a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

Senate

February 2004 WEAPONS OF MASS 

DESTRUCTION

Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency 

Addresses Broad 

Range of Threats,

but Performance 

Reporting Can Be 

Improved

GAO-04-330
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-330.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph A. 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979. 

Highlights of GAO-04-330, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities, Committee on 

Armed Services, U.S. Senate 

February 2004

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Addresses Broad Range of Threats, but 

Performance Reporting Can Be Improved 

Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to address the threat of 

WMD. DTRA addresses WMD threats through four core functions: threat 

control, threat reduction, combat support, and technology development. 

The agency supports the implementation of arms control treaties by 

conducting inspections in other countries and by supporting inspections of 

U.S. facilities, reduces the threat of WMD by eliminating and securing 

weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, supports military 

commanders by providing technical and analytical support regarding WMD, 

and develops technologies that support efforts to address the WMD threat. 

DTRA also uses its specialized capabilities and services in various ways to 

support other government efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA has a 

formal relationship with Energy to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons 

stockpile. DTRA’s relationship with DHS is subject to the broader DOD-DHS 

relationship and may change as the relationship between DOD and DHS 

evolves. 

The agency uses a strategic planning process modeled on the Government 

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to prioritize its resources and 

assess progress toward its organizational goals. DTRA’s planning process 

identifies long-term goals, establishes short-term objectives by which to 

measure progress in meeting goals, and collects data to assess progress. 

DTRA’s planning process is influenced by funding, most of which is 

appropriated for specific programs. GAO found that the performance report 

resulting from its internal review summarized DTRA’s accomplishments and 

activities but did not compare them with established goals and objectives 

nor explain the actions needed to achieve or modify these unmet goals as 

called for under GPRA. 

DTRA’s Four Core Functions to Address WMD Threats 

• Eliminates Russian 

WMD 

• Strengthens security at 

Russian nuclear 

weapons transportation 

and storage facilities 

• Eliminates any WMD 

assets found in Iraq 

• Eliminates strategic 

submarines, bombers, 

and missiles 

• Provides employment 

for Russian WMD 

scientists, such as at 

former biological 

weapons research 

facilities

• Conducts assessments 

of DOD and other 

facilities' vulnerabliity to 

terrorist attacks 

• Maintains the security 

and safety of the nuclear 

weapons stockpile 

• Provides a continuous 

resource to answer 

WMD-related questions 

• Helps commanders plan 

attacks against 

suspected WMD sites— 

what weapons to use, 

when to carry out the 

attack, and how to attack 

the site—to mitigate the 

potential WMD effects

• Facilitates and escorts 

foreign inspection teams' 

visits to U.S. and U.S. 

overseas facilities subject 

to arms control 

agreements 

• Provides DOD support 

to United Nations 

inspection and 

monitoring activities 

• Conducts intrusive arms 

control inspections under 

the terms of arms control 

treaties and agreements 

• Assists efforts to counter 

WMD smuggling across 

borders in the former 

Soviet Union

• Develops sensor 

technologies to detect 

WMD for use on the 

battlefield or to support 

arms control efforts 

• Develops capabilities 

to assess, analyze, 

and mitigate the effects 

of WMD 

• Develops specialized 

weapons, such as 

bunker busting bombs 

• Researches 

persistence of various 

chemical and biological 

agents under a variety 

of conditions

Threat control Threat reduction Combat support Technology development

Sources: GAO and DTRA.

The Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA), within the 

Department of Defense (DOD), 

plays a key role in addressing the 

threats posed by weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD). Since the 

September 11, 2001, attacks, the 

visibility of DTRA’s role has 

increased as federal agencies and 

military commanders have looked 

to the agency for additional 

support and advice. 

GAO was asked to report on 

DTRA’s (1) mission and the efforts 

it undertakes to fulfill this mission; 

(2) relationship with other 

government entities, specifically 

the Department of Energy and the 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS); and (3) process that it uses 

to prioritize resources and assess 

progress toward organizational 

goals. 

GAO recommends that the Director 

of DTRA improve the agency’s 

annual performance report by 

comparing the agency’s actual 

performance against planned goals 

and, where appropriate, explain 

why goals were not met and the 

agency’s plan to address these 

unmet goals in the future. 

DTRA agreed with the GAO 

recommendation that it improve its 

annual performance report. DTRA 

stated that it is refining its 

performance report methodology 

to better address the linkage of 

reported performance to planned 

goals and future efforts. 
Page i GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

DTRA’s Mission Is to Address All Aspects of the WMD Threat 8

DTRA Works with Other Government Agencies 15

DTRA’s Planning Process Establishes Priorities and Summarizes 

Progress, but Achievements Are Not Reported against Goals 18

Conclusions 24

Recommendations 24

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24

Scope and Methodology 24

Appendix

Appendix I: Comments from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 27

Related GAO Products 29

GAO Products Covering the CTR Program 29

Tables Table 1: DTRA’s Budget and Personnel 4

Table 2: DTRA Role in Nine Treaties and Agreements 10

Figures Figure 1: DTRA Locations 5

Figure 2: Establishment of DTRA and Significant Changes 6

Figure 3: DTRA Activities That Address the Threat of WMD 9

Figure 4: DTRA’s Funding Profile, Fiscal Year 2004 21

Figure 5: GPRA Performance Reporting Requirements Compared 

with DTRA’s 2002 Performance Report 23
Contents

Page ii GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Abbreviations

ASCO Advanced Systems Concepts Office

CBDP Chemical and Biological Defense Program

CMAT Consequence Management Advisory Team

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NWC Nuclear Weapons Council

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Page 1 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

February 13, 2004 Letr

The Honorable Pat Roberts

Chairman, Subcommittee on

 Emerging Threats and Capabilities

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of 

Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With a fiscal year 2004 budget 

request of more than $2.3 billion, the agency has a broad range of 

responsibilities, including the support of combat commanders in defending 

against nuclear, chemical, and biological threats on the battlefield and 

monitoring international arms control treaties. Since the September 11, 

2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon 

in Washington, D.C., and the anthrax attack in Washington, D.C., federal 

agencies and military commanders have increasingly looked to DTRA for 

support and advice. 

Because of the increased visibility of this agency’s role within DOD and in 

relation to other federal agencies, particularly the Departments of Energy 

and Homeland Security (DHS), you asked us to report on DTRA’s (1) 

mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2) relationship 

with other government entities, specifically Energy and DHS; and (3) 

process that it uses to prioritize resources and assess progress toward 

organizational goals. 

