Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted and Majority and 

Dissenting Opinions filed December 23, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00275-CV

IN RE WYATT FIELD SERVICE COMPANY, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

125th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2011-44838

MAJORITY OPINION

This case presents our court its opportunity to address the next of the 

unintended consequences wrought on Texas mandamus practice due to the holding

in In Re Columbia: exactly what is a “merits review,” and how does an 

intermediate appellate court apply it to evaluate the “great weight and 

preponderance of the evidence”?
2

Real parties in interest, David McBride and Glenn Burns, sustained personal 

injuries due to an accident at a refinery owned by ExxonMobil Corporation in 

Baytown, Texas. Real parties sued relator, Wyatt Field Services Company, and 

ExxonMobil. Real parties settled with ExxonMobil prior to trial and argued that 

Wyatt was solely responsible for the accident. The jury returned a verdict that 

Wyatt was not negligent, but ExxonMobil was solely responsible for real parties’ 

injuries. On real parties’ motion, the Honorable Kyle Carter, presiding judge of 

the 125th District Court of Harris County, signed a new trial order in favor of real 

parties on March 3, 2014. The trial court’s new trial order and the findings of fact 

reflect that the bases for granting a new trial are (1) the jury’s findings that 

ExxonMobil was negligent and Wyatt was not were against the great weight and 

preponderance of the evidence; and (2) Wyatt’s repeated injection of collateral 

source evidence into the case violated the motion in limine and tainted the jury’s 

verdict. 

Wyatt filed a petition for writ of mandamus on September 16, 2013, 

challenging the new trial order. We denied Wyatt’s petition because it had not 

provided the entire trial record and, therefore, we could not ascertain whether the 

trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new trial. See In re Wyatt Field 

Serv. Co., No. 14-13-00811-CV, 2013 WL 6506749, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Dec. 10, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Wyatt filed the current petition for writ of mandamus, which includes the 

entire trial record. Wyatt again challenges the new trial order and requests that we 

compel the trial court to vacate its March 3, 2014 order and render judgment on the 
3

jury’s verdict. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 (West 2004); see also Tex. R. 

App. P. 52. We conditionally grant the petition. 

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Mandamus Review of New Trial Orders Before and after In re Columbia

To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must demonstrate (1) the trial 

court clearly abused its discretion; and (2) the relator has no adequate remedy by 

appeal. In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding). A trial 

court clearly abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and 

unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly 

fails to analyze the law correctly or apply the law correctly to the facts. In re 

Cerberus Capital Mgmt. L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) 

(per curiam). “In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion with 

respect to resolution of factual matters, we may not substitute our judgment for that 

of the trial court and may not disturb the trial court’s decision unless it is shown to 

be arbitrary and unreasonable.” In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 2004) 

(orig. proceeding) (per curiam). In other words, under an abuse of discretion 

standard, we defer to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are supported 

by the evidence, but we review the trial court’s legal determinations de novo. In re 

Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).

Although acknowledging that Texas trial courts have historically been 

afforded broad discretion in granting new trials, the Texas Supreme Court, in 2009, 

held that a trial court abuses its discretion by granting a motion for new trial 

without providing a reasonably specific explanation of the court’s reasons for 

setting aside a jury verdict. See In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 
4

Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 210, 213 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding)

(holding “that discretion is not limitless”). Thus, the trial court abused its 

discretion by ordering a new trial based solely on “in the interest of justice” 

because that reason was not sufficiently specific. Id. at 215. 

The long-established rule in Texas is that, except in very limited 

circumstances, an order granting a motion for new trial rendered within the trial 

court’s plenary power is not subject to review either by direct appeal from that 

order or from a final judgment rendered after further proceedings in the trial court. 

Cummins v. Paisan Constr. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam); 

Hull v. S. Coast Catamarans, L.P., 365 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Before In Re Columbia, only two such circumstances 

had been identified: (1) when the trial court’s order was wholly void; and (2) when

the trial court erroneously concluded that the jury’s answers to special issues were 

irreconcilably in conflict. 290 S.W.3d at 208−09; see also Wilkins v. Methodist 

Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex. 2005).

1

 The court in Columbia held 

the long-established rule, which denies aggrieved parties an adequate remedy by 

appeal, demonstrates why mandamus relief must be afforded in what it described 

 

1

In Wilkins, the court noted that “[e]xcept in very limited circumstances, an order 

granting a motion for new trial rendered within the trial court’s plenary power is not reviewable 

on appeal.” 160 S.W.3d at 563. However, new trial orders that were void or were based on the 

trial court’s erroneous conclusion that the jury’s answers to special issues were irreconcilably in 

conflict were subject to review on mandamus. See Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 

S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding); Johnson v. Court of Civil Appeals for the 

Seventh Supreme Judicial Dist. of Tex., 350 S.W.2d 330, 331 (Tex. 1961) (orig. proceeding).
5

as “exceptional circumstances”—the protection of the right to a jury trial.2290 

S.W.3d at 210. 

Subsequently, the Texas Supreme Court articulated a two-prong test for 

determining whether a trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial. See 

In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding). A 

trial court does not abuse its discretion so long as its stated reason for granting a 

new trial (1) is a reason for which a new trial is legally appropriate (such as a welldefined legal standard or a defect that probably resulted in an improper verdict); 

and (2) is specific enough to indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro 

forma template, but rather derived the articulated reasons from the particular facts 

and circumstances of the case at hand. Id. at 688–89. 

