COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00144-CV 

IN RE FORT WORTH STARTELEGRAM; DALLAS MORNING 

NEWS; CBS STATIONS GROUP 

OF TEXAS LLC; KXAS-TV; NW 

COMMUNICATIONS OF TEXAS, 

INC., ON BEHALF OF STATION 

KDFW FOX 4; AND WFAA-TV, INC.

RELATORS

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ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

TRIAL COURT NO. 323-98857J-13

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OPINION

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the underlying case involving juvenile R.J.D., Respondent, the 

Honorable Jean Boyd, sua sponte ordered the courtroom closed to the public 

and to members of the media during R.J.D.’s certification hearing and during the

setting for R.J.D.’s determinate sentence trial. Relators Fort Worth Star-
2

Telegram; Dallas Morning News; CBS Stations Group of Texas LLC; KXAS-TV;

NW Communications of Texas, Inc., on behalf of KDFW Fox 4; and WFAA-TV, 

Inc. assert that Respondent abused her discretion by closing the courtroom, by 

excluding Relators from the courtroom during these proceedings, and also by 

subsequently denying Relators’ motion for access to the reporter’s records 

generated at these proceedings. For the reasons set forth below, we will 

conditionally grant a writ of mandamus ordering Respondent to vacate her orders 

closing the courtroom; to set aside her March 20, 2014 order denying Relators’ 

motion to vacate the closure orders; and to take immediate steps to make 

transcripts of these proceedings available to Relators upon payment and making 

proper arrangements. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The State alleged that R.J.D. had committed the primary offense of capital 

murder and sought to have him certified to stand trial as an adult. The 

certification hearing was held on January 10, 2014; R.J.D. had turned seventeen 

years old in December 2013. R.J.D. had been in detention an unusually long 

time based on the unavailability of his attorney due to medical conditions. 

Consequently, the trial on R.J.D.’s determinate sentence was scheduled for 

January 22, 2014, just twelve days after the certification hearing. In light of this 

fact, Respondent stated that she was finding good cause to close the courtroom 

on January 10 to avoid tainting the jury pool and ordered all members of the 

public and the media to leave the courtroom prior to commencement of the 
3

certification hearing. R.J.D. did not seek the courtroom closure, and the State 

opposed it.

Respondent declined to waive her exclusive jurisdiction by certifying R.J.D. 

to stand trial as an adult, and the State and R.J.D. subsequently reached a plea 

agreement. They planned to present the agreement to Respondent at R.J.D.’s 

determinate sentence trial setting scheduled for January 22, 2014. Prior to this 

setting, the State—in consultation with the victim’s family—and the defense 

attorneys agreed to omit from the stipulation of evidence certain facts regarding 

the sexual relationship between R.J.D. and the victim. On January 22, 

Respondent again ordered the courtroom closed to the public and to members of 

the media. R.J.D. did not seek the courtroom closure, and the State opposed it. 

Respondent accepted the parties’ plea agreement, and the case concluded.

Relators later filed a motion with Respondent seeking access to the 

reporter’s records from the January 10 and the January 22 proceedings and 

requesting that Respondent vacate her courtroom closure orders.1 Relators’ 

motion urged Respondent to make available to any member of the public, upon 

request, copies of the transcripts of the January 10 and the January 22 

proceedings. After a hearing, Respondent denied the motion. 

 

1Relators concede that Respondent did not sign written courtroom closure 

orders. But Respondent’s oral closure orders were clear and specific and were 

actually enforced by removing the public and the media from the courtroom on 

January 10 and January 22. Therefore, the lack of written orders does not 

preclude mandamus relief in this case. See In re Bledsoe, 41 S.W.3d 807, 811 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, orig. proceeding).
4

Relators then filed this original proceeding. Relators claim that 

Respondent abused her discretion by issuing the January 10 and the January 22

courtroom closure orders and by denying Relators’ motion seeking access to the 

reporter’s records from the two proceedings.

