alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15

- 10670 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v. ADRIAN GOMEZ

- UREABA, also known as Gerardo Gomez

- Uribe, also known as Angel Uribe , Defendant

- Appellant
Consolidated with Case No. 15

- 10870 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff

- Appellee

v. SILVANO GARCIA

- IBARRA,
Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3 : 15

- CR

- 60

- 1 USDC No. 6:15

- CR

- 9

- 1 United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 10, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 15-10670 Document: 00514676100 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/10/2018No. 15

- 10670 c/w No. 15

- 10870

2 Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and CLEMENT and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES PER CURIAM: * Adrian Gomez

- Ureaba pleaded guilty to illegal reentry into the United States and received a withi n - guidelines sentence of 34 months in prison and a

one - year term of supervised release. Silvano Garcia

- Ibarra likewise pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, and he received a within

- guidel ines sentence of 18 months in prison and a three

- year term of supervis ed release. Each appellant was sentenced in accordance with a determination that his prior Texas conviction for evading arrest with a motor vehicle amounted to an aggravated felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (2014), which incorporates the definition of crime of violence found in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). We rejected their challenges to their sentences and affirmed. United States v. Gomez

- Ureaba , 686 F. App’x 271 (5th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court granted their petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Sessions v. Dimaya , 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) , which held that § 16 (b) is unconstitutionally vague
. However, we then held that § 16(b) remains validl y incorporated into the advisory Guidelines for definitional purposes. United States v. Godoy , 890 F.3d 531, 540 (5th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, the appellants’ sentences are still valid. However, Gomez

- Ureaba’s prior conviction does not constitute an agg ravated felony warranting judgment under § 1326(b)(2). A ccordingly, Gomez

- Ureaba’s judgment is MODIFIED to reflect that he was convicted and

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. Case: 15-10670 Document: 00514676100 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/10/2018No. 15

- 10670 c/w No. 15

- 10870

3 sentenced under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1), and the judgment as modified is AFFIRMED. Garcia

- Ibarra ’s judgment is likewise AFFIRMED. Because Gomez

- Ureaba’s release date is imminent, the mandate shall issue forthwith. Case: 15-10670 Document: 00514676100 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/10/2018
120 STAT. 570 PUBLIC LAW 109–242—JULY 19, 2006

Public Law 109–242

109th Congress

An Act

To amend the Public Health Service Act to prohibit the solicitation or acceptance

of tissue from fetuses gestated for research purposes, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fetus Farming Prohibition Act

of 2006’’.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF THE SOLICITATION OR ACCEPTANCE OF

TISSUE FROM FETUSES GESTATED FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES.

Section 498B of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 289g–

2) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (c) and (d) as subsections

(d) and (e), respectively;

(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

‘‘(c) SOLICITATION OR ACCEPTANCE OF TISSUE FROM FETUSES

GESTATED FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES.—It shall be unlawful for any

person or entity involved or engaged in interstate commerce to—

‘‘(1) solicit or knowingly acquire, receive, or accept a donation of human fetal tissue knowing that a human pregnancy

was deliberately initiated to provide such tissue; or

‘‘(2) knowingly acquire, receive, or accept tissue or cells

obtained from a human embryo or fetus that was gestated

in the uterus of a nonhuman animal.’’;

(3) in paragraph (1) of subsection (d), as so redesignated,

by striking ‘‘(a) or (b)’’ and inserting ‘‘(a), (b), or (c)’’; and

Fetus Farming

Prohibition Act

of 2006.

42 USC 201 note.

July 19, 2006

[S. 3504]

PUBLIC LAW 109–242—JULY 19, 2006 120 STAT. 571

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 3504:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 152 (2006):

July 17, considered in Senate.

July 18, considered and passed Senate and House.

Æ

(4) in paragraph (1) of subsection (e), as so redesignated,

by striking ‘‘section 498A(f)’’ and inserting ‘‘section 498A(g)’’.

Approved July 19, 2006.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 30, 2006
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

TOMAS L.A. CROWLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant

v. CITY OF BURLINGAME, KANSAS Defendant-Appellee. No. 05-3078 (D.C. No. 04-CV-2078-GTV)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before McCONNELL, ANDERSON , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Tomas L.A. Crowley appeals from the distr ict court’s memorandum and order granting summary judgment in f avor of defendant City of-2-

