NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5028-14T1

JACLYN THOMPSON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, TEACHERS' 

PENSION AND ANNUITY FUND,

Respondent-Respondent. 

____________________________________

Argued September 13, 2016 – Decided

Before Judges Ostrer, Leone, and Vernoia

(Judge Ostrer dissenting in part).

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the 

Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund, 

Department of Treasury.

Richard A. Friedman argued the cause for 

appellant (Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, 

Kleinbaum & Friedman, attorneys; Mr. 

Friedman, of counsel and on the briefs; 

Edward M. Suarez, Jr., on the briefs).

Robert S. Garrison, Jr., Deputy Attorney 

General, argued the cause for respondent 

(Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Garrison, 

on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

LEONE, J.A.D.

April 11, 2017 

, 2017

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

April 11, 2017

APPELLATE DIVISION
2 A-5028-14T1

Petitioner Jaclyn Thompson alleged that she was mentally 

disabled as a result of three incidents at work. She was 

awarded ordinary disability retirement benefits by respondent 

the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Teachers' Pension and 

Annuity Fund (TPAF). She appeals the Board's June 5, 2013 

decision to deny accidental disability benefits. 

Our Supreme Court has held that to obtain accidental 

disability benefits for a purely mental disability, "[t]he 

disability must result from direct personal experience of a 

terrifying or horror-inducing event that involves actual or 

threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly serious 

threat to the physical integrity of the member or another 

person." Patterson v. Bd. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 194 

N.J. 29, 34 (2008). The Court has applied that Patterson

requirement to a person whose mental disability resulted from an 

incident where the person also suffered temporary physical 

injury. Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 

N.J. 14, 33 (2011). 

Petitioner sustained no physical injuries in the three 

incidents, save for "a little bit of a stomachache" which was 

minor and temporary, and she required no medical treatment. 

However, Thompson argues she need not meet the Patterson

requirement for mental disability because the incidents involved 
3 A-5028-14T1

physical contact. She cites an Appellate Division case which 

involved a potentially-fatal injury requiring debilitating

treatment. Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. 

Sys., 431 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2013). We hold that, under 

Russo, the Patterson requirement applies to claims for 

accidental disability benefits for mental disability arising

from incidents involving mental and physical stressors if any 

physical injury was temporary or minor. To the extent Caminiti

suggests otherwise, we must follow the Supreme Court's decision 

in Russo and apply the Patterson requirement. 

Because the three incidents, individually and collectively, 

were not terrifying or horror-inducing events involving actual 

or threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly serious

threat to the physical integrity of the member or another 

person, they do not meet the Patterson requirement. Therefore,

we affirm.

I.

Petitioner testified as follows before the Administrative 

Law Judge (ALJ). Petitioner was a health and physical education 

teacher at North Hunterdon Regional High School. She taught 

regular gym classes, coached, and served as an advisor and 

mentor. She also taught adaptive gym classes specifically 

geared toward students with disabilities.
4 A-5028-14T1

On January 21, 2011, during petitioner's health class, an 

approximately seventeen-year-old female student with Down 

syndrome began hitting a teacher's aide. When petitioner 

intervened, the student became extremely irate, punched 

petitioner in the stomach "very hard," and slapped her across 

her face. Petitioner and another aide immediately escorted the 

screaming student from the classroom. Petitioner was "a little 

nervous" during the incident but figured "it happens." She went 

to the nurse's office to write a report, and "kind of laid in 

the nurse's office for a few minutes only because [she] had a 

little bit of a stomachache." Petitioner did not seek any 

medical attention and sustained no lasting physical injuries. 

As class was over, she went home, but she returned to work the 

next day with no ill effects.

On September 22, 2011, petitioner was teaching an adaptive 

physical education class. During a Nerf pin soccer game, a 

sixteen-year-old male student with autism and borderline 

schizophrenia became severely angry, grabbed a pin, and 

approached a teacher's aide. Petitioner approached, and the 

extremely irate student "began to kind of push and shove" her 

shoulders with his hands and spat on the floor. Petitioner and 

an aide removed the student from the classroom. Petitioner was 

not physically injured and did not seek medical attention or 
5 A-5028-14T1

counseling. She went to the nurse's office, reported the 

situation, and returned to work. She "was a little bit more 

like nervous going in the classroom" with "a little bit" of 

anxiety, and was "definitely on edge" about "what's next," but 

she had no psychiatric problems.

On October 29, 2011, during another Nerf pin soccer game, a 

fifteen-year-old male student with autism threw a ball at 

another student. When petitioner corrected him, he became very 

angry. He loudly told petitioner "You're an assh*le" and "I'm 

going to kick your ass," briefly "had [her] hands behind [her] 

back," then let go and threw three punches at her face, but she 

dodged the punches. Teacher's aides grabbed the student and 

escorted him out. 

This third incident "did happen fast," but to petitioner it 

"fe[lt] like forever" that her hands were behind her back. She 

felt "helpless," "had no control," and "was petrified." 

Afterwards, she was very upset but calmed down and finished the 

class. She went to the nurse's office to report the incident. 

She had no physical injuries and went on with her day. 

After going home and "sleeping on it," petitioner became 

"hysterical" and had "a downright almost panic attack." Her 

husband, a police officer, had her call a psychologist for 

police officers. The psychologist did not think petitioner 
6 A-5028-14T1

"belonged in any kind of school atmosphere" and wrote a note 

putting her on leave. She never returned to work.

Eight months later, petitioner filed a request for 

accidental disability retirement benefits based on the three 

incidents. She stated that she was afraid of turning her back 

on students, and that she had panic attacks when attending her 

stepson's wrestling match and when seeing a special education 

class out in the community. Her psychiatrist diagnosed her with 

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The TPAF Board denied 

her request for accidental disability benefits but found 

petitioner qualified for a deferred retirement. 

Petitioner appealed to the Office of Administrative Law. 

The ALJ heard testimony from petitioner, her psychiatrist, and a 

psychologist called by the Board. The ALJ found petitioner did 

not meet the standard for accidental disability benefits. 

However, the ALJ granted her ordinary disability benefits 

because, as a result of the incidents, "she became anxious, 

suffering from panic attacks, nightmares, vivid dreams, severe 

depression, lethargy, lack of motivation, and tachycardia." The 

ALJ found that she suffered from PTSD, that medication was 

ineffective at abating her symptoms, and that she was totally 

and permanently disabled from the performance of her regularly 

assigned duties. 
7 A-5028-14T1

Petitioner appealed the denial of accidental disability 

benefits. The Board affirmed the ALJ. Petitioner appeals.

II.

We must hew to our standard of review. Judicial "review of 

administrative agency action is limited. 'An administrative 

agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless 

there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or 

unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" 

Russo, supra, 206 N.J. at 27 (citations omitted). "A reviewing 

court 'may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's, 

even though the court might have reached a different result.'" 

In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (citation omitted).

"Generally, courts afford substantial deference to an 

agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged 

with enforcing." Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's 

Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007). "Such deference has been 

specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension 

statutes," because "'a state agency brings experience and 

specialized knowledge to its task of administering and 

regulating a legislative enactment within its field of 

expertise.'" Piatt v. Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. 

Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015) (citations omitted). "An 

appellate court, however, is 'in no way bound by the agency's 
8 A-5028-14T1

interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly 

legal issue.'" Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 196 (citation 

omitted). Courts "apply de novo review to an agency's 

interpretation of a statute or case law." Russo, supra, 206 

N.J. at 27.

III.

"[A]n accidental disability retirement entitles a member to 

receive a higher level of benefits than those provided under an 

ordinary disability retirement." Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 

43. A TPAF member is eligible to be retired "on an accidental 

disability allowance" "if said member is permanently and totally 

disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring 

during and as a result of the performance of his regular or 

assigned duties." N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(c). 

