[Cite as In re R.T., 2013-Ohio-4886.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

In the matter of: : 

R.T., : No. 13AP-291 

 (P.C. No. MI-19885) 

 Respondent-Appellant. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 5, 2013 

 

R.T., pro se. 

J. Michael Evans, for Franklin County ADAMH Board. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Probate Division 

T. BRYANT, J. 

{¶1} Respondent-appellant, R.T., appeals from a judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, overruling objections and adopting 

the magistrate's reports and entries dated March 7 and March 14, 2013. Appellee, 

Franklin County Alcohol, Drug Addiction and Mental Health Services Board ("ADAMH 

Board"), filed a motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we deny the motion to 

dismiss, and affirm the trial court's decision. 

{¶2} On February 28, 2013, Lora Ford, LSW, filed an affidavit of mental illness 

regarding appellant pursuant to R.C. 5122.11.1 That day, an order of detention was filed 

and appellant was taken to Riverside Methodist Hospital. On March 6, 2013, a hearing 

was held on the affidavit of mental illness. On March 7, 2013, a magistrate's report and 

entry was filed finding appellant to be a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization. 

 

1 The facts are taken mostly from the trial court judgment entry. 
No. 13AP-291 2

{¶3} On March 7, 2013, an application to authorize antipsychotic medication 

was filed and a hearing was held on March 13, 2013. On March 14, 2013, a magistrate's 

report and entry was filed authorizing the administration of antipsychotic medication to 

appellant. 

{¶4} Appellant filed a general objection to both the March 7 and March 14, 2013 

magistrate's reports and entries. On March 28, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on 

the objection and overruled the objection on March 29, 2013. 

{¶5} Acting pro se, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and raised the 

following assignments of error: 

I. The First assignment of error of the March 28th probate 

court objection hearing decision is when the court made the 

error of upholding the magistrate[']s decision. 

II. The second assignment of error of the March 28th 

probate court objection hearing decision is when the trial 

court's decision was based upon inadmissible evidence. 

III. The third assignment of error of the March 28th probate 

court objection hearing decision is when [the] trial court 

made the error by forcing medication on the appellant. 

IV. The fourth assignment of error of the March 28th 

probate court objection hearing decision is when the trial 

court made the error by precluding appellant from 

introducing evidence at her hearing, as guaranteed by 

Revised [C]ode 5122.15. 

 

{¶6} Preliminarily, we note that appellant was present for oral argument before 

this court and has been released from the hospital and the matter appears to be moot. 

"Actions are moot when ' "they involve no actual genuine, live controversy, the decision 

of which can definitely affect existing legal relations." ' " In re K.W., 10th Dist. No. 

06AP-943, 2007-Ohio-699, ¶ 8, quoting Lingo v. Ohio Cent. RR., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 

05AP-206, 2006-Ohio-2268, ¶ 20, quoting Grove City v. Clark, 10th Dist. No. 01AP1369, 2002-Ohio-4549, ¶ 11. However, this matter is not moot. An adjudication by the 

probate court of mental illness carries a stigma that can have a significant impact and 

adverse consequences on the individual's life. In re Miller, 63 Ohio St.3d 99, 108 

(1992), citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979). See also K.W.; In re 

P.H., 10th Dist. No. 96APF12-1729 (July 10, 1997). Thus, we address the merits of her 

appeal. 
No. 13AP-291 3

{¶7} We also note that the brief appellant filed with this court is very difficult to 

decipher and does not comply with App.R. 16 in many respects, including a lack of 

reference to the places in the record where each error is reflected (App.R. 16(A)(3)), no 

statement of the issues (App.R. 16(A)(4)), and the supporting argument does not clearly 

specify the contentions pertaining to each assignment of error (App.R. 16(A)(7)). We 

are free to disregard appellant's assignments of error under these circumstances. See

App.R. 12(A)(2). However, in the interest of justice, we will address what we discern to 

be her assignments of error. 

{¶8} By her first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court 

erred in adopting the March 7, 2013, magistrate's report and entry because she alleges 

that it was based on pending municipal court charges. 

