U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

A Comparison of Two Fires:

The Westview Towers - North Bergen, New Jersey and 

The Council Towers Apartments - St. Louis, Missouri

USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by Varley-Campbell & 

Associates, Inc. Miami and Chicago, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the Fire 

Administration in carrying out the Fire Reports Program. 

The United States Fire Administration greatly appreciates the cooperation received from the North 

Bergen, New Jersey and St. Louis, Missouri Fire Departments.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

A Comparison of Two Fires:

The Westview Towers

North Bergen, New Jersey

and

The Council Towers Apartments

St. Louis, Missouri

This is Report 119 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted 

by Varley-Campbell and Associates, Inc./TriData Corporation under 

contract EME-97-CO-0506 to the United States Fire Administration, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Investigated by: John Lee Cook, Jr.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

TABLe oF CoNTeNTS

OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

KEY ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE BUILDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

FIRE DEPARTMENT PROFILE: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

THE FIRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

FIRE DEPARTMENT ARRIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

INJURIES AND FATALITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

THE INVESTIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

THE BUILDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

FIRE DEPARTMENT PROFILE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

THE FIRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

FIRE DEPARTMENT ARRIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

INJURIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

THE INVESTIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

LESSONS LEARNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

APPENDIX A: Diagram of the Westview Towers Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

APPENDIX B: Photographs of the Westview Towers Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

APPENDIX C: List of EMS Agencies That Responded to the Westview Towers Fire . . . . . . . . . . 19

APPENDIX D: Diagram of the Council Tower Apartment Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

APPENDIX E: Photographs of the Council Towers Apartments Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

APPENDIX F: Medical Oxygen Cylinders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

1

A Comparison of Two Fires: 

The Westview Towers, North Bergen, New Jersey 

and 

The Council Towers Apartments

St. Louis, Missouri

O

On August 9, 1998, a fire occurred in an apartment located on the fourth floor of the Westview Towers 

Building in North Bergen, New Jersey. Four residents of the building died and thirty-two people, 

including seven emergency responders, were injured seriously enough to require transportation to a 

hospital. Twenty-two firefighters and an undetermined number of residents were also treated at the 

scene for minor injuries due to heat, smoke inhalation, minor burns, cuts, and bruises.

Two of the fatalities occurred in the apartment of origin, #4E, when the victims were trapped by heat 

and smoke conditions that forced them to retreat to the balcony of their apartment. The balcony was 

inaccessible by an aerial device and firefighters attempted to reach the trapped victims with ground 

ladders. One victim fell to her death during this attempt because she lunged at a ladder, which had 

not been secured to the balcony railing. The other victim succumbed to the intense heat and smoke 

conditions on the balcony before firefighters could reach her.

Two additional victims were discovered in a stairwell between the sixth and seventh floors. They 

were residents of the tenth floor and were overcome by smoke as they attempted to escape down 

the stairwell. Firefighters removed them to an apartment on the sixth floor, but were unsuccessful in 

their attempt to revive them.

It took more than eighty firefighters to extinguish the blaze in the twenty-two-story building. 

Companies from West New York, Weehawken, Jersey City, and Hoboken assisted the North Bergen 

Fire Department with the fire. The fire resistive construction of the building limited the spread of the 

fire, but contributed to the development of severe heat conditions on the fire floor and delayed extinguishment. The building was not sprinklered. The stairwells were not pressurized and this allowed 

the smoke to spread to the upper floors of the building.

After the fire, three oxygen bottles were discovered in Apartment 4E. An aluminum cylinder was 

found in the living room of the apartment and the cylinder ruptured during the fire. Two cylinders 

were found in the kitchen. The relief devices actuated during the fire, but the two cylinders remained 

intact. The release of the contents of the three cylinders increased the rate of combustion and resulted 

in the almost complete destruction of the contents in the room of origin. The intensity of the blaze 

also caused heavy spalling of the ceiling.
2 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

On October 12, 1998 in Saint Louis, Missouri a fire started in Apartment 2103 of the Council Tower 

Apartments Building and communicated out the windows to the apartment immediately above on 

the twenty-second floor. No one died in the eight-alarm blaze, but thirteen residents and three firefighters received sufficient injuries to require transportation to a hospital. Most of the injuries proved 

to be minor. However, a Fire Department Captain suffered severe burns to his respiratory tract and is 

not expected to be able to return to active duty as a firefighter due to extent of his injuries.

The extinguishment effort in the twenty-seven-story building required the response of over 150 

firefighters and all but three of the department’s fire companies. Mutual-aid companies were called 

in to fill vacant St. Louis fire stations and off-duty personnel also responded. The fire was similar to 

the fire in New Jersey because of the presence of three oxygen cylinders in the apartment of origin. 

At least two of the cylinders ruptured which intensified fire conditions and allowed heat and smoke 

to spread to an adjacent apartment on the fire floor. The Council Tower Apartments Building was also 

built of fire resistive construction and was not fully sprinklered.

The cause of both fires remains undetermined, but it is believed by fire officials in both jurisdictions 

that the fires were the result of smoking. The resident of the apartment of origin in the St. Louis fire 

smoked in spite of suffering from emphysema and chronic bronchitis. One of the two residents of 

the apartment of origin in North Bergen also smoked, is suffering from cancer, and having had one 

lung removed.

KeY ISSUeS

Issues Comments

Fire Building Both fires occurred in highrise apartment buildings. The 27-story Council Tower Apartments 

Building was occupied exclusively by elderly residents. The 22-story Westview Towers Building was 

predominately occupied by elderly residents.

Fatalities and Injuries Four residents died in the Westview Towers fire and there were fifty-four injuries. No one died in the 

Council Tower Apartments fire, but there were sixty-eight injuries. One firefighter will be unable to 

return to work as a result of injuries sustained while fighting the fire.

Origin and Cause The cause of both fires is undetermined, but it is probable that both fires were the result of smoking. The Westview fire began in the living room of a three-room apartment, while the Council Tower 

Apartments fire began in the bedroom of a three-room apartment.

Fire Protection Systems Both buildings were equipped with standpipe systems that were supplemented by a fire pump. 

Neither building was fully equipped with an automatic fire sprinkler system.

