In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-2615 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

VINCENT STORME, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:20-cr-650-1 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. 

____________________ 

SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 11, 2023 — DECIDED OCTOBER 17, 2023 

____________________ 

Before BRENNAN, SCUDDER, ST. EVE Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. Federal judges grapple every day with one of 

the most common but consequential decisions in our criminal 

justice system: whether to detain a defendant pending trial. 

Those decisions occur pursuant to the Bail Reform Act, which 

embodies a careful and complementary balance of procedural 

and substantive protections for those accused of crime and 

presumed innocent under the Constitution. Before us is Vincent Storme’s challenge to the district court’s determination 
2 No. 23-2615 

to terminate his pretrial release and order him detained pending trial. Two factors complicate the appeal. Foremost, Storme 

suffers from mental illness and has attempted suicide three 

times, most recently threatening to take his life if the district 

court declined to dismiss his pending criminal charges. So we 

must consider the role suicide risk plays under the operative 

provisions of the Bail Reform Act. Also complicating this appeal is the choppy procedural path that this case has traveled 

in the district court. So we also take care to underscore the 

importance of the procedural safeguards Congress embedded 

within the Act. In the end, we affirm the district court’s decision detaining Storme pending trial.

I 

Storme awaits trial on multiple charges of cyberstalking, 

18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), and unauthorized intrusion into a cell 

phone, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). His indictment, and the criminal 

complaint leading to it, allege an extreme online campaign of 

harassment against three different women. The harassment 

entailed obsessive accusations and occasional physical 

stalking.

Following Storme’s arrest in September 2020, a magistrate 

judge ordered him released on bond into the custody of his 

mother subject to conditions of curfew, psychiatric treatment, 

and restricted use of technology. 

Storme’s concerning and increasingly erratic behavior 

began almost immediately. The day after his release, he

attempted suicide by overdosing on medication. In February 

2021, Pretrial Services reported that Storme had not only

violated his curfew over thirty times but had also been

arrested in Arlington Heights, Illinois for allegedly stalking a 
No. 23-2615 3

fourth ex-girlfriend by following her home in his car. The exgirlfriend obtained a protective order against Storme.

Pretrial Services also relayed that Storme had begun abusing alcohol and was continuing to have suicidal ideation. On 

one occasion, Storme called his Pretrial Services officer from 

the shores of Lake Michigan, threatening to drown himself 

until the officer talked him down. Ultimately, the district 

court—then with a different judge presiding over Storme’s 

case—opted to admonish Storme, prohibit him from contacting the ex-girlfriend, and require that he submit to substance 

abuse testing. But the district court did not revoke release. A 

few months later, Storme's mother left the Chicagoland area and moved to Virginia. The court did not appoint a 

new third-party custodian in her stead.

In July 2023, after Storme moved to dismiss a superseding 

indictment, Pretrial Services provided the district court with 

a report from Storme’s therapist. The therapist expressed concern that Storme would kill himself if he thought the court 

might deny his motion to dismiss. (Storme contends that the 

charges seek to criminalize speech protected by the First 

Amendment.) In anticipation of a hearing on the motion, 

Storme began transferring assets to his mother—a sign of ongoing suicidal ideation. He also appeared multiple times in 

the district court to watch unrelated proceedings before his 

assigned judge, apparently in an attempt to learn how to predict the judge’s ruling on the motion to dismiss the criminal 

charges. During the same period, Storme refused to discuss a 

safety plan with his therapist or Pretrial Services officer, instead continuing to hint ominously at his plans for self-harm.

On August 3, the day of the hearing, the district court 

heard argument but decided to reserve ruling on Storme’s 
4 No. 23-2615 

motion to dismiss. At the close of the proceeding, and without 

advance notice, the court then revoked Storme’s pretrial release and ordered him detained. The court did not make supporting findings or offer explanation, stating that it would do 

so in a future written order.

