United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, 

Border Security, and Citizenship, 

Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate

IMMIGRATION 

ENFORCEMENT 

Weaknesses Hinder 

Employment Verification 

and Worksite Enforcement 

Efforts 

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Monday, June 19, 2006

 

GAO-06-895T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 19, 2006

IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

Weaknesses Hinder Employment 

Verification and Worksite Enforcement 

Efforts 

Highlights of GAO-06-895T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Immigration, 

Border Security, and Citizenship, 

Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 

The opportunity for employment is 

one of the most important magnets 

attracting illegal immigrants to the 

United States. The Immigration 

Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 

1986 established an employment

eligibility verification process and a

sanctions program for fining

employers for noncompliance. 

Few modifications have been made 

to the verification process and 

sanctions program since 1986, and 

immigration experts state that a 

more reliable verification process 

and a strengthened worksite

enforcement capacity are needed

to help deter illegal immigration. 

This testimony is based on GAO’s 

August 2005 report on the 

employment verification process 

and worksite enforcement efforts. 

In this testimony, GAO provides

observations on (1) the current 

employment verification process 

and (2) U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) 

priorities and resources for the 

worksite enforcement program and 

the challenges it faces in 

implementing that program.

What GAO Recommends

We recommended that the 

Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) set time frames for 

completing its review of the Form 

I-9 and that U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services in DHS 

assess the costs and feasibility of 

addressing Basic Pilot Program 

weaknesses. DHS agreed with 

these recommendations and is 

taking steps to assess the pilot 

program’s weaknesses.

The current employment verification (Form I-9) process is based on 

employers’ review of documents presented by new employees to prove their 

identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they 

have reviewed documents presented by their employees and that the 

documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting the 

documents. However, document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and 

identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging 

to others) have undermined the employment verification process by making 

it difficult for employers who want to comply with the process to ensure 

they hire only authorized workers and easier for unscrupulous employers to 

knowingly hire unauthorized workers with little fear of sanction. In addition, 

the large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work 

eligibility has hindered employer verification efforts. In 1998, the former 

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of DHS, proposed 

revising the Form I-9 process, particularly to reduce the number of 

acceptable work eligibility documents, but DHS has not yet finalized the 

proposal. The Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which 

participating employers electronically verify employees’ work eligibility,

shows promise to enhance the current employment verification process, 

help reduce document fraud, and assist ICE in better targeting its worksite 

enforcement efforts. Yet, several weaknesses in the pilot program’s 

implementation, such as its inability to detect identity fraud and DHS delays 

in entering data into its databases, could adversely affect increased use of 

the pilot program, if not addressed. 

The worksite enforcement program has been a relatively low priority under 

both INS and ICE. Consistent with the DHS mission to combat terrorism, 

after September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused worksite enforcement 

efforts mainly on detecting and removing unauthorized workers from critical 

infrastructure sites. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of employer notices

of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests have generally declined. 

According to ICE, this decline is due to various factors, such as the 

prevalence of document fraud that makes it difficult to prove employer 

violations. ICE officials told us that the agency has previously experienced 

difficulties in proving employer violations and setting and collecting fine 

amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring 

unauthorized workers. In April 2006, ICE announced a new interior 

enforcement strategy to target employers who knowingly hire unauthorized 

workers by bringing criminal charges against them, and ICE has reported 

increases in the number of criminal arrests and indictments since fiscal year 

2004. However, it is too early to tell what effect, if any, this new strategy will

have on enhancing worksite enforcement efforts and identifying 

unauthorized workers and their employers. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-895T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Richard M. 

Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to participate in this hearing 

on immigration enforcement at the workplace. As we and others have 

reported in the past, the opportunity for employment is one of the most 

important magnets attracting unauthorized immigrants to the United 

States. To help address this magnet, in 1986 Congress passed the 

Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),1

 which made it illegal for 

individuals and entities to knowingly hire, continue to employ, or recruit 

or refer for a fee unauthorized workers. The act established a two-pronged 

approach for helping to limit the employment of unauthorized workers: (1) 

an employment verification process through which employers verify all

newly hired employees’ work eligibility and (2) a sanctions program for 

fining employers who do not comply with the act. Efforts to enforce these

sanctions are referred to as worksite enforcement and are conducted by

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 

As the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform reported, immigration 

contributes to the U.S. national economy by providing workers for certain 

labor-intensive industries and contributing to the economic revitalization

of some communities.2 Yet, the commission also noted that immigration, 

particularly illegal immigration, can have adverse consequences by helping 

to depress wages for low-skilled workers and creating net fiscal costs for 

state and local governments. Following the passage of IRCA, the U.S. 

Commission on Immigration Reform and various immigration experts have 

concluded that deterring illegal immigration requires, among other things, 

strategies that focus on disrupting the ability of illegal immigrants to gain 

employment through a more reliable employment eligibility verification 

process and a more robust worksite enforcement capacity. In particular, 

the commission report and other studies have found that the single most 

important step that could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the 

development of a more effective system for verifying work authorization. 

In the nearly 20 years since passage of IRCA, the employment eligibility 

verification process and worksite enforcement program have remained 

largely unchanged. Moreover, in previous work, we reported that 

employers of unauthorized aliens faced little likelihood that the 

 1

Pub. L. No. 99-603, 8 U.S.C. 1324a et seq. 

2

U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration and

Immigrant Policy (Washington, D.C: September 1997).

