ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER 30, 2018 

No. 18-5227 

_______________________________________________ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

_______________________________________________ 

LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

_______________________________________________ 

On Certification of Constitutional Questions from the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia 

_______________________________________________ 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 

_______________________________________________ 

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Acting General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley 

Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

September 10, 2018 

Harry J. Summers 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

Jacob S. Siler 

Attorney 

jsiler@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION 

1050 First Street NE 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 

STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................. 3 

A. FECA’s Limits on Contributions to 

National Party Committees ............................................................. 3 

B. Joseph Shaber’s Gift to the LNC .................................................... 5 

C. The LNC’s Segregated Account Expenses ..................................... 6 

D. District Court Proceedings .............................................................. 9 

STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................... 11 

ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................... 11 

I. THE LNC’S ALLEGED INABILITY TO ACCESS 

SHABER’S CONTRIBUTION IS A WHOLLY 

SELF-INFLICTED INJURY ........................................................ 12 

II. THE LNC’S SEGREGATED ACCOUNT EXPENSES 

IN 2015 AND 2016 COULD HAVE EASILY 

ABSORBED SHABER’S ENTIRE GIFT .................................... 16 

III. THE LNC’S ALLEGED INJURY IN 2015 WAS 

NOT REDRESSABLE IN 2016 OR AFTERWARDS................. 18 

IV. THE LNC’S ALLEGATIONS OF COMPETITIVE INJURY 

SIMILARLY FAIL TO SUPPORT ARTICLE III STANDING .. 20 

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 22

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases 

Albanese v. FEC, 78 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1996) ..................................................... 22

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ........................................................ 1, 21, 22

Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192 

(D.C. Cir. 2011) ............................................................................................ 17

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)...................................................... 1 

Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on 

Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .................................. 11, 12

Fair Emp’t Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 

28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ...................................................................... 16

FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) ................................ 21 

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.(TOC), Inc., 

528 U.S. 167 (2000) ...................................................................................... 20

Holmes v. FEC, 875 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .............................................. 11

In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2010) ............................................................ 11

Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) .................................................................. 19

Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298 (2012) ................. 15

Libertarian Nat’l Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 

930 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D.D.C. 2013) ................................................................ 1

Libertarian Nat’l Comm., Inc. v. FEC, No. 13-5094, 

2014 WL 590973 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 7, 2014) ..................................................... 1 

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................ 12 

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) ................................................... 1, 13, 21

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Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Gonzales, 

468 F.3d 826 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ................................................................ 12, 13

Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ...................... 19

O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) .......................................................... 19

Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991) ................................................................ 20 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) ............................. 19

Sykes v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2004) .............................................. 19

Zimmerman v. City of Austin, 881 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2018) ................. 13, 14, 15

Statutes 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(14) ......................................................................................... 3

52 U.S.C. § 30110 .............................................................................................. 11

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B) ......................................................................... 3, 4, 8

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9) ....................................................................................... 4 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)(A) ................................................................................. 8 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)(B) ....................................................................... 8, 9, 17 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)(C) ................................................................................. 8 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(c) ........................................................................................... 3

Rules 

Circuit Rule 27(g) ................................................................................................ 1

Fed. R. App. P. 27(a) ........................................................................................... 1

Miscellaneous 

Brief of the Political Parties, McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-1727 

(and consolidated cases), 2003 WL 21911213 (U.S. filed July 8, 2003) ....... 15 

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FEC Advisory Op. 2015-05 (Shaber), 2015 WL 4978865 (Aug. 11, 2015) ....... 5

FEC, Types of Political Party Committees, https://www.fec.gov/ 

help-candidates-and-committees/registering-political-party/ 

types-political-party-committees/ .................................................................... 3

Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure 

Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 

82 Fed. Reg. 10904 (Feb. 16, 2017) ............................................................. 3, 4

Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations, 

80 Fed. Reg. 5750-02 (Feb. 3, 2015) ................................................................ 3

 

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GLOSSARY 

Add. Addendum 

FEC Federal Election Commission 

FECA Federal Election Campaign Act 

LNC Libertarian National Committee, Inc. 

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INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a) and Circuit Rule 

27(g), the Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) respectfully 

moves to dismiss this action for lack of Article III standing. 

For more than forty years, the Libertarian Party has sought to have Federal 

Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) limits on amounts it may accept in a calendar 

year declared unconstitutional, but courts have repeatedly rejected those claims. 

See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1976) (per curiam); McConnell v. 

FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 133-89 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens 

United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010). In 2013, a claim by the Libertarian 

National Committee, Inc. (“LNC”) that a contribution limit could not be 

constitutionally applied to bequests from deceased donors was generally rejected, 

with a panel of this Court finding “[t]he merits of the parties’ positions . . . so clear 

as to warrant summary action.” Libertarian Nat’l Comm., Inc. v. FEC, No. 13-

5094, 2014 WL 590973, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 7, 2014) (per curiam). The district 

court in that case also came to the conclusion that application of the limit to a 

bequest with certain atypical characteristics merited consideration under special 

judicial review procedures, Libertarian Nat’l Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 930 F. Supp. 2d 

154, 168-71 (D.D.C. 2013) (“LNC I”), but that part of the matter became moot 

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while pending before this Court. See Order, Libertarian Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, No. 

13-5088 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2014) (en banc) (Doc. No. 1485531). 

Later in 2014, Congress expanded the limit on contributions to national 

party committees, permitting those committees to raise more money to defray 

specific types of expenses, which include spending on presidential nominating 

conventions, national party headquarters, and legal proceedings. The LNC has had 

substantial expenses in those categories — including a mortgage on its recently 

acquired headquarters and the substantial sums it spends on its presidential 

nominating conventions. Because money is fungible, moreover, every dollar of 

contributions the LNC accepts under the new, higher limits increases dollar-fordollar the amount it can accept into its general account, thereby freeing up funds to 

use for more political advocacy or any other type of expense. 

In October 2014, the LNC learned that one of its longtime supporters, 

Joseph Shaber, had died, leaving the party a beneficial interest in a trust that was 

eventually determined to be worth more than $235,000. The LNC perceived that 

the new bequest could provide another vehicle for challenging FECA’s 

contribution limits, but the recent statutory amendments meant that FECA did not 

prevent the LNC from accepting the entirety of its interest in Shaber’s estate. The 

LNC nevertheless chose to accept less than it could have to generate standing for 

this constitutional challenge. That decision was a self-inflicted injury that cannot 

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support standing. In any event, the declaratory and injunctive relief the LNC first 

sought in 2016 cannot redress its alleged 2015 injuries. And its claim of 

competitive injury relative to other political parties is likewise insufficient. 

This case should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

A. FECA’s Limits on Contributions to National Party Committees 

The LNC is the national committee of the Libertarian Party of the United 

States. Add. 14, at ¶ 1; see 52 U.S.C. § 30101(14); FEC, Types of Political Party 

Committees, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/registeringpolitical-party/types-political-party-committees/. 

FECA has placed limits on the amount of money that individuals may 

annually contribute to any national political party committee for more than forty 

years. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B). Today, FECA creates a two-tiered set of 

limits for contributions by individuals to national party committees like the LNC. 

Under the first tier, an individual donor may annually contribute up to an inflationadjusted limit to a national party committee’s general account (the “General Party 

Limit”). See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B), (c). During 2015-2016, that limit was 

$33,400 per year. Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure 

Limitations, 80 Fed. Reg. 5750-02, 5751 (Feb. 3, 2015). The limit was increased 

to $33,900 per year for 2017-2018. Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and 

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Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 82 Fed. 

Reg. 10904, 10905-06 (Feb. 16, 2017). 

In 2014, Congress added a second tier of limits through which an individual 

donor may contribute annually up to 300% of the General Party Limit into any of 

three specified segregated accounts that national party committees may elect to 

create (the “Segregated Account Limit”). See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B), (a)(9). 

The segregated accounts may be used to defray expenses incurred with respect to: 

(1) “a presidential nominating convention”; 

(2) “the construction, purchase, renovation, operation, and furnishing of 

one or more headquarters buildings of the party or to repay loans the 

proceeds of which were used to defray such expenses (including 

expenses for obligations incurred during the 2-year period which ends 

on December 16, 2014)”; and 

(3) “the preparation for and the conduct of election recounts and contests 

and other legal proceedings.” 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9). 

These two tiers apply separately. A single individual may contribute the 

maximum through the General Party Limit and also the maximum to each of the 

national party committee’s segregated accounts through the Segregated Account 

Limit. Therefore, an individual could have contributed as much as $334,000 to a 

national party committee in 2015 by giving the maximum under the General Party 

Limit ($33,400) and to each of the three segregated accounts ($100,200 x 3). 

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The Commission has interpreted FECA’s contribution limits to apply to a 

decedent’s estate just as those limits would have applied to the decedent were he or 

she still living and making the contributions directly. See, e.g., FEC Advisory Op. 

2015-05 (Shaber), 2015 WL 4978865, at *2 (Aug. 11, 2015) (citing FEC advisory 

opinions). If the decedent’s donation would exceed the relevant contribution limit, 

the FEC has concluded that an independent third-party (such as a trustee or escrow 

agent) may retain the funds and make subsequent contributions in amounts that 

comply with FECA’s limits until the beneficiary’s interest is discharged. Id.

B. Joseph Shaber’s Gift to the LNC 

Joseph Shaber was a long-time LNC donor who died in August 2014. 

(Addendum (“Add.”) 54-56, at ¶¶ 109-117.) Shaber’s estate planning documents 

named the LNC a beneficiary of a trust, which was eventually determined to be 

worth $235,575.20. (Add. 55-57, at ¶¶ 115-17, 121.) The LNC first had access to 

the money from Shaber’s bequest in 2015. (Add. 56, at ¶ 119.) Shaber put no 

restriction on how the LNC was to use the funds, directing his estate 

representatives to distribute the LNC’s share “outright.” (Add. 57, at ¶ 123.) In 

June 2015, these representatives requested that the LNC immediately accept its full 

share through contributions pursuant to the Segregated Account Limits. (Add. 

104-105, 108.) The LNC declined to do so, evidently at least in part to maintain 

standing for this lawsuit. (Add. 106.) 

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Had the LNC elected to accept its interest in the Shaber estate using the 

Segregated Account Limits, it could have obtained the full amount in 2015, 

because the LNC’s share was $235,575.20, which was less than the $334,000 it 

could have received annually from a single donor using segregated accounts. 

Because the LNC refused, however, Shaber’s trustee and the LNC agreed to place 

the balance of the funds exceeding the General Party Limit in escrow to be 

annually distributed to the LNC pursuant to that limit until the balance is 

exhausted. (Add. 57-58, at ¶ 128.) 

The LNC received its first distribution of $33,400 from Shaber’s gift in 

February 2015, and it received similar distributions in 2016 and 2017. (Add. 56, 

58, at ¶¶ 119, 130-31.) The LNC also received a $33,900 distribution in January 

2018. (See LNC Report of Receipts and Disbursements at 38 (Feb. 20, 2018), 

http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?201802209094625986.) 

C. The LNC’s Segregated Account Expenses 

During the relevant time period, the LNC incurred significant expenses that 

could have been defrayed through segregated account spending. In April 2014, the 

LNC purchased a building to serve as its headquarters for $825,000, including a 

down payment of $325,000. (Add. 20, at ¶ 24; Add. 112.) The LNC has since that 

time paid a monthly minimum of $2,900.21 toward mortgage principal and interest 

(see Add. 86-87), and it has also made additional payments to principal (e.g., Add. 

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86 (lines 32, 34, 37)). Shortly after purchasing the headquarters, the LNC adopted 

a policy requiring it to budget “at least $60,000 in . . . odd-numbered year[s] to pay 

down the principal” in order to pay the balance “as quickly as possible” and to 

avoid a “balloon payment.” (Add. 20, at ¶ 25.) The LNC failed to meet this target 

in 2015, raising only $22,435.63 for headquarters expenses despite projecting more 

than $65,000 in fundraising. (Add. 82-84.) 

The LNC admits that in 2015, it spent a total of $80,428.22 on all eligible 

expenses, including $340.50 on its 2016 presidential nominating convention, 

$7,260.61 on legal proceedings, and $72,827.11 on its headquarters. (See Add. 

115; Add. 86 (line 12).) That figure excludes the $174,031.88 the LNC spent on 

“office rent, tax, maintenance & utilities” in 2013 and 2014,1

 which Congress 

included as permissible segregated-account spending. See 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(9)(B). 

The LNC’s significant spending on segregated-account-eligible expenses 

continued in 2016, the year this lawsuit was filed. (Add. 21, at ¶ 29.) The LNC’s 

internal accounting documents show that it spent $220,449,59 on its 2016 

presidential nominating convention, $193,873.52 on its headquarters, and $52,928 

 1

 This spending is reflected in the LNC’s public filings available at 

https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?committee_id=C00255695&two_year_tr

ansaction_period=2014&recipient_name=GREENPENZ2600+VIRGINIA+AVE+

LLC&data_type=processed&min_date=01%2F01%2F2013&max_date=12%2F31

%2F2014. 

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headquarters fund. (Add. 19, at ¶ 22.) That money includes contributions that 

would not have been permissible under FECA prior to the 2014 adoption of the 

Segregated Account Limits, because the donor had already contributed the 

maximum under the General Party Limit. (Add. 19, at ¶ 21.) 

D. District Court Proceedings 

The LNC filed its complaint in this case on January 25, 2016. Counts I and 

III of its complaint raise as-applied claims that the First Amendment prohibits the 

application of the General Party Limit and the Segregated Account Limits to 

Shaber’s donation specifically. (Add. 75-78, at ¶¶ 21-27, 32-34.) Count II alleges 

that Congress’s inclusion of the Segregated Account Limits renders the 

contribution limits applicable to donations to national party committees facially 

unconstitutional because they are content-based restrictions on speech. (Add. 77-

78, at ¶ 28-31.) 

Because Counts I and III are as-applied claims, the LNC’s allegations of 

injury rely on its inability to accept its full share of the Shaber estate into its 

general account. (See, e.g., Add. 75, 78, at ¶¶ 18-19, 31.) As the LNC alleges, if it 

could take “immediate control over the balance of the Shaber funds,” then “the 

LNC would substantially improve its ability to advocate and achieve electoral 

 

with the FEC. As explained above, the latter amount may be defrayed by 

segregated account funds pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)(B). 

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success.” (Add. 76, at ¶ 26.) With respect to its facial claim in Count II, the LNC 

asserts that it “has comparatively less use” for segregated account funds than the 

major parties do and that it must spend much of the money in its general account 

on achieving ballot access instead of campaigning. (Add. 74, at ¶ 13.) The LNC 

similarly alleges that “its lack of resources” dissuades “[d]onors, voters, and 

prospective political candidates who might be attracted to the party’s ideology” 

from supporting it. (Add. 73, at ¶ 12.) 

In the district court, the Commission moved to dismiss, arguing that the 

LNC’s decision not to accept its share of the Shaber estate was a self-inflicted 

injury incapable of supporting standing under Article III. In rejecting this 

argument, the district court concluded that the LNC’s “precise” alleged injury was 

that it could not “accept the entire bequest for general expressive purposes when 

the bequest became available in 2015.” (Add. 8, 10.) The district court recognized 

that the LNC would not have suffered a cognizable injury if its expenses for which 

segregated account contributions could be used were sufficient to free up for 

general use any portion of the Shaber bequest that it accepted into such a 

segregated account. (Add. 9-11.) But the court concluded that the LNC’s 

expenses that could be defrayed by segregated account spending were insufficient 

to “free[] up the full value of the Shaber bequest . . . in 2015.” (Add. 11.) In its 

analysis, the court excluded all of the LNC’s substantial headquarters expenditures 

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from 2013-2014, although FECA permitted those expenses to be reimbursed 

through segregated account contributions in 2015. (Add. 10.) The district court 

also excluded all of the LNC’s 2016 expenses, although the LNC filed this lawsuit 

in 2016 when a new set of annual contribution limits applied. (Id.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The LNC brought this case pursuant to FECA’s special provision for judicial 

review of constitutional claims, 52 U.S.C. § 30110, which requires the district 

court to certify non-frivolous constitutional questions to the en banc court of 

appeals, Holmes v. FEC, 875 F.3d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 

S. Ct. 2018 (2018). This case comes to this Court after such a certification, rather 

than as an appeal. Regardless of that posture, this Court reviews the question 

whether the LNC has standing under Article III de novo, and it owes “no deference 

to the district court’s” decision. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory 

Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 377 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see In re 

Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 414, 421 (5th Cir. 2010). 

ARGUMENT 

The LNC cannot demonstrate that it has Article III standing to pursue any of 

its claims. “To establish standing, the plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered a 

‘concrete and particularized’ injury (2) that is ‘fairly traceable to the challenged 

action of the defendant’ and (3) that is ‘likely’ to be ‘redressed by a favorable 

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decision,’ i.e., a decision granting the plaintiff the relief it seeks.” Elec. Privacy 

Info. Ctr., 878 F.3d at 376-77 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

560-61 (1992)). The LNC’s claims fail at all three steps. First, FECA permitted 

the LNC to accept the full amount Shaber left to it in 2015, and its choice not to 

accept that money is a self-inflicted injury incapable of supporting standing. 

Second, even assuming that the LNC suffered a cognizable injury in 2015, its 

decision not to file suit until 2016 means that those alleged injuries could not be 

redressed by the declaratory and injunctive relief it seeks. Third, the LNC’s 

allegations that FECA places it at a competitive disadvantage compared to other 

political parties do not establish standing because its claimed disadvantage is 

caused by its inability to convince additional donors to make contributions, not 

FECA. 

I. THE LNC’S ALLEGED INABILITY TO ACCESS SHABER’S 

CONTRIBUTION IS A WHOLLY SELF-INFLICTED INJURY 

The LNC lacks standing to pursue its as-applied claims because the harm it 

claims to suffer is entirely the product of its own choice not to accept all of the 

Shaber funds. This Court has “consistently held that self-inflicted harm doesn’t 

satisfy the basic requirements for standing.” Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. 

Health Ass’n v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This is so both 

because a self-inflicted “harm does not amount to an ‘injury’ cognizable under 

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Article III” and because the harm is not “fairly traceable to the defendant’s 

challenged conduct.” Id. 

In the campaign finance context, this means that a recipient’s voluntary 

choice not to accept a permitted contribution cannot create standing to challenge 

the constitutionality of the applicable limit. In McConnell, a group of candidates 

alleged that they suffered an injury stemming from Congress’s decision to raise the 

ceiling on individual contributions, a decision the candidates claimed was 

unconstitutional. 540 U.S. at 226-28. The candidates did not “‘wish to solicit or 

accept’” contributions in amounts permitted by the new limits, allegedly “making 

it more difficult for them to compete in elections.” Id. at 228. The Supreme Court 

rejected this claim, holding that the candidates’ “alleged inability to compete stems 

not from the operation of” the increased contribution limit, “but from their own 

personal ‘wish’ not to solicit or accept large contributions, i.e., their personal 

choice.” Id. 

Similar results apply when plaintiffs claim contribution limits are too 

restrictive. See Zimmerman v. City of Austin, 881 F.3d 378, 389-90 (5th Cir. 

2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-93 (U.S. July 17, 2018). In Zimmerman, a 

candidate for local office argued that a city’s “aggregate limit” on the amount of 

contributions a candidate could receive from outside of the relevant constituency 

was unconstitutional even though he had not himself attempted to solicit 

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contributions from such donors. Id. at 383, 389. In support of standing, the 

candidate claimed that the aggregate limit caused him to forego making the 

necessary solicitations because doing so would not have been cost-effective. Id. 

The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the candidate’s “decision to 

forego solicitations” was a “self-inflicted injury” that was not “sufficient to confer 

standing.” Id. 

It is undisputed here that FECA permitted the LNC to accept its entire share 

of the Shaber estate at the time it became available. (See Add. 78, at ¶ 33.) Under 

the limits applicable to 2015, FECA permitted the LNC to accept as much as 

$334,000 from any single donor by maximizing receipts subject to the General 

Party Limit and the Segregated Account Limits. Shaber placed no other conditions 

on the LNC’s ability to accept the full amount of his gift; indeed, his estate 

representatives asked the LNC in 2015 to use the Segregated Account Limits to do 

so. (Add. 57, at ¶ 123; Add. 104-105; Add. 108.) 

The LNC’s allegation that it desires to use the funds Shaber left it for 

“general expressive purposes” because it has “comparatively less use for funds” 

under the Segregated Account Limits does not make its purported injury any less 

self-inflicted. (Add. 74-75, at ¶¶ 13, 18.) Money is fungible, and therefore a dollar 

the LNC raises through the Segregated Account Limits to defray convention, 

headquarters, or legal proceedings expenses is an extra dollar from the LNC’s 

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general account that becomes available for its general expressive purposes. Add. 

25, at ¶ 38; see Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 317 n.6 

(2012) (“[O]ur cases have recognized that a union’s money is fungible, so even if 

the new fee were spent entirely for nonpolitical activities, it would free up other 

funds to be spent for political purposes.”). As in Zimmerman, the LNC’s choice 

here not to pursue permitted political fundraising because it objects to legal 

constraints placed on that fundraising does not show a cognizable injury. 

As a factual matter, moreover, the LNC’s assertion that it does not need or 

want money to defray segregated account expenses is belied by the record. Even 

before Congress enacted the Segregated Account Limits, the LNC engaged in 

project-based fundraising to defray specific, identified expenses. (Add. 16-19, 21, 

at ¶¶ 10-13, 18-22, 27.) Indeed, it even highlighted the importance of its 

convention expenses to the Supreme Court when doing so benefitted its theories in 

a different challenge to FECA. See Brief of the Political Parties, McConnell, No. 

02-1727 (and consolidated cases), 2003 WL 21911213, at *21, *65-66 (U.S. filed 

July 8, 2003). The LNC solicited contributions into its “building fund” and 

“guaranteed” prospective donors that those contributions “must, by law, be spent 

on buying an office or associated expenses.” (Add. 18-19, at ¶ 19.) And it is LNC 

policy to “completely pay off the headquarters building as quickly as possible” by 

budgeting “at least $60,000” every non-election year “to pay down the principal.” 

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(Add. 20, at ¶ 25.) The Segregated Account Limits provided the LNC with a 

mechanism to do just that. The LNC chose not to do so. 

The record also establishes that the LNC has not hesitated to accept other 

contributions subject to the Segregated Account Limits. For example, the LNC has 

accepted more than $55,000 into its segregated headquarters fund pursuant to those 

limits. (Add. 19, at ¶ 22.) The LNC could have done the same with Shaber’s gift 

in 2015, but it elected not to do so. These “budgetary choices” cannot serve as the 

predicate for standing under Article III. Fair Emp’t Council of Greater Wash., Inc. 

v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

II. THE LNC’S SEGREGATED ACCOUNT EXPENSES IN 2015 AND 

2016 COULD HAVE EASILY ABSORBED SHABER’S ENTIRE GIFT 

The district court concluded that the LNC’s ability to accept the entire 

Shaber contribution at once using segregated accounts did not ameliorate the 

LNC’s alleged injury because the LNC lacked sufficient expenses in 2015 to 

“free[] up the full value” of Shaber’s gift in that year. (See Add. at 11). This 

conclusion is wrong for two reasons. 

First, contrary to FECA’s plain text, the district court categorically excluded 

expenses the LNC incurred for its headquarters in 2013 and 2014. When Congress 

enacted the Segregated Account Limits, it expressly provided that national party 

committees could use funds raised into a segregated account to defray headquarters 

“expenses for obligations incurred during the 2-year period which ends on 

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17 

December 16, 2014.” 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)(B). The LNC’s headquarters 

expenses incurred in those years were directly relevant, because the party could 

have used funds from segregated account contributions — including amounts from 

Shaber’s estate made available in 2015 — to defray outstanding expenses and 

thereby offset general account spending. 

Second, the district court’s exclusion of the LNC’s 2016 expenditures was 

erroneous. “Standing is assessed as of the time a suit commences,” Chamber of 

Commerce of the U.S. v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2011), which in this 

case was 2016. Therefore, the LNC’s 2016 budget expectations and expenditures 

must be considered for the Court to determine whether the LNC suffered any 

injury then. 

It is undisputed that the LNC’s 2016 segregated-account expenses were 

more than sufficient to offset the full amount of Shaber’s gift. As the district court 

found, the LNC spent “roughly $467,251.58 on 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)-

sanctioned expenses in 2016.” (Add. 21, at ¶ 29.) That spending was planned. 

The LNC budgeted $200,000 in 2016 spending toward its presidential nominating 

convention, and it actually spent more than $20,000 above what it had budgeted. 

(Add. 103.) The LNC also spent $193,873.52 on its headquarters in 2016, 

including $156,802.52 on mortgage and interest alone. (Add. 94, 97.) So the LNC 

could have freed up far more than its total share of the Shaber estate for general 

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18 

spending by accepting funds to cover those expenses into a convention or 

headquarters segregated account. Even accepting the LNC’s account of its 

spending and excluding the amount it spent on its headquarters in 2013-2014 (see

Add. 115-16, at ¶¶ 4-7), the LNC could have exhausted the gift by accepting the 

maximum limit into its general account and either its convention account or 

headquarters segregated account. 

In short, the LNC could have accepted the entire amount Shaber left it by the 

time this lawsuit was filed. By accepting Shaber’s contribution through segregated 

accounts, the LNC would have been able to defray more of its expenses and would 

have freed an equal amount in its general account. The LNC’s choice not to take 

that route is a self-inflicted injury. 

