Department of Command, Leadership and Management 

United States Army War College 

Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050 

2nd Edition edited by Colonel Stephen A. Shambach 

Director of Leader Development 

This Primer is the result of several years of research by the faculty of the Department of 

Command, Leadership, and Management. Please forward comments to Colonel George Reed, 

Box 467 (phone: 717-245-3821). 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Preface to 2nd Edition.............................................................................................. ii 

Preface to Original Edition .................................................................................... iii 

Introduction .............................................................................................................1 

Chapter 1. Strategy and Strategic Leadership.........................................................5 

Chapter 2. The Strategic Leadership Environment ..............................................12 

Chapter 3. Strategic Vision ..................................................................................20 

Chapter 4. Strategic Culture .................................................................................30 

Chapter 5. Strategic Leader Competencies ..........................................................37 

Chapter 6. Strategic Leadership Tasks .................................................................44 

Chapter 7. The Strategic Leader and the Human 

 Dimension of Combat.........................................................................52 

Appendix A, Strategic Leadership Competencies ................................................54 

Endnotes ................................................................................................................63 

References..............................................................................................................64 

i
PREFACE TO 2nd EDITION 

The original edition of the Strategic Leadership Primer served the Army War College 

well as a basic overview of Strategic Leadership. Written by Dr. Rod Magee with the 

assistance of several other faculty members, it was intended as an orientation reading for 

students arriving at the Army War College whose background was primarily in the 

tactical and operational field environment. The Primer was useful because there was no 

other adequate work that described and defined strategic leadership in terms that could be 

understood and applied by War College students. Largely written in 1997 and published 

in 1998, the Primer has been well received by internal and external audiences alike. 

As we enter the 21st Century, the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 

11, 2001 and subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have provided the 

impetus for review and revision of the original edition. It is not so much that strategic 

leadership has changed drastically, and much of the original work is retained in this 

edition. Rather, this edition attempts to preserve the salient features of the original 

edition while updating it with contemporary literature, examples and anecdotes to sustain 

the Primer’s relevance and usefulness for perhaps the next 10 years. 

One significant change from the 1998 edition is that Annex A has been changed from 

a list of Strategic-Leader Competencies to a lengthy discussion of competencies based 

primarily on a Strategic Studies Institute monograph, “Strategic Leadership 

Competencies” by Wong, et al, September, 2003. This Annex reviews competencies and 

identifies several metacompetencies that provide a conceptual framework of competency 

“clusters” that is more in line with the style and purpose of this Primer. 

The author acknowledges the tremendous contributions of Dr. Lenny Wong, Colonel 

John Troxell, Colonel Charley Higbee, Dr. Craig Bullis and Colonel George Reed whose 

collaboration was critical to the interdisciplinary usefulness of this Strategic Leadership 

Primer. 

ii
PREFACE TO THE ORIGINAL EDITION 

Strategic Leadership is the “coin of the realm” at the Army’s highest level, and its 

practice is significantly different in scope, effect, and execution than leadership at lower 

levels of the organization. The environment at this level is characterized by the highest 

degrees of uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, as well as tremendous volatility 

(VUCA) due to the compression of time in which the leader must act. Strategic leaders 

find themselves enmeshed in intricate networks of competing constituencies and 

cooperative endeavors that extend beyond their own organization. The strategic leader 

must be an expert, not only in his own domain of warfighting and leading large military 

organizations, but also in the bureaucratic and political environment of the nation’s 

decision-making process. This domain includes a detailed knowledge of, as well as the 

interrelationship among, economics, geopolitics, military, and information. Moreover, the 

leader at this level must interact with a number of actors over which he has minimal 

influence. The successful strategic leader is the quintessential communicator, using all 

means of communication. As the organizational spokesman, the strategic leader is 

constantly required to discuss his/her organization, as well as comfortably interact with 

the media. The leader’s ability to effectively communicate with the media is a harbinger 

of organizational success. Whereas leaders at lower levels of the organization remain 

focused on the short term, strategic leaders must have a “future focus,” spending much of 

their time looking toward the future and positioning the organization for long-term 

success. 

The study of strategic leadership is an enduring concern of the Army as it educates its 

senior officer corps to better execute the Army’s role in contributing to our nation’s 

national security. This “Strategic Leadership Primer” defines strategy and strategic 

leadership in terms of the Army's role in national security. As Figure 1 depicts, strategic 

leaders are the group that ascends to the top of the organization where indirect leadership 

is the norm, and there is increased uncertainty and complexity. 

Throughout our nation's history, the Army has been a powerful strategic force in 

pursuing, achieving, and defending U.S. national security objectives. From the 

Revolutionary War through Desert Storm to current operations other than war and into 

the nation's future, the Army is the entity charged with prosecuting the land war. Only the 

Army with its physical presence, long term if necessary, can satisfy this enduring 

strategic imperative. This document discusses the unique aspects of leading this strategic 

force. This primer is intended to set the stage for a greater understanding and more indepth study of leadership at the top of organizations -- the context, challenges, 

characteristics, and requirements of Strategic Leadership. 

iii
15

Organizational

Leadership

Strategic

Leadership

Direct Leadership

BE KNOW DO

Global/Regional

National/Societal

Perspective

Predominantly "Improving/

Building" in nature

Predominantly "Operating/

Maintaining" in nature

Organizational/Systems

and Processes Perspectives

Climate

Policies

Direction

Culture

Values

Purpose

Cohesion

Procedures

Motivation

Army Values

And Ethics

Leader Actions:

Influencing

Operating

Improving

Individual/Small Group

Task Oriented Perspective

Predominantly "Influencing

and Interpersonal" in nature

Leader Attributes:

Leader Skills:

Mental

Physical

Emotional

Conceptual

Interpersonal

Technical

Tactical

and

Complexity

Trust, Dignity and Respect for Others

Loyalty

Duty

Respect

Selfless Service

Honor

Personal Courage

Figure 1

iv
INTRODUCTION 

It became clear to me that at the age of 58 I would have to learn 

new tricks that were not taught in the military manuals or on the 

battlefield. In this position I am a political soldier and will have to 

put my training in rapping-out orders and making snap decisions 

on the back burner, and have to learn the arts of persuasion and 

guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills.

 George C. Marshall 

 General Marshall is alleged to have made this observation as he reflected upon his 

early years as Chief of Staff of the United States Army (CSA) in the months prior to 

World War II. It is obvious from this comment that Marshall believed that his previous 

education, training, and experience had not adequately prepared him for the leadership 

role he had embarked upon. As the CSA, his success depended upon his ability to 

persuade influential people and organizations, both internal and external to the 

government, employ their efforts on behalf of his vision of a winning wartime strategy 

and mobilize the Army necessary to make that strategy a reality. General Marshall's 

particular insights in this matter support the belief that beyond the direct and 

organizational levels is a third level of leadership, the strategic level. 

