U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Concept Sciences, 

Incorporated

Hanover Township, Pennsylvania

USFA-TR-127/February 1999

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by Varley-Campbell & 

Associates, Inc. Miami and Chicago, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the Fire 

Administration in carrying out the Fire Reports Program.

The U.S. Fire Administration greatly appreciates the cooperation received from Director John Conklin 

of the Lehigh County Emergency Management Agency, Stephen Martin of the Eastern Pennsylvania 

EMS Council and David Lesak. Appreciation also goes to Scott Snyder, Pennsylvania State Police and 

Chief Robin Yoder of the Hanover Lehigh County Fire and Rescue Company.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Concept Sciences, Incorporated

Hanover Township, Pennsylvania

Investigated by: John Lee Cook, Jr.

This is Report 127 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted 

by Varley-Campbell and Associates, Inc./TriData Corporation under 

contract EMW-94-4423 to the United States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

TAble oF ConTenTS

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

HANOVER TOWNSHIP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

BUILDING HISTORY AND OCCUPANCY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

BUILDING CONSTRUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

THE EXPLOSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

THE INVESTIGATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

APPENDICES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

APPENDIX A: List of Responding Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Fire Departments:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Emergency Medical Services:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Law Enforcement Agencies:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Government Agencies:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Support Services:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

APPENDIX B: Maps of the Lehigh Valley Industrial Park. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

APPENDIX C: Hazardous Materials Guide for Hydoxylamine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

APPENDIX D: MSDS for Hydoxylamine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

APPENDIX E: Site Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

APPENDIX F: Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

APPENDIX G: Mechanics of an Explosion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

The different ways that something may explode.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

1

Concept Sciences Incorporated 

Hanover Township, Pennsylvania

February 19, 1999

Investigated By: John Lee Cook, Jr.

Local Contacts:

Stephen J. Martin, Assistant Executive Director

Eastern Pennsylvania EMS Council

1405 Cedar Crest Blvd., Suite 208

Allentown, PA 18104

610-820-9212

Scott R. Snyder, Lieutenant

Pennsylvania State Police

2930 Airport RD

Allentown, PA 18017-2149

610-861-2100

Robin Yoder, Chief

Hanover Lehigh County Volunteer Fire & 

Rescue Company

1001 Postal RD

Allentown, PA 18103

610-264-7227

John Conklin, Director

Lehigh County Emergency 

Management Agency

455 West Hamilton Street

Allentown, PA 18101

610-782-3073

Scott M. Grim, Coroner

County of Lehigh

501 West Hamilton Street

Allentown, PA 18101-1614

610-782-3426

David M. Lesak

Hazard Management Associates

PO Box 3004

Allentown, PA 18106

610-395-6409
2 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

O

On Friday, February 19, 1999, a devastating explosion destroyed a plant operated by Concept Sciences, 

Incorporated (CSI) in Hanover Township, Pennsylvania. Hanover Township is located in Lehigh 

County near Allentown. The blast killed five people, caused approximately $5 million in damages, 

and disrupted electrical service to approximately 1,188 PP&L customers. All of the victims were men 

between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-five. Four of the deceased were CSI employees and died 

from the effects of the massive explosion. The fifth victim, an employee of a business located next 

to the CSI facility, died as a result of a severe head injury from flying debris. One of the deceased CSI 

employees was a member of an area volunteer fire company.

Fourteen people, including five firefighters, were transported to area hospitals during the incident. 

The most severely injured were two CSI employees who were buried beneath debris. They were 

rescued by firefighters more than one hour into the incident. Firefighter injuries included chemical 

burns, chest pains, lacerations, strained muscles, and shortness of breath.

The explosion registered 0.7 on the Richter Scale at Lehigh University’s seismograph center, which is 

located approximately five miles from the site in Bethlehem. The University’s readings indicate that 

the explosion occurred at 20:14:43 hours and caused the ground to move both up and down and 

side to side. The explosion could be seen for seven miles and could be felt as far away as Lehighton 

and Tobyhana to the north and Trexlertown and Longswamp Township to the west. There were 

numerous reports of windows being blown out of homes on Dauphin Road and Irving Street in 

Hanover, Township.

The explosion produced a white cloud that rained chemical residue onto the streets of Allentown, 

approximately two miles from the blast site. An evaluation of the chemical residue concluded that 

the airborne materials were not harmful and could easily be neutralized with soap and water.

The force of the explosion produced a crater four feet deep and approximately eighteen feet in 

diameter in the floor of the CSI plant, destroyed three twenty-five-foot-high exterior concrete walls, 

and partially destroyed the building’s concrete roof. Eleven buildings adjacent to the CSI Plant also 

sustained damage and a number of automobiles were damaged when the exterior wall of a building, which faced the CSI facility, collapsed onto the automobiles and crushed roofs, hoods and 

windshields.

The cause of the explosion is still under investigation. According to local authorities, CSI employees 

were in the process of distilling a diluted form of hydroxylamine at the time that the explosion 

occurred. Authorities indicated that this was the first production run of this material at the plant. The 

product was used to clean semiconductors and to manufacture pharmaceuticals and CSI was the first 

US manufacturer to produce the product.

During the peak of the incident over 400 emergency personnel were involved in the incident and 

included fire and EMS agencies from three counties. A number of local, State, and Federal agencies 

also assisted the fire and rescue personnel in their efforts. A list of the agencies that responded to 

the incident is included as Appendix A. Emergency personnel remained at the scene until Monday, 

February 22, 1999.
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 3

KeY ISSUeS

Issues Comments

Early identification of the 

hazardous material(s) 

involved in the incident

The first emergency personnel to arrive at the incident did not know what material(s) were 

involved in the incident. It was 60 to 80 minutes into the incident before the hazardous 

materials team became fully operational and was able to conclusively identify the product. The 

explosion destroyed the MSDS’s and floor plan of the facility and there were a large number of 

unmarked 55-gallon drums scattered throughout the blast area.

Personal protective clothing 

and equipment

The first emergency personnel took pH and oxygen readings which indicated that the area was 

safe. Operations personnel did not know what material(s) were involved and were unsure of 

the proper level of protection required. A number of EMS personnel and search dogs entered 

the area without proper protection. Fortunately there were no serious results of these actions. 

Some responders also purposely avoided being decontaminated in order to remain active in the 

incident. Personnel did not have a secondary set of personal protective clothing.

Communications The incident involved agencies from three counties. There was no set of frequencies at the 

operations level that were common to all the agencies involved in the incident. The incident 

also generated approximately 400 calls to the 9-1-1 Center, which was staffed by six personnel.

Coordination More than 400 personnel responded to this incident. Agencies from local, State, and Federal 

governments also responded. Unified incident command and a solid emergency management 

plan allowed this incident to be managed to a satisfactory conclusion.

Clean-up operations CSI hired a private contractor to cleanup the site of the explosion. Work was delayed more 

than twelve days because insurance companies would not approve the work. The State 

assumed the responsibility and began work on the fourteenth day following the incident. 

Cleanup involved run-off control, removal of structural and other debris, and handling of the 

drums containing the hydroxylamine solutions.

Time of day The incident occurred on a Friday evening. This minimized the number of injuries and fatalities 

because many of the buildings were unoccupied at the time of the explosion. Two nearby 

day-car centers were also closed. Most of the responders were volunteers and the fact that the 

event occurred at night and during a weekend no doubt enhanced the number of people who 

were able to respond and participate throughout the duration of the event.

