United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

NASA’S JAMES WEBB 

SPACE TELESCOPE 

Knowledge-Based 

Acquisition Approach 

Key to Addressing 

Program Challenges 

July 2006 

 

GAO-06-634 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2006

NASA’S JAMES WEBB SPACE 

TELESCOPE 

Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach 

Key to Addressing Program Challenges 

Highlights of GAO-06-634, a report to 

congressional committees 

The National Aeronautics and

Space Administration’s (NASA) 

James Webb Space Telescope 

(JWST) is being designed to

explore the origins and nature of

the universe. It should allow 

scientists to look deeper into 

space—and thus farther back in

time—than ever before. The 

program, however, has 

experienced cost growth of more

than $1 billion and its schedule has 

slipped nearly 2 years. NASA

recently restructured the program

and now anticipates a launch no 

sooner than June 2013. Because of

the cost and schedule problems,

under the Comptroller General’s 

authority, we reviewed the JWST 

program to determine the extent to

which this procurement follows 

NASA acquisition policy and GAO

best practices for ensuring that 

adequate product knowledge is 

used to make informed investment 

decisions 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the NASA 

administrator: (1) direct the JWST

program to fully apply a 

knowledge-based acquisition 

approach to ensure that adequate

knowledge is attained at key 

decision points and also to hold 

the program accountable and 

(2) instruct the JWST program to 

continue to adhere to NASA 

acquisition policy and go forward 

only after demonstrating that it is 

meeting incremental knowledge

markers and has sufficient funds 

to execute the program. NASA 

concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations. 

Although the JWST program recently revised its acquisition strategy to 

conform to NASA’s acquisition policies, the program still faces considerable

challenges because it has not fully implemented a knowledge-based 

approach, which our past work has shown is often a key factor in program 

success. In a recent report, we made recommendations that NASA take steps 

to ensure that projects follow a knowledge-based approach for product 

development. NASA concurred and revised its acquisition policy. When we 

initiated our work and before the JWST program’s recently revised 

acquisition strategy, program officials intended to have NASA commit to 

program start, which is the end of the formulation phase and the beginning 

of the implementation phase, with immature technologies, according to best 

practices, and without a preliminary design. During our review, we discussed

these shortfalls with NASA officials, and they revised their acquisition 

strategy to conform to NASA policy. However, the current strategy still does

not fully incorporate a knowledge-based approach which ensures that 

resources match requirements in terms of knowledge, time, and money 

before program start. If program officials follow the current plan, the 

maturity of key technologies may not be adequately tested prior to program 

start. In addition, it appears the program will not have sufficient funding 

resources to ensure the program’s success. In light of the fiscally 

constrained environment the federal government and NASA will face in the 

years ahead, adopting a knowledge-based approach will not only increase 

the JWST program’s chances for success but also lay the foundation for 

comparison between competing programs. 

Conceptual Drawing of NASA’s JWST 

Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-634.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Allen Li at 

(202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 3

JWST’s Revised Strategy Does Not Fully Incorporate a KnowledgeBased Approach That Could Reduce Risks and Better Inform 

Decision Making 6 

Conclusions 18

Recommendations for Executive Action 18 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 22 

Appendix II Technology Readiness Levels 23 

Appendix III Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 25 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 27 

Related GAO Products 28 

Figures 

Figure 1: Conceptual Drawing of NASA’s JWST 4 

Figure 2: Comparison of NASA’s Life Cycle with a KnowledgeBased Acquisition Life Cycle 11 

Figure 3: Technology Maturity Levels for Product Development 13 

Page i GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Abbreviations 

CSA Canadian Space Agency

ESA European Space Agency

JWST James Webb Space Telescope 

KP1 Knowledge point 1 

NAR Non-advocate Review 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

PDR Preliminary Design Review 

TRL Technology Readiness Levels 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

July 14, 2006

Congressional Committees 

As the expected follow-on to the tremendously successful Hubble Space 

Telescope, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) 

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is being designed to explore the 

early universe and allow scientists to shed light on the origins and nature 

of the universe by allowing them to look deeper into space—and thus 

farther back in time—than ever before. Recently, however, NASA 

acknowledged that the program1

 has experienced cost growth exceeding 

$1 billion—which increased its life-cycle cost estimate from $3.5 billion to

$4.5 billion—and its schedule has slipped nearly 2 years. The agency 

restructured the program and is now anticipating a launch no sooner than 

June 2013. 

Because of the restructuring and past cost and schedule problems, we 

reviewed the program to determine the extent to which the JWST 

program’s acquisition strategy follows NASA acquisition policy and

Government Accountability Office (GAO) best practices for ensuring that 

adequate product knowledge is used to make informed investments. We 

conducted our work under the Comptroller General’s authority and are 

addressing this report to you because of your committee’s or 

subcommittee’s interest in NASA activities. 

To assess the extent to which the JWST acquisition strategy follows NASA 

policy and GAO best practices for ensuring readiness to proceed into 

implementation, we reviewed NASA policy guidance and compared it with 

the JWST program’s acquisition strategy. We also benchmarked the JWST

acquisition strategy to best practices. We interviewed NASA and 

contractor officials to clarify our understanding of the program’s 

management approach and technology development plan. We analyzed 

cost and schedule information and discussed the impact of the investment 

in the JWST on other NASA programs with NASA officials. We attended 

two design reviews, including one at the prime contractor’s facility. We 

 1

The JWST is a one-project program, according to a NASA official. The terms “program”

and “project” are used interchangeably throughout this report. 

