U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

27–231PDF 2006

THE ENDANGERED CHILDREN OF NORTHERN

UGANDA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN 

RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 26, 2006

Serial No. 109–177

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL

OPERATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, 

Vice Chairman 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

MARY M. NOONAN, Subcommittee Staff Director 

GREG SIMPKINS, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member 

NOELLE LUSANE, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

SHERI A. RICKERT, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member and Counsel 

LINDSEY M. PLUMLEY, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Jeffrey Krilla, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State ..................................................... 10

Mr. Leonard Rogers, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency 

for International Development ............................................................................ 17

Ms. Grace Grall Akallo, former Abducted Child Soldier for the LRA, World 

Vision .................................................................................................................... 40

Ronald Waldman, M.D., Professor of Clinical, Population and Family Health, 

Mailman School of Policy, Columbia University ............................................... 46

Ms. Michelle Brown, U.N. Advocate, Refugees International .............................. 53

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Human Rights and International Operations: Prepared statement ................ 3

Mr. Jeffrey Krilla: Prepared statement ................................................................. 14

Mr. Leonard Rogers: Prepared statement ............................................................. 19

Ms. Grace Grall Akallo: Prepared statement ........................................................ 43

Ronald Waldman, M.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 50

Ms. Michelle Brown: Prepared statement ............................................................. 57

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 67

(1)

THE ENDANGERED CHILDREN OF NORTHERN 

UGANDA 

WEDNESDAY APRIL 26, 2006, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS

AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m. in 

room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. 

Smith (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The hearing will come to order, and welcome, everybody. 

Due to the fact that there are four votes pending on the House 

Floor, both Mr. Payne and I hope to give our opening statements, 

and then we will recess to vote on the Floor and come right back 

to resume the meeting. I apologize in advance for that delay. 

Good afternoon, everybody, and welcome to our hearing. 

When current Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni overthrew 

the murderous regime of the late Milton Obote in Uganda in 1986, 

many had hoped that their nation would finally emerge from the 

nightmares of the Obote and Idi Amin regimes. Unfortunately, yet 

another horror lay ahead for the people of northern Uganda. 

Many in the Acholi community were alarmed at the sudden loss 

of power when Obote was overthrown, and Alice Lakwena formed 

the Holy Spirit Movement to fight for the Acholi people. Despite 

her promises that her followers would have immunity from the bullets of the Ugandan army, they were defeated 2 years later, and 

she fled to Kenya. 

Meanwhile, Joseph Kony, believed to be her cousin, took up the 

battle, forming a group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army or 

the LRA. The LRA is often said to be determined to rule Uganda 

according to the Bible’s 10 Commandments. In reality, this group 

has a philosophy that blends elements of Christianity, Islam and 

traditional beliefs into the murderous world view that has terrorized Kony’s own people and set back development in the north by 

years, if not decades. 

Over the last 20 years, as many as two million persons—an estimated 90 percent of the population of the Acholi area in northern 

Uganda—have been forced into internally displaced camps. More 

than 20,000 children have been forced to serve as either soldiers 

or sexual slaves for the LRA. Those children who have escaped 

kidnappings by the LRA are forced into the phenomenon known as 

‘‘night commuting,’’ in which an estimated 50,000 children walk 

2

miles from the rural areas to towns in order to find relative safety 

in bus shelters, churches, or even in the streets. 

The impact of this war on Ugandans in the north, as reported by 

the Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda, is 

almost unbelievable. 

The rates of violent death in northern Uganda are three times 

higher than those reported in Iraq following the allied invasion in 

2003. Each month nearly 3,500 Ugandans die from easily preventable diseases, extreme violence and torture. Each day, 58 children 

under the age of 5 die as a result of violence and preventable diseases. Three times more children under the age of 5 die in northern 

Uganda than in the rest of the country. 

One quarter of the children in northern Uganda over 10 years of 

age have lost one or both parents. Half of nearly two million internally displaced persons in northern Uganda are children under the 

age of 15. 

About a quarter of a million children in northern Uganda receive 

no education at all because of displacement and the fact that 60 

percent of the schools in northern Uganda no longer function due 

to the war. 

Because of the war in the north, Uganda has developed a lost 

generation that has grown up in dire circumstances with fear and 

deprivation as their constant companions. Nearly half of the children in one town are stunted from malnutrition. They likely will 

never be able to recover. 

There is great concern that the Government of Uganda is insufficiently committed to improving the situation in northern Uganda. 

On at least two occasions when there appeared to be a chance for 

peace talks with the LRA—one in 1993 and again in 2004–2005—

the Government of Uganda launched offenses that ended any 

chance of peace and yet failed to end the terrorism of the LRA. 

More recently, the indictment of top LRA leaders by the International Criminal Court, the ICC, has effectively ended further 

peace efforts. 

Because of its inability to end the LRA threat, in 2003 the 

United States Government began encouraging local leaders in 

northern and eastern Uganda to raise civilian militias to help protect civilians. Unfortunately, according to a study done by the Alan 

Shawn Feinstein International Famine center at Tufts University, 

these militias were hurriedly recruited, poorly screened, and incompletely trained. Furthermore, known criminals are part of these militias, which also contain boys and girls less than 18 years of age. 

The Feinstein Center study also reports that there is a widespread perception among individuals and organizations in northern 

Uganda that the government has malevolent reasons for not ending 

the war with the LRA. They include revenge against northerners 

for human rights abuses under previous governments and neutralization of political challenges from the north. 

In Uganda elections held earlier this year, Presidential candidate 

opponent, Mr. Bessigye, won 80 percent of the vote in northern 

Uganda——a testimony to the government’s unpopularity in the 

north. 

3

I would note parenthetically during a recent trip to Uganda, both 

my staff and I met with Mr. Bessigye and President Museveni, and 

raised these issues with both of those men. 

Whatever the truth about the Government of Uganda’s war effort, it is certainly a fact that not enough is being done to safeguard the endangered children of northern Uganda. With all the 

attention given to the genocide in Darfur, and certainly all of that 

is needed, a similar crisis in northern Uganda has been eclipsed in 

both attention and resources. 

Just as we have a moral obligation to rescue the suffering people 

of Darfur, we have a similar obligation not to ignore the terrorized 

population of northern Uganda. If the eyes and ears of the world 

are focused elsewhere, we must redirect them to Uganda’s distressed northern population—especially the children. Uganda’s future may depend on our efforts. 

Regrettably, the phenomenon of child soldiers is not one confined 

to Uganda or to Africa. It is a global tragedy in which an estimated 

300,000 children are involved in as many as 30 conflicts around the 

world. As in Uganda, children are used by governments or government-supported militias and rebel forces such as the LRA. Utilized 

for combat, spying, and clearing minefields, these children are 

often killed or maimed. Even those who escape often find it difficult 

to reintegrate back into society. They desperately need our help. 

To that end, I and some of my colleagues in the House and Senate are planning to shortly introduce legislation to address the 

issue of child soldiers. This legislation condemns the conscription, 

forced recruitment, or use of children by governments or 

paramilitaries in hostilities and urges the U.S. Government to lead 

efforts to enforce existing international standards to end this horrendous human rights abuse. 

The legislation, if it were in effect today, would deny U.S. military assistance to at least seven of the 26 nations believed to be 

using children in their military forces, and hopefully this legislation will receive strong bipartisan support as it makes its way 

through the process. 

I look forward to our hearing. I am very, very grateful to our witnesses, and we will get into those introductions momentarily, but 

I would like to yield to my friend and colleague, Mr. Payne. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

When current Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni overthrew the murderous regime of the late Milton Obote in Uganda in 1986, many had hope that their nation 

would finally emerge from the nightmares of the Obote and Idi Amin regimes. Unfortunately, yet another horror lay ahead for the people of northern Uganda. 

Many in the Acholi community were alarmed at the sudden loss of power when 

Obote was overthrown, and Alice Lakwena formed the Holy Spirit Movement to 

fight for the Acholi people. Despite her promises that her followers would have immunity from the bullets of the Ugandan army, they were defeated two years later, 

and she fled to Kenya. 

Meanwhile, Joseph Kony, believed to be Lakwena’s cousin, took up the battle, 

forming a group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army or LRA. The LRA is often 

said to be determined to rule Uganda according to the Bible’s 10 Commandments. 

In reality, this group has a philosophy that blends elements of Christianity, Islam 

and traditional Acholi beliefs into a murderous world view that has terrorized 

4

Kony’s own Acholi people and set back development in the North by years if not 

decades. 

Over the last 20 years, as many as two million persons—an estimated 90% of the 

population of the Acholi area in northern Uganda—have been forced into internally 

displaced persons camps. More than 20,000 children have been forced to serve as 

either soldiers or sexual slaves for the LRA. Those children who have escaped kidnapping by the LRA are forced into the phenomenon known as ‘‘night commuting,’’ 

in which an estimated 50,000 children walk miles from the rural areas to towns in 

order to find relative safety in bus shelters, churches or even on the streets. 

The impact of this war on Ugandans in the North, as reported by the Civil Society 

Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda, is almost unbelievable:

• The rates of violent death in northern Uganda are three times higher than 

those reported in Iraq following the Allied invasion in 2003.

• Each month, nearly 3,500 Ugandans die from easily preventable diseases, extreme violence and torture;

• Each day, 58 children under the age of five die as a result of violence and 

preventable diseases.

• Three times more children under the age of five die in northern Uganda than 

in the rest of the country.

• One quarter of the children in northern Uganda over ten years of age have 

lost one or both parents.

• Half of the nearly two million internally displaced persons in northern Uganda are children under the age of 15.

• About a quarter of a million children in northern Uganda receive no education at all because of displacement and the fact that 60% of schools in 

northern Uganda no longer function due to the war.

Because of the war in the North, Uganda has developed a ‘‘lost generation’’ that 

has grown up in dire circumstances with fear and deprivation as their constant companions. Nearly half of all children in the northern town of Kitgum are stunted from 

malnutrition. They likely will never be able to recover what this war has cost them. 

There is great concern that the Government of Uganda is insufficiently committed 

to improving the situation in northern Uganda. On at least two occasions when 

there appeared to be a chance for peace talks with the LRA—once in 1993 and again 

in late 2004–2005—the Government of Uganda launched offensives that ended any 

chance of peace and yet failed to end the terrorism of the LRA. More recently, the 

indictment of top LRA leaders by the International Criminal Court has effectively 

ended further peace efforts. 

Because of its inability to end the LRA threat, the Ugandan government in 2003 

began encouraging local leaders in northern and eastern Uganda to raise civilian 

militias to help protect civilians. Unfortunately, according to a study done by the 

Alan Shawn Feinstein International Famine Center at Tufts University, these militias were hurriedly recruited, poorly screened and incompletely trained. Furthermore, known criminals are part of these militias, which also contain boys and girls 

less than 18 years of age. 

The Feinstein Center study also reports that there is a widespread perception 

among individuals and organizations in northern Uganda that the government has 

malevolent reasons for not ending the war with the LRA. They include revenge 

against northerners for human rights abuses under previous governments and neutralization of political challenge from the North. In the Uganda elections held earlier 

this year, President Museveni’s main opponent Kizza Bessigye , won 80% of the vote 

in northern Uganda—a testimony to the government’s unpopularity in the North. 

Whatever the truth about the Government of Uganda’s war effort, it is certainly 

a fact that not enough is being done to safeguard the endangered children of northern Uganda. With all the attention given to the genocide in Darfur, a similar crisis 

in northern Uganda has been eclipsed in both attention and resources. 

Just as we have a moral obligation to rescue the suffering people of Darfur, we 

have a similar obligation not to ignore the terrorized population of northern Uganda. If the eyes and ears of the world are focused elsewhere, we must redirect them 

to Uganda’s distressed northern population—especially the children. Uganda’s future may depend on our efforts. 

Regrettably, the phenomenon of child soldiers is not one confined to Uganda or 

Africa. It is a global tragedy in which as many as 300,000 children are involved in 

as many as 30 conflicts around the world. As in Uganda, children are used by governments or government-supported militias and rebel forces such as the LRA. Utilized in everything from combat to spying to clearing minefields, these children are 

5

often killed or maimed, and even those who can escape often find it difficult to reintegrate back into society. They desperately need our help. 

To that end, I and some of my colleagues in the House and Senate are planning 

to introduce legislation shortly to address the issue of child soldiers. This legislation 

condemns the conscription, forced recruitment or use of children by governments or 

paramilitaries in hostilities and urges the U.S. Government to lead efforts to enforce 

existing international standards to end this horrendous human rights abuse. 

This legislation would deny U.S. military assistance to seven of the 26 nations believed to use children in their military forces: Burundi, Columbia, the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Paraguay, Sudan and Uganda. We hope today’s 

hearing will provide further information to help make this legislation as effective 

as possible in saving and rehabilitating so many innocent victims.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for us having 

this important topic that we have been advocating for some time 

about the severity of it to have a formal hearing, and I think the 

title is correct; endangered children of northern Uganda, and the 

situation has been there for a long time. 

I want to start from the outset to talk about the region in general, and why this hearing is so important because it focuses on 

one of the forgotten crises in the world. The truth is that the crisis 

in northern Uganda is one of the worst humanitarian crisis that 

exists in the world today. 

I want to start my comments though today on another forgotten 

tragedy, the Rwandan genocide. Twelve years ago this month the 

murderous militia and their allies in Rwanda began their brutal 

campaign genocide of killing and maiming the innocent children, 

including women and elderly. More than a million people were 

murdered in 100 days while the international community looked 

the other way. The United Nations Peacekeepers sent to Rwanda 

to keep the peace left at the height of the Rwandan genocide, leaving behind helpless civilians to be murdered, to be hacked to death. 

We are once again reminded of the suffering of the innocent people, as the Chairman even mentioned, in Darfur, Sudan. Shamefully, we have done very little to stop the suffering, the rape, the 

killing of the innocent. 

In January 1994, the commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force, General Delair, wrote to his superiors that the militias in Rwanda intended to kill large numbers of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, and informed the United Nations Peacekeeping Department that he intended to seize the arms and ask for the United 

Nations protection. 

On January 12, 1994, General Delair was told by the United Nations Headquarters that the mandate did not give him the authority to seize the arms cache, and would not provide protection to the 

informants, and instead he was ordered to provide the information 

to the President Habyarimana at that time, and the Ambassadors 

of Belgium, France, and the United States. 

Three months later the genocide, the general war began. A 

month into it the Clinton Administration refused to use the word 

‘‘genocide,’’ and on April 28, 1994, the Security Council deliberately 

omitted the word from a resolution to avoid its legal and international obligation. It was a shameful time in the history of this 

country and of the world. 

We said it was important to remember that what happened in 

Rwanda would never happen again. We never would make the 

same mistake. But we have heard never again before. We heard it 

6

after the Holocaust. We should have heard it after the Armenian 

genocide. We should have heard it about Cambodia. We should 

have heard it about Darfur. 

Well, let us remember today’s victims in Darfur, and those who 

would be killed or raped as we debate what to do for them, what 

type of protection should we do, what sort of sanction should we 

have. As we met today to discuss the tragedy in Uganda, the victims of Darfur are being portrayed in Abuja, by what is being referred to as the final agreement proposal. 

As we have witnessed the deliberate targeting of civilians in 

Rwanda and Darfur, the LRA has been consistent in its brutal 

campaign against innocent civilians. The LRA has abducted over 

20,000 children, maimed, raped and brutally murdered innocent civilians over the last two decades. I seriously doubt if the LRA ever 

knows or cares about any government in the Uganda or as any 

other political agenda. The fact of the matter is that those who are 

being killed and maimed are innocent civilians, not just in Uganda 

but also in southern Sudan. 

It is not surprising that the protectors and friends of the LRA 

are the same people committing genocide in Darfur, the National 

Party of the Government of Sudan. 

I understand I have 1 minute left to vote, so I suppose—I am not 

sure what vote it is, but it may be a critical vote, so I will leave 

and complete my statement when the Committee reconvenes in 

about 10 minutes or 15 minutes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. PAYNE. We will call the meeting back again. In order to save 

time, since the Chairman—why don’t we all just stay. Those who 

are standing in the back just stand until the Chairman comes, and 

then we can decide what his decision is. I understand those standing were asked to leave, but just stand on the side as long as you 

don’t fall on someone. 

As I was indicating before, as I sort of reviewed the situation 

that occurred in Rwanda, and I will just start again saying as we 

have witnessed the deliberate targeting of civilians in Rwanda and 

Darfur, the LRA has been consistent in its brutal campaign against 

innocent civilians. 

The LRA has abducted over 20,000 children, maimed, raped and 

brutally murdered innocent civilians over the last two decades. I 

seriously doubt if the LRA even knows or cares about any government in Uganda, or has any political agenda. The fact of the matter is that those who are being killed and maimed are innocent civilians, not just in Uganda but also in southern Sudan. 

It is not surprising that the protectors and friends of the LRA 

are the same people committing genocide in Darfur. The government, National Part of the Government of Sudan, the same ones 

that are perpretrating the disorder. 

I am not suggesting that the exit option from this tragedy is the 

military option. The vast majority of the LRA soldiers are those 

that abducted children. They are focusing on these innocent, vulnerable people. The leadership of the LRA and those responsible 

for this tragedy must be held accountable. We cannot allow people 

to continue to perpetrate this kind of terror on people, and we have 

to have the special court as we had for Charles Taylor in Sierra 

7

Leone, a special court, the National Criminal Court, someone must 

holder the leaders of the LRA accountable. They must be brought 

before justice. 

I first traveled to Uganda in 1972. It was shortly after the—actually, it was in February 1973, shortly after the expulsion of the 

Asians in Uganda. You may recall that on Christmas eve of 1972, 

Idi Amin, the brutal dictator of Uganda, ordered every Asian to 

leave the country immediately. It was one of the first exodus of a 

group of ethnic people anywhere in the world. 

I went and met with him, and condemned him because at that 

time I chaired the World Refugee Committee, and these refugees 

ended up in London, Great Britain, some went back to India. However, we made it clear that this was wrong, and that it was—and 

actually, we should have taken, the world community should have 

taken stronger actions at that time. I happened to be simply Chairman of the World Refugee and Rehabilitation Committee out of Geneva, and did not have any enforcement, but made it very clear 

that this was wrong. 

So I have been involved in Uganda for many, many years, long 

before coming to the Congress. Back in 1993, I went to Gulu, and 

met with the former LRA abductees. I met with children back there 

12 years ago, 13 years ago, children who had escaped the nightmare but still lived in fear, margionalized in their communities. 

We drove from Gulu all the way to southern Sudan, and then 

met with Dr. John Gurang and the SPLA, the long route, the same 

route that abducted children of northern Uganda are forced to take 

on foot, and it was a very, very difficult trip in a vehicle, and can 

you imagine what these children have to do on foot. 

We cannot ignore the victims and engage in a policy of appeasement in order to secure an agreement. We must do more to protect 

the people of northern Uganda, especially the children both in the 

IDP camps and in their homes. 

We have seen the pictures of the night commuters. No child 

should go through that. No parent should have to make the decision to send their children alone into a city at night in hopes that 

they will be safe from attack and abduction so that they can come 

back home the next day. This is unheard of in the new millennium, 

in the 21st century. 

No child should be forced to kill anyone, not another child, another family member, or anyone. It is simply unconscionable. 

I asked John Prendergast to be our witness for this hearing. Unfortunately, he has to attend a family matter. However, we received a short testimony from John, a long-time peace advocate, 

and mediator Betty Bigombe who was currently in Uganda to help 

bring this tragedy to an end. According to John and Betty, with a 

tiny fraction of the resources now being spend in northern Uganda, 

new initiative with a real prospect of success can now be undertaken. Such an initiative requires a targeted carrot-and-stick strategy with an exit option for the LRA leadership if their calculations 

to leave the battlefield can be significantly altered. 

The decision of the LRA commanders to leave the bush and defect are greatly influenced by the post-defection livelihood opportunities that await them, while amnesty already exists for all noninducted LRA and small reintegrated packages are provided to exVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042606\27231.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
8

combatants. What remains is to develop a more substantial incentive package for the remaining 50 or so top and mid-level non-indicted LRA commanders. It would also create space between the indicted and the non-indicted commanders. 

The top commanders must be indicated. However, if we can give 

an incentive for the others to go out. As we know, it is a part of 

the country that has been ignored by the central government which 

showed in the recent elections, then perhaps we can move in the 

right direction. 

And so the LRA has found a new sanctuary in Garamba National 

Park in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, still receives support from elements of the Sudanese military intelligence, and unless a reasonable military plan is negotiated and implemented, the 

LRA will be able to reorganize, to retrain, reequip itself just as it 

did in 1994, when conventional wisdom similarly held that its days 

were numbered, only to see it strike back with a vengeance. 

There are two primary options for enhancing military pressure. 

Option one, agreements between the governments in Conchasa, 

Juba, Conchasa and Campala, and Khartoum and Juba, Conchasa 

and Compala, to allow for a joint coordinated and cross-border military operation against the LRA positions could be brokered with 

help from the United Nations or a combination of core group countries. Somehow we have to surround them and get agreements 

from those governments. 

Option two could be a unit which could be inserted into Manuk 

in the DRC or UNMIS in southern Sudan for a specific time period 

with a specific limited mandate, focusing on operations against the 

NRA positions. Applying both the carrot-and-the-stick simultaneously would disrupt the LRA’s ability to regroup further, reduce 

the material conditions of the combatants and provide greater incentive for the non-indicted commanders to defect. 

However, as long as the five indicted LRA leaders are still in the 

bush, a grave threat to the people of the three countries will continue to exist. 

Therefore, a specific diplomatic initiative aimed at removing 

them from the battlefield should be a part of any expanded strategy. Options here are challenging and require creative thinking 

about trade-offs between justice and peace. 

According to John and Betty, the U.S. role in an expanded strategy is clear. President Museveni needs a partner in the search for 

peace, and a more focused effort by the United States on ending 

the LRA conflict would provide that partnership. The U.S. has the 

most leverage to bring to the table great expertise in these matters, 

and a new Ambassador with a commitment to addressing this 

issue. The United States also has a major investment in helping to 

consolidate peace in southern Sudan and is the largest contributor 

to the largest peacekeeping mission in the world in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo financially. 

The U.S. should therefore name an envoy to work regionally on 

all aspects of an enhanced strategy and should help lead the effort 

to craft their reintegration effort for non-indicted LRA commanders. 

