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Special Report 164 July 2006

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Contents 

Introduction 2

Current U.S. Policies 4

What is Tajdid or Islamic Renewal? 6

A Culturally Viable Movement 7

A Strong Philosophical Legacy 7

Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy 8

Conclusion 9

Recommendations 10

About the Report

This report is part of the Muslim World Initiative’s “Islamic 

Renewal Project: Translating Islamic Reformist Ideas into 

Concrete Policies” of the United States Institute of Peace. The 

project’s main objective is to “mobilize the moderates” in the 

Muslim world by broadening societal support for modernist 

Islam around a coherent vision and translating that vision 

into enduring pacts, viable institutions, and concrete policies. 

It includes the collection of a database on Islamic modernist 

networks across the globe and the organization of a series of 

regional workshops held in predominantly Muslim countries 

and countries where Muslims constitute significant minorities.

The major argument of this report is that the problem of 

“religious extremism” in the Muslim world is an ideological 

challenge best confronted by drawing on Islam’s humanist and 

progressive traditions. The author would like to thank Daniel 

Brumberg, Michael Kofman, David Smock, Paul Stares, and 

Mona Yacoubian for comments on earlier drafts of this report. 

Any shortcomings are the author’s sole responsibility.

Dr. Abdeslam Maghraoui joined the Institute as director of the 

Muslim World Initiative in 2004. His research and published 

works focus on religion, politics, and reform in Muslim societies 

and the connections between terrorism, political violence, and 

vacuums of authority. He holds a Ph.D. in comparative politics 

from Princeton University’s Department of Politics.

Abdeslam M. Maghraoui 

American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal

Summary

• The United States still lacks an integrated and sustainable strategy to confront 

religious extremism in the Muslim world. Policymakers have failed to recognize that 

the challenge is not only a conflict with the West but also involves ideological shifts 

within the Muslim world. These shifts have precipitated a major battle for the future 

of Islam as a faith and a civilization.

• The single most important initiative the United States can take to combat Islamist 

extremism is to support “Islamic renewal,” a diffuse but growing social, political, and 

intellectual movement whose goal is profound reform of Muslim societies and polities. 

The United States must engage moderate Islam because core aspects of the religion 

have an enormous moderating and modernizing potential that policymakers have 

overlooked.

• Previous efforts to address the challenges of the Muslim world have often contradicted 

one another and worked at cross-purposes. There is a visible misunderstanding of the 

region’s political culture, particularly regarding the questions of terrorism, extremism, 

and political reform. Security cooperation with authoritarian regimes to deal with 

the terrorist threat has reinforced negative attitudes about the United States and its 

policies. 

• Democracy promotion efforts are likely to empower fundamentalists in many Muslim 

states. Although desirable in principle, free elections may not be the best mechanisms 

to negotiate substantive political issues, and deep suspicion toward formal authority 

structures persists in Muslim societies.

• Islamic renewal seeks to reclaim the religion’s heritage from extremist, traditionalist, 

and fundamentalist groups. Today’s reformers have a long history and cultural tradition to draw upon. From the early period of Islam, when the Prophet Muhammad saw 

himself as a religious reformer, to the adoption of modern public and international 

law, Islam has shown great potential to adapt and modernize. Today the movement is 

on the ground and has the capacity to make coherent a scattered cluster of reformist 

ideas on social and political issues.
• American policy could tip the balance between extremist and modernist interpretations of Islam and seize a great opportunity for constructive engagement. The U.S. 

strategy should be to support the renewal movement, which could reform Islam and 

mobilize Muslim constituencies against religious extremism. 

• Policy priorities should be to promote Muslim modernist works and ideas, engage the 

rising moderate Islamist parties on normative grounds, and put more emphasis on 

substantive social, educational, and religious reforms. As fault lines become apparent, 

U.S. agencies already are taking sides by supporting moderate Islamic leaders over 

others.

Introduction

Nearly five years after 9/11, the United States still lacks an integrated and sustainable 

strategy to confront religious extremism in the Muslim world. The challenges in Iraq and 

uncertainties in Afghanistan are raising doubts about the current thrust of the “global 

war on terrorism.” The prospect of electoral victories by hard-line Islamists is dimming the 

hope that promoting democracy will produce moderate regimes and good relations with 

the United States. And attempts to win “hearts and minds” through public diplomacy 

have not yielded significant results. A June 2006 Pew Global Attitudes survey shows that 

unfavorable opinions of the United States are still widespread in five traditionally moderate Muslim countries (Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey).

Missing from U.S. policies is the recognition that the challenge comes not only from 

conflict with western modernity but also ideological conflicts inside the Muslim world. A 

simmering, historically rooted battle within Islam pits modernists against radical Islamists. 

Following the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, conservative Sunni regimes unleashed their 

own brand of puritanical Islam to counter the growing ideological influence and political 

dynamism of the Shi’ite revolution. Saudi financial largesse and Wahabism, a doctrine that 

advocates a literal, legalistic, and purist interpretation of the Qur’an, have influenced the 

Sunni response to the Shi’ite challenge. 

Sunni extremists have gained ground during the past three decades as a result of the 

poor social and economic performance and repressive nature of Muslim political regimes. 

