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Special Report 169 August 2006

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Contents 

Introduction 2

State of the Conflict and Prospects for Peace 2

Defining the Role of Civil Society in Conflict Zones 4

National Peace Initiatives 6

Local and Regional Initiatives 8

Sectorial Initiatives 11

International Initiatives 13

Lessons from Colombia for Other Conflicts 15

Challenges to Peace 16

Conclusions and Possible Ways Forward 17

About the Report

Nearly half-a-century old, the Colombian conflict has spawned a 

long tradition of peace initiatives that offer innovative alternatives 

to violence. Peace Initiatives in Colombia, a conference sponsored 

by the United States Institute of Peace and the Latin American 

Studies Program at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, November 

19–20, 2005, analyzed these initiatives from various perspectives and 

identified the variables and strategies relevant to their success. 

The conference brought together contributors to a book on Colombian 

peace initiatives being edited by Virginia M. Bouvier, a Latin American 

specialist and senior program officer of the Jennings Randolph 

Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Conference speakers included 

some twenty individuals from a broad range of academic fields, as 

well as human rights and development specialists, photographers, 

and political and military analysts from Colombia, the United States, 

and Europe. A list of conference participants, about half of whom are 

current or former USIP grantees or peace scholars, is at the end of 

this report. 

The conference was organized by Dr. Bouvier and Dr. Mary Roldán. 

Additional sponsors included Cornell’s Africana Studies and Research 

Center; its departments of development sociology, government, 

history, and anthropology; the Mario Einaudi Center for International 

Studies; the Institute for European Studies; the Johnson School 

of Management; the Peace Studies Program; the Society for the 

Humanities; the Committee on U.S.–Latin American Relations 

(CUSLAR); and the Colombian Student Association, as well as Syracuse 

University’s Program for Analysis and Resolution of Conflict (PARC). 

This report is based primarily on presentations and papers prepared 

for the conference, and participants have reviewed it.

Virginia M. Bouvier 

Harbingers of Hope

Peace Initiatives in Colombia

Summary

• With the reelection of incumbent President Alvaro Uribe on May 28, 2006, a “ripe 

moment” may be emerging for resolving Colombia’s long-standing armed conflict. 

After exerting pressure on the guerrillas and demobilizing the largest paramilitary 

organization during his first term, President Uribe is well positioned to pursue a 

political solution to the conflict. If he does not, the window of opportunity may close 

and the conflict could quickly intensify.

• The Colombian state has a rich and varied history of negotiating peace at the national 

level with illegal armed groups. Increasingly, state authorities at local and regional 

levels, as well as individuals, groups, and communities within civil society, have 

gained experience in negotiating peace with armed actors and establishing mechanisms for the nonviolent resolution of conflict. 

• Since local peacebuilding involves informal, unofficial (“track two”) diplomacy, a 

central question is how these local experiences might contribute to “track two” diplomacy at the national level. 

• Vibrant, organized, and diverse, civil society actors are seeking ways to participate in 

a future negotiation while debating what form that participation might take. These 

actors generally agree on the need for citizen mobilization and peace education, 

political support for dialogue with armed actors, increased and broader citizen participation in any peace process, and solidarity with all the victims of violence. 

• Peace initiatives that cut across geographic lines offer opportunities for more comprehensive approaches. Women’s, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian groups have successfully organized at the local, regional, national, and, increasingly, international 

levels, and women’s groups have designed consensus peace agendas. These sectors 

have borne the brunt of the conflict and have high stakes in its resolution. 

• International actors can be most effective if they play a subsidiary or complementary 

role that supports and builds on local, regional, and national peace initiatives. They 

can provide financial or technical assistance, support basic human rights protection 

and monitoring, and accompany peace and development initiatives. They also can 

facilitate consensus that will lead to public policies more conducive to the transformation of the conflict.
• Contrary to the usual notion that peacemaking should take place before peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, and reconciliation, and that humanitarian assistance 

should be emphasized over development, the case of Colombia suggests that concurrent pursuit of these goals can help reduce violence, mitigate conflict, and create 

conditions for a peace accord. 

Introduction

Colombia is in the midst of a prolonged and chronic, internal armed conflict that involves 

multiple armed actors (including guerrillas, paramilitary forces, state armed forces, common criminals, and drug traffickers) and has lasted for more than four decades. It also 

involves a broad range of individuals, organizations, and institutions dedicated to finding 

a nonviolent resolution to the conflict. This report, the USIP-Cornell conference on which 

it is based, and the upcoming book focus on the often-unacknowledged actors in what we 

broadly consider “peace initiatives.” 

Civilians are increasingly involved in the Colombian conflict, not only as victims but 

also as protagonists seeking ways to end the violence, marginalize actors advocating 

violence as a vehicle for change, and negotiate conflicts as they emerge on the ground. 

Armed actors are thus not the only or even the primary stakeholders in the resolution of 

Colombia’s conflict. Peace initiatives are promoting attitudes and structures that may help 

create a more inclusive political system that can manage conflict nonviolently. Thus these 

and other expressions of social mobilization and collective action must be seen as integral 

parts of any comprehensive and strategic peace policy and as important mechanisms for 

building the relationships of trust necessary for a reconciled society in Colombia.

State of the Conflict and Prospects for Peace 

In Colombia conflict-related violence claims the lives of more than a dozen people and 

internally displaces 850 people every day, observed conference speaker Jorge Rojas, president of the Consultancy on Human Rights and Displacement. With 3 to 4 million people 

now estimated as displaced by the conflict, Colombia ranks second only to Sudan in numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs). 

The human costs of war are not felt equally by all Colombians, conference participants 

observed. Afro-Colombians comprise one-third of Colombia’s internally displaced population. Half of the internally displaced are under age fifteen, and most IDPs are female. The 

war is most pervasive in the countryside: At least 13 percent of Colombia’s rural population 

is now displaced, and rural poverty reached 69 percent in 2004, up from 64 percent the 

previous year.1

According to Rojas, the war is costing the Colombian government US$14 million per 

day; the U.S. government is spending $1.6 million per day (compared with a high of $1 

million per day during the worst part of El Salvador’s civil war); and Colombia’s guerrillas 

and paramilitaries pay some $2.7 million per day to keep the war going. 

Since the 1990s, the narcotics industry has become increasingly important in prolonging the conflict by underwriting the war economy, enabling the conflict to spread and 

escalate, preventing its resolution, and fostering corruption and impunity. This aspect 

makes Colombia’s conflict atypical but similar to those in countries with shadow economies that create their own incentive structures for the conflict’s perpetuation, Rojas said. 

The chronic nature of the war has meant that in areas with few economic alternatives, job 

security and employment options are enmeshed in the war economy. 

Because the conflict is rooted in long-standing social and economic inequities that 

predate the drug problem, whatever approach brings the armed actors to the table also 

must create or apply mechanisms for addressing the issues of poverty, inequity, marginalAbout the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created 

by Congress to promote the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international 

conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets 

its congressional mandate through an array of 

programs, including research grants, fellowships, 

professional training, education programs from high 

school through graduate school, conferences and 

workshops, library services, and publications. The 

Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the 

President of the United States and confirmed 

by the Senate.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, ACCION 

International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, Founder 

and former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. • 

Holly J. Burkhalter, Director of U.S. Policy, Physicians 

for Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. 

Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic 

Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University • 

Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, 

Washington, D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Seymour Martin Lipset, 

Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University • 

Mora L. McLean, President, Africa-America Institute, 

New York, N.Y. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State 

Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt.

Members ex officio

Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • Peter W. Rodman,

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs • Richard H. Solomon, President, United States 

Institute of Peace (nonvoting) • Frances C. Wilson,

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps; President, 

National Defense University 
ity, and exclusion, Rojas observed. These conditions gave rise to the conflict, continue 

to nourish it, and at least partly sustain the illegal economy that finances many of the 

armed actors. 

Few believe any longer that the armed conflict in Colombia can be won militarily, 

conference participants agreed. Colombia’s largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), has waged war steadily for more than four decades, 

while governments have changed every four years.2 In recent decades, with each change 

of government, war policies have alternated with efforts to negotiate peace. 

A key resource available to the guerrillas is their ability to manage time. In a best-case 

scenario, one participant suggested, the guerrillas would be reduced to a “law enforcement problem.” But the speaker considered this scenario overly optimistic, given the 

extent of the FARC’s territorial control, Colombian geography, the guerrillas’ historical 

resilience, and limitations on the capacity of the Colombian army. As one conference participant noted, “In order to declare victory, the government has to win, but the guerrilla 

has merely not to lose.” 

Although electoral commentators today credit Uribe with reducing violence and 

the reach of the FARC, conference participants agreed that the government’s military 

approach has nearly run its course without achieving a decisive victory over the FARC. 