To meet these objectives, we reviewed DTRA’s 2000, 2001, and 2003 

strategic plans and interviewed its Director. We reviewed supporting 

documentation, including budget documents, historical records, program 

and project plans, and assessments. We also interviewed senior officials 

from each of DTRA’s core functions and other DTRA officials and 

contractors associated with specific programs. We met with officials from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss their assessments of 

DTRA and the agency’s relationships with other government entities. In 

addition, we interviewed officials from Energy to discuss its interaction 

with DTRA, including the management of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
Page 2 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Results in Brief Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to address the threat of 

WMD. DTRA program documents show that its mission is carried out 

through four core functions—(1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3) 

combat support, and (4) technology development. First, the agency works 

to control the threat of WMD by verifying other countries’ compliance with 

arms control treaties and by meeting U.S. obligations to support 

inspections of U.S. facilities. For example, DTRA personnel inspect 

Russian facilities to ensure compliance with treaties limiting WMD delivery 

systems and provide support for Russian inspections of similar U.S. 

facilities. Second, DTRA works to reduce the threat of WMD by eliminating 

and securing weapons and materials through the Cooperative Threat 

Reduction program in the former Soviet Union. Third, DTRA works to 

support military commanders by providing technical and analytical support 

regarding WMD. For example, DTRA provides commanders with 

information on the vulnerabilities of their forces and installations to a 

WMD attack. Finally, the agency develops technologies that support efforts 

to address the WMD threat. For example, the agency develops computer 

programs that model the effects of WMD releases, specialized weapons for 

use against WMD targets, and sensors to detect the presence of WMD 

materials.

DTRA’s specialized capabilities and services are also used to support 

civilian agencies’ efforts to address WMD threats, particularly the efforts of 

Energy and DHS. DTRA has a formal relationship with Energy’s National 

Nuclear Security Administration, resulting from legislation requiring DOD 

and Energy to share responsibility for maintaining the U.S. nuclear 

weapons stockpile. The Nuclear Weapons Council, to which DTRA 

provides staffing and expertise, manages this responsibility, which includes 

the production, inventorying, and dismantlement of all nuclear weapons. 

DTRA works with Energy on several other programs, including securing 

nuclear materials in Russia. However, as we reported in March 2003, these 

efforts face several coordination issues.1

 DTRA also works with DHS on a 

variety of programs, such as the International Counterproliferation 

Program. DTRA’s relationship with DHS may change as the relationship 

between DOD and DHS evolves. DTRA also works with and supports other 

federal entities, state and local governments, and governments with which 

1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian 

Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites,

GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2003).
Page 3 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

the United States has bilateral agreements. For example, DTRA provides 

training for emergency personnel responding to WMD incidents and 

assesses the vulnerability of personnel and facilities to WMD threats.

DTRA uses a strategic planning process to prioritize resources and assess 

progress toward its organizational goals; however, its performance report 

does not document the extent to which the agency’s accomplishments and 

activities may or may not have met these goals. DTRA’s strategic planning 

process incorporates elements of the Government Performance and 

Results Act of 1993; the agency’s process identifies long-term goals, 

establishes short-term objectives by which to measure progress in meeting 

goals, and collects data to assess progress. The resources prioritized 

through this process consist of personnel and funds for the agency’s use, 

funds for the congressionally directed Cooperative Threat Reduction 

program, and the Chemical and Biological Defense Program administered 

by DTRA. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense assess DTRA’s performance biennially, and their most recent 

reviews concluded that, in general, DTRA supports the requirements of the 

operating military forces by providing useful products and services. For 

example, the 2001 assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff commended 

DTRA’s focus on supporting military commanders. In 2002, DTRA 

completed an internal self-assessment that resulted in the 2002 

performance report. While DTRA management quarterly tracks the 

agency’s progress against its goals, the 2002 performance report 

summarizes the agency’s accomplishments and activities but does not 

compare these accomplishments and activities with the established goals 

and objectives, nor does it explain why performance goals may not have 

been met. For example, it discusses the number and types of vulnerability 

assessments conducted in 2002 without discussing how many were 

planned.

We are recommending that DTRA improve its annual performance report 

by comparing its actual performance against planned goals and, where 

appropriate, explain why goals were not met and how these unmet goals 

will be addressed in the future. 

Background In the early 1990s, DOD officials recognized that the proliferation of 

chemical, biological, and nuclear materials that could be used to develop 

WMD was a growing threat. A series of terrorist attacks highlighted by the 

1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in Tokyo’s subway system heightened 

concerns about U.S. vulnerability to a terrorist attack involving WMD. 
Page 4 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Senior DOD leaders, supported by a Defense Science Board study, 

concluded that DOD was not properly organized to focus on 

nonproliferation and counterproliferation. 

On October 1, 1998, DTRA was established, with a budget of approximately 

$1.7 billion and almost 2,000 military and civilian personnel, to address all 

aspects of the WMD threat. The agency reports to the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, with the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy providing input into several of DTRA’s 

programs. Additionally, DTRA responds to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff pertaining to the agency’s support of military commanders. 

Table 1 provides data on DTRA’s budget and personnel since the agency’s 

inception. DTRA’s budget has increased by over $650 million (about 40 

percent) since its establishment, of which over $450 million was due to 

increases in the funding of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

(CBDP). Total personnel at DTRA also have increased.

Table 1: DTRA’s Budget and Personnel

Source: DTRA.

Note: Fiscal years 1999 to 2003 data are actual figures, and fiscal year 2004 data are based on 

personnel authorizations and program budget decisions.

DTRA is currently headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; maintains test 

facilities in the United States; maintains a Defense Nuclear Weapons 

School in New Mexico; and maintains permanent staff at other locations, 

including Germany, Japan, and the Russian Federation, as seen in figure 1. 

DTRA also maintains liaison officers at several locations, including the 

combatant commanders’ headquarters, the National Guard Bureau, and the 

Pentagon.

Dollars in millions

Budget and personnel

Fiscal Year

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

DTRA $1,044.7 $1,122.5 $1,175.4 $1,291.2 $1,359.2 $1,253.9

CBDP 642.0 762.5 874.6 1,118.2 1,070.7 1,104.7

Total budget $1,686.7 $1,885.0 $2,050.0 $2,409.4 $2,429.9 $2,358.6

Civilian personnel 881 917 957 972 875 1,022

Military personnel 941 970 872 866 771 888

Total personnel 1,822 1,887 1,829 1,838 1,646 1,910
Page 5 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 1: DTRA Locations

DTRA was established in 1998 through the consolidation of three agencies 

and two programs, as shown in figure 2. The Defense Special Weapons 

Agency tested, analyzed, and provided assistance in developing new 

technologies for maintaining and modernizing the nation’s nuclear 

weapons. The agency also worked to counter the effects of the use of 

chemical and biological weapons against U.S. military bases and forces. 