The three Arab Human Development Reports published by the United Nations between 

2002 and 2004 show the Arab part of the Muslim world lagging behind other regions in 

social opportunity, knowledge, and good governance.1 Fragmentation of religious authority 

in Sunni Islam and official religious scholars’ reluctance or failure to reinterpret Islamic 

laws also are serious problems. With no institutionalized authority comparable to the 

Catholic papacy and the Shi’ite velayat-e faqih (rule of the jurist), an independent legal 

scholar, a respected preacher, or even a fanatic can issue a fatwa (a religious edict or 

opinion). Although the vast majority of fatwas issued on any given day are about mundane 

matters and have nothing to do with politics or violence, they undermine the authority 

of official religious institutions, which in turn use the prevailing “anarchy of fatwas” to 

monopolize and limit the scope of ijtihad, or reasoned interpretation.

Standard economic and political reform policies, often touted as the solution to the 

Muslim world’s problems, are necessary but no longer sufficient to address a crisis of this 

magnitude. Perhaps a freer political environment and social and economic incentives could 

have reinforced ideological moderation if they had been implemented decades ago. 

Today, however, the major battle is over the soul of Islam and will require substantive, 

normative, and institutional reforms. The outcome of this religious and ideological contest 

will be determined by the balance of power and influence between radical Islamists, bent 

on imposing a puritanical form of Islam through intimidation and violence, and moderate 

Muslims who aim to renew Islam from within.

The single most important step the United States can take to combat Islamist extremism is to support “Islamic renewal,” a recent, diffuse but growing social, political, and 

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by 

Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent 

international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and 

democratic transformations, and increase peacebuilding 

capacity, /sStools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The 

Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, 

skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in 

peacebuilding efforts around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, ACCION 

International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, Founder 

and former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. • 

Holly J. Burkhalter, Director of U.S. Policy, Physicians 

for Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. 

Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic 

Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University • 

Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, 

Washington, D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Seymour Martin Lipset, 

Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University • 

Mora L. McLean, President, Africa-America Institute, 

New York, N.Y. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State 

Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt.

Members ex officio

Michael M. Dunn, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air

 Force; President, National Defense University • Barry F. 

Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs • 

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
intellectual movement that aims to cultivate modern norms and address modern needs 

by drawing on Islamic traditions. Its objective is profound reform of Muslim societies 

and polities. Although they do not comprise an ideologically homogenous and uniformly 

committed movement, various actors with similar agendas and significant social backing 

are involved. The movement may include women’s groups such as the Sisters in Islam 

networks in Indonesia and Malaysia, AISHA Arab Women Forum, Karamah: Muslim Women 

Lawyers for Human Rights, or the anonymous group of progressive Muslim women that 

published “Claiming our Rights: A Manual for Women’s Human Rights Education in Muslim 

Societies.” It includes moderate Islamist parties, such as Egypt and Jordan’s wasat parties, 

which call for “self-reform,” and Turkey’s and Morocco’s Justice and Development parties, 

which define themselves as modern political actors taking progressive Islamic positions. 

And it includes hundreds of active democracy networks (such as the Philippine Council 

for Islam Democracy, the U.S.-based Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, or the 

International Center for Islam and Pluralism in Indonesia), and lively Web sites that foster 

international communication and transmission of progressive Islamic ideas (Liberal Islam 

Network, Liberal Islam.net, IslamOnline.net, ProgressiveIslam.org). 

In general, the Islamic renewal movement comprises four broad groups. Proponents of 

“civic Islam” include civil society organizations that advocate women’s equality, human 

rights, social responsibility, environmental protection, and similar social issues but make 

no overt claim to political power. Referring to the progressive teachings of Islam, they 

call on regimes to enact reforms and respect basic rights. Proponents of “Islam and 

democracy” include parties and movements that see no incompatibility between Islamic 

values and teachings and modern democratic principles. This group advocates participation in the political process with the goal of achieving power and applying political 

reforms on the basis of Islamic principles. Proponents of “reforms within Islam” include 

leading religious figures, scholars, and academic institutions that call for reinterpretation 

of Islamic laws, a historical reading of Islam and the Qur’an, and the modernization of 

Islamic knowledge. “Culturally modern Islam” developed mainly among Muslim communities living in the West. These diaspora groups and organizations, which try to articulate 

a “western Islamic identity,” see no tension between being a Muslim and a citizen of a 

western democracy. Tying these diverse actors together is their commitment to modernize 

Islamic institutions, traditions, and practices.

In some instances the Islamic renewal movement also includes governments. In 

Malaysia, for example, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi uses his country’s broad and 

entrenched tradition of democratic Islam as a model to call for religious moderation 

throughout the Muslim world. In Morocco, the monarchy applied progressive interpretations of specific clauses in Islamic law to reform the family code and grant women equal 

civil rights in 2004. In a parallel effort, the government opened one of Morocco’s most 

prestigious seminaries to women, and some fifty women imams and preachers (murshidat) 

graduated in 2006; sixty more enrolled that year. This is a first in Islamic history and a 

major breakthrough for a conservative society in which women have been excluded from 

the public sphere. Thanks to the education ministry’s revision of school curricula and 

textbooks, Moroccan children learn about religious freedom and tolerance, universal principles of human rights, minority rights, and gender equality. The revisions draw on both 

international agreements and Islamic principles. To carry out these reforms, the monarchy 

carefully chose the language to explain the changes and involved civil society, religious 

scholars, political parties, the government, and the parliament.

