IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

CINCINNATI DIVISION 

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL 

COMMITTEE, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

 

Defendant.

No. 1:22-cv-639 

Hon. Douglas R. Cole

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TRANSFER

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

There is no dispute that this District is a proper venue under the general federal venue 

statute: the Federal Election Commission (FEC) is “an agency of the United States,” “no real 

property is involved” in this action, and at least one plaintiff “resides” in this District. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1391(e)(1)(C). The FEC nonetheless insists that this case must be heard in the District of 

Columbia—and, in fact, asserts that it has the right as a defendant to select the forum for First 

Amendment challenges to the federal campaign finance laws it enforces nationwide. The FEC 

even goes so far as to intimate that this Court is not up to the task of adjudicating this case because 

it either is not sufficiently “well-versed” in the governing law or faces unsubstantiated “public 

concerns” about its involvement. ECF 10 (Mot.) 13 n.4, 16.1 

Congress, however, has conveyed no right on the FEC to shop for its preferred forum. 

Unsurprisingly, neither of the FEC’s arguments for its remarkable position holds up to scrutiny. 

First, a statutory judicial review provision, 52 U.S.C. § 30110, authorizes Plaintiffs to bring this 

constitutional challenge in “the appropriate district court”—but the FEC posits that this provision 

somehow requires dismissal of the Complaint. The FEC theorizes that the phrase “the appropriate 

district court” ousts the general venue statute from operation. Yet that phrase merely incorporates, 

rather than invalidates, the general venue rules. And even the FEC concedes that federal courts 

have applied § 1391’s venue rules in prior § 30110 cases. Second, the FEC urges the Court to 

transfer this case to the D.C. District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), but never comes close to 

making the strong showing necessary to disturb Plaintiffs’ choice of forum. This Court should 

promptly deny the FEC’s motion so that it can “immediately . . . certify” the constitutional 

questions presented here to the en banc Sixth Circuit. 52 U.S.C. § 30110. 

1

 Plaintiffs use the ECF pagination when citing the FEC’s filing. 

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BACKGROUND 

The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) imposes coordinated party expenditure limits 

that apply, and are enforced by the FEC, in connection with all federal elections nationwide. See

52 U.S.C. § 30116(d). Plaintiffs—the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), the 

National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), Senator J.D. Vance, and former 

Representative Steven Chabot—filed their constitutional challenge to those limits in this District 

late last year. See ECF 1 (Compl.). 

Both Senator Vance and former Representative Chabot are eligible voters who reside in 

this District, and Senator Vance’s campaign committee is predominantly located in Cincinnati. See 

id. ¶ 12; Chabot for Congress: About Steve, https://bit.ly/3Wt6h7M (last visited Jan. 30, 2023); 

JD Vance for Senate Inc. FEC Form 1, Statement of Organization, Filing 1521965, https://bit.ly/

3wjTXMv (last visited Jan. 30, 2023). Moreover, former Representative Chabot served as the U.S. 

Congressman for Ohio’s First Congressional District, located primarily within this judicial 

District, from 1995 to 2009, and then again from 2011 to 2023. See Compl. ¶ 16; About Steve, 

supra. And both the NRSC and the NRCC have long made (including in the last election cycle) 

campaign expenditures targeting voters in this District, which covers 48 of Ohio’s 88 counties and 

three of the State’s largest urban areas (Cincinnati, Columbus, and Dayton), in support of Senator 

Vance, former Representative Chabot, and other federal candidates. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14, 29, 35. 

In support of their challenge, Plaintiffs invoked FECA’s special judicial review provision, 

52 U.S.C. § 30110, which provides: 

The [FEC], the national committee of any political party, or any individual eligible 

to vote in any election for the office of President may institute such actions in the 

appropriate district court of the United States, including actions for declaratory 

judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision 

of this Act. The district court immediately shall certify all questions of 

constitutionality of this Act to the United States court of appeals for the circuit 

involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc. 

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52 U.S.C. § 30110; see Compl. ¶¶ 11-12. The FEC acknowledges that the NRSC and the NRCC 

are “the national committee[s] of a[] political party” for purposes of § 30110. Mot. 5. Accordingly, 

the FEC accepts that these Plaintiffs—as well as Senator Vance and former Representative Chabot 

as “individual[s] eligible to vote” for “President”—may invoke § 30110 and its expedited judicial 

review procedures. Mot. 8. 