Page 1 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
performed our review from August 2005 through May 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Although the JWST program recently revised its acquisition strategy to 

conform to NASA’s acquisition policies, the program still faces 

considerable challenges because it has not fully implemented a 

knowledge-based approach. Our past work on the best practices of 

product developers in government and industry has found that using a 

knowledge-based approach is often a key factor in program success. We 

recently made recommendations that NASA take steps to ensure that 

projects follow a knowledge-based approach for product development.2

NASA concurred and revised its acquisition policy. When we initiated our 

work and before the JWST program’s recently revised acquisition strategy, 

program officials intended to have NASA commit to the program and start 

implementation with immature technologies, according to best practices, 

and without a preliminary design. During our review, we discussed these 

shortfalls with NASA officials, and they revised their acquisition strategy 

to conform to NASA policy. However, the current strategy still does not 

fully incorporate a knowledge-based approach that ensures that resources 

match requirements in terms of knowledge, time, and money before 

program start, which is the end of the formulation phase and the beginning

of the implementation phase. If program officials follow the current plan, 

the maturity of key technologies may not be adequately tested prior to 

program start. For example, a test to demonstrate critical performance 

parameters is scheduled to occur after the program start decision and 

some planned test items may not provide the validity needed to adequately 

verify technology maturity. In addition, it appears the program will not 

have sufficient funding resources to ensure the program’s success. 

According to a review conducted by NASA’s Independent Program 

Assessment Office, the program’s contingency funding is too low and 

phased in too late in the program to support the planned launch date and 

provide the necessary resources to address as yet unforeseen problems. In 

light of the fiscally constrained environment the federal government and 

NASA will face in the years ahead, adopting a knowledge-based approach 

will not only increase the JWST program’s chances for success but also lay 

the foundation for comparison between competing programs. As more 

Results in Brief 

 2

GAO, NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could Lead to 

Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes, GAO-06-218 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 21, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
programs, such as the JWST, move into implementation, using a 

knowledge-based approach will allow NASA to assess these development 

efforts in a consistent format to confirm the continued viability of the 

investment. 

To increase the JWST program’s chances of successful product 

development and to better inform NASA’s decision-making process, we 

are recommending that the NASA Administrator (1) direct the JWST 

program to apply a knowledge-based acquisition approach, including 

incremental markers, to ensure that adequate knowledge is attained at key 

decision points and to hold the program accountable and (2) instruct the 

JWST program to continue to adhere to NASA acquisition policy and base

the program’s go/no-go decision not only on adherence to that policy, but 

also on demonstrating that it is meeting incremental knowledge markers 

and that adequate funds are available to execute the program. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our 

recommendations. NASA’s comments are included in their entirety in 

appendix III. 

The JWST—identified by the National Research Council as the top priority 

new initiative for astronomy and physics for the current decade—is a large 

deployable space-based observatory being developed to study and answer 

fundamental questions ranging from the formation and structure of the 

universe to the origin of planetary systems and the origins of life. Often 

referred to as the replacement to Hubble, the JWST is more of a next 

generation telescope—one that scientists believe will be capable of seeing

back to the origins of the universe (Big Bang). The JWST will have a large, 

segmented primary mirror—6.5 meters (about 21 feet) in diameter—which 

is a leap ahead in technology over the last generation of mirrors. The 

observatory requires a sunshield approximately the size of a tennis court 

to allow it to cool to the extremely cold temperature (around 40 degrees 

Kelvin, or minus 388 degrees Fahrenheit) necessary for the telescope and 

science instruments to work. The mirror and the sunshield—both critical 

components—must fold up to fit inside the launch vehicle and open to 

their operational configuration once the JWST is in orbit. In addition, the 

Background 

Page 3 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
observatory will house science instruments—such as a near-infrared3

camera, a near-infrared spectrograph,

4

 a mid-infrared instrument, and a 

fine guidance sensor—to enable scientists to conduct various research 

activities. 

Figure 1: Conceptual Drawing of NASA’s JWST

Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation. 

The JWST is an international collaboration among the United States, the 

European Space Agency (ESA), and the Canadian Space Agency (CSA). 

ESA will provide the near-infrared spectrograph science instrument, the 

optical bench assembly of the mid-infrared instrument, and the launch of 

the JWST by means of an Ariane 5 expendable launch vehicle. CSA’s 

contribution will be the fine guidance sensor to enable stable pointing. 

 3

Infrared radiation is one of the many types of “light” that comprise the electromagnetic 

spectrum. Infrared light is situated outside of the visible spectrum and has wavelengths 

longer than visible light. Astronomers generally divide the infrared portion of the 

electromagnetic spectrum into three regions: near infrared, mid infrared, and far infrared. 

The JWST will be sensitive to near-infrared and mid-infrared radiation.

4

A spectrograph is an instrument for dispersing radiation (as electromagnetic radiation or 

sound waves) into a spectrum and photographing or mapping the spectrum. 

Page 4 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Recently, the JWST program recognized significant cost growth and 

schedule slippage. In March 2005, NASA identified about $1 billion cost 

growth, which increased the JWST’s life-cycle cost estimate from 

$3.5 billion to $4.5 billion. In addition, the program’s schedule slipped 

nearly 2 years. As a result, the program began a series of re-baselining 

efforts to revise its acquisition strategy. In summer 2005, NASA 

Headquarters chartered two independent review teams—an Independent

Review Team from NASA’s Independent Program Assessment Office and a 

Science Assessment Team—to evaluate the program. The Independent 

Review Team was charged with examining the program’s new 

cost/schedule/ technical baseline and reported in mid-April 2006 that 

(1) the JWST’s scientific performance met the expectations of the science

community, (2) the technical content was complete and sound, and (3) the 

Goddard Space Flight Center and contractor teams were effective. 

However, the team was concerned about the program’s early year funding 

constraints. 

The Science Assessment Team, an international team of outside experts, 

was established to evaluate scientific capabilities of the JWST in the 2015 

time frame in light of other astronomical facilities that would be available. 

The team concluded that the financial savings gained from the reduction in

the size of the primary mirror area would not be worth the resultant loss of 

scientific capabilities. The team recommended relaxing some science 

requirements and simplifying other aspects of the mission, such as 

integration and testing, to reduce the program’s cost risk. For example, the 

team recommended relaxing the contamination requirements, allowing the 

project to test the mirrors using an innovative approach that will reduce 

costs. The team also recommended that the JWST de-emphasize the 

shorter wavelengths, since other astronomical facilities would be available 

to cover that range. 