Some argued that this approach has fostered greater intransigence among the FARC. 

Much as fumigation of illicit crops yielded short-term declines in particular geographic 

locales, only to be replaced by new crops in new zones, prosecution of the conflict has 

caused similar “balloon” effects. Rojas noted that the FARC guerrillas have responded to 

the government’s military offensives in the guerrilla-controlled south under Plan Colombia 

(a U.S.-supported program initiated in 2000 to strengthen the Colombian state, reduce 

drugs, and defeat the insurgency) and Plan Patriota (a military counterinsurgency offensive launched in 2003) by expanding their activities into new regions. 

In the western departments bordering the Pacific Ocean, Rojas noted, the conflict has 

intensified most sharply, with more fighting and increased presence of paramilitaries, 

guerrillas, and state armed forces; increased displacement; increased fumigation; and 

increases in coca exports. In the middle of the country the conflict has continued more 

or less the same. In the southeastern departments (Amazonas, Vaupes, Guaviare, Guainía, 

and Vichada), the guerrillas are expanding their activities and consolidating new bases 

likely to sustain the insurgents and prolong the conflict. 

The general environment for local peacebuilding has changed considerably since 2003, 

noted Christopher Mitchell of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George 

Mason University. Until recently, the war manifested itself as a competition for control of 

territory that consisted in some regions of attacks by local armed actors on local communities, rather than direct fighting between combatants. With programs and policies 

like Plan Patriota, “democratic security,” and the drive south involving local communities 

more directly in the conflicts and making it more difficult for them to remain outside the 

conflict, Mitchell said, many local communities are caught up in fighting between local 

armed actors. As a result, they are increasingly seeking ways to maintain their neutrality 

as civilian noncombatants.

In its first term the Uribe administration demobilized the largest number of combatants in Colombian history. High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo announced 

in April 2006 that more than 30,000 paramilitary combatants had demobilized since late 

2003, and the Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) had officially ceased to exist. 

With state benefits for ex-combatants limited to a maximum of two years, conference 

participants noted that a small window of opportunity exists now to dismantle paramilitary structures and bring the remaining illegal armed actors to the peace table. The sooner 

this happens, the less likely the paramilitaries will take up arms again. Unfortunately, 

recidivism has already begun. In his fifth quarterly report in March 2006 to the Permanent 

Council on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, Secretary-General José 

Miguel Insulza of the Organization of American States (OAS) expressed concern about the 

Civilians are increasingly involved 

in the Colombian conflict, not only 

as victims but also as protagonists 

seeking ways to end the violence.

Few believe any longer that the 

armed conflict in Colombia can 

be won militarily.

The war manifested itself as attacks 

by local armed actors on local communities, rather than direct fighting 

between combatants.
paramilitaries’ continued “failure to observe the cessation of hostilities” and the transformation of demobilized groups into new criminal gangs.

After decades of warfare, intensified in recent years under Plan Colombia, and with 

heightened opposition to their violent tactics in the communities they purport to serve, 

guerrilla groups may be more open to a negotiated settlement in the post-election period, 

some participants believed. One participant said there “is more space to negotiate with 

the FARC than might be imagined.” In the past year, UN consultant and anthropologist 

James Jones noted, several peace initiatives have succeeded in placing a humanitarian 

accord between the government and the FARC on the national political agenda. Although 

armed actors have been called on to respond to these proposals, the accord initiative has 

yet to move forward in any significant way.3

Some movement has taken place toward a negotiated settlement with Colombia’s 

second-largest guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN). Most recently, a 

civil society commission created the House of Peace to facilitate a consultation process 

between Colombian civil society and the ELN. This led in late 2005 and early 2006 to 

three rounds of formal, exploratory meetings in Cuba between the ELN and the Colombian 

government, mediated by international facilitators from Cuba, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. Although the talks ended in May 2006, just before the presidential election, this 

process is expected to pick up again soon and could result in an ELN cease-fire.

The international community may be ready to put renewed weight behind a new 

peace effort, conference participants suggested. Under the leadership of its secretarygeneral, the OAS is beefing up its mission in Colombia and has secured new international 

donors to support its oversight of the demobilization and reintegration of paramilitary 

ex-combatants. 

Uribe and his predecessor, Andres Pastrana, have secured strong backing (some $4 

billion—mostly in military and police aid—since 2000) from the United States for Plan 

Colombia; but U.S. pressure on Colombia to move toward peace may increase as such 

levels of funding become more difficult to sustain. 

Participants did not believe that U.S. funding for Colombia would be cut off in the 

near future; they did note that the battle for funding was becoming more difficult for a 

number of reasons. First, U.S. resources are coming under increasing strain because of 

commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, Hurricane Katrina, and U.S. indebtedness (particularly to China and Japan). Second, skepticism is growing about the effectiveness of 

current U.S. antidrug policies, as the intellectual case for a supply-side strategy to control 

drugs has collapsed, and policymakers are questioning whether the results warrant further 

investment.4

Third, President Uribe’s much-touted successes could redound to his detriment. Kidnappings, homicides, and massacres have declined dramatically in recent years, bringing 

greater security to large portions of the population, particularly in the urban areas. 

Given these apparent successes, some U.S. policymakers may be ready in coming years 

to “declare victory and go home,” particularly in light of what they might perceive as 

more pressing problems in the surrounding Andean neighborhood. Finally, many who have 

advocated applying military pressure to get the guerrillas to talk peace may determine 

that it is now time to bring them to the negotiating table. 

In the absence of significant successes—such as the capture or killing of senior FARC 

leaders—conference participants indicated that momentum for peace is likely to build 

again. Given the current military impasse with the FARC, “there may be more support for 

a negotiated settlement now than there has been previously,” one speaker said.

Defining the Role of Civil Society in Conflict Zones 

Colombia is a democracy with long-standing electoral traditions and active engagement 

by a vibrant civil society. Civil society is ordinarily thought to include primarily nongovSome movement has taken place 

toward a negotiated settlement 

with Colombia’s second-largest 

guerrilla group, the National 

Liberation Army (ELN).

Participants did not believe that 

U.S. funding for Colombia would 

be cut off in the near future.

U.S. policymakers may be ready in 

coming years to “declare victory 

and go home.”
ernmental actors—religious organizations, secular and educational institutions, human 

rights and other social organizations, journalists, labor unions, peasants, professionals, 

and a broad range of others who act collectively in accordance with shared interests, 

values, and goals. Although many of the participants viewed civil society as distinct 

from the state, family, and market (and the term as used in this report reflects this 

view), participants recognized that these boundaries are frequently porous, blurred, and 

negotiated—especially in the rural regions of Colombia where the state is weak and illegal 

armed actors dominate. 

In the Magdalena Medio region, eastern Antioquia, Montes de María, and Putumayo, 

noted participants, civil society often constitutes itself in opposition to the armed actors. 

As Javier Moncayo, head of the National Network of Regional Programs for Peace and 

Development, wrote in his conference paper on the Magdalena Medio, “in the midst of 

fear and desperation, there is a civil society that is stronger, more proactive.” In such 

conflict zones, then, the term “civil society” may include the private sector, landowners, 

and municipal workers or other agents of the state. 

Conference participants discussed the role of different civil society actors in conflict 

prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and reconciliation. Considering the tremendous 

diversity and sometimes conflicting interests of the actors comprising civil society, its 

contribution is necessarily complex.

The Colombian experience thus far underscores the positive role that a healthy and 

well-organized civil society has in conflict prevention, noted United Nations Development Program (UNDP) adviser Borja Paladini Adell. Development organizations working 

in Colombia, such as UNDP’s REDES program, are finding that the more organized a community, the less vulnerable it is to violent conflict and the more capacity it has to present 

nonviolent alternatives to reconfigure social relations and enhance democratic practices 

and institutions. Civil society’s heightened engagement in pushing for peace in the past 

two decades has resulted in the creation of institutional positions and mechanisms to 

keep negotiations on the national agenda, channel and respond to public opinion and 

activism at the grassroots level, and include civil society in creating a climate for political 

resolution of the conflict.

Adam Isacson reviewed civil society’s role in peacemaking in Colombia, especially 

in laying the groundwork for the 1998–2002 talks between the FARC and the Pastrana 

government. He discussed the emergence of social movements for peace, including the 

REDEPAZ (Network of Initiatives for Peace and Against War) in 1993 and subsequent 

campaigns of youth and other social groups. These culminated in a massive mobilization 

of public opinion for peace and contributed to the creation of the government-mandated 

National Peace Council and the National Conciliation Commission, and later the Coordinating Committee and the Alliance. These institutional mechanisms, suggested Isacson, 

have been mostly underutilized, as has civil society’s capacity to sustain the momentum 

toward a negotiated resolution of the conflict. 

