

Sayer. In his claim objection, Samson argued that Boyce and

Sayer’s claim should be disallowed because the Montana District

Court for the County of Missoula, Fourth Judicial District, had

entered a final judgment against Boyce and Sayer on all of the

causes of action on which Boyce and Sayer based their proof of

claim. The bankruptcy court agreed with Samson and disallowed

the claim.

In the second, Boyce and Sayer sought, in essence, a

declaration that the judgment entered by the Missoula County

District Court was void as a violation of the automatic stay and,

hence, that a real property transfer the District Court had

voided as a fraudulent transfer had validly conveyed title to the

subject real property to Boyce and Sayer. The bankruptcy court

denied Boyce and Sayer’s requested relief for two reasons:

(1) Boyce and Sayer should have sought the requested relief in an

adversary proceeding rather than in a contested matter, and

(2) the District Court’s judgment was not entered in violation of

the automatic stay.

Boyce and Sayer challenge on appeal the bankruptcy court’s

1Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and

all "Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. All "Civil Rule" references are to

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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disposition of both matters. Because the bankruptcy court did

not commit reversible error in ruling on these matters, we

AFFIRM.

FACTS2

Debtor Darrel Linn Moss, formerly licensed to practice law

in Montana, conducted business through his law firm known as Moss

& Associates, P.C. (“MAPC”). Boyce and Sayer were the sole

members of a Montana limited liability company known as Tupi

Plain, LLC. (“Tupi”). In September 2009, Tupi retained MAPC to

defend Tupi in a pending state court lawsuit, Loken Builders,

Inc. V. Tupi Plain, LLC, et al., Missoula County District Court

Case No. DV-06-1036.

In July 2010, MAPC sued Tupi, Boyce and Sayer in the

Missoula County District Court, Case No. DV-10-961, for

nonpayment of its legal fees arising from its representation of

Tupi in the Loken Builders lawsuit. Over the course of the next

two years, the Missoula County District Court entered a series of

orders and judgments in MAPC’s lawsuit ultimately culminating in

a final judgment entered on July 26, 2012, in the amount of

$101,181.34, against Tupi, Boyce and Sayer.

Understanding what the Missoula County District Court ruled

in these orders is essential to our resolution of this appeal. 

In March 2011, the Missoula County District Court entered a

default judgment against Tupi in the amount of $49,267.87. In

2Unless otherwise indicated, the facts set forth herein are

drawn from the bankruptcy court’s memorandum of decision entered

on August 13, 2013. Most of the facts are not subject to genuine

dispute, and Boyce and Sayer have not challenged any of the

recited facts in their opening brief.

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response to the default judgment, in April 2011 Boyce and Sayer

filed a motion to set it aside and in November 2011 a separate

motion to vacate the default judgment as void. The Missoula

County District Court denied both motions. Boyce and Sayer also

filed two appeals with the Montana Supreme Court seeking to set

aside or reverse the default judgment, as well as a petition for

writ of supervisory control. The Montana Supreme Court dismissed

the appeals and denied the petition, without prejudice to Boyce

and Sayer filing a timely appeal after the Missoula County

District Court entered a final judgment in MAPC’s lawsuit.

Shortly after entry of the default judgment against Tupi,

MAPC amended its complaint. In the amended complaint, MAPC

alleged that Boyce and Sayer caused Tupi to transfer its only

asset, a residence located on Gerald Avenue in Missoula, Montana,

and that this transfer should be voided as a fraudulent transfer

under Montana law. The amended complaint also contained a

separate cause of action seeking to pierce the limited liability

company veil between Tupi on the one hand and Boyce and Sayer on

the other hand.

In response to the amended complaint, Boyce and Sayer filed

separate but nearly identical answers and counterclaims against

MAPC for breach of contract, malpractice, breach of fiduciary

duty and fraud. Sayer’s counterclaims also included an extra

counterclaim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Boyce and Sayer then filed third party complaints against Moss,

which mirrored their counterclaims. As the counterclaims and

third party claims demonstrate on their face, they all arose from

MAPC’s representation of Tupi in the Loken Builders lawsuit. 

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Over the next several months, the parties filed numerous

motions. Some of these motions related to discovery disputes,

while others sought to dispose of the parties’ claims,

counterclaims and third party claims. 

