Filed 5/18/22; Certified for Publication 6/16/22 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Q.M. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

_____________________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PAMELA M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B313171

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. DK12546C-D)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Michael C. Kelley, Judge. Affirmed.

Suzanne M. Nicholson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Kimberly Roura, Deputy County 

Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳
2

Pamela M. (mother) appeals from orders of the juvenile 

court terminating parental rights to two of her four children. 

Mother contends the juvenile court erred by finding that the 

Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

(DCFS) adequately investigated the children’s possible Indian 

ancestry, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 

(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related state statutes. We find no 

error, and thus we will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother and James M. (father) have four children: K.M. 

(born in Aug. 2006), James M. (born in Feb. 2008), Q.M. (born in 

April 2010), and P.M. (born in Dec. 2013). This appeal concerns 

only Q.M. and P.M.

A. Investigation and detention.

On October 22, 2015, DCFS filed a dependency petition 

alleging that the children came under the jurisdiction of the 

juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 

300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The petition alleged that K.M. had a 

psychiatric condition for which the parents failed to obtain 

necessary treatment (counts b-1, j-1); father had mental and 

emotional problems, including paranoid delusions, which

prevented him from safely caring for the children (count b-2); and 

mother and father had failed to provide appropriate care and 

supervision of the children (counts b-3, j-2). The petition 

subsequently was amended to add additional counts alleging that 

K.M. had marks on his body consistent with having been hit with 

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

a switch (counts b-4, j-3), and mother and father had a history of 

arguments and physical altercations in the children’s presence 

(count b-5).

The October 2015 detention report stated that the family 

had come to the attention of DCFS because nine-year-old K.M.

had become catatonic and lost control of his movements. Because 

K.M.’s medical tests were normal, he had been transferred to the 

psychiatric unit at the UCLA Medical Center. The parents 

discharged K.M. after two nights against medical advice, stating 

that “ ‘the devil’ ” was in him and they would conduct an 

exorcism. UCLA staff reported that father had symptoms of 

paranoia and schizophrenia, as evidenced by his statements that 

he was in communication with President Barak Obama, First 

Lady Michelle Obama, and Attorney General Eric Holder, headed 

a large non-profit corporation, and was the head of the United 

States mafia. Mother said she would not encourage father to 

seek mental health services because “ ‘that is the way he is.’ ” 

Mother and father both told DCFS that ICWA did not apply. 

On October 22, 2015, both parents completed and signed

ICWA-020 forms. Mother stated that she had “no Indian 

ancestry as far as I know”; father stated he “may have Indian 

ancestry” through a Cherokee tribe.

At the October 22, 2015 detention hearing, the court 

ordered all four children detained from the parents and placed in 

foster care. When father heard that his children would be 

detained, he responded that he would leave the courtroom to take 

care of paperwork because “I deal with the President of the 

United States . . . about the White House prophesy.” After a 

break, the court noted that father “is in extreme distress and he 

is not responding to my questions.” The court then asked father 
4

whether he had Indian ancestry; father did not respond, but his 

lawyer said father “indicated that he may have some Cherokee. I 

believe he has got family in Louisiana. They would probably best 

be able to tell us.” The court asked father to provide his lawyer 

and the social worker with any information relevant to father’s 

possible Indian ancestry, and it then found there was “reason to 

believe that this may be an ICWA case and [the court] is going to 

order the Department to do further investigation based upon 

[father’s] responses to his [ICWA] questionnaire and the 

indication that family members in Louisiana may have more 

information about their Indian status.”

B. Jurisdiction, disposition, and initial appeal.

A contested jurisdiction hearing took place in September 

2016. The juvenile court dismissed two counts of the petition and 

sustained the remaining counts as amended. Subsequently, in 

January 2017, the juvenile court entered a disposition order 

requiring both parents to submit to Evidence Code section 730 

evaluations, participate in individual counseling, and complete 

parenting classes and domestic violence programs.

Mother and father appealed from the jurisdiction and 

disposition orders, raising only ICWA issues. While the appeal 

was pending, the parties stipulated to a conditional affirmance 

and limited remand with directions to the juvenile court to order 

DCFS to further investigate father’s claims of Cherokee Indian 

heritage and, if appropriate, to provide proper ICWA notice. This 

court accepted the parties’ stipulation and ordered a conditional 

affirmance and remand on June 23, 2017.
5

C. Additional ICWA inquiry; termination of 

parents’ reunification services.