Page 5 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
The JWST program recently revised its acquisition strategy to conform to 

NASA’s acquisition policies; however, the program still faces considerable 

challenges. GAO best practices work has found that using a knowledgebased approach is a key factor in program success. When we initiated our 

work and before the program’s recently revised acquisition strategy, 

program officials intended to have NASA commit to the program and start 

implementation with immature technologies, according to best practices, 

and without a preliminary design. During our review, we discussed these 

shortfalls with NASA officials, and they revised their acquisition strategy 

to align their decision milestones in accordance with NASA acquisition 

policy. While this is a good step, the current strategy does not fully 

incorporate a knowledge-based approach that could reduce the program’s 

risks by ensuring that resources match requirements at program start. By 

closely following a knowledge-based approach, the JWST program will 

increase its chances for success and better inform NASA’s decision 

making. 

JWST’s Revised 

Strategy Does Not 

Fully Incorporate a 

Knowledge-Based 

Approach That Could 

Reduce Risks and 

Better Inform 

Decision Making 

Immature Technologies, 

Design Challenges, and 

Testing Restrictions Still 

Pose Risks 

The JWST contains several innovations, including lightweight optics, a 

deployable sunshield, and a folding segmented mirror. Although the 

program began risk reduction activities early to develop and mature some 

technologies, such as the lightweight segmented folding mirror, the 

program is challenged with maturing some of its other critical 

technologies. For example, the sunshield, which consists of five layers of 

membranes, must be folded for launch but then unfurled to its operational 

configuration—with enough tension to prevent wrinkle patterns that could 

interfere with the telescope’s mirrors, but not so much tension to cause 

tears in the fabric. The sunshield must also be aligned with the rest of the 

observatory so that only the top layer of the sunshield is visible to the 

primary mirror and a correct angle between the observatory and the sun 

and other heat-radiating bodies is maintained to enable the telescope and

science instruments to preserve the very cold temperature—about 

40 degrees Kelvin—critical for achieving the JWST’s mission. In addition, 

using passive cooling devices, such as heat switches, to allow specific 

areas of the telescope to cool down, represent additional challenges since 

these items will be used in new configurations. NASA also recently 

substituted the cryo-cooler used for the mid-infrared instrument for a 

lower technology component to save mass. According to JWST officials, 

the program recently awarded the development contract for the cryocooler. In addition, the micro shutter array, which will allow the JWST to 

program specific patterns of the electromagnetic spectrum for viewing, is 

a new technology being developed by the Goddard Space Flight Center 

and is still at a relatively low level of maturity. JWST officials acknowledge 

Page 6 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
that they are concerned about maturing the cryo-cooler and the micro 

shutter array. 

In addition, the program also faces design challenges related to the launch

vehicle and the observatory’s stability. For example, program officials told

us that they may need to request a waiver because the telescope will not fit 

within the criteria limits of the launch vehicle’s envelop without making 

design modifications. Furthermore, due to the late selection of the launch 

vehicle, the project office and prime contractor are just beginning to 

discuss interfaces, transportation at the launch site, and the additional 

space issue with Ariane 5 officials. Also, the project faces the unresolved 

problem of finding the best way to keep the observatory stable. The large 

sunshield, observatory attitude changes, and other effects conspire to 

produce unbalanced torques, which can make the observatory unstable. 

The project continues to look at ways to resolve this problem, including 

thrusters to rebalance the observatory, but project officials say this will 

continue to be a challenge. 

Another overriding concern is NASA’s inability to test the entire 

observatory in its operational environment, since there is no test facility in 

the United States large enough to perform this test. The plan is to 

incrementally test components and subsystems on the ground in 

laboratories simulating the observatory’s operational environment and to 

make extensive use of modeling and simulation. According to the 

memorandum summarizing the January 2006 System Definition Review, a 

key concern is that the JWST is pushing the limits of ground test facilities 

and cannot be tested at the observatory level; therefore, requiring 

complicated integration and testing with a series of subsystem tests and 

analyses. In its April 2006 assessment of the JWST program, the 

Independent Review Team reported that there are several exceptions to 

the “test as you fly”5

 guideline and that mitigation strategies need to be 

developed before the end of the preliminary design phase. 

Containing Further Cost 

Growth and Schedule 

Slippage 

In March 2005, the JWST program recognized that its cost had grown by 

about $1 billion, increasing the JWST’s life-cycle cost estimate from 

$3.5 billion to $4.5 billion. About half of the cost growth was due to 

 5

“Test as you fly” means performing the final performance and environmental test with the 

spacecraft fully integrated in the same configuration that it will be in when it launches, 

according an agency official. 

Page 7 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
schedule slippage—a 1-year schedule slip because of a delay in the 

decision to use an ESA-supplied Ariane 5 launch vehicle and an additional 

10-month slip caused by budget profile limitations in fiscal years 2006 and

2007. More than a third of the cost increase was caused by requirements 

and other changes. An increase in the program’s contingency funding 

accounted for the remainder—about 12 percent—of the growth. 

Despite an increase in the program’s contingency funding, the 

Independent Review Team found that the contingency funding is still 

inadequate. In its April 2006 assessment of the JWST program’s rebaselining, the Independent Review Team expressed concern over the 

program’s contingency funding, stating that it is too low and phased in too 

late. According to the team, the program’s contingency from 2006 through

2010 of only $29 million, or about 1.5 percent,6

 after “liens” and “threats”7 is 

inadequate.8

 The team also stated that a 25 percent to 30 percent total 

contingency is appropriate for a program of this complexity. The 

program’s total contingency is only about 19 percent. The team warned 

that because of the inadequate contingency, the program’s ability to 

resolve issues, address program risk areas, and accommodate unknown 

problems is very limited. Therefore, the team concluded that from a 

budget perspective, the re-baselined program is not viable for a 2013 

launch. The team recommended that before the Non-Advocate Review 

(NAR)

9

 leading to program start, steps should be taken by the Science 

Mission Directorate to assure that the JWST program contains an adequate

time-phased funding contingency to secure a stable launch date. 

 6

Some budget cuts were restored after the Independent Review Team’s assessment, 

increasing this amount to about 3 percent.

7

A “lien” is a potential cost to a project, direct or indirect, which may or may not come to

fruition, for which a portion of funding reserves is set aside. According to a JWST project 

official, “threats” are things that concern a project or engineer, which may or may not come 

true, but which bear watching to see if they have validity; however, they do not require the 

same rigor as “liens.” 