ARGUMENT

The Court should deny the FEC’s motion. Venue is proper in this District, and the FEC has 

failed to make the strong showing necessary to overcome Plaintiffs’ choice of venue. 

I. Venue Is Proper In This District. 

There is no dispute that this case satisfies § 1391(e)(1)(C)’s general venue rule: the FEC is 

“an agency of the United States,” “no real property is involved in the action,” and two Plaintiffs 

“reside[]” in this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C); see also Sidney Coal Co. v. SSA, 427 F.3d 

336, 343-44 (6th Cir. 2005) (§ 1391(e)’s residency requirement is satisfied as long as “at least one 

plaintiff resides in the district in which the action has been brought”). The FEC, however, contends 

that § 30110’s mention of “the appropriate district court” requires dismissal of this case because it 

was not brought in the District of Columbia. Mot. 11 n.2. The FEC’s premise is incorrect, and its 

conclusion does not follow. 

A. Section 30110 Does Not Displace Section 1391(e). 

1. The FEC concedes that Plaintiffs are appropriate parties to invoke § 30110, but 

claims that § 30110 designates this District as an improper venue for this suit. Under the FEC’s 

construction, § 30110’s reference to “the appropriate district court” renders it a specialized venue 

provision that supplants the general venue statute in § 1391. Mot. 11 n.2. That construction, 

however, is fatally flawed: the phrase “the appropriate district court” incorporates rather than 

invalidates otherwise applicable venue rules. Indeed, that is how courts regularly use the phrase. 

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See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 & n.10 (1972), disapproved on other 

grounds in later proceedings sub nom. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 

(1981) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as the basis for determining the “appropriate district court”);

Horizon Coal Corp. v. United States, 43 F.3d 234, 240 n.5 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[A] finding that the 

United States Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction over operator reimbursement actions would 

work a hardship against operators by requiring them to litigate their claims in Washington, D.C., 

rather than in the appropriate district court.”); see also NLRB v. Line, 50 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 

1995) (“Venue is necessarily defined as the appropriate district court to file an action.”). In other 

words, the phrase simply refers to the district court where venue is proper under other rules. 

 Thus, as the FEC recognizes, other “courts in previous section 30110 cases” have relied on 

“§ 1391(e)” to determine “venue.” Mot. 11 n.2 (citing, as an example, Holmes v. FEC, 99 F. Supp. 

3d 123, 138 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d part and remanded, 823 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). 

Conversely, the FEC identifies no case that has ever construed “appropriate district court” in 52 

U.S.C. § 30110 to command a special venue inquiry, and Plaintiffs are unaware of any. 

 The FEC thus invites this Court to break new ground without ever explaining why it should 

do so. Indeed, adopting the FEC’s construction of § 30110 would produce a hopelessly 

indeterminate venue provision. The term “appropriate,” which “means ‘specially fitted or suitable, 

proper,’” is “open-ended on its face” and thus “inherently context dependent.” Tanzin v. Tanvir, 

141 S. Ct. 486, 491 (2020) (cleaned up). FECA, however, neither defines the phrase “the 

appropriate district court” nor indicates what would make a particular forum “appropriate.” 

Moreover, the FEC itself does not even attempt to define the term, other than to offer some reasons 

why it thinks litigating in the District of Columbia would be more desirable. See Mot. 9-12. Thus, 

under the FEC’s theory, both bench and bar would be left with nothing more than “‘the classic 

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broad and all-encompassing term that naturally and traditionally includes consideration of all the 

relevant factors.’” Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015) (discussing “appropriate”). But 

there is no evident reason why Congress would have chosen to adopt such an inkblot approach to 

determining venue, which promises to needlessly “complicate a case, eating up time and money 

as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which court is the right court to decide 

those claims”—all in a statutory provision Congress designed to expedite final resolution of the 

merits of a constitutional challenge. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (addressing 

“complex jurisdictional tests”); see 52 U.S.C. § 30110 (requiring “immediate[]” district court 

certification of “all questions of constitutionality” for “en banc” review). All of this confirms the 

FEC’s theory cannot be right. 

