U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

$12 Million Dollar Fire 

at Dogwood Elementary 

School

Reston, Virginia

USFA-TR-135/November 2000

Homeland

Security

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, 

drills, or new technologies or tactics that are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

reports are available on request from USFA. Announcements of their availability are published widely 

in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policy­makers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that USFA’s assistance and presence would be supportive and would in no way interfere 

with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive during 

the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objective 

review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review USFA’s 

report while it is in draft form. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities should 

they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

Arlington, Virginia, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the Fire Administration 

in carrying out the Fire Reports Program.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727 or via USFA Web page at http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/

$12 Million Dollar Fire at Dogwood 

Elementary School

Reston, Virginia

Investigated by: William A. Tobin

Hollis Stambaugh

Jennifer Roberson

This is Report 135 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted 

by Varley-Campbell and Associates, Inc./TriData Corporation under 

contract EMW-97-C0-0506 to the United States Fire Administration, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Homeland

Security

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The United States Fire Administration’s Major Investigation Team would like to thank the following 

people for their assistance with this report:

Captain David McKernan Fairfax County Fire/Rescue Fire Investigations

Mr. Fred Ellis Director, Office of Security and Risk Management Service

Fairfax County Public Schools

Mr. Tom Brady Assistant Supervisor for Facility Services 

Fairfax County Public Schools

Ms. Kitty Porterfield Community Affairs

Fairfax County Public Schools

Mr. Don Greenwood Facility Services

Fairfax County Public Schools

Captain Sam Hsu Fire Investigator

Montgomery County Department of Fire/Rescue Services

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INCIDENT NARRATIVE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Building Structure and Site. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Fire Protection Systems and Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Summary of Key Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Automatic Fire Alarms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Automatic Resetting of Intrusion Alarms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Sprinklers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Firewalls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Water Supply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Sustained Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Special Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

BACKGROUND AND INVESTIGATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Injuries and Fatalities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Damage Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

FIRE ORIGIN AND SPREAD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

APPENDICES List. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Appendix A: List of Responding Units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

APPENDIX B: Fireground Map. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

APPENDIX C: LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On November 27, 2000, at 10:30 p.m., Fairfax County, Virginia, Fire and Rescue received a call from 

the Fairfax County Police Department reporting a fire at the Dogwood Elementary School in Reston, 

Virginia. The school was built in 1974 in an “open classroom” design with demountable partitions 

as “walls” between groups of four and six classrooms and between classrooms and halls. Measuring 

approximately 300’ by 300’, the school was a one story, noncombustible steel frame building with 

masonry exterior walls. Dogwood served grades kindergarten through six.

The school security monitoring station received an intrusion alarm from the north side of the school 

at 10:17 p.m. This was the first detected activity in a sequence of events likely related to the fire. Fire 

dispatch was alerted of the alarm at 10:36 p.m. and the first fire department units were dispatched at 

that time. Fire suppression personnel from Fairfax Fire Station 31 arrived at 10:41 p.m., within five 

minutes of dispatch. There were no authorized or known individuals in the school at the time of the 

fire; thus, no evacuation of occupants was necessary.

The fire progressed so rapidly and was burning so intensely that the first arriving fire department 

units quickly had to be moved and positioned further away from the building at a safe distance. 

During the two days of fire suppression operations, 100 firefighters and 35 units responded to the 

scene.

Determination of origin and cause was hampered by the extent of damage and the enormity of the 

dig-out, which required participation from numerous agencies and subcontractors over a two-week 

period of time. The school, valued at $12 million, was declared a total loss as a result of the fire. 

Eight months after the fire, following an intensive, thorough investigation, investigators determined 

the cause of the fire to be an electrical short in the building’s plenum space, with the origin in 

Quadrant B of the structure.

INCIDENT NARRATIVE

At 10:17 p.m. on November 27, 2000, the school security central monitoring station received an 

annunciated intrusion alarm from Zone 7 of the Dogwood Elementary School at 12300 Glade Drive, 

Reston, Virginia. Zone 7 was comprised of four doors on the north (windward) corner of the building. Due to the history of false alarms at the school, the alarm was reset without investigation per 

normal procedure. Fairfax County School Security dispatched a security officer at 10:23 p.m., after 

a second intrusion alarm was received from the same zone. At the same time, Fairfax County Police 

were notified by school security and dispatched an officer to investigate the scene.