9

I would like to thank John and Betty for their tireless effort and 

encourage them to continue to fight for peace and justice as they 

do throughout Africa. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

convening this hearing today to address a longstanding tragedy of 

child abduction and enslavement in northern Uganda. 

In our review of excerpts of the Human Rights Watch account of 

children abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda prior 

to this hearing, one cannot find the words to express the horror 

and shock at the perpetrators of this rebel movement and what 

they have done to innocent children. It is bad enough to learn 

about the brutalities forced upon child soldiers and slaves in northern Uganda, and it is utterly a tragic to realize that those fortunate enough to escape from this infernal nightmare often return orphan to ravaged, desolated villages. 

I want to commend first and foremost the non-governmental organizations that are working in Uganda to provide support to the 

victims of LRA atrocities, and I also note with deep sadness that 

humanitarian workers in Sudan and Uganda have lost their lives 

in the effort to help displaced populations which continue to suffer 

the wanton lawlessness that prevails in northern Uganda. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to learning more about the role of 

Sudan in this humanitarian crisis, and to understand what points 

of leverage we may employ to help the Government of Uganda stop 

these atrocities which have permanently scarred the lives of tens 

of thousands of children. In particular, I want to commend and 

thank Mrs. Grace Akallo for her courage to appear before this Subcommittee to help guide us toward an end to this dreadful war on 

children. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much, and my understanding is 

that you have a group of Georgian parliamentarians with whom 

you meet, so we thank you for coming because I know they are 

waiting for you. 

Let me now welcome our two very distinguished witnesses, beginning with Mr. Jeffrey Krilla who joined the U.S. Department of 

State in January 2006, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human rights and Labor. Prior to joining DRL, Secretary 

Krilla served as Regional Director for Africa at the International 

Republican Institute. 

In addition, Secretary Krilla also served as a senior aid and attorney in the U.S. Congress for 8 years. During that time he 

worked, among many other things, for the U.S. House of Representatives and Fill Their Shelves Program, which provides children of southern Africa educational tools. 

We will then hear from Mr. Len Rogers who is Deputy Assistant 

Administrator in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

10

Prior to this assignment, Mr. Rogers had oversight for the Office 

of Food for Peace. Prior to joining USAID, Mr. Rogers served in the 

United States Army in Vietnam. 

Secretary Krilla, if you could proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JEFFREY KRILLA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 

LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. KRILLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this very timely hearing on the endangered children of northern Uganda. 

Before I summarize my remarks, I would ask that my remarks 

be submitted into the record in their entirety. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. KRILLA. Thank you. 

I would like to also start by acknowledging my wife and daughter 

who have come in today. As a fairly new father, I think today’s 

topic I view through a new lens, and can only now appreciate fully 

the depths of the horror that the children undergo in northern 

Uganda. So thank you again for holding this. 

Chairman Smith, you recently returned from a trip to Uganda, 

and Mr. Royce and Mr. Payne I know, and many Members of the 

Subcommittee have also traveled to the region and know these 

issues firsthand. Clearly, you do not make a trip to a country 

where the lives of children are so heavily impacted and return 

home the same. For that matter, you cannot listen to the moving 

NGO testimony on northern Uganda or see a movie like Invisible 

Children and remain the same. 

We recently held a screening of the film Invisible Children in my 

bureau, and I understand that there may be screenings of the film 

up on Capitol Hill. For those Members of the Subcommittee who 

have not seen this movie, I would commend this film to your attention. 

The film is educating many people around the world about this 

conflict and its lasting effects on the children. This issue has understandably struck a cord with the American people. I understand 

that on the night of April 29 groups of American plan to gather in 

136 cities across the country for what is being called ‘‘The Global 

Night Commute.’’ This is a profound act of solidarity on behalf of 

the children of northern Uganda. 

I am new to the State Department, and this is my first official 

appearance before this Committee as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. 

However, I have had a longstanding interest in Africa and care 

deeply about the conditions of the people on the continent. 

Prior to joining the department, I served for 5 years as the Regional Director for Africa at the International Republican Institute 

where I coordinated election observation missions, political party 

development programs, and civil society programs in Africa. My 

work in Africa extends back even further to my time as a high 

school teacher in the segregated Lebowa region of South Africa 

during the last years of the apartheid rule. 

My experiences in Lebowa where I witnessed firsthand the potential resiliency and eventual triumph of the South African people 

11

in the face of brutal oppression continued to influence my work 

with the people of Africa today. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the people of northern Uganda continue to suffer under a 20-year reign of terror imposed by Joseph 

Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army. Without question, those who 

suffer the most from the LRA’s cruel tactics are the children. 

In the 2005 country report on human rights practices for Uganda, something produced by my bureau, we reported on the LRA’s 

sexual exploitation of children, the use of child soldiers, the plight 

of the night commuter, children who travel long distances from 

their homes in search of protection from the LRA, and the overall 

deplorable conditions of the IDP camps in which over 80 percent 

of approximately 1.5 million occupants are women and children. 

I have recently met with the new Ugandan Ambassador to the 

United States, Perezi Kamunanwire, and the new United States 

Ambassador to Uganda, Steven Browning, to discuss these very 

issues. I look forward to close cooperation with them as we work 

to improve the security and living conditions for the people of 

northern Uganda. 

In February, a member of my staff traveled to Gulu to monitor 

a DRL-funded project that focuses on building a coalition of civil 

society organizations in the north, to lobby the local and national 

government more effectively for their myriad needs. 

As you know, Uganda is one of the three countries in which the 

U.N. has agreed to pilot a new approach to ensuring both more predictable and more robust protection and assistance for internallydisplaced persons. That will bring in the Office of the U.N. High 

Commissioner for Refugees in a protection role, and hence our department’s Bureau for Population Refugees and Migration, or PRM. 

P.R.M.’s Assistant Secretary of State Ellen Saulray also recently 

traveled to Kenya and Uganda to study refugee conditions, and the 

nexus with IDP issues. USAID, PRM and my bureau are all coordinating our efforts. 

This summer, I and members of my staff plan to travel to the 

region for meetings that will address the regional dimensions of the 

LRA threat as well as what more the international community can 

do to improve the situation in northern Uganda. 

The living conditions in northern Uganda are stark and deserve 

international attention. Uganda has the third largest IDP population in the world, approximately 200 camps house 1.5 million or 

more IDPs. Estimates indicate that approximately 1.2 million of 

these IDPs in the districts of Kitgum, Gulu and Pader. 

The IDP camps are heavily congested and some house in excess 

of 60,000 people. Resources have proven insufficient to provide adequate security, water, sanitation facilities, or health care services 

to the people who live there. Consequently, the IDP camps have 

high mortality rates, roughly three times the national average. 

Civilians freedom of movement outside of the camps is extremely 

limited by the LRA threat as well as Ugandan Government policies. 

The 2005 country report on human rights practices for Uganda 

stated approximately 38,000 children have been abducted by the 

LRA during the past 20 years and forced into roles as soldiers, laVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042606\27231.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
12

borers, and sex slaves. An estimated 85 percent of LRA captives 

are children, and most are between the ages of 11 and 16. 

These children are forced to fight as rebels and participate in the 

killing of civilians, including other children. We know that children 

suffer higher casualties in battle than adults, and often emerge 

from conflicts with greater physical and psychological challenges. 

In September 2005, the International Criminal Court indicted 

Kony and several of his commanders on charges of crimes against 

humanity and war crimes, including enslavement and sexual enslavement, and enlisting children into armed forces and cruel treatment of civilians. 

The U.S. Government has also designated the LRA has a terrorist organization. 

Last year Rory Anderson of World Vision reported having met an 

11-year-old boy in Gulu in the World Vision Center for Children of 

War who was forced to bite to death and swallow the blood of a 

fellow child who attempted to escape from the LRA. He was forced 

to perform this heinous act as a warning so that he himself would 

not attempt to escape. Truly this is a deeply disturbing story, and 

yet this is one of thousands of deeply disturbing stories that reflect 

the lives of the endangered children of northern Uganda. 

Due to the threat of LRA abduction, one time as many as 30,000 

night commuters traveled from conflict areas or IDP camps to 

spend the night in shelters, churches or balconies in urban centers 

with greater capacity to protect them. Recent assessments, including one by the State Department, revealed that due to a decrease 

in LRA attacks, the number of night commuter children has declined dramatically in the past 6 months to 19,000 or fewer. 

However, for even one child to be subjected to nightly separation 

from his or her community and forced to commute long distances 

under the threat of violence, abduction or sexual assaults is one 

child too many. 

The United States places a high priority on assisting child victims of conflict throughout the world. In northern Uganda, it is 

clear that the key to assisting child soldiers and child victims is to 

continue to focus our diplomatic and programmatic assistance on 

three key areas: Humanitarian assistance, military assistance to 

help defeat the LRA, and build the capacity and professionalism of 

the UPDF and political pressure to urge the Government of Uganda to reach out to the Acholi people and support reconciliation efforts. 

The United States is a leading source of humanitarian and other 

aid for the people of northern Uganda. We provided $78 million for 

bilateral assistance in Fiscal Year 2005. The United States was the 

source of more than 50 percent of the total World Food Program 

assistance in Uganda in 2005. The U.S. also funds critical program 

that address the deep psychological wounds of former child soldiers 

and child abductees by providing these children with a psycho-social counseling, medical care, vocational training, and opportunities 

to reintegrate themselves into the local community. 

The U.S. has funded child reception centers for children rescued 

from LRA captivity. U.S. assistance has also supported several 

overnight shelters where children stay to be protected from LRA 

13

abduction. My USAID colleague, Leonard Rogers, is here to discuss 

our assistance programs in greater depth. We have provided the UPDF with more than $5 million in nonlethal military assistance to combat the LRA, including communication equipment and trucks. We also provide training for the 

UPDF in the areas of human rights, civil/military relations, military justice, and professional military education, and we continue 

to urge the Ugandan Government to reach out to the Acholi people 

through dialogue to support the reconciliation process. 

The United States continues to support efforts to promote a dialogue of peace and reconciliation among civilians in northern Uganda. We urge the Ugandan Government to coordinate with the 

neighboring Governments of Sudan and the Democratic Republic of 

Congo to end the spread of LRA terror into these countries. 

One of northern Uganda’s most pressing needs is increased and 

adequate security, and protection for civilians in these IDP camps 

and surrounding areas as well as protection for the brave, local and 

international humanitarian aid workers who risk their lives to provide basic needs. Both the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces and 

the local defense units, or LDUs, which are local militia units composed of volunteers, are assigned to protect IDP camps, and this 

protection regrettably is inadequate. 

The United States continues to urge the Government of Uganda 

to provide effective protection for civilians by adequately deploying 

UPDF troops in the region, particularly to enhance the protection 

of these IDP camps against LRA attacks, and in addition the 

United States strongly urges the Government of Uganda to investigate and prosecute all violence against civilians by security forces 

and focus efforts on providing human rights training along with security training to deployed personnel in the region. 

The U.S. Government and the international community pay a 

close attention to human rights abuses by the UPDF and the 

LDUs. We have documented these abuses, including rape of women 

and girls by UPDF and LDU security forces, acting with impunity 

in our recent 2005 annual human rights report. 

As I stated earlier, the U.S. provides funding to training UPDF 

in the areas of civil/military relations, military justice, and human 

rights in an effort to curb these human rights abuses. 

In 2002, the Ugandan Government ratified the optional protocol 

to the convention of the rights of children, which the State Department worked hard to negotiate. This protocol prescribes minimum 

ages for military recruitment and participation in conflict. Ugandan law prohibits service in the military by persons under 18 years 

of age. 

In October 2005, the UNICEF Uganda representative, Martin 

Nogwanja, stated that the UPDF regular force has no child soldiers, and though the UPDF appears to be making a concentrated 

effort to comply with the protocol, the LDUs continue to have high 

child recruitments purportedly due to collusion of local officials and 

lack of doctors present to test the age of LDU recruits. 

In another critical area of concern is the NGO registration 

amendment bill that was approved recently by the Ugandan parliament. The Uganda parliament’s passage of this NGO bill is troubling, and sends the wrong message to the international commuVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042606\27231.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
14

nity about the country’s commitment to address the problems in 

the north. It requires NGOs and evangelical churches to renew 

their registration permits annually. Controversial clause allows 

representatives of the Ugandan internal and external security 

forces to be members of the NGO board, and the bill gives the NGO 

board powers to register or deny registry to NGOs opposed to government policy. 

Uganda enjoys a vibrant civil society that serves as a mechanism 

for checks and balances on the government. We will continue to 

press the government to allow wide latitude in its implementation 

so that the important work of NGOs in the region is not unduly 

hampered. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this critical hearing 

on the deeply troubling situation of the children in northern Uganda. Thank you for the invitation to testify. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor wants to work with this Subcommittee in the weeks and months ahead to help the children of 

northern Uganda. 

We are working with partner organizations such as the International Committee for the Red Cross, Save the Children, World 

Vision and the International Rescue Committee to provide vital humanitarian assistance. In northern and western Uganda we work 

with over 70 local and national NGOs to provide counseling, to provide conflict resolution, and encourage economic development in 

areas affected by conflict. 

Through our partnership with NGOs and their humanitarian assistance, through continued dialogue with the Ugandan Government and other governments in the region, and through continued 

non-lethal military assistance and training, the U.S. Government 

will continue to develop and implement policies and programs focused on resolving the humanitarian and human rights crises facing children and the general population in the region, and of course 

work on strategies to resolve peacefully the LRA conflict itself. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Krilla follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JEFFREY KRILLA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Chairman Smith, Members of the Subcommittee, 

Thank you for holding this timely hearing on the endangered children of northern 

Uganda. Chairman Smith, you recently returned from a trip to Uganda, and Mr. 

Royce and Mr. Payne and many Members of the Subcommittee have also traveled 

to the region and know these issues first-hand. Clearly, you do not make a trip to 

a country where the lives of children are so heavily impacted and return home the 

same. For that matter, you can not listen to the moving NGO testimony on northern 

Uganda or see a movie like Invisible Children and remain the same. We held a 

screening of the film Invisible Children in my bureau recently and I understand 

that there may have been screenings of this film on Capitol Hill. For those Members 

of the Subcommittee who have not seen Invisible Children, I commend this film to 

your attention. This film is educating many people around the world about the conflict and its lasting effects on the children. This issue has understandably struck 

a chord with the American people. I understand that on the night of April 29th, 

groups of Americans plan to gather in 136 cities across the country for what is being 

called the Global Night Commute. This is a profound act of solidarity on behalf of 

the children of northern Uganda. 

I am new to the State Department and this is my first official appearance before 

this Committee as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. However, I have had a long-standing interest in AfVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AGI\042606\27231.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
15

rica and care deeply about the African people. Prior to joining the Department, I 

served for five years as Regional Director for Africa for the International Republic 

Institute (IRI) where I coordinated election observation missions, political party development programs and civil society programs in Africa. My work in Africa extends 

back even further to my time as a high school teacher in the segregated Lebowa 

region of South Africa during the last years of Apartheid rule. My experiences in 

Lebowa, where I witnessed firsthand the potential, resiliency and eventual triumph 

of the South African people in the face of brutal oppression, continue to influence 

my work with the people of Africa today. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the people of northern Uganda continue to suffer 

under a 20-year reign of terror imposed by Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance 

Army (LRA). Without question, those who suffer the most from the LRA’s perverse 

tactics are the children. 

In the 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Uganda, we reported 

on the LRA’s sexual exploitation of children, the use of child soldiers, the plight of 

the ‘‘night commuter’’ children who travel long distances from their homes in search 

of protection from the LRA, and the overall deplorable conditions of the IDP camps, 

in which over 80% of the approximately 1.5 million occupants are women and children. 

I have recently met with the new Ugandan Ambassador to the United States, 

Perezi Kamunanwire, and the new U.S. Ambassador to Uganda, Steven Browning, 

to discuss these issues. I look forward to close cooperation with them as we work 

to improve the security and living conditions for the people of northern Uganda. 

In February, a member of my staff traveled to Gulu to monitor a DRL-funded 

project that focuses on building a coalition of civil society organizations in the north 

to lobby the local and national government more effectively for their myriad needs. 

As you may know, Uganda is one of three countries in which the UN system has 

agreed to pilot a new approach to ensuring both more predictable and more robust 

protection and assistance for internally displaced persons. That will bring in the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in a protection role and hence our 

Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration. PRM Assistant Secretary of State, 

Ellen Sauerbrey, also recently traveled to Kenya and Uganda to study refugee conditions and the nexus with IDP issues. USAID, PRM, and we are all coordinating 

our efforts. 

This summer, I and members of my staff plan to travel to the region for meetings 

that will address the regional dimensions of the LRA threat as well as what more 

the international community can do to improve the situation in northern Uganda. 

The living conditions in northern Uganda are stark and deserve international attention. Uganda has the 3rd largest IDP population in the world. Approximately 200 

camps house 1.5 million or more IDPs. Estimates indicate that approximately 1.2 

million of these IDPs are in the Acholi districts of Kitgum, Gulu, and Pader. The 

IDP camps are heavily congested, and some house an excess of 60,000 people. Resources have proven insufficient to provide adequate security, water, sanitation facilities, or health care services to the people who live there. Consequently, the IDP 

camps have high mortality rates (1.54 per 10,000 per day); roughly three times the 

national average (based on January to July 2005 estimates of 35,000 deaths in 

Kitgum, Gulu, and Pader). Civilians’ freedom of movement outside of camps is extremely limited by the LRA threat as well as Ugandan government policies. 

The 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Uganda stated approximately 38,000 children have been abducted by the LRA during the past 20 years 

and forced into roles as soldiers, laborers, and sex slaves. An estimated 85 percent 

of LRA captives are children and most are between the ages of 11 to 16. These children are forced to fight as rebels and participate in the killing of civilians, including 

other children. We know that children suffer higher casualties in battle than adults, 

and often emerge from conflicts with greater physical and psychological challenges. 

In September 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Kony and several of his commanders on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including enslavement and sexual enslavement, enlisting children into armed forces, 

and cruel treatment of civilians . The U.S. government has also designated the LRA 

as a terrorist organization. 

Last year, Rory Anderson of World Vision reported having met an 11-year-old boy 

in the Gulu World Vision Children of War Center who was forced to bite to death 

and swallow the blood of a fellow child who had attempted to escape from the LRA. 

He was forced to perform this heinous act as a warning, so that he himself would 

not attempt to escape. I am a father, and this is a deeply disturbing story. And yet, 

this is just one of thousands of deeply disturbing stories that reflect the lives of the 

endangered children of northern Uganda. 

16

Due to the threat of LRA abduction, at one time as many as 35,000 child ‘‘night 

commuters’’ traveled from conflict areas or IDP camps to spend the night in shelters, schools, churches or balconies in urban centers with greater capacity to protect 

them. Recent assessments, including one by the State Department, reveal that due 

to a decrease in LRA attacks the number of night commuter children has declined 

dramatically in the past six months to 19,000 or fewer. For even one child to be 

subjected to nightly separation from his or her community, and forced to commute 

long distances under the threat of violence, abduction or sexual assault, is one too 

many. 

The U.S. places a high priority on assisting child victims of conflict throughout 

the world. In northern Uganda, it is clear that the key to assisting child soldiers 

and child victims is to continue to focus our diplomatic and programmatic assistance 

on three key areas: humanitarian assistance, military assistance to help defeat the 

LRA and build the capacity and professionalism of the UPDF, and political pressure 

to urge the Government of Uganda to reach out to the Acholi people and support 

reconciliation efforts. 

The U.S. is a leading source of humanitarian and other aid for the people of 

northern Uganda and we provided $78 million in bi-lateral assistance in fiscal year 

2005. The U.S. was the source of more than 50% of the total World Food Program 

assistance in Uganda in 2005. The U.S. also funds critical programs that address 

the deep psychological wounds of former child soldiers and child abductees, by providing these children with psycho-social counseling, medical care, vocational training, and opportunities to reintegrate themselves into the local community. The U.S. 

has funded child reception centers for children rescued from LRA captivity. U.S. assistance has also supported several overnight shelters where children stay to be protected from LRA abduction. My USAID colleague, Leonard Rogers, is here to discuss 

our assistance programs in greater depth. 

We have provided the UPDF with more than $5 million in non-lethal military assistance to combat the LRA, including communication equipment and trucks. We 

also provide training for the UPDF in the areas of human rights, civil/military relations, military justice and professional military education. 

We continue to urge the Ugandan government to reach out to the Acholi people 

through dialogue to support the reconciliation process. The U.S. continues to support efforts to promote a dialogue of peace and reconciliation among civilians in 

northern Uganda. In addition, the Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) is an 

American initiative that addresses a peaceful solution to the ongoing civil conflict 

in the region and seeks to engage the Government of Uganda and the LRA in talks, 

with the goal of achieving peace and support for national reconciliation. 

We also urge the Ugandan government to coordinate with the neighboring governments of Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to end the spread of LRA 

terror into these countries. 

One of northern Uganda’s most pressing needs is increased and adequate security 

and protection for civilians living in IDP camps and surrounding areas, as well as 

protection for the brave local and international humanitarian workers who risk 

their lives to provide basic needs. Both the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces 

(UPDF) and the Local Defense Units (LDUs)—which are local militia units composed of volunteers—are assigned to protect IDP camps. The protection regrettably 

is inadequate. 

The U.S. continues to urge the Government of Uganda to provide effective protection for civilians by adequately deploying UPDF troops in the region, particularly 

to enhance the protection of IDP camps against LRA attacks. In addition, the U.S. 

strongly urges the Government of Uganda to investigate and prosecute all violence 

against civilians by security forces, and focus efforts on providing human rights 

training along with security training to deployed personnel in the region. 

The U.S. government and international community pay close attention to human 

rights abuses committed by the UPDF and LDUs. We have documented those 

abuses, including rape of women and girls, by UPDF and LDU security forces acting 

with impunity in the 2005 annual human rights report. As I stated earlier, the U.S. 

provides funding to train UPDF in the areas of civil/military relations, military justice and human rights in an effort to curb these human rights abuses. 