Upon being removed from the courtroom, Storme began 

slamming his head to the floor and urging the marshals to kill 

him. An hour later, while in a holding cell at the Metropolitan 

Correctional Center, he tried to hang himself with his 

t-shirt. A correctional officer intervened, leading to Storme 

being placed on suicide watch for 48 hours.

Storme’s counsel—a very experienced and talented criminal defense lawyer—reacted to the district court’s unexpected 

detention decision by promptly seeking our review. Troubled 

by the lack of any notice that bail would be revisited, opportunity to be heard, and findings in support of detention, we 

entered an order on August 8 directing that Storme be released within 24 hours unless the government filed a motion 

to revoke under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3145(a) or 3148(b). 

The government complied. After a lengthy detention hearing on August 9, the district court granted its motion to revoke Storme’s release. The district court found probable cause 

to believe that, while on release, Storme had both committed 

crimes and otherwise violated his release conditions, rendering him subject to detention. On the merits of the detention 

question, the district court agreed with the government that 

suicide was a form of flight within the meaning of the Bail 

Reform Act. The district court also determined that Storme’s 

erratic behavior made him a potential danger to others that 

could not be adequately mitigated by additional release 

conditions.
No. 23-2615 5

Storme now appeals a second time, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c),

once again urging us to order his release. See FED. R. APP. P. 

9(a). 

II

A

The Bail Reform Act supplies the statutory framework for 

making pretrial release and detention decisions in criminal 

cases. Section 3148 authorizes judges to revoke prior release 

orders and remand defendants into custody under specific 

circumstances. Any such order must satisfy the two-part

standard Congress delineated in § 3148(b). See United States v. 

Wilks, 15 F.4th 842, 848 (7th Cir. 2021). 

First, the district court must make a threshold finding under § 3148(b)(1) that there exists either “probable cause to believe that the person committed a Federal, State, or local crime 

while on release” or “clear and convincing evidence that the 

person has violated any other condition of release.” 

Second, the district court must find that detention is necessary under § 3148(b)(2), meaning either that “there is no condition or combination of conditions of release that will assure 

that the person will not flee or pose a danger to the safety of 

any other person or the community” or that “the person is 

unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of conditions of release.” In making this assessment, the court must 

consider the factors delineated in § 3142(g) that informed the

initial detention or release decision.
6 No. 23-2615 

B 

1 

The district court had sufficient cause to revoke Storme’s 

detention under § 3148. As a threshold matter, Storme was 

subject to revocation because he met both alternative grounds 

in § 3148(b)(1). The record provides probable cause to believe 

Storme had committed crimes while on release, including (at 

the very least) felony stalking under Illinois law. See 720 ILCS 

5/12-7.3. Although the state did not press charges in response 

to Storme’s stalking of a fourth ex-girlfriend, probable cause 

requires only evidence “sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed an offense.” 

United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 391 (7th Cir. 2021); accord United States v. Gotti, 794 F.2d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1986) 

(holding that § 3148(b)(1) adopts this traditional definition).

The record also provides clear and convincing evidence that 

Storme violated his curfew multiple times in 2020 and 2021. 

Storme does not challenge either finding. He asserts only 

that those events are too dated and stale to support revocation

of his pretrial release. We cannot agree. Although staleness is 

a relevant fact for a court to consider when deciding whether 

to revoke release, it presents no legal barrier to doing so. Congress included no revocation time limit within § 3148(b)(1). 

While the Bail Reform Act generally contemplates swift revocation, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(h)(2)(B) (requiring that a release 

order inform the defendant of “the consequences of violating 

a condition of release, including the immediate issuance of a 

warrant for the person’s arrest” (emphasis added)), it nowhere imposes consequences for delay. The absence of such a 

provision has led the Supreme Court to hold that a defendant 

should not be released solely because a judge or the 
No. 23-2615 7

government violated even explicit time limits elsewhere in 

the Act. See United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 

716–17 (1990). We see no reason why an implicit deadline—if 

indeed one exists—should be more strictly enforced.