2

III. STANDING

The general test for standing in Texas requires that there “(a) shall be a 

real controversy between the parties, which (b) will be actually determined by the 

judicial declaration sought.” See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 

S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). A relator must have standing to seek mandamus 

relief. See, e.g., In re Baker, 404 S.W.3d 575, 577–78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding); Cole v. Gabriel, 822 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1991, orig. proceeding). A lack of standing may be raised at any time 

or by the court on its own motion. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445–

 

2

The State filed a response to Relators’ petition for writ of mandamus 

consistent with its position in the trial court—the State objected to the courtroom 

closures—and asserted that Respondent had abused her discretion in various 

respects by closing the courtroom. Respondent filed a response. R.J.D. filed a 

response and an amended response. An amicus curiae brief was tendered by a 

group of juvenile justice law professors contending that Respondent did not 

abuse her discretion. The Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association

(TCDLA) tendered an amicus curiae brief asserting that Respondent did not 

abuse her discretion. The TCDLA also timely filed a motion pursuant to Texas 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 39.5 requesting permission to share the time for 

argument allotted to Real Party in Interest R.J.D. This court granted that motion. 

The General Counsel for the TCDLA presented argument on behalf of R.J.D. and 

in support of the amicus curiae brief tendered by the TCDLA. Relators and the 

State also tendered, and we ordered filed, postsubmission briefs. TCDLA also 

tendered a postsubmission amicus curiae brief.
5

46. Relators’ standing is an element of our subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. 

Accordingly, we address it here.

Courts have routinely recognized that members of the press possess 

standing to seek relief from orders barring them from a courtroom. See, e.g.,

United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 845–46 (3rd Cir. 1978).3 In Cianfrani, 

several newsgathering organizations and two named reporters alleged that the 

order of a district court barred them from attending a hearing and prevented them

from subsequently reading a transcript of that hearing; they sought aid from the 

appellate court to remove the continuing effect of the district court’s action, as 

well as to establish the illegality of such closure orders for the future. Id. The 

Cianfrani court explained that these allegations pleaded specific, concrete facts 

demonstrating that the challenged practices harmed the newsgathering 

organizations and the two named reporters and that they would personally 

benefit in a tangible way from the court’s intervention. Id. Thus, the court held 

that the newsgathering organizations, as well as the two named reporters, had 

satisfied the standing requirements implicit in Article III of the United States 

Constitution and discussed in Warth v. Seldin: they had made an allegation of 

such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant invocation 

 

3See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 

U.S. 596, 603, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2618 (1982); Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dist. 

Court for Dist. of Or., 920 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 

1210 (1991); Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. Peers, 747 S.W.2d 125, 

126–28 (Ky. 1988).
6

of federal-court jurisdiction (the injury-in-fact requirement) and to justify exercise 

of the court’s remedial powers on their behalf (the prudential concerns 

requirement). Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 845–46 (discussing Warth v. Seldin, 422 

U.S. 490, 498–500, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205–06 (1975)).

Relators here allege that Respondent issued two courtroom closure orders 

barring them from attending proceedings conducted in her courtroom and then 

later denied their motion requesting that she vacate the orders and permit them

to obtain a copy of the transcripts of these two proceedings. They seek aid from 

this court to remove the continuing effect of Respondent’s action, as well as to 

establish the illegality of these types of courtroom closure orders for the future. 

We hold that these allegations satisfy the first prong of the general test for 

standing in Texas, akin to the injury-in-fact federal standing requirement, that

requires a party seeking relief to have a personal stake in the outcome in order 

for a real controversy to exist between the parties. See Brown v. Todd, 53 

S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. 2001) (recognizing that to establish standing, plaintiff 

must allege injury distinct from public); see also Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d 

at 446; accord Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–500, 95 S. Ct. at 2205–06; Cianfrani, 573 

F.2d at 845–46. We next address whether Relators established the second

prong of the general test for standing in Texas that required them to show that 

the controversy between them will be actually determined by the judicial 

declaration sought. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.
7

IV. THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE

The mootness doctrine is rooted in the separation of powers doctrine in the 

United States and Texas constitutions, both of which prohibit courts from 

rendering advisory opinions. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Tex. Const. art. II, 

§ 1; see also Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex.

2000); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444. The doctrine limits courts to 

deciding cases in which an actual controversy exists. FDIC v. Nueces Cnty., 886 

S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1994); Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. Crapitto, 907 

S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding). An 

actual controversy does not exist when a party seeks a ruling on some matter 

that, when rendered, would not have any practical legal effect. See Meeker v. 

Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 317 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. 

denied).

