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27–215 PDF 2006

S. HRG. 109–368

FIREFIGHTING AIRCRAFT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND FORESTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

TO

REVIEW PROGRESS MADE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERIM AND 

LONG TERM PLANS FOR USE OF FIRE RETARDANT AIRCRAFT IN FEDERAL WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS

FEBRUARY 15, 2006

(

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman 

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

RICHARD M. BURR, North Carolina, 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

KEN SALAZAR, Colorado 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

ALEX FLINT, STAFF DIRECTOR

JUDITH K. PENSABENE, CHIEF COUNSEL

ROBERT M. SIMON, DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

SAM E. FOWLER, DEMOCRATIC CHIEF COUNSEL

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND FORESTS

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho, Chairman 

CONRAD R. BURNS, Montana, Vice Chairman

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington

PETE V. DOMENICI and JEFF BINGAMAN are Ex Officio Members of the Subcommittee

FRANK GLADICS, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT MILLER, Democratic Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS 

Page

Burns, Hon. Conrad R., U.S. Senator from Montana ........................................... 2

Craig, Hon. Larry E., U.S. Senator from Idaho .................................................... 1

Hall, James, Hall & Associates, LLC ..................................................................... 20

Hatfield, Nina Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Policy, Management and 

Budget, Department of the Interior .................................................................... 7

Hull, James B., President, National Association of State Foresters ................... 27

Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska ................................................ 2

Rey, Mark, Under Secretary for Natural Resources and the Environment, 

Department of Agriculture .................................................................................. 5

Salazar, Hon. Ken, U.S. Senator from Colorado ................................................... 4

APPENDIX 

Responses to additional questions .......................................................................... 33 

(1)

FIREFIGHTING AIRCRAFT 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2006

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LAND AND FORESTS, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met at 2:30 p.m. in room SD–366, Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, Hon. Larry E. Craig presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY E. CRAIG,

U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO 

Senator CRAIG. Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to today’s 

Public Lands and Forests Subcommittee hearing. Today we will 

take testimony from the Department of Agriculture’s Under Secretary of Natural Resources and the Environment, Mark Rey, and 

the Department of the Interior’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Policy Management and Budget, Nina Rose Hatfield. Tom Harbour, I 

understand, is a backup resource for the U.S. Forest Service. 

I also want to welcome back to our hearing room Mr. Jim Hall 

of Hall & Associates and Mr. Jim Hull, the Texas State Forester. 

They provided excellent testimony on the Blue Ribbon Panel on 

Federal Aerial Firefighting Assisting Safety and Effectiveness Report in our 2003 meeting and I expect that same type of testimony 

today. Mr. Hull, if you also want to give us a quick update on your 

experiences in the recent fires in both Texas and Oklahoma this 

winter, I think the committee and the record would appreciate 

that. 

I’ve called this hearing for four reasons. First, the Blue Ribbon 

Panel called for the agencies to develop a plan to replace retardant 

aircraft with non-military aircraft. 

In 2004, Congress directed the agency to develop a long-term 

strategy and report back to Congress by March 2005. What do the 

agencies plan on doing to resolve this issue? What will the cost be 

to move away from the old paradigm by using old military aircraft 

to do whatever it is the agencies plan and are recommending? 

Next, the Forest Service has acquired three Navy P-3 Orions that 

it plans to convert into retardant aircraft and contract with a company or companies to operate and maintain these aircraft. It would 

seem to me that this acquisition might tell us what the long-term 

strategy is, but we need to discuss the costs and the implication of 

this strategy. 

Third, the blue ribbon report included a number of other important recommendations and I will explore some of them in my questions with our witnesses this afternoon. 

2

Last, I see that the BLM is moving toward a higher number of 

exclusive use contracts for its single-engine retardant aircraft. 

Given the uproar that engulfed the Forest Service last year regarding helicopter contracts, I want to know that the BLM has learned 

from the Forest Service’s tantrum of last year. Additionally, you 

need to help me understand the shift to larger single-engine retardant aircraft and what that means. 

Mr. Hall will have to leave us earlier to make his flight. Thus 

I may move him forward in the hearing in relation to questions. 

We will see how we’re progressing and I’ll let, of course, him know, 

but I don’t think that we’re going to extend beyond his time limit. 

Finally, I know that many of the members may want to take this 

opportunity to ask Under Secretary Rey about the administration’s 

proposal to sell Forest Service lands in order to finance payments 

to counties. So far, those Senators have not showed up. We’ll see 

how that progresses. Mark, I would suggest one might need to be 

prepared to respond to those kinds of questions. 

Mr. Rey and the Chief of the Forest Service are scheduled for a 

hearing on February 28 at 10 a.m. here on budget issues. That 

would be the more appropriate time for us to discuss that. I will 

maintain a 5-minute clock for testimony and questions of the committee. We’ll make both your written and oral testimonies a part 

of our record, so I urge you to resist referring to your full testimony, giving us the opportunity to move to the necessary and appropriate questions. 

Again, welcome before the committee. And before I turn to Nina 

and Mark, let me turn to Senator Lisa Murkowski. 

Senator Murkowski. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Burns follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD R. BURNS, U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA

Chairman Craig, thank you for calling this hearing to discuss wildland aviation 

fire safety and thanks to our witnesses for traveling to be here today. 

Firefighting aircraft play an integral role in wildland fire management. In Montana, we understand the dangers associated with catastrophic wildfires and firefighting. The crews of these planes take exceptional risk and perform a great service 

to our state. Since the Blue Ribbon report was published in 2002, this subcommittee 

has met several times to track the Forest Service’s progress in implementing the 

findings of the report. 

I am also concerned with the rising cost of aerial operations. In recent years the 

Forest Service has expended as little as $155 million dollars in FY 2004 and as 

much as $255 million in FY 2002 for all aviation activities. It is estimated the cost 

could be in excess of $280 million in a bad fire season. With rising costs, it is important the Forest Service has a strategy plan in place for procuring and managing its 

aviation assets in the future. Congress has asked for this plan and is still waiting. 

I am also interested to hear more about the Forest Service’s plan for the recently 

acquired Lockheed P-3 Orion Aircraft. I am primarily concerned about whether or 

not the government will face liability in the event of an accident. 

Thank you again for joining us here today. I look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR

FROM ALASKA 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 

opportunity to speak this afternoon. Welcome. It’s always nice to 

see and talk about issues that are important to us up north, and 

as you know, things have been warm up there the past couple of 

summers. But, Senator Craig, I want to thank you, as the chairVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:49 Apr 28, 2006 Jkt 109368 PO 27215 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\27215.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
3

man of the subcommittee, for holding the hearing so early this 

year. What has been happening up north is that it appears that 

our fire season seems to be coming just a little bit earlier year after 

year. So it is appropriate for the subcommittee to conduct the oversight hearings while we can still influence the Federal fire managers for the upcoming season. 

Now, we always seem to refer to the 2004 fire season in Alaska 

as the toughest fire season on record. We lost about seven million 

acres burned up there, mostly in the interior, but really last year 

wasn’t much better. We lost 4.1 million acres. It was the third busiest fire season on record and it was also very significant in that 

fire managers were battling two very significant fires in May. We 

never used to think about May as being fire season in Alaska, but 

we saw them in Kenai and the Northway fires. 

While the number of acres burned in 2005 was less than in 2004, 

what we saw from the smoke and Alaskans suffering from the 

smoke, I felt it was increased. I spent a little bit of time in the interior in both July and in August doing my other duties—that of 

being a soccer mom—and had the misfortune of being in conditions 

where the soccer tournaments were canceled, where I had people 

coming up to me and saying, yes, we appreciate that the job is all 

about protecting property, protecting life, but the quality of life is 

such that we can’t go outside. We’re canceling the sporting events, 

they’re advising seniors and young children to stay indoors if 

you’ve got any kind of respiratory issues. It was an issue where I 

had people coming to me saying, I live here in the interior, suffer 

through the long, cold winters because we know during the summertime we can go out and enjoy the sunshine, enjoy the heat of 

the interior, and people couldn’t go outside because of the air quality issues. 

So, really, we still see the lack of availability of the heavy 

airtankers during the fire season and that’s irritating people as 

much as the smoke. They’re saying, where are the tankers, what’s 

going on? Now, we have contracted with the heavy airtankers from 

Canada for the past several seasons, but there remains this arguing, quibbling with the Federal Government about where the tankers can be used. 

And we’ve had great discussion in this committee about the 

interagency operations. As we know, the firefighting in Alaska is 

uniformly interagency. The State has the lead in south-central, the 

Federal Government has the lead in the interior, but the resources 

are used Statewide. We believe, the State firmly believes, that the 

tankers are safe to fly on fires anywhere in the State and that the 

rigor of the Canadian regulation assures that they’re safe. 

We’ve brought this issue up now for several years, 3 years running. We still don’t have an entirely straight answer. Last year, 

Mr. Rey, you testified the problem was resolved, but then we got 

a letter from Lynn Scarlett saying that, in fact, it wasn’t fixed. So 

I do look forward to the agency’s plans for the 2006 fire season. We 

certainly hope that a long-term solution to the tanker availability 

problem is going to be resolved and we see that problem disappear. 

So I appreciate your testimony here this afternoon. And I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chair, to make a few comments. 

4

Senator CRAIG. Senator, thank you very much. Now let us turn 

to our colleague, Ken Salazar, Senator Salazar of Colorado. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KEN SALAZAR, U.S. SENATOR

FROM COLORADO 

Senator SALAZAR. Thank you very much, Chairman Craig, and 

thank you for your leadership, not only on this subcommittee, but 

also on this issue. It’s good to know that you’re out front before the 

heat of the fire season starts making sure that we’re ready to do 

what we need to do. 

Senator CRAIG. Well, looking at that map, you’re kind of in it feet 

first, I guess. Is that how we say it? 

Senator SALAZAR. I was trying to calculate the percentage. It 

looks like about 66 percent, about two-thirds of us, are right there 

in that danger zone. 

Senator CRAIG. Okay. 

Senator SALAZAR. So I am concerned. And I very much appreciate 

you holding the hearing. I was noticing—let me see, how much of 

Idaho is in there? Well, not very much. Thank you, sir, for holding 

this hearing. I know Alaska’s right in there, too, so I think there 

are a number of our States that are in there. I think it’s an important hearing because, even though we now have 10 feet of snow in 

many of our mountain ranges, we know that that will all disappear 

and we’ll be in the fire season again sooner than we expect. 

For me, from a perspective of Colorado, I witnessed in 1994 a 

Storm King tragedy which resulted in 14 men and women dying on 

Storm King Mountain near Glenwood Springs. I also, during the 

time I was attorney general, participated in some of the efforts concerning two huge fires in Colorado. One, which was the Hayman 

fire, was started by one of the Federal employees and burned 

138,000 acres. Also in that tragedy, there were four young men and 

women who died on their way to fighting that fire. And, finally, in 

2002, we lost two crew members when a helicopter and a tanker 

crashed in the Big Elk fire near Estes Park. 

And so it’s an issue of great concern to me and I look forward 

to hearing from the agency what plans we have with respect to 

these slurry bombers in the year ahead. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I have some questions 

that I would ask, if I could submit them for the record, and then 

if the agency could respond to those questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CRAIG. Certainly questions will become a part of the 

record for their response. We appreciate that. 

Senator SALAZAR. Thank you. 

Senator CRAIG. Now let us proceed with our witnesses. Aerial fire 

assault has become a very major part of your fire budgets and the 

quality of the aircraft is in question and, of course, we’ve been 

through several iterations of this now, so let us proceed. Let me 

turn first to Mark Rey, Under Secretary for Natural Resources and 

the Environment, Department of Agriculture. Again, Mark, welcome before the committee. Please proceed. 

5

STATEMENT OF MARK REY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT 

OF AGRICULTURE 

Mr. REY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to talk about our Department’s aviation programs today. 

We’ll be submitting a single statement and we’ll both summarize 

elements of it. In the statements, we’ll discuss our aviation resources, responses to reports and recommendations to improve the 

fire aviation program, progress on our long-term aviation plans, 

and the outlook for the upcoming fire season. 

The fire aviation program has undergone significant changes 

since the spring of 2004, when contracts for large airtankers were 

terminated in the wake of the NTSB report addressing airworthiness issues. In 2004 and 2005, we made greater use of small singleengine airtankers and both large and medium helicopters. This 

strategy, combined with the certification and return to service of 16 

large tankers, has served us well. The mix of aircraft, including 

large airtankers, SEATs, helicopters, and other aircraft, provided 

aerial support to our firefighters in achieving an initial attack success rate of 98.2 percent in 2003, 99.1 percent in 2004, and 98.5 

percent in 2005. So our 2 years of experience in 2004 and 2005 

with our modified aviation fleet has proven successful results. We 

continue to have the firefighter’s equipment and aircraft necessary 

to achieve a high rate of success in suppressing fires on initial attack, and we expect that will continue during the 2006 fire season. 

As I indicated, in May 2004, we terminated the contracts for 33 

large airtankers, based on the recommendation of the NTSB regarding the airworthiness of these aircraft. The NTSB’s recommendation were the result of investigations of three large 

airtanker crashes. The report noted the need to have maintenance 

and investigation—maintenance and inspection programs for all 

firefighting aircraft based on their operational service life in the 

firefighting environment. It was the opinion of NTSB that the FAA, 

the Forest Service and DOI all have a role in ensuring airworthiness for aircraft use in firefighting operations, but that the primary 

role for assuring the airworthiness of large airtankers rests with 

the Forest Service. 