In 2002, the Ugandan government ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Children, which the State Department worked hard to negotiate. The protocol prescribes minimum ages for military recruitment and participation in conflict. Ugandan law prohibits service in the military by persons under 18 

years of age. In October 2005, the UNICEF-Uganda Representative, Martin 

Nogwanja, stated that the UPDF regular force has no child soldiers. Though the 

UPDF appears to be making a concentrated effort to comply with the protocol, the 

17

LDUs continue to have high child recruitments, reportedly due to the collusion of 

local officials, and lack of doctors present to assess the age of LDU recruits. 

Another area of concern is the NGO Registration Amendment Bill that was approved recently by the Ugandan Parliament. The Ugandan Parliament’s passage of 

the NGO Bill is troubling and sends the wrong message to the international community about the country’s commitment to address the problems in the north. It requires NGOs and evangelical churches to renew their registration permits annually. 

A controversial clause allows representatives of the Ugandan Internal and External 

Security Forces to be members on the NGO board, and the Bill gives the NGO 

Board powers to register or deny registry to NGOs opposed to government policy. 

Uganda enjoys a vibrant civil society that serves as a mechanism for checks and 

balances on the government. We will continue to press the government to allow wide 

latitude in its implementation so that the important work of NGOs in the region 

is not unduly hampered. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing on the deeply troubling 

situation of the children in northern Uganda. Thank you for the invitation to testify. 

The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor wants to work with this Subcommittee in the weeks and months ahead to help the children in northern Uganda. 

We are working with partner organizations such as the International Committee for 

the Red Cross, Save the Children, World Vision and the International Rescue Committee to provide vital humanitarian assistance. In northern and western Uganda, 

we work with over 70 local and national NGOs to provide counseling, provide conflict resolution, and encourage economic development in areas affected by conflict. 

Through our partnerships with NGOs and their humanitarian assistance, through 

continued dialogue with the Ugandan government and other governments in the region, and through continued non-lethal military assistance and training, the U.S. 

government will continue to develop and implement policies and programs focused 

on resolving the humanitarian and human rights crises facing children and the general population of the region, and of course work on strategies to resolve peacefully 

the LRA conflict itself.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Krilla, thank you very much for your testimony. 

I would now like to turn to Mr. Rogers. 

STATEMENT OF MR. LEONARD ROGERS, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to appear 

before the Subcommittee today. If I might, I would also like to submit a written statement for the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

For over 20 years, the people of northern Uganda have suffered 

the brutal atrocities of the Lord’s Resistance Army. An estimated 

1.5 million people have been driven from their homes by LRA terror. Families are now forced to live in squalid displacement camps. 

These camps rarely meet minimum humanitarian standards. As a 

result, mortality rates are unacceptably high. 

The most reliable study we have shows mortality rates among 

the displaced population average 1.54 deaths per day per 10,000 

people. This is over 50 percent higher than the threshold we use 

to declare an emergency, and more than triple the normal death 

rate in non-emergency communities in sub-Sahara Africa. 

It is tragic that children are especially victimized in northern 

Uganda. Mortality rates in the camps for children are more than 

double those of adults—3.18 deaths per day per 10,000 children. 

But even worse than life in the camps, the LRA’s atrocities have 

had a devastating impact on these children. 

Over the course of the conflict UNICEF estimates that 25,000 

children have been abducted by the LRA. They are forced to serve 

as LRA shock troops, and the smallest are porters and the girls are 

18

sex slaves for LRA commanders. Children are forced to kill other 

children as part of the LRA indoctrination process. 

As the reality of what happens to those abducted by the LRA has 

become known, other children in the community have understandably become terrified. Parents are terrified as well. To protect their 

children, an estimated 19,000 are sent as so-called night commuters to live in the protection of special camps in the cities of the 

north. These children hike many miles to and from home each day 

just to be safe at night from the LRA. This has had a devastating 

impact on their family life and their schooling. 

The United States Government has worked closely with the Government of Uganda to address this crisis. We have been the largest 

donor of humanitarian assistance to address the many needs of the 

LRA’s victims. We have also worked with the Ugandans in a variety of ways to finally bring this nightmare to an end. 

In Fiscal Year 2005, USAID provided $78 million in relief and 

development programs to northern Uganda, and we expect to provide a somewhat larger amount during Fiscal Year 2006. 

Our Office of Food for Peace provided 79,000 metric tons of U.S. 

food to the World Food Program to help feed nearly 1.5 million displaced people. 

Our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance provided nearly $12 

million, most in support of desperately-needed water and sanitation 

projects in displacement camps. USAID’s mission in Kapala is significantly increasing HIV/AIDS and anti-malaria programs in the 

north where malaria and AIDS rank as the two leading causes of 

death. 

However, we have always recognized that more must be done to 

break the cycle of LRA-led violence and displacement. The Government of Uganda believes the only realistic solution lies through the 

military, and the United States has provided modest military assistance to the UPDF. We have also encouraged and supported in 

a variety of ways keeping open options for peaceful resolution of 

the conflict. The government’s amnesty program which allows LRA 

fighters to return to society has proven successful, and we believe 

should be strengthened. 

It is important to understand, however, that there has never 

been any concrete evidence that the LRA senior leadership is interested in peace. Now they appear to be on the run with their leaders 

reportedly forced out of Sudan and into Congo. We believe now is 

the time to redouble efforts to end this conflict, and we intend to 

work closely with the Government of Uganda to do so. 

For USAID, we intend to pursue the following course: 

First, we will reorient our development assistance programs to 

focus more on the north, especially for malaria and HIV/AIDS programs, and we will continue to play a leading role in providing humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced. 

Second, we will work with and support the Ugandan Government 

in providing improved protection for the internally displaced, including strengthening accountability for UPDF performance around 

the camps, expanded freedom of movement for the displaced so 

that they can farm, and voluntary and assisted return of the IDPs 

to their homes as security permits. 

19

Third, we will work with the United Nations on improving coordination and U.N. performance in the displacement camps. This 

will require early agreement with the Government of Uganda on 

appointment of a new U.N. humanitarian coordinator and rapid 

implementation of a new system to designate lead U.N. agencies 

for specific responsibilities such as camp management. 

Fourth, we will seek ways to further support the Government of 

Uganda’s program for LRA fighters who seek amnesty. This would 

include strengthening reintegration programs and expanding livelihood opportunities. 

Fifth, we will continue to work with the Government of Uganda, 

the U.N. and non-governmental organizations to assess health and 

nutritional conditions among the internally displaced so our aid 

can be properly targeted to address priority problems. 

Sixth, we strongly believe non-governmental organizations remain critical to the successful implementation of many humanitarian and development programs in northern Uganda. We will 

work to ensure open communication with the government and the 

NGOs, and we trust that all sides can work to resolve issues constructively. 

Finally, we will strongly support what we hope will be a transition to peace and security in northern Uganda over the coming 

months and years. We believe elimination of the LRA and reconciliation between the Acholi people and the Government of Uganda 

will allow Uganda to fully realize its democratic and economic potential. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LEONARD ROGERS, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT

ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify at today’s hearing. Northern Uganda remains one of the world’s least publicized humanitarian emergencies with 1.5 million or more persons internally displaced by ongoing conflict. I have seen first-hand the situation in Northern Uganda, 

and I can assure you that this is a conflict that merits the close attention of this 

Subcommittee. Thank you for convening this hearing. 

My testimony on behalf of USAID today seeks to summarize key aspects of the 

humanitarian emergency and our response to it. 

LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

The United States National Security Strategy specifically refers to the rebel 

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) as a regional challenge that demands attention. The 

Strategy accurately states that ‘‘In Uganda, a barbaric rebel cult—the Lord’s Resistance Army—is exploiting a regional conflict and terrorizing a vulnerable population.’’

It is clear that Northern Uganda’s population continues to live in abject fear of 

continued attacks by the LRA, whose utter brutality against civilians is well-documented and well-known by this Subcommittee. The LRA has committed widespread 

serious abuses and atrocities, including the abduction, rape, maiming, mutilation 

and killing of civilians, including children. The LRA uses children as soldiers, holds 

children and others in slave-like conditions, and subjects female captives to rape 

and other forms of severe sexual exploitation. The LRA has abducted some 25,000 

children during the course of the conflict, according to UNICEF; other estimates are 

even higher. Although LRA activities in Northern Uganda have diminished during 

the recent dry season, LRA combatants reportedly remain in the vicinity of many 

20

displacement sites, and residents are fearful that random LRA attacks and atrocities could resume. 

The LRA is a sub-regional issue that must be addressed. The LRA now threaten 

regional stability not only in Uganda, but in the volatile regions of southern Sudan 

and eastern Congo. The latter two countries are emerging, we hope, from long periods of warfare with heavy US investment in securing a peace. In particular, it 

threatens the fragile political situation in Sudan and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Overall, LRA activity in Northern Uganda and southern Sudan limits humanitarian access; blocks trans-border market and logistics 

routes; and limits agricultural production and trade. 

HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS

Most of the estimated 1.5 million persons displaced during Northern Uganda’s 

conflict continue to live in deplorable conditions, scattered among more than 200 

camps. With more than 90 percent of the population pushed from their homes in 

several districts, population density in Northern Uganda’s overcrowded camps is virtually unprecedented even by international emergency standards. 

The international relief community depends on measurements of mortality rates 

to obtain essential information about how well the affected population is surviving 

and what more needs to be done. Therefore, it was highly significant when a muchanticipated study of mortality levels in Northern Ugandan camps in 2005 found that 

mortality rates among the displaced population averaged 1.54 deaths per day per 

10,000 people, significantly above the commonly used emergency threshold of 1 

death per day, and more than triple the normal expected death rate in non-emergency communities in sub-Saharan Africa. Among children under age five, mortality 

rates in Northern Uganda’s conflict zone were even more tragic, averaging 3.18 

deaths per day per 10,000 children. These mortality rates translate into more than 

900 excess deaths per week among displaced Ugandans. 

It is important to note that this mortality data is the product of a study conducted 

in 2005 under the auspices of the Ugandan Ministry of Health, the World Health 

Organization, UNICEF, the World Food Program (WFP), the UN Population Fund, 

and the International Rescue Committee. Health experts within the USAID Office 

of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) with vast experience in health 

surveys have examined the Northern Uganda mortality study and have concluded 

that the survey is methodologically sound and arrives at credible conclusions. A 

USAID health expert in Uganda earlier this month further examined health conditions in the North, closely reviewed Government of Uganda concerns about the 

study’s approach, and has also concluded that the mortality survey was conducted 

according to standard practices. Regular measurements of basic health indicators, 

including mortality rates, are a fundamentally important component in mounting a 

well-informed, well-calibrated humanitarian response in crisis situations. 

I am sorry to report that these grim mortality measurements tend to confirm 

what USAID has known for some time—that seriously substandard conditions at 

displacement camps have exacted a deadly toll on Northern Uganda’s population. 

Even when compared to other humanitarian emergencies, Northern Uganda’s camps 

are woefully deficient in the provision of water for drinking and bathing, latrines 

for adequate sanitation, and basic living space for physical and mental well-being. 

The uprooted population, deprived of any semblance of normal life, is overwhelmingly dependent on relief deliveries. More than 70 percent of displaced households 

in Northern Uganda have absolutely no income or earn negligible amounts equivalent to less than $6 per month, according to a comprehensive survey conducted last 

year with support from USAID. 

These conditions clearly indicate the challenges confronting the Government of 

Uganda, international donors, and the United Nations. 

PROTECTION ISSUES

Mr. Chairman, as you may know, USAID has made a concerted effort in recent 

years to be more mindful of the serious protection problems confronting many of the 

needy populations we serve. We know from experience that displaced populations 

worldwide are particularly vulnerable to physical abuse, sexual exploitation, and 

other violations of their basic rights. USAID adopted an official policy on assistance 

to internally displaced persons in 2004 that explicitly acknowledges USAID’s responsibility to devise programming strategies within its mandate to try to help vulnerable populations better manage the security risks they face. 

In line with this USAID responsibility, we have conducted two on-the-ground assessments of protection issues in Northern Uganda during the past year, including 

an assessment last month led by the USAID/OFDA Senior Advisor on Internal DisVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AGI\042606\27231.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
21

placement and Protection. The United States Government also participated in a recent multi-donor/multi-agency assessment of displacement, under the leadership of 

the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, to refine the international 

community’s approach to internally displaced persons. 

USAID’s two protection assessments in Northern Uganda found that while displaced Ugandans express appreciation that government soldiers and governmentsupported local defense units offer some security from LRA attacks, mistreatment 

of camp residents by some of those same Ugandan government security personnel 

remains a continuing problem. Citizens in Northern Uganda complain frequently of 

mistreatment by security personnel, and say that neither the Uganda Peoples Defense Force (UPDF) nor the judicial system offers an adequate mechanism for addressing these complaints. The UPDF has taken strong measures against some perpetrators, and has even executed soldiers convicted of these offenses. However, in 

other cases there has been no effective action against those responsible. 

In the three Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, where most displacement 

is concentrated, Ugandan government restrictions limit residents’ movements outside the camps to a few kilometers during daylight hours. While tight controls on 

civilian movement are meant to protect the population and hamper the LRA, many 

Northern Ugandans report that as a result they are unable to engage in livelihood 

activities such as farming and trade. Some 40 percent of camp occupants report that 

they are afraid to use their camp’s water point. More than 40 percent state that 

living in a camp is as dangerous, or more dangerous, than returning to their home. 

USAID will work closely with Ugandan officials at all levels to support greater 

freedom of movement to the displaced population in accordance with the Government of Uganda’s national policy on internal displacement, which states that ‘‘freedom of movement is a fundamental human right of all Ugandans, including internally displaced persons.’’ Easing restrictions on movement would allow more displaced families to engage in agricultural activities that would improve food security 

and household incomes, lessen the population’s pervasive sense of entrapped dependency, and embolden a percentage of displaced persons to begin returning voluntarily to their nearby homes if and when security conditions permit. 

USAID welcomes the Government of Uganda’s plans to establish ‘‘Civil-Military 

Coordination Centers’’ and ‘‘Subcommittees on Human Rights Promotion and Protection’’ to monitor, report, and resolve protection problems and facilitate accountability. USAID will work with the Government of Uganda to help implement such 

plans effectively. Improved protection and disciplined behavior by government security personnel should be achievable and would build confidence within the displaced 

population, reduce tensions in camps, increase access to livelihood opportunities, 

and would serve as an important step forward in fostering reconciliation between 

the northern population and their national government. 

USAID ASSISTANCE TO NORTHERN UGANDA

Mr. Chairman, Northern Uganda has an enormous ongoing need for emergency 

humanitarian relief as well as long-term development assistance. During the many 

years of conflict and massive population displacement in the North, the government 

of Uganda and the international humanitarian assistance community as a whole 

have failed to respond commensurate to the needs on the ground. USAID realizes 

that more needs to be done to help the people of Northern Uganda. 

That is why the USAID Mission in Uganda, working closely with USAID/Washington, during the past year has developed an action plan for the North which is 

being institutionalized into a core strategic objective to mitigate the causes and consequences of conflict and will channel additional USAID staffing and financial resources to the affected area. The USAID Mission in Uganda will seek to focus more 

strategically on increasing access to essential services, enhancing the protection of 

individuals from physical and psychological violence to the extent possible, advancing peace and reconciliation processes, restoring food security and basic economic activity, and help displaced families voluntarily return home and reintegrate when 

safe and appropriate to do so. The Agency is determined to make a more significant 

dent in the miserable human conditions that dominate the daily existence of Northern Uganda’s people. 

State Department support of the International Committee of the Red Cross 

(through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration) benefited the internally displaced persons; earmarked funds for that purpose reached $4 million in FY 

05. USAID also provided $78 million to relief and development programs in Northern Uganda during FY 2005 and hopes to provide a similar or larger amount during 

FY 2006. The largest component of USAID assistance is food aid. USAID’s Office 

of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) provided 79,000 metric tons in FY 2005 valued at 

22

$47.6 million and continues to work through the World Food Program (WFP) in FY 

2006 to deliver food to nearly 1.5 million displaced persons and more than 160,000 

refugees and other vulnerable persons in the North. USAID/FFP has provided 26 

percent of the total funding and metric tonnage requested by WFP for 2006, nearly 

twice the amount provided by the next three largest donor nations combined. In addition to food for general distributions, supplementary and therapeutic feeding, 

school feeding, and HIV/AIDS programs, USAID/FFP this year will work with WFP 

to supply three-month return rations to families planning to return home voluntarily from camps, primarily in Northern Uganda’s Lira district. USAID/FFP anticipates that food dependency will decline somewhat as more displaced households 

gain access to farm land to meet a larger proportion of their own food needs. 

The second-largest component of USAID assistance to Northern Uganda is nonfood humanitarian assistance provided by USAID/OFDA, which has steered the bulk 

of its support in recent years toward desperately needed water and sanitation 

projects in displacement camps, as well as health and nutrition programs. In FY 

2006, USAID/OFDA has also begun to support small-scale food security programs 

that will enable camp residents to produce limited amounts of food. USAID/OFDA 

provided $11.8 million to Northern Ugandan programs during FY 2005. USAID/

OFDA is currently planning a response of $6–8 million in FY 2006 depending upon 

circumstances and needs in other countries. 

The USAID Mission in Uganda is significantly increasing its support in FY 2006 

for HIV/AIDS programs and anti-malarial projects in the North, where malaria and 

AIDS rank as the two leading causes of death. Through the President’s Malaria Initiative, USAID is distributing insecticide-treated mosquito netting to 85 percent of 

the dwellings in displacement camps. USAID is also funding HIV/AIDS programs 

targeting the North, as part of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. This 

includes funding for the start-up of a $30 million, five-year program focused on delivery of services for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and Orphans and Vulnerable 

Children in conflict-affected districts of Northern Uganda. 

In addition, USAID is supporting programs ranging from strengthening of governmental decentralization and teacher training, to infrastructure support and longterm agricultural development focused on increasing opportunities for food security 

and income generation through effective use of food and cash crops. USAID’s Northern Uganda Peace Initiative continues to provide technical assistance to promote 

conflict resolution and reconciliation at local and national levels. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that this hearing and indeed this entire Subcommittee has 

a special interest in the plight of Northern Uganda’s endangered children. USAID 

has initiated a Community Resilience and Dialogue program in recent years that 

includes assistance for formerly abducted children and adults who have escaped the 

LRA to reunite with their families. USAID’s Displaced Children and Orphans Fund 

and its Victims of Torture fund have contributed toward these efforts during the 

past six years. 

The LRA uses abductions to force children into servitude as fighters, porters, 

manual laborers in base camps, and—in the case of female abductees—as sex slaves. 

Many young girls held captive have become pregnant with the children of LRA combatants. These girls and their children face significant challenges trying to reintegrate into communities, a process made all the more difficult by the displacement and destitution still suffered by many of the abductees’ families. About 40 percent of the ex-abductees pass through reception centers for several weeks—three 

such centers are supported by USAID and its implementing partners who provide 

technical oversight—where programs partially address the traumatized youths’ considerable health, nutritional, and psychosocial needs before the children reunite 

with their families, often aided by family tracing services. Experience has shown 

that traditional cleansing ceremonies are an important aspect in easing the shame 

and stigma that many returnees encounter. The USAID Community Resilience and 

Dialogue program has supported skills training and paid school fees for exabductees, provided scholastic materials, and has rehabilitated schools. 

USAID continues to provide support to several ‘‘night commuter’’ centers where 

thousands of Northern Ugandan children walk each evening to spend the night 

sleeping in safety from LRA attacks. The number of children registering at night 

commuter centers has declined by about one-third during the past six months, to 

approximately 19,000. The decline might be a tentative sign that the northern population is gradually gaining a stronger sense of security. However, we know that the 

numbers of ‘‘night commuters’’ can fluctuate significantly depending on events. 

Therefore the sad spectacle of parents having to send their children several miles 

away to sleep safely at separate locations each night is a phenomenon that will likely continue. Many relief workers and child experts are increasingly concerned that 

23

the ‘‘night commuting’’ phenomenon might be producing secondary negative emotional and social effects on some of the children. 

The efforts by USAID and its implementing partners have helped thousands of 

ex-abductees. However, these efforts have by no means been adequate considering 

the large number of abducted children—unprecedented in any other conflict—and 

the horrific perversities that the LRA inflicted on many of the children, compounded 

by the instability that continues to make a return to normal life difficult if not impossible even after children and young adults have managed to escape the grasp of 

the LRA. 

THE WAY FORWARD

USAID is acutely aware that its ability to help bring dramatic improvements to 

the lives of Northern Ugandans is limited until the LRA conflict ends either by military or political means. Within USAID’s mandate, here is our thinking about the 

way forward. 

Mr. Chairman, more needs to be done in Northern Uganda. In addition to the aid 

that USAID is providing, other donor countries, UN humanitarian agencies, and the 

Government of Uganda itself need to do more. Northern Uganda contains, by some 

independent estimates, the third largest displaced population in the world. It is 

worth noting that Uganda and its neighboring countries of Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo collectively account for nearly four of every ten internally displaced people on this planet. It is also worth noting that the LRA operates 

in all three of those countries, ruthlessly exploiting the regional instability that it 

helps to create and sustain. The LRA has ruthlessly earned its place on the U.S. 

Government’s Terrorist Exclusion List. 

First, as mentioned earlier, the USAID Mission in Uganda is making budgetary 

and staffing adjustments to strengthen its ability to respond in Northern Uganda. 

USAID must maintain and expand emergency relief efforts while also preparing for 

a transition to reintegration and long-term development where appropriate. USAID 

is committed to doing what it can within its budget and mandate. We will be 

pleased to keep the Subcommittee informed as this process evolves. 

Secondly, all USAID relief and development programs in Northern Uganda will 

make a heightened effort to analyze the population’s protection problems and integrate those concerns into our programming. We know, for example, that improved 

water programs can help protect displaced populations by reducing their need to 

seek water at dangerous locations outside of camps. Basic health programs can do 

a better job of identifying and treating rape victims. Food rations can be distributed 

in ways that reduce the risk of theft or exploitation. In addition, we are in regular 

contact with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and UNICEF as those three agencies become more engaged in monitoring, documenting, and helping to resolve protection and human rights problems in the North. USAID strongly supports UN officials’ new efforts to work with Ugandan authorities to secure greater freedom of 

movement for camp occupants. 