Here, the parties agree that no actual controversy currently exists 

concerning Respondent’s courtroom closure orders. Relators were ordered 

excluded from the January 10 and the January 22 proceedings, and any ruling by 

this court on the propriety of Respondent’s courtroom closure orders will have no 

practical legal effect at this point; R.J.D.’s case has concluded. Thus, the issue 

of whether Respondent abused her discretion by issuing the courtroom closure 

orders has become moot. See, e.g., Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 

2001) (holding inmates’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief concerning 

unconstitutional program run in jail were moot because inmates had been 
8

released from jail); Valley Baptist Med. Ctr., 33 S.W.3d at 822 (holding appeal of 

rule 202 presuit discovery order permitting deposition became moot when 

appellant produced representative for deposition).

Relators nonetheless contend that this issue falls within the capable-ofrepetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine. “Capable of 

repetition yet evading review” is a rare exception to the mootness doctrine. Tex.

A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 290–91 (Tex. 2011). To 

invoke this exception, a party must establish both that the challenged act is of 

such short duration that the issue becomes moot before review may be obtained 

and that a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining party will be 

subjected to the same action again. Williams, 52 S.W.3d at 184–85; Gen. Land 

Office v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990). 

Here, via testimony and affidavits presented at the hearing on Relators’ 

motion for access to the court reporter’s records generated at the January 10 and 

the January 22 hearings, Relators established that Respondent had sua sponte, 

and without reliance on evidence in the record, issued the courtroom closure 

orders on January 10 and January 22;

4

that Respondent had issued courtroom 

closure orders under similar circumstances a few times in the past; and that the

January 10 and the January 22 hearings had both concluded on the same day 

 

4

It is undisputed that no evidence supporting either of the courtroom 

closure orders was offered, judicially noticed, stipulated to, made mention of, or 

otherwise made a part of the trial court record other than the fact that R.J.D.’s 

determinate sentence trial was set twelve days after his certification hearing.
9

that they had started. Consequently, Relators met their burden of establishing 

that the challenged act—the sua sponte issuance of a courtroom closure order 

excluding Relators from the courtroom in the absence of on-the-record 

evidence—was, and will be in the future, of such short duration that Relators 

could not, or probably would not, be able to obtain review before the issue 

becomes moot. Relators also established that a reasonable expectation exists 

that they will be subject in the future to a sua sponte order by Respondent 

excluding them from the courtroom in the absence of on-the-record evidence of 

good cause. See Crapitto, 907 S.W.2d at 101–02 (holding that order excluding 

media from courtroom during voir dire, although moot, fell within the capable-ofrepetition-yet-evading-review exception because of short duration of voir dire and

likelihood of repetition based on judge’s statement on record that she was 

entitled to exclude media from voir dire).5 Thus, although no actual controversy 

currently exists concerning Respondent’s courtroom closure orders, Relators met 

their burden of establishing that the challenged act—Respondent’s sua sponte 

issuance of courtroom closure orders in the absence of evidence in the record 

showing good cause for the closures—is capable of repetition yet will evade 

review. We therefore possess jurisdiction over this original proceeding under the 

 

5Respondent stated on the record that she disagreed with the contention of 

the attorney for the State that she could not close the proceedings in the absence 

of evidence presented on the record.
10

capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine 

embodied in the second prong of the general test for standing in Texas.

V. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Prerequisites to Mandamus Relief

A writ of mandamus will issue to correct a clear abuse of discretion when 

there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 

S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 

S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial court abuses its 

discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to 

a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply 

the law. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839–40. The relator has the burden to establish 

an abuse of discretion as well as the inadequacy of appeal as a remedy. 

Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. 1994) (orig.

proceeding), superseded by statute on other grounds, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 

Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7) (West Supp. 2014), as recognized in In re AIU Ins. 

Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 119 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).

An adequate remedy by appeal does not exist when a trial court improperly 

excludes the public or the press from proceedings that are to be open. See, e.g.,

Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. Shaver, 630 S.W.2d 927, 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1982); Crapitto, 907 S.W.2d at 100–02. Because Relators are members of the 

media who were excluded from Respondent’s courtroom on January 10 and on 

January 22, they have no adequate remedy by appeal. See Shaver, 630 S.W.2d 
11

at 934; Crapitto, 907 S.W.2d at 100–02. Below we discuss whether 

Respondent’s challenged action in issuing the courtroom closure orders 

constituted an abuse of discretion. 

B. Rules of Statutory Construction

We review issues of statutory construction de novo. Tex. Lottery Comm’n 

v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010). In construing 

statutes, our primary objective is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id.

(citing Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex.