Page 1 GAO-06-895T 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)3

 would investigate, fine, or 

criminally prosecute them, a circumstance that provides little disincentive 

for employers who want to circumvent the law.4

 The legislative proposals 

currently under consideration would revise the current employment 

verification process and the employer sanctions program. 

My testimony today is based on our August 2005 report to Congress on the 

employment verification process and ICE’s worksite enforcement 

program.5

 Specifically, I will discuss our observations on (1) the current 

employment verification process and (2) ICE’s priorities and resources for 

the worksite enforcement program and the challenges it has faced in 

implementing that program. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed federal laws and information 

obtained from ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 

and Social Security Administration (SSA) officials in headquarters and 

selected field locations. We examined regulations, guidance, past GAO 

reports, and other studies on the employment verification process and the 

worksite enforcement program. We also analyzed the results and 

examined the methodology of an independent evaluation of the Basic Pilot 

Program, an automated system through which employers electronically

check employees’ work eligibility information against information in 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and SSA databases, conducted

by the Institute for Survey Research at Temple University and Westat in 

June 2004.6 Furthermore, we analyzed data on employer use of the Basic 

Pilot Program and on worksite enforcement and assessed the data 

reliability by reviewing them for accuracy and completeness, interviewing

agency officials knowledgeable about the data, and examining 

documentation on how the data are entered, categorized, and verified in 

 3

In March 2003, INS was merged into the Department of Homeland Security, and its 

immigration functions were divided between U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement is responsible for managing and implementing the

worksite enforcement program. 

4

GAO, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment 

Exist, GAO/GGD-99-33 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999). 

5

GAO, Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and

Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-05-813 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2005). 

6

Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Basic Pilot Program 

Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: June 2004). 

Page 2 GAO-06-895T 
the databases. We determined that the independent evaluation and these 

data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We 

conducted the work reflected in this statement from September 2004 

through July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

The employment verification process is primarily based on employers’ 

review of work eligibility documents presented by new employees, but 

various weaknesses, such as the process’ vulnerability to fraud, have 

undermined this process. Employers certify that they have reviewed 

documents presented by their employees and that the documents appear

genuine and relate to the individual presenting the documents. However, 

document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud 

(fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others) 

have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with the 

employment verification process to ensure that they hire only authorized 

workers and have made it easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly 

hire unauthorized workers with little fear of sanction. In addition, the large 

number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility 

have hindered employers’ verification efforts. In 1998, the former INS 

proposed revising the verification process and reducing the number of 

acceptable work eligibility documents; that proposal was never acted 

upon. DHS, however, at the direction of Congress, introduced the Basic 

Pilot Program, an automated system for employers to electronically check 

employees’ work eligibility information with information in DHS and SSA 

databases, that may enhance this process. This program shows promise to 

help reduce document fraud and assist ICE in better targeting its worksite

enforcement efforts. Yet, a number of weaknesses in the pilot program’s 

implementation, including its inability to detect identity fraud and DHS 

delays in entering data into its databases, could adversely affect increased 

use of the pilot program, if not addressed. In addition, USCIS officials told

us the current Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete timely 

verifications if the number of employers using the program significantly 

increased. About 8,600 employers have registered to use the Basic Pilot 

Program, and a smaller number of these employers are active users. 

Summary 

Under both INS and ICE, worksite enforcement has been a relatively low 

priority. Consistent with the DHS mission to combat terrorism, after 

September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused worksite enforcement 

resources mainly on identifying and removing unauthorized workers from

critical infrastructure sites, such as airports and nuclear power plants, to 

help address vulnerabilities at those sites. In fiscal year 1999, INS devoted 

Page 3 GAO-06-895T 
about 240 full-time equivalents (or about 9 percent of its total investigative 

agent work-years) to worksite enforcement, while in fiscal year 2003 it 

devoted about 90 full-time equivalents

7

 (or about 4 percent of total agent 

work-years). Furthermore, between fiscal years 1999 and 2003 the number 

of notices of intent to fine issued to employers for knowingly hiring 

unauthorized workers or improperly completing employment verification

forms and the number of administrative worksite arrests generally 

declined. ICE has attributed this decline to various factors, including the 

widespread use of counterfeit documents that make it difficult for ICE 

agents to prove that employers knowingly hired unauthorized workers. In 

addition, INS and ICE have faced difficulties in setting and collecting fine

amounts from employers and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested 

at worksites. In April 2006 ICE announced a new interior enforcement 

strategy as part of the Secure Border Initiative. Under this strategy, ICE 

plans to target employers who knowingly employ unauthorized workers by

bringing criminal charges against them. While ICE has taken some steps 

to address difficulties it has faced in implementing worksite enforcement 

efforts and has announced a new interior enforcement strategy, it is too 

early to tell what effect, if any, these steps will have on identifying the 

millions of unauthorized workers and the employers who hired them.

In our August 2005 report, we recommended that DHS establish specific 

time frames for completing its review of the Form I-9 process to help 

strengthen the current employment verification process. We also 

recommended that USCIS include an assessment of the feasibility and 

costs of addressing the Basic Pilot Program’s weaknesses in its evaluation

of the program. DHS agreed with our recommendations and plans to 

include information on addressing the pilot program’s weaknesses in the 

evaluation.

IRCA provided for sanctions against employers who do not follow the 

employment verification (Form I-9) process. Employers who fail to 

properly complete, retain, or present for inspection a Form I-9 may face

civil or administrative fines ranging from $110 to $1,100 for each employee 

for whom the form was not properly completed, retained, or presented. 