III. THE LNC’S ALLEGED INJURY IN 2015 WAS NOT REDRESSABLE 

IN 2016 OR AFTERWARDS 

The LNC’s decision not to file suit until 2016 also means that the injury the 

district court found sufficient cannot be redressed by the declaratory and injunctive 

relief the LNC now seeks. The district court concluded that the LNC was injured 

in 2015 by not being able to accept the full amount of Shaber’s gift at the time it 

became available. (See Add. at 8, 11.) To remedy this alleged injury, the LNC’s 

complaint seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief; compensatory damages are 

not at issue. (See Add. 78-79.) Time only runs in one direction, however, and the 

remedies the LNC first sought in 2016 would not remedy any 2015 harm. 

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19 

“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or 

controversy regarding injunctive relief.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 

(1974). Thus, when an injunction or declaration could not “conceivably remedy 

any past wrong,” the plaintiff’s alleged injuries are not redressable. Steel Co. v. 

Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 108-09 (1998); see also Juidice v. Vail, 

430 U.S. 327 (1977) (holding that released prisoners lacked standing to obtain 

injunctive relief to challenge constitutionality of past incarceration); Nat. Res. Def. 

Council v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012, 1021-22 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs’ 

alleged injury of exclusion from past meetings would not be remedied by 

injunction prohibiting defendant from using materials generated from those 

meetings); Sykes v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 84, 92 (D.D.C. 2004) (“A declaratory 

judgment that portions of FECA are unconstitutional would do nothing to [remedy 

alleged constitutional violations] that have already occurred.”). 

Similarly, when this lawsuit was filed in late January 2016, no declaration or 

injunction could have retroactively allowed the LNC to spend the money from 

Shaber’s gift on general expressive purposes in 2015. At most, a court could allow 

the LNC access to the remaining Shaber funds being held in escrow, but even that 

would not permit the LNC to access those funds in 2015. 

Nor would it be significant for the standing analysis that any similar injury 

might recur. The LNC contended below that the Commission’s “arguments sound 

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20 

more in mootness than standing” and suggested that its claims fall within the 

exception for disputes that are capable of repetition, yet evade review. (See Add. 

12 n.7.) As the Supreme Court has held, however, “that doctrine will not revive a 

dispute which became moot before the action commenced.” Renne v. Geary, 501 

U.S. 312, 320 (1991); accord Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000) (“[I]f a plaintiff lacks standing at the time 

the action commences, the fact that the dispute is capable of repetition yet evading 

review will not entitle the complainant to a federal judicial forum.”). It is therefore 

of no moment that the LNC has identified other current or potential contributions 

that might exceed the General Party Limit. As to the only contribution at issue in 

the LNC’s complaint, Shaber’s, the LNC lacks any redressable injury. 

IV. THE LNC’S ALLEGATIONS OF COMPETITIVE INJURY 

SIMILARLY FAIL TO SUPPORT ARTICLE III STANDING 

The LNC also lacks standing to the extent its claims are dependent on its 

allegations that FECA’s contribution limits in general, and the Segregated Account 

Limits in particular, place the Libertarian Party at a competitive disadvantage visà-vis other political parties. These allegations cannot support standing in this case. 

The fact that other political parties have different expenses does not establish 

that FECA causes the LNC to suffer a cognizable injury. The LNC alleges that it 

is harmed by the Segregated Account Limits because its monetary “needs” for the 

types of expenses that may be defrayed with segregated account funds are “not 

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21 

commensurate with the needs of the two major political parties.” (Add. 74, at 

¶ 13.) That assertion, however, is akin to the oft-rejected argument that a party is 

harmed because it is at a fundraising disadvantage to its competitors. See, e.g., 

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 227; FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 

257 (1986) (“[P]olitical ‘free trade’ does not necessarily require that all who 

participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources.”); 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48. The Supreme Court rejected that exact argument when 

the Libertarian Party presented it in Buckley. 424 U.S. at 33-34 & n.40 (noting that 

the “record [was] devoid of support” for the Libertarian Party’s claim that FECA’s 

contribution limitations “have a serious effect on the initiation and scope of minorparty and independent candidacies.”). There is no reason for this Court to reach a 

different result. 

In any event, the LNC’s claims of competitive disadvantage are not fairly 

traceable to FECA’s contribution limits. If the LNC faces higher costs to “secur[e] 

access to the ballot” than other political parties (Add. 73, at ¶ 12), those costs are 

imposed by various state election statutes, not FECA. Similarly, the LNC’s 

alleged difficulty in raising sufficient funds is determined not by FECA’s limits but 

by the individual decisions of potential donors. FECA’s limits — including the 

Segregated Account Limits — apply identically to all parties. See Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 31 (noting that FECA “applies the same limitations on contributions to all 

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22 

candidates regardless of their present occupations, ideological views, or party 

affiliations.”). From the perspective of candidates and political committees, the 

“overall effect” of FECA’s contribution limits “is merely to require candidates and 

political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons.” Id. at 21-

22. 

Finally, the LNC’s “ability to advocate and achieve electoral success” would 

not be remedied by striking down the Segregated Account Limits. (See Add. 76, at 

¶ 26.) As the Supreme Court has recognized, FECA’s contribution limits actually 

“benefit minor-party and independent candidates relative to their major-party 

opponents because major-party candidates receive far more money in large 

contributions.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 33; see Albanese v. FEC, 78 F.3d 66, 68-69 

(2d Cir. 1996) (“Indeed, since FECA limits the amounts of contributions that are 

permissible, the elimination of those ceilings could well place candidates whose 

constituencies do not include a plethora of wealthy supporters at an even greater 

disadvantage.”). Striking down those limits could actually exacerbate the LNC’s 

funding disadvantage compared to the Democratic and Republican parties. 

CONCLUSION 

The LNC lacks standing to sue under Article III, and this Court should 

decline to answer the questions certified to it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

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23 

Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Acting General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Harry J. Summers 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley 

Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

/s/Jacob S. Siler 

Jacob S. Siler 

Attorney 

jsiler@fec.gov 

September 10, 2018 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

1050 First Street NE 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

USCA Case #18-5227 Document #1749853 Filed: 09/10/2018 Page 29 of 150
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

This motion complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 

27(d)(2)(B) because it contains 5,162 words, excluding the parts of the motion 

exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 27 (d)(2)(B) and 32(f). 

The motion also complies with the typeface and type style requirements of 

Fed. R. App. P. 27(d)(1)(E) because it was prepared using Microsoft Word 14-

point Times New Roman. 

/s/Jacob S. Siler 

Jacob S. Siler 

Attorney 

Federal Election Commission 

 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 10th day of September, 2018, I electronically 

filed the foregoing motion with the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF 

system. The participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and service will 

be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF System. 

/s/Jacob S. Siler 

Jacob S. Siler 

Attorney 

jsiler@fec.gov 

 

USCA Case #18-5227 Document #1749853 Filed: 09/10/2018 Page 31 of 150
CERTIFICATE OF PARTIES AND AMICI CURIAE 

Pursuant to Circuit Rules 27(a)(4) and 28(a)(1)(A), the Federal Election 

Commission hereby certifies that the Libertarian National Committee, Inc., was the 

plaintiff in the district court and has been designated as the appellant in this Court. 

The Federal Election Commission was the defendant in the district court and has 

been designated as the appellee in this Court. There were no amici curiae in the 

district court. Although no amici curiae have yet filed briefs in this Court, the 

Federal Election Commission has given its consent for the Goldwater Institute and 

the Institute for Free Speech to participate as amici curiae in support of the 

appellant. 

USCA Case #18-5227 Document #1749853 Filed: 09/10/2018 Page 32 of 150
ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER 30, 2018 

No. 18-5227 

_______________________________________________ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

_______________________________________________ 

LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

_______________________________________________ 

On Certification of Constitutional Questions from the 

United States District Court for the District of Columbia 

_______________________________________________ 

ADDENDUM TO FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 

_______________________________________________ 

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Acting General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley 

Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

September 10, 2018 

Harry J. Summers 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

Jacob S. Siler 

Attorney 

jsiler@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION 

1050 First Street NE 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

USCA Case #18-5227 Document #1749853 Filed: 09/10/2018 Page 33 of 150
ADDENDUM CONTENTS 

1. Memorandum Opinion, Libertarian Nat’l Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 

1:16-cv-121 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2017) (Docket No. 21) ............................ 1 

2. Findings of Fact, Libertarian Nat’l Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 

1:16-cv-121 (D.D.C. Jun. 29, 2018) (Docket No. 35)........................ 14 

3. Complaint, Libertarian Nat’l Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 

1:16-cv-121 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2016) (Docket No. 1) .......................... 69 

4. Transcript of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Nicolas J. Sarwark 

(Docket No. 26-10) (excerpts) ............................................................ 80 

5. Libertarian National Committee, Inc. Account QuickReport 

(Docket No. 26-11) (excerpts) ............................................................ 86 

6. Libertarian National Committee, Inc. 2016 Budget 

(Docket No. 26-14) ........................................................................... 103 

7. Letter from Michelle M. Lauer, John C. Lincoln Law Offices, 

to William W. Hall, Esq., Warner Norcross & Judd LLP, Re: 

The Joseph Shaber Revocable Trust (June 3, 2015) 

(Docket No. 26-20) ........................................................................... 104 

8. Email from Caryn Ann Harlos to “lnc-business@hp.lp.org”, 

Subject: Re: [Lnc-business] Added Mortgage Payment 

(Nov. 29, 2016) (excerpts) (Docket No. 26-21) ............................... 106 

9. Letter from John C. Lincoln and Michelle M. Lauer, 

John C. Lincoln Law Offices, to Federal Election 

Commission, Re: Amended Request for Advisory Opinion 

(June 15, 2015) (Docket No. 26-32) ................................................. 107 

10. Fundraising Letter from Wes Benedict, Executive Director, 

Libertarian Party (Apr. 26, 2014) (Docket No. 26-34) .................... 111 

11. Declaration of Robert Kraus, Libertarian Nat’l Comm., Inc. 

v. FEC, 1:16-cv-121 (D.D.C. May 2, 2016) 

(Docket No. 11-1) ............................................................................. 115 

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, 

INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 16-121 (BAH)

Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The plaintiff, the Libertarian National Committee (“LNC”), was left a testamentary 

bequest by Joseph Shaber in 2015 in the amount of $235,575.20 but was allegedly unable to 

accept the bequest in full due to restrictions imposed by the Federal Election Commission Act 

(“FECA”), see 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116 and 30125. The LNC challenges certain aspects of the 

statutory scheme as unconstitutional and seeks certification of the constitutional issues it raises to 

the D.C. Circuit en banc, pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30110.1 The defendant, the Federal Election 

Commission (“FEC”), has moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1) on the ground that LNC lacks standing to bring this suit. This potential Article III issue 

must be addressed before certifying any question to the D.C. Circuit under § 30110. See Holmes,

823 F.3d at 70 (“If the requirements of Article III of the Constitution are satisfied, the district 

court must ‘immediately’ ‘certify all questions of constitutionality of this Act to the United 

1 Pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30110, “the national committee of any political party” may bring an action “in the 

appropriate district court” challenging the constitutionality of a FECA provision. Section 30110 further provides 

that the district court “immediately shall certify” any non-frivolous constitutional challenge to FECA to the court of 

appeals en banc. Id.;see also Holmes v. FEC, 823 F.3d 69, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[D]istrict courts do not certify 

‘frivolous’ constitutional questions to the en banc court of appeals.” (quoting Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 

192 n.4 (1981))).

Case 1:16-cv-00121-BAH Document 21 Filed 01/03/17 Page 1 of 13

Add. 1

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2

States court of appeals for the circuit involved . . . sitting en banc.’”); see also Republican Party 

of La. v. FEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2015) (“This Court may properly dismiss [the 

plaintiffs’] claims [under analogous Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act] without convening a 

three-judge panel if [the plaintiffs] lack standing to bring those claims.”); Holistic Candlers & 

Consumers Ass’n v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing standing as a 

“threshold jurisdictional question” (quoting Byrd v. EPA, 174 F.3d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).

For the reasons set out below, the FEC’s motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The challenged statutory framework is summarized before discussing the particular facts

underlying this suit and the LNC’s claims.

A. FECA’s Limits on Contributions to Political Committees

Under FECA, “no person,” including, inter alia, a testamentary estate,2 “shall make 

contributions . . . to the political committees established and maintained by a national political 

party, which are not the authorized political committees of any candidate, in any calendar year 

which, in the aggregate, exceed $25,000.” 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1). FECA was amended in 

2014 to allow individuals to make additional donations of up to three hundred percent of the 

annual contribution limit set out in § 30116(a)(1) for each of three specified purposes:

(1) “expenses incurred with respect to a presidential nominating convention;” (2) “expenses

incurred with respect to the construction, purchase, renovation, operation, and furnishing of one 

or more headquarters buildings of the party;” and (3) “expenses incurred with respect to the 

2 The FEC has interpreted the word “person” as used in § 30116(a)(1) to include an individual’s testamentary 

estate, see, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. C (“FEC Advisory Op. 2015-05”), ECF No. 12-3. The LNC does not challenge 

this interpretation of the statute, and, in a recent case involving these same parties, this Court explained that the 

FEC’s interpretation is entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984). See LNC v. FEC (“LNC I”), 930 F. Supp. 2d 154, 165 (D.D.C. 2013) (“The FEC’s

interpretation of the statute to include a testamentary bequest appears reasonable, is not seriously challenged by the 

LNC in its briefs, and is entitled to deference underChevron. . . .”).

Case 1:16-cv-00121-BAH Document 21 Filed 01/03/17 Page 2 of 13

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3

preparation for and the conduct of election recounts and contests and other legal proceedings.” 

Id. § 30116(a)(9)(A)–(C). Donations accepted for the three enumerated purposes under 

§ 30116(a)(9) must be funneled into a “separate, segregated account” and not comingled with 

other funds. Id.

The contribution limits set forth in § 30116(a)(1) are adjusted for inflation in oddnumbered years such that, at the time this Complaint was filed, the annual limit on a general

account contribution was $33,400, and the annual limit on a segregated account contribution for 

each of the three segregated accounts was $100,200. See id. § 30116(c). Accordingly, in 2015,

the total amount that a party’s political committee could accept from any person, including a 

testamentary estate, was $334,000.

B. Bequest to the LNC by Joseph Shaber

The LNC is “the national committee of the Libertarian Party of the United States.” 

Compl. ¶ 1. Its mission is “to field national [p]residential tickets, to support its state party 

affiliates in running candidates for public office, and to conduct other political activities in 

furtherance of a libertarian public policy agenda in the United States.” Id. From 1988 to 2011, 

Mr. Shaber made small, periodic donations to the LNC. Id. ¶ 15. “Unbeknown to the LNC, it 

was made a beneficiary of the Joseph Shaber Revocable Living Trust U/T/D February 11, 2010.” 

Id. ¶ 16. Upon his death on August 23, 2014, Mr. Shaber’s trust became irrevocable, with the 

LNC’s share amounting to$235,575.20. Id. ¶ 17. No restrictions were placed on how the LNC 

could utilize the bequest, and the trustee maintains that it is “entirely up to the LNC how it 

wishes to apply the distribution.” See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 6–7, ECF No. 9 (quoting Letter 

from Trustee’s Counsel to FEC (dated June 15, 2015), available online at http://saos.fec.gov/

aodocs/1317218.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2016)).

Case 1:16-cv-00121-BAH Document 21 Filed 01/03/17 Page 3 of 13

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4

On February 23, 2015, the trustee distributed $33,400 of the bequest to the LNC’s 

general account. Id. ¶ 19. LNC asserts that it “would [have] accept[ed] and spen[t] the entire 

amount of the Shaber bequest for its general expressive purposes” but for FECA’s contribution 

limits. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. On May 6, 2015, the trustee requested an advisory opinion from the FEC 

as to whether the remainder of the bequest could be placed in a third-party escrow account for 

annual disbursements pursuant to § 30116(a)(1). The FEC approved the trustee’s request on 

August 11, 2015. See generally FEC Advisory Op. 2015-05. In January 2016, the LNC 

accepted another $33,400 of the Shaber bequest from escrow for deposit into the party’s general 

purpose account. Compl. ¶ 20. Thus, as of the filing of the complaint, approximately 

$168,775.20 of the bequest remained in escrow. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 7; Pl.’s Opp’n

Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 20, ECF No. 12 (referencing $168,000 in escrow).

C. The LNC’s Claims

The LNC’s complaint alleges in three counts that application of the § 30116 contribution 

limits to the Shaber bequest “violates the First Amendment speech and associational rights of the 

LNC and its supporters,” id. ¶ 27 (Count I), and that the segregated accounts scheme, which 

allows parties to accept larger donations for three specified purposes only, amounts to a contentbased restriction on speech, both on its face and as applied to the Shaber bequest id. ¶¶ 31, 34

(Counts II and III); see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 8 (“[P]rivileging large donations based on their 

purposes—as if a party would be corrupted by a $33,401 donation for general purposes, but not a 

$312,000 donation for conventions, buildings, and lawyers[—]is an irrational content-based 

speech restriction.”). The LNC seeks “[a]n order permanently enjoining [the FEC] . . . from 

enforcing 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116 and 30125, either generally or in relation to the Shaber [b]equest,”

in addition to “[d]eclaratory relief consistent with the injunction.” Id., Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1–2.

Case 1:16-cv-00121-BAH Document 21 Filed 01/03/17 Page 4 of 13

Add. 4

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5

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power 

authorized by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013) (quoting

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Indeed, federal courts 

are “forbidden . . . from acting beyond our authority,” NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 

120 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and, therefore, have “an affirmative obligation ‘to consider whether the 

constitutional and statutory authority exist for us to hear each dispute,’” James Madison Ltd. ex 

rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of 

Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is the proper vehicle for moving to dismiss a 

complaint due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Absent subject-matter jurisdiction over a 

case, the court must dismiss it, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 

506–07 (2006), and the burden of establishing any jurisdictional facts to support the exercise of 

the subject matter jurisdiction rests on the plaintiff, see Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96–

97 (2010); Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 2007). A court “may 

consider materials outside the pleadings” in determining whether jurisdiction exists. Jerome 

Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Belhas v. Ya’Alon,

515 F.3d 1279, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (examining materials outside the pleadings in ruling on a 

Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

With regard to standing, Article III of the Constitution restricts the power of federal 

courts to hear only “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “The doctrine 

of standing gives meaning to these constitutional limits by ‘identify[ing] those disputes which 

are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.”’ Susan B. Anthony List v. Drie haus,

Case 1:16-cv-00121-BAH Document 21 Filed 01/03/17 Page 5 of 13

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6

134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (“‘One 

element of the case-or-controversy requirement’ is that plaintiffs ‘must establish that they 

have standing to sue.”’ (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997))). As the Supreme 

Court has explained, “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three 

elements.” Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in 

fact,” i.e., “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, 

and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Second, there must be “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 

complained of,” i.e., the injury alleged must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 

defendant. Id. Finally, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 

decision. Id. at 561. In analyzing whether a party has standing, the Court “must be ‘careful not 

to decide the questions on the merits for or against the plaintiff, and must therefore assume that 

on the merits the plaintiff[] would be successful in [its] claims.’” In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 

F.3d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 

2003)).

III. DISCUSSION

In considering the FEC’s motion to dismiss the LNC’s complaint for lack of standing, a 

recent case in this Court involving the same parties is instructive since, in that case, the LNC was 

found to have standing to challenge the predecessor provision to § 30116(a). See LNC v. FEC 

(“LNC I”), 930 F. Supp. 2d 154, 163 (D.D.C. 2013) (Wilkins, J.).3 The LNC I Court explained 

that “[t]he LNC satisfies the core elements of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, 

3 FECA was transferred from Title 2 to Title 52 on September 1, 2014. Thus, LNC Irefers to 2 U.S.C. 

§ 441a(a)(1), which is currently codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1).

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because it alleges an injury connected to the FEC’s conduct—the prevention of obtaining 

immediate control of the entire . . . bequest—that would be redressed by a favorable decision.” 

Id.

The FEC advances two arguments in an apparent effort to show why LNC I’s standing 

analysis does not apply here, but neither argument is persuasive.4 First, relying on the 2014 

amendment to § 30116, which established the segregated accounts scheme and therefore 

increased the total amount a person may donate to a political committee in a given year, the FEC 

asserts that the LNC’s injury is self-inflicted because the LNC could accept the full bequest but 

has chosen not to. Second, and in the alternative, the FEC argues that even if not self-inflicted, 

the alleged injury, which the FEC construes as a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the two 

major political parties, is not a valid injury in fact under binding precedent, that actors in the 

political marketplace, not FECA, caused LNC’s claimed competitive disadvantage, and that a

favorable decision from this Court is not likely to redress the claimed injury. The FEC’s 

arguments are addressed seriatim.

A. Self-Inflicted Injury

“[S]elf-inflicted harm doesn’t satisfy the basic requirements for standing” since it is 

neither a “cognizable” injury nor “fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct.” Nat’l 

Family Planning & Reproductive Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 468 F.3d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 

2006); accord Afifi v. Lynch, 101 F. Supp. 3d 90, 110 (D.D.C. 2015); Ellis v. Comm’r of IRS, 67 

F. Supp. 3d 325, 336–37 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Ellis v. C.I.R., 622 Fed. App’x 2 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015). According to the FEC, the LNC has chosen not to accept the entire Shaber bequest

even though it could and, consequently, any injury suffered by the LNC is self-inflicted and

4 Notably, while referencingLNC Ifor various propositions, the FEC fails to engage with LNC I’s most 

pertinent holding that the LNC had standingto challenge the contribution limits applicable to testamentary estates.

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thereby insufficient to establish standing. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 10–14. As support, the FEC 

points out that § 30116(a) permits the LNC to accept immediately the entire balance of the 

bequest by funneling funds beyond the general spending account into the special-purpose 

segregated accounts. See id. at 11. Indeed, FECA allows a committee of a national party to 

accept, in addition to $33,400 for general spending, $100,200 for the party’s presidential 

nominating convention, $100,200 for work on the party headquarters, and $100,200 for legal 

fees, which, when combined, far exceeds the balance in the escrow account. See id. (“FECA 

allows the LNC in 2016 to receive a total of $334,000 from any one donor.”). Accordingly, the 

FEC contends that the alleged harm flows from the LNC’s choice not to deposit the funds into

segregated accounts.5

The FEC’s argument papers over the nuance in the LNC’s claims. The LNC does not 

argue that the amended statutory scheme allowing a party to accept a contribution as large as 

$334,000 prohibits the LNC from accepting the entire Shaber bequest in one lump sum. Rather, 

the LNC alleges that the harm is due to the restriction on the political committee’s inability to 

accept the entire bequest for general expressive purposes when the bequest became available in 

2015. See Compl. ¶¶ 18–19; Pl.’s Opp’n at 8 (“LNC’s injury is that it cannot accept money—

from Shaber’s bequest and from other donors—for spending as it wishes.”) (emphasis in 

5 The FEC’s reliance on Sykes v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87 (D.D.C. 2004), see Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 10–

11; Def.’s Reply at 7, is misplaced. According to the FEC, “[i]n the campaign finance context, any harm allegedly 

arising from a political actor’s voluntary choice not to accept contributions that FECA allows it to accept is a selfinflicted injury that cannot support standing.” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 10. In Sykes, the plaintiff, a Green Party 

candidate for Senate, challenged FECA’s tacit authorization of out-of-state campaign contributions. Sykes, 335 F. 

Supp. 2d at 85. He argued that FECA’s silence as to out-of-state contributions injured his opportunity to compete in 

the Senate race,id. at 88–89, even though he had not actually received any out-of-state contributions, id. at 87. This 

Court held,inter alia, that the plaintiff had not establishedan injury in fact and therefore lacked standing to sue 

because he had challenged FECA’s “failure to restrictout-of-state contributions” as opposed to “[a] portion[] of 

FECA which directly restrictedhis own campaign activity.” Id. at 89 (emphasis in original). Here, § 30116 

“directly restrict[s]” the LNC’s ability to accept the Shaber bequest. Accordingly, the discussion in Sykes about the 

standard for asserting an injury in fact does not support the FEC’s position.

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original). Thus, the fact that the LNC could accept the entire bequest by utilizing its segregated 

accounts does not eliminate the alleged harm. The precise harm alleged confers a sufficient 

injury in fact to sustain standing. See Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1010 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 

(“Our constitutional jurisdiction is clear. Because Appellants declare that they would make 

political contributions but for section 441c [52 U.S.C. § 30119’s predecessor provision], they 

have Article III standing. Section 441c allegedly deprives them of a legally protected interest 

(making a political contribution) that an order of this court declaring section 441c unenforceable 

would remedy.”); Republican Party of La. v. FEC, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. 15-cv-1241, 2016 

WL 6601420, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2016) (three-judge panel) (“The state party’s inability to use 

corporate funds in its possession for additional [federal election activity] in which it would like 

to engage qualifies as a concrete injury.”).

The FEC, however, advances an additional theory as to why the LNC’s injury is selfinflicted. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 12. The FEC suggests that “LNC’s public disclosure 

reports show that it actually spends significant amounts on expenses for which Segregated 

Account funds may be used” and, therefore, the LNC “could have spent the entire bequest during 

this election cycle had it chosen to do so.” Id. According to the FEC, “the LNC spent in excess 

of $940,000 on its Alexandria building headquarters” during the 2014 election cycle, id., and 

spent $120,000 on its 2014 national convention, id. at 12–13. At the time the FEC moved to 

dismiss this case, “the LNC has spent approximately $63,000 on its headquarters” during the 

2016 election cycle. Id. at 13; see also Def.’s Notice Supplemental Jurisdictional Facts at 2, ECF 

No. 18 (“Since the parties completed briefing, the LNC has filed public disclosure reports with 

the FEC confirming that it has in fact spent at least as much money on segregated account 

purposes in 2016 as it would have received from the bequest.”). Based on these spending sums,

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the FEC posits that “[i]f the LNC were to accept the remaining $168,775.20 of the Shaber 

bequest into its Segregated Accounts and spend it on its convention, building, or legal expenses, 

that same amount from the LNC’s General Account would become available for other 

purposes—including advocacy and elections.” Id. at 13–14. The FEC thus contends that the 

LNC’s alleged injury “is not an injury in fact but a mere ‘self-inflicted budgetary choice.’” Id. at 

14 (quoting Envtl. Integrity Project v. McCarthy, 13-cv-1306, 2015 WL 5730427, at *8 (D.D.C. 