More recently, the supreme court held that an appellate court may conduct a 

“merits review” of the correctness of a new trial order setting aside a jury verdict 

that facially comports with Columbia and United Scaffolding. In re Toyota Motor 

Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 757−59 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding).3 

Specifically, the court explained that, if, despite conformity with the procedural 

requirements of its precedent, a trial court’s articulated reasons are not “actually 

true,” the new trial order may be an abuse of discretion. Id. at 758. Thus, it is 

 

2

It is unclear whether the “exceptional circumstances” extend to all jury trials or only to 

those where a second trial would involve undue “time, trouble and expense.” The court did not 

expressly balance the benefits of mandamus against the detriments. See Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 

209−10; see also In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding)

(explaining that the adequacy of an appellate remedy must be determined by balancing the 

benefits of mandamus review against the detriments).

3

The high court did not indicate the circumstances under which an intermediate appellate 

court may decline to conduct such a review.
6

well-settled that merits-based review of new trial orders granted following a jury 

trial are now available to litigants. See, e.g., In re Health Care Unlimited, Inc., 429 

S.W.3d 600, 602 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (noting that the court 

had previously held in Toyota that appellate courts may conduct a merits-based 

review of the trial court’s articulated reasons for granting a new trial); In re 

Whataburger Restaurants LP, 429 S.W.3d 597, 598 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) 

(per curiam) (same).

B. Against the Great Weight and Preponderance of the Evidence

Ironically, although the high court has directed trial courts to articulate a 

well-defined legal standard as one indicia that its new trial order is legally 

appropriate, see United Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 685, it has enunciated a new 

standard of review for intermediate appellate courts to use in implementing its 

directive: the “merits-based review.” See Toyota Motor Sales, 407 S.W.3d at 757; 

see generally W. Wendall Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J.

3 (2010). It provided little guidance to review the trial court’s ruling where, as 

here, one reason given by the trial court for granting a new trial is that the evidence 

is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.4

 

4 The panel granted oral argument on the specific issue of what standard of review applies 

to this case. We asked the parties to address the following at oral argument: 

1. Is the standard of review any different from when a trial judge grants a 

new trial on the basis that the verdict was against the great weight and 

preponderance of the evidence versus when the appellate court does? If 

so, explain the difference in the articulated standard.

2. Do we have to conduct a harm analysis as to the collateral source 

violations?
7

In a factual sufficiency review, an appellate court considers and weighs all 

the evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding. Maritime Overseas 

Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406−07 (Tex. 1998). When a party attacks the 

factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it had the burden of 

proof, the party must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the 

great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 

S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). A reviewing court considers all the 

evidence and will set aside the judgment only if it is so contrary to the 

overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. 

Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). The fact finder is the sole 

judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given their testimony. 

Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). When 

presented with conflicting testimony, the fact finder may believe one witness and 

disbelieve others, and it may resolve inconsistencies in the testimony of any 

witness. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986). The 

reviewing court “must not merely substitute its judgment for that of the jury.” 

Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 761. 

After Toyota, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed an order granting a 

new trial on the ground that the jury’s finding in favor of the defendants was

 

3. Should the new trial order or the judge’s findings of fact control in the 

event of any discrepancy?

4. What weight do we give the trial judge’s findings versus the jury’s 

findings?

5. Assuming the interest of justice alone is insufficient to grant a new trial, 

how do we incorporate that finding by the trial judge?
8

against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See In re Baker, 420 

S.W.3d 397, 400 (Tex. App—Texarkana 2014, orig. proceeding). The appellate 

court framed the issues in the case as whether the plaintiffs had met their burden to 

prove that the relator had breached his duty of care and that such negligence was a 

proximate cause of the their injuries. Id. at 400. The court set forth the factual 

sufficiency standard of review, reviewed all the evidence, observed that the case 

turned on the relator’s credibility, and held that evidence was factually sufficient to 

support the adverse finding if the evidence was such that reasonable minds could 

differ on the meaning of the evidence or inferences and conclusions drawn 

therefrom. Id. at 402−04. The court, therefore, concluded that “the grant of the 

new trial improperly intruded on the jury’s province,” and the trial should have 

rendered judgment on the verdict. Id. at 404; see also In re Zimmer, Inc., No. 05-

14-00940-CV, — S.W.3d —, 2014 WL 6613043, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 

21, 2014, orig. proceeding) (stating that “we see no reason to believe the standards 

for factual sufficiency review in new trial mandamus proceedings should differ 

from the standards of review on appeal,” and holding, after a cumbersome review 

of the forty-one-volume record, that the trial court incorrectly substituted its 

credibility decisions for those of the jury and weighed the evidence differently than 

the jury weighed the evidence).

5

 

 

5

The First Court of Appeals addressed a new trial order, which granted a new trial based 

in part on the trial court’s determination that the jury’s finding that the insurance company did 

not breach the homeowner’s policy was contrary to great weight and preponderance of the 

evidence. See In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. 01-13-00508-CV, — S.W.3d —, 2014 WL 

4109756, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21, 2014, orig. proceeding [mand. filed]). 

The court stated that it must review “all the evidence in a light favorable to the verdict and must 

assume that the jurors resolved all conflicts in the evidence in accordance with the verdict.” Id.

at *7 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 821 (Tex. 2005)). The appellate court 
9

Real parties take the position that, in conducting the traditional factual 

sufficiency review, the appellate courts will not give any deference to the trial 

court’s “significant discretion” in granting new trials. Instead, according to real 

parties, the appellate courts will essentially be performing their own de novo 

factual sufficiency review of the cold record to reach a different conclusion. 