2. Even if the FEC’s account of § 30110 were a plausible one, it still would not justify 

reading this provision to displace the general venue statute. “When confronted with two Acts of 

Congress allegedly touching on the same topic,” courts are “not at liberty to pick and choose 

among congressional enactments and must instead strive to give effect to both.” Epic Sys. Corp. 

v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the “party seeking 

to suggest that two statutes cannot be harmonized, and that one displaces the other,” the FEC 

therefore “bears the heavy burden of showing a clearly expressed congressional intention that such 

a result should follow,” and must overcome “the strong presumption that repeals by implication 

are disfavored.” Id. (cleaned up). At a minimum, nothing about § 30110’s reference to “the 

appropriate district court” qualifies as a “clear and manifest congressional command to displace” 

the general venue statute. Id.; see supra Pt. I.A.1. 

 While the FEC notes (Mot. 11 n.2) Congress has displaced § 1391 through other

specialized venue statutes, § 30110 cannot claim kinship with those provisions. To the contrary, 

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the examples cited by the FEC confirm that Congress knows how to clearly supplant the general 

venue statute when it wants to—and that it did not do so here. For example, the special remedial 

provision under Title VII discussed in Bolar v. Frank, 938 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1991) (cited at Mot. 

11 n.2), specifically details four possible venues: 

[A]n action may be brought [1] in any judicial district in the State in which the 

unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, [2] in the 

judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are 

maintained and administered, or [3] in the judicial district in which the aggrieved 

person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but 

if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be 

brought [4] within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal 

office. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Similarly, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 

Rights Act (USERRA) provision addressed in Johnson v. General Dynamics Information 

Technology, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.N.H. 2009) (cited at Mot. 11 n.2), expressly limits venue 

for USERRA suits against private employers to the “district court for any district in which the 

private employer of the person maintains a place of business.” 38 U.S.C. § 4323(c)(2). And the 

federal habeas statute discussed in Switkes v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (cited at 

Mot. 11 n.2), specifies that courts may enter habeas relief only “within their respective 

jurisdictions,” 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which has long been understood to mean “‘in the district of 

confinement,’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004).2

 That “Congress has been clear in 

promulgating venue in other federal statutes” means a provision that simply refers to an undefined 

“‘appropriate district court’” “does not contain a special rule for venue.” Gouge, Jr. v. CSX 

Transp., Inc., No. 12-cv-1140, 2013 WL 3283714, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 28, 2013) (quoting 49 

U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3)). 

2

 Moreover, § 1391(e), which governs “ordinary civil actions,” does not cover “habeas corpus jurisdiction,” meaning there is no conflict between the two provisions in the first place. Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 (1971). 

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B. This Is “The Appropriate District Court” Even Under The FEC’s Theory. 

 Section 30110 clearly does not displace the general venue statute, but were it otherwise, 

this Court would still be “the appropriate district court” under that provision. Given that the term 

“appropriate” “‘naturally and traditionally includes consideration of all the relevant factors,’” 

Michigan, 576 U.S. at 752, any inquiry into “the appropriate district court” here would be akin to 

the multi-factor transfer analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), see, e.g., Tekfor, Inc. v. SMS Meer 

Serv., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-1341, 2014 WL 5456525, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2014) (describing the 

transferee district under § 1404(a) as “the appropriate district court”). Indeed, the FEC’s case for 

why the D.C. District Court is the “appropriate” venue under § 30110 is essentially a short-form 

version of its § 1404(a) argument, compare Mot. 11-12 with Mot. 12-14, and fails for the same 

reasons, see infra Pt. II. 

II. The FEC’s Request To Transfer Must Be Denied. 

 As a fallback to its novel reading of 52 U.S.C. § 30110, the FEC urges this Court to transfer 

the case to the D.C. District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which, as relevant here, provides 

that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may 

transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” While 

this challenge could “have been brought” in the D.C. District Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(A), 

the FEC cannot carry its heavy burden of showing a transfer to that forum is warranted. 

 “[T]he plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed,” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 

330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947), so a “party seeking transfer under § 1404(a) bears the burden of showing 

that the relevant factors weigh ‘strongly in favor of’ transfer,” Mesa Indus., Inc. v. Charter Indus. 