 General Marshall seems to have intuitively understood that the development of a 

national strategy and acquiring the associated force structure along with integrating our 

industrial capabilities to accomplish that strategy requires a complex decision-making 

structure at national and even international levels. Since the time of Marshall, the 

political complexity of these national and international decision-making structures has 

continued to grow. To be effective in the strategic arena senior military leaders and their 

staffs must fully understand the nation’s strategic vision and strategy formulation process, 

as well as appreciate the environment and the cultures in which they must operate, the 

competencies they must develop, and finally the tasks they must perform. The operating 

environment of the strategic leader is one in which an uncertain future is translated into a 

visionary but achievable future. The changes and initiatives necessary to get from the 

uncertain to the visionary future are then incorporated into a strategy that articulates the 

"ends, ways, and means.” This must be accomplished in a world where the threats are 

both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherently unpredictable, and where our 

capability to defend and promote our national interests may be restricted by political, 

diplomatic, informational and economic constraints. In short, it is an environment marked 

by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). 

The Army War College defines the strategic art as: "The skillful formulation, 

coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action) and means 

(supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests." The skills necessary 

1
for mastering the strategic art fall under three general categories: strategic leader,

strategic theorist, and strategic practitioner. 

The Strategic Leader provides strategic vision and focus, masters command and peer 

leadership skills, inspires others to think and act, and coordinates ends, ways, and means.1

The Strategic Theorist develops strategic concepts and theories, integrates all elements 

of power and components of national security, studies the history of warfare, teaches and 

mentors the strategic art, and formulates ends, ways, and means. The Strategic 

Practitioner develops and executes strategic plans, employs force and other dimensions 

of power, unifies military and nonmilitary activities through command and peer 

leadership skills, and applies ends, ways and means. 

THE MASTER OF THE STRATEGIC ART ... 

INTEGRATES AND COMBINES THREE ROLES

Strategic 

Leader

Roles

Strategic Strategic Practitioner

Theorist

Skills:

•Provides vision and focus

•Masters command and 

peer leadership skills

•Inspires others to think

and act

•Coordinates ends, ways, 

and means

Skills:

•Develops and executes strategic

plans 

•Employs force and other

dimensions of power

•Unifies activities through 

command and leadership skills

•Grasps all levels of war and 

strategy Skills:

•Develops strategic concepts

and theories

•Integrates elements of power

•Studies history of warfare

•Teaches strategic art

•Formulates ends, ways, and means

•Applies ends, ways and means 

 

Figure 2.

It is rare that one person alone is the master of all these components. A few are 

strategic leaders by virtue of their position or responsibility, but strategic leadership does 

not reside exclusively in the person of the leader. Strategic leadership is a shared 

responsibility within the organization, including staff and others. The reality is that only 

one or two percent will ever attain strategic leadership rank or position. But, anyone in a 

staff position working for a strategic leader should be well-trained as a strategic thinker 

or they cannot adequately support the leader. Effective strategic leadership cannot 

reside merely in the person of one leader. Effective leadership is a function of the 

interaction of the leader, those being led or influenced (inside and outside of the 

organization) and the situation or circumstances facing the organization. The complexity 

2
of these relationships and interactions determine the effectiveness of strategic leadership 

for the organization. Therefore, the focus of this Primer is on the concept of strategic 

leadership, rather than the strategic leader as a single person. 

We speak of the strategic level of leadership to differentiate it from the tactical and 

operational level of leadership. Army Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, speaks to 

these different levels as separate and distinct entities. In practice, the lines between these 

levels are not sharply drawn. It is apparent that increased communications, technology, 

globalization and the media, as well as the contemporary operating environment within 

which military forces operate, are blurring these lines as never before. Some have 

suggested that this blurring is to the extent that even corporals at the lowest 

organizational level are exercising strategic leadership. While the most junior person’s 

actions have strategic impact and implications, this is a very different thing from 

exercising strategic leadership. The point is that, more than ever, it is important that every 

level of the organization have an understanding and appreciation of strategic leadership, 

its responsibilities, functions and impacts on the organization. Building this appreciation 

and education in the organization are primary responsibilities of the strategic leader who 

is responsible to shape the climate and culture by vision, policy, communication, 

education, coaching, mentoring and personal example. 

 In our constitutionally divided political system where decision making authority is 

separated from the process of resource allocation, the development and implementation 

of strategy are inherently more difficult. The process of crafting and executing a coherent 

national security strategy and a national military strategy is as much political as it is 

analytical. Invariably, multiple strategic visions compete for influence and resources. 

Under the best of circumstances strategy formulation and implementation are heavily 

influenced by parochial interests, bureaucratic conflict, negotiation, and ultimately 

compromise. We essentially do what we can agree to do since rational decision making in 

a democracy is based on seeking consensus among competing visions and interests. 

 The strategic decision making process extends beyond the President and Secretary of 

Defense, to which the military is subordinate, and even Congress which provides the 

financial resources. Strategic leaders and the strategy formulation and execution process 

operate within the boundaries of what Clausewitz described as the "remarkable trinity"--

the government (executive and legislative branches), the military, and the people. 

Strategy, in both war and peace, that does not achieve a consensus of support from each 

of these three elements of a nation-state, especially in a democracy, is most vulnerable to 

failure. 

 While the need for senior officers to transition to the strategic level of leadership is 

clearly recognized, the leadership skills and qualities developed at the direct and 

organizational levels are still important. The strategic leader must still exercise direct 

leadership of his subordinate commanders and staff. At the same time, the strategic leader 

is also an executive who must manage and lead a very large and complex organization. 

The strategic leader represents the organization to the external environment and is 

responsible for shaping the external environment to help the organization accomplish its 

3
vision and purpose. More than any other level of leadership, strategic leadership operates 

in good measure with other organizations, agencies and nations in a proactive manner to 

further the success of the organization. At the same time, the leader cannot neglect the 

internal environment of the organization. Though the primary focus is outward, the leader 

must also tend to the internal organizational environment. Excessive focus inside or 

outside the organization will detract from organizational success and perhaps even 

viability. The key to a successful transition to strategic leadership is an appreciation for 

the dramatic increase in scope of leadership responsibilities, an understanding of the 

unique nature of these increased responsibilities, and the dedication of effort necessary to 

understand and influence the challenging and dynamic environment in which these 

leadership responsibilities must be executed. It is incumbent upon strategic leaders and 

their staffs, not only to understand the strategic environment, but to exercise strategic 

leadership competencies that will foster accomplishment of their vision within that 

complex environment. 

