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H.R. 1445, THE WORKPLACE

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 2005

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMPLOYER–EMPLOYEE 

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION 

AND THE WORKFORCE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

November 10, 2005

Serial No. 109–26

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and the Workforce

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house 

or 

Committee address: http://edworkforce.house.gov 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE 

JOHN A. BOEHNER, Ohio, Chairman

Thomas E. Petri, Wisconsin, Vice Chairman 

Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon, California 

Michael N. Castle, Delaware 

Sam Johnson, Texas 

Mark E. Souder, Indiana 

Charlie Norwood, Georgia 

Vernon J. Ehlers, Michigan 

Judy Biggert, Illinois 

Todd Russell Platts, Pennsylvania 

Patrick J. Tiberi, Ohio 

Ric Keller, Florida 

Tom Osborne, Nebraska 

Joe Wilson, South Carolina 

Jon C. Porter, Nevada 

John Kline, Minnesota 

Marilyn N. Musgrave, Colorado 

Bob Inglis, South Carolina 

Cathy McMorris, Washington 

Kenny Marchant, Texas 

Tom Price, Georgia 

Luis G. Fortun ̃ o, Puerto Rico 

Bobby Jindal, Louisiana 

Charles W. Boustany, Jr., Louisiana 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Thelma D. Drake, Virginia 

John R. ‘‘Randy’’ Kuhl, Jr., New York 

George Miller, California 

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan 

Major R. Owens, New York 

Donald M. Payne, New Jersey 

Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey 

Robert C. Scott, Virginia 

Lynn C. Woolsey, California 

Rube ́n Hinojosa, Texas 

Carolyn McCarthy, New York 

John F. Tierney, Massachusetts 

Ron Kind, Wisconsin 

Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio 

David Wu, Oregon 

Rush D. Holt, New Jersey 

Susan A. Davis, California 

Betty McCollum, Minnesota 

Danny K. Davis, Illinois 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, Arizona 

Chris Van Hollen, Maryland 

Tim Ryan, Ohio 

Timothy H. Bishop, New York 

John Barrow, Georgia

Paula Nowakowski, Staff Director 

John Lawrence, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMPLOYER–EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 

SAM JOHNSON, Texas, Chairman

John Kline, Minnesota, Vice Chairman 

John A. Boehner, Ohio 

Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon, California 

Todd Russell Platts, Pennsylvania 

Patrick J. Tiberi, Ohio 

Joe Wilson, South Carolina 

Marilyn N. Musgrave, Colorado 

Kenny Marchant, Texas 

Bobby Jindal, Louisiana 

Charles W. Boustany, Jr., Loiusiana 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey 

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan 

Donald M. Payne, New Jersey 

Carolyn McCarthy, New York 

John F. Tierney, Massachusetts 

David Wu, Oregon 

Rush D. Holt, New Jersey 

Betty McCollum, Minnesota 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, Arizona 

George Miller, California, ex officio 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Hearing held on November 10, 2005 ...................................................................... 1

Statement of Members: 

Johnson, Hon. Sam, Chairman, Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations, Committee on Education and the Workforce ................................ 1

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 4

McCarthy, Hon. Carolyn, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York ................................................................................................... 10

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 14

Souder, Hon. Mark A., a Repesentative in Congress from the State of 

Indiana ........................................................................................................... 6

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 8

Statement of Witnesses: 

Foltin, Richard T., Esq., Legislative Director and Counsel, American Jewish Committee ............................................................................................... 21

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 23

Land, Dr. Richard, President, Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, 

Southern Baptist Convention ....................................................................... 18

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 20

Marcosson, Samuel A., Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Louis D. 

Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville ....................................... 34

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 35

Olson, Camille A., Partner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, on behalf of the U.S. 

Chamber of Commerce ................................................................................. 38

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 40

Additional Submissions: 

Letters of Support for H.R. 1445: 

Coalition for Religious Freedom in the Workplace ................................. 86

Nevada-Utah Conference of Seventh-day Adventists ............................. 82

Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America ............................ 84

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops ........................................ 83

U.S. Senators Santorum and Kerry ......................................................... 12

Appendix I: New York’s Human Rights Law: 

Letters to witnesses requesting supplemental testimony ...................... 55

Response from Richard T. Foltin, the American Jewish Committee .... 58

Response from Camille A. Olson, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw LLP, on behalf 

of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce ....................................................... 62

Various appendices pertaining to New York’s human rights law ......... 64

(1)

H.R. 1445, THE WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM ACT OF 2005

Thursday, November 10, 2005

U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations 

Committee on Education and the Workforce 

Washington, DC 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:33 a.m., in room 

2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sam Johnson [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Johnson, Kline, Boehner, Jindal, Kildee, McCarthy, Holt, and Tierney. 

Staff present: Steve Forde, Director of Media Relations; Ed 

Gilroy, Director of Workforce Policy; Rob Gregg, Legislative Assistant; Byron Campbell, Legislative Assistant; Richard Hoar, Professional Staff Member; Jim Paretti, Workforce Policy Counsel; Steve 

Perrotta, Professional Staff Member; Deborah L. Emerson 

Samantar, Committee Clerk and Intern Coordinator; Jody 

Calemine, Counsel Employer-Employee Relations; Tylease Fitzgerald, Legislative Assistant/Labor; Michele Varnhagen, Labor 

Counsel/Coordinator; Michele Evermore, Legislative Associate/

Labor. 

Chairman JOHNSON [presiding]. A quorum being present, the 

Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations will come to order. 

We are holding this hearing today to hear testimony on H.R. 

1445, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act. 

[The bill follows:]

H. R. 1445

To amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to establish provisions with respect to religious accommodation in employment, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 17, 2005

Mr. SOUDER (for himself, Mrs. MCCARTHY, Mr. JINDAL, Mr. WEINER, Mr. CANTOR, 

Mr. VAN HOLLEN, and Mr. PRICE of North Carolina) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to establish provisions with respect to religious accommodation in employment, and for other purposes. 

2

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 

of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005’’. 

SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS. 

(a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 

2000e(j)) is amended—

(1) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘(j)’’; 

(2) by inserting ‘‘, after initiating and engaging in an affirmative and bona 

fide effort,’’ after ‘‘unable’’; 

(3) by striking ‘‘an employee’s’’ and all that follows through ‘‘religious’’ and 

inserting ‘‘an employee’s religious’’; and 

(4) by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(2)(A) In this subsection, the term ‘employee’ includes an employee (as defined 

in subsection (f)), or a prospective employee, who, with or without reasonable accommodation, is qualified to perform the essential functions of the employment position 

that such individual holds or desires. 

‘‘(B) In this paragraph, the term ‘perform the essential functions’ includes carrying out the core requirements of an employment position and does not include carrying out practices relating to clothing, practices relating to taking time off, or other 

practices that may have a temporary or tangential impact on the ability to perform 

job functions, if any of the practices described in this subparagraph restrict the ability to wear religious clothing, to take time off for a holy day, or to participate in 

a religious observance or practice. 

‘‘(3) In this subsection, the term ‘undue hardship’ means an accommodation requiring significant difficulty or expense. For purposes of determining whether an accommodation requires significant difficulty or expense, factors to be considered in 

making the determination shall include—

‘‘(A) the identifiable cost of the accommodation, including the costs of loss 

of productivity and of retraining or hiring employees or transferring employees 

from 1 facility to another; 

‘‘(B) the overall financial resources and size of the employer involved, relative to the number of its employees; and 

‘‘(C) for an employer with multiple facilities, the geographic separateness or 

administrative or fiscal relationship of the facilities.’’. 

(b) EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES.—Section 703 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e–2) is 

amended by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(o)(1) In this subsection: 

‘‘(A) The term ‘employee’ has the meaning given the term in section 

701(j)(2). 

‘‘(B) The term ‘leave of general usage’ means leave provided under the policy or program of an employer, under which—

‘‘(i) an employee may take leave by adjusting or altering the work 

schedule or assignment of the employee according to criteria determined by 

the employer; and 

‘‘(ii) the employee may determine the purpose for which the leave is to 

be utilized. 

‘‘(2) For purposes of determining whether an employer has committed an unlawful employment practice under this title by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation to the religious observance or practice of an employee, for an accommodation 

to be considered to be reasonable, the accommodation shall remove the conflict between employment requirements and the religious observance or practice of the employee. 

‘‘(3) An employer shall be considered to commit such a practice by failing to provide such a reasonable accommodation for an employee if the employer refuses to 

permit the employee to utilize leave of general usage to remove such a conflict solely 

because the leave will be used to accommodate the religious observance or practice 

of the employee.’’. 

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS. 

(a) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act and the 

amendments made by section 2 take effect on the date of enactment of this Act. 

(b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.—The amendments made by section 2 do not 

apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of enactment of this Act. 

3

Under committee rule 12(b), opening statements are limited to 

the chairman and ranking minority member of the committee. 

Therefore, if other members have statements, they will be included 

in the hearing record. 

With that, I ask unanimous consent for the hearing to remain 

open 14 days to allow member statements and other extraneous 

material referenced during the hearing to be submitted in the official hearing record. Without objection, so ordered. 

I am pleased to chair this morning’s hearing on the Workplace 

Religious Freedom Act sponsored by our committee colleague, Mr. 

Souder. I am also pleased to welcome our subcommittee colleague, 

Mrs. McCarthy, who will also be testifying on this important bill. 

It will be a pleasure to hear from both of you today. 

Today, the subcommittee will hear testimony on an issue of great 

importance and of deep interest to members on both sides of the 

aisle. The issue is, how in the workforce do we accommodate the 

beliefs and practices of those of strong religious faith? Or, put another way, how do we protect the rights of people of faith, adhering 

to their beliefs in an increasingly diverse workplace? At the same 

time, how do we strike the right balance so that employers and 

businesses, often small businesses, are able to staff and run their 

operations in a productive manner? 

I think we would start with the basic premise. In general, employees should not have to choose between a job and their religions. 

It is just that simple. 

Since its enactment in 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act has 

long given absolute protection to individuals by making it unlawful 

for a private, nonsectarian employer to discriminate against any 

employee or applicant on the basis of their religious beliefs. 

In fact, to give meaning to that protection, Congress amended 

Title VII in 1972 to ensure the maximum ability of employees to 

adhere to their religious faiths and practices in the workplace, 

while recognizing the legitimate day-to-day needs of employers determined to run successful businesses. 

However, despite the provisions of Title VII, there is concern that 

these protections have been undermined by interpretation by the 

courts, and in particular by two Supreme Court decisions. 

In one case, the court held that if an accommodation of a religious belief or practice causes an employer to bear more than a 

minimal cost, it is an undue hardship and thus the employer is not 

required to make that accommodation. 

Several years later, the Supreme Court further limited the scope 

of Title VII, basically ruling that there are several options for reasonably accommodating an employee’s religious practices, and it is 

the employer’s choice which accommodation he or she will provide. 

Many have argued that the legacy of these decisions has been to 

render Title VII protection of religious practice meaningless. H.R. 

1445 is a response to those cases and an attempt to restore those 

protections. 

H.R. 1445 would prohibit discrimination against any employee 

who, with or without reasonable accommodation, is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, unless the accommodation constitutes an undue hardship. 

4

‘‘Undue hardship’’ is defined as requiring significant difficulty or 

expense as measured by, one, the cost to the employer, including 

the loss of productivity and/or retraining or transferring employee 

from one facility to another; two, the overall financial resources 

and size of the employer; and three, for multi-facility employers, 

the geographic or administrative separateness of the facilities. 

At the same time, H.R. 1445 specifically states the essential 

functions of any position do not include dress codes or scheduling 

issues. Therefore, an employer must accommodate an employee’s 

request for leave to participate in religious observances or to modify a dress code for religious purposes. 

Finally, the bill requires that an employer initiate and engage an 

affirmative and bona-fide effort to accommodate an employee’s religious belief or practice. 

The issues at stake are far too important to leave to the law of 

unintended consequences. If we are to pursue legislative solutions, 

they must be fair, equitable and properly balanced in many important and sometimes competing interests. 

In that light, I look forward to hearing the testimony from all of 

our witnesses. We will first hear from our distinguished colleagues, 

then from an equally distinguished panel of experts, each of whom 

will provide insight as to how Title VII is working, whether or not 

it is broken, and how H.R. 1445 would address any problems. 

With that, I would yield to my friend, Mr. Kildee, for any opening statement he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Johnson follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Johnson, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Employer-Employee Relations, Committee on Education and the Workforce 

I am pleased to chair this morning’s hearing on the Workplace Religious Freedom 

Act, sponsored by our committee colleague, Mr. Souder. I am also pleased to welcome our Subcommittee colleague, Mrs. McCarthy, who will also be testifying on 

this important bill. It will be a pleasure to hear from both of you today. 

Today the Subcommittee will hear testimony on an issue of great importance, and 

of deep interest to members on both sides of the aisle. The issue is how, in the workforce, do we accommodate the beliefs and practices of those of strong religious faith? 

Or put another way, how do we protect the rights of people of faith adhering to their 

beliefs in an increasingly diverse workplace? 

At the same time, how do we strike the right balance so that employers and businesses—often small businesses—are able to staff and run their operations in a productive manner while respecting all employees? 

I think we would start with the basic premise—in general, employees should not 

have to choose between a job and their religion. It’s just that simple. 

Since its enactment in 1964, title 7 of the civil rights act has long given absolute 

protection to individuals by making it unlawful for a private, non-sectarian employer to discriminate against any employee or applicant on the basis of their religious beliefs. 

In fact, to give meaning to that protection, Congress amended Title 7 in 1972 to 

ensure the maximum ability of employees to adhere to their religious faiths and 

practices in the workplace—while recognizing the legitimate day to day needs of employers determined to run successful businesses. 

However, despite the provisions of Title 7, there is concern that these protections 

have been undermined by interpretation by the courts, and in particular by two Supreme Court decisions. 

In one case, the Court held that if an accommodation of a religious belief or practice causes an employer to bear more than a minimal cost it is an ‘‘undue hardship’’ 

and thus the employer is not required to make that accommodation. Several years 

later, the Supreme Court further limited the scope of Title 7, basically ruling that 

there are several options for reasonably accommodating an employee’s religious 

practices, and it is the employer’s choice which accommodation he or she will provide. 

5

Many have argued that the legacy of these decisions has been to render Title 7’s 

protection of religious practice meaningless. 

H.R. 1445 is a response to those cases, and an attempt to restore those protections. 

H.R. 1445 would prohibit discrimination against any employee who ‘‘with or without reasonable accommodation’’ is qualified to perform the essential functions of the 

position, unless the accommodation constitutes an ‘‘undue hardship.’’

‘‘Undue hardship’’ is defined as ‘‘requiring significant difficulty or expense,’’ as 

measured by: (1) the cost to the employer (including the loss of productivity and/

or retraining or transferring employees from one facility to another); (2) the overall 

financial resources and size of the employer; and (3) for multi-facility employers, the 

geographic or administrative separateness of the facilities. 

At the same time, H.R. 1445 specifically states that the essential functions of any 

position do not include dress codes or scheduling issues; therefore, an employer 

must accommodate an employee’s request for leave to participate in religious observances or to modify a dress code for religious purposes. 

Finally, the bill requires that an employer initiate and engage in an affirmative 

and bona-fide effort to accommodate an employee’s religious belief or practice. 

The issues at stake are far too important to leave to the law of unintended consequences. 

If we are to pursue legislative solutions, they must be fair, equitable, and properly 

balance the many important, if sometimes competing, interests. 

In that light, I look forward to hearing the testimony from all of our witnesses. 

We will hear first from our distinguished colleagues, then from an equally distinguished panel of experts, each of whom will provide insight as to how Title 7 is 

working, whether it is broken, and how H.R. 1445 would address any problems. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this hearing this morning. 

I would like to thank especially my colleagues, Mr. Souder and 

Mrs. McCarthy, for agreeing to testify on religious discrimination 

in the workplace and their very serious proposal to advance employee rights against that discrimination. That proposal is the 

Workplace Religious Freedom Act. This bill deserves our attention, 

as do the underlying problems of workplace discrimination which 

it seeks to address. 

Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, prohibiting, among other things, religious discrimination in the workplace. That right against religious discrimination recognizes a core 

principle in American government and society. We cherish religious 

liberty. Religious liberty in fact was so important to our founding 

fathers that they enshrined it in the very first amendment to our 

Constitution. 

Mr. Chairman, when it comes to religious freedom in the workplace, Congress must be very, very sensitive. We must protect the 

rights of the worker to practice his or her religion. We must also 

consider the legitimate needs of the employer to have a productive 

workplace, and we must protect the rights of fellow coworkers. 

This bill seeks to strike the right balance among providing meaningful religious accommodation, protecting others when those accommodations might conflict with their rights, and avoiding needless burdens on the employers. 

I suspect that today we will hear about whether that right balance has been struck. It seems that most people, if not everyone, 

engaged in this issue have the same intent and purpose in mind: 

to advance the right of employees against religious discrimination, 

without imposing undue hardships on the employers and without 

infringing on the rights of others. During the course of this hearing, we should keep in mind that common intent and purpose. 

6

I look forward to hearing today’s testimony from a very esteemed 

group of witnesses. Their testimony will help us advance a common 

cause: to protect people from having to choose between living their 

faith and earning a living, while ensuring that any accommodation 

which the law might mandate does not trample on the fundamental 

rights of others. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Kildee. 

We have two distinguished panels of witnesses today. 

For the first panel, we welcome our colleagues and fellow members of the Education and Workforce Committee, Congressman 

Souder and Congresswoman McCarthy, who have sponsored the 

Workplace Religious Freedom Act. 

I do not think I need to explain the light system to you two, but 

we will restrict you to 5 minutes. 

Mr. Souder, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK E. SOUDER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA 

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify and for holding this hearing today on the Employer-Employee Relations Subcommittee. 

The Workplace Religious Freedom Act has broad bipartisan support in both the House and Senate, indicating that it is an issue 

that deserves serious consideration. Senators John Kerry and Rick 

Santorum, a somewhat unusual combination, just like Congresswoman McCarthy and myself, and Chris Van Hollen was just at 

our press conference, have been leaders on this legislation for a 

number of years. I am pleased to be able to work with them in 

moving this legislation forward in the House. 

Let me start by laying out a rationale why this legislation is 

needed at this particular point in American history. 

I would add: an unusual opportunity time. We argue all the time 

about faith-based legislation, but here is one where the left and 

right both agree. It is a way for us to show, in a united way, the 

importance of religious liberty and faith in our country at a time 

when we are in fact becoming more diverse. This bill offers that opportunity. 

As America becomes increasingly diverse in its ethnic and religious heritage and as more Americans are finding their religious 

beliefs at odds with the secular and often anti-religious society, the 

need for strengthening religious liberties has become all the more 

important, and indeed necessary. 

America was founded as a place of religious freedom, and yet 

today these very freedoms are being denied as some employers 

refuse to work out reasonable accommodations for their employees’ 

religious observances. 

Catholics, Jews, Muslims, conservative evangelical Christians 

and individuals from many other faiths have found themselves in 

the position of having to compromise their religious convictions in 

order to keep their job. 

In fact, three are behind me: James Aligne is from Maryland and 

he lost his job; Deborah Fountain from California lost her job; and 

Miguel Hernandez from Arizona, are all here. 

7

They lost their jobs because they tried to practice their faith. In 

fact, in Deborah’s case, the employer then came back and found a 

reasonable accommodation. None of them were things that could 

not have been accommodated inside the workplace, which is what 

our bill tries to do. 

In fact, the Supreme Court has effectively thwarted the intent of 

Congress as expressed in the 1972 amendments in Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964: to protect all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or perspective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. 

Because in the Trans World Airlines case, what they did is they 

took a de minimis standard opposed to an undue hardship. Well, 

de minimis makes it almost impossible to prove because a de minimis cost gives the employer such a huge upper hand in the negotiations, and in many of these cases they are not high-paying jobs, 

they are lower-paying jobs. So it is not like the employee has a lot 

at stake here in the sense of lawsuits. 

Before my time runs out, because the chairman outlined much of 

the undue hardship and the reasonable accommodation standard, 

I want to address some concerns that the business community, including in my district, has expressed to me and some of the conservative concerns with this bill, which I believe are incorrect. 

One of them is that this is somehow going to impose or lead to 

a proliferation of lawsuits. In fact, litigation probably will decline 

under this bill if it became law. 

What has happened is, in the last 10 years where they have the 

data, from 1993 to 2003, religious discrimination in the workplace 

rose 82 percent because we do not understand the standards. And 

this is in spite of the fact that the burden is really on the employee 

because you do not do class action suits. You do get large-dollar 

settlements here. All you can do is get your job back or the amount 

that you lost in that period, and if it is a low-paying job, the cost 

of going to trial is far greater. 

So, the only cases that are being brought are basically nonprofits 

who have a backlog of cases because the discrimination has become 

more prevalent. So it is not like there is going to be this huge 

bursting out of lawsuits where attorneys’ fees can get you 30 or 40 

percent and huge, huge settlements. These are basically grassroots 

people from all sorts of faiths who have lost mostly low-to mediumpaid jobs and do not have the resources even to protect their religious rights. 

Now, from the business side, they will probably get less lawsuits 

because if we can clarify this, then you can at the very least stabilize it. 

Now, another thing is, how do we sort through whether people 

are going to claim they are in a religion? Well, we have standards. 

It is defined in the different acts, and furthermore if it does, there 

is no financial incentive to make up a religion so you do not have 

to work Saturdays, because the whole thing here is then you are 

going to have to go through the lawsuits. All you are going to do 

is get the job back, unless you could establish that it was a valid 

reason in court. 

8

That is the key thing. The court gets to determine whether it is 

a truly held belief, a valid belief, and they can go into that examination, and that has not been a problem. I do not believe the validity of the religion will be a problem. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Souder follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress 

From the State of Indiana 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before the Employer-Employee Relations Subcommittee today. I appreciate being able to discuss a bill that 

I have introduced, along with my colleague Congresswoman Carolyn McCarthy, that 

will help restore religious liberties in the workplace. 

The Workplace Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1445, has broad, bi-partisan support 

in both the House and Senate, indicating that it is an issue that deserves serious 

consideration. Senators John Kerry and Rick Santorum have been the leaders on 

this legislation for a number of years, and I am pleased to be able to work with 

them in moving this legislation forward in the House. 

Let me start, by laying out the rationale for why this legislation is needed at this 

particular point in American history. Then, I’ll address, briefly, some of the concerns 

that I have heard about this legislation, and I’ll be happy to answer any questions 

my colleagues may have. 

Why WRFA? Why Now? 

As America becomes increasingly diverse in its ethnic and religious makeup, and 

as more Americans are finding their religious beliefs at odds with a secular, often 

anti-religious society, the need for strengthening religious liberties has become all 

the more important and, indeed, necessary. America was founded as a place of religious freedom, yet today those very freedoms are being denied as some employers 

refuse to work out reasonable accommodations for their employees’ religious observances. Catholics, Jews, Muslims, conservative evangelical Christians and individuals 

from many other faiths have found themselves in the position of having to compromise their religious convictions in order to keep their job. 

While the large majority of the Title VII religious accommodation cases involve 

religious garb, grooming or observance of holy days, about 25 percent of the cases 

involve other religious accommodation requests, such as conscience objections to certain work activities. One gentleman who is with us in the audience today was working as a network designer and systems engineer in the Maryland suburbs. As a 

member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, he objected to his assignment to 

work on a website project that sold and distributed pornography. Fortunately, this 

gentleman was able to find work elsewhere since he was a highly skilled worker, 

but he shouldn’t have been forced to make this choice. There are many other employees across the country that are not so fortunate. 