Burlingame, Kansas on his claims pursuant to 42 U.S .C. § 1983 for alleged violation of his due process rights and breach of an implied contract under Kansas law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. The undisputed relevant facts are set forth in deta il in Crowley v. City of Burlingame, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D. Kan. 2005). Briefly, Crow ley was employed by the City as a police officer from July 18, 2002, until March 13, 2003, when he was fired by the unanimous vote of Ci ty Council. We review the district court’s grant of summary jud gment de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Gossett v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1175 (10th Cir. 2001). Summary j udgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of mater ial fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 1175. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the di strict court correctly identified the elements for a due process claim con cerning the alleged violation of Crowley’s property and liberty interests, as well a s for breach of an implied contract. The court then correctly applied the law to the undisputed, material facts. As such, the judgment is AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson-3- Circuit Judge
§ 1172.40 Exhaustion of administrative remedies. ( a ) A complainant may file a civil action under the Act and the regulations in this part following the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Administrative remedies are exhausted if one hundred eighty (180) days have elapsed since the complainant filed the complaint and NEH has made no finding with regard to the complaint, or NEH issues any finding in favor of the recipient.
( b ) If either of the conditions set forth in § 1172.40(a) is satisfied, NEH will: ( 1 ) Promptly advise the complainant of this fact,
( 2 ) Advise the complainant of his or her right, to bring a civil action for injunctive relief, and
( 3 ) Inform the complainant: ( i ) That a civil action can only be brought in a United States district court for the district in which the recipient is found or transacts business,
( ii ) That a complainant prevailing in a civil action has the right to be awarded the costs of the action, including reasonable attorney's fees, but that these costs must be demanded in the complaint,
( iii ) That before commencing the action, the complainant must give thirty (30) days' notice by registered mail to the Secretary, the Attorney General of the United States, the Chairman, and the recipient,
( iv ) That the notice must state the alleged violation of the Act, the relief requested, the court in which the complainant is bringing the action, and, whether or not attorney's fees are demanded in the event the complainant prevails, and
( v ) That no action may be brought if the same alleged violation of the Act by the same recipient is the subject of a pending action in any court of the United States.
# EUR-Lex - 12008M045 - EN

Important legal notice

*|*

# 12008M045

**Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - TITLE V: GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE UNION'S EXTERNAL ACTION AND SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY - Chapter 2: Specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy - Section 2: Provisions on the common security and defence policy - Article 45 **

*
Official Journal 115 , 09/05/2008 P. 0040 - 0040 *

Article 45

1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its task to:

(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;

(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;

(c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;

(d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs;

(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.

2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of effective participation in the Agency's activities. Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary.

--------------------------------------------------
§ 1302.41 Collaboration and communication with parents. ( a ) For all activities described in this part, programs must collaborate with parents as partners in the health, mental health, and well-being of their children in a linguistically and culturally appropriate manner and communicate with parents about their child's health and mental health needs and development concerns in a timely and effective manner.
( b ) At a minimum, a program must: ( 1 ) Obtain advance authorization from the parent or other person with legal authority for all health, mental health, and developmental procedures administered through the program or by contract or agreement, and, maintain written documentation if they refuse to give authorization for health and mental health services; and,
( 2 ) Share with parents the policies for health or mental health emergencies that require rapid response on the part of staff or immediate medical attention.
[89 FR 67810, Aug. 21, 2024]
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Michigan Community Bancorp Limited
(the "Corporation") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), each of the undersigned hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to
the best of our respective knowledge and belief, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Corporation.



/s/  J. William Sumner                /s/  Frank D. Blowers
   ----------------------               ------------------------
     J. William Sumner                     Frank D. Blowers
     Chief Executive Officer               President and Chief Operating Officer
     November 12,  2003                    (Principal Financial Officer)
                                           November 12, 2003


                                       28
#### §§ 2301.112-2301.129 [Reserved]
#### Mary Coffey, as Administratrix of the Estate of Daniel Coffey, Deceased, Respondent, *v.*Richard L. Walsh Company, Appellant.

*Coffey*v. *Walsh Co.,*126 App. Div. 951, affirmed.

(Argued December 16, 1908;

decided January 5, 1909.)

Appeal from a judgment' of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered June 23, 1908, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and an order denying a motion for a new trial in an action to recover for- the death of plaintiff’s intestate alleged to have occurred through defendant’s negligence.

*Alfred A. Wheat, Frank A. Gaynor*and *Harold C. McCollum*for appellant.

*G. Washbourne Smith*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Cullen, Ch. J., Edward T. Bartlett, Haight, Vann, Werner, Hisoook and Chase, J J.
Order entered August 5 , 2014

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05
- 13
- 01681
- CV
CONEJOS RIVER OUTFIT TERS, LLC, LANCE COC HRAN AND WILLIAM MCMURREY, Appellant s V. KENT JARNAGIN AND SU SAN JARNAGIN, Appellee s On Appeal from t he 14th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC
- 12
- 07598 

### O RDER
W e DENY appellees’ July 25, 2014 motion to strike evidence offered by appellants in support of their brief

. The Court notes, however, that, upon submission, it will consider only those factual assertions supported by the record and those documents that are part of the appellate record. See Wilhoite v. Sims , 401 S.W.3d 752, 762 (Tex. App.

-- Dallas 2013, no pet.).

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG

- MIERS JUSTICE
EXHIBIT 32.1

Each of, Edwin L. Adler, Chief
Executive Officer, and James W. Distelrath, Chief Financial Officer, of Clarkston
Financial Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)    
          the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly period ended September 30,
          2006 which this statement accompanies fully complies with the requirements of
          Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

(2)    
          the information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the
          quarterly period ended September 30, 2006 fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Clarkston
          Financial Corporation.

