U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Sodium Explosion Critically 

Burns Firefighters

Newton, Massachusetts

USFA-TR-075/October 1993

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

Arlington, Virginia, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the Fire Administration 

in carrying out the Fire Reports Program.

The USFA greatly appreciates the cooperation received from Fire Chief Joseph S. Daniele and Captain 

Joseph La Croix of the Newton, Massachusetts, Fire Department; Trooper James Bradbury of the Office 

of the State Fire Marshal; and Steve Coan, Director of the Massachusetts Firefighting Academy.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton 

Avenue, Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the USFA Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Sodium Explosion Critically 

Burns Firefighters

Newton, Massachusetts

Investigated by: J. Gordon Routley

 

This is Report 075 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-4-4329 to the United 

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), the mission 

of the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) is to 

reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. We 

serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, and in partnership with fire protection and emergency 

service communities. With a commitment to 

excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data initiatives.

TAblE oF ConTEnTS

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

NEWTON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

SODIUM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

DISPOSAL OF WASTE SODIUM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

INCIDENT HISTORY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

FIRE CONTROL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

ANALYSIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

AFTERWORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Appendix A: Sodium MSDS Sheets and Other Materials on Sodium

Properties, Uses, Storage, and Handling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Appendix B: Problems Relatingto Fire Service Awareness of SCBA Fire

Resistance Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Appendix c: Photographs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

1

Sodium Explosion Critically Burns Firefighters

Newton, Massachusetts

october 25, 1993

Local Contact: Fire Chief Joseph S. Daniele

Newton Fire Department

1164 Newton Street

Newton, MA 02159

(617) 552-7272

O

Eleven firefighters were burned, six seriously, one critically, and one extremely critically, in an explosion that occurred while they were attempting to extinguish a sodium fire in a metals processing 

establishment in Newton, Massachusetts, on October 25, 1993. The incident illustrates how quickly 

and unpredictable an apparently minor hazardous materials situation can change, with tragic consequences. It also shows how standard protective clothing and equipment, designed for structural 

firefighting, is dangerously inadequate for a molten metals incident.

The situation was caused by a deviation from standard procedures for handling waste sodium at the 

facility. The incident provides an important series of lessons for all firefighters on the risks involved 

with sodium and other flammable metals and on the need to obtain reliable information from 

responsible individuals at hazardous materials incidents.

Fires in sodium and other waste reactive metals are uncommon, and the circumstances of this incident are particularly unusual. Previous experience and pre-fire planning at the facility contributed 

to a false sense of security among the firefighters, who believed that the incident could be handled 

easily and without significant risk. Employees at the facility did not provide information that would 

have caused the officers in charge of the incident to more fully evaluate the risks of this particular 

situation before initiating action.
2 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

SUMMARY oF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Cause of Explosion Employees deviated from standard procedures by attempting to dispose of an excessive 

amount of residual sodium. The sodium overflowed and came in contact with water 

causing an explosion and fire.

Second Explosion A second explosion occurred when firefighters were attempting to extinguish the residual 

fire from the first explosion. The firefighters were splashed with burning molten sodium.

Casualties Eleven firefighters burned, two very critically, six others seriously. Two plant employees 

were also injured.

Risk Assessment The hazards of burning liquid sodium exceed the capabilities of the fire department. 

There is an extreme risk of explosion, extinguishing agents are ineffective, and protective 

clothing is inadequate.

Additional Hazard The use of the same enclosure to perform wet washing and to burn-off excess sodium 

created an unnecessary hazard. Sodium should never be handled in a location where 

there is any possibility of contact with water.

Action Plan Responding fire department personnel were not provided with essential information that 

should have been considered in the development of an action plan. A full evaluation of 

the risks and potential consequences of this incident would have resulted in the conclusion that the safe plan would have been to take no action.

Structural Protective Clothing Structural protective clothing are self-contained breathing apparatus and are not 

designed to provide adequate protection for exposure to molten metal. There is no 

practical protective clothing for this hazard.

Proper Use of Protective Clothing Members involved in the incident would have been better protected if they had been 

wearing full protective clothing ensembles that meet current standards and had used the 

chin straps on their helmets, pulled up 3/4 length boots, and (in one case) not worn a 

turnout coat without the liner.

Communications With ambulance radios set to police (dispatch) channel, heavy radio traffic interfered with 

the Incident Command getting them into the scene to transport burn victims.

Molten Metal Burns caused by molten metal are more severe than other types of burns, because the 

metal is extremely hot and impregnates protective clothing.

The objective of the United States Fire Administration, in preparing this report, and of Chief Joseph 

Daniele of the Newton Fire Department in requesting the participation of the U.S. Fire Administration 

in the investigation, is to share the lessons that were learned so that similar painful and tragic situations can be avoided in the future. The actions that were taken prior to and during this incident have 

been analyzed in great detail to determine what went wrong.

The analysis, which was conducted with the luxury of time and access to all available information 

and expertise, indicates that the action that was taken involved a high level of risk and resulted in 

the situation that is described. It must be recognized that these resources were not available to the 

individuals who had to face the situation as it was presented to them at the time. This report should 

not be interpreted as a criticism of the decisions that were made or the actions that were taken.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 3

N

Newton is a suburb located immediately to the west of Boston, Massachusetts. Newton is primarily a 

residential community with approximately 80,000 residents, although it has significant commercial 

and business areas and a relatively small industrial area. The community includes some very affluent 

areas, as well as a mixture of other residential neighborhoods. The main campus of Boston College 

and several smaller educational institutions are also located in Newton.

The Newton Fire Department has 199 career personnel, operating seven engine companies and three 

truck companies, with an assistant chief on duty at all times. All of the companies operate with four 

member crews during the winter months; however, the engine companies often operate with three 

crew members in the warmer months.

The Newton Fire Department is headed by Chief Joseph S. Daniele and includes its own Fire Prevention 

Bureau and Communications Center. Newton takes an active part in Metro Fire, the mutual aid system that covers Boston and 35 surrounding jurisdictions. The Newton Fire Communications Center 

serves as the primary mutual aid coordinating center for the Metro Fire system. Newton also participates in the regional hazardous materials team with several of the other Metro Fire jurisdictions. 

The Boston Fire Department operates an additional Hazmat team to serve the central city, and the two 

teams provide backup for each other.

Emergency medical service in Newton is provided by a private ambulance company, under the direction of the police department. Advanced life support ambulances are stationed at two fire stations 

but are dispatched by the police department. The fire department does not routinely respond to EMS 

calls, unless they involve rescue or extrication. The ambulance company serves several communities 

in the area and has units deployed at several additional locations around Newton.

LO

The facility where the incident occurred is located in an industrial area in the southern part of the 

city. The complex consists of several one story brick industrial buildings on a crowded site. The 

particular building where the incident occurred is toward the back of the complex. The site plan and 

building plan appear on the following pages. Several “high tech” companies have their manufacturing and processing facilities in the immediate area.

The incident occurred at a plant operated by H. C. Starck, Inc., a multinational company that produces a wide range of products. The facility in Newton produces items manufactured from tantalum, 

a rare metal that is used for components that require exceptionally high strength and temperature 

resistance. The tantalum parts are used in assemblies such as jet engines and nuclear reactors.

Tantalum is shipped to the H. C. Starck facility as a salt, tantalum chloride, which must be converted 

to an extremely high grade metallic state before it can be molded and machined into finished products. Sodium is used in the process as a reducing agent; the tantalum is converted from the salt 

compound to a pure metal and the metallic sodium is converted to a non-hazardous salt compound 

(sodium chloride). The reaction takes place in a closed system and all of the by-products are retained 

for other industrial uses.
4 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

H.C. STARCK INC. – SITE PLAN 

NEWTON, MASSACHUSETTS
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 5

The facility is reported to have an exceptionally good relationship with the Newton Fire Department. 

The plant has a full-time safety specialist, who maintains a close liaison with the Newton Fire 

Department, and the company is involved with the Local Emergency Planning Committee for hazardous materials incidents. All of the Newton Fire Department companies that respond to the plan 

had been given familiarization tours and were provided with information on the hazards of materials 

used at the plant, including extinguishing procedures for minor sodium fires. Employees are also 

trained to handle minor sodium fires.

There had been some incidents involving sodium at the facility in the past. The Newton Fire 

Department had responded to some of these incidents, which were handled with no unusual problems. Large containers of sodium chloride are located in areas where sodium is handled for use as 

an extinguishing agent.

SoDIUM

Sodium is classified as a hazardous material, primarily because of its extreme reactivity when it comes 

in contact with water and many other substances.1 (See Appendix A for the Sodium MSDS Sheet and 

other material on its properties, uses, storage, and handling.) Because of its reactivity, sodium is 

seldom encountered in the pure metallic state, except when it is being used in an industrial process 

or for some extremely special application. It must be shipped in sealed containers, because it will 

react even with the moisture in the air on a humid day.

Sodium is a constituent of several non-hazardous compounds that are in common use, such as table 

salt (sodium chloride) and several pharmaceutical products. The metallic form of sodium is used in 

applications that require unusual heat transfer and electrical conductivity properties. Pure sodium 

is encountered more frequently, however, as an agent in the processing of other substances. It is an 

extremely powerful reducing agent, with the ability to strip oxygen atoms and other atoms or molecules from otherwise stable molecules. These reactions usually release large amounts of energy and 

additional chemical by-products are often created, some of which are hazardous in themselves.