It is undisputed that petitioner is permanently and totally 

disabled and that the three incidents occurred during and as a 

result of the performance of her regular, assigned duties. The 

parties dispute whether her disability was "a direct result of a 

traumatic event." Ibid.

A.

"[T]he question of what constitutes a 'traumatic event'

. . . has dogged courts for generations." Russo, supra, 206 

N.J. at 28. Recently, our Supreme Court has redefined and 
9 A-5028-14T1

applied that phrase in three cases: Richardson, Patterson, and

Russo. 

In Richardson, supra, an inmate knocked a corrections

officer to the ground, causing a complete tear of his wrist 

ligament which left him physically disabled. 192 N.J. at 192, 

214. The Court ruled his physical disability was the direct 

result of a traumatic event. Id. at 214-15.1 The Court held 

"the traumatic event standard will . . . be met by a workconnected event that is: (a) identifiable as to time and place; 

(b) undesigned and unexpected; and (c) caused by a circumstance 

external to the member (not the result of pre-existing disease 

that is aggravated or accelerated by the work)." Id. at 192. 

In Patterson, supra, the Court addressed "whether an 

applicant who has suffered a permanent mental disability as a 

result of a mental stressor, without any physical impact, can be 

considered to have experienced a 'traumatic event' and, if so, 

what standard should apply in assessing such a claim." 194 N.J.

at 33. The Court held "a member must satisfy the standards in 

Richardson," and "add[ed] a requirement beyond those set forth 

 

1 The Court was considering an accidental disability statute, 

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1), under the Police and Firemen's Retirement 

System (PFRS), but noted that the TPAF in N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39 

"conditions the grant of accidental disability benefits on 

satisfying identical standards." Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 

192 n.1.
10 A-5028-14T1

in Richardson: [t]he disability must result from direct personal 

experience of a terrifying or horror-inducing event that 

involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a 

similarly serious threat to the physical integrity of the member 

or another person." Id. at 33-34, 50. 

The Court in Patterson applied that requirement to three 

members who were permanently mentally disabled. First, Trooper 

Patterson was repeatedly insulted by an angry sergeant, and "was 

fearful that if he did not submit, the sergeant would hit him." 

Id. at 34-35. The Court ruled the conduct "simply did not 

involve actual or threatened death or serious injury to 

Patterson's physical integrity and thus failed to vault the 

traumatic event threshold." Id. at 51. Second, the Court found 

another trooper's exposure "to numerous incidents of racially 

motivated abuse carried out by fellow officers" was inadequate, 

but remanded to consider whether officers' death threats to the 

trooper "qualif[ied] as a traumatic event." Id. at 36-37, 51-

52. Third, the Court found a "credible threat of rape and 

murder against [a correction officer]'s wife and daughter by a 

presumed gang member who knew where [he] lived and worked could 

satisfy the traumatic event element of the statute." Id. at 38-

40, 53. 
11 A-5028-14T1

In Russo, supra, the Court "revisit[ed]" Richardson and 

Patterson. 206 N.J. at 17. Police Officer Russo "was involved 

in a terrifying fire rescue in which he was injured and the 

victim died." Id. at 18. Specifically, Russo tried to reach 

the victim who was crying out for help, but Russo became 

disoriented, dizzy, and nauseous. Id. at 19. 

Russo testified that the fire produced heavy 

smoke and incredibly intense heat: "The heat 

was all over. It felt like my ears were 

going to come right off my head, they felt 

like they were melting. It hurt to breathe, 

I could feel it everywhere. . . . [It] 

became increasingly harder to breathe, the 

heat and the smoke just kept getting worse.

. . . [I] couldn't breathe." 

[Id. at 21-22.]

Russo was rescued by firefighters, received first aid, and was 

hospitalized overnight for smoke inhalation. Id. at 19-20. 

While still at the fire scene, Officer Russo saw the 

victim's body brought out, and the victim's family "confronted 

Russo, blaming him and the other officers for the victim's 

death." Id. at 20. Russo was unable to return to work for 

weeks, was diagnosed with PTSD, and was "permanently mentally 

disabled." Id. at 20, 34-35. The PFRS Board found Russo 

"satisfied Richardson and experienced a Patterson-type horrific 

event." However, the PFRS Board ruled the event was "'not 

objectively capable of causing a reasonable person in similar 
12 A-5028-14T1

circumstances to suffer a disabling mental injury.'" Id. at 18 

(citation omitted).

Even though Officer Russo was physically injured, the Court 

applied the Patterson requirement. Id. at 33. The Court found 

Russo met "the objective reasonableness standard of Patterson." 

Ibid. Thus, the Court reversed. Id. at 35. 

B.

Petitioner argues she need only meet the Richardson

standard for disability, not the Patterson requirement for 

mental disability. We agree with the ALJ and the TPAF Board 

that under Russo, petitioner must meet both the Richardson and 

Patterson standards. 

Unlike Richardson, where the officer suffered a disabling 

physical injury, petitioner did not suffer a physical 

disability. Indeed, the ALJ found "petitioner was not 

physically injured" in any of these incidents. In the first 

incident, the adolescent girl's punch and slap resulted in just 

"a little bit of a stomachache." Even if it was a physical 

injury, it was minor and lasted only a few minutes. In the 

second incident, the adolescent boy "kind of" pushed and shoved 

her shoulders with his hands. In the third incident, another 

adolescent boy held petitioner's hands behind her back for a few 

seconds. She concededly was not physically injured in the 
13 A-5028-14T1

second or third incident and did not seek or need medical 

treatment in any of the incidents. 

Such minor physical contacts with little or no physical 

injury, only the punch's minor and temporary effects, would not 

themselves meet the Richardson standard for a disabling injury. 

Under Richardson, "an applicant for accidental disability 

benefits must meet 'an extraordinarily high threshold that culls 

out all minor injuries; all major injuries that have fully 

resolved; all partial or temporary disabilities; and all cases 

in which a member can continue to work in some other capacity.'" 

Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 43 (quoting Richardson, supra, 192 

N.J. at 195). 

Here, as the ALJ found, petitioner's "application is solely 

based on mental diagnoses." Thus, she must rely on her 

"permanent mental disability as a result of a mental stressor,"

rather than the minor, temporary physical effects. Id. at 33. 

Therefore, she was required to meet the Patterson requirement. 

Petitioner contends she need not meet the Patterson

requirement because there was physical contact. She cites

language in Patterson favoring her position. In Patterson, the 

Court stated it "ha[s] been asked to determine whether an 

applicant who has suffered a permanent mental disability as a 

result of a mental stressor, without any physical impact, can be 
14 A-5028-14T1

considered to have experienced a 'traumatic event.'" Ibid. 

"The only issue is whether [a permanent mental] injury will be 

recognized as a basis for accidental disability if it is caused 

by an exclusively psychological trauma." Id. at 44-45; see id.

at 43. The Court held "permanent mental injury caused by a 

mental stressor without any physical impact can satisfy the 

Richardson standard." Id. at 48. The Court first ruled "a 

member suffering from a so-called mental-mental injury must 

satisfy the standards we recently enunciated in Richardson." 

Id. at 33-34.2 The Court added "to obtain accidental disability 

benefits for a mental injury precipitated by an exclusively 

mental stressor, a member must satisfy" the Patterson

requirement. Id. at 34, 50.

However, in Patterson it was not clear the Court was 

restricting its new requirement to such situations, rather than 

simply referring to the issue before it — three members whose 

mental disabilities were caused exclusively by mental stressors. 

Moreover, the Court applied the requirement to mental disability 

 

2 The Court noted "[t]he accidental disability statutes 

themselves do not expressly include the mental-mental category," 

but that workers' compensation cases recognized "the so-called 

mental-mental category of compensable injury." Patterson, 

supra, 194 N.J. at 45-47 (quoting Brunell v. Wildwood Crest 

Police Dep't, 176 N.J. 225, 243 (2003) (defining mental-mental 

as "cases in which a purely mental stimulus results in emotional 

or nervous injury")).
15 A-5028-14T1

"without any physical impact," a term encompassing situations 

where there was no physical injury or only minor or temporary 

physical injury. Id. at 33, 48. 