Supply, Inc., No. 1:22-cv-160, 2022 WL 3082031, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2022); see Atl. Marine 

Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 62-63 & n.6 (2013) (discussing some of the relevant 

factors). In other words, “the Court does not start with the assumption that the case should proceed 

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in whichever forum is slightly more advantageous to the parties or the witnesses,” Nat’l Ben. 

Programs, Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-1156, 2010 WL 1963431, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 

May 17, 2010), but with “a presumption that the plaintiff’s choice of a forum is entitled to 

considerable weight,” Doe S.W. v. Lorain-Elyria Motel, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-1194, 2020 WL 

1244192, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2020). While the FEC acknowledges that “a plaintiff’s choice 

of forum is generally entitled to deference,” Mot. 16, it offers three reasons why that presumption 

does not control here. All are meritless. Cf. Mesa, 2022 WL 3082031, at *16 (noting that while 

“the public and private interests relevant to the transfer analysis are myriad, . . . the parties focus 

on five,” and limiting the analysis to those considerations). 

A. This District Has A Substantial Connection To Plaintiffs’ Challenge. 

 To start, the FEC makes the remarkable claim that the presumptive deference to Plaintiffs’ 

choice of forum does “not apply” here on the premise that this District “‘has no connection with 

the matter in controversy.’” Mot. 16; see Mot. 9-11, 15-16. Indeed, the FEC goes so far as to 

suggest that the NRSC and the NRCC merely “included in their complaint two Ohio individuals” 

at random in order to “file[] here.” Mot. 4. But Senator Vance and Former Congressman Chabot 

were not plucked from a Cincinnati phonebook, and the FEC’s cavalier dismissal of Plaintiffs’ 

interests here only betrays the agency’s disregard for the core political speech at stake.3

 Plaintiffs bring this suit not because they have some abstract interest in federal campaignfinance law or the FEC’s operations, but because they want to make coordinated expenditures on 

speech in this District, and throughout Ohio, to the maximum extent permitted by the Constitution. 

3

 Perhaps even more troubling, the FEC suggests that allowing this challenge to proceed in this District would raise partiality concerns because this Court was “former[ly]” a “partner at the[] firm” of some of Plaintiffs’ “counsel” from 2006 to 2011. Mot. 16 n.4. That baseless insinuation 

only underscores the weakness of the FEC’s motion. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (requiring disqualification of a judge who, while “in private practice,” “served as lawyer in the matter in 

controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter”) (emphases added). 

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For example, while Senator Vance can conduct official Senate business in both the District of 

Columbia and Ohio, his campaign does its most important business—communicating with Ohio 

voters—in the latter, including in this District. That is why his campaign’s place of business is not 

found on Capitol Hill, but in Cincinnati. See supra at 2. And that makes sense: Senator Vance does 

not wish to coordinate spending with his political party in order to serve digital ads on voters in 

Georgetown, broadcast TV ads airing on D.C. television stations alongside Washington Capitals 

games, or purchase yard signs for row houses on Capitol Hill. Rather, he wishes to campaign for 

support from and communicate with the electorate in the very place where he and the voters who 

elected him live—Ohio. And to effectively and efficiently do so, he wishes to coordinate with his 

political party activities supporting his campaign in this State. 

Likewise, the Committees’ most substantial activity relevant to their First Amendment 

claims are party coordinated expenditures on campaign activities that do not occur in the District 

of Columbia, but across the country, including in the electoral bellwether of Ohio. The 

Committees’ overriding aim is not to make coordinated expenditures to influence political 

campaigns in Washington, D.C.—which the Constitution assigns no voting members in either 

House of Congress—but in Senate races and House races in Ohio and other hotly contested States. 

And the coordinated party expenditure limits they challenge here—which, as to the NRSC, are 

directly tied to the voting age population of the targeted state electorate, including in Ohio, 52 

U.S.C. § 30116(d)(3)(A)—apply to all elections “for Federal office,” id. § 30116(d), not a seat on 

the D.C. City Council. 