Employers who knowingly hire or continue to employ unauthorized aliens 

may be fined from $275 to $11,000 for each employee, depending on 

whether the violation is a first or subsequent offense. Employers who 

Background 

 7

One full-time equivalent is equal to one work-year or 2,080 non-overtime hours. 

Page 4 GAO-06-895T 
engage in a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring or continuing to 

employ unauthorized aliens are subject to criminal penalties consisting of 

fines up to $3,000 per unauthorized employee and up to 6 months 

imprisonment for the entire pattern or practice.

Basic Pilot Program 

Employment Verification 

Process 

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 

(IIRIRA)

8

 of 1996 required INS and SSA to operate three voluntary pilot 

programs to test electronic means for employers to verify an employee’s 

eligibility to work, one of which was the Basic Pilot Program.9

 The Basic 

Pilot Program was designed to test whether pilot verification procedures 

could improve the existing employment verification process by reducing 

(1) false claims of U.S. citizenship and document fraud; (2) discrimination 

against employees; (3) violations of civil liberties and privacy; and (4) the 

burden on employers to verify employees’ work eligibility. 

The Basic Pilot Program provides participating employers with an 

electronic method to verify their employees’ work eligibility. Employers 

may participate voluntarily in the Basic Pilot Program, but are still 

required to complete Forms I-910 for all newly hired employees in

accordance with IRCA. After completing the forms, these employers query 

the pilot program’s automated system by entering employee information 

provided on the forms, such as name and social security number, into the 

pilot Web site within 3 days of the employees’ hire date. The pilot program 

then electronically matches that information against information in SSA 

and, if necessary, DHS databases to determine whether the employee is 

eligible to work, as shown in figure 1. The Basic Pilot Program 

electronically notifies employers whether their employees’ work 

authorization was confirmed. Those queries that the DHS automated 

check cannot confirm are referred to DHS immigration status verifiers 

 8

8 U.S.C. 1324a(b). IIRIRA was enacted within a larger piece of legislation, the Omnibus 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208. 

9

The other two pilot programs mandated by IIRIRA—the Citizen Attestation Verification 

Pilot Program and the Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program—were discontinued in

2003 due to technical difficulties and unintended consequences identified in evaluations of 

the programs. See Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Citizen 

Attestation Verification Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: April 2003) and 

Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Machine-Readable Document 

Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: May 2003). 

10The Form I-9 is completed by employers in verifying the work eligibility of all newly hired 

employees. 

Page 5 GAO-06-895T 
who check employee information against information in other DHS 

databases. 

Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process 

Work authorization 

not confirmed (by 

SSA’s database)

Immigration

Status Verifier reviews

Form I-9 information 

and checks other 

DHS databases

Information

 is compared 

with DHS 

database

SSA tentative nonconfirmation issued

Employee 

contests 

finding; Must visit 

SSA local 

office

Employee 

contests 

finding; Must 

call or visit 

DHS

Employee does not 

contest finding or does 

not resolve issue with 

SSA local office within 

8 days

Employee does not 

contest finding or does 

not resolve issue with 

DHS within 

8 days

Employer informs employee of the finding

DHS Tentative non-confirmation issued

Authorized

Authorized

Authorized

Authorized

Authorized

Final 

nonconfirmation

Final 

nonconfirmation 

DHS tentative nonconfirmation issued

Employer informs employee of the finding

Noncitizens

Citizens

Social Security Administration

Department of Homeland Security

Source: GAO analysis based on USCIS information.

Employer enters 

new employee

Form I-9 data

Information

 is compared with SSA

database through

DHS system

In cases when the pilot system cannot confirm an employee’s work 

Page 6 GAO-06-895T 
authorization status either through the automatic check or the check by an 

immigration status verifier, the system issues the employer a tentative 

nonconfirmation of the employee’s work authorization status. In this case, 

the employers must notify the affected employees of the finding, and the 

employees have the right to contest their tentative nonconfirmations by 

contacting SSA or USCIS to resolve any inaccuracies in their records 

within 8 days. During this time, employers may not take any adverse 

actions against those employees, such as limiting their work assignments 

or pay. Employers are required to either immediately terminate the 

employment, or notify DHS of the continued employment, of workers who 

do not successfully contest the tentative nonconfirmation and those who 

the pilot program finds are not work-authorized. 

In 1986, IRCA established the employment verification process based on 

employers’ review of documents presented by employees to prove identity

and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employees must attest that they are 

U.S. citizens, lawfully admitted permanent residents, or aliens authorized 

to work in the United States. Employers must then certify that they have

reviewed the documents presented by their employees to establish identity 

and work eligibility and that the documents appear genuine and relate to 

the individual presenting them. In making their certifications, employers 

are expected to judge whether the documents presented are obviously 

counterfeit or fraudulent. Employers are deemed in compliance with IRCA 

if they have followed the Form I-9 process, including when an

unauthorized alien presents fraudulent documents that appear genuine. 