In any event, the Court's decision in Russo made clear the 

Patterson requirement applies to members whose mental disability 

resulted from mental stressors accompanied by temporary physical 

injury. As set forth above, the Court found Officer Russo was 

physically injured by the fire's heat and smoke, which caused 

him pain and breathing difficulties. Russo, supra, 206 N.J. at 

18-22. The Court emphasized "Russo experienced a qualifying 

event insofar as he was ordered into a burning building so full 

of intense heat and smoke that his uniform was singed," and, "in 

fact, he was hospitalized for smoke inhalation" overnight. Id.

at 33-34. The Court viewed Russo's mental disability as 

deriving in part from physical stressors and physical injury.3

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court required the physicallyinjured Russo to meet the Patterson requirement. Id. at 18, 33-

35. The Court ruled "the objective reasonableness standard of 

 

3 The Court rejected the suggestion that Russo's mental 

disability "did not directly result from the horrific fire 

incident, but from 'guilt feelings' over the victim's death." 

Russo, supra, 206 N.J. at 34. Rather, the Court found "[i]t was 

as a result of the fire and the confluence of events it 

generated, including the death of the victim and the relatives' 

accusations, that Russo was rendered permanently mentally 

disabled." Id. at 34-35. 
16 A-5028-14T1

Patterson has been met" both because of the threat of death and 

serious bodily injury to Russo himself and because "Russo 

clearly satisfied the other Patterson standard . . . [as] he 

experienced a terrifying event that presented 'a serious threat 

to the physical integrity of another person,'" namely the fire's 

threat to the victim. Id. at 33-34. Thus, the Court found that 

"Russo sustained his burden," that the incident "objectively 

satisfied Patterson," and that Russo's "circumstances plainly 

satisfied both Patterson and Richardson." Id. at 34-35.

Indeed, the Court in Russo would have had no need to engage 

in the above analysis if it believed the Patterson requirement 

only applied to members whose mental disability resulted solely 

from mental stressors unaccompanied by physical injury. The 

Court could have simply stated Patterson did not apply to Russo 

because of his temporary physical injuries. Instead, the Court 

explained at length both the nature of the Patterson requirement 

and how Russo carried his burden under the Patterson

requirement. Id. at 18-19, 31-35.

Moreover, the Court in Russo reiterated and emphasized the 

necessity of applying the Patterson requirement to members like 

Russo (and petitioner) who claim mental disability. The Court 

stated: "We adopted that standard to assure the bona fides of 

claimed mental injuries and to ameliorate the problem of 
17 A-5028-14T1

subjectivity inherent in mental claims." Id. at 31 (citing 

Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 50). 

"In most physical disability claims, medical 

analysis quickly goes beyond the subjective 

statement by the patient to clinical and 

laboratory tests by the physician . . . .

In psychiatric disability claims, by 

contrast, medical analysis to a greater 

degree is analysis of the subjective 

statement of the patient." Thus, in the 

context of psychological injuries, the 

proofs related to the traumatic nature of an 

event and the causal relationship between 

event and injury may be more problematic 

than in the case of a physical event. As a 

result the boards have expressed legitimate 

concerns about becoming bogged down in 

litigation over idiosyncratic responses by 

members to inconsequential mental stressors.

[Ibid. (quoting Patterson, supra, 194 N.J.

at 48-49 (citation omitted)).]

"In response, [the Court] established a high threshold for 

the award of accidental disability benefits" in Patterson. 

Ibid. "Satisfying Patterson eliminates the problem of 

'idiosyncratic responses by members to inconsequential mental 

stressors.'" Id. at 32 (quoting Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 

49).

Thus, the Supreme Court assigned an important role to the 

Patterson requirement – to prevent idiosyncratic and subjective 

claims of mental disability from crossing the high threshold for 

the award of accidental disability benefits. The important and 

necessary purpose of the Patterson requirement is served by its 
18 A-5028-14T1

application as in Russo to claims based on mental disability due 

to mental stressors even if accompanied by minor or temporary 

physical injuries. 

Here, for example, there were no clinical or laboratory 

tests of petitioner's minor and temporary physical complaint. 

Rather, her subjective statements provided the sole basis for 

the description of her mental disability and the factual basis 

for her psychiatrist's testimony. Id. at 31. That made the 

traumatic nature of the incidents and the causal relationship 

between the incidents and her claimed injury more problematic. 

Ibid. Applying the Patterson requirement to petitioner and 

similar claimants for mental disability properly weeds out 

"idiosyncratic responses" and "limit[s] accidental disability 

recovery to stressors sufficient to inflict a disabling injury 

when experienced by a reasonable person in similar 

circumstances." Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 49-50; accord

Russo, supra, 206 N.J. at 32. 

As the Court recognized in Patterson, supra, "a traumatic 

event giving rise to a mental disability, like PTSD, may . . .

involve physical impact." 194 N.J. at 45. In Russo, supra, the 

Court decided such claims of mental disability had to satisfy 

the Patterson requirement. To rule otherwise would allow such 

mental disability claims to escape the objective test the Court 
19 A-5028-14T1

required to avoid "the problem of subjectivity" and 

"idiosyncratic responses." 206 N.J. at 31-32 (quoting 

Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 49, 50).

Accordingly, under our Supreme Court's decision in Russo, 

petitioner must satisfy the Patterson requirement. However, she 

argues she is not required to do so under the Appellate Division 

decision in Caminiti. However, Caminiti, supra, failed to 

recognize the effect of Russo's application of the Patterson

requirement to a member suffering both temporary physical injury 

and disabling mental injury. 431 N.J. Super. at 4. Instead, 

Caminiti stated "[t]he Patterson standard is inapplicable where 

a petitioner suffers both a physical and psychiatric injury," 

and "[t]he Board's analysis should have ended with an 

application of the Richardson factors." Id. at 14, 21.

Those statements in Caminiti contravene our Supreme Court's 

decision in Russo, supra, that the Patterson requirement was 

applicable to Russo, who suffered both a physical and 

psychiatric injury. 206 N.J. at 34. 

In any event, petitioner's case is clearly distinguishable 

from Caminiti, where the member's physical injury created a risk 

of death and required traumatic treatment. Officer Caminiti was 

subduing a violent intravenous drug user when a needle in the 

user's shirt pierced the officer's finger "from the bottom 
20 A-5028-14T1

through to the nail." Caminiti, supra, 431 N.J. Super. at 7. 

The user, who had track marks all over his arms, said: "I'm 

sorry. I just used it." Id. at 8. Caminiti was immediately 

afraid he was fatally infected with the AIDS virus. Ibid. 

Other officers tried to squeeze the blood out of Caminiti's 

finger and ordered him to go to the hospital. Ibid. There, 

doctors forbade him from having any sexual relations with his 

wife or letting his saliva contact his children for six months. 

Ibid. The doctors were unable to determine if Caminiti was 

infected, and prescribed "'the AIDS cocktail,'" telling him it 

"'could possibly prevent [him] from contracting AIDS,'" but 

"would make him 'deathly ill.'" Id. at 8, 9. While taking the 

AIDS cocktail, 

[h]e was constantly vomiting and became 

dehydrated. Eventually he obtained a 

prescription for a drug given to cancer 

patients to counteract the effects of 

chemotherapy and lessen the nausea. The 

medication also made him "jittery" and 

unable to concentrate. The doctor's warning 

concerning the physical effects of the 

medications did not prepare him for the 

emotional and psychological trauma he 

experienced.

[Id. at 9.]

Caminiti became "mentally incapacitated." Id. at 22. 