At the time of the NTSB report, mechanisms to assure airworthiness of firefighting aircraft were not fully developed. Consequently, 

the contracts for 33 large airtankers were terminated. Two subsequent actions were immediately taken. First, we developed a strategy of utilizing SEATs and helicopters to provide additional aerial 

support, and second, we began a lengthy process to address the airworthiness of the large airtankers. Following that work, a determination on the airworthiness of two models of large tankers was 

made and these aircraft were turned into service. 

We have been unsuccessful in assessing the operational service 

life for 14 Douglas DC-4, 6, and 7 aircraft. Without confidence in 

a method of determining the structural strength and fatigue life of 

the Douglas aircraft, neither the Forest Service, nor any other firefighting organization, can be reasonably assured of their safety. 

Therefore, consistent with the manufacturer’s advice—that would 

be the Boeing Corporation—the DC-7 that was flown experiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:49 Apr 28, 2006 Jkt 109368 PO 27215 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 P:\DOCS\27215.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
6

mentally in 2004 and 2005 will not be federally contracted for 

2006. 

In January 2006, three additional Lockheed P-3B aircraft were 

made available from the U.S. Navy. Ownership of these aircraft 

has been transferred to the Forest Service. The Forest Service, on 

behalf of the firefighting agencies, will pursue competitive bids to 

install tanks and operate the aircraft. Conversion inspections of 

these aircraft could take several months. They are expected to be 

available for the 2007 fire season. In response to your question, 

this is not part of our long-term strategy, but it’s an effort in the 

interim to add some additional flexibility to our airtanker fleet. 

During the 2006 fire season, we expect to have available 16 large 

airtankers, subject to testing and inspection, and four military C130 aircraft equipped with modular airborne firefighting systems. 

An additional four of these C-130 aircraft will be available when 

maintenance and inspections are completed in the early summer 

and they will thereafter be added to the firefighting fleet. 

Along with the heavy tankers and the SEATs, additional large, 

type I helicopters and medium helicopters have allowed us to fight 

wildland fires even with the reduction in the number of large 

airtankers. While the large, fixed-wing airtankers have the ability 

to fly faster and go longer distances to deliver retardant, a type I 

helicopter with a retardant supply can exceed fixed-wing airtankers 

in capacity and effectiveness. 

For the 2006 fire season, the Forest Service and DOI plan to 

have available 15 exclusive-use and 94 call-when-needed large 

helitankers and helicopters, as well as 39 exclusive-use and 110 

call-when-needed medium helicopters. Seventy-three smaller, type 

III, exclusive-use helicopters are stationed around the country for 

local use in areas of high fire potential. There are also a large number of call-when-needed, type III helicopters available. 

I’ll take just a second to respond to the clarification that Senator 

Murkowski requested about the availability of tankers in Alaska. 

First and foremost, all of our large airtankers and all of—virtually 

all of our aviation assets are national assets and if they are needed 

in Alaska, they will be directed there, as they’re requested by incident commanders in the State. 

Additionally, the State of Alaska also flies aircraft. At one time 

last year, we thought they were going to be flying the CL-215’s, 

which are certificated for air safety and would not have been restricted in any fashion. Later, the State changed its mind and contracted with some DC-6’s. As I said earlier, we have not been able 

to assure the operational service life of the DC-6’s, so those won’t 

be flown in Federal incidences. As long as they’re flown under 

State control, however, they would not be restricted for use in Alaska. 

With that, I turn the microphone over to Ms. Hatfield for the balance of our statement. 

Ms. HATFIELD. Thank you, Mark. 

Senator CRAIG. Please proceed. 

7

STATEMENT OF NINA ROSE HATFIELD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, POLICY MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Ms. HATFIELD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 

thank you for this opportunity to meet with you today to discuss 

the Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service and the Department of the Interior’s Fire Aviation Program. As Mr. Rey stated, 

the fire aviation program is an important and multi-faceted component of our overall firefighting strategy and is used in tandem and 

in support of our other firefighting operations. 

Today, I’d like to address our refinement in the use of single-engine airtankers, or SEATs, in our firefighting efforts, our response 

to the report of the blue ribbon panel, and the 2006 outlook for the 

fire season. In 2006, the BLM will implement a refined aviation 

program that will achieve greater operational efficiencies by focusing on faster, higher-capacity aircraft and enhancing collaboration 

and cooperation to position these aircraft where the need is the 

greatest. 

The overall number of aircraft will essentially remain unchanged 

from last year, but they’ll be managed in a more efficient manner. 

By using faster, higher-capacity aircraft and extending the lengths 

of the exclusive use contracts, the BLM will achieve the same or 

greater capacity than in 2005. For example, two 800-gallon SEATs 

would replace three 500-gallon SEATs in this new strategy. 

As a result, all the geographic areas will continue to have access, 

as they have in previous years, to more aircraft when the need 

arises. BLM is also initiating a program to collect flight data encountered in firefighting operations with the long-term goal to 

gather and analyze data regarding the structural conditions and 

continuing airworthiness in the fire environment for each aircraft’s 

particular mission, whether it’s a smokejumper aircraft, helicopters, aerial supervision, or other types of aircraft and missions. 

We referred earlier today to the NTSB study, which the Forest 

Service and DOI co-sponsored, and to a blue ribbon panel to review 

all aspects of the aviation program. Both Departments appreciate 

the efforts of Mr. Hall and Mr. Hull, who are co-chairs of the blue 

ribbon panel. 

As a result of the NTSB and blue ribbon panel reports, the Departments have a number of efforts underway to anticipate and address the long-term aviation needs of the fire community and for 

the continued protection of lives, property, and resources. The feasibility of aircraft, such as the S-3 Viking and other aircraft, for the 

use of airtankers is being studied. In addition, both the Forest 

Service and DOI are collecting and analyzing flight data that will 

help us in improving aviation’s safety for the future. This data will 

also provide a foundation for the discussion of purpose-built 

airtankers, or airtankers specifically designed and built for missions and operations in the fire environment. 

In response to the blue ribbon panel findings, both DOI and the 

Forest Service have modified its contracting procedures for aircraft 

to focus on obtaining the best value without compromising safety 

considerations. 

In addition, both DOI and the Forest Service have progressed in 

the implementation of training, including online training for our 

8

SEAT contract pilots. Prior to the 2006 season, the Forest Service 

will train nearly 300 agency and contract pilots through its sponsored crew resource management courses and the National Aerial 

Firefighter Academy. 

An interagency work group comprised of the agency fire directors 

and the National Association of State Foresters is identifying unified and consistent mission standards, as well as assessing the 

long-term needs of the aviation program. Recognizing the evolution 

and changing needs of the aviation program, this group will address the next 10 to 15 years of interagency fire aviation needs. 

The first phase of this group’s work, which provides a broad overview of the entire aviation program, including large airtankers, is 

currently underway. Phase two will address congressional direction 

for a strategic plan and will contain more specific elements, such 

as the issues surrounding purpose-built airtankers. Phase three of 

this effort will be the creation of an implementation plan that will 

be developed shortly after the completion and approval of phase 

two. We anticipate initial implementation to occur in fiscal year 

2007, with full implementation phased in over a number of years. 

Now, as we turn our attention to the outlook for the 2006 fire 

season, as you have already noted, this map demonstrates that our 

2006 fire season is shaping up to be another challenging year. The 

areas in maroon represent those areas in which we believe there’s 

an above normal potential for fire activity. And then in the Northeast area, you will see that the predictive services indicate that we 

think we’ll have less than a normal fire year. So this certainly does 

reflect the drought conditions that continue across much of the 

Southwest and the fire activity that is expected to begin early and 

remain above normal through June and into July. 

However, Alaska, as you can see, especially in the Kenai Peninsula, continues to have areas of concern where we expect to have 

higher than normal fire potential. We do expect to have firefighting 

resources, firefighters, equipment, and aircraft that are comparable 

to those that were available in 2005. If local areas experience severe fire risks, we will continue to increase firefighting ability by 

staging or deploying our firefighters and equipment as it is needed. 

Each aerial resource, whether fixed-wing or helicopter, fields a key 

role in that multifaceted interagency fire suppression strategy. 

We have shown that we have the capability for adjusting for the 

short-term as we complete our long-range plan using the kind of 

information that is behind the construction of this map. We certainly are keenly aware of the challenges that we face regarding 

fire aviation and aerial support of our firefighters on the ground in 

protecting lives, property, and resources, and we are facing these 

challenges head-on. 

We appreciate your continued support and look forward to working with you as we move forward through this process toward an 

ever more modern and efficient fire and aviation program for the 

future. We’d like to thank you again for the opportunity to discuss 

these aviation issues with you today and we’d be happy to answer 

your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared joint statement of Mr. Rey and Ms. Hatfield follows:]

9

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NINA ROSE HATFIELD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, AND MARK

REY, UNDER SECRETARY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT

OF AGRICULTURE

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

meet with you today to discuss the Department of Agriculture Forest Service and 

the Department of the Interior (DOI) fire aviation program. Since the two Departments work closely together in fire management, we are providing a joint statement. 

The fire aviation program is an important and multifaceted component of our overall firefighting strategy, and is used in tandem and in support of other firefighting 

operations. In our testimony today, we will discuss our aviation resources, responses 

to reports and recommendations to improve the fire aviation program, progress on 

our long-term aviation plans, and the outlook for the upcoming fire season. 

BACKGROUND

The fire aviation program has undergone significant changes since the spring of 

2004 when contracts for large airtankers were terminated in the wake of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report addressing airworthiness issues. 

In 2004 and 2005, we made greater use of smaller Single Engine Air Tankers 

(SEATs) and both large and medium helicopters. This strategy, combined with the 

certification and return to service of 16 large air tankers has served us well. The 

mix of aircraft, including large air tankers, SEATs, helicopters, and other aircraft 

provided aerial support to our firefighters in achieving an initial attack success rate 

of 98.2 percent in 2003, 99.1 percent in 2004, and 98.5 percent in 2005. 

The increasing accuracy of interagency predictive services capabilities assists in 

the refinement of fire aviation management. Advances in technology, data-gathering, and data analysis, combined with increased collaboration between interagency 

meteorologists and fire behavior and fuels specialists, provide greater accuracy in 

predicting the potential for, and severity of, fire activity. In turn, this allows managers to move and place aircraft where the needs are greatest and aviation resources can be most effective. 

The Forest Service and DOI continue to have the firefighters, equipment, and aircraft necessary to achieve a high rate of success in suppressing fires on initial attack. We have increased our fleet of firefighting aircraft to assist ground firefighters, 

particularly during extended attack. As you know, during any year, the vast majority of wildland fires—numbering in the thousands—are suppressed without the benefit of air support. If a fire continues to grow and locally available resources are inadequate, fire managers request additional resources, including aviation support. 

Aviation assets are managed through the National Multiagency Coordination Group 

and prioritized for prepositioning, initial attack, and extended attack. 

In calendar year 2005, more than 66,000 fires burned 8.7 million acres of Federal, 

State and private lands. In calendar year 2005, Federal suppression costs totaled 

$966 million. Wildland fire use—by which fire was used to achieve resource management objectives in predefined geographic areas—accounted for an additional 489,000 

acres. 

AVIATION RESOURCES

Large Airtankers—Large airtankers are only one of the many tools we use to suppress wildland fires. The primary role of large airtankers is to rapidly deliver a 

large amount of retardant in the initial attack of a wildfire. In May 2004, the Forest 

Service and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) terminated the contracts for 33 

large airtankers based on the recommendations of the NTSB regarding the airworthiness of these firefighting aircraft; the NTSB recommendations were the result 

of investigations of three large airtanker crashes. The report noted the need to have 

maintenance and inspection programs for all firefighting aircraft based on their 

operational service life in the firefighting environment. It was the opinion of NTSB 

that the Federal Aviation Administration, the Forest Service, and DOI all have a 

role in ensuring airworthiness for aircraft used in firefighting operations, but that 

the primary role for assuring the airworthiness of large air tankers rests with the 

Forest Service. 

At the time of the NTSB report, the mechanisms to ensure airworthiness of firefighting aircraft were not fully developed. Consequently, the contracts for 33 large 

airtankers were terminated. Two subsequent actions were immediately taken: first, 

the Departments developed a strategy of utilizing SEATs and additional large and 

medium helicopters to provide aerial support; this reconfigured fleet performed sucVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:49 Apr 28, 2006 Jkt 109368 PO 27215 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\DOCS\27215.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
10

cessfully albeit at a higher per hour cost during the 2004 fire season. Second, a process to address airworthiness was developed by the Forest Service through contracting with aviation technical experts. 

Following the work of the aviation technical contractors, a determination on the 

airworthiness of two models of large airtankers was made and these aircraft returned to service. The Forest Service spent considerable time and effort with the 

owners and operators of all large airtankers to respond to the NTSB findings. We 

have been unsuccessful in assessing the operational service life for fourteen Douglas 

DC-4, 6, and 7 aircraft. Without confidence in a method of determining the structural strength and fatigue life of the Douglas aircraft, neither the Forest Service nor 

other Federal firefighting organizations can be reasonably assured of their safety. 

Therefore, consistent with the manufacturer’s (Boeing Corporation) advice, the DC7 that was flown experimentally in 2004 and 2005 will not be Federally-contracted 

during 2006. 