The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that “appellate courts benefit from 

the hindsight that a complete record provides. Trial courts, on the other hand, must 

make difficult, often dispositive, decisions based on their recollection and best 

judgment alone, frequently without the aid of full records, transcripts, or briefing.” 

Toyota Motor Sales, 407 S.W.3d at 761. However, the court also made clear that 

the trial court’s stated reasons for granting a new trial must be supported by record. 

See id. at 759 (“Having concluded that the reasons articulated in a trial order are 

reviewable on the merits by mandamus, we now evaluate the trial court’s grant of 

new trial against the underlying record.”). Moreover, while the court has not 

retreated from its position that trial courts have significant discretion in granting 

new trials, “such discretion should not, and does not permit a trial judge to 

substitute his or her own views for that of the jury without a valid basis.” 

Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 212. 

 

found that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial on this ground. We note 

that, in citing to City of Keller, the court articulated the standard for reviewing the legal 

sufficiency of the evidence. See Augusta Barge Co. v. Five B’s, Inc., No. 01-13-00092-CV, 

2014 WL 4219449, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 26, 2014, no. pet. h.) (mem. op.) 

(“In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it.”); see also

Wells v. Johnson, 443 S.W.3d 479, 493(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014, pet. filed) (explaining that, 

in conducting a factual sufficiency review, the court of appeals does not consider the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the finding). 
10

The position advocated by real parties would leave the courts of appeals 

with no ability to review new trial orders based on factual insufficiency. We do 

not believe this is the result intended by the Texas Supreme Court in providing for 

mandamus review of new trial orders. In a mandamus proceeding, we may not 

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 56. But 

neither may the trial court substitute its judgment for that of the jury in granting a 

new trial. Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 212. The method for ensuring that the trial 

court does not substitute its judgment for that of the jury, is to confirm that the 

court’s reasons for granting a new trial are valid and correct, i.e., supported by the 

trial record. See Toyota Motor Sales, 407 S.W.3d at 758 (“If . . . a trial court’s 

articulated reasons are not supported by the underlying record, the new trial order 

cannot stand.”). Thus, using a factual sufficiency standard, we will engage in a 

review of the entire trial record to determine whether it supports the trial court’s

reasons for granting a new trial. If the record does not support the trial court’s 

stated reasons, then the trial court will have abused its discretion in granting a new 

trial. See id. at 761 (holding the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new 

trial because the record did not support the articulated reason). 

II. BACKGROUND

ExxonMobil processes crude oil at its refinery to turn it into gasoline. A byproduct of that process is tar. A “flexicoker” unit at the refinery breaks down the 

tar into pure carbon at 1300 degrees. The carbon, which is like sand, is called 

“coke.” The coke is “heated up and sent back to the reactor” as the source of heat 

for the reactor. 
11

ExxonMobil performs a “turnaround” on the flexicoker unit about every two 

to three years, during which maintenance is performed on the unit. It takes about 

two years to plan the turnaround, and the unit has to be shut down for the 

maintenance work to be performed. As part of the turnaround process, the heater 

of the flexicoker unit, which is about 1300 degrees, must be cooled down in order 

for the maintenance work to be performed. Water and steam are sprayed from 

nozzles to cool down the heater. Because coke builds ups in the spray nozzles and

clogs them, ExxonMobil designed the system so that, during the time between the 

turnarounds, the spray nozzles were replaced with “dummy nozzles.” The only 

function of the dummy nozzles was to act as “placeholders” for the spray nozzles. 

To remove the dummy nozzle, a worker would pull the nozzle out a certain 

distance, but not so far as to pull it out of the heater. An ExxonMobil employee 

would shut the gate valve, which acted as a barrier to keep the steam and coke 

from coming out. The dummy nozzle could then be pulled out all the way out. A 

safety chain was installed on the nozzle. When installed properly, the safety chain 

only allowed the dummy nozzle to be pulled out a certain distance so that the

nozzle was not pulled out too far before the gate valve was closed and thereby 

letting steam and water escape. 

On July 3, 2011, McBride and Burns, as LWL, Inc. employees, were 

assigned to remove the dummy nozzles. They were pulling out a dummy nozzle, 

when it came out too far, the gate valve was not shut, and steam and coke spewed 

out of the heater. McBride and Burns were thrown, and stem and coke were 

sprayed on them, causing burns and other injuries. 
12

Subsequent to the accident, ExxonMobil performed a root cause analysis and 

determined that the safety chain had been “anchored to the wrong location 

allowing the nozzle to be detached completely out of its packing before the chain 

stopped.” ExxonMobil also determined that Wyatt had put the dummy nozzles 

back in place and reattached the safety chain in the previous turnaround in 2008. 

McBride and Burns sued Wyatt for negligence, negligence per se, and gross 

negligence for improperly installing a safety chain. They also sued ExxonMobil, 

which settled the case before trial. 

The case went to trial on January 30, 2013. Wyatt did not dispute that the 

safety chain was installed in an incorrect location, the condition was unreasonably

dangerous, or real parties were not warned of the incorrect installation. Wyatt, 

however, disputed that it was the contractor that put the dummy nozzles back in

place and reattached the safety chains in 2008. Real parties argued to the jury that 

Wyatt was solely liable, ExxonMobil was not liable because it had no actual 

knowledge that the safety chains were in an incorrect location, and LWL bore no 

responsibility for the accident. 

On February 13, 2013, the jury reached a verdict, finding that (1) Wyatt was 

not negligent; (2) LWL was not negligent; (3) ExxonMobil exercised or retained 

some control over the manner in which the work in question was performed, other 

than the right to order the work to start or stop or to inspect progress or receive 

reports; and (4) ExxonMobil’s negligence with respect to the condition of the 

dummy nozzle system proximately caused the occurrence. Although the jury 

found damages for McBride ($902,681.41) and Burns ($2,905,898.95), neither 
13

would recover because of the jury’s no-negligence finding as to Wyatt and 

ExxonMobil’s settlement prior to trial. 