8

According to a member of the Independent Review Team, “threats” were included in the

analysis because after examining the project office’s “threat” list, the team concluded that 

the “threats” had a high probability of occurring and were therefore more like “liens.” 

9

The NAR—a program/project milestone review prescribed by NASA Procedural 

Requirements 7120.5C—is intended to provide NASA management with an independent

assessment of a program’s readiness to move into implementation and the final design 

phase. 

Page 8 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
The JWST program remains at risk of incurring additional cost growth and 

schedule slippage because of the technical challenges that must be 

resolved—immature technologies, design challenges, and testing 

restrictions. Our best practices work indicates that immature technology 

increases the risk of cost increases and schedule slips. Unresolved 

technology challenges can cascade through a product development cycle 

often resulting in an unstable design that will require more testing and 

thus more time and money to fix the problems. Subsequently, it will be 

difficult to prepare a reliable cost estimate until these challenges are 

resolved. 

Knowledge-Based 

Approach Key to 

Overcoming Challenges 

Our past work on the best practices of product developers in government 

and industry has found that the use of a knowledge-based approach is a 

key factor in successfully addressing challenges such as those faced by the 

JWST program. Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of

work on how leading developers in industry and government use a 

knowledge-based approach to deliver high quality products on time and 

within budget.10 A knowledge-based approach to product development 

efforts enables developers to be reasonably certain that, at critical 

junctures or “knowledge points” in the acquisition life cycle, their products 

are more likely to meet established cost, schedule, and performance 

baselines and therefore provides them with information needed to make 

sound investment decisions. The marker for the first juncture—knowledge 

point 1 (KP1)—occurs just prior to program start. At KP1, the customer’s 

requirements match the product developer’s resources in terms of 

knowledge, time, and money. At KP 2, the product design is stable, and 

production processes are mature at KP 3. Product development efforts 

that have not followed a knowledge-based approach can frequently be 

characterized by poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. 

We recently reported that NASA’s revised acquisition policy for developing

flight systems and ground support projects incorporates some aspects of 

the best practices used by successful developers.11 For example, NASA 

policy requires projects to conduct a major decision review—NAR—

before moving from formulation to implementation. Further, before 

moving from formulation to implementation, projects must validate 

 10Our best practice reviews are identified in the “Related GAO Products” section at the end

of this report. 

11GAO-06-218. 

Page 9 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
requirements and develop realistic cost and schedule estimates, human 

capital plans, a preliminary design, and a technology plan—all key 

elements for matching needs to resources before commitment to a major 

investment is made at project start. Figure 2 compares NASA’s life cycle 

with a knowledge-based acquisition life cycle. 

Page 10 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Figure 2: Comparison of NASA’s Life Cycle with a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Life Cycle 

Formulation Implementation 

Pre-Phase A

Concept

Studies

Phase A

Concept

Development

Phase B

Preliminary

Design

Phase C

Final

Design

Phase D

Fabrication, Assembly, 

and Test

Phase E

Operations and

Sustainment

Phase F

Disposal

PreNAR

NAR

(KP1)

No management decision 

review at KP2, KP3

Integration Demonstration

Product Development

Knowledge point 3 (KP3)

Production meets cost, 

schedule, and quality 

targets

Knowledge point 2 (KP2)

Design performs as

expected

Knowledge point 1 (KP1)

Technologies, time, 

funding, and other 

resources match customer 

needs

PROGRAM

START

Concept & Technology Development

SDR CDR PDR

Sources: NASA and GAO analysis.

NAR = Non-Advocate Review

Pre-NAR = Preliminary Non-Advocate Review

No management review at KP2, KP3

SDR = System Design Review

PDR = Preliminary Design Review

CDR = Critical Design Review

NASA's Lifecycle for Flight Systems and Ground Support Projects

Knowledge Based Approach

Management Decision Reviews Technical Reviews

2 3

Production

While the policy incorporates elements of a knowledge-based approach, 

we also reported that NASA’s acquisition policies lack the necessary 

requirements to ensure that programs proceed and are funded only after 

Page 11 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
an adequate level of knowledge at key junctures. For example, NASA 

policy does not require that programs demonstrate technologies at high 

levels of maturity at program start. Further, although NASA policy does 

require project managers to establish a continuum of technical and 

management reviews, the policy does not specify what these reviews 

should be nor does it require major decision reviews at other key points in 

a product’s development. These best practices could be used to further 

reduce program risks. 

In order to close the gaps between NASA’s current acquisition 

environment and best practices on knowledge-based acquisition, we 

recommended that NASA take steps to ensure that NASA projects follow a 

knowledge-based approach for product development. Specifically, we 

recommended that NASA (1) in drafting its systems engineering policy, 

incorporate requirements for flight systems and ground support projects 

to capture specific product knowledge by key junctures in project 

development and use demonstration of this knowledge as exit criteria for 

decision making at key milestones and (2) revise NASA Procedural 

Requirements 7120.5C to institute additional major decision reviews 

following the NAR for flight systems and ground support projects, which 

result in recommendations to the appropriate decision authority at key 

milestones. NASA concurred with our recommendations and agreed to 

revise its policies. 

One of the resources needed at program start is mature technology. Our 

best practices work has shown that technology readiness levels (TRL)12— 

a concept developed by NASA—can be used to gauge the maturity of 

individual technologies. Specifically, TRL 6—demonstrating a technology 

as a fully integrated prototype in a realistic environment—is the level of 

maturity needed to minimize risks for space systems entering product 

development. To achieve TRL 6, technology maturity must be 

demonstrated in a relevant environment using a prototype or model. 

(See app. II for a detailed description and definition of TRLs and test 

environments.) 

 12TRLs characterize the readiness of technologies for hand-off to project implementers. 

Nine levels are defined representing concepts from fundamental research level through 

technologies fully qualified and demonstrated in flight. 

Page 12 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Figure 3: Technology Maturity Levels for Product Development 

High Technology unproven Technology proven 

Low High 

Low 

Risk level Readiness level 

1 2 3 

Concept 

Component 

validation 

Prototype 

demonstration 

Testing, 

evaluation, and 

application 

4 5 

8 9 

6 7 

Source: GAO. 