In January 2006, three Lockheed P3B large aircraft became available from the 

U.S. Navy. Ownership of these aircraft has been transferred to the Forest Service. 

The Forest Service, on behalf of the firefighting agencies, will pursue competitive 

bids to install tanks and operate the aircraft. Conversion and inspections of these 

aircraft could take a year. They are expected to be available for the 2007 fire season. 

Airworthiness efforts related to airtankers and other aircraft are continuing. The 

Forest Service plans to have all airtankers and agency owned aircraft instrumented 

with Operational Loads Monitoring Systems by the end of 2006. The Forest Service’s Operational Loads Monitoring Program collected, converted, and disseminated 

over 800 hours of flight loads data and expects that figure will quadruple for 2006. 

These data will be analyzed by aviation technical experts to identify aerial firefighting environment. The long-term goal is to gather and analyze data regarding 

operational loads and continue to use that data to enhance the continuing airworthiness of aircraft used in aerial firefighting. The data collected and its analysis were 

instrumental in the reintroduction of the Lockheed P2V aircraft and have helped 

validate its use for the next 5-10 years. All of the airtankers have been configured 

with traffic collision avoidance systems. 

During the 2006 fire season, we expect to have available 16 large airtankers, subject to testing and inspection, and 4 military C-130 aircraft equipped with modular 

airborne firefighting systems (MAFFS). An additional 4 MAFFS will be available 

when maintenance and inspections are complete in the early summer. 

Helicopters—Along with SEATs, additional large (Type I) helicopters and medium 

helicopters have allowed us to fight wildland fires even with the reduction in the 

number of large airtankers. While the large fixed-wing airtankers have the ability 

to fly faster and go longer distances to deliver retardant, a Type I helicopter, with 

a close suppressant/retardant supply, can exceed a fixed wing airtanker in capacity 

and effectiveness. This provides improved operational effectiveness through quick 

turnarounds, precision drops, and increased gallons delivered. 

For the 2006 fire season, the Forest Service and DOI plan to have available 15 

exclusive use and 94 call-when-needed large helitankers and helicopters, as well as 

39 exclusive use and 110 call-when-needed medium helicopters. Seventy three 

smaller (Type III) exclusive use helicopters are stationed around the country for 

local use in areas of high fire potential. There are also a large number of call-whenneeded Type III helicopters available. 

Single Engine Airtankers—For the 2006 fire season, the BLM, which manages the 

vast majority of the DOI fire aviation program, will implement a refined aviation 

program that will achieve greater operational efficiencies by focusing on faster, 

higher-capacity aircraft, and by enhancing collaboration and cooperation to position 

these aircraft where the need is greatest. The overall number of aircraft will essentially remain unchanged from last year, but they will be managed in a more efficient manner. 

Vendors are gradually transitioning from piston aircraft to the faster turbine aircraft which have a higher capacity, are more reliable, and perform better at higher 

altitudes. By using faster, higher-capacity aircraft and extending the lengths of the 

exclusive-use contracts, the BLM will achieve the same or greater capacity than in 

2005. For example, two 800-gallon SEATs would replace three 500-gallon SEATs. 

Additionally, these aircraft will be contracted at the national level, allowing for improved cooperation at all organizational levels and for greater flexibility in positioning and utilizing the aircraft where they are most needed. The net result is that 

all geographic areas will have greater access than in previous years to more aircraft 

when the need arises. 

Additionally, in a separate effort the BLM has initiated a program to collect flight 

data encountered in firefighting operations. This program, which stems from the 

findings of the Blue Ribbon Commission (discussed below in more detail), is in the 

11

process of evaluating each type of aircraft and its use in the Department’s fleet. 

BLM instrumented two aircraft in 2005 to monitor structural conditions and gather 

data regarding operations in the fire environment. A third aircraft will be equipped 

in 2006. The long-term goal is to gather and analyze data regarding structural conditions and continuing airworthiness in the fire environment for each aircraft’s particular mission, whether it is smokejumper aircraft, helicopters, aerial supervision, 

or other types of aircraft and missions. 

WORKING TOWARD THE FUTURE

In 2002, prior to the NTSB study, the Forest Service and DOI co-sponsored a Blue 

Ribbon Panel to review all aspects of the aviation program. Both Departments appreciate the efforts of Mr. Hall and Mr. Hull who were Co-Chairs of the Blue Ribbon 

Panel. As a result of the NTSB and Blue Ribbon Panel reports, the Departments 

have a number of efforts underway to anticipate and address the long-term aviation 

needs of the fire community, and for the continued protection of lives, property, and 

resources. The feasibility of aircraft such as the S3 Viking and other aircraft for use 

as airtankers is being studied. 

Large airtankers, helicopters, and SEATS have specific missions in responding to 

wildland fires, ranging from the delivery of crews and supplies, providing a management platform, to dropping water and retardants. The collection and analysis of 

flight data will aid us in improving aviation safety for the future. It will also provide 

a foundation for discussions about ‘‘purpose-built’’ air tankers, or air tankers specifically designed and built for missions and operations in the fire environment. The 

data we are gathering will be analyzed by independent aviation experts, either original manufacturers or other experts. We will limit our aircraft to those having the 

structural strength to operate safely in the fire environment. 

In response to the Blue Ribbon Panel findings, both DOI and the Forest Service 

modified its aircraft contracting process to focus on obtaining the best value without 

compromising safety considerations. In addition, DOI and the Forest Service have 

progressed in the implementation of training, including on-line training for SEAT 

contract pilots. Additional training modules for helicopter pilots, air tactical supervision pilots, and others are scheduled to be completed and available in the future. 

Prior to the 2006 fire season the Forest Service will train nearly 300 agency and 

contract pilots through its sponsored crew resource management courses and the 

National Aerial Firefighter Academy. 

An interagency work group chartered by the National Fire and Aviation Executive 

Board, comprised of the Agency Fire Directors and the National Association of State 

Foresters, is identifying unified and consistent mission standards, as well as assessing the long-term needs of the aviation program. Recognizing the evolution and 

changing needs of the aviation program, the National Fire and Aviation Executive 

Board chartered a group to address the next 10 to 15 years of interagency fire aviation needs. The first phase of this group’s work, which provides a broad overview 

of the entire aviation program, including large air tankers, is currently underway. 

Phase 2 of the group’s work will address the Congress’s direction for a strategic 

plan and will contain more specific elements such as the issues surrounding ‘‘purpose-built’’ air tankers; the anticipated numbers and types of airtankers that will 

be needed; the infrastructure that will be required to support a future air tanker 

fleet; acquisition, infrastructure, maintenances, and other associated costs; and acquisition and management models. 

Phase 3 of this effort will be the creation of an implementation plan that will be 

developed shortly after completion and approval of Phase 2. We anticipate initial 

implementation to occur in fiscal year 2007, with full implementation phased in over 

a number of years. 

OUTLOOK FOR THE 2006 FIRE SEASON

The 2006 fire season is shaping up to be another challenging year. Drought conditions continue across much of the southwest and fire activity is expected to begin 

early and remain above normal through June into July. Below normal fire potential 

exists in the northeast based on a wet winter. In Alaska, the Kenai Peninsula continues to be an area of concern with higher than normal fire potential. We expect 

to have firefighting resources—firefighters, equipment, and aircraft—comparable to 

those available in 2005. If local areas experience severe fire risk, we will increase 

firefighting ability by staging or deploying our firefighters and equipment as needed. 

SUMMARY

In conclusion, we would again like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss 

these aviation issues with you today. Each aerial resource, whether fixed wing or 

12

helicopter, fills a key role in the multifaceted interagency fire suppression strategy. 

We have shown that we have the capability of adjusting for the short-term as we 

complete our long-range plans. We are keenly aware of the challenges we face regarding fire aviation and aerial support of our firefighters on the ground in protecting lives, property, and resources. We are facing these challenges head-on and 

with determination, and we are pursuing every possible avenue to maintain and improve the safety, efficiency, and effectiveness we’ve all come to expect from the fire 

aviation community. We appreciate your continued support and look forward to 

working with you as we move through this process toward an ever more modern 

and efficient fire and aviation program for the future. I would be happy to answer 

any questions you may have.

Senator CRAIG. Secretary Hatfield, thank you very much. Both 

Secretary Rey and Secretary Hatfield, thank you. We’ve been 

joined by two more of our colleagues, Senator Conrad Burns of 

Montana and Senator John Kyl of Arizona. If you two are not on 

a hard timeline, we’ll move right into questions and allow you to 

make any opening statements along with your questions; okay? If 

not, we’ll give you the floor. All right, thank you all very much. 

Mark, the blue ribbon report suggested that the Forest Service 

and BLM develop a strategy to replace the aging ex-military retardant aircraft with a plane developed specifically for the purpose 

of dropping retardant on fires on Federal land. The blue ribbon 

panel report was critical of the repeated reliance on ex-military aircraft for conversion into airtankers. 

In view of this—and you partly explained this, but I wish you’d 

broaden your explanation—why is the Forest Service contemplating 

issuing a contract for the conversion of P-3 aircraft to airtankers 

and investigating the feasibility of converting S-3 Viking antisubmarine tracking aircraft into airtankers? 

Mr. REY. The blue ribbon panel made several very useful recommendations, many of which we’re following and we’ll probably 

talk about today. But with all due respect to the panel, we believe 

that both the P-3 and the S-3 are built stronger than commercial 

aircraft and are better able to withstand the stress loads—stress 

and loads encountered in the firefighting environment. 

We also believe that an aircraft’s hours flown, or the operational 

service life, rather than the year it was manufactured is the more 

appropriate measure for deciding when it’s time to retire an aircraft. And the three P-3’s that we’ve got access to have very low 

flight hours on them, so they give us a very cost-effective way of 

adding some flexibility to our existing fleet. 

One area where we, and I guess the Blue Ribbon Commission, 

don’t completely agree is on the utility of former military aircraft. 

We think that they have demonstrated capabilities, they’re built 

stronger than most commercial aircraft, and as they have been 

used within their operational service life, they have generally performed well. That having been said, there are in the market a 

number of contractors and entrepreneurs who are trying to develop 

a fire service-based aircraft and we’re in relatively constant communications with them. And to the extent that—and at the point 

that—they are able to achieve certification from the FAA and from 

the tanker board, we’ll consider adding those aircraft to our fleet 

as well. The idea is to have as much variety and as much flexibility 

in the fleet as we can get. And I can provide to the committee a 

list of all of the known contractors and entrepreneurs who are currently working on different aircraft models, some former military, 

13

and other aircraft that are specifically built for this purpose in 

other countries. 

Senator CRAIG. Well, we would appreciate the list, but don’t give 

out our phone number. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CRAIG. Both Mr. Hall and Mr. Hull will testify there is 

still a strong need to designate one agency in charge of aviation. 

Both also continue to insist that the FAA must play a greater role 

in firefighting aviation safety certification. Do you agree with their 

testimony, and if so, which agency should be put in charge and how 

do we get the FAA to do more? 

Mr. REY. I don’t think we completely agree with their testimony, 

in the sense that I don’t think there’s a great deal of utility to be—

or benefit to be garnered from either of those recommendations, 

and here’s why. 

First off, in terms of coordination of aviation assets, there are 

only two agencies involved, the Forest Service and the Bureau of 

Land Management. We operate through a unified command system, so I don’t think you’re going to see much change if you decide 

that one or the other of us is going to have to manage all of the 

aviation assets and all of the aviation contracts. In a sense, right 

now, our operations are seamless. 

Moreover, there are a number of States that also manage aviation assets and this recommendation wouldn’t change that. Indeed, 

to some degree, the fact that we have had to develop a unified command system to coordinate our two agencies’ efforts has helped ensure and encourage the States to participate accordingly. So you’ve 

already, I think, gotten as much unification or coordination as 

you’re going to get, and adding one more step isn’t probably going 

to materially improve how well we use these assets. 

With regard to the role of the FAA, they’re already involved. 

Much of the work that we’ve done to certificate the safety of the 

large airtankers and now the other aviation assets has been closely 

advised by the FAA. And indeed, to the extent that we’ve retained 

outside experts, they’ve been experts that have been recommended 

and approved by the FAA. But to the extent that you want the 

FAA more directly involved, that’s really an issue for Congress to 

decide, because under the relevant legislation that governs the 

FAA’s activities, they’re now only responsible for the civil fleet and 

not for public use aircraft. But, again, I think the bottom line is 

we’ve achieved most of the goals of those recommendations, even 

if we haven’t achieved exactly those recommendations as they were 

offered. 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you. I’ll have more questions in the next 

round. Let me turn to Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, I’m sitting 

here looking at your map with great concern, because last year, if 

you’ll recall, at this hearing, you had highlighted the Kenai Peninsula as being the one area in the State that was vulnerable, and 

you were right on the money. And so I’m looking at this, and perhaps the map isn’t as accurate as last year, but if you are even 

close to being right, I am greatly concerned and I think my constituents back home are going to be even more concerned, because 

we want to believe that there is going to be a relief in sight and 

14

we’re going to be able to enjoy the summer, but that’s a large 

swath and that runs through the population centers in the interior 

down in south central, in Anchorage, certainly on the Kenai Peninsula, so that’s a great concern. So my question is, in terms of stationing aviation assets, what can you tell me that we can expect 

in the 2006 fire season in terms of those assets that would be on 

the ground in Alaska? 