Various Weaknesses 

Have Undermined the 

Employment 

Verification Process, 

but Opportunities 

Exist to Enhance It 

Current Employment 

Verification Process Is 

Based on Employers’ 

Review of Documents 

Form I-9 Process Is

Vulnerable to Document 

and Identity Fraud 

Since passage of IRCA in 1986, document and identity fraud have made it

difficult for employers who want to comply with the employment 

verification process to ensure they hire only authorized workers. In its 

1997 report to Congress, the Commission on Immigration Reform noted 

that the widespread availability of false documents made it easy for 

Page 7 GAO-06-895T 
unauthorized aliens to obtain jobs in the United States. In past work, we 

reported that large numbers of unauthorized aliens have used false 

documents or fraudulently used valid documents belonging to others to 

acquire employment, including at critical infrastructure sites like airports 

and nuclear power plants.11 In addition, although studies have shown that 

the majority of employers comply with IRCA and try to hire only 

authorized workers, some employers knowingly hire unauthorized 

workers, often to exploit the workers’ low cost labor. For example, the 

Commission on Immigration Reform reported that employers who 

knowingly hired illegal aliens often avoided sanctions by going through the 

motions of compliance while accepting false documents. Likewise, in 1999 

we concluded that those employers who do want to comply with IRCA can 

intentionally hire unauthorized workers under the guise of having 

complied with the employment verification requirements by claiming that

unauthorized workers presented false documents to obtain employment.12

The Number and Variety of 

Acceptable Documents 

Hinders Employer 

Verification Efforts 

The large number and variety of documents that are acceptable for 

proving work eligibility have complicated employer verification efforts 

under IRCA. Following the passage of IRCA in 1986, employees could 

present 29 different documents to establish their identity and/or work 

eligibility. In a 1997 interim rule, INS reduced the number of acceptable 

work eligibility documents from 29 to 27.13 The interim rule implemented 

changes to the list of acceptable work eligibility documents mandated by 

IIRIRA and was intended to serve as a temporary measure until INS issued 

final regulations on modifications to the Form I-9. In 1998, INS proposed a 

further reduction in the number of acceptable work eligibility documents

to 14, but did not finalize the proposed rule. 

Since the passage of IRCA, various studies have addressed the need to

reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents to make the 

employment verification process simpler and more secure. For example, 

we previously reported that the multiplicity of work eligibility documents 

contributed to (1) employer uncertainty about how to comply with the 

 11GAO/GGD-99-33, and GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security

and a Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004). 

12GAO/GGD-99-33. 

13Eight of these documents establish both identity and employment eligibility (e.g., U.S. 

passport or permanent resident card); 12 documents establish identity only (e.g., driver’s

license); and 7 documents establish employment eligibility only (e.g., social security card).

Page 8 GAO-06-895T 
employment verification requirements and (2) discrimination against 

authorized workers.14 In 1998, INS noted that, when IRCA was first passed, 

a long inclusive list of acceptable work eligibility documents was allowed 

for the Form I-9 to help ensure that all persons who were eligible to work 

could easily meet the requirements, but as early as 1990, there had been 

evidence that some employers found the list confusing. 

According to DHS officials, the department is assessing possible revisions 

to the Form I-9 process, including reducing the number of acceptable 

work eligibility documents, but has not established a target time frame for 

completing this assessment and issuing regulations on Form I-9 changes. 

DHS released an updated version of the Form I-9 in May 2005 that changed 

references from INS to DHS but did not modify the list of acceptable work 

eligibility documents on the Form I-9 to reflect changes made to the list by 

the 1997 interim rule. Moreover, DHS recently issued interim regulations 

on the use of electronic Forms I-9, which provide guidance to employers 

on electronically signing and storing Forms I-9.15

The Basic Pilot Program 

Shows Promise to 

Enhance Employment 

Verification, but Current 

Weaknesses Could 

Undermine Increased Use 

Various immigration experts have noted that the most important step that

could be taken to reduce illegal immigration is the development of a more 

effective system for verifying work authorization. In particular, the 

Commission on Immigration Reform concluded that the most promising 

option for verifying work authorization was a computerized registry based 

on employers’ electronic verification of an employee’s social security 

number with records on work authorization for aliens. The Basic Pilot 

Program, which is currently available on a voluntary basis to all employers 

in the United States, operates in a similar way to the computerized registry 

recommended by the commission, and shows promise to enhance 

employment verification and worksite enforcement efforts. Only a small 

portion—about 8,600 as of June 2006—of the approximately 5.6 million 

 14GAO, Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination, 

GAO/GGD-90-62 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1990). 

15In October 2004, Congress authorized the electronic Form I-9 to be implemented by the

end of April 2005. See Pub. L. No. 108-390. 

Page 9 GAO-06-895T 
employer firms nationwide have registered to use the pilot program, and 

about 4,300 employers are active users.16

The Basic Pilot Program enhances the ability of participating employers to 

reliably verify their employees’ work eligibility and assists participating 

employers with identification of false documents used to obtain 

employment by comparing employees’ Form I-9 information with 

information in SSA and DHS databases. If newly hired employees present

counterfeit documents, the pilot program would not confirm the 

employees’ work eligibility because their employees’ Form I-9 information, 

such as the false name or social security number, would not match SSA 

and DHS database information when queried through the Basic Pilot 

Program. 

Although ICE has no direct role in monitoring employer use of the Basic 

Pilot Program and does not have direct access to program information, 

which is maintained by USCIS, ICE officials told us that program data 

could indicate cases in which employers do not follow program 

requirements and therefore would help the agency better target its 

worksite enforcement efforts toward those employers. For example, the 

Basic Pilot Program’s confirmation of numerous queries of the same social

security number could indicate that a social security number is being used

fraudulently or that an unscrupulous employer is knowingly hiring 

unauthorized workers by accepting the same social security number for 

multiple employees. ICE officials noted that, in a few cases, they have 

requested and received pilot program data from USCIS on specific 

employers who participate in the program and are under ICE investigation. 