Conference participants noted that civil society today—as well as local government 

officials—needs to become more proactive again in creating a propitious environment 

for a new peace process, elaborating proposals for citizen involvement, and analyzing 

and publicizing the costs of war for society at large, as well as their impact on particular 

regions and sectors. 

Civil society organizations can serve as a third party in the peacemaking process, 

helping bridge the divide between the government and armed groups—much as they 

have been doing in facilitating the ELN-government discussions. Conference participants 

believed that civil society might have a similar role in exploring negotiating options with 

the FARC on the national level. 

To the extent that civil society participates in the formulation of peace agreements 

or processes, those agreements will have greater legitimacy at the local level and greater 

likelihood of implementation in the post-conflict era.

The more organized a community, 

the less vulnerable it is to violent 

conflict and the more capacity it 

has to present nonviolent alternatives to reconfigure social relations.

Civil society organizations can 

serve as a third party in the 

peacemaking process, helping 

bridge the divide between the 

government and armed groups.
Civil society has the power to legitimize a process or withhold its stamp of approval, 

as the recent demobilization of the paramilitary umbrella group, the AUC, has shown. 

Although the Catholic Church initiated talks that led the AUC to declare a cease-fire and 

enter into dialogue with the Uribe government in December 2002, other parts of civil 

society (as well as some within the Uribe administration and many international actors) 

have challenged aspects of the process. Most of the public supports removal of the paramilitaries from the battlefield. Some worry, however, that the process will legitimize the 

ill-gotten gains of the paramilitary forces, limit accountability and punishment for crimes 

committed, and protect drug traffickers from extradition or prosecution. The business community has supported the process rhetorically, but it has offered relatively little in the way 

of financial support or jobs, noted one participant. 

Participants discussed the appropriate roles of civil society and the state and speculated 

about how these might reinforce a culture of democracy, human rights, accountability, and 

peace. Some participants spoke of the emergence of a more engaged citizenry bolstered by 

international human rights and humanitarian laws, as well as national institutions such as 

the Office of the Public Defender, the Constitutional Court, and the legal recourse granted 

through the writ of tutela, which allows individuals to request immediate court action if 

they believe their constitutional rights are being violated. Participants noted that civil 

society can assist the state in defining the needs of communities and developing and 

implementing appropriate programs to meet those needs. It can also pressure the state to 

include and represent marginalized groups, they said. 

National Peace Initiatives

Since the early 1980s, every Colombian government has faced multiple challenges from 

illegal armed actors—both guerrillas and paramilitary forces—that control large stretches 

of national territory. In these decades governments have demobilized five different groups 

of guerrillas, including the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), Revolutionary Workers’ Party 

(PRT), Quintín Lame Armed Movement (MAQL), April 19th Movement (M-19), and later, 

the Socialist Renewal Current (CRS), a splinter faction of the ELN. These successes and 

the failed efforts to demobilize the primary guerrilla groups—the FARC and the ELN—can 

teach us much about what has worked and what has not. 

In his presentation Carlo Nasi, a political scientist at the Universidad de los Andes, 

observed that Colombia’s experience of bringing armed actors to the negotiating table 

challenges the conventional wisdom of current conflict-resolution literature, particularly 

insofar as it suggests that combatants come to the negotiating table when they have been 

defeated or when the costs of war become unacceptable for both sides. At one point or 

another all of Colombia’s principal guerrilla groups have negotiated despite the lack of a 

“mutually hurting stalemate” (at least from the perspective of the combatants). They did 

so when insurgents had demonstrated relative military strength, as well as in periods of 

relative weakness. Nasi said, “While a rebel group whose offensive capacity is increasing Nasi said, “While a rebel group whose offensive capacity is increasing 

will probably not sign a peace accord ... even a strong rebel organization could end up 

demobilizing if a government negotiates skillfully, makes some major concessions, and 

redresses the rebels’ key concerns.” 

Georgetown Professor Marc Chernick agreed, “Negotiations will not be based on military 

strength or military defeat, but on the pursuit by both sides and more ample members of 

political and civil society of broader national interest.”5

Some national peace processes in the past two decades were at least partly successful. 

During the governments of Presidents Barco (1986–90) and Gaviria (1990–94), several 

smaller groups such as the M-19, EPL, and MAQL demobilized and attempted to transform 

themselves into political parties. The M-19 had substantial electoral success initially 

but then faded from the political arena. Nasi concluded that institutional mechanisms, 

including employment of full-time personnel dedicated to the peace process, had been 

Every Colombian government 

has faced multiple challenges 

from illegal armed actors.

All of Colombia’s principal 

guerrilla groups have negotiated 

despite the lack of a “mutually 

hurting stalemate.”
instrumental in the success of these peace processes. He noted that empowering the 

M-19 guerrillas and reaching agreement on a clear political path for change had proven 

more successful than addressing issues of structural change at the negotiating table. 

Broader bargaining agendas to address root causes had had little success in previous 

negotiations. 

Nasi considered the demobilizations under Barco and Gaviria successful because the 

Colombian government and the rebels reached negotiated settlements that led to new, 

nonviolent mechanisms for participation, representation, and human rights guarantees 

that allowed the insurgents to pursue a political agenda. Largely as a result of these earlier 

peace processes, in 1991 a new constitution was enacted that guarantees the right to 

peace; provides protections under the law for some traditionally excluded groups, including indigenous communities; enhances citizens’ basic rights by guaranteeing the writ of 

protection, or tutela; and establishes an independent court to decide constitutional cases 

and ensure the adherence of national laws to Colombia’s commitments and obligations 

under international norms and standards. 

More pronounced than the demobilization successes of Barco and Gaviria, however, 

were the failures of successive governments to reach agreements with the country’s largest 

guerrilla groups, the FARC and ELN. Chernick observed that the first attempts at negotiations were in the late 1950s, before the formal founding of the FARC, when liberal and 

communist guerrillas were organized in self-defense groups. Other major negotiations took 

place in 1982–86, 1990–91, and 1998–2002. During each period, Chernick said, the FARC 

has held firm to relatively moderate positions that call for agrarian reform and rural development; broader access to state resources; greater accountability of local governments; 

public participation in state decision making on economic and social issues; restructuring 

of the armed forces and police; and human rights protections for leftist political movements, labor leaders, and civil-society opposition groups, including amnestied or demobilized combatants. 

Chernick said many analysts believe the FARC is unlikely to enter into serious negotia many analysts believe the FARC is unlikely to enter into serious negotiations without addressing some of the broad structural issues they claim are at the root of 

the Colombian violence. For the FARC, the most important are agrarian reform and rural 

development. “Even as Uribe intimates that he may change course in his second term,” Even as Uribe intimates that he may change course in his second term,” 

Chernick wrote, “I argue that for the FARC the Justice and Peace Law is not an acceptable framework: They [FARC] will not accept negotiations based on demobilizations and 

alternative sentencing, even if most former combatants will not be punished. They believe 

their rebellion is just. They will only accept a model based on reforms and a sharing of 

political power in some way. They will insist on an amnesty. They will also ask for despejes

[demilitarized zones] and a broad agenda ... as they did in previous periods. The challenge 

will be how to close these gaps.” 

Nasi concluded that the factors blocking these unsuccessful peace processes with the 

FARC and others have included

• The role of spoilers (such as paramilitary organizations, rebel groups that did not 

participate in negotiations, and even some state agencies); 

• The increased militarization of the conflict (especially with Plan Colombia); 

• The financial sustainability of the armed groups (through drug trafficking, extortion, 

and illegal trade); 

• Lack of effective security guarantees;

• Inexperienced negotiators and ineffective negotiating strategies; 

• Underutilized peacemaking mechanisms and institutions; and 

• Unrealistic bargaining agendas.

Conference participants also discussed national initiatives under Uribe to demobilize 

paramilitary groups. Law Professor Arturo Carrillo analyzed the evolution of the con- Arturo Carrillo analyzed the evolution of the con- analyzed the evolution of the controversial Justice and Peace Law passed in July 2005 to regulate the terms of the AUC 

demobilization. Carrillo said the Uribe administration’s proponents of the Alternatives to Carrillo said the Uribe administration’s proponents of the Alternatives to

The FARC is unlikely to enter 

into serious negotiations without addressing some of the broad 

structural issues they claim are at 

the root of the Colombian violence.
Criminal Sanctions Law, the precursor of the Justice and Peace Law, drew lessons from 

earlier successful peace negotiations with guerrilla insurgent groups but failed to consider 

the dramatic changes since the 1990s in the national and international contexts with 

regard to transitional justice norms. 