On November 28, 2016, a dependency investigator 

contacted mother regarding ICWA. Mother said her family had 

no Indian ancestry. Mother then asked father about his family; 

father “replied that the family did not have any Indian American 

heritage and that he has said no before when he was asked that 

question.”

On July 3, 2017, the juvenile court noted its receipt of the 

remittitur from the Court of Appeal and ordered DCFS to 

investigate father’s claim of Cherokee heritage by interviewing 

the parents and any known relatives and providing ICWA notice 

to the appropriate tribes, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the 

Department of the Interior.

On August 31, 2017, the children’s social worker (CSW)

attempted to meet with the parents to have them sign an ICWA020 form. However, the parents texted that they wanted to 

reschedule so they could first speak to their lawyers. They later

sent the CSW the following text: “ ‘Do Cherokee have anything to 

do with our children coming home. If so we don’t want anything 

to do with that.’ ” On September 5, 2017, mother told the CSW 

that “ ‘the Indian ancestry came back negative.’ ” When the CSW 

said she had to provide notice to the tribes if there was any 

possibility of Indian ancestry, mother said she and father would 

discuss it with their attorneys. The parents never again made 

themselves available to DCFS to discuss the family’s possible 

Indian ancestry.

On November 3, 2017, father’s counsel requested an 

expedited investigation into the suitability of placing the children 
6

with paternal aunt Reba M. in Louisiana. An address and 

telephone number for Reba were provided.

Sometime prior to March 2018, the parents moved to 

Louisiana, and later to Mississippi. Their last visit with the 

children was in October 2017, and they thereafter telephoned the 

children only intermittently.

Neither parent was present at the July 5, 2018 status 

review hearing.2 Through their counsel, both parents objected to 

termination of family reunification services. The juvenile court 

found that the parents had made minimal progress towards 

alleviating the causes of DCFS’s intervention, terminated the 

parents’ reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing

for November 2018. With regard to ICWA, the court asked 

counsel whether either parent had contacted them regarding 

ICWA, and both counsel confirmed they had not. The court noted 

that the parents “are not cooperating with the Department with 

reference to the Department’s efforts to get the ICWA-020 form 

and its information to send appropriate notice. So at this time,

I am ordering the Department to notice the appropriate tribes as 

well as the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Secretary of Interior, 

and that notice must be done prior to any . . . other hearings.”

On August 16, 2018, DCFS filed a “Last Minute 

Information for the Court” repeating the details of the CSW’s 

conversations with the parents regarding ICWA.

2 The July 5, 2018 hearing was nominally a 12-month review 

hearing, but it took place more than two years after the children 

were detained and nearly 18 months after the disposition 

hearing.
7

In November 2018, a CSW tried unsuccessfully to reach 

mother and father by calling numerous past or potential 

telephone numbers. Letters and blank ICWA-030 forms were 

mailed to five possible addresses for the parents but were not 

returned. On November 26 and December 21, 2018, and January 

14, 2019, a CSW called a new telephone number for the parents 

and left messages, but she did not receive a return phone call.

On November 2, 2018, DCFS reported that the 

investigation into the possibility of placing the children with 

paternal aunt Reba had closed. A Louisiana social worker had 

been unable to reach Reba by telephone, and after numerous 

attempts she had gone to Reba’s home in person. Reba was not 

home, but the social worker spoke to two men, one of whom said 

he lived in the home. The home was described as “cluttered and

unkempt” and was deemed unsuitable for the children.

On December 21, 2018, DCFS reported that it had

attempted to reach both parents at a variety of different phone 

numbers and had left messages where possible. It also had 

mailed ICWA forms to the parents at a variety of different 

addresses where DCFS believed they might be living. DCFS had 

not been able to make any contact with the parents to determine 

if ICWA applied, and it therefore requested that the court make 

an ICWA finding in order to allow adoption to proceed. 

On January 9, 2019, the court ordered DCFS to continue to 

try to contact the parents regarding ICWA and asked the parents’ 

attorneys to encourage the parents to cooperate with DCFS’s 

efforts to determine whether ICWA applied. Both counsel agreed 

to do so. 

The CSW again tried to contact father regarding his 

possible Indian ancestry on January 14, 2019, but father did not 
8

return the call. The same day, the CSW mailed a blank ICWA 

form to father’s last known address in Mississippi. 

In April 2019, the CSW attempted to reach paternal aunt 

Reba regarding the paternal family’s possible Indian ancestry, 

but the phone number provided was not in service.