Sept. 29, 2015)).

The FEC’s argument has some surface-level appeal, but does not stand up to scrutiny. 

The LNC’s precise injury is that it was not permitted to accept the Shaber bequest in full, when it 

became available, to spend on federal election activities. See Compl. ¶ 18 (“LNC would accept 

and spend the entire amount of the Shaber bequest for its general expressive purposes, including 

expression in aid of its federal election efforts.”). Since the bequest became available in 2015, 

the LNC’s 2014 and 2016 expenditures are of no moment.6 Likewise, as the LNC points out, 

“FECA’s limits apply per annum,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 13, so the LNC’s total spending in a given 

election cycle is a red herring. What matters is that in 2015, LNC spent no money on a 

presidential nominating convention, $72,827.11 on its headquarters, and $7,260.61 on legal 

proceedings, totaling $80,872.72 in segregated purpose spending. Decl. of Robert Kraus, 

Operations Director, Libertarian National Committee, Inc. ¶¶ 5–7, ECF No. 13. On these

undisputed attestations, if the LNC had accepted the entire bequest when it became available by

6 The LNC contends that even if the entire bequest has been accepted into segregated accounts, it still would 

not have freed up the same amount of money for expressive purposes. See Pl.’s Resp. Notice of Supplemental 

Jurisdictional Facts at 2, ECF No. 19 (“Worse still, the FEC’s math doesn’t add up.”). The Court need not resolve 

this factual dispute given that the LNC’s 2016 expenditures are irrelevantfor standing purposes. The Court also 

need not address the LNC’s argument that “the FEC bars political parties from making strategic withdrawals from 

testamentary bequest trusts,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 9, and thus would not permit the LNC to accept the bequest into 

segregated accounts in order to free up funds in the general account for other purposes. Even if the FEC did prohibit 

this, the dispositive and undisputed allegation here is that the LNC did not spend an amount equivalent to the 

remaining bequest funds on segregated account purposes in 2015.

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taking $33,400 of the bequest into its general account and the remainder (approximately 

$168,000, see Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 7; Pl.’s Opp’n at 20) into segregated purpose accounts, the 

LNC would have accepted more into its segregated purpose accounts than it spent on its 

building, presidential nominating convention, and legal expenses in 2015. Due to this overage,

accepting the entire bequest would not have freed up the full value of the Shaber bequest for 

engaging in federal election activities and resulted in the alleged injury in 2015. See Elrod v. 

Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal 

periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”). The FEC’s argument that the 

LNC’s injury was self-inflicted thus fails.

B. Competitive Disadvantage

The FEC argues that “[e]ven if the LNC’s choice to forego [sic] immediate acceptance of 

the Shaber bequest is not to blame for its claimed competitive injury, that alleged injury cannot 

support the LNC’s standing for three independent reasons.” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 15. First,

under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003),

“LNC’s claim that it is competitively disadvantaged and so must use the Shaber bequest to 

achieve electoral success fails to allege a valid injury in fact.” See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 15. 

Second, the LNC’s alleged competitive disadvantage is not caused by FECA but by decisions of

private actors in the political marketplace. Id. at 15–17. Finally, a favorable decision by this 

Court would not remedy the alleged injury but instead would exacerbate the injury by giving the 

major parties access to more money. Id. at 17–19.

These arguments are predicated on the FEC’s characterization of the LNC’s alleged 

injury as stemming from a “competitive disadvantage . . . against its major party rivals.” Id. at 2. 

In suggesting that the LNC’s alleged injury is a competitive disadvantage, the FEC cherry-picks 

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certain phrases from the LNC’s complaint referencing the party’s interest in competing with 

other parties. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 8 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 12–14, 26). The Complaint does 

allege that, “[u]nlike its two major competitors, the Libertarian Party’s national committee is 

forced to spend the bulk of its resources securing access to the ballot, leaving comparatively little 

for actual campaigning—an expensive activity in and of itself.” Compl. ¶ 12; see also id. ¶ 13

(“[T]he LNC has comparatively less use for funds intended to support national conventions, a 

headquarters building, or attorney fees.”). Further, the Complaint alleges that “[i]n the absence 

of the Party Limit’s application to the Shaber bequest, the LNC would substantially improve its 

ability to advocate and achieve electoral success by taking immediate control over the balance of 

the Shaber funds.” Id. ¶ 26. 

The Court agrees with the LNC that “the Commission does not afford the Complaint a 

fair reading.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 18; see also id. at 19 (“The Libertarian Party certainly does not

argue that the First Amendment requires a level electoral playing field, free of the advantages 

that speakers may have owing to their resources.” (emphasis in original)). The phrases the FEC 

relies on are included in the Complaint to explain why the LNC sought to accept the entire 

bequest into its general purpose account when the bequest became available and why accepting 

the bequest into the segregated accounts was not an adequate substitute. See id. at 19. As noted 

above, the LNC clearly articulates the injury suffered to be the inability to accept the entire 

Shaber bequest, when it became available in 2015 to engage in election activities, including 

various forms of expressive conduct. See Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18–19. Accordingly, the FEC’s 

arguments that the LNC’s alleged injury is not cognizable, not caused by the FEC, and not 

redressable are premised on a mischaracterization of the alleged injury and therefore fail.7

7 The LNC suggests that the FEC’s arguments sound more in mootness than standing and then proceeds to 

argue that the claims asserted here fall within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”exception to mootness.

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IV. CONCLUSION

The LNC has standing to challenge FECA provisions that restricted immediate access to 

the full amount of a bequest for expressive activities. That the LNC could accept the entire 

bequest by depositing the funds into segregated accounts does not alter this analysis because the 

LNC alleges that it wishes to use the funds for expressive activities. Accordingly, the FEC’s 

motion to dismiss is denied. The parties shall submit jointly, within twenty days, a schedule to 

govern further proceedings in this matter.

Date: January 3, 2017

__________________________

BERYL A. HOWELL

Chief Judge

See id. at 14–18 (citing Honeywell Int’l v. NRC, 628 F.3d 568, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). The FEC argues in reply that 

“[b]ecause the LNC lacks standing, its assertion that its claims are capable of repetition yet evading review is beside 

the point.” Def.’s Reply at 9 n.4. Mootness has been an issue in past litigation between these two parties

concerning FECA’s contribution limits. See generally LNCv. FEC, No. 13-5088, Order (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2014), 

ECF No. 1485531 (en banc) (unpublished). In the earlier case, however, the LNC had accepted or was able to 

accept the entire bequest—into its general account—by the time the case reached the D.C. Circuit. See FEC’s 

Suggestion of Mootness at 1,LNC I, No. 13-5088 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 3, 2014) (“As of January 1, 2014, however, the 

LNC has either already received, or can immediately accept the entire bequest.”). Here, thousands of dollars remain 

in escrow, waiting to be distributedinto the LNC’s general account. Accordingly, the LNC’s claims are not moot,

see Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Kerry, No. 16-5015, 2016 WL 7439010, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 2016) (reversing the 

district court’s dismissal on mootness grounds because the plaintiff “ha[d] not ‘been given everything [they] asked 

for’” (quoting Noble v. Sombrotto, 525 F.3d 1230, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2008))), and the Court need not address the 

LNC’s arguments concerning the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to mootness.

Case 1:16-cv-00121-BAH Document 21 Filed 01/03/17 Page 13 of 13

Digitally signed by Hon. Beryl A. Howell 

DN: cn=Hon. Beryl A. Howell, o, ou=Chief 

Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of 

Columbia, 

email=Howell_Chambers@dcd.uscourts.gov, 

c=US 

Date: 2017.01.03 10:36:43 -05'00'

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APPENDIX 

FINDINGS OF FACT17

I. The Parties 

1. The Plaintiff, Libertarian National Committee, Inc. (“LNC”), is the national 

committee of the Libertarian Party of the United States. Pet.’s Mot. Cert., Decl. 

of Nicholas Sarwark, Chair, LNC, Inc. (“Sarwark Decl.”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 24-17; 

Def.’s Answer & Affirmative Defenses (“Def.’s Answer”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 22.

2. The Defendant, Federal Election Committee (“FEC”), is the federal government 

agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act (“FECA”), 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. Pet.’s Complaint (“Compl.”)

at 3, ECF No. 1. The FEC has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil 

enforcement of such provisions. Id. §§ 30106(b)(1), 30109. The FEC also has 

the authority to make rules and regulations necessary to carry out the FECA, id. 

§§ 30107(a)(8), 30111(a)(8), 30111(d), and to issue advisory opinions concerning 

the application of FECA and prescribed regulations, id. §§ 30107(a)(7), 30108. 

3. The LNC is a “not-for-profit organization incorporated under the laws of the 

District of Columbia.” Sarwark Decl. ¶ 1. “The LNC has 15,031 active paid 

sustaining donors, and 137,451 members, in all 50 states and the District of 

Columbia.” Id. at ¶ 2. “Over half a million registered voters identify with the 

Libertarian Party in the states in which voters can register as Libertarians.” Id. 

 

17 The Court’s findings of fact are taken from the parties’ proposed findings of fact and responses thereto. 

See Pet.’s Mot. Cert., Ex. A, Pet.’s Facts Submitted for Cert. (“Pet.’s Proposed Facts”), ECF No. 24-3; Def.’s Opp’n, 

Attach. 2, Def.’s Resps. Pet.’s Proposed Facts, ECF No. 26-2; Def.’s Opp’n, Attach. 3, Def.’s Proposed Findings of 

Fact (“Def.’s Proposed Facts”), ECF No. 26-3; Pet.’s Reply, Attach. 1, Pet.’s Resps. Def.’s Proposed Facts, ECF 

No. 27-1. To the extent that objections were lodged to any proposed factual finding, those objections are sustained, 

denied, or resolved as reflected in the factual findings included in this Appendix. 

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“[Forty-eight] partisan officeholders and 111 non-partisan officeholders across the 

country are affiliated with the Libertarian Party.” Id.

4. “Founded in 1971, the Libertarian Party has yet to elect a federal office holder, 

and no current federal office holder is affiliated with the Libertarian Party.” 

Libertarian Nat’l Comm., Inc. v. FEC (“LNC I”), 930 F. Supp. 2d 154, 172 

(D.D.C. 2013) (Wilkins, J.) (citation omitted). 

5. “The LNC’s purpose is to field national Presidential tickets, to support its state 

party affiliates in running candidates for public office, and to conduct other 

political activities in furtherance of a libertarian public policy agenda in the 

United States.” LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 172 (citation omitted); Sarwark Decl. ¶ 

3. 

6. The LNC “facilitates mutual contacts between contributors and federal 

candidates,” and “assists candidates in their efforts to win federal office.” Def.’s

Opp’n, Ex. 2, Pet.’s Resps. Def.’s First Set Requests for Admissions at 10, ECF 

No. 26-6. 

7. To achieve its political goals, the LNC organizes affiliate parties in all fifty states 

and runs candidates for public office “with the goal of reducing government 

control over individuals’ lives.” Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 6, Dep. of Nicholas Sarwark 

(“Sarwark Dep.”) at 28:4–10, ECF No. 26-10. The LNC nominates candidates for 

president and vice president on behalf of the Libertarian Party every four years. 

Id. at 48:2–7, 49:8–11. 

8. “Even if a Libertarian Party candidate does not win a federal election, the LNC 

generally views it as positive if its candidate gets more votes than the margin of 

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victory between the two major-party candidates and thus affects the outcome of 

the election.” LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d. at 173 (citation omitted). That is because 

such a result might cause a candidate of a major party to listen to the Libertarian 

Party’s position in the future or reconsider his or her own position, “since the 

party would have demonstrated that a sizeable percentage of the electorate agrees 

with the Libertarian Party and wants to see more Libertarian public policies.” Id. 

(internal quotations omitted). 

9. In a 2006 letter to prospective donors, the LNC stated that 

[o]ne of the most significant achievements of the year was our 

candidates being identified as the deciding factor in control of the 

U.S. Senate. This led to positive press coverage in the Washington 

Post and many other news outlets. Our impact in these important 

elections even led to an article in The Economist titled “Libertarians 

Emerge as a Force.” Clearly, it was a good year for our party. 

Id. at (citation omitted). 

II. The LNC’s Fundraising and Spending On Segregated Account Expenses

10. In some of its fundraising solicitations, the LNC has told potential contributors 

that their contributions will only be used for specific expenses. Sarwark Dep. at 

13:8–14:6, 40:11–21. Some donors have informed the LNC that they will only 

give money if they are told what the money will be used for. Id. at 21:18–22:3. 

Such project-based fundraising is often more effective for the LNC than asking 

for “unearmarked” money. Id. at 22:18–23:4. 

11. The LNC “earmarks” certain contributions to specify that those contributions are 

only to be used for particular categories of expenses. Id. at 13:20–14:6. Those 

earmarks include funds for “ballot access.” Id. at 14:14–15:19. This may include 

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litigation over whether the Libertarian candidate will appear on a ballot in a 

particular election. See id. at 15:7–19. 

12. The LNC maintains a “Legal Offense Fund” that is used to finance “proactive 

litigation” on behalf of the LNC. Id. at 40:11–14; see also Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 8, 

LNC Legal Offense Fund Email, ECF No. 26-12. To raise money for this fund, 

the LNC has sent solicitations to potential contributors asking them specifically to 

donate to finance proactive litigation. LNC Legal Offense Fund Email at 2. In 

one such solicitation, LNC Chair Nicholas Sarwark wrote: “I promise you that 

every dollar we receive from this fundraiser will be spent on legal offense.” Id. at 

3. 

13. The LNC also maintains a segregated account for a “building fund,” which it 

operates pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)(B). Sarwark Dep. at 14:14–15; 

Sarwark Decl. ¶ 29. 

14. The LNC does not place donations into its segregated purpose building account 

unless the donors specifically earmark their donations for building purposes. Id. 

“Of course, mortgage payments and payments for other expenses related to the 

building may be made from LNC’s general account as circumstances warrant.” 

Id.

15. “The Libertarian Party’s headquarters building makes an architectural statement 

that is consistent with the party’s mission. LNC would not occupy a headquarters 

building that would make an unsuitable architectural statement.” Id. ¶ 30. 

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16. “The Libertarian Party occasionally places political signs in its headquarters 

windows, or on the lawn in front of the building, but is prohibited by city 

ordinance from placing outdoor signage on its building.” Id. ¶ 31. 

17. News reports indicate that major cities typically bid to host the presidential 

nominating conventions of the two major legacy parties. See, e.g., Chris Brennan, 

Democrats to Convene in Philly in 2016, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Feb. 13, 

2015), 

http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/20150213_Source__Philadelphia_to_

host_2016_Democratic_Convention.html; Andrew J. Tobias, Cleveland Chosen 

to Host 2016 Republican National Convention, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (July 

8, 2014), 

https://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/07/cleveland_gop_convention_a

nnou.html. 

18. The LNC solicits directly for the building fund. Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 30, LNC 

Building Fund Solicitation Letter, ECF No. 26-34. On April 26, 2014, the LNC 

sent a solicitation to contributors asking for contributions to this fund, which the 

LNC has also referred to as the David F. Nolan Memorial Headquarters Office 

Fund. Id. at 1. The solicitation explained that “[a]ll funds raised go into a 

separate account and are dedicated to the Nolan Memorial Headquarters Office, 

and will be restricted for use toward the associated purchase, furnishing, 

renovation, and moving expenses.” Id. at 3. 

19. On April 4, 2013, the LNC sent an email to potential contributors soliciting 

contributions to its building fund that explained that “every dollar contributed to 

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the David F. Nolan Memorial Building Fund must, by law, be spent on buying an 

office or associated expenses – or it must be returned to you, the donor.” Def.’s 

Opp’n, Ex. 32, LNC Building Fund Email at 2, ECF No. 26-36. The email noted 

“that means your donation is guaranteed to be used only for the Building Fund.” 

Id. (emphasis in original). 

20. The LNC has offered recognition for people who contributed to the building fund 

at certain levels. Sarwark Dep. at 20:1–11. Specifically, the LNC offered to 

allow contributors to the building fund to name certain rooms in the LNC’s 

headquarters or place their name on plaques to be displayed in those rooms. Id. at 

18:15–19:1. 

21. The LNC has accepted money into an account authorized by 52 U.S.C. § 

30116(a)(1)(B) and (a)(9) that it could not have accepted prior to the specialized 

purpose regime’s creation because the donor had already contributed the 

maximum amount in unrestricted funds. See, e.g., Sarwark Dep. at 12:10–13:1; 

Pet.’s Proposed Facts. 

22. As of December 31, 2016, the LNC accepted a total of $31,508 in contributions to 

a segregated account for its headquarters. Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1, Decl. of Paul C. 

Clark II, Federal Election Commission (“Clark Decl.”) ¶ 13 tbl.2, ECF No. 26-5; 

Pet.’s Mot. Cert., Attach. 22, Decl. of Paul C. Clark II ¶ 13 tbl.2, ECF No. 24-22. 

One donor, Michael Chastain, donated $26,410.01 into the LNC’s segregated 

building fund in 2017. Pet.’s Mot. Cert., Attach. 20, Decl. of Michael Chastain 

(“Chastain Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 24-20. 

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23. The purpose of the LNC’s headquarters “is to provide full-time, professional 

support for the on-going political activities of the [p]arty.” Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 11, 

LNC Policy Manual at 48, ECF No. 26-15. The activities of the LNC’s 

headquarters include record keeping, member services, development activities, 

external communications, and political action. Id. at 48–49. 

24. In 2014, the LNC purchased a building to serve as its headquarters. LNC 

Building Fund Solicitation Letter at 1. The purchase price was $825,000. Id. at 2. 

25. “Among the LNC’s goals is to completely pay off the headquarters building as 

quickly as possible, and in any case prior to the 2024 due date of a balloon 

payment. [To] that end, the LNC budgets at least $60,000 in . . . odd-numbered 

year[s] to pay down the principal, and undertakes fundraising efforts dedicated 

specifically towards that purpose. Accordingly, LNC expects that it would pay 

off the mortgage well before 2024. However, the LNC’s goals at times exceed its 

budget, and budget targets are not always met.” Sarwark Decl. ¶ 28. 

26. The LNC holds a presidential nominating convention once every four years 

immediately preceding a presidential election. Sarwark Dep. at 48:2–4. The 

purpose of these conventions is to conduct party business, including hearing 

reports from various LNC committees regarding changes to the national party 

bylaws, changes to the national party platform, election of officers and at-large 

members of the LNC, the election of the judicial committee, and occasional 

adoption of public policy resolutions. See id. at 48:12–49:7. In addition, 

Libertarian candidates for president and vice president are nominated at 

presidential nominating conventions. Id. at 49:8–11. 

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27. The LNC engages in fundraising specific to expenses that would be incurred for 

presidential nominating conventions. Id. at 49:12–50:13. 

28. “All, or very nearly all, of the Libertarian Party’s expenses for holding its 

presidential nominating conventions are incurred and paid for in the year in which 

the convention is held. Occasionally . . . minor expenses related to presidential 

nominating conventions . . . are pre-paid in the year preceding the presidential 

nominating conventions. No expenses related to holding presidential nominating 

conventions are incurred in the two years following a year in which the [LNC] 

holds a presidential nominating convention.” Sarwark Decl. ¶ 34. 

29. During discovery, the LNC provided an expense report for years 2013 through 

2016. Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 7, LNC Account QuickReport, ECF No. 26-11. While 

the description of costs were not specifically tailored to the exact language of the 

segregated account provision in FECA, in general, the LNC spent roughly 

$467,251.58 on 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)-sanctioned expenses in 2016. Id. at 30. 

30. The LNC’s total budget for program expenses and cost of support and revenue, 

including fundraising, was $1,406,400 in 2014, Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 22, LNC 2014 

Budget, ECF No. 26-26, $1,304,246.33 in 2015, Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 9, LNC 2015 

Budget, ECF No. 26-13, and $2,263,183 in 2016, Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 10, LNC 

2016 Budget, ECF No. 26-14. 

31. Between December 16, 2014, and December 31, 2016, national party committees 

have accepted a total of $129,997,590 into their specialized purpose accounts. 

Clark Decl. ¶ 13 tbl.2. The national party committees affiliated with the 

Democratic Party have accepted a total of $41,510,551; the national party 

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committees affiliated with the Republican Party have accepted a total of 

$88,455,532; and the LNC has accepted $31,508. Id. No other national 

committee of any political party reported segregated account contributions as of 

December 31, 2016. Id. ¶ 14. 

III. The FECA’s Specialized Purpose Regime

32. Potential donors may forego making a contribution to the national committee of a 

political party, or reduce the amount of their contribution, if the uses of that 

contribution are restricted. See Sarwark Decl. ¶ 10; see, e.g., Pet.’s Mot. Cert., 

Attach. 19, Decl. of Chris Rufer (“Rufer Decl.”) ¶¶ 5–7, ECF No. 24-19; Chastain 

Decl. ¶¶ 5–7; Pet.’s Mot. Cert., Attach. 21, Decl. of William Redpath (“Redpath 

Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 24-21. 

33. “LNC is unaware of any documentary evidence comparing the corrupting 

potential of restricted, [specialized-purpose] contributions with the corrupting 

potential of unrestricted, general purpose contributions.” Sarwark Decl. ¶ 11. 

34. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC posed the following interrogatory to 

the FEC: “[P]lease describe in detail all evidence tending to support the 

proposition that a maximum allowable contribution to one of the separate, 

segregated accounts provided for in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9) is less corrupting 

than a contribution that exceeds the unrestricted, general purpose contribution 

limits by one dollar.” Pet.’s Mot. Cert., Ex. B, Def.’s Objections & Resps. Pet. 

LNC’s First Discovery Requests (“Def.’s First Objections & Resps.”) at 15, ECF 

24-4. The FEC responded: “The FEC cannot respond to this interrogatory 

because it rejects the premise that a contribution of any particular dollar value is 

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‘corrupting’ but that lower values are not ‘corrupting.’ Moreover, the FEC cannot 

completely answer this interrogatory, as discovery is ongoing. Nevertheless, the 

FEC is aware of case law, publicly available secondary material, and simple logic 

which dictates that parties may prefer unrestricted contributions to those that may 

only be used in connection with particular expenses. The FEC is also aware of 

LNC’s allegations that ‘the LNC has comparatively less use for funds intended to 

support national conventions, a headquarters building, or attorney fees’ and 

therefore ‘needs’ unrestricted funds ‘in order to directly speak to the electorate.’ 

Compl. ¶ 13. Additional evidence may be uncovered through continuing 

discovery in this case.” Id. at 15–16.18

35. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC posed the following interrogatory to 

the FEC: “Please describe the likelihood that an individual’s contribution of 

$101,700 to the national committee of a political party, restricted for the purpose 

of funding a headquarters building, election contests, or a presidential nominating 

convention, would create the same or greater appearance of corruption as an 

unrestricted contribution in the amount of $33,901 by that individual to the same 

national committee of a political party.” Pet.’s Mot. Cert., Ex. C, Def.’s

Objections & Resps. Pet.’s Second Discovery Requests (“Def.’s Second 

Objections & Resps.”) at 6, ECF 24-5. The FEC responded: “[L]arger 

contributions [to political parties] are generally more likely to lead to actual or 

 

18 The LNC proposed to certify only the following fact: “The FEC . . . rejects the premise that a contribution 

of any particular dollar value is ‘corrupting’ but that lower values are not ‘corrupting.’” Pet.’s Proposed Facts ¶ 30 

(citation omitted). The FEC noted that the LNC’s proposed fact excerpted from a longer interrogatory response, and 

argued that “[t]o the extent this proposed fact is certified . . . the FEC’s full response should in fairness be included. 

See FED. R. EVID. 106.” Def.’s Resps. Pet.’s Proposed Facts at 15.

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apparent quid pro quo arrangements and can do so regardless of how the funds are 

ultimately used, but unrestricted funds contributed to a political party may be used 

for activities that maximally benefit federal candidates and thus may pose a 

relatively more acute danger of actual and apparent corruption.” Id. at 7.19

36. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC posed the following interrogatory to 

the FEC: “Please explain why a maximum allowable contribution to one of the 

separate, segregated accounts provided for in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9) may be less 

corrupting than a contribution that exceeds the unrestricted, general purpose 

contribution limits by one dollar.” Def.’s First Objections & Resps. at 17. The 

FEC responded in part: “Although all contributions to political parties can create 

the risk of corruption or its appearance regardless of the way that money is 

ultimately spent, Congress could have permissibly concluded that contributions to 

a political party that directly benefit a particular candidate or can be spent directly 

on a particular election contest pose an especially acute risk warranting a lower 

dollar limit.” Id.

20

37. The FEC takes the position that “Congress could have permissibly concluded” 

that unrestricted donations to a political party pose greater risk than restricted 

donations, Def.’s First Objections & Resps. at 17, as it believes that “unrestricted 

 

19 The LNC proposed to certify only the following fact: “‘[L]arger contributions [to political parties] are 

generally more likely to lead to actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements and can do so regardless of how the 

funds are ultimately used . . . .” Pet.’s Proposed Facts ¶ 31 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The FEC 

objected that the proposed fact “omits the context of the FEC’s interrogatory response,” and argued that “[t]o the 

extent this proposed fact is certified, the FEC’s full response should in fairness be included. See FED. R. EVID. 106.” 