In ordering accidental disability benefits for Caminiti, we 

stressed that, "[i]n addition to the physical impact of the 
21 A-5028-14T1

potentially lethal needle prick, appellant endured many weeks of 

physical discomfort associated with the medications prescribed 

to prevent the transmission of HIV." Id. at 21. "The treatment 

created specific, medically anticipated, and extremely harsh 

effects on his body that were similar to the effects experienced 

by cancer patients who undergo chemotherapy after surgery." 

Ibid. 

We emphasized "[t]his was not an officer who accidentally 

stuck himself on a straight pin while frisking a suspect's 

clothes and was treated with a band-aid or experienced a minor 

infection at the site." Ibid.

To the contrary, the medical effect of the 

event was comparable to the experience of 

surgical intervention or extended 

hospitalization. It triggered serious bouts 

of pharmacological intervention and a 

prolonged period of physical discomfort and 

recovery. Simply stated, the record does 

not support the Board's finding that 

appellant's physical injury was "minor."

[Ibid.]

Unlike Caminiti, petitioner suffered little or no physical

injury and required no medical treatment, hospitalization, or 

medication. The physical effect of the "little bit of a 

stomachache" was temporary and minor and no greater than a pin 

wound requiring a band-aid and resulting in minor infection, 

which Caminiti was careful to distinguish. Her physical effect 
22 A-5028-14T1

could not compare with Caminiti's potentially fatal injury and 

hellish treatment. Even if Caminiti's physical injury and 

treatment was sufficient to justify not applying the Patterson

requirement, petitioner experienced neither physical injury nor 

treatment, and had to meet the Patterson requirement. 

Accordingly, petitioner had to show her mental disability 

"result[ed] from direct personal experience of a terrifying or 

horror-inducing event that involves actual or threatened death 

or serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to the physical 

integrity of the member or another person." Russo, supra, 206 

N.J. at 18 (quoting Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 34). 

C.

We agree with the ALJ and the TPAF Board that petitioner 

failed to meet the Patterson requirement. Petitioner's three 

separate incidents involved an adolescent girl punching her and 

slapping her face; an adolescent boy "kind of" pushing and 

shoving her shoulders with his hands and spitting on the floor; 

and an adolescent boy placing her hands behind her back for a 

few seconds, then swinging and missing. In the first incident, 

petitioner experienced only "a little bit of a stomachache," 

which the ALJ found was not a physical injury and which in any 

event was minor and temporary. Petitioner admittedly was not 

physically injured in the second or third incidents. She 
23 A-5028-14T1

neither needed nor sought medical treatment after any of the 

incidents. In each incident, petitioner was accompanied by 

teacher's aides who quickly assisted petitioner in removing the 

student. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we 

agree with the ALJ and the Board that these three incidents, 

whether considered individually or collectively, failed to meet 

the Patterson requirement.

Petitioner contends the incidents were terrifying and 

horror-inducing for her. However, her subjective views do not 

satisfy "the objective reasonableness standard of Patterson." 

Id. at 33. None of the incidents here were "a terrifying or 

horror-inducing event that involves actual or threatened death 

or serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to the physical 

integrity of the member or another person." Patterson, supra, 

194 N.J. at 50 (emphasis added). The Court "impose[d] the 

aforementioned limitations to assure objectivity in the 

analysis." Ibid.

Regarding the third incident, petitioner's psychiatrist 

opined that, while her arms were behind her back, it was a 

"potentially life threatening situation" because she "could have 

been seriously injured" or "killed in that position." However, 

her arms were no longer behind her back when the swings 

occurred, and she was able to dodge them. Moreover, the 
24 A-5028-14T1

psychiatrist conceded he did not even know the adolescent's age, 

let alone strength. Thus, "the facts of record" do not show 

that this third incident was life threatening, unlike the 

burning building in Russo. Cf. Russo, supra, 206 N.J. at 33.4 

Moreover, the ALJ and the Board did not find that the third 

incident involved threatened death or serious injury.

Petitioner notes she was diagnosed with PTSD. However, the 

diagnostic criteria for PTSD are not identical to the Patterson

requirement. In particular, our Supreme Court requires the

member show the incident involved "actual or threatened death or 

serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to the physical 

integrity of the member or another person." Patterson, supra, 

194 N.J. at 50 (emphasis added); cf. id. at 49 (setting forth 

the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria, which omit the emphasized 

words). Here, the incidents did not involve threatened death or 

serious injury or a similarly serious threat to petitioner's 

physical integrity. 

More importantly, the Supreme Court in Patterson and Russo

did not hold that any employee who obtains a PTSD diagnosis 

qualifies for accidental disability benefits. In Patterson, the

 

4 The dissent adds "that had one or more of the three swings [by 

the fifteen-year-old] landed on petitioner's head, petitioner 

could have suffered traumatic brain injury, fractures, or 

sensory damage." Post at __ (slip op. at 7). However, there 

was no such evidence before the ALJ. 
25 A-5028-14T1

Court did not equate a diagnosis of PTSD with the Patterson

requirement; rather, it simply used the history and criteria of 

PTSD as a "backdrop" showing there could be "a causal 

relationship between certain delineated traumatic events and a 

resultant mental disorder." Id. at 40-42, 49. In Russo, supra, 

Russo was diagnosed with PTSD. 206 N.J. at 20-21. Rather than 

treating that diagnosis as decisive, the Court did not even 

mention Russo's PTSD diagnosis in its analysis of why he met the 

Patterson requirement. Id. at 33-35. 

In any event, it is the Board, not a member's psychiatrist, 

which determines whether the incident meets "Patterson's 

objective reasonableness standard." Id. at 33. The ALJ and the 

TPAF Board did not adopt the conclusion of petitioner's 

psychiatrist that "any of the assaults that [she] suffered would 

cause a reasonable person in her circumstances [to] suffer a 

disabling injury." Further, the psychiatrist's hypothesizing

about what a reasonable person would do cannot change whether or 

not "a member has experienced a qualifying incident — a 

'terrifying or horror-inducing event that involves actual or 

threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly serious 

threat to the physical integrity of the member or another 

person.'" See id. at 25-27, 31-33 (quoting Patterson, supra, 

194 N.J. at 50).
26 A-5028-14T1

The failure of petitioner's incidents to meet that standard 

is illustrated by the Supreme Court's dispositions of the three 

appeals in Patterson. Petitioner feared being hit by an angry 

adolescent, but the Court held Patterson's fear of being hit by 

an angry police sergeant "simply did not involve actual or 

threatened death or serious injury to Patterson's physical 

integrity and thus failed to vault the traumatic event 

threshold." Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 51. The adolescent 

threatened to "kick [her] ass," but that pales by comparison to 

the death threats and the gang member's threats to rape and 

murder considered in Patterson. Id. at 52-53.

Petitioner's incidents also bore no resemblance to the 

traumatic events the Supreme Court in Russo found satisfied the 

Patterson requirement. The Court stressed that Russo, "was 

ordered into a burning building," where "[t]he intensity of the 

fire terrified and disoriented Russo, singed his uniform, and 

sent him to the hospital overnight for smoke inhalation," which 

the Court viewed as a life-threatening situation. Russo, supra, 

206 N.J. at 33-34. Moreover, the fire also presented "'a 

serious threat to the physical integrity of another person' —

the victim, who suffered while crying out for help that Russo 

was unable to provide and who ultimately died as a result of the 
27 A-5028-14T1

fire," after which "the victim's family heaped scorn on Russo 

and blamed him for their relative's death." Id. at 34. 