At 10:26 p.m., the monitoring station received a “trouble” indication from the fire panel at the elementary school. A “trouble” indication suggests an electrical fault, since there are only “pull-boxes” 

or “pull stations” on the school premises (no passive fire alarms or annunciated smoke detectors). 

At the same time (10:26 p.m.), an intrusion alarm was received at the monitoring station from an 

adjacent zone within the school (Zone 6). At 10:28 p.m., intrusion alarms for Zone 8, followed 

by Zone 5, Zone 2, and numerous other zones (9 alerts in total) were received. At 10:29 p.m., a 

“trouble in the phone line” alert was received.
2

A Fairfax County Police officer was the first to arrive at the school, at approximately 10:31 p.m., and 

began surveying the external premises. A second officer arrived three minutes later, and as they were 

walking around the back of the school (north side of the building), five or six classrooms “went 

off (ignited) at the same time”. One of the officers immediately notified the Fairfax County Police, 

along with school security, of “flames at least 50 feet in the air.”

Fairfax County Police and Fire Dispatch are both located in the Public Safety Communications Center, 

thereby minimizing any delay in sharing information. Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department 

was dispatched at 10:36 p.m., after being notified by the Fairfax County Police of the report of “large 

flames coming from the roof” of Dogwood Elementary School. Initial dispatch included four engine 

companies, one rescue engine, one truck company, one tower-ladder, one ambulance, and two command units. A fifth engine company which had been dispatched for an outside fire in the area of 

the school shortly after the initial box assignment was added to the initial assignment once it was 

realized their response was related to the school fire.

Fairfax County Ambulance 431 arrived on-scene at 10:40 p.m., and immediately reported they had 

heavy fire showing. Engine 431 arrived at 10:41 p.m., and established a water supply by laying 

dual three-inch supply lines from the fire hydrant on Side One of the building to a position on Side 

Two. Engine 431 requested a second alarm assignment based on the heavy fire showing from the 

rear of the building, and assumed command of the incident per Fairfax County Standard Operating 

Procedure. Units dispatched on the second alarm at 10:43 p.m. included three engines, one truck, 

one medic unit, one ambulance, four command officers, and the canteen.

Battalion 401 arrived on scene at 10:42 p.m., assumed command, and made the decision to utilize 

defensive, exterior operations. All truck companies were instructed to set up for elevated stream 

operations, and engine companies were utilized to establish water supplies for master stream operations on all sides of the building. In addition to using master stream devices, attack hand lines and 

portable monitor devices were employed in exterior operations. At 10:47 p.m., ten minutes after 

being dispatched, fire ground units were notified that the roof of Dogwood Elementary School had 

collapsed on Side Three of the building.

As additional units responded, they were incorporated into exterior operations. Due to the large volume of water being used by units, a water supply sector was established. In addition to working to 

establish a secondary water supply, the sector officer worked with the Fairfax County Water Authority 

to boost water pressure in the area.

A third alarm, comprised of three engines, one truck, and an additional Battalion Chief, was requested 

at 11:05 p.m. Unites were directed to stage at the intersection of Laurel Glade Court and Glad Drive, 

approximately half a mile to the east of the incident scene. A special alarm, consisting of three 

engines, one tower ladder, and the command “POD” (a portable command post) was transmitted 

at 11:30 p.m. hours. Additional equipment was requested as necessary during the course of operations. (Appendix A, List of Responding Units).

The Rehabilitation Sector was established near the command post on Side Two of the school. Fairfax 

County Fire/Rescue’s POD was directed to report to Side Two of the building at 12:03 a.m. (Appendix 

B, Fireground Map).
USFA-TR-135/November 2000 3

Building Structure and Site

The Dogwood Elementary School was located in an area of Fairfax County that is predominately residential. The school housed elementary grades kindergarten through grade six. The main entrance to 

the school was from the bus loop running off Glade Drive, on Side One. A secondary entrance from 

the parking lot was on Side Two.