Def.’s Resps. Pet.’s Proposed Facts at 15–16. 20 The LNC proposed to certify only the following fact: “[A]ll contributions to political parties can create the 

risk of corruption or its appearance regardless of the way that money is ultimately spent.” Pet.’s Proposed Facts ¶ 

32 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The FEC objected that the proposed fact “omits the context of the 

FEC’s interrogatory response,” and argued that “[t]o the extent this proposed fact is certified, the FEC’s full 

response should in fairness be included. See FED. R. EVID. 106.” Def.’s Resps. Pet.’s Proposed Facts at 16.

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funds contributed to a political party may be used for activities that maximally 

benefit federal candidates and thus may pose a relatively more acute danger of 

actual and apparent corruption,” Def.’s Second Objections & Resps. at 7. 

38. “Every dollar received through the separate, segregated accounts provided for in 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9) potentially frees up another dollar in the recipient’s 

general account for unrestricted spending.” Def.’s First Objections & Resps. at 

12; Sarwark Decl. ¶ 12. 

39. “[A] political party may in some circumstances value a contribution with use 

restrictions more highly than a smaller contribution without such restrictions.” 

Sarwark Decl. ¶ 13; see also Def.’s Second Objections & Resps. at 4. 

40. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC posed the following interrogatory to 

the FEC: “Please describe the likelihood that a political party would value a 

contribution with use restrictions more highly than a smaller contribution without 

such restrictions.” Def.’s Second Objections & Resps. at 7. The FEC responded 

in part: “[U]nrestricted funds contributed to a political party may be used for 

activities that maximally benefit federal candidates and thus will generally be 

more highly valued. A political party may value a higher contribution with use 

restrictions in some circumstances, however, such as in the case of a contribution 

that the party may use to defray expenses for which it knows it must pay and for 

which it would otherwise have trouble raising funds. The party may value that 

contribution more than a smaller contribution that comes with no use restrictions 

but is easier to replicate through other fundraising efforts.”21 Id. at 8. 

 

21 The LNC proposed to certify only the following fact: “A political party may value a higher contribution 

with use restrictions in some circumstances . . . such as in the case of a contribution that the party may use to defray 

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41. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC requested that the FEC admit the 

following: “An individual’s contribution of $101,700 to the national committee of 

a political party, even if restricted for the purpose of funding a headquarters 

building, election contests, or a presidential nominating convention, may create 

the same or greater appearance of corruption as an unrestricted contribution in the 

amount of $33,901 by that individual to the same national committee of a political 

party.” Def.’s Second Objections & Resps. at 5. The FEC “denie[d] that the 

requested admission is true as a general matter but admit[ted] that the hypothetical 

scenario described in the request may occur in some circumstances, for the 

reasons provided and subject to the general caveats in the response to Request 

27.” Id. In responding to the LNC’s Request 27, the FEC asserted: 

Given the close connection and alignment of interests between 

national party committees and federal officeholders, larger 

contributions are generally more likely to lead to actual or apparent 

quid pro quo arrangements and can do so regardless of how the 

funds are ultimately used. See, e.g., Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 

219 F. Supp. 3d 86, 97 (2016) (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 

93, 154-55 (2003)), aff’d 137 S. Ct. 2178 (2017). The danger of 

actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption can, however, be 

relatively more acute when funds are used for activities that provide 

direct benefits to federal candidates. Id. at 96 (citing McConnell, 

540 U.S. at 166–71). Because unrestricted funds contributed to a 

political party may be used for activities that maximally benefit 

federal candidates, including campaign advertisements in 

coordination with candidate campaigns, political parties will 

generally value them higher and such contributions pose a relatively 

more acute danger of quid pro quo corruption. Subject to those 

general caveats, the Commission admits that a political party may in 

 

expenses for which it knows it must pay and for which it would otherwise have trouble raising funds. The party may 

value that contribution more than a smaller contribution that comes with no use restrictions but is easier to replicate 

through other fundraising efforts.” Pet.’s Proposed Facts ¶ 39 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The FEC 

“object[ed] to this proposed fact to the extent that it omits the full context of the FEC’s interrogatory response,” and 

argued that “[t]o the extent this proposed fact is certified, the FEC’s full response should in fairness be included. 

See FED. R. EVID. 106.” Def.’s Resps. Pet.’s Proposed Facts at 20.

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some circumstances value a contribution with use restrictions more 

highly than a smaller contribution without such restrictions.” 

Def.’s Second Objections & Resps. at 3−4.22

42. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC requested that the FEC admit the 

following: “Were a national committee of a political party planning to spend at 

least $101,700 from its general account in a given year for any of the purposes for 

which separate, segregated accounts are provided in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9), a 

$101,700 contribution received in one of the separate, segregated accounts would 

have the same effect as an unrestricted $101,700 contribution.” Def.’s Second 

Objections & Resps. at 5. The FEC “object[ed] to this request for admission as 

vague and ambiguous insofar as it does not define the ‘effect’ to which the request 

alludes.” Id.

43. During discovery in this litigation, the LNC posed the following interrogatories to 

the FEC: (1) “Please describe the likelihood that an individual’s contribution of 

$101,700 to the national committee of a political party, restricted for the purpose 

of funding a headquarters building, election contests, or a presidential nominating 

convention, would create the same or greater appearance of corruption as an 

unrestricted contribution in the amount of $33,901 by that individual to the same 

national committee of a political party,” Def.’s Second Objections & Resps. at 6; 

and (2) “Please describe the circumstances under which an individual’s 

 

22 The LNC proposed to certify only the following fact: “An individual’s contribution of $101,700 to the 

national committee of a political party, even if restricted for the purpose of funding a headquarters building, election 

contests, or a presidential nominating convention, may create the same or greater appearance of corruption as an 

unrestricted contribution in the amount of $33,901 by that individual to the same national committee of a political 

party.” Pet.’s Proposed Facts ¶ 40. The FEC objected that the proposed fact “omits the full context of the FEC’s [] 

response,” and argued that “[t]o the extent this proposed fact is certified, the FEC’s full response should in fairness 

be included. See FED. R. EVID. 106.” Def.’s Resps. Pet.’s Proposed Facts at 20.

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contribution of $101,700 to the national committee of a political party, restricted 

for the purpose of funding a headquarters building, election contests, or a 

presidential nominating convention, would create the same or greater appearance 

of corruption as an unrestricted contribution in the amount of $33,901 by that 

individual to the same national committee of a political party.” Id. at 8. The FEC 

responded to both interrogatories, in part, “that a particular within-limit 

contribution to the segregated account of a national committee of a political party 

could appear as corrupt as or more corrupt than a lower contribution to that 

committee’s general account that exceeds the general account limit, depending on 

circumstances such as the identity of the contributor and the receiver, the policy 

interests of the contributor, the current status of relevant policies, the financial 

needs and goals of the receiver including as to the types of spending for which 

segregated account funds might be used and the public knowledge of those 

matters, the receiver’s relative ability to raise funds for different proposed uses, 

and whether any relevant policy changes happen close in time to the 

contribution.” Id. at 7, 9.23

44. No parties, apart from the Libertarian, Democratic, and Republican Parties, have 

reported any segregated purpose accounts to the FEC. Clark Decl. ¶ 14. 

45. Between 2014 and 2016, the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) reported 

receiving $12,255,964 for its segregated convention account, $3,901,490 for its 

 

23 The LNC proposed to certify only the following facts: (1) “[A] particular within-limit contribution to the 

segregated account of a national committee of a political party could appear as corrupt as or more corrupt than a 

lower contribution to that committee’s general account that exceeds the general account limit,” and (2) “[I]t is . . . 

possible that a particular contribution below the general account limit may have an appearance of corruption that 

exceeds that of a higher contribution to a segregated account.” Pet.’s Proposed Facts ¶¶ 42, 43 (alterations in 

original) (citations omitted). The FEC objected to both proposed facts on the ground that they “omit[] needed 

context from the cited FEC discovery response.” Def.’s Resps. Pet.’s Proposed Facts at 21,22.

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segregated headquarters account, and $6,764,189 for its segregated recount 

account. Clark Decl. at 5 tbl.2. 

46. Between 2014 and 2016, the Republican National Committee (“RNC”) reported 

receiving $23,817,038 for its segregated convention account, $26,367,459 for its 

segregated headquarters account, and $5,992,015 for its segregated recount 

account. Clark Decl. at 5 tbl.2. 

47. Between 2014 and 2016, the DNC’s individual contributions, not including many 

contributions accepted in the segregated purpose accounts, totaled 

$189,112,962.62. See DNC Year-End FEC Reports at 3, line 11(a)(iii), 

http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?_15951133010+0 (last visited June 28, 

2018) (for 2014), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgibin/fecimg/?_201601299004933424+0 (last visited June 28, 2018) (for 2015), 

http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/ ?_201706019055202873+0 (last visited 

June 28, 2018) (for 2016). 

48. Between 2014 and 2016, the RNC’s individual contributions, not including many 

contributions accepted in the segregated purpose accounts, see supra ¶ 46, totaled 

$266,758,900.34. RNC Year-End FEC Reports at 3, line 11(a)(iii), 

http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?_15970244221+0 (last visited June 28, 

2018) (for 2014), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgibin/fecimg/?_201603229011936493+0 (last visited June 28, 2018) (for 2015); 

http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/ ?_201701319042260933+0 (last visited 

June 28, 2018) (for 2016). 

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49. In 2016, the RNC’s individual contributions, not including many contributions 

accepted in the segregated purpose accounts, supra ¶ 46, totaled $89,643,729.23. 

2016 RNC Year-End FEC Report at 3, line 11(a)(iii), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgibin/fecimg/?_201701319042260933+0 (last visited June 28, 2018). 

50. “Unrestricted funds are more valuable to national party committees and their 

candidates than funds that may only be used for particular categories of 

expenses.” FEC’s Proposed Facts at 9. 

51. The RNC and Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., entered a joint fundraising 

agreement during the 2016 presidential election. See Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 34, 

Excerpt of Production from Republican National Committee to the Def.’s

Subpoena to Produce Documents, ECF No. 26-38. According to that agreement, 

any donations to the joint fundraising committee that exceeded the maximum that 

could be donated to Trump’s campaign would be allocated first to RNC’s general 

operating account up to the General Party Limit. Id. at 8. Only after the 

contributor reached the General Party Limit would contributions be allocated to 

RNC’s segregated accounts pursuant to the Segregated Account Limit. Id.

52. The specialized purpose limit applicable to national party committees’ legal 

expenses allows parties to engage in litigation without having to reduce their 

general political advocacy. For example, RNC spokeswoman Cassie Smedile 

recently explained that paying for legal expenses “with funds from a pre-existing 

legal proceedings account [] [did] not reduce by a dime the resources we can put 

towards our political work.” Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 35, Matea Gold, RNC Taps Legal 

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Account to Help Pay for Lawyers for President Trump and Son Donald Jr. in 

Russia Probes, WASH. POST. (Sept. 20, 2017), ECF No. 26-39. 

IV. Political Parties and Quid Pro Quo Corruption

53. Because of the close relationship between parties and candidates, contributions to 

parties can lead to the actuality and appearance of quid pro quo corruption. 

National political parties are “inextricably intertwined” with their federal 

officeholders and candidates, with whom they “enjoy a special relationship and 

unity of interest.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 145, 155 (2003) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 

U.S. 310 (2010). In fact, “[t]here is no meaningful separation between the 

national party committees and the public officials who control them.” Id. at 155 

(citations omitted). 

54. “Once elected to legislative office, public officials enter an environment in which 

political parties-in-government control the resources crucial to subsequent 

electoral success and legislative power. Political parties organize the legislative 

caucuses that make committee assignments.” Id. at 156 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Thus, “officeholders’ reelection prospects are significantly 

influenced by attitudes of party leadership,” id. (citing Krasno & Sorauf Expert 

Report), and an individual Member’s stature and responsibilities vary 

dramatically depending on whether his party is in the majority or in the minority. 

55. Parties are not like regular political committees. Non-connected committees “do 

not select slates of candidates for elections,” “determine who will serve on 

legislative committees, elect congressional leadership, or organize legislative 

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caucuses,” but these activities count among the parties’ core responsibilities. Id.

at 188 (“Political parties have influence and power in the Legislature that vastly 

exceeds that of any interest group. . . . [P]arty affiliation is the primary way . . . 

voters identify candidates,” and therefore parties have special relationships with 

those who hold public office.). “A primary goal of all the major political parties 

is to win elections.” Cao v. FEC, 688 F. Supp. 2d 498, 527 (E.D. La.), aff’d sub 

nom. In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2010); see also id. (“The ultimate goal of a 

political party is to get as many party members as possible into elective office, 

and in doing so to increase voting and party activity by average party members.” 

(quoting declaration of former Representative Meehan)). 

56. This overriding purpose makes political parties particularly susceptible to 

contributors who want to create a quid pro quo relationship with an officeholder. 

As the Supreme Court has explained: 

Parties are []necessarily the instruments of some contributors whose 

object is not to support the party’s message or to elect party 

candidates across the board, but ratherto support a specific candidate 

for the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even to support any 

candidate who will be obliged to the contributors. 

FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n, 533 U.S. 431, 451–52 (2001); 

see also id. at 452 (“[W]hether they like it or not, [parties] act as agents for 

spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders.”); id. at 

455 (“In reality, parties . . . function for the benefit of donors whose object is to 

place candidates under obligation, a fact that parties cannot escape. Indeed, 

parties’ capacity to concentrate power to elect is the very capacity that apparently 

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opens them to exploitation as channels for circumventing contribution and 

coordinated spending limits binding on other political players.”).

57. The national committees of the two major parties—the Democratic Party and the 

Republican Party—are “both run by, and largely composed of, federal 

officeholders and candidates.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 155. “The President 

typically controls his party’s national committee, and once a favorite has emerged 

for the presidential nomination of the other party, that candidate and his party’s 

national committee typically work closely together.” McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. 

Supp. 2d 176, 697 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). The leaders of the two 

major parties are also the parties’ federal candidates, officeholders, and important

Congressional leaders. Id. at 469 (“[T]he internal structure of parties permits, for 

example, former U.S. Senator D’Amato, who chaired the [RSCC] from 1995–97, 

to at the same time serve as chair of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban 

Affairs Committee.”) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 

58. Similarly, LNC officials have run for federal office as Libertarian Party 

candidates while holding their offices with the LNC. For example, William 

Redpath is currently an at-large member of the LNC, and he previously served as 

the LNC’s national chair from July 2006 through May 2010 and as the LNC’s 

treasurer three times. Redpath Decl. ¶ 1. Redpath ran as a Libertarian Party 

candidate for United States Senate in 2008 and for United States House of 

Representatives in 2010 and 2014. Id. As national chair, Redpath was the LNC’s 

“chief executive officer . . . with full authority to direct [the LNC’s] business and 

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affairs.” LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (citation omitted). The LNC’s rules do 

not bar its leaders from also running for federal office. Id.

59. The public record contains significant evidence of actual and apparent quid pro 

quos involving contributions to national, state, and local parties. In the 1930s, 

Congress enacted restrictions on contributions to national political parties in light 

of the notorious “Democratic campaign book” scandal, in which federal 

contractors were forced to buy books at hyper-inflated prices from the Democratic 

party to assure that they would continue to receive government business. 84 

CONG. REC. 9598-99 (1939) (statement of Rep. Taylor); see also Wagner v. FEC, 

793 F.3d 1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“Congressman J. Will Taylor 

pointed to the coercion of contractors in the celebrated Democratic campaign 

book scandal as a prime example of political immorality and skullduggery that 

should not be tolerated. 84 CONG. REC. 9598-99 (1939). Representative Taylor 

recounted that, at the behest of the Democratic National Committee, party 

representatives paid visits to government contractors, reminding each one of the 

business he had received from the Government and explaining that the contractor 

was expected to buy a number of the party’s souvenir convention books—at $250 

each—in proportion to the amount of Government business he had enjoyed.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

60. In 1976, Armand Hammer was fined and placed on probation after pleading guilty 

to making an illegal contribution to President Nixon’s reelection campaign. 

David Rampe, Armand Hammer Pardoned by Bush, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 1989), 

http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/15/us/armand-hammer-pardoned-by-bush.html. 

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Mr. Hammer contributed $54,000 to the Nixon re-election campaign in the names 

of others, friends of a subordinate at Occidental Petroleum. Id. The subordinate 

was convicted of concealing the source of the contribution. Id. In 1989, Mr. 

Hammer made contributions exceeding $100,000 to the Republican Party and 

another $100,000 to the Bush-Quayle Inaugural Committee. Marc Lacey, 

Political Memo; Resurrecting Ghosts of Pardons Past, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 

2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/04/us/political-memo-resurrectingghosts-of-pardons-past.html. Shortly afterward, on August 14, 1989, President 

George H.W. Bush pardoned Mr. Hammer for his illegal contribution to President 

Nixon’s reelection campaign. Id.; David Hoffman, Bush Signs Pardon for 

Armand Hammer, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 1989), 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/15/bush-signs-pardonfor-armand-hammer/b6cb4260-bbb1-40ae-a9d6-7f67ef4a7226/. In comparing the 

pardon to President Bill Clinton’s later pardon of Marc Rich, Representative 

Henry Waxman observed that “‘[t]he appearance of a quid pro quo is just as 

strong in the Hammer case as in the Rich case, if not stronger, since Mr. Hammer 

himself gave the contribution.’” Lacey, supra. 

61. In 1988, Edwin Cox, Jr. pled guilty to bank fraud by falsifying collateral on an 

$80 million loan. Bank Fraud Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1988), 

http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/17/business/bank-fraud-guilty-plea.html. 

According to CNN’s matching of Cox family members with contribution records, 

from 1980 to 2000 that family contributed approximately $200,000 to campaigns 

of President George H.W. Bush, his relatives, and Republican campaign 

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committees. Kelly Wallace, Former President Bush Granted Last Minute Pardon 

to Contributor’s Son, CNN (Mar. 7, 2001, 1:57 PM), 

http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/03/07/bush.pardon/. In addition to 

contributing to these various campaigns, Cox’s father, Texas oilman Edwin L. 

Cox, Sr., coordinated political support for the pardon. See id. On November 24, 

1992, former White House chief of staff James Baker wrote to the White House 

counsel, copying the president, that “[f]ormer Texas Gov. Bill Clements called me 

and asked me whether or not the president would consider a pardon for Edwin 

Cox, son of Ed Cox, who is a longtime supporter of the president’s.” Id. On 

January 18, 1993, two days before leaving the White House, President Bush 

pardoned Mr. Cox for his bank fraud conviction. Id. After the pardon, Edwin 

Cox, Sr. donated at least $100,000 to the George Bush Presidential Library. Id.; 

Michael Weisskopf, A Pardon, a Presidential Library, a Big Donation, TIME

(Mar. 6, 2001), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,101652,00.html 

(noting that Edwin Cox, Sr.’s “name is etched in gold as a ‘benefactor,’ those 

whose donations amount to between $100,000 to $250,000”).

62. In McConnell, the record documented that, as one former senator described, 

“‘[l]arge soft money contributions in fact distort the legislative process. They 

affect what gets done and how it gets done. . . . [M]ake no mistake about it—this 

money affects outcomes.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (quoting Sen. Rudman). 

63. As another Senator testified: 

It is not unusual for large contributors to seek legislative favors in 

exchange for their contributions. A good example of that which 

stands out in my mind because it was so stark and recent occurred 

on the next to last day of the 1995-96 legislative session. Federal 

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Express wanted to amend a bill being considered by a Conference 

Committee . . . . This was clearly of benefit to Federal Express, 

which according to published reports had contributed $1.4 million 

in the last 2-year cycle to incumbent Members of Congress and 

almost $1 million in soft money to the political parties. I opposed 

this in the Democratic Caucus, arguing that even if it was good 

legislation, it should not be approved without holding a hearing, we 

should not cave in to special interests. One of my senior colleagues 

got up and said, ‘I’m tired of Paul always talking about special

interests; we’ve got to pay attention to who is buttering our bread.’ 

I will never forget that. This was a clear example of donors getting 

their way, not on the merits of the legislation, but just because they 

had been big contributors. I do not think there is any question that 

this is the reason it passed. 

McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 482 (quoting former Sen. Simon); see also Colo. 

Republican, 533 U.S. at 451 n.12 (quoting Senator Simon’s statement that “I 

believe people contribute to party committees on both sides of the aisle for the 

same reason that Federal Express does, because they want favors. There is an 

expectation that giving to party committees helps you legislatively.”).

64. In July 1995, the Department of Interior denied an application by three bands of 

Wisconsin Indian tribes to open a casino in Hudson, Wisconsin. S. REP. NO. 105-

167, pt. 1, at 44–45 (1998). Initially, the application was approved by a branch 

office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). Id. at 44. A wealthy group of 

neighboring tribes in Minnesota, who operated a competing casino, hired a 

prominent lobbyist and former DNC treasurer, who spoke personally with 

President Clinton and officials of the DNC. Id. Following their meeting, DNC 

officials promised to talk to the White House and have them contact Secretary of 

the Interior Bruce Babbitt. Id. at 45. Meanwhile, a career BIA employee had 

drafted “a 17-page analysis recommending approval of the Hudson application.” 

Id. According to testimony provided to a Senate Committee, Secretary Babbitt 

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felt pressure from the White House to make a determination quickly on the 

application and was aware of tribal “political contributions” to the DNC and state 

Democratic parties. Id. (recalling that Secretary Babbitt remarked to the applicant 

tribes’ attorney, “Do you have any idea how much these Indians, Indians with 

gaming contracts . . . have given to Democrats? . . . [H]alf a million dollars.”). 

Ultimately, the application was denied. Id. In the four months following the 

application’s denial, “the opposition tribes contributed $53,000 to the DNC and 

the DSCC . . . an additional $230,000 to the DNC and the DSCC during 1996, 

and . . . more than $50,000 in additional money to the Minnesota Democratic 

Party.” Id. “There is strong circumstantial evidence that the Interior 

Department’s decision to deny the Hudson application was caused in large part by 

improper political considerations, including the promise of political contributions 

from opposition tribes.” Id., pt. 2, at 3168; see also id. at 3193 (“From all the 

circumstances, there appears to be a direct relationship between the activities of 

the Department of the Interior and contributions received by the DNC and DSCC 

from the opposition tribes.”). Political donations to the DNC and the Minnesota 

Democratic Party “apparently succeeded in purchasing government policy 

concessions.” Id., pt. 1, at 45 (emphasis in original); see also McConnell, 540 

U.S. at 164–65,165 n.61 (discussing the episode in connection with of the 

governmental interests underlying § 30125(b)). 

65. Between 1995 and 1996, Roger Tamraz contributed approximately $300,000 to 

the DNC and various state Democratic parties to gain support for an oil-pipeline 

project in the Caucuses, which was opposed by the National Security Council 

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(“NSC”) and other executive branch agencies. See generally S. REP. NO. 105-

167, pt. 2, at 2907–31. NSC staff developed a policy of denying Mr. Tamraz 

“high-level U.S. Government access” to discuss the pipeline. Id. at 2911. To 

circumvent this policy, Mr. Tamraz met with DNC officials and began 

contributing to the DNC and state Democratic parties. See id. at 2912–13. All 

told, “by the end of March 1996 Tamraz had made contributions totaling 

$100,000 to the Virginia Democratic Party, $25,000 to the Virginia Legislative 

Conference, $20,000 to [Richard] Molpus[’s] campaign [for governor of 

Mississippi], $25,000 to the Louisiana Democratic Party, and $130,000 to the 

DNC.” Id. at 2913–14. In addition, Mr. Tamraz contributed “‘10 [or] 20’ 

thousand dollars either to Senator [Ted] Kennedy’s campaign or to the 

Massachusetts Democratic Party.” Id. at 2915. DNC officials “went to great 

lengths in an attempt to provide Tamraz the ‘political leverage’ he sought in his 

Caspian ventures.” Id. at 2913. Their efforts included providing pressure from 

White House and Department of Energy officials to change the U.S. 

Government’s position on the pipeline. See id. at 2928–30. While Mr. Tamraz 

was not ultimately successful “in persuading the U.S. Government to support his 

pipeline,” the Committee Report notes he “succeeded through his political 

contributions, and apparently the promise of additional donations, in enlisting 

senior United States officials in his attempt to change the working group’s policy 

on Caspian energy issues.” Id. at 2930. Undeterred by his White House rebuke, 

Mr. Tamraz also approached officials at the Overseas Private Investment 

Corporation, an independent U.S. Government agency whose president was Ruth 

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Harkin. Id. at 2929. Mr. Tamraz contributed “$35,000 to the Iowa Democratic 

Party at the request of Ruth Harkin’s husband, Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa.” Id. 

66. As explained by the D.C. Circuit in Wagner v. FEC, there were a “series of quid 

pro quos” made by the former lobbyist Jack Abramoff and former Representative 

Bob Ney. 793 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

67. Abramoff, who pled guilty in 2006 to corruption charges and served time in 

prison, has written a book about how he and fellow lobbyists made campaign 

contributions to a range of political committees as part of a strategy to obtain 

political favors. See generally JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: THE 

HARD TRUTH ABOUT WASHINGTON CORRUPTION FROM AMERICA’S MOST 

NOTORIOUS LOBBYIST (2011). 

68. Abramoff’s book describes a 1995 meeting involving former House Majority 

Whip Tom DeLay and executives from Microsoft. Id. at 64−65. The issue being 

discussed was “software program encryption export.” Id. Once “DeLay 

expressed his general support for their positions and reminded [the executives] 

that it was likely to be the Republicans who would defend the freedom they 

required to develop their company,” he made a “soft appeal for political 

contributions from the company.” Id. at 65. When one of the executives “firmly 

brushed off” the solicitation, DeLay delivered a “stern message”: he told the 

executives a story about an earlier time when Walmart had suffered by refusing to 

“‘sully their hands’” by making a contribution. Id. That refusal backfired a year 

later when Walmart could not get DeLay to “‘sully his hands’” with a request to 

get a highway ramp near one of their stores. Id. Once DeLay related this story, 

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the “quivering executives” “finally got the joke.” Id. “A $100,000 check was 

soon delivered to the [National] Republican Congressional Committee, and 

Microsoft’s relationship with the American right commenced.” Id. 