Smoke Travel The absence of pressurized smoke towers contributed to the upward spread of smoke in both buildings and resulted in numerous injuries and two fatalities in the Westview Towers fire.

Access Access was limited at both buildings and neither was accessible by an aerial device.

Fire Alarm Systems Hardwired smoke detectors, pull stations, and audible/visual alarm devices were present in the 

interior hallways of both buildings, which were monitored by a private alarm company. The Council 

Tower Apartments had a public address system and Westview Towers did not. The apartments in 

both buildings were equipped with battery-operated smoke detectors.

Smoke Detectors The residents in the apartment of origin in both fires were using medical oxygen and had a number 

of cylinders in their apartments. In both instances, the release of the stored oxygen intensified the 

fire and contributed to fire spread.
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 3

The Westview Towers

NoRTH BeRGeN, NeW JeRSeY

AUGUST 9, 1998

Local Contacts: Lt. Thomas Irving, Inspector

Battalion Chief Charles Severino

North Bergen Fire Department

6102 Tonnelle Avenue

North Bergen, NJ 07047

(201) 392-2162

Captain Michael A. Macari, EMT-D

North Bergen Emergency Medical Service

P.O. Box 873

North Bergen, NJ 07047

(201) 758-1990

THe BUILDING

The Westview Towers Building, located at 6115 Granton Avenue in North Bergen, New Jersey, was 

built in 1976. The twenty-two-story building is located in a working class neighborhood with narrow streets that includes a number of buildings that house the elderly. Westview Towers is approximately 230 feet tall and was built of fire resistive construction. There were 296 apartments in the 

building and the building was fully occupied at the time of the fire. The majority of the 400 residents 

were elderly. Jack Pomerane owned the building at the time of the fire and the complex is a HUD 

subsidized housing project.

The main entrance faces to the east and the front door opens onto a sidewalk, which leads up to 

Granton Avenue. The first floor contains a bank of elevators at the center of the lobby as well as 

offices, meeting rooms, and a number of apartments. The upper floors are exclusively dwelling 

units. Access to the front of the building is limited as the entrance is situated below the elevation of 

Granton Avenue and visitors must walk down a number of steps to reach the front door. Landscaping 

and overhead power lines also further restrict access.

Access to the south side of the building is limited to foot traffic. A parking lot and driveway located 

on the north side of the building allows vehicle access as well as provides access to the fire department connection for the standpipe system. A multiple-story parking garage is located along the west 

side of the building and is not accessible by larger fire department apparatus.

The building had wet standpipes in both the north and south stairwells. Both stairwells were enclosed 

and had openings to the roof. The standpipe system is supplemented by a fire pump, which operated properly during the fire. The fire alarm system consisted of hardwired smoke detectors and pull 

stations in the common areas and hallways. The apartments were provided with battery-operated 

smoke detectors. There were smoke barrier doors on each side of the elevators, which close when the 

fire alarm system is activated and the building was equipped with emergency lighting. The building 

was not equipped with an automatic fire sprinkler system. Westview Towers had been inspected prior 

to the fire and had been found to be in compliance with local codes.
4 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The walls in the hallways and the separations between apartments were built of metal studs covered 

by fire rated gypsum board. The apartment doors were fire rated and the windows of the individual 

apartments were operable. A number of the apartments, including the apartment of origin, had 

balconies, which were accessible by a sliding glass door. The floors of the balconies were made of 

concrete and had an iron safety railing around the perimeter of each balcony.

FIRe DePARTMeNT PRoFILe:

North Bergen, New Jersey is located across the Hudson River from New York City. At the time of the 

fire, the community of approximately 60,000 residents and was protected by the North Bergen Fire 

Department. The Department consisted of 100 personnel who were deployed on four suppression 

shifts. On-duty strength was a minimum of twenty firefighters who staffed four engines, and one 

truck company and each shift was commanded by a Battalion Chief. On January 1, 1999 the department merged with four area departments to become the North Hudson Regional Fire and Rescue 

Department.

The North Bergen Emergency Medical Service provides emergency medical services. The EMS service 

is a combination department with both career and volunteer members.

THe FIRe

The fire alarm company reported the fire at the Westview Towers Building at 16:44 hours on Sunday, 

August 9, 1998. An occupant of Apartment 4E also telephoned 9-1-1 and reported that her couch 

was on fire. As the fire progressed, numerous calls to 9-1-1 flooded the North Bergen dispatch center 

with reports of occupants being trapped in their apartments.

The occupant of Apartment 4F provided a statement to the investigators in which she stated that she 

was at home at the time of the fire and that she saw both victims in their apartment, which was on 

fire at the time. The door to Apartment 4E was open and she heard someone shouting, “Help! Fire!” 

She also stated that she saw that the couch, located at the right side of the room, was on fire. She 

could see both of the occupants and urged them to leave their apartment. Smoke and fire conditions 

were such that an escape was still possible at that time.

Smoke conditions then began to worsen in the hallway so the witness went back to her apartment, 

secured a towel from her apartment to cover her face, and went back to Apartment 4E. She could still 

see both occupants and urged them to crawl below the smoke towards her and to safety. She continued to urge them to escape until heavy smoke conditions forced her to retreat to the safety of her 

own balcony where she witnessed both of the victims perish. She was later rescued by firefighters.

FIRe DePARTMeNT ARRIVeS

Four engines, a truck company, and the Battalion Chief from North Bergen responded on the initial 

alarm and began to arrive at 16:47 hours. Engine companies laid 300 feet of 4-inch supply line to 

nearby hydrants and pumped into the standpipe connection with two 2-1/2-inch lines. Attack crews 

began to advance 1-3/4-inch hand lines to combat the fire on the fourth floor, but found that heavy 

smoke and heat conditions would not allow them to reach Apartment 4E.

An attempt was made to reach the two occupants of Apartment 4E from the exterior of the building. 

They were trapped on their balcony by the extreme heat and heavy smoke and firefighters attempted 
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 5

to reach the balcony by raising a 35-foot ground ladder. Due to the height of the building at this 

point, the 35-foot ladder would only reach the second floor balcony. Firefighters then carried a 14-

foot roof ladder to the second floor balcony and attempted to secure the hooks to the railing on the 

fourth floor in order to reach the victims.

