This opinion is subject to revision before final

p ublication in the Pacific Reporter

20 20 UT 32

IN THE



## S UPREME 

## C OURT OF THE 

## S TATE OF 

## U TAH

S TATE OF U TAH , Appellee

,

v.
J EREMY W ILLIAMS B RIDGEWATERS , Appellant

.

No. 20180190 Heard September 18, 20 19
Filed May 28 , 2020

On Certification from the Court of Appeals

Third District

, West Jordan
The Honorable William K. Kendall

No s

. 171402 352 and 171403026

Attorneys:

Sim Gill, Samuel P. Sutton

, Salt Lake City , for appellee
Samantha R. Dugan , Salt Lake City, for appellant

J USTICE P ETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which

C HIEF J USTICE D URRANT , A SSOCIATE C HIEF J USTICE L EE , J USTICE H IMONAS , and J USTICE P EARCE joined.

J USTICE P ETERSEN , opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Jeremy Bridgewaters was charged with two separate
instances of violating a protective order. After a preliminary hearing, the district court

, acting as a magistrate

, bound him over to stand trial. Bridgewaters moved to quash the bindover . He

a rgu ed that he had not been properly served with the protective
order he was accused of violating, and that a previously issued ex parte order had expired

. The district court denied his mot ion.S TATE v. B RIDGEWATERS
Opinion of the Court

2 Bridgewater s filed an interlocutory appeal , which the court of appeals certified to us

. ¶2 The statute that criminalizes violation of a protective order (Violation Statute ) requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant was “properly served” with t he order at issue. U TAH C ODE § 76

- 5

- 108(1) (2017)

. 1 While the Violation Statute does not define proper service, t he Utah Cohabitant Abuse Act (Act or Cohabitant Abuse Act )

, id. §§ 78B

- 7

- 101 to

- 116 (2017), 2 under which the orders in this case were issued, contains certain specific procedural requirements that inform our analysis

. We conclude
that the Act requires a protective order to be served in accordance
with rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure , even though a protective order does not initiate a civil protective order proceeding in the same way that a summons and complaint

commence other civil action s

. Because the protective order here was served pursuant to rule 5, it was not properly served.

¶3 However, as the district court correctly determined

, the

ex parte order was still in effect at the time of the events in question . Under the Act, once a court holds a hearing on a petition for a protective order and issues such an order, a previously
issued ex parte order “ remains in eff ect until service of process of the protective order is completed.” Id. § 78B

- 7

- 107 (1) (d) (2017)

. ¶4 Bridgewaters argues that even under such circumstances, Utah Code § 78B

- 7

- 107(1)(c) (2017) does not permit an ex parte order to remain in effect longer than 180 days. W e disa gree with
his reading of the Act

. Because the district court issued a protective order after a hearing, the “ ex parte protective order

remain [ ed ] in effect ” until the protective order was served in
accordance with the Act

. See id. § 78B

- 7

- 107(1)(d) (2017)

.

__________________________________________________________

1 This statute was amended during the 2018 general session of the Utah Legislature. See 2018 Utah Laws 1564 . We refer to the version of the statute in effect at the time of the alleged violations.

2 As with the Violation Statute, portions of the Cohabitant
Abuse Act have been amended . S o we refer to the version of the statute in effect at the time of the alleged violations.C ite as: 20 20 UT 32

Opinion of the Court

3 ¶5 Accordingly, the magistrate properly bound over Bridgewaters to face both counts to the extent they are based on the ex parte order. We affirm.

BACKGROUND 3

¶6 On February 5, 2016, Bridgewaters ’ former girlfriend (T.T.) petitioned for a temporary protective or der against him. T he
district court issued an ex parte protective order (ex parte order)
that same day. The ex parte order prohibited Bridgewater s from communicating with T.T. other than during court mediation

sessions

, and from going to T.T.’s residence and workplace

, among other things. Bridgewaters was personally served with a copy of the ex parte order the day it was issued

. The order
indicat ed that there would be a hearing on February 23, 2016 , and
it instructed Bri dgewaters to “[g]o to the court hearing on the date listed [on the order]

. ”

¶7 The district court held a hearing on the scheduled date

. But Bridgewaters did not attend. Upon conclusion of the hearing,

t he court entered a protective order, dated February 23, 2 016. Like the ex parte order, t he protective order prohibited Bridgewater s from communicating in any way with T.T. other than during court mediation sessions and from going to T.T.’s residence and workplace

. ¶8 The Cohabitant Abuse Act requires t hat “ [f] ollow ing the protective order hearing, the court shall .