69. In 2002, in exchange for former Representative Ney’s commitment to add to the 

Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”) language to reopen a casino owned by the 

Tiguas, a Texas Indian tribe that Abramoff represented, Abramoff arranged for 

lavish contributions to be made by tribal officials to or on Ney’s behalf, including 

at least $32,000 in contributions “to Ney’s campaign and political . . . 

committees.” James V. Grimaldi & Susan Schmidt, Lawmaker From Ohio 

Subpoenaed in Abramoff Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2005), 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/04/AR2005110401197.html; FEC Opp’n, Ex. 38, 

Factual Basis for Plea of Robert W. Ney (“Ney Factual Proffer”) ¶ 10(a)(ii), ECF 

No. 26-42; see FEC Opp’n, Ex. 37, Factual Basis for Plea of Jack A. Abramoff 

(“Abramoff Factual Proffer”) ¶¶ 20, 22, ECF No. 26-41. On March 20, 2002, 

Ney agreed to “move forward” with the plan to slip into the HAVA an “abstruse” 

sentence drafted by Abramoff’s office that “would magically open the doors to 

the Tigua casino.” ABRAMOFF, supra, at 197–198, 205–06; id. at 198 (referencing 

the abstruse sentence: “Public Law 100-89 is amended by striking section 207 

(101 Stat. 668, 672)”); see also Ney Factual Proffer ¶ 10(a)(ii). Abramoff had the 

Tiguas make “substantial campaign contributions.” Ney Factual Proffer ¶ 9(d) 

(admitting receipt of substantial campaign contributions from Abramoff’s clients 

in exchange for performing official acts). Furthermore, on March 22, 2002, two 

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days after the agreement, the Tiguas donated another $30,000 to the National 

Republic Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”). NRSC Report of Receipts and 

Disbursements at 871, http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?22020272668 (last 

visited June 28, 2018); see also ABRAMOFF, supra, at 197 (noting a strategy to 

prepare for a “backlash” through a strategy of “Tigua contributions to the 

Republican Party,” which would help “construct a cadre of supporters”). 

According to Abramoff, Senator Christopher Dodd gave his “assent” in mid-April 

2002 to the plan “and a request for a $50,000 contribution to the Democrats in 

Dodd’s name.” ABRAMOFF, supra, at 206; see also id. at 206, 210 (explaining 

that Abramoff’s associate assured Abramoff that he would cover the requested 

contribution “from the budget the Tiguas had provided him,” and that neither of 

them considered that this “‘contribution’ was, in fact, merely a bribe;” according 

to Abramoff, Senator Dodd reneged when he later got “cold feet”). 

70. In his book, Abramoff described his approach to lobbying: 

As a lobbyist, I thought it only natural and right that my clients 

should reward those members who saved them such substantial 

sums with generous contributions. This quid pro quo became one 

of the hallmarks of our lobbying efforts. . . . Since the tribes I 

represented lived and died by what the Congress did to and for them, 

and since they had comparatively unlimited funds, we were in the 

position to deliver millions of dollars in legal political contributions, 

and did. 

ABRAMOFF, supra, at 90; see also McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (quoting an 

affidavit of the lobbyist Daniel Murray: “I advise my clients as to which federal 

office-holders (or candidates) they should contribute and in what amounts, in 

order to best use the resources they are able to allocate to such efforts to advance 

their legislative agenda. Such plans also would include soft money contributions 

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to political parties and interest groups associated with political issues.”); id. (“To 

have true political clout, the giving and raising of campaign money for candidates 

and political parties is often critically important.” (quoting lobbyist Wright 

Andrews)). 

71. Abramoff also explained: 

The regularity with which my staff would return from congressional 

offices with request for funds, on the heels of our asking for help 

should have disturbed me, but it didn’t. It was illegal and wrong, 

but it didn’t register as abnormal in any way. I was so used to 

hearing senator so-and-so wants $25,000 for his charity, or 

representative X wants $50,000 for the Congressional Campaign 

Committee, that I would actually double check with my staff when 

they didn’t request lucre for the legislators. The whole process 

became so perfunctory it actually seemed natural. 

ABRAMOFF, supra, at 206. 

V. The LNC’s Major Donor Network

72. “Just like the major parties, the LNC offers its donors membership in various 

major-donor groups that provide ‘certain perks’ and benefits. For example, an 

LNC donor can become a member of the ‘Chairman’s Circle’ for $25,000 

annually or $2,500 monthly, and in return, receive ‘[d]irect contact with [the] 

National Chair, POTUS [President of the United States] nominee, or significant 

L[ibertarian] P[arty] candidate during [the] campaign season.’ Chairman’s Circle 

members also receive ‘VIP Seating . . . with [the] National Chair, LNC officer, 

special guest, or POTUS nominee at [the] National Convention banquet or other 

events.’ The LNC also offers membership in major-donor groups for annual 

donors of $15,000 (‘Select Benefactor’), $5,000 (‘Beacon of Liberty’), $2,500 

(‘Pioneer of Freedom’), or $1,500 (‘Lifetime Founder’). In addition to 

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predetermined benefits, LNC staff has the ‘discretion to create and bestow 

additional benefits’ upon its major-donor group members.” LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 

2d at 179–80 (citations omitted); see also LNC Policy Manual at 36–38. 

73. “The LNC offers a monthly pledge program in which donors can agree to give a 

recurring monthly contribution to the LNC, and the LNC will automatically 

charge the donor’s credit card or checking account. The monthly pledges 

continue indefinitely until the donor decides to end the donations.” LNC I, 930 F. 

Supp. 2d at 180 (citations omitted). 

74. “Members of the LNC’s top five major-donor groups are also granted 

membership in the LNC’s ‘Torch Club,’ which entitles members to attend a 

special Torch Club event at the LNC’s national convention. The Libertarian 

Party’s federal candidates can attend this special event so long as they are also 

Torch Club members, and William Redpath attended the event while serving as 

the LNC’s national chair and running as a Libertarian Party candidate for federal 

office.” LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (citations omitted); see also LNC Policy 

Manual at 38. 

75. “The LNC offers the benefits of major-donor-group membership as an 

inducement to hopefully have people increase their contributions. And the 

inducement has worked, as the groups have been effective in attracting larger 

donations for the LNC. Donations from the relatively small group of donors who 

are members of the LNC’s major-donor groups account for a substantial 

percentage of LNC revenue.” LNC I, F. Supp. 2d at 181 (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). 

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76. “The LNC could potentially grant someone membership in one of its major-donor 

groups, such as the Chairman’s Circle, if the person showed the LNC his or her 

will providing for a bequest large enough to qualify for membership or if the 

person threatened to revoke such a bequest.” Id. at 187 (citation omitted). 

77. “If individuals informed the LNC that they intended to leave the LNC a bequest 

upon death, the LNC would be thankful to them for possibly leaving a gift for the 

LNC someday, since the LNC needs more money. And the LNC would be 

grateful to these potential future donors for the possible contributions even though 

the donors could revoke their bequests before death.” Id. (internal quotations 

omitted and citation omitted). 

78. “[I]ndividuals have bequeathed very large amounts of money to non-profit 

organizations. For example, in 2005, the National Rifle Association received a $1 

million bequest from a member and donor. And in 2003, philanthropist Joan 

Kroc bequeathed more than $200 million to National Public Radio, an amount 

almost double its then-annual budget.” Id.at 182 (citations omitted). 

79. “Philanthropists recognize that there is potential to raise great sums of money via 

bequests. For example, in 2009, Bill Gates and Warren Buffet started an effort to 

convince the 400 wealthiest Americans to pledge ‘at least 50% of their net worth 

to charity during their lifetimes or at death.’” Id. (citation omitted). In 2015, 

Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and his wife committed to giving 99% of 

their Facebook shares—then valued at more than $45 billion—to charity during 

their lives. Vindu Goel & Nick Wingfield, Mark Zuckerberg Vows to Donate 

99% of His Facebook Shares for Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015), 

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https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/technology/mark-zuckerberg-facebookcharity.html. 

80. “Many non-profit organizations have sophisticated planned-giving programs that 

solicit bequests and other forms of planned giving, such as the National Rifle 

Association, the Nature Conservancy, the American Civil Liberties Union, and 

the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Planned-giving consultants advise groups 

looking to increase their fundraising on how to more effectively solicit bequests.” 

LNC I, F. Supp. 2d at 182–83 (citations omitted). 

81. “Political parties are ‘primarily concerned with electing their candidates’ to 

office.” Id. at 178 (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (Kollar-Kotelly, 

J.)). “They have no economic interests apart from this ultimate goal, and thus ‘the 

money they raise is spent assisting their candidates’ campaigns.’” Id. (quoting 

McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 469−70 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)). As a former member 

of Congress explained: 

The ultimate goal of a political party such as the Democratic Party 

is to get as many Party members as possible into elective office, and 

in doing so to increase voting and Party activity by average Party 

members. The Party does this by developing principles on public 

policy matters the Party stands for, and then by finding candidates 

to run for the various political offices who represent those principles 

for the Party. When the Party finds its candidates, it tries to raise 

money to help get like-minded people to participate in the elections, 

and to try to get the Party’s candidates the resources they need to get 

their message out to voters. 

Id. at 178–79. 

82. “Similarly, it is the LNC’s mission to move public policy in a Libertarian 

direction by . . . nominating candidates for political office that are Libertarian and 

trying to get them elected. It is the LNC’s goal to have a Libertarian president 

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and a Libertarian Congress and Libertarians elected to governorships and state 

general assemblies, state legislatures. As the LNC told a donor in 2003, the LNC 

is in the business of winning elections and the donor’s gift goes towards making 

that happen.” LNC I, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 179 (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). 

83. “The LNC spends the bulk of its resources on obtaining access to the ballot for its 

candidates. Obtaining ballot access is probably the most important thing the 

[LNC] does, since the LNC’s role in this electoral system is to field as many 

candidates . . . as possible for federal and state and local offices[.]” Id. (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). “Thus, the LNC funds petition drives for the 

party’s federal candidates and works closely with its presidential candidate’s 

campaign on ballot-access issues.” Id. (citations omitted). 

84. “In order to receive financial support from the LNC, Libertarian Party candidates 

must be certified as Libertarian candidates by the governing board of the party in 

their state and must not support any Presidential ticket other than the Libertarian 

Party’s presidential ticket. The LNC has the power to take the Libertarian Party 

nomination away from a presidential ticket that fails to conduct its campaign in 

accordance with the party’s platform.” LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 179 (citations 

omitted); see also LNC Policy Manual at 43. 

85. “Individuals have bequeathed contributions directly to federal candidates and 

their authorized political committees.” LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (citation 

omitted). “Such contributions are subject to FECA’s limit on contributions to 

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‘any candidate and his authorized political committees.’” Id. (quoting 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(1)(A)). 

86. For example, the Estate of Louise Welch made a $2,600 contribution to Yarmuth 

for Congress in 2013. Clark Decl., Ex. B, FEC Form 3X, ECF No. 24-22. In 

2007, the Estate of Shirley Bogs made a $2,100 contribution to Kucinich for 

President 2008. Clark Decl. ¶ 15, tbl.6. And in 2006, the Estate of William G. 

Helis made a $2,100 contribution to Committee to Re-Elect Bobby Jindal. Id.

87. “Before BCRA banned soft-money donations to national party committees in 

2002, the committees could accept the full amount of a bequest from an estate so 

long as the committees designated the amount in excess of FECA’s contribution 

limit as soft money—that is, funds purportedly to be used for non-federal-election 

purposes.” LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 183. 

88. “As a result, when soft-money donations to national party committees were legal, 

estates were able to donate the entire amount of a large bequest in one lump sum. 

For example, in 2002, the Estate of Martha Huges donated $390,000 from a 

bequest to the DNC. In 1999, the Estate of Lola Cameron donated $141,988 from 

a bequest to the RNC. In 1997, the Estate of Gwendolyn Williams donated 

$133,829 from a bequest to the DNC. And in 2002, the Estate of Joan Shepard 

donated $80,000 to the RNC.” Id. at 183 (citations omitted). 

VI. The Specialized Purpose Regime’s Impact on the LNC

89. “The Libertarian Party’s ability to influence elections is in some measure related 

to its ability to raise and expend money.” Sarwark Decl. ¶ 53. “The LNC needs, 

and would prefer, to spend its funds in order to directly speak to the electorate 

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about its ideology and political mission, to support its candidates, and to build its 

institutional capability, including its ability to regularly qualify for the ballot in 

various states.” Id.

90. “LNC’s ability to solicit donations depends in part on having adequate financial 

resources on hand.” Id. at ¶ 54. “Donors, voters, and prospective political 

candidates who might be attracted to the party’s ideology are nonetheless 

dissuaded from supporting the party by its lack of resources.” Id.

91. Absent the annual contribution limit, the LNC would utilize donations exceeding 

such limit for political expression, including improving the party’s access to 

ballots, promoting awareness of the party and its ideology, and supporting 

candidates for state and federal office. Id. ¶ 56. 

92. “The LNC is confident that it could identify and develop additional donors who 

would give beyond the base annual contribution limit (currently $33,900), but 

refrain from doing so because it is illegal to give larger amounts without 

restriction and they do not perceive sufficient value in donations that carry the 

government’s purpose restrictions.” Id. ¶ 58. “The LNC would also be better 

able to attract larger testamentary bequests if the donors would know that a larger 

portion of their bequest would be immediately effective.” Id.

VII. Testamentary Contributions

93. “[I]t is possible for a bequest to raise valid anti-corruption concerns,” as the LNC 

has “concede[d].” LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 166. 

94. As a general matter, nothing prevents a living person from informing the 

beneficiary of a planned bequest about that bequest. FEC’s Proposed Facts at 8. 

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95. In the past, “associates of a decedent who has left a bequest for a national party 

committee [have] inform[ed] specific federal officeholders or candidates of the 

bequest.” LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 188. “In 2009, an attorney representing the 

co-trustees of a trust holding a bequest of over $100,000 for the Democratic Party 

wrote a letter to United States Senator Frank Lautenberg informing him of the 

bequest.” Id. “The attorney stated that his ‘good friend and accountant’ who ‘had 

interactions with [the Senator] in his role as a director of Holy Name Hospital’ 

suggested that he alert the Senator to the bequest.” Id. at 189 (alteration in 

original) (citations omitted). “The attorney sent Senator Lautenberg a copy of the 

trust documents and in doing so highlighted the fact that the bequest was for more 

than $100,000.” Id. 

96. “In April 2009, the LNC learned that it was to receive a $10,000 bequest from the 

estate of James Kelleher.” Id. “Upon learning of the bequest in an e-mail, the 

LNC’s then-national chair asked, ‘Whom do we thank?,’ even though Kelleher 

was deceased.” Id. (citations omitted). “According to the LNC, in the case of a 

bequest it ‘would be reasonable to thank anybody who was helping to [e]ffect the 

donation’ to the LNC, including ‘[p]ossibly the executor. Possibly the estate 

administrator or the estate attorney.’” Id. (alterations in original) (citations 

omitted). “As the LNC sees it, ‘[s]omebody is doing something to give $10,000 

to the [LNC], even if a penny is not coming out of their pocket, it is not 

inappropriate and mighty inexpensive to say thank you.’” Id. (alterations in 

original) (citations omitted). “For the Kelleher bequest, the LNC's director of 

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operations directed a colleague to send a thank you note to the executor of the 

Kelleher estate.” Id. (citations omitted). 

97. The LNC has been informed by living persons that those persons planned to make 

large bequests to the LNC. Those persons include Michael Chastain (value of 

bequest estimated to be between $500,000 and $1,000,000) and Dominick Frollini 

(value of bequest estimated to be between $25,000 and $75,000). Chastain Decl. 

¶ 8; Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 12, Frollini LNC Estate Planning Email, ECF No. 26-16. 

98. Another living person, William Redpath, has informed the LNC that he would 

leave a large bequest, with a value estimated at $1.1 million, to fund a trust 

charged with furthering ballot access and electoral reform, but that he would 

prefer to leave an unrestricted contribution if it would not be subject to the current 

FECA contribution limits. Redpath Decl. ¶¶ 3–5. 

99. “If a national party committee discovered that an individual planned to bequeath it 

a contribution or donation, the national party committee, its candidates, or 

officeholders could, in exchange, grant that individual political favors.” LNC I, 

930 F. Supp. 2d at 186. “A bequest may also help friends or family of the 

deceased in securing meetings with federal officeholders and candidates.” Id. at 

166. 

100.“An individual can revoke a request before death, and . . . this possibility creates 

an incentive for a national party committee to limit the risk that a planned bequest 

will be revoked.” Id. at 186. “An individual’s revocable promise to bequeath a 

contribution” in the future “could cause that political party, its candidates, or its 

office holders to grant political favors to the individual in the hopes of preventing 

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the individual from revoking his or her promise.” FEC’s Proposed Facts at 7. 

Political committees “could feel pressure to . . . ensure that a (potential) donor is 

happy with the committee’s actions lest [that donor] revoke the bequest.” LNC I, 

930 F. Supp. 2d at 167. 

101.“A living person may alter his or her estate planning documents at any time 

before death for any reason, including that a candidate, office holder, or political 

party votes or takes a political position contrary to the person’s wishes.” FEC’s 

Proposed Facts at 8. 

102.Estates have contributed more than $3.7 million in bequeathed funds to recipients 

that must file reports with the FEC, according to FEC records dating from 1978 

through August 2, 2017. Clark Decl. ¶¶ 1–4. The actual amount of bequeathed 

funds is likely even higher, because reporting entities are not required to inform 

the FEC that a particular contribution they received came from a bequest, and if 

they choose to do so anyway, they are not required to report this information in 

any standardized manner. Id. ¶ 5. For example, the LNC’s disclosures regarding 

the Shaber bequest at issue in this litigation do not indicate that the contributions 

are the result of a bequest. Id. “As a result, Shaber’s bequest to the LNC is not 

reflected in the totals described above.” Id. Bequests, therefore, are likely 

underreported to the FEC. See id.

103.National political party committees have reported bequeathed contributions that 

exceeded the General Party Limit. Clark Decl. ¶ 6 & tbl.1. For example, the 

Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (“DCCC”) received 

$206,955.46 between 2014 and 2016 in bequeathed contributions from Robert 

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Bohna. Id. at tbl.1. The DCCC “accepted $167,992.06 of the total bequest on 

December 31, 2014, with $32,400 of that amount going to the DCCC’s general 

account, and the remainder going to the type of segregated accounts described in 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9): $38,392.06 of the contribution went into the DCCC’s 

building fund, and $97,200 went to the DCCC’s recount fund.” Id. ¶ 7. “In 2015, 

the DCCC accepted an additional $32,400 of the bequest into its general fund.” 

Id. “In 2016, the DCCC accepted an additional $6,563.40 into its general fund.” 

Id.

104.“On January 13, 2017, the [RNC] accepted a total of $100,000 from the Estate of 

Richard Peter Belden by accepting $33,400 into its general account and $66,600 

into its headquarters account.” Clark Decl. ¶ 8.

105.“The [DNC] accepted $32,400 from the Ronald L. Gabriel Trust in 2013 and 

again in 2014.” Clark Decl. ¶ 9. “In 2015, DNC accepted $45,243.96 from the 

same trust by accepting $32,400 into its general account and an additional 

$12,843.96 into its convention account.” Id.

106.The “DNC also accepted $50,000 from the Sarah Weatherbee Trust on April 4, 

2015, with $33,400 of that amount going to the DNC’s general account and 

$16,600 going to its convention account.” Id. ¶ 10. “The next year, DNC 

accepted an additional $9,723.30 into its convention account.” Id.

107.The “LNC accepted $30,800 from the Estate of Raymond Groves Burrington in 

2012 and again 2013. In 2014, the LNC accepted $15,744.75 from the same 

estate.” Id. ¶ 11. 

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108.In 2010, the trustee of a trust holding a $200,000 bequest to the DNC wrote a 

letter to the then-chair of the DNC stating: 

Due to the fact that mid-term elections are upon us, I [am] working 

to get this [contribution from the decedent’s bequest] out to you as 

quickly as possible. I know it would be important to my friend, 

Michael Buckley, who we called “Buckley.” Of course I cannot 

speak with him, as he is deceased, but both of us were kindred spirits 

with regard to our political views and had many, many discussions 

on politics. As you can see by the fact that he left the [DNC] 25% 

of his estate, it was a very important thing to him. While I believe 

he would want you to use the money in the way you think best, it is 

my heartfelt belief that he would want this year’s money going 

towards defeating Carly Fiorina and Meg Whitman in California. 

Buckley was a former employee of Hewlett Packard under the reigns 

of Carly Fiorina and he was not silent with regard to how he felt 

about her. I think he would be actively campaigning against her and 

Meg Whitman, if he were alive today. 

LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 188 (alteration in the original) (citation omitted). “The 

trustee then asked the DNC to let her know if the money would in fact be used to 

help defeat Fiorina and Whitman, because the decedent’s ‘friends would be 

pleased to know.’” Id.

VIII. Joseph Shaber’s Bequest

109.Between 1988 and 2011, Joseph Shaber made donations to the LNC in amounts 

ranging from $10 to $300. Pet.’s Mot. Cert., Ex. E, Joseph Shaber Gift History, 

ECF 24-7. The most that Mr. Shaber donated to the LNC at any time during that 

period was $300 in March 1997. Id. Between June 2011 and November 2012, 

Shaber donated $100 per month to the LNC. Id. In May 2012, he donated an 

additional $100. Id.

110.In total, Mr. Shaber made 46 donations totaling $3,315 to the LNC. Id.

111.Mr. Shaber’s contributions to the LNC made him eligible to be a life member of 

the LNC in 2012. Sarwark Dep. at 78:12–18. 

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112.“On May 20, 2013, LNC sent Joseph Shaber an invitation to attend a VIP 

reception to be held on July 12, 2013, to raise money for the David F. Nolan 

Building Fund.” Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 5, Joint Stipulation ¶ 3, ECF No. 26-9; see 

also Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 14, LNC Invitation, ECF No. 26-18. This event was held 

in conjunction with FreedomFest, a large, annual convention for conservatives 

and libertarians. See Sarwark Dep. at 81:11−19; LNC Invitation at 3. The LNC 

typically participates in FreedomFest by having a table at the event and 

organizing breakout sessions to attempt to recruit and solicit donors. Sarwark 

Dep. at 82:1–10. Libertarian candidates frequently attend the event. Id. at 82:11–

13. 

113.Mr. Shaber was included on LNC in-house mailing lists, Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 3, 

Pet.’s Resps. Def.’s Interrogatories at 1, ECF No. 26-7, to which the LNC sends 

communications soliciting contributions, Sarwark Dep. at 17:7–21, 70:14–73:12. 

Mr. Shaber responded to some of these solicitations with contributions to the 

LNC. See Joseph Shaber Gift History. 

114.By April 2012, Mr. Shaber had contributed $750 to Ron Paul’s campaign in the 

Republican presidential primary. See Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 21, Shaber Contribution 

Receipt, ECF No. 26-25. Although Ron Paul was then running for the Republican 

nomination, he later switched to the Libertarian Party after leaving federal office. 

LNC I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 173. 

115.Without the LNC’s knowledge, the LNC was made a beneficiary of the Joseph 

Shaber Revocable Trust under a trust dated February 11, 2010. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 

35. 

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116.The size of Mr. Shaber’s gift to the LNC was contingent upon a variety of factors, 

including the value of Mr. Shaber’s property and whether he would have 

grandchildren at the time of his passing. See Pet.’s Mot. Cert., Ex. G, Notice of 

Irrevocable Trust, ECF No. 24-9. 

117.Mr. Shaber died on August 23, 2014, rendering the trust irrevocable. Id.; Pet.’s 

Mot. Cert., Ex. F, Escrow Agreement at 1, ECF No. 24-8; Pet,’s Mot. Cert., Ex. 

H, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-05, ECF No. 24-10. 

118.Mr. Shaber’s death prevents him from engaging in political expression, 

association, or support. Def.’s First Objections & Resps. at 4; Sarwark Decl. ¶ 

43. 

119.The LNC first had access to money from Shaber’s bequest in 2015, and took the 

maximum $33,400 allowed for unrestricted purposes, in compliance with the 

FECA’s general purpose limit, in February of that year. Decl. of Robert Kraus, 

Operations Director, LNC (“Kraus Decl.”) ¶¶ 2, 4, ECF No. 12-4; FEC Advisory 

Opinion 2015-05 at 1–2. 

120.By the terms of the trust, the LNC was named as the specific beneficiary of a 

$50,000 monetary gift, plus a residual beneficiary of 25% of the remaining trust 

estate after specific distributions were made. Notice of Irrevocable Trust at 4–5. 

The LNC was also a contingent beneficiary of an additional 25% of the residue of 

Mr. Shaber’s trust estate, which it would receive if Mr. Shaber died with no 

grandchildren. Id. Mr. Shaber did not have any grandchildren at the time of his 

death. Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 29, Email from Michelle Lauer to William Hall at 1, 

ECF No. 26-33. 

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121.It was finally determined in September 2015, that The LNC’s share of the Shaber 

trust was $235,575.20. Escrow Agreement at 1.24

122.The LNC had sent Mr. Shaber a fundraising appeal related directly to its 

headquarters building. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 36. 

123.Mr. Shaber specified that the LNC should take his bequest “outright.” Notice of 

Irrevocable Trust at 5. 

124.The FEC is unaware of any condition or limitation attached by Mr. Shaber to his 

bequest to the LNC. Def.’s First Objections & Resps. at 5. 

125.The FEC is unaware at this time of any quid pro quo arrangement related to Mr. 

Shaber’s bequest to the LNC. Def.’s First Objections & Resps. at 3. 