Unfortunately, the firefighters could not see the victims during their attempt to secure the ladder 

because of the concrete floor of the balcony above them. The 60-year-old female apparently panicked 

in spite of reported attempts by firefighters and occupants of an adjacent apartment to calm her. They 

urged her to wait for the firefighters to reach her, but she lunged for the ladder before it had been 

secured to the railing. The ladder swayed back and forth and the firefighters holding the ladder were 

unaware of what was happening. Tragically the victim fell off the ladder to her death. The firefighters 

were also unable to reach the 90-year-old female and she perished on the balcony after the glass door 

broke and allowed the intense heat and heavy smoke to reach the victim.

Rescue efforts were hampered by numerous occupants who using the stairwells to exit the burning 

building. The stairwells were not pressurized and smoke filled both stairwells when residents opened 

the doors from their hallways into the stairwells. The spread of smoke throughout the building 

resulted in two additional fatalities and contributed to the large number of people that had to be 

transported to local hospitals. Firefighters discovered the bodies of the occupants of Apartment 10B 

in the north stairwell between the sixth and seventh floors. The victims were removed to Apartment 

6L where resuscitation efforts proved to be unsuccessful. The victims were later identified as a 49-

year-old female and her 65-year-old husband.

Because of the magnitude of the fire, the incident commander struck additional alarms for more 

personnel. Approximately eighty firefighters responded to the incident. Units from West New York, 

Weehawken, Jersey City, and Hoboken assisted in the effort to bring the fire under control. At least 

eighteen engine companies and four truck companies responded along with numerous support 

vehicles.

Efforts to extinguish the fire proved to be very difficult. The fire resistive construction trapped the 

heat on the fourth floor. The fire burned with sufficient intensity, apparently due to escaping oxygen 

from the cylinders in Apartment 4E, to cause the wall between Apartment 4E and the hallway to fail. 

This slowed the firefighters effort to reach the room of origin.

The fire was commanded throughout the incident by the on-duty Battalion Chief and was finally 

declared to be under control at 19:33 hours, almost four hours after the initial alarm. Firefighters 

remained at the scene until 01:05 hours the next morning. During the fire the Governor of New 

Jersey flew to the site in a helicopter to visit with fire officials and to reassure the residents of the 

building. The Red Cross provided assistance at the scene and shelter to the occupants displaced by 

the fire.

INJURIeS AND FATALITIeS

The fire killed four residents and injured fifty-four people. Thirty-two people, including seven emergency responders, were transported to seven local hospitals primarily because of smoke inhalation 

and respiratory problems. Table One, below, provides a breakdown of the distribution of the injured. 

Twenty-two firefighters and an undetermined number of residents were also treated at the scene for 

minor injuries, cuts, burns, heat stress, and related conditions.
6 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Table 1. Distribution of Patients Transported

Hospital Location Patients

Palisade Medical Center North Bergen 9

Christ Hospital Jersey City 4

Meadowlands Hospital Medical Center Secaucus 4

Jersey City Medical Center (trauma center) Jersey City 5

Holy Name Hospital Teaneck 1

Saint Frances Hospital Jersey City 4

Unknown 1

Total: 32

The North Bergen EMS was dispatched for a fire standby at the Westview Towers at 16:48 hours and 

the first ambulance arrived on the scene at 16:50 hours. At 16:51 hours, the EMS Supervisor arrived 

and assumed EMS Command. Based upon the heavy smoke conditions and the presence of two 

victims on the balcony, the EMS Commander requested that two additional ambulances and one ALS 

Unit be dispatched to the fire.

By 17:05 hours, ten patients had been triaged and treated and EMS Command reported that the fire 

was quickly evolving into a mass casualty incident. EMS Command established the following sectors: 

triage, treatment, transportation, primary staging, secondary staging, Rehab, and a non-patient holding area. At 19:45 hours the EMS Annex to the County’s Emergency Operations Plan was activated. 

A total of thirty-nine agencies (See Appendix C) assisted in the treatment and transportation of the 

victims.

THe INVeSTIGATIoN

The fire was investigated by the North Bergen Fire Department in conjunction with the Hudson 

County Prosecutor’s Office and the North Bergen Police Department. The Medical Examiner’s Office 

performed the autopsies on the four victims. The investigation revealed that the fire started in the 

southwest corner of the living room of Apartment 4E. A small aluminum oxygen cylinder ruptured 

in this area. A large steel oxygen cylinder and a small aluminum cylinder were also found in the 

kitchen and the relief devices on both cylinders had actuated during the fire.

The presence of an oxygen enriched atmosphere within Apartment 4E contributed to the intense 

heat build up, the almost complete combustion of the contents of the living room, the heavy spalling 

of the concrete ceiling which exposed the reinforcement rods, and the failure of the fire separation 

between the room of origin and the hallway. The fire separation between the bedroom held and the 

damage to the contents of the bedroom was far less severe.

The investigation ruled out any mechanical or electrical cause and the fire was not found to have 

been suspicious or incendiary in origin. The fire has been listed as accidental because investigators 

could not conclusively determine what caused the blaze. It is, however, believed to have been the 

result of smoking on the part of the younger of the two victims in Apartment 4E.
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 7

ANALYSIS

Fortunately, the fire occurred at a time of the day when most people are alert and active. The results 

might have been far worse had the fire occurred when the majority of the occupants of the building were asleep. Investigative reports indicate that the residents most immediately threatened were 

awake at the time of the fire and were aware that the building was on fire. For reasons unknown, the 

occupants of the apartment in which the fire began failed to escape even though it was possible to 

do so in the early stages of the fire according to an eyewitness.

The fire was contained to the room of origin and the adjacent hallway. There was damage to the 

bedroom of Apartment 4E, but the contents were not completely consumed, as was the case in the 

living room, because the fire did not destroy the wall between the two rooms. It is also possible that 

the damage to the room of origin would have been less severe and that the wall between the hallway 

would have held if the oxygen cylinders had not been present. Furthermore, if the building had 

been equipped with a functioning automatic fire sprinkler system one or two heads would have in 

all likelihood actuated and controlled the fire with minimal damage or loss of life. Unfortunately, the 

building code in effect at the time the building was constructed did not require the installation of an 

automatic fire sprinkler system.