Carrillo noted that Inter-American Court jurisprudence, international criminal law and 

human rights norms, and international experience with truth and reconciliation in countries such as Chile and South Africa—as well as changes in Colombian law and society 

since the ratification of the 1991 constitution, including jurisprudence of Colombia’s 

Constitutional Court—have increasingly supported victims’ rights to truth, justice, and 

reparations. Greater international oversight, the rise of professional human rights NGOs, 

and increased U.S. pressures for “justice” for paramilitaries and guerrillas charged with 

drug trafficking have also contributed to a new calculus for peace. 

Carrillo observed, “The search for peace in Colombia and DDR [demobilization, dis The search for peace in Colombia and DDR [demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration] processes can no longer be resolved through models that 

promote forgiveness without accountability, that sacrifice truth for political expediency, or 

that gloss over the rights of victims to participate in the process and to obtain reparations 

for the abuses they have suffered at the hands of the parties to the conflict.” He said legal 

challenges to the Justice and Peace Law were pending in the Constitutional Court.6

As paramilitary demobilization has moved forward, civil society leaders have come to 

differ over their role in the implementation of the Justice and Peace Law, particularly the 

official National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission it established, conference 

participants said. Two of the thirteen commissioners—including REDEPAZ president Ana 

Teresa Bernal—have been charged with representing civil society and victims. However, 

some victims’ groups, including the Movement of Victims of State and Paramilitary Crimes, 

have challenged the commission’s capacity to maintain its independence, since it is 

chaired by Colombia’s vice president. They worry that the interests of victims will not be 

adequately represented—particularly in the regions outside Bogotá, where land titling 

is sporadic, and displacement and illegal land appropriation by the paramilitaries are 

widespread.

Local and Regional Initiatives

Although peace writ large has been elusive, and national dialogues between the FARC 

and the government have been stalled since 2002, local and regional dialogues appear to 

be filling the gap at the grassroots level. “Colombia is a land of hope,” observed Ricardo “Colombia is a land of hope,” observed Ricardo

Esquivia, general coordinator of the Red Asvidas of Montes de María and Sincelejo general coordinator of the Red Asvidas of Montes de María and Sincelejo, “where , “where 

more than 30,000 peace initiatives have been counted.” Extreme situations of violence, 

the long-term nature of the conflict, and regional variations in its manifestations help 

account for the peace movement’s tremendous diversity in Colombia.

Local peace initiatives emerge primarily in areas of violence and conflict where state 

institutions have little or no presence, Mitchell observed. In general they promote a 

message and culture of peace in response to violence and conflict, and they seek ways 

for the multiple actors—armed and unarmed—to coexist. Peace initiatives promote the 

association of citizens and the inclusive participation of communities in common projects 

of development, democracy, local governance, protection and promotion of human rights, 

and nonviolent resistance, as well as nonviolent transformation and negotiation of social 

conflicts. They usually start from the premise that social organization and leadership can 

protect communities from violent actors or from corruption and poor governance, Mitchell 

said. Based on this broad definition, some initiatives have emphasized development and 

satisfying basic needs, while others have had a more political focus, trying to empower 

citizens and promote inclusive democracy at the local level. 

Overall, peace initiatives in Colombia have undergone several changes in the past years, 

noted political scientist Angelika Rettberg, who directs a research program on peacebuild-



Civil society leaders have come 

to differ over their role in the 

implementation of the Justice 

and Peace Law.
ing at the Universidad de los Andes. First, peace initiatives have moved from national to 

regional and local levels. These initiatives emerged partly because armed actors increasingly launched attacks on towns or small groups of towns to gain control of lootable 

resources. This in turn generated locally specific peace initiatives. The spread of regional 

and local initiatives reflects the inability of national initiatives to grasp and represent 

the highly diverse interests of civil society and testifies to the state’s inability to provide 

basic security, as well as the communities’ creativity in the face of crisis. Second, Rettberg 

noted, the objectives of local and regional initiatives have shifted in recent years. In 

the aftermath of the failed Pastrana-FARC talks, local and regional initiatives went from 

demanding national peace negotiations among armed actors to seeking more contextspecific solutions to problems caused by conflict (such as kidnappings, displacements, 

and land mines). Thereby they contributed to a broader and more complex peacebuilding 

agenda. 

Regional and local initiatives are less ambitious than national initiatives but perhaps 

more effective in delivering on their promises, Rettberg observed. Conference participants 

discussed the efforts of local government authorities and civil society leaders to negotiate 

development plans that were transparent, ensured accountability, and met community 

needs. They spoke of the REDEPAZ initiative to create “100 Municipalities of Peace” and 

the establishment of constituent assemblies in places like Tarso, Sonsón, Mogotes, and 

Samaniego. In these places civil society has achieved concrete results in establishing 

and using new conflict-resolution mechanisms through alternative governance arrangements that encourage greater participation, accountability, and peaceful coexistence. 

Conference participants analyzed citizen initiatives to promote electoral debates, address 

corruption, and create mechanisms to ensure that local populations can contribute to the 

formation of municipal and national economic development plans. 

In many cases—most of which receive little publicity—local negotiations with 

armed actors have been effective. Participants discussed women’s experiences in suc discussed women’s experiences in successfully negotiating with armed actors to secure safe passage through contested territory. They noted the periodic successes of indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups in 

securing the release of hostages from a variety of armed groups and maintaining their 

autonomy, lands, and neutrality. They mentioned other success stories in places such as 

Micoahumado, where peasant communities have secured agreements from the ELN to 

remove land mines on nearby roads. (Colombia now holds the world record for the highest number of land-mine victims.) In Putumayo unarmed peasants have succeeded in 

persuading the FARC to lift armed blockades (paros armados) and have overcome FARC 

opposition to alternative development projects. In Cauca, Nasa indigenous guards wielding only their ceremonial batons have faced down paramilitary death squads and forced 

drug traffickers to shut down their cocaine laboratories. The churches—Catholic and 

Protestant alike—often participate in and support these community-level negotiations. 

Although no clear and systematic typology of initiatives yet exists, Paladini Adell suggested that the initiatives can be grouped roughly according to the aims they promote 

and the strategies they employ to meet their goals.7 These include 

• Resisting, protecting from, and defending against violence (as in peace communities 

and some indigenous initiatives);

• Educating for peace and nonviolent, alternative conflict resolution (through both 

formal and informal education);

• Expanding democracy and increasing public participation in local governance (especially through local and regional constituent assemblies);

• Engaging in dialogue and negotiation toward agreements on humanitarian issues or 

for conflict mitigation (House of Peace and civil society efforts to reach a humanitarian accord); 

• Promoting regional development and peace (largely through regionally based Peace 

and Development Programs, some sixteen of which have been established throughout 

the country);

Civil society has achieved concrete 

results in establishing and using new 

conflict-resolution mechanisms.

Nasa indigenous guards wielding 

only their ceremonial batons have 

faced down paramilitary death 

squads.

The spread of regional and local 

initiatives reflects the inability 

of national initiatives to grasp 

and represent the highly diverse 

interests of civil society.
10

• Creating or strengthening regional and national organizations and networks (including networks such as Redepaz, Indepaz, Planeta Paz);

• Researching and systematizing best practices for conflict resolution (Indepaz, UNDP 

Good Practices to Overcome the Conflict); and 

• Supporting and providing international accompaniment to communities, organizations, and individuals in highly conflictive zones (Peace Brigades International, 

Fellowship of Reconciliation, Christian Peacemaker Teams, Pax Christi, Society of 

Friends).

Local populations in conflict zones have rather limited options, noted Mitchell, who 

has been leading a USIP-supported project to study these local zones of peace. They 

may flee and join the ranks of those internally displaced by the conflict. In rare cases 

they return to their community of origin as a peace community. They may stay and hope 

that one side or the other will predominate so that things at least calm down a bit. Or 

they may seek to separate themselves from the local violence, in a territorial but mainly 

in a behavioral sense, by making explicit the community’s rejection of the use of arms. 

Throughout the country, unarmed communities are choosing the latter option and establishing peace communities; peace laboratories; zones of peace; no-conflict zones; territories of nonviolence, peace, or peaceful coexistence; or humanitarian zones of peace. 

Peace communities multiplied dramatically in the 1990s, fostered by REDEPAZ’s “100 

Municipalities of Peace” project. These communities are sometimes but not always defined 

geographically and include both displaced communities and those that have refused to be 

displaced. By and large, peace communities are villages whose residents have sought to 

exclude all armed groups, including the military. 

Mitchell said peace communities frequently are sparked by the participation or collusion of public security forces in massacres, or they emerge where government authorities 

engage in corrupt practices. They seem to start locally in a patterned way. “A community 

may be under stress for a long time, and then a trigger event enrages people to the point 

that they decide something must be done to exclude violence from the community,” Mitchell said. This might be a violent incident, but it might also be related to governance. In 

Tarso, for example, the municipality was to be downgraded to a lesser administrative unit, 

a corregimiento, and a constituent assembly formed to defend its status as a municipality. 