126.The Trustee of Shaber’s Trust could not impose restrictions on Mr. Shaber’s 

bequest that Mr. Shaber did not himself place. FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-05 at 

2.25

127.The LNC would accept and spend the entire amount of the Shaber bequest for its 

general expressive purposes, including expression in aid of its federal election 

efforts. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 38. 

128.On September 15, 2015, the Trust and the LNC agreed to deposit the remaining 

$202,175.20 due to the LNC into an escrow account. Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 27, 

Escrow Agreement at 10, ECF No. 26-31. The escrow agent, First International 

Bank & Trust, has control over the annual distributions to the LNC in amounts 

 

24 Other aspects of the record suggest that the LNC’s share of the Shaber trust was $225,000. See FEC 

Advisory Opinion 2015-05 at 1–2. The parties seem to agree that the LNC’s share of the trust was $235,575.20, 

however, see Def.’s Resps. Pet.’s Proposed Facts at 33, and thus the Court so finds. 25 The FEC Advisory Opinion notes that “[t]he request [for an advisory opinion] states that Ms. Shaber, as 

trustee, has no power to require that the [LNC] accept its share in a way not required by the Settlor,” though does 

not present this assertion as a fact. FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-05 at 2 (alterations omitted). 

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equal to the limitations of federal campaign finance law, 52 U.S.C § 

30116(a)(1)(B). Id. at 1. The Escrow Agreement instructs the Escrow Agent to 

invest the funds in the escrow account in bank accounts or certificates of deposit, 

with all interest accruing to the benefit of the national Libertarian Party, and to 

annually disburse the funds to LP at the maximum allowed permitted by 

contribution limits. Id.; Sarwark Dep. at 93:15-19. The agreement explicitly 

provides that LP may challenge the legal validity of the contribution limit, and 

demand payment of the full amount remaining in the account should its challenge 

succeed. Escrow Agreement at 2. 

129.To LNC’s knowledge, neither Mr. Shaber nor anyone related to him or acting on 

his behalf has had any relationship with the LNC, its officers, board members, or 

candidates, apart from Mr. Shaber’s contribution history. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 41.

130.The LNC received a contribution of $33,400 on behalf of Mr. Shaber from the 

escrow account on January 29, 2016. Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 19, 2016 Itemized 

Receipts, ECF No. 26-23. 

131.The LNC has also received its maximum contribution from the Shaber trust for 

2017. Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 18, 2017 Itemized Receipts, ECF No. 26-22. 

132.The LNC is prohibited from pledging, assigning, or otherwise obligating the 

anticipated contributions before they are disbursed. FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-

05 at 4 n.5 (citing FEC Advisory Opinion 2004-02). 

133.Aside from pursuing its ideological and political mission, the LNC has provided 

nothing of value to Mr. Shaber, or to anyone else, in exchange for his bequest to 

the LNC. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 42. 

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134.Upon learning of the Shaber bequest, the LNC removed Mr. Shaber from the 

membership rolls. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 44. 

IX. Other Potential Donors To The LNC

135.The LNC solicits potential contributors to include the LNC as a beneficiary in 

donors’ estate planning materials. See Def.’s Opp’n, Ex. 25, LNC Legacy 

Libertarians Email, ECF No. 26-29. On March 27, 2017, the LNC sent an email 

to 140,322 people on its contact list informing them that the party had started a 

planned giving program for people who want to designate the Libertarian Party as 

a beneficiary in their will. Pet.’s Resps. Def.’s Interrogatories at 4. The email 

noted that the “Libertarian Party will honor these generous supporters by listing 

their names on a permanent plaque at our headquarters.” Id.

136.In response to this email, Nick Frollini wrote to the LNC to explain that he had 

designated the LNC as a beneficiary in his will and that he estimated his bequest 

would be worth “between $25,000 and $75,000 at the time of [his] passing.” 

Frollini LNC Estate Planning Email at 1. The LNC’s Head of Development, 

Lauren Daugherty, responded to the email with an invitation to have dinner with 

the LNC’s national chair. Id. Frollini did not ultimately attend the dinner. 

Sarwark Dep. at 68:2−4. 

137.“If contribution limits did not apply to bequests, the LNC would increase its 

outreach about its planned giving program to its members who have a high 

capacity for giving.” Pet.’s Resps. Def.’s Interrogatories at 4. “Planned giving 

would take a more prominent place in the LNC’s donor cultivation via in person 

meetings, online correspondence, and traditional mail.” Id.

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138.“Among the donations that the LNC would solicit and accept in excess of the base 

annual contribution limit (currently $33,900) would be donations from donors 

who have already given the base annual contribution limit but stand ready to give 

more for unrestricted purposes if it were legal to do so, including Chris Rufer, 

Michael Chastain, the Shaber escrow, the forthcoming Clinard escrow, and, at 

some point, the Redpath and Chastain estates.” Sarwark Decl. ¶ 57. 

a. Chris Rufer

139.Chris Rufer is a Libertarian who desires “to maximize the ideals of the Libertarian 

Party and to see them implemented through political action.” Rufer Decl. ¶ 1. 

140.Rufer believes that “the Libertarian Party is the only organization that seeks to 

directly participate in and control the government, with the aim of steering its 

functions according to libertarian principles.” Id. ¶ 1. Therefore, he “regularly 

donate[s] money to the [LNC], and to Libertarian candidates.” Id. In 2016 alone, 

Rufer “donated over $900,000 to directly support the election of the LNC’s 

candidates.” Id.

141.Rufer “trust[s] the LNC to effectively spend funds advancing its mission, which 

[he] support[s].” Id. ¶ 2. He wishes to “maximize LNC’s unrestrained ability to 

advocate its message, and further [his] participation in the LNC’s mission, by 

donating as much as [he is] comfortably able to the LNC to be spent freely in the 

LNC’s judgment.” Id. “The government’s contribution limitations are below the 

amount [Rufer] would freely give the LNC this year, and in future years, to be 

spent as the LNC sees fit.” Id.

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142.Rufer says he wishes “to donate money to the [LNC] to advance its mission, not 

to obtain access to or the gratitude of any candidates or officeholders.” Id. ¶ 3. 

Rufer has “no expectation of receiving any special access to candidates or 

officeholders if [he] were to donate over $33,900 to the [LNC] in any given year, 

to be spent for a particular purpose or without restriction.” Id.

143.Rufer has “donated over $280,000 directly to the LNC over the years, including 

the maximum amounts allowed by law for unrestricted purposes this year, and in 

2012, 2013, and 2016.” Id. ¶ 4. 

144.Rufer “understand[s] that the government now allows [him] to donate up to 

$339,000 to the LNC per year, but not if the money would be spent as the LNC 

wishes.” Id. ¶ 5. “Any additional money [Rufer] would donate this year beyond 

the $33,900 he has already donated would come with government-imposed 

strings.” Id. Accordingly, Rufer is “not giving the LNC any additional money for 

the year.” Id.

145.Rufer does “not want any part of [his] contribution this year restricted to spending 

on a headquarters building, fees for election contests and other legal proceedings, 

and presidential nominating conventions.” Id. Rufer does “not believe that the 

LNC has much use for those spending purposes this year, and any money spent 

for those purposes may not communicate the same messages that the LNC would 

otherwise communicate with [his] donation.” Id.

146.Rufer “would donate funds to the [LNC] in excess of the annual contribution 

limits for general, non-segregated purposes and the party’s spending for 

segregated account purposes, this year and . . . in future years, but refrain[s] from 

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doing so owing to the contribution limits and restrictions imposed by the 

government.” Id. ¶ 6. Rufer understands that he “face[s] a real threat of 

prosecution if [he] were to violate the federal laws restricting [his] ability to 

donate money to the [LNC], and [he is] not willing to risk prosecution.” Id.

147.“If it is determined that the [LNC] is not subject to the limitation for general, 

non-segregated purposes, currently $33,900 per year, such that donations 

exceeding that amount per year need not be dedicated to the segregated purpose 

accounts, [Rufer] would expect to donate to the Libertarian National Committee 

in excess of that amount, this year and in future years.” Id. ¶ 7. 

b. Michael Chastain

148.Michael Chastain is a Libertarian who “desire[s] to maximize the ideals of the 

Libertarian Party and see them implemented through political action.” Chastain 

Decl. ¶ 1. 

149.Chastain believes that the “Libertarian Party is the only organization that seeks to 

directly participate in and control the government, with the aim of steering its 

functions according to libertarian principles.” Id. ¶ 1. Therefore, Chastain 

“regularly donate[s] money to the [LNC] and to Libertarian candidates.” Id.

150.Chastain “trust[s] the LNC to effectively spend funds advancing its mission, 

which [he] support[s].” Id. ¶ 2. He “wish[es] to maximize LNC’s unrestrained 

ability to advocate its message, and further [his] participation in the LNC’s 

mission, by donating as much as [he is] comfortably able to the LNC to be spent 

freely in the LNC’s judgment.” Id. “The government’s contribution limitations 

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are below the amount [Chastain] would freely give the LNC this year, and in 

future years, to be spent as the LNC sees fit.” Id.

151.Chastain “wish[es] to donate money to the [LNC] to advance its mission, not to 

obtain access to or the gratitude of any candidates or officeholders.” Id. ¶ 3. 

Chastain has “no expectation of receiving any special access to candidates or 

officeholders if [he] were to donate over $33,900 to the [LNC] in any given year, 

to be spent for a particular purpose or without restriction.” Id.

152.“Thus far in 2017, [Chastain has] donated a total of $60,310.01 to the [LNC].” 

Id. ¶ 4. Chastain has “donated the maximum $33,900 in unrestricted funds, and 

an additional $26,410.01 to the building fund.” Id.

153.Chastain “understand[s] that the government now allows him to donate up to 

$339,000 to the LNC per year, but not if the money would be spent as the LNC 

wishes.” Id. ¶ 5. “Any additional money [Chastain] would donate this year 

beyond the $33,900 he has already donated for unrestricted purposes would come 

with government-imposed strings.” Id. Accordingly, Chastain is “not giving the 

LNC any additional money for the year.” Id.

154.Chastain does “not want any additional part of his contribution this year restricted 

to spending on a headquarters building, fees for election contests and other legal 

proceedings, and presidential nominating conventions.” Id. Chastain does “not 

believe that the LNC has much use for those spending purposes this year, and any 

money spent for those purposes may not communicate the same messages that the 

LNC would otherwise communicate with [his] donation.” Id.

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155.Chastain “would donate funds to the [LNC] in excess of the annual contribution 

limits for general, non-segregated purposes and the party’s spending for 

segregated account purposes, this year and in future years, but refrain[s] from 

doing so owing to the contribution limits and restrictions imposed by the 

government.” Id. ¶ 6. Chastain “understand[s] that he face[s] a real threat of 

prosecution if [he] were to violate the federal laws restricting [his] ability to 

donate money to the [LNC], and [he is] not willing to risk prosecution.” Id.

156.“If it is determined that the [LNC]is not subject to the limitation for general, nonsegregated purposes, currently $33,900 per year, such that donations exceeding 

that amount per year need not be dedicated to the segregated purpose accounts, 

[Chastain] would donate to the [LNC] in excess of that amount, this year and in 

future years. Id. ¶ 7. 

157.Chastain is “in the process of revising [his] estate plan,” and “plan[s] to make the 

LNC a contingent beneficiary in the amount of $500,000-$1,000,000.” Id. ¶ 8. 

158.Chastain “would not want the government to impose any strings on how the LNC 

would spend [his] bequest.” Id. Chastain “would not want any part of his bequest 

to LNC restricted to spending on a headquarters building, fees for election 

contests and other legal proceedings, and presidential nominating conventions.” 

Id. Chastain “would want the LNC to have [his] bequest entirely without 

restriction.” Id.

159.Chastain “would not bequeath money to LNC in an attempt to remain affiliated 

with the party after [he is] dead.” Id. ¶ 9. “The party does not have deceased 

members.” Id.

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160.Chastain has “no idea who would be running as a Libertarian Party candidate for 

any office at the time [his] estate would disburse his assets to the Libertarian 

Party.” Id. ¶ 10. Chastain “cannot predict who will run for office under the 

Libertarian banner in the future, and [he] hope[s] and expects to live beyond the 

time through which the party’s candidates, and the likely issues they would 

espouse, may be currently foreseen.” Id.

161.Chastain has “not received any sort of benefit whatsoever for promising to 

remember the Libertarian Party in [his] will should the contribution limits 

change.” Id. ¶ 11. “The Party does not offer any benefits in exchange for being 

remembered in an individual’s will, apart from perhaps a simple expression of 

gratitude.” Id.

c. William Redpath

162.William Redpath is “currently an at-large member of the [LNC].” Redpath Decl. 

¶ 1. He has “served as the Treasurer of the Libertarian Party three times, and 

served as the National Chair of the Libertarian Party from July, 2006 through 

May, 2010.” Id. He has also repeatedly “run for public office as a Libertarian.” 

Id.

163.Redpath is a Libertarian who “desire[s] to maximize the ideals of the Libertarian 

Party and see them implemented through political action.” Id. ¶ 2. Redpath 

believes that “the Libertarian Party is the only organization that seeks to directly 

participate in and control the government, with the aim of steering its functions 

according to libertarian principles.” Id. “Therefore, [Redpath] regularly 

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donate[s] money to the [LNC] and to Libertarian candidates.” Id. “Apart from 

[his] time, over the years, [he has] contributed over $100,000 to the LNC.” Id.

164.Redpath’s “last will and testament provides that upon [his] death, 40% of his 

estate—a portion of his anticipated estate that is currently valued at over $1.1 

million—would fund a trust charged with furthering ballot access and electoral 

reform to benefit the Libertarian Party.” Id. ¶ 3. 

165.Redpath “would prefer, however, to leave this seven-figure amount to the LNC as 

an unrestricted bequest.” Id. ¶ 4. Redpath “would want [his] death to give 

expression to the LNC cause that [he has] so steadfastly endorsed and advocated 

throughout [his] life, and to assist in the LNC’s expression of its ideals and 

political program.” Id. Redpath “trust[s] the LNC to effectively use [his] bequest 

for these expressive purposes, and want[s] to maximize the LNC’s expression by 

seeing that [his] bequest is given to the LNC without restriction.” Id.

166.“But for the current contribution limits, which limit the purposes for which the 

LNC could spend [Redpath’s] bequest, [Redpath] would immediately alter [his] 

last will and testament to replace the current ballot access and electoral reform 

trust with an unrestricted donation of that same 40% of [his] estate to the LNC.” 

Id. ¶ 5. Redpath “do[es] not want any part of his bequest restricted to spending on 

a headquarters building, fees for election contests and other legal proceedings, 

and presidential nominating conventions, and [he] will not leave a sizable gift to 

the LNC so long as these strings are attached to the LNC’s ability to access [his] 

gift.” Id. Redpath “do[es] not believe that the LNC has much use for those 

spending purposes in any given year, and any money spent for those purposes 

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may not communicate the same messages that the LNC might otherwise 

communicate with [his] donation.” Id.

167.Redpath “would not bequeath money to LNC in an attempt to remain affiliated 

with the party after he is dead.” Id. ¶ 6. “The party does not have deceased 

members.” Id.

168.Redpath has “no idea who would be running as a Libertarian Party candidate for 

any office at the time his estate would disburse assets to the Libertarian Party.” 

Id. ¶ 7. Redpath “cannot predict who will run for office under the Libertarian 

banner in the future, and [he] hope[s] and expect[s] to live beyond the time 

through which the party’s candidates, and the likely issues they would espouse, 

may be currently foreseen.” Id.

169.Redpath has “not received any sort of benefit whatsoever for promising to 

remember the Libertarian Party in [his] will should the contribution limits 

change.” Id. ¶ 8. “The Party does not offer any benefits in exchange for being 

remembered in an individual’s will, apart from perhaps a simple expression of 

gratitude.” Id.

d. Frank Welch Clinard, Jr. 

170. “LNC has been left a testamentary bequest by one Frank Welch Clinard, Jr. The 

bequest does not specify any use restriction. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 45; see also Pet.’s 

Mot. Cert., Ex. L, Last Will and Testament of Frank Welch Clinard, Jr. at 3–4, 

ECF No. 24-14. 

171.Between 1988 and 2008, Clinard had sporadically donated to the LNC, in small 

amounts that totaled $1,625.30 throughout the time period. See Pet.’s Mot. Cert., 

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Ex. M, Donor Clinard Gift History, ECF No. 24-15. Only three times did his 

donations meet or exceed $100, with the highest donation amounting to $159. 

See id.26

172.“To LNC’s knowledge, neither Clinard nor anyone related to him or acting on his 

behalf has had any relationship with the LNC, its officers, board members, or 

candidates, apart from Clinard’s contribution history.” Sarwark Decl. ¶ 47. 

173.Clinard’s bequest to LNC totals $111,863.52. Pet.’s Mot. Cert., Ex. N, Estate of 

Frank W. Clinard, Jr. at 12, ECF No. 24-16. 

174.“LNC would accept and spend the entire amount of the Clinard bequest for its 

general expressive purposes, including expression in aid of its federal election 

efforts.” Sarwark Decl. ¶ 48. 

175.“LNC is in the process of establishing an escrow account so that it may receive 

the entirety of Clinard’s bequest for general expressive purposes, without 

restriction.” Id. ¶ 49. 

176.“Aside from pursuing its ideological and political mission, LNC has provided 

nothing of value to Frank Clinard, or to anyone else, in exchange for his bequest 

to the LNC.” Id. ¶ 50. 

177.“Frank Clinard’s death prevents him from engaging in political expression, 

association, or support.” Id. ¶ 51. 

178.“The LNC has removed Frank Clinard from its membership rolls on account of 

his death.” Id. ¶ 52. 

 

26 The Sarwark Declaration asserts that Clinard donated $1,625.30 to the petitioner between 1996 (rather than 

1988) and 2008. Sarwark Decl. ¶ 46. This appears to be a typographical error, which the parties inadvertently 

repeat, see Def.’s Resps. Pet.’s Proposed Facts at 49, as Exhibit M to the petitioner’s memorandum shows that 

Clinard donated $1,625.30 to the petitioner between 1988 and 2008. See Donor Clinard Gift History. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC., ) Case No. 

1444 Duke Street )

Alexandria, VA 22314 ) COMPLAINT

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. )

 )

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )

999 E Street, N.W. )

Washington, DC 20463 )

)

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Libertarian National Committee, Inc., by and through undersigned counsel, 

complains of Defendant as follows:

INTRODUCTION

“You can’t take it with you.”

Accordingly, many people leave instructions for the disbursement of their worldly

possessions and money upon their passing—instructions that our legal system aims to honor. Those

instructions, often called a “last will and testament,” are inherently expressive, conveying the

decedent’s desires to advance particular charitable and ideological goals. Often times, those

instructions direct the funding of political parties.

Consistent with this longstanding American tradition, Joseph Shaber bequeathed

$235,575.20, without restrictions, to the Libertarian National Committee. But the LNC cannot

access this money, at least not for the purposes that would best help it communicate with voters,

elect its candidates, and achieve its political objectives. 

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Defendant Federal Election Commission applies the federal annual contribution limits to

political party committees, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116, 30125 (“the Party Limit”), against decedents’

bequests, infringing upon the speech rights of both donors and donees. And while the Party Limit is

currently $33,400, that limit only applies where a particular contribution might be used for general

communication and party-building. Conversely, the Government would allow the Party to accept as

much as $100,200 per year from Shaber’s bequest provided it was used for each of three

Government-approved purposes: a national convention, attorneys, or a headquarters building. See

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B) and (a)(9). In other words, the Government imposes a content-based

restriction on a national party’s speech: a party can only spend $33,400 of a donor’s money on

general political speech, but nearly ten times that amount on Government-favored purposes.

Applying any contribution limits to Joseph Shaber’s bequest is unconstitutional.

And the content-based restrictions on how the Libertarian Party may use its funds are also

unconstitutional, on their face, and as applied against Shaber’s bequest.

THE PARTIES

1. Plaintiff Libertarian National Committee, Inc. (“LNC”) is the national committee of

the Libertarian Party of the United States. The LNC is a not-for-profit organization incorporated

under the laws of the District of Columbia, which maintains its headquarters in Alexandria,

Virginia. The LNC has 12,235 current dues paying members, in all 50 states and the District of

Columbia. Approximately 399,302 registered voters identify with the Libertarian Party in the 27

states in which voters can register as Libertarians. Throughout the Nation, 141 officeholders

(including holders of non-partisan offices), are affiliated with the Libertarian Party. The LNC’s

purpose is to field national Presidential tickets, to support its state party affiliates in running

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candidates for public office, and to conduct other political activities in furtherance of a libertarian

public policy agenda in the United States.

2. Defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) is the federal government agency

charged with administrating and enforcing the federal campaign finance laws, including the laws

challenged in this action.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1331 and 2201, and 52 U.S.C. § 30110, pursuant to which the matter should be immediately

certified to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for consideration

en banc.

4. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Legislative and Regulatory Background

5. Title 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “no person shall make

contributions– (B) to the political committees established and maintained by a national political

party, which are not the authorized political committees of any candidate, in any calendar year

which, in the aggregate, exceed $ 25,000, or, in the case of contributions made to any of the

accounts described in paragraph (9), exceed 300 percent of the amount otherwise applicable under

this subparagraph with respect to such calendar year.”

6. Title 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9) describes three “separate, segregated account[s]”

referenced in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a), to which individuals may, pursuant to that section, contribute

“300 percent of the amount otherwise applicable” under that section. These accounts are:

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(A) an account “which is used solely to defray expenses incurred with respect to a

presidential nominating convention (including the payment of deposits) or to repay

loans the proceeds of which were used to defray such expenses, or otherwise to

restore funds used to defray such expenses, except that the aggregate amount of

expenditures the national committee of a political party may make from such

account may not exceed $ 20,000,000 with respect to any single convention;”

(B) an account “which is used solely to defray expenses incurred with respect to the

construction, purchase, renovation, operation, and furnishing of one or more

headquarters buildings of the party or to repay loans the proceeds of which were used

to defray such expenses, or otherwise to restore funds used to defray such expenses

(including expenses for obligations incurred during the 2-year period which ends on

the date of the enactment of this paragraph);” and 

(C) an account “which is used to defray expenses incurred with respect to the preparation

for and the conduct of election recounts and contests and other legal proceedings.”

7. Pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30125, enacted as part of the “Bipartisan Campaign Reform

Act of 2002,” no political committee can “solicit, receive or direct to another person a contribution,

donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to

the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements” of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1). The

Libertarian Party is not one of the two parties referenced in the “Bipartisan” Act’s title.

8. The FEC has previously taken the litigating position in this Court, which this Court

has accepted, that the limitation on the amounts that political committees may “solicit” is not

violated if the funds are subject to the Party Limit when they are actually received; e.g., a political

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party may solicit bequests in any amount, provided that it does not, in any year, accept funds from

said bequests in excess of the Party Limit.

9. Pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30116(c), the contribution limits set forth in 52 U.S.C. §

30116(a)(1) are indexed for inflation. The current annual limit on contributions to political parties is

$33,400.00.

10. Although the term “person,” as used in 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1), is not specifically

defined to include an individual’s testamentary estate, Defendant FEC has determined that the

definition should be so extended. See, e.g. FEC Advisory Opinions 2015-05, 2004-02, 1999-14.

11. Accordingly, the national committees of political parties may not receive bequests

exceeding the federal contribution limits applicable to living individuals. In the event such bequests

are made, defendant FEC does not permit national party committees to receive such bequests into

escrow funds over which they exercise control, including control over the direction of the funds’

investment strategies or choice as to the amount of any withdrawals made in any particular year.

The Libertarian National Committee

12. The Libertarian Party may be the largest “third” party in the United States, but it is

generally unable to effectively recruit and advocate for its candidates. Founded in 1971, the party

has yet to elect a federal office holder. Unlike its two major competitors, the Libertarian Party’s

national committee is forced to spend the bulk of its resources securing access to the ballot, leaving

comparatively little for actual campaigning—an expensive activity in and of itself. The situation is

self-perpetuating, as a party’s ability to solicit donations depends in part on having adequate

financial resources on hand. Donors, voters, and prospective political candidates who might be

attracted to the party’s ideology are nonetheless dissuaded from supporting the party by its lack of

resources.

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13. Accordingly, the LNC has comparatively less use for funds intended to support 

national conventions, a headquarters building, or attorney fees. The LNC’s needs in these areas is

not commensurate with the needs of the two major political parties whose elected officials were

exclusively responsible for enacting the segregated account structure of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9).

The LNC needs, and would prefer, to spend its funds in order to directly speak to the electorate

about its ideology and political mission, to support its candidates, and to build its institutional

capability, including its ability to regularly qualify for the ballot in various states.

14. But for the Party Limits, the LNC would accept sums in excess of the annual

contribution limit, from living donors as well as from testamentary bequests, and spend those funds

for its general expressive purposes, including expression in aid of its federal election efforts. LNC

would accept and spend such sums in amounts that are otherwise within the limits it could accept

and spend for the segregated account purposes of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9).

The Shaber Bequest

15. Between 1988 and 2011, Joseph Shaber sporadically made small donations to the

LNC, in amounts as low as $10 and rarely exceeding $50. The most that Mr. Shaber donated to

LNC at any time during this period was $300 in March, 1997. Between June, 2011 and November,

2012, Shaber donated $100 per month to the LNC, an amount he twice supplemented by $100

during this period.

16. Unbeknown to the LNC, it was made a beneficiary of the Joseph Shaber Revocable

Living Trust U/T/D February 11, 2010 (“the trust”). 

17. On August 23, 2014, Joseph Shaber passed away, rendering the trust irrevocable.

LNC’s share of the trust’s estate is $235,575.20.

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18. LNC would accept and spend the entire amount of the Shaber bequest for its general

expressive purposes, including expression in aid of its federal election efforts.