The absence of a public address system in the building and the lack of knowledge on the part of the 

occupants about what to do in the event of a fire may have contributed to the deaths of the two victims found in the stairwell. Most occupants in fire resistive buildings are safer if they remain in their 

room and close the door and seal off the opening at the bottom of the door with a wet towel. The use 

of the stairwells by escaping occupants allowed toxic levels of smoke to accumulate in the stairwells. 

If the stairwells had been pressurized this would not have occurred and would have reduced the 

number of injuries and deaths.

The fire department did not have sufficient resources on duty at the time of the fire to successfully manage an incident of this magnitude in the absence of a functioning automatic fire sprinkler 

system and the firefighters that responded were challenged by the magnitude of the event. Even 

though mutual-aid companies responded with additional apparatus and personnel, the firefighters 

were subjected adverse conditions due to the entrapment of heat and smoke within the fire resistive 

structure.

The steel cylinder and the lack of flame impingement on the aluminum cylinder in the kitchen 

prevented the oxygen cylinders from rupturing because the relief devices functioned properly and 

vented the contents of the cylinders into the atmosphere. The energy released by the rupture of a 

compressed gas cylinder is significant and has the potential to injure or kill anyone in close proximity of the rupture.
8 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Council Tower Apartments

St. Louis Missouri

october 12, 1998

Local Contacts: Neil Svetanics, Fire Chief

Captain Ron Gronemeyer, Chief Fire Investigator

St. Louis Fire Department

1421 North Jefferson

St. Louis, Missouri 63106

(314) 289-1901

THe BUILDING

The Council Tower Apartments Building is located at 310 South Grand in Saint Louis, Missouri and 

was built in 1969 to house the elderly. It is part of a three building complex that includes the Council 

House West Apartment Building, constructed in 1966, and a large parking structure. The apartment 

building was owned by the Teamsters Joint Council 13 and managed by the Sansone Group.

The Council Tower Apartments Building is twenty-seven stories tall was constructed of fire resistive 

materials consisting of poured concrete re-enforced with steel. The building has a flat room, a full 

basement, and contains 150 apartments. There were approximately 160 people living in the building 

at the time of the fire. The floor plan is similar on floors two through twenty-seven and has a single 

hallway on each floor that is oriented east to west.

There is enclosed stairwell at each end. The east stairwell could be entered from the lobby, extended 

from the basement to the roof, and had an exterior exit door located at the ground level. The west 

stairwell extended from the basement to the roof and had an exterior ground level exit, but could 

not be entered from the lobby. Two passenger elevators and a freight elevator were located off the 

north side of the hallway. During a fire, the elevators are programmed to automatically return to the 

lobby.

The exterior apartment doors were solid core pressed composition with a laminated finish and the 

interior apartment doors were hollow core. The floors were concrete covered by either carpet or vinyl 

tile. The ceilings were poured concrete with a mortar acoustic finish. Windows spanned the length 

of the exterior rooms and were single glazed tempered glass. The interior walls were constructed of 

gypsum board that was screwed onto metal studs and the walls in the hallway had wallpaper that 

had been painted. Doors into the stairwells were marked as having a B fire rating, but the apartment 

entry doors were not labeled.

The building was equipped with a voice evacuation system and speakers were located on the south 

wall in each hallway. There is emergency lighting and a pull station is located at each stairwell exit. 

The smoke detectors in the hallways were hard wired and were monitored by an alarm company. 

A simplex alarm panel that displayed the various alarm zones was located in the lobby near the 

northwest corner of the building. Each apartment was also equipped with a battery-powered 

smoke detector.
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 9

The Council Tower Apartments Building was equipped with a partial sprinkler system that protected 

the basement, trash chute, and elevator penthouse located on the top floor. The sprinkler system was 

inter-connected to the standpipe system. The standpipe system consisted of two risers located at 

the east and west end of the building. A hose cabinet with a 1-1/2-inch connection, a 1-1/2-inch 

connection, and a fire extinguisher was located adjacent to the doors at each of the stairwells in the 

interior of the hallway. The two cabinets were 117 feet apart and the standpipe system was supported 

by a 1,000 gpm fire pumper powered by a 100 hp electric motor. The fire department connection 

was located on the west side of the building.

Fire department access to the building was limited. The main entrance to the lobby, located on the 

south side of the building, was covered to protect the residents from the weather and the cover 

extended westward over the sidewalk to the Council House Apartments Building. The north side of 

the building was inaccessible by vehicles and the driveway to the building passed through an overhang in the Council House Apartments Building. Service vehicles and automobiles often congested 

the drive and the passageways as can be seen in the photos in Appendix D.

The complex was located in an area congested by heavy traffic and was bordered on the south by I 

40, on the West by South Grand, on the North by Forest Park, and on the east by the on and off ramps 

to the confluence of I 40, Forest Park, and Market Streets. Further, the on-site parking was inadequate 

to handle the number and size of the vehicles and apparatus that was required to control an incident 

of the magnitude that took place on October 12, 1998.

FIRe DePARTMeNT PRoFILe

Saint Louis is located on the west bank of the Mississippi River and has approximately 351,000 

residents. The State legislature recognized Saint Louis as a city in 1822 and the fire department has 

been fully career since 1857. By 1930, Saint Louis had grown to 800,000 residents and the fire 

department staffed fifty-six engine companies. Unfortunately, Saint Louis suffered hard economic 

times during the 1970s and 1980s. The city lost population and many of the fire companies were 

disbanded due to austerity measures.

Currently, the sixty-two square mile city is protected by thirty fire stations that house thirty engine 

companies; four truck companies, and two heavy rescue squads. The city is divided into six suppression districts and a seventh district protects Lambert International Airport with two stations.

All of the engine companies run quints staffed by four firefighters. At the time of the fire, fifteen of 

the engine companies were equipped with 50-foot aerial devices and fifteen ran with 75-foot aerial 

devices. In November 1998, a bond referendum was approved replaced all thirty of the engines with 

75-foot quints. The ladder companies are equipped with 110-foot quints.