However, USCIS officials told us that they have concerns about providing 

ICE broader access to Basic Pilot Program information because it could 

create a disincentive for employers to participate in the program, as 

employers may believe that they are more likely to be targeted for a 

worksite enforcement investigation as a result of program participation. 

According to ICE officials, mandatory employer participation in the Basic 

 16The approximately 8,600 employers who registered to use the Basic Pilot Program do not

reflect the number of worksites or individual business establishments using the program.

The about 5.6 million firms in the United States was the number of firms in 2002, which is 

the most current data available. Under the Basic Pilot Program, one employer may have 

multiple worksites that use the pilot program. For example, a hotel chain could have 

multiple individual hotels using the Basic Pilot Program, but the hotel chain would

represent one employer using the pilot program. A firm is a business organization 

consisting of one or more domestic establishments in the same state and industry that were 

specified under common ownership or control. 

Page 10 GAO-06-895T 
Pilot Program would eliminate the concern about sharing data and could 

help ICE better target its worksite enforcement efforts on employers who 

try to evade using the program. Moreover, these officials told us that 

mandatory use of an automated system like the pilot program, could limit 

the ability of employers who knowingly hired unauthorized workers to 

claim that the workers presented false documents to obtain employment, 

which could assist ICE agents in proving employer violations of IRCA. 

Although the Basic Pilot Program may enhance the employment 

verification process and a mandatory program could assist ICE in targeting 

its worksite enforcement efforts, weaknesses exist in the current program. 

For example, the current Basic Pilot Program cannot help employers 

detect identity fraud. If an unauthorized worker presents valid

documentation that belongs to another person authorized to work, the 

Basic Pilot Program would likely find the worker to be work-authorized. 

Similarly, if an employee presents counterfeit documentation that contains

valid information and appears authentic, the pilot program may verify the

employee as work-authorized. DHS officials told us that the department is 

currently considering possible ways to enhance the Basic Pilot Program to 

help it detect cases of identity fraud, for example, by providing a digitized 

photograph associated with employment authorization information 

presented by an employee. 

Delays in the entry of information on arrivals and employment 

authorization into DHS databases can lengthen the pilot program 

verification process for some secondary verifications. Although the 

majority of pilot program queries entered by employers are confirmed via 

the automated SSA and DHS verification checks, about 15 percent of 

queries authorized by DHS required secondary verifications by 

immigration status verifiers in fiscal year 2004.17 According to USCIS, cases 

referred for secondary verification are typically resolved within 24 hours, 

but a small number of cases take longer, sometimes up to 2 weeks, due to, 

among other things, delays in entry of data on employees who received 

employment authorization documents generated by a computer and 

 17In fiscal year 2004, only about 8 percent of total Basic Pilot Program queries were referred 

to DHS for verification. Of these queries referred to DHS for verification, about 85 percent 

were confirmed via the DHS automated verification check. 

Page 11 GAO-06-895T 
camera that are not directly linked to DHS databases.18 Secondary 

verifications lengthen the time needed to complete the employment 

verification process and could harm employees because employers might 

reduce those employees’ pay or restrict training or work assignments, 

which are prohibited under pilot program requirements, while waiting for 

verification of their work eligibility.19 DHS has taken steps to increase the 

timeliness and accuracy of information entered into databases used as part 

of the Basic Pilot Program and reports, for example, that data on new 

immigrants are now typically available for verification within 10 to 12 days

of an immigrant’s arrival in the United States while, previously, the 

information was not available for up to 6 to 9 months after arrival.20

Furthermore, employer noncompliance with Basic Pilot Program 

requirements may adversely affect employees queried through the 

program. The Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat 

evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program concluded that the majority of 

employers surveyed appeared to be in compliance with Basic Pilot 

Program procedures. However the evaluation and our review found 

evidence of some noncompliance with these procedures, such as those 

that prohibit screening job applicants or limiting of employees’ work 

assignments or pay while contesting tentative nonconfirmations. The 

Basic Pilot Program provides a variety of reports that may help USCIS 

determine whether employers follow program requirements, but USCIS 

officials told us that their efforts to review employers’ use of the pilot 

program have been limited by lack of staff available to oversee and 

examine employer use of the program. 

According to USCIS officials, due to the growth in other USCIS 

verification programs, current USCIS staff may not be able to complete 

timely secondary verifications if the number of employers using the 

program significantly increased. In particular, these officials said that if a 

significant number of new employers registered for the program or if the 

 18Information on employment authorization documents generated through this process is 

electronically sent to USCIS headquarters for entry, but is sometimes lost or not entered

into databases in a timely manner. By contrast, employment authorization documents

issued at USCIS service centers are produced via computers that are used to update data in

USCIS databases, which USCIS officials told us represent the majority of employment 

authorization documents currently issued by USCIS.

19Institute for Survey Research and Westat. 

20DHS, Report to Congress on the Basic Pilot Program (Washington, D.C.: June 2004). 

Page 12 GAO-06-895T 
program were mandatory for all employers, additional staff would be 

needed to maintain timely secondary verifications. USCIS has 

approximately 38 Immigration Status Verifiers allocated for completing 

Basic Pilot Program secondary verifications, and these verifiers reported 

that they are able to complete the majority of manual verification checks 

within their target time frame of 24 hours. However, USCIS officials said 

that the agency has serious concerns about its ability to complete timely 

verifications if the number of Basic Pilot Program users greatly increased.

