### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE O ct obe r 4, 200 6 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KELL Y M ICHA EL P ICKET T

App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2002-C- 1439 Steve D ozier , Judge

No. M2004- 00732-SC-R11- CD - F iled on Jan uary 22, 2007

AND



### STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. GR EGOR Y T . H AR WOOD

App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2003-B-843 SteveDozier , Judge

No. M2004- 01811-SC-R11- CO - F iled on Jan uary 22, 2007

We gr anted the a

ppeal in ea ch of the se cases t o determine the consti tutionality of Tennessee Code A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 3 9

- 1 7

- 1 0 0 3 ( 2 0 0 3 ) , w h i c h p r o h i b i t s t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f c h i l d p o r n o g r ap h y. I nitially , the s t at u t e i s neither unc onstitut ionally vag ue nor ove rbroa d. Secondly , we hold that beca use the c harg es ag ainst Pickett were multipl icitous, onlyone conviction is permissible under the circ umstances of

that case

. I n conseque nce, the judgme nt of t he C ourt of C riminal Appea ls in eac h

case is affirme d.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e nt s o f theCo ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Aff irm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., J A N I CE M. H OL DER , and C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J J ., and A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., S P . J ., joined.

Ma rk C. Sc ru g g s, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e llant, Ke lly

Mic ha e l Pic ke tt.-2-

J odie A. B ell and Wendy

S. Tucker, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Gre g ory

T. Har wood.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Mic ha e l E . M oo re , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; E liza be th B. Marney , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. Johnson, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; B erna

rd McEvoy and B rian K. H olmgr en, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound

Sta te v . P ic k e tt
When police discover ed imag es of nude children on his pe rsonal computer, K elly Michae l Pickett was indicted on e leven c ounts of sexual ex ploitati o n of a minor in violation of Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-17-1003 (2003). Prior to trial, Pickett filed a motion to dismiss the entire ind ic tme nt, a lle g ing that Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d se c tio n 39 -1 7- 10 03 wa s u nc on sti tut ion a l onits fac e. In the alternative, he soug ht dismi ssal of ten of the counts on g rounds of multipl icity

. The trial court rule d that the cha

rg es in the indictment wer e not multipli citous. As to Pickett’s constituti onal

c h a ll e n g e , th e tria l c o u rt c o n c lu d e d th a t r e s o lu ti o n o f th e is s u e w a s n o t “ c ap ab leo f d e te rmination without a trial of the g ener al issue.” The case proce eded to trial without a jury some eleve n months later.

Th e te sti mon y

e sta bli sh e d th a t in Oc tob e r of 19 99 , Pic ke tt mov e d his pe rs on a l c omp ute r t o the re sidence of a f

riend, Allen Bi rn ey , who had Interne t acc ess. Ther eaf ter, Pickett visited the Birne y residenc e re g ularly

in order to use the computer . On one oc casion, B irney obs er v ed an “unusual” imag e on the scre en while Pickett was using the computer . He late r ac cesse d some files on the computer

and discove red imag es depic ting nude children, one of w hich was a repr esentation of two y oung boy s eng ag ed in ora l sex

. When Birne y confr onted P ickett, demanding that he either delete the imag es or r emove the computer from the residenc e, Pickett c laimed that the imag es had been e -mailed to him by

a friend.

After being alerted that Pickett posse s s e d child pornog raphy , Detec tives Robert Carrig an and Gra nt Carroll of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Depa rtment asked f

or and r ece ived permission fr om P ic ke tt t o s e arc h the c omp ute r. Th e y dis c ov e re d nume ro us ima g e s o f n ud e c hil dr e n s tor e d in thec omp ute r’ s tempo ra

ry I nte rn e t f

ile . D e te c tiv e Carr oll te sti fi e d th a t hefo un d im a g e s o f b oth prepube scent a nd teena g e girls i n provocative poses. Dete ctive Carr oll ex plained that whe n a user visits a website that contains imag es, the imag es ar e automatically stored in the tempora ry I nterne t file.
A more thoroug h sear ch of Picke tt’s computer re veale d even more stored imag es. De tective Sta nle y Mitc he ll o f the Compu te r F or e ns ic s L abo ratory of thepo lic e de pa

rt me nt t e sti fi e d th a t in-3-

addition to those image s contained in the te mporary I nterne t file, there wer e more than one hundr ed ima g e s inthec omp ute r’ s u na llo c a te d s pa c e . D e te c tiv e Mit c he ll e xpla ine d th a t th e ima g e s c ou ld have been place d in the computer’ s unallocate d space when Pickett visited ch i l d p o rn o g raphy websites or when he downloaded and then deleted imag es from either the I nterne t, a diskette, or an
e-ma il. The offic er e x plained that ther e was no way to c onclusively determine how the imag es had been store d in the unallocate d space

. Following the trial, the trial c ourt upheld the c onstitut ionality of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 39-17- 1003 and found Pickett g uilty of eleve n counts of sexual expl oitation of a minor base d up on e le ve n o f the ima g e s re c ov e re d fr om his c omp ute r. On app e a l, the Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls held that the statute wa s not unconstituti onal but dismiss ed ten of the e leven c onvictions, concluding that th e c ha

rg e s w e remul tip lic ito us

.
State v. Harwood

B e c aus e theapp e a l by

Ha rw oo d is int e rl oc uto ry , f

e w f a c ts w e re de ve lop e d in the tria l c ou rt

. He wa s indicted fo r four counts of sexual expl oitation of a minor in violation of Tennesse e Code An no tate d s e c tio n 3 9- 17 -1 00 3 ( 20 03 ). F oll ow ing theind ic tme nt, Ha rw o o d f i l e d a m o ti o nt o d i s mis s, challeng ing the constitutionalit y of Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 39-17-1003. The trial c ourt
re je c te d th e c la im, ru lin g that th e statut e wa s c on sti tut ion a l, b ut g rante d th e requ est fo r this interlocutory

appea l pursuant to Rule 9 of t he Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e. The Court of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls a ff

irme d th e ru lin g of

thetria l c ou rt

.
II. Ana lys is

A. Constit utionalit

y of Tennessee Code Annotated sec tion 39-17-1003 ( 2003)

Both P ickett and Har wood assert that Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39-17-1003 (2003) is unconstituti onal on its fac e. Rely ing on the United States Supreme Court dec ision in Ashcroft v. F re e Spe e c h Co a lit io n, 53 5 U.S. 234 (2 00 2) , e a c h d e fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e statut e is unconstitutionallyvag ue and ove rbroa d.

I nitially , our courts are c harg ed with upholding the con s t i t u t i o nality of statutes whe re po ssible. Dykes v. Ha milton C ounty , 191 S.W .2d 155, 159 (Tenn. 1945) ; State v. J oy ner, 759 S.W. 2d42 2, 42 5 (T e nn . Crim . App . 198 7)

. “ I n ev a luatin g thec on sti tut ion a lit y of a statut e , w e be g in with the presumption that an act of the Gene ral Assembly is c onstitut ional.” Gallahe r v. Elam, 104 S.W .3d 455, 459 (Tenn. 2003) (citing State v. Robinson, 29 S.W .3d 476, 479-80 (Tenn. 2000); R i ggs v

. Bu rs o n , 9 4 1 S

. W

. 2 d 4 4 , 5 1 (T en n

. 1 9 9 7 ))

. M o re o v er , t h i s C o u rti s re q u i re d t o “‘ i n d u l ge
every presumption and re solve eve ry doubt in favor of t he st atute’s c onstitut ionality .’” I d. (quoting State v. Tay lor, 70 S.W .3d 717, 721 (Tenn. 2002) ).

This Court’s role whe n construing a statute is “‘ to asce rtain and g ive ef fec t to the leg islative intent with o u t u n d u l y

restric ting or

expanding a

statute’s cove rag e bey ond its int ended sc ope.’”T his versio n o f t he st atute b ec am e l aw i n 19 9 0

. T he st atute wa s am en d ed i n 2 0 0 5 an d no w p ro vid es a s fo l l o w s: 1

(a) It i s unl awf

ul fo r any pe rs o n t o know i ngl y po ss ess m at eri al t hat i ncl ud es a mi no r engaged i n:
( 1) Se x u al a ct i v i t y ; or
( 2) Si mul at ed s exu al ac t i vi t y t hat i s pat ent l y offens i ve.
( b) A pe r s on pos s es s i n g mat er i al t h at v i ol at es s u bs ec t i on ( a) ma y be c h ar g ed i n a s epa r at e cou n t for
eac h i ndi vi dual i mage, pi ct ur e, d r awi ng , phot ogr aph, mo t i on pi ct ur e f i l m, vi deocas s et t e t ape, or ot her pi ct or i al r epr es en t at i on

. W h er e t h e n u mber of m at er i al s pos s es s ed i s gr ea t er t h an fi f t y (50) , t h e per s on
m ay b e charged i n a s i ngl e co unt t o enhance t he cl ass of o f fense under subsect i o n (d).

( c) I n a pros ecu t i on un der t hi s s ect i on, t he t r i er of f act may cons i der t he ti t l e, tex t , vi s ual

r epre s ent at i on, I nt er net hi s t o r y , phy s i cal deve l op ment of t he pers on depi ct ed, ex pert medi cal t est i m o ny , exp ert co m p ut er f o rens i c t est i m o ny , and any other rele v ant evi d ence, i n de t erm i ni ng whether a p ers o n kno wi ngl y p o ss ess ed the m at eri al , o r i n d et erm i ni ng w het her t he m at eri al or i m age
o t herwi se r ep res ent s o r dep i ct s t hat a pa rt i ci p ant i s a m i no r.
(d ) A vio l ati o n o f

t his s ec t i o n is a C l ass D f elo ny; ho w e ve r, i f

t he num b er o f

i nd i vid ua l i m ag es,

(c o n tinu e d ...)
-4- Houg hton v. Arama

rk Educ. Re s., I nc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W .2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995)). “L eg islative intent is determined ‘f rom the natura l and ordinary
me a nin g of

thestatut ory

la ng ua g e wi thi n th e c on te xt of the e nti restatut e wi tho ut any fo rc e d o r s ub tle construction that would extend or limit t he statute’s me aning .’” O sborn v. M arr , 127 S.W .3d 737, 740 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting State v. Flemming , 19 S.W .3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000))

. “W h en the statutory lang uag e is clea

r and unambiguous, we apply the plain lang uag e in its normal and ac cepte d use.” B oarma n v. J aynes, 109 S.W.3d 286, 291 (Tenn. 2003) (citing State v. Nelson, 23 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tenn. 2000) ).

At the t i m e of the offe nses in these c ases, Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-17-1003 pr ov ide d a s f

oll ow s:
(a) It is unlawful for any person to knowing ly possess materia l that includes a minor eng ag ed in: (1) Sexual activity ; or (2) Simulated sexual activity that is patently

offe nsive.
(b) In a prosec ution under this section, the trier of fa ct may

infer that a participant is a min or if themate ri a l th ro ug h it s ti tle , te xt, vi su a l r e pr e se ntatio n o r o the rw ise repr esents or de picts the participant as a minor.
( c ) A v i o l a t i o n o f

t h i s s e c t i o n i s a

C l a s s E f e l o n y.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 17-1003 (2003) (empha sis added). 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1

m at eri al s, or co m b i nat i o n of i m ages and m at eri al s, t hat are p o ss ess ed i s m o re t han f i f t y (50 ), t hen t he of f en s e s h a l l b e a Cl a s s C fe l o n y

. I f t h e n u m b e r o f i n d i v i d u a l i m a g e s , m a t e r i a l s , o r c o m b i n a t i o n of im a g e s a n d m a te ria ls, ex c e e d s o n e hu n d re d (1 0 0 ), the o ff e n se sh a ll b e a C la ss B felo n y.
( e) I n a pr os ec u t i on u n der t h i s s ec t i on , t h e s t at e i s n ot r equ i r ed t o pr ov e t h e ac t u al i den t i t y or a g e of t he m i no r.

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 7

- 1 0 0 3 (20 0 6 ).

Congr ess amende d the Child P ornog raphy Protection Act in 2003 to remove the offe nding 2 lang uag e. See 18 U .S.C. § 2256 (2003).

-5- I n Ashcrof

t v. Fre e Speec h Coalitio n , t h e United St ates SupremeCourt ruled that the provision of the Child Pornogra phy Prevention Act of 1996 that prohibited any visual depiction that “is, or appe ars to be, of

a minor eng ag ing in se x ually expli cit conduct” was unc onstitut ional. See Fr ee Spee ch Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)( B) (1996). Citi ng its earlier 2 decisions in Miller v. California, 413 U. S

. 1 5 , 24 (1973) ( defining obscenity , which is not

c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d s pe e c h, a s “ wo rk s w hic h, take n a s a wh ole , app e a l to the pr urie nt i nte re st in sex , which portray

sexual conduct in a pate ntly offe nsive way , and which, taken a s a whole, do

no t hav e se ri ou s lite ra

ry , artis tic , poli tic a l, o r s c ie nti fi c va lue ” ), a ndNe w Y or k v . F e rb e r, 45 8 U .S. 747, 76 4 (1982) ( concluding that pornog raphy which is cre ated by

using a ctual childre n is not constitutionallyprotec ted spee ch), the Court concluded that the statutory provision at issue was overbr oad bec ause it criminaliz ed eve n those imag es that we re not obsce ne and that did not involve t h e ex p l o i tation of ac tual children, suc h as computer -g ener ated imag es or the use of adults that appea r to be minors. I d. at 250-56.

Both Pi ck ett and Ha

rwood a ssert that Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-17-1003(b), wh i ch p ro v i d es t h at“t h e t ri ero f f ac tm ayi n fe r t h ata p ar t i ci p an ti s a m i n o r i f t h e m at er i al t h ro u gh its ti tle, text , visu al re p re s en t ation or otherw ise repr esents or de picts the participant as a minor,”

abridg e s f

re e sp e e c h b e c aus e it en c omp a sse s im a g e s w he reno c hil d e xploi tatio n w a s a c tua lly involved, such as c o mp u ter

- s im u la te d o r v irtual imag es. The de fendants also contend that subsec tion (b) impermissibly shifts the burden to the defe ndant to prove that the imag es do not portray actua l minors. The State submits that subsection (b) does not prohibit constitutionallypro te cted spe ech and that the infer encecontained in that se ction operates mere ly as an e videntiary

device

.
I n eac h case , the Court of Criminal Appea ls concluded that the statute is not overbroa d. The intermediate court rule d that subsection (b) doe s not ex pand subsec tion (a) to include imag es that do not depict ac tual m i n o rs . The c ourt also held that subsec tion (b) oper ates a s an evide ntiary device . I n an unre lated ca se, howe ver, a separ ate panel of the Court of Criminal Appea ls questioned the constitutionalityof the statute. In the consoli d at ed cases of State v. B utler and State v. A llen, No. E2004- 0 0 3 59-CCA-R9-CD, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 302 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 20 05 ), theint e rm e diate c ou rt he ld that su bs e c tio n ( b) is u nc on sti tut ion a l bec aus e it “c ome s to o c los e-6-

to permitting a

conviction base d on the possession of material in which an ac tual minor is not involved, in violation of the holding in Free Speech Coa lition.” I d. at *17.

The c onstitut ional test for ove rbre adth is whether th es ta tu te ’ s la n g u a g eo v e r

r e a ches unla wful conduct and encompa ss es activity that is constituti onally

protec ted. State v. For

bes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 448 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ; see Gr ayned v. City of R ockfor d, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972). The United States Supreme Court has ma de the f oll o wing observations reg arding the doctrine of overbr eadth:

Be cause of the wide -re aching eff ects of striking down a statut e o n i t s fa ce at the

re qu e st o f on e wh os e ow n c on du c t may be pu nis he d d e sp ite theF ir st A me nd me nt, we ha ve re co gn ized that the overbre adth doctrine is “strong medicine” and have

e mpl oy e d it wi th he sit a tio n, a ndthe n “ on ly a s a la st r e so rt .” We h a ve , in conseque nce, insisted that the ove rbre adth invol v ed b e “substantial” befor e the statute involved will be invalidated on its fac e.

Fe rber , 458 U.S. at 769 (citation and f ootnote omitted).

Under our principles o f d u e proce ss, an over broad or vag ue statute is vulnera ble to a

c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle ng e be c aus e it ( 1) fails to p ro vid e fair no tic e that c e rt a in a c tiv iti e s a reun la wf ul; and (2) fails to e stablish r easona bly clea r g uidelines for law enfor ceme nt of ficials and c ourts, which, in turn, inv ite s a

rb itr ary a nd dis c ri min a tory

e nf or c e me nt. F or

be s, 91 8 S. W.2 d at 44 8 ( c iti ng Ros e v. L ocke, 423 U .S. 48, 49-50 (1975); Smith v. Gogue n, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974))

.
I n o u r v i ew , t h e p l ai n l an gu age o f s u b s ec t i o n (a ) o f T en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t at ed section 39-17- 10 03 re qu ir e s th at th e im ag e be of “ a min or .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 17 -1 00 3( a ) ( 20 03 ). Th is lang uag e is marke dly

differ ent from the statute at i ssue in Fr ee Spee ch Coalition, which criminalized the possession of any

sexuallyexpli cit imag e that “is, or a ppear s to be” of a m inor. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 241-56 (e mphasis added) . I n that case , the “appe ars to be” lang uag e re ndere d the statute unconstitutionallyoverbr oad. I d. The Te nnessee sta t u t e does not c ontain this langua g e. Moreove r, we are not persuade d that the lang uag e of subse ction (b) ex p an d s the cove rag e of subsection (a ) t o include constit utionally protec ted s peec h. Subsection (b), which permits the trier of fa ct to infer that t h e i m age is of a minor, does not alter the re quirement that the imag e be of “a mi n or.” In conseque nce, it is our view that Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39-17-1003(b) (2003), whic h can best be described as a permissive infere nce, is not unconstitut ionally overbr oad.

Further, it is our view that the statute does not impermissibl y shift the burden to the defe ndant to p ro ve that th e ima g e do e s n ot d e pic t a min or . B othth is Co urt and theUn ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court have spe cifica lly

approve d of the use of

permissive infer ence s in criminal trials. See, e.g ., Es te lle v. Mc Gu ir e , 5 02 U. S. 62, 78 -7 9 (19 91 ); L ow e v. State , 8 05 S.W. 2d36 8, 37 1- 72 (1 99 1) ; State v. Bolin, 678 S.W .2d 40, 42 (Tenn. 1984) . I n Estelle, the United States Supreme Court held that “a permi s s iv e in f

e r e n c e is n o t a v io lati o n o f d u e p r o c e s s b e c au s e th e St a te s ti ll h a s the burden of pe rs ua din g thejury

that th e su g g e ste d c on clusio n s ho uldbe inf e rr e d b a se d o n th e pr e dic a te fa c ts-7-

proved.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 79 (citing Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-63 (1979))

. A “pe rmissive infere nce a llows, but does not require, the triers of f act to infe r the e lemental fa ct from proof by the S tate of the basic fac t and places no burde n of any kind on the defe ndant.” B olin, 678 S.W .2d at 42.
Conversely , a mandatory

presumption violates due proc ess because it shifts the burden to the de fe nd a nt. Pa tte rs on v. Ne w Yo rk , 43 2 U. S. 1 97 , 2 15 (1 97 7) . “ Th e ma nd a tory pr e su mpt ionte lls the triers of

fac t that they

must find the el em en t al fa ct upon proof of the basic f

act unless [the] defe ndant comes f

orwa rd with some evidenc e to re but the p re s u m ed conne ction betwee n the two fac ts.” Bolin, 678 S.W.2d at 42.

I n this inst an ce, T ennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39-17-1003(b) pr ovides that “the trie r of fa ct may

infer that a participant is a minor if t h e m at er i al throug h its ti tle, text , visual repr esentation or otherwise r epre sents or depic ts the participant a s a minor.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 17-1003(b) (2003) ( emphasis added) . The statute doe s not require the trier of fac t to conclude that the material depicts a minor. Further, the statute pla ces no bur den on the de fendant to prove that the imag e is not th at o f a minor. The State must sti ll establish each of the eleme nts of the crime, including the fac t that the m aterial contains t he im ag e of a mi nor. It is our view, there fore , that the statute does not unconstitutionallyshift the burden of proof.

The de fendant Harw ood also asserts that the definition of the term “ materia l,” as it appe ars in the statute, is unconstitu t i o n ally overbr oad. Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-17-1002( 2) (2 00 3) de fi ne s “ mate ri a l” a s f oll ow s:
(A ) A ny pic tur e , d ra wi ng , p ho tog ra ph , m ot io n p ic tur e fi lm, vid e oc a sse tte tape or other pictoria l repre sentation;
(B ) Any statue, fig ure, the atrica l production or ele ctrica l reproduc tion; or
(C) Any text or imag e stored on a computer hard drive, a c omputer disk of any type, or any

other medium desig ned to store information for later re trieval; . . .

.
Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 17 -1 00 2( 2) (A )- (C ) ( 20 03 ). Ha rw oo d conte nd s th a t th is l a ng ua g e is overbr oad bec ause the re is no re quirement that the material be obscene as d efined in Mill er. See Miller , 4 1 3 U

. S. a t 2 4

. T h is ar g u me n t, h o w e v e r , o v e r lo o k s th e f a c t th a t in o r d e r to c o n s titute a criminal ac t under sec tion 39-17-1003, possession of any of the above must include a minor eng ag ed in sex ual ac tivity . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1003( a) (2003). The United States Supre me Court he ld i n F e rb e r that the Mil le r te st d oe s n ot a pp ly to c hil d p orno g ra

ph y , w hic h is no t c on sti tut ion a lly protec ted s peec h. See F erbe r, 458 U.S. at 756. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-17-1003 does

no t c ri min a lize thepo sse ssi on of mate ri a ls that do no t c on ta in a c tua l min or s. B e c aus e ou r s tatut e
re qu ir e s p ro of

that th e mate ri a ls d e pic t a c tua l mi no rs , it is n ot s ub

je c t to theMil le r t e st.-8-

Finally , the def

endants a ssert that the statute is unconstituti onally vag ue bec ause it does not define the word “ possess.” While maintaining that the t erm “possess” provides too much discretion i n t h e ap p l i cation of the law, Pickett and Ha rwood a rg ue that the statute w ould permit the p r o s e c u ti o no f

o th e rw i s e i n n o c e n ti n d i v i d u a l s w h o , b y m e r e c h a n c e , h ap p e n u p o n c h i l d p o r n o g r ap h y.

“ It is a ba sic princ ipl e of

du e pr oc e ss that a n e na c tme nt i s v oidfo r v a g ue ne ss i f i ts prohibitions are not cle arly define d.” Gr ayned, 408 U.S. at 108. “A criminal statute that forbids the do ing of a n a c t in te rm s so va gu e that me n o f c omm on int e lli g e nc e mus t ne c e ssa ri ly g ue ss at it s meaning and diffe r as to it s application violates the f irst essential of due proce ss of law.” L eec h v. Am. Bookse llers Ass’n, 582 S.W.2d 738, 746 (Tenn. 1979) ( citing U .S. Const . amend. XI V, § 1 (“[N]or shall any

state deprive any person of life, liberty , or prope rty , without due proce ss of law; . . . .”); Te nn. Const. art. I , § 8 (“[N]o man shall be take n or imprisoned, or disseized of his fre ehold, liberties or p ri v i l eges, or outlawed, or

exil ed, or in a ny

manner destroy ed or de prived of his life, liberty or prope rty , but by

the judg ment of his peer s or t h e l aw of the land.” )). The fair w arning require ment embodied in the due pr o cess clause prohibits the states fr om holding an individual “criminallyresponsible fo r co n d uct which he could not rea sonably understand to be proscribed.” United States v. Har

riss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (footnote omitted). Due process requires that the la w g ivesu ff

ic ie nt w arn ing so that pe op le ma y a vo id c on du c t wh ic h is f or bid de n. Ros e , 4 23 U. S. at 50. “Ma ny

statutes will have some inher ent vag ueness, f or ‘[i] n most Eng lish wor ds and phra ses there lurk unce rtainti es

. ’” I d. at 49-50 (quoting Robinson v. United St ates, 324 U.S. 282, 286 (1 94 5) ). Th e c on sti tut ion a l te st f or va g ue ne ss i s w he th er a st atut e ’s “ pr oh ibi tio ns areno t c le arl y define d and ar e susce ptible to differe nt interpretations as to what conduc t is actually proscribed.” For bes, 918 S.W.2d at 447-48 (citing Gray ned, 408 U.S. at 108; Ba g g ett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964))

.
This Court must employ the natura l and ordinary meaning of the wor ds in the statute to give eff ect to the leg islative intent. Her e, the statute makes ita crime to “possess material that includes a minor eng ag ed in . . . [s] exual activity ; or . . . [s] imulated sexual activity that is patently offe nsive.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 17-1003(a ) (2003) . Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary define s the term “posse ss” as “[t] o have in one ’s ac tual control; to have posse ssion of.” B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary 1201 (8th ed. 2004). “Possession” is def ined as “ [ t ] h e fa ct of ha ving or holding pr operty

in one’s powe r; the exercise of dominion over property .” I d. Moreove r, as the Court of Criminal Appeals observed, the te rm “ po sse ss” is m od if

ie d b y thete rm “ kn ow ing ly .” “ ‘Kn owi ng’ me a ns that a pe rs on a c ts knowing ly

with respec t to the conduct or to c ircumstance s surrounding the conduc t when the pe rson is a w ar e o f th e n a tu r e o f th e c o n d u c t o r th a t th e c ir c u ms tan c e s e xis t. ” T e n n

. Co d e A n n. § 39-11-106( 20) (2006) . Be cause the pos session contemplated by the s tatute m ust be “know ing,” a person who ina dverte ntly

stumbles upon child pornog raphy would not be g uiltyof a c rime under the terms of the statute. B eca use the prohibited c onduct is clea rly define d, the ac t is not unconstitutionallyvag ue. See F orbes, 918 S.W.2d at 447-48.

II . M ult ipl ic ity-9-

The State c ontends in this appea l that the C ourt of C riminal Appea ls err ed by ruling that ten of Pickett’s ele ven convic tions for sexual exploi tation of a minor wer e mul tiplicitous

. We disag ree

.
Th e do ub le je op ard y

c laus e of the Un ite d Stat e s Cons tituti on pr ov ide s tha t no pe rs on sh a ll “be subje ct for the same off ence to be twice put in jeopa rdy of life or limb.” U.S. Const . amend. V. Simi larly , article 1, section 10 of the T ennesse e Constituti on provides that “no person shall, for the

sam e o ff en s e, be twic e put in jeopar dy of life or limb.” Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 10. This Court has

o b s e rv e d th at “ th r e ef u n d amental principles underlie double jeopar dy : (1) prote ction ag ainst a sec ond prosec ution after an acquittal; (2) protec tion a g ainst a second prosec ution a fter c onviction; and (3) protec tion ag ainst multi ple punishments for the same off ense.” State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 37 8 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( c it a ti o n s a n d f o o tn o te o mi tt e d )

. I n D e n to n , w e o b s e r v e d th a t “ w hether two offe nses ar e the ‘ same’ f

or double jeopa

rdy purposes de pends upon a ‘close and care ful ana ly sis of the offe nses involved, the statutory definitions of t he crimes, the leg islative intent and the particular fac ts and circ umstances.’ ” I d. at 379 (quoting State v. Bla ck, 524 S.W .2d 913, 919 (Tenn. 1975) ). F ina lly , th is C ou rt

no te d th a t w hil e app e llate re vie w mus t beg ui ded by th e test a nn ou nc e d in Bloc kburg er v. U nited State s , 2 8 4 U.S . 299, 304 (1932), that test is not conclusive of leg islative intent and the re viewing court must a lso e x amine (1) whether there wer e multipl e victims involved; (2 ) w he the r s e ve ra l di sc re te a c ts w e reinv olv e d; and(3 ) w he the r the evi l at w hic h e a c h o ff e ns e is direc ted is the same or

differ ent. Denton, 938 S.W.2d at 380-81.

In S t a t e v

. P h i l l i p s , t h i s C o u rte x p l a i n e d t h e d o c tr i n e o f m u l t i p l i c i t y: Multipl icity conce rns the division of conduct into discr ete offe nses, cre ating sever al offe nses out of a sing le offe nse. Sever al gene ral princ iples determine w hether of fe ns e s a re“ sta c ke d” so a s to be mul tip lic ito us : 1. A s ing le of

fe ns e ma y

no t bediv ide d in to se para te pa rt s; g eneral ly , a sing le wrong ful ac t may not furnish the basis for

more than o ne c ri min a l pr os e c uti on ; 2. I f eac h offe nse char g ed require s proof of a fa ct not require d in proving the other, the offe nses ar e not multipli citous; and 3. Where time and l o ca t ion separate and disting uish the commission of the offe nses, the off enses c annot be sa id to ha ve arisen

ou t of a sin g le wr on g fu l a c t.

State v. Phill ips, 924 S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1996) (footnotes omitted). “Additional fac tors such as the nature of the act; the time e lapsed betwee n the alleg ed conduct; the intent of the a ccuse d, i.e.,

was a new intent formed; and cumulative punishment may be conside red f

o r g u idance in determining whether the multiple co n v i cti ons violate double jeopa rdy .” State v. Epps, 989 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Phill ips, 924 S.W .2d at 665).

I n th is c a se , the Cou rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls co nc lud e d tha t ten of the e le ve n co un ts a g a ins t Pickett were multipl icitous. That court re asoned that b ec au s e “the State prese nted no evidenc e-10-

conce rning which picture s came from which website or when [Pi ckett] acc essed e ach pic ture,” the evidenc e esta

blished only

one crime.

Th e p r o o f a t Pi c k e tt ’ s tria l e s ta b li s h e d th a t n u me r o u s im a g e s w e r e s to r e d in e ith e r the te mpo ra ry I nte rn e t f ileor theun a llo c a te d s pa c e of

Pic ke tt’ s p e rs on a l c omp ute r. De te c tiv e Mit c he ll testified that he wa s unable to dete rmine whe n the def endant ha d acc essed the imag es or f rom which websites the image s had come. Ba sed upon t hat testimony , the Court of Criminal Appea ls concluded that “ a ll o f the pic tur e s c ou ld h a ve c omefr om a sin g le we bs ite a nd c ou ld h a ve be e n auto matic a lly downloaded onto the appellant’ s hard drive simult aneously .” The State did not otherwise attempt to disti ng uish the offe nses by showing that the crimes weresepar ated by time o r l o ca t i o n o r by otherwise de monstrating that Pickett formed a ne w i ntent as t o eac h imag e. See E pps, 989 S.W .2d

a t 74 5. F urthe r, the State ha s no t e sta bli sh e d th at ou r l e g isl a tur e int e nd e d c umu lativ e pu nis hme nt. By the application of controlling pr ece dent, it is our view that t h e ev i d en ce established only one of fe ns e a ndthat th e c ha

rg e s a g a ins t Pic ke tt w e re , th e re fo re , mu lti pli c ito us

.

Conclusion

We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 39-17-1003 ( 2003 ) i s n o t vag ue or overbr oad in violation of

the state or f

eder al constitutions. W e also hold that the c harg es ag ainst the defe ndant Pickett wer e multiplicitous and that the e vidence supports only one conviction. Thus, we aff irm the judg ments of the Court of Criminal Appea ls in each c ase.

It app e ari ng that th e de fe nd a nt, Ke lly Mic ha e l Pic ke tt, is ind ig e nt, thec os ts o f the app e a l in his ca s e ar e taxe d to th e St a te o f T e n n e s s e e

. I n th e d e f e n d a n t H ar w o o d ’ s ap p e a l, th e c o sts of the appea l are taxed to the defendant, Greg ory T. Har wood and his surety , for which execution may issue i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ GA RY R. WA DE , JUST I CE