The mayor participated actively and was elected by the assembly—in effect forming a 

co-government and creating a new and highly participatory vehicle for local engagement. 

In Samaniego, the community secured a promise that the local municipal government 

would inform the Working Group for Peace (which represented more than twenty local 

nongovernmental organizations) about development proposals, keep the group informed 

about the local budget, and consider community proposals regarding expenditures.

Sara Ramírez, a member of Mitchell’s team at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and 

Resolution, spoke about eight peace initiatives established between 1987 and 2002 that 

she had researched.8 She found a number of commonalities among them in terms of their 

actual and potential contributions to long-term reconciliation and reconstruction of the 

Colombian social fabric. Ramírez observed that these initiatives all contribute to fostering 

social cohesion, developing a coherent political position favoring nonviolent peacebuilding, strengthening democratic participation and increased knowledge of the rights and 

duties of citizens, practicing consensus building, providing alternative local and regional 

development programs and training, and generating confidence-building measures. They 

favor reconciliation by creating a bridge of communication between the armed groups, 

delegitimizing violence as a path to justice, and highlighting problems of displacement 

and intrafamilial violence. 

Several speakers talked about San José de Apartadó. Established in 1997 in the Pacific 

coastal region of Urabá by some 350 villagers, and now with five times that number of 

inhabitants, it is one of Colombia’s oldest and largest peace communities. Its members, 

like those of other peace communities, engage in “active neutrality,” as they press armed 

actors on all sides to adhere to the Geneva Conventions’ human rights provisions requiring 

Peace communities are villages 

whose residents have sought to 

exclude all armed groups, including 

the military.
11

them to ensure the protection of the civilian population. Nevertheless, in the past eight 

years, some 157 members of the community have been killed. 

Photojournalist Jesús Abad Colorado told of his efforts to investigate the killings of 

seven community members in February 2005, and the difficulty he had in persuading 

other journalists to cover the story. He was told to wait and see if the massacre could 

be verified before going to visit the community. A colleague told him, “Fifteen or twenty 

deaths are newsworthy, not five to seven.” Abad underscored the need to “sensitize the 

memory of the nation with these stories.”

Conference participants noted that the peace communities have been particular targets 

of hostility from President Uribe and the security forces, who believe that no part of the 

national territory should have the right to prohibit entry of the state and its agents—or, 

for that matter, to carry out its own negotiations with armed actors. The national government under both Uribe and Pastrana has perceived these efforts to maintain “neutrality” 

at the local level—both by civil society and municipal or regional authorities—as a threat 

to its ability to exercise sovereign control. 

Several speakers observed that central government policies tended to stymie local and 

regional efforts to mitigate conflict. They pointed out that the difficulties local armed 

actors have in recognizing the status of neutrals or noncombatants and the ease with 

which people are defined as “military targets” have particularly endangered the survival 

of peace communities.

In some cases local populations and authorities have contravened federal prohibitions 

and successfully negotiated with armed actors. In a paper prepared for the conference, 

María Clemencia Ramírez, director of the Colombian Institute of Anthropology and History, 

described how in 2000 and 2005 peasants in Putumayo succeeded in pressuring the FARC 

to lift armed blockades that had obstructed access roads and banned traffic in and out of 

town centers—even though the government had not met any of FARC’s stated demands. 

She noted that the FARC saw itself obligated by its own discourse and self-presentation 

as “representative of the people” to take peasant demands into consideration. 

Historian Mary Roldán analyzed the efforts of the twenty-three mayors who launched 

the Oriente Antioqueño’s No-Violence Movement and their clashes with the central government as they sought to negotiate a humanitarian solution to the repeated killings and 

blockades of their towns by the FARC, ELN, and AUC. She also discussed their initiatives to 

secure greater participation in policymaking on hydroelectric development, land tenure, 

and resource use in the region.

The relationship between local and regional authorities, on the one hand, and those 

based in Bogotá, on the other, is historically marked by mutual distrust. One speaker 

pointed out, “It is important to realize that many local communities view the Colombian 

state, which has long been absent from many areas of the country, as merely another 

armed actor and not as an actor whose presence is more legitimate than that of other 

actors.” In rural areas that have been marginalized, abandoned, and subject to criminalization, it is often difficult for civil society and the state to renegotiate a relationship of 

trust or for the state to achieve legitimacy. The state’s efforts to assert itself primarily 

through an armed presence have sometimes exacerbated this mistrust.

Sectorial Initiatives 

Conference speakers discussed the peace efforts of different sectors of Colombian 

society—women, business, education, the church, and Afro-Colombian and indigenous 

groups. These initiatives provide opportunities for crosscutting integration of efforts as 

well as the advancement of particular peace agendas. The real challenge is combining 

them in a framework of mutual reinforcement. 

Catalina Rojas, a political scientist and graduate of George Mason University’s Institute 

for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, described the way women’s groups are working for 

The peace communities have been 

particular targets of hostility from 

President Uribe and the security 

forces.

The ease with which people are 

defined as “military targets” have 

particularly endangered the survival 

of peace communities.

The relationship between local and 

regional authorities and those based in 

Bogotá is historically marked by mutual 

distrust. Many local communities view 

the Colombian state as merely another 

armed actor.
12

peace at the local, regional, and national levels in Colombia. These groups have begun 

forming networks and meta-networks (or “coalitions of coalitions”) that include women 

from both urban and rural zones, cut across class and ethnic lines, and bring together 

peasants and academics. Beyond negotiating safe passage for humanitarian needs, women 

and women’s groups have sometimes managed to prevent displacement of a community. 

Women’s groups also have succeeded in bringing together large numbers of people from 

across the country, including a meeting in November 2002 following the breakdown of 

the Pastrana-FARC talks. On that occasion, Rojas said, they convened more than 300 

women—representing 270 organizations of diverse ideological, social, cultural, regional, 

and ethnic backgrounds—to produce a twelve-point consensus agenda for peace. 

On the national level, their success ultimately will be measured by their ability to 

foster consensus on their peace agenda, secure inclusion of their particular points in the 

broader national agenda, and increase women’s visibility and impact on major issues. 

These include women’s participation in national peace commissions or peace talks, 

violence against women, and integration of gender analysis into the design and implementation of DDR programs. 

Private-sector-led peacebuilding is occurring in Colombia. On a small scale, businesses 

are seeking innovative, pragmatic solutions to the specific problems of companies faced 

with local conflict. Rettberg addressed business’s current and potential contributions, 

which can take a variety of forms, including provision of income, resources, tax revenue, 

and jobs. The domestic business sector, she said, has a particular stake in establishing a 

stable network of domestic markets. Given constraints on exit options, domestic business 

is more vulnerable to the costs of domestic conflict than foreign corporations or investors 

that have the option of simply relocating their businesses elsewhere. 

Rettberg discussed four initiatives in Cali and the surrounding municipalities of the 

Valle del Cauca region, the Magdalena River Valley region, Bogotá, and Medellín. She 

emphasized these initiatives’ varying approaches and motivations, as well as the tremendous diversity within the business sector as a whole. Company traits (such as rural 

or urban, sector, company size, and region), previous philanthropic experience, and the 

availability of external funds for implementation often affected a company’s willingness 

to participate in conflict mitigation or peacebuilding efforts. 

The more severe the conflict and the more unhealthy the economy becomes (especially at the local level), the more likely that businesses will get involved in peace initiatives, she said. This was particularly true in the 1990s, when the costs of the Colombian 

conflict—increased taxes for the execution of the war; increased expenditures (an average of 4–6 percent of corporate budgets) to protect staff, equipment, and operations; 

and the deferral of investment for security concerns—rose dramatically for businesses. 

Business initiatives for peace have yet to be extensively evaluated, although conflict 

levels seem to have dropped in some areas where they were undertaken.

Psychologist and education specialist Ana Maria Velasquez said that education offers 

an important, if often overlooked or underestimated, vehicle for conflict prevention, 

management, resolution, and transformation. The conflict’s chronic and prolonged nature 

has shaped the environment in which Colombian youth have been raised, validating 

and rewarding violent beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. However, schools can foster an 

alternative culture of democratic participation, nonviolent resolution of conflicts, critical 

thinking, and cooperative interactions for problem solving. 

Velasquez discussed government and NGO peace-education initiatives aimed at creating national standards of citizenship that would ensure

• Students are educated and gain skills and experience in peaceful relations and 

coexistence; 

• Schools provide opportunities for democratic participation and responsibility; 

• Students learn to appreciate pluralism, identity, and the value of differences; and 

• Human rights initiatives are integrated into primary and middle-school education. 