A knowledge-based approach also involves the use of incremental markers 

to ensure that the required knowledge has been attained at each critical 

juncture. For example, exit criteria at KP1 should include demonstrated 

maturity of critical technologies, completed trade-offs and finalized 

requirements, and initial cost and schedule estimates using results from 

the preliminary design review. The approach ensures that managers will 

(1) conduct activities to capture relevant product development knowledge, 

(2) provide evidence that knowledge was captured, and (3) hold decision 

reviews to determine that appropriate knowledge was captured to allow a 

move to the next phase. If the knowledge attained at each juncture does 

not justify the initial investment, the project should not go forward and 

additional resources should not be committed. 

Risks Not Fully Addressed 

by Recently Revised 

Acquisition Strategy 

Prior to the program’s recent acquisition strategy revision, program 

officials were not following NASA acquisition policy13 and were set to 

commit to the program and start implementation with immature 

technologies, according to best practices, and without a preliminary 

design. For instance, the schedule called for convening the NAR before the 

end of preliminary design. NASA policy indicates that the NAR and 

Preliminary Design Review (PDR) should be aligned. Even at the pre-

 13NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5C, which states that its requirements are applicable 

to all programs and projects currently in formulation as of the effective date of March 22, 

2005. 

Page 13 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
NAR14 in July 2003, the plan had been to have the NAR before the PDR,15

although the two reviews were closer together than the more recent plan. 

During our review, we discussed these shortfalls with NASA officials. To 

their credit, they revised their acquisition strategy to conform to NASA 

policy. Currently, the mission NAR—upon which the program start 

decision will be based—will be aligned with the mission PDR (scheduled 

for March 2008). We believe this is a positive step, since it will ensure that 

a preliminary design—a key element for matching needs to resources—is 

established before program start. The revised strategy also splits the NAR 

into two parts—a technical NAR and a mission NAR. The purpose of the 

technical NAR (scheduled for January 2007) will be to determine whether 

the project has successfully retired its invention risk, i.e., critical 

technologies have achieved TRL 6, according to a NASA official. 

Technology issues will not be revisited after the technical NAR unless 

problems arise. However, it is unclear if the critical technologies will be 

demonstrated to a level of fidelity required by best practices at the 

technical NAR. Furthermore, the strategy does not fully incorporate a 

knowledge-based approach that could address the program’s risks by 

ensuring—through the use of exit criteria—that resources match 

requirements in terms of knowledge, time, and money before program 

start. For example: 

• Under a knowledge-based approach, adequate testing is required to 

demonstrate that key technologies are mature—at TRL 6—prior to 

program start. This is particularly important for the JWST, given the 

program’s challenges with testing restrictions and the fact that the 

observatory cannot be serviced in space. In some cases, such as the 

sunshield, backup technologies do not exist, thus increasing the 

importance of adequately maturing and testing critical technologies. If 

key components—like the sunshield—fail, then the entire observatory 

will be lost. This requires greater fidelity in the testing, even as early as 

demonstrating the maturity of key technologies prior to program start. 

 14The pre-NAR is an independent review of programs/projects conducted at the end of the

concept development phase to assess readiness to proceed into the preliminary design 

phase. 

15The PDR is the project milestone review which establishes the basis for proceeding with a

detailed design. The purpose of the PDR is to demonstrate that the preliminary design 

meets all system requirements with an acceptable level of risk within the planned cost and 

schedule. 

Page 14 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
To achieve TRL 6 (the maturity level required by best practices for 

program start), technology maturity must be demonstrated as a 

representative model or prototype—which is very close to the actual 

system in form, fit, and function—in a relevant environment. However, 

there is risk that the current JWST technology development plan will 

not result in the appropriate demonstration of technology maturity. For 

example, the half-scale thermal vacuum test of the entire observatory16

at Johnson Space Center is currently planned for September 2008, and 

so the knowledge gained regarding the maturity of the sunshield’s 

thermal and dynamic performance17 is pushed out 6 months beyond the 

PDR/NAR/program start date of March 2008. When JWST program 

officials briefed us in August 2005, the TRL levels for thermal and 

dynamic performance of the sunshield were both assessed to be at TRL 

4, and the plan to get to TRL 6 was to test these subsystems during this 

half-scale thermal vacuum test. However, in fall 2005 program officials 

reviewed the technology development plan and concluded that only the 

materials for the sunshield’s membrane are technology development 

items, while other items affecting the configuration and deployment of 

the sunshield—such as thermal and dynamic performance—are 

considered engineering challenges. JWST officials stated that earlier 

testing of sample materials demonstrated the sunshield’s thermal 

performance and a demonstration using a 1/10th scale model

demonstrated dynamic performance18 and satisfied TRL 6 requirements. 

However, we have found in our best practices work that demonstrating 

a technology to a TRL 6 typically involves demonstrating that a 

prototype—close to the form, fit, and functionality intended for the 

product—has been demonstrated in an environment that closely 

represents the anticipated operational environment. In our past review 

of development programs, we have found that if this level of maturity is 

not demonstrated before a product development effort is launched, a 

 16According to the mission systems engineer, the half-scale thermal vacuum test will be 

done using a half-scale model of the entire observatory. Deployments, including the

sunshield, will be tested, and the sunshield membrane will be vibrated during the test.

17The purpose of dynamic testing is to determine how the sunshield behaves structurally 

when shaken at different frequencies in order to predict the influence of disturbances on

the pointing control of the JWST’s optics.

18The main components of the 1/10th scale model test article were a central mounting

block, four support tubes, and four Kapton film layers. Therefore, the 1/10th scale model 

was not a scale version of the current JWST sunshield, which consists of five layers of 

Kapton membranes with special coatings, booms, hinges, deployment motors, edge cables,

stowed boom restraints, stowed membrane containment structure, and other mechanisms. 

Page 15 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
program increases the likelihood of cost growth and schedule delays as 

it tries to close the knowledge gap between the technologies’ maturity 

level and the product’s design requirements. 