A former small businessman and a conservative evangelical Christian myself, I 

understand the tension in the workplace between accommodating the beliefs of all 

religious employees—particularly those of a minority religion—and maintaining a 

profitable and productive business. It isn’t always easy to find a solution agreeable 

to both the employer and employee. Yet, if America is to stand as the protector of 

religious freedom, the work environment must be a place where people of all faiths 

are free to follow their conscience without fear of losing their job. 

How Would WRFA Change Current Law? 

As you may know, existing civil rights law does provide some protections to religious people in the workplace. However, these protections have been severely undermined by a few Supreme Court cases that have effectively thwarted the intent of 

Congress—as expressed in the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964—to protect ‘‘all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate 

to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without 

undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).’’

In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, the Supreme Court re-interpreted Title VII 

religious liberty protections by applying a ‘‘de minimis’’ cost standard to the definition of ‘‘undue hardship’’ on the employer. The Court held that ‘‘to require TWA to 

bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an 

undue hardship.’’ This new de minimis standard established such a low threshold 

for employers that today there is little incentive for them to work out religious accommodations with their employees. 

9

The Workplace Religious Freedom Act is necessary to re-establish the intent of 

Congress that only real hardship is reason for an employer not to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee. My bill would define ‘‘undue hardship’’ as a 

‘‘significant difficulty or expense,’’ similar to the definition used in the Americans 

with Disabilities Act. The bill establishes several criteria for determining what constitutes a significant difficulty or expense, including the costs of providing such an 

accommodation, the size of the employer (in terms of financial resources and number of employees), and the geographic separateness or administrative or fiscal relationship of an employer’s multiple facilities. 

The bill I introduced will also establish that a ‘‘reasonable accommodation’’ ‘‘shall 

remove the conflict between employment requirements and the religious observance 

or practice of the employee.’’ The reasonable accommodation requirement of current 

law was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook to favor the preferred accommodation of the employer—not the employee. The 

Workplace Religious Freedom Act would require the employer to find an accommodation that satisfies the employee as long as that accommodation does not impose 

a significant difficulty or expense on the employer. 

Together, I believe the proposed new definitions of ‘‘reasonable accommodation’’ 

and ‘‘undue hardship’’ strike the appropriate balance between employer and employee rights as they relate to religious liberty in the workplace. 

To clarify the rights of employers, however, the legislation states that an employee must be able to perform the ‘‘essential functions’’ of his or her job ‘‘with or 

without reasonable accommodation.’’ This provision ensures that an employee cannot request an accommodation that would make it impossible to fulfill the core requirements of a job. The ‘‘essential functions’’ term cannot, however, be interpreted 

to include practices such as wearing religious clothing, taking time off for religious 

observances, or ‘‘other practices that may have a temporary or tangential impact on 

the ability to perform job functions.’’ Those practices may not be considered an ‘‘essential function’’ of a job under this legislation, unless an accommodation for those 

practices is believed to be an ‘‘undue hardship’’ on the employer. For instance, if an 

individual applied for a weekend watchman job at a warehouse and knew that his 

particular faith disallowed working on either a Saturday or Sunday, the employer 

would not be obligated to provide an accommodation for that individual. 

Addressing Concerns 

Whenever legislation deals with such a highly individual and personal subject as 

religion in the workplace, there will always be criticism from various groups that 

are unsure of how it will be carried out in practice. Fortunately, however, WRFA 

does have some precedent in state law that can be examined to determine how it 

might play out on a national level. The state of New York passed a law similar to 

WRFA in 2002 that, by all reports, has not resulted in the dire predictions anticipated by critics on both the right and left. According to Attorney General Eliot 

Spitzer, New York’s law has not been overly burdensome on businesses or resulted 

in an increase in litigation; nor has it resulted in the infringement of a woman’s 

ability to have an abortion or purchase birth control as the ACLU has predicted. 

Still, even with the positive experience with workplace religious freedom law in 

New York, criticisms of WRFA still exist. I do believe, however, that some of these 

concerns can be resolved with a clear explanation of the facts about the bill. 

I know that my colleague Mrs. McCarthy will be addressing some of the concerns 

from the more liberal perspective, so I will focus my analysis on those criticisms 

from traditional Republican constituencies—namely the business community. First, 

however, let me just say that religious accommodation will not work without a little 

give and take from all interested parties. Religious accommodation cannot mean 

anything an employee wants it to be—especially when it has a direct impact on 

other individuals, whether they be co-workers or a business’ clients or customers. 

Thus, whether one is a conservative Christian, devout Muslim, or adherent of a 

smaller, less organized religion, he or she should not be able to demand an accommodation that would impose significant difficulty or expense on the employer or result in the inability to perform the core functions of his or her job. 

With that said, let me address just a few of the concerns of the business community: the potential for a rise in litigation and a growth in fraudulent religious 

claims. 

First, quite to the contrary of some of WRFA’s critics, regarding litigation, the 

Workplace Religious Freedom Act is expected to reduce or at the very least stabilize 

litigation. Between 1993 and 2003, claims to the EEOC involving religious discrimination in the workplace rose 82 percent. During this same time period, racial discrimination cases declined slightly. By clarifying the ‘‘undue hardship’’ standard for 

employers to work out a religious accommodation with employees, litigation will be 

10

1 James F. Morgan, ‘‘In Defense of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act: Protecting the Unprotected Without Sanctifying the Workplace,’’ Labor Law Journal, Spring 2002: 71. 

reduced as fewer employees will be forced to sue in order to get the attention of 

their employers. 

Additionally, according to James Morgan, a professor of Legal Studies in Business 

at California State University, Chico, there has been some disagreement in lower 

courts as to the interpretation of the Hardison and Philbrook Supreme Court Opinions. This judicial confusion has led to varying standards and interpretations of the 

Title VII religious accommodation provisions, possibly resulting in an increase in 

litigation. Morgan writes: ‘‘A strong argument can be made that many lower courts 

are writing opinions favoring the employee’s position, in possible violation of the restrictive mandate that necessarily flows from the Hardison/Philbrook approach, because they perceive the Court’s position as overly burdensome on the rights of religious applicants and employees.’’ 1 WRFA will ensure that the religious accommodation provisions (as amended in 1972 to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) 

are clarified in U.S. Code as originally intended by Congress. This clarification will 

help reduce litigation, while at the same time provide greater incentive for employers to work out an amicable accommodation with religious employees. 

Secondly, let me address the concern that WRFA will result in an increasing number of bogus religious claims by employees who are seeking time off or dislike strict 

requirements on outward appearance and dress. I can sympathize with these concerns from the business community, especially as religious beliefs are becoming increasingly more personal and difficult to classify according to more traditional views 

of religious belief and practice. However, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act does 

nothing to change the current definition of ‘‘religion’’ under EEOC guidelines. Existing Title VII interpretive guidelines published by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) provide that: (1) religious practices protected under Title 

VII include ‘‘moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views;’’ (2) a person may ascribe to a particular religious belief even if ‘‘no religious group espouses such beliefs 

or the fact the religious group to which the individual professes to belong may not 

accept such belief,’’ and (3) the term ‘‘religious practice’’ includes ‘‘both religious observances and practices.’’

Admittedly, this broad interpretation of religion and religious practices makes it 

difficult for an employer to call into question the validity of an employee’s stated 

religious beliefs or practices. However, the courts can examine whether an individual has a ‘‘sincerely held’’ religious belief. Few individuals would go through the 

trouble and expense of being fired from their job and suing their employer in order 

to obtain an accommodation if they did not sincerely hold their religious beliefs. 

And, of course, there is a limit to what an employee can receive as an accommodation. If the employee’s request would result in a significant difficulty or expense to 

the employer, the accommodation would not have to be granted. Additionally, I am 

hesitant to allow the federal government to further tinker with the definition of religion for fear that it could be defined so narrowly that many religious beliefs and 

practices would be considered ineligible for purposes of making accommodations. 

I am sure there are other concerns that I have not addressed, but I believe these 

are the most common concerns I have heard. Part of the reason I have been looking 

forward to this hearing is to listen to the panel members and my colleagues to understand the concerns that they may have. This legislation has been carefully crafted over a number of years, but I am always open to considering other legitimate 

possibilities as long as they result in restoring the intent of the 1972 amendments 

to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was to hold employers accountable to working 

out a reasonable accommodation for their religious employees. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to testify before the subcommittee today. I am happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Souder. 

Mrs. McCarthy, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CAROLYN MCCARTHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Mrs. MCCARTHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and fellow members 

of our subcommittee, and Mr. Kildee, ranking member. I welcome 

11

the opportunity to testify about the Workforce Religious Freedom 

Act. 

I also want to thank my colleague, Mr. Souder, for bringing this 

to my attention and working with him on it. We have worked 

bipartisanly on this bill for months and have not wavered in our 

support. 

Secondly, I would like to thank Senator Kerry and Senator 

Santorum for introducing the same legislation in the Senate. As 

was mentioned earlier, who thought that two of the Democrats and 

two of the Republicans would be working on this? 

I have a letter of support from the senators, which I would like 

to include into the record. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The letter follows:]

12


mcc1.eps
13

Mrs. MCCARTHY. Thank you. 

This bill, simply stated, is pro-business, pro-faith and pro-family. 

It is an important piece of legislation whose passage is long overdue. 

I felt the need to get involved with this legislation, with over 40 

diverse organizations in favor of this legislation, because I have 

heard of many individuals who were forced to choose between their 

job and their religions. 

Nowadays, we have a 24/7-week work environment that clashes 

with our religions observations. Unfortunately, since 9/11, our Muslim and Sikh friends have been the target of backlash. Our great 

nation was founded under the principles of freedom, including religion. We, as members of Congress, have the responsibility to ensure people are able to freely practice. Asking the person to leave 

their religion at their door is impossible and something they should 

not be asked to do. 

In 1964, as mentioned before, we had Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act. Simply stated, employers are not allowed to discriminate based on race, gender, color and religion. 

But as the courts began to rule in the cases, they ruled that any 

hardship is an undue hardship. This has left religious-observant 

workers with little legal protection. 

We are trying to re-establish the principle that employees must 

reasonably accommodate the religious needs of employees. We 

would do this by redefining ‘‘undue hardship’’ as something that 

imposes significant difficulty or expense on the employer or that 

would keep an employee from carrying out the essential functions 

of the job. 

It is an important point to make that the third parties would not 

be adversely affected. I am hearing and reading a lot regarding the 

bill from organizations which I agree with a majority of the time 

that third parties would be affected. 

I am a pro-choice member of Congress and believe a woman 

should be able to choose what happens to her body, especially in 

the case of an emergency. This legislation would not prevent a 

woman from receiving an emergency abortion, obtaining birth control medications or emergency contraceptives. 

For example, if a nurse—and by the way, you all know my background as a nurse—if a nurse has a religious objection to particiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Aug 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\EER\11-10-05\24514.TXT DICK

mcc2.eps
14

pating in an emergency abortion, she would be covered. Performing 

emergency surgery is an essential function of a nurse’s job. A court 

would not hear a case brought by a nurse who feels wrongly dismissed by a hospital because the nurse walked away from a patient 

in a case of emergency care. A patient who is suffering places a significant burden on a hospital, and a hospital would have to assist 

them. 

Unfortunately, there has been a need to have clinics protected in 

this day and age. This law would not allow a clinic to be unprotected. If a police officer had a religious objection with guarding the 

clinic, the request for removal is accommodated as long as a replacement was possible. If not, then the officer must accept the assignment. 

Another concern I have heard regarding the bill is women would 

have difficulty obtaining birth control because this bill would protect a pharmacist who feels it is against their religion fulfilling the 

prescription. 

Currently, the American Pharmacists Association policy is that 

pharmacies can refuse to fill prescriptions as long as they make 

sure customers can get their medication some way. This is exactly 

the point of this legislation. 

We would be allowed to have a pharmacist who has a strong religious objection in filling the prescription from doing so without any 

effect on the individual. She would still receive her prescription. 

I would like to point out that WRFA does not apply to employees 

who have fewer than 50 employees, so we are taking care of the 

small-business person. This protects against a circumstance in 

which an employee would not have a personal place or it is located 

in a rural area. 

I think the reason that we are testifying today is really because 

we want to take away from the mix of what some people might be 

seeing in this bill. New York State already has this type of legislation in our state, and it is working very, very well. We brought this 

legislation and we appreciate your having this hearing, because it 

would give us the opportunity to answer the questions where there 

might be some confusion about it. 

This country is different today than it was 50 or 60 years ago. 

But even going then, when my great-grandparents came to this 

country, they were Catholic, and they were discriminated against. 

That is one of the reasons why I have a very strong feeling about 

this. 

And it is our job as Congress-people to certainly protect the constitutional rights. It is something I strongly feel. We might disagree on a number of issues in this Congress, but when many of 

us can come together, I think that is the important thing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. McCarthy follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Carolyn McCarthy, a Representative in 

Congress From the State of New York 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and fellow members of the subcommittee. 

I welcome the opportunity to testify about the Workforce Religious Freedom Act. 

I would first like to thank my colleague, Mr. Souder. We have worked bipartisanly 

on this bill for months and have not wavered on our support. Secondly, I would like 

15

to thank Senator Kerry and Senator Santorum for introducing the same legislation 

in the Senate and their tireless work. 

This bill, simply stated, is pro-business, pro-faith and pro-family. It is an important piece of legislation whose passage is long overdue. 

I felt the need to get involved, with the over 40 diverse organizations, in favor 

of this legislation because I have heard of many individuals who are forced to choose 

between their job and their religion. Nowadays we have a 24 hour, 7 day a week 

work environment that clashes with religious observances. And unfortunately, since 

9/11 our Muslim and Sikh friends have been the target of backlash. 

Our great nation was founded under the principles of freedom, including religion. 

And we as members of Congress have a responsibility to ensure people are able to 

freely practice. Asking a person to leave their religion at their door is impossible 

and something they should not be asked to do. 

In 1964 Congress realized the importance of religion to workers by providing Title 

7 of the Civil Rights Act. Simply stated employers are not allowed to discriminate 

based on race, gender, color and religion. But as the courts began to rule on cases 

they ruled that any hardship is an ‘‘undue hardship.’’ This has left religiously observant workers with little legal protection. 

WRFA will re-establish the principle that employers must reasonably accommodate the religious needs of employees. WRFA would redefine undue hardship as 

something that imposes significant difficulty or expense on the employer or that 

would keep an employee from carrying out the essential functions of the job. 

An important point to make is that third parties would not be adversely affected. 

I have been hearing and reading a lot regarding the bill from organizations, which 

I agree with a majority of the time, that third parties would be affected. 

I am a pro-choice member of Congress and believe a woman should be able to 

choose what happens to her body, especially in case of an emergency. This legislation would not prevent a woman from receiving an emergency abortion, obtaining 

birth control medication or emergency contraceptives. 

For example, if a nurse has a religious objection to participating in an emergency 

abortion she would not be covered under WRFA. Performing an emergency surgery 

of any kind is an essential function of nurse’s job. 

A court would not hear a case brought by a nurse, who feels wrongly dismissed 

by a hospital because the nurse walked away from a patient in need of emergency 

care. A patient who is suffering places a significant burden on a hospital and the 

hospital would have to assist them. 

If a woman goes to an abortion clinic she can be subjected to violence and threats. 

Unfortunately there has been a need to have the clinics protected. This law would 

not allow a clinic to be unprotected. 

If a police officer had a religious objection with guarding the clinic his request for 

removal is accommodated as long as a replacement was possible. If not, then the 

officer must accept the assignment. 

Another concern I have heard regarding the bill is women would have difficulty 

obtaining birth control because WRFA would protect a pharmacist who feels it is 

against their religion from filling the prescription. 

Currently, The American Pharmacists Association’s policy is that pharmacists can 

refuse to fill prescriptions as long as they make sure customers can get their medications some other way. This is exactly the point of the legislation!! WRFA would 

allow a pharmacist who has a strong religious objection to filling the prescription 

from doing so without any affect on the individual. She would still receive her prescription. 

I’d like to point out that WRFA does not apply to employers who have fewer than 

15 employees. This protects against circumstances in which an employer would not 

have the personnel in place or is located in a rural area. So, for example, a pharmacy with less than 15 employees would operate under their association’s policy. 

It is time to allow people to once again practice their religion without fear of losing their job. 

Once again I thank you for the opportunity to talk about legislation that is probusiness, pro-faith and pro-family. 

I welcome any questions you may have. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mrs. McCarthy. 

Mr. Souder, I might ask you, you have people here, do you want 

to take one case in particular and explain to us why you are interested in this legislation? Can I ask you, will it stop the wind from 

blowing through the windows up there? 

16

[Laughter.] 

Mr. SOUDER. Let me use Deborah Fountain’s case and relate it 

to a couple of others. 

In her case—she is behind me here—she was an airline attendant and wanted to have the Sabbath off. They fired her. Then they 

came back and, my understanding is, rehired her with a Sabbathaccommodating schedule, because of course when you are flying 

seven days a week and have all these flights, it is not that hard 

to accommodate this kind of stuff. 

There was another case of a Sears repairman who wanted Saturdays off, and they said it was the busiest repair day, and so they 

fired him. Now, the fact is that Saturday turned out not to be the 

busiest repair day. 

In another case, they were pressing on the Saturday Sabbath 

question and found that the person said he would come in at sundown. 

Now, if it is an essential function—this was what Congressman 

McCarthy said is critical—if it is an essential function, you cannot 

get the Saturday off. If that becomes a key part of their job—in retail furniture that I grew up in, as much as 40 percent of the sales 

may fall on a Saturday. If you are the top salesman, then you 

would define that much like in parental and family leave, where 

we have key employees, we do this essential function-type stuff all 

the time in legislation. This is not that hard to work through, yet 

it is one of the big bogeymen that we try to deal with this. 

I have a company in my district that the way they first found 

they had very devout Muslims was their assembly line crashed at 

prayer time. They tried to figure out why the line crashed: because 

two people went down on the rug and started praying to the east. 

Now, they could have fired them, which many companies would 

do. They could have said, ‘‘Oh, this is inconvenient. Just work 

through this.’’ But they adjusted the break period, and in the one 

break room they set it up so they could have a prayer in the break 

room, adjusted the schedule, and everybody is happy. 

Now, in a tight labor market in that area, they have a significant 

percentage in this rural country town of Arab employees because 

they showed some sensitivity to their culture with no impact whatsoever on the production at the factory. What was so hard about 

that? 

Some people just want to fight the change, and that is why it is 

not effective. If they are a key employee or if it is an essential function, you can have these type of things in law, but some people just 

do not want to do anything. That, kind of, is inconvenient, and that 

is what the court has given the advantage of. If a business does not 

feel like accommodating you, they do not have to accommodate you. 

Mrs. MCCARTHY. I would like to just follow up on that too. 

In my world of nursing, obviously we worked 24/7. Every patient 

had to be covered in the hospital that I worked in. And yet many 

of us nurses, whether they were Muslim nurses or Jewish nurses 

or myself, we always were able to accommodate each other. I think 

that is important to know, because basically the hospital allowed 

us to accommodate each other. 

Now, there were many times I would have loved to have Christmas off every single year, but I can certainly remember working on 

17

Christmases because they could not replace me. I worked in the intensive care unit; I understood that. 

This legislation would also enforce that. If there is no accommodation there, then that person would have to work. So I think it 

is a fair and balanced thing. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, both. 

Mr. Kildee, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you very much. 

I appreciate Mr. Souder’s and Mrs. McCarthy’s work on this. 

One question to Mrs. McCarthy. You say New York state has a 

similar law to the one you are proposing. How has the business 

community accommodated itself to that law? 

Because New York is not just New York City. It is quite a microcosm of America when you travel the whole state of New York. 

Mrs. MCCARTHY. I think what this legislation also does, in New 

York because we do have a similar law, it is really a matter of accommodation. We have found that with the law in New York, it 

gave the employers and the employees exactly what the rules were, 

so everyone knew exactly where they were when they were asking 

for accommodations on their religion. 

Now, I understand New York certainly is a very, very large area, 

but we found that they could accommodate it and it did not hurt 

businesses at all. I think it is something, whether it is a low-income job or even on the higher end, the businesses have been able 

to accommodate it. 

So, I think that what we are trying to do—and that is why I certainly support this legislation, is that we are doing it in New York. 

It already is working well in New York, and I think the rest of the 

country needs to catch up to New York. 

Mr. KILDEE. After the enactment of the New York law, did you 

see any increase in litigation or decrease or about the same? 

Mrs. MCCARTHY. Actually less, mainly because, again, the companies saw what their responsibility was and it was clear, it was 

actually clear, on how to accommodate those that were looking for 

the day off on their religious observation. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, both. I think there are no more 

questions. We appreciate your testimony. You all may step down. 

Would the next panel come forward and take their seats, please? 

Dr. Richard Land is president of the Ethics and Religious Liberty 

Commission, the Southern Baptist Convention’s official entity assigned to address social, moral and ethical concerns. Dr. Land is 

executive editor of the magazine ‘‘Faith and Family Values,’’ and 

was appointed this year to the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom. Dr. Land received his bachelor’s degree from 

Princeton and his doctorate from Oxford. 

Mr. Richard Foltin is legislative director and counsel in the 

American Jewish Committee’s Office of Government and International Affairs. He serves as the chair of the ABA’s First Amendment Rights Committee and is a member of the National Council 

of Church’s Committee on Religious Liberty. Mr. Foltin received his 

bachelor’s degree from New York University and his law degree 

from Harvard. 

18

Mr. Samuel Marcosson is an associate dean and professor of law 

at the University of Louisville’s Brandeis School of Law. He has 

previously served as an attorney for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Mr. Marcosson received his bachelor’s degree 

from Bradley University and his law degree from the Yale Law 

School. 

Mrs. Camille Olson is a partner in the law firm of Sayfarth Shaw 

and is a member of its Labor and Employment Law Steering Committee and chair of its Employment Law Committee. She has 20 

years of practice in all areas of employment law, including employment discrimination. Ms. Olson received both her bachelor’s and 

law degree from the University of Michigan. 

You all have watched the lights up there. When they are green, 

you have 5 minutes to start, and when the little yellow one comes 

on, you have 1 minute. We would appreciate it if you all would restrict your comments to 5 minutes. 

We will begin with Dr. Land. 

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD LAND, PRESIDENT, ETHICS AND 

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY COMMISSION, SOUTHERN BAPTIST 

CONVENTION 

Dr. LAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be here 

to speak on this legislation. 

As you are aware, the Southern Baptist Convention is the nation’s largest non-catholic denomination, with more than 16 million 

members worshiping in more than 43,000 autonomous churches in 

the United States. The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission is 

the official Southern Baptist entity charged by the Southern Baptist Convention to speak to our nation’s moral, cultural and religious liberty issues. 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to this committee about the 

importance of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005 to 

Southern Baptists and to all people of faith. 

The Southern Baptist Convention believes strongly in the principle of religious liberty for all Americans of all faiths, as well as 

those who espouse no faith. We believe that God has given this 

freedom to mankind and that therefore we have a duty to respect 

and ensure that freedom. 

As recognized by the founders of this nation, freedom of religion 

is not merely the right to believe what we want, but the right to 

act in conformity with those beliefs. This is reflected in the historical record of the debates about the First Amendment, which shows 

that the framers rejected a proposed First Amendment text which 

would have protected freedom of conscience for a text that protects 

free exercise. 

Given the great amount of time people spend in the workplace, 

it makes sense and is consistent with fundamental American values that more than 30 years ago Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964 was amended to require employers to accommodate the religious needs of employees in the workplace unless doing so would 

impose an undue hardship on the employer. 