2009)). “Where text is clear, text is determinative of that intent.” Entergy Gulf 

States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009) (op. on reh’g). Thus, 

we rely on the plain meaning of the text as expressing legislative intent unless a 

different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the 

context, or the plain meaning leads to absurd results. Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 325 

S.W.3d at 635; see also Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., 996 S.W.2d 

864, 866 (Tex. 1999) (explaining that “it is a fair assumption that the Legislature 

tries to say what it means, and therefore the words it chooses should be the 

surest guide to legislative intent”).

VI. TEXAS FAMILY CODE SECTION 54.08

Texas Family Code section 54.08 is part of the Texas Juvenile Justice 

Code and is titled, “Public Access to Court Hearings.” It provides, in pertinent 

part, as follows:
12

(a) Except as provided by this section, the court shall open hearings 

under this title to the public unless the court, for good cause shown, 

determines that the public should be excluded.

. . . .

(c) If a child is under the age of 14 at the time of the hearing, the 

court shall close the hearing to the public unless the court finds that 

the interests of the child or the interests of the public would be better 

served by opening the hearing to the public.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.08(a), (c) (West 2014). 

In their first three issues, Relators argue that Respondent abused her 

discretion in several respects by issuing the courtroom closure orders. One of 

Relators’ contentions is that Respondent closed the courtroom without a showing 

of good cause, as required by section 54.08(a). Relators contend that the “forgood-cause-shown” language of section 54.08(a) requires an evidentiary hearing 

at which Relators and members of the public must be permitted to appear and to 

offer evidence and also requires Respondent to make specific findings to support 

the closure.6

A. The January 10 Hearing

Relators assert that Respondent’s reason for closing the January 10 

hearing—to avoid tainting the jury pool because R.J.D.’s determinate sentence

 

6Relators assert that Respondent should be required to make specific 

findings documenting the showing of good cause that are sufficient to permit 

review by a court of appeals and by way of analogy cite to In re United 

Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 689 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding).
13

trial was set twelve days later—was conclusory and is not, as a matter of law, 

good cause for closing the courtroom. 

The fear of tainting the jury pool is indeed a concern in every pretrial 

hearing in every high profile case, criminal or civil, including juvenile cases. See, 

e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 378–79, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2912–13

(2010) (recognizing that “most cases of consequence garner at least some 

pretrial publicity”). Juror exposure to news accounts of a crime does not alone, 

however, presumptively deprive the defendant of due process. Id. at 377–85, 

130 S. Ct. at 2913–17 (distinguishing cases in which the media coverage was so 

pervasive that the United States Supreme Court presumed prejudice to the 

defendant). “Every case of public interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, 

brought to the attention of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely 

any one can be found among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or 

heard of it, and who has not some impression or some opinion in respect to its 

merits.” Id. at 381, 130 S. Ct. at 2915 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 

U.S. 145, 155–56 (1879)). Prominence does not necessarily produce prejudice,

and juror impartiality does not require juror ignorance. Id. at 381, 130 S. Ct. at 

2914–15 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722–23, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 1642–43 

(1961)). 

The plain language of family code section 54.08(a) states that proceedings 

involving juveniles who are fourteen years or older “shall” be open “unless the 

court, for good cause shown, determines that the public should be excluded.” 
14

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.08(a).7 “Shall,” when used in a statute, imposes a 

duty. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.016(2) (West 2013). Thus, giving section 

54.08(a) its plain meaning, it imposes a duty to open hearings to the public. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.08(a). The limited exception to this imposed duty of 

openness is found in the phrase “unless the court, for good cause shown, 

determines that the public should be excluded.” Id. The plain meaning of the 

phrase “for good cause shown” has been construed in other statutes to require 

evidence in the record establishing good cause. See Abron v. State, 531 S.W.2d 

643, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (construing former code of criminal procedure 

article 44.08(e)—which authorized a court of appeals to permit the filing of a late 

notice of appeal “for good cause shown”—as requiring sufficient supportive 

evidence in the record), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. State, 556 

S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Hooker v. State, 932 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 1996, no pet.) (construing article 35.29 of the code of criminal 

procedure—which requires a trial court to release personal information regarding 

the jury to a party to the trial upon a request and a showing of good cause—as 

requiring sufficient supportive evidence in the record); accord Roberts v. 

