In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-1130

HAICHUN LIU,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR. , Attorney General

of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A097-838-869.

ARGUED AUGUST 7, 2012—DECIDED AUGUST 31, 2012

Before POSNER, TINDER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Haichun Liu, a 50-year-old

native and citizen of China, came to the United States

over a decade ago after protesting the loss of his job at

a state-owned factory. He petitions for review of an order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals upholding the

immigration judge’s denial of his requests for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the United
2 No. 12-1130

Nations Convention Against Torture. Because the

Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,

we deny the petition.

Liu arrived in the United States as a nonimmigrant

visitor in 2000 and overstayed. He came to the government’s attention while working at a restaurant in Wisconsin. The government began removal proceedings

against him in 2008, charging him with overstaying and

violating the conditions of his admission. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(1)(B), (C)(i). Liu conceded removability but

sought asylum and withholding of removal based on

political opinion, as well as relief under the Convention

Against Torture.

At a hearing before the immigration judge, Liu — who

is from the large industrial city of Fushun (Liaoning

Province) in China’s northeastern rustbelt — testified that

he was persecuted after protesting layoffs at Huafeng,

a state-owned machinery factory. Liu worked at

Huafeng as a welder from 1980 until 1999, when he and

half the workforce were laid off because of the factory’s

restructuring. Liu met with a company manager three

times to ask for his job and benefits back. At the third

meeting, Liu brought along sixteen co-workers and

pled that they had to “get back our insurances and benefits” to survive. Liu testified that he became “very emotional” during the meeting and used “aggressive” language

and swear words. The manager accused the group of

making trouble. After the meeting devolved into “verbal

quarrels,” Liu testified, security personnel handcuffed

him and brought him to the police station, where
No. 12-1130 3

officers accused him of “interfering with the social order.” The next day jail inmates interrogated Liu. When

he refused to answer, the inmates beat him — kicking

him, pulling his hair, hitting him with a belt, and

knocking his head against a wall — for ten minutes until

he lost consciousness.

Liu was released from the police station five days

later after he admitted to wrongdoing and, he testified,

promised not to “make such a scene again” or to “report

on the company anymore.” He went to the hospital for

an x-ray and medications. (Liu testified that he did

not know the x-ray results, but that his body was

bruised and swollen and he had internal injuries in

his lower back.) Later Liu wrote an anonymous letter to

the civil complaints department of the municipal government complaining, he testified, about “how corrupted

the company leadership was” and how “despite the

hardship of the worker’s life,” they still laid off many

workers. He did not keep a copy of the letter because,

he said, he feared revenge. Presumably because the

letter was anonymous, Liu received no response to it.

He testified, however, that the municipal government

knew the letter was written by “one of the people who

was laid off by this company.” Public officials later

told Liu’s wife that he would face “serious consequences”

if he continued to make trouble. Five months later, Liu

left China for the United States, but he learned from

his wife that officials often came by their home asking

about his whereabouts. At the hearing, Liu testified that

he never belonged to any political organization in China
4 No. 12-1130

or the United States, and he acknowledged that he

“didn’t do anything to protest or criticize the government of China.”

The immigration judge found Liu removable and

denied his applications for relief. Liu was ineligible

for asylum, the judge found, because he filed his application eight years after arriving in the United States

and failed to show that he fell within an exception to

the one-year filing deadline. Liu was ineligible for withholding of removal, the judge determined, because his

alleged persecution did not occur on account of a

political opinion: Liu did not engage “in political agitation

against state corruption,” the judge explained, and “did

not publicly express any opposition.” Although Liu sent

an anonymous letter about corruption, he offered no

evidence that authorities knew he wrote it. Ultimately,

the judge found, Liu was a “private actor” whose “emotional outburst led to his detention.” The judge also

said that Liu’s medical treatment after the beating suggested only “superficial injury.” And although his testimony was credible, the judge noted, Liu did not corroborate it with letters from family or friends. The judge

found that the police visits to Liu’s wife did not establish

a clear probability of future persecution because his

family remained unharmed. Finally, the judge found Liu

ineligible for Convention Against Torture protection

because he failed to show that he would likely

be tortured upon returning to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed with the judge’s rationale

and upheld the decision.
No. 12-1130 5

In his petition, Liu first asserts that the immigration judge wrongly dismissed his asylum application

as untimely and insists he provided a “legally sound

reason to establish an exceptional circumstance” to

the one-year bar. But Liu does not identify why extraordinary or changed circumstances excuse his late

filing, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D), so his undeveloped

contentions are waived. See Raghunathan v. Holder, 604

F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2010); Wang v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d