Nor did petitioner's incidents resemble the traumatic 

experiences involved in the only other published case applying 

the Patterson requirement. See Hayes v. Bd. of Trs. of Police &

Firemen's Ret. Sys., 421 N.J. Super. 43 (App. Div. 2011). In 

1998, after Officer Hayes and other officers tried to stop a 

stolen car, it "'ran over' one of the responding officers," and 

police "responded with gunfire, severely injuring the unarmed 

teenage driver and killing his fifteen-year-old female 

passenger" in a highly-publicized, controversial shooting. Id.

at 47. In a 2001 incident, while shots were being fired, Hayes 

rescued a wounded officer whom she discovered "was her younger 

brother, who had been shot in the face and neck. [Hayes]

cradled her brother in her arms, certain he was going to die, as 

he lay on the ground bleeding profusely." Ibid. Subsequently, 

Hayes "learned [that] a 'hit' had been put out on her by a 

Trenton gang," and that "the driver of the vehicle involved in 

the 1998 shooting had been released from prison" and might come 

for her. Id. at 48.

Further, petitioner's incidents do not rise to the level of 

the examples given in Patterson, supra: "Under that standard a 

permanently mentally disabled policeman who sees his partner 
28 A-5028-14T1

shot; a teacher who is held hostage by a student; and a 

government lawyer used as a shield by a defendant all could 

vault the traumatic event threshold." 194 N.J. at 50. 

Petitioner was not held hostage by a student. Rather, in a 

classroom containing several teacher's aides, a student had 

petitioner's hands behind her back for a few seconds until he 

let go and was removed from the room by the teacher's aides. As 

the ALJ found, the incidents, "although undoubtedly distressing, 

did not constitute a terrifying or horror-inducing event in line 

with the examples given by the Patterson Court."

We do not question the mentally-disabling reaction 

petitioner had to these incidents. However, Patterson imposed 

an "objective standard[]" based on the "the character of an 

event rather than" the reaction of an individual claimant. 

Ibid. By adding the Patterson requirement, our Supreme Court 

"achieve[d] the important assurance that the traumatic event 

posited as the basis for an accidental disability pension is not 

inconsequential but is objectively capable of causing a 

reasonable person in similar circumstances to suffer a disabling 

mental injury." Russo, supra, 206 N.J. at 18 (quoting 

Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 34). "Satisfying Patterson

eliminates the problem of 'idiosyncratic responses by members to 
29 A-5028-14T1

inconsequential mental stressors[.]'" Id. at 32 (quoting 

Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 49).

Here, the ALJ found petitioner's mental disability in 

response to these incidents was "the very definition of an 

idiosyncratic response." The Board affirmed. We cannot say 

that finding was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. While 

petitioner's idiosyncratic response entitled her to ordinary 

disability benefits, it failed to satisfy the Patterson

requirement for accidental disability benefits. 

Before we conclude discussion of the Patterson standard, we 

address three arguments not raised by petitioner but raised by 

the dissent. First, the dissent asserts the ALJ replicated the 

error in Russo. We disagree. 

In Russo, the PFRS Board found Russo's "'disability did 

result from direct personal experience of a terrifying or 

horror-inducing event that involved actual or threatened death 

or serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to the physical 

integrity of [Russo] or another person.'" Id. at 24; see id. at 

25. Despite finding that Russo "experienced a Patterson-type 

horrific event," the Board then found "the event was 

'inconsequential' and 'not objectively capable of causing a 

reasonable person in similar circumstances to suffer a disabling 
30 A-5028-14T1

mental injury.'" Id. at 18; see id. at 24-25. Our Supreme 

Court ruled:

[T]he [PFRS] Board went astray in [Russo's] 

case in failing to recognize that once a 

member has experienced a qualifying incident 

— a 'terrifying or horror-inducing event 

that involves actual or threatened death or 

serious injury, or a similarly serious 

threat to the physical integrity of the 

member or another person' — the objective 

reasonableness standard of Patterson has 

been met.

[Id. at 33 (quoting Patterson, supra, 194 

N.J. at 50).] 

By contrast, the ALJ did not find a qualifying event and 

then fail to recognize the dispositive nature of that finding. 

Rather, the ALJ found no qualifying event had occurred. The ALJ 

began by recognizing that "'[t]he disability must result from 

direct personal experience of a terrifying or horror-inducing 

event that involves actual or threatened death or serious 

injury, or a similarly serious threat to the physical integrity 

of the member or another person.'" (quoting Patterson, supra, 

194 N.J. at 34). The ALJ cited the examples of qualifying 

events cited in Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 48-50,5 and ruled:

 

5 The dissent criticizes the ALJ for referencing what the Supreme 

Court in Patterson called the "relevant statutory incidents 

under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-196." Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 49. 

However, the ALJ simply noted: "Although these examples are lawenforcement specific, the Patterson Court used them to suggest 

the quality of traumatic event that might be expected to result 

(continued)
31 A-5028-14T1

"I CONCLUDE that [petitioner] does not meet the additional 

requirements . . . enunciated in Patterson" because "[t]he 

circumstances of the three incidents experienced by the 

petitioner, although undoubtedly distressing, did not constitute 

a terrifying or horror-inducing event in line with the examples 

given by the Patterson Court."

Only then did the ALJ add: "In other words, the stressors 

were not sufficient to inflict a disabling injury when 

experienced by a reasonable person in similar circumstances." 

That echoed the Supreme Court's own language: "Put another way, 

by our enunciation [of the Patterson requirement], we limit 

accidental disability recovery to stressors sufficient to 

inflict a disabling injury when experienced by a reasonable 

person in similar circumstances." Id. at 50.

The ALJ reiterated: "I cannot conclude that petitioner here 

experienced a terrifying or horror-inducing event or events that 

would have caused a reasonable person in similar circumstances 

to suffer a disabling mental injury." That resembled the 

Court's statement in Patterson: "a qualifying horrific event

 

(continued)

in mental injury under the various public-sector pension plans." 

The ALJ's comment reflected the Supreme Court's assessment of 

N.J.S.A. 40A:14-196: "To be sure, [its] categories are lawenforcement specific," but it "sheds light on the meaning of the 

term 'traumatic event' in the accidental disability statutes." 

Id. at 45, 49. 
32 A-5028-14T1

must be objectively capable of causing a reasonable person in 

similar circumstances to suffer a disabling mental injury." Id.

at 34.

The ALJ briefly posited that "[a] reasonable teacher might 

have found the incident upsetting or disturbing [at] being 

pushed and shoved, or grabbed." The ALJ then continued 

examining the nature of the incidents: "The petitioner was not

physically injured and there were no weapons brandished at or 

near her or even involved in these incidents. The physical 

trauma that petitioner described was minimal[.]" The ALJ 

properly distinguished petitioner's case from the "hostage" 

example given by the Supreme Court. See Russo, supra, 206 N.J.

at 31 (quoting Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 50).6 The ALJ's 

brief discussion of the reasonable teacher, while unnecessary, 

was not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result" given 

her proper application of the correct standard. R. 2:10-2. 

Second, the dissent asserts petitioner met the Patterson

requirement due to her lack of training in dealing with 

physically disruptive students, and cites Russo. We note that

the Supreme Court mentioned the PFRS "Board should have 

 

6 The dissent asserts the ALJ minimized the third incident by 

saying the adolescent "grabbed" petitioner's arms. However, the 

ALJ also stated the adolescent "yanked them behind her back." 

Moreover, petitioner testified only that the adolescent "had my 

hands behind my back."
33 A-5028-14T1

recognized that Russo experienced a qualifying event" in part 

because "he had no training or equipment for such an event." 

Id. at 33. However, the Supreme Court in Russo primarily 

addressed the role of training under "Richardson's 'undesigned

and unexpected' standard," finding that Russo met that 

Richardson standard due to his lack of firefighting training. 

Id. at 33-35.7 

Even assuming an employee's training can be considered in

determining if an incident meets "the objective reasonableness 

standard of Patterson," petitioner's lack of training does not 

convert any of the three incidents into a "terrifying or horrorinducing event that involve[d] actual or threatened death or 

serious injury, or a similarly serious threat to the physical 

integrity of the member or another person." Id. at 33 (quoting 

Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 50). 