The cases Storme cites are not inconsistent with this interpretation. Read in context, the decisions treat delay as a nondispositive factor informing whether revocation is appropriate in the totality of circumstances leading to the detention 

decision. See United States v. Hamilton, 708 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th 

Cir. 1983) (“Three years is beyond that point under the circumstances of this case.”); United States v. Sciuto, 531 F.2d 842, 

847 (7th Cir. 1976) (“Whether the delay was unreasonable depends upon whether [the defendant] deceived the probation 

officer.”). But § 3148(b)(1) merely asks whether a defendant is 

eligible for a revocation of pretrial release. Clear and convincing evidence of violations of release conditions establishes 

such eligibility and thereby exposes a defendant like Vincent 

Storme to the risk of pretrial detention.

2 

Turning to the application of § 3148(b)(2), we do not believe that Storme’s likelihood of violating release conditions 

is sufficiently high to justify detention. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3148(b)(2)(B). Although Storme repeatedly violated curfew, 

each violation was only by a few minutes, and after the district court admonished him over two years ago, he never violated his curfew again. Indeed, before the district court ordered him detained on August 3, 2023, Storme had been released subject to conditions for nearly three years while generally remaining compliant. Based on the record before us, we 

cannot conclude that Storme is “unlikely to abide by any 
8 No. 23-2615 

condition or combination of conditions of release.” Id.

§ 3148(b)(2)(B).

That brings us to a more difficult question: whether detaining Storme pending trial is necessary to “assure that the 

person will not flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other 

person or the community.” Id. § 3148(b)(2)(A). We conclude

that, although the mere existence of suicide risk is not itself 

sufficient to justify pretrial detention, the unique circumstances of this case nonetheless warrant detention. Storme’s 

suicidal ideation, the district court reasonably determined, is 

but one manifestation of a broader pattern of erratic, obsessive, and unpredictable behavior presenting a danger to 

others. 

Suicide risk is distinct from a risk of flight or nonappearance. The text of the Bail Reform Act provides no indication 

that the term “flight” encompasses suicide. To the contrary, 

the plain import of the term “flight” connotes an intentional 

act by a defendant to evade criminal prosecution by leaving 

the jurisdiction. See United States v. Ailon-Ailon, 875 F.3d 1334, 

1337 (10th Cir. 2017) (concluding that immigration removal 

does not qualify as flight because flight must involve an element of volition). That explains why magistrate and district 

judges routinely impose travel restrictions and require defendants to surrender passports—all to mitigate the risk of 

flight. Common definitions of flight support this conclusion. 

See Flee, WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY

(1984) (“To run away”); Flee, AMERICAN HERITAGE 

DICTIONARY (2d Coll. Ed. 1982) (“To run away from or as from 

danger”). And the Bail Reform Act’s legislative history, to the 

extent it is relevant, provides no hint that Congress contemplated “flight by suicide” as a cognizable basis for detention.
No. 23-2615 9

The same goes for nonappearance. In the bail context, nonappearance refers to an attempt to avoid submitting to a 

court’s jurisdiction, not to death. Judges “assure the appearance” of criminal defendants by imposing release conditions 

and adopting precautionary measures to prevent them from 

evading prosecution. But a defendant’s death terminates a 

pending criminal proceeding “from its inception” as if 

charges had never been brought. See United States v. 

Volpendesto, 755 F.3d 448, 452–53 (7th Cir. 2014). The need to 

secure a defendant’s appearance ceases to have meaning if a 

defendant dies and the criminal case terminates by operation 

of law. 

Consider the practical implications of a contrary conclusion. If a defendant’s death constituted a form of nonappearance, judges could detain upon a showing of a sufficient risk 

of death, including one created by age, poor health, or inadequate access to medical services. We have a difficult time seeing how Congress intended the Bail Reform Act to operate 

with such breadth.