...the hierarchical position of leaders within their own system is of 

 limited value, because some of the most critically important tasks require 

 lateral leadership--- boundary-crossing leadership—involving groups 

 over whom they have no control. They must exercise leader like influence 

 beyond the system over which they preside. They must do what they can 

 to lead without authority. (bold added for emphasis)2 

 

4
 CHAPTER 1

STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

Strategy is the art and science of developing and using political, economic, 

psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford 

the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and 

favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. 

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms 

Strategic leadership is the process used by a leader to affect the achievement of 

a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational 

culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and 

building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global 

environment which is marked by opportunities and threats.

 US Army War College definition 

Executive leadership: The set of activities directed toward the development and 

management of the organization as a whole, including all of its subcomponents, 

to reflect long-range policies and purposes that have emerged from the 

executive leader’s interactions within and interpretations of the organization’s 

external environment. 

Stephen Zaccaro 

 The search for national security strategy periodically opens major policy debates that 

push us in new, sometimes revolutionary directions. Dramatic changes in the 

international environment have forced us to reevaluate old strategies and look for new 

focal points amidst the still unsettled debris of a post-9/11 world. At issue for the Army’s 

strategic leaders is the role of the United States Army in a new world and our capabilities 

to defend and promote our national interests in a new environment where threats are both 

diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent, yet unpredictable. 

5
 The US Army War College defines strategic art as the skillful formulation, 

coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to promote and defend the 

nation's interests. The strategy paradigm comprised of "ends, ways, and means" has 

almost universal applicability. It defines objectives, identifies courses of action to achieve 

them, and provides the resources to support each course of action. The relationships 

among these elements of strategy allow for planning and the debating of alternative 

strategic visions and calculations. This paradigm and its application to national strategy 

and to military strategy are taught to senior military officers at every service college. 

 The creative core of strategy is the calculated relationship of ends and means. But in 

the complex decision-making structures of a modern nation-state and the proliferation of 

non-state actors, who defines the ends, who provides the means, and who is responsible 

for the calculated relationships between the two? Strategy as a rational, calculating 

process is possible only when a single vision dominates or is shared at every stage of the 

paradigm. In a politically fragmented system in which decision-making authority is 

constitutionally separated from the process of resource allocation, the search for strategy 

is difficult. It is not a scientific enterprise wherein success depends solely on expertise 

and the systematic analysis of data. Instead, multiple strategic visions compete for 

influence and resources. Under the best of circumstances (a consensus on interests, 

objectives, and threats), strategy formulation is an intensely political process, heavily 

influenced by parochial interests, conflict, bargaining, personal leadership skills, and 

ultimately compromise. We do what we can agree to do; decision making in a democracy 

is the ability to harmonize competing strategic visions and interests. That assumption 

forms the major thesis of this document: Strategic leaders must be experts in their 

domain and in the bureaucratic and political environment of the decision-making process 

in a democracy.

In addition to domestic or internal influences on strategic decision-makers, the 

strategic vision that they proclaim and the strategy designed to achieve that vision must 

be applied in a complex and uncertain international arena. In our contemporary operating 

environment, increased interdependence as a result of globalization, coupled with 

changing alliances reacting to differing threat perceptions, makes the search for an 

effective strategy extremely challenging. International organizations and other non-state 

actors, such as global terrorist or criminal networks, further complicate the process. All 

of these actors are pursuing their own strategies and interests. The concurrent pursuit of 

competing strategies highlights the dynamic nature of the strategy formulation process. 

The other side gets a vote! Thus, a developed strategy must always be assessed, 

reevaluated, and readjusted as necessary. The on-going challenge of developing and 

articulating a coherent strategy for the war on terrorism is an example of the complex 

nature of this process. 

THE SEARCH FOR GRAND STRATEGY. 

The evolution of the United States as an independent nation coincided with a new era 

in warfare marked by the democratization and industrialization of war and its growing 

complexity and impact on the Clausewitzian Trinity. At the same time, the vagaries of 

6
history and geography combined to give Americans a distinct attitude toward national 

security. For much of its existence, the U.S. lay sheltered behind broad oceans. The 

balance of power abroad ensured its insularity and reinforced the premise, basic in 

American foreign policy, that alliances were contrary to its national interests. With 

generally friendly neighbors on both borders, the nation benefited from "free security" 

and could early on define its security in terms of its contiguous frontiers and boundaries. 

As a consequence, absolutist ideas of national security took hold. Distinctions 

between war and peace normally were hard and fast. There were decent intervals between 

wars, and the nation knew when it was at war and when it was at peace. Soldiers would 

conduct war; their civilian superiors make peace. To most Americans, war represented an 

unwelcome disturbance of normal peace and progress. The whole tradition regarding war 

was to hold it off as long as possible--a tradition that led first to declare, then to prepare. 

The meanings of the terms "victory" and "winning" were clear. Once the nation became 

involved in war, the disturber of peace must be thrashed like a bully, given punishment to 

fit the crime, and the nation returned to its normal pursuits as quickly as possible. 

Historically, up to World War II most American military strategy in war had been 

generally self-contained--that is, military and political objectives could be meshed 

simply. Either there had been no real political threat (the Indian Wars), or the military 

and political threat coincided (Germany in World War I). 

If the United States concentrated its energies on military victory and the immediate 

foe was decisively beaten, the assumption was the political threat would subside. But in 

World War II a new political factor was introduced. The more thoroughly the immediate 

European enemy, Germany, was beaten, the greater loomed another threat - the half-ally, 

the Soviet Union. The United States found itself confronted in victory with an expansive 

power whose conflicting national postwar aims had been cloaked by the common military 

enemy faced in World War II. The final result of World War II was the beginning of the 

Cold War. 

The central strategic reality of the Cold War security environment was the geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. A second reality 

was the development of atomic and then thermonuclear weapons by each of the 

competing superpowers. The geo-political competition spawned a grand strategy for the 

United States and the West expressed in theory and in practice by the concept of 

containment. Containment quickly grew to encompass other nations which lined up 

(voluntarily or involuntarily) on one side or the other of this geo-political divide. 

Alliance building played a major part in implementing the grand strategy of containment, 

particularly in regards to NATO and the U.S.-Japanese mutual defense treaty. The vast 

nuclear arsenals on either side of this rivalry caused states to rely on deterrence to 

maintain a relatively stable international order. Nuclear deterrence was based on 

offensive nuclear forces and a fairly sophisticated understanding between the adversaries 

of each other’s capabilities and motives derived from extensive intelligence and adequate 

communication. 