Private-sector-led peacebuilding is 

occurring in Colombia. On a small 

scale, businesses are seeking innovative, pragmatic solutions to the 

specific problems of companies 

faced with local conflict.

Schools can foster an alternative 

culture of democratic participation, 

nonviolent resolution of conflicts, 

critical thinking, and cooperative 

interactions for problem solving.
13

Teachers, NGOs, program developers, local and regional state institutions, and district 

and regional secretaries of education are promoting these initiatives. Evaluation thus far 

seems to indicate some short-term successes, but evaluation tools and measures are still 

somewhat problematic.

Many of the conference participants mentioned the important facilitating role churches 

have played at different points, across regions, and on the local and national levels. The 

Catholic Church has been a key intermediary in the recent paramilitary demobilization, 

creation of mechanisms to involve civil society in moving the country toward reconciliation, local dialogue and negotiations between armed actors, and reconciliation efforts 

that provide a place for victims to speak and be heard. In addition, Ricardo Esquivia, coordinator of the Colombian Council of Evangelical Churches’ peace commission, described 

the growing organization and emerging consensus on peace among Protestant evangelicals, who have become targets of violence. 

In some regions groups have appealed to a constitutive identity based on ethnicity 

and culture to develop peace agendas. Using traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms, 

their own histories of resisting Spanish colonial rule, and the growing political presence 

of indigenous groups throughout the continent, highly organized indigenous communities 

in Colombia engage in their own efforts to move the country toward peace. International 

studies scholar Leslie Wirpsa, who spent two decades as a journalist in Colombia, said 

the 1991 constitution offers indigenous groups special protections and rights and has 

enabled indigenous communities in Cauca and elsewhere to create their own development 

“plans for life,” based on constitutional requirements for prior consultation with these 

communities.

Both indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups frequently have been caught in the cross 

fire of the conflict. Because much of their land is resource-rich, they have been affected 

disproportionately by violence and displacement. Although indigenous peoples comprise 

only 2 percent of Colombia’s population, they own 20 percent of the national territory, 

Wirpsa pointed out. Afro-Colombians constitute approximately 30 percent of the population but hold less than 5 percent of the national territory. Unlike indigenous communities, Afro-Colombians are not subjects of any special constitutional provisions that would 

protect their collectively held lands, although they worked hard to secure legal recognition and territorial rights to their ancestral lands through passage of Law 70 in 1993. 

Implementation of the law has been difficult, however.

International Initiatives

Since 2002, with the breakdown of FARC-government negotiations and the inauguration of President Alvaro Uribe, the international community has been divided over the 

best approach to the Colombian conflict. German political scientist Sabine Kurtenbach 

described the marked differences between the overall approaches of the United States 

and the European Union. The U.S. government has supported the Uribe administration 

(and before that, the Pastrana administration) through Plan Colombia, investing heavily 

in strengthening the Colombian state. 

Nonetheless, U.S. actors and objectives are multiple and complex. Various agencies are 

charged, respectively, with the fight against drugs, insurgencies, and terrorism, and they 

often compete for the upper hand. Jones noted, “The U.S. has played a largely negative 

role by supplying arms to the government and by not sorting out the three wars—on 

drugs, on insurgents, and on terrorists—in a way conducive to peace in Colombia.” 

U.S. policymakers have been divided over paramilitary demobilization. The U.S. 

congressional contribution of $20 million for demobilization was less than the Uribe 

government had requested, came with many strings attached, was opposed by most U.S. 

NGOs, and was controversial within the U.S. executive branch, noted one participant. The 

Justice Department had long argued that the Patriot Act prohibited financing of foreign 

The Catholic Church has been a 

key intermediary in the recent 

paramilitary demobilization.

Afro-Colombians worked hard to 

secure legal recognition and territorial rights to their ancestral 

lands.
14

terrorist organizations. (The AUC, the paramilitary umbrella group whose demobilized 

members would benefit from such funds, appears on the foreign terrorist organization 

list.) The State Department argued for conditions on aid for demobilization, proposing 

that U.S. cash be channeled through the OAS or other bodies, rather than directly to the 

paramilitary ex-combatants. U.S. Southern Command (Southcom) leaders favored financing the demobilization as a way to remove paramilitary forces from the battlefield. The 

U.S. Agency for International Development supported aid for reintegration of ex-combatants based on its experience in Mozambique, where war had resumed in the absence of 

reintegration support. And both sides of the political aisle in Congress worried that the 

Justice and Peace Law would allow both drug traffickers and human rights violators to 

enjoy virtual impunity. 

In the United States, NGOs and think tanks have differed over the best approach to 

the conflict in general, observed Neil Jeffery, a founder of Peace Brigades International’s 

Colombia Project. Some believe a military-security approach will bring the armed actors to 

the negotiating table and hold that security must be in place before development can take 

place or be effective. Other NGOs, particularly those supported by religious and human 

rights organizations and coalitions, advocate a policy less heavily weighted toward the 

military side. They insist that security in the absence of development cannot be sustained. 

And they suggest that development aid and economic assistance will decrease the attraction of the economic incentives that armed groups offer to new recruits. 

Colombia is not a top priority for Europeans, noted Kurtenbach, but the European 

Union has channeled support to victims of violence and promoted peace as a prerequisite 

for sustainable development and social development as necessary to overcome the causes 

of the conflict. It has supported “islands of civility” in Colombia, including NGOs and 

peace laboratories. These peace laboratories, supported by the Colombian government 

and funded by international donors such as the World Bank and the European Union, 

are designed to support the implementation of specific accords between conflict actors, 

strengthen local institutions, support civil society actors working for peace, and encourage social and economic development as they foster regional peace proposals in highly 

conflicted areas.9

NGOs working for a peaceful resolution of the conflict increasingly have found common 

ground with EU efforts to open space for civil society, especially human rights defenders 

and victims of violence, noted one speaker. Donor meetings in London in July 2003 and 

Cartagena in February 2005 have facilitated a tripartite dialogue involving the Colombian 

authorities, civil society, and international actors. Following the London meetings, U.S. 

NGOs supported the development of the Alliance, a coalition that brought together business, church, philanthropic sectors, regional entities, NGOs, ethnic groups, and state-led 

initiatives to plan and prepare for the Cartagena conference. Civil society used these 

meetings to generate consensus on peace and reconciliation proposals, noted Isacson.

Many Colombian NGOs are calling for greater engagement by the EU, harking back to 

Europe’s role in promoting the Contadora talks that preceded peace negotiations in Central 

America. They look to the EU to provide an alternative view to the U.S. military approach 

to the conflict. Kurtenbach said such a role, at least from an institutional perspective, 

seems highly unlikely; but enhanced European engagement might be possible if other 

Latin American actors take the lead. 

Jennifer Schirmer, a political anthropologist at the University of Oslo and director of a 

project funded by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry for mediated dialogues between armed 

actors and civil society, is optimistic about the possibilities for Nordic governments to 

participate in and give political and financial support to a peace process in Colombia, as 

well as provide lessons learned from processes they are mediating or have mediated in 

the past.

NGOs and think tanks have differed over the best approach to 

the conflict in general.

NGOs working for a peaceful resolution of the conflict 

increasingly have found common 

ground with EU efforts. 
15

Paladini Adell summarized the myriad ways international actors—including multilateral 

institutions, bilateral aid agencies, and international NGOs—can continue to support 

peace initiatives: 

1. Financial support. The level of international economic assistance to Colombian 

peace initiatives has been growing in recent years. Among other things, it has 

helped strengthen grassroots communities, buttressed the technical capacity of the 

initiatives, and developed specific social development projects. Nonetheless, it also 

has triggered disputes over resources and occasionally overwhelmed the administrative capacities of the initiatives. The trick seems to be to help local people in zones 

of peace develop their own resource base without becoming dependent on outside 

help.

2. Technical assistance. Although Colombia has a wealth of experience, some outside 

initiatives can provide guidance, lessons, and good practices that could be adapted to 

the particular conditions of the country and the respective regions. Examples include 

social participation in the peace negotiations in Central America, methodologies 

drawn from peace territories in the Philippines as an inspiration for Colombia’s constituent assemblies, and numerous truth commissions that might increase the options 

available to Colombia’s National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission.

3. Accompaniment. Conflict zones are usually areas with weak institutional capacity, 

where violent behavior often is neither approved nor prevented through institutional 

channels. In these places, ad hoc mechanisms of dissuasion, such as international 

accompaniment or regular field visits, can play an informal but significant protective 

role. While not totally eliminating the risk, such mechanisms can ensure external 

publicity of any violent act against the initiatives, imposing an additional political 

cost on the authors of the violence. 