On February 16, 2012, the Missoula County District Court

entered its “Opinion and Order re: Pending Motions.” In this

order, the Missoula County District Court resolved all of the

outstanding motions and, in fact, disposed of all of the pending

claims, counterclaims and third party claims. The only aspect of

the lawsuit not resolved by the February 2012 order was MAPC’s

entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

In relevant part, the February 2012 order granted Moss’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to all of Boyce

and Sayer’s third party claims against Moss. The Missoula County

District Court acknowledged that Boyce and Sayer voluntarily

dissolved Tupi in January 2011 but held that Tupi nonetheless

remained a distinct business entity under Montana law, separate

from its members Boyce and Sayer for purposes of winding up

Tupi’s affairs. The District Court further held that, to the

extent Boyce and Sayer sufficiently pled third party claims

against Moss, these third party claims on their face belonged to

Tupi, not to Boyce and Sayer, and Boyce and Sayer could not

pursue these claims on Tupi’s behalf.

Additionally, the February 2012 order granted MAPC summary

judgment on its fraudulent transfer and alter ego claims against

Boyce and Sayer, voided the transfer of the Gerald Avenue

residence, and adjudged Boyce and Sayer jointly and severally

liable for the same amount of damages (plus interest, costs and

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attorney’s fees) it had awarded against Tupi in the March 2011

default judgment.

On July 19, 2012, the Missoula County District Court entered

an order awarding MAPC attorney’s fees of $43,584 and costs of

$1,646.97. In a final judgment entered on July 26, 2012, the

District court aggregated all of the amounts awarded in favor of

MAPC and against Tupi, Boyce and Sayer, for a grand total of

$101,181.34. On July 30, 2012, Moss recorded in the official

records of Missoula County a document entitled “Notice of Entry

of Judgment Affecting Title to Real Property,” which document

excerpted the portion of the District Court’s February 2012 order

that had voided the transfer of the Gerald Avenue residence. 

On August 27, 2012, Boyce and Sayer filed in the Montana

Supreme Court a notice of appeal seeking review of the Missoula

County District Court’s July 2012 judgment, the July 2012 fee

award, the February 2012 order and the March 2011 default

judgment. Subsequently, however, Boyce and Sayer requested a

voluntary dismissal of their appeal, which request the Montana

Supreme Court granted on September 24, 2012.

On July 3, 2012, just prior to the entry of the July 2012

fee award and the July 2012 judgment in MAPC’s lawsuit, Moss

commenced his chapter 7 case, and Samson was appointed to serve

as chapter 7 trustee. On Samson’s request, the bankruptcy court

set a claims bar date, and Boyce and Sayer filed their joint

proof of claim asserting entitlement to an allowed claim against

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Moss’s bankruptcy estate in the amount of $533,000.3 On its

face, the proof of claim identified as the basis of the claim the

third party claims they had filed against Moss in MAPC’s state

court lawsuit. Indeed, Boyce and Sayer even attached copies of

their third party claims to their proof of claim. Boyce and

Sayer later filed an amended proof of claim recalculating the

total amount claimed at $440,000. However, the amended proof of

claim otherwise was no different than their initial proof of

claim. The claim still was based on the third party claims Boyce

and Sayer had asserted in the state court lawsuit.

Samson thereafter filed his claim objection. In essence,

the trustee pointed out that the Missoula County District Court

had ruled against Boyce and Sayer on their third party claims,

that the District Court’s judgment was final, and that Boyce and

Sayer could have but failed to prosecute an appeal challenging

the District Court’s judgment and specifically its February 2012

ruling on the third party claims. Consequently, Samson argued,

the proof of claim should be disallowed because it was based on

the same third party claims the Missoula County District Court

had rejected in February 2012.

In response, Boyce and Sayer contended that the July 2012

judgment was void, as were the March 2011 default judgment, the

3We could not find a copy of Boyce and Sayer’s initial proof

of claim in either party’s excerpts of the record. Accordingly,

we obtained a copy of that proof of claim by accessing the

bankuptcy court’s electronic claims register for case no.

12-61093-RBK. We take judicial notice of the filing and contents

of Boyce and Sayer’s initial proof of claim. See O'Rourke v.

Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955, 957–58

(9th Cir. 1989).

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February 2012 order, the July 2012 fee award and the July 2012

final judgment.