7
The security environment went through a dramatic transformation after the end of the 

Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The threat of large-scale nuclear war has 

largely receded and the United States has become the sole remaining superpower. 

Coupled with this are the twin phenomenon of accelerating economic interaction and the 

information technology revolution, known as globalization. In the midst of sorting out the 

post-Cold War security environment, the shock of 9/11 has only added to the complexity 

and urgency of rethinking the organizing principles of the international order. 

The dominant power position of the United States and the excesses of globalization 

attributed to U.S. policy provide more than sufficient motivation for discontents to 

challenge America. In addition, several of the technological advances associated with 

globalization have contributed to the means available to the most serious and threatening 

challengers. John Lewis Gaddis commented on the burgeoning dark side of 

globalization: 

It was held to be a good thing that capital, commodities, ideas, and people could 

move freely across boundaries. There was little talk, though, of an alternative 

possibility: that danger might move just as freely. It was as if we had convinced 

ourselves that the new world of global communications had somehow transformed 

an old aspect of human nature, which is the tendency to harbor grievances and 

sometimes to act upon them.

3

The principle security threats to the United States today are unconventional in nature 

and seek to respond to America’s massive conventional force superiority in asymmetric 

ways. The lesson of the Persian Gulf War, Kosovo, and most recently in Afghanistan and 

Iraq is that no nation-state can afford to oppose the United States in a symmetrical 

manner with heavy Army divisions or tactical fighter planes. The two asymmetric 

options of most concern are the use of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. 

Writing more than three years before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, three 

noted national security practitioners addressed the prospects of a successful terrorist 

attack using weapons of mass destruction. “Such an attack of catastrophic terrorism 

would be a watershed event in American history... Like Pearl Harbor, this event would 

divide our past and future into a before and after.”4

 They subtitled the opening section of 

the article as Imagining the Transforming Event. Unfortunately, such an event no longer 

has to be imagined. Although operating below the threshold of WMD, the Al Qaeda 

terrorist network was able to cause massive destruction and loss of life. The response of 

the United States and the world has been dramatic and events continue to unfold that 

point toward a transformation of the international state system and the grand strategic 

logic of the sole remaining super power. 

In the 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush outlined the new direction for 

U.S. grand strategy, “America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are protected 

from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.” The 

September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) 

highlighted the three strategic implications of this new age of terror: U.S. vulnerability, 

8
and the need to respond with both offensive and defensive measures. Most assessments 

view this NSS as the most transformational grand strategy since containment and 

deterrence were institutionalized during the Cold War. According to John Ikenberry: 

“These radical strategic ideas and impulses [the Bush NSS] could transform today’s 

world order in a way that the end of the Cold War, strangely enough, did not.” John 

Lewis Gaddis shares that view, “President George W. Bush’s national security strategy 

could represent the most sweeping shift in U.S. grand strategy since the beginning of the 

Cold War.” This is the environment, and these are some of the challenges that today’s 

strategic leaders must operate in and address. 

THE ROAD AHEAD: VISIONING, CHANGE, AND CONTINUITY. 

First, strategic leadership during periods of historic transformation need not require a 

detailed or perfect road map to the future. The post-September 11, 2001 period, for 

example, is too much in flux for that. Having vision can also mean acknowledging that 

historic changes have taken place as the result of our sudden victory in the Cold War and 

the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), giving voice to their impact, and galvanizing the 

bureaucracy, the Congress, and the nation to debate new issues and challenges. Strategic 

leadership is as much about asking the right questions as it is promoting preferred 

solutions. 

Second, articulating strategic vision, however tentative the vision may be, is made 

difficult by the unrealistic American concept of victory. To Americans, victory connotes 

that both a struggle and U.S. involvement have ended, preferably in some unconditional 

and final form. Military victory, for example, is symbolized by Marines raising the flag 

on Mt. Suribachi or by governments signing the documents of unconditional surrender or 

pulling down the statue of a dictator in a public square. Victory in hot wars or cold ones 

means that we can withdraw, that our responsibilities have ended, and that our interests 

are secure. Certainly the situation in Iraq in 2004 is a clear example of the difficulty of 

determining victory. Military “victory” may not endure if the stability and support 

operations do not result in achieving a coalition force’s goals or ends. 

Good strategy does not recognize the concept of victory as a conclusion. 

There are no absolute victories; there are only phases in a permanent struggle to 

promote and defend our national interests. At each phase, threats are defeated or 

recede, the international system reconfigures as old powers decline and new powers 

rise; and at home, resources are redistributed in support of priorities and strategies. 

But neither the international nor the domestic political systems are static. Only the 

nation's interests remain relatively constant, requiring new strategies for their 

promotion and defense. 

National security strategy requires the permanent management of the nation's 

interests through the planning and application of political, economic, informational and 

military strategies. Collectively they constitute classical Grand Strategy. What we now 

describe as national security strategy relates to the third concept concerning uniting the 

strategy and political paradigms into a coherent plan of action. The concept of victory as 

9
an end state feeds the natural tension between domestic and foreign policy. This tension 

manifests itself in the debate for resource allocation. Simply stated, every dollar invested 

in external security is a dollar not available to meet a domestic security requirement and 

vice versa. This attitude is, to a large degree, the fault of strategists themselves who 

traditionally promoted threat-based rather than interest-based strategies. 

A comprehensive interest-based strategy recognizes that grand strategy bridges the 

gap between foreign and domestic policies in a world in which domestic prosperity is 

now directly linked to global activism and status. The national security strategy 

recognizes the organic relationship between foreign and domestic interests and 

coordinates political, economic, and military power in the pursuit of those interests. The 

most telling symptom that strategic consensus has broken down is a debate that puts 

domestic and military spending on a zero-sum collision course. By contrast, strategic 

vision is the ability to articulate a national security strategy that coordinates the allocation 

of resources to all elements of power--political, economic, and military. 

The Cold War marked the first time in American history that our strategic leaders 

were forced to deal with the essential paradox of grand strategy faced by the Roman 

Empire and other great powers in the intervening centuries: Si vis pacem, para bellum--if 

you want peace, prepare for war. This is a paradox that still exists for the United States in 

the current post-9/11period, in which a national security strategy of American 

internationalism is supported by a national military strategy focused on protect, prevent 

and prevail with the operational imperative of having to execute multiple contingencies 

as well as stability and support operations. The key to the success of these strategies still 

remains the creation of a reasonably instrumental relationship between national ends, 

ways, and means. 