The annual budget is approximately $37.8 million and there are 873 personnel. Firefighters work 

a 52-hour workweek. In 1997, the department responded to 109,922 incidents. There were 30,332 

fires, 79,590 EMS calls, and 2,781 false alarms.

THe FIRe

At 09:35 hours on Monday October 12, 1998, the sixty-six year old female occupant of Apartment 

2103 telephoned the manager of the Council Tower Apartments Building and informed her that her 

bed was on fire and requested that she call the fire department. Her actions were in accordance 

with the instructions for reporting fires previously provided to the residents by management. The 
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

manager promptly called 9-1-1 and reported the fire. The alarm company reported the fire at 09:44 

hours. By that time the incident commander had struck a third alarm.

After reporting the fire, the elderly resident of Apartment 2103 left her apartment and went down to 

the lobby. She indicated that she left the door to the hallway open when she vacated her apartment. 

The fire vented itself by breaking out the apartment windows. Firefighters, however, found the apartment door closed when they reached her apartment.

FIRe DePARTMeNT ARRIVeS

Engine 29 was the first company on the scene and arrived only minutes after the initial alarm. The 

officer reported that forty-foot flames were visible on the north side of the building and were coming out of the windows of the twenty-first floor. Before the fire would be declared under control 

eight alarms would be struck and would summon over 150 firefighters to the incident, including 

the Chief of the Department who became the incident commander. Approximately forty pieces of 

apparatus responded leaving only three of the department’s fire companies in service in the entire 

city during the height of the fire. Empty stations were filled by mutual-aid companies and by offduty firefighters who staffed reserve apparatus.

The crew from Engine 29 attempted to attack the fire with a 13/4-inch handline connected to the 

standpipe, but found that they could not make the fire floor because of the intense heat and heavy 

smoke conditions. Meanwhile, the fire had extended out of the windows of Apartment 2103 and had 

broken the windows of the apartment immediately above, #2203, and had communicated into that 

apartment. The fire in Apartment 2203 was actually controlled before the fire in Apartment 2103 

could be extinguished.

A search of the fire floor revealed that there were twelve apartments on the twenty-first floor. Only 

five were occupied at the time of the fire (2103, 2104, 2107, 2108, and 2111). The resident of 

Apartment 2108 was apparently not at home at the time of the fire and as previously stated, the resident of Apartment 2103 escaped to the lobby. The sixty-nine year old male occupant of Apartment 

2111 remained in his apartment during the fire and his apartment only suffered minor soot damage. 

The eighty-year-old female occupant of Apartment 2107 also remained in her apartment during the 

fire. The seventy-year-old male occupant of Apartment 2104 had to be removed from his apartment 

by firefighters. When the oxygen cylinders ruptured in Apartment 2013 the separation wall was 

damaged and allowed the products of combustion to render adjoining Apartment 2104 untenable.

Firefighters and rescue workers evacuated the remainder of the building and used both stairwells and 

the elevators to remove approximately 160 residents. The stairwells were not pressurized and allowed 

smoke to seep into the stairwells.

INJURIeS

Ten residents required transportation to area hospitals, but none were seriously injured. Three firefighters were also transported. An additional thirty residents and approximately twenty-five firefighters were treated at the scene for minor injuries, but were not transported. EMS service in Saint Louis 

is provided by the Fire Department. 

The forty-seven year old Captain of Engine Company 17 was the most seriously injured. He ran out 

of air and was trapped on the fire floor. His fellow firefighters located him in the room leading to 
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 11

the trash chute. His SCBA cylinder was empty and he had suffered burns to his respiratory tract. He 

was wearing a PASS device, but due to the confusion during the fire it is unclear if the device was 

turned on, or if it operated properly. The Captain was unconscious when he was found by his fellow 

firefighters and his SCBA was entangled in the wiring of the alarm system. The alarm system had 

been retrofitted and plastic molding located near the ceiling of the hallway concealed the wiring. 

The molding failed due to the intense heat and the wires sagged down into the hallway. The Captain 

suffered severe burns to his respiratory system and was permanently disabled.

The incident was investigated by NIOSH (Report 98F-26 11/23/99). A summary of their recommendations is as follows:

• Ensure that all SOPs regarding highrise firefighting operations are followed.

• Ensure that incident command always maintains close accountability to monitor the location 

of all firefighters on the fireground.

• Ensure that all officers and firefighters wear and use a PASS device when involved in firefighting or other hazardous duty.

• Ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is in place before conditions become unsafe.

• Develop and implement a written respirator maintenance program for all respiratory protective equipment used by firefighters.

• Ensure that firefighters entering IDLH atmospheres have fully charged air tanks on their 

SCBAs.

• Ensure that at least four fighters are on the scene before initiating interior firefighting operations at a structural fire-two in, two out.

• Consider using a rope attached to a permanent object or placing a bright, narrow-beamed 

light at the entry portal to a structural fire to assist lost or disoriented firefighters in emergency escape.

Ensure that procedures are established to record fireground radio communications.

THe INVeSTIGATIoN

The fire was investigated by the Saint Louis Fire Prevention Bureau and the Saint Louis Police 

Department. The investigation revealed that nearly all of the contents in the three rooms that comprised Apartment 2103 were totally consumed by the intensity of the fire. The partition wall that 

separated the living room and the bedroom was totally destroyed, leaving only the metal studs and 

the electric wires. All of the windows were also destroyed. The east wall, which separated Apartment 

2103 from Apartment 2104 also sustained significant damage and had allowed smoke to penetrate 

into Apartment 2104.

The damage to the partition wall between the two apartments occurred when the aluminum oxygen cylinders in Apartment 2103 ruptured. The remains of three aluminum oxygen cylinders were 

recovered from the northeast corner of the living room. The release of the oxygen into the burning 

apartment apparently intensified the rate of combustion and may account for the heavy destruction of the contents and walls. The intensity of the combustion process also contributed to the heat 

buildup in the hallway and hindered the firefighters in their efforts to extinguish the blaze.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Investigators determined that the area of origin was in the bedroom at the east wall on the north 

side of the room. Due to the extensive damage the investigators were unable to determine with 

any degree of certainty the exact cause or ignition source and have classified the fire as “open”. The 

occupant of Apartment 2103 was known to smoke in spite of suffering from chronic bronchitis and 

emphysema. Investigators collected an ashtray with a cigarette butt in it along with plastic oxygen 

tubing and a plastic bag as evidence. The items were found in the kitchen sink.