{¶9} When a person faces involuntary commitment to a mental hospital, "the 

individual's right against involuntary confinement depriving him or her of liberty must 

be balanced against the state's interest in committing those who are mentally ill." Miller

at 101. R.C. Chapter 5122 sets forth the procedures for committing a person to a mental 

hospital. "When commitment is against a person's will, it is particularly important that 

the statutory scheme be followed, so that the patient's due-process rights receive 

adequate protection." Id.

{¶10} Non-emergency hospitalization under R.C. Chapter 5122 is commenced 

with the filing of an affidavit with the court setting forth specifics under R.C. 5122.01(B) 

upon which the court's jurisdiction is based. The affidavit must contain facts sufficient 

to indicate probable cause that an individual is a mentally ill person subject to 

hospitalization by court order. R.C. 5122.01(B) sets forth the criteria defining 

"[m]entally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order." The court must conduct 

a hearing to determine whether the individual is a mentally ill person subject to 

hospitalization. The statute provides a three-part definition of "mentally ill person 

subject to hospitalization by court order," which the state must demonstrate to have a 

person involuntarily committed. State v. Welch, 125 Ohio App.3d 49, 52 (11th 

Dist.1997). R.C. 5122.01(A) provides the first two parts, as follows: 

[1.] "Mental illness" means a substantial disorder of thought, 

mood, perception, orientation, or memory that [2.] grossly 

impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or 

ability to meet the ordinary demands of life. 

 
No. 13AP-291 4

{¶11} The third part of the definition is found in R.C. 5122.01(B), and requires a 

finding that the individual: 

(1) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to self as 

manifested by evidence of threats of, or attempts at, suicide 

or serious self-inflicted bodily harm; 

(2) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to others 

as manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other 

violent behavior, evidence of recent threats that place 

another in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious 

physical harm, or other evidence of present dangerousness; 

(3) Represents a substantial and immediate risk of serious 

physical impairment or injury to self as manifested by 

evidence that the person is unable to provide for and is not 

providing for the person's basic physical needs because of the 

person's mental illness and that appropriate provision for 

those needs cannot be made immediately available in the 

community; or 

(4) Would benefit from treatment in a hospital for the 

person's mental illness and is in need of such treatment as 

manifested by evidence of behavior that creates a grave and 

imminent risk to substantial rights of others or the person. 

{¶12} Thus, the state must prove that a defendant has a substantial mental 

disorder, that the mental disorder grossly impairs his functioning, and the defendant 

must be hospitalized for one of the four reasons provided in R.C. 5122.01(B). Each part 

of the definition must be established by clear and convincing evidence. R.C. 5122.15(H). 

"Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a 

mere 'preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of such certainty as is 

required 'beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will produce in the 

mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 

established." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

"Where the proof required must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine 

the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to 

satisfy the requisite degree of proof." State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990). 

{¶13} In In re Burton, 11 Ohio St.3d 147, 149 (1984), the Supreme Court of Ohio 

established a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a person is subject 
No. 13AP-291 5

to hospitalization pursuant to R.C. 5122.01(B). The factors the probate court is to 

consider include, but are not limited to: 

(1) [W]hether, in the court's view, the individual currently 

represents a substantial risk of physical harm to himself or 

other members of society; (2) psychiatric and medical 

testimony as to the present mental and physical condition of 

the alleged incompetent; (3) whether the person has insight 

into his condition so that he will continue treatment as 

prescribed or seek professional assistance if needed; (4) the 

grounds upon which the state relies for the proposed 

commitment; (5) any past history which is relevant to 

establish the individual's degree of conformity to the laws, 

rules, regulations and values of society; and (6) if there is 

evidence that the person's mental illness is in a state of 

remission, the court must also consider the medically 

suggested cause and degree of the remission and the 

probability that the individual will continue treatment to 

maintain the remissive state of his illness should he be 

released from commitment. 

Burton, at 149-50. 