The United States is well positioned to support this movement and engage “moderate” Islam. Contrary to common perceptions in the West, the word “moderate” accurately 

describes the vast majority of Muslims, who reject violence, yearn for justice and accountable governance, and value Muslim traditions of family, knowledge, and prosperity. An 

oft-cited saying of the Prophet Muhammad honors any Muslim who bequeaths “good 

offspring, useful knowledge, or honestly earned wealth.” Emphasizing these aspects of 

Islam will discredit the extremists’ message of hate, despair, and destruction. Moreover, 

The single most important 

initiative the United States 

can take to combat Islamist 

extremism is to support “Islamic 

renewal.”

Today, the major battle is 

over the soul of Islam and will 

require substantive, normative, 

and institutional reforms.

The word “moderate” accurately 

describes the vast majority of 

Muslims.
these aspects of Islam have an enormous potential for religious moderation that the 

United States is better placed to understand and appreciate than secular Europe, communist China, nationalist Russia, or the region’s repressive governments. Among all 

liberal democracies, the United States shows the broadest social and political support for 

religious compassion, religious figures and institutions, religiously based charities, and 

even virtuous politics. Yet many U.S. policymakers and strategists have overlooked Islam’s 

ethical appeal.2

The United States can support reforms in the Muslim world by refocusing its existing 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs, its democratization projects, and its public diplomacy initiatives to pay more attention to ongoing ideological 

conflicts. These reforms are more likely than forced regime change, democratic elections, 

or skilled marketing of U.S. foreign policies to build open and peaceful Muslim societies 

and good U.S.–Muslim relations. 

This report discusses the inadequacy of current policies toward the Muslim world in 

light of its internal ideological conflict. We then develop the idea of “Islamic renewal.” 

The third section outlines specific recommendations for the U.S. government and other 

international actors.

A definitional note: “Islamist” political parties and movements seek to legitimate 

or overturn a political order on the basis of their interpretation of Islamic principles. 

“Extremist” groups eschew nonviolence in the name of the principles of the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-salih) and literal interpretation of the Qur’an. “Moderate” parties and 

movements accept and apply human reason to Islamic principles, law, or precedents. They 

see no incompatibility between participation in the modern political process and Islamic 

values. Within these camps, theological variations and differing degrees of “extremism” 

and “moderation” are the products of local power relations.

Current U.S. Policies

Since September 11, 2001, there has been no lack of ideas and initiatives to confront 

challenges from the Muslim world. Three efforts have received special attention from the 

Bush administration and in public discourse: the global war on terrorism, the Middle East 

Partnership Initiative (MEPI) to promote democratic reform, and the public diplomacy 

campaign to improve America’s image in the Muslim world.

The components and declared objectives of these efforts often conflict with one 

another. For example, the global war on terrorism requires the cooperation of security services that form the backbone of authoritarian regimes in Muslim countries. Such cooperation undermines both democratic ambitions and the effort to change negative attitudes 

about the United States in the Muslim world. This initiative conflicts with one of MEPI’s 

major objectives: to push for political reforms and free elections. But free elections in 

some states are likely to bring to power Islamic fundamentalists. Such an outcome seems 

to conflict with the anti-terrorism strategy that conflates various Islamist groups into a 

monolithic threat, regardless of political, ideological, or strategic motivations. Furthermore, one of the major tasks of public diplomacy is to discredit the extremists’ message 

by promoting credible moderate voices. Yet these come from moderate Islamist parties or 

organizations that are often under the scrutiny of local governments and may never be 

granted a U.S. visa or entry into the United States. 

The U.S. strategy toward the Muslim world also shows misunderstanding of its political 

cultures. The war on terrorism is a primary example. Because the ideological and political 

differences among Islamic groups are still misunderstood or too subtle to warrant attention, the tendency has been to use terms such as “jihadists,” “Salafists,” or “extremists,” 

regardless of context. Yet empirical evidence from various countries points to a discernable pattern of ideological radicalization and a parallel shift to violence every time 

Islamist parties with a reformist agenda are weakened. Being aware of these patterns and 

shifts is important to understanding ideological extremism and combating terrorism. 

Theological variations and differing 

degrees of “extremism” and 

“moderation” are the products of 

local power relations.

Anti-terrorism strategy conflates 

various Islamist groups into a 

monolithic threat, regardless of 

political, ideological, or strategic 

motivations.
For example, the first violent radical group in the twentieth-century Muslim world 

emerged as the result of a split among Egypt’s Muslim Brothers in the 1970s. Members 

of al-Takfir wal-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus) broke with the Muslim Brotherhood 

after successive Egyptian governments rejected its reformist agenda and killed its leaders or sent them to jail. In addition to fighting the regime, the group’s objective was to 

“cleanse” Egyptian society through takfir, or excommunication, a violent doctrine that 

targets alleged Muslim apostates. This major ideological break with traditional Islamist 

reformist movements paved the way for a potent alliance with the Salafists and their 

global agenda. The Egyptians Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second in command, and 

Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind cleric convicted of planning the World Trade Center 

bombing in 1993, emerged from this ideological rupture. They led al-Jihad al-Islami and 

Jama’at al-Jihad, which also split from the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s. 