III. REAL PARTIES’ MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL & COURT’S ORDER

Real parties filed a motion for new trial, arguing (1) the jury’s findings that 

Wyatt was not negligent and the accident was caused by Exxon’s negligence were

contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence; and (2) Wyatt’s 

injection of collateral sources into the evidence tainted the verdict. 

On March 4, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on real parties’ motion for 

new trial and ordered a new trial as follows: 

The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial, all 

responsive briefing, the arguments of counsel, and the Court’s own 

observations during the trial of this case. The Court believes 

Plaintiffs’ motion is meritorious and should be granted.

The jury’s answer to Question 1(a) was contrary to the 

overwhelming weight of the evidence. The great and overwhelming 

preponderance of the evidence showed that the safety chain at issue in 

this case was installed in an incorrect location. The great weight and 

overwhelming preponderance of the evidence also showed that the 

incorrect location of the safety chain created an unreasonably 

dangerous condition. The great weight and overwhelming 

preponderance of the evidence introduced at trial confirmed that 

Defendant Wyatt Field Services Company installed the safety chain in 

2008 and that the chain remained in the same location until July 3, 

2011. Further, the great weight and overwhelming preponderance of 

evidence introduced at trial confirmed that Plaintiffs were never 

warned that the safety chain was incorrectly installed and had no 

reason to be aware of the danger. The interests of justice require a 

new trial.
14

A new trial is also required because Defendant and its witnesses 

regularly injected evidence of collateral sources into the case in 

violation of the Court’s order granting Plaintiff’s [sic] motion in 

limine on this topic. This inadmissible evidence tainted the jury’s 

verdict. Good cause and the interests of justice require the Court to 

grant a new trial.

On April 9, 2013, the trial court entered the following findings of fact in 

support of its new trial order, addressing ExxonMobil’s actual knowledge, in 

addition to the prior grounds expressed in its order March 4, 2013 order:

1. The jury’s finding that Defendant Wyatt Field Services 

Company was not negligent is against the great weight and 

preponderance of the evidence.

2. The jury’s finding that Defendant Wyatt Field Services 

Company was not negligent renders the jury’s verdict 

manifestly unjust.

3. The jury’s finding that ExxonMobil had actual knowledge of 

any unreasonable risk of harm/condition is not supported by 

factually sufficient evidence.

4. The jury’s finding that ExxonMobil had actual knowledge of 

any unreasonable risk of harm/condition renders the jury’s 

verdict manifestly unjust.

5. Based on the combination of factually insufficient liability 

findings concerning Defendant Wyatt Field Services Company 

and ExxonMobil, the Court finds that the jury failed to follow 

the Court’s instructions and simply decided to place all 

responsibility on ExxonMobil without regard to the legal 

standards set forth in the Court’s charge.

6. Defendant Wyatt Field Services Company repeatedly violated 

the Court’s order granting Plaintiff’s motion in limine.
15

7. Defendant Wyatt Field Services Company ignored this Court’s 

admonishments about the motion in limine.

8. Defendant Wyatt Field Services Company’s repeated injection 

of information into this case that was inadmissible, including 

but not limited to information regarding benefits available to 

Plaintiff from collateral sources, tainted the verdict and 

rendered it manifestly unjust.

The trial court also entered the following conclusions of law:

1. The Court concludes that it is entitled to grant a new trial when 

it finds the jury verdict is contrary to the great weight or is not 

supported by factually sufficient evidence.

2. The Court concludes that it is entitled to grant a new trial when 

it finds that the injection of inflammatory collateral matters 

(such as collateral sources) poisons the verdict.

3. The Court concludes that it is entitled to grant a new trial when 

it is required in the interest of justice.

This mandamus followed. Wyatt claims the trial court abused its discretion 

in granting real parties’ motion for new trial because (1) the jury’s finding that 

Wyatt was not negligent was not against the great weight and preponderance of the 

evidence; (2) the jury’s finding that ExxonMobil had actual knowledge of the 

condition that caused the injuries was immaterial and could have no impact on the 

verdict after the jury had found Wyatt was not negligent; (3) any violations of the 

motion in limine on collateral sources made no mention of any fact bearing on 

Wyatt’s liability; and (4) the Texas Supreme Court has disapproved of granting a 

new trial based on the “interests of justice.”
16

The new trial was granted following a very long and very expensive jury 

trial. We find that this case presents the “exceptional circumstances” found in 

Columbia to warrant mandamus review. See 290 S.W.3d at 208−210.

The trial court’s new trial order and the findings of fact reflect that the bases 

for granting a new trial are (1) the jury’s findings that ExxonMobil was negligent 

and Wyatt was not were against the great weight and preponderance of the 

evidence; and (2) Wyatt’s repeated injection of collateral source evidence into the 

case violated the motion in limine order and tainted the jury’s verdict. We hold 

that these are reasonably specific reasons facially comporting “with Columbia’s

procedural ‘form’ requirements.” See Toyota Motor Sales, 407 S.W.3d at 759 

(comparing new trial order in that case with new trial order at issue in Columbia, 

which merely asserted “in the interest of justice” as the basis for granting a new 

trial). The stated reasons for granting the new trial here—the jury’s verdict is 

against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and evidence injected 

into the record in violation of a limine order tainted the verdict—are also legally 

appropriate and satisfy United Scaffolding. See In re United Servs. Auto Ass’n,

2014 WL 4109756, at *7 (holding “against the great weight and preponderance of 

the evidence” is a legally appropriate basis for granting a new trial); In re City of 

Houston, 418 S.W.3d 388, 393 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, orig. 

proceeding) (holding that the order granting a new trial on violations of a limine 

order, among other bases, satisfied United Scaffolding standard). 