Ms. HATFIELD. I’d like to start by mentioning again that the 

aviation assets vitally important in Alaska certainly are only one 

piece of the infrastructure that we have in place to fight fires in 

Alaska. We also are going to have three hotshot crews, a number 

of firefighting crews and other emergency crews that are available. 

And so now we’re looking at working with the State to evaluate 

what additional resources we might need to bring in, in light of 

this map, which was done as of February 8. We can give you a list 

of particular aircraft that are there now and will be available, but, 

again, as we are structuring our strategy, we would be able to 

move aircraft to Alaska as we needed it and as the season erupted. 

So our whole strategy is really built on being able to pre-position 

and then making other resources available as it becomes necessary. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, we were in a position last year of not 

having any Federal retardant tankers in the State, and I think 

that was an issue of basically having to requisition the assets. I 

think it would be helpful and certainly I appreciate the opportunity 

to do the sit-down before the fire season begins so that we do have 

an understanding as to what assets will be positioned up north, 

recognizing again we’ve got earlier fire seasons coming, we have a 

huge area that we have to cover, and we’re still a long way from 

the lower 48 even when you’re flying there. So it is something that 

we want to be able to resolve before we have a crisis. 

Ms. HATFIELD. We would be glad to sit down with you. I might 

mention, in terms of airtankers, we do have two airtankers already 

pre-positioned or planned to be pre-positioned in Alaska. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Okay. That is helpful to know. As far as 

the comment you had made, Mr. Rey, about the DC-6’s that the 

State had contracted with last year, I understand those are still on 

contract with the State. Under what conditions will the State be 

able to utilize the contracted tankers on federally managed lands, 

on those fires that are on those lands? 

Mr. REY. The issue is not the land, it’s who has operational control of the fire. If this is an incident where the State is running 

the incident, in the unified command structure this is a State-controlled fire. It’s their incident command team that’s running it. If 

they want to contract for use of those tankers, then that’s not a 

Federal issue. 

Where we have the operational responsibility for the fire, following the recommendations of the NTSB, we do not believe that 

we can guarantee the operational safety of a DC-6 and so we won’t 

have it flown on a Federal fire, because we don’t want to accept the 

risk or the liability associated with that. We do not know today the 

operational life of any of the DC aircraft that may be flown by any 

other firefighting agency. As contrast, we know with the P-3’s, the 

P-2V’s and the military’s C-130H’s when it is no longer safe to fly 

15

that aircraft because of the flight hours that that specific aircraft 

has acquired. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, the difficulty, as you know, is the 

Alaskan on the ground doesn’t care who’s managing the fire, just 

take care of the fire, protect the property, protect the life, and the 

issue of the air quality that I spoke to at the beginning is really 

a major irritant. And it’s not just that it’s smoky out there, it is 

literally unsafe to be outside. And I think this is what perhaps is 

not getting through, this recognition that the fires that we are seeing and the smoke levels that we are seeing are not just an inconvenience, but that they are stopping us from being able to really 

move around and do what you would consider to be normal business. 

And so there is this—there’s this wall, this problem that we have 

in working through this Federal interagency. I do hope that we can 

have some good, long sit-downs, again, before the fire season, to 

work out these things because we talk about them ahead of time 

and then the fires come and nothing seems to be any different than 

it was the previous fire season. So, again, we need to do something 

that’s going to be different this year. 

Mr. REY. I think that we should sit down, because the issue that 

you’re describing goes beyond the use of large airtankers to the 

overall decisions about when and how to attack fires. And, you 

know, in reality, I don’t think the issue is the availability of large 

airtankers, it’s the need to walk through what our current suppression and attack strategies are and see if you agree with them and 

then see what we can do about it if you don’t. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Okay. I will look forward to some of those 

meetings. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you. 

Senator Burns. 

Senator BURNS. Secretary Rey, I’ve just got a couple of questions 

and I guess they have to do with the blue ribbon report. It was supposed to be up here the first of March. When can we expect that 

report? 

Mr. REY. Not the blue ribbon report, which is a report we contracted, but the report on the——

Senator BURNS. Yes, I’m sorry. I got the wrong one. 

Mr. REY. When did you say that would be available? 

Ms. HATFIELD. I think it’s by the end of the year. 

Mr. REY. We’ll have it probably sometime in the fall. 

Senator BURNS. Okay. 

Mr. REY. This report isn’t going to affect this year’s firefighting. 

Senator BURNS. Okay. Now, on the Lockheed P-3’s, you bought 

those from the Navy. Have we worked out the liability issue on 

that—on those airplanes? 

Mr. REY. Yes. We hold the liability for their use. 

Senator BURNS. Okay. 

Mr. REY. And the responsibility to assure their safety. The Navy 

gave them to us, we didn’t—no money changed hands. 

Senator BURNS. No money changed hands. 

Mr. REY. No money changed hands. 

16

Senator BURNS. I’ll send you out on a—I’ve got to buy another 

car. I’ll send you. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BURNS. But I was just wondering if that report and the 

firefighting and the assessment of—how big does this aviation 

fleet—what do you see? How far do we go on that and are we better 

off owning our own or contracting? 

Mr. REY. We think we’re better off contracting. We think the 

Government gets better service at a more reasonable price. 

Senator BURNS. Now, these P-3’s. If you’ve decided that and if 

you have them equipped so they can haul retardant, do you have 

the authorization to sell those P-3’s to a private contractor? 

Mr. REY. We don’t. You would have to give us that authorization 

through additional legislation, but we do have the authority to contract to have a private operator fly it. So absent legislation to allow 

us to convey these three P-3’s into private ownership——

Senator BURNS. You do have that authority though? You can contract those airplanes out. 

Mr. REY. We can contract with private contractors to fly them for 

us. 

Senator BURNS. Okay. That’s about the only thing that I was 

concerned about, just how far we’re going to go with this with the 

size of our air force for the Forest Service. 

Mr. REY. We can give you the aviation plan for this year, which 

includes the number of large tankers, helicopters, and single-engine tankers. 

Senator BURNS. Okay. Helicopters, I realize, are a lot more efficient whenever you start—they put the retardant closer to the fire 

and they can spot it a lot quicker and are a lot more accurate with 

it, although they do have a range problem. I’m aware of that. 

Mr. REY. Right. Each aircraft has its advantages and disadvantages, that’s why we try to have some variety in the fleet for different tactical purposes. 

Senator BURNS. Well, it’s important and I think you know that 

we’re coming up on a fire season, and it looks like you’ve got a big 

season down south. For the first time in many years we have read 

about the range fires in Texas and Oklahoma and so their conditions have not really improved a lot down there as we move into 

the summer months. But I would hope that we can be ahead of this 

thing a little bit this year in pre-positioning where we think the 

problems are going to be and to get on those fires a lot quicker. I 

know the worst fire we had in Montana, in 1988, could have been 

stopped. It burned from an old snag for 4 or 5 days before it decided to really blow up and go. So we need to react a lot faster. 

Thank you. 

Senator CRAIG. Senator Burns, thank you. Senator Kyl, you’re 

burning. I have a feeling that’s probably why you’re here. Welcome 

to the committee. 

Senator KYL. Well, it’s one of the reasons. Mr. Chairman, thank 

you. As a former member of this committee, I appreciate your courtesy in letting me sit in. 

Senator CRAIG. Certainly. 

Senator KYL. It’s always good to visit with Mark Rey. Thank you 

for being here and for all of the cooperation that you’ve given to 

17

my office and to our State over the years. We appreciate it very 

much. 

It is, in fact, true that we are just mopping up the first fire that 

actually began on February 7. It’s the earliest on record. It’s called 

the February fire. It burned about 4,200 acres, $3.3 million in cost, 

had 539 personnel, 11 type II crews, a couple of airtankers, and six 

helicopters, plus a lot of other equipment that helped to fight it. 

Fortunately, it was a combination of mixed—well, it was primarily ponderosa pine and some pine pinyon in both the Coconino 

and Tonto Forests. The point is, that area has not had moisture in 

about 4 months, any significant amount. And the point is that 

what it presages is a very long and very dangerous season. As you 

noted, the type of aircraft that can be utilized, each have their purposes, but there’s no question in your mind that the large airtanker 

is a significant contributor in fighting the fires; that’s correct, isn’t 

it? 

Mr. REY. It’s the most cost-effective asset for initial attack, but 

we do get good results from other aircraft as well. 

Senator KYL. Sure. It’s just that you’d like to have a good combination of all of the different types of aircrafts you have and, I 

guess let me put it this way, if you had the ability to get more of 

the large tankers, given the fact that we’re already in the fire season and it’s only the middle of February, in a world in which you 

could have what you wanted, you would have more large tankers, 

would you not? 

Mr. REY. Well, we’re actually evaluating that in the context of 

putting together our long-term plan. It’s not as simple as it seems 

because we’re balancing the capabilities of each of the three categories of aircraft and also looking at what new technologies are 

being brought online to increase the efficiency of the single-engine 

airtankers and helicopters. What I tell you is this, we seem to be 

sort of heading toward a future where we think the optimal number of large airtankers would be somewhere between 22 and 24. 

This year we’ll have probably close to that many available if we 

add the military aircraft. We have 17 of our own and then eight 

available from the military. 

Senator KYL. Well, we certainly hope that that’s enough. I hope 

that next September, Mr. Chairman, we can come back together 

and say, wow, that was just great, we only had a few fires and we 

were able to get to them quickly and didn’t have any problems. But 

judging on the basis of what we’ve seen so far, I’d be very happy 

if that prediction or anything close to it came true. 

Just one other thought. I’ve written a letter to the President and 

sent you a copy that raises two concerns, but let me give you one 

bit of good news first. In fighting this particular fire, once again 

we find that earlier treatments were of significant help. In fact, in 

the report from the Tonto Forest—I’ll just read these two sentences—there were over 5,000 acres of previously treated land right 

in the vicinity of this fire and the writer says, ‘‘the thinned areas 

and previously burned areas were instrumental in stopping advance of the February fire in several locations. The areas also provided secure anchor points for fire line construction.’’ A point that 

you’ve made many times, and that is that the more we can treat 

18

the forests, the better we are to prevent the fires in the first instance. 

Now, in the President’s budget, there’s a reduction both in the 

amount of money for treatment and in the amount of money for 

fighting fires, and that’s the point of my letter to the President. We 

just can’t continue in these kinds of circumstances to reduce the 

amount of money available. 

The second problem is that in the wet Northwest, which is not 

colored on your map, there is an oversupply of money compared to 

the very dry and the dangerous Southwest, which has already been 

noted is a significant part of the map there and which includes my 

State, which has already had fires. What this suggests to me is 

that during the course of this year and early on, if possible, there 

could be a readjustment of money made available. We have thousands of acres of NEPA-ready land for treatment in the Tonto Forest alone, where this fire burned. I met with the local forester 

ranger there the Saturday before this fire was reported a day or 

two later and he noted that it was strictly a matter of money, that 

they were ready to go and we were ready to do some more treatments, but the money is not available. 

And so what I would ask you to do is to work with us to transfer 

money from the Northwest to the extent that that’s possible to do, 

and to support the plus subs which we will be seeking, both for restoration as well as for firefighting in this particular year, because 

clearly in the Southwest we’re going to need those resources. I suspect you haven’t seen my letter yet. 

Mr. REY. No, I’ve seen it. 

Senator KYL. Oh, you have? Good. Okay. Great. That’s good news 

in and of itself, the speed with which you got the communique, and 

I appreciate that. Any comment on that right now? 

Mr. REY. Let me comment on both the preparedness issue as well 

as the fuels treatment issue. For preparedness, since the fire season typically begins in the Southwest, we are already starting to 

move assets and send severity funding to Arizona and New Mexico. 

Last week we sent an additional $1.25 million to Arizona for severity funding. Presently deployed in the State is somewhere in the 

neighborhood of 560 engines, 21 single-engine airtankers, seven 

large helicopters, and six large airtankers. Additionally, by the end 

of the month, that is to say before March 1, we will be pre-positioning 10 type I crews. Those are the most experienced and sophisticated crews in our firefighting force. So we think with the 

pre-positioning of assets, we will be in good shape. Unfortunately, 

your hope that there will be few fires is one I don’t think will be 

realized, but I feel reasonably confident that we will be able to realize your second hope and that is that we maintain a level of success at initial attack at around the 99 percent level. 

With regard to fuels funding, actually our overall budget, the two 

Departments combined, shows a slight increase in fuels funding 

from fiscal year 2006. The totality of what we devoted to implementing the President’s Healthy Forest Initiative in 2005 was $835 

million. The totality in 2006 was $907 million. The totality of what 

we’ve proposed for 2007 is $902 million. 

Now, in our fiscal year 2007 request, we did request a boost for 

the Pacific Northwest, but not in fuels treatment, per se, but rather 

19

in the forest management program to increase commercial timber 

sales to meet the President’s commitment to fully implement the 

Northwest Forest Plan. So much of that work would not be fuelsrelated, although some of it will have an ancillary fuels treatment 

benefit. All of our regions showed slight increases in fuels treatment, and obviously as the appropriations process continues, we’ll 

be happy to work with you to look at adjustments for how that 

money is distributed throughout the country. 

Senator KYL. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you for being with us. We know you’re in 

a critical situation in your State and in the Southwest and we’ll 

monitor it very closely. Thank you. A couple more questions for this 

panel and then I need to get to our next panel because of their time 

constraints. 