. . as soon as possible, deliver the order to the county sheriff for service of process.”

U TAH C ODE § 78B

- 7

- 106(4) (a) (2017) . But for reasons that do not appear in the record, the sheriff did not serve th e protective order on Bridgewaters.

¶9 Eventually, o n May 3, 2016, c ounsel for T.T. stepped in
and filed a certificate of service, informing the court that counsel

__________________________________________________________

3 When reviewing a bindover determination, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
resolv e all inferences in favor of t he prosecution. See State v. Virgin , 2006 UT 29, ¶ 24, 137 P.3d 787 ; State v. Clark , 2001 UT 9, ¶ 19, 20 P.3d 300 (“Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the facts presented at the preliminary hearing were
suff icient to meet the reasonable belief standard.”)

.S TATE v. B RIDGEWATERS
Opinion of the Court

4 had mailed a true and correct copy of the protective order to Bridgewaters at his last known address

. Notably

, B ridgewaters’
last known address was T.T.’s residence at the time she filed the protective order petition, and the ex parte order and protective
order both prohibited him from being there.

¶10 On June 27, 2017 , T.T. spotted Bridgewaters at her apartment complex. She and her adult daughter were returning
home late that night when they saw Bridgewaters exiting the complex. Bridgewaters rolled down his car window and said that he “was driving through.” 4

¶11 The next day, Bridgewate rs texted T.T. Although the text messages were from various unknown numbers

, T.T. knew the text messages were from Bridgewaters because of “the way he addressed [her] .

. . in them.”

¶12 The State charged Bridgewaters with violating the ex parte order and the protective order in two separate criminal

cases : one related to Bridgewaters’ physical presence at T.T.’s apartment complex, and the other related to the text messages he
had sent her the following day . After a pre liminary hearing in which both cases were heard together, t he magistrate bound Bridgewaters over to stand trial on both counts

. ¶13 Bridgewaters moved to quash the bindover , arguing that the State had not presented evidence that he had been properly
served wit h the protective order, and that the ex parte order had expired at the time of the alleged offense s because the Cohabitant Abuse Act prohibits an ex parte order from being extended beyond 180 days . The district court denied t h e motion . It looked
to the lan guage of the Act, which states that “ [i] f at that hearing [on the ex parte order] the court issues a protective order, the ex parte protective order remains in effect until service of process of the protective order is completed. ” Id. § 78B

- 7

- 107 (1) (d) (2017)

. The court rejected Bridgewaters ’ statutory interpretation and
concluded that the ex parte order remained in effect

.

__________________________________________________________

4 At a different point in the preliminary hearing, Bridgewaters’ attorney asked T.T. if Bridgewaters had “told [her] he was just turning around,” to which she responded

, “ Y eah.” While this
does not bear on the outcome, we include this information for the
sak e of accuracy and completeness.C ite as: 20 20 UT 32

Opinion of the Court

5 ¶14 Bridgewaters petition ed for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order, which the court of appeals granted

. The court of appe als then consolidat ed the two cases for a single
determination and certified the case to us to decide (1) “whether, pursuant to Utah Code section 78B

- 7

- 107

, a properly served ex

parte protective order may extend beyond 180 days if a permanent protective or der is subsequently issue d but not properly served upon a respondent” and (2) “whether rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs proper service of protective orders, as provided in Utah Code section 76

- 5

- 108 , or whether rule 5 governs

. ”

¶15 We exerci se jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A

- 3

- 102(3)(b).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶16 The two questions before us are whether the protective
order was properly served as required by the Violation Statute,

U TAH C ODE § 76

- 5

- 108 (2017)

, and whether the ex parte order
remained in effect under the Cohabitant Abuse Act

, id. §§ 78B

- 7

- 101 to

- 116 (2017)