Having determined that the new trial order facially complies with the 

requirements articulated in Columbia and United Scaffolding, we must determine 

whether the trial court’s stated reasons for granting a new trial are valid and correct 
17

by conducting a careful “merits review” of the record. See Toyota Motor Sales, 

407 S.W.3d at 759 (“Simply articulating understandable, reasonably specific, and 

legally appropriate reasons is not enough; the reasons must be valid and correct.”).

IV. JURY’S NO-LIABILITY FINDING AS TO WYATT

In its first issue, Wyatt claims that the trial court’s finding that the jury’s 

verdict as to Wyatt’s negligence was against the great weight and preponderance of 

the evidence is not supported by the record. The trial court set forth the following 

in support of its finding: (1) the safety chain was installed in an incorrect location; 

(2) the incorrect location of the safety chain created an unreasonably dangerous 

condition; (3) Wyatt installed the safety chain in 2008, and it remained in the same 

location until July 3, 2011; and (4) real parties were never warned that the safety 

chain was incorrectly installed and had no reason to be aware of the danger.

Wyatt did not dispute at trial that the safety chain was installed in an 

incorrect location, the condition was unreasonably dangerous, or that real parties 

were not warned of the incorrect installation. Instead, Wyatt only disputed that it 

installed the safety chain in 2008, and that the chain remained in the same location 

until July 3, 2011. 

Robert Merryman, who was recently retired, had worked as a turnaround 

planner for ExxonMobil since 1990. Merryman testified that the 2008 turnaround 

involved about 20,000 activities. ExxonMobil kept track of the activities and the 

schedule with a computer program known as “Primavera.” The Primavera printout 

for the 2008 turnaround showed that Wyatt reinstalled the dummy nozzles and 

reconnected the safety chains. Merryman saw no documents suggesting that any 

contractor other than Wyatt installed the safety chain. Merryman also testified 
18

that, if another contractor had replaced the dummy nozzles and safety chains, then

such contractor would have wanted credit and compensation for the work.

Peter Howell, plaintiff’s expert in refineries and process safety, testified that,

based on the documents and Primavera, Wyatt was assigned the job of reinstalling 

the dummy nozzles and connecting safety chains to the nozzles. Furthermore, 

Howell testified about Plaintiff’s Exhibit 22, an email chain regarding which 

contractor replaced the dummy nozzles and reattached the safety chains. Tim 

McCarthy, refinery manager for the fuels department, which included the 

flexicoker unit, led ExxonMobil’s root cause investigation. McCarthy sent an 

email, on August 3, 2011, to Tommy Stanley, a turnaround manager, asking who 

had performed the dummy nozzle installation in the 2008 turnaround; Stanley 

replied that Wyatt had performed the work in 2008. Howell testified that he did 

not see any documents showing that Wyatt did not do the work; instead, all the 

documents he reviewed showed that Wyatt had done the work. Howell further 

testified that ExxonMobil hired Wyatt to the do the quality control, which means 

that Wyatt was to make sure all the work had “been done per the drawings.” 

Howell stated that either Wyatt did not perform the quality control or it did not do 

it properly.

Wyatt’s expert, Russ Elveston, who worked as an OSHA safety compliance 

officer for almost thirty years, stated on cross-examination that Wyatt was assigned 

the job of putting in the safety chains and “more likely than not that Wyatt did it.” 

Elveston further explained that “[i]t showed up on at least one or two documents 

that indicated that [Wyatt] would be assigned it.” Elveston noted that the 

documents showing Wyatt did the work all stem from the Primavera entry. 
19

However, Elveston limited his response that Wyatt performed the work: “To say 

with one hundred percent certainty that they did it, I won’t do it.” 

Wyatt’s corporate representative, James Jordan, testified regarding whether 

Wyatt performed the work. Jordan stated that “[w]e have nothing yet that actually 

confirms” that Wyatt installed the chain in 2008, even though Jordan had gone 

through Wyatt’s documents trying to find information that would confirm that 

Wyatt did the work. Jordan stated that the documents showing that Wyatt did the 

work are “all based on that Primavera.” With regard to Primavera, Jordan testified 

that “[o]n face value, that document says that Wyatt — it was Wyatt’s work.” 

However, Jordan said “there should be more documents out there that indicate 

when it was done, who did it, and have all the sign-offs accordingly.” Jordan 

admitted that he had seen not seen any documents showing that Wyatt had been 

pulled off the job of installing the chains. Jordan testified that ExxonMobil did the 

quality control on Wyatt’s work in 2008.

There was also evidence that the dummy nozzle and chain had not been 

changed or worked on since the 2008 turnaround. Howell explained that a work 

order would be required for any work to have been performed on the dummy 

nozzles. ExxonMobil provided Howell with a list of all work orders for the 

flexicoker unit for the period between 2008 and July 3, 2011. None of the work 

orders showed that there was any work performed on the dummy nozzles. 

Jordan also testified that he did not have any documents showing that the 

chain had been moved between 2008 and July 3, 2011. Elveston explained that, if 

it had just been a single nozzle, there would be a possibility that the chain had been 

changed. Elveston further stated that “[s]ince all of them were set up the same way 
20

and there was no evidence that any changes had been made, although, again, you 

cannot rely on two and a half years. You’re not absolutely sure that something 

didn’t happen.” 