It is tragic that this protection of the rights of Americans of faith 

has been eviscerated by the federal courts over the years and that 

the ability of religious Americans to have their religious needs acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Aug 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\EER\11-10-05\24514.TXT DICK
19

commodated in the workplace relies upon the benevolence of one’s 

foreman, shop steward or human resources leadership. 

The Workplace Religious Freedom Act is not designed to revolutionize federal law. It simply seeks to reinstate the protection Congress put in place years ago and the courts have eroded. 

WRFA is supported not only by most Southern Baptists but by 

as a broad and diverse a coalition of faith communities and organizations that you could assemble, conservatives and liberals, Catholics, Jews, evangelicals, Protestants, Sikhs, Muslims and others. 

WRFA has also brought together a remarkably diverse set of bipartisan congressional sponsors. What unites us all is the simple 

principle that we will not prejudice particular faiths or practices, 

but wish to put a legal standard in place which says, so long as 

a religious accommodation will not adversely affect third parties, 

whether that third party is the employer, coworker or clients/customers of the employers, the employee’s religious needs should be 

accommodated at work. 

This principle unites people of diverse faiths because we all have 

challenges to our religious observances. This is truly one of those 

situations where we protect our own by protecting everyone. The 

Sikh ought to have his faith-mandated requirement to wear a turban accommodated, just as the Baptist who wishes to dress modestly. The Adventist and Orthodox Jew ought to have their work 

schedule accommodated for their holy day, just as the Catholic, 

Protestant and evangelical Christian who wishes not to work on 

Christmas or Good Friday. 

The computer scientist who is suddenly assigned to a military 

contract which conflicts with her faith-informed pacifist beliefs 

ought ideally to be accommodated with a reassignment, just as a 

laboratory technician ought to be accommodated to not have to 

work on an embryonic stem-cell research project over her religious 

objections. 

An array of criticisms have been asserted against WRFA, some 

from representatives of the business community who warn against 

it being unduly burdensome on employers and some who warn it 

imperils civil rights of one sort or another. What all these criticisms have in common is they are entirely hypothetical and speculative. 

I believe business can accommodate the needs of people of faith 

without experiencing any measurable negative effects. Indeed, it is 

my conviction that a business that shows a genuine concern for the 

personal and spiritual lives of its employees, in doing so, is going 

to become a more productive company because its employees will 

be happier and more fulfilled. 

WRFA has been road-tested in New York state, and as attested 

to in a letter to this subcommittee from Attorney General Eliot 

Spitzer, that state’s WRFA statute has not proven to either burden 

businesses or imperil civil rights. We believe the results at the national level would be the same. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Land follows:]

20

Prepared Statement of Dr. Richard Land, President, the Ethics & Religious 

Liberty Commission, Southern Baptist Convention 

Good morning, I am Dr. Richard Land, President of the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission. As you are aware, the Southern Baptist Convention is the nation’s largest non-catholic denomination, with more than 

16 million members worshipping in more than 43,000 autonomous churches in the 

United States. The Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission is the official Southern 

Baptist entity charged by the Southern Baptist Convention to speak to our nation’s 

moral, cultural, and religious liberty issues. 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to this committee this morning about the 

importance of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005 to Southern Baptists 

and to all people of faith. The Southern Baptist Convention believes strongly in the 

principle of religious liberty for all Americans of all faiths, as well as those who 

espouse no faith. We believe that God has given this freedom to mankind, and that 

therefore, we have a duty to respect and ensure that freedom. 

As recognized by the Founders of this nation, freedom of religion is not merely 

the right to believe what we want, but the right to act in conformity with those beliefs. This is reflected in the historical record of the debates about the First Amendment which show that the Framers rejected a proposed First Amendment text which 

would have protected freedom ‘‘of conscience’’ for our text that protects ‘‘free exercise.’’

Given the great amount of time people spend in the workplace, it makes sense 

and is consistent with fundamental American values that, more than 30 years ago, 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended to require employers to accommodate the religious needs of employees in the workplace unless doing so would 

impose an undue hardship on the employer. It is tragic that this protection of the 

rights of Americans of faith has been eviscerated by the federal courts over the 

years and that the ability of religious Americans to have their religious needs accommodated in the workplace relies upon the benevolence of one’s foreman, shop 

steward, or human resources leadership. 

The Workplace Religious Freedom Act is not designed to revolutionize federal law, 

it simply seeks to reinstate the protection Congress put in place years ago and the 

courts have eroded. 

WRFA is supported not only by most Southern Baptists, but by as broad and diverse a coalition of faith communities and organizations you could assemble-conservatives and liberals, Catholics, Jews, Evangelicals, Protestants, Sikhs, Muslims, and 

others. WRFA has also brought together a remarkably diverse set of bipartisan congressional sponsors. What unites us all is the simple principle that we will not prejudge particular faiths or practices, but wish to put a legal standard in place which 

says-so long as a religious accommodation will not adversely affect third parties, 

whether that third party is the employer, co-worker or clients/customers of the employer, the employee’s religious needs should be accommodated at work. 

This principle unites people of diverse faiths because we all have challenges to 

our religious observances, and this is truly one of those situations where we protect 

our own by protecting everyone. The Sikh ought to have his faith-mandated requirement to wear a turban accommodated just as the Baptist who wishes to dress modestly. The Adventist and Orthodox Jew ought to have their work schedule accommodated for their holy day just as the Catholic, Protestant, or evangelical Christian 

who wishes not to work on Christmas or Good Friday. The computer scientist who 

is suddenly assigned to a military contract which conflicts with her faith-informed 

pacifist beliefs ought, ideally, be accommodated with a reassignment just as a laboratory technician ought to be accommodated to not have to work on an embryonic 

stem-cell research project over her religious objections. 

An array of criticisms have been asserted against WRFA, some from representatives of the business community who warn against it being unduly burdensome on 

employers, and some who warn of WRFA imperiling civil rights of one sort or another. What all these criticisms have in common is that they are entirely hypothetical and speculative. I believe business can accommodate the needs of people of 

faith without experiencing any measurable negative effects. Indeed, it is my conviction that a business that shows a genuine concern for the personal and spiritual 

lives of its employees is going to be a more productive company because its employees will be happier and more fulfilled. 

Hopefully, a business will accommodate the religious needs and convictions of its 

employees voluntarily, and I am gratified to know that most go to considerable 

length to do so. But I know that some businesses are less responsive to their employees in these regards. In these cases, some guidelines seem imperative. Both the 

employer and the employee need to know what is expected of them and each other. 

21

H.R. 1445 provides some very reasonable guidelines to help both the employee and 

the employer understand their responsibilities to each other in the accommodation 

of the employee’s faith requirements in the workplace. 

I know this approach works. WRFA has been ‘‘road tested’’ in New York State, 

which several years ago updated its state religious accommodation law to track the 

text proposed in H.R. 1445. As attested to in a letter to this Subcommittee from 

New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, that state’s WRFA statute has not 

proven to either burden businesses or imperil civil rights. We believe the results at 

the national level would be the same. 

I appreciate the opportunity to share my convictions and express my support for 

this legislation. I will be pleased to make myself or my staff available to work with 

you or to answer any questions you may have, now or in the future. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. We appreciate your testimony. 

Mr. Foltin, you may begin. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD T. FOLTIN, ESQ., LEGISLATIVE 

DIRECTOR AND COUNSEL, AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE 

Mr. FOLTIN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Kildee, members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the 

Workplace Religious Freedom Act, an important bipartisan civil 

rights and religious liberty legislation introduced by Representative 

Mark Souder and Carolyn McCarthy. 

My name is Richard Foltin. I serve as legislative director and 

counsel in the Office of Government and International Affairs of 

the American Jewish Committee. 

I also have the privilege of serving as co-chair, together with 

James Standish, of the General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists of the coalition promoting passage of WRFA. This is a broad 

coalition of over 40 religious groups which spans the political spectrum, reflecting the robust diversity of American religious life. 

With the permission of the chair, I would like to submit for the 

record statements and letters of support for WRFA that have been 

prepared by several of these organizations. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Without objection, so ordered. 

[See Appendix I for all supplemental letters.] 

Mr. FOLTIN. As you know, current civil rights law defines the refusal of an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious practice as a form of religious discrimination unless such accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. 

But, as has already been discussed, this standard has been so vitiated by the fashion in which it has been interpreted by the courts 

as to needlessly force upon religiously observing employees a conflict between the dictates of religious conscience and the requirements of the workplace. 

Indeed, as has already been pointed out by Congressman Souder, 

we are joined today by several employees or former employers who 

were placed in just that position. I would like to make note of a 

particular one of these individuals, Mr. James Aligne, who worked 

as a network designer and systems engineer for a company in 

Maryland. 

In this role, he worked on a variety of commercial Web sites. He 

was assigned to work on a Web site for the sale and distribution 

of pornography, in violation of his religious beliefs. The continued 

22

pressure to work on the project led Mr. Aligne to decide to seek employment elsewhere. 

Now, as a highly qualified individual searching for work in a robust market, he was able to find that alternative work quickly. But 

the fact is that the current state of the law, in too many cases, can 

leave people in Mr. Aligne’s position unprotected. 

And unlike Mr. Aligne, many of those who experience intolerance 

in the workplace are low-skilled workers with few options. Those 

are the people, more than anyone else, who WRFA would protect. 

The good news is that since the problems in this area turn on 

judicial interpretation of existing law, rather than constitutional 

doctrine, they are susceptible to correction by the U.S. Congress. 

That is what the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, which is moderate and well-crafted legislation, is intended to do. 

Instead of the not more than de minimis standard established by 

the Supreme Court in 1977 in the Hardison case, WRFA would define ‘‘undue hardship’’ as an action requiring significant difficulty 

or expense, and would require that to be considered undue hardship, the cost of accommodation would have to be quantified and 

considered in relation to the size of the employer. 

WRFA would also require that to qualify as a reasonable accommodation, an arrangement must actually remove the conflict, which 

would put to rest the notion that a neutral working arrangement 

or an attempt to accommodate that fails to accommodate a religious practice can itself be viewed as a religious accommodation. 

The accommodation might, of course, still be an undue hardship, 

but a toothless and confusing definition of ‘‘reasonable accommodation’’ should not be utilized to avoid engaging in ‘‘undue hardship’’ 

analysis. 

I note here that on the specific issue of collective bargaining arrangements, nothing in the bill purports to override the routine application of a bona fide seniority system. 

Finally, in order to address concerns raised by the business community, WRFA would add to existing religious accommodation law, 

with certain clarifying language, a provision that an employer need 

not provide a reasonable accommodation if, as a result of the accommodation, the employee will not be able to fulfill the essential 

functions of the job. 

I think all of these aspects of WRFA are part of New York state 

law, as has been discussed. And I would like to submit for the 

record a letter from the attorney general of the state of New York 

discussing how that law has worked, without raising the parade of 

horribles that some have raised as concerns about WRFA in that 

state. 

[See Appendix I for all supplemental letters.] 

Now, concerns have been raised as to the impact on business of 

WRFA. While I would be glad to elaborate on this in Q and A, I 

would just like to note that WRFA does not give employees a blank 

check to demand any accommodation in the name of religion and 

receive it. Rather, it restores the protection Congress intended for 

religious employees, while at the same time leaving in place a balancing test that still gives substantial regard to the legitimate 

needs of business, even as it somewhat levels the playing field for 

an employee in need of accommodation. 

23

*See additional submissions in Appendix I. 

In addition, concerns have been raised that implementation of 

WRFA will lead to material adverse impacts on third parties either 

by somehow legitimizing the harassment of fellow employees in the 

workplace in the name of religion or by limiting access to reproductive health care. 

Neither of those scenarios is a realistic scenario, based on a reasonable reading of this legislation, which makes clear, as one turns 

to existing cases which have interpreted existing law, that the 

courts are not by any means likely, in fact are exceedingly unlikely, 

to read into WRFA the kind of open door to harassment and denial 

of essential benefits that some have suggested would occur. 

In sum, the courts clearly take impact on third parties very seriously as an element of undue hardship. And again and again, their 

analysis has not turned on the existing de minimis standard, and 

they would come to the same conclusions under the change in the 

standard proposed under WRFA. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Foltin follows:]

Prepared Statement of Richard T. Foltin, Esq., Legislative Director and 

Counsel, Office of Government and International Affairs, the American 

Jewish Committee*

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify before the House Education and the Workforce Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations on the 

Workplace Religious Freedom Act, important civil rights legislation introduced as 

H.R.1445 by Representatives Mark Souder and Carolyn McCarthy. 

And thank you, as well, Representatives Souder and McCarthy, for bringing this 

crucial religious liberty and antidiscrimination legislation to the fore. Your bipartisan effort sends exactly the right signal—that the effort to safeguard religious liberty and fight against religious discrimination is one that should, and must, bring 

together Americans from a broad range of political and religious persuasions. 

My name is Richard T. Foltin. I serve as Legislative Director and Counsel in the 

Office of Government and International Affairs of the American Jewish Committee. 

The American Jewish Committee was founded in 1906 with a mandate to protect 

the civil and religious rights of Jews. Through the years, AJC has been a vigorous 

proponent of the free exercise of religion, not only for Jews, but for people of all 

faiths. 

I also have the privilege of serving as co-chairman—together with James Standish, legislative director of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists—of the 

Coalition for Religious Freedom in the Workplace. This broad coalition of over forty 

religious groups—spanning the political spectrum and reflecting the robust diversity 

of American religious life—has come together to promote the passage of legislation 

to strengthen the religious accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964. A list of the organizations comprising the coalition is appended to my 

testimony. 

Current civil rights law defines the refusal of an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious practice, unless such accommodation would impose 

an undue hardship on the employer, as a form of religious discrimination. But this 

standard has been interpreted by the courts in a fashion that places little restraint 

on an employer’s ability to refuse to provide religious accommodation, needlessly 

forcing upon religiously observant employees a conflict between the dictates of religious conscience and the requirements of the workplace. 

The Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA) will promote the cause of protection of the free exercise of religion just as have two other bipartisan initiatives, the 

Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), enacted into law in 1993 and 2000, respectively. 

WRFA is a similar response to the failure of the Supreme Court, and of lower courts 

following the high court’s lead, to give due regard to the importance of accommodation of religious practice in a heterogeneous society. However, as I discuss further 

below, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act is clearly distinguishable in terms of 

24

the issues that led the Supreme Court to strike down RFRA, as applied to state and 

local governments, as unconstitutional. 

The Need for WRFA 

Why is the Workplace Religious Freedom Act necessary? After all, in 1972 the 

U.S. Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 so as to define as a form of 

religious discrimination the failure of an employer to reasonably accommodate an 

employee’s religious observance unless such accommodation would impose an undue 

hardship on the employer’s business.1 In so doing, Congress properly recognized 

that the arbitrary refusal of an employer to accommodate an employee’s religious 

practice is nothing more than a form of discrimination. Unfortunately, this standard, set forth in section 701(j) of Title VII (42 U.S.C. section 2000e(j)), although appropriate on its face, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court and lower courts 

in a fashion that makes it exceedingly difficult to enforce an employer’s obligation 

to provide religious accommodation. 

The constricted reading of section 701(j) is no small matter. RFRA and RLUIPA 

were enacted by Congress in order to extend important protections to all Americans 

from undue government encroachment on their religious liberties. But for many religiously observant Americans the greatest peril to their ability to carry out their religious faiths, on a day-to-day basis, may come in the workplace. 

Of course, many employers recognize that both they and their employees benefit 

when they mutually work together to find a fit between the needs of the workplace 

and the religious obligations of the employee. But it is not always so. In too many 

cases, employees who want to do a good job are faced with employers who will not 

make reasonable accommodation for observance of the Sabbath and other holy 

days.2 Or employers who refuse to make a reasonable accommodation to employees 

who must wear religiously-required garb, such as a yarmulke, a turban or clothing 

that meets modesty requirements.3 And the issues of holy day observance and religious garb, while accounting for a substantial portion of religious accommodation 

cases, far from exhaust the situations in which an employee is faced with an untenable choice because of an employer’s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. 

Based on figures released by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the 

number of claims of religious discrimination in the workplace filed for the fiscal year 

ending on September 30, 2004, as compared to the fiscal year ending on September 

30, 1992, reflect a staggering increase of over 75 percent. During the same period, 

by comparison, claims involving racial discrimination declined slightly. 

Behind the filing of each claim is the story of an American forced to choose between his or her livelihood and faith. Frequently, those who put their faith first suffer catastrophic losses, including their homes, their health insurance, their ability 

to help their children through college, and, in some particularly sad situations, their 

marriages. Where employers have no good reason for refusing to make religious accommodation, Americans should not face such a harsh choice. 

One of the contributing factors to this dramatic rise in claims is the weakness of 

the accommodation provisions as currently written. Under current law, there is little incentive for recalcitrant employers to accommodate the religious beliefs of their 

employees. This does not deter people of faith in the workplace from asserting their 

rights, however, because many of them are unwilling to compromise their conscience 

no matter what the legal ramifications might be. 

But there are other factors behind the increase in religious discrimination claims 

as well. These include the movement toward a twenty-four-hours-a-day/seven-daysa-week economy, with consequent conflict with religious demands for rest and worship on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays; our nation’s increasing diversity, marked 

by a broad spectrum of religious traditions, some of which may clash with workplace 

parameters that do not take into account the religious observances of immigrant 

communities; latent animosity toward some religious traditions after the September 

11 attacks, a phenomenon evidenced by a particularly severe spike in religious 

claims after the attacks, when Sikh and Muslim Americans faced greater hostility 

at work; and a growing emphasis on material values at the expense of spiritual 

ones, with some employers refusing to see any adjustment in workplace requirements to allow for religious practices. 

To be sure, EEOC data also suggests that in recent years that agency has evidenced a commendable increase in its bringing of religious discrimination cases, including cases premised on an employer’s failure to provide an appropriate accommodation of religious practice. But the EEOC’s ability to bring those cases successfully 

is necessarily limited by the strength of the underlying law. And the claims brought 

before the EEOC are but the tip of the iceberg. Many such claims go through local 

or state processes instead. And we will never know of the many people who do not 

bring claims having been advised, whether by an enforcement agency or by private 

25

counsel, that the present law leaves them with no—or a vanishingly small chance 

of—recourse * * * and, therefore, to the choice of violating a religious precept or 

giving up a source of livelihood. 

Hardison and Its Progeny 

The seminal Supreme Court case in this area is Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 

432 U.S. 63 (1977). Larry Hardison was a member of a seventh-day denomination, 

the Worldwide Church of God, who was discharged by Trans World Airlines because 

he refused to work on Saturdays in his position as a clerk at an airline-maintenance 

facility that required staffing 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. The U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that TWA had not provided an adequate religious accommodation. TWA, joined by the employees’ collective-bargaining representative, filed an appeal with the Supreme Court contending ‘‘that adequate 

steps had been taken to accommodate Hardison’s religious observances and that to 

construe the statute to require further efforts at accommodation would create an establishment of religion contrary to the First Amendment of the Constitution.’’ The 

Court did not reach the constitutional question; it determined, instead—in a 7-2 decision—that anything more than a de minimis cost to an employer would be an 

‘‘undue hardship’’ for purposes of section 701(j), and found that the proposed accommodations would have imposed such a cost. The Court also found that TWA had 

made reasonable efforts at accommodation. 

Hardison had proposed several proposed accommodations to his employer, two of 

which were found by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to be reasonable: 

‘‘TWA would suffer no undue hardship if it were required to replace Hardison either 

with supervisory personnel or with qualified personnel from other departments. Alternatively, * * * TWA could have replaced Hardison on his Saturday shift with 

other available employees through the payment of premium wages.’’ 432 U.S. at 84. 

But the high court rejected ‘‘[b]oth of these alternatives [because they] would involve 

costs to TWA, either in the form of lost efficiency in other jobs or higher wages. To 

require more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an 

undue hardship.’’ 432 U.S. at 84. 

Although Justice Marshall’s dissent in Hardison, joined by Justice William Brennan, argues that Trans World Airlines had not satisfied its obligation to reasonably 

accommodate even under the ‘‘more than a de minimis cost’’ definition of ‘‘undue 

hardship,’’ its more crucial point is that the Court’s reading of section 701(j) reflects 

a determination by the Court that the Congress, in providing in the Civil Rights 

Act that an employer must make reasonable accommodation for religious practice, 

did ‘‘not really mean what it [said].’’ 432 U.S. at 86, 87. Justice Marshall went on 

to state: 

An employer, the Court concludes, need not grant even the most minor special 

privilege to religious observers to enable them to follow their faith. As a question 

of social policy, this result is deeply troubling, for a society that truly values religious pluralism cannot compel adherents of minority religions to make the cruel 

choice of surrendering their religion or their job. And as a matter of law today’s result is intolerable, for the Court adopts the very position that Congress expressly 

rejected in 1972, as if we were free to disregard congressional choices that a majority of this Court thinks unwise. 

432 U.S. at 87. In other words, the Court’s reading of section 701(j), in particular 

the de minimis interpretation of ‘‘undue burden,’’ so vitiates the obligation to reasonably accommodate as to result in ‘‘effectively nullifying it.’’ 432 U.S. at 89.4

The history of religious accommodation litigation since 1977 bears out this vision. 

It would be an overstatement to say that employees seeking a reasonable accommodation of their religious practices never prevail in court, to say nothing of the many 

whose cases we never hear about because they and their employers work out an accommodation amicably. But a brief overview demonstrates that for the most part, 

to borrow the title of one law review article on the subject, ‘‘heaven can wait.’’

Thus, one might expect a ‘‘reasonable accommodation’’ to be one that actually removes the conflict with religious practice, with employers then required to show an 

‘‘undue hardship’’ before being relieved of the obligation to provide such an accommodation. To be sure, courts have in some instances interpreted the requirement of 

reasonable accommodation to mean just that. See Shelton v. University of Medicine 

& Dentistry of New Jersey, 223 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, there 

have also been disturbing cases in which courts have suggested—beginning with 

Hardison—that employees’ rights under collective bargaining agreements or other 

‘‘neutral’’ shift-allocation procedures are, in of themselves, reasonable accommodations even when those agreements make absolutely no provision for employee religious practices that may come into conflict with the requirements of the workplace. 

26

It is in the application of the Hardison Court’s interpretation of ‘‘undue hardship’’ 

that religiously observant employees have most often come to grief. The absence of 

nontrivial economic cost to employers has not prevented the courts from finding, on 

the basis of quite dubious rationales, that the provision of a reasonable accommodation will amount to an undue hardship. 

In one case, Mohan Singh—a Sikh forbidden by his religious precepts from shaving his facial hair except in medical emergencies—applied for the position of manager at a restaurant where he was already employed, but he was denied the position 

because he would not shave off his beard. When the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission brought a religious discrimination claim on Mr. Singh’s behalf, a federal district court ruled that ‘‘relaxation’’ of the restaurant’s grooming standards 

would adversely affect the restaurant’s efforts to project a ‘‘clean-cut’’ image and 

would make it more difficult for the restaurant to require that other employees adhere to its facial hair policy. EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D.Ga. 

1981). 

Hardison also held that the existence of seniority provisions in a collective bargaining agreement serves as a basis to find undue hardship in the granting of an 

accommodation because, for instance, to allow the employee his Sabbath off would 

be in derogation of the seniority rights of another employee. But, all too often, this 

conclusion is reached without further inquiry as to whether the bargaining representative might have been enlisted in a search for voluntary swaps or whether 

an exemption might be sought to provisions of the collective bargaining agreement 

that seem to stand in the way of an amicable arrangement (i.e., an arrangement 

that does not require a senior employee to give up his or her right not to work on 

a particular day). 