Moreover, addressing the LRA issue is critical to advance U.S. national interests 

in the sub-region, reintegrate 1.5 million displaced persons, and address the recurring drain on humanitarian assistance funds. USAID believes that efforts to ‘‘push’’ 

the LRA through military and diplomatic pressure should be complemented by 

stronger efforts to ‘‘pull’’ non-indicted LRA commanders away from the LRA by persuading them to defect. Many mid-level LRA commanders choose to leave the LRA 

when opportunity permits, and experience suggests that such commanders tend to 

bring, on average, groups of about 20 LRA members with them when they defect. 

According to a recent study about LRA defectors, rebel commanders tend to be more 

ready to escape and return home when they are confident that physical security, 

freedom, and livelihood opportunities await them in civilian life in Northern Uganda. Thorough and accurate information about the Ugandan government’s amnesty 

and reintegration process is the most significant factor encouraging commanders to 

defect, according to the study entitled ‘‘Opportunities for Peace in Northern Uganda’’ 

conducted by Conciliation Resources and Quaker Peace & Social Witness. Therefore, 

more effort is needed to disseminate information about demobilization and reintegration programs for LRA ex-combatants, and specialized support is required 

immediately to improve those reintegration programs. 

Additionally, USAID and the Department of State Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM) have closely collaborated to push the UN to improve its global humanitarian response system to make UN agencies better coordinated and more accountable in response to the needs of the internally displaced. 

Such UN reforms are particularly crucial in Northern Uganda because of the UN 

24

system’s weak performance there addressing the needs of internally displaced persons over the years. The UN has appropriately chosen Northern Uganda as a prime 

location to introduce one of the humanitarian reforms during 2006, known as the 

‘‘cluster leads strategy’’, which we believe will make the response by the UN humanitarian community more predictable and the UN agencies more accountable. USAID 

and State/PRM have fielded two joint assessment teams during the past three 

months to monitor UN reform efforts and help push the process forward. We believe 

it is absolutely crucial that UN humanitarian agencies become more effective in the 

Northern Uganda crisis. That will require agreement with the Government of Uganda and appointment by the UN of a strong humanitarian coordinator. 

USAID welcomes indications from the Government of Uganda that it intends to 

intensify its efforts in the North. The Ugandan government last year unveiled an 

excellent overall ‘‘National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons’’ that largely remains to be implemented in practice. Helping the Ugandan government activate its 

displacement policy remains a high priority for USAID, the UN and other major donors. In March 2006, Ugandan authorities in consultation with bilateral and multilateral partners—including the U.S. Government—prepared an ‘‘Emergency Plan for 

Humanitarian Interventions in LRA-Affected Areas of Northern Uganda’’ and designated a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) to set performance benchmarks. The 

JMC includes the U.S. Government, the governments of the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, and South Africa, and representatives of the World Bank, the UN, 

and civil society. The Emergency Plan pledges intensified efforts by the Ugandan 

government to end the conflict in the North and lay the groundwork for reconciliation and ex-combatant reintegration. The Action Plan commits the Government of 

Uganda to enhance protection of displaced populations and improve camp conditions. It is noteworthy that the new Emergency Plan commits the Ugandan government ‘‘to increased funding for interventions identified in the Action Plan.’’ USAID 

will work closely with the Government of Uganda to take concrete actions which 

produce tangible results through the JMC and to fulfill its primary responsibility 

for the protection of its citizens. 

In addition, the Government of Uganda in the coming months will finalize a comprehensive National Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan for Northern Uganda 

which USAID hopes will provide an even more detailed picture of the Ugandan government’s plans and commitment to the North. 

Lastly, access to displaced populations for purposes of assessing needs, documentation and analysis of protection problems, design and implementation of assistance programs, and evaluation of projects is absolutely essential to everything that 

USAID and its implementing partners are attempting to do in Northern Uganda. 

Therefore, signs of increased tensions between the Government of Uganda and 

international relief agencies are troubling and will, we hope, be resolved in a manner that best serves the considerable needs of Northern Uganda’s large, vulnerable 

population. 

Plans by the Ugandan military to reduce military escorts for humanitarian relief 

convoys, for example, are understandable in light of recent security improvements 

at some locations. However, such decisions should, USAID believes, occur as part 

of a consultative process that seriously considers the safety concerns of humanitarian agencies in the field, some of whom suffered deadly highway ambushes just 

five months ago. 

The Department of State’s testimony refers to recently passed Ugandan legislation that would impose tighter licensing and permit rules on non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This has raised concerns among local and international relief 

organizations that Ugandan officials are seeking greater control over some agencies’ 

information collection and advocacy efforts on behalf of Northern Uganda’s conflict 

victims. USAID believes that the ability to independently collect, analyze and make 

public information on the humanitarian crisis, subject to principles of political neutrality, impartiality, and accuracy, is essential to providing the most appropriate response commensurate with the scale of the crisis. USAID will work closely with 

Ugandan authorities to promote a process for strengthening collaboration between 

nongovernmental organizations and the Government of Uganda, including institutionalized channels of regular communication and adequate representation of NGO 

viewpoints. The U.S. Government and no doubt other donors would welcome the opportunity to foster dialogue and continued good relations between the Government 

of Uganda and the organizations working to provide assistance to the Ugandan people. 

Mr. Chairman, the Lord’s Resistance Army has terrorized the people of Northern 

Uganda for too long. There are signs the LRA is now on the run. The Government 

of Uganda and the international community need to step up efforts to end the conVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AGI\042606\27231.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
25

flict, support the displaced as they remain in camps or as they voluntarily return 

home, and heal the physical and psychological wounds of this terrible tragedy. Far 

too many people continue to perish, and far too many survivors are forced to lead 

a miserable and fearful daily existence. Only the full restoration of peace and security will eliminate the current emergency in the North. Until that time comes, 

USAID is determined to effectively respond to what remains one of the most overlooked humanitarian crises in the world. Given the complexity of moving forward, 

we welcome the opportunity to continue working in strong partnership with the 

Government of Uganda in the future. 

I welcome your questions on my testimony or any others you might have for me 

at this time.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much as well. 

Let me just begin the questioning, first of all, to Mr. Krilla if I 

could. Given the ability of the LRA to cross borders between Uganda, Sudan, and the Congo at will, what role do you think a regional 

approach might take here—particularly with the U.N. and other 

nations like ourselves who are very interested in working with 

Uganda? 

Secondly, on the indictment of Joseph Kony by the International 

Criminal Court; do you see this as a double-edge sword? I would 

note that Charles Taylor was indicted with the regional court and 

the pressure of that indictment certainly helped to bring him to 

what we hope will be justice. But in the former Yugoslavia, 

Karadich and Malanovich remain even though we have complete 

access to the former Yugoslavia, have troops deployed, and international peacekeepers all over the former Yugoslavia. Yet these 

two individuals have still evaded arrest and done so even though 

Serbia claims it is cooperating. 

So my question is, has that indictment perhaps served as a block 

to a negotiated settlement of some kind? And as far as we know, 

what was the ICC thinking when they did this without having a 

viable means of apprehending Joseph Kony? 

It seems to me that when you put out an arrest warrant you better have some realistic possibility of apprehending the suspect, and 

I am not sure that exists currently. Maybe I am wrong, but if you 

would spend a moment or two on that. 

Then the issue you mentioned in your testimony that the 

UNICEF representative in Uganda says that the UPDF regular 

forces have no child soldiers. The LDUs continue to have high child 

recruits. If you could define what high is. How many are we talking 

about? And does our intelligence back up what the UNICEF representative have said, that the Ugandan UPDF forces do not have 

child soldiers? 

Then if you could, Mr. Rogers, in your testimony you talked 

about many things, and it is very comprehensive statement and we 

thank you for it. Both of you have provided very comprehensive 

statements, but about 40 percent of the abductees pass through reception centers for several weeks, and three of those centers are 

backed by the USAID. How many centers are there, and how are 

the ex-abductees tiered? 

Obviously, some are more hardened than others. We know that 

PTSD and other psychological trauma, in addition to all the physical trauma, is sometimes life-long, and I wonder what kind of massive effort is made for the most hardened of these young people 

who have been killing and raping themselves? Do they escape, 

26

some of them, and again how many are we talking about? And is 

there a need for us to be funding additional centers? 

You say we are helping in a partnership with at least three. Are 

there some that are going underfunded simply because we have not 

deployed enough resources? 

Then finally on the issue of non-lethal military assistance and 

training, has that produced positive tangible successes in terms of 

human rights training for the Ugandan miliary? 

Over the last 30 years that I have tracked this there have been 

times when military training has not been effective. It has actually 

been counterproductive, and I can explain it, but how do we gauge 

this? Is there a good monitoring system to ensure that human 

rights training really is taking hold? 

Mr. KRILLA. Well, I will start off first with a couple of your questions, and perhaps turn over to my colleague for some of the others. 

Certainly the international role, the role of the U.N., the situation is bigger than just the U.S. Government solution here, and for 

the U.S. Government to apply pressure and to weigh in in the region would not be nearly as effective without the kind of international efforts that we share the burden with our colleagues not 

only in the core group that is working in the region, the U.K., Norway and The Netherlands, but truthfully the entire United Nations 

in examining the greater region and especially inasmuch as it affects Sudan and the DRC, something that Mr. Payne mentioned 

earlier in his comments. 

In terms of our general strategy of applying—this is in terms of 

United States Government strategy, and the international aspect of 

it is applying pressure on the Ugandan Government to reach out 

to the Acholi people is something that we are doing in coordination 

with other international—especially the international donors. 

The second prong being humanitarian assistance is clearly something that we share the burden with other international partners 

as well. 

Then lastly, the military support through non-lethal assistance 

and training, although it is something that the United States Government has taken the lead on, certainly in the military coordination the region has done in conjunction with the forces, the 

MONUC forces in the DRC as well as the UNMIS Forces in Sudan, 

and I will just touch on that very briefly because Mr. Payne, as I 

mentioned, did mention it in his opening statement, the idea of trying to coordinate some sort of military response. 

I would say that that is true and that could be effective to a 

point. Certainly those forces there have to make sure that they respect their own mandates. Earlier this year, in January, the 

MONUC forces in Congo engaged with the LRA in the eastern part 

of the country. Unfortunately, they suffered some losses, although 

generally were considered to be an effective encounter for the 

MONUC forces. I believe eight Guatemalan soldiers were killed at 

that time, which is very unfortunate, but at the same time they 

were fulfilling their mission. They were trying to stabilize the region in the eastern Congo. 

Similarly, they soldiers that are serving in Sudan are maxed out 

in their capacities and able to just maintain their mandate in 

Sudan. So I would hesitate at this time to say that we should exVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042606\27231.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
27

tend their mandate and expect them to be able to cross over into 

Uganda, but at the same time having them in the region has been 

very helpful with an insurgency like the LRA that tends to cross 

back and forth across the borders as easily as they have. 

So I think there is an international angle both in terms of humanitarian assistance pressure that can be brought on the government as well as the military forces there. So I think that answers 

your first question. 

Mr. SMITH. On that first question, Michelle Brown from Refugees 

International makes a number of recommendations, and if you 

could just add to that answer. She believes there should be support 

for an appointment of high-level U.N. envoy on the regional crisis, 

including northern Uganda, who reports regularly to the Security 

Council. Is that something the Administration would support? 

And support for a panel of experts to investigate the sources of 

support for the LRA, which remains illusive as to exactly where are 

they getting their money. 

Mr. KRILLA. Yes. Well, I will address both of those issues because 

they are certainly ones that are frustrating us. 

Well, the special envoy I wouldn’t say so much frustrating as so 

much of one of the things that we are considering. I brought up 

this issue not only with our own Ambassador when he was heading 

out the door, but it is something that the Africa Bureau and my 

bureau have discussed as something, a tool that perhaps down the 

road we could explore. 

Like other donors, we are frustrated at times by the seeming 

lack of progress in the efforts to bring peace to the people of northern Uganda. I think there are a number of levers that we are using 

right now, some of the additional humanitarian assistance we have 

seen in effect, the slight reduction in the night commuters, and the 

additional security around the IDP camps is something that I believe in the future will bear fruit and will help out the situation 

there. 

So in terms of the U.N. special envoy, we are certainly examining 

proposals, but we haven’t come to a final decision on that, a final 

conclusion, but I will work with you and keep you abreast as they 

develop. 

The second issue that you just raised, I am sorry, the special 

envoy and then? 

Mr. SMITH. It was per Michelle Brown, the idea of a panel of experts to look into sources of funding. 

Mr. KRILLA. Yes. I think that is—I, myself, have been very discouraged by the lack of a clear path as to where the LRA is getting 

their support. Up until last year, up until the comprehensive peace 

agreement was signed in Sudan, there was a very clear connection 

between the government and Sudan and the support for the LRA, 

not only serving as a safe haven for LRA troops within the southern enclaves of the government’s safe areas there, but also providing direct financial and military assistance. 

Now, after the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement, 

the safe havens were no longer offered, and we have not seen, although it is difficult to judge directly where things are coming 

from, we have not seen a great deal of continuing support. We 

haven’t seen support from the Sudanese Government to the LRA. 

28

The one thing I will say is we believe that with the levels of support pre-January of last year being so significant, the arms caches 

that existed are ones that they can rely on for years to come, which 

is a very unfortunate situation, and certainly something that we 

are continuing to monitor. 

Mr. ROGERS. In terms of the number of reception centers, frankly, I am not sure we have a good count on the number of centers. 

There is sort of a degree of formality to these things. As I said, we 

estimate that 40 percent of the people come through the formal 

centers. I will try and get you the number of how many of those 

formal centers there are for the record. 

Obviously, as you suggest, there are various degrees of trauma 

suffered by these children, and some of them are rehabilitated fairly simply. I think, to be frank, many of the most traumatized, and 

I have seen kids in Lira and Gulu who were severely traumatized; 

I think it is going to take a long time, if ever, before they get over 

this sort of thing. 

But having said that, it is amazing to see the capacity of the 

Acholi people to forgive, and part of the process of helping these 

kids over the trauma is to go through ritual Acholi cleansing procedures that allow them to see themselves as returning to their society as a worthwhile member, and once they are welcome back into 

the community, the community helps with the healing process. 

So I think we are reasonably encouraged that these centers actually do serve the children well. I think, as I said in the testimony, 

I think there is capacity for us to do more. We would like to support more centers. We would like to come up with a more robust 

program for attracting the LRA fighters to come out, and so we are 

continuing to try and find opportunities to do that. But I think the 

centers are very worthwhile institutions doing a good job. 

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Krilla, did you want to touch on the ICC 

end of the human rights training? 

Mr. KRILLA. I did. If you don’t mind me skipping, going to the 

human rights training first——

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Mr. KRILLA [continuing]. Because it is something I feel very passionately about. 

Certainly in my bureau, the Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights and Labor, we are very supportive of the idea of any sort 

of professional military training coming, hand-in-hand, coming in 

conjunction with human rights training as well. We found this to 

be effective throughout the world as U.S. Government seeks to engage in professionalize militaries and certainly this program which 

is called the IMET Program, the International Military Education 

and Training Program, which we provided approximately $250,000 

per year for training of the UPDF includes a large component of 

civil/military relations, military justice, professional military education, and human rights, which we consider fundamental in the 

training of the soldiers there. 

In terms of the effect, I mean, we have seen this program being 

very effective throughout the world, and in Uganda, even just in 

the year or so that this has been up and running, we have been 

very pleased with the training with the fact that the UPDF is itself 

29

a much more professional force, and the trainers that we have used 

there have been very pleased with the results. 

But that is something, too, I would like to keep you informed of 

as we see greater benchmarks for that training. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could, for the record, elaborate on what that 

training actually entails, and who it is that we train. Is it the colonels, the sergeants, the upper echelon, the officer corps? That 

would be very helpful for the record. 

Mr. ROGERS. Between the two of us, we will get you that information. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that very much. 

Mr. KRILLA. Well, I would say the training itself is counter-insurgency oriented command and staff training, so it tends to target 

the higher echelon officers. It is generally non-lethal communications and ground mobility assistance. It is not so much tactics and 

infantry training as it is communication, command and communications, especially the human rights training that I spoke to earlier, but it tends to directly impact the leadership as they carry out 

their orders with this ground force. 

Mr. SMITH. Does the human rights training also include a package on human trafficking and sexual exploitation? 

Mr. KRILLA. Yes, that is part of the training as well. And if you 

would like, even if we can’t cover it in its more comprehensive 

manner right now, I can get you some more written information——

Mr. SMITH. I would appreciate that, yes. 

Mr. KRILLA [continuing]. In response to your question, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Ambassador Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. I didn’t see the light on. 

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I was just reading this story 

of a young women Acholi, and is she here? 

Mr. SMITH. The fourth from the left there. 

Ms. WATSON. Okay. 

Mr. SMITH. She will be testifying. 

Ms. WATSON. Oh, she will be testifying, so I am going to hold my 

questions until she is able to come up and testify. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Dr. Boozman. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 

having this hearing, you and Mr. Payne. I have got to run in a little bit. The House Democratization Committee has a group of Macedonia here, and they are coming by my office. 

But I have actually had the opportunity to go to Uganda and see 

firsthand what is being talked about. I went to Senator Inhofe, and 

Senator Inslee, and we were able to go to the north and visit with 

some of the children that were being repatriated, you know, going 

through the process, and hearing the stories and visiting with 

these young girls that had borne children at a very early age, and 

then there was the process of trying to go back to a village that 

because of cultural norms and things it was very difficult to do 

many times. 

Then I also got to visit with some of the people that were a member of the rebel group that had come back, you know, and been repatriated that way. So I guess my message to you is I will do anyVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042606\27231.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
30

thing you ask me to do. We just need some direction as to how to 

solve the problem. 

You know, we are blessed. We live in a wonderful country and 

our great nation, and have tremendous resources, and I guess it is 

difficult for us to really understand how, you know, the whole 

world. When I visit with my colleagues in the EU and this and 

that, and being on the International Relations Committee, we are 

with these folks, but it is difficult. The whole world condemns this 

and yet we allow it to go on. You all have done a tremendous job 

in being involved because the reality is a lot of people, though they 

condemn it, they don’t really care, or we wouldn’t allow it to continue. 

So I appreciate you being here, and certainly we look to you for 

guidance as to how to rectify this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Dr. Boozman. 

Ms. McCollum. 

Mr. KRILLA. I just wanted to make one comment there. 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Mr. KRILLA. I think it is critical for hearings like this to be conducted. I think it is great that this issue was raised. I think bringing the spotlight on northern Uganda at this time is so important, 

and similarly I would say, Congressman, that your trips out to the 

region are very helpful. I know that you have been out to the region, and Congressman Smith, I know, Congresswoman McCollum 

has been out there as well. 

I think anything that you can do to raise the attention of Americans to these crisis, I mean, we see this kind of situation, we react, 

and we want to try and solve the problems, and I think it is important for us as diplomats and for our aid organizations to be able 

to see the support back at home, and I think the more the Americans know about this the more they will feel similar to the comments you made, sir. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Ms. McCollum. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I had the opportunity, as it was pointed out, to be in the Gulu 

area just this year, and it was wonderful in many regards to meet 

the people in the community working with our NGOs. I was with 

CARE for awhile, working to make these young children feel that 

they can come home. Military men that we spoke to that were from 

the Uganda military, talking about how difficult it is in situations 

like that. They have been encouraging the children to approach 

them, but at the same times sometimes when these young children 

are approaching them, sometimes they are friends, sometimes they 

are foe, and the heartbreaking stories that everyone had to tell, but 

at the same time the determination to turn these children’s lives 

around and to bring peace and stability to the region, and from the 

archbishop to the human rights activists, Betty that I met, it was 

phenomenal. 

But I recently had an opportunity, in fact, just this week, in talking to a parliamentarian, former parliamentarian from Uganda, 

Norbert Mau, who is now the governor of an encompassed area in 

Gulu, and he was talking to me about needing help with the people 

31

coming from the IDP camps, and, you know, there is not only the 

security issue, but there is getting people with ongoing support and 

help as they reintegrate into another part of their community. 

What kind of plans do we have in either working with our NGOs 

or with government-to-government or government-to-local government in that region to not only offer the security so that the return 

home can happen, but also to continue the journey to be successful, 

because counseling just doesn’t take place in 6 months and everything is going good because you are going to hit those bumps along 

the way? So what are our long-term plans over the next—and by 

long term, I don’t mean a generation—what are our long-term 

plans beyond just the first couple of months where we are interacting with the children who have escaped? 

Mr. ROGERS. I will try and take a crack at that one. 

Our field mission has worked with the government, and we have 

developed a long-range plan in anticipation that there is going to 

be the opportunity for more IDPs to return to their homes, and we 

have already seen—I think I just saw a report of 100,000 down in 

the Teso region had begun to repatriate to their homes. 

You are absolutely right that security is going to be a problem. 

We want to be sure that people are not forced out of the IDP camps 

in a situation where they don’t feel secure and are forced to go into 

an insecure area. So we are working with the government to establish volunteerism as a principal part of the return policy. 

Then we have begun to develop some packages of assistance, food 

assistance to help people get back, farming implements, that sort 

of thing. It will allow people to get back and started with their livelihoods. 

It is fortunate for the people from that region that it is a very 

productive area. You must remember how beautiful, I don’t know 

whether you were there in the rainy season or not, but it is a very 

beautiful area of Africa, and very productive agriculturally. 

So it is our expectation that the economy can actually revive fairly quickly once the security situation will permit people to get back 

to agriculture. But we have begun doing some extensive planning 

ourselves and extensive planning with the government on how that 

is going to work. 

The government is developing, and we expect a more detailed 

plan to be published shortly on how they intend to assist the transition in the north. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chair, if I may. Were you referring to the 

government because I have served in local government, state government, no national government? What governmental organizations are we working with? 

Of course, we have to work with the national Government of 

Uganda. But are you able to break that down in working with regions? 

Mr. Chair, if I might, Norbert Mau is now called Chairman Mall, 

but he is a really good Chairman Mau. [Laughter.] 

Of northern Uganda. Are you going to be working with people at 

that level, at Chairman Mau’s level? He was telling me his constituents, he is about five times the size larger than I am, so it is 

a fairly good subset. Or do you just work with the national government and hope that things get moved down? 