 

7Relators point us to the legislative history of family code section 54.08 and 

to prior versions of the statute as evidence of the legislature’s intent in enacting 

the current version of the statute. But we apply a “text-centric model” when 

construing statutes; we will use extrinsic aids such as legislative history only 

when the text is not clear. See Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 435 

(Tex. 2011) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring); Jennings v. WallBuilder Presentations, 

Inc. ex rel. Barton, 378 S.W.3d 519, 528 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2012, pet. 

denied). The text of family code section 54.08(a) is clear.
15

Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tex. 2003) (construing rule of civil procedure 

141—which authorizes trial court, for good cause stated on the record, to 

adjudge costs against prevailing party—as requiring trial court’s stated good 

cause to be specific; general fairness is not good cause).8 Given the duty 

imposed by section 54.08(a) to open hearings to the public and giving the 

statutorily articulated exception to this duty its plain meaning, we hold that 

section 54.08(a) requires some evidence in the record supportive of a goodcause finding that the public should be excluded. In the absence of evidence in 

the record—stipulated facts, judicial notice taken of facts or of files, testimony, 

self-authenticating documents, or some other evidence—as to why and how 

R.J.D.’s jury pool might be tainted by the media’s and the public’s presence at 

the January 10 hearing, good cause has not been “shown” for Respondent’s 

January 10 courtroom closure order as required by the plain language of the 

statute.

9

 We hold that Respondent abused her discretion by issuing the January 

 

8See also Richard E. Flint, Mandamus Review of the Granting of the 

Motion for New Trial: Lost in the Thicket, 45 St. Mary’s L.J. 575, 630 n.267 

(2014) (distinguishing rules of civil procedure that authorize a trial court to take 

action for “good cause” from rules of civil procedure that authorize a trial court to 

take action for “good cause shown” or other similar language). 

9Accord In re A.J.S., No. 08-12-00306-CV, 2014 WL 3732569, at *5 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso July 29, 2014, no pet. h.) (holding that juvenile had a Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process right to an “open trial” and assuming error from 

courtroom closure during voir dire over juvenile’s objection because no facts or 

fact-findings existed in record providing constitutionally sound basis for closure).
16

10 courtroom closure order in the absence of evidence supportive of a goodcause finding.

B. The January 22 Trial Setting

Relators assert that Respondent also abused her discretion by sua sponte

closing the January 22 proceeding. Respondent indicated that the reason she 

closed this proceeding was because the prosecutor had removed certain facts 

from the stipulation of evidence to be presented at this hearing, causing 

Respondent to likewise be concerned about the publication of these omitted 

facts. Thus, Respondent’s sole stated reason in the record for sua sponte

closing the January 22 hearing was to avoid the possible presentation of private 

facts that the prosecutor had decided to omit from the stipulation of evidence.

We recognize that the goals of the juvenile justice system are different 

from the adult criminal justice system; otherwise, a separate juvenile justice 

system would be unnecessary. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.01 (West 2014) 

(setting forth the purposes of the juvenile justice code). The different goals of the 

juvenile justice system cause the types of privacy concerns at issue here to be 

more compelling in juvenile cases.10 And we do not doubt that privacy concerns 

could, in some instances, justify closing a juvenile proceeding involving a juvenile 

who is at least fourteen years old for some period if the statutory requisite of 

 

10The amicus curiae briefs tendered to this court on behalf of four law 

professors with expertise in Texas juvenile law and by the TCDLA detail the 

unique issues and concerns faced by juvenile judges like Respondent. 
17

good cause is shown on the record. But, again, as set forth above, giving the 

language of family code section 54.08(a) its plain meaning, in the absence of 

evidence in the record—stipulated facts, judicial notice taken of facts or of files, 

testimony, self-authenticating documents, or some other evidence—as to why 

and how and the extent to which the public dissemination of these private facts 

would be detrimental to the juvenile or to another party, good cause has not been 

shown for Respondent’s January 22 courtroom closure order as required by the 

plain language of the statute. Accord A.J.S., 2014 WL 3732569, at *5. We hold 

that under the facts presented here, Respondent abused her discretion by 

issuing the January 22 courtroom closure order in the absence of evidence 

supportive of a good-cause finding.

C. The Limitations of Our Holdings

Relators and the State contend that Respondent’s courtroom closure 

orders also violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 

“Open Courts” provision of the Texas constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. I; 

Tex. Const. art. 1, § 13. Having determined that Respondent abused her 

discretion by failing to correctly apply family code section 54.08(a) in the present 

case, we need not address the constitutional issues raised by Relators. See, 

e.g., In re Ostrofsky, 112 S.W.3d 925, 932–33 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2003, orig. proceeding) (“Having found an abuse of discretion by the trial court 

under [Texas Family Code] section 156.006, we need not address the 

constitutional ground raised by relator.”).
18

Relators and the State also urge us to define “good cause shown” and to 

articulate procedures applicable in the future to govern courtroom closure orders

under section 54.08(a) in all Texas juvenile proceedings.