Competing Priorities 

and Implementation 

Challenges Have 

Hindered Worksite 

Enforcement Efforts 

Worksite Enforcement Has 

Been a Relatively Low 

Priority 

Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement 

programs that competes for resources and among INS and ICE 

responsibilities, and worksite enforcement has been a relatively low 

priority. For example, in the 1999 INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, the 

strategy to block and remove employers’ access to undocumented workers 

was the fifth of five interior enforcement priorities.21 In that same year, we 

reported that, relative to other enforcement programs in INS, worksite 

enforcement received a small portion of INS’s staffing and enforcement 

budget and that the number of employer investigations INS conducted 

each year covered only a fraction of the number of employers who may 

have employed unauthorized aliens.22

In keeping with the primary mission of DHS to combat terrorism, after 

September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused investigative resources 

primarily on national security cases. In particular, INS and then ICE 

focused available resources for worksite enforcement on identifying and

removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites, such as 

airports and nuclear power plants, to help reduce vulnerabilities at those 

sites. We previously reported that, if critical infrastructure-related 

businesses were to be compromised by terrorists, this would pose a 

 21INS, Interior Enforcement Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1999). 

22GAO/GGD-99-33. 

Page 13 GAO-06-895T 
serious threat to domestic security. According to ICE, the agency adopted 

this focus on critical infrastructure protection because the fact that 

unauthorized workers can obtain employment at critical infrastructure 

sites indicates that there are vulnerabilities in those sites’ hiring and 

screening practices, and unauthorized workers employed at those sites are 

vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists, smugglers, traffickers, and other 

criminals. ICE has inspected Forms I-9 and employer records at hundreds 

of critical infrastructure sites, including at about 200 airports as part of 

Operation Tarmac and at more than 50 nuclear power plants as part of 

Operation Glow Worm.23 More recently, ICE announced conducting 

worksite enforcement operations at other critical infrastructure sites, 

including at an airport, chemical plants, and a water and power facility. 

Since fiscal year 1999, INS and ICE have dedicated a relatively small 

portion of overall agent resources to the worksite enforcement program. 

As shown in figure 2, in fiscal year 1999 INS allocated about 240 full-time 

equivalents to worksite enforcement efforts, while in fiscal year 2003, ICE 

allocated about 90 full-time equivalents. Between fiscal years 1999 and 

2003, the percentage of agent work-years spent on worksite enforcement 

efforts generally decreased from about 9 percent to about 4 percent.24

 23Operations Tarmac and Glow Worm were ICE initiatives to detect and remove 

unauthorized workers from airports and nuclear power plants, respectively. 

24More recent data on investigative agent work-years cannot be shared publicly. 

Page 14 GAO-06-895T 
Figure 2: Investigative Agent Work-years Spent on Worksite Enforcement Efforts 

and Agent Work-years Spent on Other Investigative Areas for Each Fiscal Year from

1999 through 2003

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

240

2,499

176

2,472

117

2,341

132

2,290

90

2,430

Work-years

Work-years for worksite enforcement

Work-years for all other investigative areas

Source: GAO analysis of INS case management data.

Fiscal year

Although worksite enforcement has been a low priority relative to other 

programs, ICE has proposed increasing agent resources for the worksite 

enforcement program. For example, in its fiscal year 2007 budget 

submission, ICE requested funding for 206 additional positions for 

worksite enforcement. Yet, at this point, it is unclear what impact, if any, 

these additional resources would have on worksite enforcement efforts. 

Page 15 GAO-06-895T 
The number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers as well as the 

number of unauthorized workers arrested at worksites have generally

declined.25 Between fiscal years 1999 and 2004, the number of notices of 

intent to fine issued to employers for improperly completing Forms I-9 or 

knowingly hiring unauthorized workers generally decreased from 417 to 3. 

(See fig. 3.) 

ICE Attributes Decline in 

Numbers of Employer Fine 

Notices and Worksite 

Arrests to Document 

Fraud and Resource 

Allocation Decisions 

Figure 3: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers for Each Fiscal 

Year from 1999 through 2004 

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

Notices of intent to fine

Source: GAO analysis of INS and ICE case management data. 

Fiscal year

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

417

178

100

53

162

3

The number of unauthorized workers arrested during worksite 

enforcement operations has also declined since fiscal year 1999. As shown 

in figure 4, the number of worksite arrests for administrative violations of

immigration law, such as for violating the terms of a visa, declined by 

about 84 percent from 2,849 in fiscal year 1999 to 445 in fiscal year 2003. 

 25If warranted as a result of a worksite enforcement operation, ICE may issue a notice of

intent to fine to an employer that specifies the amount of the fine ICE is seeking to collect 

from the employer. This amount may be reduced after negotiations between ICE attorneys

and the employer. 

Page 16 GAO-06-895T 
Figure 4: Number of Administrative Worksite Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal 

Year from 1999 through 2003 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

Number of arrests

Source: GAO analysis of INS case management data.

Fiscal year

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

2,849

953

735

485 445

ICE attributes the decline in the number of notices of intent to fine issued 

to employers and number of administrative worksite arrests to various 

factors including the widespread availability and use of counterfeit 

documents and the allocation of resources to other priorities. Various 

studies have shown that the availability and use of fraudulent documents 

have made it difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers knowingly 

hired unauthorized workers. ICE officials also told us that employers who 

agents suspect of knowingly hiring unauthorized workers can claim that 

they were unaware that their workers presented false documents at the 

time of hire, making it difficult for agents to prove that the employer 

willfully violated IRCA. 