, on the dates of the alleged offenses. The se are legal questions, which we review for correctness. See Keystone Ins. Agency, LLC v. Inside Ins., LLC , 2019 UT 20, ¶ 12, 445 P .3d 434 (reviewing interpretation of rules of civil procedure for correctness); Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship , 2011 UT 50, ¶ 12, 267 P.3d 863 (reviewing questions of statutory interpretation for correctness)

.
ANALYSIS

¶17 The State charged Bridgewate rs with two counts of violating “ a protective order or ex parte protective order issued to [him] under Utah Code 78B

- 7

- 1, [the] Cohabitant Abuse Act. ” (Emphasis added.) The Cohabita nt Abuse Act defines an “ex parte protective order” as “an order issued wit hout notice to the
defendant in accordance with this chapter.” U TAH C ODE § 78B

- 7

- 102(6) (2017) . It defines a “protective order” as “ an order issued pursuant to this chapter subsequent to a hearing on the petition, of which the petitioner and respondent have been given notice in accordance with this chapter.” Id. § 78B

- 7

- 102(10)(a) (2017)

. ¶18 The parties do not dispute that the Violation S tatute requires the State to prove Bridgewaters was “properly served” with the orders he is alleged to have violated. See id. § 76

- 5

- 108(1) (2017)

. Bridgewaters contends that proper service means serviceS TATE v. B RIDGEWATERS
Opinion of the Court

6 of process under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil P rocedure,
which was not done here. And while he does not dispute that the ex parte order was properly served o n him, he argues that it had expired by the time of the alleged offenses. He contends that the
Cohabitant Abuse Act does not permit an ex parte or der to remain in effect longer than 180 days from its issuance, regardless of the

circumstances. See i d. § 78B

- 7

- 107(1)(c) (2017)

. ¶19 We first analyze whether the protective order was properly served. Because we conclude it was not, we then
determine whether the ex parte order remained in effect at t he time of the alleged offense.

I. SERVICE OF THE PROTECTIVE OR DER

¶20 Bridgewaters argues that the district court should have granted his motion to quash the bindover because t he State did not produce evidence that he was properly served with the protective order he i s charged with violating. We agree that the State was required to produce evidence of proper service, and that proper service in this context mandates service under ru le 4. However, because this argument applies only to the protective order, not the ex parte order, our agreement with Bridgewaters
here does not lead to a reversal of the magistrate’s decision on the motion to quash. 5

¶21 As a threshold matter, proper service is an element of the charged offense, and therefore the State was required to produce evidence that Bridgewaters was properly served. A t a preliminary hearing, the State must “establish probable cause” by “produc[ing] evidence sufficient to support a reaso nable belief that the defendant committed the charged crime.” State v. Virgin

, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 17, 137 P.3d 787. And p roper service is an element
of the crime charged here. T he Violation Statute states that “[a]ny person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective
order ” or “ ex parte protective order .

. . who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after having been properly served , is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.” U TAH C ODE § 76

- 5

- 108(1) (2017) (emphasis added)

.

__________________________________________________________

5 B ridgewaters does not dispute that he was properly served with the ex parte order . So this section deals only with service of the protective orde r

.C ite as: 20 20 UT 32

Opinion of the Court

7 ¶22 Bridgewa ters argues that proper service in this context

means service under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although this is a criminal case, which is generally governed by the procedural rules established in the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the protective order Bridgewaters is charged with violating was issued in a civil proceeding under the Cohabitant
Abuse Act. See U TAH C ODE §§ 78B

- 7

- 101 to

- 116 (2017)

. When a plaintiff or petitioner commences a civil action, r ule 4 generally governs how the plaintiff must serve the summons and complaint
on the defendant

. R ule 4 requires service upon the defendant personally ; leaving the documents at the defendant’s “dwelling house or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age a nd
discretion who resides there ” ; delivery of the documents to an authorized agent ; or sending the documents by mail or

comme rcial courier service, “ provided the defendant signs a document indicating receipt.” 6 U TAH R. C IV

. P. 4(d)(1)(A), (2) (A). If the plaintiff cannot locate the person to be served, or if the person is avoiding service, r ule 4 allows the plaintiff to move to serve the defendant by some other means. 7 Id. 4(d)(5)(A).