No violations had been recorded during the last inspection according to Fire Department sources.

ANALYSIS

If the building had been equipped with a functioning automatic fire sprinkler system, a single fire 

company could have handled the fire. Their primary function would have been to mop up the water 

and restore the sprinkler system. Instead, it took almost the entire on-duty force of a large metropolitan fire department to extinguish the blaze. Fortunately, the fire occurred at a time when most of 

the residents were awake. The results might have been far worse if the fire had occurred late at night 

when the majority of the residents would have been asleep.

The incident once again demonstrated the value of fire resistive construction in containing the 

spread of a fire. The fire was confined to the apartment of origin on the twenty-first floor, but spread 

to the twenty-second floor through the windows. Glass is not a fire barrier. The fire did not extend 

beyond Apartment 2203, however, due to the fire resistive construction and the quick action by 

firefighters.

The incident also demonstrated that it is possible to leave occupants in place in a highrise building 

constructed of fire resistive materials. There was a significant fire on the twenty-first and twentysecond floors. Nevertheless, several occupants of the twenty-first floor escaped harm by remaining 

in their apartments.

Unfortunately, the fire also demonstrated the hazards of smoking and of storing oxygen in a residential structure. Firefighters should always assume, until proven otherwise, that any dwelling that 

houses an elderly or ill resident contains oxygen cylinders. Most of these cylinders will be constructed of aluminum due to their light weight. Aluminum cylinders are susceptible to failure in a 

fire. At a minimum, cylinder venting will increase the rate of combustion and generate more heat

LeSSoNS LeARNeD

1. The presence of medical oxygen within a dwelling poses a potential hazard to firefighters.

Oxygen is essential for life. Many people who suffer from an acute illness that affects their 

respiratory system must supplement the amount of oxygen that they breathe. Therefore, these 

individuals maintain a supply of oxygen within their homes. To assure their mobility, the oxygen 

supply is usually kept in small cylinders. These cylinders can be made of either aluminum or 

steel. Aluminum, however, is preferably due to its lighter weight.

The number of people who rely on supplemental oxygen will no doubt increase as the aged 

become a larger percentage of the general population and as medical technology expands to sustain the lives of more and more people who previously would not have survived their illnesses. 

Therefore, there will always be a potential for one or more oxygen cylinders to be present if a 

fire occurs in the residence of an elderly person.
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 13

Firefighters should acquaint themselves with the hazards associated with the presence of medical oxygen. If the stored oxygen is released during a fire, the oxygen will enrich the atmosphere 

and the rate of combustion will increase and intensify. There is also the potential for a catastrophic failure of an oxygen cylinder, which could injure or kill anyone near the cylinder when 

it failed.

Eliminating the hazard is not an option. Managing the hazard, however, is an option and the 

key to proper management is prevention. Fire departments should provide public education 

programs, which target this special needs population and acquaint the people who use supplemental medical oxygen with the hazards associated with their use of oxygen and the methods 

to be followed to mitigate the associated dangers. Particular emphasis should be placed upon the 

safe handling and storage of oxygen cylinders.

Public Education efforts should include acquainting firefighters with the locations of these special needs residents. If possible, a sign or placard should be placed at a conspicuous location 

alerting firefighters that medical oxygen was in use at that location.

2. Highrise buildings should be equipped with automatic fire sprinkler systems.

Automatic fire sprinkler systems have consistently proven to be the most effective form of protection for life and property. Both fires demonstrated the tragic results that can occur when an 

automatic fire sprinkler system is not present in a highrise building. Fire officials in both jurisdictions believe that the fires would have been relatively minor incidents had sprinklers been in 

place. Instead, four people perished and a large number of people were injured. A number of 

residents were displaced by the fires and both buildings sustained major damage.

3. Fire resistive construction is very effective in limiting the spread of fires beyond the point 

of origin.

The fire in the Westview Towers Building was confined to the apartment of origin and the 

adjacent hallway. A concrete overhang created by the presence of the balcony landing prevented 

the upward spread of the fire via the exterior of the building. The fire in the Council Tower 

Apartments Building was confined to the room of origin on the twenty-first floor, but spread to 

the twenty-second floor via the windows. Nevertheless, the firefighters were able to contain the 

fire on the twenty-second floor to a single apartment because of compartmentation.

Unfortunately, fire resistive construction can trap heat and smoke and can potentially make 

the job of extinguishment more difficult. The firefighters in both fires endured severe heat and 

smoke conditions, which prolonged their extinguishment efforts and no doubt contributed to 

the number of injuries.

4. Large scale incidents in highrise buildings are labor intensive and require effective preincident plans and mass casualty procedures.

The North Bergen fire required the services of eighty firefighters to extinguish because of the 

size of the building and the number of occupants in the building. In Saint Louis, more than 

150 firefighters were needed to bring the fire under control. Both of these incidents represent 

a significant commitment of personnel and equipment. Many fire departments would be hard 

pressed to muster the resources required to handle an incident of this magnitude.
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

A pre-incident plan is one of the best ways to identify the resources that will be required to 

manage an incident in a given target hazard. The plan will help to identify the potential life 

hazard in the occupancy and well as provide information on the built-in fire protection within 

a structure. The amount and types of resources will be required to manage an incident should 

also be included in the plan.

Pre-incident planning saves time can help mitigate many problems before they occur. A pre-incident plan can also be used to identify an occupancy that houses someone who must use medical 

oxygen to sustain his or her life and can assist firefighters with familiarizing themselves with the 

location and quantity of oxygen that is being used and stored at these locations.

A mass casualty procedure or plan is also an effective tool for managing an event with a significant number of injuries and/or fatalities. The planning process allows a fire or EMS agency to 

identify the amount and types of resources that may be necessary to manage an incident and also 

allows medical facilities to plan for such an event.

5. Large-scale incidents demand the use of an incident management system and an accountability system.

A large-scale incident with multiple injuries or fatalities will require a significant commitment 

of resources and often appear chaotic in the initial stages of the incident. A sound incident 

management system is essential to effectively and safely manage such events. The presence of a 

large number of firefighters also increases the potential for a firefighter to become a casualty. An 

effective accountability system can reduce the potential for that.