 Just as venue for a libel claim is proper in the forum where the libelous material was 

published because “the claim arose where the libel was published,” Klauder & Nunno Enterprises, 

Inc. v. Hereford Assocs., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 336, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1989), venue for a First Amendment 

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claim is proper in the forum where the burdened speech would occur. And here, that speech has 

and would occur in this District. For instance, the NRSC targeted this forum in 2022 with 

coordinated advertising specific to Ohio’s U.S. senate race, running seven figures worth of ads 

predominately in four cities (Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, and Dayton), three of which are in 

this District. See ICYMI NEW AD// JD Vance’s Ohio Story, NRSC.org Press Release (Aug. 3, 

2022), https://bit.ly/3DcpMuf. The NRCC similarly spent up to the maximum amount of 

coordinated party expenditure authority assigned to it to communicate with voters in the First 

Congressional District in support of Steve Chabot’s 2022 general election campaign. And both the 

NRSC and the NRCC intend to make similar and greater coordinated expenditures on campaign 

speech in this District, and throughout Ohio, in the future. Compl. ¶¶ 29-31, 34-37. So even if 

“some” of the relevant events here “played out in” Washington, D.C., the burdened political speech 

at the heart of this case has “a substantial connection to Ohio.” Mesa, 2022 WL 3082031, at *17. 

 Conversely, it is far from clear what “unique connection to the matter in controversy” the 

District of Columbia has. Mot. 15. As the FEC admits, “no district has any claims to unique local 

concerns” when it comes to “the ‘public affected’” by the challenged laws, id., and Washington, 

D.C., which lacks a voting member in either House of Congress, can boast even less, see supra at 

9. And while the FEC asserts that the “vast majority of the facts relevant to these claims originate 

in the District of Columbia,” it never specifies what facts those might be. Mot. 4. At most, it insists 

that “virtually all the parties in the case reside or at least do most business” inside the Beltway, id., 

but never grapples with the fact that the relevant “business” for this case occurs in Ohio, where 

Plaintiffs seek to engage in campaign-related speech, see supra at 8-10.4

 

4

 For all these reasons, “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim 

occurred” in this district, meaning venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B) as well. Because this Court clearly has venue under § 1391(e)(1)(C), however, there is no need to 

also address this basis for venue. See supra Pt. I. 

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B. This District Is A More Convenient Forum. 

 This Court is the most convenient forum given the substantial connections between this 

case and this District. See supra Pts. I-II.A. Unable to escape the presumptive deference owed 

Plaintiffs’ choice of forum, the FEC tries to overcome it by claiming that “the District of Columbia 

is the most convenient district” for resolving this case. Mot. 5. That argument is doubly flawed. 

1. To start, the D.C. District Court is a far less convenient forum for Plaintiffs for the 

simple reason that its current docket congestion threatens a slower resolution of this case than in 

this Court. Whether it goes to the interests of the parties or the public, “‘the administrative 

difficulties flowing from court congestion’” present an important consideration in the § 1404(a) 

analysis, Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62 n.6, primarily because “getting to trial may be speedier” due 

to a particular jurisdiction’s “less crowded docket,” Wright & Miller, 15 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. 

§ 3854 (4th ed. Apr. 2022 update); see, e.g., Fannin v. Jones, 229 F.2d 368, 369 (6th Cir. 1956) 

(per curiam) (“A court should not under § 1404(a) look to docket conditions in order simply to 

serve the court’s own convenience. A prompt trial, however, is not without relevance to the 

convenience of parties and witnesses and the interest of justice.”) (internal citations omitted). 

Accordingly, “transfer will be denied if the docket congestion is greater in the proposed transferee 

court than it is in the original forum.” 15 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3854 (citing, e.g., Emps. Mut. 

Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1169 (10th Cir. 2010)). 

 That is the case here. As of now, the D.C. District Court faces an enormous backlog of 

cases and trial proceedings. As one Member of that Court has explained, January 6-related 

litigation has already “‘created a massive traffic jam’ on the court calendar.” Sarah D. Wire, 

Ripples for Years to Come: What the Jan. 6 Cases Mean for the Judicial System, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 

31, 2022) (quoting Judge Mehta), https://lat.ms/3ZXlMrj. As of November 9, 2022, there were 

950 criminal trials pending in the D.C. district court. See Eleventh Extension of Authorization for 

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Use of Video Teleconferencing and Teleconferencing for Certain Criminal and Juvenile 

Delinquency Proceedings, Standing Order No. 22-64 at ¶ 7 (BAH) (Nov. 9, 2022), https://bit.ly/

3ZXNp3z. And there is no sign that the problem will abate any time soon. While there are “nearly 

900” January 6 arrests currently “moving their way through the court system,” federal prosecutors 

have indicated that “it’s ‘not an unreasonable expectation’ that more than 2,000 cases could be 

filed.” Wire, supra. And this “heavier than normal workload in a single court” will almost certainly 

“ripple through all aspects” of its docket, “civil cases” included. Id. 