Built in 1974, the school was a single story building occupying approximately 90,000 square feet. 

It was a noncombustible structure comprised of structural steel framing with brick and cinder 

block external walls. The roof had been replaced in 1994, and was constructed of corrugated steel, 

layers of fiberglass insulation, and five plies of roofing asphalt paper, topped with aggregate (“pea 

gravel”).

The interior of Dogwood Elementary School was arranged in an “open classroom” design: basically 

a warehouse with a demountable (extruded aluminum frame) partition system for internal “walls” 

(Appendix C, Figures 1 and 2). Thirteen other schools in the county were constructed during the 

1970’s with the same design. The USFA team observed one of the schools nearby and noted that 

typically six to eight “classrooms” could be viewed from each hallway “wall” opening (Appendix 

C, Figures 3 and 4). Boundaries between classrooms consisted mostly of four-foot high bookcases, 

shelving, and counters and/or “soft” partitions. Boundaries between groups of classrooms were created by using demountable partitions. Additionally, the team observed that fluorescent light diffusers 

were stored in the plenum above the plenum access ladder at the school they visited.

The area between the building roof and the ceiling of the occupied space was approximately four 

feet in height, contained no significant structural impediments to air flow within the space, and 

was considered a “continuous, open air plenum” of approximately 360,000 feet (volume). In this 

configuration, the plenum was open from one end to the other (Appendix C, Figure 4) – creating an 

ideal environment for rapid fire extension throughout the school.

In the plenum space were the load bearing girders, bar joists, HVAC ducts (both sheet and flex), 

roof drainpipe (heavy gauge steel), copper plumbing feeds, and electrical wiring. No PVC tubing 

was observed or detected during the post-event examinations, and an interview with the school 

construction inspector revealed that none existed in the plenum space at the time of the fire.

Load-bearing columns were positioned 30 feet apart in the approximate north-south directions of 

the school and were spanned by girders. The columns were spaced 60 feet apart in the perpendicular 

direction and were spanned by bar joists (Appendix C, Figure 4). The columns were comprised of 8-

inch square tubular (welded) wrought steel of quarter-inch wall thickness, and girders of 3/8-inch 

wrought steel. Seven HVAC units were positioned on the building rooftop. The HVAC unit above and 

closest to the probable area or origin (indicated in Appendix C, Figure 5) and similar to five of the 

other six HVAC units on the roof, weighted 4-1/4 tons. An aerial view of the school, both before and 

after the fire, can be found in Appendix C, Figures 5 and 6. Appendix C, Figure 9, shows a post-fire 

view of the debris under the area of the HVAC unit indicated in Figure 5.

As expected from the age range of its daytime occupants, the visit to the similar, nearby school confirmed the relatively high prevalence of plastics in the classrooms and activity rooms which, when 

ignited, provide high BTU-generating fuels similar to hydrocarbon accelerants. Some of the plastics 
4

in the classrooms can be seen in Appendix C, Figures 1 through 3. In terms of situational risk, the 

building was warehouse-like with a significant fire load of high surface area to mass ratio combustibles, many of which were high BTU-generating fuels. Compounding the fire load and contributing 

to substantial free burn conditions, the building constituted over a million cubic feet of available air 

to support combustion.

Fire Protection Systems and Equipment

Dogwood Elementary School, as well as other schools of similar construction in Fairfax County, was 

not subject to current code regulations since it was built in 1974. The last inspection for compliance with applicable grandfathered code was in June 2000, when a full fire alarm test was also 

performed.

Annunciated alarm systems, owned and maintained by the property owner, provide a local alarm 

system for a structure. Smoke and/or heat detectors are located throughout the structure and are 

wired into a central, easily accessible alarm panel that provides a visual indicator of which alarm is 

going off. This local alarm system is generally connected to a central monitoring station. In the event 

of alarm activation, the central monitoring station is alerted through a dedicated connection; they, in 

turn, notify local fire and police. Sprinkler systems may or may not be a part of a local alarm system. 