993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006). Because Liu did not discuss the

Convention Against Torture claim in his opening brief,

he has waived it as well. See Haxhiu v. Mukasey, 519

F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2008); Huang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d

945, 951 (7th Cir. 2005).

Liu focuses on the denial of his application for withholding of removal, arguing that the record compels

the conclusion that he was persecuted because of a

political opinion that he held. Specifically, he argues

that his efforts in organizing sixteen co-workers in

“waging the protests” at Huafeng constituted a “matter

of public concern.” He contends that the immigration

judge “ignored” both his anonymous letter in which

he “expose[d] the corruption of the leadership” and the

fact that public officials told his wife to forward warnings

to him. He identifies the correct legal standards: to

qualify for withholding of removal based on political

opinion, Liu had to show a clear probability that his life

or freedom would be threatened on account of political

opinion if he returns to China. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);

8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b); Prela v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 515, 519 (7th

Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s decision denying
6 No. 12-1130

withholding of removal for substantial evidence and

may reverse “only if the evidence compels a different

result.” Abraham v. Holder, 647 F.3d 626, 632 (7th

Cir. 2011); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

The factory closures, mass layoffs, and labor unrest

in China’s northeast region in the 1990s — like those

described in Liu’s petition — set the stage for large-scale

political protests condemning official corruption. See

Reforming the north-east: Rustbelt revival, The Economist

(June 16, 2012), available at http://www.economist.com/

node/21556988; U.S. Dep’t of State, 2002 Country Report

on Human Rights Practices: China (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18239. htm.

Courts have granted petitions for review of laid-off Chinese workers who publicly condemned government

misconduct during this era. See generally Hu v. Holder,

652 F.3d 1011, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2011) (granting petition

where petitioner organized 100 laid-off workers to

protest in front of city government building, was accused

of acting against Communist party, and was detained

and beaten); Bu v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 424, 426-31 (6th Cir.

2007) (granting petition where petitioner organized

1,800 factory workers to stage sit-in strike to protest

factory officials’ corrupt acts and was arrested and beaten).

In Liu’s case, however, the record does not compel

the conclusion that he was mistreated because of his

political activities in arranging his protest at Huafeng,

as required for withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A). A political opinion is “one that is expressed through political activities or through some sort
No. 12-1130 7

of speech in the political arena.” Li v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d

681, 685 (7th Cir. 2005). Campaigning against the government, writing op-ed pieces, urging voters to oust corrupt

officials, founding an anti-corruption political party,

actively participating in an anti-corruption party’s activities, or speaking out repeatedly as a “public gadfly” are

classic examples of political speech. See Musabelliu v.

Gonzales, 442 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2006); Marquez v. INS,

105 F.3d 374, 381 (7th Cir. 1997). Liu did not engage in

these political activities. As he conceded, he never belonged to a political organization or demonstrated against

the Chinese government. Rather, he organized co-workers

at Huafeng to ask for their jobs and benefits back; this

was an economic demand, not a protest of government

corruption. Cf. Hu, 652 F.3d at 1013-14; Bu, 490 F.3d at 426-

31. Furthermore, he was removed from the Huafeng

premises for causing a “verbal quarrel,” not for the

content of the protest. (After all, he previously met with

his manager posing the same grievances without incident.) See Zhang v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 167, 172 (2d

Cir. 2006) (finding no political persecution where police

removed Chinese petitioner from factory premises

when she organized protest of layoffs).