¶23 T he State counters that the Cohabitant Abuse Act does

not re quire the protective order to be served in accordance with

r ule 4 . It argues that the protective order was properly served
when T.T.’s counsel mailed it to Bridgwaters’ last known address
in accordance with rule 5 (b)(3)(C) . Rule 5 governs the service of pl eadings and papers after a civil action has been initiated

. 8 T he

__________________________________________________________

6 These methods of service apply unless the defendant is a “minor under 14 years old” ; has been “judicially declared to be incapacitated, of unsound mind, or incapable of conducting the
individual’s own affairs” ; or is “incarcerated or committed at a
facili ty operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions.”

U TAH R. C IV

. P. 4 (d)(1)( B), (C), (D).

7 Specifically, alternative methods of service may be available

“ [i] f the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are
unknown and cannot be asc ertained through reasonable diligence, if service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or if there is good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service.” Id. 4(d)(5)(A).

8 Rule 5 permits service of a paper upon a party’s lawyer, or upon a party if he or she is unrepresented, through the following (Continued .

. .)S TATE v. B RIDGEWATERS
Opinion of the Court

8 State reasons that rule 5 should have govern ed service of the protective order because the action had already commenced with the ex parte order , which had been personally served on Bridgewaters

. ¶24 W hile the Violation Statute establishes that proper service is an element of the offense, the statute does not contain further guidance regarding what is meant by that phrase. So we turn to
the civil Cohabitant Abuse Act

, under which the underlying protective order was issued. Although the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern service of process, pleadings, and papers in
civil cases

, the Cohabitant Abuse Act sets forth some unique procedures that are specific to protective order proceedings

, as described below . In light of this, the Act states, “Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are more specific than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding protective orders, the provisions of this chapter govern.” 9 U TAH C ODE § 78B

- 7

- 106(12) (2017)

.

methods: emailing the paper to the email address provided by the person; mailing it to the person’s last known address; handing it to the person; leaving it at the person’s office with a person in charge, in a receptacle for deliveries, or in a conspicuous place; leaving it at the “person’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there ; ” or any other method agreed to by the parties. Id. 5(b)(3)(B)

– (G).

9 A rticle VIII

, s ection 4 of the Utah Constitution requires this

court to “ adopt rules of procedure

. . . to be used in the courts of
the state

. ” T he legislature may amend those rules “ upon a vote of

two

- thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature. ” See
also Brown v. Cox , 2017 UT 3, ¶ 17, 387 P.3d 1040

. When the legislature enacts procedure, this provision contemplates that it must do so by amending our rules. Such an amendment “would
need to contain a reference to the rule to be amended and a clear expression of the Legislature’s intent to modify our rules.” Id. ¶ 20. While the Cohabitant Abuse Act contains unique procedural rules that purport to supersede the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where applicable, see U TAH C ODE § 78B

- 7

- 106(12) (2017), the legislature did not enact those procedural provisions in a joint resolution that amended the corresponding rule of civil procedure. The State has not challenged the constitutionality of (Continued .

. .)C ite as: 20 20 UT 32

Opinion of the Court

9 ¶25 Protective order petitions do not commence with a summons and complaint. Compare id. § 78B

- 7

- 105 (2017) (discussing forms for petitions and protective orders), with U TAH R. C IV

. P. 3 (a) (discussing commencement of a civil action by filing a complaint and serving a summons with a copy of the complaint). Rather, if a person files a petition for an order of protection, a court may immediately issue an ex parte protective order, without noti ce to the respondent or a hearing, “[i]f it appears from [the] petition .

. . that domestic violence or abuse has
occurred

. ” U TAH C ODE § 78B

- 7

- 106(1) (2017)

. ¶26 If the court issues an ex parte protective order, it must schedule a hearing on the petition withi n twenty days of the issuance of the ex parte order. 10 Id. § 78B

- 7

- 107(1)(a) (2017)

. If at the hearing the court does not issue a protective order, the ex parte order expires. Id. § 78B

- 7

- 107(1)(b) (2017)

. But i f the court does issue a protective order and the respondent is not present at the hearing , “the ex parte protective order remains in effect until service of process of the protective order is completed.” Id. § 78B

7

- 107(1)( d ) (2017)

. ¶27 Relevant here, the Cohabitant Abuse Act specifies how a protective order issued after a hearing must be served. It states that “[f]ollowing the protective order hearing, the court shall .