The parties agreed to submit their dispute over the claim

objection to the bankruptcy court based on the parties’ exhibits

and briefs. The parties additionally agreed to the admission

into evidence of all of their respective exhibits.4

On August 13, 2013, the bankruptcy court entered its order

and a separate memorandum of decision sustaining Samson’s claim

objection and disallowing Boyce and Sayer’s claim. The

bankruptcy court held that Boyce and Sayer had failed to

establish that any of the Missoula County District Court’s orders

or judgments were void. The bankruptcy court also held that the

Missoula County District Court had fully and finally adjudicated

Boyce and Sayer’s third party claims and that the District Court

had rejected each of those claims. Consequently, the bankruptcy

court reasoned, Boyce and Sayer’s proof of claim, which was based

on precisely the same third party claims, was barred under the

4Samson also filed a request that the bankruptcy court take

judicial notice of the filing and contents of four of the

Missoula County District Court’s orders. In both the bankruptcy

court and on appeal, Boyce and Sayer strenuously have opposed

this request for judicial notice. Boyce and Sayer seem to

misapprehend the purpose and effect of a judicial notice request. 

They seem to believe that the act of granting judicial notice

established the legal effect and validity of the documents. This

is not how judicial notice works. Granting judicial notice

merely established that the subject documents were on file in the

District Court and what was set forth in those documents. See

Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d

1384, 1388-89 (2d Cir. 1992). In any event, the judicial notice

issue is irrelevant to the resolution of this appeal because

Boyce and Sayer stipulated to the admission of these same

documents as exhibits.

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doctrines of issue preclusion, claim preclusion and the RookerFeldman Doctrine.

The bankruptcy court’s order and memorandum decision also

addressed and resolved Boyce and Sayer’s Motion to Remove Void

Judgement, filed on March 26, 2013. In that motion, Boyce and

Sayer in essence sought a judicial declaration that the Missoula

County District Court’s entry of the July 2012 judgment was void

as a violation of the automatic stay and that title to the Gerald

Avenue residence remained vested in Boyce and Sayer. Boyce and

Sayer further sought to render ineffective Moss’s notice of entry

of judgment, recorded on July 30, 2012, in the official records

of Missoula County, which notice excerpted the portion of the

District Court’s earlier ruling voiding the transfer of the

residence to Boyce and Sayer as a fraudulent transfer.

The bankruptcy court denied the motion for two reasons. 

First, the bankruptcy court held that the motion should have been

commenced and prosecuted as an adversary proceeding under

Rule 7001, et seq. And second, the bankruptcy court held that

the District Court’s ruling voiding the subject real property

transfer did not violate the automatic stay.

Boyce and Sayer timely filed their notice of appeal on

August 22, 2013.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A) and (B). We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUES

1. Did the bankruptcy court commit reversible error when it

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sustained Samson’s claim objection and disallowed Boyce and

Sayer’s claim?

2. Did the bankruptcy court commit reversible error when it

denied Boyce and Sayer’s motion to remove void judgment?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The ultimate decision of the bankruptcy court to disallow a

claim is reviewed de no novo. Continental Ins. Co. v. Thorpe

Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 671 F.3d 1011,

1019-20 (9th Cir. 2012). The legal conclusions the bankruptcy

court relied upon in disallowing the claim also are reviewed de

novo. Id. However, the bankruptcy court’s predicate findings of

fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. And

these findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if they are

illogical, implausible, or lacking support in the record. Retz

v. Sampson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010).

We also review de novo the bankruptcy court’s interpretation

of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Am. Sports Radio

Network v. Krause (In re Krause), 546 F.3d 1070, 1073 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2008).

Finally, whether certain actions violated the automatic stay 

is a question of law subject to de novo review. Wade v. State

Bar of Ariz. (In re Wade), 115 B.R. 222, 225 (9th Cir. BAP 1990),

aff'd, 948 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1991).

DISCUSSION

We consider first whether the bankruptcy court correctly

determined that the proof of claim was barred by the doctrine of

claim preclusion.

Pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Act, bankruptcy courts

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must give preclusive effect to a state court judgment to the same

extent courts from that state would give such judgment preclusive

effect. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Marciano v. Chapnick (In re Marciano),

708 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2013). Thus, in order to determine the

preclusive effect of the Missoula County District Court’s

judgment, we must look at Montana law. See Cal–Micro, Inc. v.

Cantrell (In re Cantrell), 329 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003).

Montana courts will apply res judicata or claim preclusion 

if four criteria are satisfied: “The parties or their privies

are the same; the subject matter of the claim is the same; the

issues are the same and relate to the same subject matter; and

the capacities of the persons are the same in reference to the

subject matter and the issues.” In re B.P., 35 P.3d 291, 293

(Mont. 2001). Accord, Bragg v. McLaughlin, 993 P.2d 662, 665

(Mont. 1999), partially overruled on other grounds, Essex Ins.

Co. v. Moose's Saloon, Inc., 166 P.3d 451 (Mont. 2007). 