The pattern of political exclusion, ideological radicalization, and ensuing links 

between groups fighting local “infidels” and Salafists fighting external “infidels” can be 

seen in other situations. The banning of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria after it won 

local and national elections in 1990 and 1991 led to the emergence of two violent organizations, the Armed Islamic Groups and the Salafist Preaching and Combat Group. Both 

embraced a takfiri ideology that was behind many of the killings of civilians during the 

1990s. At least one of these groups has been linked to international terrorist networks. 

The same split explains the emergence and links of two Moroccan groups, the Straight 

Path and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, to global terrorism; their members were convicted in the Madrid and Casablanca terrorist attacks. When the reformist 

al-Adl wal-Ihssan and the Justice and Development Party made no headway during the 

monarchy’s guided political opening of the 1990s, various takfiri groups emerged in Fez, 

Sale, Tangiers, and Casablanca. In 2002, for example, extremists assassinated more than 

166 civilians during illegally organized “apostasy trials” in Morocco. These examples show 

that to understand religious extremism in the Muslim world, it is critical to take ideological shifts and conflicts into account. However, because the global war on terrorism is not 

sharply focused, analysts could reinforce the dominance of the Salafi jihadist camp by 

lumping together diverse groups under the same rubric.

Democracy promotion policies in the region also reflect a lack of understanding. The 

equation of democratic reforms with free parliamentary elections assumes the intrinsic 

legitimacy of formal political institutions as an arena in which national actors can negotiate interests and resolve conflicts facing the community. Yet every survey conducted in 

Muslim societies, including Arab, non-Arab, African, and Asian countries, suggests that 

they harbor deep and widespread suspicion of formal political authority.3 This suspicion 

is unlikely to disappear with the democratization of the political process. Throughout 

Islamic history, political leaders have not enjoyed the esteem granted to religious scholars, tribal chiefs, or mystics who kept a distance from state power. 

One lesson to be drawn from Iraq, for example, is that the formal political process, 

which privileges majority rule over traditional consensus, might not be the best mechanism 

for negotiating divisive substantive issues. Religious councils, tribal chiefs, charismatic 

leaders, local assemblies, and similar informal bodies can be more effective in reinforcing 

political legitimacy through popular consultation, negotiation, and concessions. 

Finally, efforts to improve America’s image in the Muslim world must go beyond influencing Muslim public opinion through better communication. We cannot assume that 

Muslims would change their attitudes if the United States simply changed the packaging 

of its policies and values.

There is a need for a new vision and a grand strategy to serve the mutual interests of 

the United States and the Muslim world. At the core of that vision and strategy should 

be the idea of tajdid, or renewal of Islam by modernist Muslim scholars and thinkers for 

the benefit of Muslim societies. This is not a zero-sum game; the United States can help 

itself by helping the Muslim world.

To understand religious extremism 

in the Muslim world, it is critical to 

take ideological shifts and conflicts 

into account.

Muslim societies, including Arab, 

non-Arab, African, and Asian 

countries, harbor deep and 

widespread suspicion of formal 

political authority.
What is Tajdid or Islamic Renewal?

The term “Islamic renewal” describes the systematic reconsideration and rationalization of 

Islamic doctrines, institutions, beliefs, and practices. Many individuals and institutions are 

involved. Although not formally connected, their efforts coalesce around research centers, 

individual scholars, modernist religious figures, moderate religious organizations, political 

parties, and activist Web sites scattered throughout the Muslim world and the Muslim diaspora in the West. While geographically diffuse and lacking a coherent agenda, these efforts 

have two overarching purposes. The first is to reclaim the Islamic heritage from traditional 

clerics (associated with autocratic states), extremist Islamist groups (bent on waging holy 

war against the West and their own “adulterated” societies), and fundamentalist movements (whose goal is to apply strict Sharia law once they gain power through democratic 

elections or through informal da’wa—a religious call to fellow Muslims to abide by Islamic 

principles). The major fault lines between modernist Muslim reformers and radical Islamists 

include the sources of law in the country, the role of religion in public life, gender equality, 

the foundations of government, the balance between individual and collective rights, and 

relations with other religions. 

The reformists’ second goal is to adapt Islamic principles, values, and institutions to the 

modern world while recognizing the importance of Islam as a cultural frame of reference.

In the western context, the idea of “Islamic renewal” recalls the Christian Reformation. 

This frequently used analogy requires a word of caution, however. First, Islam does not 

have a church to be reformed and separated from the state, and it does not have a single 

religious leader such as the pope from whom religious scholars can dissent. Furthermore, 

the history of the Christian Reformation is not linear and coherent, as is conventionally 

assumed. Any analogy would have to specify the geographical location, historical context, 

and sociological strand of various Christian Reformations at different times and places. 