Generally speaking, automatic sprinkler systems would be installed in the ceiling of the structure, 

and would be activated by heat. Sprinkler heads discharge water after a glass vial or piece of metal is 

melted—the temperature required varies, in order that sprinklers can be installed in a wide variety 

of structures. Once water has begun to be discharged through a sprinkler head, a water flow alarm 

located on the exterior of the structure will sound, alerting passers-by. Both systems are commonly 

found in all types of construction. However, due to the age of Dogwood, the only fire alarm system 

available at the school consisted of “pull-stations” or “pull-boxes.” There were no annunciated alarm 

systems (heat or smoke) on the premises, and no sprinkler system.

The intrusion alarms and pull-station fire alarms were in the same electrical system lines. Intrusion 

alarms, which were activated when a door was opened, automatically reset when the door was 

closed. The north side of the school is directly exposed to prevailing winds which are channeled 

across a playing field situated in an otherwise wooded windbreak. Wind gusts frequently triggered 

false intrusion alarm in the past, so a policy of automatically resetting the alarm after the first alert 

was established to minimize the frequency of after-hours dispatching to manually reset the alarms.

Three fire hydrants were located near the school: one 55 feet from the NW corner of the building, 

near the parking lot; one 120 feet from the SE corner of the building at Glade Road; and one located 

200 feet from the NE corner of the school, off Laurel Glade Court.
USFA-TR-135/November 2000 5

Summary of Key Issues

Issue Comments

Automatic fire alarms The fire alarm system at Dogwood Elementary consisted of annunciator panels only. 

Therefore, when an alarm was received, it was difficult to determine what triggered it. 

Passive alarms may have assisted in recognizing that there was a working fire at the 

school, and in pinpointing the area of origin

Automatic resetting of initial intrusion 

alarms

The practice of resetting the intrusion alarm without investigating probably contributed to 

the sizes and extent of the fire. False intrusion alarms certainly are a problem in many 

monitored building, however, as this fire demonstrates, there can be serious consequences if fire alarms are not routinely investigated.

Lack of sprinklers Early detection and extinguishment of a fire is critical to minimizing loss. The lack of 

sprinklers at Dogwood contributed to the heavy volume of fire seen by first arriving units, 

and to the complete devastation of the school.

Lack of firewalls and fire stops Fire spread was unrestricted, thereby enabling the fire to rapidly and freely spread 

throughout the building. The presence of firewalls or fire stops could have helped to 

reduce fire damage and fire spread.

Large volume water supply Due to the volume of fire and length of fire suppression operations, adequate water 

supply was a key factor in successful suppression. Early usage of dual water supply 

lines by the first arriving engine, along with good interaction between the fire and water 

departments, ensured that twelve master streams were supplied during fire suppression 

operations.

Sustained operations Due to the magnitude of the incident, on-scene suppression operations continued 

unabated for two days. Personnel rotation and on-scene support, along with apparatus 

fueling and maintenance, were well handled during this incident.

Special Considerations Since the incident occurred during the school year, the school district had to make 

immediate plans, had to relocate the students from Dogwood Elementary to other facilities for the remainder of the school year. Young students, parents, teachers, and other 

staff faced long travel distances to temporary quarters, which affected school, work, and 

family schedules. In addition, there were concerns about academic and health records 

that may have been lost or destroyed in the fire; roll books, along with health certificates, 

were originals. The immediate community and the school district collected and donated 

supplies and other essentials.

Automatic Fire Alarms

When Dogwood Elementary School had “pull-boxes” or “pull-stations”, there were no passive fire 

alarms or annunciated smoke detectors. Therefore, when school security received the first trouble 

indication from the fire panel at the elementary school, it was assumed that there was an electrical 

fault. There was no way for personnel to be aware of what was occurring at the school. The lack of 

automatic fire alarms may have led to a delay in dispatching units to the school, as there was no clear 

indication of a working fire.