HAnoVeR ToWnSHIP

Hanover Township is located near Allentown in Lehigh County, Pennsylvania. Lehigh County’s 

population is approximately 350,000. The Township is home to approximately 2,500 people and 

encompasses five square miles. The Lehigh Valley International Airport covers nearly one half of the 

Township’s total land area. Fire service is provided by the Hanover Lehigh County Volunteer Fire and 

Rescue Company Number One. The department was founded in 1978 and has forty members, all of 

whom are volunteers. The Department responds to approximately 300 incidents per year. 

The fire department has one station, designated as Station 33, and maintains an engine company 

(E 3312), a 75 ft. quint (Ladder 3331), a rescue-pumper (E 341), a tanker (Tanker 3321), and 

a rescue squad (Rescue 3341). The Northampton Regional Emergency Medical Service provides 

ambulance service in the Township.

The Lehigh County Hazardous Materials Team provides hazardous materials response to the Township. 

The team, established in 1990, is an agency of the Lehigh County Government and is composed of seventy paid-on-call members, many of whom are local career and volunteer fire and rescue personnel.
4 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

B

The Concept Sciences, Incorporated facility was located at 749 Roble Road in the 1,600-acre Lehigh 

Valley Industrial Park. A map of the complex is attached in Appendix B. The industrial park is 

southwest of the Lehigh Realty Associates of Roseland, New Jersey and had been occupied by CSI in 

September 1998.

CSI began their operations in April 1997 in the Allentown Business Park and was reported to be 

the first, and only, manufacturer and supplier of free-base hydroxylamine in the United States. The 

product was used by pharmaceutical companies and to clean semiconductors. Known as 50-HA, the 

hydroxylamine is a clear, colorless liquid in the form of a fifty percent solution in water. The NFPA 

rates the hazards of hydroxylamine as: Health-2, Flammability-0, and Reactivity-3. A Hazardous 

Materials Guide for the product is attached as Appendix C. The MSDS published by CSI, which is 

included as Appendix D, listed the product’s hazards as:

• Corrosive

• Corrosive to skin – causes burns

• Do not distill to dryness

• Excessive and extended heating may cause a "pressure build-up" explosion within a closed 

container

• Decomposes in presence of heat and air. Decomposition is accelerated with transition metal 

ions (e.g. Fe, Cu, Ni, et al)

There are approximately 2,000 gallons of the finished product on site and thirty to forty blue, 

unmarked 55-gallon drums. Very little of the materials was found after the explosion and it is theorized that most of the material was consumed during the explosion. The sprinkler system ruptured 

and water flowed from the broken pipes for a period of time causing a run off problem in a nearby 

creek. The Incident Commander indicated that some of the product apparently made its way into the 

sanitary sewer system and the local sewer plant recorded some unusual readings as a result.

B

CSI occupied 19,200 square feet on the north end of a 42,000 square foot building. The site plan is 

attached as Appendix E. The one story building had a ceiling height of approximately twenty feet. 

Constructed in 1987, the noncombustible building had a steel frame and the building’s exterior 

walls were constructed of concrete masonry units (CMU’s). An interior CMU firewall separated the 

CSI facility from the other occupancies within the building. The firewall was penetrated by debris 

from the explosion and resulted in the death of an occupant in the leased space immediately adjacent 

to CSI.

The building was fully sprinklered and the system was operational at the time of the explosion. The 

explosion destroyed the system in the CSI plant and water was pouring into the facility when the 

fire department arrived at the scene. The system was shut off by the fire department shortly after 

their arrival when it became evident that runoff was occurring from the site. The occupancy did not 

have a fire alarm system according to the New Tenant Inspection Report obtained from the Hanover 

Township. The Township had adopted the BOCA Building Code.
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 5

A key to the building was provided for fire department use, as required, and was enclosed in a rapid 

entry lock box located near the main entrance. Emergency information, including MSDS sheets 

about the chemicals used in manufacturing process and floor plans, was provided inside the building near the main entrance. The explosion destroyed these materials and this information was not 

immediately available to the fire department. Therefore, the fire department did not immediately 

know what materials were involved in the explosion and resulting fire.

THe eXPloSIon

The explosion registered 0.7 on the Richter Scale at Lehigh University’s seismograph center, which 

is located five miles from the CSI Plant in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. The University’s readings indicate that the explosion occurred at 20:14:43 hours on Friday, February 19, 1999, and that the blast 

caused the ground to move both up and down and side to side. The explosion was seen as far as 

seven miles away and was felt as far away as Lehighton and Tobyhana to the north and Trexlertown 

and Longswamp Township to the west.

There were numerous reports of windows being blown out of homes on Dauphin Road and Irving 

Street in Hanover, Township. The blast produced a white cloud that rained chemical residue onto the 

streets of Allentown, two miles away. A subsequent evaluation of the chemical residue concluded 

that the airborne material was not harmful. The white cloud and the magnitude of the explosion 

generated a significant amount of interest in the residents of the area.

The Lehigh County 9-1-1 Center received approximately 300 to 400 calls during the first few hours 

of the incident. There were six personnel on duty at the time of the explosion and the unusually high 

volume of calls overloaded the Center. Reports of an explosion were also received by other agencies 

in the vicinity, including the Lehigh Valley International Airport.

The Fire Chief of the Hanover Lehigh County Volunteer Fire and Rescue Company Number One, the 

first due fire company for the CSI facility, was in his vehicle and was monitoring his scanner when 

the explosion occurred. The chief immediately responded in the direction of the industrial park 

based upon the information that he was hearing. While he was enroute, an alarm was transmitted 

at 20:22 hours for a reported explosion at the TruGreen Chemlawn Facility, located in the industrial 

park at 764 Roble Road.

At 20:25 hours, the Communications Center confirmed that the correct address was 749 Roble Road 

based upon reports from a security service. At 20:29 hours, the first two EMS units were dispatched.

The fire chief was the first fire official to arrive at the scene. Several members of the Pennsylvania 

State Police met the chief at the scene; having responded from their barracks located a few blocks 

from the site. They were asked to evacuate the buildings across the street. The fire chief gave an initial size up and reported that approximately one-half of the building had collapsed and that there was 

damage to several adjacent buildings. A search of the area was ordered at 20:33 hours and command 

was established at 20:35 hours. The Command Post was initially the chief’s car, but was transferred 

to the county’s mobile command post later in the operations.

The incident commander promptly began to summon additional assistance. There is no standardized 

multiple alarm system in effect in Lehigh County. Therefore, the IC requested specific agencies to respond 

based upon his personal knowledge of their capabilities and resources. The initial request asked for companies from Allen Township, East Allen, Hanover, Catasauqua, and Northampton Regional EMS.
6 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Throughout the duration of the incident, the fire chief managed all of the requests for fire and 

EMS resources. The county’s Emergency Management Director responded to the Command Post 

early in the incident and assisted the incident commander by coordinating the requests for all 

other resources.

In accordance with the Department’s SOPs, the firefighters from the Hanover Lehigh County Volunteer 

Fire and Rescue Company Number One (Station 33) respond to their station to staff their apparatus 

rather than responding directly to an incident. Given the close proximity of the incident to their 

station, this practice did not delay their response and actually helped reduce congestion at the scene 

that is often created by the presence of the volunteer emergency responders’ personal vehicles.

Apparatus from Station 33 began to arrive at 20:32 hours. Firefighters arrived on the scene to find 

a collapsed building, smoke drifting from the blast sight, and a small fire of little real significance. 

Water was pouring from the demolished automatic sprinkler system and there was debris everywhere. Ceiling lights were hanging down in a number of buildings and a large number of spectators 

had assembled due to the magnitude of the blast. Law enforcement agencies quickly secured the 

scene and the utilities were subsequently shut off.

The weather at the time of the explosion was very cold. The temperature was in the low twenty’s 

(Fahrenheit) and there was a wind from the northwest that created a wind chill in the single digits. 