11

 We lack jurisdiction to 

do so. The Texas constitution’s separation of powers provision prohibits courts 

from issuing advisory opinions that decide abstract questions of law. See Brown,

53 S.W.3d at 302; see also Coalson v. City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W.2d 744, 

747 (Tex. 1980) (explaining that courts may not give advisory opinions or decide 

cases upon speculative, hypothetical, or contingent situations). The distinctive 

feature of an advisory opinion is that it decides an abstract question of law 

without binding the parties. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444. Any 

definition of “good cause shown” created by this court and any procedures 

articulated by this court as governing courtroom closures under section 54.08 

would constitute the resolution of abstract questions of law that would not apply 

 

11Relators cite to several United States Supreme Court criminal cases and 

to several out-of-state juvenile cases setting forth tests and procedures for 

courtroom closure orders that Relators contend would be appropriate here. See

e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 215, 130 S. Ct. 721, 725 (2010) 

(explaining that trial courts are required to consider alternatives to closure of 

criminal trials); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 581, 100 S. Ct. 

2814, 2829–30 (1980) (holding that, “[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in 

findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public”); State ex. rel. 

Plain Dealer Publ’g v. Geauga Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl., Juv. Div., 734 N.E.2d 1214, 

1218–20 (Ohio 2000) (placing burden on party seeking closure of juvenile 

proceeding to show three factors). As previously mentioned, Relators also 

contend specific good-cause findings should be required as in United 

Scaffolding, 377 S.W.3d at 689.
19

to the parties before us and would thus constitute an impermissible advisory 

opinion.12

Although we possess jurisdiction to address the narrow issue presented by 

the facts here—whether or not Respondent abused her discretion by issuing 

courtroom closure orders in the absence of any type of evidence on the record 

showing good cause—our jurisdiction to address this specific moot issue under 

the limited capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness 

doctrine does not extend to pronouncing definitions or to adopting procedures 

concerning family code section 54.08(a) that will not be binding on the parties in 

this case because R.J.D.’s case has concluded. That is, the complained-of 

action by Respondent that satisfies the capable-of-repetition prong of the 

exception to the mootness doctrine here is only the exact action taken by 

Respondent in R.J.D.’s case. We cannot speculate as to whether some other 

 

12We likewise question whether Relators and the State possess standing 

to seek this relief—a definition of good cause shown and articulation of 

procedures governing courtroom closures under section 54.08. They have not 

established the first prong of the general test for standing in Texas concerning 

this relief; Relators and the State have suffered no actual, as opposed to merely 

hypothetical or generalized, grievance regarding these issues. See Brown, 53 

S.W.3d at 302; see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 

U.S. 208, 221–22, 94 S. Ct. 2925, 2932–33 (1974) (explaining in the context of 

standing that “[t]he desire to obtain (sweeping relief) cannot be accepted as a 

substitute for compliance with the general rule that the complainant must present 

facts sufficient to show that his individual need requires the remedy for which he 

asks”). If Relators and the State lack standing to assert these issues, then we 

lack subject-matter jurisdiction over them on this basis as well. See Tex. Ass’n of 

Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444 (recognizing standing is component of subject-matter 

jurisdiction). 
20

type of courtroom closure action taken or courtroom closure procedure followed 

by Respondent in the future might or might not constitute an abuse of discretion; 

nor may we pontificate on the abstract application of section 54.08 to 

hypothetical facts that are not before us. See Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 

Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442–43 (Tex. 1998) (explaining that “[a] case is not ripe 

when its resolution depends on contingent or hypothetical facts, or upon events 

that have not yet come to pass” and recognizing an opinion in a case that is not 

ripe is an advisory opinion); accord Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. Thomas, 

196 S.W.3d 396, 401 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding 

declaratory judgment action seeking construction of Texas Public Information Act 

was moot because autopsy report sought was produced and declining to 

construe act based on future hypothetical fact situations); see also North 

Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S. Ct. 402, 404 (1971) (“[C]ourts are 

without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the 

case before them[.]”).