The Supreme Court’s lead in restrictively reading section 701(j) has been reflected 

in lower court rulings on other aspects of how that provision is to be applied. In 

Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982), Marvin Brener, 

a hospital staff pharmacist and Orthodox Jew, asked his supervisor to arrange his 

shift so that he would not have to work on Saturday, his Sabbath, or on Jewish holidays, such as Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Though granting the request at 

first, the hospital eventually refused, arguing that accommodation of Mr. Brener’s 

religious practice posed a ‘‘morale problem’’ because other pharmacists were complaining about this ‘‘preferential treatment.’’ Brener—scheduled to work on a day 

that his faith forbade him to—was forced to resign. He sued, but lost. In its ruling, 

a federal court of appeals held that it is the employee’s, rather than the employer’s, 

duty to arrange job swaps with other employees to avoid conflict with religious observance.5 But an employer’s inquiry is far more likely to be given serious consideration by fellow workers. Further, the employer is better situated to know which of 

the other employees is likely to be receptive to a request to adjust schedules. Conversely, once the employer appears indifferent to the request for accommodation, 

other employees may be less likely to cooperate. In short, placing the onus for arranging job swaps on an employee works to discourage that employee from seeking 

to avoid discrimination. 

In another case, Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986), the 

Supreme Court found that ‘‘any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet the obligation to accommodate’’ and that the employer could refuse alternatives that were less onerous to the employee, but still reasonable. But even if 

the employer is left the discretion to choose the reasonable accommodation most appropriate from its perspective, two principles should apply—first, the accommodation should actually remove the conflict (which was the case in Philbrook but not, 

as has been noted above, in other cases), and, second, an accommodation should not 

treat a religious practice less favorably than other, secular practices that are accommodated. 

The Workplace Religious Freedom Act 

The constrictive readings of section 701(j) discussed above are inconsistent with 

the principle that religious discrimination should be treated fully as seriously as any 

other form of discrimination. The civil rights of religious minorities should be protected by interpreting the religious accommodation provision of Title VII in a fashion consistent with other protections against discrimination to be found elsewhere 

in this nation’s civil-rights laws. Since the problems in this area turn on judicial 

interpretation of legislation, rather than constitutional doctrine, they are susceptible 

to correction by the U.S. Congress. That is what the Workplace Religious Freedom 

Act is intended to do. 

Instead of the ‘‘not more than de minimis’’ standard, WRFA would define ‘‘undue 

hardship’’ as an ‘‘an action requiring ‘‘significant difficulty or expense’’ and would 

require that, to be considered an undue hardship, the cost of accommodation must 

27

be quantified and considered in relation to the size of the employer. In this respect, 

it would resemble (although not be identical with) the definition of ‘‘undue hardship’’ 

set forth in the Americans with Disabilities Act. The ADA presents, in fact, an apt 

analogy to the provisions of Section 701(j). As it later did for Americans with disabilities, the U.S. Congress determined in enacting Section 701(j) that the special 

situation of religiously observant employees requires accommodation so that those 

employees would not be deprived of equal employment opportunities. 

Crucially, WRFA would require that to qualify as a reasonable accommodation an 

arrangement must actually remove the conflict. This would put to rest the notion 

that a collective bargaining agreement or any other neutral arrangement, or an ‘‘attempt to accommodate,’’ that fails to accommodate a religious practice might itself 

be viewed as a ‘‘reasonable accommodation.’’ The accommodation might, of course, 

constitute an undue hardship, but a vitiated definition of reasonable accommodation 

should not be utilized to avoid engaging in undue hardship analysis. 

WRFA would also make clear that the employer has an affirmative and ongoing 

obligation to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious practice and observance. This provision does not in of itself alter the standard for what is a reasonable 

accommodation or an undue hardship. It does, however, require that all to whom 

section 701(j) applies bear the responsibility to make actual, palpable efforts to arrive at an accommodation. 

On the specific issue of collective bargaining arrangements, nothing in the bill 

purports to override section 703(h) of Title VII (42 U.S.C. section 2000e-2(h)), a provision included in Title VII to make clear that ‘‘the routine application of a bona 

fide seniority system [i.e., without intention to discriminate because of race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin] would not be unlawful under Title VII.’’ Teamsters 

v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). It would, however, encourage religiously observant employees and their employers, and a collective bargaining representative 

where applicable, to seek amicable arrangements within the context of an existing 

seniority system, perhaps through voluntary shift swaps or modifications of work 

hours. 

WRFA also explicitly puts to rest any suggestion in the Philbrook case that it is 

appropriate to forbid the use of personal leave time for religious purposes when that 

leave is available for other, secular purposes. 

Finally, in order to address concerns raised by business interests, WRFA—tracking an element of the Americans with Disabilities Act—would add to existing religious accommodation law, with certain clarifying language, a provision that an employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation if, as a result of the accommodation, the employee will not be able to fulfill the ‘‘essential functions’’ of the job. 

Once it is shown that an employee cannot fulfill these functions, the employer is 

under no obligation to show that he or she would incur an undue hardship were 

a reasonable accommodation to be afforded. 

Concerns about Impact on Business 

As was just referenced, there have been concerns raised WRFA will impose an unmanageable burden on employers. But the concept of religious accommodation is 

not, as we have seen, a new one under federal civil rights law. And, as under the 

current interpretation of Title VII, WRFA does not give employees a ‘‘blank check’’ 

to demand any accommodation in the name of religion and receive it. Rather, it restores the protection Congress intended for religious employees in enacting the 1972 

amendment by adjusting the applicable balancing test in a fashion that still gives 

substantial regard to the legitimate needs of business standard even as it somewhat 

levels the field for an employee in need of accommodation. 

In this regard, it is well to note that, as an amendment to Title VII and therefore 

subject to its restrictions, WRFA does not apply to employers of less than 15 full 

time employees. Moreover, the factors that it sets forth for determining what is an 

‘‘undue hardship’’ are designed to make the determination context specific so that 

a relatively small employer—of, say, 100 employees, might well not have to provide 

an accommodation where a larger employer of 1,000 would have to do so. 

It is commonly argued that fakers will seek illegitimate accommodations based on 

fraudulent beliefs. But the fact is that courts have for decades engaged in assessing 

the sincerity of asserted religious beliefs. Indeed, under the Supreme Court’s 1965 

decision in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the threshold question of 

sincerity as to religious belief must be resolved as a question of fact. In practical 

terms, the problem of insincerity in the realm of religious accommodation in the 

workplace is particularly small. People who do not have a genuine and sincere reason to ask for an accommodation are simply unlikely to risk employer displeasure 

and social stigma by doing so. In addition, religious accommodation cases are almost 

always brought after a worker has been fired. Given the economic disincentive to 

28

bring such suits, it would be odd indeed for an individual to be fired and then spend 

financial resources to vindicate a religious belief she doesn’t sincerely hold. 

Historical precedent indicates that bogus claims are much more prominent in the 

minds of WRFA opponents than in reality. New York State has had a holy-day accommodation law for many years, yet there is no record of people bringing cases for 

failure to honor their ‘‘Church of the Super Bowl’’ or ‘‘Mosque of the Long Weekend.’’ 

For that matter, there has been no epidemic of these fanciful claims under existing 

federal religious accommodation law. 

Concerns about Impact on Third Parties 

Another set of concerns has been raised that implementation of WRFA will lead 

to material adverse impacts on third parties. These concerns arise primarily in the 

context of two types of hypothetical situations—that WRFA will be used to protect 

those who would cite religious beliefs as a justification for harassing gays in the 

workplace, and that WRFA will be used to limit access to reproductive healthcare. 

These concerns are based on an unreasonable and untenable reading of the proposed 

law under which claims for accommodations that would have material adverse impact on third parties that have, until now, lost virtually without exception, might 

have different results should WRFA be passed. As an organization that supports 

both reproductive rights and measures to protect against discrimination on the basis 

of sexual orientation, the American Jewish Committee would not be supporting 

WRFA if we thought that it would lead to such baleful results. 

A central component of WRFA, as is the case under current accommodation law, 

is its balancing test, albeit with a modification of the operative definitions of ‘‘reasonable accommodation’’ and ‘‘undue hardship.’’ Nothing in that change in definition 

will alter the fact that courts are quick to recognize that workplace harassment imposes a significant hardship on employers in various ways: Permitting harassment 

to proceed unchecked opens the employer up to lawsuits based on the employer 

maintaining a hostile work environment; the loss of productivity and collegiality 

caused by attacks on colleagues constitutes a significant burden; and the cost of recruiting and hiring new employees to replace those who leave due to harassment 

also meets the significant burden test. 

Thus, in Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1996), an 

appellate court dismissed the religious accommodation claim brought by an employer who was fired for writing accusatory letters to co-employees. The court reasoned, ‘‘where an employee contends that she has a religious need to impose personally and directly on fellow employees, invading their privacy and criticizing their 

personal lives, the employer is placed between a rock and a hard place. If [the employer] had the power to authorize [the plaintiff] to write the letters, the company 

would subject itself to possible suits from [other employees] claiming that [the plaintiff’s] conduct violated their religious freedoms or constituted religious harassment.’’ 

As in Peterson, the court considered the proposition that the plaintiff’s conduct constituted an undue hardship to be self-evident, and did not find it necessary to analyze the claim in terms of the de minimis standard. 

Similarly, in the only reported Title VII religious accommodation case of which 

I know involving harassment of gays in the workplace, a court of appeals unequivocally decided in January of 2004 that Title VII provides no protection for the harasser. In that case, a Christian employee was fired when he refuse to remove form 

his cubicle a quote from the Bible condemning homosexuality. Both the lower court 

and the appeals court had no problem at all finding against the plaintiff on the Title 

VII claim he brought for failure to provide a religious accommodation. The Ninth 

Circuit did not discuss the standard the employer had to meet, but rather focused 

on the burden on fellow employees, finding, in effect, that religious beliefs cannot 

insulate actions that demean or degrade other employees. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard, 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004). There is nothing in WRFA that would change this 

analysis. 

It is also significant that there is only one reported Title VII religious accommodation case involving the issue of harassment of gays in the workplace. While it is true 

that reported cases are a fraction of all cases brought, and that cases brought are 

a fraction of all complaints, nevertheless, it is illustrative that attempts to use Title 

VII to protect those involved in harassment of gays in the workplace are exceedingly 

rare. 

Concerns have also been raised that WRFA would permit an emergency-room 

nurse to walk away from a woman in need of an emergency abortion on the grounds 

that the nurse’s participation in the procedure would violate his or her religious precepts—as if any court hearing a case brought by the nurse against an employer for 

unfair dismissal would likely find that it is not a significant burden on the hospital 

when its employees refuse to treat patients in need of emergent care. If employees 

29

leaving patients suffering isn’t a significant burden on a hospital, one is forced to 

ask, what is? If facing significant malpractice liability from the patient for substandard care isn’t a significant burden, what is? If risking the hospital’s accreditation isn’t a significant burden, what would be? 6

The same analysis plays out in the context of the claim that WRFA would permit 

policemen to refuse to guard abortion clinics. If a policeman had a religious objection 

to guarding an abortion clinic, he could, under WRFA, ask to be reassigned. His employer would be required to facilitate such a reassignment, but only if by so doing 

it did not incur a significant burden. Sometimes accommodation would simply not 

be practicable. Does this mean that the abortion clinic would remain unguarded? 

No. In such circumstances the policeman would have to accept his assignment or 

accept the consequences of disobeying an order. Nothing in WRFA comes close to 

leaving abortion clinics exposed. 

And, finally, it is claimed that WRFA would somehow empower pharmaceutical 

employees to refuse to fill prescriptions for birth control medication or for emergency 

contraception, even at the cost of the patient’s prescription not being filled at all. 

Last year, this concern was raised in the context of a case in which a CVS pharmaceutical employee refused to fill a prescription for birth control pills because the 

pharmacist did not ‘‘believe’’ in birth control. After some initial confusion, CVS confirmed that the refusal was not in line with company policy, which requires that 

a pharmacist who refuses to dispense medication based on personal ideology must 

make sure that the patient’s prescription is filled anyway, either by another pharmacist at that location or by another pharmacy in the area. In a similar vein, an 

Eckerd pharmacy fired a pharmacist who refused to fill a rape victim’s prescription 

for emergency contraception. 

As with existing Title VII provisions, WRFA provides a floor in terms of the extent to which an employer must accommodate an employee’s religious practice, not 

a ceiling. Thus, WRFA has no role to play as to whether a pharmacy will require—

as CVS and Eckerd do—that prescriptions be filled, regardless of an employee’s personal beliefs. But, crucially, as in the context of abortion services, once a pharmacy 

does have such a policy, any fair reading of the ‘‘undue hardship’’ standard must 

lead to the conclusion that an employee fired for not filling the prescription would 

not be sustained under WRFA. Quite the opposite, given the impact on a customer 

whose prescription is not filled, this would constitute a palpable significant difficulty 

or expense. 

In sum, the courts clearly take impact on third parties very seriously as an element of undue hardship and, again and again, their analysis does not turn on the 

de minimis standard. Indeed, the cases cited by opponents of WRFA often turn on 

aspects that have nothing to do with the ‘‘undue hardship’’ standard at all.7 Moreover, the assertion that baleful results will flow from strengthening federal protections against religious discrimination are also without basis in the experience of 

prior efforts to enhance antidiscrimination law.8

Thus, the suggestion that Congress should not pass WRFA because it will open 

the door to harassment and denial of essential medical treatment places a fanciful 

swatting at phantoms over the very real need to remedy the harm faced by religiously observant employees every day. 

Why the ‘‘Targeted’’ Approach Will Not Work 

It has been suggested that the way to deal with these concerns is to resort to a 

so-called ‘‘targeted’’ approach, under which Congress would single out particular religious practices—dress, grooming, holy days—for protection under the WRFA 

standard. But the ‘‘targeted’’ approach embraces a troubling notion—that certain religious practices are simply not worthy of even a day in court to establish whether 

accommodation of those practices can be afforded without significant difficulty or expense for the employer or third parties. Again, the AJC—joined by many of the organizations supporting WRFA—is committed to combating discrimination on the 

basis of sexual orientation and to reproductive rights. But we are also committed 

to a fundamental premise of our Constitution and our society, that it is not up to 

the government to prescribe orthodoxies of belief or practice, and that the religious 

beliefs and practices of those with whom we disagree on these (and other) fundamental matters should be accommodated if this can be done without harm to others. 

Moreover, under the ‘‘targeted’’ approach as many as 25% of accommodation 

claims would be consigned by a Faustian bargain to the old, inadequate standard—

all in order to ensure that a subset of those claims with little chance of success are 

eliminated from a miniscule improved chance of success. 

Claims that would be eliminated from coverage a targeted application of the 

WRFA standard include: 

30

• Jehovah’s Witness employees who request to opt out of raising the flag and 

pledging allegiance at work; • A Methodist attorney who requests accommodation not to work on tobacco litigation; • A Quaker (Society of Friends) employee who requests to be transferred to a division that does not work on armaments; • An Orthodox Jewish woman who requests permission not to shake the hands 

of male customers; • A Hindu employee who requests permission not to greet guests with the phrase 

‘‘Merry Christmas;’’ • A Christian employee who requests to be assigned to work that does not involve 

embryonic research; • A Muslim hospital employee who requests to be exempted from duty in which 

she would be present when a member of the opposite sex is unclothed. 

While these examples provide an overview of some of the types of cases that 

would be omitted from coverage by WRFA were the targeted approach adopted, it 

is by no means designed to give the totality of cases. Indeed, the variety of religious 

beliefs is one of the factors that make our nation such a fascinating place to live. 

In addition, there are numerous relatively new religious groups in the United 

States. Many of these groups are relatively small and some are primarily made up 

of immigrants. As a result, they often are unaware of their rights under current 

law, and frequently do not have the resources to vindicate their rights in the courts. 

Thus, the reported cases almost certainly undercount the claims from these groups. 

To agree to a targeted bill is to agree to a lower protection for these groups without 

their having any input in the decision.9

WRFA provides that when it can be shown that accommodating a person of faith 

in the workplace proves significantly difficult or expensive, the accommodation need 

not be provided. Whether that difficulty arises due to disharmony caused by a religious employee harassing another employee, when an employee refuses to provide 

medical care when no reasonable accommodation can be made, or whether the accommodation of the religious employee would result in disfavoring fellow employees 

or other third parties in a host of other ways, the balancing test provides assurance 

that religious employees will not trample the rights of others in the workplace. 

Constitutional Issues 

Amendment of the law so as to provide a reading of Section 701(j) that affords 

meaningful protections for religiously observant employees is consistent with the Establishment Clause’s requirement that government action not favor one religion 

over another, or religion over non-religion. 

It has been suggested by some commentators that the reading of ‘‘undue hardship’’ to mean not more than de minimis difficulty or expense was necessary to 

avoid a reading of the accommodation provision that would have caused it to run 

afoul of the Establishment Clause. Although not explicitly invoking the Establishment Clause, Justice White—writing for the Court in Hardison—asserted that any 

construction of Title VII that was more protective of religious practice would mean 

that employees would be treated not on a nondiscriminatory basis but unequally on 

the basis of their religion. ‘‘ * * * [T]he privilege of having Saturdays off would be 

allocated according to religious belief,’’ he said in writing for the Court, ‘‘Title VII 

does not contemplate such unequal treatment.’’

But Justice Marshall’s dissent in Hardison, joined by Justice Brennan, saw no 

constitutional problem in requiring employers ‘‘to grant privileges to religious observers as part of the accommodation process.’’ Justice Marshall went on, ‘‘If the 

State does not establish religion over nonreligion by excusing religious practitioners 

from obligations owed the State, I do not see how the State can be said to establish 

religion by requiring employers to do the same with respect to obligations owed the 

employer.’’ 432 U.S. at 91. He added in a footnote: 

The purpose and primary effect of requiring such exemptions is the wholly secular 

one of securing equal economic opportunity to members of minority religions. * * * 

And the mere fact that the law sometimes requires special treatment of religious 

practitioners does not present the dangers of ‘‘sponsorship, financial support, and 

active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity,’’ against which the Establishment Clause is principally aimed. 

432 U.S. at 90-91, fn. 4. As we all know, Justices Marshall and Brennan were 

both resolute supporters of a strict reading of the Establishment Clause. Thus, it 

is particularly compelling that neither believed that the Constitution required a 

weak reading of section 701(j). 

The case of Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985), is distinguishable. 

In that case the Supreme Court struck down by a vote of 8-1, as a violation of the 

31

Establishment Clause, a Connecticut statute that gave employees the absolute right 

not to work on their respective Sabbaths. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger said the state law imposed an excessive burden on employers, as well as on nonreligious employees who also had ‘‘strong and legitimate’’ reasons for wanting to 

avoid having to work on the weekend. 472 U.S. at 710, fn.9. The opinion of the Chief 

Justice did not, however, address the question of the constitutionality of a less absolute approach to the issue of employee Sabbath observance. 

In a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, Justice O’Connor agreed with 

the Court’s decision, but stated also that ‘‘the Connecticut Sabbath law has an impermissible effect because it conveys a message of endorsement of Sabbath observance.’’ She went on to note that ‘‘the statute singles out Sabbath observers for special and, as the Court concludes, absolute protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of other private employees.’’ 472 U.S. at 711 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Hence, in her view, the statute advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Importantly, Justice O’Connor distinguished the Connecticut statute from the religious accommodation provision of Title VII: 

* * * a statute outlawing employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin has the valid secular purpose of assuring employment 

opportunity to all groups in our pluralistic society. * * * Since Title VII calls for 

reasonable rather than absolute accommodation and extends that requirement to all 

religious beliefs and practices rather than protecting only * * * Sabbath observance, I believe that an objective observer would perceive it as an anti-discrimination 

law rather than an endorsement of religion or a particular religious practice. 

472 U.S. at 712. 

Both prior to and subsequent to Thornton, a number of federal appellate courts 

have held the reasonable accommodation provisions of section 701(j) to be constitutional, reasoning that, under the tripartite analysis of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 

672 (1971), the requirement had a secular purpose (the elimination of religious 

workplace discrimination); a primary effect that neither advances nor prohibits religion; and does not lead to excessive government entanglement with religion. See, 

e.g., EEOC v. Ithaca Industries, Inc., 849 F. 2d 116 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 

924 (1988); McDaniel v. Essex International, Inc., 696 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1982). 

Left unaddressed by the courts, except for the views expressed by Justices Marshall and Brennan in their dissent in Hardison, is whether a standard more protective of religious observance than de minimis but not absolute, as was the Connecticut statute struck down in Thornton, would survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. In our view, it would. Turning to the Lemon tripartite analysis,10 easing of the 

undue hardship standard (and, indeed, the other aspects of the bill), so as to afford 

greater protection for employees serves the secular purpose of combating discrimination. Moreover, the parallels between WRFA and the Americans with Disabilities 

Act—albeit their provisions are not identical—demonstrate that the Congress will 

not be granting a religion a kind of protection not available to secular interests. The 

primary effect prong appears satisfied by the balancing of interests and non-absolute nature of the accommodation reflected in the bill. Finally, the excessive entanglement prong has been invoked by the courts only in cases involving government 

monitoring of religious institutions that receive public funds. 

An invalidation of WRFA on Establishment Clause grounds would be grounded 

in paradox; it would be to say that an assuredly valid government purpose of combating religious discrimination may be accomplished only by a reading of section 

701(j) so circumscribed as to fail to afford religiously observant employees a genuine 

modicum of protection. Surely, that cannot be the constitutionally mandated result. 

The Supreme Court’s rulings in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), 

and in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), among other decisions of 

the last decade striking down legislation enacted in reliance upon the Commerce 

Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively, gives rise to an 

understandable concern as to the prospects for WRFA should it be enacted. 

Turning to the Boerne issue first, the Court went to significant lengths in that 

case to distinguish its decision striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 

from earlier cases upholding the authority of the Congress under section 5 to enact 

the voting rights laws. And section 5 has provided the basis for other congressional 

action to ensure uniform federal protection of civil rights. To the extent the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964 is grounded in section 5 there is ample basis to find that the 

Act affords remedies that strengthen and fortify existing rights. WRFA is simply a 

clarification of terms from Title VII of the 1964 act, as amended. 

In addition, and crucially, the 1964 Civil Rights Act is founded in the Commerce 

Clause. Commerce Clause legislation remains valid so long as Congress has a rational basis for concluding that the regulated activity ‘‘substantially affects’’ interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Aug 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\EER\11-10-05\24514.TXT DICK
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state commerce. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. The prohibition on invidious discrimination in connection with employment seems the sine qua non of 

legislation with respect to an activity that ‘‘substantially affects’’ interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding 

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and, by implication, the rest of the Act). 

Conclusion 

Enactment of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act will constitute an important 

step towards ensuring that all members of society, whatever their religious beliefs 

and practices, will be protected from an invidious form of discrimination. The refusal of an employer, absent undue hardship, to provide reasonable accommodation 

of a religious practice should be seen as—and was intended by Congress in 1972 

to be treated as—a form of religious discrimination. And religious discrimination 

should be treated fully as seriously as any other form of discrimination that stands 

between Americans and equal employment opportunities. 

In assuring that employers have a meaningful obligation to reasonably accommodate their employees’ religious practices, WRFA will restore to Title VII’s religiousaccommodation provision the weight that Congress originally intended. And, although necessarily framed as a strengthening of the legal protection to be afforded 

religiously observant employees, enactment of WRFA will, it is hoped, have a benefit 

that is not strictly legal. It may cause employees and employers to start talking to 

each other where they have not—employers may not think they now have to address 

issues of accommodation because they believe the law is on their side, and some employees may simply think they have no recourse. The true mark of this bill’s success, when it becomes law, will be if there is less, not more, litigation over accommodation of religious practice. 