 What constitutes "reasonable" in terms of national security in the coming years will 

depend, as it always has in American history, on the interworkings of the elements of the 

Clausewitzian Trinity--the government, the people, and the army [military]--which must 

integrate domestic and international politics. This means, in turn, that civilian and 

military strategic leadership will have to work harder in this post-9/11 period to build a 

consensus among the American people concerning the increasingly more complex 

concept of national security. Patience, perseverance, and endurance in the face of 

protracted conflict without prospects of clear victory is assuredly a lesson of the Cold 

War. The relatively short and bloodless operational successes of coalition forces in 

Desert Storm and Bosnia have created expectations among the people that strategic 

victory is quickly and easily achieved. Now, in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

patience, perseverance and endurance are once again important in shaping strategy. 

There is a growing awareness on the part of the American people that the United 

States faces a situation in the post-9/11 period similar to that which, in Edward Luttwak's 

description, confronted the Roman Empire in its later stages: 

10
The Romans did not face a single enemy, or even a fixed group of enemies, 

 whose ultimate defeat would ensure permanent security. Regardless of the 

amplitude of Roman victories, the frontiers of the empire would always 

 remain under attack, since they were barriers in the path of secular 

 migration flows from north to south and from east to west. Hence Roman 

 strategy could not usefully aim at total victory at any cost, for the threat 

 was not temporary but endless. The only rational goal was the maintenance 

 of a minimally adequate level of security at the lowest feasible cost to society.5 

11
CHAPTER 2 

THE STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP ENVIRONMENT 

Environment: The aggregate of social and cultural conditions that 

influence...life....

Webster's Third 

International Dictionary 

Owen Jacobs, in his book “Strategic Leadership: The Competitive Edge”, describes 

the external environment as filled with Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and 

Ambiguity, hence the acronym “VUCA.” Some authors describe the work of the 

strategic leader as understanding, interpreting and mastering this environment. Jacobs 

suggests that it is virtually impossible to have complete knowledge about the factors 

governing strategic decisions. Decisions must be made with incomplete understanding 

and with the associated risk that brings. 

Volatility refers to the rate of change of information and the rate of change of the 

situation. A rapidly changing environment calls for adaptive and innovative decisionmaking. Power and wealth set the stage for competition over finite resources. Both the 

nature and the means of competition are changing rapidly, driven on the “hard” side by 

technology and on the “soft” side by increasingly easy communication. Some change 

seems short-term and explosive, but often that is because it was unanticipated. We must 

have a better way of anticipating the future. 

Uncertainty stems from the inability to know everything about the current situation 

and the difficulty of predicting what the effects of a proposed change today will be on the 

future. It can also arise because decision-makers do not have good “intelligence” 

gathering operations. And, it can arise from deception; competitors seek to gain 

advantage by achieving surprise. With uncertainty, strategic leaders must be willing to 

take measured and prudent risks, be able to assess risk accurately and develop risk 

management strategies. 

Complexity differs from uncertainty, though its effects may sometimes be similar. At 

the strategic level, there are an enormous number of factors that have causal bearing on a 

given situation. The web of cause and effect linkages-- second, third, and multiple-order 

effects have become more complex in our globalized, technologically connected world. 

The temptation to reach for short term solutions and pressure to address symptoms 

quickly are compelling. Competing demands of various constituencies with strategic 

influence further add to the complexity facing the leader. So, system complexity affects 

the ability of the strategic leader to formulate and execute effective policy. Determination 

of cause and effect relationships is made more difficult because of the lag time between 

12
cause and effect in complex systems. Often, things get worse in the short term before 

they get better in the long run. 

Ambiguity exists when a decision maker does not understand the significance of a 

given event or situation—doesn’t know what is happening. It can occur when leaders 

have insufficient mental models and observed events “don’t make sense”. Ambiguity can 

also occur when an event can legitimately be interpreted in more than one way. 

Vulnerability to misinterpretation of events in complex situations is high when decisions 

are centralized, decision pressure is high, the decision maker is powerful and the decision 

maker acts alone. This appears to be a recipe for disaster. The likelihood of good 

strategic decisions is greater when the leader creates a climate that promotes a 

questioning attitude of the obvious and encourages multiple perspectives that differ from 

his/her own. 

 Large, complex organizations consist of intricate networks of staff, functional, and 

operating components. These components interact with each other and with external 

entities, which are equally as complex, to achieve organizational goals. A strategic 

leader is an individual, who not only has organizational leadership responsibility, but 

who must also represent his or her organization in the necessary interaction with that 

maze of other entities that constitute the organization's external environment. Strategic 

and organizational leaders must conceptually envision a direction for their organization 

and then shape the flow of internal and the influence of external events toward that 

future. With the VUCA environment, this is increasingly a collective rather than 

individual effort. Seldom does any one individual alone have sufficient knowledge to 

adequately develop the organizational vision. 

 Thus, the strategic leadership environment consists of both internal and external 

complexities that directly and indirectly affect the resourcing, structuring, and 

operational performance of the organization. The dynamics of a changing threat, the 

changes in international coalitions, the shifting of public attitudes, the rapid advances in 

technology, the election of new governments, the fluctuation of national budgets, and 

the evolution of new missions make the challenges of strategic leadership that much 

more difficult. The only constant in the strategic environment is the continuous 

acceleration of the rate of change, which gives rise to greater uncertainties. 

 The complexities of the strategic environment often make identification of the origin 

and cause of external influences a difficult process. The magnitude and pace of external 

change serves to enhance the complexity of the environment and to give rise to greater 

organizational uncertainty. The organization feels the effects of change; but, without 

effective strategic leadership, the organization is incapable of adapting to that 

environment to its own benefit. 

 It is essential that the strategic leader be aware of what is happening within the 

crosscurrents of the organization's external environment. The leader must also understand 

the dynamics of why it is happening and be consistently alert for the opportunities to 

influence such events as may be required in furtherance of organizational goals. The 

13
strategic leader must develop an association and rapport with a network of 

knowledgeable individuals in those external agencies and entities that influence the 

organization. It is also essential that a strategic leader's staff develop similar networks of 

contacts at the working level to assure that this multiplicity of networks runs like a root 

system throughout the external environment. A strategic leader cannot influence external 

events unless the organization is in timely receipt of relevant information, appreciates the 

context and significance of such information, and understands the right pressure points 

where education and persuasion can most effectively be applied in order to influence 

events for the benefit of the organization. 