Third, the dissent asserts the Board's determination is far 

afield from the historical requirements established several 

decades ago by the Legislature for accidental disability 

benefits. However, it was not until 2008 that the Supreme Court 

in Patterson, supra, held that "an applicant who has suffered a 

 

7 As set forth below, we find petitioner's lack of training 

helped her meet that Richardson standard. We need not address 

our dissenting colleague's additional comments regarding that 

standard.
34 A-5028-14T1

permanent mental disability as a result of a mental stressor, 

without any physical impact," could qualify for an accidental 

disability retirement. 194 N.J. at 33. The Court recognized it 

was necessary to add "a new test" in order "to assure the bona 

fides of claimed mental injuries[,] to ameliorate the problem of 

subjectivity inherent in mental claims," and to "eliminate[] the 

problem of 'idiosyncratic responses.'" Russo, supra, 206 N.J.

at 31-32 (quoting Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 49). The Court 

thus "established a high threshold for the award of accidental 

disability benefits" based on claims of mental disability. Id.

at 31. 

Finally, it is crucial to remember that we are neither the 

factfinder nor the administrative agency charged with making the 

determination whether the threshold has been met. Absent a 

misinterpretation of the statute or case law, an appellate 

court's "review of administrative agency action is limited," and 

the Board's "'decision will be sustained unless there is a clear 

showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or 

that it lacks fair support in the record.'" Id. at 27 (citation 

omitted). Petitioner failed to make the requisite clear 

showing.
35 A-5028-14T1

IV. 

As the Supreme Court stated in Russo, "Patterson is the 

threshold that must be met for further inquiry to be warranted." 

Id. at 32. Nonetheless, we also consider petitioner's claim 

that these incidents were not "undesigned and unexpected" under 

Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 212. The ALJ and the Board found 

the incidents were not undesigned or unexpected because a high 

school health and physical education teacher should expect to 

experience such incidents. 

However, in Richardson, our Supreme Court rejected the 

similar argument "that because subduing an inmate is part of the 

anticipated work of a corrections officer and was not unexpected 

or unintended, Richardson cannot satisfy the traumatic event 

standard." Id. at 213. "That is a misreading of the statute, 

which requires that the traumatic event occur 'during and as a 

result of the performance of [the member's] regular or assigned

duties.'" Ibid. The Court noted that under prior statutes the 

courts long "defined 'accident' in accordance with its ordinary 

meaning — as 'an unlooked for mishap or untoward event which is 

not expected or designed.'" Id. at 197 (citations omitted). 

The Court ruled that under the current statutes "a traumatic 

event is essentially the same as what we historically understood 

an accident to be — an unexpected external happening that 
36 A-5028-14T1

directly causes injury and is not the result of pre-existing 

disease alone or in combination with work effort." Id. at 212; 

see id. at 214. 

Richardson gave examples of physically traumatic events,

occurring during ordinary work effort, which were "undesigned 

and unexpected": "A policeman can be shot while pursuing a 

suspect; a librarian can be hit by a falling bookshelf while reshelving books; a social worker can catch her hand in the car 

door while transporting a child to court." Id. at 214. 

Similarly, a "gym teacher who trips over a riser and is injured 

has satisfied the standard." Id. at 213.

The Board cites the job description, which states a health 

and physical education teacher "[e]stablishes and maintains 

standards of pupil behavior needed to provide an orderly, 

productive learning environment." However, there was no 

evidence it was a designed and expected part of petitioner's job 

that she be punched, slapped, pushed, shoved, restrained, or 

threatened with physical harm by students. Thus, the incidents 

were undesigned and unexpected under the Richardson test.8 

 

8 Richardson, supra, rejected a prior test requiring the member 

to show "his injuries were not induced by the stress or strain 

of the normal work effort." 192 N.J. at 192. Even under that 

test, we observed:

(continued)
37 A-5028-14T1

The ALJ concluded the assaults were not undesigned and 

unexpected on the premise that "[i]t is not unusual for [special 

education] students to become distressed and upset in class or 

to act out with others. The petitioner should have anticipated

that such conduct could or would occur in a physical education 

class of adolescents." However, no evidence was introduced to 

support that premise. In any event, "an accident can be 

'undesigned and unexpected' under the Richardson tests even 

though it may be concluded in retrospect that the employee could 

have anticipated the risk of such an accident and taken steps to 

 

(continued)

having to break up fistfights among students 

in a school corridor and then suffering the 

physical or emotional sequelae thereof are 

[not] part of the "stress or strain of the 

normal work effort" of a teacher. It may be 

part of the stress or strain of the normal 

work effort of a policeman or a security 

guard, but we do not regard the hazards of 

combat as part of the normal stress of 

public school educators.

[Pushko v. Bd. of Trs. of Teachers' Pension 

& Annuity Fund, 208 N.J. Super. 141, 145 

(App. Div. 1986).]

Moreover, under that test our Supreme Court found that while 

corrections officers must subdue inmates, "it is not part of the 

stress or strain of the 'normal' work effort of a corrections 

officer to be violently assaulted by an inmate. Corrections 

officers are not hired to be punching bags." Gable v. Bd. of 

Trs. of Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 115 N.J. 212, 224 (1989). Though 

these cases under the prior test are not dispositive, they are 

instructive.
38 A-5028-14T1

avoid it." Brooks v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., 425 N.J. 

Super. 277, 284 (App. Div. 2012) (finding undesigned and 

unexpected a school custodian's injury when the students helping 

him carry a 300-pound weight bench dropped their side of the 

weight bench). 

The Supreme Court added in Russo that a member's training 

must be considered:

[A]n employee who experiences a horrific 

event which falls within his job description 

and for which he has been trained will be 

unlikely to pass the "undesigned and 

unexpected" test. Thus, for example, an 

emergency medical technician who comes upon 

a terrible accident involving lifethreatening injuries or death, will have 

experienced a Patterson-type horrific event, 

but will not satisfy Richardson's

"undesigned and unexpected" standard because 

that is exactly what his training has 

prepared him for.

[Russo, supra, 206 N.J. at 33.]

In Russo, Russo's role in the house fire was "undesigned 

and unexpected" because he "was trained and equipped as a police 

officer, not as a firefighter." Id. at 24, 34. We have since 

held, because an engine company firefighter was trained to 

deploy hoses, and his "training had not prepared him to break 

into burning buildings without the battering rams and other 

specialized equipment used by the truck company," an incident 

where he had to kick in a door to rescue victims trapped inside 
39 A-5028-14T1

a burning building was undesigned and unexpected. Moran v. Bd.

of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 438 N.J. Super. 346, 355

(App. Div. 2014). 

Being assaulted was not part of petitioner's job 

description or training. She had a certification allowing her 

to teach adaptive special physical education, but there was no 

evidence she received training about handling violence from 

special needs students. After the first incident, she requested 

training on how to restrain students, but her request was 

denied.

Therefore, the Board erred in concluding the incidents were 

not undesigned and unexpected. However, because petitioner 

failed to meet the Patterson requirement, the Board properly 

rejected her claim for accidental disability benefits.9

Affirmed. 

 

9 Thus, we need not resolve whether petitioner was disabled as "a 

direct result of" the incidents, as required by Richardson, 

supra, 192 N.J. at 212.
________________________________________

OSTRER, J.A.D., dissenting.

I concur with, and join in, my colleagues' determination 

that the Patterson objective reasonableness test applies to this 

case, in which petitioner suffered both mental injury and minor 

physical injury. I part company with my colleagues because I 

believe petitioner met that test, and the Board erred in 

reaching the opposite conclusion. Thus, I dissent from Part 

III-C of the majority opinion.

Since the Board adopted the ALJ's decision, I look to the 

ALJ's reasoning to explain the Board's result here. That

reasoning included multiple reversible errors. 

1.

Contrary to Russo, the ALJ required petitioner to satisfy 

more than the Patterson standard by evaluating whether 

petitioner's response to the assault against her was reasonable 

for similarly situated teachers. Then, applying the wrong 

standard, the ALJ found that petitioner failed in that showing 

without adequate support in the record.