On April 19, 2019, DCFS mailed ICWA notices, which 

included the limited information available, to registered 

Cherokee tribes, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs (BIA). Each tribe responded that the children

were not eligible for tribal membership.

D. ICWA finding and termination of parental 

rights.

In June 2019, DCFS reported that the girls’ caregiver was 

interested in adopting them, and K.M.’s and James’s caregiver 

was interested in legal guardianship. All four children were 

doing well in their placements and no longer wished to return to 

the home of their parents.

In April 2021, DCFS reported that it had received 

responses from all noticed tribes stating the children were not 

Indian children. DCFS had not received a response from BIA, 

but more than 60 days had elapsed since notice was provided. 

DCFS therefore requested that the court find that the children 

were not Indian children and that ICWA did not apply. DCFS 

further requested that parental rights be terminated as to Q.M.

and P.M.3

3 Termination of parental rights was not requested for the 

boys. K.M. had been placed in out-of-home care after he was 

placed on a psychiatric hold in October 2020, and James was in 
9

At the April 20, 2021 section 366.26 hearing, counsel for 

mother stated that she “do[es] not have direction” from mother, 

who was not present at the hearing, but she objected to 

termination of parental rights on mother’s behalf. Counsel for 

father stated a similar objection. Neither attorney objected to 

DCFS’s request that the court find that ICWA did not apply.

After hearing argument, the juvenile court found that 

DCFS “completed an appropriate investigation into potential 

Indian ancestry identified by the father [and] mailed notice to the 

relevant tribes.” Based on the record before it, the court found 

there was no reason to know that the children were Indian 

children and that ICWA did not apply. The court then

terminated parental rights as to Q.M. and P.M.

Mother timely appealed from the order terminating 

parental rights.

DISCUSSION

Mother contends DCFS failed to conduct an adequate 

investigation into her and father’s possible Indian ancestry. She 

urges that although she denied Indian ancestry, DCFS was 

required to contact her extended family members about possible 

Indian ancestry, and its failure to do so was reversible error. She 

further urges that because father made an initial report of 

Cherokee ancestry, DCFS had a duty to follow up with his 

extended family members in Louisiana. 

DCFS contends that it conducted an adequate ICWA 

inquiry and there was no reason to believe Q.M. and P.M. were 

the process of being placed with his sisters, whose caregiver was 

open to adopting him.
10

Indian children. In the alternative, DCFS urges that mother 

forfeited any error in this second appeal challenging ICWA 

inquiry by failing to raise the error below.

I. Relevant law.

A. ICWA.

ICWA was enacted “ ‘to protect the best interests of Indian 

children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes 

and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards 

for the removal of Indian children from their families and the 

placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will 

reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .’ [Citation.]” 

(In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8 (Isaiah W.); see 25 U.S.C. 

§ 1902.) 

“[T]he burden of coming forward with information to 

determine whether an Indian child may be involved . . . in a 

dependency proceeding does not rest entirely—or even 

primarily—on the child and his or her family.” (In re Michael V.

(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225, 233.) Rather, “[j]uvenile courts and 

child protective agencies have ‘an affirmative and continuing 

duty to inquire’ whether a dependent child is or may be an Indian 

child.” (Ibid.; see also Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 9–11; 

§ 224.2, subd. (a).) An “Indian child” is “any unmarried person 

who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an 

Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe 

and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” 

(25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); see also § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal 

definition of “Indian child”].) 

This affirmative duty to inquire has several elements. The 

statute provides that if a child is removed from his or her parents 
11

and placed in the custody of a county welfare department, the 

department has a duty to inquire whether a child is an Indian 

child. Such inquiry “includes, but is not limited to, asking the 

child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family 

members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party 

reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, 

an Indian child . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) The court also must 

make an ICWA inquiry when the parents first appear in court: 

The court “shall ask each participant present in the hearing 

whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the 

child is an Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (c)), and must require 

each party to complete California Judicial Council Form ICWA020, Parental Notification of Indian Status (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.481(a)(2)(C)).