Secretary Hatfield, what steps has the BLM and the National 

Interagency Fire Center taken to ensure that companies that might 

be affected are notified well in advance of any of the changes that 

you’re making as it relates to the contracting that you’re looking 

at, and by that I’m referencing plans to move away from the callas-needed contract to the exclusive-use contracts and to a shift to 

larger, single-engine retardant aircraft? 

Ms. HATFIELD. Well, the first thing is our strategy, as refined, 

would actually decrease the number of exclusive-use contracts and 

supplement those exclusive-use contracts with more call-whenneeded contracts. 

Senator CRAIG. Okay. 

Ms. HATFIELD. The exclusive-use contracts would be for the larger planes that carry more retardant. In the process of doing that 

refinement of our strategy, we have talked with all of the vendors 

and all the States and explained what we were doing and what 

that would mean in terms of the contracting process for them. 

We’re currently in that contracting process, so I think in terms of 

vendor impact, it’s difficult for us to tell, at this point, that it’s 

going to have very much of an impact on them. To the extent that 

a vendor does not have an exclusive-use contract, the vendor will 

still be in the pool that would be available for the call-when-needed 

contracts. So it’s really a matter of a difference in terms of the vehicle we’ll use and in terms of having the resources there we need 

when we need them. 

Senator CRAIG. Well, I thank you for that. We’ll monitor that 

closely with you. Last year, when the Forest Service announced a 

similar shift in its contracting for helicopters, I think we received 

a significant amount of complaints from helicopter operators in Oregon and in Idaho and we hope that you are advancing this in a 

way that will give effective pre-notice and all of that. 

Ms. HATFIELD. Right. Well, we have talked to them and they are 

aware of the shift and how we’re going to approach this fire year. 

Senator CRAIG. Secretary Rey, one last question of you. Has the 

U.S. Forest Service sought the ongoing participation and involvement of existing and potential airtanker operators in your strategic 

planning process? 

Mr. REY. Yes. That’s something we do on an ongoing basis. We 

meet with a variety of current operators, that is, people who are 

20

flying aircraft under contract for us now as well as people who 

would like to be future operators, that is, people who have an aircraft that they’re testing and trying to bring online for firefighting 

purposes. One of the things that we’re going to announce in short 

order is an aviation day that’s similar to what the Air Force does 

when they invite all of the various potential and current vendors 

for military aircraft to come and give them some ideas about where 

they think the future of the industry is headed and what sorts of 

new models they have that they want to bring online and what the 

capabilities are. So you’ll hear more about that later as we have 

the first Federal Firefighting Aircraft Aviation Day, modeled after 

the Air Force approach. 

Senator CRAIG. Well, thank you. Thank you both very much for 

being with us this afternoon. We’ll obviously stay tuned and monitor this very closely as we proceed—I won’t say into the fire season, it’s obvious we’re already into it—but as the fire season 

spreads North and West. Thank you both. 

Mr. REY. Thank you. 

Ms. HATFIELD. Thank you. 

Senator CRAIG. Now let me call James Hall of Hall & Associates, 

Washington, DC, co-chair of the Blue Ribbon Report on Aerial Firefighting Safety, along with James Hull, a Texas State forester, College Station, Texas, co-chair, again, along with Mr. Hall of the Blue 

Ribbon Report for Aerial Firefighting Safety. 

Mr. Hall, we understand you’re the one time-sensitive. We’re 

going to allow you to proceed first and I’ll ask some questions of 

you, then you’ll be free to leave and we’ll turn to Mr. Hull. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES HALL, HALL & ASSOCIATES, LLC 

Mr. HALL. Thank you very much, Senator, and I greatly appreciate that courtesy and my wife appreciates it more. As chairman 

of the 2002 blue ribbon panel that reviewed the safety of Federal 

aerial firefighting, I’m pleased to appear before you for the second 

time with my co-chair, Jim Hull. We have submitted a document 

that reflects the views of all the panel members and contains more 

detail on each of the items that I will discuss today. I would appreciate it if our long testimony and an article submitted by one of our 

members could be placed in the record. 

Senator CRAIG. All of your material testimonies will become a 

part of the permanent record. 

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, simply put, there has been some 

progress in dealing with the safety and effectiveness of aerial firefighting, but much less than we had hoped for. We have little direct information comparing the cost and effectiveness of the more 

recent operations that have been characterized by fewer large 

airtankers, the introduction of single-engine tankers, and increased 

numbers of large helicopter tankers, as opposed to earlier operations using mostly large airtankers and some large helicopters. 

We are concerned, Mr. Chairman, about the acquisition of additional P-3 aircraft for conversion to airtankers, given that the most 

recent fatal large airtanker accident involving a P-3 occurred April 

20, 2005, killing three crew members, and we consider this particularly troubling considering that the NTSB has not yet released its 

report on the accident. 

21

The panel’s first finding was that the safety record of airtankers 

was unacceptable. Some aircraft types are no longer given contracts and others have had more intense inspections, but the safety 

of the aircraft used in aerial firefighting has not been assured. The 

loss of the P-3 as well as a number of helicopters since the report 

was submitted demonstrates that the record remains unacceptable. 

Our second finding noted that the wildland environment has 

changed so that controlling wildland fires could not be considered 

an auxiliary mission to land management. The Forest Service has 

produced a strategic plan, but it has not led to the resources necessary for the overhaul of the aerial firefighting activity. 

The panel’s third finding was that under the present arrangement for certification, contracting, and operation, key elements of 

the fleet are unsustainable. There has been some work, but no real 

progress. 

Our fourth finding noted that a variety of philosophies, missions, 

and standards created a mission muddle that seriously undermined 

the effectiveness of wild land firefighting. While work on this complex problem is underway, not much headway appears to have been 

made. 

The panel’s fifth finding concluded that the culture, organizational structure, and management of the agencies conducting the 

aerial firefighting was inappropriate to the task. Little seems to 

have changed and the accidents continue. 

Our sixth finding noted that the FAA had a minimal role in certifying the public aircraft use in firefighting. This leaves the Forest 

Service in the untenable position of being both operator and regulator of firefighting aircraft. It has neither the resources nor the 

skills to provide the safety oversight of this fleet. 

The seventh finding of the panel noted that the contracting procedures did not recognize the business and operational realities of 

aerial firefighting and did not produce incentives to conduct safe 

operations. From what we have been able to determine, there have 

been minor improvements in contracting, but the fundamental 

problems remain. 

Our final finding was that training was underfunded and inadequately specified. Again, while there have been some improvements, we are not aware of any comprehensive plan based on validated training needs. 

In conclusion, the Forest Service is composed of many dedicated 

individuals who are experts in land management, but have limited 

aviation expertise. I want to thank the work of the individuals in 

the Forest Service Office of Fire and Aviation Management who 

have spent countless hours working in an attempt to address the 

issues raised in our 2002 report. However, one cannot expect such 

an organization to possess the resources nor the expertise of the 

Federal Aviation Administration in aircraft certification and the 

oversight of airworthiness. 

I appreciate the opportunity to present again before the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

22

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES HALL, HALL & ASSOCIATES, LLC 

REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS MADE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERIM AND LONG-TERM

PLANS FOR THE USE OF FIRE RETARDANT AIRCRAFT FOR FIREFIGHTING ON FEDERAL

LAND

The Blue Ribbon Panel has not been directly involved with the work of the USDAFS since it submitted its report in December of 2002, nor has the Panel remained 

formally constituted since the publication of its report. However, members of the 

Panel did assemble in Washington on December 17, 2003 for a progress briefing 

that was given by the USDA-FS. 

Information in our presentation is based on published information and on a listening watch of progress toward a safe, affordable, and effective fleet of retardant/water 

dropping firefighting and related support aircraft. We have also considered a document provided to us by the USDA-FS titled ‘Actions Taken in Response to the Findings of the Blue Ribbon Panel,’ dated October 2005. 

There has been some progress in both the safety and effectiveness of aerial firefighting. The USDA-FS has increased its emphasis on initial attack and made 

changes to the mix of aircraft types. The change in the mix of aircraft types is partly 

because some of the large tankers have been disqualified from eligibility for contracts. We have been told that the present mix of large tankers, single-engine tankers and helicopter tankers seems to be improving the effectiveness of firefighting operations. While progress has been made toward determining what is necessary to 

keep aging aircraft airworthy and training has been improved, accidents continue 

to take place. The involvement of the FAA in assuring the airworthiness of the air 

tankers remains minimal. 

You have indicated that you want to review the costs and effectiveness of utilizing 

single-engine fire retardant aircraft and heavy-lift helicopters as opposed to the Forest Service’s reliance on multi-engine retardant aircraft in earlier seasons. Most recently, the approach has been to use fewer large multi-engine tankers, supplemented by single-engine tankers, and an increased number of heavy-lift helicopters. 

In the earlier fire seasons the mix included a larger number of large multi-engine 

aircraft and fewer heavy-lift helicopters. Thus, there is not a clear distinction between the traditional and the most recent practices. We have been informed that 

the single-engine tankers were effective for initial attack—in some regions. We have 

also been advised that teaming a few single-engine tankers with a large airtanker 

made a positive difference in controlling a number of fires. However, we do not have 

access to the financial information or the measured effectiveness of the different operations to assist you with the comparisons that you wish to make. We are advised 

that the USDA-FS Pacific South-West region is making progress in analyzing aging 

aircraft problems and introducing new technology into both training and firefighting 

operations. 

We have not been provided with the USDA-FS long-term strategy for replacing 

aging multi-engine aircraft. We understand that the USDA-FS is prepared to conduct a three-year study of its aviation assets. 

Unfortunately, we cannot be of great assistance in assessing the three recently 

acquired P-3 aircraft. The earlier model P-3s that have been in service were seen 

as effective and were the newest aircraft type in the heavy airtanker fleet. However, 

there was a fatal P-3 airtanker accident in April 2005 and the NTSB has not released its analysis of that accident. We have no way of ascertaining whether aircraft 

design, performance, or airworthiness were among the factors involved in the P-3 

accident. It does seem risky to acquire more of the same aircraft type involved in 

this most recent accident before learning what factors contributed to that accident. 

In the following parts of this submission, we comment on the low probability that 

the USDA-FS is capable of conducting and controlling a safe aviation operation. As 

the operator of the public aircraft employed in aerial fire suppression, the Forest 

Service appears particularly unprepared to assure their airworthiness. 

As our major product was our December 2002 Report, we will structure our comments in the context of the Panel’s findings and the progress, or lack thereof, in 

addressing the Panel’s findings through its consultations. 

The Panel’s first finding was: The safety record of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters used in wildland fire management is unacceptable. 

In our March 26, 2003 report to this subcommittee, we noted that contractor personnel flying the large airtankers were subject to lower safety standards than were 

government personnel flying the lead planes and smoke jumper aircraft. We also 

noted that both contractor and government aerial firefighting was being conducted 

at lower safety standards than we feel could be justified. 

23

Sadly, since our last appearance, a four-engine P-3 airtanker crashed, killing its 

crew, in addition to a number of helicopter accidents. Each aircraft was attempting 

to support the wildland fire management program. The safety record, after more 

than three years since the release of our report, remains unacceptable. 

Efforts were made by the USDA-FS to assess the structural integrity of the aircraft, and some types are no longer eligible for firefighting contracts. Some structural assessments have been carried out under contract, and some in-flight data has 

been gathered from a sampling of aircraft that were fitted with stress recording devices. We understand that the information from the instrumentation was fairly limited, and while it may provide useful data, it will be, on its own, far from sufficient 

to call for detailed measures that will assure the airworthiness of the airtankers. 

We are unaware whether the data from the instrumented aircraft has been analyzed. In any event, we have no indications that the data has been put too much 

use. Some aircraft operated by the Forest Service have been fitted with airborne collision avoidance devices. 

The USDA-FS notes in its progress report that ‘‘safety as a core value’’ was a goal 

and that they will develop a systems-safety approach. We are dismayed to see ‘‘safety as a core value’’ still listed as a goal when it should have immediately been 

adopted as a core value—even as the paramount core value. In our view, three years 

after our report and with continuing accidents and fatalities in the fleet it operates, 

this is a feeble and telling response to the Forest Service’s unacceptable safety 

record. 

The USDA-FS has discontinued the use of the two aircraft types that experienced 

structural failure accidents in 2002. The rationale for that decision does not seem 

to be related to the suitability of those aircraft, if appropriately maintained, but due 

solely to the fact that they had accidents. The use of fewer large airtankers has been 

offset by the greater use of SEATS (Single Engine Airtankers) and helicopters, without any apparent assessing of the structural effects of more intense use of these aircraft. There appears to have been no consideration of the mid-sized twin-engine 

tankers like the S-2s used by California and other states. 

Flight load monitoring devices (which gather data on in-flight stresses and are 

quite different from flight data recorders that capture altitude, speed, and control 

positions, etc. for accident investigation purposes) have been installed on a small 

sample of the large multi-engine tankers. Flight load data has been gathered, but 

to our knowledge it has not been validated and analyzed. As far as we know, none 

of the USDA-FS aircraft have been fitted with flight data recorders to assist in accident investigations. From what we have seen, the concern of the Forest Service is 

with aircraft exceeding certain maximum ‘g’ acceleration criteria and not the cumulative effect of low-level turbulence. Literature suggests the low-level turbulence is 

as great a concern in generating structural fatigue as the exceeding of the maximum 

allowed for ‘g’ levels. 