The Defense Technology Security Administration managed the DOD 

license review process for the export of munitions and critical technologies 

that have both civilian and military applications. As part of this effort, the 

Defense Technology Security Administration oversaw U.S. satellites 

launched abroad. The On-Site Inspection Agency, established as a result of 

the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, carried out on-site 

inspections to verify that treaty implementation was done in accordance 

San Francisco,

California

Mercury,

Nevada

Albuquerque,

New Mexico

National 

Capital 

Region

Darmstadt,

Germany

Moscow,

Russia

Votkinsk,

Russia

Almaty,

Kazakhstan

Baghdad, 

Iraq

Yokota,

Japan

Kiev,

Ukraine

Major operating locations

Sources: GAO, DTRA, and MapArt.
Page 6 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

with all treaty requirements. Throughout the 1990s, the agency’s 

responsibilities were expanded as new treaties were ratified, and, in 2000, 

the agency was asked to support the United Nation’s mission to monitor 

and eliminate WMD in Iraq.2

Figure 2: Establishment of DTRA and Significant Changes 

2

In the early 1990s, the On-Site Inspection Agency was asked to support the earlier United 

Nation’s efforts in Iraq.

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

Defense Special Weapons Agency

 

Nuclear, chemical, and biological research

On-Site Inspection Agency

Treaty monitoring and compliance

Defense Technology Security 

Administration

 

Export controls for technologies with WMD 

application

Defense Technology Security 

Administration

 

Export controls for technologies with 

WMD application

(August 2001)

Cooperative Threat Reduction program

 

Reducing and securing WMD stockpiles 

in the former Soviet Union

DOD Chemical/Biological Defense Program

Developing defensive measures against 

chemical or biological weapons

October 1, 1998: 

DOD established DTRA 

as a result of the 

heightened concern 

about the WMD threat

DOD consolidated the following 

organizations and programs to 

form DTRA:

The following organizations and 

programs have been moved out 

of or into DTRA:

Mission to eliminate WMD 

found in Iraq

(March 2003)

Management of the DOD 

Chemical/Biological Defense Program 

Science and Technology program 

(April 2003)

Source: GAO.
Page 7 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

The two additional programs included in DTRA’s formation dealt 

extensively with the threats posed by WMD and related materials. The 

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program implemented a 

congressionally mandated program to assist the nations of the former 

Soviet Union in securing and eliminating their WMD stockpiles. We have 

undertaken several reviews of the DTRA-managed CTR program. A list of 

our reports concerning the CTR program appears at the end of this report. 

In addition, CBDP was established in 1994 to consolidate, coordinate, and 

integrate the chemical and biological defense requirements of all the 

services into a single DOD program. DTRA was given the responsibility to 

administer the distribution of program funds, but the agency did not 

directly manage the program. 

To integrate these components, DTRA began a strategic planning process in 

January 1999 and published its first strategic plan in March 2000. DTRA 

used the principles of the Government Performance and Result Act of 1993 

(GPRA) to guide its planning process. The act calls for agencies to develop 

long-term strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual 

assessment reports. Also in 2000, DTRA realigned itself around four core 

functions (1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3) combat support 

(support to military forces), and (4) technology development. Among these 

core functions, DTRA officials have stressed combat support as its first 

priority. 

Three major changes have occurred in the agency’s responsibilities, as 

illustrated in figure 2. First, in August 2001, responsibility for the export 

license review process shifted from DTRA to the reestablished Defense 

Technology Security Administration. According to senior officials, the 

export license review process did not integrate well with other DTRA 

functions and was more appropriately placed under the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy. Second, in March 2003, DTRA was assigned the mission 

to support the elimination of WMD materials found in Iraq. Third, in April 

2003, DTRA was given the responsibility for managing the CBDP’s science 

and technology program rather than just overseeing the funds 

disbursement. 
Page 8 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

DTRA’s Mission Is to 

Address All Aspects of 

the WMD Threat

DTRA carries out its mission to address the threat posed by WMD through 

four core functions: (1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3) combat 

support, and (4) technology development.3

 First, the agency controls the 

threat of WMD through inspections of Russian facilities to ensure 

compliance with treaties limiting WMD, as well as supporting inspections 

of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors. Second, DTRA works to reduce the 

WMD threat by securing and eliminating WMD materials, such as 

destroying aircraft and missiles, through the CTR program in the former 

Soviet Union. Third, DTRA supports military commanders by providing 

technical and analytical support regarding WMD threats on the battlefield 

and U.S. installations. Finally, DTRA develops technologies to assist in its 

threat control and reduction efforts and in the support of military 

operations, such as developing weapons and sensor technologies to 

destroy or detect WMD and related materials. Figure 3 provides examples 

of DTRA activities in each of these areas.

3

WMD, once defined by DOD as nuclear, biological and chemical, now includes radiological 

and high explosives as well.
Page 9 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 3: DTRA Activities That Address the Threat of WMD 

• Eliminates Russian WMD

 

• Strengthens security at 

Russian nuclear weapons 

transportation and 

storage facilities

 

• Eliminates any WMD 

assets found in Iraq

 

• Eliminates strategic 

submarines, bombers, 

and missiles

 

• Provides employment for 

Russian WMD scientists, 

such as at former 

biological weapons 

research facilities

• Conducts assessments of 

DOD and other facilities' 

vulnerabliity to terrorist 

attacks

 

• Maintains the security and 

safety of the nuclear 

weapons stockpile

 

• Provides a continuous 

resource to answer 

WMD-related questions

 

• Helps commanders plan 

attacks against suspected 

WMD sites—what weapons

to use, when to carry out 

the attack, and how to 

attack the site—to mitigate 

the potential WMD effects

• Facilitates and escorts 

foreign inspection teams' 

visits to U.S. and 

U.S. overseas facilities 

subject to arms control 

agreements

 

• Provides DOD support to 

United Nations inspection 

and monitoring activities

 

• Conducts intrusive arms 

control inspections under 

the terms of arms control 

treaties and agreements

 

• Assists efforts to counter 

WMD smuggling across 

borders in the former 

Soviet Union

• Develops sensor 

technologies to detect 

WMD for use on the 

battlefield or to support 

arms control efforts

 

• Develops capabilities to 

assess, analyze, and 

mitigate the effects of 

WMD

 

• Develops specialized 

weapons, such as bunker 

busting bombs

 

• Researches persistence 

of various chemical and 

biological agents under a 

variety of conditions

Threat control Threat reduction Combat support Technology development

Sources: GAO and DTRA.

Blast mitigation techniques

Inspecting MiG-23 aircraft WMD incidence response training

Inspecting nuclear warheads Heavy bomber elimination

Securing WMD facilities

Bunker busting missile

Remote robotic vehicle
Page 10 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Threat Control Focuses on 

Inspection and Treaty 

Activities

DTRA implements U.S. responsibilities established under four arms control 

treaties dealing with WMD and other treaties and agreements. DTRA 

conducts on-site inspections at other nations’ WMD facilities and supports 

on-site inspections of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors. These 

inspections are carried out in accordance with agreements between the 

U.S. and other governments. The agency provides inspectors, 

transportation, and linguists in support of inspection efforts, and also 

provides visa and passport support for visiting inspection teams. Table 2 

shows nine treaties and agreements and DTRA’s role in each.