Sodium is most widely recognized for its violent reaction with water. Pure sodium will break apart 

water molecules, separating the hydrogen atoms from the oxygen atoms. The sodium combines 

with the oxygen and liberates the hydrogen. The oxidation of the sodium is a combustion process, 

in which the sodium burns with a yellow flame to produce an ash (sodium oxide), which is liberated as a dense white acrid smoke. The hydrogen is released as a gas, which usually explodes in the 

air as the hydrogen recombines with oxygen from the ambient atmosphere.

In addition to creating sodium oxide and hydrogen gas, contact with moisture can create sodium 

hydroxide, a corrosive liquid, which can cause corrosion burns to exposed skin.

The power of sodium to break apart other compounds that contain oxygen atoms and/or atoms 

with similar properties to oxygen make it an extremely valuable reducing agent with numerous 

applications in the processing of other materials. Sodium is a solid at normal ambient temperatures 

1 El DuPont is the only remaining producer of sodium in the United States. The demand for sodium has decreased 

significantly in recent years due to the switch from regular gasoline to unleaded gasoline as a motor fuel. Sodium was 

used in the production of tetraethyl lead, an important additive in regular gasoline. Sodium is also used as a coolant in 

some nuclear reactors, and particularly in experimental breeder reactors. For additional information on sodium, readers 

should contact El DuPont at (800) 441-9372.
6 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

but melts at the relatively low temperature of 208 degrees Fahrenheit. Above 208 degrees, it can 

be transferred and mixed with other substances as a liquid; however, it must be kept in a closed 

system because it will auto-ignite in air at temperatures only slightly above its melting temperature. 

Liquefied sodium flows easily, with a viscosity similar to water.

Once ignited, sodium is very difficult to extinguish. It will react violently with water, as noted 

previously, and with any extinguishing agent that contains water. It will also react with many other 

common extinguishing agents, including carbon dioxide and the halogen compounds and most dry 

chemical agents. The only safe and effective extinguishing agents are completely dry inert materials, 

such as Class D extinguishing agents, soda ash, graphite, diatomaceous earth, or sodium chloride, all 

of which can be used to bury a small quantity of burning sodium and exclude oxygen from reaching 

the metal.

The extinguishing agent must be absolutely dry, as even a trace of water in the material can react 

with the burning sodium to cause an explosion. Sodium chloride is recognized as an extinguishing 

medium because of its chemical stability; however, it is hydroscopic (has the property of attracting 

and holding water molecules on the surface of the salt crystals) and must be kept absolutely dry to be 

used safely as an extinguishing agent. Every crystal of sodium chloride also contains a trace quantity 

of moisture within the structure of the crystal.

Molten sodium is extremely dangerous because it is much more reactive than a solid mass. In the 

liquid form, every sodium atom is free and mobile to instantaneously combine with any available 

oxygen atom or other oxidizer, and any gaseous by-product will be created as a rapidly expanding 

gas bubble within the molten mass. Even a minute amount of water can create this type of reaction. 

Any amount of water introduced into a pool of molten sodium is likely to cause a violent explosion 

inside the liquid mass, releasing the hydrogen as a rapidly expanding gas and causing the molten 

sodium to erupt from the container.

When molten sodium is involved in a fire, the combustion occurs at the surface of the liquid. An 

inert gas, such as nitrogen or argon, can be used to form an inert layer over the pool of burning liquid sodium, but the gas must be applied very gently and contained over the surface. Except for soda 

ash, most of the powdered agents that are used to extinguish small fires in solid pieces or shallow 

pools will sink to the bottom of a molten mass of burning sodium – the sodium will float to the top 

and continue to burn. If the burning sodium is in a container, it may be feasible to extinguish the 

fire by placing a lid on the container to exclude oxygen.

Most municipal fire departments rarely, if ever, come in contact with pure sodium, particularly 

molten sodium, in any significant quantities. It is shipped in sealed containers and can only be used 

under extremely controlled conditions in closed industrial processes. It is most often used within 

large industrial complexes, where municipal fire departments are unlikely to become involved with 

it. Industries that use sodium must be extremely careful with it, because of the consequences of 

using it unsafely; many have plant fire brigades trained to handle small sodium incidents.

It is also used in high energy/high temperature systems as a heat transfer medium. In this application it may be encountered at some nuclear power facilities and in experimental installations that are 

involved in high energy power generation and transmission.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 7

DISPoSAl oF WASTE SoDIUM

The pure sodium is shipped to the plant in Newton in 55 gallon steel drums each of which contains 

400 lbs. of reactor grade (more than 99.9 percent pure) sodium metal in a fused (solid) state. The 

solid mass of sodium occupies all but a few inches at the top of the drum and the remaining space is 

filled with argon, an inert gas, to avoid contamination of the product in transit or storage.

To extract the sodium, the steel drum is placed in a special heater jacket that warms the contents 

until the sodium liquefies. A bayonet pick-up tube is then inserted into the drum and additional 

inert gas is introduced at the top of the drum, to displace the liquefied sodium. The sodium is drawn 

up into the tube and directly into the closed processing system. The entire process takes place in a 

sealed atmosphere, since even the moisture and other contaminants in the outside ambient air can 

contaminate the sodium, creating a risk of explosion and making it unusable for the process.

The normal procedure is to extract all of the sodium from the drum, sometimes over a period of 

several days, down to the point that it can no longer be drawn into the pick-up tube. This usually 

leaves two to five pounds of sodium at the bottom of the drum which is allowed to cool and solidify 

after the tube is withdrawn. The residual sodium, referred to as a “heel,” usually occupies less than 

1/2 inch at the bottom of the drum. This amount of sodium is impractical to extract or recycle; 

burning-off is a common practice in the industry to dispose of small quantities of residual sodium. 

Burning-off the residual sodium avoids having to dispose of the drums as a hazardous waste. This 

is practical, because the sodium can be completely consumed and converted to sodium oxide ash, 

which is collected by a filter system and can be disposed of much more easily. The plant routinely 

has several drums with residual sodium to burn off each week. The task is usually performed during 

the second or third shift.

The waste sodium is burned-off in a special enclosure that was built for cleaning drums. The room 

is approximately 8 ft. x 10 ft., with an exhaust system built into the roof to draw out the smoke. 

The burning sodium produces large quantities of smoke which is passed through a scrubber system 

to capture the sodium oxide ash and prevent atmospheric contamination. The room has concrete 

block walls, with a large blowout explosion relief panel in the exterior wall to allow the force of an 

explosion to be vented to the outside. The blowout panel consists of a plywood sheet, held in-place 

by a metal framework.

The access to the enclosure is a double doorway opening into a maintenance area of the plant. The 

doors are “blast doors” reinforced to stay closed while the force of an explosion is directed to the 

outside through the blowout panel, instead of through the doorway to the interior of the plant.

In addition to being designed for the disposal of waste sodium, the room was also designed for 

wet washing drums and equipment that had contained other products and other items used in the 

process. Spray nozzles are located in one part of the room and the floor is a heavy metal grate, which 

allows any runoff to drain into a system of shallow troughs that lead to a holding tank and waste 

treatment system. Drums and equipment can be placed in the room and flushed, with all runoff 

draining down through the grates and into the troughs. There is often residual water under the floor 

grates, after the room has been used for wet washing.

To burn-off a sodium drum, the near empty drum is placed in a special cradle that sets it at a slight 

angle inside the room (diagram appears on the following page). The cradle has a rocker end to allow 

the drum to be tilted from a vertical position to an almost horizontal position. A metal drip pan is 
8 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 9

placed under the drum cradle to catch anything that might drip out of the drum and keep it from 

contacting the floor grates or falling into the troughs. The top of the drum is completely removed 

and the drum is positioned with the open end facing toward the blast doors.

After the blast doors are closed and secured with a vertical bar, a worker ignites the sodium with 

a MAPP gas lance, which is inserted through an access hole in the blast doors and directly into the 

drum. Any residual sodium coating the sides of the drum is melted and forms a pool at the low end 

of the drum. When the sodium is ignited, the lance is removed and the product is allowed to burn 

itself out, which usually takes one to two hours. The sodium first melts and form a puddle in the low 

end of the drum, then the liquid usually burns calmly with a glowing red combustion.

The burning sodium sometimes sputters and emits small flares of glowing metal which are contained within the room. A heavy gray/white smoke is produced, which is drawn immediately up 

into the exhaust system and out through the scrubbers. When the sodium is completely burned out 

and the drum has cooled, it can be removed and sent out for disposal as a non-hazardous waste.

InCIDEnT HISToRY

On the afternoon of October 25, 1993, a drum in the heater jacket was allowed to cool before all of 

the sodium had been extracted. Due to a mathematical error by the operator, approximately 100 lbs. 

of sodium, almost one quarter of the drum’s capacity, was left in the drum when the heaters were 

turned off. The re-solidified mass of sodium could not be reheated and drawn into the processing 

system, because it had been contaminated by contact with outside air.

The company’s standard operating procedures contained detailed specific instructions on how to 

burn-off the sodium residue from a drum, anticipating that less than 10 pounds of residue would 

have to be burned off. There was no reference to guide employees on disposal of a large heel of 

sodium.