Finally, although the Christian Reformation analogy might render intelligible what the 

Muslim world is going through, it could create false political expectations and posit erroneous evolutionary stages.4

At the same time, the idea of “Islamic renewal” may evoke in western popular understanding the specter of Islamic fundamentalism wrapped in legal garb. So we must 

distinguish the renewal movement from both the conservative Islamist parties that seek 

to establish Sharia through democratic elections and the more moderate Islamist parties 

that advocate a modern social and political agenda. Conservative Islamist parties use 

the modern political process as a peaceful means to establish and legitimate the Islamic 

state, economy, and society. Although moderate Islamic parties are forward-looking and do 

not advocate strict application of Sharia, their main objective is still to achieve political 

power. That may involve building alliances with religious conservatives and curtailing basic 

democratic rights if necessary. Hence, without a broad modernist worldview, even moderates may fall back on conservative, populist ideologies to harness votes during severe 

domestic or external crises (such as Bangladesh in 1991, Indonesia in 2004, Malaysia in 

1999, Pakistan in 1990 and 1993, and Turkey in 1995 and 1999). 

As a strategy, “Islamic renewal” can bring coherence to a significant but scattered 

cluster of Muslim reformist ideas and tie them to a social and political agenda that includes 

reform of family codes to give women equal rights; revisions of textbooks to teach human 

rights and religious pluralism; and modernization of Islamic charities, schools, and consultative traditions. The movement is already a fact on the ground. Various influential 

Arab and Muslim reformists, including secular human rights and women’s groups, consider 

modernist Islamic values as a means to advocate broad-based social and political change.5

This is a promising development that also holds great potential for U.S. engagement in 

the region.

Although moderate Islamic parties are forward-looking and do 

not advocate strict application 

of Sharia, their main objective is 

still to achieve political power.

“Islamic renewal” can bring 

coherence to a significant but 

scattered cluster of Muslim 

reformist ideas and tie them to 

a social and political agenda.
A Culturally Viable Movement

Reformers in the Muslim world always have drawn on Islamic traditions. The concepts of 

renewal (tajdid), reform (islah), and renaissance (nahda) are firmly rooted in Islamic history. Efforts to renew and reform Islam thus continue a long tradition. The modernizing 

movement can draw on many historical precedents. 

In the early period of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad saw himself primarily as a religious reformer with an egalitarian social agenda. Muhammad’s attention to the need for 

reform and renewal is recorded in a prophetic saying (hadith) that explicitly calls upon 

Muslims to renew their faith at the beginning of each century.

During the medieval period, the expansion of Islam from seventh-century Arabia 

to twelfth-century Asia, Europe, and Africa brought Muslims into contact with diverse 

peoples and cultures. The Islamic expansions unleashed a profound, and in many ways 

continuing, debate about the Muslim capacity to adapt to changing needs, cultures, and 

societies. An important legacy of this process is ijtihad, the reinterpretation of the Qur’an 

and the Sunna (the two main canons of Islam). The existence of four Sunni schools of 

jurisprudence (Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi’i), alongside the Shi’i Jafari school and 

various mystical orders, attests to the fluidity of Islam and its historic adaptability to 

worldly considerations and diverse spiritual needs.

In the modern period, Muslims have had to revise or bypass Islamic law to adapt 

their states and societies to changing realities. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and 

the rise of modern nation-states following European colonization forced Muslim religious 

scholars and jurists to rethink the classical Islamic theory of international relations (siyar) 

and adapt it to secular international law.6 Although many states in the Muslim world still 

considered themselves part of the umma (Muslim community) and formed various Islamic 

intergovernmental organizations, they fully embraced the notion of national sovereignty 

and interacted with one another on the basis of international law and norms, even when 

these contradicted international Islamic legal arguments.7

Another significant precedent is the adaptation of Muslim legal traditions to modern 

public law. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, most Muslim states borrow from modern 

European penal codes. The aspect of Islamic law that has resisted change is the body of 

laws regulating personal issues such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody of children. But even here, significant departures from the Sharia have taken place in countries 

like Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, and Indonesia.8

A third area where Islamic law and institutions have adapted to international standards 

is human rights. Numerous studies have shown that lack of tangible progress in this area 

has more to do more with politics than theology.9 In the end, for the Islamic renewal 

project to succeed, Muslim modernist thinkers from different countries need to share 

their experiences and strategies. Equally important is “cross-topical” fertilization, through 

which methods to accommodate secular international law and national sovereignty can be 

applied to women’s rights, freedom of belief, and human rights.

A Strong Philosophical Legacy 

The Islamic renewal movement can also draw on a progressive Muslim political philosophy. Many important social concepts in Islam, such as maslaha `amma (common good), 

masali’h al-`ibad (the welfare of the people), `adl (social justice), rahma (compassion 

in social interactions), ahl al-dhima (religious minority rights), and fard `ayn (human 

beings’ capacity to act responsibly), are clearly applicable to modern society. Notions of 

ijma’ (consensus), shura (consultation), `aqd (contract), haqq (right), naskh (change or 

abrogation of existing laws or Qur’anic injunctions), talfiq (invention), kiyas (reasoning by 

analogy beyond scriptural evidence), and ijtihad provide a formidable politico-conceptual 

apparatus to revise anachronistic rulings and legitimize modern, accountable governance. 

The Prophet Muhammad saw 

himself primarily as a religious 

reformer with an egalitarian 

social agenda. 

Muslims have had to revise or 

bypass Islamic law to adapt 

their states and societies to 

changing realities.

Muslim modernist thinkers 

from different countries need 

to share their experiences and 

strategies. 
Last, religiously prescribed values, such as the protection of human life, personal property, 

moral and intellectual integrity, and the natural environment, provide ample means for 

molding a modern ethical outlook. 

Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

The importance of supporting “Islamic renewal” to counter religious extremism and enhance 

relations between the Muslim world and the West cannot be overstated. The fundamental question is whether the U.S. government can play a role without compromising the 

nascent renewal movement. Skeptics point to two major problems: Faith-based initiatives 

are unlikely to muster American political support because they raise thorny constitutional 

issues. The other challenge is that the U.S. government is not trusted in the region. Any 

overt American role could undermine the modernists’ agenda and position. These are valid 

concerns.

However, the United States is already implicitly involved in reforms with religious connotations. USAID and State Department programs that aim to revise textbooks, upgrade 

primary and secondary education, empower women, engage with moderate Islamists, 

modernize the legal systems, or encourage interfaith dialogue already involve normative 

issues and taking sides in religious conflicts. 

As for the U.S. standing in the region, Islamic renewal provides a great healing opportunity, perhaps the only realistic one. Calling on Muslims to reform their societies on the 

basis of their own humanistic traditions and cultural heritage is surely less controversial 

for the United States than supporting regime change, cooperating with local security 

agencies, or pushing for reforms in the name of an abstract, secular notion of western 

democracy.

Current efforts by various government programs involving implicit religious reforms 

are insufficient and do not have a major impact because they lack clarity of purpose 

and coordination. They do not adequately involve independent American institutions, 

international agencies, and transnational civil society. They lack an explicit commitment 

and a concerted effort to engage with broad Muslim constituencies through trusted local 

charities, civic groups, and moderate religious movements. The involvement of the Islamic 

renewal movement would reinforce U.S. engagement, international backing, and Muslim 

support for meaningful, forward-looking reforms in Muslim countries. Outside the Islamic 

framework, there is no real chance for substantive, progressive, and sustainable reform in 

the Muslim world. 

Democratic reforms in Muslim countries during the coming decade are likely to bring to 

power Islamist political parties. “Islamic politics” has emerged as the most likely choice 

among a constituency of hundreds of millions of people stretching from the Atlantic Ocean 

to Southeast Asia. Religious values and beliefs continue to inform social interactions at 

the community level; influential social groups throughout the Muslim world, including 

social, political, and economic elites, adhere to such a vision; and the formal political 

process has been shifting to accommodate “Islamic politics.” Religion in politics is a reality in the Muslim world.

But what brand of “Islamic politics” will triumph? The radical, extremist version certainly has gained ground during the past decade, but a modernist, humanistic form of 

Islam should not be dismissed. U.S. policies could help tip the balance. 

Before us is a historic opportunity for positive change in the Muslim world and for 

constructive American engagement. The most realistic and sustainable strategy for the 

United States today is to support a broad-based Islamic renewal movement by modernist Muslim thinkers for the explicit benefit of Muslim societies. Only a modern, reformed 

Islam can provide the normative appeal to mobilize broad Muslim constituencies against 

religious extremism, for modern accountable governance, and for better understanding 

with the West. The development of such movements in the Muslim world is the terrorists’ 



The fundamental question is 

whether the U.S. government can 

play a role without compromising 

the nascent renewal movement. 

Outside the Islamic framework, there is no real chance 

for substantive, progressive, 

and sustainable reform in the 

Muslim world. 
biggest fear and vulnerability. A renewal movement that addresses the Muslim world’s 

major problems, using familiar language, historical references, and religious values, and 

providing a hopeful alternative to al-Qaeda’s message of violence and self-destruction, 

will discredit not only bin Laden and his associates but the Salafi jihadist ideology as a 

whole.

America’s most obvious allies in this effort are independent, moderate Muslim thinkers, scholars, and community leaders who may question the moral superiority of “secular 

reason” but are willing to confront violence, oppression, and intolerance in the name of 

Islam. Moderate Islamist parties throughout the region, charitable groups with a social 

agenda in Morocco, Egypt, or Indonesia, international Islamic feminist networks, religious literary circles in Turkey, or prominent Islamic universities such as Malaysia’s are all 

potential partners. The other religious actors are either ideologically opposed to a 

modernist project or do not have the political will to carry it out. The Salafists, who 

seek a society patterned exclusively on the Qur’an and Sunna, radically oppose modernity—which for them includes Islam’s ninth-century, classical, golden age. Salafists 

include violent groups like al-Qaeda and its affiliates and nonviolent groups associated 

with schools, sects, and doctrines that reject ijtihad and call for a return to an unmediated, original Islam. 

Proponents of traditional Islam, including official religious scholars, state-run religious 

institutions, and chief muftis of prominent religious universities such as al-Azhar, are 

generally not hostile to the West. But they often are too closed-minded or dependent on 

authoritarian governments to provide a credible alternative to the Salafi onslaught. And 

radical Islamist parties—which compete for votes with the moderate Islamists—can be 

tempted by ideological extremism if they participate in the political process.

Despite growing efforts and networks, the prospects for an Islamic renewal across 

countries and regions remains slim, unless these scattered efforts and networks coalesce 

in a coherent movement that can articulate a common modernist vision and propose 

concrete reforms to achieve it. 

Conclusion

Current U.S. efforts to fight terrorism, promote democratic change, and improve America’s 

image in Muslim countries are insufficient because they do not pay attention to the religious debate in the Muslim world. The United States could address these challenges by 

using the enormous, yet neglected, normative capital of Islamic reformist traditions in 

partnership with viable and credible Muslim partners. Obviously, the mechanisms, specific 

policies, and programmatic priorities of these concepts must be developed, refined, and 

synchronized to maximize impact and ensure cumulative success. 