Table 2: DTRA Role in Nine Treaties and Agreements

Treaty/Agreement Objective of treaty/agreement DTRA role

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Mandates substantial reductions in the number of 

U.S. and former Soviet Union strategic ballistic 

missiles, heavy bombers, submarines, and the 

nuclear warheads attributed to those delivery 

systems. 

Conducts U.S. inspections of signatory facilities to 

ensure compliance; monitors missile production 

facility operations in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 

and Belarus; and provides escorts to teams 

inspecting U.S. facilities. 

Intermediate Range Nuclear 

Forces Treaty 

Requires the U.S. and former Soviet Union to 

eliminate all ground-launched ballistic and cruise 

missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 

kilometers, their support structure, and 

equipment.

Provides inspectors to observe and measure all 

vehicles exiting the Votkinsk missile manufacturing 

plant and supports Russian inspections of U.S. 

facilities.

Chemical Weapons Convention Prohibits the development, production, 

acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, or use of 

chemical weapons; obligates parties to destroy 

their chemical weapons and production facilities. 

Provides escorts for international teams inspecting 

U.S. facilities, including DOD and commercial 

industry sites. 

Threshold Test Ban Treaty Prohibits nuclear tests having a yield exceeding 

150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT). 

Provides monitors for Russian tests and escorts 

for Russian teams monitoring U.S. tests. 

Plutonium Production Reactor 

Agreement 

Mandates the monitoring of the shutdown of U.S. 

and Russian production reactors and Russia’s 

reprocessed plutonium oxide.

Conducts on-site monitoring of Russian shutdown 

reactors in Seversk, Ozersk, and Zheleznogorsk 

and plutonium oxide facilities at Seversk and 

Zheleznogorsk and provides escorts to Russian 

teams monitoring shutdown of U.S. reactors.

Conventional Armed Forces in 

Europe Treaty

Limits five types of conventional weapons: tanks, 

armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack 

helicopters, and combat aircraft.

Conducts on-site inspections and provides escorts 

for inspections of U.S. facilities. 

Vienna Document 1999 of the 

Negotiations on Confidence and 

Security Building Measures

Limits the number of military exercises permitted 

by signatories and requires signatories to give 

prior notice of large-scale military activities.

Provides personnel for inspections and evaluations 

of other signatories and provides escorts and 

liaison officers for inspections and evaluations of 

U.S. facilities. 
Page 11 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Sources: GAO and DTRA.

Threat Reduction Has 

Focused on the WMD 

Threat in the Former Soviet 

Union

DTRA works to reduce the threat of WMD primarily through its activities 

with the CTR program, which assists the states of the former Soviet Union 

to (1) destroy WMD in the former Soviet Union, (2) safely store and 

transport weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) reduce the 

risk of the WMD proliferation. Our previous reviews of the CTR program 

have found that it has faced two critical challenges: the Russian 

government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs, 

and Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key 

nuclear and biological sites (see the list of prior GAO reports at the end of 

this report). In addition to the CTR program, DTRA was recently tasked to 

secure and destroy any WMD or related materials that might be found in 

Iraq. 

The CTR program has removed nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, 

Ukraine, and Belarus inherited from the former Soviet Union, and the 

United States continues to work with Russia and other former Soviet states 

in WMD elimination programs. According to agency documents, the CTR 

program had, as of October 31, 2003, overseen the destruction of 520 of 

1,473 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 451 of 831 missile silos, 122 of 205 

strategic bombers, and 27 of 48 strategic missile submarines that the 

United States and former Soviet Union agreed to destroy. WMD 

destruction programs continue with CTR overseeing projects to eliminate 

missile fuel and launcher equipment. DTRA personnel have also 

supervised the securing of chemical weapons and are overseeing the 

construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, 

Russia. 

DTRA also assists with the storing and transporting of WMD materials as 

part of the CTR program. For example, DTRA is overseeing the 

General Framework Agreement 

for Peace in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina (Dayton Accords) 

Outlines peace agreement that implements a 

series of verification measures similar to those 

under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 

Treaty and the Vienna Documents and imposes 

limits on various types of offensive arms.

Represents the United States on international 

inspection teams that inspect facilities of the 

signatories.

Open Skies Treaty Promotes openness and transparency in military 

activities through reciprocal, unarmed observation 

flights.

Provides inspectors and flight monitors during 

mission and training activities, conducts preflight 

inspections of U.S. and foreign observation aircraft 

sensor equipment, and operates imaging sensors 

during U.S. observation flights. 

(Continued From Previous Page)

Treaty/Agreement Objective of treaty/agreement DTRA role
Page 12 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

construction of a facility that will be used to securely store nuclear 

materials from weapons at Mayak, Russia. This project, however, has 

suffered from both a lack of committed Russian funding and access to the 

site. As a result, the project, once scheduled to begin accepting nuclear 

materials for storage in 1998, will not begin to do so until 2004. 

Additionally, DTRA works through the CTR program to enhance the 

security and safety of biological pathogens located at research centers in 

the former Soviet Union, such as at Novosibirsk and Obolensk. However, 

lack of Russian cooperation has affected DTRA’s ability to access other 

suspected biological facilities, and, after 4 years of effort, DOD has made 

little progress in addressing security concerns at the 49 biological sites 

where Russia and the United States have collaborative programs.

DTRA works to prevent the spread of WMD through continuing contacts 

with former Soviet Union military personnel and providing expertise and 

equipment to the countries of the former Soviet Union to enhance border 

security. According to agency documents, in fiscal year 2002, the CTR 

program sponsored 423 contacts with former Soviet Union military 

personnel in support of various efforts to halt the spread of WMD. 

In March 2003, DTRA was also assigned the responsibility of destroying any 

WMD materials found in Iraq. Agency personnel accompanied combat 

forces into Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, DTRA 

teams were involved in searching the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center to 

recover, inventory, and safeguard several tons of non-weapons-grade 

uranium and other radiological materials. DTRA personnel remain in Iraq 

and continue to support efforts to search for WMD and WMD-related 

materials. If WMD are found, DTRA personnel would have the 

responsibility for securing and eliminating them.

DTRA Supports U.S. 

Military Forces in 

Addressing WMD Threats

DTRA provides a wide variety of support to military commanders in their 

efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA provides liaison officers to assist 

military commanders in their planning and conduct of military operations. 