Similar situations were reported to have happened occasionally in the past and caused major problems for the employees responsible for disposal of the drums. On one occasion, several months 

earlier, they had used a chipping hammer to chip the sodium out of the barrel and burn it off in 

small quantities. The chipping-out process was labor intensive and time consuming and, when the 

sodium was chipped out, the chips came in contact with the sweaty skin of the worker. This caused 

painful burns as the sodium reacted with his perspiration. They had decided to do something different if it happened again. The alternatives are to dispose of the drum as hazardous waste or to return 

it to the original supplier for recycling.

On the night of October 25, the night shift supervisor advised the worker who handled the drums 

that they had another drum with a large quantity of residual sodium and they were going to try 

burning it off, following the normal disposal procedure. They anticipated that it would take longer, 

possibly all night to burn this quantity of sodium.

The room had been used earlier in the evening to wash a reactor head and the floor grates were 

reported to be damp when the drip pan was placed on top of them. The pan, which is leaned against 

the wall of the room when it is not in use, is also believed to have been wet when it was laid on top 

of the floor grates and there may have been water under the grates.

The drum was removed from the process area and transported to the disposal room where the top 

was removed. When it was attempted to place the drum in the cradle, the mass of solid sodium at 
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

the bottom would not allow it to sit in the normal near-horizontal position; a metal agitator shaft 

was used as a strut to keep it from tilting back to the upright position. The braced drum was placed 

in the normal position for burning, on top of the drip pan with the open end toward the door.

Shortly after the sodium was ignited with the MAPP gas lance, the worker looked through a viewing 

port and noted that the fire was creating much more smoke than usual. He also noted within a few 

minutes that the solid sodium was liquefying and creating a liquid pool that was quickly filling the 

deep end of the drum. He became concerned and summoned the supervisor who had directed him 

to burn the drum in this manner.

Moments later, as the supervisor and two employees were discussing possible courses of action, they 

noted that the liquid level was almost up to the lip of the drum at the open end and the heavy smoke 

was filling the burnroom. A few second later an explosion occurred inside the burnroom that shook 

the area and knocked them off their feet. Although the blast doors held closed, some flecks of burning sodium were expelled through the openings in the door and struck two of the plant personnel, 

causing minor burns. White smoke filled the immediate area and began to spread to other parts of 

the building. All three employees evacuated the area, assisted by other plant personnel. The injured 

personnel were treated for minor burns by other employees.

FIRE DEPARTMEnT RESPonSE

The Newton Fire Department received box 6237, the alarm box located at the front door of the 

building, at 2131 hours. As the box was being transmitted, the first of several telephone calls was 

received, reporting an explosion and fire with injuries at the plant. The details given by callers were 

incomplete and conflicting; however, the assignment was upgraded from the regular response (two 

engines, one truck, and a command officer) to the full building fire response, which adds an engine 

company from the neighboring town of Needham. An additional Newton engine company was also 

dispatched as the 4th due engine company on the full box assignment. All responding units were 

advised of the reports of a fire and explosion with injuries.

The Newton Police Department, which dispatches the private ambulance company that serves the 

city, also received reports indicating an explosion with injuries. Two ambulances and several police 

cars were dispatched to the scene.

The first companies to arrive reported smoke coming from the building but no evidence of a major 

fire or explosion damage. Engines 7 and 3, Ladder 2, and Car 2, the on-duty Assistant Chief, took 

positions in the parking area near the front entrance to the building and made contact with several 

employees who described the situation. There was no particular employee who appeared to be in 

charge or to be specifically responsible for providing information to the fire department. The shift 

supervisor had been injured in the initial explosion and was being treated by other employees.

The employees advised that the material on fire was sodium, that approximately 100 pounds of 

sodium was involved, and emphasized that it was important not to use water on it or to allow it 

come in contact with water. The employees also advised that salt should be used as the extinguishing 

agent. The firefighters were not advised that there could be water in the area from the previous wet 

washing operation.

Note: Sodium chloride is used as an extinguishing agent at this plant, because large quantities of pure dry sodium chloride 

are used for metal processing and the company keeps plenty on hand at all times. Large salt containers, designated for fighting 
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 11

combustible metals fires, are distributed around the plant. Scoops to apply the salt are kept in the containers, under a lid that is 

designed to exclude moisture.

These salt containers could be moved around on wheeled dollies and brought to the area where the material was burning. 

Additional quantities of bagged salt were stored in another area of the plant and could be used as a backup supply.

The assistant chief’s aide, accompanied by a plant employee, made an initial reconnaissance entry 

to the fire area, which was approximately 200 feet back into the building. He was able to get close 

enough to open the doors to the fire room and see that there was a barrel burning and additional 

glowing material on the floor, apparently in the drip pan. There was a considerable amount of smoke 

in the interior; however, he was able to make this entry to the fire area and back without protective 

clothing or breathing apparatus. He returned to report his observations to the Assistant Chief, who 

had assumed command of the incident and was in contact with plant personnel inside the front door 

to the building. The Aide then went with a plant employee to open doors and activate exhaust fans 

to ventilate the interior of the building.

The assistant chief had been told that the drum contained about 100 lbs. of sodium, which would 

take all night to burn out. He was concerned about maintaining the integrity of the steel drum if the 

fire continued to burn and was told by an employee that the fire might burn through the bottom of 

the drum in three quarters of an hour. He was not aware of the fact that 100 pounds is far in excess 

of the normal amount of sodium that is burned in the disposal room or that the room had been used 

for wet washing earlier in the evening.

The assistant chief and the personnel from the first three companies were sufficiently familiar with 

the facility and confident in their previous experience with minor sodium fires that they felt they 

could handle the situation safely. They were familiar with the salt containers and enlisted the assistance of several employees to move some of the containers from other areas closer to the fire location. 

The assistant chief warned the crews to use all their standard protective clothing and self-contained 

breathing apparatus.

All three companies proceeded to the area of the disposal room. Several members worked with the 

plant personnel who were collecting salt containers from different parts of the building and staging them in the area outside the doorway to the fire area. The employees also obtained additional 

bagged salt from a storage area, but were directed to stay out of the immediate area of the fire by the 

firefighters.

The firefighters found several lumps of burning sodium in the drip pan and splattered around a small 

area, and a glowing red liquid in the drum, which they described as looking like volcanic lava. The 

liquid level in the drum was estimated at eight to ten inches deep. The drum was standing upright 

in the pan. Apparently the explosion had dislodged the metal strut and the weight at the bottom end 

of the drum had caused it to rotate to a vertical position. Heavy smoke was coming from the open 

top of the drum and visibility in the area was very limited.

Two lieutenants entered the small room to apply the salt, giving their first attention to the burning 

metal in the drip pan. The other firefighters scooped salt from the containers and passed the scoops 

to the lieutenants. A shovel that was found in the area was also used to bury the burning material in 

mounds of salt. Within a few minutes they had successfully buried all the exposed burning sodium 

and this part of the fire was considered under control, although the buried metal continued to flow 

red through the salt.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The two lieutenants then turned their attention to the fire in the drum. One grasped the edge of 

the drum with a gloved had and tilted it slightly to provide better access. Several scoops of salt were 

dumped into the drum by one of the officers with no apparent effect. The other lieutenant picked 

up the shovel and used it to transfer more salt into the burning drum.

When the first shovel of salt was dumped into the drum, there was a violent explosion. A fireball 

enveloped most of the area and burning molten sodium erupted up and out of the drum, splashed 

off the walls and ceilings, and splattered on the firefighters. All of the firefighters in the area were 

knocked off their feet and away from the center of the blast, bouncing off walls and equipment. 

Their leather helmets were blown from their heads as the hydrogen fireball passed through the area, 

then the molten sodium landed on them. Their distance from the drum determined how much of 

the burning metal landed on each individual.

The two lieutenants, who were in the room with the drum, were splashed with the molten metal 

virtually from head to toe. Their protective clothing and station uniforms were severely burned and 

both received critical, life threatening third-degree burns to major parts of their bodies. One of the 

lieutenants was able to remove himself from the room, but the second lieutenant had to be removed 

by rescuers.

Six firefighters and a third lieutenant had been involved in moving the salt containers and passing salt 

to the two lieutenants. They were all in the area outside the room, and were burned by the combination of the fireball and the spray of molten sodium. The assistant chief’s aide was slightly burned by 

the fireball as he was returning to the fire area after completing his ventilation assignment.

The injured members extricated themselves and helped each other out of the immediate area. They 

had difficulty maneuvering in the tight space with the salt containers crowded into the narrow 

area near the room where the explosion occurred. The burning sodium that was splashed on their 

protective clothing continued to burn as they tried to exit toward the front of the building. Plant 

employees stopped them from leaving the building, warning that the moist outside air would make 

the sodium burn more intensely, and helped them remove their SCBAs and protective clothing in an 

interior corridor.

The plant employees poured mineral oil on the burning sodium to cool the material and the firefighters’ burns. The assistant chief and two additional firefighters received burns to their hands 

attempting to help the injured firefighters remove their burning clothing. The molten metal was 

extremely hot and, where it landed on the protective clothing, it continued to penetrate through the 

layers to the skin. The sodium also reacted with moisture in the air and perspiration on the firefighters’ skin to form corrosive sodium hydroxide.