. .

the Act’s procedural provisions, so we will not opine on that question. We note, however, the practical concern with the way in
which section 78B

- 7

- 106(12) (2017) purports to take precedence over less specific rules. In protective order proceedings, litigants
and co urts are faced with two sets of procedural rules running on parallel tracks and are required to make judgment calls about which rule should apply in a given circumstance. Aside from any constitutional concerns, the legislature could increase clarity for
th e bar and the bench if it were to enact rule changes through joint resolutions that specifically amend the relevant rule of procedure.

10 The court may extend the ex parte order beyond twenty days only if the petitioner is unable to attend the hearing, the respondent has not been served, the respondent has had the opportunity to present a defense at the hearing, the respondent requests that the ex parte order be extended, or exigent

circumstances exist. Id. § 78B 7

- 107(1)(b) (2017)

.S TATE v. B RIDGEWATERS
Opinion of the Court

10 as soon as possible, deliver the order to the county sheriff for service of process .” Id. § 78B

- 7

- 106(4)(a) (2017) (emphasis added)

. ¶28 The Act’s use of the phrase “service of process” indicates that the protective order must be served in accordance with rule 4. Most importantly, rule 4 explicitly governs service of process. See

U TAH R. C IV

. P. 4 (titled “Process”). We have explained tha t “[s]ervice of process implements the procedural due process requirement that a defendant be informed of pending legal action and be provided with an opportunity to defend against the
action.” Carlson v. Bos , 740 P.2d 1269, 1271 ( Utah 1987). In this

conte xt, “process” means a “ summons or writ, esp [ecially] to appear or respond in court

. ” Process

, B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) . And the phrase “service of process” is generally
understood as service on a defendant of the documents that

commence an action, pursuant to rule 4. See Weber C oun ty v. Ogden

Trece , 2013 UT 62, ¶¶ 28, 45, 48, 64, 321 P.3d 1067

. ¶29 In using the phrase “service of process,” the legislature referenced the procedure codified in rule 4 . Accordingly, w e

conc lude that even though the protective order does not initiate a protective order p roceeding in the same way a summons and complaint commence other civil action s , the legislature intended a protective order to be served as if it were “process.” This implicates rule 4, not rule 5. 11

__________________________________________________________

11 The State argues that it would be duplicative and unnecessary to require rule 4 service of the protective order where
the ex parte order has a lready been personally served, as is the case here. But the language of the Act does not support that argument. It clearly s tates that a protective order issued after a hearing shall be delivered “to the county sheriff for service of process.” Id. § 78B

- 7

- 106(4)(a) (2017) . The State does not identify statutory language modifying this requirement where the defendant was personal ly served with a previous ex parte order. Further, such dual service would not necessarily be duplicative and unnecessary, because both the ex parte order and the protective order can give rise to criminal and civil liability in the
event of a violation. S ee id. § 78B

- 7

- 106( 5)(a) (2017) . And a protective order can include certain additional restrictions not present in the ex parte order. See id. § 78B

- 7

- 106(2)

– (3) (2017) . In this way, a protective order is substantively different than other (Continued .

. .)C ite as: 20 20 UT 32

Opinion of the Court

11 ¶30 Bu t u nlike rule 4, which puts the onus of service on the plaintiff, the Cohabitant Abuse Act provides for rule 4 service by
the sheriff

. See U TAH C ODE § 78B

- 7

- 106( 4 ) (a) (2017)

. The Act
directs the court to transmit the order to the sheriff “as soon as possible

. ” Id. It then specifies that the sheriff must provide “expedited service” for orders for protection, and that once the order has been served, the sheriff must transmit verification of service of process to the statewide domestic viole nce network. Id. § 78B

- 7

- 106( 8 )(a) (2017)

. ¶31 H ere, for reasons that do not appear in the record, these procedures were not completed. The sheriff did not serv e Bridgewaters with the protective order. Instead, T.T.’s counsel
mailed the protective order to Bri dgewaters ’ last known address