There appears to be an increasing amount of public opposition to the dropping of 

water mixed with retardants. The mixture is much more effective in fire suppression 

than water alone. However, concerns are being expressed about the contamination 

of lakes and rivers as well as risks to both communities and firefighters. It may be 

that tankers will, in the future, be restricted to dropping water. If so, there will likely be more emphasis on helicopters and ‘scooper’ aircraft that are typically able to 

scoop up water from lakes and rivers without stopping to be loaded. 

We have received information that various elements of the Forest Service and 

some regional offices have been working on some of these problems, but in an uncoordinated manner and without central direction. 

The Panel’s second finding was: Because the wildland environment has changed 

significantly, controlling wildland fires cannot be considered an auxiliary mission to 

land management. Wildland firefighting has grown to a level of importance that 

warrants the attention of national leaders. 

From what we have been able to gather, the Forest Service has obtained some 

climate forecasts that predict a continuation, for at least several years, of the dry 

conditions recently experienced in much of the United States. How that information 

has been employed to justify the resources necessary to maintain a safe, efficient 

fleet of fire suppression aircraft is not known. A viewpoint that allows the natural 

regeneration of forests through periodic fires and more attention to the presence of 

fuels in unwanted areas appears to be gaining prominence—but we have seen little 

indication of progress. Our 2002 comment that ‘‘fire policy to address all of this is 

not evolving at a rate that is essential to address the situation,’’ remains valid. 

The USDA-FS has developed a strategic plan to address the appropriate mix of 

aircraft (the composition of which has not been made available to us) to meet new 

environmental requirements, but has reported no change other than increasing emVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:49 Apr 28, 2006 Jkt 109368 PO 27215 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\DOCS\27215.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
24

phasis on initial attack. This seems to us to be a very slow response to the fatal 

aircraft accidents, the loss of homes at the wildland urban interface, and the loss 

of many millions of dollars worth of commercially valuable forest. 

The Panel’s third finding was: Under the current system of aircraft certification, 

contracting and operation, key elements of the aerial wildland firefighting fleet are 

unsustainable. 

Considerable sums have been spent on attempting to assure the structural integrity of the air tanker fleet. Some aircraft types that were part of the fleet in 2002 

are no longer used. The original fleet of lead planes has been disposed of. To our 

knowledge, no method has been validated that will determine the remaining operational service life of the large airtankers and many of the other aircraft used in 

aerial firefighting. There have been some attempts to work more effectively with the 

FAA on the initial certification of the air tankers, but we have seen nothing to suggest that there is an effective way to ensure the continuing structural integrity of 

the aircraft. The FAA, we understand, has been making efforts to cooperate with 

the Forest Service, but its involvement in assuring the airworthiness of the firefighting aircraft has changed little since the time of the Blue Ribbon Panel. There 

is no formal understanding between the FAA and the Forest Service. The additional 

role of the FAA, we are informed, is limited to such matters as providing lists of 

individuals and firms that the Forest Service may choose to engage to assist them. 

The Panel’s fourth finding was: The variety of missions, philosophies, and unclear 

standards of federal land management agencies creates a ‘‘mission muddle’’ that seriously compromises the safety and effectiveness of wildland fire management. 

We noted in our last appearance that no single body was in charge of fire suppression aviation activities, with the result being that risks associated with unclear command and control were higher than necessary. That situation remains. Some 

progress has been made toward creating improved interagency coordinating bodies, 

but there is still no one agency in charge. 

A recent Quadrennial Fire and Fuel Review Report that was developed with the 

assistance of the Brookings Institution is the first substantive attempt to deal with 

the very difficult question of what our Panel characterized as ‘‘mission muddle.’’ 

While the Report created a blueprint for change, the mandate for the quadrennial 

review depends, as it must, on interagency cooperation. As the interests of the various agencies become affected, the principles outlined in the blueprint will become 

irrelevant unless there is a decision to allow one agency to have the final word in 

setting priorities and allocating resources to fire management. Discussing who is to 

do what while fires rage cannot be allowed. 

The Panel’s fifth finding noted: The culture, organizational structure and management of federal wildland fire management agencies are ill-suited to conduct safe and 

effective aviation operations in the current environment. 

At our last appearance we noted that a clearly articulated and widely understood 

safety culture seemed to be either absent or, as in the case of the mission, muddled. 

We noted that the lack of knowledge of aircraft condition, together with insufficient 

training, inspection, and maintenance, has resulted in the deplorable safety record 

for airtankers and a less than acceptable record for other aircraft. 

We have seen no evidence of substantive improvement. 

The Panel’s sixth finding related to the very limited role of the FAA in certifying 

‘public aircraft.’

We noted that there had been a misunderstanding of the role of the FAA. The 

operators believed that the FAA had a much more significant role than it does for 

the certification and continuing airworthiness of public aircraft. The absence of real 

airworthiness oversight by the FAA puts the Forest Service in the untenable position of being both the operator and the regulator of its fleet of firefighting aircraft. 

There have been several initiatives by the Forest Service in the area of continuing 

airworthiness, and it has hired some additional staff. However, the Forest Service 

does not have the expertise or experience of the FAA, and it is, in our view, most 

unlikely that it ever will be an effective airworthiness authority for a fleet of large, 

old aircraft that are being employed in a role that is much harsher than they were 

designed for. The USDA-FS reports increased cooperation with the FAA, but as far 

as we can tell, the continuing airworthiness responsibility remains with the USDAFS, an organization that is suited to—and respected for—plant life management 

rather than the airworthiness of aircraft. In this country we have the world’s most 

outstanding airworthiness authority in the FAA. It seems completely unreasonable 

not to provide the resources to the FAA and give it the mandate to employ its expertise in ensuring the necessary standards and oversight of airtanker airworthiness. 

The Forest Service reports that it is also examining strategies for obtaining needed funding to maintain and/or replace old airtankers. That a plan for this has not 

25

been formulated three years after the release of Blue Ribbon Panel Report is so slow 

as to be baffling. 

The Panel’s seventh finding was: Government contracts for airtanker and helicopter fire management services do not adequately recognize business and operational realities or aircraft limitations. As a result, contract provisions contain disincentives to flight safety. 

At our previous appearance we noted the importance of the contracting process 

as the only effective means of enforcing the airworthiness and safety requirements 

of the Forest Service. We also noted that the process as it was did not provide incentives for safe operation. Even by using its contracts to assure airworthiness, it is 

in our view, very unlikely that the Forest Service will possess the aviation knowledge necessary to include the appropriate language in its airtanker contracts. Even 

if it does develop suitable contract language, the Forest Service does not have, and 

cannot be expected to develop, an FAA-like capability of providing the necessary airworthiness safety oversight. There are still no multi-year contracts that will allow 

contractors to obtain adequate financing. 

We are aware of some minor changes in the contracting process but have seen 

nothing to give us confidence that it has been changed sufficiently to take on the 

functions, which at the time of our Panel were presumed by the USDA-FS to have 

been vested in the FAA. 

The Panel’s final finding was: Training is underfunded and inadequately specified 

for helicopters, large airtankers, and other fixed-wing operations. 

When we were here in 2003, we noted that the training deficiencies remained. We 

are aware of some minor changes but the situation remains much as it was. 

Summary/Proposal: The Forest Service and the other agencies involved with 

wildland fire protection appear to have made little progress in three years. Progress 

toward resolving airtanker safety and effectiveness has been unacceptably slow. We 

say this with full knowledge that the Forest Service and other agencies are staffed 

with dedicated individuals who are knowledgeable in their primary fields of endeavor. The problem at the time we did our work, and which remains today, is largely 

institutional and is associated more with mandates and appropriate expertise than 

with a lack of will. 

It is time to cut the Gordian knot rather than continue to try to unravel it. One 

approach would be for authority to be put into the USDA-FS and other agencies to 

deal with command and control problems that are necessary to ensure that one 

agency is clearly in charge. However, this would still leave the fundamental question of who should provide the airworthiness standards and aviation safety oversight. Alternately, and probably preferably, the government land management agencies could get out of the aircraft operating business and simply state their operational requirements. Those requirements, which could be handled entirely by competent aviation operators, would leave the land management people to their established expertise. This latter approach would be contingent on some assurance that 

the industry would be capable of providing the needed service on a safe, effective 

and reliable basis. Whatever approach is taken, our view is that significant additional resources will be required; but before additional funding is provided, the institutional arrangements need to be changed so that aviation operations can be effectively and efficiently carried out. 

Finally, we believe there is need for an independent external body that can speak 

freely and advocate necessary change. It could advise and work with the Forest 

Service and the related agencies to speed up the resolution of the problems that 

were identified in our 2002 Report. We believe that institutional problems like these 

(e.g., multiple agencies and limited aviation expertise) cannot be solved from within.

Senator CRAIG. Mr. Hall, again, thank you very much for your 

commitment to this and obviously your continued critical and constructive observation. You suggest that the Government land agencies get out of the aircraft operating business. That would suggest 

that either—that some Federal agency, like the FAA, take over the 

job of providing the firefighting aircraft or, as you suggest, have 

the aircraft provided by a competent aviation operator. I presume 

that the FAA would still be required to certify the airworthiness 

of aircraft operated by the competent aviation operator, is that not 

correct? 

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, let me point out that if the FAA—and 

maybe clarify—were to operate the aircraft, they would be both the 

26

operator and the regulator of this aircraft, which would produce a 

conflict of responsibilities, and operation by the FAA would not be 

a good idea. If a competent operator were to operate the aircraft, 

it would depend on whether the aircraft was classified as a public 

aircraft. If they continue to be considered public aircraft, little 

would change unless the FAA received additional funding for the 

airworthiness oversight function. 

I might add, Mr. Chairman, since 1993, in my presence on the 

board, I’ve been talking on this because we have the black hole of 

safety, which is public-use aircraft, that exists, not just with the 

Forest Service and BLM, but with other Federal agencies. 

Senator CRAIG. Well, you’re absolutely right. And I guess, given 

the FAA’s reluctance to take over responsibility for checking airworthiness of government-operated aircraft, other than outright 

legislation that would require this to happen, do you have any 

other suggestions? 

Mr. HALL. Well, obviously, congressional action with appropriate 

funding for the FAA to do the job. My understanding from conversations with two administrators, and I’m certainly—this is my 

understanding, my conversations with them is they would be very 

reluctant to take on the airworthiness oversight of the aircraft unless they were provided additional funding to perform the function, 

and the overnment money would have to be spent also to provide 

airworthiness oversight. And I believe if that’s done, the FAA is an 

agency already sitting there with that expertise. Personally, I believe from a public policy perspective, it would make good sense to 

provide the FAA money to do the airworthiness oversight job that 

they already do in commercial aviation. 

Senator CRAIG. You’ve also recommended an independent external body to help address the other institutional concerns that surfaced in the blue ribbon report which, as you correctly point out, 

have not been resolved. Do you have an organization in mind? 

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, let me point out that I had the honor 

for 8 years to serve an independent body that was set up by Congress that I personally believe functioned very well and we all 

worked very hard at our responsibilities. I think when Congress 

goes to agencies—operating agencies and asks for oversight and 

recommendations that that is ineffective. I think you need an independent look and an independent look that reports directly to the 

oversight committees. 

How that would be structured with the funding of a report 

through OMB, I’m not sure, but I don’t believe that you will get 

any independence—the structure of that, obviously, the BRP could 

be reconstituted or a new panel could be created to look at some 

of these things that are put on the table before you all, like the effectiveness of initial attack. 

As you know, those numbers—the 99 percent numbers are based 

on fires all over the United States, many of those very small fires 

in the South or in Tennessee, where I’m from, and it skews the 

numbers and presentations for the committee for representatives 

from States where forest fires can actually be major, major killers. 

Senator CRAIG. Well, again, Mr. Hall, thank you very much for 

staying involved in this. We’ll continue to work with you and your 

expertise. 

27

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, anything we can do. And let me apologize to my co-chairman and beg his indulgence for not being here 

to listen to his excellent testimony, which I’ve already read. Thank 

you. 

Senator CRAIG. Fair enough. Thank you very much. Now, let’s 

turn to Jim Hull, Texas State forester, College Station, Texas, cochair of the Blue Ribbon Aerial Firefighting Safety Panel. Again, 

welcome before the committee, Mr. Hull. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES B. HULL, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION OF STATE FORESTERS 

Mr. HULL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to be back. I would 

present testimony somewhat on behalf of the blue ribbon panel, but 

also State foresters. As you know, over two-thirds of the forests in 

the United States are in State and private ownership. State foresters have the primary responsibility for protecting these acres 

from wildfire, along with most other private lands in America, and 

a lot of Federal land, for that matter. It’s essential that we have 

access to aerial firefighting resources if we’re going to do our job 

successfully. 

In Texas, we saw significant wildfires in 2005, however, on New 

Year’s Day of this year, 2006, 1 day, we saw more wildfire destruction, acres burned, than we did in all of 2005 put together. I was 

very appalled that during the week of Christmas, between the 

week of Christmas and New Year’s, that we saw 345 homes destroyed by wildfire. We saw three fatalities. We saw two and a half 

entire communities destroyed by wildfire, hundreds of cars, tractors, barns, livestock. This was more wildfire destruction in Texas 

than I’ve seen in my entire 40-year career combined, and that happened in 1 week. It happened largely because of 40, 50 mile-anhour winds restricted our use of aerial firefighting resources. As 

drought, fuels, and population increase across our Nation, it becomes more and more critical that we have reliable, high quality, 

sustainable aerial firefighting resources. It’s in this context that I 

would offer three specific points. 