Therefore, our holdings here are limited to concluding that Respondent 

abused her discretion by closing the January 10 and January 22 proceedings

because no evidence was shown on the record to support any good-cause 

finding. A plain-language reading of family code section 54.08(a) mandates that 

good cause for closing a juvenile proceeding involving a juvenile who is at least 

fourteen years old be shown by evidence on the record.
21

VII. THE RECORDINGS OF THE PROCEEDINGS

In their fourth issue, Relators claim that Respondent abused her discretion 

by failing, after R.J.D.’s case was concluded, to vacate her closure orders and to 

permit Relators access to the recordings made by the court reporter of the 

January 10 and January 22 proceedings. R.J.D. contends that the recordings

are, by law, confidential pursuant to Texas Family Code sections 58.005 and

58.007. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 58.005, .007 (West 2014).

Section 58.005 is titled, “Confidentiality of Records.” Id. § 58.005. It 

declares confidential

[r]ecords and files concerning a child, including personally 

identifiable information, and information obtained for the purpose of 

diagnosis, examination, evaluation, or treatment or for making a 

referral for treatment of a child by a public or private agency or 

institution providing supervision of a child by arrangement of the 

juvenile court or having custody of the child under order of the 

juvenile court.

Id. Section 58.007 is titled, “Physical Records or Files.” Id. § 58.007. It provides

as follows:

(b) Except as provided by Section 54.051(d-1) and by Article 15.27, 

Code of Criminal Procedure, the records and files of a juvenile court, 

a clerk of court, a juvenile probation department, or a prosecuting 

attorney relating to a child who is a party to a proceeding under this 

title may be inspected or copied only by:

. . . .

(5) with leave of the juvenile court, any other person, agency, 

or institution having a legitimate interest in the proceeding or in the 

work of the court.
22

Id. § 58.007(b)(5).13 Section 54.09 of the family code is titled, “Recording of 

Proceedings” and requires that all judicial proceedings under chapter 54 be 

recorded by stenographic notes or by electronic, mechanical, or other 

appropriate means. Id. § 54.09 (West 2014).

Examining these provisions and giving the words of the provisions their 

plain meaning, no language exists making the recordings of the January 10 and 

January 22 proceedings involving R.J.D. confidential as a matter of law. Section 

58.005 makes “records and files concerning a child” that are “obtained for the 

purpose of diagnosis, examination, evaluation, or treatment” confidential as 

opposed to making recordings of judicial proceedings confidential. See id.

§ 58.005. Section 58.007 does limit inspection of juvenile court records, but 

recordings of judicial proceedings—mandated to be recorded per section 54.09—

are not specifically included in the court records subject to limited inspection. 

See id. § 58.007. Reporter’s records of juvenile disposition hearings, including 

 

13In addition to these provisions, the Juvenile Justice Code contains 

numerous other provisions concerning information regarding juveniles. See, e.g., 

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 58.001–.405 (West 2014). Some of the statutory 

provisions restricting access to juvenile records appear to not apply in cases 

such as this one in which a determinate sentence is imposed. Accord id. 

§ 58.003(b) (prohibiting juvenile court from sealing records of a juvenile who has 

received a determinate sentence for engaging in the delinquent conduct that 

violates a penal law listed in section 53.045; section 53.045 lists capital murder); 

see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(f) (West Supp. 2014) (providing that an 

adjudication by a juvenile court that a juvenile engaged in delinquent conduct 

constituting a felony offense for which he was committed to the Texas Juvenile 

Justice Department under family code section 54.04(d)(2), (d)(3), or (m), or 

section 54.05(f) for a determinate sentence is a final conviction for enhancement 

purposes). 
23

determinate sentence trials, are routinely filed in appellate courts when a juvenile 

appeals his disposition order. See id. § 56.01(c)(1)(B) (West 2014) (authorizing 

juvenile to appeal disposition order), § 56.02 (providing for reporter’s record in 

juvenile case to be prepared and included in appellate record). See generally In 

re J.A.B., No. 08-11-00244-CV, 2013 WL 3943087, at *1–8 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

July 24, 2013, no pet.) (involving juvenile’s appeal from adjudication and 

disposition orders). Appeals in juvenile cases are as in civil cases generally; no 

special confidentiality rules exist in the rules of appellate procedure concerning 

reporter’s records in juvenile appeals.14 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(b); In 

re G.C.F., 42 S.W.3d 194, 195–96 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). 