Whenever the temperature is below freezing and there are windy, wet conditions emergency personnel must take adequate precautions to prevent hypothermia. An excellent reference to consult is 

Emergency Incident Rehabilitation published by the United States Fire Administration.

The explosion created a crater four feet deep and approximately eighteen feet in diameter in the floor 

of the CSI plant, blew out three of the building’s 25-foot high concrete walls, and partially destroyed 

the concrete roof. The explosion damaged eleven other buildings, including the RPS package delivery service located at 759 Roble Road, Sugarloaf Mid-Atlantic, and the Meixell Brothers Warehouse.

The exterior walls of RPS and Meixell Brothers that faced the CSI plant crashed onto the automobiles 

in the parking lot, crushing roofs, hoods and windshields. A glass door was also blown through at 

Nikon Precision, Inc. located across Roble Street from the CSI facility. Much of the damage to the 

adjacent structures appears to have been caused by the negative pressures created by the explosion.

The Northampton Regional Emergency Medical Service provides EMS transport service to Hanover 

Township. The first unit from the agency established command of the medical operations at 20:39 

hours. EMS Command initially established five different triage areas due to the size and scope of 

the incident. Because there were multiple casualties at the incident, EMS operations were conducted 

in accordance with the Disaster Operating Guidelines promulgated by the Eastern Pennsylvania 

Emergency Medical Services Council. Radio communications for the EMS operations were coordinated by MEDCOM, a service that connects the sixteen area hospitals with the local area rescue 

squads.

At 20:40 hours, rescuers confirmed that there was an entrapment at the site. At 20:46 hours, a level 

one disaster was declared indicating that at least six people were trapped in the debris. Rescue efforts 

were conducted on both the East and West sides of the building and sectors were established in each 

area. There was less damage on the East Side and the North wind kept this sector relative free of 

smoke. Conditions were more difficult on the West Side, however. The adjacent buildings that had 

been damaged by the blast were also searched several times.
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 7

Fourteen people, including five firefighters, were transported to area hospitals during the incident. 

The most severe injuries were sustained by two CSI employees found buried beneath debris on the 

East Side of the collapse zone by firefighters more than one hour into the incident. Firefighter injuries included chemical burns, chest pains, lacerations, strained muscles, and shortness of breath. The 

EMS commander initially thought that the incident was a natural gas explosion and did not order the 

decontamination of the first victim to be transported.

The explosion killed five men, aged 25 to 55. Four of the deceased were employees of CSI, including 

two victims (father and son) from the same family. Ironically, the father was a long time member of 

a local volunteer fire company. According to the coroner’s report, the CSI employees were all killed 

as a direct result of the effects of the blast. The fifth victim, an employee of Sugarloaf Mid-Atlantic, 

died as the result of a severe head injury.

The first emergency personnel to arrive at the incident did not know what material(s) were involved 

in the incident. It was initially believed that the blast had resulted from an explosion of natural gas. 

The force of the explosion destroyed the MSDS’s and floor plan of the facility and there were a large 

number of unmarked 55-gallon drums scattered throughout the blast area. Oxygen and pH levels 

were taken and it was felt that personnel could safely operate in the area if they used bunker gear and 

SCBAs. The situation was further complicated by the fact that a representative from CSI downplayed 

the dangers of the material involved saying that it was merely corrosive and could easily be neutralized with soap and water.

A number of the mutual aid companies were concerned about the presence of hazardous materials and staged some distance from the building and requested orders from Command before they 

deployed their personnel. The sector commanders also began to become concerned during their 

search and rescue efforts because they were finding chemical residue, which indicated that hazardous materials were present. They contacted Command about their concerns and it was felt that 

bunker gear and a SCBA would provide sufficient protection to rescue personnel.

The Lehigh County Hazardous Materials Team was requested at 20:30 hours and responded to the 

incident. The team, however, did not become fully operational until approximately sixty to eighty 

minutes after the first fire company arrived at the scene. The delay resulted in the first responders 

not being able to conclusively identify the product until well into the incident. The Lehigh Team was 

assisted in their efforts by the Hazmat team from Berks County. The two teams established an inner 

perimeter and a decontamination sector. Approximately eighty people and several search and rescue 

dogs were decontaminated during the incident. Even though the dogs were not allowed in the inner 

perimeter, several dogs sustained glass cuts and chemical burns to their paws.

The majority of the emergency responders at the scene did not have access to a second set of personal protective clothing. As a result, a number of personnel deliberately avoided going through 

the decontamination process because the Hazmat team was impounding their protective clothing, 

which meant they could no longer operate within the inner perimeter of the site.

The Hazmat team decontaminated the five bodies of the deceased. The Chief of Lehigh County 

Hazmat Team made the decision not to rotate the members of the team that was used to decontaminate the profoundly injured, the deceased, and the body parts that were recovered at the scene. The 

Chief felt that this would minimize the number of team members that would be exposed to the stress 

and trauma created by the graphic injuries. The Chief also stated that his exposure to the experiences 
8 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

of others through attendance at the United State Fire Administration’s National Fire Academy helped 

him to manage the incident.

Two medical transport helicopters responded to the scene as well as a helicopter from the State 

Police. The helicopters were used to conduct an aerial search of the site with an infrared camera in 

an attempt to locate the victims. No one was transported to a medical facility by a helicopter.

The Pennsylvania Urban Search and Rescue Task Force, based in Harrisburg, was activated and 

responded to the incident. The team is one of the FEMA USAR Teams and this was the first time that 

the team had been activated to respond to an incident within the State of Pennsylvania. The USAR 

Team used search dogs, cameras, and the blueprints of the building to coordinate the rescue and 

recovery efforts. Several other area search and rescue teams also responded with their search dogs. 

There was some initial confusion because the local responders did not have any training on how to 

work with a USAR Team.

A number of agencies assisted with the rehabilitation of the first responders. Given the duration 

of the incident, there was a concern that if people were allowed to leave they would not return. 

Command had originally planned to relieve everyone at 06:00 hours. It became by 03:00, however, 

that everyone was very tired. Relief efforts were pushed up to 04:00 and transit buses were used to 

transport personnel to Station 33 for Rehab. The low temperature and the fact that the station was 

less than one mile away from the incident site made the station an ideal site. Personnel were rotated 

through the station throughout the incident. Key command personnel were rotated on a staggered 

basis in order to preserve continuity at the scene.

The local Red Cross Chapter provided two food vans at the scene to assist the emergency responders. 

The Red Cross also opened its facility at 2200 Avenue A in Bethlehem for the family members of 

anyone involved in the explosion.

Communications proved to be a problem because there were agencies from three different counties 

at the incident as well as numerous State and Federal agencies. There was no common radio frequency that all of the agencies could communicate on. The Incident Command did have radios for 

both Lehigh and Northampton Counties and was able to communicate effectively with companies 

from both jurisdictions. Operational personnel, however, did not have this capability. There was also 

some incompatibility of hose threads between the various fire departments that responded to the 

incident. Fortunately, there was very little fire and this did not prove to be a major problem.

Approximately 400 personnel were ultimately used to bring the incident to a conclusion and a lot of 

private vendors were called in to provide special assistance. The Post Office parking lot near Station 

33 was used to stage personnel and apparatus in order to account for everyone and to coordinate the 

rescue and recovery efforts. The parking lot was also used as a staging area for the large number of 

media personnel who responded to the event. Since Roble Road is a dead end street every effort was 

made by the staging officer to prevent the influx of emergency personnel and private vendors from 

congesting the area.