Automatic Resetting of Intrusion Alarms

In the minutes leading up to the fire at Dogwood Elementary School, school security had received 

numerous annunciated intrusion alarms. Due to the history of false intrusion alarms at the school, 

normal procedure dictated that the first intrusion alarm be reset without investigation. While the 
6 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

subsequent numerous and rapid intrusion alarms did lead to Fairfax County School Security and 

Fairfax County Police Officers being dispatched to the school, the procedure of automatically resetting the alarm resulted in a nine-minute delay that contributed to the intensity of the fire upon the 

arrival of School Security and Fairfax County Fire and Police Units. Not even the rapid response of 

these units could save the school, because the fire had gotten too great a head start.

Sprinklers

When Dogwood Elementary School was constructed, the benefit of sprinklers in schools was not 

fully recognized. Moreover, the cost and expense were still too high to make mandating them practical. When codes requiring sprinklers were put into place, Dogwood was not required to retrofit with 

sprinklers in order to be code-compliant. While sprinklers would not have prevented the fire, they 

certainly could have minimized the destruction caused by it. Additionally, the activation of sprinkler 

heads would have provided information that a fire did, in fact, exist at Dogwood.

Firewalls

Further contributing to the size of the fire at Dogwood Elementary was the lack of firewalls or fire 

stops in the building. As noted previously the school was essentially a large, open area with a high 

fire load of high surface area to mass ration combustibles, many of which were high BTU-generating 

fuels. There was over 1.1 million cubic feet of air available to fuel the fire—even more, if a window 

was open or after the roof collapsed. Firewalls could have limited the rapid growth and spread of the 

fire by containing it to smaller areas of the school.

Water Supply

The sheer size and intensity of the fire at Dogwood Elementary necessitated the use of ten master 

streams, along with several attack lines, over a prolonged period of time. Sufficient water supply 

and effective management were instrumental in bringing the fire under control and limiting further 

damage or spread to the surrounding area.

Fairfax County Fire and Rescue units are to be commended for their water supply operations on this 

fire. Due to the heavy volume of fire upon arrival, along with the subsequent collapse of the roof, fire 

suppression operations were strictly defensive and exterior. Early establishment of dual supply lines, 

along with placement of apparatus on all sides of the building (regardless of the presence of access 

roads) ensured that sustained large volume water supply operations were possible. Additionally, good 

coordination between the water supply sector and Fairfax County Water Authority made it possible 

to boost water pressure before it could become a problem and limit operations. Proactive thinking 

and response ensured that, although difficult logistically, water supply was ensured.

Sustained Operations

Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Units operated in a suppression capacity for two days. As a result, 

several logistical considerations had to be addressed to ensure that operations were sustained without 

interruption. A canteen was dispatched early in the incident, thereby ensuring that there was some 

food and beverages available on the fireground. Personnel were rotated out during the course of operations, so that no one crew was overworked. Additionally, provisions were made to refuel apparatus at 

the scene by utilizing Fairfax Fire and Rescue’s 100-gallon fuel tanker, thereby limiting the time a unit 

was removed from the fireground. Per Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Standard Operating Procedure, 

fire units from around the county were re-assigned to cover for those on the scene.
USFA-TR-135/November 2000 7

The continued monitoring of the structure and scene safety required vigilance on the part of all personnel on-scene. High-volume water supply operations associated with ten master streams required 

continued attention. Late-autumn temperatures, generally in the 40’s, drained the energy of personnel, both wet and dry. Personnel had to be fed, kept hydrated, and if possible, sheltered in a warm 

vehicle or outbuilding. Personal needs had to be addressed. All of these issues were effectively 

handled by Fairfax County Fire and Rescue.

Special Considerations

In interviews with school personnel, several special considerations were brought to light. The first, 

and most obvious, was the immediate relocation of students. The fire occurred on a Monday night in 

the middle of the school year, meaning that a new home had to be found for the students as quickly 

as possible. Children were temporarily spread among five other elementary schools—this situation 

lasted two weeks, or until winter break began. After the winter holiday, the Dogwood students were 

transferred to two smaller schools that were being closed as a result of consolidation (one was completely vacated, one was partially vacated). The students will remain at these two facilities until the 

new Dogwood is opened in the spring of 2002.