Neither Respondent nor the amicus curiae have directed us to other statutes or 

rules mandating that a transcription of a juvenile proceeding is confidential as a 

matter of law, and we have not located any. 

Finally, to construe sections 58.005 and 58.007 as making the two 

recordings at issue confidential when section 54.08 mandates that judicial 

proceedings involving a juvenile who is at least fourteen years old “shall” be open 

to the public “unless the court, for good cause shown, determines that the public 

 

14The only privacy accommodation for juveniles in the rules of appellate 

procedure is that an appellate court is to identify a juvenile by a pseudonym 

instead of by the juvenile’s name in its opinion in a juvenile appeal. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 9.8(c). Appellate courts are expressly prohibited from altering the 

original appellate record—which includes the clerk’s record and the reporter’s 

record—in juvenile cases to protect a juvenile’s identity. See Tex. R. App. P. 

9.8(d), 34.1. 
24

should be excluded” would create an absurd result in the case before us. See 

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 54.08(a); 58.005, 58.007. In other words, because the 

legislature has mandated that judicial proceedings involving juveniles like R.J.D. 

who are at least fourteen years old shall be open to the public absent good cause 

shown to exclude the public, it would be nonsensical and would constitute an 

absurd result for us to construe other statutory provisions as cloaking the 

recordings of the two proceedings with confidentiality when there was no good 

cause shown in the trial court.

15

 See, e.g., Jose Carreras, M.D., P.A. v. 

Marroquin, 339 S.W.3d 68, 73 (Tex. 2011) (declining to interpret statute in 

manner that would lead to absurd results) (citing City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 

246 S.W.3d 621, 625–26 (Tex. 2008) (“[W]e construe the statute’s words 

according to their plain and common meaning . . . unless such a construction 

leads to absurd results.”)); City of Laredo v. Villarreal, 81 S.W.3d 865, 868–69

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (declining to adopt one party’s proposed 

construction of ordinance because it would lead to absurd results).

We hold that Respondent abused her discretion by refusing to vacate the 

courtroom closure orders issued in R.J.D.’s case on January 10 and January 22,

 

15We need not, and do not, determine whether recordings of proceedings 

made pursuant to section 54.09 may be confidential when the proceedings 

involve a juvenile younger than fourteen years old. Likewise, we need not, and 

do not, determine whether recordings of proceedings involving a juvenile 

fourteen years or older may be considered confidential when such proceedings 

are closed based on an on-the-record showing of good cause under section 

54.08(a).
25

and we will order her to vacate these orders and to set aside her March 20, 2014 

order denying Relators’ motion to vacate the closure orders. The vacatur of the 

closure orders means that Relators are entitled to obtain a copy of the recording 

of the judicial proceedings, exclusive of any exhibits,16 upon making payment and 

proper arrangements. See Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 846 (recognizing that reversal 

of courtroom closure order would have the immediate effect of requiring the court 

to open the transcript of the hearing to the public, which court had previously 

declined to do); accord Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 24 (Tex. 1992) (orig. 

proceeding) (explaining that “with the gag order lifted, there should be no 

impediment to viewing the court records”); Lesikar v. Anthony, 750 S.W.2d 338, 

339–40 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, orig. proceeding) (conditionally 

granting writ of mandamus and directing district court judge to vacate order that 

prevented relators from obtaining a copy of a reporter’s record). 

VIII. CONCLUSION

Having determined that Respondent abused her discretion by issuing the 

January 10 and the January 22 courtroom closure orders and by subsequently 

refusing to vacate the courtroom closure orders, we conditionally grant a writ of 

 

16Relators limit their request for relief to seeking the transcripts of the two 

proceedings at issue. Our opinion therefore addresses only Relators’ access to 

the recordings of the proceedings on January 10 and on January 22 that were 

made pursuant to section 54.09. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.09. We do not 

speculate on whether exhibits, if any, offered into evidence at these proceedings 

may or may not be confidential as a matter of law under other provisions of the 

Texas Family Code.
26

mandamus. We are confident that Respondent will promptly vacate her January 

10, 2014 and January 22, 2014 orders closing the courtroom in R.J.D.’s case; set 

aside her March 20, 2014 order denying Relators’ motion to vacate those orders;

and take immediate steps to make the transcripts of the January 10 and January 

22 proceedings at issue here available to Relators upon payment and proper 

arrangements. The writ will issue only if Respondent fails to promptly do so.

/s/ Sue Walker

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE 

PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DELIVERED: August 12, 2014