 While the FEC may prefer for this challenge to languish in an overcrowded district court, 

such a result would neither be “convenien[t]” for Plaintiffs nor “in the interest of justice.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(a). Nor would it be consistent with § 30110, a provision designed to allow 

“immediate[]” certification of constitutional challenges to FECA to the relevant en banc court of 

appeals. 52 U.S.C. § 30110. 

2. The supposed inconveniences faced by the FEC, by contrast, are negligible at best. 

While the FEC plays up the proximity of the “federal courthouse” in Washington, D.C., to (some 

of) the parties and (some of) their counsel, it does not claim that litigating this case here would 

result in any meaningful burden. Mot. 4. For example, neither the FEC nor its lawyers have 

“submitted affidavits averring to the disruption traveling to Ohio would create in their personal 

and professional lives.” Mesa, 2022 WL 3082031, at *14. Nor has the FEC identified any “nonparty, non-employee witnesses who would likely be inconvenienced if travel to Ohio becomes 

necessary.” Id. at *17. In fact, the FEC has not even identified either a single issue of fact that will 

require travel for an evidentiary hearing or an allegation in the complaint that cannot be established 

through the submission of affidavits and declarations, witnesses who reside in this district, or 

technological means. Cf. Mot. 9. That is unsurprising, as the “location of documents and sources 

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of proof have become a less significant factor in the § 1404(a) transfer analysis because of 

technological advances and availability of documents in electronic form.” Mesa, 2022 WL 

3082031, at *17. 

 To the extent the less-than-two-hour flight from Washington to Cincinnati ever ends up 

proving significantly burdensome, “parties now routinely conduct depositions remotely via 

videoconferencing technology, and courts use the same technology for oral arguments, evidentiary 

hearings, and even mediation discussions.” Id. Indeed, the FEC has proven quite capable of 

adapting to such technological advancements itself, as it recently held an open meeting in which 

witnesses joined virtually via Zoom. See FEC, January 12, 2023 Open Meeting, https://bit.ly/

3DbH7Ua (last visited Jan. 30, 2023). For their part, Plaintiffs would gladly agree to measures 

facilitating the FEC’s ability to “participate in an evidentiary hearing remotely” to the extent it 

ever becomes necessary. Mesa, 2022 WL 3082031, at *14. 

 In all events, any travel-related inconveniences here cut both ways. While Senator Vance 

will appear in Washington, D.C., to attend to “Senate” business, Mot. 11, he is a resident of this 

District and his campaign conducts the substantial part of its operations from Cincinnati. See supra 

at 2. Transfer could therefore inconvenience him and any present or former campaign staff. 

Accordingly, any travel-related burdens on the FEC do not strongly weigh in favor of transferring 

this case to the District of Columbia, especially when proceeding in that forum would likely 

impede the prompt resolution of this case, see supra Pt. II.B.1. 

C. This Court Is Equally Qualified To Apply Federal Law. 

 Moving on from convenience considerations, the FEC claims that the Members of the D.C. 

District Court (and the D.C. Circuit) are “uniquely qualified” to “resolve the issues” in this case, 

given their experience with “federal campaign finance law” and challenges to “‘the 

constitutionality of federal legislation’ generally.” Mot. 15-17. That argument is a non-starter. 

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14 

Where, as here, “a case raises a federal question, the ‘governing law’ factor generally provides no 

basis for granting a transfer motion, because ‘all federal courts are presumed to be equally familiar 

with federal law.’” SEC v. Comm. on Ways & Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, 161 F. 

