IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COMMON CAUSE GEORGIA and

TREAUNNA C. DENNIS 

 Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-03067

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

 Defendant. 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Plaintiffs, Common Cause Georgia and Treaunna C. Dennis, by their undersigned 

counsel, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 7(h), the Federal 

Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C), and the Administrative Procedure 

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and (C), respectfully move this Court for a summary judgment declaring 

that the failure of the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) to find reason to believe that True the 

Vote and the Georgia Republican Party violated FECA, and the FEC’s subsequent dismissal of 

plaintiffs’ administrative complaint, was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and 

otherwise contrary to law, and directing the Commission to conform with such declaration within 

thirty days consistent with the Court’s judgment. 

Support for this motion is set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment; the Declaration of Treaunna 

C. Dennis, attached hereto as Exhibit 1; and the joint appendix containing copies of those portions 

of the administrative record that are cited or otherwise relied upon, to be filed no later than May 

18, 2023. Plaintiffs’ requested relief is set forth in the accompanying Proposed Order. 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 1 of 52
Dated: February 16, 2023 

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Megan P. McAllen

Megan P. McAllen (DC Bar No. 1020509) 

mmcallen@campaignlegalcenter.org

Erin Chlopak (DC Bar No. 496370) 

echlopak@campaignlegalcenter.org 

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER ACTION

1101 14th St. NW, Suite 400 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 736-2200 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 2 of 52
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COMMON CAUSE GEORGIA and

TREAUNNA C. DENNIS 

 Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-03067

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

 Defendant. 

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Megan P. McAllen (DC Bar No. 1020509) 

mmcallen@campaignlegalcenter.org

Erin Chlopak (DC Bar No. 496370) 

echlopak@campaignlegalcenter.org 

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER ACTION

1101 14th St. NW, Suite 400 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 736-2200 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 3 of 52
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..........................................................1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....................................................................................................4 

I. Statutory and Regulatory Background .......................................................................................4 

A. Coordinated expenditures are in-kind contributions subject to FECA’s contribution 

limits, source restrictions, and disclosure requirements ......................................................4 

B. The statutory framework for FEC administrative complaints .............................................7 

II. Statement of Facts ......................................................................................................................8 

A. Plaintiffs’ administrative complaint .....................................................................................8 

B. True the Vote and the Georgia GOP’s responses to the administrative complaint ...........10 

C. The FEC’s Office of General Counsel recommends finding reason to believe .................11 

D. The Commission deadlocks and subsequently votes to dismisses the complaint ..............14 

III. Procedural History ..................................................................................................................15 

STANDARD OF REVIEW .........................................................................................................16

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................17 

I. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Challenge the Dismissal of Their Administrative Complaint .....17 

II. The Dismissal Was Contrary to Law ......................................................................................19 

A. FECA unambiguously mandates that coordinated expenditures like those at issue here 

be regulated as in-kind contributions .................................................................................21 

B. The controlling Commissioners improperly assessed True the Vote’s electoral 

purpose based on invented and impermissible legal standards ..........................................23 

1. Neither FECA nor FEC regulations provides a categorical enforcement exemption 

for electoral contributions that relate to “state law compliance” .................................24 

2. The controlling Commissioners’ “issue advocacy” rationale is foreclosed by 

FECA and Supreme Court precedent ...........................................................................28 

C. The dismissal rested on an impermissible coordination standard ......................................33 

D. The dismissal was contrary to law because it rested on conclusions that were arbitrary 

and capricious, irrational, and counter to the record ..........................................................37 

1. Abundant record evidence showed that True the Vote made—and the Georgia 

GOP accepted and failed to disclose—contributions in the form of coordinated 

expenditures .................................................................................................................38 

2. The controlling Commissioners imposed an unjustifiably strict standard of 

proof, arbitrarily disregarded key facts, and failed to support their conclusions 

with reasoning or record evidence ...............................................................................41 

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................43 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................44 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 4 of 52
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

*Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ................................................................1, 19, 21, 22, 29, 30 

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“CLC I”) .........................16, 17, 18 

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 31 F.4th 781 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“CLC II”) .........................17, 18, 19 

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, No. 19-cv-2336-JEB, 2022 WL 17496220 

(D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2022) (“CLC III”) ....................................................................................38, 42 

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) ..................................................................................5 

Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ...........................................................7, 17 

Democratic Congressional Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 831 F.2d 1131 

(D.C. Cir. 1987) .......................................................................................................................16 

Farrell v. Blinken, 4 F.4th 124 (D.C. Cir. 2021) .............................................................................3 

FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) ..................................................................................................19 

FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) ..........................36 

FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981) ........................................28 

FEC v. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ................. 16-17 

In re Carter-Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc., 642 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ............................16 

Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) .........................................................................................17 

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) ...........................................................21, 22, 26, 29, 30, 35 

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

463 U.S. 29 (1983) .................................................................................................16, 20, 41, 43 

National Gypsum Co. v. EPA, 968 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1992) .......................................................32

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) .........................................................22 

*Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ...................................3, 16, 20, 23, 24, 26, 28, 37 

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 

797 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ...............................................................................................19 

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) .................................................................................32 

Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Shays II”) ...........................................26, 27, 33, 37 

Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Shays III”) ....................................................27, 38 

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) .................................................................................17 

Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989)..................................................31 

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) .......................................................................17 

Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) .......................................................................31 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 5 of 52
iv

Statutes: 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) ..................................................................................................4, 21, 30 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A)(i) ......................................................................................................30, 37 

52 U.S.C. § 30104 ................................................................................................................6, 10, 25 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(l)....................................................................................................................1 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b) .....................................................................................................................18 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A) .............................................................................................................7 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(5)(A) .............................................................................................................7 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(l)................................................................................................................7, 1 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2) .............................................................................................................7, 38 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(3) ...................................................................................................................7 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A) .......................................................................................................7, 38 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(5) ...................................................................................................................7 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(6)(A) .............................................................................................................7 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8) ...................................................................................................................1 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) .........................................................................................................7, 8 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(B) .........................................................................................................7, 8 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) .......................................................................................................8, 16 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii) ..............................................................1, 2, 4, 5, 22, 25, 31, 37, 41 

52 U.S.C. § 30118 ............................................................................................1, 4, 5, 10, 22, 25, 28 

52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) .....................................................................................................5, 21, 22, 29 

52 U.S.C. § 30118(b) .....................................................................................................................21 

52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2) ..........................................................................................................22, 29 

52 U.S.C. § 30143 ..........................................................................................................................25

Regulations: 

11 C.F.R. § 100.52(a).......................................................................................................................4 

11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1) ............................................................................................................4, 36 

11 C.F.R. § 104.3 .............................................................................................................................6 

11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a).......................................................................................................................18 

11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4)(i) ............................................................................................................ 6-7 

11 C.F.R. § 104.3(b) ......................................................................................................................18 

11 C.F.R. § 104.3(b)(3)(i) ............................................................................................................ 6-7 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 6 of 52
v 

11 C.F.R. § 108.7(b) ......................................................................................................................25 

11 C.F.R. § 108.7(c)(3) ..................................................................................................................24 

11 C.F.R. § 108.7(c)(4) ..................................................................................................................24 

11 C.F.R. § 109.20 .......................................................................................................1, 5, 6, 22, 25 

11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a)...............................................................................................................31, 37 

11 CFR § 109.21 ........................................................................................................................6, 34 

11 C.F.R. § 109.21(e).....................................................................................................................34 

11 C.F.R. § 114.l(a)(l) ................................................................................................................5, 22 

11 C.F.R. § 114.2 ...........................................................................................................................10 

11 C.F.R. § 114.2(a).....................................................................................................................1, 4 

11 C.F.R. § 114.2(d) ..............................................................................................................1, 5, 22 

11 C.F.R. § 114.2(e).........................................................................................................................5 

11 C.F.R. § 114.4(a).............................................................................................................6, 22, 26 

11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c).........................................................................................................................6 

11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(l) ...............................................................................................................6, 26 

11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(2) ..............................................................................................................6, 26 

11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(2)(ii) .........................................................................................................6, 25 

11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(2)(ii)(B) ........................................................................................................25 

11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(3)(i) ..........................................................................................................6, 26 

11 C.F.R. § 114.4(d) ........................................................................................................................6 

11 C.F.R. § 114.4(d)(l)...................................................................................................................26 

11 C.F.R. § 114.10 ...............................................................................................................5, 10, 22

Other Authorities

148 Cong. Rec. S2145 (Daily Ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain) ......................22, 34 

Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. 421 (Jan. 3, 2003) ..............................34 

Factual and Legal Analysis, MUR 5645 (America’s Foundation, et al.) (Mar. 15, 2006) ...........29 

Factual and Legal Analysis, MUR 5924 (Tan Nguyen for Congress) (Aug. 31, 2010) ...............29 

Factual and Legal Analysis, MUR 7870 (Google LLC, et al.) (Mar. 28, 2022) ...........................32 

Factual and Legal Analysis, MURs 7324, 7332, 7366 (A360 Media, LLC f/k/a American Media, 

Inc.) (April 13, 2021) ...................................................................................................29, 34, 42 

Factual and Legal Analysis, MUR 7024 (Van Hollen for Senate) (May 31, 2017) ......................32 

Factual and Legal Analysis, MUR 5564 (Alaska Democratic Party) (May 4, 2006) 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/5564/28044191227.pdf ................................................34 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 7 of 52
vi 

FEC Advisory Opinion 2018-11 (Microsoft Corp.) ......................................................................32 

FEC, Corporate and Labor Organization Activity; Express Advocacy and Coordination 

With Candidates, 60 Fed. Reg. 64260 (Dec. 14, 1995) .............................................................5 

FEC, Independent Expenditures and Electioneering Communications by Corporations 

and Labor Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 62797 (Oct. 21, 2014) .....................................6, 26, 29 

FEC, Statement of Policy Regarding Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage 

in the Enforcement Process, 72 Fed. Reg. 12545 (Mar. 16, 2007) ......................................7, 42 

Statement of Reasons of Chair Broussard, Vice Chair Dickerson, & Commissioners Trainor, 

Walther, & Weintraub, MUR 7832 (Twitter, Inc.) (Oct. 26, 2021) .........................................32 

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

APA Administrative Procedure Act

CLC Campaign Legal Center

BCRA Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act

FEC Federal Election Commission

FECA Federal Election Campaign Act

F&LA Factual and Legal Analysis

GOTV Get Out the Vote

MUR Matter Under Review

OGC Office of General Counsel (FEC)

SOR Statement of Reasons

TTV True the Vote

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 8 of 52
1 

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

To guard against corruption and its appearance, the Federal Election Campaign Act 

(“FECA” or “Act”) and Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) regulations broadly prohibit 

corporations from making contributions to political party committees. 52 U.S.C. § 30118; 11 

C.F.R. § 114.2(a). The same provisions correspondingly prohibit political party committees from 

knowingly accepting or receiving corporate contributions. 52 U.S.C. § 30118; 11 C.F.R. 