. ¶32 Bridgewaters argues that this does not constitute proper service under the Violation Statute because it does not satisfy the requirements of rule 4. We agree. Because the Cohabitant Abuse Act requires service of process pursu ant to rule 4 , mailing the protective order to Bridgewaters ’ last known address pursuant to
rule 5 does not suffice

. 12 Accordingly, the protective order was not

papers and plead ings that are typically served under rule 5. The State also raises a policy concern that a dual

- service requirement could allow a defendant to avoid service of the protective order after being alerted to the proceeding by the ex parte order. We
note that o ur reading of section 78B

- 7

- 107(1)(d) (2017)

, infra ¶ ¶ 3 3

– 4 0 , alleviates this concern by holding that the ex parte order remains in effect until service of the protective order.

12 In his briefing, Bridgewaters occasionally appears to equate
rule 4 service of process with personal service. But as Bridgewaters acknowledges, rule 4 includes service short of personal service, such as service by certified mail, or by
alternative means in certain circumstances. U TAH R. C IV

. P. 4(d)(2), (d)(5). We are not presented here with the question of whether a particular method of service under rule 4 meets constitutional procedural due process requirements in this context. We hold only that the Act requires service of the protective orde r under
rule 4.S TATE v. B RIDGEWATERS
Opinion of the Court

12 properly served upon Bridgewaters as required by the Violation

Statute. 13

II. TIMEFRAME OF THE EX PARTE ORDER

¶33 Because we have determined that the protective order

was not served in accordance with the Act , subsection 107 (1) (d) applies. It states that “ [i] f at [the] hearing the court issues a protective order, the ex parte protective order remains in e ffect until service of process of the protective order is completed .” U TAH C ODE § 78B

- 7

- 107 (1) (d) (2017) (emphasis added). Based on this provision, the magistrate concluded that the ex parte order was
still in effect. This was correct

. 14

¶34 Bridgewaters does n ot dispute that the ex parte order was properly served on him. However

, he argues that another

__________________________________________________________

13 We flag another issue highlighted by these circumstances.
The Act specifies that a protective order is to be served by the
sheriff ( or an other law enforcement agency if it has contact with the respondent and the agency determines it is in the best interests of the petitioner to do so)

. See U TAH C ODE § 78B

- 7

- 106(8) (2017) . Bridgewaters has not argued that the service here was improper because it was completed by counsel rather than the
sheriff. However, it is arguable that the Cohabitant Ab use Act requires not only rule 4 service, but rule 4 service by the entities it specifies

— the sheriff or another law enforcement agency. See id. § 78B

- 7

- 106(12) (2017) ( “Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are more specific than the Utah Rules of Civ il Procedure, regarding protective orders, the provisions of this chapter govern.” ). As Bridgewaters has not made this argument, we do
not resolve it. However, we note the issue in the event that the legislature wishes to provide clarification.

14 The State argues that because the magistrate based its
bindover decision on subsection 107(1)(d), we should not reach the issue of whether the protective order was properly served , as we have done

. See supra ¶¶ 20

– 32

. But under the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the ex parte order remains in effect only if “service of process of the protective order” has not been “completed.” So it is necessary to first determine whether the protective order has been
served in a particular case to ascertain whether sub section 107( 1 )(d) is applicable.C ite as: 20 20 UT 32

Opinion of the Court

13 provision of the Act limits the life of an ex parte order to 180 days, so it had expired by the time of the alleged violations. See id. § 78B

- 7

- 107 (1)(c) (2017)

. ¶35 If a court issues an ex parte protective order, the Act requires the court to hold a hearing on the petition within twenty days. Id. § 78B

- 7

- 107(1)(a) (2017)

. “If at th at hearing the court does not issue a protective order, the ex parte protective order s hall expire, unless it is otherwise extended by the court .” Id. § 78B

- 7

- 107(1)(b) (2017) (emphasis added). Th e Act then specifies that a

court may not extend an ex parte order beyond the twenty

- day period unless:
(i) the petitioner is unable to be present at t he hearing; (ii) the respondent has not been served; (iii) the respondent has had the opportunity to present a defense at the hearing; (iv) the respondent requests that the ex parte order be extended; or (v) exigent circumstances exist.