Another concern was the academic and health records of the students. Grades and other student 

records are stored both at the school and the county’s mainframe computer. However, health records 

and emergency care cards were only kept at the school. There was initially concern that the records 

had been destroyed in the fire, leading parents, teachers, and administrators to attempt to gather 

new records for the children. Upon further salvage operations, however, it was discovered that the 

records had emerged mostly unscathed from the fire. The incident highlighted the need, however, 

for duplicate records to be kept in two separate locations.

Additionally, some teacher’s grade books were lost in the fire. While many teachers took their grade 

books home with them at night, some others were damaged or destroyed, further emphasizing the 

need to maintain duplicate copies of irreplaceable records.

BACKGROUND AND INVESTIGATION

The school used no hydrocarbon fuel for eating, cooling or cooking, and was “all electric”. The only 

hydrocarbon fuel stored on the grounds was gasoline for the lawn mowers (stored in an outbuilding), which was accounted for during the post-fire investigation. As a test for the Fairfax Fire and 

Rescue accelerant-detection canine, “Bert”, ten dilute accelerant control samples were deposited 

in the fire debris and left exposed to the ambient environment (which included rain) for 10 days. 

Bert detected nine of the ten samples after the 10-day test, but detected no other possible trace of 

hydrocarbon accelerant on site other than paint thinner in the sewer system nearby. Additionally, no 

suspicious or questionable purchase of gasoline was detected from surveillance videos or interviews 

of local convenience store and gasoline dispensing station personnel.

Schools of similar construction in a neighboring county have reported serious and ongoing 

problems with fluorescent lighting, “flickering lights”, and electrical connections. The problems, 

which included several electrical fires attributed to the fluorescent lighting fixtures, forced school 

closures until the fixtures could be replaced. This led investigators to explore the possibility that 

the fire could have been electrical in nature, and originated in or around one of the fluorescent 

lights in the school.
8 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Based on interviews and drawings provided by teachers and staff, fire investigators could account for 

all major equipment (e.g., computers, printers, AV equipment, televisions) and other items in the 

school at the time of the fire. No controlled substances or any significant amount of money were 

stored on the premises.

Graffiti, consisting of the single word “ARSON”, was observed spray-painted on a telephone utility box 155 feet from the driveway to the school. It was concluded by the gang unit of the Fairfax 

County Police that the graffiti had been present for several months at that location, and that “ARSON” 

was the street name of a local gang member who had spray-painted the same “name” in several other 

locations throughout the county. Although the graffiti was “evidence” of both state of mind and 

proximity, Fairfax County Fire Investigators have not established any association of the graffiti with 

the fire.

A number of individuals claimed credit for the fire, but all were dismissed as suspects based on subsequent interviews and follow-up by the police department and fire investigators.

Injuries and Fatalities

Upon arrival of police or fire units, there were no authorized occupants of the school, and there 

are no known, reported or suspected civilian injuries or fatalities. One firefighter strained his lower 

right back during exterior fire suppression operations.

Damage Assessment

The rapidity of propagation, due primarily to almost unlimited fuel and ventilation availability, 

caused such extensive damage that Dogwood Elementary was declared a total loss, valued at $12 

million. The located of seven HVAC units on the roof, most weight 4 1⁄4 tons, combined with the 

overhead presence of other heavy gauge steel structure and drainpipe, significantly accelerated structural collapse.

The extent of damage, volume of debris, and enormity of the dig-out operations required thousands 

of extra labor hours during frigid weather and short daylight. Many leads had to be followed-up and 

dozens of interviews conducted. Many federal and local agencies, plus private companies, contributed to the overall investigation and clean-up; they were;

•	 Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department

•	 Fairfax County Police Department

•	 Fairfax County School District—Construction Inspector and support staff

•	 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

•	 Federal Emergency Management Agency

•	 Excavating and trucking operations

•	 Rigging equipment operations

•	 Insurance investigators

•	 Plumbing and electrical subcontractors

•	 Labor crews for clearing debris
USFA-TR-135/November 2000 9

•	 Verizon telephone crews for establishing command center lines

•	 Virginia Power electrical assistance

FIRE ORIGIN AND SPREAD

The school was positioned at the end of a playing field, with a natural windbreak (tree line) on the 

windward side of the school. Based on internal building construction and layout, HVAC induced 

air movement, and exposure to prevailing winds, fire propagation was fuel-controlled at all times, 

and probably never shifted to ventilation control.1 Based on the fire load in the school and apparent 

rapidity of propagation, however, it is likely that the fire had almost unlimited access to both fuel and 

ventilation within a very short period of time after ignition.