The assistant chief, who was in the building’s main corridor, was also knocked down by the force of 

the explosion. He made an urgent call for a second alarm and ten ambulances. Two units and a supervisor from the private ambulance company had been dispatched by the Newton Police Department 

on the original call and were already staged outside the complex when the explosion occurred. The 

additional units were dispatched when the Newton Fire Communications Center requested them 

through the police department. Following standard operating procedures for a hazardous materials 

incident, the ambulances and the supervisor had staged outside the immediate area, on Charlemont 

Street, anticipating that any patients would be brought out to a triage area in a safe room.

The burned members were all gathered in one area inside the building and were being treated by 

other firefighters and plant workers. Attempts to direct the ambulances to come to that location were 
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 13

unsuccessful for several minutes, because the ambulance radios were set with the Newton Police as 

the priority channel on their scan feature. The volume of police radio traffic prevented the messages from the Fire Department Incident Commander from getting through to the ambulances. This 

delayed the arrival of paramedics to treat the burned patients for several frantic minutes, although 

ambulances were staged only a block away.

Eleven fire department members were transported to area hospitals, including the burn centers at the 

Massachusetts General Hospital and at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, both in the city of Boston. 

The presence of two burn centers in the metropolitan Boston area allowed the most seriously burned 

patients to be distributed to share the workload for treatment. Eight were admitted, two in critical 

condition, and three were treated and released with less severe burns. The two lieutenants were 

admitted in extremely critical condition; three months after the incident one remained in the Burn 

Center at Massachusetts General Hospital, still in very critical condition, with burns over 85 percent 

of his body.

FIRE ConTRol

The assistant chief called for a second alarm immediately after the explosion. Fire Chief Joseph 

Daniele, who had been monitoring the radio traffic at home, responded to the scene and requested a 

third alarm shortly after his arrival. The regional hazardous materials response team, which includes 

members from several suburban Boston fire departments, also responded. All firefighting operations 

were suspended until an assessment of the hazards and the risk of additional explosions could be 

made.

The sodium burned itself out within an hour and only a very small amount of residual fire was left 

for extinguishment. The fire was contained to the drum cleaning enclosure and smoke damage to 

the rest of the building was minor.

Massachusetts State Fire Marshal, F. James Kauffman, who was also monitoring the radio traffic, 

also responded to the scene and activated a major response of investigators from his division of the 

Department of Public Safety to assistant the Newton Fire Department

AnAlYSIS

The immediate cause of the explosion was determined to be the introduction of water to the molten 

sodium. Physical evidence confirmed that the explosion occurred within the drum and did not 

involve the material that had been spilled or the water under the floor grates. The water is believed 

to have come from the shovel, which had been placed on the wet floor grate. The moisture was 

transferred to the salt as it was shoveled into the sodium drum.

Since sodium reacts violently with many substances, the contaminant may have been something 

other than water. Even rust on the shovel could cause a reaction; however, water is the most likely 

cause of the reaction.

The primary causal factor of this incident was the inappropriate actions of employees at the H. C. 

Starck facility, trying to burn a much larger heel of waste sodium than the normal operating procedure could accommodate. In addition, the design of the drum cleaning area, to include wet washing 

and sodium disposal in the same enclosure, created an unnecessary hazard. The requirement to keep 

sodium away from any potential source of moisture should have precluded conducting both of these 

operations in the same space.
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The documented procedure for burning small amounts of waste sodium in the bottoms of drums 

appears to be reasonably safe, if all of the steps are followed. The appropriate procedure for dealing 

with a larger amount of residual sodium would be to maintain the argon in the empty space above 

the sodium, reseal the drum, and return it to the supplier for disposal or recycling. The lack of a 

documented procedure for dealing with larger quantities created a situation where employees had to 

make a judgment that could not be based on experience or an appropriate risk evaluation.

The company and the Newton Fire Department had done a good job of working together to familiarize firefighters with the facility and to inform them of the types of situations they might face at 

the plant. The training, however, was directed toward small sodium spill fires that can usually be 

handled with a relatively minor risk to personnel, as long as basic safety precautions are followed and 

standard operating procedures are employed. The dangers that were involved in this situation, with 

a drum containing molten sodium, were far more severe than the fire department or the company 

had anticipated. This situation shows how training that deals with low risk situations can create a 

false sense of security when the situation is more complex and dangerous.

If all of the information had been provided to the fire department, including the significance of the 

quantity of sodium that was involved, the fact that the sodium was in a molten state, and the presence of water in the area, a thorough risk analysis could have been considered, prior to formulating 

an action plan. The actual situation that was encountered was an extremely high risk hazardous 

materials incident. The risk evaluation would have revealed:

1. The presence of burning molten sodium in the drum was a different and much higher risk 

incident than previous training had anticipated.

2. There is no safe procedure available for a municipal fire department to deal with a molten 

sodium fire, unless it has been previously trained specifically for this type of situation and provided with specialized equipment and protective clothing. Structural protective clothing and 

self-contained breathing apparatus are inadequate protection for the risk of being splashed with 

molten sodium or any molten metal. There is no protective clothing designed to protect the 

user from direct contact with burning molten sodium. (A detailed analysis of the performance 

of the protective clothing and breathing apparatus are provided in the following section of this 

report.)

3. The possible extinguishment alternatives for molten sodium are very limited: blanketing the 

molten sodium with an inert gas or covering it with soda ash. In either case, the extinguishment 

agent, if available, would have to be applied very gently and carefully to float on top of the molten metal surface. It may also have been feasible to smother the fire with a lid that completely 

covered the opening, if one had been available. However, all of these possibilities would expose 

firefighters to excessive risk. The potential consequences of an error in the extinguishing procedure are extreme.

4. In the worst case scenario, if the container had failed, the molten sodium could have flowed 

through the grates and into the water containing troughs, resulting in an immediate explosion, 

probably of equal or greater magnitude to the explosion that did occur. The fire was burning in 

an isolated room, designed to contain an explosion. If no one had been in the immediate area 

when the explosion occurred, there would have been no injuries and the damage would have 

been about the same as actually occurred, which was minor. If the doors to the room had been 

closed even less damage would have occurred.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 15

Weighing the alternatives that were available to the Newton Fire Department, a thorough risk evaluation would suggest taking no action on this fire. The risks involved in taking action are very high, 

while the consequences of not fighting the fire are relatively minor. The fire probably would have 

continued to burn, producing smoke, until the material was fully consumed. In all probability, the 

steel drum would not have failed and the fire would have terminated when the fuel was consumed.

The post incident evaluation suggests that a decision to not fight the fire would have been the best 

decision. However, it was very difficult to recognize these factors at the time, based on the information that was available to the Incident Commander and the other firefighters. Their training had not 

prepared them for the situation they encountered, although they were much better informed and 

trained than most municipal firefighters on dealing with sodium fires. They had been trained to 

handle a less hazardous situation and had not been trained or given the information that would have 

caused them to recognize the higher risk situation.

The failure to establish an effective liaison with knowledgeable plant employees caused decisions 

to be made before all of the information could be gathered, assembled, and analyzed. Instead of 

one primary liaison contact between the fire department and a responsible individual for the plant, 

several different fire department members had contact with several different plant employees, which 

increased the level of confusion.

The interviews with injured fire department members indicate that the crews did not have a good 

appreciation of the nature of the situation before they went in to attempt extinguishment. The 

smoke filled atmosphere made it difficult to size-up the situation; however, they were guided by the 

plant workers’ confirmation that they should use salt as an extinguishing agent. They did not have a 

more specific plan of action to establish what they would do after entering the fire area.

Less than ten minutes elapsed from the arrival of the first companies until the explosion occurred. 

This suggests that very little time was taken for evaluation of the situation and formulation of a plan. 

This indicates that the approach was very action oriented, when the actual situation should have 

called for careful analysis before, or instead of, taking action.

The delay that occurred in contacting the EMS units to come in and treat the injured firefighters indicated a deficiency in an otherwise good standard operating procedure. Having EMS units respond 

and stage at a safe distance from the incident is a good plan for hazardous materials incidents, particularly when the EMS providers are not trained or equipped to operate in a dangerous area. The 

weakness in the plan was the inability to make contact between the Incident Commander and the 

EMS supervisor when the ambulances were needed at a specific location. The delay of several minutes caused an extremely high level of anxiety, although it does not appear to have had significant 

consequences on the outcome of the incident; the paramedics did not have any better treatment 

capability for the burned firefighters than was already being attempted and faster transportation 

would have made little difference in the outcome.

Note: The communications problem between the Fire Incident Commander and the ambulances has already been corrected by 

changing the standard operating procedure. The ambulance crews had been provided with an additional radio to maintain contact 

with the Fire Incident Commander.

PRoTECTIVE CloTHInG

The protective clothing worn by the personnel involved in this situation was designed for structural 

firefighting and could not be expected to protect the user from exposure to a molten metal fire. It is 
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

significant to note the performance of the protective clothing and equipment and the protection that 

it did provide, recognizing that there is no standard for protective clothing for the actual situation 

that was encountered.

All of the injured personnel, except the assistant chief’s aide, were wearing a basic ensemble consisting of black Nomex® turnout coats, leather helmets, leather gloves, 3/4 length rubber boots, 

and self-contained breathing apparatus. The aide was wearing a station uniform without protective 

clothing or SCBA.