Here, Boyce and Sayer have not disputed that these factors

have been met. Nor could they seriously have disputed the

existence of these factors. As the sole basis for their claim,

Boyce and Sayer attached to their proof of claim copies of the

third party claims they filed against Moss in the Missoula County

District Court. In its February 2012 order, the District Court

disposed of these claims by ruling that, on their face, the

claims were meritless as a matter of law and that Moss was

entitled to a judgment on the pleadings as to each of these

claims.

Moreover, the time to appeal this ruling ended, at the very

latest, 30 days after Boyce and Sayer were sent notice on

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December 7, 2012, of Moss’s bankruptcy discharge, which

effectively caused the automatic stay to expire as to acts

against Moss. §§ 108(c)(2), 362(c)(2)(C); see also

In re Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 329 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir.

2003)(citing Parker v. Bain, 68 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Boyce and Sayer argue that the Missoula County District

Court’s rejection of their third party claims in the February

2012 order never became a binding, final ruling for claim

preclusion purposes. According to Boyce and Sayer, the District

Court’s July 2012 entry of a final judgment was an essential step

in fully and finally disposing of all the claims, counterclaims

and third party claims asserted in the state court lawsuit. 

Because the entry of the July 2012 judgment was void as a

violation of the automatic stay, Boyce and Sayer reason, none of

the rulings contained in the February 2012 order became final and

binding for claim preclusion purposes.

Boyce and Sayer’s argument lacks merit because it is based

on a false premise - that the July 2012 judgment is void as a

violation of the automatic stay. The Missoula County District

Court’s entry of the July 2012 fee award and the July 2012

judgment are beyond the scope of the automatic stay. They did

not constitute acts against the bankruptcy estate, the debtor or

his property. See § 362(a). Boyce and Sayer contend that,

because the state court lawsuit included their third party claims

against Moss, the District Court could not enter the July 2012

final judgment without violating the automatic stay arising from

Moss’s bankruptcy case, filed on July 3, 2012. 

We disagree with Boyce and Sayer. When a single lawsuit

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consists of claims both by and against the debtor, the claims are

considered separately in terms of determining the effect of the

automatic stay on the prosecution of those claims. Parker v.

Bain, 68 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 1995). As Parker explained: 

“All proceedings in a single case are not lumped

together for purposes of automatic stay analysis. Even

if the first claim filed in a case was originally

brought against the debtor, section 362 does not

necessarily stay all other claims in the case. Within

a single case, some actions may be stayed, others not.

Multiple claim and multiple party litigation must be

disaggregated so that particular claims, counterclaims,

cross claims and third-party claims are treated

independently when determining which of their

respective proceedings are subject to the bankruptcy

stay.”

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Maritime Elec. Co. v. United Jersey

Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204–05 (3d Cir. 1992)).

Here, the Missoula County District Court issued a

dispositive ruling rejecting all of Boyce and Sayer’s third party

claims against Moss in February 2012, roughly four months before

Moss commenced his chapter 7 case. These third party claims were

the only claims stated in the lawsuit against Moss and, hence,

were the only claims potentially subject to the automatic stay. 

Because the third party claims were resolved well before the

bankruptcy case and the automatic stay arose, their resolution

could not and did not constitute a stay violation. And because

all of the other claims stated in the state court lawsuit were

beyond the scope of the automatic stay, the District Court’s

actions concerning these other claims also could not and did not

constitute a stay violation. 

Alternately, Boyce and Sayer argue that one or more of the

Missoula County District Court’s orders and judgments were void

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for the following three reasons: (1) while the state court

lawsuit was pending, Moss could not lawfully represent MAPC

because he lost his status as a member in good standing with the

State Bar of Montana; (2) while the state court lawsuit was

pending, MAPC could not lawfully prosecute its claims against

Tupi, Boyce and Sayer because MAPC lost its status as a business

entity in good standing with the Montana Secretary of State; and

(3) while the state court lawsuit was pending, Tupi could not

lawfully be sued because Boyce and Sayer voluntarily dissolved

Tupi. If any of the District Court’s orders or judgments were

void, it is true that those void orders or judgments should not

be given any preclusive effect. Mountain W. Bank, N.A. v.

Glacier Kitchens, Inc., 281 P.3d 600, 603 (Mont. 2012). 

Even so, assuming without deciding the truth of the

predicate facts underlying each of Boyce and Sayer’s asserted

voidness grounds, none of these grounds establish that any of the

Missoula County District Court’s orders or judgments were void. 