§ 114.2(d). This prohibition extends to a corporate expenditure made in coordination with a party 

committee or its agents—because under FECA, any expenditure that is coordinated with a 

candidate or party is treated as an in-kind contribution to “prevent attempts to circumvent the Act 

through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contributions.” Buckley

v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam); see also 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii); 11 C.F.R. 

§ 109.20. Federal law likewise mandates public disclosure of federal contributions, including those

that take the form of coordinated expenditures. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(l), (b)(3)(A). FECA’s 

disclosure requirements ensure that plaintiffs and others have access to crucial information about 

the money spent to influence elections—information that helps safeguard the First Amendment 

rights of voters to fully participate in the political process. 

Plaintiffs Common Cause Georgia and Treaunna C. Dennis filed this action under 52 

U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8) to challenge the FEC’s unjustified refusal to enforce these rules—including 

by inventing new exceptions to them and arbitrarily ignoring relevant facts—when the agency 

dismissed plaintiffs’ allegations of unlawful and undisclosed coordination between True the Vote 

(“TTV”), a nonprofit corporation, and the Georgia Republican Party (“Georgia GOP” or “Party”) 

during the 2021 U.S. Senate runoff elections in Georgia. 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 9 of 52
2 

In late 2020, after it became clear that both U.S. Senate races in Georgia would go to runoff 

elections on January 5, 2021, the Georgia GOP made a request to TTV for assistance. TTV, 

motivated by “what happened in November,” AR 60, agreed to join forces with the Georgia GOP

at the Party’s “request,” and announced, in multiple public statements, its “partnership” with the 

Georgia GOP to provide a variety of services in connection with the 2021 Senate runoff elections.

Those services included a voter hotline, ballot-curing support, signature verification training, 

absentee ballot drop box monitoring, and other so-called “election integrity initiatives.” The 

fundamental goal of this enterprise, as described in emails summarizing conversations between 

TTV’s legal counsel and donors, was to “‘win by eliminating votes and changing the count.’” AR 

73. In other words, TTV, a corporation, coordinated with the Georgia GOP, at the Party’s express 

request, to provide free services to the Party to influence a federal election. 

These facts provided ample reason to believe TTV and the Georgia GOP violated federal 

campaign finance law—and when plaintiffs filed a complaint with the FEC urging the agency to 

investigate, the FEC’s Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) agreed. But despite OGC’s

recommendation that the Commission find “reason to believe” the Act was violated and open an 

investigation, a “controlling” group of three FEC Commissioners rejected that finding, and the 

Commission deadlocked. A majority of Commissioners then voted to dismiss plaintiffs’ 

administrative complaint. 

The controlling Commissioners’ Statement of Reasons makes clear that their decision to 

depart from OGC’s recommendations relied on unsupported conclusions of law and counterfactual 

assumptions that cannot be reconciled with FECA’s clear mandate to regulate and require 

disclosure of all expenditures “made in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request 

or suggestion of,” a political party as in-kind contributions. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii). 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 10 of 52
3 

Because the dismissal thus rested on impermissible interpretations of the Act and arbitrary and 

capricious decisionmaking, see Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986), it was contrary to 

law and should be set aside. 

First, in explaining why they believed the coordination alleged here was beyond the 

purview of the FEC, the Commissioners relied on impermissibly constrained interpretations of the 

Act to carve out broad swaths of coordinated, campaign-related spending from FECA—inventing 

a new, categorical exemption for purported “state law compliance” expenditures and applying a 

constitutional narrowing construction of the term “expenditure” that the Supreme Court has 

recognized has no application in the context of contributions, including contributions in the form 

of coordinated expenditures. The Commissioners’ finding that TTV’s election-related services—

performed at a political party’s “request” and explicitly directed at federal elections—nevertheless 

constituted unregulable spending on “state law compliance” or “issue advocacy” was unmoored 

from FECA’s statutory text, contrary to its purposes, and will facilitate rampant evasion of the 

Act’s core contribution restrictions. 

Second, the Commissioners’ finding that TTV did not “coordinate” any activities with the 

Georgia GOP within the meaning of the Act hinged on both an unduly stringent conduct standard 

that FECA does not permit, and the unexplained and unreasonable disregard of facts established 

in the administrative record. Indeed, the Commissioners simply sidestepped any inconvenient facts 

to reach a predetermined conclusion, ultimately offering no cogent explanation of their reasoning

that could merit judicial deference. 

“An agency’s action must be within its lawful authority, and ‘the process by which it 

reaches that result must be logical and rational.’” Farrell v. Blinken, 4 F.4th 124, 137 (D.C. Cir. 

2021) (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)). The FEC 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 11 of 52
4 

dismissal here fails on both counts. If left unchecked, it could open a huge loophole in the Act for 

any coordinated spending ostensibly related to “compliance” with state election law—providing 

an expedient avenue for attempts to circumvent FECA’s contribution restrictions and disclosure 

requirements given the States’ role in election administration. 

The Court should award summary judgment to plaintiffs, declare the FEC’s dismissal of 

plaintiffs’ complaint contrary to law, and order the FEC to conform with that declaration. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Statutory and Regulatory Background 

A. Coordinated expenditures are in-kind contributions subject to FECA’s 

contribution limits, source prohibitions, and disclosure requirements.

FECA imposes certain restrictions and disclosure requirements on “contributions” and 

“expenditures.” Under the Act, both terms are defined broadly to include “anything of value” made 

by any person “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30101(8)(A)(i); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(a) (payment of money or “anything of value made 

by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office is a contribution”).1

In addition, an expenditure made by a person other than a candidate or the candidate’s authorized 

committee “in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of a 

national, State, or local committee of a political party shall be considered to be a contribution made 

to such party committee.” 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii).

The Act and Commission regulations broadly prohibit corporations from making 

contributions to federal political committees. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118; 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(a). For 

 

1 The statutory phrase “anything of value” is understood to include “all in-kind contributions,” 

including the provision of “any goods or services without charge or at a charge that is less than the 

usual and normal charge.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1). 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 12 of 52
5 

purposes of the corporate contribution ban, a “contribution or expenditure” also includes “any 

direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, 

or anything of value . . . in connection with any election.” 11 C.F.R. § 114.l(a)(l). 

A corporate expenditure made in coordination with a party committee—i.e., “in 

cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of” the party or its 

agents—is a prohibited in-kind contribution to that party committee. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii); 11 C.F.R. § 109.20; see also 11 C.F.R. § 114.10 (“[C]orporations . . . are 

prohibited from making coordinated expenditures as defined in 11 CFR 109.20.”). Political 

committees (other than independent expenditure-only committees or “super PACs”) are 

correspondingly prohibited from knowingly accepting or receiving corporate contributions. 52 

U.S.C. § 30118; 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(d). Corporate officers and directors are also prohibited from 

consenting to such prohibited contributions. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(e). 

Consistent with the statutory and regulatory definitions, the Commission has emphasized 

that “payments which are coordinated with candidates constitute expenditures and in-kind 

contributions to those candidates even if the communications do not contain express advocacy.” 

FEC, Corporate and Labor Organization Activity; Express Advocacy and Coordination With 

Candidates, 60 Fed. Reg. 64260, 64262 (Dec. 14, 1995). “A corporation . . . that engages in 

election-related activities directed at the general public must avoid most forms of coordination 

with candidates,” or else risk making “prohibited in-kind contributions.” Id. at 64263. 

In 2014, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 

(2010), the Commission updated its regulations and made clear that, while the Court had permitted 

corporations to make unlimited independent expenditures, that holding applies only to corporate 

and labor organization expenditures “that are not coordinated and do not otherwise constitute inCase 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 13 of 52
6 

kind contributions.” FEC, Independent Expenditures and Electioneering Communications by 

Corporations and Labor Organizations, 79 Fed. Reg. 62797, 62804 (Oct. 21, 2014). In revising 11 

C.F.R. § 114.4(c), which governs corporate communications to the general public in connection 

with a federal election, the Commission removed the pre-Citizens United prohibition on express 

advocacy and added “an explicit prohibition on corporations and labor organizations coordinating 

with candidates or party committees, pursuant to the Commission’s coordination regulations, on 

communications to the general public.” Id. at 62805; see 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(1) (noting that a 

corporation or labor organization may not make “coordinated expenditures as defined in 11 CFR 

§ 109.20, coordinated communications as defined in 11 CFR § 109.21, or contributions as defined 

in 11 CFR part 100, subpart B”).2

 

In its 2014 rulemaking, the Commission also emphasized that corporations may not 

coordinate with a candidate or political party regarding non-communication expenditures, 

including but not limited to expenditures for the voter registration and get-out-the-vote (“GOTV”)

drives described in 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(d). See 79 Fed. Reg. at 62805 (explaining that under revised 

C.F.R. § 114.4(a), corporations remain prohibited from making coordinated expenditures for voter 

registration and GOTV drives); 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(a). 

FECA and Commission regulations require all federal political committees to file periodic 

reports accurately disclosing their receipts, disbursements, and debts and obligations, including inkind contributions in the form of coordinated expenditures. 52 U.S.C. § 30104; 11 C.F.R. § 104.3. 

Political committees must also itemize the names of each person from whom the committee 

received contributions and each person to whom it made expenditures aggregating over $200 in 

 

2 The corporate communications referenced in 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c) include the distribution of 

voter registration or GOTV communications, id. § 114.4(c)(2)(ii), (c)(2)(ii)(B); and registration or 

voting information produced by official election administrators, id. § 114.4(c)(3)(i), (c)(3)(iv)(B).

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 14 of 52
7 

value, together with the dates, amounts, and purposes of such receipts and disbursements. 52 

U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A), (5)(A); 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a)(4)(i), (b)(3)(i). 

B. The statutory framework for FEC administrative complaints. 

Any person may file a complaint with the Commission alleging a violation of FECA. 52 

U.S.C. § 30109(a)(l). After reviewing the complaint, any responses thereto, and the Office of 

General Counsel’s recommendations, the Commission votes on whether there is sufficient “reason 

to believe” that a FECA violation occurred to justify an investigation, i.e., whether a complaint 

“credibly alleges” a FECA violation “may have occurred.” FEC, Statement of Policy Regarding 

Commission Action in Matters at the Initial Stage in the Enforcement Process, 72 Fed. Reg. 12545 

(Mar. 16, 2007); see also id. (reason to believe requires that “the available evidence . . . is at least 

sufficient to warrant conducting an investigation”). After any investigation, if the Commission 

determines that there is probable cause to believe the law has been violated, id. § 30109(a)(3), it 

seeks a conciliation agreement with the respondent, which may include civil penalties, id. 

§ 30109(a)(4)(A), (5). If the Commission is unable to correct the violation and enter a conciliation 

agreement, it may institute a civil action in federal district court. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(A). All of these 

decisions require four affirmative votes. 