Turnout Coats – Most of the turnout coats were several years old and appear to have been purchased 

prior to the adoption of the NFPA standards for protective clothing. Only one coat, worn by a 

younger firefighter, had a label indicating compliance with NFPA Standard 1971. Most of the coats 

did not have labels to identify the constituent materials or construction standards and appear to date 

back to the 1970s. The outer shells are black Nomex®, approximately 7.5 oz. per square yard, some 

impregnated with neoprene to make the outer layer impermeable. (The materials appear to be generally acceptable with respect to the NFPA standards that were first adopted in 1975.)

Most of the liners appear to be needle punch Nomex® with neoprene moisture barriers and several 

had webbing sections in the armpit areas to allow for ventilation. One coat had a quilted liner, with 

no moisture barrier, but was worn under an outer shell that incorporated a neoprene moisture barrier in the shell. Another coat was worn with a nylon winter liner, in addition to the regular liner.

One coat was worn with no inner liner; only the outer shell provided protection to the user. Wearing 

a structural fire suppression coat in this manner is a dangerous practice, as much of the thermal 

protection provided by a turnout coat depends on the insulation provided by the liner.

The damage to the coats indicates that they withstood the initial fire ball created by the hydrogen 

explosion, without significant damage or failure. This fire ball probably lasted for only a second (or a 

fraction of a second) and the turnout coats would be expected to provide reasonably good protection 

to the body from this type of exposure. Burns could be anticipated anywhere the protection of the 

coat was compromised, such as an unsecured collar closure. The coat that was worn without a liner 

could be inadequate to prevent burns from this type of exposure.

Where the coats were splashed with molten sodium, it burned or melted through the outer shell and 

continued to penetrate into the liner material. The degree of damage indicated the pattern of molten 

sodium impact on the individual coats. The two lieutenants who were in the room with the sodium 

drum were directly splashed by the molten metal, which burned large sections of the coats and liners 

and penetrated through to the station uniforms, resulting in large areas of third degree burns to their 

bodies. In each case the major burn areas coincided with their orientation toward the drum.

Most of the other members were splashed or splattered by varying amounts of molten sodium, 

depending on their distance from the drum. The splatter patterns were visible where the sodium 

burned through the coats and into the liners. In most cases the sodium did not burn all the way 

through the liners; however, the heat of the burning molten sodium would be sufficient to cause 

second or third degree burns to the skin in these areas.

Boots – All of the personnel wore 3/4 length rubber boots, some in the extended position and some 

in the folded down position, as noted from the damage to the boots. This is believed to have contributed to some leg and thigh burns on the firefighters who had their boots turned down. There was 

no evidence of molten or burning sodium on the boots; however, the exposed surfaces were coated 

with sodium oxide.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 17

Helmets – The helmets were all leather and also appeared to be several years old. Due to the absence 

of labels it was impossible to determine their vintage or specific design features; however, none 

appeared to meet any of the newer editions of NFPA Standard 1974. Most of the helmets had been 

retrofitted with chin straps, but many were found to be secured around the brim of the helmet 

instead of being used to hold the helmets in place. All of the helmets are believed to have been blown 

off the wearers’ heads by the explosion, exposing their heads and the retaining system of their SCBA 

face masks to the fire.

The helmets were also fitted with Bourke eye shields, but all of the eye shields appeared to be in the 

flip-up position, indicating they were not in use when the explosion occurred. It was impossible 

to determine if the ear flaps had been in use at the time of the explosion, because the liners and ear 

flaps of several helmets had burned away.

Gloves – The gloves that were examined were leather and appeared to comply with current or recent 

editions of NFPA Standard 1973. The gloves protected the hands of the members who were wearing 

them. At least one member had removed a glove and suffered serious burns to that hand. Some 

wrist burns were reported where the knit wristlets bunched-up and allowed some penetration of 

molten metal.

Station Uniforms – Most of the personnel were wearing non-fire retardant station uniforms under 

their protective clothing. The Newton Fire Department was in the process of issuing fire retardant 

(FR) station uniforms, complying with NFPA Standard 1975; however, they were being phased-in 

and only one of the injured personnel is believed to have been wearing an FR uniform. Most of the 

personnel still wore the previous issue uniform items, which were cotton/polyester blends. (One 

label indicated a 65 percent polyester content and 35 percent cotton content on a particular item.) 

Some also wore items of non-uniform clothing.

The objective of the fire retardant station uniform standard is to avoid materials that could contribute 

to a burn injury by igniting or melting. The one FR uniform that was worn in this incident showed 

no evidence of damage, while most of the non-FR items showed some damage where they were 

most directly exposed to the molten sodium. The non-FR station uniforms of the two most seriously 

burned members were seriously damaged.

It is doubtful if the FR clothing would have made a significant difference in the burn injuries to the 

members who were splashed directly by molten sodium. In the cases where burning sodium splattered on turnout coats and burned into the liners, the burns might have been reduced if the members had been wearing FR uniforms. The most significant area of exposure for the station uniforms 

was the upper legs, thighs, and buttocks, where the uniform pants provided the only protection, 

particularly where the members had their boots folded down.

Evidence of the heat content of the molten metal could be seen in a pair of eyeglasses that were 

found in the shirt pocket of one of the firefighters. Molten sodium had burned through the coat and 

liner, penetrated the outer layer of the shirt material, and then penetrated through the lens of the 

eyeglasses, leaving a metallic luster on the inner and outer surfaces.

Breathing Apparatus – The self-contained breathing apparatus included both Scott 4.5 and Scott 2A 

units, depending on the company to which the individual was assigned. The shoulder and waist 

straps on some of the 2A units melted from heat exposure and released from the wearers’ bodies. 

(The straps had not been upgraded from the original black webbed material that has been noted in 

previous incidents to be susceptible to very rapid melting when exposed to flames.) There was also 
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

damage to the low pressure breathing tubes on some of these units, including one which separated 

at the regulator fitting. The face masks on the 2A models stayed in-place on the users heads, since 

the heavy rubber “spider” straps resisted the heat exposure.

The Scott 4.5 units have fire resistant shoulder and waist straps and no problems were noted with 

the main harnesses; however, the facepiece retaining systems on these units were compromised by 

heat exposure. The netting and the single take-up straps that hold the facepiece on the user’s head 

were exposed to the fireball when the helmets were blown off and the straps and/or the netting 

failed on all of the 4.5 units. This released the facepiece from the user’s head. On one unit the lens 

also separated from the rubber body of the mask along the upper part of the face piece. Some of the 

burns to the face, neck, and ears were particularly severe.

The facepieces of the members who were close to the explosion were completely coated with a 

mixture of sodium and sodium oxide which made them opaque and impossible to see through. The 

members trying to escape from the fire had to remove their facepieces to see anything. Where molten sodium landed on the lenses, it penetrated through the plastic material leaving a metallic coating 

on the inside and outside. Also, on one of the 4.5 SCBAs that was splashed directly with molten 

sodium, the facepiece mounted regulator was completely destroyed, including the metal parts.

All of the SCBAs were equipped with Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices; however, they did 

not appear to have been turned on at the time of the explosion. The PASS devices that were examined 

were still functional, but showed signs of heat exposure while in the off position. No one reported 

using or hearing an alarm from a PASS device.

Comment – Protective clothing and breathing apparatus that is designed for structural fire suppression 

does not provide adequate protection for exposure to molten metals. Molten metals, particularly 

burning molten metals, present a much more severe danger than ordinary structure fires. Only special protective clothing, designed to resist very high temperatures and to shed molten metals, should 

be used where there is a potential of coming in any contact with molten metals. There is no practical protective ensemble that would offer adequate protection for an individual splashed by burning 

molten sodium. Firefighters should avoid situations where there is a danger of being splashed by 

any molten metal.

The Newton Fire Department was in the process of evaluating newer protective ensembles, which 

incorporate protective trousers (bunker pants) instead of 3/4 length rubber boots. This level of 

protection is required by current NFPA standards; however, the acceptance of the concept has been 

slow in some geographic areas, particularly in New England. The analysis of the injuries in this 

incident clearly indicates that the burn injuries would have been less extensive if the personnel had 

been wearing ensembles that meet the current editions of the NFPA standards.

The currently accepted level of protective clothing for structural fire suppression includes protective coats and pants, foot protection, gloves, helmets with chin straps, full ear and neck protection, 

fire resistant station uniforms, self-contained breathing apparatus, and PASS devices. Most of the 

items used by the members involved in this incident did not met current design standards or were 

used improperly, or both. A full protective ensemble, meeting the standards for structural fire suppression, could prove adequate for an incident involving a small amount of burning molten metal, 

where the risk of coming in contact with molten metal is remote. This level of protection should 

be limited to situations where the greatest risk would be to come in contact with a few droplets of 

molten metal, which would not penetrate the outer shell of protective coat and pants. In this type 
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 19

of situation a face shield should be used over the SCBA facemask for extra protection from metal 

splatter on the facemask lens.

In a situation where a significant amount of molten sodium was involved and splashed directly 

on the firefighters, even a full set of modern structural protective clothing would not have been 

adequate to prevent injury. However, the degree of injury could have been reduced if the clothing 

had met current standards or if all the clothing that was available had been worn properly. The only 

way to avoid injury would have been to avoid the risk by taking no action to extinguish the fire.