• The JWST program’s inadequate contingency runs contrary to another 

premise of a knowledge-based approach—having sufficient resources 

in terms of funding available to ensure a program’s success. As 

discussed in an earlier section, the Independent Review Team stated 

that the program’s contingency from 2006 through 2010 of only about 

1.5 percent after “liens” and “threats” is inadequate. The team warned 

that, because of the inadequate contingency, the program’s ability to 

resolve issues, address program risk areas, and accommodate 

unknown problems is very limited. The team concluded that, from a 

budget perspective, the re-baselined program is not viable for a 2013 

launch. 

Knowledge-Based 

Approach Would Allow the 

JWST Program to Better 

Inform NASA’s DecisionMaking Process 

A good basis for making informed investment decisions is essential in the 

fiscally constrained environment that now exists across the federal 

government. Our nation faces large, growing, and structural long-term 

fiscal imbalances. Given the severity of those fiscal challenges and the 

wide range of federal programs, hard choices need to be considered 

across the government, and NASA is no exception. NASA must compete 

with other departments and agencies for part of a constricted 

discretionary spending budget. 

In the near future, NASA will need to determine the resources necessary to 

develop the systems and supporting technologies to achieve the 

President’s Vision for Space Exploration—while simultaneously financing 

its other priority programs—and structure its investment strategy 

accordingly. Initial implementation of the Vision as explained in NASA’s 

Exploration Systems Architecture Study calls for completing the 

International Space Station, developing a new crew exploration vehicle, 

and returning to the moon no later than 2020. NASA estimates that it will 

cost approximately $104 billion over the next 13 years to accomplish these 

initial goals. These priorities, along with NASA’s other missions, will be 

competing within NASA for funding. It will likely be difficult for decision 

makers to agree on which projects to invest in and which projects, if any, 

to terminate. The NASA Administrator has acknowledged that NASA faces 

difficult choices about its missions in the future—for example, between 

human space flight, science, and aeronautics missions. 

In the President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request for NASA, the JWST has 

the largest budget allocation of all programs in the Science Mission 

Page 16 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Directorate’s Astrophysics Division for the 5-year budget horizon from 

fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011—nearly $2 billion of the division’s 

$6.9 billion total budget, or about 29 percent. An inadequately informed 

decision to commit to the estimated $4.5 billion total funding for the JWST 

would significantly impact NASA’s science portfolio, since funding given 

to the JWST will not available for other programs. Early in the planning for 

how to handle the JWST program’s cost growth, NASA officials recognized 

the impact that the JWST’s cost growth could have on other programs. In a 

July 2005 briefing to the Agency Program Management Council19 soon after 

the cost growth was identified, NASA officials stated that “something must 

give if JWST stays in the portfolio.” The choices discussed were 

(1) relaxing requirements or (2) adding budget and schedule, which would 

mean that other missions would be deferred or deleted from the portfolio. 

In addition, committing to the JWST program obligates the government 

contractually, since it allows the prime contractor to begin 

implementation tasks on the very long prime contract extending from 

October 2002 through launch—currently planned for June 2013—plus one 

year. The contract states that until the project achieves the 

implementation milestone, contract spending is limited to formulation 

activities, except for long-lead items and other activities approved in 

writing. After the implementation milestone is achieved at program start, 

the contracting officer will notify the contractor by letter to proceed to

implementation. According to the contracting officer, the assumption is 

that this is the go-ahead for the whole program. 

To make well-informed decisions, NASA needs the knowledge to assess 

the value of its programs—like the JWST program—in relationship to each 

other. In May 2004, we reported that, of 27 NASA programs we examined, 

17 had cost increases averaging about 31percent.20 One of the programs in 

our sample was another infrared telescope program—the Spitzer Space 

Telescope—and it was plagued by schedule slippages caused by delays in 

the delivery of components, flight software, the mission operation system, 

and launch delays, all contributing to a 29.3 percent increase in program 

costs. In general, we found the programs in the sample lacked sufficient 

 19The Agency Program Management Council is one of a system of Governing Program

Management Councils responsible for assessing program and project formulation and 

implementation as well as providing oversight and direction. 

20GAO, NASA: Lack of Disciplined Cost-Estimating Processes Hinders Effective Program

Management, GAO-04-642 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).

Page 17 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
knowledge needed to make informed acquisition decisions. Insufficient 

knowledge to make informed investment decisions can further complicate 

the already-difficult choices that NASA faces. Conversely, sufficient 

knowledge at key junctures can facilitate well-informed investment 

decisions and protect the government from incurring contractual liabilities 

before it is appropriate. A knowledge-based approach ensures that 

comprehensive and comparable programmatic data are obtained. 

Within the JWST program, NASA officials have accomplished a great deal,

such as the development of the large, segmented mirror that is a leap 

ahead in technology. Moreover, the program has support from the larger 

scientific community. To enhance the program’s chances for success, 

program officials have chosen a path forward which follows NASA’s 

policies for ensuring readiness to proceed into implementation/product 

development. However, the JWST program’s revised strategy does not 

fully address the risks associated with the many challenges that the 

program still faces—including maturing technology, mitigating testing 

restrictions, and ensuring that adequate funding is available for 

contingencies. This puts the program at risk of further cost growth and 

schedule slippage. The program needs to have sufficient knowledge at key 

junctures to successfully address its challenges and use incremental 

markers to make certain that resources in terms of knowledge, time, 

workforce, and money match the requirements. Given the severity of the

fiscal challenges our nation faces and the wide range of competing federal 

programs, hard choices need to be considered across the government, and 

NASA is no exception. Using a knowledge-based approach for NASA’s new 

development programs such as the JWST could help the agency make the

difficult choices about how to allocate its limited budget resources among 

competing priorities by utilizing common and consistent criteria in 

program evaluations. 

To increase the JWST program’s chances of successful product 

development, we recommend that the NASA Administrator take the 

following actions: 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Direct the JWST program to fully apply a knowledge-based acquisition 

approach—to include incremental markers—that will not only ensure 

that adequate knowledge is attained at key decision points, but also 

hold the program accountable. These markers should include, but not 

be limited to 

Page 18 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
• schedules that demonstrate the maturity of all critical 

technologies prior to program start; 

• criteria to ensure the validity of test articles; 

• criteria to demonstrate that mature component designs being 

used in new configurations meet form, fit, and function 

standards; and 

• criteria to ensure that sufficient contingency funding can be 

provided and phased appropriately.