3 

Moving beyond flight and nonappearance, we turn to the 

question whether suicide risk alone poses a sufficient danger 

to justify detention. We hold that it cannot. The Act is clear 

that a revocation of pretrial release must be based on a risk to 

“the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3148(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). By its terms, then, the statute requires a finding that the defendant’s conduct poses a 

danger to some person other than themselves. 

The government urges a broader construction, pointing to 

one of the § 3142(g) factors that judges must consider when 
10 No. 23-2615 

deciding whether to revoke pretrial release under § 3148. We 

recognize that Congress worded that factor in terms of “the 

danger to any person or the community,” notably omitting 

the term “other” before person. But this language does not 

supply the operative standard for deciding whether detention 

is appropriate. It is simply one factor among many that a court 

should consider when evaluating what is the controlling 

standard: whether the defendant poses a risk to the “safety of 

any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3148(b)(2)(A). At best, therefore, § 3142(g) suggests that suicide risk is relevant only to the extent that it presents a risk 

of harm to others—for example, with a defendant who threatens to shoot himself and anyone else who seeks to monitor his 

whereabouts or well-being. But the mere risk of self-harm is 

not itself enough.

Congress’s inclusion of the phrase “or the community” in 

§ 3148(b)(2)(A) is consistent with our conclusion. It is well understood that harms to the “community” refer not to the defendant but to crimes without specific victims. See, e.g., United 

States v. Ramirez, 843 F.2d 256, 257–58 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying 

the Bail Reform Act to vacate a release order based on evidence of a drug trafficking conspiracy that presents a danger 

to the community); United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 

1283 (D.C. Cir.), judgment entered, 844 F. App'x 373 (D.C. Cir. 

2021) (observing that a danger to a community need not be 

tied to a risk of physical violence to justify detention under 

the Bail Reform Act).

So we conclude that the mere existence of a risk of suicide 

does not provide grounds to detain a defendant under the 

Bail Reform Act in any and every case. But this is no routine

case.
No. 23-2615 11

Revoking release based on dangerousness requires a careful assessment of the facts and circumstances relevant to the 

broad factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3148(b)(2)(A) (directing courts to consider these factors 

when deciding whether to revoke release in light of flight risk 

or dangerousness). Considering those factors in totality, we 

agree with the district court that Storme’s continued release 

would pose a danger to other persons or the community. The 

allegations against Storme paint a picture of a defendant who 

responds unexpectedly, dangerously, and obsessively to adversity in potentially escalatory ways. Shortly after Storme 

was charged with electronically stalking one ex-girlfriend, 

police arrested him for physically stalking another, even 

while he was under strict supervision. The facts identified by 

Pretrial Services leading to the August 3 hearing suggest that 

Storme’s condition was worsening rapidly. 

The evidence presented to the district court demonstrates 

that, as of at least July 2023, Storme was preparing for things 

to escalate again, whether through self-harm or some other 

unpredictable, desperate action that mere conditions of release could not prevent. By that point, Storme’s mother had 

left the state, leaving him without a third-party custodian to 

help monitor him. For months, Storme came to the federal 

courthouse and sat through unrelated hearings conducted by 

his assigned judge in an attempt to predict how the court

would rule on the pending motion to dismiss. Viewed in this 

light, his suicide threats created more than a mere risk of selfharm. Tied explicitly to his charges, they were essentially 

threats of unpredictable violence if the district court ruled 

against him.
12 No. 23-2615 

The district court properly revoked Storme’s detention on 

the ground that no conditions would assure that he does not 

pose a danger to the safety of other persons orthe community. 

III

In the ordinary case, this conclusion would end our 

analysis. But this is not an ordinary case, in no small part because it traveled a rocky path to our court. In these circumstances, then, we close by underscoring the importance of adherence to the procedural protections Congress incorporated 

into the Bail Reform Act.