19. Owing to Defendant FEC’s application of federal contribution limits, Plaintiff LNC

could not accept this entire bequest at once, as it would use at least some if not all of the money on

federal election efforts and for its other desired expressive purposes. Rather, the LNC accepted a

single payment of $33,400 in 2015, and agreed that the remaining $202,175.20 would be placed in

an escrow.

20. The escrow account is established pursuant to an agreement among Alexina Shaber,

a trustee of the trust, the LNC, and the escrow agent, First International Bank & Trust of Phoenix,

Arizona, attached hereto as Exhibit A. The agreement provides, inter alia, that the escrow agent is to

invest the funds in bank accounts or certificates of deposit, and to annually disburse the funds to

LNC at the maximum amount permitted by the FEC. The agreement explicitly provides, however,

that the LNC may challenge the legal validity of the contribution limit, and demand payment of the

full amount remaining in the account should its challenge succeed. LNC has received its 2016

disbursement.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF U.S. CONST. AMEND. I – RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH

APPLICATION OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS AGAINST THE SHABER BEQUEST

21. Paragraphs 1 through 20 are incorporated as though fully re-stated herein.

22. A unilateral, revocable promise to donate money to a political party at some

indeterminate future time upon one’s death does not readily create the appearance or possibility of

quid pro quo corruption justifying restrictions upon the size of bequests to political parties. Such

bequests, by their nature, cannot effectively circumvent contribution limits to political candidates

because the donor often has no idea which candidates might benefit from the contribution, no

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candidate can predictably rely on receiving the money from a bequest, and neither candidates nor

political parties risk offending the donors of bequests once the money is received.

23. Although the Libertarian Party is the nation’s third-largest political party in terms of

elected officeholders, ballot access, and participation in federal, state, and local elections, the

Libertarian Party has never seen one of its candidates elected to federal office. No current federal

office holder is affiliated with the Libertarian Party. The Libertarian Party is thus not in any position

to deliver political favors in exchange for promises of future bequests. 

24. The Supreme Court has previously upheld the Party Limit against a facial challenge,

applying a relaxed standard of review on the theory that individuals contributing to political parties

are typically engaged in associational, rather than expressive conduct. However, individuals acting

in a testamentary capacity are not exercising their associational rights, but their right of free speech

in desiring to leave a political legacy, a circumstance that the Supreme Court has not previously

considered. Laws restricting the solicitation and acceptance of testamentary contributions must

therefore be strictly scrutinized under the First Amendment. 

25. Even if the testamentary donation could be viewed as an associational rather than

primarily expressive act, the Party Limit’s application to testamentary bequests does not “leav[e]

persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering

their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates

and committees with financial resources.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (per curiam). 

26. In the absence of the Party Limit’s application to the Shaber bequest, the LNC would

substantially improve its ability to advocate and achieve electoral success by taking immediate

control over the balance of the Shaber funds.

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27. Considering the unenforceable nature of promises to make testamentary bequests; the

lack of coordination, let alone a quid-pro-quo relationship, between Joseph Shaber or anyone related

to him and the Libertarian Party; the Libertarian Party’s critical need for funds given its distant

third-party status; and the Libertarian Party’s inability, owing to its lack of elected federal

officeholders, to engage in a quid pro quo donor relationship even if it were inclined to make such

arrangements, application of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(B) and 30125 to Joseph Shaber’s bequest to

the LNC violates the First Amendment speech and associational rights of the LNC and its

supporters. Such application significantly hampers the LNC in its ability to attract and advocate for

its candidates and does not serve any valid governmental interest.

COUNT TWO

VIOLATION OF U.S. CONST. AMEND. I – RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH

CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS OF 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116, 30125

28. Paragraphs 1 through 27 are incorporated as though fully re-stated herein.

29. The Party Limit discriminates against LNC based on the content of LNC’s speech.

LNC is allowed to accept only $33,400 per year from individuals if it would use that money for

general expressive purposes, but it can accept individual donations in the amount $100,200 to speak

through a convention, to promote itself via the establishment of a headquarters building, and to pay

attorneys to speak on its behalf. The LNC could even accept any combination of these $100,200

donations, in addition to the $33,400 limit for general expressive purposes.

30. Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny. Yet there is not

even a rational basis to imagine that a $33,401 donation for general expressive purposes might

corrupt the political process, but a $100,200 donation for a political party’s lawyers, a $100,200

donation for a political party’s convention, a $100,200 donation for a political party’s headquarters

building, a $300,600 donation to a political party for all three purposes—or even a $334,000

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donation to a political party for general purposes and the maximum amount for each of the favored

purposes—would not be corrupting.

31. Because they favor, on their face, the acceptance of funds based on the content of a

political party’s speech, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(B) and 30125 violate the First Amendment

speech and associational rights of the LNC and its supporters.

COUNT THREE

VIOLATION OF U.S. CONST. AMEND. I – RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH

CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS OF 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116, 30125

AS APPLIED TO THE SHABER BEQUEST

32. Paragraphs 1 through 31 are incorporated as though fully re-stated herein.

33. Plaintiff LNC could accept the entire balance of the Shaber bequest immediately if it

agreed to spend the bulk of the money on attorney fees, a convention, or a building. Because LNC

prefers to spend that money to express itself generally, it can access only a small portion of the

Shaber bequest every year.

34. Accordingly, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(B) and 30125 violate the First Amendment

speech and associational rights of the LNC and its supporters.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Libertarian National Committee, Inc. requests that judgment be

entered in its favor and against Defendant as follows:

1. An order permanently enjoining Defendant, its officers, agents, servants, employees,

and all persons in active concert or participation with it who receives actual notice of the injunction,

from enforcing 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116 and 30125, either generally or in relation to the Shaber

Bequest;

2. Declaratory relief consistent with the injunction;

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3. Costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to any applicable statute or authority; and

4. Any other further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

Dated: January 25, 2016 Respectfully submitted,

Alan Gura (D.C. Bar No. 453449)

Gura & Possessky, PLLC

916 Prince Street, Suite 107

Alexandria, VA 22314

703.835.9085/Fax 703.997.7665

 By: /s/ Alan Gura 

Alan Gura

Attorney for Plaintiff

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From: Alan Gura

To: info@andersonreporting.net; Jacob S. Siler

Subject: Sarwark Deposition -- errata sheet

Date: Monday, August 28, 2017 8:21:03 AM

With respect to the deposition of Nicholas Sarwark on July 25, 2017, we did not receive an

errata sheet or signature page for this deposition. 

Please note there are a few non-substantive typographical errors:

Page 23, line 20: "there" should be "their"

Page 28, line 1: insert "you" after "would"

Page 39, line 14: insert "about" after "email"

Page 40, line 21: "Allen" should be "Alan"

Page 56, line 5: "request" should be "bequest"

Page 58, line 7: "Prolini" should be "Frollini"

Page 68, line 2: "Fellini" should be "Frollini"

Page 69, line 17: "Tyler" should be "Robert"

Page 84, line 11: "Paul" should be "Hall"

Page 88, line 7: "descanting" should be "dissenting"

Page 88, line 12: "descant" should be "dissent"

Page 92, line 3: "Karen Ann Haloes" should be "Caryn Ann Harlos"

Page 97, line 7: insert "52" after "Title"

Page 100, lines 5 and 6: "Krouse" should be "Kraus"

Page 101, line 1: "Krouse" should be "Kraus"

Thanks,

Alan

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A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 

Libertarian National Committee, Inc.

Account QuickReport

As of December 31, 2015

Type Date Num Name Memo 

16 · Prepaid Expenses

160 · Office Acquisition Deposits/Exp

Total 160 · Office Acquisition Deposits/Exp

167 · Prepaid Convention

167-10 · Prepaid Convention General Exp

Bill 12/17/2015 LP0017 Luckey, Denise Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup 

Credit Card Charge 12/17/2015 Nationbuilder, Inc. Split Conv Exp and IT 

Total 167-10 · Prepaid Convention General Exp 

167-20 · Prepaid Convention Travel/Other

Total 167-20 · Prepaid Convention Travel/Other

Total 167 · Prepaid Convention 

Total 16 · Prepaid Expenses 

17 · Fixed Assets

178 · Ofc Imprmnt Acq & Capt Expense

Bill 08/03/2015 283173 Fire & Life Safety America, Inc. Sprinkler Flow Alarm System 

Total 178 · Ofc Imprmnt Acq & Capt Expense 

Total 17 · Fixed Assets 

24 · Accrued Expenses

245 · Accrued Real Estate Tax

Bill 06/01/2015 City of Alexandria Virginia 2015 Property Tax 

Bill 11/04/2015 City of Alexandria Virginia 2015 Real Property Tax 

Total 245 · Accrued Real Estate Tax 

Total 24 · Accrued Expenses 

29 · Loans & Mortgages (Principal)

Bill 01/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 02/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 03/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 04/07/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 04/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 05/14/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 05/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 06/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 07/16/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 07/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 08/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 09/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 10/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 11/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 12/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Total 29 · Loans & Mortgages (Principal) 

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

Add. 86
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

31 · General Operating

Total 31 · General Operating

7000 · General Fundraising Expense

7085 · Building Fund Fundraising Exp

Credit Card Charge 01/22/2015 Gallery Leather Company, Inc. PNC BF Donor Recognition Book -003 

Credit Card Charge 01/25/2015 PlaqueMaker.com BF Donor Recognition Plaques 

Credit Card Charge 08/01/2015 Marriott Hotels Donor Recognition Benefits 

Total 7085 · Building Fund Fundraising Exp 

Total 7000 · General Fundraising Expense 

7100 · Project-Related Expenses

7111 · Legal Offense Fund

Bill 06/10/2015 LNCvFEC Gura, PLLC LNCvFEC Legal Expense 

Bill 07/27/2015 KRC Engagement Chris Wiest AAL PLLC Legal Expense 

Total 7111 · Legal Offense Fund 

Total 7100 · Project-Related Expenses 

7300 · Program-Related Expenses

7380 · Ballot Access - Other Related

7380-30 · Ballot Access Legal

Bill 12/14/2015 LPME-Lagal Branson Law Office, P.A. LPME v. ME SOS Legal Retainer 

Total 7380-30 · Ballot Access Legal 

Total 7380 · Ballot Access - Other Related 

Total 7300 · Program-Related Expenses 

8100 · Admin & Overhead Expense

8170 · Occupancy Expenses

8170-10 · Mortgage Interest Expense

Bill 01/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 02/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 03/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 04/07/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 04/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 05/14/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 05/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 06/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 07/16/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 07/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 08/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 09/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 10/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 11/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 12/25/2015 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Total 8170-10 · Mortgage Interest Expense 

8170-20 · Utilities Expense

Bill 01/10/2015 Dominion Virginia Power Electric 

Bill 01/22/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 12031556-3000189 

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

Add. 87
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

Bill 01/22/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 02/09/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 02/11/2015 Dominion Virginia Power Electric 

Bill 02/11/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 03/06/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 03/09/2015 Dominion Virginia Power Electric 

Bill 03/12/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 04/09/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 04/09/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 04/09/2015 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 05/07/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 05/09/2015 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 05/13/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 06/03/2015 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 06/10/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 06/10/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 07/03/2015 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 07/13/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 07/13/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 08/03/2015 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 08/12/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 08/17/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 09/03/2015 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 09/14/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 09/14/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 10/03/2015 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 10/07/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 10/07/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 10/20/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 11/03/2015 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 11/12/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 12/03/2015 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 12/11/2015 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 12/11/2015 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Total 8170-20 · Utilities Expense 

8170-30 · Property Taxes, Fees & Permits

Bill 11/04/2015 City of Alexandria Virginia Property Tax Map ID 073.02.08.17 

Total 8170-30 · Property Taxes, Fees & Permits 

8170-40 · Maintenance, Cleaning & Repairs

Bill 01/07/2015 IN-0270563 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 01/07/2015 IN-0270339 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 01/08/2015 01/05-08-12-15 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 01/22/2015 IN-0279359 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 01/22/2015 IN-0272173 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

Add. 88
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

169

170

171

172

173

174

175

176

Bill 01/26/2015 IN-0280053 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 01/26/2015 IN-02802807 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 01/29/2015 01/19-22-26-29 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 02/09/2015 286309 Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Bi Monthly Pest Control Services 

Bill 02/11/2015 IN-0287439 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 02/11/2015 In-0288007 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 02/12/2015 Cleaning-2/2-5-9-12 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 02/19/2015 IN-0290451 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 02/20/2015 97031 PROLEC HVAC Repair and Maint. 

Bill 02/25/2015 02/16-19-23-25 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 03/04/2015 IN-0297812 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 03/12/2015 Clean-03/02-05-09-12 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Credit Card Charge 03/12/2015 Amazon.com Maint Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 03/13/2015 ADT Security Systems BBT Security System Monthly Fee 

Credit Card Charge 03/15/2015 ComplianceSigns.com BB&T Maintenance Supplies 

Bill 03/20/2015 IN-0303901 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 03/20/2015 IN-0302708 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 03/24/2015 IN-0305212 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 03/26/2015 03/16-19-23-26 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 03/26/2015 IN-0282326 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 03/26/2015 272828 Fire & Life Safety America, Inc. Sprinkler Inspection & Maintenance 

Bill 03/26/2015 272799 Fire & Life Safety America, Inc. Sprinkler Inspection & Maintenance 

Bill 04/09/2015 03/30-4/2-4/6-4/9 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 04/09/2015 IN-0313112 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 04/15/2015 286310 Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Bi Monthly Pest Control Services 

Credit Card Charge 04/16/2015 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 04/21/2015 IN-0316233 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 04/21/2015 IN-0317282 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 04/23/2015 04/13-16-20-23 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 05/07/2015 4/27-30 & 5/4-7 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 05/13/2015 IN-0327102 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 05/17/2015 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 05/21/2015 05/11-14-18-21 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 05/27/2015 IN-0332357 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2015 Executive Lock & Key BB&T Door Locks & Repairs 

Bill 06/04/2015 05/25-28 06/01-04 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 06/10/2015 974411 HVAC PROLEC HVAC Repair and Maint. 

Bill 06/10/2015 286311 Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Bi Monthly Pest Control Services 

Credit Card Charge 06/16/2015 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 06/18/2015 06/08-11-15-18 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 06/23/2015 IN-0344385 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 06/23/2015 IN-0340253 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 06/29/2015 IN-0345066 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 07/02/2015 06/22-25-31&07/02 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Add. 89
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

199

200

201

202

203

204

205

206

207

208

209

210

211

212

213

214

215

216

217

218

219

220

Bill 07/13/2015 IN-0352242 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 07/13/2015 IN-0352034 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 07/16/2015 07/06-09-13-16 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Credit Card Charge 07/16/2015 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 07/24/2015 IN-0354902 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 07/24/2015 IN-0353526 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 07/24/2015 IN-0353316 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/03/2015 07-20-23-27-30 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 08/03/2015 283173 Fire & Life Safety America, Inc. Fire Extinguishers 

Bill 08/12/2015 IN-0365178 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/12/2015 292814 Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Bi Monthly Pest Control Services 

Bill 08/12/2015 IN-0363621 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/13/2015 08/03-06-10-13 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Credit Card Charge 08/16/2015 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 08/17/2015 98140 PROLEC Water Heater Repair 

Bill 08/27/2015 08-17-20-24-27 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 09/03/2015 IN-0374349 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 09/10/2015 08/31-09/04-07-10 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 09/14/2015 IN-0376040 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 09/15/2015 IN-0378033 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 09/16/2015 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 10/07/2015 IN-0384361 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/07/2015 IN-0384273 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/07/2015 09/14-10/08 (4 Wks) A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Credit Card Charge 10/16/2015 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 10/20/2015 IN-0391111 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/22/2015 10/12-15-19-22 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 10/22/2015 292815 Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Bi Monthly Pest Control Services 

Bill 10/30/2015 IN-0393563 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 11/04/2015 IN-0394008 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 11/05/2015 Cleaning- 10/26-29+1 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 11/12/2015 IN-0400926 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 11/16/2015 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 11/19/2015 11/9-12-16-19 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Credit Card Charge 11/19/2015 Atlantic Sun Control, Inc. BB&T Window Cleaning and Film 

Bill 11/24/2015 in-0404702 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 12/03/2015 11/23-11/30-02/03 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 12/10/2015 IN-001555 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 12/11/2015 IN-014465 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 12/11/2015 C106-AnnualMaint PROLEC Annual Maint Agreement HVAC/Electrical 

Bill 12/11/2015 IN-0411920 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 12/11/2015 304590 Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Bi Monthly Pest Control Services 

Credit Card Charge 12/16/2015 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 12/21/2015 12/7-10-14-17 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Add. 90
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

235

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

255

256

257

258

259

260

261

262

263

264

Bill 12/29/2015 99005 PROLEC HVAC/Electrical Repairs/Maint. 

Bill 12/29/2015 IN-0416973 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 12/31/2015 12/21-24-28-31 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Total 8170-40 · Maintenance, Cleaning & Repairs 

8170-50 · Property / GL Insurance

Bill 04/21/2015 CNA Insurance 3002817127 Liability Insurance 

Bill 04/21/2015 CNA Insurance 3002817127 Liability Insurance 

Bill 05/22/2015 CNA Insurance 3002817127 Liability Insurance 

Bill 09/03/2015 CNA Insurance 3002817127 Liability Insurance 

Total 8170-50 · Property / GL Insurance 

8170-60 · Assc Fees, Rent & Storage

Bill 01/01/2015 RHS-0115 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Bill 02/01/2015 RHS-0215 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Bill 03/01/2015 RHS-0315 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Bill 04/01/2015 RHS-0415 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Bill 05/04/2015 RHS-0215-1215 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Bill 06/01/2015 RHS-0615 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Bill 06/23/2015 LNC-01 / 142 Round House Sq UOA Association Spec Assessment Snow Remov

Bill 07/01/2015 RHS-0215-1215 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Credit Card Charge 07/05/2015 Public Storage, Inc. BB&T Storage Rent 

Bill 08/01/2015 RHS-0815 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Credit Card Charge 08/04/2015 Public Storage, Inc. BB&T Storage Rent 

Bill 09/01/2015 RHS-0215-1215 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Credit Card Charge 09/04/2015 Public Storage, Inc. BB&T Storage Rent 

Bill 10/01/2015 RHS-1015 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Credit Card Charge 10/04/2015 Public Storage, Inc. BB&T Storage Rent 

Bill 11/01/2015 RHS-1115 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Credit Card Charge 11/04/2015 Public Storage, Inc. BB&T Storage Rent 

Bill 12/01/2015 RHS-1215 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Credit Card Charge 12/04/2015 Public Storage, Inc. BB&T Storage Rent 

Total 8170-60 · Assc Fees, Rent & Storage 

8170-70 · Office Move Related Expenses

Credit Card Charge 06/21/2015 U-Haul International - AMERCO, Inc. BB&T Storage Moving Expense 

Credit Card Charge 07/01/2015 Colonial Parking, Inc. Storage Move Related Exp 

Credit Card Charge 07/01/2015 DC Dept. of Transportation Storage Move Related Exp 

Credit Card Charge 07/01/2015 ExxonMobil Storage Move Related Exp 

Credit Card Charge 07/01/2015 U-Haul International - AMERCO, Inc. BB&T Storage Moving Expense 

Total 8170-70 · Office Move Related Expenses 

Total 8170 · Occupancy Expenses 

Total 8100 · Admin & Overhead Expense 

8200 · Professional Services

8210 · Legal

8210-10 · Legal - General

Bill 01/07/2015 75879996 CSC - Corp. Services Co. DC Rep Filing 

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

Add. 91
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

Bill 02/19/2015 1938541 Warner, Norcross & Judd Trademark related legal services 

Bill 02/19/2015 1938542 Warner, Norcross & Judd Trademark related legal services 

Bill 04/09/2015 SCC ID #F195931-3 Virginia State Corp. Commission Annual Reg Fee 

Bill 11/02/2015 LP Legal 10/15 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 11/12/2015 81103621541 CSC - Corp. Services Co. Acct 146357A - DC Clean Hands Cert 

Bill 12/01/2015 LP-Legal-1215 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 12/29/2015 78511989 CSC - Corp. Services Co. Annual Rep DC/VA 

Bill 12/31/2015 LP Legal 1215 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Total 8210-10 · Legal - General 

Total 8210 · Legal 

Total 8200 · Professional Services 

TOTAL 

Add. 92
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 

Libertarian National Committee, Inc.

Account QuickReport

As of December 31, 2016

Type Date Num Name Memo 

16 · Prepaid Expenses

160 · Office Acquisition Deposits/Exp

Total 160 · Office Acquisition Deposits/Exp

167 · Prepaid Convention

167-10 · Prepaid Convention General Exp

Bill 01/05/2016 LP0018 Luckey, Denise Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup 

Credit Card Charge 01/17/2016 Nationbuilder, Inc. Split Conv Exp and IT (forgot to split in DecJan c

Bill 01/20/2016 LP0019 Luckey, Denise Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup 

Bill 02/01/2016 101 Daugherty, Lauren NB Conv 1/2 Conv 1/2 IT 

Bill 02/01/2016 2387 Brown, David Conv Insert 

Bill 02/10/2016 LP0020 Luckey, Denise Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup 

Bill 02/17/2016 103 Daugherty, Lauren NB Conv 1/2 Conv 1/2 IT 

Bill 02/17/2016 LP0021 Luckey, Denise Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup 

Credit Card Charge 02/17/2016 Nationbuilder, Inc. Split Conv Exp and IT (charge all to Conv) 

Bill 03/02/2016 104 Daugherty, Lauren NB Conv 1/2 Conv 1/2 IT 

Bill 03/02/2016 LP0022 Luckey, Denise Nationbuilder LP Conv Setup 

Bill 03/17/2016 105 Daugherty, Lauren Convention related 

Bill 03/17/2016 LP0023 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Credit Card Charge 03/18/2016 Nationbuilder, Inc. Conv Website 

Bill 03/31/2016 106 Daugherty, Lauren Convention related 

Bill 04/04/2016 LP0024 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Credit Card Charge 04/06/2016 Clear Imprint, LLC R bbons 

Bill 04/11/2016 2402 Brown, David Conv Insert 

Bill 04/12/2016 LP Convention David Keith Photography Convention Photography Deposit 

Credit Card Charge 04/17/2016 Nationbuilder, Inc. Conv Website 

Bill 04/19/2016 LP0025 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Bill 04/19/2016 108 Daugherty, Lauren Convention related 

Bill 06/27/2016 2415 Brown, David Conv Insert 

Bill 09/19/2016 2433 Brown, David Conv Insert 

Total 167-10 · Prepaid Convention General Exp 

167-20 · Prepaid Convention Travel/Other

Credit Card Charge 04/01/2016 American Airlines Conv Staff Travel 

Credit Card Charge 04/01/2016 American Airlines Conv VIP Travel 

Credit Card Charge 04/01/2016 Corporate & Leisure Conv VIP Travel - Air 

Credit Card Charge 04/01/2016 Delta Airlines Conv Staff Travel - Air 

Credit Card Charge 04/01/2016 Southwest Airlines Conv VIP Travel - Air 

Credit Card Charge 04/15/2016 JetBlue Conv Staff Travel - Air 

Bill 08/03/2016 LNC062018 Hyatt Regency New Orleans 2018 Convention Deposit 

Add. 93
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

Total 167-20 · Prepaid Convention Travel/Other 

Total 167 · Prepaid Convention 

Total 16 · Prepaid Expenses 

17 · Fixed Assets

178 · Ofc Imprmnt Acq & Capt Expense

Bill 08/17/2016 FR8854 Freedom Restoration, LLC Brick Entry Stair Restoration Project 

Total 178 · Ofc Imprmnt Acq & Capt Expense 

Total 17 · Fixed Assets 

24 · Accrued Expenses

244 · Other Accrued Expenses

Bill 12/30/2016 201509-LNC01 Brierly, Elizabeth 2015 Exp billed 12/16 

Total 244 · Other Accrued Expenses 

245 · Accrued Real Estate Tax

Bill 06/06/2016 City of Alexandria Virginia 2016 Real Property Tax 

Bill 10/25/2016 City of Alexandria Virginia 2016 Real Property Tax 

Total 245 · Accrued Real Estate Tax 

Total 24 · Accrued Expenses 

29 · Loans & Mortgages (Principal)

Bill 01/25/2016 Mort-0116 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 02/25/2016 Morgt 02/16 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 03/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 03/31/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Bill 04/25/2016 BBT-Loan-0416 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Check 05/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortg Principle 

Check 06/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortg Principle 

Check 07/25/2016 1607-01 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortg Principle 

Bill 08/23/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Check 08/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortg Principle 

Check 09/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortg Principle 

Check 10/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortg Principle 

Check 11/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortg Principle 

Bill 12/12/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Principle 

Check 12/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortg Principle 

Total 29 · Loans & Mortgages (Principal) 

31 · General Operating

Total 31 · General Operating

7000 · General Fundraising Expense

7085 · Building Fund Fundraising Exp

Credit Card Charge 11/20/2016 PlaqueMaker.com Donor Recognition Plaques 

Total 7085 · Building Fund Fundraising Exp 

Total 7000 · General Fundraising Expense 

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

Add. 94
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

7200 · Events and Conventions Exp

7200-10 · Convention Expenses - General

Credit Card Charge 05/01/2016 First American Media Group Podium and State Signs 

Credit Card Charge 05/01/2016 NorthStar Flags Podium Banners 

Bill 05/02/2016 110 Daugherty, Lauren Convention related 

Credit Card Charge 05/03/2016 Sign11.com Photo Op Banner 

Bill 05/04/2016 lp0026 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Credit Card Charge 05/08/2016 Trophies Plus, Inc. Awards 

Bill 05/11/2016 2697 The A V Guys, Inc. a/v 

Credit Card Charge 05/12/2016 PC Nametag, Inc. Convention Name Tag Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 05/13/2016 Northern Nye Printing Badges and Order Forms 