{¶14} The magistrate's March 7, 2013 report and entry found appellant to be a 

mentally ill person subject to hospitalization. The report was based on an affidavit and a 

hearing held on March 6, 2013. The affidavit was filed by Lora Ford, LSW, concerning 

appellant. It provided the following significant points: 

[Respondent] [R]epresents a substantial risk of physical 

harm to others as manifested by evidence of recent 

homicidal or other violent behavior, evidence of recent 

threats that place another in reasonable fear of violent 

behavior and serious physical harm, or other evidence of 

present dangerousness; 

* * * 

On 02/07/2013, client went to her neighbor's house and 

opened up his screen door. Client had 2 knives and a hand 

saw and started swinging the weapons at the neighbor. * * * 

Since being released pending her trial, client made numerous 

phone calls to Columbus Police Department asserting that 

one of the officers that has been out to her home this month 

"should be dead and his family set on fire". This statement 

was made on 02/24/2013. She has also stated that this 

officer needs "a bullet in his head". * * * This information 

was provided by the Columbus Police Department based on 

the 11 runs to the home this month. * * * Per the neighbor's 
No. 13AP-291 6

[sic], client is seen pacing on the sidewalks on their street 

carrying knives. She can be seen talking to herself and will 

respond as if someone not present is speaking to her. 

Neighbor's [sic] further report that client's daughter has 

stated that client hears voices. Client is also banging on the 

walls of her apartment and can be heard screaming for no 

apparent reason. 

{¶15} At the hearing, William Bates, M.D., a psychiatrist, testified as to his 

expert opinion regarding appellant. Dr. Bates testified that appellant has a schizoaffective disorder and numerous delusions. As a result of her persecutory delusions, she 

feels various people follow her and want to kill, rape, and poison or harass her. She 

confronted a neighbor earlier that month with knives and weapons because she believed 

he wanted to rape her. Her schizo-affective disorder is a disorder of thought and mind 

and is substantial. She represents a substantial risk to others because she is in a state of 

fear. Appellant made threatening phone calls to the police and has been walking around 

the neighborhood with weapons. Dr. Bates testified that appellant is not able to 

function in society in a meaningful way in her present condition and the least restrictive 

environment is a psychiatric hospital. His ultimate conclusion was that appellant is a 

mentally ill person and needs to be in a psychiatric facility. 

{¶16} Under the totality of the circumstances, the testimony of Dr. Bates 

presents clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that appellant 

is a mentally ill person, who, because of her illness, represents a substantial risk of 

physical harm to others under R.C. 5122.01(B)(2). Appellant, as a result of her mental 

illness, entered a neighbor's home and threatened him with knives and a saw. Appellant 

repeatedly made threatening phone calls to police officers and walked the neighborhood 

streets carrying weapons. The trial court had clear and convincing evidence that she has 

a substantial mental disorder, that the mental disorder grossly impairs her functioning 

and appellant must be hospitalized because her behavior represents a substantial risk of 

physical harm to others that satisfies R.C. 5122.01(B)(2). Appellant's first assignment of 

error is overruled. 

{¶17} By her second assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred 

in adopting the magistrate's March 7 report and entry because the magistrate relied on 

inadmissible expert testimony. Appellant argues that the testimony of Dr. Bates was 

inadmissible because appellant's medical records were not available to the court. 
No. 13AP-291 7

Appellant's counsel filed a motion in limine requesting that the court limit the testimony 

of Dr. Bates to his personal observations. However, counsel withdrew the motion at the 

conclusion of the hearing because it was not necessary based on the testimony. 

{¶18} Despite appellant's contentions, the trial court did not rely on inadmissible 

evidence. Pursuant to Evid.R. 703, "[t]he facts or data in the particular case upon which 

an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by the expert or 

admitted in evidence at the hearing." Thus, the medical records did not need to be 

admitted in this case because the expert testified based upon facts and data he 

perceived. Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶19} By her third assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court 

erred in adopting the March 14, 2013 magistrate's report and entry because the 

magistrate did not acknowledge the power of attorney appellant had signed the day 

before the hearing. Appellant also seems to be arguing that an involuntarily committed 

patient cannot be forcibly medicated if that person has the capacity to make an informed 

decision. 