For example, DTRA personnel assisted military commanders during the 

recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq by providing information on the 

appropriate weapons to use on suspected WMD storage sites, how to 

counter the effects of WMD that might be used on coalition forces, and how 

to secure and dispose of any WMD or WMD-related materials that might be 

found. DTRA also developed a handbook used by troops in Iraq for how to 

recognize and handle WMD and WMD-related materials. In addition, these 

efforts are supported by DTRA’s operations center, which responds to 
Page 13 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

WMD-related requests for expertise, computer modeling of potential 

events, and support for training exercises.

DTRA teams evaluate the security of personnel and facilities worldwide 

and assess the survivability of specific infrastructure crucial to maintaining 

command and control of U.S. forces. According to agency documents, 

DTRA evaluates 80 to 100 DOD installations per year through Joint Staff 

Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, which are broad in scope and focus 

on the overall safety and security of personnel. For example, agency teams 

assess physical security plans, review architectural and structural 

drawings, and perform analyses of potential blast effects to recommend 

procedural, structural, or other enhancements to reduce vulnerabilities. 

These assessments were instituted in the aftermath of (1) the Khobar 

Towers bombing in 19964

 and (2) the publication of a subsequent DOD 

report in 1997 that determined there were no published standards for 

securing personnel and facilities. In addition, DTRA conducts Balanced 

Survivability Assessments to evaluate specific U.S. and allied infrastructure 

crucial in maintaining command and control of all U.S. forces. These 

assessments evaluate the ability of power, heating, computer, and 

communications systems to continue functioning in the event of a WMD 

attack, accident or natural disaster, technological failure, or sabotage. 

According to agency officials, DTRA teams conduct an average of 8 

Balanced Survivability Assessments per year, but that number rose 

temporarily to 30 to meet additional requirements. 

DTRA provides additional support to military commanders through the 

Defense Nuclear Weapons School and Consequence Management Advisory 

Teams (CMAT). DTRA operates the Defense Nuclear Weapons School in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, to train military and civilian personnel in 

various aspects of WMD. The school originally focused on training military 

personnel in the aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons and their effects. The 

school now includes other areas of the WMD threat, such as addressing the 

civil and military responses to radiological, chemical, and biological 

attacks or accidents and preventing the spread of WMD. Additionally, 

DTRA maintains and deploys teams to deal with the effects of WMD use. 

The agency has CMATs whose purpose is to mitigate the effects of WMD 

use or accidents. CMATs also work with military and civilian authorities by 

4

In June 1996, 19 U.S. Air Force personnel were killed when terrorists detonated a truck 

bomb near a fence in the American military section of Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia, 

damaging the Khobar Towers housing facilities.
Page 14 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

conducting training exercises that simulate the effects of WMD use or 

accidents in the United States and overseas. 

DTRA Works to Develop 

Technologies to Address the 

WMD Threat

To assist in WMD threat control activities, DTRA has developed 

technologies that detect WMD. For example, the agency has been 

developing sensors to help countries of the former Soviet Union prevent 

smuggling of WMD or WMD-related materials across borders. DTRA has 

also developed computer-tracking systems to help member countries 

comply with the reporting obligations stated in treaties and other 

agreements. The agency also works to develop ways to protect military 

equipment and personnel from WMD effects and manages and operates 

various technology testing facilities, such as facilities that simulate the 

effects of electromagnetic energy or radiation on military equipment in the 

event a nuclear weapon is detonated. Additionally, DTRA has also 

developed software to model nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks or 

accidents. 

DTRA does not have its own laboratories. Rather, the agency uses existing 

institutions, such as the service laboratories (Departments of the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force), and national laboratories as well as academic 

institutions. For example, in response to the military requirement for a 

specialized weapon to bomb caves and tunnels in Afghanistan, DTRA 

organized a team that employed products and expertise from the Navy, Air 

Force, Energy, and industry, which allowed DTRA to develop, test, and 

deploy a weapon that could be used to attack cave and tunnel targets. 

DTRA has also worked to develop specialized incendiary devices that 

would destroy WMD material held in a storage facility. 

To support DTRA’s efforts to address the WMD threat, the agency’s 

Advanced Systems Concepts Office (ASCO) works to address ways to 

identify, anticipate, and address technology gaps to improve agency 

capabilities. For example, ASCO personnel with scientific expertise work 

to analyze the potential threat to military forces of pathogens such as 

bubonic plague, E. coli, and Ebola. DTRA also has overseen a project to 

test the ability of military facilities to protect against and recover from the 

consequences of chemical and biological attacks. From 2001 to 2003, 

DTRA and other military personnel undertook a series of exercises, 

technology demonstrations, and assessments at the U.S. Air Force base at 

Osan, Korea, to determine different ways to defend military forces and 

facilities against chemical and biological attacks. 
Page 15 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

DTRA Works with 

Other Government 

Agencies

As the DOD agency responsible for addressing all aspects of WMD threats, 

DTRA possesses specialized capabilities and services that can assist 

civilian entities, including Energy and DHS. DTRA has a formal 

relationship with Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) that coordinates and supports legislatively mandated joint DODEnergy responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. DTRA also 

works with NNSA to secure nuclear materials in Russia. DTRA works with 

DHS offices on programs related to WMD issues, such as the International 

Counterproliferation Program and crisis response exercises. DTRA’s 

interface with DHS is through DOD’s newly established Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. DTRA’s relationship 

with DHS may be subject to change as the broader DOD-DHS relationship 

evolves. In addition to its relations with NNSA and DHS, DTRA also works 

with and supports other federal agencies, state and local governments, and 

governments with which the United States has bilateral agreements. 

DTRA Works on Many 

Programs with the 

Department of Energy

DTRA works closely with Energy’s NNSA5 in matters pertaining to the U.S. 

nuclear weapons stockpile. This relationship has its roots in the 1946 

Atomic Energy Act,6

 which establishes joint DOD and NNSA responsibility 

for the U.S. nuclear weapons program, including ensuring the safety, 

security, and control of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. These 

activities are conducted through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), the 

senior-level body dedicated to these activities. DTRA plays an active role in 

all activities of the NWC, from participating as an observer on the NWC to 

membership on its subordinate bodies. In addition, both DTRA and NNSA 

are responsible for providing the working staff for the NWC. DTRA also 

works with NNSA on various nuclear weapons issues associated with the 

U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program, such as nuclear

5

In 2001, NNSA was established as a semiautonomous agency within Energy that is 

responsible for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and associated nonproliferation 

activities. NNSA includes all atomic energy defense activities, specifically those parts of 

Energy formerly known as Defense Programs, Nonproliferation and National Security, 

Fissile Materials Disposition, and Naval Reactors, as well as the national weapons 

laboratories and other plants and facilities that constitute the nuclear weapons complex.