Liu’s testimony that he composed an unsigned letter

asserting corruption in the layoffs does not transform

his economic protest into a political one. He never

publicly acknowledged writing the anonymous letter or

testified that anyone knew he wrote it. Cf. Hu, 652 F.3d

at 1018. Although at oral argument Liu’s counsel

insisted that Chinese officials knew he wrote the letter

because they could identify his handwriting, Liu never
8 No. 12-1130

testified to that effect. Nor does any other evidence in

the record support this assertion. Liu testified that

officials knew only that some laid-off worker from

Huafeng wrote the letter, not that he wrote it.

The lack of compelling evidence that Liu was

mistreated because of his political opinion is “a more

important consideration in an evaluation of [his] claim

of persecution” than the severity of his injuries

following his beating and detention. See Zheng v. Holder,

666 F.3d 1064, 1066 (7th Cir. 2012). The mistreatment

must be on account of his political activity, and as we

have explained, the judge did not err by finding that

Liu’s activity was economic, not political. For this

reason, we must deny his petition for review.

We are troubled, however, that the immigration judge

and Board concluded that Liu did not experience past

persecution because, in their view, the beating and detention caused only “superficial injury.” The Board has not

defined persecution, and although in the past we have

determined that evidence of government-sanctioned or

tolerated beatings did not necessarily compel a finding

of past persecution, see, e.g., Mema v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d

412, 416-18 (7th Cir. 2007); Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316,

318-20 (7th Cir. 2006); Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573-

74 (7th Cir. 2003), we have recently clarified that “the

physical force [at issue in persecution] need not be so

great as to inflict a serious injury.” Zheng, 666 F.3d at

1067, citing Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 224 (2d

Cir. 2006); see also Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 948

(7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that although past persecution
No. 12-1130 9

sometimes involves “the use of significant physical force

against a person’s body, or the infliction of comparable

physical harm without direct application of force,” it

also includes “nonphysical harm of equal gravity”).

In this case, Liu testified that he was struck with a belt

until he fainted, his body was bruised and swollen, and

he had internal injuries in his lower back. He did not

have medical records of the x-ray results, but he was not

required to document organ damage to prove that the

beating amounted to persecution. See Bu, 490 F.3d at

427, 430 (beating constituted persecution where petitioner testified that beating by inmates caused bleeding,

vomiting, lost consciousness, and blood clots on petitioner’s body). Nonetheless, even if the beatings were

carried out, approved, or tolerated by the government,

the ground for the beating must be one of the grounds

listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Zheng, 666 F.3d at 1067.

The record here does not compel the conclusion that

Liu’s political opinion provided the ground for his

beating and detention.

Liu also argues that he established a clear probability

of future persecution on account of his political opinion

because the police occasionally visit his wife’s house to

ask where he is. But inquiries about his location, without

any threats to his “life or freedom,” do not compel a

conclusion of future persecution on account of political

opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).

Moreover, the mistreatment that Liu experienced

occurred over a decade ago, and despite the police inquiries, his family in China has never been harmed.

See Marquez, 105 F.3d at 380.
10 No. 12-1130

Finally, Liu maintains that because the immigration

judge found him credible, the judge erred in requiring

corroboration of past or future persecution with letters

from family and friends. But because the REAL ID

Act applies to Liu’s case, once the judge determined that

he should provide corroborating evidence, he was

required to do so unless he showed that he could

not reasonably obtain that evidence. See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii), 1229a(c)(4)(B), 1231(b)(3)(C), 1252(b)(4);

Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 618 (7th Cir. 2009). Liu

contends that he gave a reasonable explanation for not

acquiring letters from his family or friends: he did not

want to implicate them or put them at risk. But if Liu

organized a protest of sixteen people who were already

willing to go public with their grievances, it is not unreasonable to expect that at least one of them would

provide a statement. See Abraham, 647 F.3d at 633. In

any event, because the judge did not err by finding that

hostility to Liu is not politically motivated, it cannot

support the relief of withholding of removal even if the

hostility need not have been corroborated. The agency

did not err in determining that Liu’s claim did not

justify withholding of removal.

For these reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

8-31-12