Policymakers should take into consideration differences among Muslim states and societies, as well as the varying degrees of religious sensitivity. For example, it would be illadvised to make Saudi Arabia the test case of religious reforms in the Muslim world or to 

assert the human origin of the Qur’an as the starting point of the Islamic renewal project. 

Nonetheless, the principles of reforms outlined in this essay are realistic and grounded in 

historical precedents. U.S. policymakers are beginning to see the importance of engaging 

not just states and opposition groups, but Islam itself. Indeed, as the ideological fault 

lines become more apparent, several U.S. government agencies already are implicitly taking sides by supporting “moderate” Islamic leaders, groups, or parties. In this situation, 

American detachment is not a realistic option. 

America’s most obvious allies are 

independent, moderate Muslim 

thinkers, scholars, and community leaders who are willing to 

confront violence, oppression, and 

intolerance in the name of Islam. 

Policymakers should take into 

consideration differences among 

Muslim states and societies, as 

well as the varying degrees of 

religious sensitivity.
10

Recommendations

1. The United States should support the establishment of a “Muslim World Foundation” to foster the development of peaceful, prosperous, and open Muslim 

societies and polities. Modeled after the Asia Foundation and funded by an act of 

Congress, such a body would focus on the major crosscutting challenges, including 

religious reforms, facing Muslim societies. But a Muslim World Foundation need not 

be an exclusively U.S. body. The United States could adopt a centuries-old Islamic 

endowment tradition called wakf, used by leaders, states, and wealthy individuals to 

provide for charities, schools, and universities. The Muslim World Foundation would 

draw on local and international experts, donors, and partners. And it would collaborate with government and nongovernmental associates across the Muslim world to 

pursue its agenda. As a nonprofit and independent organization, the Muslim World 

Foundation would retain its intellectual credibility and ability to act as a convener 

and peacemaker, regardless of international tensions or U.S. policies.

2. The United States should provide special grants to American universities to 

promote Muslim modernist works and ideas and translate them into concrete 

policies. Muslim modernist thinkers are scattered throughout the world, and when 

they meet—on rare occasions—their debates and conference proceedings are not 

translated into practical reform policies. It is essential to establish regional forums 

where Muslim modernist thinkers meet regularly to sort out political, philosophical, 

and ideological differences and identify common denominators and goals. It is not 

sufficient to mobilize modernists to express themselves. It is also important to identify specific reform policies to be addressed to people and governments in the Muslim 

world, as well as to the international community—including western powers, the 

United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the International Court 

of Justice, and the World Bank.

The Arab Human Development Reports provide a very useful model. A similar series, 

exposing in stark terms the decay of Islamic cultures and civilizations and written by 

respected, diverse, and sympathetic Muslim scholars, would get the Muslim world’s 

attention. 

3. The United States should engage Islamist parties on normative grounds. Throughout the region, Islamist parties have emerged as major actors and likely winners when 

allowed to compete without constraint. Some of these parties run on conservative 

agendas and promise to apply strict Sharia; others are more liberal and advocate a 

modern social agenda. Yet most are pragmatic and willing to compromise on how 

much of Islamic law should be applied. This raises the issue of how to integrate 

Islamists into the democratic process without compromising the spirit of democracy 

or the rules and procedures that sustain it. 

In other words, the rationale of organizing free elections to promote democracy is 

questionable if the likely winners might subvert democratic norms and procedures. Yet 

too many procedural constraints and prenegotiated arrangements could delegitimize 

the democratic process. When incentives are offered to moderate Islamists, the conservative rank-and-file and constituencies may rebel. Hence, institutional constraints 

to limit the power of Islamists, or incentives that look like cooptation measures, may 

actually backfire.

Instead of coercion and cooptation, “normative engagement” is a more constructive strategy. That is, debate with Islamists must take place about substantive issues 

such as civil liberties, freedom of worship, individual autonomy, women’s rights, the 

rights of minorities, political pluralism, limitations on the powers of the state, and 

similar issues. For example: How would verbal commitment to the full range of civil 

and political rights play out in the real world? If Islamist leaders qualify the relevance 

of “divine sovereignty” and emphasize the role of elected rulers, that does not guarThe United States should support 

the establishment of a “Muslim 

World Foundation.”

Instead of coercion and cooptation, 

“normative engagement” is a more 

constructive strategy.

It is essential to establish regional 

forums where Muslim modernist 

thinkers meet regularly. 
11

antee they will respect modern democratic rights. Anti-democratic norms and restrictions can be imposed in the name of a conservative majority that believes ultimate 

sovereignty rests with God. Islamist leaders are not clear about whom they represent. 

Some Islamic principles may well be compatible with modern democratic norms, but 

the challenge is how Muslims choose to apply them. The possibility exists that different, even contradictory, interpretations of Islamic principles can arise and, in the 

absence of institutionalized religious authority accepted by all, lead to the subversion 

of democratic norms.