In addition, according to ICE, the allocation of INS and ICE resources to 

other priorities has contributed to the decline in the number of notices of 

intent to fine and worksite arrests. For example, INS focused its worksite 

enforcement resources on egregious violators who were linked to other 

criminal violations, like smuggling, fraud or worksite exploitation, and deemphasized administrative employer cases and fines. Furthermore, ICE 

investigative resources were redirected from worksite enforcement 

activities to criminal alien cases, which consumed more investigative 

hours by the late 1990s than any other enforcement activity. After 

Page 17 GAO-06-895T 
September 11, 2001, INS and ICE focused investigative resources on 

national security cases, and in particular, focused worksite enforcement 

efforts on critical infrastructure protection, which is consistent with DHS’s

primary mission to combat terrorism. According to ICE, the redirection of 

resources from other enforcement programs to perform national securityrelated investigations resulted in fewer resources for traditional program 

areas like fraud and noncritical infrastructure worksite enforcement. 

Additionally, some ICE field representatives, as well as immigration 

experts, noted that the focus on critical infrastructure protection does not 

address the majority of worksites in industries that have traditionally 

provided the magnet of jobs attracting illegal aliens to the United States. 

As part of the Secure Border Initiative, in April 2006 ICE announced a new 

interior enforcement strategy to target employers of unauthorized aliens, 

immigration violators, and criminal networks. Under this strategy, ICE 

plans to target employers who knowingly employ unauthorized workers by

bringing criminal charges against them. ICE has reported increases in the

numbers of criminal arrests, indictments, and convictions between fiscal 

years 2004 and 2005 as a result of these efforts.26 Between fiscal years 2004 

and 2005, ICE reported that the number of criminal arrests increased from

160 to 165. Furthermore, in fiscal year 2005 ICE reported that the number 

of criminal indictments and convictions were 140 and 127, respectively,

and in fiscal year 2004 the number of indictments and convictions were 67 

and 46, respectively. In addition, ICE reported arresting 980 individuals on 

administrative immigration violations in fiscal year 2005 as a result of its 

worksite enforcement efforts. 

 26Data from fiscal years 2004 and 2005 cannot be compared with data for previous fiscal 

years because the way INS agents entered data on investigations into the INS case 

management system differs from the way ICE agents enter such data into the ICE system. 

Following the creation of ICE in March 2003, the case management system used to enter 

and maintain information on immigration investigations changed. With the establishment of 

ICE, agents began using the legacy U.S. Customs Service’s case management system, called 

the Treasury Enforcement Communications System, for entering and maintaining 

information on investigations, including worksite enforcement operations. Prior to the

creation of ICE, the former INS entered and maintained information on investigative 

activities in the Performance Analysis System, which captured information on immigration 

investigations differently than the Treasury Enforcement Communications System. 

Page 18 GAO-06-895T 
INS and ICE have faced difficulties in setting and collecting fine amounts 

that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized 

workers and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested at worksites. ICE 

officials told us that because fine amounts are so low, the fines do not 

provide a meaningful deterrent. These officials also said that when agents

could prove that an employer knowingly hired an unauthorized worker 

and issued a notice of intent to fine, the fine amounts agents 

recommended were often negotiated down in value during discussion 

between agency attorneys and employers. The amount of mitigated fines 

may be, in the opinion of some ICE officials, so low that they believe that

employers view the fines as a cost of doing business, making the fines an 

ineffective deterrent for employers who attempt to circumvent IRCA. 

According to ICE, the agency mitigates employer fine amounts because 

doing so may be a more efficient use of government resources than 

pursuing employers who contest or ignore fines, which could be more 

costly to the government than the fine amount sought. 

INS and ICE Have Faced 

Difficulties in Setting Fine 

Amounts and in Detaining 

Unauthorized Workers, but 

Have Taken Steps to 

Address Difficulties 

An ICE official told us that use of civil settlements and criminal charges 

instead of pursuit of administrative fines, specifically in regard to 

noncritical infrastructure employers, could be a more efficient use of 

investigative resources. In 2005, ICE settled a worksite enforcement case

with a large company without going through the administrative fine 

process. As part of the settlement, the company agreed to pay $11 million 

and company contractors agreed to pay $4 million in forfeitures—more 

than an administrative fine amount ever issued against an employer for 

ICE violations. ICE officials also said that use of civil settlements could 

help ensure employers’ future compliance by including in the settlements 

a requirement to entire into compliance agreements, such as the Basic 

Pilot Program. In addition, as part of ICE’s new interior enforcement 

strategy, the agency plans to bring criminal charges against employers 

who knowingly hire unauthorized workers, rather than using 

administrative fines to sanction employers. The practice of using civil 

settlements and criminal charges against employers is in the early stages 

of implementation; therefore, the extent to which it may help limit the 

employment of unauthorized workers is not yet known. 

The former INS also faced difficulties in collecting fine amounts from 

employers, but collection efforts have improved. We previously reported 

that the former INS faced difficulties in collecting fine amounts from 

employers for a number of reasons, including that employers went out of 

Page 19 GAO-06-895T 
business, moved, or declared bankruptcy.27 In 1998, INS created the Debt 

Management Center to centralize the collections process, and the center is

now responsible for collecting fines ICE issued against employers for 

violations of IRCA, among other things. The ICE Debt Management Center 

has succeeded in collecting the full amount of final fines on most of the 

invoices issued to employers between fiscal years 1999 and 2004.

