IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-70013

JUSTEN HALL, 

 Petitioner−Appellant

versus

WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, 

Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, 

 Respondent−Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:10-CV-135

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Justen Hall, found guilty of capital murder in 2004, moved in federal 

district court for relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) from 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 27, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 14-70013

denial of that motion. 

This court reviews the denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion under an abuseof-discretion standard. Because reasonable jurists would not find debatable 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion, we deny a COA. Diaz v. 

Stephens, 731 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 48 (2013). “It is 

not enough that the granting of relief might have been permissible, or even 

warranted . . . [the] denial must have been so unwarranted as to constitute an 

abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 

402 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981)). A movant is required “to show ‘extraordinary 

circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Id. (quoting 

Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)). “Such circumstances will rarely 

occur in the habeas context.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535.

From Hall’s application for a COA, it is not remotely evident what “extraordinary circumstances” he believes justify the unusual award of Rule 60(b) 

relief from a final judgment. The vast majority of his brief merely reurges the 

merits of an inadequate-assistance-of-counsel (“IAC”) claim that was long ago 

rejected on the merits by the district court and this court1 before the Supreme 

Court ultimately denied certiorari.2 A Rule 60(b) motion is not a proper mechanism to re-litigate the merits of the IAC claim and surely not a proper vehicle 

for doing so when the judgment from which Hall seeks relief has been confirmed on appeal (on the merits). See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532; Adams v. 

Thaler, 679 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2012); Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420, 

427 (5th Cir. 2011). Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that Hall’s two-year delay in filing his Rule 60(b) motion was 

unreasonable. 

1 See Hall v. Thaler, 504 F. App’x 269 (5th Cir. 2012).

2 See 134 S. Ct. 385 (2013).

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Opaquely, Hall alludes to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and 

Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), as “extraordinary circumstances” 

justifying Rule 60(b) relief. That notion is without merit. We have already 

rejected the theory that those changes in decisional law constituted a kind of 

“extraordinary circumstance” that warrants relief under Rule 60(b). See Diaz, 

731 F.3d at 376 (as to Trevino); Adams, 679 F.3d at 320 (as to Martinez). In 

any event, Hall has already received that to which Trevino would entitle him: 

consideration of his IAC claims, which both the district court and this court 

rejected on the merits. See Hall v. Thaler, 504 F. App’x 269 (5th Cir. 2012).

Finally, Hall’s explanation as to the necessity of relief from a final judgment is puzzling. He claims that he needs this relief because two recent Texas 

state-court decisions relating to his former lawyer have opened an avenue for 

him for habeas corpus relief in state court. Yet, he has provided no explanation 

or authority for why we would have to vacate a final judgment of a district 

court (affirmed on appeal) before Texas would consider his state petition.

The application for a COA is DENIED. 

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