CRITICAl InCIDEnT STRESS

One of the most severe consequences of this incident was severe post incident stress, which particularly affected many of the individuals who were involved in assisting the injured firefighters. The 

victims could not help themselves and the rescuers were frustrated in their attempts to help them.

All of the personnel in the fire area were burned and some were in very critical condition. The 

sodium that had impregnated their protective clothing continued to burn the injured members as 

others tried to help them. The most common burn treatment, applying cool water, would only have 

made their injuries more severe.

Additional stress was created by the realization that the injured members had not been adequately 

protected by their protective clothing. Personnel who had not previously encountered molten metal 

burns did not appreciate the severity of the burns or the inadequacy of structural protective clothing 

to prevent them.

Immediate counseling assistance was provided by the regional traumatic incident response team and 

several individuals have been referred for further treatment.

L

1. The extreme hazard of molten sodium must be recognized.

Molten sodium is an extremely hazardous material, reactive to water and most other extinguishing agents. Previous experience, pre-fire planning, and information provided by plant employees caused firefighters to believe they could handle the burning sodium without excessive risk.

2. The best action plan would have been No Action.

A full evaluation of the risks and potential consequences of this incident, after the fact, leads to 

the conclusion that the safe plan would have been to take no action.

3. Structural protective clothing is not designed for molten metal.

Structural protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus are not designed to provide adequate protection for exposure to molten metal.

4. The way protective clothing was worn decreased its effectiveness.

Members involved in the incident would have been considerably better protected if they had 

been wearing full protective clothing ensembles that meet current standards, including protective trousers (turnout pants) instead of 3/4 length boots. They would have had better protection 

if they had used the chin straps on their helmets, pulled up 3/4 length boots, and (in one case) 

not worn a turnout coat without the liner.
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

5. Extinguishing agent choice has limitations.

Sodium chloride is effective as an extinguishing agent for small quantities of burning sodium, 

but it is ineffective on molten sodium. Sodium chloride may be dangerous if it is not completely dry. Other agents offer higher degrees of safety for small sodium fires.

6. The number of injuries reflects the fact that the hazard was not recognized.

Because the hazard was not recognized, three companies of firefighters were in the immediate 

area assisting in the extinguishment efforts. All of the personnel in the area were burned when 

the explosion occurred.

AFTERWoRD

During the start-up procedure at the H. C. Starck facility, after the process had been shut down for 

investigation of the explosions, another fire occurred. The system had been shut down for more 

than two months and as it was being reheated a minor sodium leak occurred. The leaking sodium 

ignited and the area was evacuated. The Newton Fire Department responded and isolated the area, 

but took no action. The system was shut down and the fire was allowed to burn itself out. There was 

no significant damage from this incident and there were no injuries.

The company was cited by the U.S. Department of Labor for OSHA violations as a result of this incident. The violations related to the burning of sodium in an area where molten sodium and water 

could mix, and the company was required to have a person qualified in process design approve any 

deviations from standard operating procedure when burning excess sodium.

The company has changed its policy and now returns all used drums to the supplier for disposal. 

Plant personnel are being trained to function as an individual fire brigade.
21

APPEnDIx A

Sodium MSDS Sheets and Other Materials on Sodium 

Properties, Uses, Storage, and Handling
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

Du Pont Chemicals

1160CR Revised O3-Sep-93 Printed 07-Sep93

Sodium

MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION

Corporate Number DU001251

Manufacturer/Distributor DuPont

1007 Market Street

Wilmington, DE 19898

Phone Numbers

Grade

Product Information l-800-441 -9442

Transport Emergency CHEMTREC: l-800-424-9300

Medical Emergency l-800-441-3637

REGULAR (STANDARD); NIAPURE (LOW CALCIUM)

Chemical Family

Trade Names and Synonyms

ALKALI METAL

SODIUM METAL

“NIAPURE” SODIUM

“NIAPURE” is a non-registered trademark of Du Pont.

CAS Name

CAS Number

Formula

TSCA Inventory Status

NFPA Ratings

SODIUM

7440-23-5

Na

Reported/Included

Health: 3

Flammability: 1

Reactivity: 2

Water Reactive

NPCA-HMIS Ratings Health: 3

Flammability: 1

Reactivity: 2

Personal Protection rating to be supplied by user depending on use

conditions.

(continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 23

COMPONENTS

Material

SODIUM

CAS Number

7440-23-5

Percent

100

REACTION PRODUCT WITH WATER:

SODIUM HYDROXIDE 1310-73-2

PHYSICAL DATA

Boiling Point

Vapor Pressure

Vapor Density

Melting Point

Evaporation Rate

Water Solubility

Odor

Form -

Specific Gravity

881°C (1,618°F) at 760 mm Hg.

1 mm Hg at 493°C (920°F)

Not applicable

97.8C (208°F)

Not applicable

Reacts violently with water.

Odorless

Metallic solid

0.97 at 20°C (68°F)

pH Information : Reacts with water to form sodium

hydroxide (high pH) and hydrogen gas.

Color : In inert atmosphere- pinkish silvery when

fresh cut.

In air- white to gray.

HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY

Instability Stable.

Decomposition

Polymerization

Decomposition will not occur.

Polymerization will not occur.

Incompatibility : Reacts violently with any materials

containing water and many materials

containing oxygen, halides, or active

hydrogen. Reaction with water gives

sodium hydroxide and hydrogen gas, which

may explode. Burning produces sodium

oxide fumes.

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIRE AND EXPLOSION DATA

Flash Point Not applicable

Flammable Limits in Air, % by Volume LEL Not determined

UEL Not determined

Autodecomposition Not applicable

Autoignition : -120-125 deg C (-248-257 deg F)

The Autoignition Temperature range varies widely depending

on pool or droplet size, air temperature, velocity,

humidity, etc.

Fire and Explosion Hazards Flammable solid.

Reacts violently with water releasing hydrogen gas, which

will ignite and explode in air. Burning produces dense,

white, irritating smoke. Follow appropriate National Fire

Protection Association (NFPA) codes.

Extinguishing Media Dry Soda Ash, Light (low density, floats on molten sodium)

or Class D fire extinguisher. Dry salt or sand is less

effective, but can be used.

Special Fire Fighting Instructions DO NOT use water. Do not use Carbon Dioxide (CO2),

soda-acid, or chlorinated fire extinguishing agents such as

carbon tetrachloride. Stay upwind and use self-contained

breathing apparatus if needed. Sodium melts and burns with

little or no flame, but with yellow to yellow-orange glowing

globules that appear to move on the surface of the molten

pool. Reduce fire by diking to limit sodium surface, then

smother with soda ash or cover with a steel lid.

HEALTH HAZARD INFORMATION

Causes severe eye and skin burns from reactions to sodium

hydroxide-- effects may be permanent. Fumes from sodium

reactions to sodium oxide may irritate the nose, throat, and

lungs. Ingestion will cause burns of the gastrointestinal

tract with perforations by formation of sodium hydroxide.

Sodium reacts rapidly with 'moisture in air or tissues to

form sodium hydroxide and sodium oxide. Effects following

inhalation, ingestion, or skin or eye contact result from

direct chemical reaction with tissue and from thermal

reaction with water.

ANIMAL DATA:

Oral ALD: 500 mg/kg in rabbits (sodium hydroxide)

Sodium is very corrosive to animal skin and eyes by reactive'

formation of sodium hydroxide. Toxic effects described in

animals from exposure by inhalation or ingestion include

irritation of the respiratory tract, and extensive necrosis

of the gastrointestinal tract.

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 25

HEALTH HAZARD INFORMATI0N(continued)

HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS:

Overexposure by skin or eye contact include skin burns or

ulceration; or eye corrosion with cornea1 or conjunctival

ulceration. By inhalation, the effects include irritation

of the upper respiratory passages with coughing and

discomfort. By ingestion, the effects include abdominal

discomfort characterized by nausea, severe pain, diarrhea,

and collapse.

Carcinogenicity None of the components in this material is listed by IARC, NTP,

OSHA, or ACGIH as a carcinogen.

Exposure Limits

TLV (ACGIH)

PEL (OSHA)

None Established

Particulates Not Otherwise Regulated

15 mg/m3 - 8 Hr TWA - Total Dust

5 mg/m3 - 8 Hr TWA - Respirable Dust

Other Applicable Exposure Limits

SODIUM HYDROXIDE

AEL* (Du Pont)

TLV (ACGIH) 2 mg/m3 - 15 Min. TWA

PEL (OSHA) 2 mg/Jm3 (Ceiling)2 mg/m3,8 Hr TWA

 Du Ponrs Acceptable Exposure Limit. Where governmentally imposed occupational exposure limits which are lower than

the AEL are in effect, such limits shall take precedence.

Safety Precautions Persons handling sodium should be thoroughly familiar with

its hazards and proper first aid procedures. Do not get in

eyes, on skin, or on clothing, and avoid any contact with

water. Avoid breathing fumes from sodium reactions.

FIRST AID

INHALATION

If fumes from sodium reactions are inhaled, remove to

fresh air immediately. If not breathing, give artificial

respiration. If breathing is difficult, give oxygen.

Call a physician.

SKIN CONTACT

In case of contact, immediately remove particles of

sodium adhering to the body or clothing. This must be

done before washing to avoid additional heat from the

reaction between sodium and water. After the particles

are removed, flush the skin with plenty of water for at

least 15 minutes while removing contaminated clothing and

shoes. Call a physician. Burn or wash clothing and

shoes.