6

Responsibility for the management of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile was originally 

established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
Page 16 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

surviviability, nuclear surety,7 and nuclear weapons effects. According to 

both DTRA and NNSA officials, coordination between DTRA and NNSA on 

activities related to these issues takes place at various levels, such as 

serving on committees and working groups, cooperating on research, and 

participating on various ad hoc working groups. For example, DTRA and 

NNSA are currently engaged in a joint study to understand nuclear 

weapons effects and develop simulation techniques to address survivability 

of U.S. weapons systems in nuclear environments. 

DTRA also works with Energy to implement various agreements, research 

projects, and training and exercises. According to DOD documents, DTRA 

works with Energy on a variety of agreements related to nuclear weapons, 

including the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, the Plutonium 

Disposition Agreement, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.8

 In addition, 

DTRA works with Energy laboratories on joint research projects, working 

groups, and field tests. For example, DTRA is currently working with the 

laboratories on the development of DOD’s unconventional nuclear warfare 

defense program, which is developing tools for detecting an 

unconventionally delivered nuclear or radiological weapon. DTRA and 

Energy work on programs to secure nuclear warheads in Russia, but, as we 

reported in March 2003, these efforts face several coordination issues, such 

as deciding which agency will secure sites identified in both of their plans 

and coordinating the type of equipment used and guard force training.9

 

DTRA’s Relationship with 

DHS Is Dependent on the 

Broader DOD-DHS 

Relationship 

DTRA worked and continues to work with several government entities that 

are now part of DHS. For example, DTRA works with the U.S. Customs 

Service on the congressionally mandated International 

Counterproliferation Program, which is designed to prevent the illicit 

movement of WMD material, technology, and expertise. As the executive 

agent, DTRA implements this program in cooperation with the U.S. 

Customs Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. DTRA works 

7

DOD defines “surety” as material, personnel, and procedures that contribute to the safety, 

security, and control of nuclear weapons.

8

The Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement and the Plutonium Disposition Agreement 

are agreements between the United States and Russia that are designed to prevent the 

accumulation of excessive stocks of plutonium by both eliminating the reactors that 

produce plutonium and reducing existing stocks of plutonium.

9

GAO-03-482.
Page 17 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

with these two agencies to develop courses and training exercises that 

provide training and equipment to customs, border guards, and law 

enforcement personnel in 25 countries of the former Soviet Union, the 

Baltic region, and Eastern Europe. 

DTRA also works with DHS on joint exercises and interagency working 

groups. For example, DTRA, DHS, and Energy recently sponsored and 

participated in a joint atmospheric dispersion study in Oklahoma City. 

According to documentation, the study conducted a series of experiments 

to evaluate current outdoor atmospheric dispersion models and to advance 

the knowledge of the dispersion of contaminants in urban environments 

and building interiors. In addition, DTRA participates with DHS entities in 

interagency working groups that address issues of homeland security and 

preparedness. 

According to DTRA officials, the agency is working to share information 

and experiences with DHS for homeland security applications. For 

example, DTRA has shared with DHS information regarding its experience 

on demonstrations conducted as part of the unconventional nuclear 

warfare defense program. In addition, DTRA has also shared with DHS the 

WMD crisis decision guides that it developed for DOD. These guides 

provide response plans for various WMD scenarios. According to DTRA 

officials, DHS used the response plans for WMD scenarios that are outlined 

in these crisis decision guides to develop its own WMD response plans. 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was recently established as 

the focal point for DOD’s interaction with DHS and the interagency 

community for homeland security issues. This newly established office is 

responsible for ensuring internal coordination of DOD policy direction and 

for coordinating activities with DHS. Therefore, the coordination of all 

new activities, programs, and assistance related to the threat of WMD that 

involve DTRA and DHS is the responsibility of this office. DTRA’s 

relationship with DHS is subject to the broader DOD-DHS relationship and 

therefore may change. The new relationship between DOD and DHS itself 

is still evolving because the roles and responsibilities of the two 

departments are still under development.

DTRA’s Expertise Is Shared 

with Civilian Entities

DTRA has provided various capabilities and services, such as vulnerability 

assessments and first-responder training programs to civilian government 

entities. DTRA’s capabilities for conducting vulnerability assessments are 
Page 18 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

used to perform vulnerability assessments of civilian facilities and 

personnel. After the events of September 11, 2001, DTRA was called upon 

to complete vulnerability assessments of several federal buildings, such as 

the U.S. Capitol Building and U.S. Supreme Court, as well as vulnerability 

assessments of commercial U.S. ports. DTRA shares its capabilities and 

expertise by providing training programs to civilian entities. For example, 

the agency provides training to the National Guard for performing 

vulnerability assessment of infrastructure. DTRA also provides WMD and 

first-responder awareness training to state and local government entities. 

In addition, DTRA provides informational support—ranging from modeling 

to subject matter expertise—to civilian government entities and bilateral 

partners through the services of its operations center. For example, the 

operations center modeled the potential spread of contamination resulting 

from a chemical spill of a derailed train by using the agency’s software for 

chemical weapon attack models. Finally, DTRA’s expertise is also shared 

with governments with which the United States has bilateral agreements. 

For example, according to senior DTRA officials, the WMD handbooks 

developed by DTRA were provided to allied forces supporting U.S. efforts 

in Iraq, and DTRA has conducted vulnerability assessments for allies. 

Finally, DTRA is also involved in interagency programs that address issues 

related to WMD threats. For example, DTRA supports the integration of 

the DOD Technical Support Working Group that conducts a national 

interagency response and development program for combating terrorism. 

Participants in this program include DOD, Energy, State, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Aviation Administration. 

DTRA’s Planning 

Process Establishes 

Priorities and 

Summarizes Progress, 

but Achievements Are 

Not Reported against 

Goals

DTRA uses a strategic planning process, guided by the principles of GPRA, 

to prioritize its resources and assess its progress. It has developed 

strategic plans identifying long-term goals and short-term objectives by 

which it measures progress in meeting its goals. These objectives are 

affected by funding that comes from several appropriations, some of which 

must be spent on specific activities, such as the funding for the CTR 

program. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense assess DTRA every 2 years. In 2002, DTRA completed its first 

internal self-assessment, which it intends to do annually. We found that the 

performance report resulting from the self-assessment summarized the 

agency’s accomplishments and activities but did not assess its progress 

against established annual performance goals.
Page 19 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Strategic Planning Process 

Establishes Agency’s 

Priorities

DTRA has incorporated GPRA principles in its planning process. Under 

GPRA, agencies should prepare 5-year strategic plans that set the general 

direction for their efforts. These plans should include comprehensive 

mission statements, general and outcome-related goals, descriptions of 

how those goals will be achieved, identification of external factors that 

could affect progress, and a description of how performance will be 

evaluated. Agencies should then prepare annual performance plans that 

establish connections between the long-term goals in the strategic plans 

with the day-to-day activities of program managers and staff. These plans 

should include measurable goals and objectives to be achieved by a 

program activity, descriptions of the resources needed to meet these goals, 

and a description of the methods used to verify and validate measured 

values. Finally, GPRA requires that the agency report annually on the 

extent to which it is meeting its goals and the actions needed to achieve or 

modify those goals that were not met. 