The time of day proved to be an important factor at this incident. If the event had occurred during 

the normal business day, the number of deaths and injuries would have no doubt been much higher 

due to the presence of more workers within the park and because there were two day care centers 

located near the site of the explosion. Additionally, the majority of the fire personnel who responded 

were volunteers. The large turnout of personnel may not have occurred had the event happened 

earlier in the day when the majority of the firefighters would have been at work. The event lasted for 
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 9

nearly four days and although companies were rotated during the event, many of the volunteers may 

not have been able to be absent from their jobs for such a long period of time.

The incident had a profound impact on the community. The emergency responders knew a number of 

the victims and one victim was a volunteer firefighter with a local fire company. By the third day of the 

incident, people began to erect crosses in memory of the victims and to bring flowers and prayers to 

site. This had an impact on the emergency responders who were still at the incident and had not faced 

this situation before. Stress debriefing was made available to anyone who wanted the service.

A post-incident critique of the event was conducted at 19:00 hours on March 22, 1999 in the auditorium of Dieruff High School, Washington and Irving Streets, in Allentown. The Lehigh County 

Emergency Management Agency coordinated the process and the session was well attended. The 

session was taped and the Emergency Management Office published a transcript of the event.

A summary of the Chronology of events is provided below:

Friday 19 February:

• 19:45 CSI workers contact supervisor at home and inform the supervisor that there was a 

problem, he heads for plant.

• 20:14 An explosion destroys the Concept Sciences Building, damages other buildings, throwing debris more than 200 yards, and cutting power to 1,188 PP&L Inc. customers.

• 20:22 State police and emergency workers rush to scene.

• 20:25 Location confirmed as 749 Roble Rd.

• 20:29 EMS is dispatched.

• 20:33 Search of the site is ordered.

• 20:35 Command established.

• 20:39 EMS Command established.

• 20:40 Entrapment is confirmed.

• 20:45 Lehigh County Emergency Management Services Director John Conklin issues a warning advising people to remain indoors because of potential exposure to hazardous 

chemicals.

• 20:46 Level One disaster declared.

• 20:50 First live victim recovered from debris.

• 21:00 The Lehigh Valley Chapter of the American Red Cross opens its headquarters at 2200 

Avenue A in Bethlehem for the victims' relatives and friends.

• 21:30 The Lehigh County Hazmat team arrives and begins decontaminating people who 

were exposed to chemicals.

• 21:50 The Incident Commander calls for a crane to remove debris.

• 22:30 Rescuers decide that it is too dangerous to enter the building.

• 22:44 Electric power is restored to area customers.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Saturday 20 February:

• 00:20 Wearing SCBA, firefighters begin searching the wreckage for victims.

• 01:30 Members of the Northeast Search and Rescue Team and East Penn Search and Rescue 

Teams, arrive.

• 02:00 Officials hold a news conference and announce that they are still trying to locate three 

of four victims.

• 03:00 A rescue official visits the Red Cross shelter to update family and friends on their 

progress.

• 04:00 Operations change from rescue to body recovery.

• 06:00 The body of the last fatality is recovered from the rubble.

• 09:20 A news conference is held and officials announce that there are five dead and thirteen 

injured as a result of the explosion.

• 09:45 Members of the media are allowed to inspect the site.

• 12:00 Lt. Governor Mark Schweiker arrives.

• 13:00 A news conference is held to discuss the investigation.

THe InVeSTIGATIon

An investigation was conducted by a number of local, State, and Federal agencies following the incident to determine the cause of the explosion. No official determination had been made at the time 

that this report was prepared and the investigation is still open.

Within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the State Police are responsible for determining the 

cause and origin of fires and for investigating all deaths that occur. The CSI explosion occurred 

within the jurisdiction of Troop M, which maintains a team trained investigators for this purpose. 

An investigative team was dispatched to the incident and the State Police also assisted with on scene 

security and crowd control. The Troop Commander responded to the incident as well and assisted 

with media relations and public information efforts.

The State Police assumed command of the incident upon conclusion of the rescue/recovery efforts 

and after the incident was stabilized in order to conduct a criminal investigation. The Coroner’s 

Office responded to the incident to assist the State Police with the determination of the cause of 

death of the five victims.

The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) visited the site at the request 

of Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge. The new Federal agency is modeled after the National 

Transportation Safety Board and is a non-regulatory, independent Federal agency that seeks to ensure 

the safety of workers and the public by preventing or minimizing chemical accidents at industries. 

The agency agreed to conduct an investigation of the incident, the tenth probe of its kinds since the 

Board began its work in January 1998. The CSB is being assisted in its investigation by experts from 

Naval Surface Warfare Center located at Indian Head, Maryland and the agency had not made a final 

determination at the time that this report was prepared.
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 11

On August 11, 1999, the United State Department of Labor issued a news release, which stated that 

the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had cited CSI for safety violations 

and had proposed penalties of $641,200. OSHA alleged twenty violations, including eleven willful 

violations for failure to protect employees from the explosive potential of hazardous chemicals and 

nine serious violations. Willful violations are those committed with an intentional disregard of, or 

plain indifference to, the requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and OSHA regulations. A serious violation is defined, as one in which there is a substantial probability that death or 

serious physical harm could result, and the employer knew or should have known of the hazard.

The infractions included violations of OSHA’s process management standard (PSM) and the hazard 

communications standards, which included allegations that CSI had not provided pertinent information to their employees on the hazards involved in the production process or the explosive nature 

of the chemical. The willful violations included failure to compile and process safety information; 

inadequate process hazard analysis and operating procedures; failure to train employees on operating 

procedures and the physical hazards of chemicals; lack of a pre-startup safety review; process equipment deficiencies; and failure to develop mechanical integrity procedures.

Serious violations included the lack of employee participation in a PSM program, failure to adopt 

safer work practices, no injury and illness logs for contract employees, inadequate mechanical maintenance training, deficiencies in chemical hazard evaluation procedures, and improper labeling of 

chemical containers.

OSHA’s inspection of the explosion site revealed that the explosion occurred at a 2,500-gallon fiberglass reinforced charge tank containing approximately 750 pounds of hydroxylamine. The tank was 

being used in the distillation process. Pure hydroxylamine has explosive energy roughly equivalent 

to that of TNT.

LE

1. Prior preparation increases the opportunity for success.

The presence of an effective Emergency Management Agency proved to be beneficial at this 

incident. Every key player interviewed during the preparation of this report stated that they 

believed that the local emergency planning process was a key factor in the successful management of the incident. Frequent planning sessions and training exercise, including tabletop 

disaster drills, helped the emergency responders to know each other and enabled them to know 

what they could expect from each other. The planning process had also identified the resources 

that were needed to manage the incident. The management of an incident of this magnitude 

requires a significant amount of human and material resources and prior planning helps insure 

that adequate resources will be available on a timely basis. Pre-incident planning is important 

regardless of the hazards involved, but it is especially important whenever a hazardous material 

is involved. Unfortunately, in this instance there was very little information available that would 

have indicated that an explosion, especially of this magnitude, would or could have occurred at 

this site.

2. A unified incident management system allowed the operation to run smoothly.

The fire chief remained in command throughout the initial phases of the incident. Command 

was transferred in an orderly manner to the appropriate official as the mission of the incident 
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

evolved from a rescue operation, to the recovery phase, and finally into a crime scene. Federal, 

State, and local agencies coordinated their efforts through a single incident commander, minimizing the potential for conflict and confusion that can accompany an event of this magnitude.

Every successful incident includes items that can be improved upon to help the next incident be 

managed more effectively. One such item that was identified during this incident is the need 

to communicate more effectively with the front line personnel. The command post personnel 

easily transitioned from one mission to another as the incident progressed. Some confusion and 

misunderstanding, however, was reported at the operations level because personnel believed that 

they were still operating in one phase (e.g. rescue) when the operation’s objectives had actually 

changed (e.g. victim recovery).