32

When we are doing bilateral government-to-government, we can 

follow up on the NGOs, but how are we following up on the government to make sure it is really getting to Gulu? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, we have been doing most of our planning up 

to now with the national government, but the AID mission is planning on refocusing to the north, and we have considered the possibility of actually stationing people in the north once security permits. So we do expect to be moving into work with the local governments in the north once the security situation permits. 

So far most of our work has been done at the national level. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an important hearing to keep follow up on it, so thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. McCollum. Thank you for your contribution as well and for going there. 

Let me just ask one final question with regards to the NGO registration amendment bill that you referenced, Secretary Krilla. 

You called it troubling. One, has it been signed by the President 

because you indicated it passed the parliament, but I am not clear 

if it was actually signed? And what do you think the genesis of this 

is? Is it all about control, or is there anything that legitimatize its 

enactment? How can we exert the maximum pressure since friends 

don’t let friends commit human rights abuses. It seems to me the 

NGOs are really on the front line of providing the necessary help 

and assistance to people who might otherwise die, be sick, or be abducted. 

Putting security forces people on NGO boards could have a severe chilling effect. It could make the LRA as evil as it is less willing to allow some people to get assistance or even target aid workers. I mean, this bill seems to have trouble written all over it. If 

you could speak to it perhaps. 

On the question of the ICC again, do we have a position as a 

country? Not on the ICC itself, but on the indictment of Joseph 

Kony? 

Mr. KRILLA. Sure. Let me talk about the ICC issue first and then 

the NGO bill because this is very important as well. 

The Kony indictment, you know, this is another example of sort 

of peace versus justice. What are we looking for here? The LRA, 

one of the reasons it is so difficult target the LRA is because so 

many of the members of the LRA, of the actual foot soldiers are 

victims. These are the child soldiers who have been abducted into 

serving the LRA leadership, the ones who really need to be bought 

to justice, and what is in effect a human shield around these perpetrators. So it is very difficult to carry out the war and it is very 

difficult to get at those five without having other victims included 

in whatever effort you are trying to make. 

So I think the ICC’s effort was a way to try and target those five 

individuals that are most responsible for the atrocities. Certainly 

the challenge, as we have seen in other countries, is when an indictment comes through it makes them less willing to come forward. However, as we have seen in terms of the LRA, there hasn’t 

been a whole lot of direction or policy. It is difficult to even know 

what they stand for. 

33

I think it is about power, it is about control, and that is why it 

has been so difficult to negotiate with them as well because it is 

not clear what they want out of this whole thing. 

So I would say the ICC effort has been part of the Ugandan Government’s effort to bring a solution. I think they were very keen 

on getting these indictments of these five individuals, and I think 

we should support them in trying to bring them to justice through 

the levers that we have already explained, and it does definitely 

complicate things, but at the same time I don’t think that if they 

hadn’t come down, I don’t think these individuals would have come 

forward anyway. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chair? 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. That point, when we met with the bishop and 

with Betty up there, they were kind of inclined to think that the 

indictments were counterproductive, because it also kind of trickled 

over into the layers of if these people are wanted by the international court system, then some of the victims, the child soldiers 

and that, then they become kind of tainted and branded with this, 

and they were wondering why we didn’t hold off on it because we 

didn’t have anybody in hand to take to court anyway. 

So I don’t know how much input the citizens of northern Uganda 

who have been most impacted by the LRA had in any say with 

what was happening in the capital. Did you hear any of that? 

Mr. KRILLA. I would suspect that you are correct. This was the 

decision that was more of a top down decision in Uganda. The one 

thing that I will say toward that ends is the Ugandan Government’s efforts are sort of two-pronged right now. One is providing 

amnesty to LRA members who disarm and demobilize willingly 

while at the same time conducting the war, and talking about 

going with the five leaders through the ICC and going at the five 

leaders there. 

So the amnesty program is something that is trying to target the 

victims themselves that are members of the LRA, but the Ugandan 

Government felt they are going in this direction, and I don’t think 

that I can necessarily speak for the Ugandan Government on this, 

but as I understand the strategy it was one of trying to provide incentives for the victims within the LRA to be able to leave while 

at the same time targeting them, but I definitely understand your 

point, Ms.McCollum. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just wanted to make 

sure that the voices of the citizens in that area who shared it with 

us as elected officials that they knew that we heard the loud and 

clear. 

Mr. ROGERS. I know Betty quite well, and I agree that her view 

was that this was counterproductive, but I think there are other 

people in the north who feel that the likelihood of the senior-most 

leadership ever coming to peace was very remote as hard as Betty 

has tried for an agreement. So I think that there are others who 

feel that this actually sort of clarifies and divides the lines between 

those who are most culpable and those who can be brought out 

under an amnesty program. 

34

So I think there are some people who think there is still a chance 

that the LRA itself can be divided and actually that seems to be 

the way things might be going, but we will have to see. 

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Krilla, would a bounty of U.S. funding on 

the head of people like Joseph Kony make a difference, you know, 

the rewards for justice? 

Mr. KRILLA. No, I don’t know. I could talk to my bureau. 

Mr. SMITH. Will you take that back and maybe get back to us? 

Mr. KRILLA. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. We have done that for many of these prior individuals in the past. 

Finally, Mr. Rogers, if you could, how much in additional spending do you think is needed this year and into 2007 to adequately 

address the needs of the IDPs? Is there a relatively hard number 

that we can work from? 

Mr. ROGERS. Before I answer that question, or attempt to answer 

it, I do think it is important for us to answer the NGO bill question 

because we couldn’t do our humanitarian assistance in Uganda in 

the north without the NGOs. So we recognize their concern with 

respect to this bill, and we are committed, the Embassy is committed and AID mission in Uganda is committed, to working with 

the government to see if we can resolve any issue satisfactorily and 

try and establish better lines of communication than have apparently been there so far. 

So the NGO bill is a concern, and we expect to be able to deal 

with it. 

With respect to money, we don’t have a firm figure. Obviously 

substantial additional resources would be necessary in order to 

bring these displacement camps up to standards. However, there 

are limitations on what we can do. The fact is that if there weren’t 

a security problem in the north, we would be able to do more than 

we are currently able to do. So there is a balance that has to be 

struck between what we can do under current security circumstances and what additional resources we would like to provide. 

As I said in my testimony, the United States is the largest donor 

and certainly we expect other donors to provide their fair share, 

but the basic point that these displacement camps are substandard 

by all humanitarian standards that are established is absolutely 

accurate, and it would require substantial additional resources to 

bring them up to standards. 

Mr. SMITH. Have you seen or detected in President Museveni’s 

post-election a new willingness to try to resolve the issue of northern Uganda? 

Mr. ROGERS. We have seen the government effect in a number 

of its own publications, they did an excellent IDP policy. We think 

that what is necessary is to work more effectively with the government. They themselves have committed to providing more resources to the north, so it is a question of the government following 

through on what it said it wants to do. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate it. Could you provide us the government’s Uganda’s IDP policy paper. 

Mr. ROGERS. Absolutely. 

35

Mr. SMITH. And we will make it a part of the record, without objection and it will be helpful in our contacts as well with the government. 

[The information referred to follows:]


27231a0001.eps
36


27231a0002.eps
37


27231a0003.eps
38


27231a0004.eps
39


27231a0005.eps
40

Mr. SMITH. I thank you so much, I thank you both for your excellent testimony and your service on behalf of those who are so disadvantaged. 

Mr. KRILLA. Thank you, Your Honor. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to now welcome our second panel to our 

witness table, beginning with Ms. Grace Akallo. Ms. Akallo was 

born in northern Uganda. In October 1996 the rebel group known 

as the Lord’s Resistance Army attacked her school, St. Mary’s College in northern Uganda. For 7 months, Ms. Akallo was held in 

captivity by the LRA, serving as a child soldier, and given as a 

‘‘wife’’ to a senior LRA commander. 

After she escaped from the LRA, Grace completed her education. 

During the past few years, she has traveled the world sharing her 

story on the plight of child soldiers, including sharing her story on 

the Oprah Winfrey Show in 2004. 

We will then hear from Dr. Ronald Waldman, who is Professor 

of Clinical, Population and Family Health and Professor of Clinical 

Epidemiology at the Mailman School of Public Health of Columbia 

University, and founding director of its program on forced migration and health. 

Dr. Waldman began his career with the World Health Organization’s Global Smallpox Eradication Program in Bangladesh. In addition, he has served as the WHO’s emergency response team leader in Acheh, Indonesia, following the tsunami of December 2004, 

and has written about health care policy in Afghanistan and the 

Democratic Republic of Congo. 

We will then hear from Ms. Michelle Brown who joined Refugees 

International in 2000, and currently represents the organization at 

the United Nations. 

Previously Ms. Brown worked for 3 years as an English teacher 

in Japan. She also worked in South Asia with various women’s 

health organizations and with a women’s microenterprise organizations in Cambodia. 

Grace, if you could begin with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MS. GRACE GRALL AKALLO, FORMER 

ABDUCTED CHILD SOLDIER FOR THE LRA, WORLD VISION 

Ms. AKALLO. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 

submit my testimony for the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, it will be part of the record. 

Ms. AKALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to 

speak on behalf of the endangered children of northern Uganda. 

I am speaking on behalf of World Vision, a Christian relief and 

development organization that provides on-the-ground assistance to 

children and families in need, regardless of who they are. 

For the past 55 years, World Vision has been serving children 

and families throughout the world. In Uganda, World Vision has 

been serving since 1986 with a broad range of assistance including 

meeting emergency needs; offering direct HIV/AIDS care and prevention education; and leading long-term poverty alleviation efforts 

in the areas of agriculture, economic development, and water and 

sanitation; care for orphans and vulnerable children, and more. 

41

In northern Uganda, where I was born and raised, for over 10 

years, World Vision has been working to serve through a broad 

range of intervention, but in particular, they have had a very important ministry to young people like myself. For the past 11 years, 

World Vision staff have counseled, rehabilitated, and reconciled 

more than 15,000 formerly abducted children with their families 

and communities. 

Since 1986, a rebel group called the Lord’s Resistance Army, or 

the LRA, led by Joseph Kony, has waged war against the current 

Ugandan Government, and against us, the children of northern 

Uganda. Kony has abducted more than 30,000 children, forcing 

them to serve as soldiers and forced concubines within their ranks. 

I was once one of those children. But by God’s grace I am alive 

and with you today. 

In October 1996, the Lord’s Resistance Army, LRA, attacked St. 

Mary’s college, Aboke, a girls’ boarding school in Aboke Town, in 

Apac District in northern Uganda. They abducted 139 girls—including myself. I was 15 years old at the time. 

One of the nuns who ran the school, Sister Rachelle Fassera, followed the rebels into the bush, pleading for our release. The rebels 

released 109 of my classmates, but the LRA refused to let me go. 

I was forced to stay, along with 29 others. 

I was forcibly marched into southern Sudan. We walked for 4 

days and 4 nights. There the LRA had bases that were run and 

protected by forces allied with the Sudanese Government in Khartoum. 

I, and the other girls captured with me were trained to assemble 

and disassemble, and clean and use guns. We were used as slave 

labor by the Lord’s Resistance Army and Sudanese Government 

soldiers. We were forcibly given to senior LRA commanders as socalled ‘‘wives.’’

For 7 months, I was held in captivity by the LRA, always looking 

for an opportunity to escape. I constantly prayed that God would 

allow me to see my family once more before I died. I desperately 

wanted to finish my education. But hope seemed distant. I saw two 

other children who had tried to unsuccessfully escape. They were 

brutally murdered in front of me as a warning. 

One night, we were forced to raid a village, and I was directed 

to help steal food and water. I fainted from thirst. I woke up hours 

later, buried aline in a shallow grave. The Ugandan soldiers, along 

with the SPLA, Sudan People’s Liberation Army, attacked the base 

of the Lord’s Resistance Army, allowing me a chance to escape. 

I walked for 3 days, living on soil and leaves before I found another group of children who had also escaped. I persuaded eight of 

them to join me, and we eventually found a group of villagers who 

took care of us, before helping us to connect with the Ugandan 

army to return home. 

I escaped alive from the Lord’s Resistance Army, but five of my 

classmates died in captivity. The others gradually managed to escape over the past 10 years; some are infected by HIV/AIDS; many 

of them have children by the commanders who abused them. Ten 

years later, two of my friends are still held hostage by the LRA. 

So I thank God for allowing me to see my family again. I thank 

him for allowing me to continue on with my education. I went back 

42

to St. Mary’s, Aboke, to finish high school, and then I began studying at Uganda Christian University in southern Uganda near the 

capital city, Kampala. 

I have since transferred to Gordon College in Boston, where I am 

now working on my undergraduate degree in communications. 

When I finish my education, I would like to work for 1 year, and 

then continue on to graduate school to study international relations 

and conflict resolution. I want to be part of the people struggling 

day and night to try to bring peace in the world. 

Thousands of children walk each night by themselves to town as 

far as 10 miles away. Unfortunately, my story is not uncommon. 

In fact, it has become so common that abduction is now a fear 

which daily defines the lives of children who live in the war-affected areas. Because there is no protection for children in northern 

Uganda, they have to create their own way to cope with abduction. 

Thousands of children walk each evening by themselves to town as 

far as 10 miles away to find safety from the LRA. They sleep on 

the streets of town centers and makeshift camps. These children 

are now know as ‘‘night commuters.’’

Recently, there has been a decline in the number of attacks by 

the LRA, so the number of night commuters has been reduced. But 

just as the LRA kidnapped me in the middle of the night, they usually abduct children under the cover of darkness. Because of this, 

most children in northern Uganda are now afraid to sleep in their 

own beds at night. 

This war continues because the world ignores our plight. But this 

war can stop if leaders in the international community take real 

action to end this crisis. By action, I specifically mean three things: 

One, high-level engagement by the U.S. Government. Members of 

Congress, the Administration, and international leaders must use 

their political influence to pressure the Government of Sudan to 

stop support for the Lord’s Resistance Army. The United States 

must also use high-level influence to pressure the Government of 

Uganda to end the war. 

Remember, more than 80 percent of the Lord’s Resistance Army 

is comprised of abducted children, people like myself who were stolen in the middle of the night. 

Two, U.S. leadership in mobilizing the international community 

to put global pressure on combatants to protect children and to end 

the conflict. 

Three, provide more resources to help people suffering because of 

this conflict. Although the number of rebel attacks has decreased 

in some areas, many of my family and friends are still living in 

squalid displacement camps. Those who remain in IDP camps continue to need significant humanitarian assistance. In some areas, 

people have begun to return to their villages, but continued protection and security against the LRA who are still at-large is critical. 

It will also be important for the Government of Uganda and the 

international community to provide returnees with adequate resettlement assistance and support in restoring and developing community infrastructure so that people can begin to rebuild their lives. 

We also need support for more psycho-social programs that help 

all children living in northern Uganda, because all children in the 

region have been traumatized by this war: Whether they have been 

43

abducted, or watched their brothers or sisters or classmates being 

abducted, or they are a night commuter, and live in fear of abduction. 

If these things are done, I believe the war will end. It can end 

tomorrow if the world comes together to do these things. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask for your help and the help of others to take 

action to end this war so that my sisters and brothers and all the 

children of northern Uganda can sleep in peace. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Akallo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. GRACE GRALL AKALLO, FORMER ABDUCTED CHILD

SOLDIER FOR THE LRA, WORLD VISION

INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to speak on behalf 

of the endangered children of northern Uganda. 

I am speaking on behalf of World Vision, a Christian relief and development organization that provides on-the-ground assistance to children and families in need, regardless of who they are. For the past 55 years, World Vision has been serving children and families throughout the world. In Uganda, WV has been serving since 

1986 with a broad range of assistance including meeting emergency needs; offering 

direct HIV/AIDS care and prevention education; and leading long-term poverty alleviation efforts in the areas of agriculture, economic development; water and sanitation; care for Orphans and Vulnerable children, and more. 

In northern Uganda, where I was born and raised, for over 10 years World Vision 

has been working to serve through a broad range of interventions, but in particular, 

they have had a very important ministry to young people like myself. For the past 

11 years World Vision staff has counseled, rehabilitated and reconciled more than 

15,000 formerly abducted child soldiers, with their families and communities. 

Since 1986, a rebel group called the Lord’s Resistance Army, or ‘‘LRA’’, led by Joseph Kony, has waged war against the current Ugandan government, and against 

us, the children of northern Uganda. Kony has abducted more than 30,000 children, 

forcing them to serve as soldiers and ‘‘forced concubines’’ within their ranks. 

I was once one of those children. But by God’s grace I am alive and with you 

today. 

MY STORY

In October 1996, the LRA attacked St. Mary’s College, a girls’ boarding school in 

Aboke Town, in the Apac District, in northern Uganda. They abducted 139 girls—

including myself. I was 15 years old at the time. 

One of the nuns who ran the school, Sister Rachelle Fassera, followed the rebels 

into the bush, pleading for our release. The rebels released 109 of my classmates, 

but the LRA refused to let me go. I was forced to stay, along with 29 others. 

I was forcibly marched into southern Sudan. We walked 4 days and 4 nights. 

There, the LRA had bases that were run and protected by forces allied with the Sudanese government in Khartoum. 

I, and the other girls captured with me were trained to assemble and disassemble, 

clean and use guns. We were used as slave labor by the LRA and Sudanese government soldiers. We were forcibly given to senior LRA commanders as so-called 

‘‘wives’’. 

For seven months, I was held in captivity by the LRA, always looking for an opportunity to escape. I constantly prayed that God would allow me to see my family 

once more before I died. I desperately wanted to finish my education. But hope 

seemed distant. I saw two other children who had tried, unsuccessfully, to escape. 

They were brutally murdered in front of me as a warning. 

One night, we were forced to raid a village, and I was directed to help steal food 

and water. I fainted from thirst. I woke up hours later, buried alive in a shallow 

grave. The Ugandan soldiers, along with the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation 

Army) attacked the base of the LRA, allowing me a chance to escape. 

I walked for three days, living on soil and leaves before I found another group 

of children who had also escaped. I persuaded eight of them to join me, and we 

eventually found a group of villagers who took care of us, before helping us connect 

with the Ugandan army to return home. 

44

I escaped, alive from the LRA, but five of my classmates died in captivity. The 

others gradually managed to escape over the past ten years; some are infected with 

HIV/AIDS; many of them have children by the commanders who abused them. Ten 

years later, two of my friends are still held hostage by the LRA. 

So I thank God for allowing me to see my family again. I thank Him for allowing 

me to continue on with my education. I went back to St. Mary’s to finish high 

school, and then I began studying at Uganda Christian University, in southern 

Uganda near the capital city, Kampala. I have since transferred to Gordon College 

in Boston, where I am now working on my undergraduate degree in Communications. When I finish my education I would like to work for one year, and then continue on to graduate school to study International Relations and Conflict Resolution. 

I want to be part of the people struggling day and night to try to bring peace in 

the world. 

NIGHT COMMUTERS

Unfortunately, my story is not uncommon. In fact, it has become so common that 

abduction is now a fear which daily defines the lives of children who live in the waraffected areas. Because there is no protection for children in northern Uganda, they 

have created their own way to cope. Thousands of children walk each evening, by 

themselves, to towns, as far as 10 miles away, to find safety from the LRA. They 

sleep on the streets of town centers and in makeshift camps. These children are now 

known as ‘‘night commuters’’. Recently, there has been a decline in the number of 

attacks by the LRA, so the number of night commuters has been reduced. But just 

as the LRA kidnapped me in the middle of the night, they usually abduct children 

under the cover of darkness. Because of this, most children in northern Uganda are 

now afraid to sleep in their own beds at night. 

ENDING THE WAR

This war continues because the world ignores our plight. But this war can stop 

if leaders in the international community take real action to end this crisis. By action, I specifically mean three things:

1. High-level Engagement by the US Government. Members of Congress, the Administration, and international leaders must use their political influence to 

pressure the Government of Sudan to stop supporting the LRA. The US must 

also use high-level influence to pressure the Ugandan government to end the 

war. 

Remember, more than eighty (80%) of the LRA is comprised of abducted 

children—young people, like myself, who were stolen in the middle of the 

night.

2. US leadership in mobilizing the international community, to put global pressure on combatants to protect children and to end the conflict.

3. Provide more resources to help people suffering because of this conflict. Although the number of rebel attacks has decreased in some areas, many of 

my family and friends are still living in squalid displacement camps. Those 

who remain in the IDPs camps continue to need significant humanitarian assistance. In some areas, people have begun to return to their villages, but 

continued protection and security against the LRA who are still at-large is 

critical. It will also be important for the Government of Uganda and the 

international community to provide returnees with adequate resettlement assistance and support in restoring and developing community infrastructure, 

so that people can begin to rebuild their lives. 

We also need support for more psycho-social programs that help all children 

living in northern Uganda, because all children in the region have been traumatized by this war: whether they have been abducted; or watched their 

brother, or sister, or classmate being abducted; or they are a ‘‘night commuter’’ and live in fear of abduction.

If these things are done, I believe the war will end. It can end tomorrow if the 

world comes together to do these things. Mr. Chairman, I ask for your help and the 

help of others to take action to end this war, so that my sisters and brothers and 

all the children of northern Uganda can sleep in peace. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Akallo, thank you very much for that very passionate and sobering statement, and it truly is a testament that 

you could be so remarkably poised and strong. It has been a few 

45

years, and I am sure you have worked through an enormous 

amount of trauma, and when we do get to questions, I would like 

to just ask you how some of the others might have fared, especially 

as they were coming out of this——

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes? 

Ms. WATSON. If you don’t mind, could I raise a few questions 

with her. 

Mr. SMITH. Before we go to the others? 

Ms. WATSON. Yes, before we hear the others. 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Ms. WATSON. I have a hearing right next door that they are expecting me in. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Go ahead. 

Ms. WATSON. I want to thank the Chairman for his sensitivity 

to these humanitarian issues. I have noticed that in other areas 

too, so thank you so much for this hearing today. 

Ms. Akallo, I was reading your story, and all the time I was 

reading I was thinking how does a human being at any age, any 

sex, endure, and live to tell about it. What I am very concerned is 

about the traumatization that the children go through, and the fact 

that it went on for months and maybe even years, and some are 

still enduring. 

I raise this with USAID all the time about the need for intense 

psychological, emotional treatment, and so I would like to hear 

from you the extent to which you think we need to get involved 

with treatment. Can we reclaim the lives of those young people? Do 

you feel they will ever be normal again? You have learned to use 

a gun to kill, and I am wondering how we can really impact on 

that. 