If, at any of these decision-making junctures, fewer than four Commissioners vote to 

proceed, the Commission may vote to dismiss the complaint and the “controlling” group of 

Commissioners who voted not to proceed must issue a Statement of Reasons to serve as the basis 

for any judicial review. Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1988). “Any party 

aggrieved” by the dismissal of its FEC complaint may seek review in the U.S. District Court for 

the District of Columbia to determine whether the dismissal was “contrary to law,” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(A), (B). If the Court finds the dismissal contrary to law, the dismissal should be set 

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aside and the matter remanded to the Commission to conform with such declaration within thirty 

days, failing which the complainant “may bring, in the name of such complainant, a civil action to 

remedy the violation involved in the original complaint.” Id. § 30109(a)(8)(C). 

II. Statement of Facts

A. Plaintiffs’ administrative complaint.

On March 31, 2021, Common Cause Georgia, Treaunna C. Dennis, and Campaign Legal 

Center Action filed an administrative complaint (designated Matter Under Review (“MUR”) 

7894), alleging that TTV made, and the Georgia GOP accepted and failed to report, prohibited inkind contributions in the form of coordinated expenditures, in violation of FECA’s reporting 

requirements and contribution restrictions. AR 3-6 ¶¶ 7-16, 10-12 ¶¶ 30-40.

The administrative complaint—relying on publicly available information including press 

releases and statements from both TTV and the Georgia GOP—documented how, in late 2020,

TTV received a “request” from the Party for assistance with the 2021 Georgia Senate runoff 

election and publicly announced the groups’ “partnership” to provide a variety of services in 

connection with the election, including a voter hotline, ballot-curing support, signature verification

training, absentee ballot drop box monitoring, and “other election integrity initiatives.” See 

generally AR 3-4 ¶¶ 9-12. 

On December 14, 2020, for example, TTV founder and president, Catherine Engelbrecht, 

sent an email to TTV supporters describing its work in Georgia and the Georgia GOP’s “request” 

for assistance: 

For the past two weeks, I’ve been in Georgia with a small team from True the Vote, 

working on specific, tangible ways to help ensure transparency and accuracy in the 

critical run-off elections that will determine the balance of power in the Senate. 

We’ve met with voters and state leaders, leading ultimately to a request from the 

Georgia Republican Party to provide publicly available nonpartisan signature 

verification training, a 24x7 voter hotline, ballot-curing support, and more. 

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AR 3-4 ¶ 9 (quoting Email from True the Vote, Weekly Update | Validate the Vote GA | 12.13.20

(Dec. 14, 2020, 12:26am), https://politicalemails.org/messages/318884 (“Dec. 14 TTV Email”)). 

The email further described “leading webinars and FAQ sessions for government leaders” to 

support constituents “who are understandably angry about what happened in November.” Dec. 14 

TTV Email; see also AR 60. Engelbrecht’s email concluded with a fundraising appeal pledging 

that any donations received in response “will be used to fund the work in Georgia.” AR 4 ¶ 9. 

Later the same day, TTV issued a press release touting its “partnership with the Georgia 

Republican Party to assist with the Senate runoff election process,” including by providing 

“publicly available signature verification training, a statewide voter hotline, monitoring absentee 

ballot drop boxes, and other election integrity initiatives.” AR 4 ¶ 10 (quoting Press Release, True 

the Vote, True the Vote Partners With Georgia GOP to Ensure Transparent, Secure Ballot Effort 

for Senate Runoff Elections (Dec. 14, 2020), https://truethevote.org/true-the-vote-partners-withgeorgia-gop-to-ensure-transparent-secure-ballot-effort-for-senate-runoff-elections). The press 

release included a quote from Georgia GOP Chairman David Shafer that the party was “grateful 

for the help of the TTV team in the fight for election integrity,” and avowing that “[t]he resources 

of TTV will help us organize and implement the most comprehensive ballot security initiative in 

Georgia history.” AR 4 ¶ 11. The press release also quoted Ms. Engelbrecht as saying, “[w]e have 

focused our ‘Eyes on Georgia’ in these critical final days before the runoff, and we are thrilled to 

partner with the Georgia Republican Party, Chairman Shafer, and his team to ensure the law is 

upheld and law-abiding voters have their voices heard.” AR 4 ¶ 12. 

Three days after announcing its partnership with the Georgia GOP, TTV challenged the 

eligibility of more than 360,000 Georgia voters. AR 6 ¶ 15. Nevertheless, according to the Georgia 

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GOP’s publicly filed FEC disclosure reports, it has not disclosed any contributions from, nor 

payments to, True the Vote. See AR 6 ¶ 16. 

On the basis of this evidence, plaintiffs’ administrative complaint: (1) urged the 

Commission to find “reason to believe” that TTV made, and the Georgia GOP accepted and failed 

to report, illegal in-kind contributions in the form of coordinated expenditures, in violation of 52 

U.S.C. §§ 30104, 30118 and 11 C.F.R. § 114.2, 114.10; and (2) requested that the Commission 

conduct an immediate investigation under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2). AR 10-12 ¶¶ 30-41. 

B. True the Vote and the Georgia GOP’s responses to the administrative complaint. 

True the Vote and its president, and the Georgia GOP and its chairman, represented by 

counsel, filed separate responses to plaintiffs’ administrative complaint. See AR 33-50 (TTV & 

Engelbrecht Response); AR 52-55 (Georgia GOP response). 

TTV and Ms. Engelbrecht acknowledged in their response and attached declaration that 

Ms. Engelbrecht met with the Georgia GOP in December 2020, that the Georgia GOP “requested 

that [TTV] provide their publicly available nonpartisan signature verification, a 24x7 hotline, and 

ballot-curing support, etc. to Georgians,” and that TTV’s public statements “mentioned a 

‘partnership’” with the Party. AR 35, 43; see also AR 47 ¶¶ 9-12. The Georgia GOP likewise 

acknowledged the December 14, 2020 public statements announcing its “partnership” with TTV, 

though it disputed the implications of those statements. See AR 53. 

Despite these admissions, both TTV and the Georgia GOP generally denied the allegations 

in the administrative complaint. Both argued that TTV’s activities were not “expenditures” under 

FECA because all of TTV’s trainings and materials were publicly available, so “nothing of value 

was provided to the [Georgia] GOP,” AR 40, 53-54; TTV further argued that its efforts were 

“related to election integrity and voting procedures,” and “did not engage in express advocacy,” 

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so were not for the purpose of influencing a federal election, AR 40. Both respondents also broadly 

denied that the groups had coordinated, despite announcing their “partnership” after the Georgia 

GOP’s “request” for help in the 2021 Georgia Senate runoff. See AR 42-44, 54-55. 

C. The FEC’s Office of General Counsel recommends finding reason to believe. 

After reviewing plaintiffs’ administrative complaint, respondents’ written replies, and 

other available evidence, OGC recommended that the Commission find reason to believe that 

TTV, Ms. Engelbrecht, and the Georgia GOP violated FECA by making, consenting to, and 

accepting prohibited in-kind contributions, and that the Georgia GOP also violated FECA by 

failing to report those contributions. See AR 58-59, 73-75, 77.3

 

Based on the available information, OGC concluded that TTV had “provided services to 

the Georgia GOP by researching and implementing ballot challenges at the request of and in 

partnership with the Georgia GOP,” and that such services “should have been treated like services 

from any other vendor and reported as in-kind contributions or else paid for . . . and reported as 

disbursements.” AR 58. OGC arrived at this conclusion based largely on the “unrebutted public 

statements” from TTV and Georgia GOP officials and “True the Vote’s own explanation of a 

meeting with the Georgia GOP.” AR 58; see also AR 59-61 (describing public statements); AR

67-68 (“[I]n True the Vote’s own words, [its] activity followed a consultation with and then a 

request from a political party committee” and was undertaken “to ‘assist’ that political party 

committee.”). OGC also found additional “detailed information” about TTV’s Georgia activities

contained in filings from a civil lawsuit between TTV and one of its donors, indicating that TTV 

 

3 OGC recommended taking no action at that time with respect to the allegation that David Shafer, 

Chairman of the Georgia GOP, knowingly accepted prohibited in-kind corporate contributions, 

“[b]ecause the record is incomplete as to [his] involvement.” AR 59; see also AR 74 (“[W]e expect 

to learn more information about his activities during the investigation.”). 

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“did more than offer publicly available resources” to the Georgia GOP, but instead worked on “a 

variety of projects involving data collection, investigation and research, analytics, media 

production, and software development, acquiring teams of data miners, analysts, investigators, and 

subject-matter experts in connection with those projects.” AR 57-58; see also AR 61-63, 72-73, 

111-12 (declaration from Eshelman v. TTV, Inc., No. 20-cv-4034 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2021)). 

In evaluating the matter, OGC highlighted two key considerations: whether the available 

information was sufficient to provide reason to believe that TTV’s activities were “coordinated” 

with the Georgia GOP, i.e., were undertaken “in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at 

the request or suggestion” of the Georgia GOP or its agents, AR 67-71; and if so, whether TTV’s 

payments for these coordinated activities were “expenditures” as defined in FECA, i.e., were made 

“for the purpose of influencing” the Georgia Senate runoff election, AR 72-73. 

Because TTV had publicly announced receiving a “request” from the Georgia GOP to 

“assist” with the Georgia Senate runoff election and expressly “characterized the endeavor as a 

‘partnership,’” OGC concluded that the record was more than sufficient to show coordination 

between the two entities. AR 67-68, 70; see also AR 71 (noting that Ms. Engelbrecht’s declaration 

acknowledged that TTV met with the Georgia GOP, discussed TTV’s Georgia operations with the 

party, and received the party’s imprimatur to continue them—indicating that TTV had “consulted 

the Georgia GOP in connection with its intended activity in Georgia” and sought the party’s 

“input” regarding those activities). The OGC further concluded that available information 

suggested a partnership between TTV and the Georgia GOP “for the Georgia GOP to provide 

access to Georgia county residents willing to serve as ‘challengers’ and challenge the ballots 

identified by TTV in the counties in which the challengers resided.” AR 71; see also AR 60-61. 

OGC explained that “at least two of the individuals thanked by Engelbrecht” in a December 18, 

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2020 press release announcing TTV’s statewide voter challenges, who were “identified as having 

‘led the charge in recruiting hundreds of volunteer challengers across the state,’ have held 

prominent county-level roles within the Georgia GOP.” AR 71 (citation omitted). And because

TTV’s December 18 press release indicated that it “worked with members of the Georgia GOP to 

recruit volunteers,” OGC found the record more than sufficient to “suggest active cooperation 

between the two groups beyond their initial discussions,” and to “indicate the presence of both a

request from the Georgia GOP and subsequent cooperation between the two entities.” AR 70. 

In finding sufficient reason to believe TTV coordinated its activities with the Georgia GOP, 

OGC rebuffed TTV’s arguments based on the purported absence of an “official” partnership or 

“joint venture” with the party, “substantial discussions between the groups,” or proof that the 

Georgia GOP had exerted “control” over TTV’s activities. AR 43. OGC stressed instead that “[t]he 

Commission does not require a formalized agreement or official partnership structure” or a “loss 

of autonomy” to find coordination. AR 68, 70. 