DTRA’s current strategic plan, issued in 2003, contains most of the elements 

in a strategic plan developed using GPRA standards. This plan lays out the 

agency’s five goals, which serve as the basis of its individual units’ annual 

performance plans: (1) deter the use and reduce the impact of WMD, (2) 

reduce the present threat, (3) prepare for future threats, (4) conduct the 

right programs in the best manner, and (5) develop people and enable them 

to succeed. These long-term goals are further broken down into four or 

five objectives, each with 6 to 17 measurable tasks under each objective. 

These tasks have projected completion dates and identify the DTRA unit 

responsible for the specific task. For example, under the goal “deter the 

use and reduce the impact of WMD” is the objective “support the nuclear 

force.” A measurable task under this objective is to work with Energy to 

develop support plans for potential resumption of underground nuclear 

weapons effects testing. The technology development unit in DTRA is 

expected to complete this task by the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2004. The 

strategic plan does not discuss external factors that could affect goal 

achievement, but it does have a discussion of how performance will be 

measured externally, by other DOD components, and internally through an 

annual performance report.

Each unit within DTRA develops its own annual performance plan that 

identifies the activities to be completed each year with available funding. 

These plans do not use the same format, but they all include goals, 

performance measures by which to measure achievement of those goals, 

and a link to the strategic plan to show how they support the long-term 

goals of the agency. DTRA’s leadership discusses each unit’s plan to 
Page 20 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

validate the prioritization of resources and establish the unit’s priorities. 

DTRA’s annual performance plan consists of these units’ plans and detailed 

budget annexes. DOD guidance now requires DTRA to submit a 

consolidated annual performance plan to the DOD comptroller to facilitate 

DOD’s GPRA reporting. DTRA is in the process of making the unit plans 

more consistent for fiscal year 2004.

DTRA’s Planning Is 

Influenced by Its Funding

Most of DTRA’s funding is appropriated only for specific programs over 

which it has various levels of control. First, it administers the funding for 

CBDP. Second, it receives money that Congress provides solely for the 

CTR program that DTRA is in charge of managing with congressional 

direction. Third, it receives funding that it can spend according to its own 

priorities, while meeting certain mission requirements, such as treaty 

implementation work. Fourth, it receives reimbursements from other 

federal entities for some activities, such as vulnerability assessments 

conducted for non-DOD agencies.10 Figure 4 shows the funding profile for 

DTRA in fiscal year 2004.

10The specific reimbursement arrangements vary by activity and agency.
Page 21 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure 4: DTRA’s Funding Profile, Fiscal Year 2004

Note: Numbers do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

As shown in figure 4, DTRA’s administration of CBDP includes funds that it 

uses, distributes, and manages. DTRA uses a portion of the CBDP funds for 

large-scale technology demonstration projects, such as a project that 

focused on restoring operations at bases attacked by chemical or biological 

agents. The agency distributes a large portion of the CBDP funds to others 

for various purposes, such as procuring chemical suits for the military 

forces. Recently, in April 2003, DTRA was given the responsibility for 

managing the CBDP’s Science and Technology projects, which are 

conducted by various laboratories and research institutes throughout the 

country.

DTRA Undergoes External 

and Internal Reviews, but 

Reporting on Internal 

Review Could Be Improved

DTRA undergoes two DOD reviews—the Biennial Defense Review 

commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Combat 

Support Agency Review conducted for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. These reviews focus on how well DTRA meets its customers’ 

requirements as a combat support agency. Overall, these two reviews have 

33%

45%

18%

3%

Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP)

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program 

(fenced off funding)

Funds to DTRA from Department of Defense

External funds from other agencies

Source: GAO analysis of DTRA data.

Funds DTRA controls and oversees CBDP funds

DTRA manages 

$241 million

DTRA distributes 

$838 million

DTRA uses 

$25 million
Page 22 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

concluded that DTRA supports the requirements of the operating military 

forces and provides useful products and services.

The most recent biennial review was issued December 2002. DTRA was 

assessed on its combat support, technology development, and threat 

reduction and control efforts. DTRA’s efforts at threat reduction and 

control received high satisfaction ratings from the customers surveyed. 

The agency received acceptable satisfaction ratings in combat support but 

had below average ratings in the area of technology development. 

In 2001, the Combat Support Agency Review Team conducted an 

assessment of DTRA’s responsiveness and readiness to support operating 

forces in the event of war or threat to national security. The Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required by law to conduct assessments of all 

combat support agencies every 2 years. The review team went to the 

commands supported by DTRA and conducted extensive interviewing and 

fieldwork regarding the support provided by DTRA. In the 2001 

assessment, DTRA was commended for significant improvements in 

customer orientation and combat support focus. DTRA was found to be 

ready to support the requirements of the operating forces. A major finding 

in the assessment concerned DTRA’s ongoing work on decontamination 

standards for airbases and strategic air and sealift assets. The study 

acknowledged that DTRA was supporting the development of these 

standards, but, as DOD’s center of WMD expertise, it needs to provide 

commanders with the best possible information currently available, rather 

than wait until all studies have been completed. A Combat Support Agency 

Review Team official stated that DTRA has addressed the findings of the 

2001 assessment, and that the 2003 assessment was delayed by operations 

in Iraq but should be released in early 2004.

As part of the GPRA process, DTRA produced its first annual performance 

assessment in 2002. GPRA requires that agencies report on the extent to 

which they are meeting their annual performance goals and the actions 

needed to achieve or modify the goals that have not been met. DTRA’s 

performance report did not compare the agency’s achievements to its 

goals, discuss the areas where DTRA fell short of its goals, or discuss 

DTRA’s plans to address goals that it did not achieve. For example, in the 

threat control area, the agency discussed the number of missions 

conducted and the equipment provided under the International 

Counterproliferation Program without stating the program’s goals. In the 

threat reduction area, the report discussed the number of weapons systems 

eliminated in the former Soviet Union and other achievements, such as 
Page 23 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

implementing security measures over chemical stockpiles at two sites, 

again, without discussing the goals of the program. In the area of combat 

support, the report discussed the number of vulnerability and survivability 

assessments, training exercises of all types, and number of training courses 

provided, but does not discuss how many of each were planned. Finally, in 

the technology development area, the report discussed several 

technologies developed or under development but does not discuss the 

agency’s plans for the year. See figure 5 for a comparison of what is 

expected in an annual performance report and what DTRA’s report 

contained.