• Instruct the JWST program to continue to adhere to NASA acquisition 

policy and base the program’s go/no-go review (NAR) decision not 

only on adherence to that policy, but also on (1) the program’s ability 

to demonstrate whether it is meeting the knowledge markers outlined 

earlier and (2) whether adequate funds are available to execute the 

program. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our 

two recommendations and outlined actions that the agency plans to take 

to implement such recommendations. NASA said that it endorses the 

knowledge-based approach recommended and that it believes the current 

JWST program plan is consistent with that approach. NASA’s recognition 

of the value of obtaining knowledge prior to moving to subsequent 

acquisition phases and acknowledgment that it plans to use exit criteria as 

knowledge markers for other JWST mission-level reviews are welcome 

steps toward establishing an agency-wide risk reduction culture. Now, it 

will be critical for NASA decision makers to enforce adherence to the 

discipline of the knowledge-based approach and ensure that critical 

product knowledge is indeed demonstrated before allowing the JWST 

program to proceed. In the years ahead, NASA decision makers will likely 

face pressures to grant waivers for going forward with immature 

technologies, allow programs to be restructured, and thus marginalize 

accountability. For a program such as the JWST, whose investment is 

already substantial and successful outcome eagerly anticipated by the 

science community, adherence to such knowledge-based principles will 

need to be strictly enforced. As identified in this report, NASA would be 

well served by applying its own technology readiness standards (reprinted 

in appendix II) as part of its exit criteria, and demonstrating that critical 

technologies are at the TRL 6 level prior to program start using a 

representative model or prototype—which is very close to the actual 

system in form, fit, and function—in a relevant environment. Emphasis by

decision makers on the application of “form, fit, and function standards” 

and “validity of test articles” as exit criteria for the JWST program start 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 19 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
and entry into Phase C will help address our concern that the current 

JWST technology development plan may not result in the appropriate 

demonstration of technology maturity prior to program start. NASA’s 

comments are reprinted in appendix III. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees and to the NASA Administrator. We will make copies available 

to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged in 

appendix IV.

Allen Li 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 20 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Chairman 

The Honorable Bill Nelson 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Science and Space 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

United State Senate 

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby 

Chairman 

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert

Chairman 

The Honorable Bart Gordon 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Science 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ken Calvert 

Chairman 

The Honorable Mark Udall 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics 

Committee on Science 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf 

Chairman 

The Honorable Alan B. Mollohan 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and 

 Commerce, and, Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 21 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the extent to which the JWST acquisition strategy follows NASA 

policy and GAO best practices for ensuring readiness to proceed into 

implementation, we reviewed NASA policy on program management and 

compared the JWST project office’s management approach to NASA 

policy. Additionally, we analyzed the JWST acquisition strategy and 

benchmarked it to best practices. We interviewed NASA and contractor 

officials to clarify our understanding of the JWST management approach 

and technology development plan in relation to NASA policy and 

guidelines and best practices. To deepen our understanding of JWST 

technical issues, we attended the 3-day Sunshield Subsystem Concept 

Design Review as well as the 4-day JWST System Definition Review. 

To evaluate the impact of the JWST acquisition strategy on NASA’s ability 

to assess the program and make informed investment decisions in the 

context of its other priorities, we analyzed available JWST cost and 

schedule data and conducted interviews with program officials to clarify 

our understanding of the information. Furthermore, we requested and 

reviewed documentary support breaking out the components of the cost 

increases and schedule slippage. We also interviewed program officials to 

clarify our understanding of the potential impact that investment in the 

JWST will have on other NASA programs. In addition, we reviewed 

statements of the NASA Administrator, budget documents, GAO’s HighRisk Series, and GAO’s 21st Century Challenges to better evaluate the 

JWST’s significance in the larger NASA and federal government context. 

To accomplish our work, we visited NASA Headquarters, Washington, 

D.C.; Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland; Marshall Space 

Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama; Northrop Grumman Space Technology, 

Redondo Beach, California; and Ball Aerospace and Technologies 

Corporation, Boulder, Colorado. 

We performed our review from August 2005 through May 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 22 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Appendix II: Technology Readiness Levels 

Technology Readiness Level Description Hardware Software

Demonstration 

Environment 

TRL 1: Basic principles observed 

and reported. 

Lowest level of technology readiness. 

Scientific research begins to be

translated into applied research and 

development. Examples might include 

paper studies of a technology’s basic 

properties. 

None. (Paper studies and 

analysis.) 

None 

TRL 2: Technology concept and/or 

application formulated. 

Invention begins. Once basic principles 

are observed, practical applications can 

be invented. The application is

speculative and there is no proof or 

detailed analysis to support the 

assumption. Examples are still limited to 

paper studies.

None. (Paper studies and 

analysis.) 

None 

TRL 3: Analytical and 

experimental critical function

and/or characteristic proof of 

concept. 

Active research and development is 

initiated. This includes analytical studies 

and laboratory studies to physically 

validate analytical predictions of 

separate elements of the technology. 

Examples include components that are 

not yet integrated or representative. 

Analytical studies and 

demonstration of nonscale 

individual components 

(pieces of subsystem). 

Lab 

TRL 4: Component and/or 

breadboard. Validation in 

laboratory environment. 

Basic technological components are 

integrated to establish that the pieces 

will work together. This is relatively “low

fidelity” compared to the eventual 

system. Examples include integration of 

“ad hoc” hardware in a laboratory. 

Low fidelity breadboard. 

Integration of nonscale

components to show pieces 

will work together. Not fully 

functional or form or fit but 

representative of technically 

feasible approach suitable for

flight articles. 

Lab 

TRL 5: Component and/or 

breadboard validation in relevant 

environment. 

Fidelity of breadboard technology 

increases significantly. The basic 

technological components are

integrated with reasonably realistic 

supporting elements so that the 

technology can be tested in a simulated

environment. Examples include “high 

fidelity” laboratory Integration of 

components. 

High fidelity breadboard. 

Functionally equivalent but 

not necessarily form and/or fit 

(size weight, materials, etc.). 