Real parties argue there was undisputed proof that no one was likely to go 

near the safety chains without a reason and specific authorization. Howell testified 

that the dummy nozzles are located on platform forty feet above the ground, next 

to the heater, which reaches a temperature of 1300 degrees. McBride and Burns 

participated in an hour-long general safety meeting and a “toolbox meeting” to 

discuss what they were going to and how they were going to do it. They also did a 

walk-through with their LWL supervisor. An air-conditioning vent was set to blow

on them. McBride stated that they were going to work in twenty-minute shifts 

because of the heat. They wore fire retardant clothing, vests with ice packs, 

aluminized suits, which are four inches thick, “boots that go over our boots,” 

jackets, gloves, and helmets. In other words, any alleged subsequent work on the 

dummy nozzles and chain would require planning. 

Wyatt argues that despite the findings that it had installed the safety chain in 

2008, and that the chain remained in the same location until July 3, 2011, the 

grounds stated by the trial court do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 

Wyatt was negligent. Wyatt asserts that the jury was presented with evidence of 

the deficiency of the ExxonMobil’s engineering drawings, which could have led 

the jury to determine that Wyatt was not negligent. Wyatt was to have received 

engineering drawings in connection with the work on the dummy nozzles. 

Elveston testified that ExxonMobil’s engineer drawing “is less than ideal. Going 

strictly by the drawing and what we saw out there is not really representative of 
21

what was out there.” Elveston further stated “The drawing . . . does not have some 

of the elements that I would expect to see on it.” 

Elveston also testified that “the diagram with the little bubble that says the 

chain is supposed to be attached here” that was on the engineering drawing was not 

a warning. There was no procedure describing the purpose of chain, which was 

referred to as the “blow out” chain in the documents. He explained that there was 

“no mention of safety, warning any type of caution, make sure it’s done this way, 

there is no procedure going. . . . A drawing is a nice reference but without a 

written procedure and going through it step by step to make sure and including all 

the hazards that’s going to be there and all the precautions necessary it’s just not —

it just doesn’t meet the requirements to the standard.” Elveston concluded that 

“you have the procedures to tell you how to put stuff in the right place.” 

Howell stated in his report that the design of the dummy nozzle system was 

inadequate. Howell’s testimony at trial differed: “The design could have been 

better than what it was and it could have been designed so that this incident would 

not have occurred, but the design that they had was adequate.” Howell testified to 

the lack of written procedures for the system.

Howell testified that Wyatt was provided with a drawing that “showed 

exactly where it’s supposed to be attached,” but the drawing is not a “written 

procedure.” Howell explained that there were no written procedures for safely 

removing and installing dummy nozzles and he believed that ExxonMobil should 

have had such written procedures. According to Howell, without written 

procedures, it is difficult to ensure that the contractors’ workers are properly 

trained, including for the task of reinstalling the dummy nozzles. These
22

procedures can reduce human error such as attaching the safety chain in the wrong 

place, and, if there had been a written procedure for attaching the chain in the 

correct location, along with a reference to the drawing, “[i]t would have reduced 

the probability of this incident.” 

Howell also explained that, if the ExxonMobil employees, who were present 

before and during the removal of the dummy nozzle, had been properly trained, 

they would have seen that the safety chain was not properly installed and could 

have stopped the job until the chain had been correctly installed. According to 

Howell, ExxonMobil has the responsibility to train employees to perform specific 

jobs such as installing or withdrawing the dummy nozzle. 

Howell further testified that ExxonMobil performed an inadequate job 

hazards analysis concerning the dummy nozzles. ExxonMobil did not consider a 

blowout when the dummy nozzle was retracted, which would expose workers to 

high temperature hydrocarbons and poisonous hydrogen sulfide. 

We have reviewed all the evidence, both that which supports and contradicts 

the jury’s finding that Wyatt was not negligent. See Maritime Overseas Corp., 971 

S.W.2d at 406−07. The evidence regarding whether Wyatt performed the 

installation of the safety chains in 2008 was disputed at trial. The jury could have 

found Jordan’s testimony that he found nothing in Wyatt’s files to confirm that 

Wyatt had done the work was more credible than the testimony based on a single 

computer entry showing that Wyatt had done the work. See Golden Eagle 

Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 761; McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 697. The reason for 

the improper installation was also disputed. The jury could have given more 

weight to testimony that ExxonMobil’s design of the dummy nozzle system was 
23

not adequate and that this accident might not have happened if ExxonMobil had 

had written procedures concerning the proper installation of the safety chain. 

Given the presence of conflicting evidence and the jury’s apparent resolution of 

credibility of witnesses and giving greater weight to evidence favoring Wyatt, the 

jury’s finding that Wyatt was not negligent is not against the great weight and 

preponderance of the evidence. Thus, we hold that the trial court abused its 

discretion by finding that the jury’s answer that Wyatt was not negligent is against 

the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 

212 (explaining that the trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

jury when it grants a new trial). We sustain Wyatt’s first issue.

V. JURY’S LIABILITY FINDING AS TO EXXONMOBIL

In its second issue, Wyatt contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

by granting real parties a new trial based on its finding that there was no evidence 

that ExxonMobil had actual knowledge of the condition that caused real parties’ 

injuries. Wyatt primarily argues that any error by the jury in finding ExxonMobil 

liable could have no effect on the verdict after the no-liability finding as to Wyatt 

and, therefore, was harmless. 

A jury question is immaterial when it should not have been submitted, or 

when it was properly submitted but has been rendered immaterial by other 

findings. Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1994). 