OGC next turned to whether TTV’s activities in coordination with the Georgia GOP were 

“undertaken for the purpose of influencing the runoff election”—again answering in the 

affirmative. AR 72-73. OGC reasoned that TTV’s activities were not only undertaken in 

partnership with the Georgia GOP, “a committee whose fundamental purpose is to help 

Republicans win elections in Georgia,” but were also evidently “motivated by ‘what happened in 

November’” and instigated with the specific goal of “influenc[ing] the [Georgia runoff] election 

by challenging absentee voter registrations.” Id.; see also AR 73 (citing email conversations 

between TTV donors about efforts to “win by eliminating votes and changing the count”). 

Finally, OGC concluded that there was reason to believe that the Georgia GOP violated 

FECA’s reporting requirements by “fail[ing] to disclose any contribution or expenditure 

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information in connection with its self-described partnership with True the Vote, including the 

dates, amounts, and purposes of the in-kind contributions.” AR 74-75. OGC further noted that the 

record “does not include how much money True the Vote expended in connection with its election 

integrity efforts in Georgia,” and therefore proposed that the Commission’s investigation should 

“focus first on determining the nature and extent to which True the Vote and the Georgia GOP 

coordinated True the Vote’s activity, and request information to ascertain the costs associated with 

those efforts.” AR 76.

D. The Commission deadlocks and subsequently votes to dismiss the complaint. 

On August 11, 2022, the Commission, by a deadlocked vote of 2-3 with one Commissioner 

recused, failed to approve OGC’s reason-to-believe recommendations, falling short of the four 

affirmative votes needed to initiate an investigation. AR 268. The Commission also failed, again 

by a deadlocked vote of 2-3 with one recusal, to reject OGC’s recommendations and find no reason 

to believe with respect to all of the allegations. AR 269. Finally, the Commission voted 4-0, with 

one recusal and one abstention, to “[c]lose the file,” thereby dismissing the matter. AR 269-70. 

Two of three Commissioners who voted against OGC’s reason-to-believe 

recommendations subsequently issued a Statement of Reasons explaining the basis for their votes. 

See AR 277-87. These two Commissioners, whose Statement is controlling for purposes of judicial 

review, posited that TTV’s activities were neither “for the purpose of influencing any election for 

Federal office,” nor coordinated with the Georgia GOP. AR 280-86. 

First, they argued that TTV’s activities were not undertaken “for the purpose of influencing 

an election,” but rather for two purposes they described as categorically beyond the FEC’s 

jurisdiction: “state law compliance” and “core issue advocacy.” AR 281-85. In the view of these 

two Commissioners, TTV’s activities fell “outside of the ambit of FECA” because: (1) the 

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activities assertedly targeted compliance with state election laws; and (2) “trying to influence how 

elections are administered, as a policy matter, is different from acting ‘for the purpose of 

influencing’ a federal election”—and amounts to protected “issue advocacy” that the 

Commissioners believed could not be regulated as a matter of constitutional law. AR 282. 

Second, the controlling Commissioners determined, notwithstanding the extensive and 

unrebutted evidence to the contrary, that TTV’s activities were not undertaken “in cooperation, 

consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of” the Georgia GOP. AR 285. After 

cautioning that finding reason to believe coordination has occurred requires “a concrete and 

plausible factual basis” and suggesting that the requisite factual basis was absent, the 

Commissioners summarily asserted that “[t]wo primary facts” foreclosed further investigation. AR 

285-86. First, they noted that True the Vote’s services “were equally available to all comers,” 

without explaining how that was material to whether they coordinated with the Georgia GOP; and 

second, again in conclusory fashion, they posited that True the Vote would have undertaken the 

same activities regardless of the Georgia GOP’s involvement. Id. The Commissioners denied that 

the respondents’ use of the term “partnership” suggested that they coordinated within the meaning 

of the Act, asserting without further explanation that the term “had a colloquial and not a legal 

significance.” AR 286. 

III. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed this action on October 10, 2022, challenging the FEC’s dismissal of their

administrative complaint as contrary to law. Compl., ECF No. 1. The FEC filed an answer to 

plaintiffs’ complaint on December 16, 2022. See ECF No. 10. Plaintiffs now move for summary 

judgment. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). FEC 

dismissals of administrative complaints are reviewed based on the administrative record under the 

contrary-to-law standard. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C); see, e.g., Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 952 

F.3d 352, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“CLC I”). 

FECA provides for a Commission decision dismissing an administrative complaint to be 

set aside if it is “contrary to law,” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C), meaning the dismissal: (1) rests on 

an impermissible interpretation of law; or (2) is “arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” 

Orloski, 795 F.2d at 161. The test for whether the FEC’s dismissal of a complaint was arbitrary, 

capricious, or an abuse of discretion is similar to the “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard applied 

under the Administrative Procedure Act. In re Carter-Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc., 642 F.2d 

538, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wald, J., concurring in the decision to affirm). Under that analysis, 

a court must set aside agency action “if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not 

intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,” or “offered 

an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence . . . or is so implausible that it 

could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle 

Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 

FEC dismissals are subject to judicial review under the contrary-to-law standard regardless 

of whether they spring from a majority vote or a deadlock. Democratic Congressional Campaign 

Comm. v. FEC, 831 F.2d 1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987). When a complaint is dismissed after a 

deadlocked vote among the Commissioners, the Commissioners who voted to dismiss “constitute 

a controlling group for purposes of the decision, [and] their rationale necessarily states the 

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agency’s reasons for acting as it did.” FEC v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d 1471, 

1476 (D.C. Cir. 1992). When the FEC dismisses an administrative complaint “contrary to [its] 

General Counsel’s recommendation to proceed,” the “declining-to-go-ahead Commissioners” 

must issue a Statement of Reasons explaining their decision. Common Cause, 842 F.2d at 449. 

The controlling Commissioners’ legal interpretations, however, are not entitled to the 

added boost of Chevron or Auer deference because they do not reflect an exercise of delegated 

authority to make “rules carrying the force of law.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 

227 (2001). To qualify for either form of deference, an FEC interpretation of FECA or Commission 

regulations “must be one actually made by the agency,” meaning “it must be the agency’s 

‘authoritative’ or ‘official position.’” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416 (2019) (quoting Mead, 

533 U.S. at 257-59 & n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). A legal interpretation announced by fewer than 

four FEC Commissioners is neither. Common Cause, 842 F.2d at 449 n.32, 453 (recognizing that 

three-vote Statement of Reasons is “not law” and does not create “binding legal precedent or 

authority for future cases”).

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Challenge the Dismissal of Their Administrative Complaint. 

Plaintiffs have informational and organizational standing because they “suffered an injury 

in fact” that is both “fairly traceable” to the FEC’s dismissal of their complaint and “likely to be 

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). 

First, both plaintiffs have suffered “a quintessential informational injury.” Campaign Legal 

Ctr. v. FEC, 31 F.4th 781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“CLC II”). It is well settled that “a denial of 

access to information qualifies as an injury in fact . . . where a statute (on the claimants’ reading) 

requires that the information be publicly disclosed and there is no reason to doubt their claim that 

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the information would help them.” CLC I, 952 F.3d at 356. And “FECA clearly gives [plaintiffs]

a statutory right to information about the amounts, dates, recipients, and purposes of any 

coordinated expenditures and contributions” made by TTV to the Georgia GOP, a federally 

registered political committee subject to comprehensive disclosure obligations under the Act. CLC

II, 31 F.4th at 790; see also 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b); 11 C.F.R. § 104.3(a), (b). As the Commission’s 

OGC recognized, however, “the Georgia GOP failed to disclose any contribution or expenditure 

information in connection with its self-described partnership with True the Vote, including the 

dates, amounts, and purposes of the in-kind contributions.” AR 75; see also AR 76 (noting that 

“[t]he available information in this matter does not include how much money True the Vote

expended” in connection with its Georgia activities).

The inability to access this FECA-required disclosure information has concretely injured 

both plaintiffs. Ms. Dennis uses information gained from FEC disclosure reports to assess 

candidates for elective office and considers this information essential to her ability to cast an 

informed vote in federal elections. Exhibit 1, Decl. of Treaunna C. Dennis, ¶ 5-7. Without the 

information required by FECA, Plaintiff Dennis cannot fully “evaluate the roles that True the Vote 

and similar outside groups play in elections,” “obtain[] complete and accurate information about 

the true sources of parties’ and candidates’ support,” or otherwise use this information to “guide 

[her] participation in the political process.” Id. ¶¶ 7-9. 

Plaintiff Common Cause Georgia also suffers an informational injury by virtue of being

denied information to which it is statutorily entitled. Common Cause Georgia “relies on the 

accurate and complete reporting of campaign finance information to carry out activities central to 

its mission,” and the FEC’s failure to require the disclosure of this information “concretely 

impair[s]” the organization’s mission. Id. ¶¶ 10-13. Common Cause Georgia has also suffered a 

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distinct organizational injury because the FEC’s failure to enforce the prohibition on corporate 

contributions against TTV—a nonprofit corporation that pursues large-scale voter challenges in 

the name of protecting “election integrity”—has concretely impaired Common Cause Georgia’s 

voter protection activities, and it has been forced to divert resources to counteract that harm. 

Dennis Decl. ¶ 13; see People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 

797 F.3d 1087, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

Second, plaintiffs’ informational injuries are indistinguishable from those recognized in 

FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), and as such, “easily satisfy the causation and redressability 

requirements of Article III standing.” CLC II, 31 F.4th at 784 (citing Akins, 524 U.S. at 25). If 

plaintiffs succeed on the merits of their FECA claim, the Georgia GOP “would be obligated to 

disclose FECA-required factual information about the amounts of the contested coordinated, inkind contributions. That ‘information would help [plaintiffs] (and others to whom they would 

communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office . . . and to evaluate the role that [TTV’s] 

financial assistance might play in a specific election.” Id. at 783 (quoting Akins, 524 U.S. at 21). 

II. The Dismissal Was Contrary to Law 

FECA’s text and history make clear that its comprehensive scheme of contribution limits, 

source restrictions, and disclosure requirements demands vigilant regulation of the line between 

expenditures that are “totally independent” and those that are coordinated with candidates or 

parties. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added). The Commission shirked that responsibility 

here. 

The record before the Commission established that TTV, a corporation, provided valuable

election-related services at the “request” of the Georgia GOP, a federally registered political party 

committee, for the avowed purpose of “assist[ing] with the Senate runoff election” in Georgia, AR 

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59-60, 67-68; that the groups’ admitted “partnership” encompassed research and implementation 

of mass challenges to the eligibility of more than 360,000 Georgia voters, see AR 60-61, 71, 111-

12; that TTV’s Georgia activities included a broad and costly range of services beyond providing 

the “publicly available” materials touted in its press releases, see AR 57-58, 61-63; and that a key 

motivation of TTV’s Georgia efforts (and the Georgia GOP’s entire raison d’être) was to help 

both Republican Senate candidates “win” their runoff elections and thereby secure a Senate

majority, see AR 72-73, 134. 