Id. The next s ubsection states, “Under no circumstances may an

ex parte order be extended beyond 180 days from the date of
initial issuance.” Id. § 78B

- 7

- 107(1)(c) (2017)

. ¶36 This is followed by s ubsection 107 (1) (d) , which states, “If at that hearing the court issues a protective order, the ex parte protective order remains in effect until service of process of the protective order is completed.”

¶37 Bridgewaters argues that the language in subsection 107(1)(c) limits subsectio n 107(1)(d) and “shows a legislative intent for all ex parte protective orders issued pursuant to the Act to have a maximum effective life of 180 days.” Because the alleged violations occurred more than 180 days after the ex parte order was issued, Bridgew aters contends the ex parte order cannot form the basis of the criminal charge against him. But this interpretation of the statute is incorrect

. ¶38 We agree with the district court that the 180

- day limit on extensions of an ex parte order in subsection 107(1) (c) modifies the circumstances listed in subsection 107(1)(b) under which a court

may extend the ex parte order beyond twenty days

. Both
subsections 107(1)(b) and 107(1) (c) use iterations of the word “extend” (i.e.

, “extended” and “[e]xtensions”). Id. § 78 B

- 7

-S TATE v. B RIDGEWATERS
Opinion of the Court

14 107(1)(b)

– (c) (2017) . This suggests that the two subsections should be read in conjunction with one another. Further, each of these subsections uses language suggesti ve of court action (i.e.

, “extended by the court” and “be extended”), id.

, but subsect ion 107(1)(d) uses the more passive language of “remains in effect,” id. § 78B

- 7

- 107(1)(d) (2017) . Based on the language of these subsections, it is apparent that subsection 107(1) (c) works with
subsection 107(1) (b) to prohibit a court from extending an ex parte order beyond 180 days

. ¶39 But w hile t he 180

- day limit applies to a court’s decision to extend an ex parte order before the court has held a hearing or before the court has issued a protective order

, s ubsection 107(1)(d ) applies when a court has he ld a hearing and has decided to issue a protective order. See id. (“If at that hearing the court issues a protective order

. . . .”). In this circumstance, the Act permits the ex parte order to remain in effect until “service of process of the protective o rder is completed .” Id. The 180

- da y time limit no longer applies.

¶40 Here, i n the underlying civil protective order proceeding, the court issued an immediate ex parte order. Bridgewaters was personally served with the ex parte order,
which notified him of the date of the hearing on the petition. 15 The court held the hearing and determined that a protective order was warranted. However, the protective order issued by the court was not served in accordance with the Act. Under these circumstances

, the magistrate c orrectly concluded that the ex parte order

__________________________________________________________

15 We note that the ex parte order form contains potentially confusing language. It states, “This order lasts until the above hearing date; or later, if the court extends time for service.” Although we flag this language to acknowledge its potential for confusion, we also note the immediately preceding sentences: “Go to the court hearing on the date listed below. If you do not go to the hearing, the judge can make orders without hearing your
side.” Th e order lists a hearing date and time, along with the commissioner’s name and the address and specific location of the hearing. While these sentences alleviate potential confusion , we flag t his language for possible refinement in light of this opinion

. We also note that B ridgewaters has not raise d any legal challenge in relation to this language.C ite as: 20 20 UT 32

Opinion of the Court

15 remained in effect at the time of the alleged violations

. However, we clarify that the charges against Bridgewaters may be based only on a violation of the ex parte order, not the protective
order. 16

CONCLUSION

¶41 We conclude that the ex parte order remained in effect at the time of the alleged violations

. Accordingly, to the extent that the charges against Bridgewaters are based on alleged violations of the ex parte order , we affirm.

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16 After the ex parte order had been personally served on Bridgewaters, notifying him of its terms and a scheduled hearing on the underlying petition at which he co uld be heard, the ex parte order was technically no t ex parte any longer

. See U TAH C ODE § 78B

- 7

- 102(6) (2017) (defining “ex parte protective order”
as “an order issued without notice to the defendant” (emphasis added)) . However, we refer to it as the “ex parte order” throughout this opinion to distinguish it from the protective order
and to remain consistent with the terms used in the statute

.