Should be approaching 

appropriate scale. May 

include integration of several 

components with reasonably 

realistic support 

elements/subsystems to 

demonstrate functionality. 

Lab demonstrating 

functionality but not form 

and fit. May include flight 

demonstrating 

breadboard in surrogate 

aircraft. Technology 

ready for detailed design 

studies. 

TRL 6: System/subsystem model 

or prototype demonstration in a 

relevant environment. 

Representative model or prototype 

system, which is well beyond the 

breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in 

a relevant environment. Represents a 

major step up in a technology’s

demonstrated readiness. Examples 

include testing a prototype in a high 

fidelity laboratory environment or in 

simulated operational environment. 

Prototype—Should be very 

close to form, fit and function. 

Probably includes the 

integration of many new 

components and realistic 

supporting 

elements/subsystems if 

needed to demonstrate full 

functionality of the 

subsystem. 

High-fidelity lab 

demonstration or 

limited/restricted flight 

demonstration for a 

relevant environment. 

Integration of technology 

is well defined.

Appendix II: Technology Readiness Levels 

Page 23 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Appendix II: Technology Readiness Levels 

Technology Readiness Level Description Hardware Software

Demonstration 

Environment 

TRL 7: System prototype 

demonstration in an operational 

environment. 

Prototype near or at planned operational 

system. Represents a major step up 

from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration 

of an actual system prototype in an 

operational environment, such as in an 

aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples 

include testing the prototype in a test 

bed aircraft. 

Prototype. Should be form, fit 

and function integrated with 

other key supporting 

elements/subsystems to 

demonstrate full functionality 

of subsystem. 

Flight demonstration in

representative 

operational environment 

such as flying test bed or 

demonstrator aircraft. 

Technology is well 

substantiated with test 

data. 

TRL 8: Actual system completed 

and “flight qualified” through test 

and demonstration. 

Technology has been proven to work in 

its final form and under expected 

conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL 

represents the end of true system 

development. Examples include 

developmental test and evaluation of 

the system in its intended weapon 

system to determine if it meets design 

specifications.

Flight qualified hardware Developmental test and 

evaluation in the actual 

system application. 

TRL 9: Actual system “flight 

proven” through successful 

mission operations. 

Actual application of the technology in

its final form and under mission

conditions, such as those encountered 

in operational test and evaluation. In 

almost all cases, this is the end of the 

last “bug fixing” aspects of true system 

development. Examples include using 

the system under operational mission 

conditions. 

Actual system in final form Operational test and 

evaluation in operational 

mission conditions. 

Source: GAO and its analysis of NASA data. 

Page 24 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Appendix III: Comments from the National Appendix III: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 25 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Appendix III: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 26 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

Page 27 GAO-06-634 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Allen Li (202) 512-4841 

In addition to the individual named above, Jim Morrison, Assistant 

Director; Greg Campbell; Keith Rhodes; Sylvia Schatz; Erin Schoening; 

Hai Tran; and Ruthie Williamson made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

James Webb Space Telescope
Related GAO Products 

Page 28 GAO-06-634 

Related GAO Products 

NASA: Implementing a Knowledge-Based Acquisition Framework Could

Lead to Better Investment Decisions and Project Outcomes. GAO-06-218. 

Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2005. 

NASA’s Space Vision: Business Case for Prometheus 1 Needed to Ensure

Requirements Match Available Resources. GAO-05-242. Washington, D.C.: 

February 28, 2005. 

Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and Investment 

Planning Need to Address Continuing Problems. GAO-05-891T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005. 

NASA Reports 

Space Reports 

Defense Acquisitions: Incentives and Pressures That Drive Problems 

Affecting Satellite and Related Acquisitions. GAO-05-570R. Washington,

D.C.: June 23, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Radar Effort Needs Additional 

Knowledge before Starting Development. GAO-04-759. Washington, D.C.: 

July 23, 2004.

Defense Acquisitions: Risks Posed by DOD’s New Space Systems 

Acquisition Policy. GAO-04-379R. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2004. 

Space Acquisitions: Committing Prematurely to the Transformational 

Satellite Program Elevates Risks for Poor Cost, Schedule, and 

Performance Outcomes. GAO-04-71R. Washington, D.C.: December 4, 

2003. 

Defense Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems 

Acquisition Policy to Optimize Growing Investment in Space. 

GAO-04-253T. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2003. 

Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program 

Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns. GAO-04-48. Washington,

D.C.: October 31, 2003. 

Defense Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems 

Acquisition Management Policy. GAO-03-1073. Washington, D.C.: 

September 15, 2003. 

James Webb Space Telescope
Related GAO Products 

Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on 

Satellite and Related Acquisitions. GAO-03-825R. Washington, D.C.: June 

2, 2003. 

Military Space Operations: Planning, Funding, and Acquisition 

Challenges Facing Efforts to Strengthen Space Control. GAO-02-738. 

Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2002. 

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Status, Plans, and Future Data

Management Challenges. GAO-02-684T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002. 

Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Infrared System-Low at Risk of 

Missing Initial Deployment Date. GAO-01-6. Washington, D.C.: February

28, 2001. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.

GAO-05-301. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to 

Improve DOD’s Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. GAO-04-393. 

Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2004. 

Best Practices 

Reports 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.

GAO-04-248. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, 

but More Controls Are Needed. GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.: November 

10, 2003. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs.

GAO-03-476. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003. 

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon 

Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February 

11, 2003. 

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early 

Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,

2002. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best 

Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.

Page 29 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
Related GAO Products 

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 

Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 

2001. 

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better 

Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 

2000. 

Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better 

Weapon System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 

26, 2000. 

Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System 

Program Implement Best Practices. GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington, 

D.C.: August 16, 1999. 

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can 

Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington, 

D.C.: July 30, 1999. 

Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program 

Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999. 

Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1998. 

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires

Changes in DOD’s Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.: 

February 24, 1998. 

Major Acquisitions: Significant Changes Underway in DOD’s Earned 

Value Management Process. GAO/NSIAD-97-108. Washington, D.C.: May 5,

1997. 

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer 

Improvements for DOD. GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.: August 26, 

1996. 

(120480) Page 30 GAO-06-634 James Webb Space Telescope
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