I thought maybe, since you have gone on with your education, 

you probably have insights that can help us as we try to help you 

and others like you. 

Ms. AKALLO. Thank you. These children are normal. These children need love. These children need peace. These children need 

concrete future. Just a matter of counseling a child for only 6 

months doesn’t help. I am going back home, I am going back to a 

community who does not accept me. I am going back to a community where there is no food. 

Ms. WATSON. What is your age now? 

Ms. AKALLO. I am 26. 

Ms. WATSON. Twenty-six. 

Ms. AKALLO. I am going back to a community that is terrible, 

like I am used to now getting food from the people forcibly, but I 

am going home, I don’t have food. Now, how do I get no more? 

Again, I need a concrete future. And how I cope with my trauma 

was because the people who showed me love, the people showed me 

that I still have a future because these children feel like they don’t 

have a future anymore. When they come back, their future is destroyed. Their mother is killed, their father is killed, their parents—everything is not there, and they feel they have no future. 

So how do we get them to know that they have a future? I think 

through education and giving them skills to live because without 

that I think I wouldn’t be here now. 

46

Ms. WATSON. Are there guardians, are there adults that have 

taken them in? 

Ms. AKALLO. There are adults who have taken them in, but remember this war has been there for 20 years, and for 20 years the 

adults who are taking them are traumatized already too, and they 

live in the camps, and they don’t have food. Not many people who 

have comfortable places to take these children, it is always the people, the poor people, who are forced in the camps are the ones who 

take these children. But how do they take care of them? 

Ms. WATSON. Without the resources. 

Ms. AKALLO. Yes. 

Ms. WATSON. Would you suggest that we strengthen and broaden 

our programs? I know that you were dealing with an international 

organization, and I am just wondering if they could supply the resources, the training of other people like you to go out and help the 

children recapture their lives. 

Ms. AKALLO. I think that will be very, very important, but the 

most important thing is education. That actually makes the children go through their trauma well because they know they have 

something in the future. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you very much. You are a miracle, and we 

wish you well in your future. We hope it is really concrete, and we 

would like to hear from you again. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Ambassador. 

Dr. Waldman. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Waldman. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD WALDMAN, M.D., PROFESSOR OF 

CLINICAL, POPULATION AND FAMILY HEALTH, MAILMAN 

SCHOOL OF POLICY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Dr. WALDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the 

Subcommittee. I would like to thank you for holding these important hearings, and I would like to take this opportunity to summarize written testimony that I would like to submit for the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, Doctor, your full statement will be 

made a part of the record. 

Dr. WALDMAN. I hope you excuse me. I may be not as strong as 

Ms. Akallo, but I am rather shaken by her testimony as I am sure 

we all are. I don’t think I have been given the most preferred spot 

on the agenda today, but I have spent my career trying to capture 

the experiences of refugees and internally displaced people and others affected by conflict, trying to capture those kinds of experiences 

that Ms. Akallo has related to us, and to apply them to larger populations. The way we do that is by trying to tell their stories with 

numbers. 

I would like to particularly address today a mortality survey that 

was conducted by consultants to the World Health Organization in 

conjunction with the Ministry of Health of Uganda. This survey 

used internationally accepted methods and was conducted among 

internally displaced persons in four separate areas of northern 

Uganda in July 2005. 

47

The areas that were covered by the survey were Gulu Municipality, Gulu District, Kitgum District and Pader District. In all, 

3,830 households were surveyed. 

The results of the survey showed that both crude mortality rates, 

meaning deaths in the general population over a given period of 

time, and childhood mortality rates, those deaths that occurred in 

children less than 5 years old over a given period of time, were substantially elevated. The time period covered by the survey was 

from January through the beginning of July 2005, so about 1 year 

ago. 

The mortality rates for the entire region from which the sample 

was drawn were 1.54 deaths per 10,000 population per day, about 

50 percent higher than what has come to be accepted as the emergency threshold of one death per 10,000 per day. For children less 

than five, the mortality rate was about 3.2 deaths per 10,000 per 

day, well above the established emergency threshold of two deaths 

per 10,000 per day. 

The threshold itself to which these rates are being compared represents already a two-to-three-fold increase over what the United 

Nations Statistics Division and others would expect. So we are 

talking about here about mortality rates approximately five to six 

times higher than what they might be under normal circumstances 

in a developing country such as Uganda. 

The authors of the study used baseline levels, as I mentioned, of 

0.46 deaths per 10,000 per day for the general population, and a 

little bit more than one death per day for under five. This is important because of something I will come back to in a minute. 

When extrapolated from the sample that was interviewed to the 

entire population of 1.2 million internally displaced people in the 

four areas, the authors were able to calculate a total of between 

22,000 and 30,000 excess deaths. By excess deaths, I mean deaths 

above the number that would have occurred if those baseline rates 

that I have given had applied. 

So 22,000 to 30,000 in the entire population, and 8,000 to 12,000 

excess deaths in the childhood population of those less than 5 years 

old. If we apply those numbers to the time period covered by the 

survey, it just means about 900 excess deaths per week in the population of 1.2 million displaced were occurring. 

The survey didn’t restrict itself to measuring mortality, it also 

tried to look at what the most important causes of death were, and 

this is going to be a difficult thing to do because we are asking 

laypeople to report on diseases that are the causes of death of their 

relatives, members of their household. 

But what is most important to note is that among children and 

in the general population most deaths are not due to violence. Instead, they are due to common diseases such as malaria, pneumonia and diarrhea, and in all surveys that we have done in conflict areas, with the exception of those done during the Kosovo crisis, this is usually the case. Deaths due to violence are usually relatively small in terms of the direct contribution that they make to 

mortality. 

Most deaths occur because insecurity denies people access to 

health services. Other results from the survey paint this picture 

more clearly. Very few children had vaccination cards, meaning 

48

that either people were not able to access vaccination services on 

a routine basis, or that routine vaccination services were not available. 

Similarly, a relatively low proportion of children were sleeping 

under an impregnated bed net, although malaria was the leading 

cause of death of children in the area. 

In addition, contributing to the situation was that only 10 to 20 

percent of the population were able to collect even the minimum 

recommended amount of water, which according to standards that 

have been established within the relief community is only 15 liters 

or about four gallons per person per day. 

Epidemiologists I have been working with returned from northern Uganda last week, and in their preliminary report they sum up 

the situation now as it existed at the time of the WHO Ministry 

of Health Mortality Survey. They said the availability of health 

services is fragmented and unevenly distributed across districts 

and rural town areas. Much of the population in the conflict-affected areas is crowded into some 200 congested IDP, internally 

displaced person camps, with appalling water and sanitation conditions and poor basic health service. 

Access to conflict-affected areas is limited and armed escorts are 

required in order to reach displaced populations in some areas. As 

a result, service deliver is erratic, with frequent closings of peripheral health units, the exclusive use of mobile clinics in some areas 

and a total lack of service provision in others. 

The reason I focus on this survey is that for reasons that are not 

entirely clear to me the results of the survey have become quite 

controversial. The Ministry of Health has apparently withdrawn its 

initial acceptance of the survey, and the results have been disputed 

by government officials in several fora, including at the U.N. Security Council in New York and in the New Visions newspaper in 

Uganda as recently as last week, in the April 21 edition. 

The New Visions article says that it was really a report on the 

website of the non-governmental organization OXFAM entitled 

‘‘Counting the Cost’’ that upset the Ugandan Government the most. 

That report uses the survey that I have reported on as the basis 

for unfavorably comparing the situation to northern Uganda to that 

in Iraq. 

It must be said that surveys such as the one I am discussing 

here have many limitations because of the lack of accurate population data, which are necessary in order to draw a good sample, 

and because of the difficulties in the field of going house to house 

to collect the information in highly insecure areas, such as northern Uganda. 

In addition, collecting accurate information depends on the way 

the questions are formulated, the way in which they are asked, the 

way that they are understood, and the ability of those being interviewed to recall experiences that they have had and to report them 

to the interviewers in an accurate way. These conditions are true 

for every survey of this kind no matter where or under what circumstances they are conducted. 

In the report, the WHO investigators are very careful to spell out 

these limitations and to explain how they address them during the 

course of the survey. In my opinion, they do an excellent job of this, 

49

and my reading of the full report leaves me to believe that nothing 

occurred during the design, implementation, data entry or analysis 

phases of the survey that would falsify the results as they are reported. 

Yet the Ministry of Health now claims that the study was not 

done according to the proposed methodology. In particular, there 

are claims that people who were not at home at the time of the survey were replaced haphazardly by visitors or by children. This is 

not the case. 

In addition, the questionnaire was written in English and not 

translated into the Acholi language. This is common practice in 

Uganda because of the many sub-dialects that exist. The interviewers like to reserve the right to adapt the questions to the most 

commonly spoken local language. 

Thirdly, the Ministry of Health Technical Review Committee felt 

that the recall of people interviewed was faulty, and they said, 

‘‘They don’t remember major events that took place in their lives.’’ 

So I would like to point out that if people had in fact recalled more 

deaths, then of course the mortality rates found by the survey 

would have been higher than those reported. 

Fourthly, they argue that those interviewed thought that they 

might be compensated monetarily for deaths that occurred, leading 

to overreporting, but the investigators take pains to point out that 

they carefully explained to those included in the survey that this 

was not the case. 

Finally, the government has objected to the baseline rate used as 

the baseline for the calculation of excess deaths but they confuse 

it with the threshold levels for establishing an existence of an 

emergency—1 death per 10,000 per day—so their objections on this 

score are unfounded. 

So in summary then, it seems clear that between January and 

July 2005, the period covered by the survey, both crude mortality 

and under five mortality rates were substantially elevated among 

the 1.2 million internally displaced in the four areas surveyed. 

I want to say again that these numbers are really a very dispassionate description, an impersonal attempt to describe the situation as it exists. The stories told by people like Ms. Akallo and so 

many other anecdotal reports that I have heard really give a much 

more emotional description of the overall situation, but it is important also to have some way to be able to paint the entire picture, 

the background, the setting on which these events are being played 

out, and the only way we really have to do that accurately is 

through these epidemiologic studies. It is important for all of us 

who do that to make sure that these surveys are conducted in the 

most accurate and most reliable manner. 

I am here to provide my testimony to the fact that I believe that 

this particular survey, with its limitations, is among the very best 

that have been conducted under similar circumstances. 

The most important intervention by far to reduce mortality 

would be to put an end to the conflict that has been continuing in 

the area for more than 20 years. While direct violence was a cause 

of only about 11 percent of deaths in the overall population and a 

negligible cause among children, the threat of violence contributes 

to the overall insecurity of the region, and that threat is primarily 

50

1 I had been consulted on the design and implementation aspects of the survey prior to the 

survey having been conducted, but on not on data issues nor on any interpretation of the results. 

responsible for a major disruption of health services. Until peace is 

restored, the data that I have reported on tell us that humanitarian assistance offered by either the government health services 

or by the many national and international NGOs present in the 

area must be increased so that all internally displaced persons can 

avail themselves of appropriate primary health care interventions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Waldman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RONALD WALDMAN, M.D., PROFESSOR OF CLINICAL, POPU- LATION AND FAMILY HEALTH, MAILMAN SCHOOL OF POLICY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Although it is relatively easy to know when an international emergency is occurring—one can listen to people who are on the spot, or sometimes one just has to 

watch the news, it is quite difficult to be able to gauge just how bad a situation 

is. One stark question which can give at least a partial answer is: how many people 

are dying? For this reason, it has become increasingly common for public health authorities to try to describe the magnitude of a health emergency by determining the 

mortality rates in a population over a given period of time. Few places where emergencies occur have civil registration systems: no birth certificates, no death certificates, no social security records, etc. To overcome these problems, epidemiologists 

use mortality surveys—interviews with households—to determine how many deaths 

have occurred. The number of deaths in a population is compared to the number 

of deaths that are expected to have occurred during the same period, and the result 

is reported as ‘‘excess deaths’’. 

In developing countries, according to the United Nations Statistics Division, about 

0.3–0.5 deaths occur each day for every 10,000 people. In the mid-late 1980’s, in the 

wake of a series of public health emergencies that had resulted in very high mortality in Cambodia/Thailand, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan, epidemiologists at the 

Center for Disease Control and Prevention devised a simple rule of thumb: when 

mortality was doubled or trebled and reached a rate of more than 1 death per 

10,000 population per day, a situation should be considered an emergency, and 

international assistance should be provided. 

Determining mortality rates is both a skill and an art. Samples have to be carefully selected so that rates calculated from those interviewed are truly representative of the population to which they are being attributed. Questionnaires need to 

be carefully devised so that both questions and answers are clearly understood by 

interviewers and respondents. Data need to be carefully recorded and analyzed, because misclassifying information can give very skewed results. Designing, conducting, analyzing, interpreting, and reporting the results of these surveys is difficult and every step should be carefully discussed and considered. 

It is important for those reading and using the results of population-based mortality surveys to consider the circumstances in which they are conducted. Gathering 

representative data from insecure, conflict-affected areas is tricky business. If one 

goes only to the ‘safer’ areas, mortality rates (and other important information) will 

clearly be under-estimated. If surveyors go to all areas, but hurriedly, rushing to 

complete an interview in the minimum time possible, they will get the data they 

want, but questions regarding it their validity would be legitimate. On the other 

hand, a properly conducted mortality survey takes investigators to every part of the 

area surveyed, gives them a chance to look around and to collect ancillary information, and allows them to paint, in their report, a more nuanced picture than that 

which can be told only through the numbers. 

In my estimation,1 the Health and Mortality Survey among Internally Displaced 

Persons in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts, Northern Uganda, conducted by the 

World Health Organization with the participation of UNICEF, World Food Program, 

United Nations Population Fund and the International Rescue Committee in July 

2005 is an example of an excellent survey and an excellent report. 

POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS PRESENTED BY INVESTIGATORS

Every survey has its limitations. In the report of this mortality survey, the authors clearly delineate the problems that they encountered and explained how the 

attempted to deal with them. 

51

First, in any survey that is not a complete census of the population, there are potential ‘‘sampling errors’’; that is, it is possible that that the individuals who are 

included in the survey will not be representative of the entire population from which 

they are drawn. The sampling method used for this survey, two-stage cluster sampling, is well recognized and commonly used in mortality surveys—it is not perfect, 

but it is, at this time, the state of the art. 

Nevertheless, in this method, clusters are assigned proportional to the size of the 

population. In other words, larger IDP camps are more likely to have more clusters 

sampled within them than are smaller IDP camps. This obviously presupposes that 

one knows the size of the camps. In N. Uganda, the authors had difficulty establishing exact populations for each camp, and it is possible that the cluster assignment process was somewhat inaccurate. They did, however, use all available information to establish their best estimates of camp populations, and they used information that became available after the survey to validate their results. 

In one of the four surveys (Gulu district), almost one-third of the households selected to be interviewed had to be replaced because no one was home at the time 

of the survey (even after one re-visit)—they were frequently working in their fields. 

It is hard to know what effect this might have had on the results of the survey, 

but it is possible that their absence reflected a relatively better security situation 

which could, in turn, explain the lower (but not low) mortality rates found in this 

area. On the other hand, it is possible that people had to work because they were 

poorer, a characteristic associated with higher mortality. 

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, all surveys that involve interviews are 

susceptible to ‘‘non-sampling bias’’, potential errors that are usually more important. 

Did the respondents understand the questions? Were there incentives for them to 

answer in one way rather than in another? Did the interviewers understand the answers correctly? Did they record them accurately? 

In this survey, the questionnaire was in English, not in the local language. The 

interviewers apparently insisted on working from English, over the objections of the 

principal investigators, because of the many dialects of the Acholi language in which 

they were working. All interviewers were, however, supervised by native Acholi 

speakers. Other surveys conducted in the northern Uganda have also used English 

questionnaires and relied upon the interviewers to translate into the appropriate 

dialects. 

Camp administrators were ‘‘almost never warned in advance’’ of the day on which 

the interviews were held. There was no opportunity for them to bias the answers 

of household included in the sample, should they have wanted to do so. In addition, 

interviewees were told clearly that there would be no compensation for reporting 

deaths. There is no other obvious reason to suspect that there was any over-reporting of mortality. Finally, a recent rebuttal of the survey results published in the 

New Vision newspaper in Uganda a few days ago, on Aril 21, 2006, objected on the 

basis that ‘‘the respondents had to recall how many household members died in the 

last six months. That is difficult for people who are illiterate and traumatised. Many 

people in the camps have little notion of time. They don’t remember major events 

that took place in their lives.’’ The investigators used a method that was aimed at 

eliciting the fullest possible recounting of events for the period of recall (January–

June 2005). Should people have forgotten about deaths that had occurred, then they 

would not have been included in the survey and the reported mortality rates lower, 

not higher, than the actual rates. 

As with the design and conduct of the survey, data entry was carefully controlled 

using double entry techniques and ‘‘range checking’’ and data analysis was done 

using appropriate computer programs. 

In summary, it is unlikely that any important sampling or non-sampling error 

could have significantly influenced the results in one direction or another. 

OTHER POSSIBLE ERRORS

In November 2005, the Director-General of Health Services of the Ministry of 

Health appointed a Technical Review Committee (TRC) composed of representatives 

of the Ministry of Health, the Institute of Public Health, UNICEF, and the World 

Health Organization. For the most part, their objections of this Committee to the 

survey report (which had initially carried the imprimaturs of the Ministry of Health, 

the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the World Food Programme, the United 

Nations Population Fund, and the International Rescue Committee) are either similar to those discussed by the authors of the report (and outlined above) or of limited 

validity. They emphasize, for example, the high initial non-response rate in Gulu 

district, but claim that replacement interviews were conducted on the basis of convenience, that they were done with visitors and children, and that the investigators 

52

were ‘‘driven by the desire just to complete the study on time’’. This does not appear 

to have been the case. 

The TRC suggests that the baseline crude mortality rate of 0.46/10,000/day that 

was used as the basis for calculations of ‘‘excess’’ mortality was too low and that 

a figure of 1/10,000/day should have been used, thereby lowering significantly the 

number of ‘‘excess’’ deaths. This objection was echoed recently in a speech by a representative of the Foreign Minister to the UN Security Council. The figure used by 

the investigators is the appropriate one and the objection is based on a misunderstanding of the difference between a ‘‘baseline rate’’ and the ‘‘emergency threshold’’ 

discussed above—the threshold level already represents a significant increase of 

mortality above the baseline, not the baseline level itself. 

There are objections to the language used in the interpretation of the results, including comparisons, or lack of them, made to the situation in Darfur. These have 

no bearing on the sampling methods, on the conduct of the survey, or on the presentation of the results, only on their interpretation. Conservatively put, the mortality 

rates found in the survey represent a significant increase over appropriately-used 

baseline rates for both crude mortality and under-five year mortality, and they are 

considerably above the levels commonly used as thresholds for defining a ‘‘public 

health emergency’’. The results are only valid for the population from which the 

sample used in the survey was drawn (the internally displaced in the three districts 

and one municipality) and only for the time period in question—January–July 2005. 

RESULTS

The principal results of the survey, the mortality rates, are presented below, with 

mortality rates expressed as deaths per 10,000 population per day:

Area Crude mortality rates 95% confidence interval 

Gulu District 1.22 1.00—1.44

Gulu Municipality 1.29 1.04—1.53

Kitgum District 1.91 1.45—2.37

Pader District 1.86 1.53—2.19

Acholi Region total 1.54 1.38—1.71

Area Under-5 year mortality rates 95% confidence interval 

Gulu District 2.31 1.76—2.86

Gulu Municipality 2.49 1.79—3.18

Kitgum District 4.04 3.17—4.91

Pader District 4.24 3.40—5.08

Acholi Region total 3.18 2.18—3.56

These mortality rates are high, exceeding the ‘‘emergency threshold’’ in every 

case. The overall regional crude mortality rate of 1.5 per 10,000 per day represents, 

in essence, a near-quadrupling of the baseline mortality rate for Uganda. 

Experience in humanitarian emergencies over the past 25 years in all parts of the 

world has taught that mortality rates in children less than five years old tend to 

be between 2–3 times higher than those in the general population. Accordingly, the 

emergency threshold for children has been informally set at 2 deaths per 10,000 

children under five years, per day. In Northern Uganda, this threshold is surpassed 

in each of the four areas surveyed, although in Gulu District and Gulu Municipality, 

the 95% confidence intervals extend below the threshold. Still, even these lower 

bounds of the confidence intervals are considerably higher than the baseline under5 mortality rates (1.14 per 10,000 per day). And in Kitgum and Pader Districts, 

under-five mortality was exceedingly high. 

During the six-month period under study, mortality was fairly constant (approximately equal numbers of deaths were reported to have occurred during each month, 

except for January, when reported deaths were lower). 

In addition to mortality, the investigators also inquired about causes of death. 

Most conflict-related deaths in a general population have been found to be ‘‘indirect’’ 

consequences of the conflict itself—that is, they are not deaths due to violence, but 

53

rather increases in usual causes of death—in developing countries, these are usually 

from relatively common communicable diseases. These increases come about because 

the insecure environment lowers access to health services—clinics are understaffed 

and/or under-supplied and not maintained, the population is afraid to travel to the 

nearest health facility, etc. In Northern Uganda, this is exactly what was found—

the leading cause of death in the surveys was malaria, which accounted for nearly 

one-half of children’s deaths and one-quarter of overall deaths in the survey. Other 

important causes of death were pneumonia, diarrhea, and a local entity known as 

‘‘two-langu’’ of which the clinical description includes diarrhea as a prominent symptom. Violence accounted for 11% of overall mortality, but less than 1% of mortality 

in children under 5 years old. 

CONCLUSION

The mortality survey conducted in northern Uganda in July 2005 was technically 

sound and the results should be accepted. The limitations expressed by the authors 

of the survey report should be taken into consideration, but there are no objections 

raised by either the authors or by subsequent reviewers that are likely to have resulted in serious errors to the crude mortality rates or children’s mortality rates reported. 

The sample was drawn from a population of 1.2 million internally displaced living 

in four areas of northern Uganda. On the basis of an average daily crude mortality 

rate of 1.54 per ten thousand per day and an average child mortality rate of 3.18 

per 10,000 per day, and their accompanying confidence intervals, one can calculate 

that between 22–30,000 excess deaths occurred in the displaced population during 

the first seven months of 2005, of which between 8–12,000 were deaths of children. 