In Montana, “when a court has jurisdiction over the person and

the subject matter, and the judgment rendered is not in excess of

the jurisdiction or power of the court, no error or irregularity

can make the judgment void.” Bragg, 993 P.2d at 665. Here, none

of Boyce and Sayer’s claimed voidness grounds implicate the

Missoula County District Court’s personal jurisdiction or subject

matter jurisdiction. While Boyce and Sayer have attempted to

characterize the issue regarding the dissolution of Tupi as a

jurisdictional issue, they have cited no case law holding that a

Montana court will lose personal jurisdiction over a limited

liability company if its members voluntarily dissolve the company

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while a lawsuit against the company is pending. Nor are we aware

of any legal authority supporting this novel proposition.

In any event, even if one or more of Boyce and Sayer’s

voidness arguments were to rise to the level of a jurisdictional

issue, Boyce and Sayer needed to raise them, and prevail on them,

either in the original action or on direct appeal from the

original action. The Montana Supreme Court does not permit

litigants to collaterally attack prior final judgments based on

jurisdictional grounds when they had a full and fair opportunity

to raise them in the original action or on direct appeal from the

original action. Bragg, 993 P.2d at 666; see also Searight v.

Cimino, 777 P.2d 335, 337 (Mont. 1989). As stated in Searight:

“Once there has been full opportunity to present an

issue for judicial decision in a given proceeding,

including those issues that pertain to a court's

jurisdiction, the determination of the court in that

proceeding must be accorded finality as to all issues

raised or which fairly could have been raised, else

judgments might be attacked piecemeal and without end.”

Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Wellman v. Wellman 643 P.2d

573, 575 (Mont. 1982)).

The record in this appeal reflects that Boyce and Sayer had

ample opportunity to raise their voidness arguments in the

District Court. They also could have raised them in a direct

appeal following the entry of the District Court’s July 2012

final judgment. In accordance with Bragg, Searight and Wellman,

we cannot permit Boyce and Sayer to proceed with these voidness

arguments now, in a collateral attack on the District Court’s

judgment.

Boyce and Sayer make two additional arguments why the

bankruptcy court erred in disallowing their claim. First, they

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assert that the Missoula County District Court judgment should

not have been given preclusive effect because the District Court

violated their constitutional right to trial by jury. This

argument is devoid of merit on its face. All of the substantive

issues in the state court lawsuit were resolved either by summary

judgment or by judgment on the pleadings. As a result, there

were no fact findings made and, hence, no need for or

constitutional right to a trial by jury.

Second, Boyce and Sayer contend that Samson’s claim

objection should have been overruled because Samson failed to

prove that the claim should be disallowed under any of enumerated

grounds set forth in § 502(b). This contention is simply wrong. 

As its very first ground for disallowance, § 502(b)(1) states in

relevant part that the bankruptcy court should disallow a claim

to the extent that it is “unenforceable against the debtor . . .

under any agreement or applicable law.” In this instance, the

reference to applicable law requires us to look at whether Boyce

and Sayer had a right to payment under Montana law. See

generally Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). And,

as we have explained above, under Montana law, Boyce and Sayer

did not have a right to payment in light of the Missoula County

District Court’s binding determination rejecting all of Boyce and

Sayer’s third party claims against Moss.

In sum, none of Boyce and Sayer’s arguments persuade us that

the bankruptcy court erred when it disallowed their proof of

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claim.5

Finally, we also conclude that the bankruptcy court did not

err when it denied Boyce and Sayer’s motion to remove void

judgment. We agree with the bankruptcy court that, because Boyce

and Sayer in essence sought declaratory relief and a

determination of the parties’ respective interests in the Gerald

Avenue residence, Boyce and Sayer should have sought this relief

by commencing an adversary proceeding. See Rule 7001(2), (9);

Expeditors Int'l of Wash., Inc. v. Citicorp N. Am., Inc.

(In re Colortran, Inc.), 218 B.R. 507, 510–11 (9th Cir. BAP

1997). We also agree with the bankruptcy court that, in the

alternative, Boyce and Sayer were not entitled to the relief

requested in this motion because the Missoula County District

Court ruling that Boyce and Sayer sought “removal” of was not

void as asserted. We already have addressed and rejected, above,

all of Boyce and Sayer’s voidness arguments. No purpose would be

served by reiterating that analysis. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy

court’s disallowance of Boyce and Sayer’s claim and the

bankruptcy court’s denial of their motion to remove void

judgment.

5Because we have affirmed the bankruptcy court’s

disallowance of the claim on the basis of claim preclusion, we do

not express any opinion on the bankruptcy court’s alternate

theories of issue preclusion and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

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