Weather conditions existing at the time of the fire were: temperature 46 degrees F, dew point 35.6 

degrees F, barometric pressure 29.89 in Hg, visibility 10 miles, winds 4.6 mps, with no precipitation, lightning or electric storm activity. A review of weather conditions within 24 hours before and 

after the fire revealed gusts of 18 to 20 mph at nearby Dulles Airport.

Post fire-interviews revealed that most of the custodial staff had departed at approximately 9:30 a.m. 

The last authorized individual to leave the premises was a maintenance custodian supervisor who 

departed at approximately 9:55 p.m. From an investigative viewpoint, it is significant that none of 

the custodial personnel recalled any sensory indications of characteristics suggestive of a fire already 

in progress prior to their departure from the school that evening. That is particularly revealing in that 

carbonaceous odors of combustion products would likely have quickly been dispersed or otherwise 

propagated throughout the “covered warehouse”-type structure through the HVAC system and open 

plenum.

Extremely rapid fire propagation is evident in view of the following:

•	 Heavy fire showing, even with the rapid response of the Fairfax County Police and Fire and 

Rescue units;

•	 “Open Warehouse” structure of the school (high ventilation access);

•	 Fully functional HVAC system capable of quickly drawing and dispersing large volumes of 

air;

•	 Large combustible and high BTU fire load available; and

•	 Complete absence of any sensory clues perceived by the custodial staff.

Determining the cause of the fire was hindered due to the enormous amount of debris that had to 

be sorted through. Fire origin was narrowed to a general area of the school, but a point of origin 

was difficult to ascertain. The first police officer on the scene observed that one of the windows on 

the north (“back”) side of the school was broken inward, and investigation revealed the likelihood 

of possibly a second broken window near the first, in the north side of the school, at the time of the 

fire. However, no correlation could be established between the broken window(s) and subsequent 

1

 In order to have combustion, three things must be present: heat, fuel and oxygen. These three things comprise the fire 

triangle. If any of these items is absent, combustion will not occur. If any one of these items is in a limited quantity, it 

is the controlling factor in the time and quality of the fire. Therefore, a fuel-controlled fire has unlimited quantities of 

oxygen and heat, and limited quantities of fuel.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

events, particularly in view of the history of window replacement on the windward side (north side) 

of the school.

No low level fire spread indicator, V-pattern, or evidence of multiple points of origin was observed in 

the debris. Although numerous plant lights were typically left on 24 hours/day in classrooms in the 

areas of suspected origin, the working hypothesis from observations and investigation of the scene 

is that fire origin was high. The HVAC system, replaced in 1992 and the object of continuing maintenance and repair work since, was eliminated by fire investigators as the source or origin of the fire.

It is noted that, at a height of fourteen feet, the roofing materials in place at the time of the fire (roofing tar and asphalt paper in 5 layers) needed temperatures of only approximately 800 degrees F to 

become a self-sustaining “running/rolling roof deck fire.”

LESSONS LEARNED

The “open classroom” style present at Dogwood Elementary School makes almost unlimited fuel 

and ventilation available to any fire that initiates on the premises. The absence of fire-resistant barriers or noncombustible walls between rooms containing high combustible fuel loads exacerbated 

extremely rapid and unimpeded lateral spread of the Dogwood Elementary School fire. Following 

the fire, a risk assessment was performed on other facilities of similar construction in Fairfax County. 

According to information released at the same time as the origin and cause findings, eleven of thirteen Fairfax County Schools built according to the same design as Dogwood will have early warning 

detectors installed. The remaining two schools are about to undergo renovations that include such 

devices.