Also identified was the need to provide the Incident Commander with an aide or support person 

early in the incident. The fire chief reported being overwhelmed with face-to-face communications and he often was unable to hear or to respond to radio messages. An aide could have 

responded to the radio messages and relayed the incident commander’s decisions to the appropriate requesting parties. The failure to properly respond to such requests can cause frustration 

and create opportunities for free lancing in the absence of clear direction from the incident 

commander.

3. When search and rescue dogs are used extreme caution must be exercised if there are hazardous materials involved.

Extreme caution should be exercised when search and rescue dogs are used in conjunction with 

an incident involving hazardous materials. It is impossible to provide a dog with the same level 

of protection as a human. Therefore, dogs should not be permitted in the hot zone or interior 

perimeter. Chemicals that are caustic to the respiratory tract can severely injure a dog and can 

permanently reduce or destroy a dog’s olfactory abilities. A number of search and rescue dogs 

had to be decontaminated during the incident due to an exposure to the caustic materials 

involved in the incident and several dogs were treated for chemical burns to the pads of their 

feet. The glass that was scattered throughout the site by the explosion also resulted in several 

dogs being cut. Fortunately, the chemicals involved in this incident were relatively minor and 

did not do any permanent damage.

4. A responsible party must be identified.

A responsible party should be identified whenever an incident involves a hazardous material or 

posses the potential for a catastrophic event, such as an explosion, to occur. The initial responders did not know what materials were involved and all of the employees at the CSI facility had 

either been killed or were trapped within the debris. The plant had exploded once. Was there 

a potential for subsequent explosions? This information may only be available with someone 

familiar with the operation and who has the authority to make decisions for the parties involved, 

i.e. the owner or manager.

The manager of the CSI facility was initially reluctant to assume any responsibility due to the 

obvious liability issues involved and the potential for litigation and possible fines from regulatory agencies. The manager’s reluctance significantly delayed the cleanup activities at the site. 

The location had the potential for another explosion, a fire, a structural collapse, or any combination of these events. The longer it took for cleanup activities to commence the greater the risk 

that of one or more of these events might occur.
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 13

5. An adequate level of personal protection must be provided to emergency responders and 

they must be properly trained to use the protective devices.

The product involved in the explosion and fire at the CSI plant was not positively identified for 

over one hour. In spite of this fact, firefighters conducted a search for victims and treated the 

injured. Firefighters wore their structural turnout clothing and SCBA’s. A number of the EMS 

personnel entered the inner perimeter without any protective clothing or respiratory protection. 

Fortunately, the hazardous materials involved were rather benign.

The issue of how much protective equipment is required is a significant one. Level C chemical suits and air-purifying respirators would have been sufficient for this incident. The Lehigh 

County Hazmat team had less than forty Level C Suits. More than 400 people were involved in 

the incident. Local jurisdictions should re-evaluate their cache of resources and ensure that their 

stock is sufficient for a major incident. One alternative is to identify local vendors that may be 

able to supply the suits on a timely basis.

The fire investigators, State police officers, and coroner’s personnel who responded to the incident did not have a significant amount of training in handling hazardous materials incidents 

and they lacked the protective clothing and respiratory protection devices required to safely 

work at an incident of this type. It is essential that all personnel expected to work in hazardous 

environments be properly trained and equipped to safely perform the tasks that will be expected 

of them.

A related matter is the need to collect and decontaminate the personal property of people who 

are killed or injured in a hazardous materials incident. These items must be properly marked 

and the chain of custody must be maintained because items may be crucial to the investigation, 

particularly if the incident is determined to have been criminal in nature.

6. The time of the day can have a significant impact on the outcome of an event.

There are two daycare centers located in the Lehigh Valley Industrial Park and the businesses 

located within the park have a significant number of employees. If the explosion had occurred 

during the normal workday it is very likely that the number of deaths and injuries would have 

been far greater in number.
14

APPenDICeS

Appendix A: List of Responding Agencies 

Appendix B: Map of the Lehigh Valley Industrial Park

Appendix C: Hazardous Materials Guide for Hydoxylamine

Appendix D: MSDS for Hydoxylamine

Appendix E: Site Plan

Appendix F: Photographs

Appendix G: Mechanics of an Explosion
15

APPenDIX A

List of Responding Agencies

The following agencies were involved in the response to the explosion at the Concept Sciences, 

Incorporated facility. The list was provided by the Hanover Lehigh County Volunteer Fire and Rescue 

Company and the author of this report regrets any unintentional omission of a responding agency.

Fire Departments:

Alburtis Fire Company

Allen Township, Northampton County

Allentown Fire Department

Berks County Hazmat Team

Catasauqua, Station 2

Cementon, Whitehall Station 40

Cetronia Fire Company

Citizen’s Fire Company

Coplay, Station 5

East Allentown Township, Northampton County

Emmaus Fire Department

Fogelsville Fire Company

Fountain Hill, Station 34

Fullerton, Whitehall Station 36

Han-Le-Co, Station 33

Hanover Twsp, Northampton Co.

Lehigh Valley Hazmat Team

Lehigh Valley Airport

Schnecksville Community

Woodlawn Fire Company

Emergency Medical Services:

Allentown, Station 78

Bath, Northampton County

Bethlehem Twsp, Northampton Co.

Cetronia, Station 62

City of Allentown

East Allen Twsp, Northampton Co.

Fountain Hill, Station 73

Hershey Medical Center Lifelion

Lehigh Valley Hospital

MEDEVAC

Muhlenberg Hospital

Northampton Regional, Sta. 75

Northern Valley, Station 67

Sacred Heart Hospital

Salisbury, Station 68

St. Luke’s Hospital

Suburban EMS

Upper Saucon, Station 72

Law Enforcement Agencies:

Catasauqua Police Department

City of Allentown Police Department

Fountain Hill Police Department

Lehigh Valley International Airport PD

Pennsylvania State Police

Whitehall Police Department
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Government Agencies:

Department of Environmental protection

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Hanover Township

Lehigh County Assessment Office

Lehigh County Coroner’s Office

Lehigh County Emergency Management Agency

Lehigh County Public Affairs Office

Northampton County Emergency Management Agency

Occupational Health and Safety Agency

Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency

Pennsylvania National Guard

Pennsylvania Urban Search and Rescue Team

US Chemical Safety Board

US Coast Guard Atlantic Strike Team

US Postal Service, Postal Road Facility

Support Services:

Action Rental

Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.

Alvin H. Butz, Inc.

American Red Cross

Amey Clean Right

AMQUIP

Andy’s Crane Services

Atlas Towing, Inc.

Deiter Bros. Fuel Company

E. PA Mountaineers Search and Rescue

First Union Bank, Lehigh Valley

Hechinger Home Project Center

LANTA

Lehigh County Communications Center

Lehigh Valley Int. Airport Com Center

MEDCOM

NE Search and Rescue

Northampton County Com Center

N. PA Goodwill

PP&L

Salvation Army

Stauffer Mfg. Company

Trexler-Haines Gas, Inc.

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 17

APPenDIX b

Maps of the Lehigh Valley Industrial Park

Lehigh Valley Industrial Park – Overall

 Page B-2

Lehigh Valley Industrial Park - Overall
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix b (continued)

Lehigh Valley Industrial Park – Immediate Area

 Page B-3

744

734

714

709

719

739

749

759

769

795

2211

921

931

941

951

754

764

794

874

861 871 881

884

894

904

914

2202

2202 2200

2202

2201

981

964

966

951

961

939

901

968

969

2202

2211

934

944

954

964

974

984

1400

987 997

999

991 995

U.S. Route 22 Daytimers

Bell & Howell

Hanger Palce Hayden Dr.