We come to this hearing a scant two weeks after the final days of the Jewish holiday of Succoth, the concluding festival of the holiday season that includes the better 

known festivals of Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. During that holiday season 

there are a number of days on which work is religiously proscribed. Too often a season that should be one of joy becomes, for Jews who observe the proscription on 

work, a period of anxiety and, sometimes, blighted careers as they face the possibility of losing their livelihood for following the dictates of their faith. 

Nearly thirty years ago, Justice Thurgood Marshall concluded his dissent in 

Hardison by saying: 

The ultimate tragedy [of this decision] is that despite Congress’ best efforts, one 

of this Nation’s pillars of strength—our hospitality to religious diversity—has been 

seriously eroded. All Americans will be a little poorer until today’s decision is 

erased. 

432 U.S. at 97. Perhaps we will come to look back on the hearing held today as 

the harbinger of the realization of Justice Marshall’s hope—that the civil rights laws 

of this great nation will give due regard to the religious diversity that is one of its 

marks of pride. 

Organizations Supporting the Workplace Religious Freedom Act 

Agudath Israel of America 

American Jewish Committee 

American Jewish Congress 

Americans for Democratic Action 

American Values 

Anti-Defamation League 

Baptist Joint Committee on Public 

Affairs 

Bible Sabbath Association 

B’nai B’rith International 

Central Conference of American Rabbis 

Christian Legal Society 

Church of Scientology International 

Concerned Women for America 

Council on Religious Freedom 

Family Research Council 

General Board of Church and Society, 

The United Methodist Church 

General Conference of 

Seventh-day Adventists 

Guru Gobind Singh Foundation 

Hadassah—WZOA 

Institute on Religion and Public Policy 

Interfaith Alliance 

International Association of 

Jewish Lawyers and Jurists 

International Commission on 

Freedom of Conscience 

International Fellowship of 

Christians and Jews 

Islamic Supreme Council of America 

Jewish Council for Public Affairs 

Jewish Policy Center 

NA’AMAT USA 

National Association of Evangelicals 

National Council of 

the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. 

National Jewish Democratic Council 

National Sikh Center 

North American Council for 

Muslim Women 

North American 

Religious Liberty Association 

Presbyterian Church (USA) 

Rabbinical Council of America 

33

Religious Action Center of Reform 

Judaism 

Republican Jewish Coalition 

Sikh American Legal Defense 

Education Fund 

Sikh Council on Religion and Education 

Southern Baptist Convention, 

Ethics and Religious Liberty 

Commission 

Traditional Values Coalition 

Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations 

Union for Reform Judaism 

United Church of Christ 

Office for Church in Society 

United Synagogue of Conservative 

Judaism 

ENDNOTES

1Section 701(j) of Title VII provides, with respect to the definition of ‘‘religion’’ as follows: 

1The term ‘‘religion’’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well, as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious practice without undue hardship on the conduct of 

the employer’s business. 1This language, in essence, codifies a 1967 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

guideline that provided a definition of ‘‘religion’’ for purposes of enforcement of the law prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of religion. In enacting this provision, however, 

the Congress modified the guideline so as to shift from the employee to the employer the burden 

of proving that the accommodation sought is not reasonable. 2 E.g., Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633 (11th Cir. 1996), and Beadle v. Hillsborough 

County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied in both, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995). 3 E.g., United States v. Bd. of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990). 

4 Justice Marshall’s discussion of section 701(j)’s legislative history is worthy of note. Section 

701(j) was introduced by Senator Jennings Randolph explicitly to rebut cases suggesting that 

‘‘to excuse religious observers from neutral work rules would ‘discriminate against * * * other 

employees’ and ‘constitute unequal administration of the collective-bargaining agreement.’ [citing Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d by an equally divided 

Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971)] * * * The primary purpose of the amendment, [Senator Randolph] 

explained, was to protect Saturday Sabbatarians like himself from employers who refuse ‘to hire 

or continue in employment employees whose religious practices rigidly require them to abstain 

from work in the nature of hire on particular days.’ [citing 118 Cong. Rec. 705 (1972)] His 

amendment was unanimously approved by the Senate on a roll-call vote [citing 118 Cong. Rec. 

731 (1972)], and was accepted by the Conference Committee [cites omitted], whose report was 

approved by both Houses. 118 Cong. Rec. 7169, 7573 (1972). Yet the Court today, in rejecting 

any accommodation that involves preferential treatment, follows the Dewey decision in direct 

contravention of congressional intent.’’ 432 U.S. at 89. 5The court also noted, in yet another example of the courts’ restrictive reading of the undue 

burden standard, that the hospital was not obligated to accommodate Brener’s religious observance if that would lead to ‘‘disruption of work routines and a lessening of morale among other 

pharmacists.’’ 6 See, in this regard, Shelton v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 223 F. 

3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000) (opinion by Judge Scirica with Judges Alito and Aldisert concurring). 

While the nurse’s claim was dismissed in that case for her failure to accept the hospital’s proffer 

of a reasonable accommodation, the federal court of appeals asserted, in the context of a discussion of ‘‘undue burden,’’ that ‘‘we believe public trust and confidence requires that a public hospital’s health care practitioners—with professional ethical obligations to care for the sick and 

the injured—will provide treatment in time of emergency.’’ 223 F.3d at 228. Nothing in this 

statement suggests that the court’s analysis would be different in light of the change contemplated by WRFA. 7See, e.g., Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2001) (case turns 

on employer’s having offered a reasonable accommodation, not undue hardship issue); Parrott 

v. District of Columbia, 1991 WL 126020 (strongly worded discussion of undue hardship requested accommodation would pose for employer suggests that WRFA standard would not have 

made a difference in result); Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Services, Inc., 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001) 

(similarly); Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995) (case turns on 

employee’s failure to accept a reasonable accommodation, not undue burden); Johnson v. Halls 

Merchandising, Inc., 1989 WL 23201 (W.D. Mo.) (plaintiff’s claim dismissed because the defendant attempted to reasonably accommodate plaintiff’s religious practices but ‘‘plaintiff did not 

make any effort to cooperate with her employer or to accommodate her beliefs to the legitimate 

and reasonable interests of her employer, i.e., to operate a retail business so as not to offend 

the religious beliefs or non beliefs of its customers’’). 8 In 2002, New York State enacted a state version of WRFA, N.Y. Executive Law Sec. 296(10). 

Similarly, in 1997, President Bill Clinton adopted guidelines on the treatment of religion in the 

federal workplace that functionally strengthened the religious accommodation standards of that 

workplace. These enactments have not led to any parade of horribles. 9This carving up of religious claims into two different categories is both philosophically troubling and possibly constitutionally problematic, as it opens WRFA up to claims that it violates 

the Establishment Clause by privileging some religious beliefs over others. See Estate of Thornton v. Calder, Inc., 472 US 703 (1985), and G. Holland, ‘‘High Court Hears Hallucinogenic Tea 

Case,’’ washingtonpost.com at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/

AR2005110101103.html , posted November 1, 2005, reporting on that day’s oral argument in 

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Unaiao Do Vegeta , October Term, 2005, No. 04-1084 

(Breyer, J., told the attorney for the Government ‘‘that he saw ‘a rather rough First Amendment 

34

problem’ of discriminating among religions if government policy allows the Native-American 

Church to use peyote as a sacramental substance, while other sect’s adherences [sic] are forbidden to use other substances.’’) 10 Although the continued vitality of the Lemon test frequently comes up for question, it is 

useful to apply that analysis in this context because it is a restrictive reading of what government action is allowed pursuant to the Establishment Clause. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Marcosson, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF SAMUEL A. MARCOSSON, ASSOCIATE DEAN 

AND PROFESSOR OF LAW, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS SCHOOL OF 

LAW, UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE 

Mr. MARCOSSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Kildee, members of the subcommittee. I am Samuel Marcosson, associate dean and professor of law at the Brandeis School of Law at 

the University of Louisville. I am honored to be with you this 

morning as you consider H.R. 1455. 

I teach a number of subjects that are at least relevant to this 

bill, including constitutional law, employment discrimination and 

disability law. I also spent 8 years working in the Office of General 

Counsel at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, during which time I litigated, among others, the appeals of a number 

of cases raising issues of religious discrimination and accommodation of religious beliefs. 

My views on WRFA begin with this essential premise: Government must, under the Establishment Clause, be neutral between 

religions and between religion and non-religion, neither favoring or 

disfavoring religion or any particular sect. 

In my view, as written, WRFA risks and raises substantial concerns about compliance with the Establishment Clause. Compulsion by government, as WRFA would of course represent, to favor 

religion may violate this requirement. 

The Supreme Court’s adoption of the de minimis standard in 

TWA v. Hardison was done at least in part and implicitly in recognition of the concern that any additional burden on businesses 

might in fact represent a favoring of religion perhaps in violation 

of the Establishment Clause. 

That implicit conclusion about the concerns was made explicit in 

the later decision of the case of Thornton v. Caldor in which the 

court actually struck down a Connecticut statute because it went 

too far in accommodating religious beliefs, in that case Sabbatarian 

beliefs of workers. 

So it is quite clear that this Congress, in my view, must be concerned and sensitive to the possibility that WRFA, like the Connecticut statute, but unlike Title VII, may go too far. I would like 

to raise a couple of concerns that I have that suggest that it may 

cross that line into non-neutrality. 

First, the ‘‘accommodation’’ and ‘‘undue hardship’’ provisions in 

WRFA are patterned after the Americans With Disabilities Act, 

which is universally understood to be non-neutral as to disability. 

That non-neutrality is not a difficulty when it comes to disability 

law, but it is a substantial concern when it comes to religion. 

Indeed, in at least one respect, WRFA goes further than the 

ADA, at least as some courts have interpreted the Disabilities Act, 

35

because it requires that reasonable accommodation actually eliminate the conflict in order to be deemed reasonable. 

The Seventh Circuit and others have held in ADA cases that an 

accommodation might in fact be reasonable even if it does not 

eliminate the conflict. So we have a statute, the ADA, that is already seen as non-neutral and WRFA, a proposal that goes even 

further than that, and perhaps would therefore be seen by the 

courts also as non-neutral when it comes to religion. 

Moreover, it is at least arguable that employers might be required under WRFA to create and honor a forum for religious 

speech by their employees in the workplace, a forum they would 

otherwise deny to non-religious speech because they do not wish to 

be associated with it. 

The compulsion on an employer to associate with religious or any 

speech raises substantial concerns when it is religious because, as 

I have said, it would be at least arguably non-neutral. And even 

if it were neutral, it might very well be seen to be contrary to the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, in 

which the court found a First Amendment free speech right for an 

association, individual or entity not to be compelled to associate 

with views with which it disagrees or that it finds controversial. 

Third, WRFA may also create conflict among employees. Under 

section 701(j) as it currently is written, employers can point to conflicts between coworkers as a basis for undue hardship, and prevail 

on the theory that it is almost always at least de minimis, if not 

more hardship to have to deal with conflict among coworkers. 

WRFA as written does not cite specifically conflict among coworkers as a form of significant difficulty or expense, nor does it talk 

about the problem of the employer being able to have the right to 

control its message. 

In my view, the proposal would be significantly improved and its 

constitutional difficulties ameliorated if two things were done. 

In the section that lists the factors the courts are supposed to 

look to in determining whether an accommodation raises substantial difficulty or expense, rather than pointing only to financial factors as the legislation does currently, if it included conflicts among 

employees as a factor toward significant difficulty, and if it included reference to the employer’s ability to control the message it 

wishes to transmit. 

Those two changes, those two amendments, in my view, would 

significantly increase the changes that WRFA would be upheld, 

were it to be challenged on constitutional grounds in the federal 

courts. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Marcosson follows:]

Prepared Statement of Samuel A. Marcosson, Associate Dean and Professor 

of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville 

Chairman Johnson, Representative Kildee, I am Samuel Marcosson, Associate 

Dean for Student Life and Professor of Law at the University of Louisville’s Louis 

D. Brandeis School of Law. I am honored to be with you this morning as you consider H.R. 1445, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act. I teach a number of subjects 

relating to this bill, including Constitutional Law, Employment Discrimination, and 

Disability Law. I also spent eight years working in the Office of General Counsel 

at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, during which I litigated the apVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Aug 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\EER\11-10-05\24514.TXT DICK
36

peals of a number of cases raising issues of religious discrimination and accommodation of religious beliefs. 

My views on the WRFA begin with this premise: when government moves to compel employers to provide accommodations in the workplace for the religious beliefs 

and practices of their employees, it must walk a fine line between the laudable goal 

of removing the conflict that many Americans face between their faith and their 

work responsibilities, and favoring religion in a way that creates conflict and raises 

constitutional concerns. As written, the WRFA may tilt too far in the direction of 

accommodating religion in a way that favors religion, and at the expense of other 

workers. There are some changes I will suggest in my testimony that would help 

to resolve these concerns. 

The Supreme Court’s decision in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), upheld 

Title VII’s requirement in § 701(j) that employers provide religious accommodations. 

But Hardison stressed the limitations built into the statutory requirement: the employer need not incur ‘‘undue hardship,’’ and any costs beyond de minimis expense 

would constitute undue hardship. The Court strongly implied that imposing any 

greater burden would raise substantial constitutional issues by favoring religion 

over non-religion.1

That implication became a reality when the Court decided Estate of Thornton v. 

Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), and struck down a Connecticut law that gave employees an absolute right not to have to work on their Sabbath. Looked at together, 

Hardison and Caldor send a clear message: employers may be required to accommodate religious beliefs, but if legislation goes too far it will be struck down. There 

are several ways in which I fear the WRFA may cross the line.2

The WRFA as a Non-Neutral Requirement 

Courts may view the WRFA as more than a neutral non-discrimination requirement.3 The accommodation standard it contains in Section 2(a) is patterned after 

the provision in the Americans with Disabilities Act,4 because it relieves the employer of the obligation to accommodate only if it would incur ‘‘significant difficulty 

or expense.’’ This is the ADA’s definition of undue hardship as well.5

The ADA’s accommodation provision has been understood universally as affording 

a right to people with disabilities that is not given to others. While this is not problematic in the disability context, it raises significant concerns when it comes to religion. The Supreme Court had made clear that government cannot disfavor religion,6

but it also cannot favor religion with special benefits. Unlike Title VII as currently 

written, the WRFA would probably confer such a benefit, because the employer 

would have to incur more than a de minimis cost to comply with the statute. Thus, 

the WRFA appears vulnerable to a challenge that it is non-neutral. 

The WRFA can also be seen as non-neutral in another sense. Under current law, 

employers can control expression in the workplace if they regard certain types of 

employee speech as contrary to their legitimate business interests. For example, 

under the National Labor Relations Act, companies may restrict the times and 

places in which employees may advocate for collective bargaining. Translated into 

constitutional terms, it might be said that the employer may choose not to make 

its workspace available as a forum for worker speech with which it disagrees or 

which it feels is inappropriate for the workplace. The WRFA may well create a special right for those with a religious message to speak to their co-workers—creating 

a forum for religious speech alone where none existed before, despite the contrary 

wishes of the employer (and perhaps many of the co-workers). Such a regime would 

run afoul of the requirement that government not favor religion.7

On each of these points, it bears emphasis that it would be prudent to take potential constitutional concerns into account in considering what form the WRFA should 

take, even if there are reasonable arguments for the validity of the current version. 

It would serve no one’s interests—not those of religious Americans seeking accommodations, nor those of employers, co-workers, the courts, or the EEOC—to have to 

start all over again because the courts determine the law violates the First Amendment. If the WRFA can be amended to remove possible constitutional infirmities, 

while still achieving its underlying purposes, it makes all the sense in the world 

to do so. 

There is a set of situations where the ‘‘forced speech’’ fear is not a concern—those 

where the employee wishes not to speak because to do so would conflict with his 

or her religious beliefs. In those situations, the employer’s difficulty is not that it 

might be compelled to associate with a message it wishes to avoid, but that its own 

message might not be delivered. In my view, the WRFA successfully deals with 

these situations by allowing employers to require that employees perform the ‘‘essential functions’’ of their jobs. For those positions requiring the employee to comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Aug 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\EER\11-10-05\24514.TXT DICK
37

municate the company’s message, his or her inability to do so on religious grounds 

would not require an accommodation. 

The WRFA May Create Conflicts Among Employees 

Second, the WRFA appears to raise a genuine potential for creating conflicts between workers. As written, it would make it significantly more difficult for the 

owner to point to workplace friction as a basis for refusing to grant a requested accommodation from one of its rules. In some situations, a religious practice might offend co-workers, or interfere with their rights.8 In others, one or more co-workers 

might be required to cover for a colleague who obtained a Sabbath day off, or relief 

from a particular task he or she would otherwise have to perform. 

As to all of these issues, employers will of course be able to raise the defense contained in the amended § 701(j)(3), and try to demonstrate that the requested accommodation would require ‘‘significant difficulty or expense.’’ One of the bill’s strengths 

is that it sets forth specific factors that are relevant to what constitutes ‘‘significant 

difficulty or expense,’’ but it is troubling that the factors identified by the bill are 

limited to financial considerations.9 They do not include the company’s right to define the message it sends in the conduct of its business and to avoid conflict with 

the rights of co-workers. Some defenders of the WRFA have suggested that it is 

alarmist to suggest that it will cause difficulties in these areas, but H.R. 1445 would 

be significantly strengthened if these considerations were explicitly added to the factors that should be considered in assessing an employer’s undue hardship defense. 

The Need for and Effectiveness of H.R. 1445

Finally, while there undoubtedly are cases where religious beliefs have received 

less accommodation than members of Congress believe is justified, that is not the 

same as saying that there is a widespread pattern or problem justifying legislative 

action. In my experience at the EEOC, religious accommodation claims were no 

more or less successful (and in fact were far less plentiful) than other sorts of cases. 

Nor, in my judgment, does the problem lie principally in the substantive coverage 

of § 701(j). 

First, there are relatively few religious discrimination charges of any kind filed 

each year with the EEOC. Since 1992, such charges have never amounted to more 

than 3.1% of the total charges the Commission has received in any given year.10

In addition, charges alleging a failure to provide a religious accommodation represent only a fraction of the total religious discrimination claims. And although I 

have not worked at the Commission since 1996, I can state categorically that the 

Commission took those charges just as seriously, investigated them as thoroughly, 

and litigated them just as aggressively, as any others. In the years 1992 to 2004, 

the range of ‘‘reasonable cause’’ determinations in religious discrimination cases 

ranged from a low of 2.5% of resolutions to a high of 10.2% in 2001,11 figures that 

mirror the range of such findings under the other statutes the EEOC enforces.12

There is not, in other words, a special problem either in terms of the breadth of 

the problem or the seriousness of the executive branch’s response. 

Nor, I submit, is there a problem with the ultimate resolution of such cases in 

federal court, at least not one attributable to the coverage provided under § 701(j). 

The unfortunate fact is that only a very small percentage of plaintiffs prevail in employment discrimination claims of any type. It is particularly ironic that the WRFA 

seeks to mirror the ADA’s definitions of ‘‘essential functions’’ and ‘‘undue hardship,’’ 

in an effort to strengthen § 701(j). It has been well-documented that ADA cases have 

fared dismally in federal court.13 An acceptable version of WRFA might well improve the landscape for religious accommodation claims somewhat, but in the long 

run more effective and stronger religious accommodation protection depends primarily on the effectiveness of Title VII generally. This, in turn, depends upon (1) 

broader reform of the standards by which summary judgment is granted, and how 

claims are proved, in employment discrimination cases,14 (2) the make-up of the federal judiciary that rules on Title VII and other employment discrimination cases, 

and (3) a commitment to provide adequate resources to permit the EEOC to perform 

its mission more effectively, both in the investigative stage and in litigating cases. 

Conclusion 

Protecting religious beliefs from the conflicts and pressures of the working world 

is an important goal. While there might be other means to serve that goal more 

fully and effectively, the WRFA could be one way of doing so, so long as it is amended to clearly and fully respect both the rights of co-workers, and the legitimate, nondiscriminatory expectations of employers. 

38

ENDNOTES

1 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84-85 (stressing reluctance to interpret Title VII to require employer 

to allocate ‘‘the privilege of having Saturdays off * * * according to religious beliefs,’’ and stating that requiring more than de minimis hardship would constitute ‘‘requir[ing] an employer to 

discriminate against some employees’’). 2 It is important to emphasize, however, that the WRFA does not go as far as the Connecticut 

law struck down in Estate of Thornton. That law gave religious employees an absolute right 

to their Sabbath as a day off, with no exception for the employer based on hardship. The WRFA 

is not absolute, nor does it suffer from the other flaw the Court pointed to, which is the singling 

out for special favor of one particular religious practice or belief above all others. 3See Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing Title VII 

and Connecticut statute because Title VII can be seen as a neutral anti-discrimination law, 

whereas the state law would be perceived as an endorsement of religion). 4 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A). 

5 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). 

6See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (government 

may not exclude religious viewpoint from a public forum). 7This also implicates the Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 

640 (2000). Employers might well raise substantial First Amendment issues if they are compelled to allow speech in the workplace with which they do not wish to be associated. 8See Virts v. Consolidated Freightways, 285 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2002) (employee’s requested 

accommodations would interfere with co-workers’ seniority rights under collective bargaining 

agreement); Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995) (employer not 

required to accommodate religious expression that co-workers perceived as offensive and 

harassing). 9The WRFA would specify as factors in the undue hardship inquiry ‘‘the identifiable costs of 

the accommodation,’’ and ‘‘the overall financial resources and size of the employer involved, relative to the number of its employees.’’ Critically, nothing in the WRFA would direct courts to 

consider non-financial factors such as those discussed in the text. 10 ‘‘Charge Statistics, FY 1992 Through FY 2004,’’ available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/

charges.html. 11 ‘‘Religion-Based Charges, FY 1992-FY 2004,’’ available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/religion.html. 12For example, when it came to ADA charges, the Commission has found reasonable cause 

from a low of 1.1% of charges resolved (1992), to a high of 13.3% in 2001. See ‘‘Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA) Charges FY 1992—FY 2004, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adacharges.html. Similarly, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, reasonable cause 

findings made up 2.2% of resolutions in 1992, and reached a peak of 8.3% in 1999. See ‘‘Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act Charges FY 1992—FY 2004, available at http://

www.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.html. 13See Kathryn Moss, et al., Prevalence and Outcomes of ADA Employment Discrimination 

Claims in the Federal Courts, 29 Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter 303, 303 & nn. 

16-24 (2005) (citing studies). 14For example, many federal courts grant summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs 

have produced insufficient evidence of the employer’s motive, even when they have put forward 

proof that the employer’s proffered, non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. See, e.g., Rhodes 

v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (summary judgment may be 

granted for the employer even if the plaintiff has substantial evidence of pretext). Such evidence 

should be sufficient to allow the plaintiff to put his or her case to the test before a jury. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. Olson, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF CAMILLE A. OLSON, ESQ., PARTNER, 

SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. CHAMBER OF 

COMMERCE 

Ms. OLSON. Thank you, and good morning, Mr. Chairman and 

members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to appear today to testify on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in connection with 

the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005. 

Especially listening to the testimony this morning and reflecting 

on my background as a labor and employment attorney as practiced in Chicago, Illinois, over the last 20 years, as well as teaching 

employment discrimination law to students at Loyola University 

and DePaul University in Chicago, testifying on behalf of the U.S. 