EYE CONTACT

In case of contact, remove sodium, then immediately flush

eyes with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes. Call

a physician.

INGESTION

If swallowed, do not induce vomiting. Give large

quantities of water. Call a physician immediately.

Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious person.

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

PROTECTION INFORMATION

Generally Applicable Control Measures and Precautions

Good general ventilation should be provided to keep fume

concentrations below the exposure limits and to prevent the

accumulation of hydrogen gas.

Personal Protective Equipment Solid Sodium: Sodium bricks can be handled safely using

chemical splash goggles and DRY moleskin mitts. Mitts

should be oversized for easy removal and should extend up

the arms to prevent caustic burns. Wear a long sleeve

shirt. A full-length face shield, alkali resistant apron,

and other special protective equipment may be needed for

specific jobs.

Molten Sodium: When liquid sodium is handled or there is

danger of spillage, full protective flameproof clothing

should be available and used as appropriate. This includes:

hard hat with brim: chemical splash goggles: full length

face shield: fire resistant (“Nomex” Aramid Fiber or

alternative) long underwear, pants and shirt (or coveralls)

neck shroud, spats, apron: and heavy duty work shoes. Two,

or preferably more, layers of flameproof c othing are l

clearly more effective than one layer. A NIOSH/MSHA air

supplied or self-contained breathing apparatus.is needed if

large amounts of sodium oxide smoke are present: a

NIOSH/MSHA approved air purifying respirator can be used for

smaller amounts.

DISPOSAL INFORMATION

Aquatic Toxicity Sodium Hydroxide (reaction product with water)

48-hour TLm, bluegill sunfish: 99 mg/L

96-hour TLm, mosquito fish : 125 mg/L

Spill, Leak, or Release NOTE: Review FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARDS and SAFETY

PRECAUTIONS before proceeding with clean up. Use appropriate

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT during clean up.

Cover with DRY Soda Ash, Light; shovel into a dry metal

container and cover again with soda ash, and dispose of

b

promptly. Avoid putting wet sodium in a covered container

ecause a hydrogen ex plosion may occur. Wear proper

protective equipment. Comply with Federal, State, and local

regulations on reporting releases. The CERCLA Reportable

Quantity is 10 Ibs.

Waste Disposal Comply with Federal, State, and local regulations. If

approved, may be burned in an incinerator equipped with a

scrubber. Small amounts of sodium can be disposed of by

weathering, by steaming (which requires special

instructions), or by burning in open air, if approved. 

Considerable white smoke will develop when burning even

small amounts of sodium. Sodium disposal, and disposal of

empty drums, should not be attempted by inexperienced

l

people. Contact DuPont for technical information or call a

icensed disposal contractor. This material may be an RCRA

Hazardous Waste upon disposal due to the reactivity

characteristic.

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 27

SHIPPING INFORMATION

DOT/IMO

Proper Shipping Name

Hazard Class

SODIUM

4.3

UN No. 1428

DOT/IMO Label DANGEROUS WHEN WET

Packaging Group II

Shipping Containers Tank Car

Tank Truck

Drums

Samples:

Fused, in 1 quart tin cans:

2 l/2 lb. bricks in 5 gallon pails

Reportable Quantity : 10 lbs/4.54 kg

# STORAGE CONDITIONS

Store in segregated area of fire resistant, watertight

building without sprinklers, steam, water lines, skylights,

or potential for flooding. Ventilate to avoid hydrogen

accumulation. Keep drums covered to prevent caustic

formation from moisture in air. Keep from possible contact

with water. Nitrogen purging of open drums will minimize

reactions with moisture and oxygen in air. Keep drums

tightly closed. Do not store with combustibles or

flammables as firefighting problems would be compounded.

Use only clean, dry utensils in handling.

WARNING:

Bulged drum indicates hydrogen gas pressurization. Puncture

drum from at least six feet away to vent pressure before

removing lid.

TITLE III HAZARD CLASSIFICATIONS

Acute Yes

Chronic No

Fire

Reactivity

Yes

Yes

Pressure No

LISTS:

SARA Extremely Hazardous Substance -NO

CERCLA Hazardous Material -Yes

SARA Toxic Chemical -NO

CANADIAN WHMIS CLASSIFICATIONS:

B6; E

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND REFERENCES

For further information, see DuPont "Properties, Uses,

Storage, and Handling" Bulletin.

The data in this Material Safety Data Sheet relates only to the specific material designated herein and

does not relate to use in combination with any other material or in any process.

Responsibility for MSDS: Dupont Chemicals

Engineering & Product Safety

P. O. Box 80709, Chestnut Run

Wilmington, DE 19880-0709

302-999-4946

# Indicates updated section.

End of MSDS

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 29

Appendix A (continued)
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

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USFA-TR-075/October 1993 31

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32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

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USFA-TR-075/October 1993 33

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34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

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36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

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Appendix A (continued)
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 39

Appendix A (continued)
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 41

Appendix A (continued)
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 43

Appendix A (continued)
44 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 45

Appendix A (continued)
46 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 47

Appendix A (continued)
48 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 49

Appendix A (continued)
50 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 51

Appendix A (continued)

I. SELECTING AND MOVING SODIUM BARRELS

A) There are two types of sodium:

1) Black drums/gray drums - for J, M, V, and VM runs

(Technical Grade).

2) Blue drums/red drums - for V3S, Z, Hl, H2M, KFXX

and YM runs (Reactor Grade).

B) Once the proper drum has been chosen, carefully and

thoroughly inspect the drum for any physical damage.

Report any damage to the supervisor. Remove any seals

and loosen bungs with bung wrench. Use a chainfall to

bring a new sodium barrel to the drum warmer. Make sure

drum is securely clamped before transporting. Always

keep drum close to ground level as it is being

transported:

II. INSTALLING SODIUM BARREL

A) Notice at the bottom of the drum warmer there is a

groove or half ring. It's purpose is to keep the sodium

barrel from sliding due to the incline of the platform.

FORM 2136-009
52 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

B)

C)

D)

E)

F)

G)

When lowering sodium barrel to drum warmer:

1) Place bungs to their proper position for Na/argon

inlet assembly hookup. 2" IPS bung for Na bayonet -

3/4" IPS bung for argon inlet.

2) Lower sodium barrel over the half ring. Make

sure drum is in place and cannot slide downward.

Close drum warmer and latch.

Hook up argon

1) Remove small bung from top of drum.

2) Screw in clean argon inlet/TC well assembly (TC

should be installed).

3) Hook up argon supply line to argon inlet

assembly.

Hook up sodium

1) Remove large bung from top of drum.

2) Screw in clean dry bayonet.

Flush with argon

1) Remove union from top of sodium bayonet.

2) Fully open argon valve.

3) Check open end of bayonet for flow. If no flow,

turn off argon and check lines for plugs.

4) Once flow is established, flush for 2 minutes.

5) TURN OFF ARGON. This must be done, otherwise sodium

will surge from drum when drum is warm and union is

removed to make final connection to accumulator fill

line.

6) Install new "O"-ring on sodium bayonet and

replace union.

Insulation: Install sodium drum cover (cover all

exposed areas).

III. CONNECTING SODIUM DRUMSIDE LINE

A) Turn sodium barrel heater on per instruction in

Accumulator Procedure So. 2116-15-0222.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 53

Appendix A (continued)

B)

C)

D)

E)

F)

As the sodium (Na) melts, both the bayonet and TC

well lowers into the drum.

When sodium in barrel is completely melted, push bayonet

and TC well to the bottom of the barrel. Gently tap the

top of the union of the bayonet to make sure you are at

the bottom of the drum. Make sure packing glands are

tight.

Before removing union from sodium line, check that

argon valve to sodium drum is closed.

Remove union from sodium line and make connections to

accumulator fill line.

Wrap insulation around sodium line.

IV. SODIUM BARREL DISCONNECTION

A)

B)

C)

D)

E)

F)

G)

H)

Shut off power to barrel heater and to electric tracing

of lines by barrel. Open drum warmer to expose sodium

barrel. Remove insulation and let cool.

Check that barrel is cool to touch before proceeding.

If still warm, let drum cool before handling.

Shut off argon flow valve.

Disconnect argon line and remove TC.

Disconnect sodium line: cap both ends to keep moisture

and oxygen from entering. Do not remove the sodium

bayonet line from the drum. Set empty drum with bayonet

aside for future sodium waste disposal (See Sodium Drum

Cleaning below).

Pull barrel out from drum warmer and set on floor.

Unscrew argon inlet and TC we'll assembly. Install bung

in barrel. Wash argon inlet with water in hood room.

When washing argon inlet and TC well assembly, observe

the safety rules for cleaning sodium with water.

After washing, dry the argon inlet and TC well assembly

with acetone. Pour acetone on both inside and outside

of the assembly.
54 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

**GENERAL SAFETY INFORMATION**

Sodium (Na) and NaK react violently with water. If air is also

present, the heat of this reaction can ignite the hydrogen-oxygen

mixture and cause an explosion. The severity of the explosion is

related to the quantity of Na and NaK and water in contact and can

vary from "popping" to a violent destructive blast. The purpose

of these instructions is to insure that unintentional contact with

water is not made while handling these materials and that when

intentional contact occurs, personnel are not in a position to be

injured by the reaction.