4. The United States should put more emphasis on substantive social, educational, 

and religious reforms. National elections are essential to democratic legislative and 

executive authority. But if abstracted from substantive issues, the exercise will result 

in a superficial formal process manipulated by semi-authoritarian rulers and radical 

Islamists. Concern with normative, substantive issues does not preclude other crucial 

institutional reforms. The development of a robust civil society, an independent judiciary, a transparent government, a depoliticized military, and accountable security 

forces is just as important for creating hospitable conditions for democratic representation. Moreover, combining limited elections with serious institutional reforms to 

enhance the state’s performance and accountability can easily be justified according 

to Islamic discursive conventions. Equally important, however, is the need for the 

U.S. government to encourage religious reforms to modernize Islamic principles, 

teachings, institutions, practices, and jurisprudence. The cornerstone of these reforms 

is the effort to expand the conceptual boundaries and foundations of Sharia beyond 

the Qur’an and Sunna, or what Muslims consider the fundamental basis of Islam. 

In other words, it is important to establish publicly that ijtihad has been a major 

source in the formulation of Islamic law. This point is important in justifying modern 

advances in women’s rights, civil rights, human rights, and the accommodation of 

cultural and religious differences on Islamic grounds.

5. The United States should refocus and coordinate public diplomacy, democracy 

promotion, and aid programs to reinforce Islamic religious reforms and renewal.

Public diplomacy should link American values and Islam’s humanist traditions. Muslims are proud of a golden-age heritage they associate with openness, tolerance, and 

scientific achievements. Islamic traditions are entirely compatible with American 

values such as tolerance and entrepreneurship. Emphasizing these aspects of Islam 

and similar American values will help discredit Islamic extremists. 

Democracy initiatives should include religious reform. If permissible, organizations 

such as the National Democratic Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy 

should expand their programs beyond elections, political parties, and parliaments. 

Nothing in their mandate would prevent them from supporting the modern training 

of religious scholars, judges, and imams; providing special scholarships to women 

studying religious topics; and reprinting and disseminating writings by modernist 

Muslim scholars. The United States should support local groups at the forefront of 

these reforms.

6. The United States should consider supporting religious charities. Because many 

Muslim governments’ social safety nets are weak or nonexistent, religious organizations provide many services to the needy, including clinics, child care, and disaster 

relief. Concerns that these networks are linked to terrorism are often misplaced. 

Extremists with a global jihadist agenda do not open local “soup kitchens” to build 

electoral support. They pursue different strategies. USAID should work with Islamic 

social networks and give impetus to moderate Islam by funding small charities and 

training programs for youth and women.

Some Islamic principles may well be 

compatible with modern democratic 

norms, but the challenge is how 

Muslims choose to apply them.

It is important to establish 

publicly that ijtihad has been a 

major source in the formulation 

of Islamic law.
Notes

1. Arab Human Development Report 2002, Creating Opportunities for Future Generations; 2003, Building 

a Knowledge Society; 2004, Freedom and Good Governance (New York: United Nations Development 

Program).

2. Roxanne Euben, The Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Western Rationalism 

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

3. Ronald Inglehart, “The World Views of Islamic Publics in Global Perspective,” World Values Survey Research 

Papers 06-02, May 20, 2006 (Center for the Study of Democracy, http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/

wvsrp/06-02).

4. The example of Reform Judaism is particularly relevant to Muslim diasporas in Europe and America. See, 

for example, Dana Evan Kaplan, ed., The Cambridge Companion to American Judaism (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2005).

5. See Mona Yacoubian, Promoting Middle East Democracy II: Arab Initiatives, USIP Special Report, May 

2005.

6. See, for example, Abd al-Hamid Abu Sulayman, The Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 

1987).

7. Abdeslam Maghraoui, “Ambiguities of Sovereignty: Morocco, The Hague and the Western Sahara Dispute,” 

Mediterranean Politics 8, no. 1 (Spring 2003), 113-26.

8. Mahnaz Afkhami and Erika Friedl, Muslim Women and the Politics of Participation: Implementing the Beijing 

Platform (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997).

Of Related Interest

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace examine issues 

related to Islam.

Recent Institute reports include

• Applying Islamic Principles in the 21st Century: Nigeria, Iran, and Indonesia, by David 

Smock (Special Report, September 2005).

• Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, by 

George Adams (Peaceworks, March 2006).

• The Diversity of Muslims in the United States: Views as Americans, by Qamar-ul Huda 

(Special Report, February 2006).

• Ijtihad: Reinterpreting Islamic Principles for the 21st Century, by David Smock 

(Special Report, August 2004).

• Islam and Democracy, by David Smock (Peaceworks, September 2002).

• Islamic Perspectives on Peace and Violence, by David Smock (Peaceworks, January 

2002).

• Islamists at the Ballot Box: Findings from Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey, by Judy 

Barsalou (Special Report, July 2005).

• Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic 

Agenda, by David Dickson (Special Report, May 2005).

• Promoting Middle East Democracy II: Arab Initiatives, by Mona Yacoubian 

(Special Report, May 2005)

• Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When Religion Brings Peace, Not War 

(Peaceworks, January 2006).

• Teaching about the Religious Other, by David Smock (Special Report, July 2005).

• What Do Islamists Really Want? An Insider’s Discussion with Islamist Leaders, by 

Abdeslam Maghraoui (Peace Briefings, May 2006).

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

9. Abdullahi An-Naim, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law

(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990).