Chamber of Commerce, the chamber is really here representing the 

largest groups of employers in the country. It is one of the largest 

business federations, representing over 3 million businesses and orVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Aug 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\EER\11-10-05\24514.TXT DICK
39

ganizations of all sizes, industry sectors and geography. I serve on 

the chamber’s Labor Relations Committee, as well as its Subcommittee on Employment Nondiscrimination Issues. 

The chamber has serious concerns regarding the Workplace Religious Freedom Act with respect to its affect on coworkers, employees in the workplace, as well as with respect to the running of an 

employer’s business. 

Let me begin my discussion by referencing Title VII because I believe, listening to the testimony this morning, that there is some 

confusion regarding an employer’s existing obligations under Title 

VII, as well as an employee’s rights, both in terms of its rights substantively under the statute, as well as its rights to damages, including compensatory and punitive damages, and the right to a 

jury trial in connection with these issues. 

Title VII’s paramount concern is to eliminate discrimination in 

employment, including discrimination against individuals based on 

their religious beliefs. 

Unlike the Americans With Disabilities Act, however, and other 

statutes, under Title VII, the prohibition against discrimination 

based on someone’s religious preferences also includes a prohibition 

against discrimination with respect to somebody who does not hold 

the same religious practices. 

Title VII’s religious discrimination claims currently proceed 

under a two-part framework. I would like to describe that to you 

so you understand the current analysis that employers are going 

through throughout the country right now under Title VII. 

First of all, an employee has to show that it has a bona fide religious practice or belief that conflicts with the job duty, provides notice to the employer about the belief or conflict, and the employee 

then suffers an adverse action or consequence because of the conflict between that belief and a job duty. 

Once that is met, the employer then has the burden of proof of 

showing that it initiated good-faith efforts to show that it could 

come up with a reasonable accommodation of the religious practice. 

And if it can, it needs to work with the employee to attempt to reasonably accommodate the religious practice without an undue hardship. 

Let me stop one moment and just reflect on the issue under Title 

VII of the many cases that have come to bear really over the last 

10 years. Many of those cases involving religion involve a wide variety of different religions. Religion is defined as a purely moral 

and ethical belief. It can be religion so long as it is sincerely held 

with the strength of religious beliefs. It need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others. 

Recent Title VII cases involving religion and recognizing different 

accommodation issues that employers engaged in with employees 

took into account religions such as the Church of Body Modification, in which an employee’s requested accommodation related to 

be able to display various body modifications including scarrings, 

including piercings, including branding and cutting of the person’s 

body. It also included another religion named The World Church of 

the Creator, which preaches ‘‘Creativity’’ beliefs, the central tenet 

of which is white supremacy. 

40

As the Supreme Court has stated, it is no business of courts to 

say what is a religious practice or activity. Title VII’s ‘‘reasonable 

accommodation’’ framework is an effort to reconcile conflicts between religious beliefs and business concerns. It requires an employer today to provide an accommodation to an employee so long 

as it is not an undue hardship. The burden is on the employer to 

support a claim of undue hardship with proof of an actual imposition on coworkers, a disruption of work-related services or products 

within the particular factual context that has arisen. 

‘‘Undue hardships’’ in connection with Title VII analysis, as well 

as the ADA analysis, includes an analysis of both economic costs, 

as well as non-economic costs such as lost business, hiring more 

employees, lost efficiencies, compromising seniority rights of employees, the safety of employees, the health of patients, the integrity of products that are produced by an employer, as well as requiring certain employees to shoulder more than their share of potentially dangerous or less appealing work or work shifts, as well 

as accommodating and reviewing an employer’s policies relating to 

diversity, nondiscrimination and non-harassment, as well as an 

employer’s compliance with the FDA, with OSHA, with state and 

federal government regulations with respect to safety and health. 

The concern that the chamber has with respect to the existing 

bill as drafted is one which really relates to the fact overall that 

there are current safeguards in Title VII that are today in my practice and in the practice of employers throughout the country are 

reasonably accommodating both the business interests, along with 

the interests of all employees. 

I would like to just mention, if I can here in summing up, four 

different specific concerns that the chamber has with respect to the 

language of this bill. 

The first relates to the issue of preferential treatment of employees, and whether because of their religious beliefs with respect to 

time off and other scheduling issues, that this raises an issue——

Chairman JOHNSON. Can you end pretty quick please? 

Ms. OLSON. I am sorry. Yes, your honor. 

With respect to a number of different issues that have been 

raised previously, I think it is also important to note that, as written, this bill includes an absolute prohibition against even engaging in the interactive process with respect to requests for time off 

and grooming and clothing issues because those issues are removed 

from the definition of an ‘‘essential function,’’ so that it would 

eliminate that discussion between employers and employees. 

I think it is also important just to note that while this does borrow the framework of the ADA, it is missing some of the safeguards that the ADA has and it is inapplicable in certain ways because the ADA, as described earlier by panelists, does not include 

certain anti-discrimination prohibitions. 

With that, I will sum up my comments and thank you for the opportunity to provide them today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Olson follows:]

Prepared Statement of Camille A. Olson, Esq., Partner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 

on Behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to 

appear this morning to testify on H.R. 1445, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act 

41

of 2005 (‘‘WRFA’’). I am a partner with the national law firm of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 

where I co-chair the Labor and Employment Group’s Complex Litigation Practice. 

In addition to my private law practice which has focused on employment discrimination issues for over twenty years, I have also regularly taught employment discrimination to law students at DePaul University and Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois. 

I am testifying today on behalf of the United States Chamber of Commerce. The 

Chamber is the world’s largest business federation, representing more than three 

million businesses and organizations of every size, industry sector and geographical 

region. I serve on the Chamber’s Labor Relations Committee as well as its subcommittee focused on employment nondiscrimination issues. 

Respect for the diverse religious beliefs in our society is important for employers 

and employees alike. Employers have experience with the law’s requirements that 

not only prohibit discrimination based on religious beliefs, but also require reasonable accommodation of religious practices and observances. However, accommodating certain religious practices or observances of individual employees is sometimes difficult in light of their impact on other employees as well as other legitimate 

business concerns. 

The Chamber has serious concerns with the Workplace Religious Freedom Act. 

The legislation appears to go too far in terms of which accommodations must be 

deemed reasonable, especially in the case of dress codes and the scheduling of employees. We are also concerned that the bill would require employers to accept accommodations for individual employees that may create a hostile work environment 

for other employees. It also raises numerous questions of practicality and fairness. 

We urge the Subcommittee to carefully consider these issues and proceed cautiously. 

Current Law 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination 

against individuals based on their religious beliefs. In addition to protecting employee beliefs, Title VII also provides protection for the religious observances and 

practices of employees, requiring that employers not discriminate based on those observances or practices unless the employer cannot reasonably accommodate the observance or practice without undue hardship. 

Employers frequently face religious accommodation issues. Often accommodations 

are easily agreed upon, for example, by permitting employees to swap shifts or permit limited time off during a shift to allow employees time to pray or engage in 

other religious practices. However, other religious accommodation requests can be 

very difficult for employers to accommodate in the workplace. Among other things, 

accommodation requests involve assessing whether or not an accommodation can be 

made, the scope of the accommodation, and the hardship created by accommodating 

the request (including the impact of the accommodation on an employer’s business, 

customers, and other employees). Importantly, employers must consider the interaction of other laws as well, including, for example, their obligations under the National Labor Relations Act, in addition to their desire to keep the workplace free 

from harassment based on one’s religious beliefs. 

In the context of religious accommodation, Title VII has been criticized as a result 

of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII’s undue hardship exception.1 Critics claim that the Court significantly weakened the law and that employers may 

deny requests to accommodate religious practices based on demonstration of a de 

minimus burden on the employer. It is important to note, however, that under the 

Supreme Court’s interpretation of the accommodation obligations under Title VII, 

employer obligations are in fact quite substantial. 

For example, courts have found employer adherence to ‘‘no-beard’’ in the workplace policies based on ‘‘professional appearance’’ as opposed to safety and health 

issues as violative of an employer’s obligations to reasonably accommodate an employee’s desire to maintain a bearded appearance in the workplace.2 Similarly, employee requests for exceptions to employer work schedules have also been found to 

violate Title VII. Title VII’s existing reasonable accommodation obligations have 

been determined to include an obligation to meet reasonable scheduling requests, 

including employee requests to not be scheduled on Easter Sunday to attend both 

morning and evening services,3 Jewish employees’ requests for leave on Yom 

Kippur,4 and individualized employee requests for days off to attend religious services relating to family members.5 In addition, courts have recognized the ability of 

employees to engage in religious conduct that does not interfere with their official 

job duties or, in the case where the employee is a manager or supervisor, does not 

create an environment of religious favoritism such as a supervisor’s spontaneous 

prayers and Bible references.6

42

Religious Practices 

It is clear that the term ‘‘religious practices’’ has been broadly defined under Title 

VII. EEOC guidance defines the phrase as any ‘‘moral or ethical beliefs as to what 

is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious 

views.’’ 7 In practice, both the EEOC and federal courts have upheld this broad interpretation. For example, in 1996, the Orange County Transit Authority discharged 

an employee who refused to hand out coupons for free hamburgers because he was 

a vegan. An EEOC area office determined that the employer discriminated against 

the employee based on his religious beliefs.8

In another case, Peterson v. Wilmur Communications,9 a federal court held that 

an employee’s racist views qualified as religious beliefs. In this case, the employee 

was a member of the World Church of the Creator, an organization preaching ‘‘Creativity,’’ the central tenet of which is white supremacy. The Court noted: ‘‘The White 

Man’s Bible, one of Creativity’s two central texts, offers a vision of a white, supremacist utopian world of ’[b]eautiful, [h]ealthy [white] people,’ free of disease, pollution, fear and hunger (citation omitted).’’ 10 According to The White Man’s Bible, 

‘‘This world can only be established through the degradation of all non-whites * * * 

the survival of white people must be ensured ’at all costs’.’’ 11 In assessing whether 

the employee’s beliefs qualified as religious and therefore within the scope of Title 

VII, the court said the question is not whether the employee’s beliefs are moral or 

ethical in the subjective sense, but whether the belief system ‘‘espouse[s] notions of 

morality and ethics and suppl[ies] a means from distinguishing right from wrong.’’ 12

The court concluded that: 

Creativity has these characteristics. Creativity teaches that followers should live 

their lives according to what will best foster the advancement of white people and 

the denigration of all others. The precept, although simplistic and repugnant to the 

notions of equality that undergird the very non-discrimination statute at issue, is 

a means from determining right from wrong.’’ 13

Another example is EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc.,14 involving a restaurant server and practicing Kemetecist who explained that Kemetecism was an 

ancient Egyptian religion, which he practiced by obtaining religious tattoos encircling his wrists. He further claimed that covering his tattoos was a sin, and thus 

he could not comply with the restaurant’s appearance policy prohibiting employees 

from having visible tattoos. Under Title VII the employer was required to accommodate the employee by allowing him to display the tattoos.15

These cases, although perhaps factually unusual, illustrate how broad the concept 

of religious practices is. The practical effect is that employers simply have no ability 

to question the legitimacy of employee claims that particular practices, no matter 

how unusual, are religious. 

With the broad definition of religious practice in mind, we can turn to the current 

reasonable accommodation standard and how WRFA might impact that standard. 

Changing the ‘‘Undue Hardship’’ Standard 

The stated intent of proponents of WRFA is to change the standard used in determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship. WRFA’s principle provisions would prevent a proposed accommodation from being considered an 

undue hardship unless it required significant difficulty or expense for the employer. 

Precisely how this provision would be interpreted by the courts is unclear, but the 

provision clearly moves the line and employers would be legally obligated to accommodate more requests than they are today. 

In assessing whether it is appropriate to change the standard, it is important to 

look at accommodation requests that courts have found to impose an undue burden 

under current law and assess how WRFA might impact similar cases in the future. 

Recently, my firm litigated a case that considered the tension between an employer’s dress code and an employee’s religious beliefs. In this case, Cloutier v. Costco 

Wholesale Corp.,16 a conflict arose between the provisions in the employer’s dress 

code that prohibited facial jewelry and the employee’s religious beliefs as a member 

of the Church of Body Modification. For those not familiar with the church, it includes members who participate in such practices as piercing, tattooing, branding, 

cutting, and body manipulation. It seeks to have its members grow as individuals 

through body modification and its teachings, and to be confident role models in 

learning, teaching, and displaying body modification. 

The employer’s dress code was established to cultivate a neat, clean, and professional image. The employee would not accept two offered accommodations, wearing 

a band-aid over the jewelry or wearing a plastic retainer in place of the jewelry, 

instead insisting that the only acceptable accommodation would be an exemption 

from the dress code. 

43

Ultimately, the First Circuit ruled that forcing the employer to exempt the employee from the dress code would be an undue hardship. The court noted that the 

employer had the discretion to require the dress code and mandating the exemption 

would adversely affect the company’s public image. If the burden were shifted and 

the employer were required to show that the exemption would have caused a significant difficultly or expense, it is certainly unclear whether the employer would have 

been able to insist on its dress code or its proffered accommodations. 

Another case, Swartzentruber v. Gunite Corp.,17 illustrates how accommodating 

one person could contribute to creating a hostile work environment for others. In 

this case, the employee had a tattoo on his forearm of a hooded figure standing in 

front of a burning cross. The employee was a member of the Church of the American 

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and stated that the tattoo depicted one of the Church’s 

seven sacred symbols. After other employees complained about the tattoo, the employer asked the employee to keep the tattoo covered at work, except when necessary to wash. While this case was ultimately decided on other grounds, how would 

WRFA’s new undue burden standard apply? Would the employer be required to permit the employee to keep his tattoo visible? Would that contribute to claims of a 

hostile work environment by other employees under Title VII’s nondiscrimination 

provisions related to race? 

A number of recent cases illustrate the growing tension between accommodating 

employee requests to adhere to their religious beliefs in the workplace, and an employer’s desire to maintain a place of business that does not impose an employee’s 

religious views on customers as well as meet the Company’s obligation to maintain 

a work environment free from harassment for all employees. In these cases, courts 

held that: 

• An employer properly discharged a telephone triage nurse who refused to stop 

making religious comments to patients calling a hotline; 18

• A supervisor who continually lectured a homosexual subordinate about her sexual orientation describing it as a sin was properly terminated for violating the company’s reasonable policy against harassment, including harassment based on sexual 

orientation; 19

• A social worker who tried to drive out the demons in a client having a seizure 

instead of calling for medical help was properly fired for violating agency rules; 20

and 

• An employer properly terminated an employee who refused to accept her employer’s accommodation of permitting her to end her correspondence with employees 

by writing, ‘‘Have a Blessed Day,’’ but refusing to allow the phrase to be inserted 

into all writings with customers and vendors.21

As the above examples illustrate, one important reason that employers might 

deny a requested accommodation is that it may create a hostile work environment 

for other employees. To ensure that they are not fostering a workplace that could 

be a hostile work environment, it is common for employers to adopt neutral policies 

designed to prohibit intimidation and harassment of all kinds. Shifting the undue 

burden standard creates conflict with such a policy and leaves the employer in the 

difficult position of deciding which provisions of Title VII to violate and which to 

comply with. 

Other Concerns 

In addition to the concerns discussed above, WRFA raises numerous other serious 

concerns. 

Essential Functions and Dress Codes and Scheduling 

As part of its new framework, WRFA would require employers to determine essential functions of employment positions which, among other things, cannot include 

practices relating to clothing or taking time off. These provisions contain no exceptions. However, there are certainly instances where dress codes and scheduling are 

essential functions of a job. For example, if a dress code is required to protect the 

employee’s safety, then it should be classified as an essential function. Courts have 

already grappled with this issue and found, under current law, that even though 

an employee’s religion required an unshaven face, a tight fitting respirator mask requirement was appropriate for employees working around toxic gases.22 As another 

example, consider a dress code that, for safety purposes, requires an employee to 

wear pants while working around machines.23 WRFA does not permit such concerns 

to be included as essential functions of a job. 

Scheduling may also be an essential function of the job. On one extreme, consider 

an employer that is only open for business one or two days a week, for example, 

on weekends. The ability to work Saturdays and Sundays would then truly be an 

essential function of the job. Other establishments may have busy seasons during 

44

the year where they need all of their employees to be available. For example, the 

ability to be available for work preceding Christmas might well be an essential function of jobs in the retail sector. 

ADA Model 

WRFA, by adopting an ‘‘essential functions’’ test, appears to borrow from the 

Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. However, it is 

important to note one major difference that exists in accommodating religious practices that does not exist in accommodating individuals with disabilities. It is relatively straightforward for employers to assess the types of physical demands that 

will be made of employees in particular positions. Therefore, an analysis of determining essential functions of a job for purposes of the ADA is more easily understood. However, given the very broad definition of religion, it will be very difficult, 

if not impossible, for employers to predict what fundamental parts of a job will conflict with an employee’s religious practices. We urge the Committee to consider the 

practical difficulties that such a requirement will impose upon employers. 

Preferential Treatment 

The Supreme Court has made it clear that laws that have the primary effect of 

advancing particular religious practices violate the Constitution’s Establishment 

Clause.24 It is unclear just how far WRFA changes the test as to which accommodations would cause undue hardship. However, it appears to make it difficult for employers to deny requests for time off to attend to religious services. In addition to 

Constitutional concerns, to the extent that the bill would give employees of particular religions a preference over others in taking time off, serious questions of fairness and potential conflict with labor union seniority systems would be implicated. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the Chamber has serious concerns with the Workplace Religious 

Freedom Act. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share the Chamber’s concerns with the Workplace Religious Freedom 

Act with you today. Please do not hesitate to contact me or the Chamber’s Labor, 

Immigration, and Employee Benefits Division if we can be of further assistance in 

this matter. 

ENDNOTES

1See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 865 (1977). 

2 Carter v. Bruce Oakley, Inc., 849 F.Supp. 673 (E.D. Ark. 1993). 

3Pedersen v. Casey’s General Stores, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 926 (D. Neb. 1997). 

4 EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569 (7th Cir. 1997). 

5 Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993). 

6 Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 516 U.S. 1158 (1996). 

7 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. 

8 Anderson v. Orange County Transit Authority, No. 345960598 (Aug. 20, 1996). 

9 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (E.D. Wis. 2002). 

10 Id. at 1016. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 1023. 13 Id. 14 No. 04-1291, 2005 WL 2090677 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2005). 15See, generally, Donna D. Page, Veganism and Sincerely Held ’Religious’ Beliefs in the Workplace: No Protection Without Definition, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 363 (Winter, 2005). 16 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 2940 (2005). 17 99 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Ind. 2000). 18Morales v. McKesson Health Solutions, LLC, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4629 (10th Cir. Mar. 

22, 2005), cer.t denied 2005 U.S. LEXIS 7490 (Oct. 11, 2005). 19 Bodett v. CoxCom Inc., 366 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2004). 20 Howard v. Family Independence Agency, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 410 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) 

(unpublished). 21 Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics Inc., 274 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2001). 22 Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F. 2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984). 23Killebrew v. Local 1683 AFSCME, 651 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Ky. 1986). 24 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, ma’am. I appreciate the testimony. 

I recognize Mr. Kline for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the panel for being with us today. 

45

I have a line of questioning I was going to go down, but I am 

going to change and pick up on what Ms. Olson was talking about, 

a dress code, just a minute ago. 

I am not sure if I understood what you said. Do I understand the 

language in this bill, are you saying that this excludes the ability 

to address dress codes? In other words, if someone is by religious 

practice required to wear a dress instead of pants, is that covered 

here or not. 

Ms. OLSON. Yes. There are two provisions in the existing bill 

which addresses that. The reading of the statute is that if there is 

an essential function of a job, the essential function cannot prohibit 

an employee from wearing certain clothing or taking certain time 

off for a holy day, for example. Those are removed from the definition of what is an ‘‘essential function.’’

If something is not an essential function of the job, then the employer cannot even engage in that reasonable accommodation process. It is a marginal function and simply has to be eliminated, resolved in favor of the employee in terms of the conflict. 

So both in terms of subparagraph (2)(b) in terms of the definition 

of ‘‘essential function,’’ as well as the separate subparagraph that 

specifically says you must remove the conflict, both of those subparagraphs require that those two issues not even be considered in 

terms of an interactive process, and that would provide a significant burden both for employers, as well as we believe jeopardize 

the safety and health of employees in the workforce. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

Would anyone else on the panel like to address that? 

Mr. FOLTIN. Yes. I would like to respond on that exact issue. 

I do not agree with that characterization of what WRFA would 

do. The ‘‘essential function’’ provision is in fact a new provision. Existing religious accommodation law says nothing one way or another about whether an employee must be able to perform the essential function of a job in order to receive religious accommodation. That provision was put in in response to what we understood 

were business concerns that this provision was not in WRFA, unlike the Americans With Disabilities Act, and therefore it is there 

as an additional obstacle to obtaining an accommodation. 

That is, before you even get to the analysis of whether there is 

a reasonable accommodation that can be provided and whether providing that accommodation would lead to an undue hardship, now 

the employee first has to be shown that he is able to fulfill the essential functions of a job. 

So once you get past that hurdle, the fact is that an employer 

still is able to show that the time, the shift requirements or the 

garb or grooming requirements would impose an undue hardship 

on the employer. If the employer can make that showing, then the 

employer is in a position to deny the accommodation of days off or 

of dress or of grooming. 

So it is simply not the case that the interactive process has been 

taken out of the need of an employee for an accommodation. It is 

simply that we believe that as is the case under current law, it 

should appropriately come into play in the context or deciding 

whether or not providing that kind of accommodation would be an 

undue hardship for the employer. 

46

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

Did anyone else have a particular comment on that? 

I was just sitting here thinking as the two of you were talking, 

and the hearings that we participated in in this subcommittee and 

others, that it is always the case that with a panel of experts, the 

experts disagree. I think that has been 100 percent of the time. 

I have another minute or two here. At least two of you have addressed the issue of conflict among employees or an unintended impact on other employees. Clearly, when we are looking at legislation, one of the pitfalls always is the unintended consequence, 

something that we had not taken into account. I think it has happened in legislation since time began. 

I see the light is about to turn red, but I think, Mr. Marcosson, 

you talked about that. What is the concern here of this conflict 

among employees that you were asking and that it addressed? 

Mr. MARCOSSON. Certainly. It seems to me that in a lot of these 

cases and a lot of the warnings that have been raised about WRFA, 

have centered on the idea that an employee may go over the line 

in expressing religious views that might amount to harassment of 

coworkers or that coworkers will be put in a position where they 

have to cover for shifts that are not taken by someone who requires 

the day off for some sort of a religious observance, a holy day or 

a Sabbath. 

I think those concerns are genuine. My concern is not so much 

that I think it is clear as a bell that this bill would create those 

conflicts, but that the factors listed in what constitutes ‘‘significant 

difficulty’’ or ‘‘hardship’’ does not point to conflict among coworkers 

as something the employer can explicitly cite as something that 

might amount to significant difficulty or expense. I think by adding 

that to the list, it would alleviate some of those concerns that coworkers might have and that employers would have as well. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Kline. 

The chair recognizes Mrs. McCarthy for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MCCARTHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Going back, Mr. Marcosson, to what you were talking about as 

far as the employees and the co-employees, how would you change 

the language around to accommodate what your concerns are? 

Mr. MARCOSSON. In the bill, the bill adds a subsection three to 

section 701(j) that tells courts and employers in looking at the 

question of ‘‘significant difficulty or expense’’ that factors to be considered in making the determination shall include, and then it lists 

three of them, all of which relate specifically to financial considerations, looking at the actual bottom-line dollar costs, essentially. 