This factual record provided ample reason to believe TTV made, and the Georgia GOP 

accepted and failed to disclose, prohibited corporate contributions in the form of coordinated 

expenditures. But the controlling Commissioners decided that not one dollar TTV spent through 

this “partnership” to help “win” a federal election was an in-kind corporate contribution. To justify

that unjustifiable conclusion, the Commissioners relied on creative-but-invalid legal theories and 

an unexplained disregard of material facts in the record. 

Specifically, the Commissioners made up two categorical exceptions to the Act’s 

regulation of coordinated expenditures that are as fanciful as they are damaging to FECA’s core 

mandate, including a novel “non-preemption” theory for “state law compliance” activities that has 

no basis in the Act, and a constitutional limitation that the Supreme Court has already rejected in 

the context of coordinated expenditures. They also applied an unduly narrow coordination standard 

that is facially inconsistent with FECA. Finally, the Commissioners arbitrarily and unreasonably 

ignored unrebutted evidence in the record and failed to “articulate a . . . rational connection 

between the facts found and the choice made.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (citation omitted). The 

dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint thus fails under both Orloski prongs. 795 F.2d at 161. Indeed, 

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this is precisely the type of impermissible legal interpretation and arbitrary and capricious 

decisionmaking that judicial review exists to correct.

A. FECA unambiguously mandates that coordinated expenditures like those at issue 

here be regulated as in-kind contributions. 

As the Supreme Court has recognized since Buckley, the “primary interest” served by 

FECA’s contribution limitations is “the prevention of corruption and the appearance of 

corruption.” 424 U.S. at 25. Failing to regulate expenditures made “at the request or suggestion” 

of a candidate or party, the Court has likewise made clear, fatally undermines FECA’s contribution 

limits and compromises the Act’s core purposes, because such coordinated expenditures have 

“virtually the same value . . . as a contribution and would pose similar dangers of abuse.” Id. at 46; 

see also, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 221-22 (2003) (“[E]xpenditures made after a ‘wink 

or nod’ often will be ‘as useful . . . as cash.’”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Act has always 

treated coordinated expenditures “as contributions rather than expenditures . . . [to] prevent 

attempts to circumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to 

disguised contributions.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47, 67. 

To this end, a “contribution or expenditure” for purposes of the corporate contribution ban 

includes “any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or 

any services, or anything of value” to any political party “in connection with any election” to 

federal office. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a), (b); see also 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(a)(1). And FECA generally 

defines the terms “contribution” and “expenditure” to include “anything of value” made by any 

person “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i), 

(9)(A)(i). FECA and Commission regulations likewise make clear that any expenditure made in 

coordination with a party committee—i.e., a payment or “anything of value” made by any person

“for the purpose of influencing” a federal election and “in cooperation, consultation, or concert, 

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with, or at the request or suggestion of,” the party or its agents—is an in-kind contribution to that 

party committee. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii); see also 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.4(a),109.20. 

Congress’s intent to broadly proscribe “disguised contributions” and “attempts to 

circumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47, is 

plain on the face of these provisions. “FECA’s longstanding definition of coordination ‘delineates 

its reach in words of common understanding,’” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 222 (quoting Cameron v. 

Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968)), and further evinces Congress’s desire “to cover ‘coordination’ 

whenever it occurs.” 148 Cong. Rec. S2145 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain).

In statutory interpretation, “the best evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text.” Nat’l 

Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012). FECA makes clear, and four decades 

of Supreme Court precedent confirms, Congress’s intent that any “expenditure” coordinated with 

a candidate or political party committee—or broader still, that a corporation’s provision of any 

“direct or indirect payment” or “anything of value” to a candidate or party “in connection with” a 

federal election—“shall” be considered a contribution to such committee. See 52 U.S.C. 

§§ 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii), 30118; see also 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20, 114.2(d), 114.10.4

 

Here, there can be no question that TTV’s services—provided at the “request” of the 

Georgia GOP in furtherance of the groups’ self-described “partnership”—were directed at 

influencing the 2021 Senate runoff elections in Georgia and “coordinated” within the meaning of 

FECA. TTV itself explained that it was motivated by “what happened in November” to join forces 

 

4 For purposes of TTV’s alleged violations of the corporate contribution ban, the relevant question 

is thus whether TTV provided the Georgia GOP “anything of value . . . in connection with any 

election.” 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a), (b)(2) (emphasis added); see also 11 C.F.R. § 114.l(a)(l). That 

standard, on its face, is even less demanding than the general “for the purpose of influencing” 

definition that applies to the FEC’s regulation of contributions and expenditures outside the context 

of those made by corporations. But the distinction is immaterial to the outcome here, because the 

FEC’s approach under the general standard was plainly contrary to law. 

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23 

with the Georgia GOP and to “assist with the Senate runoff election process.” AR 60; the group 

also claimed that “illegal votes” occur “in Democrat counties,” AR 73, and, as the OGC noted, the 

record evidence included emails summarizing communications between TTV’s legal counsel and

donors, reflecting that the purpose of TTV’s activities was to “‘win by eliminating votes and 

changing the count.’” AR 73 (citation omitted). Moreover, beyond the undisputed fact that TTV 

responded to a “request” from the Georgia GOP by “partnering” with it to provide these services,

see AR 3-4, 35, 43, 47, 59-60, 67-68, available information also indicated ongoing and “active 

cooperation between the two groups after their initial discussions,” AR 70-71. On this record, the

controlling Commissioners’ finding that they lacked the authority to even open an investigation

into the groups’ coordination was both factually and legally untenable. See infra at 38-44. 

B. The controlling Commissioners improperly assessed True the Vote’s electoral 

purpose based on invented and impermissible legal standards. 

The administrative record here establishes reason to believe that TTV provided valuable 

services concededly undertaken in “partnership” with and at the “request” of the Georgia GOP to 

“assist with the Senate runoff election” in Georgia. See, e.g., AR 59-60. The controlling 

Commissioners’ contrary conclusion that TTV’s activities could not be subject to regulation under 

the Act defies Congress’s unambiguous mandate to treat “anything of value” provided “at the 

request or suggestion of” a political party as an in-kind contribution. To reach that conclusion, the 

Commissioners invoked creative but unsupported legal theories—specifically, that TTV’s 

activities coordinated with the Georgia GOP lacked the statutorily required electoral purpose 

because they supposedly related to “state law compliance,” or else constituted unregulable “core 

issue advocacy,” and either way, were “beyond the ambit” of the Commission’s enforcement 

jurisdiction. See AR 281-82. But those legal interpretations have no basis in the statute, “unduly 

compromise[]” its purposes, and are contrary to law. See Orloski, 795 F.2d at 164. 

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1. Neither FECA nor FEC regulations provides a categorical enforcement

exemption for electoral contributions that relate to “state law compliance.” 

The Commission acted contrary to law by dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint on the basis of 

a made-up legal theory that has no grounding in FECA and no bearing on the violations alleged 

here. See Orloski, 795 F.2d at 161. The theory that disbursements related to supposed “state law 

compliance” must be categorically exempted from the Act’s regulation of contributions—even 

when coordinated with a political party in connection with a federal election, and without regard 

to other indicia of federal electoral purpose—is inconsistent with FECA, “unduly compromise[s] 

the Act’s purposes,” and clearly “create[s] the potential for gross abuse.” Id. at 165. 

According to the controlling Commissioners, the plainly election-related nature of TTV’s 

services to the Georgia GOP may not be viewed as having “the purpose of influencing” a federal 

election, and thus are exempt from regulation and enforcement under FECA, because they were 

focused on “state law compliance.” AR 281. The terse, single-paragraph explanation offered for

this supposed jurisdictional limitation argues that FECA does not supersede state laws providing 

for “‘[v]oter registration’ and the ‘[p]rohibition of false registration, voting fraud, theft of ballots, 

and similar offenses,’” and declares that TTV’s activities “fall squarely within this exception.” AR 

281-82 (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 108.7(c)(3), (4)); see also id. (characterizing the range of TTV’s 

activities as “target[ing] compliance with valid Georgia laws governing signature-verification, 

ballot-curing, ballot drop boxes, and residence requirements”). “In other words,” the 

Commissioners concluded, “because Congress has declined to preempt the Georgia laws at the 

heart of [TTV]’s activities, the Commission has no authority to police those activities.” AR 282. 

That conclusory assertion has no basis in the Act’s text and manifestly frustrates its purposes. 

It also makes no sense. Even if TTV’s activities were related to certain, non-preempted 

state laws, enforcement of the federal contribution limits and reporting requirements at issue here, 

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see 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104, 30118, does not even implicate, much less interfere with or call into 

question, the application of any Georgia laws. This case concerns payments for activities seeking

to influence federal elections—a subject that is not “outside the ambit of FECA,” AR 282, but in 

its heartland. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30143 (preempting “any provision of State law with respect to 

election to Federal office” with single exception allowing state and local party committees to use 

nonfederal funds “for the purchase or construction of an office building”); 11 C.F.R. § 108.7(b) 

(providing that “Federal law supersedes state law” regarding “[d]isclosure of receipts and 

expenditures by” and “[l]imitations on contributions and expenditures regarding” federal 

candidates and political committees). Indeed, the FECA provisions at issue here do not relate at 

all to the substance of TTV’s self-described “election integrity” activities, but simply require that 

when such activities are performed in coordination with a political party committee to influence 

federal elections, their underlying costs are in-kind contributions subject to FECA’s limits, source 

prohibitions, and disclosure requirements. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30104, 30118; see also id.

§ 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii) (all expenditures made “in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at 

the request or suggestion of, a . . . committee of a political party, shall be considered to be 

contributions made to such party committee”); 11 C.F.R. § 109.20 (same). 

In particular, the Commissioners’ suggestion that FECA’s contribution limits cannot reach 

any payments for activities related to “voter registration” is directly refuted by the FEC’s own 

regulations, which confirm that a corporation makes a prohibited contribution when it coordinates 

with a political party regarding, inter alia: the distribution of voter registration or GOTV 

communications to the general public, 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(2)(ii), (c)(2)(ii)(B); the distribution of 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 33 of 52
26 

registration or voting information produced by official election administrators, id. § 114.4(c)(3)(i), 

(c)(3)(iv)(B); or voter registration or GOTV drives, id. § 114.4(d)(1), 114.4(a).5 

The Commissioners’ unfounded non-preemption theory is also impossible to reconcile 

with FECA or the statute’s core purposes. See Orloski, 795 F.2d at 161. For one thing, the 

suggestion that TTV’s services fell “outside the ambit of FECA,” see AR 282, is contrary to the 

whole history of Congress’s efforts to rein in soft money, and specifically, its adoption of limits to 

prevent state political parties like the Georgia GOP from serving as vehicles for the evasion of

FECA’s contribution restrictions and disclosure requirements. Indeed, Congress’s adoption of the 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), was largely aimed at correcting this very 

problem. BCRA was passed to plug the so-called “soft-money loophole” that lax FEC enforcement 

had previously opened—much of it through allocation rules permitting state party committees to 

deploy vast sums of unregulated soft money on mixed-purpose activities affecting both federal and 

state elections. See Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 80-82 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Shays II”) (describing 

passage of BCRA following “meltdown” of then-existing campaign finance system). The 

Commissioners’ categorical exclusion of the coordinated expenditures at issue here due to their 

supposed relevance to “state law compliance” threatens to reopen that loophole, and flies in the 

face of Congress’s mandate in enacting BCRA: “[p]reventing corrupting activity from shifting 

wholesale to state [party] committees and thereby eviscerating FECA.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 

165-66; cf. Shays II, 414 F.3d at 112 (invalidating post-BCRA rule involving state and local 

 

5 See also 11 C.F.R. § 114.4(c)(1)-(2) (providing that a corporation’s disbursements for “[v]oter 

registration and get-out-the-vote communications” “are not contributions or expenditures, 

provided that . . . the preparation and distribution of voter registration and get-out-the-vote 

communications is not coordinated with any candidate(s) or political party”); Independent 

Expenditures and Electioneering Communications by Corporations and Labor Organizations, 79 

Fed. Reg. at 62809 (“Voter registration and GOTV drives that are not ‘nonpartisan’ are governed 

by the general statutory and regulatory definitions of ‘expenditure.’”).