Deaths rates this high, in a population this large, over an extended period of time, 

represent a true humanitarian emergency and call for major intervention—if national or local authorities are unable, or unwilling, to respond effectively in an emergency of this magnitude, intervention by the international community is usually indicated.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Waldman, thank you very much for that testimony. 

Ms. Brown. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MICHELLE BROWN, U.N. ADVOCATE, 

REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL 

Ms. BROWN. I would like to thank Representative Christopher 

Smith for calling this very important hearing on the crisis in northern Uganda, and for inviting me to speak on behalf of Refugees 

International. 

Please accept my written testimony for the congressional record. 

I will now give a brief summary. 

Refugees International is an independent humanitarian advocacy 

organization that does not accept any funding from any government or the United Nations. We have been a strong advocate for 

the Ugandan people displaced by this war for the past 4 years, and 

I have traveled to northern Uganda on four occasions during this 

period, most recently in February 2006. Refugees International also 

traveled to southern Sudan in March 2006, to assess a threat posed 

by the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

The response by the international community and the Government of Uganda to the crisis has clearly failed as evidence by Dr. 

Waldman’s explanation about the mortality study. As he said, 

there are up to 2 million internally displacement people living in 

camps without access to the most basic services, and as a result almost a thousand people are dying each week. 

I have seen many camps during the past 5 years with Refugees 

International and those in Uganda, if not the worst, are among the 

worst I have seen. 

54

As one of Uganda’s larger donors and as a permanent member 

of the United Nations Security Council, the United States has a 

critical role to play in protecting Ugandan citizens from further violence. The Government of Uganda has stated that their military 

has defeated the LRA. Although attacks on civilians have declined 

in the past 9 months, the LRA is still active in northern Uganda, 

and the conflict is now in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of 

Congo. 

Now, the LRA has abducted innocent children and turned them 

into fighters or sex slaves. They continue to mutilate, kill, and terrorize civilians. Since March 1, 2006, the LRA has killed eight people and has abducted 66. The Government of Uganda has the primary responsibility to assist and protect its displaced citizens, and 

it has clearly failed. 

More than 200 camps in northern Uganda are absolutely horrific. 

People do not have any access to adequate health care, water, sanitation, education, or protection, and as Grace mentioned, education 

is a particular concern. 

On my last trip to northern Uganda, I visited schools where one 

teacher would be teaching 150 students, and 150 was a low average. The average approach is up to 400 students. 

Refugees International recognizes the challenges that the government faces in providing these services, but Uganda is not a failed 

state. Indeed, both the Clinton and Bush Administrations have 

touted it as an African success story. 

Given the dependence of the displaced on international humanitarian assistance, recent government threats to expel outspoken 

NGOs are of grave concern. In recent months, the government has 

focused a great deal of attention on returning people home from the 

displaced persons’ camps. For people living in the most war-affected districts of northern Uganda, security has not improved sufficiently to allow returns. We are concerned that the Government 

of Uganda will encourage people to return despite ongoing violence. 

We urge the government to respect the principle of voluntary returns. 

The government has also failed to develop coherent plans to disarm and reintegrate former LRA combatants. Former fighters return to the squalid camps without a way to earn a living, and face 

difficulty in reintegrating, as Grace so poignantly described earlier. 

The government should invest more resources in the Amnesty 

Commission as well as reintegration and reconciliation programs as 

a way to encourage LRA fighters to escape. 

The government has announced that it will strengthen its humanitarian and protection response through an emergency action 

plan, and by establishing a Joint Monitoring Committee. 

Refugees International welcomes this initiative, but we remain 

deeply concerned about the actual implementation of the agreements. As Mr. Rogers mentioned earlier, in 2004, the government 

passed an IDP policy. The policy on paper is quite strong, yet it remains to be implemented. In my subsequent trips to northern 

Uganda after the passage of the IDP policy, I saw no evidence of 

any change in the government’s response on the ground. 

The United States must hold Uganda accountable for fulfilling 

its responsibilities by ensuring that it meets measurable and timeVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:15 Jul 25, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042606\27231.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
55

bound benchmarks. The Joint Monitoring Committee is not a substitute for Security Council engagement either. 

The government’s response to the crisis in the north has emphasized defeating the LRA through military means without parallel 

investments in basic services. This miliary strategy is in effect. The 

Ugandan miliary has been unable to defeat the LRA over the past 

20 years. It is Refugees International’s assessment that the northern Uganda must be settled through mediation. This is no easy 

task but the war in Uganda will continue of the root causes of the 

conflict are not addressed. 

While the LRA is a main perpetrator of human rights violations 

against civilians, the Ugandan security force also commits abuses. 

On my trip in February, the displaced reported some improvements 

in the conduct of the Ugandan army, but abuses such as rape, intimidation, torture and exploitation were still widespread. As there 

is no police presence in most camps, the displaced people have little 

opportunity to report abuses. 

Ultimately the government must strengthen the rule of law in 

northern Uganda, hold human rights violators accountable, and 

protect displaced people. 

The LRA now poses a significant threat to regional peace and security and could undermine fledgling peace agreements in Sudan 

and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The LRA was responsible 

for the deaths of eight peacekeepers in the DRC in January. It is 

rumored that LRA leaders, Joseph Kony and Vincent Otii are in 

the DRC now and using Garamba Park as a rear base to launch 

attacks in Sudan. Despite the presence of the Ugandan military in 

southern Sudan for the past 4 years, the LRA remains strong and 

is an increasing threat against Sudanese civilians. 

Refugees International traveled to southern Sudan in March 

2006, and found that LRA attacks on civilians in the south were 

impeding humanitarian access, disrupting the return of Sudanese 

displaced people, and causing new refugee outflows from previously 

peaceful areas. The United States Peacekeeping Mission in southern Sudan, or UNMIS, does not have the mandate or the resources 

to intervene proactively to protect civilians from the LRA. UNMIS 

cannot be expected to do this unless troop levels, logistics, and 

equipment are dramatically increased. 

We are concerned that disgruntled former fighters from the 

Sudan People’s Liberation Army, or SPLA, are joining ranks with 

the LRA. Also, formerly abducted children who had escaped the 

LRA in January told me that they believe members of the Government of Sudan are still providing support to the LRA. They described new guns with Arabic inscriptions and Arab escorts for Joseph Kony. 

On Refugees International’s most recent assessment to Sudan, 

humanitarian agencies on the ground perceived the elements within the Government of Sudan were still adding support to the LRA. 

The U.N. Security Council has started to see the LRA as a regional threat. We urge the United States to lead the Security 

Council on a regional response to the LRA, and we urge the Secretary General to issue his report according to Resolution 1653 in 

a timely manner on how the U.N. can address the LRA threat. 

56

The U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan must have a more robust mandate and sufficient resources to intervene more 

proactively to protect civilians from the LRA, disarm LRA fighters 

and capture indicted commanders. Eighty percent of the LRA fighters are abducted children, so the strategy against the LRA must 

focus on protecting them. 

The Government of Uganda is reluctant for the Security Council 

to become engaged on the situation inside northern Uganda, and 

supports Security Council action only outside of Uganda. The Secretary General and Security Council will have to cooperate with 

the Government of Uganda to pursue political and humanitarian 

objectives inside northern Uganda as well, and we would appreciate the United States’ leadership in the Security Council on this. 

The United States has neglected the severity of the displacement 

problem. The United States Agency for International Development 

should commit increased resources and attention to northern Uganda. Furthermore, the United States has failed to press the Government of Uganda to establish a multi-faceted response that focuses 

on effective humanitarian response, protection and reconciliation. 

The United States considers Uganda a valuable ally in the war 

on terror, and has provided substantial support to President 

Museveni in this context. U.S. Government support continues despite the failure of the government’s response in northern Uganda. 

With the LRA threatening instability far beyond the borders of 

northern Uganda, this approach is no longer tenable as United 

States interests in peace and stability especially in southern Sudan 

are now at risk. 

The United States must increase its engagement on northern 

Uganda. As the Chair mentioned, we have several recommendations on this, and I will just reiterate them because we believe they 

are very important. 

Politically and diplomatically the United States should, first, 

stress the importance to the Government of Uganda of reaching a 

political settlement this conflict, and provide high-level support to 

the effort. The United States should hold the Government of Uganda accountable under the Joint Monitoring Committee. 

Secondly, the U.S. should request the Secretary General to appoint a high-level U.N. regional envoy who can facilitate political 

initiatives to deal with the conflict. 

Thirdly, the U.S. should support the appointment of a U.N. panel 

of experts to investigate sources of support for the LRA. 

Lastly, the United States should support the strengthening of the 

U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in Sudan and Congo to ensure that 

they have the resources to protect civilians from the LRA. The U.S. 

should also share intelligence with the U.N. to promote effective civilian protection. 

To improve the lives of civilians in northern Uganda, the U.S. 

should, first, allocate the necessary resources to USAID, to increase 

support to displaced persons and to continue to fund NGOs and the 

U.N. to provide humanitarian assistance. 

Secondly, the U.S. should support comprehensive disarmament, 

demobilization, and reintegration programs that emphasize community-based initiatives. It is our assessment that everyone in the 

57

IDP camps is vulnerable and any assistance to formerly abducted 

people should include assistance to communities as well. 

Lastly, the U.S. Government should support peace building and 

reconciliation programs at the local, regional and national levels to 

stem the cycle of violence. 

Mr. Chair, these recommendations provide the United States 

Government with a number of opportunities to bring peace to a 

troubled region and save thousands of lives. It is morally and politically imperative that we take these steps. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Brown follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. MICHELLE BROWN, U.N. ADVOCATE, REFUGEES

INTERNATIONAL

NORTHERN UGANDA: URGENT MEASURES NEEDED TO ADDRESS THE LRA THREAT TO

REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

I would like to thank Representative Christopher Smith for calling this hearing 

today on the crisis in northern Uganda, demonstrating the concern of the House 

International Relations Committee Sub-Committee on Africa, Global Human Rights, 

and International Operations about the brutal 20 year conflict that has displaced 

up to two million people. Refugees International is an independent humanitarian 

advocacy organization that does not accept funding from governments or the United 

Nations. Refugees International has been a strong advocate for the Ugandan people 

displaced by this war for over four years, and I have traveled to northern Uganda 

on four separate occasions during this period. I visited northern Uganda most recently in February 2006, and my comments are based on my experiences in February. Refugees International also had a team in southern Sudan in March 2006 

assessing the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army—or LRA—in southern 

Sudan. 

The response by the international community and the Government of Uganda to 

the crisis in northern Uganda continues to fail. Up to two million people in northern 

Uganda are living in camps for internally displaced persons without access to basic 

services and without protection, and as a result almost 1,000 people are dying a 

week. As one of Uganda’s larger donors and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the United States has an important role to play in protecting Ugandan civilians and ensuring that their basic needs are met. 

Despite the Government of Uganda’s statements that the Ugandan military has 

defeated the LRA, the LRA is still very much active in northern Uganda. The LRA 

commits acts of extreme violence against the civilian population—abducting children 

and turning them into fighters or sex slaves, mutilating and killing civilians, and 

terrorizing them to such a degree that people are afraid to leave the squalid camps 

and return to their homes. Although the number of attacks on civilians in northern 

Uganda has decreased in the past nine months as have direct attacks on internally 

displaced persons camps, the LRA remains a significant threat outside the camps. 

Since March 1, the LRA has killed eight people and has abducted 66. On Refugees 

International’s assessment mission to Uganda in February 2006, attacks on civilians 

and abductions had recently occurred in the immediate vicinity of each of the eight 

camps that we visited. 

In response to this violence, the International Criminal Court has issued arrest 

warrants for the top five commanders in the LRA, which has complicated mediation 

efforts. LRA violence has taken on an increasingly regional dimension, threatening 

stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo and southern Sudan. Despite the presence of the Ugandan military in southern Sudan through an agreement with the 

Government of Sudan since 2002, the LRA remains strong and is an increasing 

threat to Sudanese civilians, a threat that the Ugandan military has been unable 

to mitigate in the past four years. Refugees International condemns the LRA and 

its violent actions towards civilians. We have seen first-hand how the LRA has brutalized and terrorized the population in northern Uganda, condemning up to two 

million people to poverty and squalor in IDP camps. 

In recent months, the Government has focused on people able to leave camps and 

return to their homes. Returns should be encouraged in areas where security permits, but for people living in the Acholi region of northern Uganda, the area most 

impacted by LRA violence, security has not improved to the degree necessary to encourage returns. In my interviews with people in camps in northern Uganda, most 

explained that they will return only when the war ends. We are concerned that the 

58

Government of Uganda will try to demonstrate improvement in the security situation in northern Uganda by encouraging people to return to their homes prematurely. We urge the Government of Uganda to respect the principle of voluntary 

returns. 

The Government of Uganda has the primary responsibility to assist and protect 

internally displaced persons in northern Uganda, and it has clearly failed in fulfilling its responsibility. Over the course of my visits to northern Uganda, I have 

seen no indication that the government has taken significant concrete steps to improve living conditions in camps. The response from the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations has also been weak, although in the past two years, the 

UN has increased its presence and programs and NGOs have strengthened their response. But despite some small improvements, I have seen no significant positive 

changes in the past four years in the living conditions for internally displaced persons, particularly in Kitgum and Pader districts. 

The living conditions in the more than 200 internally displaced persons camps in 

northern Uganda are horrific. The camps are overcrowded and people do not have 

access to adequate health care, water, sanitation, education, livelihoods and protection. According to international standards, camp residents need a minimum of 15 

liters of water per day to meet their basic needs for drinking, cooking, and hygiene. 

Most of the displaced receive half that. On my recent trip to northern Uganda, I 

witnessed many classrooms where one teacher was attempting to teach over 100 

students. I visited with sick people in the camps who were unable to access appropriate health care, including reproductive health care and HIV/AIDS treatment; estimated HIV/AIDs rates in northern Uganda are higher than the national average. 

I spoke to men and women with no way to earn a living, and displaced people whose 

rights had been abused with no access to justice. 

Rather than focusing on improving living conditions in camps, the Government’s 

response to the crisis in the north has emphasized defeating the LRA through military means. This strategy has proven to be ineffective, and the Ugandan military 

has been unable to defeat the LRA over the past 20 years. It is Refugees International’s assessment that the conflict in northern Uganda must be settled through 

mediation which addresses the root causes of the conflict. Obviously, given the numerous failed attempts, this is no easy task. Neither the Government of Uganda nor 

the LRA seems particularly committed to a negotiated settlement to the conflict, but 

without dealing with the root causes of the conflict and supporting national reconciliation programs, the war will continue. 

The Government of Uganda has used the war in the north to justify consistent 

increases in its military budget but has not provided adequate financial resources 

to northern districts for basic services. When I visited the internally displaced persons camps, government officials responsible for working in the camps were usually 

absent. Teachers and health workers were not showing up for work and district officials were not traveling to the camps to monitor them. For the most part, the UN 

and non-governmental organizations were providing the majority of assistance available in the camps. 

The displaced consistently told us that they believed their government had abandoned them, and many of them believe that there were political motivations behind 

the Government’s weak humanitarian response. Northern Uganda historically has 

not supported the President in elections, and in this past election, voted overwhelmingly for the opposition. Refugees International recognizes the challenges the Government faces in providing services in such a difficult environment, and equally recognizes the brutality and the security threat posed by the LRA. But Uganda is not 

a failed state—indeed both the Clinton and Bush Administrations have touted it as 

an African success story—and could be doing much more. The Government has not 

devoted the necessary human or financial resources to provide an effective response. 

The Government has been widely praised for passing a National Internally Displaced Persons policy in August 2004. This policy clearly outlines the Government’s 

responsibilities for assisting and protecting IDPs in the north. While the policy itself 

is sound, the Government has not actually implemented it and its response to the 

humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda has not remarkably improved since the policy was passed. The central government does not provide its ministries with the financial and human resources to ensure that the policy is implemented, and district 

officials lack the resources and capacity to meet the massive humanitarian needs 

in the north. Given the Government’s lack of response to the crisis in the north and 

the dependence of the displaced on the programs of the UN and NGOs, recent Government threats to expel outspoken NGOs are of grave concern. 

The Government has also failed to develop coherent plans to disarm former LRA 

combatants and reintegrate them into society. Former LRA fighters are returning 

to the camps without a way to earn a living, often having no choice but to join the 

59

Ugandan armed forces. There are few training programs or educational opportunities available to them, and programs that address the trauma that they have experienced are inadequate. Formerly abducted children, particularly girls and women returning with children, face difficulties reintegrating into their communities and rebuilding their lives. The Government should invest more resources in the Amnesty 

Commission, as well as reintegration and reconciliation programs as a way to encourage fighters to escape from the LRA. 

The Government of Uganda has announced that it will strengthen its humanitarian and protection response, as well as develop a comprehensive approach to ending the conflict, by establishing a Joint Monitoring Committee. Through this Committee, the Government hopes to strengthen its cooperation with the UN, key donors and NGOs. Refugees International welcomes the Government of Uganda’s stated intention to strengthen its humanitarian response in northern Uganda and its 

initiative in creating the Joint Monitoring Committee, but we remain deeply concerned about the actual implementation of the agreements. The Government has 

committed to improving its response in nine key areas, including increasing Government expenditures to improve basic services in northern Uganda, improving service 

delivery to reduce mortality rates, and strengthening protection of those displaced 

by the conflict. 

The Core Group of Donors, of which the United States is a member, and other 

members of the Joint Monitoring Committee, must hold the Government accountable for fulfilling its responsibilities by ensuring that the Government meets clear, 

measurable and time-bound benchmarks and by ensuring that living conditions for 

the displaced improve. The Core Group of Donors must ensure that the Joint Monitoring Committee does not follow a similar path as the National IDP Policy. Given 

the regional implications of the conflict, this new Committee cannot be viewed as 

a substitute for Security Council engagement and must be pursued as a parallel 

process. 

Throughout northern Uganda, human rights violations against civilians are widespread. The LRA is the main perpetrator of human rights violations, and they continue to terrorize the displaced, particularly when they travel outside the security 

perimeters surrounding internally displaced persons’ camps to gather firewood and 

water and to access their land. 

Human rights violations are also committed by members of the Ugandan military 

who are there to protect them, as confirmed by the 2006 Department of State 

Human Rights Report which stated, ‘‘UDPF [The Ugandan People’s Defense Forces] 

soldiers reportedly raped women and girls and security forces detained and mistreated suspected LRA collaborators in the camps. Security forces severely restricted 

the freedom of movement of IDPs and imposed nighttime curfews in many camps.’’ 

The Department of State Human Rights Report also includes information on civilians killed by security forces and the ‘‘precarious’’ humanitarian situation in displaced persons camps. 

As I mentioned earlier, the government’s response to the conflict in the north has 

been predominantly a military one, and the large presence of Ugandan military, 

which includes the national army, the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces, and locally 

trained militias, or Local Defense Units, in camps where government civil servants 

are absent has had a detrimental impact on human rights protection. The large 

numbers of often poorly trained local defense units and the proliferation of arms in 

the camps is of grave concern and could have negative consequences in the future. 

Poor humanitarian conditions and a lack of employment opportunities have led to 

sexual exploitation of displaced women and girls and underage recruitment. Displaced persons told Refugees International that Ugandan soldiers, particularly 

members of the mobile units, steal, rape, exploit and kill and victims have almost 

no way to address these violations. There are no police present in most camps, so 

IDPs have little opportunity to report abuses to civilian authorities. 

On my trip in February, however, the displaced reported some improvements in 

the conduct of the Ugandan army. They reported that abuses were still widespread, 

particularly sexual exploitation and sexual violence, but many people we interviewed said they had recently developed more trust in the army to protect them. 

Internally displaced people reported that in recent months more security forces, 

mainly local defense units, were stationed around the perimeter of camps, and that 

there were fewer attacks directly on camps. People in some of the camps explained 

that soldiers escorted them when they travel outside the security perimeter to collect firewood or go to their land. In some camps, a complaints system between the 

army and camp leadership has been established. These are welcome initiatives. Ultimately, the Government must strengthen its incredibly weak police and judicial capacity in northern Uganda, hold human violators accountable, and fulfill its obligation to protect internally displaced people. 

60

While the LRA has decreased its operations in northern Uganda, the conflict has 

now spread to neighboring countries and has taken on a regional dimension. For 

the past six months, the LRA has been present in eastern Democratic Republic of 

Congo and was responsible for the deaths of eight MONUC peacekeepers in January. It is rumored that LRA leaders Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti are in the Democratic Republic of Congo now, and it seems as if the LRA is using Garamba National 

Park as a rear base to launch attacks in Equatoria in Sudan. 

It does not appear that the LRA in eastern D.R. Congo currently poses a significant threat to the civilian population. In Sudan, however, the LRA has sought safe 

haven in the south for over a decade and LRA attacks on civilians in southern 

Sudan have intensified over the past six months. Refugees International traveled 

to southern Sudan in March 2006 and found that LRA attacks on civilians in the 

south were impeding humanitarian access, slowing the ability of Sudanese refugees 

and displaced people to return home, and causing new displacement and refugee 

outflows. The UN peacekeeping mission in southern Sudan, the UN Mission in 

Sudan, does not have the mandate or resources, or, more importantly, the political 

will to intervene proactively to protect civilians from the LRA. Unless troop levels, 

logistics, and equipment are dramatically increased, the UN Mission in Sudan cannot be expected to protect civilians from the LRA. 

There is also concern that disgruntled former fighters from the Sudan People’s 

Liberation Army who, now that the war is over, have not received any help reintegrating into their communities could be joining ranks with the LRA. It is also likely 

that members of the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese Armed Forces are still 

providing support to the LRA. In February, Refugees International interviewed formerly abducted children in northern Uganda who had escaped LRA captivity in January; they believed that members of the Sudanese government were still supporting 

the LRA. They cited new guns with Arabic inscriptions and Joseph Kony being escorted by Arabs as the basis for their assertion. The LRA is a serious threat to regional peace and security and could undermine the peace agreements in Sudan and 

DRC. 