By excluding others, including potential conflicts with coworkers, 

my fear is the courts will take this as their template and that these 

factors will become, if not exclusive, at least primary over others 

that are at least equally of concern, and that it would certainly not 

hurt the bill. 

If it is true that the bill is not designed or intended to allow coworker accommodation to infringe on the rights of coworkers, then 

it seems to me a reasonable step to add that explicitly to the facVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Aug 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\EER\11-10-05\24514.TXT DICK
47

tors that ought to be considered when evaluating the undue hardship inquiry. 

Mrs. MCCARTHY. Thank you. 

Mr. Foltin, how do you respond to that? 

Mr. FOLTIN. I think that the fact is the bill does say that these 

are factors to be included among those considering whether or not 

there is undue hardship. So the fact that a specific factor is not 

listed does not mean that it cannot be taken into consideration. 

The cases where we have had the most problem with the courts 

not giving due regard, or giving too much regard to the issues that 

the employer raises because of the de minimis standard, have been 

economic. So that is why I believe the bill is drafted to include the 

specifically economic factors. 

Now, if I may, on a related issue, the claim has also been made 

that because the standard is being raised from de minimis, it is 

going to be harder for the employer to take into account these noneconomic factors because of the change in standard. I think that 

that is not borne out. 

By looking at the cases in which courts have dealt with issues 

having to do with conflict between employees or harassment of one 

employee of another, in looking at those cases one finds time and 

time again that unlike the cases where economic factors are involved, the courts are very strong in their reasoning as to how no 

employer should have to put up with that kind of behavior by one 

employee to another. 

So there is nothing about the change in standard from de minimis to significant difficulty or expense that, based on a fair reading 

of cases that have been applying this law for many years, would 

lead one to have to worry that somehow we would be opening the 

door to harassment by one employee of another. 

Mrs. MCCARTHY. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mrs. McCarthy. 

Mr. Souder, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Thank you for allowing me to ask questions on the subcommittee. 

Ms. Olson, I am incredibly disgusted, as well as disappointed, 

with the chamber’s testimony. The one thing I do appreciate is that 

they have come out of the closet, so to speak, after years in many 

cases of trying to slow this legislation down, to deprive it even of 

a hearing in the past. 

But it is just amazing that you would pick out a couple of cases, 

which, by the way, were not even upheld. They ruled against this 

earring thing that has been circulating in the business community 

and in magazines like some kind of Internet phenomena, trying to 

scare businesses that there is going to be the Church of the 

Earring. 

My lands, you do not have a single case from New York. Here 

we have a law in New York, why are you silent on New York, if 

this is going to be such a big problem? 

If you want to know why the business community has such difficulty, when I worked as legislative director in the Senate dealing 

with ADA and passed it through and basically carried much of the 

business water in trying to work through family and medical leave, 

it is because you do not come in with any credibility. 

48

Tell us the problems in New York state. There are 10 times as 

many cases in civil rights discrimination as there are on religious. 

So do you favor the repeal of civil rights legislation? Is that the 

chamber’s position here? 

You have raised a number of concerns. There is no question that 

if this bill is to become law, we have to work out some things at 

the margin. I have a business degree, an MBA degree; have a family business; have had to deal with these things myself; and have 

been frustrated many times with the laws that we pass in the federal government that have unintended consequences. But my 

lands, we are going to have a standard that says that if there is 

conflict among employees—and this is addressed to the law professor too. 

So one of the problems we have in this country right now, and 

it is increasingly becoming a problem, as we heard from the Sikhs, 

is some people think the Sikhs are part of Al Qaida, and they do 

not want them working in their company and they do not want 

them in their community. So should they be fired? If employees do 

not like the way somebody is a Muslim at their factory, that is 

going to cause conflicts in America right now. You either believe in 

religious freedom or you do not. 

Now, there should be standards. As was eloquently stated, 

‘‘undue hardship’’ is a standard. Dress codes, if the dress code is 

relevant to the job and is part of the image of the company, it certainly would fall in effective part of your job and undue hardship. 

But if the dress code is not relevant to the carrying out of the job, 

why should it be considered if it is part of someone’s legitimate religious faith? 

Now, I have raised two big questions and made some challenges 

and would be interested in some responses. 

Ms. OLSON. Thank you very much. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Before you answer, let me just tell you, Mr. 

Souder, that private business is just that, and they have the right 

to set the rules in their own business. This is a free country, and 

we preserve free enterprise. 

You may answer the question. 

Ms. OLSON. Thank you very much. 

In connection with the cases that have been cited and the information that the chamber has provided to the subcommittee, those 

cases are cases that are good law today. Those cases are not cases 

that have been overturned, but also explain the wide variety of different accommodations that employers are making in the workplace. 

The description that you just gave us in terms of the interactive 

process and how it ought to occur in connection with employers and 

employees is exactly the process that is contemplated and required 

by the current requirements of Title VII, and if those requirements 

are violated, subject an employer to compensatory and punitive 

damages, attorneys’ fees, back pay and reinstatement. 

In fact, the cases that are being described are the ones in which 

accommodation issues sometimes have fallen in terms of a violation 

of the law by the employer; sometimes have come out with an employer ending up making an accommodation or offering an accomVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Aug 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\EER\11-10-05\24514.TXT DICK
49

modation that was not accepted, that was viewed as reasonable by 

the court. 

So they come up on both sides. This is the system that is in place 

today and as I practice every day, is being utilized by employers. 

The chamber’s position is that that system is working well. It 

does consider conflicts between employees as well as the economic 

issues that are raised here, as well as many other issues such as 

the enforcement of diversity, non-harassment statutes, as well as 

OSHA and other requirements. 

Mr. SOUDER. Have you had problems in New York? 

Ms. OLSON. Pardon me? 

Mr. SOUDER. Have you had any problems in New York? 

Ms. OLSON. In New York, I do not practice in New York, and I 

would be more than happy to take a look at that, but I cannot provide any guidance on the New York situation. 

Mr. SOUDER. So you are on the national chamber board, you are 

giving testimony on behalf of the chamber, and your testimony is 

that the chamber did not give you any examples, and the chamber 

does not have any examples from the state of New York, but you 

will look into it. 

Ms. OLSON. We will look into that, but I do not have those examples today. 

Mr. MARCOSSON. Mr. Chairman, if I might address Representative Souder’s question briefly. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Go right ahead. 

Mr. MARCOSSON. As far as the issue of Sikhs being fired from 

their jobs because coworkers object to them, making assumptions 

about them that are unfounded, in my view that is not a current 

problem under Title VII, nor is it the problem addressed by WRFA. 

That would be, in my view, a flat-out case of religious discrimination, not a matter of accommodation. 

Mr. SOUDER. It was a headgear question, and the other people 

felt the headgear was disruptive and upset them at work. 

Mr. MARCOSSON. In a situation like that, I would view that, if 

I were at the EEOC still, I think the EEOC would view that, in 

an investigation of a charge, they would view that as flat-out religious discrimination, not a matter of the employer seeking some accommodation for a belief, but if they were fired because of misconceptions or prejudice about their religion or its expression in a 

situation like that, it would be flat-out religious discrimination. 

I think the suit would not even be brought under Section VII 

(O)(1)(j). It would be brought under the peer discrimination section, 

and not only would be covered, but should be covered, is covered, 

and I think would prevail under those circumstances. 

Mr. FOLTIN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just have a word on this? 

Chairman JOHNSON. Of course. 

Mr. FOLTIN. It has never been the claim of supporters of WRFA 

that nobody ever prevails on a religious accommodation case. 

Clearly, there are cases that are heard by the EEOC, and thankfully in recent years actually the EEOC has been paying more attention to these kinds of cases than it has in the past. 

But the fact is that with the kind of de minimis standard we 

have, the kind of minimal interpretation of what an employer’s obligations are, it is still too hard to bring these cases and employers 

50

too often believe that based on what we believe is an arbitrary determination as to what the workplace requires, that they are entitled to resist. 

In fact, there is a case out of a District Federal Court which 

upheld the right of an employer to deny a promotion to a Sikh because this individual did not have the right image to rise to higher 

office within that organization. 

The law ought to be clear, clearer than it is now, that that is an 

act of discrimination. Perhaps having that kind of law in place 

would save organizations like SALDEF, the Sikh civil rights organization, from having to bring the kinds of cases that are described 

in the letter that I just submitted along with the other letters that 

I submitted for the record earlier. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Land, do you want to comment? 

Dr. LAND. Well, when I find myself in a bevy of lawyers, I usually find it best to keep quiet. 

[Laughter.] 

Obviously, the status quo is not working for increasing numbers 

of people of devout religious faith, many diverse kinds of faith, in 

the workplace. I believe that the Workplace Religious Freedom Act 

is a good-conscience effort to try to address the needs of our fellow 

citizens who are being discriminated against in the workplace 

based upon their devoutly held and sincere religious convictions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Kildee, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Professor Marcosson, how do the courts’ handling of the religious 

discrimination claims compare to their handling of other types of 

discrimination cases? Are there any common problems? 

Mr. MARCOSSON. I think that there are. I think it is important 

to remember that the problems or the difficulties for plaintiffs 

seeking religious accommodation, bringing religious accommodation 

claims, are not exactly unique to religious accommodation claims. 

Title VII claimants, Americans With Disabilities Act claimants, 

none of those claims are succeeding with any great regularity in 

federal courts. The problems that plaintiffs are facing in those 

cases and that the EEOC faces when it brings cases are much more 

general, and those apply as well to religious accommodation cases, 

as they apply to all others. 

You have issues of courts too readily granting summary judgment in race discrimination cases, ADA cases, because they do not 

give enough weight to plaintiffs’ evidence showing that the employers’ explanation is pretextual, for example. You have an EEOC that 

is chronically, in my day when I was there, and I think even today, 

underfunded and unable to keep up with its workload and thoroughly investigate charges, whether it is religious accommodation 

or any other of the statutes that the EEOC enforces. 

So some of the problems that have been cited today certainly relate specifically to religious accommodation, but I do not think we 

should lose sight of the fact that there are other problems that may 

contribute at least as much to the lack of success that accommodation cases have had in the federal courts. 

51

Mr. KILDEE. Ms. Olson, you pointed out that the chamber has serious concerns about WRFA. Would the Chamber of Commerce support any reforms to increase the rights of employees to religious accommodation? And what would alleviate the concerns of the chamber? 

Ms. OLSON. Based on the chamber’s experience in connection 

with working with, for examples, members of the subcommittee 

that I am on in terms of nondiscrimination and our experiences in 

representing employers and dealing with these accommodation 

issues daily, we do not see, many of the examples that have been 

given here today were examples where an employer’s failure to provide an accommodation to an employee because of their religious 

belief would violate Title VII as it is currently drafted, and there 

are significant penalties attached to that. 

So the chamber does not see the need for there to be a revision 

to those current requirements and obligations. Those are well set 

out, and really require an individual analysis of the facts and the 

specific issues with respect to coworkers, particular religious beliefs 

at issue, with particular employment situations in terms of health, 

safety and other issues. So at this point, the answer is no, the 

chamber does not see a need to make any changes. 

Mr. KILDEE. There has always been a certain, if not opposition, 

inertia at the chamber when it comes to such things as the NLRA, 

OSHA. I mean, the chamber has never come here asking us to provide greater protection for the worker in the workforce or giving 

the right to collective bargaining. I mean, we would be surprised 

probably a bit if you did not come with a position of inertia or opposition, because in my lifetime you were opposed to NLRA, you were 

opposed to OSHA. 

So it is not really surprising, is it, that you would be opposed to 

any governmental protection of employees in the workplace. 

Ms. OLSON. Absolutely not. We are strongly, obviously, in favor 

of the current protections with respect to employees under Title 

VII. 

This is a situation where you are oftentimes balancing the rights 

of co-employees in the workplace to work, some employees who do 

not want to work in connection with having an imposed religious 

belief or practice on them, alongside other employees. 

I think that those issues have to be balanced, as opposed to a 

bright-line test like exists within the current draft of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act which would provide certain absolute 

resolutions of conflicts in favor of the employee who has the religious practice that they want to impose in the workplace. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. I appreciate your comments. 

Can I ask all of you, under current law and EEOC guidance, how 

broad is the scope of religion? I recognize we are not just talking 

about what we might call mainstream denominations or religions 

that enjoy a widespread following. What, if any, are the limits of 

that definition? 

You may recall some years ago the Supreme Court forced the 

military to take Wiccans into their environment as a religion. So 

52

do we have a specific idea that we are trying to foment here? Can 

you answer that? 

Mr. MARCOSSON. I will certainly take a pass at it anyway, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The Supreme Court, I think, as well as the administrative agencies that enforce other federal laws than Title VII, and the EEOC 

in enforcing Title VII, I think all are very reluctant, deeply so, to 

get into questions of trying to question the validity of someone’s religious beliefs, for good reason, because answering those questions 

requires courts to get into areas the courts are not particularly 

well-suited to answer about what is religion, what is faith, what is 

sincere. 

The Supreme Court has made clear that those sorts of inquiries 

are so sensitive that the Court would rather err on the side of giving the person the benefit of the doubt that what they are expressing is genuinely a religious belief. 

I think that is a wise court, and I think the commission has followed that path as well in giving a broad berth to assuming, unless 

there is a really serious question on the matter, that what someone 

is asserting is in their scheme of belief religious in nature, and 

then proceeding from there. 

That has its own problems of being over-broad, perhaps, and allowing too many cases, but I think it avoids even a more serious 

problem of government sort of having to make those decisions 

about what counts as truly religious. 

Mr. FOLTIN. If I may respond? 

Chairman JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FOLTIN. I think I have two responses to that. 

First, it is the case that the courts have steered away from appropriately determining what is a legitimate religion. That is, the 

notion of what is a religion that would be covered is going to be 

broad because the state ought not be in the business of deciding 

that Christians are more entitled to accommodation than, say, 

Wiccans. 

However, it is the case that the sincerity of the religious belief 

is something that the courts have tested, do test from time to time. 

In fact, it is part of the prima facie case that an employee must 

make, is they must make a showing that they have a bona fide religious belief that requires the accommodation. So, it is not that the 

courts or any decision-maker is powerless to look into a sham allegation of need for religious accommodation. 

In addition, as a practical matter, when you look at the difficulty 

of bringing these cases, the fact that my colleague from the chamber notwithstanding, these cases do not typically result in large 

damage awards, meaning that lawyers are reluctant to bring these 

cases, and the fact that an employee often will have to be fired before they actually get to bring their claim, all of this means that 

the people that bring these claims, the people that suffer detriment 

because they need an accommodation, are almost by definition 

going to be sincere people who require that accommodation or else 

they are out of a job. Most employees are not looking for an opportunity to put themselves in conflict with their employers over a religious belief that is not really a religious belief that they hold. 

53

So for both a combination of legal reasons, but also as a matter 

of practical reasons as well, I think we do not need to be concerned 

anymore than is the case under current law that somehow this 

amendment to the law would create enormous burdens for employers in dealing with frivolous or extravagant religious claims. 

Chairman JOHNSON. You make that statement, but in some cases 

the Supreme Court has ruled on that issue to a limited degree, as 

you indicate. 

Mr. FOLTIN. I think what I am saying is consistent with what the 

Court said. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Anyone else wish to comment? 

Dr. LAND. I would just like to say that as a Baptist, I would be 

opposed to the government making any discrimination or trying to 

discern between competing religious claims or claims of religious 

faith. The last thing we should ever want the government to do, 

and it seems to me one of the things government is least capable 

of doing, is trying to adjudicate which religious beliefs or which religions would be accepted and which would not. That would run 

afoul of the Establishment Clause, it would seem to me, and would 

be contrary to what this country is all about. 

So I think the courts have adjudicated this to the best of the 

American values and the American tradition that a person’s right 

to believe what they want to believe or not believe what they do 

not want to believe is an absolute right. The government should 

not be trying to decide which ones qualify as bona fide religions 

and which ones do not. 

Chairman JOHNSON. It is a great country, isn’t it? 

Dr. LAND. Yes, sir. Better than any one that we have come up 

with yet. It can always be improved, but better than any other that 

has come forward so far. 

Chairman JOHNSON. You bet. 

Ms. Olson? 

Ms. OLSON. Mr. Chairman, if I just might note that I think we 

are all in agreement in terms of the panelists on that issue, in 

terms of the fact that religion is defined very, very broadly. The 

sincerity of the belief in terms of the employee that is exercising 

their rights under Title VII is something that is usually looked at 

very closely by the courts. 

But the issue of what is a religion is not, because the Supreme 

Court has told us that it need not be a concept of God, of afterlife 

or a supreme being; that it is really just a purely moral or ethical 

belief that is sincerely held with the strength of a religious belief, 

whether or not the belief itself is religious. 

I think that the wide variety of religions that exists and that 

qualify for that definition of ‘‘religion’’ really brings the wide variety of different issues that are more difficult to imagine than what 

you see in terms of the Americans With Disabilities Act and an employer’s obligations to accommodate there, which is why an employer’s obligations under Title VII today in connection with this issue, 

and in connection with the reasonable accommodation obligations 

are ones that employers are spending, in my experience, quite a bit 

of time working very closely with employees to ensure that they 

can accommodate those beliefs, along with the beliefs of other emVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Aug 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\EER\11-10-05\24514.TXT DICK
54

ployees who do not share that same faith or that same belief system. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Kildee? 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will submit a question in writing to all the witnesses concerning their views on the New York law, which is comparable to 

this law, and their experience basically with that law. So I would 

ask consent to ask in writing, and you respond in writing to the 

question. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Yes. Would you all be willing to accept 

questions from anyone on the panel and try to answer them? 

Dr. LAND. Yes. We would be ready to assist in any way we can. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Kildee. 

I want to thank the witnesses. 

Mr. SOUDER. Could I make a request? 

Chairman JOHNSON. Sure. You are recognized. 

Mr. SOUDER. Because this is such an important hearing, after all 

these years, there has never been a hearing like this, and for the 

hearing record, I have some additional materials I would like to insert. If it came from the committee as opposed to an advocate, that 

to actually look at what is happening in New York and see if there 

has either been a study or get some data. Did cases increase? What 

kind of cases came up? 

Also, we have historical cases around the country on the dollar 

settlements and some of this, so we don’t just have a record of a 

few cases, but really look at this. Because if we are going to move 

this law forward, we really need to figure out how to be fair and 

how to do it in the best way so it does not hurt business, but it 

does allow religious freedom. 

Chairman JOHNSON. You are welcome to put questions into the 

record if you so desire. I think the committee could look at something like that. 

I want to thank the witnesses for your time and testimony, and 

both the witnesses and the members who were here for their participation. Thank you for being part of the great American experiment. 

If there is no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

55

Appendix I 

Letters to Witnesses Requesting Supplemental Testimony on New York’s 

Human Rights Law


ltr1.eps
56


ltr2.eps
57


ltr3.eps
58

Response to Request From Richard T. Foltin, the American Jewish 

Committee 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Kildee, and Congressman Souder, thank you for 

your request to submit supplemental testimony with respect to the experience in 

New York State following that state’s revision of its religious accommodation legislation in 2002. I appreciate also the Chairman’s courtesy in agreeing, through committee staff, to allow me a brief extension of time in which to make this submission 

and to use this opportunity to provide supplemental material on other pertinent 

issues. 

In 2002, New York State amended the religious accommodation provisions of its 

Human Rights Law, found at New York Executive Law Section 296(10). (The text 

of N.Y. Executive Law Sec. 296(10) (2004), as amended—with changes from the law 

as it read prior to the 2002 amendments noted—is appended as Appendix A.) New 

York’s amended religious accommodation law is, to be sure, not identical with 


ltr4.eps
59

H.R.1445, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005 (WRFA). Nevertheless, 

those amendments, taken together with the New York law’s already existing provisions, incorporate the most crucial aspect of H.R.1445—a standard for determining 

‘‘undue hardship’’ that is comparable to that proposed by WRFA. 

The revised New York law incorporates two significant new elements. Firstly, subsection (a) of Section 296(10), as amended, explicitly extends the obligation of an 

employer to provide a reasonable accommodation of an employee’s religious practice 

to any ‘‘sincerely held practice of his or her religion;’’ the prior law had referenced 

only holy day observance. 

Secondly, subsection (a), as amended, goes on to provide that it is a discriminatory 

practice for an employer to require an employee or prospective employee ‘‘to violate 

or forego a sincerely held practice of his or her religion... unless, after engaging in 

a bona fide effort, the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee’s or prospective employee’s sincerely held religious observance 

or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.’’1

‘‘Undue hardship’’ is defined by subsection (c)(1) to mean ‘‘an accommodation requiring significant expense or difficulty (including a significant interference with the 

safe or efficient operation of the workplace or a violation of a bona fide seniority 

system)’’—a definition that is similar to, although not identical with, the definition 

of ‘‘undue hardship’’ in WRFA. While WRFA does not include the parenthetical, the 

provision that an employer shall not be obligated to accede to ‘‘a violation of a bona 

fide seniority system’’ is consistent with the provisions of Section 703(h) of Title VII 

(42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e2(h)), which will continue to be applicable to federal religious 

accommodation cases if WRFA is adopted, as it is now. Further, the clause regarding ‘‘safe or efficient operation of the workplace’’ simply expands on the meaning of 

‘‘significant difficulty or expense.’’ Subsection (c)(1) goes on to list a number of factors to be considered in determining whether the accommodation constitutes ‘‘an 

undue economic hardship,’’ a list which is, again, similar, but not identical, to the 

nonexclusive list to be found in WRFA.2

There is no evidence that enactment of the 2002 amendments has led to the parade of horribles foretold by some critics of WRFA. It has been claimed by some that 

WRFA would increase the chances of success for a claim that an employer has an 

obligation to accommodate (i) an employee who asserts a religious basis not to fill 

prescriptions or provide health care that he or she would otherwise be expected to 

carry out in the normal course of their duties, or (ii) an employee who asserts a religious basis to harass a fellow employee or customer, or make comments to a fellow 

employee or customer that such fellow employee or customer would reasonably be 

expected to find objectionable, insulting or degrading. In a state as large and diverse 

as New York, and given the speed with which information travels in this Age of the 

Internet, we would expect to have heard if the predicted onslaught of such claims 

were occurring, much less that these claims were prevailing.3 Like the dog that did 

not bark in the night in the Sherlock Holmes story, it is telling that this has not 

been the case. 

In this respect, Gina Lopez Summa, counsel to the New York State Division of 

Human Rights, advises in a letter to me dated December 20, 2005 (appended as Appendix B), that the division does not track ‘‘creed basis claims’’ (the division’s term 

for claims based on discrimination in the workplace based on religion) based upon 

the specifics of the allegations, and that therefore she cannot advise whether claims 

of the nature described above have been brought following enactment of the 2002 

amendments because the information is not readily available. However, in a conversation with Ms. Summa on or about December 14, 2005, I was advised that she 

was not personally aware of any such claims having been brought under Section 

296. One would expect that, as the division’s counsel, any such noteworthy claims 

would have been brought to her attention. Again, the dog has not barked in the 

night. 

Further, critics of WRFA have not demonstrated that the types of cases they fear 

are, in fact, being brought—and more to the point, even if such claims are asserted, 

prevailing—under the amended New York law, with its WRFA-like ‘‘undue burden’’ 

standard. The claims by those critics that WRFA’s strengthening of federal statutory 

protection against religious discrimination will lead to untoward impact on other 

significant interests has left supporters of WRFA in the difficult posture of trying 

to prove a negative. At the end of the day, given the lack of any evidence that this 

has been the case in New York, the burden of establishing such harm must fall on 

those making such claims. 