Supp. 3d 199, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). When both potential “venues are federal district courts 

applying the same federal law . . . most courts have frowned on the suggestion that the judges of 

one district are more capable or experienced in a particular area than are judges of another 

district”—even when it comes to “patent cases.” Lewis v. Grote Indus., Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 

1055 (N.D. Ill. 2012); see 15 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3854 (“[A]ll federal judges are considered 

adept at interpreting the various aspects of federal law.”). In any event, the FEC’s insinuation that 

both this Court and the Sixth Circuit are unfamiliar with “federal campaign finance law” or 

“constitutional challenges to broadly applicable federal legislation” is simply false. Mot. 15-17; 

see, e.g., United States v. Emmons, 8 F.4th 454 (6th Cir. 2021) (First Amendment challenge to 

FECA’s ban on corporate contributions); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 

2011), abrogated by NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Commerce Clause challenge to the 

Affordable Care Act); Ohio v. Yellen, 547 F. Supp. 3d 713 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (Spending Clause 

challenge to the American Rescue Plan Act), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 53 F.4th 983 (6th Cir. 

2022). 

 Indeed, the FEC’s argument stands in significant tension with Congress’s decision to allow 

constitutional challenges to FECA to proceed immediately to courts of appeals other than the D.C. 

Circuit. 52 U.S.C. § 30110. As the FEC points out, “four FECA judicial review provisions route 

cases” to the D.C. District Court. Mot. 14. But § 30110 does not. Challenges under that provision 

therefore are regularly litigated in courts outside of the Beltway, consistent with Congress’s 

express directive to “certify ‘all questions of constitutionality of this Act’ to the various circuit 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 11 Filed: 01/30/23 Page: 15 of 18 PAGEID #: 114
15 

courts of appeals.” Bread Pol. Action Comm. v. FEC, 635 F.2d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc), 

rev’d on other grounds, 455 U.S. 577 (1982); see, e.g., California Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 

182, 186 (1981) (challenge brought within the Ninth Circuit); In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 415 (5th 

Cir. 2010) (en banc) (challenge brought in Louisiana); Khachaturian v. FEC, 980 F.2d 330, 331 

(5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (same). The FEC’s invitation to accord significant weight to the D.C. 

District Court’s purported expertise in the § 1404(a) analysis—and thereby route virtually every 

constitutional challenge to FECA to the Capital—threatens to nullify that legislative choice and 

must be rejected. See FEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 95 (1994) (“Where Congress 

includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another, it is generally 

presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”) 

(cleaned up). 

CONCLUSION 

This Court should deny the motion to dismiss or transfer this case. 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 11 Filed: 01/30/23 Page: 16 of 18 PAGEID #: 115
16 

January 30, 2023 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Thomas Conerty 

Noel J. Francisco** 

Donald F. McGahn II** 

John M. Gore* 

E. Stewart Crosland* 

Charles E.T. Roberts* 

JONES DAY 

51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20001 

Phone: (202) 879-3939 

Fax: (202) 626-1700 

njfrancisco@jonesday.com 

dmcgahn@jonesday.com 

jmgore@jonesday.com 

scrosland@jonesday.com 

cetroberts@jonesday.com 

T. Elliot Gaiser** 

Thomas Conerty 

Bar No. 101619 

JONES DAY 

325 John H. McConnell Boulevard 

Suite 600 

Columbus, OH 43215 

Phone: (614) 469-3939 

Fax: (614) 461-4198 

egaiser@jonesday.com 

tconerty@jonesday.com 

Counsel for Plaintiffs 

*Admitted pro hac vice 

 

Jessica Furst Johnson** 

HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN 

TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK PLLC 

2300 N Street, N.W. 

Suite 643A 

Washington, DC 20037 

Phone: (202) 737-8808 

Fax: (540) 341-8809 

jessica@holtzmanvogel.com 

Counsel for National Republican 

Senatorial Committee & National 

Republican Congressional Committee 

**Application for admission pro hac 

Vice forthcoming 

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 11 Filed: 01/30/23 Page: 17 of 18 PAGEID #: 116
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on January 30, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk 

of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of this filing to all counsel of 

record. 

/s/ Thomas Conerty 

Thomas Conerty 

Counsel for Plaintiffs

Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 11 Filed: 01/30/23 Page: 18 of 18 PAGEID #: 117