4. Support for human rights monitoring, early-warning systems, and human rights 

advocacy. Peace communities and human rights defenders frequently suffer attacks 

from armed actors. In these cases, the international community can respond promptly 

to ensure their protection and, by insisting on accountability, help ensure that 

the perpetrators of violence are brought to justice. International actors also must 

hold the Colombian state to its commitments to international human rights norms, 

international humanitarian laws, and conventions to which it is a party. Support for 

human rights monitors and human rights organizations—whether through NGOs, 

state mechanisms, churches, or civil society organizations—can contribute to the 

prevention of future violence. 

5. Facilitation of processes of dialogue and construction of national, regional, or 

local consensus. Armed conflict generates dispersion, separation, and disarticulation 

of social sectors, and these processes tend to affect even those who have worked on 

peace strategies. International actors can help neutralize the culture of separation 

and generate convergence by creating spaces to air and discuss multiple views about 

the conflict and its resolution. They can play a significant role in facilitating strategic 

alliances among diverse actors of the social peace movement and the local, regional, 

and national authorities. In turn, these can facilitate participatory assessments 

and analytical consensus on the problems that need to be addressed to transform 

the conflict. International actors have exercised this facilitating role by assuming 

moderating functions, proposing formulas for consensus, or observing or accompanying peace initiatives. Such interventions should lead to public policies that establish better institutional responses to the challenges of conflict and peacebuilding 

opportunities.

Support for human rights monitors 

and human rights organizations 

can contribute to the prevention of 

future violence.
16

Lessons from Colombia for Other Conflicts

In addition to discussing ways the international community might contribute to supporting Colombian peace initiatives, Paladini Adell proposed a series of recommendations, 

based on UNDP’s experiences in Colombia, which might have broader implications for 

other conflict zones.

First, emergency aid in conflict zones should be reinforced by far-reaching development 

interventions. Promoting participatory human development in the middle of a conflict as 

a complement to humanitarian action can help reduce violence and create conditions for 

a sustainable peace. Through such programs, civil society and political institutions can 

recover from a logic of war based on illicit economies, corruption, and terrorist strategies, 

creating a logic of peace based on licit economies, democratic governance, a fully legitimate and territorially consolidated state, and a strong, pluralist, and active civil society. 

Second, international cooperation should play a subsidiary or complementary role in 

these initiatives for peace and development. International actors must learn to build on 

what is already in place and the knowledge accumulated in local and regional reflection 

exercises developed in Colombia. The international community, broadly defined, can 

establish mechanisms to make peace initiatives more visible, complement their needs, 

and find ways to protect and nurture them. In particular, international actors are in a 

good position to accompany and strengthen these initiatives, increase their institutional 

capacities for development and peacebuilding, and help link them strategically. 

Third, it is possible and indeed desirable to launch sustainable development and 

peacebuilding initiatives based on community organizing in zones still suffering from 

the impact of the violence. There is no need to wait for the signing of peace agreements 

before launching sustainable projects to support communities in conflict zones. Conceptually, this is a break with the paradigm that posits a rigid sequence of stages in peacebuilding, whereby humanitarian assistance precedes development projects, peacemaking 

precedes peacebuilding, and peacebuilding follows the signing of peace accords. 

Fourth, community organization establishes a kind of armor or protection for the communities. It builds “soft” power, based on persuasion, legitimacy, and moral authority, 

which helps balance and counteract the “hard” power of the armed groups. The reverse 

also seems to be true: Where social organization is lacking in the conflict zones, the 

influence of armed actors increases, making the communities more vulnerable to the 

violence. 

The objective of all these efforts must be to contribute to and support the building 

of legitimacy that reduces support for violent options, suggested Paladini Adell. This 

legitimacy must exist on various levels: in the state and institutions, through democratically elected governments’ political action, by diverse civil-society actors as a democratic 

counterweight to the state, through diverse community and cultural expressions across 

the nation, and, most of all, by replacing the logic of violence with a logic of peace and 

human development. 

Challenges to Peace

In Colombia it is difficult even to find a language to speak of peace—let alone arrive 

at a consensus about what that means or how to get there. Conference participants discussed this dilemma and noted that since the 9/11 attacks the Colombian government 

has sought to present the violence in Colombia as part of a terrorist campaign against a 

legitimately elected government. Most observers, including those at the conference, classify the violence as an internal armed conflict; some participants called it a civil war. The 

language used to define the problem is important because it dictates regulating norms 

regarding the obligations and behavior of governments and insurgents under international 

law. 

Emergency aid in conflict zones 

should be reinforced by far-reaching 

development interventions.

There is no need to wait for the 

signing of peace agreements 

before launching sustainable 

projects to support communities 

in conflict zones.

In Colombia it is difficult even to 

find a language to speak of peace.
17

Analytical agreement is also lacking. For some, terms like “dialogue,” “dissent,” 

“rapprochement” (acercamiento), and “humanitarian accords”—and even “peace communities” or “zones of peace”—have subversive connotations suggesting illegal alliances 

with armed actors that could lead to punitive consequences. In this charged context, it 

becomes difficult for international and local actors alike to discuss conflict resolution or 

support peace initiatives—to say nothing of trying to develop evaluation mechanisms or 

working toward goals related explicitly to peace objectives. 

The lack of a common vision of the problem, as well as the inability to agree on the 

appropriate language to describe it or develop a discourse that supports its resolution, 

contributes to the disheveled state of debates, conference participants found. Within the 

social movement for peace, as in Colombian society more broadly, little agreement has 

materialized on what the peace “end game” is or the methods, path, or strategies for 

reaching it. 

For both philosophical and strategic reasons, some take a narrow view of peace as 

the absence of war, observed Esquivia, a member of the National Peace Council advising 

the Colombian president. Inside and outside Colombia, he noted, some individuals and 

groups are working toward eliminating the physical manifestations of violence. They see 

this as possible to achieve with arms, with violence, or via pacts between those who are 

armed or those who are financing armed actors. Here the main objective is the defeat or 

elimination of “the other.” 

Esquivia observed, “Ending the war is necessary but not sufficient. You must also create a social base that will sustain peace, and you must do away with the social injustices 

that nurture and encourage war.” In this vision, he said, peace is the “fruit of justice, 

manifest in a dignified and abundant life for all,” and the path to such a life is “through 

education and active nonviolence, where one achieves peace through actions in favor of 

justice.” 

One U.S. participant favored a narrower definition of peace for tactical reasons. He 

noted, “Trying to insert too many things into the definition of ‘peace’ may make it far 

more elusive.” The participant cautioned, “If attempts are made to fix all of Colombians’ 

structural, class, and historical ills at the negotiating table, then nothing will go very far, 

and there will be no consensus so essential for success.”

Conference participants did not disagree about the existence and nature of the social 

inequities in Colombian society and the need to address these issues. The debates are, 

rather, over the strategies and timing by which inequities and inequalities should be 

addressed. 

Numerous other challenges remain. Participants mentioned other obstacles to a negotiated settlement, including continued violations of human rights; physical threats to 

individual, institutional, and community security; lack of political space for dissent and 

debate; guerrilla intransigence; U.S. opposition to negotiations; and what one participant 

called “the distraction of the paramilitary demobilization.” Precarious resources and 

unsustainable funding, Catalina Rojas noted, also contribute to a lack of institutional 

capacity for peacebuilding, particularly among women’s groups. 

Divisions within civil society also have prevented development of a consensus agenda 

for peace. In his presentation Isacson noted that social organizations working for peace 

are divided over how to participate in the political process; how to balance demands for 

accountability and human rights with the desire to move a peace process forward; the 

appropriate role of international actors; and attitudes toward the guerrillas and armed 

struggle as a mechanism for change. Conflicts also abound among local, regional, and 

national agendas; inter- and intra-sectorial interests; and class interests. 

Conclusions and Possible Ways Forward

Colombia now has the chance to achieve lasting peace or, alternatively, to spiral into 

another cycle of violence that could engulf the next generation. Having applied tremendous military pressure on the guerrillas and demobilized 30,000 paramilitaries during his 

“Ending the war is necessary but 

not sufficient.”

Precarious resources and unsustainable funding contribute to a lack 

of institutional capacity for peacebuilding.

Uribe is well positioned to make 

bold moves toward a political 

solution to the conflict. 
18

first administration, Uribe has an opportunity to provide leadership for a fresh push for 

peace in Colombia. With his recent victory at the polls and control of both legislative 

chambers since congressional elections last March, Uribe is well positioned to make bold 

moves toward a political solution to the conflict. Whichever avenue he chooses, Uribe will 

do well to draw on the experiences of those engaged in peacemaking and peacebuilding 

at the local, regional, national, and international levels.

Conference participants discussed a number of options for moving forward. First, the 

international community could encourage the Uribe government to initiate a guerrillagovernment dialogue or could facilitate such a dialogue. One participant suggested that 

dramatic gestures on the part of the FARC—such as the release of Ingrid Betancourt, 

three captured U.S. personnel, or other kidnapped Colombians—could “go a long way 

towards getting European and U.S. buy-in” and could “press Uribe to come to the table.” 