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27 

parties’ financing of certain “[f]ederal election activity” because the FEC had unreasonably 

“construed a BCRA provision sweeping state activities within FECA as an excuse to punt federal

activities outside it”). 

Providing valuable election-related services to a political party committee in the immediate 

weeks before a hotly contested federal election, at the party’s request and with an avowed goal of 

assisting the party in that election, see supra at 8-14, cannot be carved out of FECA merely because 

the activity also purports to advance other valid “state law” goals. Nothing in FECA authorizes the 

FEC to create such sweeping exceptions to its statutory mandate. 

Even if the relevant statutory terms were at all ambiguous—and they are not—the 

Commissioners’ construal would still fail. Because their approach unduly narrows the scope of 

FECA’s coordination provisions, it “directly frustrates” the purposes of federal campaign finance 

law and poses a clear risk of abuse—by creating a new regulatory loophole in a context where the 

D.C. Circuit has specifically admonished against them. See, e.g., Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 925 

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Shays III”) (“[B]y allowing soft money a continuing role in the form of 

coordinated expenditures, the FEC’s . . . rule would lead to the exact perception and possibility of

corruption Congress sought to stamp out.”); Shays II, 414 F.3d at 115 (“[I]f regulatory safe harbors 

permit what BCRA bans, we have no doubt that savvy campaign operators will exploit them to the 

hilt, reopening the very soft money floodgates BCRA aimed to close.”). Likewise, here, the 

determination that TTV’s Georgia activities were unregulable creates an “enormous loophole” and 

the manifest “potential for gross abuse.” Shays III, 528 F.3d at 927-28. Armed with this decision, 

any person could seek to evade FECA’s contribution limits and disclosure requirements by simply 

characterizing their coordinated expenditures to influence federal elections as targeting

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“compliance” with some aspect of state election law—an option sure to be frequently available 

given the States’ constitutional role in election administration. 

Courts “must reject administrative constructions . . . that are inconsistent with the statutory 

mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement.” FEC v. Democratic 

Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981). FECA does not permit the FEC to create an 

unbounded exception to the contribution limits allowing corporations to provide valuable electionrelated services to candidates and parties free of cost and with virtual impunity, provided the

services nominally relate to “state law compliance.” A categorical exception of this magnitude 

plainly “compromise[s] the Act’s purposes” and “create[s] the potential for gross abuse.” Orloski, 

795 F.2d at 165. 

2. The controlling Commissioners’ “issue advocacy” rationale is foreclosed by 

FECA and Supreme Court precedent. 

In addition to their newly invented “non-preemption” theory, the controlling 

Commissioners offered a different, though equally flawed, rationale for their action, suggesting 

that it would be unconstitutional to regulate TTV’s free services to the Georgia GOP as in-kind 

contributions. Essentially, the Commissioners claimed that TTV’s supposed “election integrity” 

services amounted to “core issue advocacy” that is constitutionally excluded from regulation under 

“Buckley’s narrowing construction of the phrase ‘for the purpose of influencing.’” AR 283-84. 

Apart from contradicting the Commissioners’ own conclusion that these activities were merely

directed at securing compliance with state law, AR 281-82, this argument isforeclosed by Supreme 

Court precedent. It also relies on the wrong statutory standard: the Commissioners assessed only

whether TTV provided the Georgia GOP “anything of value . . . for the purpose of influencing” 

an election, AR 281-285, while entirely ignoring the applicable standard for assessing whether 

TTV made prohibited corporate contributions under 52 U.S.C. § 30118—i.e., whether it provided 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 36 of 52
29 

the Georgia GOP “anything of value . . . in connection with any election.” Id. § 30118(a), (b)(2) 

(emphasis added); compare AR 277-286. 

But even with respect to the narrower test they did apply, the Commissioners’

constitutional argument is unsustainable. The Supreme Court has confirmed that Buckley’s 

narrowing construction is not constitutionally required with respect to FECA’s regulation of 

contributions, including in-kind contributions and coordinated expenditures. See McConnell, 540 

U.S. at 203 (affirming that “Buckley’s narrow interpretation of the term ‘expenditure’ was not a 

constitutional limitation” on the Act “such that coordinated expenditures for communications that 

avoid express advocacy cannot be counted as contributions”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 n.24; see 

also Orloski, 795 F.2d at 167 (noting that Buckley narrowly construed “provisions curtailing or 

prohibiting independent expenditures” but “[t]his [express advocacy] definition is not 

constitutionally required for those provisions limiting contributions”).6 And, contrary to the 

Commissioners’ exhortations that enforcing the Act here would unconstitutionally impinge on 

protected issue speech, see AR 282-84, the Supreme Court has flatly “rejected the notion that the 

First Amendment requires Congress to treat so-called issue advocacy differently from express 

advocacy,” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194. 

While it is true that Buckley narrowly construed the term “expenditure” to alleviate 

potential vagueness connected to the statutory phrase “for the purpose of influencing” an election, 

424 U.S. at 79, the Court addressed and rejected the contention that FECA’s definition of 

 

6 Nor was it required under Commission regulations or enforcement precedents. See, e.g., 79 Fed. 

Reg. at 62806-07; F&LA at 12-14, MURs 7324, 7332, & 7366 (A360 Media, LLC f/k/a American 

Media, Inc.) (Apr. 13, 2021); F&LA at 1-3, 5-6, MUR 5924 (Tan Nguyen for Congress) (Aug. 31, 

2010); F&LA at 8-9, MUR 5645 (America’s Foundation, et al.) (Mar. 15, 2006) (matters where 

the Commission treated coordinated payments as “contributions” even though they involved 

activity other than express advocacy).

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 37 of 52
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“contribution” was impermissibly vague even though that term also relies on the same “for the 

purpose of influencing” language, see 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) (defining “contribution”); id.

§ 30101(9)(A)(i) (defining “expenditure”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 n.24, 78. In the context of 

independent expenditures, the Court found that “for the purpose of influencing” was vague because 

it potentially “encompass[ed] both issue discussion and advocacy of a political result.” 424 U.S. 

at 79. Consequently, where the actor was not a “political committee,” the Court narrowly construed 

the term “expenditure” to reach only “funds used for communications that expressly advocate the 

election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Id. at 79-80. 

But the Court separately found that this phrase “presents fewer problems in connection 

with the definition of a contribution because of the limiting connotation created by the general 

understanding of what constitutes a political contribution.” Id. at 23 n.24 (emphasis added). Instead 

of imposing an “express advocacy” construction on “contribution,” therefore, the Court merely 

clarified that a contribution includes “not only contributions made directly or indirectly to a 

candidate, political party, or campaign committee, and contributions made to other organizations 

or individuals but earmarked for political purposes, but also all expenditures placed in cooperation 

with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate.” 

Id. at 78. In light of this “general understanding” of what constitutes a political contribution, the

Court held that the FECA provision defining contributions was neither vague nor overbroad and 

the limiting construction of “express advocacy” was unnecessary. Id. at 23 n.24, 78-80. 

Likewise, in McConnell, the Court specifically recognized that BCRA “pre-empts a 

possible claim that [the definition of coordinated expenditures] is similarly limited, such that 

coordinated expenditures for communications that avoid express advocacy cannot be counted as 

contributions.” 540 U.S. at 203; see also id. (“Buckley’s narrow interpretation of the term 

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31 

‘expenditure’ was not a constitutional limitation on Congress’s power to regulate federal 

elections,” and there was “no reason why Congress may not treat coordinated disbursements . . . in 

the same way it treats all other coordinated expenditures.”). 

Buckley’s narrowing of the phrase “for the purpose of influencing” with respect to 

expenditures thus has no bearing on the Act’s regulation of “contributions,” including expenditures 

placed in coordination with a political party. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii) (“[E]xpenditures 

made by any person . . . in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or 

suggestion of, a . . . political party, shall be considered to be contributions made to such party 

committee”); 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a) (same). Nor, to be sure, did Buckley establish any 

“foundational distinction” as a constitutional matter between (in the Commissioners’ phraseology) 

“trying to influence how elections are administered” and making contributions “‘for the purpose 

of influencing’ a federal election.” AR 282. Under the Act, only the latter inquiry is relevant. 

The Commissioners paid lip service to Buckley’s proviso that the phrase “for the purpose 

of influencing” requires no commensurate narrowing limitation with respect to FECA’s definition 

of “contributions.” AR 282-83. But they failed to explain at all why they nevertheless applied that 

construction here. “[A]n agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how 

the statute should operate.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 328 (2014). Where the 

congressional mandate is clear, the Commission has no authority to sidestep it—based on assumed

constitutional concerns or otherwise. Cf. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 658 (D.C. 

Cir. 1989) (observing “that regulatory agencies cannot invalidate an act of Congress”).

In any event, the Commissioners’ conclusory pronouncement that TTV’s admitted 

“partnership” with the Georgia GOP was directed at policy advocacy and not influencing federal 

elections was unsupported by any cogent factual analysis or reasoning, and therefore cannot be 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 39 of 52
32 

credited. National Gypsum Co. v. EPA, 968 F.2d 40, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding agency action 

arbitrary and capricious where its “inferences [were] nothing more than unsupported 

assumptions”). The bromide that “trying to influence how elections are administered, as a policy 

matter, is different from acting ‘for the purpose of influencing’ a federal election,” AR 282, 

certainly does not shed light on how the Commissioners arrived at their conclusion that TTV’s 

activities lacked any federal electoral purpose. And that conclusory statement was essentially the 

sum total of their analysis. The reasons for an agency action “must be set forth with such clarity 

as to be understandable. It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying 

the agency’s action.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947). 