A jury question is also immaterial when its answer can be found elsewhere in the 
24

verdict or when its answer cannot alter the effect of the verdict.6 City of 

Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. 1995). 

As addressed above, we have concluded that granting a new trial based on 

the jury’s no-liability finding as to Wyatt was against the great weight and 

preponderance of the evidence is not a valid reason because it is not supported by 

the record. Real parties settled with ExxonMobil prior to trial and will not recover 

any damages from ExxonMobil as a result of any verdict against it. Thus, the 

jury’s no-liability finding in favor of Wyatt renders any liability finding against 

ExxonMobil immaterial. Cf. Ramsey v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 623, 635 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (“A zero award presents no 

reversible error when the jury finds on sufficient evidence that defendant 

committed no negligent act, because even if damages were awarded, the trial court 

would still be required to enter the take-nothing judgment it did enter.”). We 

sustain Wyatt’s second issue.

VI. MOTION IN LIMINE

In its third issue, Wyatt claims the trial court abused its discretion by 

granting real parties’ motion for new trial based on violations of the court’s limine 

order prohibiting the introduction of collateral source evidence without first 

approaching the bench for a ruling. 

 

6 Real parties assert that the jury’s answer on Wyatt’s liability is not the only relevant 

finding at issue. According to real parties, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 does not require 

trial courts to consider each jury answer in a vacuum. “When it appears that a new trial should 

be granted on a point or points that affect only a part of the matters in controversy and that such 

part is clearly separable without unfairness to the parties, the court may grant a new trial as to 

that part only.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 320. Without explanation, real parties contend that the trial court 

cannot grant a separate trial as to only a part of this case. 
25

There were two occasions in which collateral source evidence was brought 

up in front of the jury. Both instances involved Wyatt’s attorney questioning 

Robert Cox, Wyatt’s vocational rehabilitation expert, on direct examination. The 

following took place in the first incident:

Q. Okay. And to the extent that and this seems like a silly 

question. If you basically — If I tell you he can’t lift anything. He 

can’t look up, he can’t climb, he can’t turn his head and 

psychologically he can’t join the workforce, I mean, do you have any 

options for vocational rehabilitation?

A. No, ma’am.

Q. Okay.

A. If a person has those sorts of limitations then I would try to 

get them signed up for Social Security for disability.

MR. J. ITKIN: Objection, your Honor.

MR. C. ITKIN: Your Honor, can we approach, please?

The trial court then conducted a bench conference outside the hearing of the 

jury. Real parties’ counsel did not request an instruction to disregard, but 

suggested that Cox be admonished when the court took a break.

Wyatt’s attorney then resumed direct examination of Cox, and the following 

testimony came out:

Q. Okay. And you — do you sometimes recommend some 

additional training for folks to get into a position where they have 

other job opportunities available?

A. Yes. Short term, on-the-job training.
26

Q. Okay. Could be even, I mean, it could be a long time but if 

you have training for three, four, five, six months, does that open up 

more opportunities to you?

A. Not to me but to the person who is trying to get reemployment, yes, ma’am.

Q. Fair enough.

A. If I may say to be sure that everyone understands these are 

services that are available throughout Texas, through the Department 

of —

MR. ITKIN: Your Honor —

The trial court then announced that they were going to take a break. While 

the jury was out of the courtroom, the trial court instructed Cox not to testify about 

government assistance or any other collateral source for compensation. Real 

parties’ counsel suggested including an instruction in the jury charge not to 

consider collateral source evidence rather than giving an instruction to disregard 

when the jury returned to the courtroom because that would have called more 

attention to Cox’s testimony. The trial court stated that it was granting real parties’

request for jury charge instruction.

Later, at the charge conference, real parties’ counsel reminded the trial court 

that “[w]e had the issue of collateral benefits. I think we agreed between the party

[sic] to put an instruction in.” Wyatt objected to the inclusion of such an 

instruction in the charge, and real parties then stated they could take up the issue 

post-trial.

Wyatt argues that the testimony makes no mention of any fact that could 

possibly bear on Wyatt’s liability, and the jury’s damages findings are immaterial 
27

in light of the no-liability finding in favor of Wyatt. The purpose of a motion in 

limine is to prevent the other party from asking prejudicial questions and 

introducing evidence in front of the jury without first asking the court’s 

permission. Weidner v. Sanchez, 14 S.W.3d 353, 363 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2000, no pet.). A motion in limine preserves nothing for review. In re R.V., 

Jr., 977 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). The 

complaining party must immediately object and also request the trial court to 

instruct the jury to disregard the evidence. State Bar of Tex. v. Evans, 774 S.W.2d 

656, 658 n.6 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam); Weidner, 14 S.W.3d at 363. 

When evidence is placed before the jury in violation of a motion in limine, 

an instruction to disregard is generally sufficient to cure error. Barnes v. Univ. 

Fed. Credit Union, No. 03-10-00147-CV, 2013 WL 1748788, at *12 (Tex. App.—

Austin Apr. 18, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). Violations of an order on a motion in 

limine are incurable if instructions to the jury would not eliminate the danger of 

prejudice. Onstad v. Wright, 54 S.W.3d 799, 805 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, 

pet. denied) (citing Dennis v. Hulse, 362 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1962)). 

Generally, the failure to request the court to instruct the jury to disregard the 

testimony results in waiver of the alleged error where the instruction would have 

cured the error. In re B.W., 99 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2003, no pet.). In that situation, the reviewing court determines whether an 

instruction to disregard would not have cured the error. Barnes, 2013 WL 

1748788, at *12; Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Barrera, No. 04-08-00681-CV, 2010 WL 

307878, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 27, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 
28

When a trial court instructs the jury to disregard evidence offered in 

violation of a motion in limine, the reviewing court may review the evidence to 

determine whether an instruction to disregard was adequate to cure its admission. 