With an understanding of the external environment and with the development of an 

established network therein, the strategic leader is in a position to intelligently adapt to 

that environment. To adapt, the strategic leader uses the access that his or her position 

accords and applies the communicative arts of education and persuasion. Over time, the 

strategic leader must build consensus with key stakeholders to make the achievement of 

a strategic vision and associated organizational goals a reality. In undertaking such 

consensus building, the strategic leader must be willing to compromise as necessary. 

Partial achievement of organizational objectives is clearly preferable to no achievement 

at all. In most instances a more complete achievement can be attained at some later 

time as the dynamics of the external environment shift favorably. The art of shaping the 

environment can be illustrated by the approach of former Joint Chief of Staff James 

Forrestal: 

Forrestal's handling of the complicated and politically explosive 

contracting problem is a representative example of his administrative

method. By patient persuasion, by pushing an idea informally, by 

implementing it on a trial basis, he gradually built a favorable consensus , 

which he then formalized. Although brusque in manner and outwardly 

impatient, he was in fact both patient and persistent in pursuing 

consultations and negotiations with those who disagreed with him. He was 

confident that demonstrated workability plus frequent, well-timed 

restatement of the facts in face-to-face discussion, as one reasonable 

person to another, could usually produce a decision acceptable to all 

parties.6

The aspects and elements of the external environment that characteristically have had 

the greatest impact upon the Army as an institution can be categorized as follows: 

threats, international alliances, national cultures, public opinion, federal budget, 

technological factors, federal government, private organizations and internal 

environment. It is incumbent upon the strategic leader to develop a sophisticated 

understanding of each so that the requisite vision for the organization's future can be 

effectively developed and the external environment influenced to achieve the long-range 

accomplishment of that vision. We will briefly discuss each of these environmental 

factors and their impact on the Army below. 

14
THREATS.

 Of all the variables in the external environment, those with the most effect on our 

national security are armed threats to our national interests. Since 9/11, there has been a 

dramatic increase in regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies, terrorist activities, 

weapons proliferation, and drug trafficking. Regional instabilities that threaten our 

national interests or threaten the lives of our citizens living abroad will require us to 

unilaterally, multilaterally, or within the United Nations framework, employ military 

forces in a variety of hostile and non-hostile circumstances. 

 The employment of the military in contingency, stability and support operations, 

peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations as part of a 

joint or combined force is an ever-present likelihood. Unfortunately, the volatile and 

dynamic nature of post-9/11 regional instabilities offers strategic planners an abundance 

of uncertainties as the only constant in this most complex of international security 

environments. It is at best difficult and at worst impossible to predict with any reliability 

which nations or groups in this world may threaten our interests or how and when such 

threats may emerge. Strategic leaders must ensure that their organizations remain ready 

to respond to worldwide challenges across the range of military operations as part of a 

joint and/or combined force. 

INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES. 

The requirement to operate effectively in the international environment demands an 

international perspective and an understanding of the various political, economic, and 

cultural factors that influence decision-making in other countries. Combined operations 

in alliance or coalition circumstances, or under the auspices of the United Nations, are 

commonplace. The current influence of radical religious groups, transnational threats and 

non-state actors further complicates the ability to form strategic alliances. As such, 

strategic leaders must be aware of who potential enemies may be, who may share 

common interests in addressing an international threat, what alliances and relationships 

exist among and between involved factions, and what the political and diplomatic 

dynamics of the situation may be both internationally and domestically. Strategic leaders 

must also be aware that the successful conduct of combined operations requires a 

particular sensitivity to the impact the deployment of United States forces may have on 

the laws, traditions, and customs of a host country. 

NATIONAL CULTURE.

Our military is a part of our society and, as such, is affected by the influences that 

mold our societal values and perceptions. Strategic leaders must appreciate that the 

various armed forces as organizations cannot survive if they isolate and remove 

themselves from the society they serve. The military services can and should mirror the 

highest ideals of our society and set standards of conduct that require the total dedication 

15
and commitment of those who serve in their ranks. But, in the final analysis, they must 

always be a part of our social fabric. An Army that reflects the beliefs and values of 

American society will inevitably maintain the respect and trust of that society. On the 

other hand, events such as the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib in 2004 and 

scandals at our military academies can quickly erode the confidence of Americans and 

the international community about America’s ideals and conduct.

PUBLIC OPINION.

Strategic leaders must consistently examine their anticipated decisions and actions 

and the impact such decisions and actions may have on the mood of the public, on 

advocacy groups, on elements of society likely to be affected, to include their own 

organizations, and on the media. The media attempts to provide a balanced view of the 

military as an institution. The media in the United States and most other democratic 

countries believe they are doing the best for society. However, they are in the business of 

satisfying the public's desire for news that will attract readers and viewers. The media is 

going to report the news, so it is incumbent upon the strategic leader to consider how best 

to provide information and work with the media for mutual benefit. The media can 

rapidly and dramatically affect world opinion, policy, and ultimately strategy. 

Strategic leaders must be skilled in information operations and strategic 

communications. They must proactively work to inform both foreign and domestic 

audiences concerning the Armed Services as organizations and the missions they 

perform. Credibility is the strategic leader’s greatest asset in developing trust with the 

public and the press. Strategic leaders will be more successful when they are able to use a 

multitude of communicative channels to explain how the organization’s operations are 

furthering national goals. In an era of instant communications and 24-hour news cycles, 

the strategic leader must be able to manage meaning, be able to “tell stories” and 

articulate organizational purpose and action to a world-wide audience. The greatest asset 

a strategic leader has is the general confidence of the public in the Armed Forces of the 

United States.. The American people do not expect a perfect military. What they do 

expect is a competent military with leadership that deals with problems, takes care of its 

sons and daughters and meets the needs of our nation. 

FEDERAL BUDGET. 

The dynamics of the federal budgeting process strongly influences decision making at 

the strategic level. Competition for scarce resources among the multiple claimants at the 

national level is intense. Interest on the national debt, entitlement programs, and the 

budgetary desires of each department of government combine to stress the federal budget 

well in excess of our nation's economic ability to resource these demands. Within the 

Department of Defense, there are far more requirements than financial resources to meet 

them. Within the context of the Department of Defense planning, programming, and 

budgeting process, strategic leaders are expected to be advocates for the legitimate 

requirements of their organizations and to provide candid assessments of the risks and 

16
consequences of various programming and budgeting alternatives. To be effective in this 

national system of resource allocation, the strategic leader must understand the planning, 

programming, and budgeting process of the Department of Defense, the role of the Office 

of Management and Budget, and the Congressional Authorization and Appropriation 

Process. 

TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS. 

U.S. forces must leverage information technology and innovative networkcentric concepts of operations to develop increasingly capable joint forces. 

New information and communications technologies hold promise for 

networking highly distributed joint and multinational forces. 

 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 

Across the range of military operations, technological developments have continued 

to have significant effects on the capability of the Army to perform its various missions. 

Technology has given our strategic leaders significant advantages in networking, 

command and control, situational awareness, and in fielding overwhelming and decisive 

combat power. 

 The technological revolution in warfare has dramatically increased the tempo of 

operations, the rapidity of maneuver, the precision of firepower, the processing of 

critical information, and the complexities of command. Technology has also enhanced 

the ability of the Army to effectively function in a joint, interagency, and multi-national 

operational environment. Strategic leaders must possess a broad understanding of 

relevant military technologies and understand how advancements in each of these 

technologies can be incorporated into Army organizations, doctrine, and equipment to 

permit continued advancements in combat effectiveness and efficiency. 

Technology is a two-edged sword. With increased capability also comes new and 

different vulnerabilities. The asymmetric nature of future warfare requires the leader to 

not only understand the capabilities of new technologies, but also the vulnerabilities. 

These vulnerabilities can and will be exploited by a determined adversary. 

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

 Since the military is subject to civilian government control, strategic leaders must 

proactively involve themselves with numerous executive, legislative, and judicial 

organizations and agencies. The military plays a key advisory role in the development of 

the national security strategy, the national military strategy, and in the development of 

legislation affecting the administration of the Armed Forces. Within the parameters of 

such directive guidance and force of law, strategic leaders develop the necessary 

strategies, plans, and policies to support and implement President, Secretary of Defense 

and Congressional intent. 

17
 Strategic leaders frequently provide counsel to civilian executive authorities and 

are routinely called upon to testify before committees and subcommittees of both 

houses of Congress. Additionally, decisions made by strategic leaders can be subject to 

judicial review by Federal Courts. A critical task that a strategic leader must perform 

well is the development of an understanding and an ability to influence the interagency 

process. The multiplicity of external elements within the Federal Government directly 

and indirectly impact upon the operations and administration of the military both in the 

present and future. 

PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS.

Many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private and Volunteer 

Organizations (PVOs) have become key components of the contemporary operating 

environment that influence the strategy development and policy process. Strategic leaders 

frequently interact with representatives of these organizations and must ensure that such 

interactions remain within the parameters of policy guidance and ethical conduct. The 

manner in which the military’s strategic leadership leverages these organizations can 

spell the difference in effectively shaping change. 

THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT. 

In many ways the internal environments of the Army and the national military 

structure are just as complex and demanding as the external environment. It would be 

impractical to describe all the organizations, systems, and subsystems that exist at the 

strategic level within and among the Services, the combatant commands, international 

commands, the Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense. Nor is it practical to describe 

the multitude of interlocking relationships, lines of communication, and operating 

dynamics. Suffice it to say that the strategic leader must interact within this complex 

internal arena to assure that his or her efforts to chart a future path for the Army can be 

effectively institutionalized both in policy and in culture. 

SUMMARY.

It is strategic leadership that transcends the organization by orchestrating internal 

events, in concert with personal and organizational influence on the external 

environment, to achieve an organizational vision. Unfortunately, the internal and external 

environments are volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous arenas. Consequently, it is 

the strategic leader who must develop the networks necessary to know what is happening 

within the environment, to appreciate why such events are or will happen, and to discern 

how best to influence events for the benefit of the organization. Strategic leaders must 

continuously apply themselves to building consensus for organizational goals among key 

stakeholders in the environment who have the individual or collective ability to mold 

events essential to the achievement of the organizational vision. Those elements within 

the environment that have characteristically had the greatest impact on the Army include: 

the threat, international alliances, our national culture, public opinion, the federal 

18
budgeting process, technology, our national system of government, private organizations, 

and the internal organization of our Services and the Department of Defense. To be 

successful, the strategic leader must remain a perpetual student of the environment and 

remain constantly engaged in the process of adapting to that environment. 

19
CHAPTER 3 

STRATEGIC VISION 

Where there is no vision, the people perish. 

The Bible, Proverbs 29:18 

Strategic leaders develop and communicate a compelling, understandable strategic 

vision for the organization. That strategic vision is a means of focusing effort and 

progressing toward a desired future--what ought to be. While the vision is an image of 

a future state, it is also a process the organization uses to guide future development. An 

effective vision also requires an implementing strategy or plan to ensure its attainment-

-how to get there. 

Creating the vision is a collaborative effort, with strategic leaders at the focal point of 

origin. Their competencies, coupled with the authority of their position, bestow upon 

strategic leaders the unique responsibility and opportunity to establish the long-term 

strategic intent and objectives of the organization. A strategic vision, properly articulated, 

can last for decades as illustrated by the following: 

We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; 

that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; 

that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to 

secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their 

just powers from the consent of the governed... 

Declaration of Independence 

OUR NATIONAL VISION

 Visioning is truly a creative process. It brings together known information and new 

ideas, integrates these ideas with future technologies and organizational requirements, 

and blends them into an innovative product. Therefore, the word "create" is purposefully 

used here. In the process of visioning, leaders forecast the future pragmatically and 

realistically. They then develop the image of "what ought to be" for the organization to 

position it for success in a futuristic environment. 

I believe this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before 

this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him 

safely to earth. 

 John Fitzgerald Kennedy 

20
Once a desired future or vision has been postulated, strategic leaders create a bridge 

to the future by means of a strategy and plans. They develop ends (objectives), ways 

(concepts), and means (resources) to achieve the vision. Obviously, overt definable 

objectives make vision attainment more recognizable when it occurs. Definable 

objectives also provide a way of measuring and evaluating movement toward vision 

achievement. "Strategy" is the crossover mechanism between the forecast future and the 

envisioned future. 

 Strategic leaders identify diverse sources of information both inside and outside the 

organizational environment and integrate this information into a strategy for change. 

The history, culture, and values of the organization; future trends in society and in the 

world; the relationship of the organization with other organizations; and the role of the 

organization within the environment are some of the factors which must be considered. 

This sounds like a clean, linear process, but in fact it occurs in a disordered, chaotic 

manner. As the leader encounters the competing values within the organization and 

between organizations, the clarity and compelling nature of the vision become 

paramount. 

VALUE OF STRATEGIC VISION. 