Rather than explaining their reasoning with logic and supporting it with record evidence, 

the Commissioners resorted to various digressions about factual scenarios wholly unlike this 

case—including generalizations about “advocacy groups” whose “programmatic activities could, 

in practice, impact a federal election,” AR 283 (emphasis added),7 and the observation that a 

corporation engaging in bona fide commercial activity is not acting with a purpose of influencing 

federal elections, AR 284-85.8

 None of their postulated concerns about groups whose activities 

 

7

 The Commissioners analogized this matter to MUR 7024 (Van Hollen for Senate), claiming that 

both involved activities “too indirect and attenuated” from federal elections “to fall within FECA’s 

ambit.” AR 284. But these matters are not alike. In MUR 7024, the Commission found that pro 

bono legal services to an elected federal official were not provided “for the purpose of influencing” 

a federal election, where the representation focused solely on challenging specific FEC regulations 

through an administrative rulemaking petition and subsequent, related litigation. See F&LA at 4-

6, MUR 7024 (May 31, 2017). TTV’s services, in contrast, were avowedly undertaken at a political 

party’s request and intended to assist with a specific and imminent federal election. 

8 Besides the fact that TTV did not allege that its activities were undertaken for a commercial 

purpose, see generally AR 33-50, the precedent on which the controlling Commissioners relied

involves commercial activity incomparable to TTV’s self-professed “partnership with the Georgia 

Republican Party to assist with the Senate runoff election process.” AR 3-4. Compare with 

Advisory Op. 2018-11 (Microsoft Corp.); F&LA at 7-11, MUR 7870 (Google LLC, et al.) (Mar. 

28, 2022); Statement of Reasons of Chair Broussard, Vice Chair Dickerson, & Comm’rs Trainor, 

Walther, & Weintraub at 5-7, MUR 7832 (Twitter, Inc.) (Oct. 26, 2021). Moreover, none of the 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 40 of 52
33 

“could influence a federal election,” AR 283, had any bearing on the operative question the 

Commissioners were purporting to answer. The issue was not whether some group’s theoretical 

activities “could influence” or “impact” a federal election, or incidentally “benefit” a candidate, 

AR 283, 284, but whether TTV’s activities were in fact undertaken for that purpose. Hypotheticals 

are no answer to whether TTV’s election-related disbursements qualified as contributions within 

the meaning of FECA because they were undertaken in cooperation and partnership with a political 

party committee in connection with, and for the conceded purpose of, assisting the party with a

specified federal election. See, e.g., AR 3-4 ¶¶ 9-12, 59-60, 73.

Conjuring a parade of horribles is not a substitute for reasoned agency decisionmaking, nor 

license for an agency to disregard its statutory mandate. Shays II, 414 F.3d at 101-02. The 

Commissioners’ reliance on Buckley’s narrowing construction for fear of “unconstitutionally 

subjecting a broad swath of” completely dissimilar activity to “the specter of Commission 

enforcement action,” AR 284, was improper and unreasonable, and accordingly, contrary to law. 

C. The dismissal rested on an impermissible coordination standard. 

In addition to flouting the Act’s clear text and purposes in their categorical exclusion of 

TTV’s coordinated expenditures from regulation, the controlling Commissioners also employed 

an impermissibly constrained coordination standard to conclude that TTV’s activities were not 

undertaken “in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of,” the 

Georgia Republican Party. AR 285. 

First, the controlling Commissioners unreasonably disregarded the Georgia GOP’s explicit 

“request” for help and discounted the groups’ own characterization of their efforts as a 

“partnership,” terming that phrasing “colloquial” and not “legal[ly] significant,” and providing no 

 

cited FEC decisions involved any evidence of coordination, the crux of the allegations here. See, 

e.g., F&LA at 11, MUR 7870 (noting that there was “no indication” of coordination). 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 41 of 52
34 

further explanation of their reasons. AR 286. As the OGC emphasized, however, see AR 68, 

Commission regulations and precedent do not require a formalized agreement or official 

partnership to find coordination. Cf. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(e) (providing that “agreement”—meaning 

“a mutual understanding or meeting of the minds on all or any part of the material aspects of the 

communication or its dissemination”—“is not required for a communication to be . . . 

coordinated”); see also Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. 421, 440 (Jan. 3, 

2003) (“[C]oordination under section 109.21 does not require a mutual understanding or meeting 

of the minds as to all, or even most, of the material aspects of a communication,” and “in the case 

of a request or suggestion . . . agreement is not required at all.”).9

 

And more importantly, the Act explicitly precludes the Commission from employing the 

rigid standard the Commissioners applied here. In Section 214 of BCRA, Congress specifically 

directed that the Commission “shall not require agreement or formal collaboration to establish 

coordination.” BCRA § 214(c), 116 Stat. at 95. Congress instead, recognizing that “[i]nformal 

understandings and de facto arrangements can result in actual coordination as effectively as 

explicit agreement or formal collaboration . . . . expect[ed] the FEC to cover ‘coordination’ 

whenever it occurs.” 148 Cong. Rec. S2145 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain).

Accordingly, whether TTV’s reference to its “partnership” with the Georgia GOP was meant 

colloquially or to denote a more formalized relationship is of no consequence; all that matters is 

that “in [its] own words, TTV’s activity followed a consultation with and then a request from a 

 

9 See also F&LA at 3-4, 10-11, MURs 7324, 7332, 7366 (American Media, Inc.), 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7324/7324_22.pdf (finding a single in-person meeting at 

which a corporation’s CEO offered to “help” a candidate committee sufficient to support a finding 

of coordination); F&LA at 12-13, MUR 5564 (Alaska Democratic Party), 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/5564/28044191227.pdf (finding the suggestion that “some 

degree of cooperation or consultation may have occurred” sufficient for reason-to-believe finding).

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35 

political party committee, and TTV agreed to ‘assist’ that political party committee.” AR 66.

10 The 

Commissioners’ approach here of requiring a more formal arrangement, or an official partnership, 

was flatly contrary to FECA and Commission precedent.

Second, the Commissioners made too much of TTV’s general statement that its services 

were “free” and equally available to all. AR 285. For example, the Commissioners asserted that 

TTV “not only met with the Georgia GOP and contacted the Democratic Party of Georgia to 

provide information about its initiatives, it also offered these services to the public, for free.” AR 

285. But the Commissioners conspicuously omitted any discussion of “available information 

indicat[ing] that TTV did more than offer publicly available resources,” AR 57, and also ignored 

evidence casting doubt on the sincerity and motivations of TTV’s claimed offer of assistance to 

the Georgia Democratic Party.11 The Commissioners also failed to explain how broader 

availability of TTV’s services contradicts evidence that TTV coordinated certain of its activities 

with the Georgia GOP—it does not. There is no “bipartisan” exception to FECA’s contribution or 

coordination provisions. Cf. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 148 & n.47 (noting “[p]articularly telling” 

and “troubling” evidence in the BCRA record that most big soft-money donors “gave substantial 

sums to both national parties”). Nor can an organization shield from regulation its provision of 

valuable, election-related services to a political party committee—at the request of that 

 

10 The Commissioners argued that this matter was “more akin to” one in which the Commission 

declined to find coordination when a person associated with a candidate committee attended and 

spoke at an event hosted by a super PAC. AR 286 (citing F&LA at 5, MUR 7119 (Donald J. 

Trump, et al.)). The Commissioners’ insistence that both this case and MUR 7119 involved only 

“communicati[ons] with a regulated committee,” and not “coordinati[on] within the meaning of 

the Act,” id., belies unrefuted record evidence confirming that TTV and the Georgia GOP went 

far beyond simply communicating. See generally supra at 8-14. 

11As noted in the administrative complaint, TTV altered its December 14, 2020 press release weeks 

after distributing it, on or around January 7, 2021—only then adding a reference to TTV’s 

supposed attempt to “contact” the Democratic Party and linking to a letter not created until 

December 21, 2020. See AR 4-6. 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 43 of 52
36 

committee—simply by providing similar or other services to committees of another party or to 

members of the public. 

Likewise, TTV’s provision of valuable services to members of the public, whether for free 

or at a charge, does not change the fact that TTV coordinated with the Georgia GOP when it agreed 

to provide the party some of the same services—and others—for free. Cf. 11 C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1) 

(“anything of value” includes the “provision of . . . services without charge”). As the Supreme 

Court recognized with respect to party-coordinated expenditures in FEC v. Colorado Republican 

Federal Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001), if a candidate or party could “arrange for a 

[corporation] to foot his bills” or coordinate spending for desired election-related services by 

disclaiming the value of requested services after the fact, the risk that “contribution limits would 

be eroded” was “beyond serious doubt.” Id. at 457, 460. So too here. “If suddenly every dollar of 

spending could be coordinated” with political parties but escape regulation through that simple 

expedient, “the inducement to circumvent would almost certainly intensify.” Id. at 460. This is 

why FECA and its regulations must be construed to minimize available “channels for 

circumventing contribution and coordinated spending limits.” Id. at 432, 455. The Commissioners 

failed to heed this instruction. 

Third, the Commissioners selectively emphasized the significance of TTV’s putatively 

autonomous pursuit of its election-related initiatives as if to negate its founder-president’s meeting 

with Georgia GOP officials. AR 284. The Commissioners’ approach was unreasonable both 

because the record belies the alleged autonomy of TTV’s operation, see, e.g., AR 3-4, 70, and also 

because any such autonomy has little bearing on whether TTV’s activities were coordinated with 

the Georgia GOP. As OGC rightly noted, moreover, this approach is also inconsistent with FECA’s 

plain language and Commission regulations, which broadly define coordination and impose no 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 44 of 52
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requirement that the spender experience a “loss of autonomy.” AR 70 (citing 11 C.F.R. 

§ 109.20(a)). See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A)(i) (defining expenditures to include “anything of 

value”); id. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii) (regulating as contributions all “expenditures made by any 

person . . . in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a 

national, State, or local committee of a political party”). 

More importantly, the evidence in the record did not support the Commissioners’ 

supposition that TTV would have engaged in the same activities absent the request from the 

Georgia GOP, see AR 285: “the available information indicate[d] the presence of both a request 

from the Georgia GOP and subsequent cooperation between the two entities,” AR 70. It was TTV’s 

partnering with a political party committee, “whose fundamental purpose is to help Republicans 

win elections in Georgia,” AR 72, that confirms the value and objectives of those activities on both 

sides of the coordinated transaction. Indeed, the Chairman of the Georgia GOP publicly thanked 

TTV for the “resources” it provided. AR 4 ¶ 11 (citation omitted). 

As courts have recognized, FECA’s expansive coordination rule is necessary to prevent 

political actors from “evad[ing] contribution limits and other restrictions by having donors finance 

campaign activity directly—say, paying for a TV ad or printing and distributing posters,” or, in 

this case, providing valuable services connected to a whole host of so-called “election integrity” 

activities. Shays II, 414 F.3d at 97. The Commissioners’ reliance on an impermissibly constrained 

coordination standard flouts that admonition and contravenes FECA’s clear language, and for this 

reason alone, their decision was contrary to law. See Orloski, 795 F.2d at 161. 

D. The dismissal was contrary to law because it rested on conclusions that were arbitrary

and capricious, irrational, and unsupported by the record. 