Figure 5: GPRA Performance Reporting Requirements Compared with DTRA’s 2002 

Performance Report 

Although this information is not in DTRA’s performance report, we found 

that DTRA leadership meets quarterly to assess progress in meeting each 

unit’s goals and discuss activities that are not on track. Further, DTRA 

leadership discusses what needs to be done to get on track and whether 

goals are unrealistic or not within its control. For example, according to 

agency officials, they have in the past transferred funding from CTR 

Data provided

No data provided

Source: GAO.

Performance report 

measures

DTRA's performance report

Threat 

control

Threat 

reduction

Combat 

support

Technology 

development

Compare 

achievements to goals

Explain goals not met

Describe plans to 

meet unmet goals

Using information and comparisons to improve 

performance

Provide annual 

achievements

Model

performance

report
Page 24 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

programs that were having problems into successful CTR programs to 

prevent those funds from being lost because congressionally provided 

funds must be spent within a certain time frame. 

Conclusions When DTRA was established in 1998, it modeled its strategic planning 

process on GPRA to prioritize resources and assess progress toward its 

organizational goals. Although DTRA officials do measure progress against 

these goals in quarterly reviews, the agency’s performance report does not 

capture the findings from these reviews. The performance report does not 

compare accomplishments and activities with established goals and 

objectives, nor does it explain what actions are needed to achieve or 

modify goals that are not met. Providing this information would allow 

decision makers outside of DTRA to have better information regarding 

DTRA’s performance.

Recommendations We recommend that the Director of DTRA improve the agency’s annual 

performance report by comparing the agency’s actual performance against 

planned goals and, where appropriate, explaining why the goals were not 

met and the agency’s plan for addressing these unmet goals in the future.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

DTRA provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are 

reproduced in appendix I. In these comments, DTRA concurred with our 

recommendation to improve DTRA’s annual performance report by 

including a comparison of the agency’s actual performance against planned 

goals and, where appropriate, explain why goals were not met, and the 

agency’s plan for addressing these unmet goals in the future. DTRA stated 

that it is refining its performance report methodology to better address the 

linkage of reported performance to planned goals and future efforts. DTRA 

also separately provided technical comments that we discussed with 

relevant officials and included in the text of the report where appropriate.

Scope and 

Methodology

To report on DTRA’s mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill that 

mission, we reviewed agency documentation. Specifically, we reviewed 

historical documents, including documentation of interviews of the DOD 

senior officials responsible for the creation of DTRA, and other agency 

mission documentation. We relied on our prior work that reviewed specific 
Page 25 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

DTRA projects. In addition, we interviewed DTRA officials, including the 

agency’s Director, senior leadership from each of DTRA’s units responsible 

for the agency’s mission, other DTRA staff, and DTRA contractor 

personnel. Finally, we attended a 3-day DTRA liaison officer training class 

to learn how DTRA trains its liaison officers about the variety of 

capabilities and services it can offer to military forces in the field. We did 

not assess the effectiveness of DTRA’s programs.

To discuss DTRA’s relationship with other government entities, we 

reviewed the agency’s documentation of programs and activities that it 

undertakes with other government entities. We reviewed documents 

provided by DTRA and NNSA staff regarding NWC responsibilities. In 

addition, we interviewed DTRA, DOD, Energy, and NNSA officials about 

DTRA’s coordination with Energy and NNSA. We relied on documentation 

and discussions with DOD officials regarding the nature of DTRA’s 

relationship with DHS. We also relied upon our previous audits reviewing 

DHS and DOD to ascertain the nature of the relationship.

To determine how DTRA prioritizes its resources to meet its mission 

objectives, we reviewed DTRA’s 2000, 2001, and 2003 strategic plans. We 

reviewed supporting documentation, including budget documents, 

program and project plans, and internal and external assessments of DTRA. 

Specifically, we compared DTRA’s strategic plan, each unit’s annual 

performance plans for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and documentation on 

the units’ ongoing assessments of their activities with what we have 

reported should be found in GPRA-based documents. We met with DTRA 

officials to discuss the agency’s planning and review process and with 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss their 

assessments of DTRA. 

We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We performed our review 

from April 2003 to December 2003 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency. We will also make copies available to others 
Page 26 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no cost on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-8979 if you or your staff have any questions 

about this report. Key contributors to this report were F. James Shafer, 

Hynek Kalkus, Monica Brym, Tim Wilson, Etana Finkler, Lynn Cothern, 

Martin de Alteriis, and Ernie Jackson.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph A. Christoff, Director

International Affairs and Trade
Page 27 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix I

Comments from the Defense Threat Apendxies

Reduction Agency ApendxiI
Appendix I

Comments from the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency

Page 28 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page 29 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Related GAO Products

GAO Products 

Covering the CTR 

Program

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-1008R. 

Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2003. 

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-627R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2003.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed 

to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. 

GAO-03-482. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction 

and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia. GAO-03-526T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 5, 2003.

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-341R. 

Washington, D.C.: December 2, 2002.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of 

Assistance, but Procedural Limitations Remain. GAO-01-694. 

Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2001.

Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers 

Benefits, Poses New Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-138. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 

2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian 

Scientists Taxed by Russia. GAO/NSIAD-00-154R. Washington, D.C.: April 

28, 2000.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD's 1997-98 Reports on Accounting for 

Assistance Were Late and Incomplete. GAO/NSIAD-00-40. Washington, 

D.C.: March 15, 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce the Threats from the 

Former Soviet Union. GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119. Washington, D.C.: 

March 6, 2000.
Related GAO Products

Page 30 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May 

Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned. GAO/NSIAD-99-76. Washington, 

D.C.: April 13, 1999.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: Review of DOD's June 1997 Report on 

Assistance Provided. GAO/NSIAD-97-218. Washington, D.C.: September 5, 

1997.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in 

the Former Soviet Union. GAO/NSIAD-97-101. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 

1997.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat 

Assistance Has Improved. GAO/NSIAD-97-84. Washington, D.C.: February 

27, 1997.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Program. GAO/NSIAD-96-222. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 1996.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States 

Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls. GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-96-118. 

Washington, D.C.: March 13, 1996.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S Efforts to Improve Nuclear 

Material Controls in Newly Independent States. GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89. 

Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Assistance Can Be Improved. GAO/NSIAD-95-191. Washington, 

D.C.: September 29, 1995.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former 

Soviet Union-An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 

1995.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former 

Soviet Union. GAO/NSIAD-95-7. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 1994.

Soviet Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Efforts to Help Former Soviet Republics 

Secure and Destroy Weapons. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-5. Washington, D.C.: 

March 9, 1993.
Related GAO Products

Page 31 GAO-04-330 Weapons of Mass Destruction

Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S. 

Dismantlement Assistance. GAO/NSIAD-93-154. Washington, D.C.: March 

8, 1993.

Russian Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Implementation of the Soviet Nuclear 

Threat Reduction Act of 1991. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-47. Washington, D.C.: July 

27, 1992. 

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