In re City of Houston, 418 S.W.3d at 397 (citing Dyer v. Cotton, 333 S.W.3d 703, 

715 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.)). A new trial may be justified 

if the impact of the improper testimony was incurable by the trial court’s 

instructions. Id. (citing Dove v. Dir., State Emps. Workers’ Comp. Div., 857 

S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied)). 

In City of Houston, the court of appeals found that the trial court abused its 

discretion by granting a motion for new trial for the plaintiffs for the violation of a 

limine order. Id. The plaintiffs sued the City after a police vehicle hit the 

plaintiffs’ vehicle while responding to the report of a suspected drunk driver. Id. at 

391. The jury found that the City bore 60 percent of the responsibility and the 

driver of the other vehicle bore the remaining responsibility. Id. The jury also 

found that the officer was performing a discretionary duty, in good faith, and 

within the scope of his authority, establishing one of the City’s affirmative 

defenses and relieving it of liability. Id. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ 

motions for new trial—one of the grounds being violations of the motion in limine 

prohibiting any mention of the issuance of the citation to the driver. Id. at 391−92, 

397. The officer, however, mentioned the citation in his testimony. Id. at 397. 

The trial court promptly sustained the objection by the driver’s counsel, granted a 

motion to strike the testimony, and instructed the jury to disregard the testimony 

about the citation. Id. 
29

On mandamus review of the new trial order, the court reviewed the evidence 

to determine whether the instruction to disregard was adequate to cure the 

admission of the prohibited evidence. Id. The court held that there was no reason 

to conclude that the instruction actually failed to cure the effect of the improper 

testimony. Id. The issuance of a citation was relevant only to the issue of who 

bore responsibility for causing the accident, and the jury found the City bore the 

greatest responsibility for the accident despite having heard that the plaintiff had 

received a citation. Id. Because the improper testimony had nothing to with the 

affirmative defense of “discretionary duty,” on which the City prevailed, the 

testimony was ultimately harmless, even if it had not been disregarded by the jury. 

Id.

The court in City of Houston applied the standard for reviewing the violation 

of a motion in limine when an instruction to disregard was given. See id. (“When a 

trial court instructs the jury to disregard evidence offered in violation of a motion 

in limine, we may review that evidence to determine whether an instruction to 

disregard was adequate to cure its admission.”). Here, the record shows that no 

instruction was given either at the time of the objection or in the jury charge; 

therefore, we consider the evidence to determine whether an instruction would 

have cured the violations. However, as addressed below, the admission of Cox’s 

testimony in violation of the limine order was harmless, regardless of whether an 

instruction would or would not have cured the violations. 

The collateral source rule is both a rule of evidence and damages. Taylor v. 

Am. Fabritech, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 613, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004,

pet. denied). The collateral source rule precludes any reduction in a tortfeasor’s 
30

liability because of benefits received by the plaintiff from someone else. Haygood 

v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 394 (Tex. 2011). In other words, the defendant 

is not entitled to present evidence of, or obtain an offset for, funds received by the 

plaintiff from a collateral source. Taylor, 132 S.W.3d at 626. The jury’s damages 

findings are not relevant in light of the jury’s no-negligence finding as to Wyatt. 

Consequently, Wyatt’s violation of the trial court’ limine order could not have 

affected the jury’s finding that Wyatt was not negligent, and any violation was 

harmless. See City of Houston, 418 S.W.3d at 397 (“[A] harmless error cannot 

constitute ‘good cause’ for granting a new trial.”). We sustain Wyatt’s third issue.

VII. “IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE”

In its fourth issue, Wyatt contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

granting the new trial “in the interest of justice.” Wyatt raised this issue in its first 

petition for writ of mandamus, and we held that the trial court abused its discretion 

by including “in the interest of justice” as a ground for granting a new trial because 

it is no longer an independently sufficiently specific reason for granting a new trial. 

Wyatt Field Serv. Co., 2013 WL 6506749, at *3 (citing United Scaffolding, 377

S.W.3d at 689−90; Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 215). We reiterate our previous 

holding. Having held that the trial court’s other three reasons for granting a new 

trial, i.e., the jury’s findings that Wyatt was not negligent and ExxonMobil was 

negligent and the introduction of collateral source evidence tainted the jury’s 

verdict, are not valid and correct reasons, the sole remaining basis for granting the 

new trial is “in the interest of justice.” Again, because this is not an independently 

sufficiently specific reason for granting a new trial, the trial court abused its 

discretion by granting a new trial on this ground. See United Scaffolding, 377 
31

S.W.3d at 689−90 (stating “in the interest of justice” is never an independently 

sufficient reason for granting a new trial); Columbia, 290 S.W.3d (“Broad 

statements such as ‘in the interest of justice’ are not sufficiently specific.”). We 

sustain Wyatt’s fourth issue.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Having sustained all of Wyatt’s issues, we conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion by granting real parties’ motion for new trial and Wyatt has 

no adequate remedy by appeal. Therefore, we conditionally grant Wyatt’s petition 

for writ of mandamus and order the trial court to (1) vacate its March 4, 2013 order 

granting real parties’ motion for new trial; and (2) render judgment on the jury’s 

verdict. The writ will only issue if the trial court does not act in accordance with 

this opinion.

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jamison, and McCally. (McCally, J., 

dissenting).