6. Public Education programs designed for the elderly should specifically advise them to not 

attempt to fight a fire, but rather to safely exit the building and to call 9-1-1 from a safe 

location.

According to an eyewitness account, the two residents of the apartment in which the fire started 

at the Westview Towers could have safely exited their apartment and would have lived had they 

done so. Unfortunately, they remained in their apartment and attempted to extinguish the fire. 

By the time they realized that they could not extinguish the fire, it was too late. The fire had 

increased in size and severity and blocked their only means of escape.

Unfortunately, this is not an uncommon occurrence. Public Educators should always instruct 

everyone, particularly the elderly, that they should quickly exit their dwelling if a fire should 

occur. They should be told to go to a safe place and call 9-1-1 to report the fire. At no time 

should they attempt to extinguish the fire, particularly before the fire has been reported. The 

instruction should include information on how quickly a fire will grow and spread, reducing 

their chances for escape.
15

APPeNDIX A

Area

of

Origin

SW Living 

Room

Living Room 

Kitchen/Dining Area 

Bedroom

Location of Victim 

Hallway

Figure 1 – Diagram of the Westview Towers Fire 

Page A-2

Diagram of the Westview Towers Fire
16

APPeNDIX B

Photographs of the Westview Towers Fire

Photographs by John Lee Cook

Photo Log:

1. Westview Towers – Balcony of Apartment 4E

2. Westview Towers front entrance

North Bergen Fire Department Photos:

None provided due to litigation
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 17

Appendix B (continued)

Apartment 4E. y of s – BalconerwoTw estvieWPhoto 1. 

Page B-2 

1. Westview Towers – Balcony of Apartment 4E
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix B (continued)

2. Westview Towers front entrance

Page B-3s front entrance. erwoTw estvieWPhoto 2. 
19

APPeNDIX C

List of EMS Agencies That Responded to the 

Westview Towers Fire

AMB-U-CAR 

American Medical Response 

Bergenfield 

Bogota 

Cliffside Park 

Clara Mass 

Dumont 

East Rutherford 

Edgewater 

Englewood 

Englewood Hospital 

Fairlawn 

Fort Lee 

Glenrock 

Hasbrouck Heights 

Hackensack 

Hackensack Hospital 

HO-HO-KUS 

Jersey City Medical Center 

Kearny

Leonia

Little Ferry

Maywood

Moohachie

New Milford

New Jersey First Aid Council

Rochelle Park

Ridgefield

Ridgefield Park

Ridgewood

Rutherford

Saddle Brook

Teaneck

Union City

University Hospital Newark

Wallington

Washington Township

Weehawken

West New York
20

APPeNDIX D

Diagram of the Council Tower Apartment Fire

2101

2104

2105

2106

2111

2110

2109

2108

2107

2102 2112

2103

Trash Chute where 

Captian was found 

unconscious

Apt. 2104 where 

70 year old Male 

rescued by FD, 

See Post Dispatch 

Photo

Area of origin 

Standpipe cabinet 

Elevation

Standpipe cabinet 

Figure 1 – Diagram of the Council Tower Apartment Fire 

Page D-2
21

APPeNDIX e

Photographs of the Council Towers Apartments Fire

Photographs 1 through 6: St. Louis Fire Department

1. Ruptured aluminum oxygen cylinder

2. Flames and smoke coming from Apartment 2103

3. Wiring to fire alarm system in the hallway of the 21st floor. (This is the wiring that the Captain 

became entangled in.)

4. Another shot of the flames on the 21st and 22nd floor

5. Tangled wiring in trash chute where the Captain was found unconscious

6. The interior of Apartment 2103. The area of origin is behind the missing wall in the room 

where the firefighter is pictured.

Photographs 7 through 9: J. L. Cook

7. Council Towers Apartment North Side. Area of fire involvement located seven rows of windows 

down from the top. Windows have been replaced.

8. Council Tower Apartment front entrance. (Note access partially obstructed by parked service 

vehicles.)

9. Council Tower Apartments--View from southeast side showing basement entrance 

(photo-overlap)

Photograph 10: St. Louis Post Dispatch

10. Occupant of Apartment 2104 awaits rescue.
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)

Photo 1. Ruptured aluminum oxygen cylinder

Page E-2 

1. Ruptured aluminum oxygen cylinder
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 23

Appendix e (continued)

Photo 2. Flames and smoke coming from Apartment 2103 2. Flames and smoke coming from Apartment 2103

Page E-3
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)

t the ing tha . (This is the wir ay of the 21st floor m system in the hallw

Captain became entangled in.)

e alar ing to firirWPhoto 3. 

Page E-4 

3. Wiring to fire alarm system in the hallway of the 21st floor. (This is the wiring that the Captain became entangled in.)
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 25

Appendix e (continued)

ames on the 21st and 22 floor Another shot of the fl Photo 4. 4. Another shot of the flames on the 21st and 22 floor

Page E-5
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)

as found unconscious ptain w e the Ca ing in trash chute wher Tangled wir Photo 5. 

Page E-6 

5. Tangled wiring in trash chute where the Captain was found unconscious
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 27

Appendix e (continued)

all in the room in is behind the missing w igea of or

efighter is pictured.

The ar Apartment 2103. 

e the firherw

ior of The inter Photo 6. 6. The interior of Apartment 2103. The area of origin is behind the missing wall in the room where the firefighter is pictured.

Page E-7
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)

Photo 7. Council Towers Apartment North Side. Area of fire involvement located seven 

rows of windows down from the top. Windows have been replaced.

7. Council Towers Apartment North Side. Area of fire involvement located seven rows of windows down from the top. Windows have been replaced. 

Page E-8 
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 29

Appendix e (continued)

ehicles.) vice ved sery park ucted b y obstr (Note access partiall er Apartment front entrance. wo Council T Photo 8. 8. Council Tower Apartment front entrance. (Note access partially obstructed by parked service vehicles.)