First, we must all work together, both Federal and State, in developing an interagency long-term strategy for our Nation’s aerial 

firefighting resources. We need a strategy that will provide a diverse fleet of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, and we need to do 

so in a manner that provides adequate numbers to allow and, in 

fact, encourage scheduled maintenance and time off for pilots to relieve stress and fatigue. Neither of those is the case right now. This 

strategy must be designed to meet the needs of our wildfire suppression mission and do so in a safe, airworthy, and sustainable 

manner over the long-term. To this end, you’ve heard about the fire 

directors and State foresters working together to initiate such a 

strategy to develop its interagency fire program, and I am hopeful 

that by the end of this fiscal year that we will have that report 

available. 

My second point addresses the issue of certifying airworthiness. 

Like all the other findings of the 2003 blue ribbon panel report, the 

National Association of State Foresters strongly supports the position that the current program of relying on aging former military 

and surplus commercial aircraft is not sustainable. 

28

Ideally, I think this would mean funding and support for aircraft 

that are designed, engineered, and purpose built specifically for delivering fire retardant products. As a State forester, I am very 

much aware of fiscal constraints, but we must not arbitrarily rule 

out the fact that purpose-built planes are too expensive. I firmly 

believe that the free enterprise system in this country is capable 

and poised to provide such aircraft if appropriate contractual assurances are provided. 

And the third point that I would make is that State foresters, 

along with the blue ribbon panel, believe that the missing link in 

this entire issue is the role of the Federal Aviation Administration. 

As the premier aviation agency, whether limited by law or merely 

a perceived lack of responsibility or funding, we feel like that the 

FAA must provide the leadership essential to assuring complete 

airworthiness of these public-use aircraft. The Federal land management agencies cannot and should not attempt to duplicate the 

expertise of the FAA when it comes to assuring sustained airworthiness of firefighting aircraft. Therefore, I’m urging Congress 

to specifically charge the FAA with the responsibility for certifying 

the airworthiness of public-use aircraft, especially airtankers. 

In closing, the National Association of State Foresters pledges to 

work with our Federal partners in any way that we possibly can 

in this entire effort. However, ultimately, it seems to me that the 

ultimate success will depend on Congress providing the necessary 

support and funding to implement whatever strategy is developed. 

I very much appreciate the opportunity to work with this committee, Congress, and the administration in this entire effort and 

look forward to addressing questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hull follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES B. HULL, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

STATE FORESTERS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: On behalf of the National Association of State Foresters (NASF), I am pleased to offer the following statement for 

the hearing record. NASF is a non-profit organization that represents the directors 

of the fifty state forestry agencies, eight U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia. State Foresters manage and protect state and private forests across the U.S. 

Aerial firefighting resources are essential to the fire protection programs of most 

states and territories represented by NASF. Over two-thirds of the forests in the 

United States are in state and private ownerships. State Foresters are not only responsible for protecting these vast forests, but in most states we are also responsible 

for wildfire protection on all rural lands and, in some states, considerable federal 

land as well. 

Fire protection in America is neither uniquely a western states’ event nor is it 

confined predominately to federal lands. More than 80,000 wildfires occur annually 

across our nation. Well over 60% of those occur in non-western states and over 75% 

occur on non-federal lands. The key point, however, is that no single entity, including federal, state, or local government, has the capacity to handle all responses to 

wildfires within their jurisdictional area of responsibility. All fire protection programs are thus, by necessity, strategically integrated to most effectively and economically serve all rural lands of the nation. Aerial firefighting resources are utilized in exactly the same way; in other words, we are all in this together. Therefore, 

at this time it is critical that we all work together, federal and state, in developing 

an interagency, long-term strategy for our nation’s aerial firefighting resources. We 

need a strategy that will provide a diverse fleet of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that will meet the needs of our wildfire suppression mission, and do so in a 

safe and airworthy and sustainable manner over the long-term. 

In this context, you asked me to address three specific topics this afternoon. First, 

you asked me to address the effectiveness of using additional single-engine air tankers (SEATs) and heavy lift (Type 1) helicopters to compensate for the loss of apVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:49 Apr 28, 2006 Jkt 109368 PO 27215 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 P:\DOCS\27215.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
29

proximately 50% of the nation’s large, multi-engine air tanker fleet. In 2004 and 

2005 the combination of additional SEATs and Type 1 helicopters along with the 

remaining 17 heavy air tankers allowed federal and state wildland fire agencies to 

achieve an initial attack success rate similar to that of previous years. However, I 

must caution that statement by reminding you that in both 2004 and 2005 we experienced relatively moderate fire seasons when viewed at a national level. We have 

yet to test this new mix of aviation resources in a long, severe fire season. In other 

words, we don’t really know if we can continue to be effective with only 16-17 large, 

multi-engine air tankers, regardless of how many SEATs and Type 1 helicopters we 

have available. The capabilities of each of these aircraft types are not entirely interchangeable. Each has specific strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, it is essential 

that we develop a long-term strategy that includes a sufficient number and variety 

of safe and effective firefighting aircraft in order to protect this nation’s forests and 

communities. 

This leads me to your second question regarding progress on a long-term strategy. 

The Fire Directors of the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the US 

Fish & Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 

and the National Association of State Foresters, acting together as the National Fire 

& Aviation Executive Board, have recently chartered a group of agency aviation experts to develop this desperately needed, long-term aviation strategy for the interagency fire program. This strategy, tentatively scheduled for completion by the end 

of this fiscal year, will continue work the Forest Service has already initiated by 

evaluating all realistic alternatives and making recommendations on: (1) the mix or 

diversity of aircraft that are needed; (2) the specific make and model of aircraft that 

meet the identified specifications; (3) the quantity of each needed; and (4) the appropriate business model for acquisition and management. 

Although this strategy will address all types of aircraft and all aviation missions 

in support of fire suppression, it will focus heavily on the large air tanker program. 

As the Subcommittee is well aware, in response to three tragic air tanker crashes 

(one in 1994 and two in 2002), the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) chartered a Blue Ribbon Panel to evaluate aviation safety issues. In 

its 2002 report the Panel, which I co-chaired, called into question the airworthiness 

of the fixed-wing heavy air tanker fleet. Subsequently on April 23, 2004, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released the report of its investigation 

and sent its findings and recommendations in a letter to the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior. Because the two Departments did not have the personnel, 

expertise, or funding to comply with the NTSB recommendations, they terminated 

the contracts for the entire fleet of 33 large air tankers in May of 2004. Since then, 

through a program of independent analysis and increased inspections, the Forest 

Service has been able to gradually return some of the less ancient former military 

aircraft to service. At the current time, 16 large air tankers are approved and available for contract—all of which are aging, former military aircraft. 

Lastly, you asked me to comment on the Forest Service’s recent acquisition of 

three former U.S. Navy P-3 Orion aircraft for conversion as air tankers and my 

thoughts regarding certification of air worthiness. In regard to the P-3 acquisition, 

even though the long-term strategy has not yet been completed, we need to make 

operational decisions in the short-term in order to continue to provide the best aerial response to wildfire that we can. In this context, the P-3—may—serve us well 

as a bridge aircraft to the next generation of large, multi-engine air tankers. However, until the strategy has been completed, we won’t know whether or not the P3 aircraft will have a role over the long term. This is yet another reason why it is 

critical that we complete the long-term strategy as quickly as possible. 

In regard to certifying airworthiness, it is time, in fact far past time, for a better 

answer. NASF strongly believes that our nation needs a safe, modem, and effective 

aerial firefighting program. As was clearly stated in the 2002 Blue Ribbon Panel report on ‘‘Federal Aerial Firefighting’’, the current program of relying on aging, 

former military and surplus commercial aircraft is not sustainable. Continued reliance on older aircraft adapted for firefighting use will merely perpetuate the problem over the long term. Ideally, this would mean funding and support for aircraft 

that are designed and engineered specifically for delivering fire retardant products. 

However, we do understand that we are currently in a time where fiscal constraint 

is necessary, and it is therefore only prudent to thoroughly examine all available 

sources of aircraft to ensure a cost-effective strategy. But, we must not arbitrarily 

rule out purpose-built aircraft as too expensive. We believe that the free enterprise 

system in this country is capable and poised to provide such aircraft if appropriate 

contractual assurances are provided. 

Further, we believe that the missing link in this entire issue is the role of the 

Federal Aviation Administration. Whether limited by law or merely a perceived lack 

30

of responsibility or funding, the FAA, as the world’s premier aviation agency, must. 

provide the leadership essential to assuring complete airworthiness of public use 

aircraft, including air tankers, to the same standards that have brought such resounding success to the overall airline industry around the world. The federal land 

management agencies cannot, and should not, attempt to duplicate the expertise of 

the FAA when it comes to assuring sustained airworthiness of firefighting aircraft 

that are such a vital part of protecting our nation. Therefore, we further encourage 

Congress to specifically charge the FAA with the responsibility for certifying the airworthiness of public use aircraft, including air tankers. 

In closing, I want to reiterate that it is absolutely essential that we use an interagency process to develop this national aviation strategy; one that includes the Forest Service, the Department of the Interior Bureaus, and the National Association 

of State Foresters. To accomplish this, NASF pledges our support to work together 

with the federal agencies in developing an interagency long-term strategy for our 

nation’s aerial firefighting resources; a strategy that will cost-effectively provide a 

diverse fleet of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that will meet the needs of our 

wildfire suppression mission in a safe and airworthy and sustainable manner over 

the long term. Therefore, we urge the Subcommittee to support sufficient funding 

for the federal wildland fire programs to ensure our collective ability, state and federal, to quickly and safely respond to wildfires across our country, and to provide 

for the safety of our communities, our firefighters, and the pilots and crew of our 

aircraft. 

We appreciate the opportunity to offer our testimony and look forward to the opportunity to work with Congress and the Administration to address this critical 

issue.

Senator CRAIG. Well, Jim, thank you very much for your testimony. First of all, I neglected to congratulate you on becoming 

president of the Association of State Foresters. 

Mr. HULL. Thank you. 

Senator CRAIG. I won’t suggest your year will be interesting. It 

sounds like it’s already been interesting and tremendously challenging. 

Mr. HULL. It has been that. 

Senator CRAIG. The fires you’ve had down in your region. Like 

Mr. Hall, you make a strong point for having the FAA take responsibility for certification of these aircraft and their continued airworthiness. I’m sure you’re aware that the FAA has resisted taking 

that duty on with government operated aircraft because of the cost 

and number of aircraft involved. I’m told the Forest Service has 

over 250 aircraft alone that are mostly assigned to States and 

counties. 

I’m wondering if you think it might be reasonable to have the 

FAA only deal with those aircraft involved in the delivery of retardant as a way to reduce the burden that might come if we were to 

charge the FAA with that responsibility? 

Mr. HULL. Yes, I think that’d be a great start. The real problem 

that we have right now is with airtankers, and I would like to see 

very much that change specifically in that area. 

Senator CRAIG. Okay. What about the other recommendations in 

the blue ribbon report? Are you comfortable that sufficient progress 

is being made in addressing these recommendations? 

Mr. HULL. I think, like co-chairman Jim Hall mentioned, the bottom line is no. I think that the entire response to me seems to be 

in slow motion to the point that at times I wonder if we’re going 

anywhere, to tell you the truth. 

I must say that we have a great group of folks that are working 

on this that are dedicated, committed to what they’re doing. These 

are without a doubt the finest folks in the world at managing any 

kind of disaster, and they’ve proved that over and over, whether 

31

it’s wildfire, hurricanes, tornadoes, it makes no difference. They do 

a great job there. Unfortunately, I don’t think they have the expertise to deal with aviation as it must be dealt with. It’s a highly specialized area and so I really get the feeling that basically we’re in 

this proverbial time warp. It just seems to me like the recommendations that I continue to see are the same types of recommendations that we’ve seen virtually ever since the aviation program started back in the 1950’s. And to me, I can really see great 

efforts, but it all seems to point toward the same cycles of disaster 

that we’ve experienced time and time again. 

Senator CRAIG. Okay. In your testimony, you mentioned that we 

cannot arbitrarily rule out propose-built aircraft as prohibitively 

expensive. How do you suggest this option be pursued in a cost-effective manner? 

Mr. HULL. I think first you have to define what cost effectiveness 

really is. Fire protection of any kind is not cheap, unless you’re 

talking about fire prevention, and fire prevention is one of the 

greatest tools that we have, regardless of what form that takes. 

But fire protection itself is very expensive until you factor in the 

enormous values being protected, and those values are increasing 

every single day. To be cost-effective, particularly in the area of 

firefighting assets, I think four or five things have to be there. 

No. 1, it has to be safe, it has to be reliable, it has to be sustainable, and it has to be affordable. And I would have to think that 

under the current system, the program is affordable, but that’s the 

only ingredient that’s there. Safety is not there, reliability is not 

there, and sustainability is certainly not there. So I would say the 

current system is not reliable. I guess my suggestion to encourage 

this to happen lies in the free enterprise system to solve the problem. And in that I would see these factors taking place. 