If the court or social worker has “reason to believe that an 

Indian child is involved in a proceeding,” the court or social 

worker must “make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian 

status of the child” by, among other things, interviewing the 

parents and extended family members, and contacting any tribe 

that may reasonably be expected to have information about the 

child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility. (§ 224.2, 

subd. (e)(2).) There is “reason to believe” a child involved in a 

proceeding is an Indian child whenever the court or social worker

“has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or 

the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an 

Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)

If the agency’s inquiry creates a “reason to know” that an 

Indian child is involved, notice of the proceedings must be 

provided to the parent, legal guardian, or Indian custodian and 

the child’s tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (f).) There is “reason to know” a 
12

child is an Indian child if any one of six statutory criteria is 

met—e.g., if the court is advised that the child “is an Indian 

child,” the child’s or parent’s residence is on a reservation, the 

child is or has been a ward of a tribal court, or either parent or 

the child possess an identification card indicating membership or 

citizenship in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (d).) Thereafter, 

the court shall confirm that the agency used due diligence to 

identify and work with all of the tribes of which there is reason to 

know the child may be a member, or eligible for membership, to 

verify whether the child is in fact a member or whether a 

biological parent is a member and the child is eligible for 

membership. (§ 224.2, subd. (g).) A determination by an Indian 

tribe that a child is or is not a member of, or eligible for 

membership in, that tribe “shall be conclusive.” (§ 224.2, 

subd. (h).)

If the juvenile court finds that “proper and adequate 

further inquiry and due diligence as required in this section have 

been conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child 

is an Indian child,” the court may make a finding that ICWA does 

not apply to the proceedings, “subject to reversal based on 

sufficiency of the evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)

B. Standard of review.

Where, as here, the juvenile court finds that ICWA does not 

apply, “ ‘ “[t]he finding implies that . . . social workers and the 

court did not know or have a reason to know the children were 

Indian children and that social workers had fulfilled their duty of 

inquiry.” (In re Austin J. [(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885]; see 

In re D.S. [(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1050] [“[t]he juvenile 

court may . . . make a finding that ICWA does not apply because 

the Agency’s further inquiry and due diligence was ‘proper and 
13

adequate’ but no ‘reason to know’ whether the child is an Indian 

child was discovered”].)’ (In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678, 

688.) ‘ “[W]e review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the 

substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if 

reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s 

order. [Citations.] We must uphold the court’s orders and 

findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or 

uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all conflicts in 

favor of affirmance.” ’ (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 

565.)” (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.) “ ‘Thus, 

we do not consider whether there is evidence from which the 

dependency court could have drawn a different conclusion but 

whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion 

that the court did draw.’ (In re Noe F. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 

358, 366.)” (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 774.)

II. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s 

finding that ICWA did not apply.

A. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile 

court’s ICWA finding as to mother.

Mother urges the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did 

not apply because DCFS did not contact mother’s extended family 

members to inquire about possible Indian ancestry. We disagree.

It is undisputed that mother completed and signed an 

ICWA-020 form in which she said she “ha[d] no Indian ancestry 

as far as I know.” It also is undisputed that mother told DCFS at 

least three different times—in October 2015, on November 28, 

2016, and on September 5, 2017—that she did not have Indian 

ancestry. Notwithstanding these denials of Indian ancestry, 

mother contends that DCFS had a duty to investigate the 
14

children’s potential Indian ancestry by interviewing all available 

members of mother’s extended family, and that the juvenile court 

erred by finding ICWA did not apply without requiring DCFS to 

undertake such an inquiry. 

There appears to be a split among the Courts of Appeal as 

to a child welfare agency’s duty to investigate a child’s possible 

Indian ancestry where a parent denies such ancestry. Several 

Courts of Appeal have adopted the approach mother advocates,

concluding that even where a parent denies any Indian ancestry, 

section 224.2, subdivision (b) requires DCFS, as part of its initial 

inquiry, to inquire of a child’s extended family members 

regarding his or her possible Indian ancestry. (See, e.g., In re 

Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 426 [although mother 

reported she had no Indian ancestry, juvenile court erred by 

concluding DCFS had conducted adequate ICWA inquiry because 

it failed to inquire of the maternal grandmother, maternal aunts, 

and a maternal uncle about the child’s possible Indian ancestry]; 

In re A.C. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1015–1017 [although 

parents denied Indian ancestry, DCFS erred by failing to ask 

members of parents’ extended family about the child’s possible 

Indian ancestry]; In re H.V. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 438

[juvenile court erred by terminating parental rights; although 

mother denied Indian ancestry, DCFS had a duty to inquire of 

the maternal great-grandmother and maternal greatgrandfather].) Other courts have reached a contrary conclusion, 

holding that a parent’s unequivocal denial of Indian ancestry is 

substantial evidence to support a juvenile court’s finding that 

ICWA does not apply. (See, e.g., In re Charles W. (2021) 