{¶20} When the hearing began, appellant's counsel informed the court that 

appellant's daughter, Stephanie, was present in the courtroom and had a health care 

power of attorney, signed by appellant the previous day. Appellant's counsel made the 

magistrate aware that even after executing the health care power of attorney, appellant 

refused her medication the previous day. The magistrate found the health care power of 

attorney ineffective for purposes of the hearing because appellant had already been 

determined by clear and convincing evidence that she has a substantial mental disorder, 

that the mental disorder grossly impairs her functioning and that she must be 

hospitalized because her behavior represents a substantial risk of physical harm to 

others. Given that adjudication, her ability to enter into a health care power of attorney 

after that adjudication was compromised. See Testa v. Roberts, 44 Ohio App.3d 161, 

164 (6th Dist.1988) ("The creation of a power of attorney requires that the principal be 

mentally competent at the time the power is executed. * * * The test to be used to 

determine mental capacity is the ability of the principal to understand the nature, scope 

and the extent of the business he is about to transact."). Thus, the magistrate did not err 

in not acknowledging the power of attorney appellant had signed the day before the 

hearing. 
No. 13AP-291 8

{¶21} Appellant also cites to Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1984) and 

Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3rd Cir.1983). The citations seem to be in support of an 

argument that an involuntarily committed mentally ill person has a constitutional right 

to refuse the administration of antipsychotic drugs if that person has the capacity to 

make informed treatment decisions and does not pose an imminent harm to 

himself/herself or others. However, those cases are distinguishable from these facts. 

{¶22} In Steele v. Hamilton Cty. Community Mental Health Bd., 90 Ohio St.3d 

176 (2000), the Supreme Court of Ohio determined the circumstances under which an 

involuntarily committed mentally ill patient may be forcibly medicated and the 

necessary due process. The Supreme Court of Ohio set forth in Steele: "[a] physician 

may order the forced medication of an involuntarily committed mentally ill patient with 

antipsychotic drugs when the physician determines that (1) the patient presents an 

imminent danger of harm to himself/herself or others, (2) there are no less intrusive 

means of avoiding the threatened harm, and (3) the medication to be administered is 

medically appropriate for the patient." Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶23} In this case, the Steele requirements were met. Dallas Erdman, M.D., a 

qualified psychiatrist who was appellant's treating physician testified and stated that 

appellant did not have the current capacity to make medical decisions. She had an 

inability to understand and have any rational, reasonable conversations about her 

illness. He explained the treatment regimen and testified that he was unaware of any 

lesser treatment alternatives and that the benefits outweighed the risks. He stated that 

without treatment, he had "significant reservations" about discharging her into the 

community because of her behavior presenting a risk to her and others' safety. (Mar. 13, 

2013 Tr. 21.) John Morcos, M.D., also testified. He agreed that appellant did not have 

the capacity to make informed consent regarding medication and he believed the 

proposed treatment plan was appropriate. He was unaware of any lesser intrusive 

treatment alternatives and the benefits outweighed the risks. Thus, the testimony 

established the Steele requirements and the trial court did not err in adopting the 

magistrate's report and entry authorizing forced medication. Appellant's third 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶24} In her fourth assignment of error, appellant contends that the magistrate 

erred during the March 6, 2013 hearing in precluding appellant from introducing the 

testimony of supportive witnesses. Appellant's complaint is that her attorney did not 
No. 13AP-291 9

have her daughter, Stephanie Thomas, and a neighbor testify. However, the attorney 

explained to the magistrate that he had spoken to two gentlemen, one who indicated he 

was a neighbor, but the neighbor's testimony was relevant to appellant's pending case in 

municipal court, not to this pending case in probate court. Appellant's counsel found no 

need to call the witnesses that appellant claims were excluded because their testimony 

was irrelevant to the proceedings. There is no duty to call witnesses to present irrelevant 

testimony. Appellant's fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶25} Appellee filed a motion to dismiss in the case, contending that a proper 

notice of appeal was not filed and that appellant's daughter, Stephanie Thomas, appears 

to have filed the appeal on behalf of her mother. Since Thomas is not a qualified 

attorney or her mother's guardian, she could not represent her mother. However, the 

brief was signed by R.T. and appellant appeared at oral argument before this court. This 

court has no reason to think other than appellant filed the appeal pro se. Appellee's 

motion to dismiss is denied. 

{¶26} For the foregoing reasons, appellant's four assignments of error are 

overruled, appellee's motion to dismiss is denied, and the judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, is affirmed. 

Motion to dismiss denied; 

 judgment affirmed. 

DORRIAN and O'GRADY, JJ., concur. 

T. BRYANT, J., retired, formerly of the Third Appellate 

District, assigned to active duty under authority of the Ohio 

Constitution, Article IV, Section 6(C).