No. 2, tell the private sector what needs to be accomplished, provide them long-term contracts and incentives to allow them to 

make the investments that are essential to develop these kind of 

aircrafts to solve the problem, insist that the FAA provide the certification to make sure the airworthiness is there, and then get out 

of the way and let the private sector develop it. 

I’ve heard one possible scenario that might save some money in 

this process and that would be to take some of the current airframes as they are being developed at the factory and at that point 

add tanks to them. I have no idea if that’s a possibility. It’s way 

beyond my understanding, but the main thing in this is I know 

that the aircraft industry is poised and ready to develop aircraft 

that are purpose built for this purpose. We just need to give them 

the incentives and the contractual arrangements that allow them 

to do it. 

Senator CRAIG. Well, once again, thank you very much for coming up to testify. We appreciate it. Your expertise, your experience 

in these areas, we’ll continue to tap it as we nudge, push, and pull 

this program along. It’s obviously a very critical component in firefighting and you’ve listed the criteria from which we need to review 

it. And reliability and safety are critical, and having obviously the 

resources available at the time necessary becomes awfully important, too. Again, thank you very much. We’ll keep the committee 

open for how long for questions? 

32

Mr. GLADICS. Ten days. 

Senator CRAIG. Ten days and the record will remain open for the 

purposes of questions to be addressed to any of the witnesses of the 

panels. 

Thank you all very much. The subcommittee will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(33)

APPENDIX 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

RESPONSE OF MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, TO

QUESTION FROM SENATOR WYDEN

Question 1. In the FY 2005 Interior Appropriation Act (S. 2804) the Senate report 

(S. Rpt. 108-341) directed the Forest Service to develop a strategic plan for procuring and managing large air tankers, as follows: ‘‘The Committee believes action 

taken by the Forest Service to ground large airtankers at the beginning of the 2004 

fire season has hampered the ability of land management agencies to mobilize efficiently the equipment necessary to protect natural resources and communities. The 

Committee expects the Forest Service to move aggressively to address its future 

needs for aviation assets, and work with the Committee to ensure that all necessary 

components of the aviation fleet, including both large airtankers and rotor aircraft, 

are available to maximize firefighting capability. The Committee directs the Forest 

Service to provide it with a strategic plan by March 1, 2005 for procuring and managing these critical assets, and further directs that this plan be developed with alternatives that include input provided by private industry.’’

Why hasn’t this Plan been completed? How can you propose, for the 2006 fire season, a combination of large airtankers, helitankers, and single engine air tankers 

to make up for the capability lost by the reduction in the number of large airtankers 

contracted, but you have no long term plan on which to base this proposal? 

Answer. A comprehensive, long-term plan is under development by the National 

Interagency Aviation Council (NIAC) with strategic options that consider all aspects 

of the wildland fire mission. The analysis considers all aircraft types in current use 

and assesses options for providing effective and cost-efficient aircraft that will meet 

interagency suppression and fuels management goals in the future. The planned 

completion date is December, 2006. 

Each year we adjust the kinds, types and numbers of resources to best meet the 

anticipated needs of the current fire season. In 2006, we plan to have sufficient resources to maintain an equivalent level of effectiveness as we have achieved on initial attack in previous years. 

RESPONSES OF MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, TO

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SALAZAR

Question 1a. How has the retirement of certain makes and models of aircraft, 

such as the Beechcraft Baron, affected the availability of aircraft to suppress 

wildfires? 

Answer. We have effectively substituted other aircraft as replacements. Consequently, there has been minimal impact on wildfire operations. 

Question 1b. Are there less aircraft available? More? The same? 

Answer. Yes, however, there have been no shortages or unfilled orders for aviation 

assets. Overall, our initial attack rate has remained stable since 2003. 

Question 2. The USFS acquired 3 Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft from the Navy to 

use as large retardant aircraft. Will those aircraft be converted and available this 

fire season? Where will those aircraft be based? 

Answer. The three Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft will require extensive modifications and are likely not to be available for this year’s wildfire season. We will conduct a thorough analysis and assessment of these resources and, should that confirm the modification and maintenance of these aircraft be shown to be cost-effective 

and cost-efficient, would perform the modifications with an anticipated aircraft 

availability 2007. 

34

RESPONSES OF MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, TO

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BURNS

Question 1. In the Fiscal Year 2005 Interior Appropriations bill, the Forest Service was directed to develop a report on the future composition of the aviation fleet. 

This report was due on March 1, 2005. Can you give me any insight to what is holding this report up and what the contents of the report are? 

Answer. A comprehensive, long-term plan is under development by the National 

Interagency Aviation Council (NIAC) with strategic options that consider all aspects 

of the wildland fire mission. The analysis considers all aircraft types in current use 

and assesses options to providing effective and cost-efficient aircraft that will meet 

interagency suppression and fuels management goals in the future. Identifying and 

coordinating the needs of the various Federal wildfire agencies as well as coordination with the States have proven to be the greatest challenge in completing this 

task. The planned completion date is December, 2006. 

Question 2. I am also concerned about the future use of military surplus aircraft. 

When do you expect to let these contracts and how much it will cost to retrofit the 

planes? 

Answer. The cost of retrofitting these aircraft is currently being evaluated. An accurate estimate of the cost will be available as soon as the aircraft can be thoroughly inspected later this month. We anticipate awarding a contract by early summer 2006 for the conversion of the aircraft. The actual conversion effort will take 

approximately 12 months. We anticipate the aircraft being available for the 2007 

fire season. 

Question 3. Will the government still hold title to these aircraft? 

Answer. Yes, the Forest Service plans to maintain ownership of these aircraft and 

offer operation and maintenance contract to commercial operators. Once these contracts are awarded, the aircraft will be provided to successful bidders as government 

furnished equipment. 

Question 3a. If so, will the government be liable if there are accidents with these 

aircraft rather than if they were solely owned by the operator? 

Answer. If the government retains title to the aircraft, it might be sued for negligent maintenance or negligently entrusting it to incompetent personnel. If the government does not retain title, such allegations cannot be made. As a practical matter, this does not appear to be a significant risk. Aircraft accidents involving such 

aircraft generally are caused by either pilot error or mechanical failure, including 

metal fatigue. Regardless of who owns the aircraft, they will be piloted by contractor 

employee; thus, the Government will not be liable for pilot error. Similarly, the Government will not be conducting maintenance of the aircraft, so the Government 

should not be liable for any mechanical failure. The two most recent accidents were 

caused by breakup of the aircraft in flight caused by metal fatigue cracks. Again, 

even where the Government holds title, the contractors will be responsible for inspections to detect such cracks. Accordingly, the Government should not be liable 

for such failures. 

Question 3b. Does it make sense to give the agency the authority to sell these aircraft to operators in order to avoid additional government liability? 

Answer. Transferring the aircraft to private contractors would not avoid Government liability. Any decision whether to retain ownership or sell the aircraft to private contractors should be based on other factors. 

Question 3c. Would that require a change in law? 

Answer. Yes, the Forest Service, like other agencies, lacks authority to sell property directly to private contractors except under very limited circumstances. Congress would need to amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act. 

Question 3d. If we did allow sale would we need to give the Forest Service the 

authority to enter into longer term contracts so that operators would know if they 

bought the aircraft they would get a return on their investment since they would 

be guaranteed that they would fly the planes for long enough time to capitalize their 

investment? 

Answer. Currently, Forest Service has authority to enter into three-year contracts 

for air tanker services. For many years, private contractors have acquired aircraft 

and competed for such contracts every three years. However, acquisition costs have 

generally been very low. Whether the contractors will need longer term contracts 

to spread the acquisition and conversion costs over a longer term and thus lower 

the price for their contracts will depend on the acquisition costs and other financial 

factors. In the past, the Forest Service has used nearly all aircraft available for air 

tanker services. Thus, the contractors might compete every three years for a specific 

contract, but could count on receiving a contract for their aircraft in at least some 

locations. Generally, the contractors could then spread their fixed costs over many 

35

years. If contractors could not rely on having contracts for at least some aircraft for 

a longer time period, one alternative would be to enter into longer term contracts. 

Congress would need to give authority to the Forest Service to enter into such 

longer term contracts. 

RESPONSE OF JAMES HALL AND JAMES B. HULL TO QUESTION FROM SENATOR

SALAZAR

Question 1. Not long ago, the 9/11 Commission graded the federal government on 

the implementation of its recommendations. If you were to do the same type of thing 

for the Blue Ribbon Commission’s Report, what grade would you hand out to the 

agencies and why? 

Answer. We are very pleased that the question asked us to grade the federal government and while Mr. Salazar mentioned the agencies, we think it is essential to 

expand the grading to include the full scope of those we addressed in our report, 

that is, the USDA Forest Service, the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land 

Management, the Federal Aviation Administration, Congress and the Administration. Therefore, on behalf of the Panel I will provide you with a grade for each, from 

our perspective:

1) USDA Forest Service and DOI Bureau of Land Management—At best we 

would give these agencies a grade of ‘‘C-’’. They clearly realize the seriousness 

of the situation and the vital role that aerial fire fighting resources play in the 

nation’s wildfire suppression responsibilities. At least they are attempting to do 

something, even if it is to sustain a very old and archaic aviation program, but 

that seems to be their only choice given financial constraints and administrative 

and political realities. 

These federal agencies appear to either be in slow motion in fully addressing 

the Blue Ribbon Panel’s report, or in the proverbial ‘‘time warp′′—trying to reinvent the same old aviation system that has for 50 plus years now proven over 

and over to be unsustainable. 

As we testified, some minor progress has been made in the area of safety, but 

accidents continue to happen and the safety record remains unacceptable. For 

further information on this, please refer to the written testimony that I submitted on behalf of the panel prior to the hearing of 2/15/06. 

We also reported that under the current system of aircraft certification, contracting, and operation, key elements of the aerial fire fighting fleet are 

unsustainable. Contracting still leaves much to be desired as it sets up a ‘‘value 

based’’ assessment that seems unduly influenced by price. Moreover, it provides 

little encouragement for scheduled maintenance and time off for pilots to relieve 

stress and fatigue. In the long term, it provides no incentive for the free enterprise system to work to develop a purpose built plane(s) to replace the failed 

approach that repeatedly sees the agencies having to rely on old surplus military or commercial aircraft for conversion to air tankers. 

Mission muddle amongst the agencies, which is caused by differences in culture, organizational structure and philosophical matters, and land management 

objectives, continues today and is not conducive to solving the problem. However, the most dominant problem is that these outstanding land management 

professionals do not have the technical expertise necessary to oversee and conduct a highly complex and much needed quality aviation program from the 

ground up. This is not to be confused with their phenomenal expertise in the 

tactical use of aircraft, as the premier emergency response management organizations in the world. 

Bottom line, the current aerial fire fighting system is not sustainable, and it 

is not possible for these federal land management agencies to improve their 

grade of ‘‘C-’’ by themselves. 

2) Federal Aviation Administration—We would also have to give the FAA a 

maximum grade of ‘‘C-’’ in response to the Blue Ribbon Panel’s report. We spent 

extensive time describing the FAA’s lack of attention to certification of air tankers and argued that a vital safety link is missing when the FAA does not certify 

airtankers. Whether limited by law or merely a perceived lack of responsibility 

or funding—we feel that the FAA should have aggressively sought to rectify this 

deplorable situation instead of rationalizing its way around taking no responsibility for it. We give the FAA a grade of ‘‘C-’’ for taking some actions to help 

the USDA Forest Service get connected with some aviation specialists and because apparently it does not in fact have the statutory authority to deal with 

public use aircraft. 

36

3) Congress and The Administration—The Blue Ribbon Panel went into considerable detail with our Finding #2 dealing with the fact that wild land firefighting has grown to a level of importance and magnitude that warrants the 

attention of national leaders. It is impossible for any of the federal agencies to 

adequately address this massive situation by themselves, or even collectively, 

without strong support, commitment and funding from the Administration and 

Congress. After three years there is no tangible evidence that our national leadership has any inclination to help provide a sustainable aerial fire-fighting program for the nation. 

A safe and efficient aviation program requires at least three basic characteristics: 1) It must be reliable; 2) It must be sustainable; and 3) It must be affordable. The current system that Congress and the Administration seem to favor 

meets only one of these criteria—it is affordable. In fact, we would express it 

as a very ‘‘cheap’’ way of trying to do business. This is not good enough. 

The puzzling part of this scenario is that we have a private free enterprise 

aviation system in this country that seems to be poised and ready to develop 

the type of purpose built aviation aircraft and program that would sustain us 

for decades to come, but they cannot make the required private investments 

without some sort of commitment from the federal government that the products will be utilized in such a manner as to make it feasible for the long term. 

We need to get the federal land management agencies out of the aviation 

business so that they can concentrate on their areas of expertise. This would 

provide our citizens with the most effective and efficient aerial fire protection 

available. 

We would suggest that the Congress and Administration jointly form another 

Blue Ribbon Panel to study and outline how a privately oriented aerial fire 

fighting (large air tanker) program might be developed, funded and operated to 

serve the federal land management agencies, not be controlled by them. This 

matter is urgent, and continuing down the current path is a waste of time and 

places the American public at greater risk every day, to say nothing of the pilots and others that are charged with flying old converted military and commercial air tankers. 

By the way, we will resist the urge to give Congress and the Administration 

a grade for their lack of taking action to set in place a workable solution to resolving the aerial fire-fighting dilemma.

Æ