The purpose of the Patterson objective test was to allay 

concerns regarding the subjectivity of psychological "proofs 

related to the traumatic nature of an event and the causal 

relationship between event and [mental] injury." Patterson, 
2 A-5028-14T1

supra, 194 N.J. at 48. The Court achieved this by focusing its 

legal standard on the underlying event. The Patterson test is 

satisfied upon a showing that the petitioner experienced a 

"terrifying or horror-inducing event that involves actual or 

threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly serious 

threat to the physical integrity of the member or another 

person." Id. at 50. The Court in Patterson noted that by 

applying its definition of a qualifying incident, the Court 

"assure[d] that the traumatic event is objectively capable of 

causing a permanent, disabling mental injury to a reasonable 

person under similar circumstances." Ibid. 

Accordingly, the "terrifying and horror-inducing event" 

standard already incorporates the concern that the injury is 

caused by an event that is "objectively capable of causing a 

reasonable person in similar circumstances to suffer a disabling 

mental injury." Id. at 34. As the Court in Russo highlighted, 

"once a member has experienced a qualifying incident — a 

'terrifying or horror-inducing event that involves actual or 

threatened death or serious injury, or a similarly serious 

threat to the physical integrity of the member or another 

person' — the objective reasonableness standard of Patterson has 

been met . . . ." See Russo, supra, 206 N.J. at 33 (quoting 

Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 50) (noting that the Board "went 
3 A-5028-14T1

astray" in failing to recognize this concept). At that point, a 

petitioner need only satisfy the Richardson factors to merit an 

accidental disability pension. Ibid. The Board must not try to 

determine separately, untethered from the Patterson definition 

of a qualifying incident, whether an event was "inconsequential" 

or "objectively capable of causing a reasonable person in 

similar circumstances to suffer a disabling injury." Id. at 18. 

Satisfying the definition of a qualifying incident is all that 

is required.

As the PFRS Board did in Russo, the TPAF Board here "went 

astray" by shifting its focus from the definition of a 

qualifying event.1 In support of its finding that petitioner did 

not experience a terrifying or horror-inducing event, the ALJ 

relied on her independent views of how a "reasonable teacher" 

might react: 

In other words, the stressors were not 

sufficient to inflict a disabling injury 

when experienced by a reasonable person in 

similar circumstances. I cannot conclude 

that petitioner here experienced a 

terrifying or horror-inducing event or 

events that would have caused a reasonable 

 

1 The majority finds a meaningful distinction between the present 

case and Russo, insofar as the Board in Russo found that the 

event was terrifying and horror-inducing, but still failed 

Patterson. I am unpersuaded. In my view, the ALJ's error 

mirrors the one the Court corrected in Russo. In both cases, 

the pension board wrongly incorporated a reasonableness standard 

into its Patterson analysis.
4 A-5028-14T1

person in similar circumstances to suffer a 

disabling mental injury. A reasonable 

teacher might have found the incident 

upsetting or disturbing, but being pushed 

and shoved, or being grabbed by a special 

education student, would come within the 

expected scope of incidents a high school 

physical and health education teacher might 

experience. And indeed, the history shows 

that such incidents, while not occurring on 

a daily basis, occur with sufficient 

regularity in the classroom setting.

. . . . I CONCLUDE that the events 

experienced by the petitioner, taken 

objectively, would not cause a reasonable 

teacher to become mentally debilitated.

However, as Russo instructs, the Board's task was to apply the 

Patterson definition, and not formulate conclusions about how "a 

reasonable teacher" might have reacted.2

 

2 The ALJ apparently misconstrues what I believe the Court means 

by its reference to a "reasonable person." See Russo, supra, 

206 N.J. at 18-19, 24-27, 31-33. The Court is not referring to 

the "reasonable person" as the hypothetical person who 

"exercises the degree of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and 

judgment that society requires of its members for the protection 

of their own and of others' interests." Black's Law Dictionary

1380 (9th ed. 2009). In that sense, there is no indication that 

a victim's "reasonableness" has anything to do with whether one 

actually develops PTSD or whether other similarly situated 

employees would react the same way. Instead, the Court uses 

"reasonable person" to capture whether the person's reaction is 

normal, and not idiosyncratic. This concept may be found 

elsewhere in our law. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10 (defining 

criminal stalking in terms of what a "reasonable person" would 

fear). A "reasonable person" was not intended to mean the 

common, typical, or usual person. The fact that a small 

fraction of employees may develop PTSD, and the overwhelming 

majority may not, after being exposed to the same horrifying or 

terrifying incident involving actual or threatened death or 

(continued)
5 A-5028-14T1

Furthermore, the ALJ's conclusion about what a "reasonable 

teacher" might have found terrifying or horrifying was unmoored 

to the record. Particularly troubling was her conclusion that 

the teacher's day-to-day routine should have, to some degree, 

prepared her for the violent attack. 

In this case, petitioner was not a special education 

teacher, although she was permitted to teach "adaptive physical 

education," which she described as a class of students with 

disabilities. There was no evidence she had training or prior 

experience in coping with assaultive, disabled students. The 

school denied her request for training in dealing with 

physically disruptive students. Thus, even applying an 

 

(continued)

serious injury, does not make the minority of employees 

"unreasonable." Even among veterans who faced the horrors of 

war, the majority reportedly do not suffer PTSD, although the 

number experiencing the disorder is significant. See Turner v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1227 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing study that found roughly thirty percent of Vietnam 

veterans suffered PTSD at some point); see also American 

Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 

Mental Disorders, 276 (5th ed. 2013) ("DSM-V") (stating that 

"[t]he conditional probability of developing PTSD following a 

similar level of exposure may . . . vary across cultural 

groups"). The wisdom of the Court's approach in Patterson and 

Russo was to rely on accepted psychiatric concepts to set the 

norm for the "reasonable person." 
6 A-5028-14T1

independent test of "reasonableness," albeit contrary to Russo, 

the ALJ's finding lacks sufficient support in the record.3

 

3 The Court in Russo suggested that a petitioner's background and 

training may be relevant in determining whether he or she 

suffered a compensable mental disability triggered by a 

terrifying or horror-inducing event. For example, the Court 

evidently weighed the fact that Russo was a "newly minted police 

officer," with no firefighting training, in concluding he was 

terrified when he was thrust into a house ferociously aflame and 

was unable to rescue a trapped resident. Russo, supra, 206 N.J.

at 34. 

It may be true — although there is no supporting record 

evidence — that training, background, and experience may 

decrease a petitioner's sensitivity to certain events and, 

accordingly, the likelihood that he or she will suffer PTSD when 

exposed to them. But it strikes me that this is a poor proxy 

for determining whether a qualifying event has occurred. Even

assuming a trained firefighter may not be terrified to enter a 

flaming structure, the training may not shield the firefighter 

from the terror of being overcome with smoke inhalation, hearing 

the cries for help of a doomed resident, and absorbing the scorn 

of the victim's family. I am not convinced that had a 

firefighter been at Russo's side, experiencing everything Russo 

experienced, and then also developed PTSD, the firefighter would 

be ineligible for an accidental disability pension. The 

employees who are most likely to repeatedly confront horrifying 

or terrifying incidents as part of their jobs — such as 

emergency medical personnel, firefighters, police officers and 

armed forces members — face heightened risks of developing PTSD. 

See DSM-V, supra, at 276 ("Rates of PTSD are higher among 

veterans and others whose vocation increases the risk of 

traumatic exposure (e.g., police, firefighters, emergency 

medical personnel)."). The fact that horrifying traumatic 

events may be more common in some occupations than others does 

not necessarily make them less traumatic or horrifying. 

Furthermore, the Richardson "unexpected and undesigned" test 

does not necessarily erect a heightened hurdle for them to 

obtain an accidental disability pension. Even if a kind of 

event is not unexpected over the course of a particular worker's 

career — e.g., an explosion in a bomb squad member's career or a 

fatal shooting in a police officer's career — and even if a 

(continued)
7 A-5028-14T1

2.