Burren

Fed Ex

Greif

Post Office

Postal Road

Postal Rd.

Marcon Boulevard

Irving St.

Roble Rd.

Dauphine Dr.

CSI

INDUSTRIAL PARK

CSI PLANT STATION 33 STAGING AREA

N

KEY:

Lehigh Valley Industrial Park - Immediate Area
19

APPenDIX C

Hazardous Materials Guide for Hydoxylamine
20

APPenDIX D

MSDS for Hydoxylamine

Material Safety Data Sheet

50-HATM

1. CHEMICAL PRODUCT AND COMPANY IDENTIFICATION

2. CHEMICAL PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION

3. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

PRODUCT NAME:

CHEMICAL NAME:

MANUFACTURER:

50-HATM

PRODUCT NAME:

HAZARD PRECAUTIONARY STATEMENTS:

COMPONENT CAS NUMBER WEIGHT %

50-HATM

Hydroxylamine

Water

Stabilizer

7803-49-8

7732-18-5

Trade Secret

48-52

48-52

<0.01

OTHER NAME: HYDROXYLAMINE, 50 WT. % SOLUTION IN WATER 

SYNONYM: OXAMMONIUM

HYDROXYLAMINE, 50 WT. % SOLUTION IN WATER 

Concept Sciences, Inc.

450 Allentown Drive

Allentown, PA 18103

Concept Sciences, Inc.

450 Allentown Drive

Allentown, PA 18103

610-435-4004

Concept Sciences, Inc.

Issue Date: 3/19/98 Rev. 5

MSDS – 50-HATM Page 1 of 11

Print Date: 09/02/98

CHEMTREC:

Concept Sciences, Inc.:

After Business Hours:

(Dr. Chip Ward)

(Brian Heath)

1-800-424-9300

1-610-435-4004

1-610-691-6889

1-215-361-0198

FOR PRODUCT INFORMATION CALL: IN CASE OF EMERGENCY CALL:

• Corrosive

• Corrosive to skin - causes burns

• Decomposes in presence of heat and air. Decomposition is accelerated with transition

metal ions (e.g.: Fe, Cu, Ni, et al)

• Excessive & extended heating may cause a “pressure build up” explosion within a

closed container

• Do not distill to dryness

 Page D-2
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 21

Appendix D (continued)

Material Safety Data Sheet

50-HATM

COMPONENT NAME NTP STATUS IARC STATUS OSHA LIST

No ingredients listed in this section.

Corrosive to skin. Will cause burns to the skin. May cause allergic

reactions.

EYES:

SKIN:

In case of contact, immediately flush with copious amounts of soap

and water for at least 15 minutes while removing contaminated

clothing and shoes.

SKIN:

Assure adequate flushing of the eyes by separating the eyelids with

fingers. Flush with water for at least 15 minutes. Seek medical

attention.

EYES:

Remove to fresh air. If not breathing, give artificial respiration. If

breathing is difficult, give oxygen.

INHALATION:

If swallowed, wash out mouth with water and swallow two to four

glasses of water provided person is conscious. Induce vomiting. Call

a physician.

INGESTION:

Wash contaminated clothing before reuse.

Discard contaminated shoes.

Test for methemoglobin. Treat according to symptoms.

GENERAL:

Causes irritation and/or burns to the eyes

INHALATION: May cause irritation to the upper respiratory tract. Additional effects

may be shortness of breadth, headache, dizziness, bluish skin color, 

convulsions and coma

INGESTION: Harmful if shallowed. May cause vomiting, digestive disorders,

headache, dizziness and bluish skin color.

DELAYED

EFFECT:

May cause methemoglobinemia. May have potential mutagenic and

teratogenic effects. Sensitizer.

Concept Sciences, Inc.

Issue Date: 3/19/98 Rev. 5

MSDS – 50-HATM Page 2 of 11

Print Date: 09/02/98

Ingredient found on one of the OSHA designated carcinogen lists are listed below.

ADVICE TO PHYSICIAN:

3. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION – (cont.)

4. FIRST AID MEASURES

POTENTIAL HEALTH HAZARDS:

 Page D-3
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (continued)

Material Safety Data Sheet

50-HATM

FLASH POINT: None. (decomposes > 158 ̊ F (70 ̊C)

FLASH POINT METHOD: Not applicable.

AUTOIGNITION TEMPERATURE: Not applicable.

UPPER FLAME LIMIT (volume % in air): Not determined.

LOWER FLAME LIMIT (volume % in air): Not determined.

FLAME PROPAGATION RATE (solids): Not applicable.

OSHA FLAMMABILITY CLASS: Not applicable.

• Flood with water.

• Use halon, carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder or appropriate foam or earth if water

is unavailable.

• Wear self-contained breathing apparatus and full protective clothing to prevent contact 

with skin and eyes.

• Fight fire from safe distance as material MAY be explosive if water has evaporated.

• Emits toxic fumes under fire conditions (e.g. NxOy, NH3)

• Container explosion may occur under fire conditions.

• Danger of fire hazard when exposed to extended and excessive heat, or flame or

oxidizers.

• Combustible rags/cloths used to soak up small spills may smolder considerably when

dried in air or under heat or direct sunlight. Such rags must be thoroughly rinsed several

times with water, squeezed and rinsed again before discarding.

Concept Sciences, Inc.

Issue Date: 3/19/98 Rev. 5

MSDS – 50-HATM Page 3 of 11

Print Date: 09/02/98

* 50-HATM as a water solution presents no danger of fire or explosion by itself. 50-HATM can

be safely used and handled as a water solution. Danger of a “pressure build-up” explosion

exists as water is removed or evaporated and HA concentration approaches levels in excess

of about 70% within a closed container.

5. FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES

FLAMMABLE PROPERTIES

EXTINGUISHING MEDIA:

SPECIAL FIREFIGHTING PROCEDURES:

UNUSUAL FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS HAZARDS:*

 Page D-4
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 23

Appendix D (continued)

Material Safety Data Sheet

50-HATM

• Evacuate area

• Wear self-containing breathing apparatus, rubber boots and heavy rubber gloves

• Cover with solid citric acid and inert absorbent, pick up and place in a closed container

and hold for waste disposal.

• 50-HATM can be neutralized (slowly because of exotherm) with approximately a 20%

aqueous hydrochloric acid solution to a pH of approximately 7.

• Ventilate area and wash spill site wit water after material pick-up is complete. Refer to

Section 5 for disposal of rags/cloths used in material pickup.

Concept Sciences, Inc.

Issue Date: 3/19/98 Rev. 5

MSDS – 50-HATM Page 4 of 11

Print Date: 09/02/98

• (Always wear recommended personal protective equipment.)

• Ensure adequate local exhaust ventilation.

• Avoid contact with skin, eyes and clothing.

• Wash thoroughly after handling.

• Do not eat or drink while handling.

Ensure adequate local exhaust ventilation. Ventilation equipment should be explosion

proof.

• Keep containers tightly closed

• Protect from physical damage and atmospheric moisture.

• Store in cool, noncombustible buildings away from oxidizing materials and incompatible

substances.

• Avoid conditions where material will be exposed to excessive heat (>70 ̊C) and exposure

to transition materials (e.g., iron, copper, nickel, aluminum, et. al.)

• Rubber Gloves

• Apron or long sleeve coveralls

• Boots

• Arm protection

6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

7. HANDLING AND STORAGE

Normal Handling:

8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS/PERSONAL PROTECTION

SKIN PROTECTION

Engineering Controls:

Storage Recommendations:

Personal Protective Equipment:

 Page D-5
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (continued)

Material Safety Data Sheet

50-HATM

Concept Sciences, Inc.