He noted, “If the FARC appears willing to negotiate in good faith ... the U.S. government 

is likely to place enormous pressure on Uribe to reciprocate and get to the table.” Conference participants expressed hope that given the proper conditions, agreements with the 

FARC could be reached in the future.

Participants underscored the important role of civil society in the ongoing efforts to 

bring the ELN to the peace table and the potential role of civil society in moving the FARC 

toward a political solution as well. Jones proposed a series of goals that might be achiev Jones proposed a series of goals that might be achievable with the participation of civil society—a prisoner swap with the FARC as an opener 

and token of good faith, followed by an agreement to start a dialogue about an agenda 

and preconditions for talks with insurgents, government, and civil society amply represented. This, in turn, could lead to talks themselves, suspension of the armed conflict, and 

agreement on a strategy for demobilization of the FARC guerrillas, he suggested.

Second, some participants felt that meetings among and with armed actors in pursuit 

of a peaceful settlement might be worth exploring. FARC leaders had once proposed meeting with the Colombian generals, noted one participant. He asked whether the United 

States might be in a position to encourage or facilitate Colombian military-guerrilla conversations or engage in confidence-building measures that might get both sides thinking 

about how to break through the current impasse. He recalled that the pre-peace-accord 

talks between the Guatemalan military and guerrillas paved the way for negotiations that 

ended Guatemala’s civil war a decade ago, and he cited the role of the Israeli military in 

pushing Israeli political leaders to seek peace. Any U.S.-Colombia military talks, cautioned 

another participant, would need to take place with the approval and knowledge of the 

highest levels of Colombia’s executive branch, or they could be seen as undermining civilian control of the military. 

Third, dialogues with armed actors could be more effective if civil society actors, such 

as the Catholic Church or one of the peace commissions representing civil society, were 

actively involved in crafting and executing them, another participant said. This was the 

case in Guatemala and is being tried now with the ELN. 

Fourth, involving the military in planning for peace could minimize the chances that 

it would take on the role of “spoiler” in future peace talks. In a paper prepared for the 

conference, Schirmer underscored this point. She noted that the armed actors of both the 

insurgency and the state—“those actors who have the most capacity to wage war”—need 

to be engaged and brought into pre-dialogues early on. 

Fifth, given their backgrounds, demobilized and reintegrated ex-guerrillas may be in a 

position to make an important contribution to current and future peace efforts. Schirmer 

noted, “Those ex-guerrilleros with both military experience and political skills, as well as 

experience with negotiating a cease-fire, are often, unsurprisingly, the most able to reach 

across the table and speak frankly and respectfully about delicate issues without raising 

rancor.” 

Finally, and perhaps most important, those engaged in peacemaking and peacebuilding at the local, regional, national, and international levels are primary stakeholders in 

the conflict, and they constitute a tremendous untapped resource whose accumulated 

The international community could 

encourage the Uribe government to initiate a guerrilla-government dialogue.

Any U.S.-Colombia military talks 

would need to take place with 

the approval and knowledge of 

Colombia’s executive branch.
19

experiences—negotiating agreements on humanitarian issues or for conflict mitigation, 

promoting inclusive and participatory governance, promoting regional development, educating for peace and nonviolent conflict resolution, and marginalizing actors advocating 

violence—may hold the keys for transforming Colombia’s conflict. 

LIST OF CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS 

(*indicates paper coauthors or contributors not present at the conference)

• Jesús Abad Colorado, photojournalist, Colombia

• Virginia M. Bouvier, senior program officer, Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace, U.S. Institute of Peace

• Arturo Carrillo, professor, George Washington University Law School; senior adviser, 

USAID

• Enrique Chaux, associate professor, Department of Psychology, Universidad de los 

Andes, Bogotá*

• Juan Cháves, program officer, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 

Bogotá*

• Marc Chernick, research associate professor, Department of Government and Center for 

Latin American Studies, Georgetown University* 

• Ricardo Esquivia, general coordinator, Red Asvidas of Montes de María and Sincelejo; 

coordinator of the Commission of Peace of the Colombian Council of Evangelical 

Churches; member of the National Peace Council of Colombia

• Catalina Garzón, Ph.D. candidate in environmental science, policy, and management, 

University of California-Berkeley

• Adam Isacson, senior associate, Center for International Policy

• Neil Jeffery, former executive director, U.S. Office on Colombia

• James Jones, adjunct professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University

• Sabine Kurtenbach, senior researcher, Instituto de Estudios Iberoamericanos, German 

Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg

• Lt. Col. Robert Levinson, deputy director, U.S. Southcom Field Office, Washington, 

D.C. 

• Christopher Mitchell, emeritus professor, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University

• Javier Moncayo, coordinator, Red Nacional de Programas Regionales de Desarrollo Javier Moncayo, coordinator, Red Nacional de Programas Regionales de Desarrollo 

Integral y Paz, Bogotá*

• Carlo Nasi, associate professor, Political Science Department, Universidad de los Carlo Nasi, associate professor, Political Science Department, Universidad de los 

Andes

• Borja Paladini Adell, Peace and Development adviser/research coordinator, REDES 

Program, UNDP, Bogotá

• Maria Clemencia Ramírez, director, Instituto Colombiano de Antropologia e Historia, Maria Clemencia Ramírez, director, Instituto Colombiano de Antropologia e Historia, 

Bogotá*

• Sara Ramírez, anthropologist and researcher, Justapaz, Bogotá

• Angelika Rettberg, associate professor and director of Peacebuilding Program, Department of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes 

• Catalina Rojas, Ph.D., Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason 

University
• Jorge Rojas, president, Consultancy on Human Rights and Displacement, Bogotá 

• Mary Roldán, associate professor, Department of History, Cornell University

• Raul Rosende, director, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 

Bogotá

• David Rothschild, program officer, Goldman Environmental Foundation, San 

Francisco*

• Jennifer Schirmer, senior researcher, University of Oslo*

• Winifred Tate, anthropologist and fellow, Watson Institute, Brown University*

• Leslie Wirpsa, S.V. Ciriacy Wantrup postdoctoral fellow in natural resource studies, 

Institute of International Studies, University of California-Berkeley

• Ana Maria Velásquez, psychologist, program director, Asesorías Pedagógicas, Bogotá Ana Maria Velásquez, psychologist, program director, Asesorías Pedagógicas, Bogotá

Notes

1. NotiSur, Latin American Data Base 16, no. 9, March 3, 2006. http://ladb.unm.edu.

2. Uribe is the first president in a century to run for reelection in Colombia—allowed by a special ruling of 

the Constitutional Court.

3. In June 2006 the FARC announced its willingness to open a dialogue with the Uribe government.

4. The most recent figures from the White House Office on National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) report a 26 

percent increase from 2004 to 2005 in coca cultivation in Colombia and an accompanying rise in coca 

production in Peru and Bolivia. Associated Press, May 2, 2006. www.ap.org.

5. Marc Chernick to Virginia M. Bouvier, e-mail communication, June 15, 2006.

6. A May 18, 2006, Constitutional Court ruling that still awaits implementation modifies the Justice and 

Peace Law by mandating greater accountability and stiffer sentencing of demobilized ex-combatants and 

requiring full reparations and disclosure of the whereabouts of the “disappeared” to victims’ families.

7. This work draws heavily from that of Mauricio Garcia Duran, Carlos Fernandez, and Fernando Sarmiento, and 

the database of peace initiatives compiled by the Jesuit Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP). 

See www.c-r.org/accord/col/a14spnsh/tablePeaceInit.htmland www.cinep.org.co/datapaz_resumenes.htm.

8. The initiatives were the Association of Peasant Workers of Carare (ATCC), founded in 1987; Peace Communities of Atrato, 1997; Samaniego Peace Territory, 1998; Municipal Constituent Assembly of Mogotes, 1998; 

Association of Municipalities of Alto Ariari, 1999; Municipal Constituent Assembly of Tarso, 2001; Municipal 

Constituent Assembly of Sonsón, 2001; and the Provincial Assembly of Eastern Antioquia, 2002.

9. The first peace laboratory was established in 2002 in the Magdalena River Valley, where civil society had 

developed the Program for Development and Peace in response to the high levels of violence in the region. 

A second peace laboratory has been established in Norte de Santander, Oriente Antioqueño, and Macizo 

Colombiano/Alto Patía, and a third in Montes de María and Meta. 

Of Related Interest

For online editions of special reports visit our Web site (www.usip.org).

Recent Institute reports include:

• Civil Society under Siege in Colombia, by Virginia M. Bouvier (Special Report, February 

2004).

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.