Recall that the district court concluded the August 3 hearing on Storme’s motion to dismiss by revoking his pretrial release and ordering him detained pending trial. We have zero 

doubt the district court made the decision not only believing 

it legally sound but also grounded in the compassionate perspective that detaining Storme may save his life. By all 

measures, the record shows Storme to be suffering from grave 

mental illness, and the district court, upon learning from Pretrial Services that his suicidal ideation was intensifying, reacted by determining that detention may help bring important stability to an unpredictable and precarious situation. 

If given the chance to redo the August 3 proceeding, we 

also have zero doubt the district court would have adhered 

more closely to the revocation process delineated in § 3148(b). 

The court could have done so by informing the parties of the 

recent findings of Pretrial Services and otherwise supplying 

advance notice (if only at the outset of the motion to dismiss 

hearing itself) that it was considering modifying Storme’s release status. See 18 U.S.C. § 3153(c)(1) (“Each pretrial services 

report shall be made available to the attorney for the accused 
No. 23-2615 13

and the attorney for the Government.”); N. D. ILL. L. CRIM. R. 

46.4(a) (requiring that attorneys receive any report “in connection with” detention, release, or modification proceedings). For its part, the government—as § 3148 contemplates—

could have unambiguously moved to revoke Storme’s 

release. 

A process along those lines would have informed Storme 

that the district court was considering modifying his release 

while providing him sufficient opportunity to prepare for a 

hearing on the matter, as Congress has determined is essential 

to affording a defendant a full and fair opportunity to 

respond. See 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b) (stating that a revocation of a 

defendant’s release must come after a “proceeding for 

revocation” that includes a “hearing”); id. § 3142(f) (stating 

that a defendant must have the opportunity to testify, crossexamine, and present witnesses at a detention hearing). 

Process matters with detention decisions precisely because it 

protects the liberty interest of persons presumed innocent 

under the Constitution. Or, as the Supreme Court has put the 

same point, “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention 

prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 

exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 

Other aspects of the August 3 proceeding give us considerable pause too. The Bail Reform Act requires express findings to support even temporary detention decisions. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3142(d) (permitting temporary detention of a person 

on release for up to 10 days if a judicial officer “determines 

that ... such person may flee or pose a danger to any other 

person or the community”). The district court did not accompany its August 3 detention decision with such findings, understandably leading Storme’s counsel to promptly seek our 
14 No. 23-2615 

review and leaving the government to file rushed and unclear 

motion papers requesting a more orderly revocation of 

Storme’s pretrial release. 

To the district court’s credit, though, a formal detention 

hearing ensued promptly on August 9. The transcript of that 

proceeding is not easy to read, for it is clear that the 

circumstances leading to the hearing escalated everyone’s 

anxiety and resulted in some tough exchanges of words. We 

make this observation believing with complete certainty that 

all involved—the government, Storme’s counsel, the district 

court—were acting in the best of faith and working through 

the tense and difficult circumstances presented by Storme’s 

ongoing mental illness and acute risk of suicide. 

Our overarching point is not one of criticism but of 

positive reinforcement: sound process often matters most in 

pressure-packed, consequential decisions. Recognizing those 

moments and taking care to adhere to the requirements 

prescribed by rule or statute will ensure the protections of the 

parties’ rights and interests and maximize the chances of 

clean transcripts containing clear findings and leaving no 

doubt everyone enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to convey 

their positions. 

In the end, the district court reached the right conclusion. 

Before the court was a defendant suffering from mental illness 

and charged with very serious crimes marked by danger, obsession, and persistence. Twice before, Vincent Storme’s mental illness manifested itself in unsuccessful suicide attempts, 

with Pretrial Services informing the district court that the suicidal ideation was only intensifying in anticipation of an adverse ruling on a pending motion to dismiss all criminal 

charges. Though scattered and disjointed in places, the record 
No. 23-2615 15

supports the district court’s conclusion that Storme’s unpredictable and erratic pattern of behavior presented a danger to 

others sufficient to justify a revocation of his pretrial release. 

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order revoking Storme’s release from pretrial detention.