The claim has also been made that enactment of WRFA would lead to an onslaught of cases making extraordinary, even frivolous, claims for accommodation. As 

reflected in Ms. Summa’s letter, and in documents provided by the Human Rights 

Division, the evidence clearly suggests precisely the opposite (the referenced docuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Aug 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\EER\11-10-05\24514.TXT DICK
60

ments are collectively appended as Appendix C). There were 278 ‘‘creed basis 

claims’’ filed with the division during the period November 1, 2001 through October 

31, 2002. During the subsequent comparable period, November 1, 2002, through October 31, 2003, the number of such claims declined to 238, and continued to decline 

each of the two subsequent reporting periods—to 228 for the period November 1, 

2003 through October 31, 2004, and to 163 for the period November 1, 2004 through 

October 31, 2005.4 Thus, claims involving religion fell 14 percent between the 2002 

and 2003 reporting periods; a further 4 percent during the period ending in 2004; 

and a further 29 percent for the period ending in 2005. In total, religion-based 

claims declined 41 percent between the periods ending in 2002 and 2005. 

Ms. Summa’s letter advises that, inasmuch as the Division’s records do not analyze the claims filed based on the type of discrimination alleged (e.g., facial discrimination, harassment, or failure to accommodate), she cannot state authoritatively 

that there was no increase in accommodation claims subsequent to enactment of the 

2002 amendments. Nevertheless, a common sense analysis suggests that a rise in 

such claims, and certainly a material rise, would be inconsistent with the declining 

overall number of creed basis cases. If anything, an appropriate inference is that 

the steady decline in claims includes a reduction in the number of accommodation 

claims—and that this reduction is attributable to a greater inclination of New York 

employers to find an amicable resolution of employee requests for accommodation, 

given that the change in state law now requires a more vigorous effort to provide 

a reasonable accommodation. 

In sum, as New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer stated in an op-ed appearing in the Forward on June 25, 2004, ‘‘New York’s law has not resulted in the 

infringement of the rights of others, or in the additional litigation that the ACLU 

[a WRFA critic] predicts will occur if WRFA is enacted. Nor has it been burdensome 

on business. Rather, it strikes the correct balance between accommodating individual liberty and the needs of businesses and the delivery of services. So does 

WRFA.’’ (A copy of Attorney General Spitzer’s op-ed is appended as Appendix D, together with his letter of November 10, 2005, to Chairman Johnson and Ranking 

Member Andrews to similar effect.) 

If, at least as reflected by the decline in numbers of religious discrimination 

claims filed, the New York experience seems to be a success story, this does not—

at least to judge by overall trends during the period from fiscal year 1992 through 

fiscal year 2002, as reflected in information provided by the U.S. Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission—appear to be the case with respect to such claims filed 

with the EEOC against state and local government employers. Attached as Appendix D is an analysis of EEOC religious discrimination charges (including charges involving a failure to accommodate religious practices) against state and local government employers prepared by James Standish, legislative director for the General 

Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, and the EEOC table upon which that analysis is based. 

Relatedly, as I stated in my written testimony before this Subcommittee of November 10, 2005, figures released by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reflect that the overall number of claims of religious discrimination in the 

workplace (against private as well as state and local government employers) filed 

for the fiscal year ending on September 30, 2004, as compared to the fiscal year ending on September 30, 1992, have increased in excess of over 75 percent. (I learned 

subsequent to the November 10 hearing that there was somewhat of a decline in 

claims filed for fiscal year 2005, as compared to fiscal year 2004, but the point remains the same.) 

This trend is reflected as well in the growth of claims characterized by the EEOC 

as involving religious accommodation issues, rising from 193 in fiscal year 1996 to 

327 in fiscal year 2005 (with 341 claims filed in fiscal year 2004), a 69 percent increase. Indeed, for the comparable FY96 through FY05 period, total religion-based 

charges rose less steeply than those analyzed as religious accommodation claims, 

from 1,564 claims to 2,340, some 50 percent. (EEOC documents reflecting the foregoing are collectively appended as Appendix E.) 5

The total number of cases may not be high, but they are high enough to demonstrate that there is a problem in terms of the ability of employees to obtain a reasonable accommodation of their religious practices.6 And we will, of course, never 

know of the many people who do not bring claims having been advised, whether by 

an enforcement agency or by private counsel, that the present law leaves them without recourse and, therefore, to the choice of violating a religious precept or giving 

up a source of livelihood.7 While over the last decade or so the EEOC has evidenced 

a commendable increased commitment to bringing religious accommodation cases, 

its ability to bring those cases successfully is necessarily limited by the strength of 

the underlying law. 

61

In conclusion, enactment of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act will constitute 

an important step towards ensuring that all members of society, whatever their religious beliefs and practices, are protected from an invidious form of discrimination—

the arbitrary refusal of an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation of an 

employee’s religious practice. New York’s experience reflects that WRFA will not 

have the baleful impact that some have predicted, and the rising number of denial 

of accommodation claims filed with the EEOC well demonstrates that the time has 

come for Congress to reinstate the robust protection against an invidious form of 

discrimination that it originally intended when it included religious accommodation 

provisions in the federal civil rights laws. 

ENDNOTES

1Subsection (b), as amended, reiterates ‘‘undue hardship’’ as the applicable standard for cases 

of holy day observance, and goes on to deal with certain specific issues relating to accommodation of that type of religious practice. 2The term ‘‘undue economic hardship’’ already appeared in the prior version of New York’s 

religious accommodation law as part of the prior, now-repealed Section 296(10)(c). The pertinent 

language read, ‘‘This subdivision shall not apply where the uniform application of terms and 

conditions of attendance to employees is essential to prevent undue economic hardship to the 

employer.’’ The term ‘‘undue economic hardship’’ was, however, not defined in the prior law, nor 

were any criteria provided for determining when that type of hardship had been demonstrated. 

In providing a definition for ‘‘undue hardship,’’ the 2002 amendments looked to New York 

State case law interpreting the term ‘‘undue economic hardship’’ as it appeared in prior Section 

296(10)(c). In State Division of Human Rights v. Carnation Co., 42 N.Y.2d 873 (1977), the New 

York State Court of Appeals (New York’s high court) interpreted ‘‘undue economic hardship’’ as 

‘‘any significant increase in costs’’ (emphasis supplied). The Court of Appeals further stated in 

that case, ‘‘It should be obvious that an undue economic hardship does not require any threat 

or undermining of the economic stability of an enterprise. It would be enough that a palpable 

increase in costs or risk to industrial peace would be required in accomplishing the end sought 

by the employee.’’ Id. (emphasis supplied). This common sense reading of even the term ‘‘undue 

economic hardship,’’ as compared to the broader concept of ‘‘undue hardship’’ utilized in WRFA 

and present New York law, undercuts any notion that WRFA will be read to open the door to 

harassment in the workplace. 3This is not to suggest that every conceivable case in which an employee might seek accommodation with respect to a work duty involving the filling of prescriptions or health care is necessarily problematic. An accommodation that burdens third parties—including an accommodation that would make services unavailable on the employer’s terms—would impose an unacceptable disruption on the employer’s business, and would therefore not be available under WRFA. 

On the other hand—consistent with the fundamental premise of our Constitution and our society that it is not up to the government to prescribe orthodoxies of belief or practice—to the extent a reasonable accommodation of religious belief regarding work duties can be afforded without such impact, or other significant difficulty or expense, that relief can and should be extended. 4Ms. Summa’s letter states, ‘‘The number of claims filed during the 2001-02 period, which 

ended shortly before the Section 296(10) amendments went into effect, was not only higher than 

the number filed during subsequent comparable periods, but also higher than those filed in prior 

years. This was attributable to an upsurge that was most likely associated with the aftermath 

of the attacks of September 11, 2001.’’ This is borne out by the sharp rise in 2001-02 in the 

number of claims filed by Muslims and persons following in the category of ‘‘other.’’ Fortunately, 

the number of claims filed by persons falling in these categories has fallen in subsequent years. 5The document breaking out religion charge receipts for the FY1996-2005 period by bases and 

issues, including religious accommodation, was prepared by the EEOC’s Office of Research, Information and Planning. We have been advised that there are some additional bases and 

charges, each amounting to less than 1% of religion charge receipts, that were not included by 

ORIP in this compilation. 6Moreover, the small number of religious accommodation cases filed with the EEOC, as compared to the overall number of religious claims, suggests—at least on an impressionistic basis—

that the number of accommodation cases coming in the door may be undercounted, perhaps because of miscoding when cases are analyzed for categorization. 7Further, James Standish’s discussion in his appended memorandum of the disincentives to 

bring, and for lawyers to take, these cases in the context of denial of accommodation claims 

against state and local governments applies with equal force to claims against private employers. 

62

Response to Request From Camille A. Olson, Esq., Partner, Seyfarth Shaw 

LLP 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE, 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

Washington, DC, December 16, 2005. 

Hon. SAM JOHNSON, Chairman, 

Hon. MARK E. SOUDER, Member, 

Hon. DALE E. KILDEE, Member, 

Committee on Education and the Workforce, 2181 Rayburn House Office Building, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR CHAIRMAN JOHNSON, CONGRESSMAN SOUDER, AND CONGRESSMAN KILDEE: I 

am writing on behalf of the United States Chamber of Commerce in response to 

your letter dated November 18, 2005. This letter addresses the Subcommittee’s specific request for the Chamber’s position with respect to New York’s Executive Law 

Section 296(10) which expanded New York’s prohibitions against religious discrimination in the workplace, and its comparability with the ‘‘Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2005’’ (‘‘WRFA’’). As noted in your letter, at the recent hearing with respect to WRFA, it was represented to the Subcommittee that New York’s state law 

prohibiting religious discrimination in the workplace was ‘‘substantively identical to 

the federal legislation contemplated in H.R. 1445.’’ In this supplemental testimony 

the Chamber explains how New York’s law differs substantially, and indeed is very 

different from WRFA. Further, there are other reasons why the employer community’s experience to date with New York’s law does not provide the Subcommittee 

with relevant experience by which to judge the impact of WRFA on the employeremployee relationship. 

In late November, 2002, New York’s Executive Law Section 296(10) became effective. It expanded the then-existing protections of New York’s employment discrimination law to include not only protections for employees who request an accommodation to observe their Sabbath or holy day, but also protections that would require 

an accommodation of other religious practices or beliefs as well that were not then 

protected under New York law. It also expanded the law by expanding the prohibitions against discrimination ‘‘in holding employment’’ to also include a prohibition 

in discrimination with respect to any terms and conditions of employment, including 

opportunities for promotion, advancement or transfers. 

In short, New York’s law was expanded to include prohibitions against discrimination in employment with respect to a wide range of practices and beliefs that had 

previously not been protected under state law, including dress, hairstyles, beards 

and prayer requirements. In addition, it also provided certain specific guidance with 

respect to an employer’s obligation to reasonably accommodate an employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs, including a definition of undue hardship, and an express statement that undue hardship does not include any abridgement of the rights 

granted to employees through a seniority system, or require an employer pay premium wages to employees whose work accommodation may require that they work 

only certain hours to accommodate their sincerely held religious beliefs. 

Specifically, the amendment to subdivision 10 of section 296 of New York’s Executive Law in relation to unlawful discriminatory practices can be summarized as follows: • Paragraph (a) of subdivision 10 was amended to make it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer, employee or agent thereof, to impose upon a person 

as a condition of employment any circumstances that would require such person to 

violate or forego a sincerely held religious practice or observance; • Paragraph (a) of subdivision 10 was also amended to provide for an exemption 

for an employer in situations, where after bona fide effort, the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee’s observance or 

practice without undue hardship; • Paragraph (a) of subdivision 10 was amended to establish that an employer is 

under no obligation to pay premium wages during hours when ordinarily required 

if the employee is working during such hours only as an accommodation to his or 

her sincerely held religious requirements; 

• Paragraph (a) of subdivision 10 was amended to provide that nothing in an employer’s duty to accommodate sincerely held religious practices and observances 

shall alter or abridge seniority rights; 

• Paragraph (c) of subdivision 10 was amended to add a new paragraph (c) to provide that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to refuse an employee leave solely because the leave is being utilized for the employee’s sincerely 

held religious observance or practice; 

63

• A new paragraph (d) was also added to subdivision 10 to define ‘‘undue hardship’’ as an accommodation requiring significant expense or difficulty and requiring 

the consideration of several factors, including, but not limited to, cost of the accommodation; the number of employees requesting accommodation; geographic separateness of facilities; and inability of the employee to perform essential job functions. • Under the new paragraph (d), undue hardship was specifically defined to include any accommodation that ‘‘will result in the inability of an employee to perform 

the essential functions of the position in which he or she is employed.’’

It is important to note that today Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 

amended, provides employees with protections that require an employer to accommodate the wide range of religious observances and practices reflected in the 2002 

amendments to New York’s law, subsection 10, paragraphs a through c. For example, Title VII currently requires employers to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious observances and practices unless an accommodation would cause an 

undue hardship on an employer. Prior to November, 2002, these protections present 

under Title VII were not included within the protections of New York law. The definition of undue hardship included within the 2002 amendments to the New York 

law differs from Title VII’s definition of undue hardship; however, as detailed below, 

New York’s definition also differs from WRFA’s definition of undue hardship. 

As the Subcommittee noted in its request for supplemental testimony, WRFA has 

been represented by its proponents as substantively identical to New York law. In 

fact, as described below, there are significant differences between New York’s law 

and WRFA. • Subparagraph (2) (B) of WRFA provides a definition of the term ‘perform the 

essential functions’ of a job that is not contained anywhere in the New York law. 

Of concern is the definition’s elimination from the consideration of an essential function of any job ‘‘carrying out practices relating to clothing and practices relating to 

taking time off, practices relating to taking time off, or other practices that may 

have a temporary or tangential impact on the ability to perform job functions, if any 

of the practices described in this subparagraph restrict the ability to wear religious 

clothing, to take time off for a holy day, or to participate in a religious observance 

or practice.’’ If practices relating to clothing and taking time off cannot be considered as an essential function of any job, under Title VII, an employer may not engage in the interactive process of determining whether or not a reasonable accommodation exists that will accommodate the religious practice, without undue hardship, but must simply grant the employee’s request regardless of its impact in the 

workplace. Again, no such similar requirement is imposed upon employers under 

New York’s law. In fact, New York’s law, to the contrary, requires employers ‘‘to 

reasonably accommodate an employee’s sincerely held religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.’’ New York’s 

law does not require a blanket requirement that an employer exempt from an employee’s job any restriction on the ability to wear religious clothing, take time off 

for a holy day or to participate in a religious observance or practice. 

• Subparagraph (3) of WRFA defines the term ‘undue hardship’ differently than 

it is defined under New York’s law. In pertinent part, New York’s law definition of 

undue hardship § 296(10) provides as follows, with that text that is bolded in New 

York’s law completely absent from WRFA: 

Article I. ‘‘undue hardship’’ shall mean an accommodation requiring significant expense or difficulty (including a significant interference with the safe or efficient operation of the workplace or a violation of a bona fide seniority system). Factors to 

be considered in determining whether the accommodation constitutes an undue economic hardship shall include, but not be limited to: 

Section 1.01 the identifiable cost of the accommodation, including the costs of loss 

of productivity and of retaining or hiring employees or transferring employees from 

one facility to another, in relation to the size and operating cost of the employer; 

Section 1.02 the number of individuals who will need the particular accommodation to a sincerely held religious observance or practice; and 

Section 1.03 for an employer with multiple facilities, the degree to which the geographic separateness or administrative or fiscal relationship of the facilities will 

make the accommodation more difficult or expensive. 

Provided, however, an accommodation shall be considered to constitute an undue 

hardship if it will result in the inability of an employee to perform the essential 

functions of the position in which he or she is employed. 

In short, absent from WRFA’s definition of ‘‘undue hardship’’ is any reference to 

consideration of an employer’s ability to: run a ‘‘safe and efficient operation,’’ implement and enforce a ‘‘bona fide seniority system,’’ or the number of employees requiring an accommodation for religious reasons. Equally important is the absence in 

WRFA of New York’s absolute requirement that an accommodation shall be considVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Aug 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\EER\11-10-05\24514.TXT DICK
64

ered to constitute an undue hardship if it will result in an employee’s inability to 

perform the essential functions of the position in which he or she was employed. • WRFA amends Section 703 of Title VII by adding in subsection (o) (2) a definition of unlawful employment practice that includes failing to provide a reasonable 

accommodation to a religious observance or practice that does not ‘‘remove the conflict between the employment requirements and the religious observance or practice 

of the employee’’. No such language, definition or similar requirement is present in 

New York’s law. • Similarly, as noted above, whereas New York’s law expressly includes guidance 

with respect to an employee not being entitled to premium wages or benefits in connection with performing work during certain hours to accommodate his or her religious requirements, as well as expressly preserving an employee’s seniority rights 

and affirming that those shall not be altered as a result of the reasonable accommodation obligations set forth in the New York law, no such similar language appears 

in WRFA. 

For all of the reasons set forth above, the Chamber submits that New York’s law 

is not substantially identical to WRFA. In fact, the language of the two laws is substantially different and not comparable. As such, the experience of employers under 

New York’s law does not provide guidance on the manner in which WRFA’s obligations would impact the workplace. 

Moreover, in the relatively short period of time since the passage of the New 

York’s law, approximately three years, the Chamber understands that New York 

employers have not experienced enforcement of its obligations in a way that differs 

from enforcement of the existing obligations of those New York employers under 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In addition, there are no publicly available 

administrative rulings of New York’s Human Rights Department interpreting the 

law, nor any reported court decisions. Where as here, New York’s judiciary has not 

answered questions concerning the scope and nature of the protections afforded 

under New York’s amended law, commentators have opined that ‘‘the cycle of legislation is never complete until the courts have interpreted and applied the legislative 

language to actual litigants’’. Law Summary, Missouri’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A New Approach to the Cause of Conscience, 69 Mo. L. Rev. 853, 863 

(2004). As such, the Chamber submits that New York’s law should not guide the 

Subcommittee’s consideration of WRFA’s obligations. 

In conclusion, the Chamber’s position is that New York’s law is substantially different from the Workplace Religious Freedom Act and offers no appreciable guidance as to the impact of the passage of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act in the 

workplace. Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide this supplemental testimony. Please do not hesitate to contact 

me or the Chamber’s Labor, Immigration, and Employee Benefits Division if we can 

be of further assistance in this matter. 

Respectfully submitted, 

CAMILLE A. OLSON, 

Seybarth Shaw LLP. 

Various Appendices Pertaining to New York’s Human Rights Law

Appendix A 

New York Executive Law Section 296(10) 

N.Y. Executive Law Sec. 296(10) (2004), as amended in 2002 reads as follows: 

10. (a) It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any employer, or an employee or agent thereof, to impose upon a person as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment, including opportunities for promotion, advancement or transfers, any terms or conditions that would require such person to violate or forego a 

sincerely held practice of his or her religion, including but not limited to the observance of any particular day or days or any portion thereof as a sabbath or other holy 

day in accordance with the requirements of his or her religion, unless, after engaging in a bona fide effort, the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably 

accommodate the employee’s or prospective employee’s sincerely held religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, an employee shall 

not be entitled to premium wages or premium benefits for work performed during 

hours to which such premium wages or premium benefits would ordinarily be applicable, if the employee is working during such hours only as an accommodation to 

his or her sincerely held religious requirements. Nothing in this paragraph or paragraph (b) of this subdivision shall alter or abridge the rights granted to an employee 

65

concerning the payment of wages or privileges of seniority accruing to that employee. 

(b) Except where it would cause an employer to incur an undue hardship, no person shall be required to remain at his or her place of employment during any day 

or days or portion thereof that, as a requirement of his or her religion, he or she 

observes as his or her sabbath or other holy day, including a reasonable time prior 

and subsequent thereto for travel between his or her place of employment and his 

or her home, provided however, that any such absence from work shall, wherever 

practicable in the reasonable judgment of the employer, be made up by an equivalent amount of time and work at some other mutually convenient time, or shall be 

charged against any leave with pay ordinarily granted, other than sick leave, provided further, however, that any such absence not so made up or charged, may be 

treated by the employer of such person as leave taken without pay. 

(c) It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to refuse to 

permit an employee to utilize leave, as provided in paragraph (b) of this subdivision, 

solely because the leave will be used for absence from work to accommodate the employee’s sincerely held religious observance or practice. 

(d) As used in this subdivision: 

(1) ‘‘undue hardship’’ shall mean an accommodation requiring significant expense 

or difficulty (including a significant interference with the safe or efficient operation 

of the workplace or a violation of a bona fide seniority system). Factors to be considered in determining whether the accommodation constitutes an undue economic 

hardship shall include, but not be limited to: 

(i) the identifiable cost of the accommodation, including the costs of loss of productivity and of retaining or hiring employees or transferring employees from one facility to another, in relation to the size and operating cost of the employer; 

(ii) the number of individuals who will need the particular accommodation to a 

sincerely held religious observance or practice; and 

(iii) for an employer with multiple facilities, the degree to which the geographic 

separateness or administrative or fiscal relationship of the facilities will make the 

accommodation more difficult or expensive. 

Provided, however, an accommodation shall be considered to constitute an undue 

hardship if it will result in the inability of an employee to perform the essential 

functions of the position in which he or she is employed. 

(2) ‘‘premium wages’’ shall include overtime pay and compensatory time off, and 

additional remuneration for night, weekend or holiday work, or for standby or irregular duty. 

(3) ‘‘premium benefit’’ shall mean an employment benefit, such as seniority, group 

life insurance, health insurance, disability insurance, sick leave, annual leave, or an 

educational or pension benefit that is greater than the employment benefit due the 

employee for an equivalent period of work performed during the regular work schedule of the employee. 

****

Attached is a copy of the New York State legislature’s Act of March 21, 2001, 

amending Executive Law Section 296(10), with the changes from prior law noted. 

While other changes in the provisions of Section 296(10) are set forth in the Act, 

the Act states that the prior Section 296(10)(c) has been repealed in its entirety 

without providing the text of forth that repealed subsection. The text of the prior, 

now-repealed Section 296(10)(c) was as follows: 

‘‘This subdivision shall not be construed to apply to any position dealing with 

health or safety where the person holding such position must be available for duty 

whenever needed, or to any position or class of positions the nature and quality of 

the duties of which are such that the personal presence of the holder of such position is regularly essential on any particular day or days or portion thereof for the 

normal performance of such duties with respect to any applicant therefor or holder 

thereof who, as a requirement of his or her religion, observes such day or days or 

portion thereof as his or her sabbath or other holy day. 

‘‘In the case of any employer other than the state, any of its political subdivisions 

or any school district, this subdivision shall not apply where the uniform application 

of terms and conditions of attendance to employees is essential to prevent undue 

economic hardship to the employer. In any proceeding in which the applicability of 

this subdivision is in issue, the burden of proof shall be upon the employer. If any 

question shall arise whether a particular position or class of positions is excepted 

from this subdivision by this paragraph, such question may be referred in writing 

by any party claimed to be aggrieved, in the case of any position of employment by 

the state or any of its political subdivisions, except by any school district, to the civil 

66

service commission, in the case of any position of employment by any school district, 

to the commissioner of education, who shall determine such question and in the case 

of any other employer, a party claiming to be aggrieved may file a complaint with 

the division pursuant to this article. Any such determination by the civil service 

commission shall be reviewable in the manner provided by article seventy-eight of 

the civil practice law and rules and any such determination by the commissioner 

of education shall be reviewable in the manner and to the same extent as other determinations of the commissioner under section three hundred ten of the education 

law.’’


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Letters of Support for H.R. 1445, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 

2005


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Submission for the Record Prepared by the Coalition for Religious 

Freedom in the Workplace


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Æ


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