Issue Date: 3/19/98 Rev. 5

MSDS – 50-HATM Page 5 of 11

Print Date: 09/02/98

(Flash point method and additional flammability data are found in Section 5.)

Clear, colorless liquid

33.04 (100% hydroxylamine)

NH2OH/H2O

SI. Ammoniacal

1.11 to 1.13

Soluble in all proportions

-10.5

105-107 ̊C

N/A

10 mm Hg @ 47 ̊C (for 100% hydroxylamine)

>1.0 (no quantitative value available)

*99.0

None

• Eye wash station

• Wash thoroughly after handling

• Avoid prolonged or repeated exposure

• Keep 50-HATM in tightly closed containers with vented caps

• In laboratory, use only in exhausted chemical fume hood

Chemical splash goggles

Fullface respirator with mist/amine type cartridge if exposed to vapors

No component listed in this section.

8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS/PERSONAL PROTECTION (cont'd)

Respiratory Protection:

9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

EYE PROTECTION

COMPONENT NAME ACGIH TLV OSHA PEL OTHER LIMIT

EXPOSURE GUIDELINES:

Appearance:

Molecular Weight:

Chemical Formula:

Odor:

Specific Gravity (water=1.0)

Solubility in Water (weight %)

ph: (50% w/w water solution)

Boiling Point:

Melting Point:

Vapor Pressure:

Vapor Density (air=1.0)

% Volatiles:

Flash Point

Additional Recommendations:

 Page D-6
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 25

Appendix D (continued)

Material Safety Data Sheet

50-HATM

Concept Sciences, Inc.

Issue Date: 3/19/98 Rev. 5

MSDS – 50-HATM Page 6 of 11

Print Date: 09/02/98

• Stable

• INGESTION: Absorption into the body through injection into mice has lad to the

formation of methemoglobin which in sufficient concentration can

cause cyanosis. Onset may be delayed 2 to 4 hours or longer.

• Do not distill to dryness

• Do not heat to dryness

• Avoid strong acids or bases

• Avoid heavy metal or transition metal contamination, (e.g.; Cu, Fe, Ni in particular)

• Toxic fumes of: Nitrogen oxides

Ammonia

• Will not occur

• Heat (excessive or prolonged which will remove solution in water)

• Oxidizing agents

• Potassium Dichromate

• Chromium Trioxide

• Zinc

• Calcium

• Copper or Copper Compounds

• Iron or Iron Compounds

• Ammonia

• Phosphorous Halides

• Carbonyls

• Pyridine

• Hypochlorites

• Transition Metals, ions, compounds

10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY

11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION

ACUTE EFFECTS: Harmful if swallowed or absorbed through skin

Stability:

Routes of Entry/Effects:

Conditions to avoid:

Hazardous Combustion or Decomposition Products

Hazardous Polymerization

Incompatibilities:

 Page D-7
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (continued)

Material Safety Data Sheet

50-HATM

Concept Sciences, Inc.

Issue Date: 3/19/98 Rev. 5

MSDS – 50-HATM Page 7 of 11

Print Date: 09/02/98

• Stable • Shortness of breath

• Coughing • Headache

• Wheezing • Nausea

• Hot or Sore Throat • Vomiting

• Laryngitis • Slight to moderate skin irritation,

depending on degree of exposure.

Blood, Central Nervous System

• INHALATION: May cause spasm, inflammation and edema of the larynx and

bronchi, chemical pneumonia and pulmonary edema.

• SKIN: Dermal Irritation/Corrosion:

– Corrosive to skin when applied for a 4 hour period.

– Irritating to skin when applied for a 1 hour period.

– Non-irritating to skin when applied for a 3-minute period.

• NTP Not listed

• IARC Monographs: Not listed

• OSHA Regulated: No

• Repeated exposure may cause dermatitis

• Hydroxylamine has been reported to produce developmental effects in rabbits, but

only when embryos were directly exposed to the chemical.

• No developmental effects were found in studies with rats and calves.

• Hydroxylamine is mutagenic in vitro, but not in vivo.

• Hydroxylamine was not carcinogenic in several studies.

Hydroxylamine has been reported to be mutagenic in vitro to lower organisms.

11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION (cont'd)

Stability:

Target Organs:

Conditions to avoid:

Medical Conditions Generally Aggravated by Exposure:

Delayed (Subchronic and Chronic) Effects:

 Page D-8
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 27

Appendix D (continued)

Material Safety Data Sheet

50-HATM

Concept Sciences, Inc.

Issue Date: 3/19/98 Rev. 5

MSDS – 50-HATM Page 8 of 11

Print Date: 09/02/98

IPR-RAT LD50:59 MG.KG CNREA8 26,1448,66

SCU-RAT LD50:29 MG/KG JPETAB 119,444,57

IPR-MUS LD50:60 MG/KG JPETAB 165,30,69

UNR-MUS LD50:175 MG/KG NJCAAI 6,160,52

ORAL-RAT LD50:190 MG/KG

ORAL-RAT-FEMALE LD50:120 MG/KG

ORAL-RAT-MALE LD50:248 MG/KG

Only selected registry of toxic effects of chemical substances (RTECS) data is presented here.

See actual entry in RTECS for complete information.

Hydroxylamine is harmful to aquatic life in very low concentration. Do not allow 50-HATM direct

entry into sewers or waterways.

Unused 50-HATM is NOT considered an RCRA hazardous waste.

Although 50-HATM is not a hazardous waster (pH (~10.5), it is not suitable for disposal down the

drain. See Section 6 for neutralization procedures. Waste 50-HATM should be treated with

hydrogen peroxide before release to sewer. Check with local authoritities before any such

disposal method is employed.

The information offered here is for the product as shipped. Use and/or alterations to the product

such as mixing with other materials may significantly charge the characteristics of the material

and alter the RCRA classification and the proper disposal method.

50-HATM may be dissolved or mixed with a combustible solvent and burned in a chemical

incinerator equipped with an after burner and scrubber.

Observe all federal, state and local environment regulation.

RTECS #: NC2975000

11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION (cont'd)

12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION

13. DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS

Toxicity Data:

RCRA

Other Disposal Considerations:

 Page D-9
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (continued)

Material Safety Data Sheet

50-HATM

Concept Sciences, Inc.

Issue Date: 3/19/98 Rev. 5

MSDS – 50-HATM Page 9 of 11

Print Date: 09/02/98

Corrosive Liquid, Toxic N.O.S. (Hydroxylamine),

8, UN2922, PGIII

Hydroxylamine

Spills or releases resulting in the loss of any ingredient at or above its RQ requires immediate

notification to the National Response Center [(800) 424-8802] and to your Local Emergency

Planning committee.

* (50-HA) does not meet Fire or Reactive criteria defined in 29 CFR, Sec. 1910.1200. 50-HA

may decompose in time with release of flame retardant gases if contaminated by certain

transition metals, particularly Fe, Ni and Cu. Elevated temperature may hasten decomposition

rate of contaminated material

TSCA Inventory Status: Components are listed on the TSCS Inventory

Other TSCA Issues: None

“Reportable Qualities” (RQ’s) and/or “Threshold Planning Quantities” (TPQ’s) exist for

the following components:

No components listed in this section.

None listed.

In addition to the components found in Section 2, the following are listed for state right-toknow purposes

NONE

Immediate ( X ) Delayed ( ) Fire* ( ) Reactive* ( ) Sudden Release ( )

of Pressure

14. TRANSITION INFORMATION

15. REGULATORY INFORMATION

DOT Description:

NOS Description:

RCRA

Sara Title III/CERCLA

Component Name SARA/CERCLA RQ[40 CFR 302.4(a)] SARA EHS TPQ (lb)

Sara 302/313 Components:

State Right-To-Know

Section 311/312 Hazard Class: (40 CFR370.2)

 Page D-10
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 29

Appendix D (continued)

Material Safety Data Sheet

50-HATM

Concept Sciences, Inc.