66 Cal.App.5th 483, 486–488, 490–491 [juvenile court and agency 

made adequate ICWA inquiry where mother’s counsel, in 
15

mother’s presence, denied that mother had Indian ancestry]; In re 

Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 887–888 [no duty to make 

further inquiry regarding children’s possible Indian ancestry 

through father where father’s in-court statement and his 

parental notification of Indian status declaration indicated that 

he and his children had no Indian ancestry]; In re A.M. (2020) 

47 Cal.App.5th 303, 323 [no need for further inquiry if no one has 

offered information that would give the court or [agency] reason 

to believe that a child might be an Indian child]; In re H.V., at 

pp. 441–442 (dis. opn. of Baker, J.) [mother’s and father’s denials 

of Indian ancestry were substantial evidence to support juvenile 

court’s finding that ICWA did not apply]; In re S.B. (2005) 

130 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1161 [“as long as the social worker did 

inquire of the parents, and as long as the parents failed to 

provide any information requiring follow-up, [the social worker]

had no further duty of inquiry”].)

We need not resolve this issue here because even were 

DCFS required to inquire further as to mother’s ancestry, that 

duty was satisfied here. While the case was pending in the 

juvenile court, mother was given multiple opportunities to 

provide names and contact information for extended family 

members DCFS could have contacted, but she did not do so. As a 

result, the record does not identify any living members of 

mother’s extended family, and on appeal she has not identified 

any specific individuals whom DCFS should have interviewed.4 

4 In her appellant’s opening brief, mother asserts that DCFS 

should have interviewed the maternal grandmother, Dixie F. As 

DCFS notes, however, the record indicates that the maternal 

grandmother is deceased.
16

No further inquiry, thus, was possible or required. (E.g., In re 

K.M. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 115, 119 [where child protective 

agency “attempted on several occasions to elicit further 

information from the child’s family, but was unsuccessful due to 

the family’s hostility” toward the agency, the agency “did all that

can or should be reasonably expected of it to meet its obligation to 

the child, to the family, to the tribes and to the court”]; In re Levi 

U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 199 [child protective agency is not 

required to conduct an extensive independent investigation or to 

“cast about” for investigative leads].)

Although mother concedes there is no indication in the 

present record that the children had Indian ancestry through her 

mother’s family, she urges that this court should assume she has 

extended family members who could provide additional 

information regarding her possible Indian ancestry––and, 

further, that we should reverse the order terminating parental 

rights because the juvenile court failed to order DCFS to 

interview these still-unidentified individuals. We decline to do 

so. The kind of inquiry mother advocates is amorphous and lacks 

a defined stopping point at which DCFS can reliably conclude 

that it has done enough to establish the absence of Indian 

ancestry. And, of course, requiring DCFS to run down 

unpromising leads comes at a significant cost in terms of 

protecting the welfare of dependent children.

Where, as here, a parent largely fails to cooperate with 

DCFS or to provide names and contact information for extended 

family members, DCFS’s ability to conduct an exhaustive ICWA 

inquiry necessarily is constrained. Although it is well established 

that the duty to develop information bearing on whether a child 

is an Indian child “rests with the court and the Department, not 
17

the parents or members of the parents’ families” (In re Antonio 

R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 430), in most cases the court and 

DCFS cannot satisfy this duty without the participation of the 

parents. While we believe it reasonable in many cases to require 

DCFS to follow up on leads provided by the parents, we cannot 

ask the agency to intuit the names of unidentified family 

members or to interview individuals for whom no contact 

information has been provided. The juvenile court did not err by 

so concluding. 

B. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile 

court’s finding as to father.

Mother also contends that DCFS did not conduct an 

adequate further inquiry into father’s claimed Cherokee heritage

because the record “contains no evidence of any inquiry made of 

any relatives or extended family members, even though father 

had advised the court that family members in Louisiana would be 

best situated to provide further information.” Again, we 

disagree.

Father advised the court at the detention hearing that he 

might have Indian ancestry through a Cherokee tribe, but he did 

not provide the court with any additional information. 