Credit Card Charge 05/15/2016 DC Banners and Signs State Signs 

Credit Card Charge 05/15/2016 Global Rose Conv Flowers 

Credit Card Charge 05/15/2016 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. Convention Decor 

Credit Card Charge 05/15/2016 The Digital Print Store Conv Book Printing 

Bill 05/16/2016 111-1 Daugherty, Lauren Convention related 

Bill 05/16/2016 111-2 Daugherty, Lauren Convention related 

Bill 05/19/2016 LP0027 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Bill 05/30/2016 Conv-Comedian McLellan, Jeremy Convention Entertainment 

Bill 05/31/2016 Parlm-4-Conv Brown, Richard Parliamentarian 

Bill 06/01/2016 LP0028 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Bill 06/01/2016 112 Daugherty, Lauren Convention related 

Bill 06/01/2016 2016-Conv Tatiana Moroz Music, LLC Convention Music 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 Northern Nye Printing Printing 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 First American Media Group Various Other Signage 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 Barbizon Capitol, Inc. Decor - GoBo's 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 Nationbuilder, Inc. Conv Website 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 OfficeDepot.com Name Badge Supples 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 OfficeDepot.com Conv Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 PC Nametag, Inc. Convention Name Tag Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Name Badge Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 Staples, Inc Conv General Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 The Digital Print Store Conv Book Printing 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 Walgreens, Inc. Conv Office Supplies 

Bill 06/02/2016 5311601 Moen, Tim Speaking Fees - Convention -007 

Credit Card Charge 06/02/2016 FedEx Kinko's Conv Shipping 

Bill 06/06/2016 2697 The A V Guys, Inc. a/v 

Bill 06/12/2016 1/11-6/9/16 Dixon, Eric D. Conv Video Production 

Bill 06/12/2016 1 Woods, Thomas Speaker Fee 

Credit Card Charge 06/12/2016 UStream.TV Fee for Conv Streaming 

Credit Card Charge 06/16/2016 Nationbuilder, Inc. Web Site Hosting 

Bill 06/20/2016 114 Daugherty, Lauren Convention related 

Add. 95
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

Bill 06/22/2016 CONV-2016 Ryan, Bette R bbons 

Bill 06/22/2016 CONV-2016 Ryan, Bette Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 06/22/2016 Trophies Plus, Inc. Awards 

Bill 06/23/2016 LP0029 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Bill 06/27/2016 Postage-062716 Daugherty, Lauren Convention related 

Bill 07/07/2016 LP0030 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Bill 07/11/2016 Marco-R bbons Ryan, Bette R bbons 

Bill 07/11/2016 Marco-R bbons Ryan, Bette Supplies 

Bill 07/11/2016 201605-LNC01 Brierly, Elizabeth Convention Media Support 

Bill 07/22/2016 1258 David Keith Photography Photograghy 

Bill 07/22/2016 LP0031 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Bill 08/12/2016 201606-LNC01 Brierly, Elizabeth Convention Media Support 

Bill 08/12/2016 LP0032 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Bill 08/20/2016 LP0033 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Bill 08/23/2016 201607-LNC01 Brierly, Elizabeth Convention Media Support 

Bill 09/15/2016 LP0034 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Bill 09/19/2016 LP0035 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Bill 10/11/2016 06-10-10-07 Dixon, Eric D. Conv Video Production 

Bill 10/19/2016 201609-LNC01 Brierly, Elizabeth Convention Media Support 

Bill 10/19/2016 LP0036-37 Luckey, Denise Convention related work 

Bill 10/20/2016 201609-LNC01-2 Brierly, Elizabeth Convention Media Support 

Bill 11/30/2016 201608-LNC01 Brierly, Elizabeth Convention Media Support 

Bill 12/13/2016 201610-LNC01 Brierly, Elizabeth Convention Media Support 

Bill 12/13/2016 201611-LNC01 Brierly, Elizabeth Convention Media Support 

Total 7200-10 · Convention Expenses - General 

7200-20 · Convention Expense - Travel/F&B

Bill 05/16/2016 SW-Air-Reimbursement Johnston, Robert Conv Travel - Staff 

Bill 05/17/2016 64847 Rosen Centre Hotel Deposit on F&B, Rooms, Etc. 

Bill 05/30/2016 64847-Deposit Rosen Centre Hotel Deposit on F&B, Rooms, Etc. 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 Best Western International, Inc. Conv Staff Travel - Hotel 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 Cracker Barrel Inc. Conv Staff Food 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 ExxonMobil Conv Staff Travel Gas 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 EZ Shop, Inc. Conv Srtaff Travel Gas 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 Ruby Tuesday's, Inc. Conv Staff Travel - Food 

Credit Card Charge 06/01/2016 Waffle House, Inc. Conv Staff Travel - Food 

Credit Card Charge 06/02/2016 Alamo Rent A Car Staff Car Rental 

Credit Card Charge 06/02/2016 L berty Petroleum, LLC Conv Staff Travel - Gas 

Credit Card Charge 06/02/2016 Bojangles, Inc. Conv Staff Meals 

Credit Card Charge 06/02/2016 Citgo Conv Staff Gas 

Credit Card Charge 06/02/2016 Rosen Centre Hotel Conv Staff Food 

Credit Card Charge 06/03/2016 Hilton Hotels Inc. Conv Staff Travel Hotel 

Bill 06/06/2016 MilageOrlando Dunbar, D. Nick Conv Staff Travel 

Add. 96
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

168

169

170

171

172

173

174

175

176

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

184

185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

193

194

195

196

197

198

199

200

201

202

203

204

205

206

207

208

Bill 06/12/2016 05/27-06-09-90-hrs Johnston, Robert Mears Shuttle Conv Staff Travel - Parking/Shuttl

Bill 06/14/2016 Delta-Air-Reimb Laurence A. Elder & Assc., Inc. Convention Travel - Air -002 

Bill 06/14/2016 206-64847 Rosen Centre Hotel Deposit on F&B, Rooms, Etc. 

Total 7200-20 · Convention Expense - Travel/F&B 

Total 7200 · Events and Conventions Exp 

7300 · Program-Related Expenses

7380 · Ballot Access - Other Related

7380-30 · Ballot Access Legal

Bill 10/25/2016 KET Funding Chris Wiest AAL PLLC KET Legal Expense 

Total 7380-30 · Ballot Access Legal 

Total 7380 · Ballot Access - Other Related 

Total 7300 · Program-Related Expenses 

8100 · Admin & Overhead Expense

8170 · Occupancy Expenses

8170-10 · Mortgage Interest Expense

Bill 01/25/2016 Mort-0116 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 02/25/2016 Morgt 02/16 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 03/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 03/31/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Bill 04/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Check 05/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Morgt Interest 

Check 06/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Morgt Interest 

Check 07/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Morgt Interest 

Bill 08/23/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Check 08/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Morgt Interest 

Check 09/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Morgt Interest 

Check 10/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Morgt Interest 

Check 11/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Morgt Interest 

Bill 12/12/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Mortgage Interest 

Check 12/25/2016 BB&T Loan Processing Center Morgt Interest 

Total 8170-10 · Mortgage Interest Expense 

8170-20 · Utilities Expense

Bill 01/03/2016 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 01/12/2016 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 01/12/2016 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 02/03/2016 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 02/08/2016 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 02/18/2016 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 03/03/2016 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 03/14/2016 Virginia American Water Water Bill 

Bill 03/14/2016 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

Add. 97
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

209

210

211

212

213

214

215

216

217

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

232

233

234

235

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

Bill 04/03/2016 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 04/28/2016 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 04/28/2016 Virginia American Water 

Check 05/10/2016 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 05/13/2016 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 05/13/2016 Virginia American Water 

Bill 06/06/2016 Virginia American Water 

Bill 06/12/2016 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 07/08/2016 Virginia American Water 

Check 07/10/2016 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 07/11/2016 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Check 08/10/2016 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 08/17/2016 Virginia American Water 

Bill 08/17/2016 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Bill 09/08/2016 Virginia American Water 

Check 09/10/2016 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 09/14/2016 Alexandria Renew Ent. 

Check 10/10/2016 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 10/11/2016 Virginia American Water 

Check 11/10/2016 Dominion Virginia Power 

Bill 11/18/2016 Virginia American Water 

Bill 12/06/2016 Virginia American Water 

Check 12/10/2016 Dominion Virginia Power 

Total 8170-20 · Utilities Expense 

8170-30 · Property Taxes, Fees & Permits

Credit Card Charge 03/10/2016 City of Alexandria VA BB&T Annual Bus Lic Fee 

Bill 06/06/2016 City of Alexandria Virginia Property Tax Map ID 073.02.08.17 

Bill 10/25/2016 City of Alexandria Virginia Property Tax Map ID 073.02.08.17 

Total 8170-30 · Property Taxes, Fees & Permits 

8170-40 · Maintenance, Cleaning & Repairs

Bill 01/13/2016 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 01/13/2016 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 01/14/2016 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Credit Card Charge 01/17/2016 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 02/01/2016 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 02/08/2016 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 02/08/2016 Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Bi Monthly Pest Control Services 

Bill 02/08/2016 IN-0434591 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 02/08/2016 IN-0431272 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 02/08/2016 IN-0427251 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 02/11/2016 02/01-04-08-11 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 02/16/2016 11317-11334 PROLEC VOID: Replaces check 11317-11334 

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

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REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

Add. 98
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

251

252

253

254

255

256

257

258

259

260

261

262

263

264

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

277

278

279

280

281

282

283

284

285

286

287

288

289

290

291

292

Credit Card Charge 02/16/2016 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 02/18/2016 IN-0440241 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 02/25/2016 02/15-18-22-25 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 03/14/2016 IN-0421855 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 03/14/2016 IN-0421859 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 03/14/2016 IN-0431272 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 03/16/2016 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 03/17/2016 02/29-3/3-7-10-14-17 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 03/18/2016 IN-0453108 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 03/18/2016 IN-0452340 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 03/31/2016 IN-0441419 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 03/31/2016 IN-0460239 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 03/31/2016 3/21-24-28-31 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Credit Card Charge 04/05/2016 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 04/28/2016 IN-0470654 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 04/28/2016 IN-0473693 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 04/28/2016 Cleaning-04/07-04/28 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 04/28/2016 IN-0460999 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 04/28/2016 IN-0460998 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 04/28/2016 304592 Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Bi Monthly Pest Control Services 

Bill 05/02/2016 IN-0467503 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 05/05/2016 IN-0476864 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 05/05/2016 ADT Security Systems BB&T Security System Monthly Fee 

Bill 05/13/2016 IN-0480615 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 05/19/2016 05/02-05-09-12-16-19 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 05/20/2016 IN-0481158 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 05/20/2016 IN-0483046 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 05/20/2016 IN-0483045 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Credit Card Charge 05/21/2016 Amazon.com Maint Supplies 

Bill 06/02/2016 05/23-26-30-06/02 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 06/06/2016 IN-0462887 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 06/06/2016 333970 Fire & Life Safety America, Inc. Annual Inspection 

Bill 06/06/2016 99593 PROLEC HVAC/Electrical Repairs/Maint. 

Bill 06/14/2016 304593 Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Bi Monthly Pest Control Services 

Bill 06/22/2016 IN-0496269 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 06/22/2016 IN-0493858 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 06/22/2016 IN-0493857 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 07/01/2016 Clean-06/02-06/30 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Credit Card Charge 07/01/2016 Amazon.com Maint Supplies 

Bill 07/08/2016 IN-0502777 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 07/08/2016 IN-0502776 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 07/08/2016 IN-0500822 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Add. 99
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

293

294

295

296

297

298

299

300

301

302

303

304

305

306

307

308

309

310

311

312

313

314

315

316

317

318

319

320

321

322

323

324

325

326

327

328

329

330

331

332

333

334

Bill 07/08/2016 IN-0497618 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 07/08/2016 ADT Security Systems 

Bill 07/21/2016 07/05-07/21 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 08/03/2016 IN-0513222 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/03/2016 IN-0511256 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/03/2016 IN-0510196 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/03/2016 IN-0510195 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/03/2016 ADT Security Systems 

Bill 08/03/2016 IN-0505190 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/03/2016 IN-0505169 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/03/2016 IN-0505188 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/04/2016 7/25-28 & 8/1-4 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 08/17/2016 323978 Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Bi Monthly Pest Control Services 

Bill 08/18/2016 08-11-15-18 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 08/25/2016 IN-0506443 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/25/2016 IN-0523538 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 08/25/2016 ADT Security Systems 

Bill 08/25/2016 IN-0522459 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 09/08/2016 IN-0530468 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 09/08/2016 08/22-25-31 9/1-5-8 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 09/22/2016 09/12-09/22 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 09/28/2016 IN-0540230 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 09/28/2016 ADT Security Systems 

Bill 09/28/2016 IN-0536556 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/04/2016 IN-0543081 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/04/2016 IN-0543081 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/06/2016 9/23-26 10/3-6 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 10/11/2016 IN-0545213 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/19/2016 IN-0511894 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/19/2016 IN-0517538 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/19/2016 IN-0525273 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/19/2016 ADT Security Systems 

Bill 10/25/2016 IN-0516911 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/25/2016 IN-0551346 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 10/27/2016 10/10-10/27 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 10/31/2016 330238 Better Termite & Pest Control, Inc. Bi Monthly Pest Control Services 

Bill 10/31/2016 IN-0553703 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 11/17/2016 10/31-11/17 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 11/18/2016 IN-0563922 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 11/28/2016 ADT Security Systems 

Bill 12/06/2016 IN-0568459 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 12/06/2016 IN-0567909 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

REDACTED REDACTED

REDACTED REDACTED

REDACTED REDACTED

REDACTED REDACTED

REDACTED REDACTED

REDACTED REDACTED

Add. 100
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

335

336

337

338

339

340

341

342

343

344

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

352

353

354

355

356

357

358

359

360

361

362

363

364

365

366

367

368

369

370

371

372

373

374

375

Bill 12/08/2016 Clean-11/21-12/08 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 12/15/2016 IN-0572016 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 12/15/2016 IN-0572006 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 12/15/2016 IN-0574139 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 12/22/2016 12/12-12/22-16 A & D Cleaning Service, LLC Cleaning 

Bill 12/30/2016 IN-0578279 Miller's Office Products, Inc. Cleaning & Maint. Supplies 

Bill 12/30/2016 ADT Security Systems 

Total 8170-40 · Maintenance, Cleaning & Repairs 

8170-50 · Property / GL Insurance

Bill 04/28/2016 0015265202 CNA Insurance Liability Insurance 

Bill 05/20/2016 0015408646 CNA Insurance Liability Insurance 

Total 8170-50 · Property / GL Insurance 

8170-60 · Assc Fees, Rent & Storage

Bill 01/01/2016 RHS-0116 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Credit Card Charge 01/04/2016 Public Storage, Inc. BB&T Storage Rent 

Credit Card Charge 02/01/2016 U-Haul International - AMERCO, Inc. BB&T Storage Moving Expense 

Bill 02/01/2016 RHS-0216 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Credit Card Charge 02/04/2016 Public Storage, Inc. BB&T Storage Rent 

Credit Card Charge 02/04/2016 U-Haul International - AMERCO, Inc. BB&T Storage Moving Expense 

Bill 03/01/2016 RHS-0316 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Bill 04/01/2016 RHS-0416 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Bill 05/01/2016 RHS-0516 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee LNC-01 

Check 06/01/2016 16060101 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee 

Check 07/01/2016 0716-01 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee 

Check 08/01/2016 160801001 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee 

Check 09/01/2016 RHS-0916 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee 

Check 10/01/2016 161001001 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee 

Check 11/01/2016 16110101 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee 

Check 12/01/2016 ACH1201161 Round House Sq UOA Association Fee 

Total 8170-60 · Assc Fees, Rent & Storage 

Total 8170 · Occupancy Expenses 

Total 8100 · Admin & Overhead Expense 

8200 · Professional Services

8210 · Legal

8210-10 · Legal - General

Bill 02/01/2016 LP Legal 01/16 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 03/01/2016 LP-Legal-0216 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 03/31/2016 81104185149 CSC - Corp. Services Co. Annual Report Filing 

Bill 03/31/2016 81104183078 CSC - Corp. Services Co. Annual Report Filing 

Bill 03/31/2016 LP Legal 03/16 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 04/29/2016 LP-Legal 04/16 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

REDACTED REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

Add. 101
4

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 

Type Date Num Name Memo 

376

377

378

379

380

381

382

383

384

385

386

387

388

389

390

391

Bill 05/31/2016 LP-Legal-0516 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 06/30/2016 LP Legal 0616 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 07/31/2016 LP-Legal-0716 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 08/31/2016 LP Legal 0816 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 09/30/2016 LP Legal 0916 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 10/31/2016 LP Legal 10/16 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 11/30/2016 LP Legal 1116 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Bill 12/22/2016 77160412 CSC - Corp. Services Co. Annual Reg Rep Fee 

Bill 12/30/2016 LP Legal 1216 Hall, Oliver Legal Retainer 

Total 8210-10 · Legal - General 

8210-20 · Legal - Proactive

Bill 02/18/2016 LNCvFEC Gura, PLLC Legal LNC v FEC 

Total 8210-20 · Legal - Proactive 

Total 8210 · Legal 

Total 8200 · Professional Services 

TOTAL 

Add. 102
2016 Budget 

* Annual 

Budget 

2016

Support and Revenue

20-Membership Dues 415,000

21-Donations 318,800

22-Recurring Gifts 329,300

23-Board/ED Solicitation MajorGifts 60,000

24-Convention Revenue 240,000

25-Project Program Revenue 10,000

26-Brand Dev / Political Materials Rev 316,269

27-Ballot Access & Related Donations 213,700

28-Membership Communication 4,800

29-Other Revenue 0

Total Support and Revenue 1,907,869

Cost of Support and Revenue

32-Fundraising Costs 201,364

33-Membership Fundraising Costs 127,200

35-Convention 200,000

36-Ballot Access Fundraising Exp 16,800

37-Building Fundraising Exp 0

Total Cost of Support and Revenue 545,364

Net Support Available for Programs 1,362,505

Program Expense

40-Adminstrative Costs 310,050

45-Compensation 448,800

50-Affiliate Support 55,000

55-Brand Dev / Political Materials 366,269

58-Campus Outreach 1,000

60-Candidate, Campaign & Initiatives 49,000

70-Ballot Access VR & Related Exp 390,000

75-Litigation 20,000

80-Media 10,000

85-Member Communication 62,500

88-Outreach 5,200

90-Project Program Other 0

Total Program Expense 1,717,819

Total Net Operating Surplus (or Deficit) (355,314)

Unrestricted Net Operating Surplus (or Def (19,814)

Note: $3,464.00 budgeted capital expenses plus release to pay off mortgage 

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Subject: Re: [Lnc‐business] Added Mortgage Payment

From: Caryn Ann Harlos <carynannharlos@gmail.com>

Date: 11/29/2016 5:32 PM

To: "lnc‐business@hq.lp.org" <lnc‐business@hq.lp.org>

Okay that's what I thought.  Yet I think the argument can sƟll be made that we should have the right to put where

we wish ‐ but yes, a strategic legal quesƟon.

Not one I am sure is worth blowing a ton of interest on if this is the only way to get principle  paid down.

On Tuesday, November 29, 2016, Nicholas Sarwark <chair@lp.org> wrote:

We are suing the Federal government over the limitaƟons on how much

we can take from a bequest in a parƟcular year.  One of their

arguments is that we could take more if we put it into their special

segregated accounts (building, convenƟon, and legal); we have argued

that we want it for operaƟng funds to do poliƟcal work, not to put

it in a special bucket.

‐Nick

On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 12:45 PM, Caryn Ann Harlos

<carynannharlos@gmail.com> wrote:

> Details? I know tangenƟally what you mean but not fully.

>

>

> On Tuesday, November 29, 2016, Nicholas Sarwark <chair@lp.org> wrote:

>>

>> Drawing money from the current bequest into any account other than the

>> operaƟng account may have a negaƟve impact on pending Federal

>> liƟgaƟon.

>>

>> ‐Nick

>>

>> On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Caryn Ann Harlos

>> <carynannharlos@gmail.com> wrote:

>> > My suggesƟon though would require paying the 105K (approx) during one

>> > year

>> > (this one most likely) and then having the re‐set for what we can draw

>> > from

>> > the bequest next year.

>> >

>> > Basically I am suggesƟng taking full advantage of what we can get from

>> > the

>> > bequest to put towards this.

>> >

>> > This would seem to saƟsfy a lot of issues.

>> >

>> > Again, not saying I support but it is an alternaƟve I thought about. It

>> > seems (?) everyone is in agreement on the make‐up we need to do from the

Re:	[Lnc‐business]	Added	Mortgage	Payment

1	of	27 5/23/2017	11:20	AM

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USCA Case #18-5227 Document #1749853 Filed: 09/10/2018 Page 144 of 150
Libertarian Party 

2600 Virginia Avenue NW, Suite 200 

Washington, DC 20037 

(202) 333-0008 • LP.org 

April 26, 2014

 

Dear [name], 

Thank you for supporting our David F. Nolan 

Memorial Headquarters Office Fund.

I'm happy to report that the Libertarian National 

Committee has just closed on a new office in Alexandria, 

Virginia. 

We did it! We're moving! 

We have several upcoming expenditures we need your 

additional help with. 

According to our records, you have donated [amount] 

to the fund, which gives you the donor level of [level]! 

These are the donor levels:

 $25,000 or more — Nolan Liberty Room

 $10,000 or more — Nolan Founder

 $5,000 or more — Nolan Hero of Liberty

 $1,000 or more — Nolan Benefactor of Liberty

 $500 or more — Nolan Defender of Liberty

 $250 or more — Nolan Friend of Liberty

 $100 or more — Nolan Advocate of Liberty

If you donate an additional [higheramount], 

then you'll rise to the level of [higherlevel]. 

As long as your total donation reaches $100 or 

more, your name will appear as follows:

[fullname]

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Our new office is a modern, recently renovated, 

all-brick end unit of a town house style building, and 

it's only three blocks away from a major Metro subway 

stop. The purchase price is $825,000. And the address is 

1444 Duke Street in Alexandria, Virginia. 

I hope to have better photos for you soon, but 

here’s a view of the main entrance. 

1444 Duke Street

I am very happy about our choice. Our current 

estimate is that we'll save over $6,200 per month after 

the move.

We hope to have the move completed within the next 

month or so.

Right before closing, we had ($333,500) in our 

Nolan Memorial Office Fund, plus ($61,255) in pledges to 

the fund. (But those are pledges, not money in the 

bank.) 

 Our mortgage down payment was $325,000.

Estimates of other related expenditures:

 $7,500 in closing costs

 $30,000 for renovations, modifications, and permits

 $15,000 for furniture

 $20,000 for moving expenses

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That's about $397,500 in total cash we need to have 

raised by the end of May. So we're still ($64,000) 

short.

If all of the pledges come in, we'll have 

($394,755), still ($2,745) short. But we can't count on 

all of the pledges coming in. (And several thousand 

dollars of the pledges are for future years.)

We need to bring in ($64,000) by the end of May. 

One of our pledges is for $32,400 from a reliable 

major donor, so we're counting on that coming in.

Please help me collect the other ($31,600) ASAP.

Please send the best donation you can in the enclosed 

envelope.

All funds raised go into a separate account and are 

dedicated to the Nolan Memorial Headquarters Office, and 

will be restricted for use toward the associated 

purchase, furnishing, renovation, and moving expenses.

If we raise extra money, that's even better. It 

will be restricted to the office fund, and we can use it 

to pay down the mortgage.

Our National Chair, Geoff Neale, just signed the 

final closing documents yesterday. It's a big 

commitment, and as soon as possible, I'd like to be able 

to tell our chairman we have all the money in the bank 

we need.

By the way, Geoff and Nancy Neale donated $10,000 

to the Office Fund this past March. 

Thanks again for your past support. If you can make 

another donation today, I sure would appreciate it.

Once again, if you donate an additional

[higheramount], then you'll rise to the level of 

[higherlevel]

But any amount is helpful.

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You can donate using the enclosed form and 

envelope, or call 1-800-ELECT-US, or donate online at

LP.org/office-fund.

Sincerely,

Wes Benedict, Executive Director

Libertarian Party

P.S. Please help us finish the move. Please send your 

best donation in the enclosed envelope. You can also 

donate online at LP.org/office-fund, or call 1-800-

ELECT-US. 

Paid for by the Libertarian National Committee, Inc., 2600 Virginia Avenue NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20037.

Not authorized by any candidate or candidate committee.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC., ) Case No. 1:16-CV-0121-BAH

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. )

 )

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )

 )

Defendant. )

 ) 

DECLARATION OF ROBERT KRAUS

I, Robert Kraus, declare the following based on my personal knowledge:

1. I am the Operations Director of the Libertarian National Committee, Inc. (“LNC”), a

position I have held for the past eleven years.

2. On October 14, 2014, the LNC received a letter dated October 9, 2014, notifying it

for the first time that it would receive a bequest from Joseph Shaber’s trust. The amount due the

LNC from the Shaber bequest was not finally determined until September, 2015.

3. The LNC did not voluntarily forego any payment in 2014.

4. The first payment received by LNC from the Shaber bequest was a payment of

$33,400, received on February 25, 2015.

5. In 2015, the LNC did not hold a presidential nominating convention. The LNC spent

no money on a presidential nominating convention in 2015.

6. In 2015, the LNC spent $7,260.61 with respect to the preparation for and the

conduct of legal proceedings.

7. In 2015, the LNC spent a total of $72,827.11 on its headquarters, including

mortgage payments, utilities, property taxes, maintenance, cleaning, insurance, and association fees. 

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Executed this the 2nd day of May, 2016.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Robert Kraus

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