V. SODIUM DRUM CLEANING:

**Protective Equipment - Face shield, Safety Glasses, Gloves**

A)

B)

C)

D)

E)

F)

G)

H)

I)

J)

K)

L)

Shut off all water sprays and hoses into washroom.

Put DRY tray on grate.

Set barrel cradle in tray - leaning back towards

wall.

Dehead the empty sodium drum.

Place head against back wall to wash when drum is

washed.

Place deheaded sodium drum in cradle with bungs and

seams away from low point as cradled.

Start scrubbers.

Insert torch nozzle through door and ignite.

Close both doors securely - wear dark burning

glasses.

With flame at moderate to low setting, melt sodium into

a pool at the low point of the tilted drum. Begin

melting sides and work towards rear of drum. If torch

keeps going out, use a smaller flame.

When all sodium has formed a pool, apply excessive

heat to pool.

Turn off flame and withdraw through door. Sodium will

burn by itself until fully oxidized. Stirring the

partially oxidized pool will expedite the process.

ALWAYS BE SURE THAT THE STIRRING TOOL IS DRY, OTHERWISE

A VIOLENT REACTION WILL RESULT.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 55

Appendix A (continued)

M) After burning is complete, let drum cool then lift drum

(with heat resistant gloves) and place in corner of

washroom.

N) Secure doors and slowly wash drum and head.

VI. REMOVING AND CLEANING SODIUM BARREL BAYONETS:

Protective Equipment - Face Shield, Safety Glasses and Gloves

A)

B)

C)

D)

E)

F)

G)

Remove bayonet from empty cold sodium barrel using

pipe chain wrench. Install bung on barrel.

Carry bayonet to hood room. Make sure all water

sprays and hoses are off.

Clamp bayonet in vise. Remove bayonet cap and poke

s/s rod into bayonet.

Secure hood room doors and turn on scrubbers.

Slowly wash bayonet with water hose. Try to keep sodium

burning. Use small amounts of water to keep reactionn

going.

When bayonet is clean, flush off inside and outside with

water. Then pour acetone through it to dry it off.

Place clean bayonet in rack provided in sodium barrel

area.
56

APPEnDIx b

Problems Relating to Fire Service Awareness of SCBA 

Fire Resistance Standards

The current standard for self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) for firefighters is NFPA 1981 

(1992 edition). Prior to 1987 there were no fire resistance requirements for SCBA units in the NFPA 

standard. Limited fire resistance requirements were introduced in the 1987 edition. The 1992 edition of NFPA 1981 introduced a function test with full flame exposure. All SCBA units must also be 

approved by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH); however, NIOSH 

does not test SCBAs for fire exposure.

The Scott model 4.5 and model 2A SCBA units that were in use in Newton were produced before 

the current edition of NFPA 1981 was adopted. The model 4.5 units that were in use in Newton are 

believed to have been manufactured between 1987 and 1991, while the model 2A units were manufactured prior to 1987. The facepiece of the model 4.5 units was secured to the user’s head with 

nylon composite straps and a polyester knitted cap, and the body harness straps on the model 2A 

units were made of polypropylene material. These materials were not required to pass fire exposure 

tests at the time the units were manufactured; however, new units are manufactured with materials 

that meet the current flame exposure test standards.

Scott’s designs of both models were upgraded in 1987 to comply with new requirements of NFPA 

1981. The designs were further upgraded to comply with the 1992 edition. The upgrade from 1987 

to 1992 involved several changes. To bring the model 4.5 SCBA into compliance with the 1992 edition 

of NFPA 1981, the model AV-2000 facepiece was introduced. The new facepiece has several upgraded 

components, including a Kevlar® neck strap and head harness assembly. Modifications were also made 

to add speaking diaphragms and built-in nosecups and to reinforce the facepiece frame.

The body harnesses on all Scott SCBA models were upgraded to a fire resistant material to meet the 

1987 standard and a more fire resistant grade of Kevlar® was introduced in 1992. The regulator 

airflow capacity was also increased on the newer units.

Upgrade kits have been available from Scott to bring pre-1987 units up to that standard, and similar kits are being developed to allow for existing units to be upgraded to meet the 1992 edition 

of NFPA 1981.

The non-fire resistant materials are still available for customers who do not have to comply with 

NFPA 1981, such as industrial users who do not engage in firefighting.

The literature accompanying the new AV-2000 facepieces states that two material options are available for the facepiece harness assemblies.

Model P/N 804177-01 with the flame resistant Kevlar® materials 

Model P/N 804063-01 with the polyester and nylon composite materials (These are the materials that were available prior to 1992.)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 57

Appendix b (continued)

The following warning is printed in bold type immediately below this information:

WARNING

DO NOT USE HEAD HARNESS SCOTT P/N 804063-01 FOR FIRE FIGHTING OR WHEN 

EXPOSURE TO HIGH HEAT OR FLAME IS POSSIBLE. THIS HEAD HARNESS INCLUDES 

MATERIALS WHICH MAY MELT OR BURN WHEN EXPOSED TO FLAME OR RADIANT HEAT.

A Scott Aviation representative confirmed that the company has not issued any notice to fire departments to inform them of the information contained in this warning, other than to include it in the 

literature provided for new units. The company’s stated position on this issue was that there is no 

requirement in the NFPA system to upgrade units produced prior to the effective date of new editions of a standard; they are only required to comply with the edition that was current at the time 

of production. Older units are not required by NFPA to be upgraded to meet the current edition of 

NFPA 1981.

The representative stated that it is up to each fire department, regulatory agency, or other authority 

having jurisdiction to determine the particular edition of the NFPA standard that must be complied 

with and whether or not any particular units need to be upgraded.

The Scott representative further stated that it is the responsibility of each fire department and regulatory authority to stay current with the requirements of the applicable NFPA standards and other 

regulations, and that it is up to fire departments to determine if their units should be upgraded to 

meet new standards. The representative noted that many calls are received from fire departments asking about the need to upgrade different units to comply with standards and that many of the callers 

appear to be unaware of the changes in regulations, which standards they are required to comply 

with, and what changes would need to be made to bring units into compliance with newer standards. (Information provided by Linda Strawn, Customer Service Representative, 800-247-7257.)
58

APPEnDIx C

Photographs

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Helmets worn by injured personnel show different degrees of damage. Most were worn without chin straps, 

which allowed the force of the explosion to lift the helmets from the users’ heads.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 59

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Backpack from Scott 2A breathing apparatus showing burn through of waist and shoulder straps on the left side.
60 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Facepiece from Scott 2A breathing apparatus showing failure of the low pressure breathing tube at the regulator and 

complete coverage of the lens with sodium residue.

Appendix C (continued)
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 61

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Outside view of Scott 4.5 facepiece showing complete coverage of lens with metallic sodium and residue.
62 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Inside view of Scott 4.5 facepiece showing complete coverage of lens and penetration of metallic sodium through the lens.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 63

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Scott facepiece showing damage caused by splatter of sodium on the lens and failure of the net retaining systems that 

secures the facepiece to the user’s head.
64 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Removal of protective clothing from storage container. All of the protective clothing that was worn by the injured 

members, as well as their station uniforms and breathing apparatus, were impounded and stored in recovery drums 

for later examinations.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 65

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Scott 4.5 breathing apparatus showing major damage to facepiece lens and facepiece mounted regulator caused by 

direct contact with molten sodium. The metal penetrated the plastic lens and burned through the net and take-up 

strap that secured the facepiece to the users’ head.
66 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Remnants of non-fire retardant station uniform worn by critically burned 

lieutenant. The 3/4 length boots were worn turned down as show in the photo.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 67

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Leather firefighting glove that was contacted by molten sodium indicates severe damage.
68 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Coat worn without thermal liner was burned through in only a small area of the right arm pit. The firefighter wearing 

this coat would have been very critically burned if the amount of sodium splashed on the outer shell had been greater.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 69

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Non-FR station uniform shirt is burned in shoulder and collar area.
70 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Winter liner (non-FR material) was ignited at lower edge, but burned in only a small area. The burns on the tee shirt 

indicated that penetration occurred in the collar area.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 71

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Inner view of coat shown in previous photograph shows that the molten sodium did not penetrate through the thermal 

liner except for a few small points.
72 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Outer shell of turnout coat shows several areas where sodium burned through the outer shell; however, it did not 

penetrate Nomex®/neoprene thermal liner except in very small areas (shown in next photograph). 

The heat was sufficient to cause serious burns to the member who was wearing the coat.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 73

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Inside view of coat shown in previous photograph shows major damage to thermal liner caused by molten sodium. The 

lieutenant who was wearing this coat received critical burn injuries.
74 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Turnout coat worn by lieutenant who was critically burned. Outer shell and thermal liner were almost completely 

destroyed by direct contact with molten sodium.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 75

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Outer shell of turnout coat shows burn through to thermal liner in several areas on left side of upper body.
76 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Inside suspension and earflaps of leather helmet were ignited and destroyed.
USFA-TR-075/October 1993 77

Appendix C (continued)

Photo by J. Gordon Routley 

Turnout coat shows major damage to the right side caused by a splash of molten sodium. The molten metal 

penetrated the outer shell in the area of the right shoulder and ran down the inside of the coat, destroying the 

thermal liner. The right sleeve is also burned through in several locations.