Subsequently, he told DCFS that he did not have Indian heritage 

“and that he has said no before when he was asked that 

question.” Father thereafter refused to cooperate with DCFS: He 

declined to meet with the CSW to fill out an ICWA form, which 

would have provided information regarding extended family 

members, if any; he did not respond to DCFS’s phone calls or text 

messages; and he did not return ICWA-030 forms mailed to him 

at various addresses.
18

Mother does not contend that DCFS made inadequate 

attempts to contact father to obtain additional ICWA

information, but she urges DCFS should have made ICWA 

inquiries of father’s “family members in Louisiana” because 

father’s statement that he might have Indian ancestry triggered 

a “reason to believe” the children were Indian children. As an 

initial matter, we are not persuaded that father’s disclosure at 

the detention hearing created a “reason to believe” as defined by 

section 224.2, subdivision (e)(1): Although father stated at that 

hearing that he might have Cherokee ancestry, he later 

disavowed this statement, saying he did not have Indian ancestry

and that he had “said no before when he was asked that 

question.” Under these unique facts, we are not persuaded that 

father’s statement at the detention hearing gave rise to “reason 

to believe” the children were Indian children. 

In any event, even if father’s statement did trigger a duty 

of further inquiry, substantial evidence supported the juvenile

court’s finding that the duty was satisfied here. While father’s 

counsel said at the detention hearing that father had “family” in 

Louisiana, father specifically identified just two paternal 

relatives––the paternal grandmother and a paternal aunt. 

Father appears not to have provided contact information for the 

paternal grandmother, and the telephone number he provided for 

the paternal aunt was not in service.5 Moreover, although DCFS 

made repeated efforts to contact the parents to obtain additional 

5 Mother faults DCFS for making just one attempt to call the 

paternal aunt. Since the number provided for the aunt was not 

in service, it is not clear what purpose would have been served by 

trying the number multiple times.
19

information about these and other extended family members,

neither parent ever provided that information. Under these 

circumstances, the juvenile court did not err by concluding that 

DCFS conducted “proper and adequate due diligence” with regard 

to the children’s possible Indian ancestry, and there was no 

reason to know whether the children were Indian children. 

(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)

Notwithstanding the parents’ failure to provide DCFS with 

information about father’s extended family members, mother 

contends the juvenile court should have required DCFS to make 

additional efforts to contact the paternal aunt and grandmother. 

We do not agree. Because no members of the parents’ extended 

families ever appeared at a hearing (compare with Antonio R., 

supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 428), DCFS could have obtained

names and contact information for paternal relatives only

through mother or father––and the parents were either unable or 

unwilling to provide that information. Without reliable contact 

information, DCFS could not reasonably have been expected to 

interview extended family members. (See, e.g., In re A.M., supra,

47 Cal.App.5th at p. 323 [although information provided by 

mother triggered a duty of further inquiry, agency’s failure to 

interview maternal relatives was reasonable where mother could 

not provide information about maternal relatives and no 

maternal relative appeared at any hearing or participated in the 

matter; ICWA “does not obligate the court or [the Department] ‘to 

cast about’ for investigative leads”]; In re C.Y. (2012) 208 

Cal.App.4th 34, 40 [although mother’s statement triggered a duty 

of further inquiry, that duty did not include investigating 

mother’s sealed and unsealed adoption records: “[Department]

must inquire as to [possible] Indian ancestry and act on any 
20

information it receives, but it has no duty to conduct an extensive 

independent investigation for information”].) The juvenile court 

did not err in so concluding.

Finally, mother contends the notices DCFS mailed to the 

tribes were inadequate because they did not provide complete 

information (names, current and former address, birth and death 

dates, birth places, and tribal enrollment information) for the 

children’s direct lineal ancestors. Not so. ICWA notice is 

required only if after initial and further inquiries there is “reason 

to know” that an Indian child is involved in the proceeding. 

(§ 224.2, subd. (f), italics added.) As we have described, there is 

“reason to know” a child is an Indian child if any one of six 

statutory criteria is met—e.g., if the court is advised that the 

child is a member or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe,

the child’s or parent’s residence is on a reservation, the child is or 

has been a ward of a tribal court, or either parent or the child 

possess an identification card indicating membership or 

citizenship in an Indian tribe. (Id., subd. (d).) Here, none of 

these statutory criteria was met, and thus ICWA notice was not 

required. Any insufficiencies in the notices sent, therefore, were 

legally irrelevant.
21

DISPOSITION

The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

EGERTON, J.
Filed 6/16/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Q.M. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

_____________________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

PAMELA M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B313171

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. DK12546C-D)

ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION

FOR PUBLICATION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-referenced matter filed May 18, 

2022, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For 

good cause shown it now appears that the opinion should be 

published in the Official Reports.

[There is no change in the judgment.]

_______________________________________________________________

EDMON, P.J. LAVIN, J. EGERTON, J.