Page E-9
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix e (continued)

Photo 9. Council Tower Apartments--View from southeast side showing 

basement entrance (photo-overlap)

9. Council Tower Apartments - View from southeast side showing basement entrance (photo-overlap) 

Page E-10 
USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 31

Appendix e (continued)

Photo 10. Occupant of Apartment 2104 awaits rescue. 10. Occupant of Apartment 2104 awaits rescue.

Page E-11
APPeNDIX F

Medical Oxygen Cylinders

It is recommended that the reader consult Report 107, Fires Involving Medical Oxygen Equipment 

March 1999, for more information on the impact of medical oxygen on a fire. The chief hazard associated with the presence of medical oxygen within a room or structure is the potential for the release 

of the oxygen into the atmosphere. Should this occur, the atmosphere might become enriched with 

oxygen, thus causing the oxygen level to exceed 21% by volume.

As the percentage of oxygen increases above 21%, the fire hazard of most materials change making 

them easier to ignite and subsequent fires more intense. Even materials, which are difficult to burn 

or are even noncombustible in air can burn readily and intensely in oxygen enriched atmospheres 

(100% or less). The amount of oxygen flowing, the size of the room or space, and the degree of 

confinement will determine the extent of the hazard.

Pure oxygen accelerates combustion resulting in higher flame temperatures than would be associated 

with fires burning in ambient air. Combustible material exposed to an oxygen-enriched atmosphere 

lowers the material’s ignition temperature. The resulting fires are very intense with rapid combustion 

and the release of large amounts of energy. If the fire is in a confined space, the rapid temperature 

rise and increase in pressure often results in the fire penetrating the walls of the enclosure quite 

quickly. The fire will involve all of the combustible materials in the room sooner than would be 

normally expected.

Oxygen is a colorless, odorless, and tasteless gas at ordinary temperatures and constitutes approximately twenty-one percent of the earth’s atmosphere. Oxygen is essential for both respiration and for 

the process of combustion. Combustion cannot continue if the volume of oxygen falls below sixteen 

percent. Conversely, the presence of an atmosphere that is enriched with oxygen will increase the 

rate at which the combustion process occurs.

The physical properties of oxygen are provided in Figure F.1, below:

Figure 1. Physical Properties of Oxygen

Boiling Point: -297 °F -182.8 °C 

Freezing Point: -361 °F -218.3 °C

Critical Temperature: -181 °F -118.4 °C

Critical Pressure: 730 psi

Vapor Density: 1.1

Expansion: 1 volume of liquid oxygen expands to 875 volumes of gas

Source: W.E. Isman and G.P. Carlson (1980). Hazardous Materials. (Encino, CA: Glencoe Publishing Company).

Greater quantities of a gas may be transported and stored in a given size of container by liquefying 

the gas. Simply compressing the gas into a container can liquefy many gases. Oxygen, however, has a 

relatively low boiling point, see Figure F.1 above, and may not be liquefied at ordinary temperatures 

32
by any amount of pressure. Therefore, the temperature of oxygen must be reduced below its boiling point through a process known as cryogenic production in order to liquefy the gas. This is an 

expensive and complicated process.

The medical grade of oxygen used almost exclusively by fire and EMS agencies and by individuals 

is in a gaseous form and is contained in a high pressure cylinder. The United States Department of 

Transportation and the Food and Drug Administration regulate the manufacture and content specifications of compressed gas cylinders. Oxygen cylinders are manufactured of both aluminum and steel 

and the capacity of these cylinders range from 5.3 cubic feet to 250 cubic feet.

Compressed gas cylinders are assigned a sequential alphabetical designation by DOT. The D and E cylinders are the two most frequently used small cylinders for medical oxygen and when fully charged 

contain fifteen and twenty-five cubic feet (650 liters), respectively. Large cylinders are designed G, 

H, K, and M. An H cylinder, such as the one found in the apartment in North Bergen, contains 244 

cubic feet of oxygen when fully charged. The M cylinder, commonly used by fire departments and 

rescue squads, contains 3,000 liters of oxygen when fully charged.

A fully charged cylinder contains from 2,000 to 2,200 psi at 70 degrees Fahrenheit. This pressure, however, is too high for medical use and requires the use of a pressure-reducing regulator. 

Regulators typically reduce pressures to 40-70 psi. The cylinder heads have a pin index, which will 

only accept a regulator designed for medical use. The flow rates are typically low.

The larger cylinders, such as the H, are constructed of steel and the smaller cylinders, such as the D 

and E, are available in both steel and aluminum. The small aluminum cylinders are very popular due 

to their light weight. A relief device, known as a frangible disc, is provided to prevent the over pressurization of the cylinder. Over pressurization can occur if a cylinder is over filled or if a cylinder is 

subjected to excessive temperature, as is the case in a fire. Gases expand when heated. Therefore, the 

pressure must be reduced or the cylinder will rupture. The bursting pressure of the frangible disc for 

C and D cylinders is 3,300 psi and approximately 3,750 psi for H cylinders.

The direct impingement of flames on the surface of a cylinder also poses a significant hazard. A cylinder can absorb more heat if the cylinder contains a liquid. A good illustration of this phenomenon 

is the process of boiling water on a stove in a saucepan. The flame temperature of the gas is much 

higher than the melting point of the material that the pan is constructed of. The heat is absorbed and 

the pan remains intact as long as the pan contains water. Once the water completely evaporates the 

pan begins to melt. 

This same phenomenon occurs in a pressurized gas cylinder. A cylinder will remain intact as long 

as the pressure relief device functions and the cylinder contains sufficient liquid to absorb the heat. 

Oxygen, however, is in a gaseous form in a cylinder and will not absorb as much heat. The cylinder 

will rupture if the flame temperature exceeds the melting point of the material that the cylinder 

is made of. Steel cylinders have a much higher melting point than aluminum cylinders and have a 

greater potential to endure the flame impingement. Aluminum cylinders are much more prone to 

failure due to the relatively low melting point of aluminum. The specific alloy composition will, of 

course, influence the exact melting point of a cylinder.

If a cylinder ruptures, the cylinder fragments can become shrapnel and pose a serious threat to 

anyone in the vicinity at the time the cylinder failed. The cylinder can also become a projectile and 

travel considerable distances. An airborne cylinder has the potential to cause considerable damage to 

anything or anyone in its path.

USFA-TR-119/August-September 1998 33