In recent months, the UN Security Council has become more engaged in looking 

at the LRA as a regional threat. We urge the United States to play a leadership 

role in the Security Council on the issue of the LRA in northern Uganda and the 

region. The Security Council passed resolution 1653 in January and Resolution 1663 

in March. Both resolutions request the Secretary General to make recommendations 

to the Security Council on ways the UN can mitigate the LRA threat. Unfortunately, the report has been delayed. 

It is critical that the Security Council maintain its engagement on the LRA threat 

both inside and outside Uganda. Refugees International is hopeful that the Secretary General will recommend that the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan have 

a stronger mandate and sufficient resources to intervene more proactively to protect 

civilians from the LRA, disarm LRA fighters and return them to northern Uganda, 

and capture indicted commanders. Eighty percent of LRA fighters are abducted children, so the strategy against the LRA must focus on capturing them safely and returning them to Uganda. UN peacekeeping forces in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo must protect civilians from further violence. In addition, a high-level 

Special Envoy who regularly reports to the Security Council should facilitate parallel political initiatives that focus on all countries impacted by LRA violence, as 

well as encourage increased regional cooperation and dialogue. There is also a need 

to establish a Panel of Experts to determine the sources of support to the LRA. 

The Government of Uganda has expressed its support for military action against 

the LRA in southern Sudan and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, with the 

support of the UN, the SPLA, and the armed forces of Sudan and the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo. The Government has been reluctant for the Security Council 

to become engaged on northern Uganda and supports Security Council action outside of Uganda. The Security Council must analyze the threat the LRA poses to the 

region, including the threat to Ugandan civilians and the Government’s ability to 

respond to the crisis in northern Uganda. The Secretary General and Security Council will have to convince the Government of Uganda to pursue political and humanitarian objectives inside northern Uganda as well, and provide the necessary support 

to any new initiatives. 

Despite repeated government assertions that the war is over, there is no indication that the Ugandan military has defeated the LRA. Instead, the situation is now 

more serious. The LRA now poses a significant threat to regional peace and security 

and could undermine fledgling peace agreements in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Mediation efforts are stalled, and it is unclear whether the LRA 

or the Government of Uganda are committed to dialogue. There is no end in sight 

61

to this war, and until the war is over, up to two million people in the north are 

condemned to a life of terror and poverty in displaced persons camps. 

The United States has contributed to the current difficult situation by neglecting 

the severity of the displacement problem in the north. Indeed, given the severity 

of the crisis, the U.S. Agency for International Development should commit increased resources and attention to northern Uganda. Furthermore, the U.S. has 

failed to press the Government of Uganda to establish a multi-faceted response to 

the disaster focusing on an effective humanitarian response, protection, and reconciliation. The U.S. has been content to consider Uganda a valuable ally in the war 

on terror, and has provided substantial support to President Museveni and his Government in this context, despite the continuing failure of the Government’s response 

in northern Uganda. With the war and its attendant problems continuing, and the 

LRA threatening instability far beyond the boundaries of northern Uganda, this approach is no longer tenable as important US interests in peace and stability, especially in southern Sudan, are at risk. 

In this context, the US needs to increase substantially its engagement in the 

northern Uganda problem. On the political and diplomatic front, the US should:

• Stress the importance to the Government of Uganda of reaching a political 

settlement to the conflict, and provide high-level support to the effort as needed. The Government of Uganda must be more proactive in its support for a 

mediation process. The US should hold the Government of Uganda accountable for meeting time-bound benchmarks under the Joint Monitoring Committee and significantly strengthening its humanitarian response.

• Support the appointment of a high-level UN envoy on the regional crisis, including on northern Uganda, who reports regularly to the Security Council.

• Support the appointment of a Panel of Experts to investigate the sources of 

support for the LRA.

• Support the strengthening of the UN peacekeeping missions in the Sudan and 

the Congo to ensure that they have the resources to protect civilians from the 

LRA. The US should share intelligence with the UN to promote effective civilian protection.

To improve the lives of civilians in northern Uganda, the US should:

• Demonstrate its commitment to northern Uganda by allocating the necessary 

resources to the U.S. Agency for International Development to enable it to increase support to displaced persons.

• Continue to fund NGOs and the UN to provide humanitarian assistance in 

camps for internally displaced persons.

• Cooperate with the Government to implement comprehensive disarmament, 

demobilization, and reintegration programs that promote dialogue, reconciliation and community-based initiatives.

• Support peacebuilding and reconciliation programs at local, regional and national levels to stem the cycle of violence.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your testimony and work 

as well. 

Let me begin with Ms. Akallo. I would have to agree with Ambassador Watson that you are a miracle and it is a privilege to 

have you before the Subcommittee today. Just a couple of questions 

with regards to your captivity. 

I think it would be very helpful to this Subcommittee if you could 

speak to the issue of what it was like with your fellow abductees, 

the others who had been kidnapped. Were bonds formed? How did 

Kony and his thugs advance perhaps a child soldier who showed 

a propensity or a proclivity to do what the master wanted? Did 

they get moved upwards and then become kind of like part of this 

chain of command? 

The indoctrination, was it done in a way that included drugs? We 

know it included brutality and cruelty and rape. But were drugs, 

like with Charles Taylor, involved at all with the young people? 

As I said before, I do think that you are remarkably poised having been through an ordeal that few of us can even imagine. 

62

How do the others fair? The estimates from the 2005 country reports on human rights practices puts the number at 38,000 child 

abductees. That is a large number of young people whose lives have 

been scarred. I would like to get more information on what we can 

do to help these transition centers. As was reported earlier by Mr. 

Krilla, only 40 percent of the abductees go through those centers. 

How intense are they? Because only one incident can cause PTSD 

in large numbers of people who only 6 months to several years 

afterwards realize what it is they have been through. To be subjected to this brutality day in and day out for weeks, months and 

years is unfathomable, so if you could speak to that issue as well. 

Ms. AKALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Concerning the training, I can call it training that the LRA go 

through with the children, the first thing, you are beaten. The 

beating is to shape you into the enemy. The second thing, you are 

forced to kill someone, and that is another training. The third thing 

is you are given a gun and they don’t train you. Few people are 

trained, few people whom they think they can go ahead and do 

something. Like they would not escape, they feel they cannot escape, are trained. But people like us, like me, I wasn’t trained. I 

was given a gun and I was told, ‘‘Hunger will teach you how to do 

it.’’ I was just told how to dismantle, clean, and assemble a gun, 

that is all. But sure enough, hunger taught me to shoot because 

with all that, you can’t really seek survival. I wanted to survive, 

although at some point almost gave up. 

But other things that you pass through before you get a higher 

position; and then after that you are forced to abduct children. So 

the more you abduct, the more they give you rank. You abduct 

more, and you kill more, and then you get rank. so when you kill 

a commander like Ugandan soldiers commanders, you are given 

more rank. So that is how it went, but first they torture, and then 

they force you to kill. 

And then on the side of the children in northern Uganda, I believe that not only the abducted children are traumatized, even 

those who have not been abducted because they sleep in the centers, and the way we can help them is to stop the war first, because we are tired. We are tired of the war. We are tired of running away. We are tired of seeing the humanitarian groups coming 

to help us and yet we can’t get enough because someone can’t provide for them. It is like we are not in control. It is like we don’t 

know what further holds us. We are depending on people. 

In our culture we are used to providing for ourselves. We are 

used to going to the garden, dig, get food, and eat. We are not used 

to begging, but now we have been reduced to begging, so we need 

the war to be stopped, and these children to be thoroughly counseled and given a concrete future, because otherwise this war is 

still going to continue, because these children are going to say, 

‘‘Where are we going to get a future?’’ We used to get food from 

people, so it is better we go back and do what we were doing before, what we are trained to do. 

A 7-year-old child abducted into captivity grows up there until 

you are 20. What do you think? He knows that—he knows the gun. 

He doesn’t know anything but from the gun. 

63

Mr. SMITH. Do any of the young people ever turn the guns on 

those who beat them, and on Kony’s people? Do any of the young 

people once they are given a gun ever shoot or try to kill those who 

have beaten them? 

Ms. AKALLO. You cannot kill the person who has beaten you because you are already being threatened. Because Kony uses the 

thing of the spirit. They said spirits, and so when you enter, they 

smear you with shea nut oil. I don’t know whether you know that. 

It comes from a tree. So they smear you with that, and they say 

that is protection. 

Then after 2 weeks, they do something, a ritual that will insert 

you into the army. So during that process they will tell you that 

you do something, you dead. You think of escape, you are dead. 

You think of killing anybody, you are dead. We already know your 

thoughts. He says he knows the thoughts of the children. He already knows what they think. 

Mr. SMITH. We do have another vote but I just want to ask you 

a couple of questions, go to my colleagues, and then if your time 

permits, we will reconvene the hearing. 

Dr. Waldman, if I could just ask you regarding whether or not 

there is an increase in suicide. You know, with such highly traumatized people, IDPs as well as the abductees, is there any——

Dr. WALDMAN. I don’t know of any data that would suggest that 

there is, no. 

Mr. SMITH. And let me just finally ask Ms. Brown, are you satisfied with the Bush Administration’s policy on northern Uganda? 

Ms. BROWN. It is our assessment that the Bush Administration 

and the United States Government, because of its close relationship with the government, should be pressuring the Government of 

Uganda to do more to protect civilians, to meet their basic humanitarian needs, and to more practically seek a negotiated settlement 

to the conflict. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Yes, thank you very much. Sorry that I missed your 

testimony. I will be able—I have scanned through it but haven’t 

been able to read it thoroughly. We had a meeting with Deputy 

Secretary Zoellick right at the same time on Darfur. 

I know that you are a refugee advocate, but I wonder if any of 

you have any idea, I gave some points about how I thought the situation could be ended. I wonder what your thoughts might be just 

in a capsule of what you would do if you had the authority. Would 

you have an all-out military tack? Would you try to get the U.N. 

forces in Sudan to be Chapter 7? Would you try to appease the 

LRA and give amnesty to lower-level people and go after Kony? 

Would you have a more robust Ugandan military to try to have intelligence from NATO or United States or someone to weed them 

out? What do you think the best—since for 20 years this has been 

going on, and even though it is a small group, what would you suggest? And any of you could take the question. 

Ms. AKALLO. I think it is mine because I believe that, first of all, 

I disagree with the military thing because it has failed for 20 years. 

I heard that they are training people. One of the witness was talking here that they have trained the military to help stop the war. 

But for 20 years, for goodness sake, where is the army? 

64

Mr. PAYNE. All right, let me ask you that question. Do you think 

that the army has had the will to do that whether the Government 

in Kampala or in Tibie are serious about a military conquest or 

not? Or is it just corruption and—I heard that numbers of military 

that was supposed to be up there, the numbers were inflated because soldiers get paid and therefore the commanders would—you 

know, the phantom people, the invisible soldiers, the money is 

made. Do you think it is the fact that they don’t have the ability 

to do it militarily? 

I am not a military person, but for 20 years, something has got 

to stop and maybe that is why I want to hear what you all think 

of this because——

Ms. AKALLO. I don’t think that they don’t have ability. I believe 

that the Government of Uganda has the ability to stop this war, 

but for some reason, I don’t know why they have not stopped it, 

because Kony doesn’t have the weapons that the Government of 

Uganda has. 

Secondly, like there is no protection for the people in northern 

Uganda. In 2004, February, more than 400 people were killed, although in the newspaper they said it was 200, and then in the memorial ground is put 121, but it was more than 400 people. Imagine the whole camp was burnt and we have the witnesses. I worked 

with them before. And we don’t have protection. I believe that the 

Government of Uganda could have stopped this war, but right now 

it is in the critical condition because so many children, the child 

soldiers, they are forced to go to war. 

And I know that peace talks also has failed for some reason, but 

peace talk, have not been conducted rightly. How can you conduct 

peace talk plus the army fighting? Can that go together? It can’t 

go! 

And the ICC has failed too, because how can you prosecute the 

five people when they are still in the bush? Will they come back 

if they hear that? Have they caught them? No, they are still in the 

bush. If they want, they should first talk peace, real peace, and 

these people come back and prosecution can go on because we need 

justice too, because for us who are afflicted by these people, we 

need justice, but we need them to come back and then they prosecute them. You cannot prosecute someone who is still hiding in 

the jungle. 

Mr. PAYNE. Yes? 

Ms. BROWN. I would agree with what Grace as said as well, and 

it is our assessment that a military solution in northern Uganda 

can’t work. As she mentioned, the war has been going on for 20 

years, and the Government of Uganda increasingly use of its military budget without a parallel increase in humanitarian services or 

basic services. The military budget keeps getting bigger and bigger, 

and more attention is paid to a military solution, and at the end 

of the day the LRA is still active in northern Uganda today. 

We would admit that a negotiated settlement to this conflict is 

incredibly difficult. No one knows what Joseph Kony’s agenda is. 

He is just a very difficult man to pin down. But we would also say 

that the government hasn’t supported mediation proactively 

enough. It seems as if the government is forced into a corner, and 

65

says, okay, we will mediate under pressure, but hasn’t proactively 

come out in support of a peaceful settlement. 

In terms of Chapter 7 to the U.N. Peacekeeping Missions, this 

is difficult because, as we have all said, 80 percent of the LRA 

fighters are children, so we don’t support a military solution on the 

part of the UPDF because, you know, they are just killing kids, but 

UNMIS in southern Sudan has to intervene more proactively to 

protect civilians. I think protection has to be the overriding lens 

through which we see U.N. engagement, especially U.N. military 

engagement. 

So intervene to protect Sudanese civilians, intervene to capture 

and repatriate LRA fighters so they can reintegrate into their communities, and capture the indicted commanders, and in the context 

of this the Ugandan Government has to make reconciliation a priority. Address the root causes of the conflict, discuss with the 

Acholi people why this conflict has gone on for so long, and try to 

address the grievances that they have had for the past 20 years. 

I mean, as you are probably aware, in the last election the northern parts of Uganda voted overwhelmingly for the opposition, so it 

is a clear rejection in the north of Museveni’s military strategy. 

Mr. PAYNE. Dr. Waldman. 

Dr. WALDMAN. I don’t have much to add. I think you asked the 

right questions regarding the will of the Ugandan Government to 

pursue a peaceful solution. I think it is easy once the will is determined to help provide the capacity to be able to provide the necessary services to the population, but in addition, and this has been 

going on for quite a long time, and although the conflict may have 

endured for 20 years, northern Uganda has been a depressed area 

for more than that, and relatively underprivileged area since the 

days of the British colonization period. 

I think it is quite important, as the Chairman intimated earlier, 

to give a much stronger voice to the local population, and I think 

that many of the solutions may lie within. I don’t think that 

enough has been done to date to solicit ideas from the population 

itself. 

Let me add one other thing that hasn’t been mentioned yet, 

which is that I think that information of the kind that I summarized is quite important as well, and since this survey was conducted a year ago, there have really been no attempts to repeat the 

survey or to see exactly in which direction things are progressing. 

We have heard some reports of fewer incidents of attack by the 

LRA, some attempts we have heard to repatriate the population 

without really knowing whether or not the time is ripe for that to 

occur. I would just like to make a pitch for some investment to be 

made in the continuation of collecting objective data of this kind to 

document the humanitarian situation and also to shed more light 

on the political and even the military situations as well. 

Mr. PAYNE. That is me beeping myself. 

But that is great. You know, I don’t think that Uganda is—I 

think when democracy came in and we pushed democracy, you 

know, we didn’t do a good job at talking about how it should work 

in all the parties. I mean, even in our country, rural parts of the 

United States is not well served as urban parts. You may recall 

they had the Tennessee Valley Authority because people in that 

66

area didn’t have lights, they didn’t have telephones. This is, you 

know, 40–50 years ago in the United States. 

So these countries, with the Sierra Leone when the RUF and 

those people had control of the rural area because they only deal 

with Freetown, whether it is Cote d’Ivoire, even Liberia, Monrovia, 

the people in Lawfan County felt no one cares about us out here. 

So I think one of the democracy-building and maybe the institutes like IRI and NDI and all those groups that go in for elections 

could stay there and talk about how do you try to—I know there 

is limited resources, but how do you go out and reach into those 

areas that are not served well as we see in northern Uganda and 

as we have seen in the ruraL parts of most of the countries, that 

the governments basically concentrate on the major urban capital, 

and there is this gruntless in the other areas. 

So I really appreciate, I don’t know how close we are to our bell. 

Well, thank you very much. I will turn back over to the Chair. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Payne. 

I do have some additional questions which I would like to submit 

to you. We have three votes, regrettably on the Floor, in succession 

which could take another 40 minutes or so, so I do regret that we 

cannot continue this dialogue, but I do thank you so much for your 

testimonies, for your good work, and Dr. Waldman, we will follow 

up on your suggestion. It was a good one, and we will get back to 

you as well and let you know what we find out. To all of you, thank 

you so much. 

Ms. Akallo, I will be asking you in a written request if you could 

just speak to the issue, as to how women and young girls who have 

had children, how well or poorly are they accepted back into their 

villages? We will have some additional questions as well, which 

time regrettably does not permit. 

But thank you so much, and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(67)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

68


27231a.eps
69

RESPONSES FROM MR. JEFFREY KRILLA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUES- TIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OPER- ATIONS

Question: 

There are concerns that the local defense units are poorly organized and are themselves guilty of offense against citizens in northern Uganda. What is the administration prepared to do to push the Government of Uganda to conduct more effective oversight of these militias? Is the government negligent in its oversight to this point, or 

do they not have the capacity to do a better job? 

Response: 

We want to see an end to all human rights abuses in northern Uganda, regardless 

of whether they are committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Ugandan 

People’s Defense Forces (UPDF), or the Local Defense Units (LDUs). We documented abuses by the LDUs in the 2005 edition of our Country Reports on Human 

Rights Practices. 

The United States is pressing the Government of Uganda to improve training and 

address impunity for the UPDF and LDUs in order to decrease the number of 

human rights abuses committed by Ugandan security forces in the north. The U.S. 

is helping to increase their capacity by providing funding to train UPDF in the 

areas of civil/military relations, military justice and human rights in an effort to 

curb these human rights abuses. The U.S. continues to urge the Government of 

Uganda to provide effective protection for civilians by adequately deploying UPDF 

troops in the region, particularly to enhance the protection of IDP camps against 

LRA attacks. In addition, the U.S. strongly urges the Government of Uganda to investigate and prosecute all violence against civilians by security forces, and focus 

efforts on providing human rights training along with security training to deployed 

personnel in the region. 

Question: 

The United States has signed onto the protocols banning the forced conscription 

of youth under 18 years, but to what extent have we been able to build a consensus 

among the major signatories to reduce and eliminate the incidence of child soldiers 

globally? 

Response: 

Since the United States signed and ratified the optional protocol banning the use 

of child soldiers, we have strongly encouraged other countries to sign as well. As 

of June 2004, 115 countries had signed the optional protocol and 71 countries had 

ratified it. 

The U.S. has also invested resources in preventing the use of child soldiers, reintegrating former child soldiers back into society, and prosecuting human rights 

violators. For example, in Colombia, the U.S. helped more than 550 former child 

combatants abandon illegal armed groups and integrate into society, and provided 

them with basic education. In Uganda, the U.S. Government has provided $360,000 

to the International Rescue Committee to address nightwalkers, or children in danger of forced conscription by the LRA. In Sierra Leone, the U.S. is the largest contributor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a body that has a mandate from the 

UN Security Council to bring to justice those with ‘‘greatest responsibility’’ for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including the issue of 

child soldiers, committed in the country from 1996 to the war’s end in 2002. 

The international community must remain vigilant in trying to ensure that the 

protocol on child soldiers is respected. In Chad, for example, Sudanese rebels have 

reportedly recruited or abducted children from refugee camps to fight in rebel ranks. 

The U.S. Government is funding additional security for refugee camps, and has expressed its concerns to parties involved in these conflicts. The U.S. is an active 

member of the Working Group of the U.N. Security Council on Children and Armed 

Conflict, created in July 2005, and supports the work of the Special Representative 

of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Ms. Radhika 

Coomaraswamy. She is planning a trip to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where 

the issue of children associated with fighting forces is still a problem. 

Question: 

According to one study, people in northern Uganda believe the government is trying 

to punish them for ethnic atrocities from previous regimes or to prevent a leader from 

70

emerging from that region. How much credibility does the Administration place in 

such speculation? 

Response: 

The underlying factors of the twenty-year conflict between the Lord’s Resistance 

Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda are complex and have varied over time. 

The conflict has its roots in the spirit movement of Alice Lakwena who opposed the 

Obote II regime and took on some new characteristics with the 1986 overthrow of 

then-President Tito Okello, an ethnic Acholi. 

The brutal LRA insurgency has cost the nation of Uganda tens of thousands of 

lives, most of them ethnic Acholi. 

We firmly believe that the Government of Uganda’s efforts to defeat the LRA are 

motivated by a sincere desire to rid Uganda of an irrational and brutal movement 

that has brought about immense suffering to the Ugandan people as a whole. We 

do not believe these efforts are motivated by a desire to punish the Acholi people 

for previous events. 

Question: 

To your knowledge, what kind of pressure is the Administration prepared to use 

with the Government of Uganda to make every effort possible to bring to a conclusion 

this extended conflict? Do you believe the Ugandan government has the capacity to 

bring the war to an end? 

Response: 

The United States places a high priority on resolving the conflict in Uganda. Toward this end, we have focused our efforts on a three-pronged strategy which includes working with the UN and NGOs to bring humanitarian assistance to the people of northern Uganda, urging the Government of Uganda to reach out to the 

Acholi people and support reconciliation efforts, and to put an end to the war itself 

by providing military assistance to help defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 

and build the capacity and professionalism of the UPDP. On the last point, in addition to providing more than $5 million in non-lethal military assistance to combat 

the LRA, we are using political pressure to encourage the Government of Uganda 

to provide police and security forces to protect the Ugandans from the violence they 

face from the LRA. 

The situation in Uganda is grave, and we continue to press for a resolution to the 

crisis. We are working closely with the Governments of Uganda, Sudan, and the 

Democratic Republic of Congo to end the LRA’s extended campaign of violence. We 

hope that the LRA’s decision to participate in peace talks with the Government of 

Uganda brokered by the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) will result in 

progress. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, at the urging of Sudanese Vice 

President Salva Kiir, has decided to send a Ugandan government team to join the 

negotiations beginning July 9. We believe the Ugandan government has the capacity 

to bring the war to an end with this support from the international community.

Æ