Issue Date: 3/19/98 Rev. 5

MSDS – 50-HATM Page 10 of 11

Print Date: 09/02/98

OSHA Process Safety Management Standard (20 CFR 1910.119): (50-50TM) as a 50%

aqueous solution does not meet hazardous or highly hazardous chemical criteria as

defined in 29 CFR 1910.119 as 50% aqueous solution.

Also, (50-HaTM) as a 50% aqueous hydroxylamine solution does not meet the criteria for

a “hazardous substance” as defined in 49 CFR 171.8 of the Hazardous Materials Guide.”

It is not listed in Appendix A to 172.101, Table Hazardous Substances other than 

Radionuclides

Not determined

Not determined

• OEL=MAK

• NOHS 1974: HZD 84783; NIS 3; TNF 116; NOS 5; TNE 1722

• NOES 1983: HZD 84783; NIS 5; TNF 112; NOS 9; TNE 12689; TFE 1481

• EPA GENETOX PROGRAM 1988, POSITIVE: CELL TRANSFORM.–RLV F344 RAT EMBRYO

• EPA GENETOX PROGRAM 1988, POSITIVE: N CRASSA-FORWARD MUTATION; S POMBEFORWARD MUTATION

• EPA GENETOX PROGRAM 1988, NEGATIVE: IN VITRO CYTOGENETICS-HUMAN LYMPHOCYTE

• EPA GENETOX PROGRAM 1988, NEGATIVE: D MELANGASTER-WHOLE SEX CHROM. LOSS

• EPA GENETOX PROGRAM 1988, INCONCLUSIVE: CARCINOGENICITY-MOUSE-RAT

• EPA GENETOX PROGRAM 1988,INCONCLUSIVE: D MELANOGASTER-NONDISJUNCTION

• EPA GENETOX PROGRAM 1988,INCONCLUSIVE: D MELANOGASTER SEX-LINKED LETHAL

• EPA TSCA TEST SUBMISSION (TSCATS) DATA BASE, OCTOBER 1996

15. REGULATORY INFORMATION

Additional Regulatory Information:

WHMIS Classification (Canada):

Foreign Inventory Status:

Reviews, Standards and Regulations:

 Page D-11
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (continued)

Material Safety Data Sheet

50-HATM

Concept Sciences, Inc.

Issue Date: 3/19/98 Rev. 5

MSDS – 50-HATM Page 11 of 11

Print Date: 09/02/98

• NFPA Rating

– Health – 2

– Flammability – 0

– Reactivity – 3

16. OTHER INFORMATION

Issue Date: 3/19/00 Rev. # 5 Approval: C. Ward (Original Signature on File) 3/19/98

Other Information:

The information above is believed to be accurate and represents information given in good faith.

However, we make no warranty of merchantability or any other warranty, express or implied,

with respect to such information, and we assume no liability resulting from its use. Users should

make their own investigations to determine the suitability of the information for their particular

purposes. In no way shall concept Sciences, Inc. be liable for any claims, losses, or damages

of any third party or for lost profits or any special, indirect, incidental, consequential or

exemplary damages, howsoever arising, even if Concept Sciences, Inc. has been advised of the

possibility of such damages.

DISTRIBUTION: CHEMTREC

Allentown Fire Department

MSDS BOOK -QA LAB

MSDS BOOK -PROD. DEPT.

MASTER FILE -L. Frank
31

APPenDIX e

Site Plans

CSI Site Plan

Page E-2

CSI Site Plan
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)

749 and 759 Roble Road

3

350'

SIDING AND BLOCK WALL DAMAGE ON WEST

460'

120' 120' 50'

STRUCTURAL� STEEL COLLAPSE

45'

STRUCTURAL� STEEL COLLAPSE

20'

STEEL ROOF DAMAGE

170'

INTERIOR CEILING,� LIGHTING, AND� PARTITION DAMAGE

65'

CRATER AND� STRUCTURAL STEEL� BLOWN AWAY

N

749 and 759 Roblre Road
33

APPenDIX F

Photographs

1. Aerial view of the CSI Plant after the explosion.

Source: David Lesak 1. Aerial view of the CSI Plnat after the explosion. Source: David Lesak

 Page F-2
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix F (continued)

2. View of the extent of the destruction.

Source: David Lesak 2. View of the extent of the destruction. Source: David Lesak

 Page F-3
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 35

Appendix F (continued)

3. View of the crater created by the explosion in the floor of the CSI plant.

Source: David Lesak 3. View of the crater created by the explosion in the florr of the CSI palnt. Source: David Lesak

 Page F-4
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix F (continued)

4. View of the destruction to the side of the CSI building.

Source: Steve Martin 4. View of the destruction to the side of the CSI building. Source: Steve Martin

 Page F-5
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 37

Appendix F (continued)

5. CSI Command Post and Operations Sector (Note date should read 2/20/99)

Source: Steve Martin 5. CSI Command Post and Operations Sector (NOte date should read 2/20/99) Source: Steve Martin

 Page F-6
38

APPenDIX G

Mechanics of an Explosion

Definitions

Brisance: The sharp, shattering effect upon the surroundings, determined by velocity of 

the detonation wave.

Deflagration: Strictly speaking an exothermic reaction which propagates from the burning 

gases to the unreacted material by conduction, connection, or radiation, also a 

rapid burning. Deflagrations are associated with low order explosives. The rate 

is subsonic.

Detonation: To explode with sudden violence, associated with high order explosives. An 

exothermic (giving off heat) reaction that is characterized by the presence of 

a shock wave in the material that establishes and maintains the reaction. Rate 

is supersonic. Principal heating mechanism is one of shock compression; temperature rise is directly associated with the intensity of the shock wave.

Explosion: A bursting or violent expansion as a result of a sudden production or release 

of pressure. It is always accompanied by a loud noise, high temperature, and 

usually by a large volume of gas. There are three types of explosions: Chemical, 

Mechanical, and Nuclear.

Initiator: A mechanism or action that induces or starts an explosion or the chain of events 

leading to an explosion.

Shrapnel: Fragments from an explosion.

Source: R.R. Lenz (1965). Explosives and Bomb Disposal Guide. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher.
USFA-TR-127/February 1999 39

The different ways that something may explode.

Chemical explosions:

• Rapid oxidation: the most common type of explosion. Oxidation is a chemical reaction 

that takes place with oxygen. If a few ounces of gasoline are ignited in a container the vapor 

will burn at a normal rate. If the same amount of gasoline is completely vaporized in air it 

can burn in a fraction of a second.

• Runaway polymerization: Polymerization is the chemical combination of smaller molecules 

into much larger ones. If this process is uncontrolled,, unstable molecules form chains and 

release energy in doing so. The heat produced from this reaction can cause an explosion.

• Decomposition of molecules: molecules breaking apart into simpler fragments can also 

release energy that can cause an explosion.

Mechanical explosions:

• Pressure relief: when a pressurized vessel is exposed to fire or whenever steam is trapped in 

a vessel or container the vessel may rupture in order to relieve the excess pressure.

Nuclear explosions:

• Nuclear fision: when the nuclei of certain atoms split.

• Nuclear fusion: after a complex chain of events multiple atoms fuse into a single atom.

Source: J. H. Meidl (1970). Explosive and Toxic Hazardous Materials. Beverly Hills, CA: Glencoe Press.