Overhead fuels in such an open construction greatly enhance lateral extension of a fire. Although 

no significant high BTU plastics (other than flex ducts and possibly some stored fluorescent fixture 

diffusers) appear to have been present in the plenum, the roof construction (incorporating asphalt 

paper and tar) provided a source of overhead fuel with a relatively low endothermic to exothermic 

transformation temperature (800 degrees F). This feature serves to enhance overhead lateral propagation even when fire-resistant walls are in place below.

Positioning seven HVAC units weighing nearly 4-1/4 tons each on the school’s roof dramatically 

accelerated structural collapse due to the inverse relationship of the structural steel yield stress to 

temperature. This phenomenon is knows as creep, where a metal can yield at stresses much below its 

normal yield strength when subjected to elevated temperatures (above approximately 1000 degrees 

F) while under load.

The presence of an annunciated passive fire alarm system incorporating smoke and heat sensors, as 

well as a sprinkler system, almost certainly would have allowed an earlier stage response. An earlier 

response may have provided an opportunity to mount an interior attack and reduce property damage, even with the “open classroom” construction design.

The policy of resetting alarms created a significant delay, allowing the fire to advance before being 

discovered. It is recommended that school officials find a way to reduce the number of false alarms, 

rather than ignoring the first one and simply resetting the alarm.

Finally, reports of electrical fixture or system difficulties in such a structure, particularly with such 

high occupancy, should be considered serious and resolved as immediately as is feasible.
11

APPENDICES

Appendix A: List of Responding Units

Appendix B: Fireground Map

Appendix C: Photographs

13

Appendix A

List of Responding Units

First Alarm:

Engines: 431,404,436,421

Trucks: 425

Tower: 436 (tower-ladder)

Rescue Engine: 425

Ambulance: 431

Command Units: BC01, EMS 1

Additional: E429

Second Alarm:

Engines: 415, 412, 434

Truck: 429

Medic: 425

Ambulance: 436

Command Units: BC03, EMS 2, DFCO, SAFETY

Canteen: 2

Third Alarm:

Engines: 402, 611, 413

Truck: 403

Command Units: BC02

Special Alarm:

Engines: 401, 423, 430

Truck: 430 (tower-ladder)

Command POD

Command Staff:

FC Chief Stinette

AFCO Assistant Chief Wheatley

DCSO Deputy Chief Martin

DFCS Deputy Chief Rohr

DFCP Deputy Chief Maurice

PIO Battalion Chief Johnson

15

APPENDIX B

Fireground Map

 (Not to Scale)

17

APPENDIX C

LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS

Figures 1-2: Views of classrooms of the “open classroom forum” style

Figure 3: View along hallway of similarly constructed “open classroom forum” 

style school

Figure 4: Similar hallway of Dogwood Elementary School after fire

Figure 5: Aerial view of Dogwood Elementary School after fire

Figure 6: Aerial view of Dogwood Elementary School after fire

Figure 7: Fire suppression efforts, Sides 3 and 4

Figure 8: Fire suppression efforts, Side 1

Figure 9: HVAC unit after fire

Figure 10: Collapsed roof and accordioned support column

USFA-TR-135/November 2000 19

Figure 1. View of three classrooms characteristic of the 

“open classroom forum” design.

Figure 2. Library area of similar school
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Figure 3. View along hallway of local school similar “open classroom forum” 

design. Note use of “demountable” partitions for room and hall definition.

Figure 4. Similar hallway in non-collapsed portion of Dogwood Elementary 

School after fire. Collapse of ceiling tiles has exposed bar joists (spanning 

hallway) and girders in plenum area.
USFA-TR-135/November 2000 21

Figure 5. Aerial view of Dogwood Elementary School before fire, with HVAC unit 

closest to fire origin indicated. HVAC unit, one of 7, weighed 4-1/4 tons.

Figure 6. Aerial view of Dogwood Elementary School after the fire.
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Figure 7. View of fire suppression operations

Figure 8. View of fire suppression operations, Side 1
USFA-TR-135/November 2000 23

Figure 9. HVAC unit (arrow in Figure 5) after fire, viewed from northeast.

Figure 10. View of collapsed truss and accordioned support column 

(left side of picture).