28

In addition, ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal has limited detention 

space, and unauthorized workers detained during worksite enforcement 

investigations have been a low priority for that space.29 In 2004, the Under 

Secretary for Border and Transportation Security sent a memo to the 

Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Assistant 

Secretary for ICE outlining the priorities for the detention of aliens. 

According to the memo, aliens who are subjects of national security 

investigations were among those groups of aliens given the highest priority 

for detention, while those arrested as a result of worksite enforcement 

investigations were to be given the lowest priority. ICE officials stated that 

the lack of sufficient detention space has limited the effectiveness of 

worksite enforcement efforts. For example, they said that if investigative 

agents arrest unauthorized aliens at worksites, the aliens would likely be

released because the Office of Detention and Removal detention centers 

do not have sufficient space to house the aliens and they may re-enter the

workforce, in some cases returning to the worksites from where they were

originally arrested. Congress has provided funds to the Office of Detention 

and Removal for additional bed spaces. Yet, given competing priorities for 

detention space, the effect, if any, these additional bed spaces will have on

ICE’s priority given to workers detained as a result of worksite 

enforcement operations cannot currently be determined. 

 27GAO/GGD-99-33. 

28The Debt Management Center issues invoices to employers for collecting fine amounts.

According to ICE, multiple invoices can be issued for each final order for an employer fine, 

as a payment plan is typically established for employers as part of the final order for the

fine amount. 

29The Office of Detention and Removal is primarily responsible for identifying and

removing criminal aliens from the United States. The office is also responsible for

managing ICE’s space for detaining aliens. 

Page 20 GAO-06-895T 
Efforts to reduce the employment of unauthorized workers in the United 

States necessitate a strong employment eligibility verification process and 

a credible worksite enforcement program to ensure that employers meet 

verification requirements. The current employment verification process 

has not fundamentally changed since its establishment in 1986, and

ongoing weaknesses have undermined its effectiveness. Although DHS and 

the former INS have been contemplating changes to the Form I-9 since 

1997, DHS has not yet issued final regulations on these changes, and it has 

not yet established a definitive time frame for completing the assessment. 

We recommended that DHS set a target time frame for completing this 

assessment and issuing final regulations to strengthen the current 

employment verification process and make it simpler and more secure. 

Furthermore, the Basic Pilot Program shows promise for enhancing the 

employment verification process and reducing document fraud if 

implemented on a much larger scale. However, current weaknesses in 

pilot program implementation would have to be fully addressed to help 

ensure the efficient and effective operation of an expanded or mandatory 

pilot program, or a similar automated employment verification program, 

and the cost of additional resources would be a consideration. USCIS is 

currently evaluating the Basic Pilot Program to include, as we have 

recommended, information on addressing the program’s weaknesses to 

assist USCIS and Congress in addressing possible future use of the Basic 

Pilot Program. 

Concluding 

Observations 

Even with a strengthened employment verification process, a credible

worksite enforcement program would be needed because no verification 

system is foolproof and not all employers may want to comply with IRCA.

ICE’s focus of its enforcement resources on critical infrastructure 

protection since September 11, 2001, is consistent with the DHS mission to 

combat terrorism by detecting and mitigating vulnerabilities to terrorist

attacks at critical infrastructure sites which, if exploited, could pose 

serious threats to domestic security. This focus on critical infrastructure 

protection, though, generally has not addressed noncritical infrastructure 

employers’ noncompliance with IRCA. As a result, employers, particularly 

those not located at or near critical infrastructure sites, who attempted to 

circumvent IRCA have faced less of a likelihood that ICE would 

investigate them for failing to comply with the current employment 

verification process or for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers. ICE is 

taking some steps to address difficulties it has faced in its worksite 

enforcement efforts, but it is too early to tell whether these steps will 

improve the effectiveness of the worksite enforcement program and help

ICE identify the millions of unauthorized workers and the employers who 

hired them.

Page 21 GAO-06-895T 
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions you and the Subcommittee Members may have. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Richard Stana 

at 202-512-8777. 

Other key contributors to this statement were Frances Cook, Michelle 

Cooper, Orlando Copeland, Michele Fejfar, Rebecca Gambler, Kathryn 

Godfrey, Eden C. Savino, and Robert E. White. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 22 GAO-06-895T 
Related GAO Products

Social Security Numbers: Coordinated Approach to SSN Data Could Help 

Reduce Unauthorized Work. GAO-06-458T. February 16, 2006.

Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment 

Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-05-813. August 31, 

2005.

Immigration Enforcement: Preliminary Observations on Employment 

Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-05-822T. June 21, 

2006.

Social Security: Better Coordination among Federal Agencies Could 

Reduce Unidentified Earnings Reports. GAO-05-154. February 4, 2005.

Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration 

Enforcement Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning

Requirements. GAO-05-66. October 8, 2004.

Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a 

Layered Defense. GAO-04-82. May 21, 2004.

Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the Immigration 

Interior Enforcement Strategy. GAO-03-660T. April 10, 2003.

Identity Fraud: Prevalence and Links to Alien Illegal Activities.

GAO-02-830T. June 25, 2002.

Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien 

Employment Exist. GAO/GGD-99-33. April 2, 1999.

Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of 

Discrimination. GAO/GGD-90-62. March 29, 1990.

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