The controlling Commissioners purported to support their flawed legal analyses with an 

equally flawed approach to the factual record. In particular, the Commissioners broadly 

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disregarded material, undisputed facts in the administrative record and imposed an improperly

high standard of proof at the pre-investigation “reason to believe” stage. These errors compounded 

the unreasonableness of the Commissioners’ misapplication of relevant law and cannot be 

reconciled with the record or the constraints of reasoned agency decisionmaking. Indeed, the 

Commissioners’ wholesale dismissal of the record was all the more unreasonable given the low 

threshold of evidence required at the preliminary “reason to believe” stage of FEC enforcement 

proceedings, which section 30109(a) of FECA makes clear is a less demanding standard than what 

is required to find liability or even probable cause.

12 Because the controlling Commissioners’ 

curtailed analysis was not supported “with reasoning and evidence,” Shays III, 528 F.3d at 928-

29, and in fact “runs counter to the evidence,” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, the dismissal was 

contrary to law for this additional reason and should be set aside. 

1. Abundant record evidence showed that True the Vote made—and the Georgia 

GOP accepted and failed to disclose—contributions in the form of coordinated 

expenditures. 

The undisputed record evidence was more than sufficient to provide reason to believe that 

TTV’s spending in connection with the 2021 Georgia Senate runoff elections was undertaken in 

“partnership” with and at the “request” of the Georgia GOP. The controlling Commissioners’ 

determination to the contrary was unsupported and irrational. 

Press releases and statements from TTV and the Georgia GOP document how TTV

responded to the Georgia GOP’s “request” for assistance in the 2021 runoff election by 

“partnering” with the party to provide various election-related services and otherwise coordinate 

 

12 A reason-to-believe finding is a necessary precursor and precondition for a subsequent “probable 

cause” determination or civil enforcement action. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2) (“reason to believe” 

finding authorizes investigation); id. § 30109(a)(4)(A) (probable cause finding); see also

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, No. 19-cv-2336-JEB, 2022 WL 17496220, at *18

(D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2022) (“CLC III”) (noting that reason to believe is a “low bar”) (citation omitted).

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 46 of 52
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such activities on the party’s behalf. See generally AR 3-4; see also AR 43, 47, 59-60, 67-68. On 

December 14, 2020, for example, TTV founder and president, Catherine Engelbrecht, emailed 

supporters that the organization had received “a request from the Georgia Republican Party to 

provide publicly available nonpartisan signature verification training, a 24x7 voter hotline, ballotcuring support, and more.” AR 3; see also AR 59-60. The email further described “leading 

webinars and FAQ sessions for government leaders in support of their constituents who are 

understandably angry about what happened in November.” AR 3-4; AR 59-60. Engelbrecht’s 

email concluded with a fundraising appeal pledging that any donations received in response “will 

be used to fund the work in Georgia.” AR 3-4. 

Later the same day, TTV issued a press release advertising its “partnership with the Georgia 

Republican Party to assist with the Senate runoff election process.” AR 60. The press release 

included a quote from Georgia GOP Chairman David Shafer, noting that the party was “grateful 

for the help of the TTV team in the fight for election integrity,” and declaring that “[t]he resources 

of TTV will help us organize and implement the most comprehensive ballot security initiative in 

Georgia history.” AR 4. The press release also quoted Ms. Engelbrecht as saying, “we are thrilled 

to partner with the Georgia Republican Party, Chairman Shafer, and his team to ensure the law is 

upheld and law-abiding voters have their voices heard.” AR 4. 

Three days after announcing its partnership with the Georgia GOP, TTV challenged the 

eligibility of more than 360,000 Georgia voters—a process requiring TTV “to locate a Georgia 

resident in each of Georgia’s 159 counties to challenge the ballots identified by TTV for his or her 

county.” AR 60-61; see also AR 6. Additional evidence detailed in the OGC Report further 

corroborates that TTV’s voter challenges were coordinated with the Georgia GOP. See AR 71 

(“[T]he available information also suggests a partnership between TTV and the Georgia GOP for 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 47 of 52
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the Georgia GOP to provide access to Georgia county residents willing to serve as ‘challengers’ 

and challenge the ballots identified by TTV in the counties in which the challengers resided.”).

The OGC noted that “at least two of the individuals thanked by Engelbrecht in the press release 

announcing the voter challenge, whom she identified as having ‘led the charge in recruiting 

hundreds of volunteer challengers across the state,’ have held prominent county-level roles within 

the Georgia GOP.” AR 71; see also AR 61. And because TTV’s December 18 press release

indicated that it “worked with members of the Georgia GOP to recruit volunteers,” the record was 

more than sufficient to “suggest active cooperation between the two groups beyond their initial 

discussions.” AR 70. 

None these basic facts is in dispute. For example, TTV and Ms. Engelbrecht acknowledged 

in their administrative responses that “[i]n December of 2020, Ms. Engelbrecht met with [the 

Georgia] GOP,” that the Georgia GOP “requested that [TTV] provide their publicly available 

nonpartisan signature training verification, a 24x7 voter hotline, and ballot-curing support, etc. to 

Georgians,” and that TTV “mentioned a ‘partnership with [the Georgia GOP]” in its public 

statements. AR 35, 43; see also AR 47, 53, 60-61 nn.9-10 (noting involvement of GOP officials 

in TTV’s voter challenges following the groups’ initial consultation). In addition, the record 

contained corroborating evidence of TTV’s Georgia activities from filings in a separate litigation 

between TTV and one of its donors. See generally AR 61-63; see also, e.g., AR 134 (emails

between TTV donors noting that “Republicans [had been] reaching out” to ask whether group 

would “play in GA Senate run-off,” referencing two Republican candidates, and stressing that both

“ha[d] to win” to “have the Senate 51-49”). 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 48 of 52
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2. The controlling Commissioners imposed an unjustifiably strict standard of proof, 

arbitrarily disregarded key facts, and failed to support their conclusions with

reasoning or record evidence. 

The abundant record evidence left the controlling Commissioners no choice but to concede 

that TTV “undoubtedly communicated with the Georgia GOP about its election integrity 

initiatives.” AR 286; see also AR 278-79 (acknowledging that “Engelbrecht met with the Georgia 

GOP,” that TTV issued the December 14, 2020 press release and email, and quoting Ms. 

Engelbrecht’s Texas declaration). Yet the Commissioners offered no explanation for why they 

discounted the unrebutted evidence showing that TTV did much more than merely 

“communicate[]” with the Georgia GOP, instead providing its services at the Georgia GOP’s 

“request” to assist with the Senate runoff elections. See, e.g., AR 3-4, 57-58. In so doing, the

Commissioners flagrantly disregarded conduct falling squarely within the plain terms of the 

statute, i.e., FECA’s definitional language providing that all expenditures made “at the request or 

suggestion of . . . a political party committee” “shall be considered to be a contribution.” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). And, tellingly, the controlling Commissioners did not even 

attempt to justify their omission. This failure to “examine the relevant data and articulate a . . . 

rational connection between the facts found and the choice made” confirms that the 

Commissioners’ conclusions were unreasonable, arbitrary, and merit no deference. State Farm, 

463 U.S. at 43 (citation omitted). 

The Commissioners compounded their error by imposing an unduly heightened pleading 

standard that is incompatible with FECA and its implementing regulations. Despite the 

Commissioners’ bland statement that there must be “a concrete and plausible factual basis” to find 

reason to believe coordination had occurred, AR 285, their explanation for finding that that 

standard had not been met here indicates that the Commissioners were in fact setting a substantially 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 49 of 52
42 

higher bar—specifically, one requiring definitive proof or acknowledgement of illegal 

coordination. See AR 285 (criticizing the absence of evidence commensurate with that presented 

in a past enforcement case where the respondent “specified” coordination violations with 

particularity, by reference to a formal Non-Prosecution Agreement with the Department of Justice

(citing MURs 7324, 7332, & 7366 (A360 Media, LLC f/k/a American Media, Inc., et al.)). But a 

reason-to-believe finding requires “only a credible allegation” of wrongdoing, and “does not 

require ‘conclusive evidence’ that a violation occurred or even ‘evidence supporting probable 

cause’ for finding a violation.” CLC III, 2022 WL 17496220, at *8; see also FEC Statement of 

Policy, 72 Fed. Reg. at 12545 (“The Commission will find ‘reason to believe’ in cases where the 

available evidence in the matter is at least sufficient to warrant conducting an investigation.”). The 

Commissioners’ rote invocation of a facially tolerable standard does not obscure—nor can it

excuse—their actual application of a far more exacting and impermissible test.

Finally, in applying this test to reach the incredible conclusion that “nothing in the record” 

indicated coordination between TTV and the Georgia GOP, see AR 286 (emphasis added), the 

Commissioners made no attempt to support their reasoning with facts in the record. Nor could 

they. Instead, they squeezed their operative assessment of coordination into three sentences of 

conclusory and counterfactual pronouncements, see id., while unjustifiably discounting any 

contradictory evidence—if not simply ignoring it altogether. But as detailed above, see supra at 

38-41, the respondents’ own statements belie the Commissioners’ claim that “nothing in the 

record” indicated coordination between the two groups, AR 286, and there was copious “concrete 

and plausible” corroborating evidence from other sources showing the contrary: that TTV 

responded to the Georgia GOP’s “request” for assistance by “partnering” with the party to provide 

various election-related services and resources—not all of which were publicly available or “open 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 50 of 52
43 

to all comers,” see AR 3-4, 35, 47, 57-58, 61-63, 67-68; that TTV continued to collaborate with 

the Georgia GOP following the groups’ initial discussions on voter challenges and other electionrelated endeavors, see AR 70-71; and that it undertook these activities “for the purpose of 

influencing” the Senate runoff elections, see AR 3-4, 46, 72-73, 111-12, 134. 

This record, far from providing insufficient factual grounds for the Commission to make a 

threshold reason-to-believe finding and open an investigation, instead compelled the opposite 

conclusion. Agency action is arbitrary and capricious where it “offer[s] an explanation for its 

decision that runs counter to the evidence.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. The explanation provided 

here falls far short of that baseline requirement. Indeed, the controlling Commissioners’ cursory 

and selective evaluation of the record evidence does not reflect reasoned agency decisionmaking, 

but rather post hoc rationalization in pursuit of a desired outcome. 

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should find that the FEC’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ 

administrative complaint was contrary to law, and the Court should remand this matter to the FEC 

with instructions to conform to the Court’s order within thirty days. 

Dated: February 16, 2023 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Megan P. McAllen

Megan P. McAllen (DC Bar No. 1020509) 

mmcallen@campaignlegalcenter.org

Erin Chlopak (DC Bar No. 496370) 

echlopak@campaignlegalcenter.org 

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER ACTION

1101 14th St. NW, Suite 400 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 736-2200 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 51 of 52
44 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 16, 2023, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

document to be served upon all counsel of record registered with the Court’s ECF system, by 

electronic service via the Court’s ECF transmission facilities.

/s/ Megan P. McAllen

Megan P. McAllen (DC Bar No. 1020509) 

mmcallen@campaignlegalcenter.org

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER ACTION

1101 14th St. NW, Suite 400 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 736-2200 

Case 1:22-cv-03067-DLF Document 13 Filed 02/16/23 Page 52 of 52