Date: November 13, 2006

| |  | /s/ Edwin L. Adler
Edwin L. AdlerChief Executive Officer
| |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------

| |  | /s/ James W. Distelrath
James W. DistelrathChief Financial Officer
| |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
§ 1149.2 Definitions. For the purposes of this part— *Authority* means the National Endowment for the Arts.
*Authority Head* means the Chairperson/head of the National Endowment for the Arts or the Chairperson/authority head/s designee.
*Benefit* means anything of value, including but not limited to, any advantage, preference, privilege, license, permit, favorable decision, ruling, status, or loan guarantee.
*Defendant* means any person alleged in a complaint to be liable for a civil penalty or assessment pursuant to the PFCRA.
*Government* means the United States Government.
*Group of related claims submitted at the same time* means only those claims arising from the same transaction (such as a grant, loan, application, or contract) which are submitted together as part of a single request, demand, or submission.
*Initial decision* means the written decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and includes a revised initial decision issued following a remand or a motion for reconsideration.
*Investigating official* means: ( 1 ) The NEA Inspector General; or
( 2 ) A designee of the NEA Inspector General.
Knows or has reason to know means that a person: ( 1 ) Has actual knowledge that the claim or statement is false, fictitious, or fraudulent; or
( 2 ) Acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the claim or statement; or
( 3 ) Acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the claim or statement.
*Makes,* whenever it appears, must include the terms *presents, submits,* and *causes to be made, presented, or submitted.* As the context requires, *making* or *made* must likewise include the corresponding forms of such terms.
*Person* means any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or private organization, and includes the plural of that term.
*Representative* means an attorney who is in good standing of the bar of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any other individual designated in writing by you.
*Reviewing official* means the General Counsel of the NEA or the General Counsel's designee.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

February 27, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

129271(26) Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 129271 

 COA: 260055 

Jackson CC: 02-000770-FC 

JOHN DAVID RUELAS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s order of 

November 29, 2005 is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the 

order was entered erroneously. 

p0221 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

February 27, 2006 

Clerk
§ 144.102 Scope and applicability. ( a ) For purposes of 45 CFR parts 144 through 149, all health insurance coverage is generally divided into two markets—the group market and the individual market. The group market is further divided into the large group market and the small group market.
( b ) The protections afforded under 45 CFR parts 144 through 149 to individuals and employers (and other sponsors of health insurance offered in connection with a group health plan) are determined by whether the coverage involved is obtained in the small group market, the large group market, or the individual market.
( c ) Coverage that is provided to associations, but not related to employment, and sold to individuals is not considered group coverage under 45 CFR parts 144 through 149. If the coverage is offered to an association member other than in connection with a group health plan, the coverage is considered individual health insurance coverage for purposes of 45 CFR parts 144 through 149. The coverage is considered coverage in the individual market, regardless of whether it is considered group coverage under state law. If the health insurance coverage is offered in connection with a group health plan as defined at 45 CFR 144.103, it is considered group health insurance coverage for purposes of 45 CFR parts 144 through 149.
( d ) Provisions relating to CMS enforcement of parts 146, 147, 148, and 149 are contained in part 150 of this subchapter.
[86 FR 36970, July 13, 2021]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 REPRESENTATIVE TED LIEU, et al., 

Plaintiffs, Civ. No. 16-2201 (EGS) 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Defendant.

ORDER 

Upon consideration of defendant’s motion to dismiss 

plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, and for the reasons stated 

in the Memorandum Opinion, defendant’s motion to dismiss is 

GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint is hereby 

DISMISSED. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

United States District Judge 

February 28, 2019 

Case 1:16-cv-02201-EGS Document 47 Filed 02/28/19 Page 1 of 1
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6648

FREDERICK GREEN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus JONATHAN E. OZMINT, Director of SCDC; GEORGE HAGAN, Warden of Allendale Correctional Institution; LAVERNE COHEN, Associate Warden of Special Management Unit (SMU); ANN HALLMAN, Institutional Grievance Coordinator at Allendale Correctional Institution; SAMUEL KEARSE, Lieutenant and SMU Supervisor at Allendale Correctional Institution; OTHER UNKNOWN AGENCY OFFICIALS, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge. (CA-04-22074-2) Submitted: October 31, 2005 Decided: November 29, 2005 Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Frederick Green, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Frederick Lindemann, DAVIDSON, MORRISON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.- 2 - Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 3 - PER CURIAM: Frederick Green seeks to appeal the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and denying his motion for a temporary restraining order. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order Green seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. SeeOffice of Pers. Mgmt. v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees , 473 U.S. 1301, 1303-04 (1985); Drudge v. McKernon , 482 F.2d 1375, 1376 (4th Cir. 1973). Accordingly, we deny Green’s motion to expedite the appeal, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED