GAO-06-693R Security Clearances

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 14, 2006 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 

 the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Subject: DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record 

Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security Clearance 

Process 

On November 9, 2005, I testified before your subcommittee at a hearing on “Access 

Delayed: Fixing the Security Clearance Process, Part II.” This letter responds to three 

questions for the record that you posed. The questions and my responses follow. 

1. What steps will GAO take to ensure that OPM, OMB, and the federal 

Intelligence Community are meeting the goals and objectives outlined in 

the OPM security clearance strategic plan? 

We will continue to assess and monitor the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

personnel security clearance program, including DOD’s progress in meeting the goals 

and objectives outlined in the governmentwide plan. At this time, we have no ongoing 

or future work that would assess whether the federal intelligence community is 

meeting the goals and objectives of the government’s plan.1

We are currently 

reviewing the timeliness and completeness of DOD’s and the Office of Personnel 

Management’s (OPM) processes used to determine whether industry personnel are 

eligible to hold a top secret clearance. We will report that information to your 

subcommittee this fall. Also, our standard steps of monitoring programs on our highrisk list require that we evaluate the progress that agencies make toward being 

removed from GAO’s high-risk list. Finally, we continuously monitor our 

recommendations to agencies to determine whether active steps are being taken to 

overcome program deficiencies. 

 

1

For us to undertake such work would require the sponsorship of the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence or the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. While we have the authority to 

do such work, we lack the cooperation we need to get our job done in that area. As a result, unless and 

until we receive such cooperation, and given GAO’s limited recourse, we will continue our longstanding policy of not doing work that relates directly to intelligence matters unless requested to do so 

by one of the select intelligence committees. 
2. As you mentioned in your statement, a commitment from leadership is a 

key indicator for successful implementation of any strategic plan. At this 

point, do you believe that OMB and OPM have made the necessary 

commitment to improve the security clearance process? What steps 

should the Administration take to ensure that their security clearance 

initiatives are transparent and will continue past the Bush 

Administration? 

We have been encouraged by the commitment that the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) and OPM have demonstrated in the development of a governmentwide 

plan to address clearance-related problems. Also, the OMB Deputy Director met with 

GAO officials to discuss OMB’s general strategy for addressing the problems that led 

to our high-risk designation for DOD’s clearance program. Demonstrating strong 

management commitment and top leadership support to address a known risk is one 

of the requirements for removing DOD’s clearance program from GAO’s high-risk list.

We are concerned about whether such progress will continue since Executive Order 

No. 13381 has not been extended and no other office has begun to assume that 

leadership role for the period after the order expires on July 1, 2006. While OPM has 

provided some leadership in assisting OMB with the development of the 

governmentwide plan, OPM may not be in a position to assume OMB’s leadership role 

for a variety of reasons. These reasons include (1) the governmentwide plan lists 

many management challenges facing OPM and the Associate Director of its 

investigation unit, such as establishing a presence to conduct overseas investigations 

and adjusting the investigative workforce to the increasing demand for clearances; 

(2) adjudication of personnel security clearances and determination of which 

organizational positions require such clearances are outside the current emphases for 

OPM; and (3) agencies’ disputes with OPM may require a high-level third party to 

mediate a resolution that is perceived to be impartial. 

OMB and OPM could enhance the transparency and likelihood that the initiatives 

would be continued by improving communications with clearance-process 

stakeholders and correcting the deficiencies in the governmentwide plan that I 

outlined in my November testimony and mention later in this correspondence.

Communication problems may be limiting governmentwide efforts to improve the 

personnel security clearance process. For example, until recently, OPM had not 

officially shared its investigator’s handbook with DOD adjudicators. Adjudicators 

raised concerns that without knowing what was required by the investigator’s 

handbook, they could not fully understand how investigations were conducted and 

the investigative reports that form the basis for their adjudicative decisions. Similarly, 

the transparency of the initiatives may be limited if the governmentwide plan is not 

communicated and available to all stakeholders, including investigators, adjudicators, 

agency and company officials needing personnel with clearances, and those seeking 

clearances. Also, another step in increasing the probability that the initiatives will 

continue into the future would be to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the 

initiatives by correcting previously identified deficiencies. Perseverance by the 

administration in implementing our recommended solutions and continued oversight 

and action by Congress are essential elements to removing DOD’s program from our 

high-risk list and improving clearance processes governmentwide.

Page 2 GAO-06-693R Security Clearances
3. Do you think that OPM’s plan includes the necessary performance goals 

and milestones to streamline the security clearance process in order to

get this removed from the high-risk list?

As I said in my November testimony, the plan represents an important step toward 

addressing some long-standing concerns GAO has raised about DOD’s personnel 

security clearance process, but much remains to be done to develop a more 

comprehensive plan for improving the timeliness and quality of the security clearance 

process. My testimony noted that the plan did not contain details on some elements 

that should be in a comprehensive strategic plan. For example, the plan provided few 

details on the discrete actions the government would take to address problems, 

projected completion dates for the actions, the resources required to accomplish the 

plan’s objectives, or potential risks or mitigation plans to address the risks. Also, 

while the plan establishes a wide variety of metrics to address timeliness for the 

investigations phase of the process, it does little to address timeliness in the 

adjudication phase of the process. Third, although the plan acknowledges that 

agencies have concerns about the quality of investigations and adjudications, the 

government plan devotes little attention to monitoring and improving the quality of 

the personnel security clearance process. Developing specific steps to address the 

general concerns that I identified in my testimony should move OMB and the 

executive branch agencies closer to their goal of improving the personnel security 

clearance process.

If you or other members of the subcommittee have any additional questions about 

DOD’s personnel security program, please contact me at (202) 512-5559 or 

stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and 

Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this correspondence. GAO staff who 

made major contributions to the correspondence are listed in the enclosure. 

Sincerely yours, 

Derek B. Stewart 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Enclosure

Page 3 GAO-06-693R Security Clearances
Enclosure 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Derek B. Stewart, (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov

Acknowledgments In addition to the contact above, Jack E. Edwards, 

Assistant Director; Jerome Brown; Kurt A. Burgeson; 

Susan C. Ditto; David Epstein; Sara Hackley; and James P. 

Klein made key contributions to this correspondence.

(350856) 

Page 4 GAO-06-693R Security Clearances
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