I would also reverse the Board's decision because of the 

fundamental incongruity in the ALJ's holding that petitioner 

suffered from PTSD, yet did not experience a terrifying and 

horror-inducing event under the Patterson test. Since the 

Patterson test quotes the DSM definition for PTSD, this finding 

essentially contradicts itself.

In order to reach this odd result, the ALJ's discussion 

regarding accidental disability minimized the nature of the 

incident in this case. She did so, first, by downplaying key 

facts. Second, she misconstrued the hypothetical examples of 

traumatic events listed in the case law as defining the scope of 

what constitutes a "terrifying or horror-inducing event."

The ALJ minimized the incident on her way to finding it 

failed the Patterson test. The record demonstrates that in the 

third and most terrifying incident, petitioner was not merely 

"grabbed," as the ALJ states in her legal analysis and 

conclusion. An angry student confronted her. With the strength 

to do so, he "yanked" petitioner's arms behind her back, to 

 

(continued)

worker's training is designed to enable the worker to confront 

such event, the event may still be undesigned and unexpected 

when it occurs. 
8 A-5028-14T1

quote the ALJ's own statement of the case. The student 

restrained petitioner's arms behind her back for what felt like 

"forever," petitioner said, while he loudly threatened to "kick 

her ass." Petitioner was petrified, terrified, and felt 

helpless. Then the student let go of petitioner's hands so he 

could take three swings at her face. That incident, 

particularly on the heels of the prior physical assaults, was a 

"terrifying . . . event." Both verbally and physically, the 

student threatened serious injury. We do not need specific 

testimony to conclude that had one or more of the three swings 

landed on petitioner's head, petitioner could have suffered 

traumatic brain injury, fractures, or sensory damage. See DSMV, supra, at 424 (including as examples of traumatic events that 

may trigger PTSD "threatened or actual physical assault" 

including "physical attack, . . . [and] mugging"). As a direct 

result of this incident, in the wake of the two prior incidents, 

petitioner developed PTSD.4

The ALJ also erred in attempting to fit petitioner's 

experience into a procrustean bed of illustrative incidents 

 

4 I recognize that the ALJ found only that the PTSD developed 

"after" the incident, but did not expressly find that PTSD was a 

"direct result" of the event. See Richardson, supra, 192 N.J.

at 212; N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(c). However, I would exercise 

original jurisdiction and find that it was, consistent with 

testimony of petitioner and her expert, whom the ALJ credited.
9 A-5028-14T1

described in Patterson and Russo. In particular, the ALJ 

assigned undue significance to the non-exclusive list of 

incidents that may warrant crisis intervention services for law 

enforcement officers under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-196.5 The Patterson

Court found this statute "instructive." Patterson, supra, 194 

N.J. at 45. Although the list "reflect[s] the Legislature's 

general acceptance of the view of the psychiatric community 

regarding the quality of traumatic event that might be expected 

to result in a mental injury," the Court recognized that the 

list was "law-enforcement specific." Id. at 49. Thus, it 

should not preclude different claims by non-law-enforcement 

pension members. The Court stated, "[T]he gravamen of that 

 

5 The statute defines such "critical incident[s]" to include:

the firing of a weapon or an exchange of gun 

fire; serious bodily injury to or the death 

of a juvenile; a terrorist act; a hostage 

situation; serious bodily injury to or the 

death of another law enforcement officer 

employed in the same agency, when that 

serious bodily injury or death occurred in 

the performance of that officer's official 

duties; a personal injury or wound; serious 

bodily injury received in the performance of 

the officer's official duties; and such 

other incidents or events as the county 

crisis intervention services advisory 

council established pursuant to section 4 

of P.L. 1998, c. 148 (C. 40A:14-198) shall 

deem appropriate.

[N.J.S.A. 40A:14-196.]
10 A-5028-14T1

statute is that the Legislature has specifically recognized that 

a traumatic event giving rise to a mental disability, like PTSD, 

may, but need not, involve physical impact." Id. at 45. The 

Court's examples evidently were intended to be illustrative, but 

not limiting. To construe them any other way opens the door to 

arbitrary or unpredictable applications of the test. 

As a result of these errors, the ALJ denied accidental 

disability while simultaneously finding that petitioner 

manifested the symptoms of PTSD after the student's assault and 

that she was "permanently and totally disabled" as "treatment 

had not been effective in alleviating" those symptoms. 

Petitioner's expert found she met the DSM criteria for PTSD. 

Thus, implicit in the ALJ's finding was the conclusion that, 

consistent with the DSM definition, petitioner suffered her 

mental disorder because of exposure to a "terrifying or horrorinducing event." As already noted, the DSM definition of PTSD 

is the direct source of the Patterson test.6 Yet, the ALJ 

incongruously found that petitioner had not confronted the 

qualifying mental stressor as defined by Patterson. While I 

agree with my colleagues that the Board — not a testifying 

 

6 While the history of PTSD was the "back drop" of the Patterson

Court's analysis, the DSM criteria are more than that. Except 

for the insertion of two words of no direct relevance to this 

case — "similarly serious" — the DSM criteria are imported 

verbatim into the Patterson test. 
11 A-5028-14T1

expert — determines whether an employee meets the Patterson

test, ante at __ (slip op. at 25), the Board must rely on more 

than its own ipse dixit, particularly when the fact-finder has 

credited that psychiatric expert. 

3.

In closing, I note how far afield the ALJ's reasoning, 

approved by the Board and the majority, has taken us from the 

fundamental purpose of an accidental disability pension, and the 

legislated distinction between disabilities that qualify for an 

ordinary disability pension and those that qualify for an 

accidental disability pension. 

As the Court noted in Patterson, "The main difference 

between the two is that ordinary disability need not have a work 

connection." Patterson, supra, 194 N.J. at 42; compare N.J.S.A.

18A:66-39(c) (providing access to accidental disability if the 

applicant "is permanently and totally disabled as a direct 

result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of 

the performance of his regular or assigned duties"), with

N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(b) (requiring only a showing that the 

applicant is "physically or mentally incapacitated for the 

performance of duty and should be retired"). The ALJ found that 

petitioner suffered PTSD, and was thus, in her words, "mentally 

incapacitated from performing her usual or any other duty." 
12 A-5028-14T1

Petitioner suffered that condition as a direct result of an 

assault in the workplace. Yet, the ALJ denied her access to an 

accidental disability pension, concluding instead that she was 

entitled only to ordinary disability pension benefits.7 

In doing so, the ALJ also thwarted the historical purpose 

of accidental disability pensions: to provide an incentive to 

workers to take on the risks of their work by providing them 

with the peace of mind that a generous benefit would be 

available without regard to a prerequisite term of service if 

they become disabled by a work-related traumatic event. Cf.

N.J. Pension Survey Commission, Report No. 4 Recommendations for 

the Sound Financing of Public Employee Pension Systems in New 

Jersey 22-23, 30 (1932); compare N.J.S.A. 18A:66-41 (providing 

TPAF ordinary disability pension and annuity equal to no less 

than 43.6 percent of final compensation), with N.J.S.A. 18A:66-

42 (providing TPAF accidental disability pension and annuity of 

72.7 percent of annual compensation); and compare N.J.S.A.

18A:66-39(b) (requiring ten years of service for ordinary 

disability pension), with N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(c) (imposing no 

minimum years of service for accidental disability pension); 

 

7 Notably, if petitioner had not accumulated ten years of 

service, she would have been denied a disability pension 

altogether. See N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(b).
13 A-5028-14T1

Robert L. Clark et al., A History of Public Sector Pensions in 

the United States (2003). 

In sum, I would reverse the Board's decision and order the 

award of an accidental disability pension. For that reason, I 

respectfully dissent.