Our terrorist enemies have a vision that guides and explains all their 

 varied acts of murder. They seek to impose Taliban-like rule country 

by country across the greater Middle East...Our actions too are 

guided by a vision. We believe that freedom can advance and change 

lives...These two visions—one of tyranny and murder, the other of 

liberty and life—clashed in Afghanistan...These two visions have now 

met in Iraq and are contending for the future of the country. The failure 

of freedom would only mark the beginning of peril and violence...We 

will persevere and defeat the enemy and hold this hard-won ground for 

the realm of liberty. 

 President George W. Bush in an address 

at the U.S. Army War College, May, 2004 

Vision provides a sense of ultimate purpose, direction, and motivation for all 

members and activities within the organization. It provides an overarching concept, 

which serves to initiate and focus more specific organizational goals, plans, and 

programs. It provides a means of analyzing and understanding the pressures and 

contingencies of the external environment. The vision helps the organization identify 

what in the environment is important, what requires action, and what that action should 

be. It also reinforces or establishes the basic values of the organization or effort and the 

leader. 

21
As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my 

idea of a democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of the 

difference, is no democracy. 

 Abraham Lincoln 

I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia the sons of 

former slaves and the sons of former slave owners will be able to sit 

down together at the table of brotherhood. 

 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 

 A vision is the first step in the development of strategies and plans for change, 

without which there is no clear direction or end. Once the desired vision has been 

articulated, then the ways and means to achieve it are identified. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF A VISION.

The concept of vision has become a popular term within academic, government, 

defense, and corporate circles. This has spawned many different definitions of vision. 

As the various definitions are examined, however, some common characteristics and 

trends begin to emerge. 

The term "vision" suggests that a core element is a visual image--a mental picture 

of what the future organization, military effort, or environment will look like. The 

concept also implies a later time horizon. This time horizon tends to be middle to longterm in nature. 

 The concept includes an ideal end state. This desired end state describes the 

organization or military effort, as it ought to be, given the expected future 

environment. Consequently, the vision includes appropriate values for the desired 

future. 

 The desired end state serves as a goal for the organization or military effort and its 

participants. It is a goal to strive for and not necessarily expected to be achieved in its 

entirety. Thus, the vision provides direction, purpose, and identity. When members 

perceive it as worth the effort, the vision creates energy, commitment, and belonging. 

When shared by all participants, the vision can move members of the organization or 

military effort to significant achievements. 

Vision exists at all organizational levels. In very small organizations, it may be an 

informal, verbally expressed understanding among members and the leader--for 

example, "best squad in the company." In somewhat larger organizations, it often 

resides in the leader's philosophy of command, written policy or statements of the 

22
leader's intent for the organization or military effort. At the highest strategic levels it is 

often expressed as a formalized vision statement. Visions at various levels of an 

organization support and influence the visions of both higher and lower levels of the 

organization. The top-down alignment of visions for greatest organizational 

effectiveness is a primary task of leaders. 

It is important not to confuse organizational strategic vision with strategic vision used 

by the President, Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders in deliberate 

strategic planning. While interrelated, the concepts differ in content. Using the concept 

of ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources), vision relates to the ends, 

while planning focuses on the ways and means to get to the end state. Mid- to long-range 

planning is more likely to be a direct extrapolation from the current situation. In the 

context of government, defense, and military vision, "strategic" implies both long-range 

and high-level. 

Simply put, strategic vision is that which is derived from, supports, and influences 

national security strategy and national military strategy. Of the three components of 

strategy--ends, ways, and means--vision relates to the ends of strategy. A strategic vision 

influences and helps define national-level strategy.

 CREATING THE VISION. 

Vision is the product of a dynamic, logical, and collective organizational process. 

Vision is often attributed only to leaders because of their critical role in developing and 

articulating it and their position as the representative of the organization; however, vision 

is rarely the result of an entirely internal, intuitive process of leaders creating vision in 

isolation. Vision does not reside only in leaders; rather, vision is often developed as a 

collaborative effort, with leaders performing the critical role of integrating and guiding 

the process. 

Though far from simple, the visioning process consists primarily of examining the 

organizational environment, projecting likely future states of the organization, and 

developing a desired end state. In this task, leaders are assisted by the collaborative 

efforts of key members of the organization: deputies, staff chiefs, subordinate leaders, 

and senior noncommissioned officer advisors. Visioning may frequently be an informal 

process; however, at very high levels of organization, temporary or permanent 

specialized staffs--so-called "think tanks" or "futures groups"--often assist leaders in this 

complex task. 

The visioning process begins with an assessment of the organizational environment, 

history, mission, values, and trends to determine which are most likely dominant in 

determining the future of the organization. From the examination of the past and present 

environment, organizations and leaders project into the future and develop likely 

alternative future states. They must assess the future environment and state of the 

organization as objectively and realistically as possible. However, visualizing the future 

23
is a significantly less precise process than examining the present environment because of 

the unlimited number of potential future world environments. While no one can 

accurately predict the future, it is possible to develop a range of possible future states and 

their likelihood of occurrence. From these plausible states of the future, organizations and 

leaders derive a desirable end state. However, this entails more than simply selecting one 

of the likely future states. Forming the vision is a creative process in which intuition and 

experience play critical roles. 

Creation of a vision involves the active use of intuition--perceiving without the 

conscious use of reasoning. This is not mystical or magical; intuition is the result of 

human experience. Past experience in analyzing, integrating, and synthesizing 

information equips leaders with "frames of reference"--the ability to perceive new 

information, relationships, and possibilities. Drawing from knowledge and values stored 

in the mind during years of experience, leaders create and synthesize a unique vision. 

Although the collaboration of other members of the organization is important, it is leaders 

whose experience, values, frames of reference, and position contribute most to the 

creation of the vision. 

Integrating values with known information, innovative ideas, likely futures, and 

organizational requirements, the vision of the future becomes what "ought to be"--a 

plausible and desirable organizational end state. This desirable end state is a 

developed vision when it has been articulated and evaluated. Articulating the vision--

converting it into a cogent vision statement--enables the leader to communicate the 

vision in a compelling, understandable manner. 

US ARMY VISION STATEMENT 

Our Army is serving a Nation at war. This war requires that all elements of our 

national power be applied in a broad, unyielding, and relentless campaign. This 

campaign will not be short; it will require deep and enduring commitment. Our 

Army is a proud member of the Joint Force expertly serving our nation and its 

citizens as we continuously strive toward new goals and improve performance. 

Our individual and organizational approach to our duties and tasks must reflect 

the seriousness and sense of urgency characteristic of an Army at war. Our 

Soldiers and our nation deserve nothing less. This is not business as usual... The 

Army’s Way Ahead...explores how we will obtain a more relevant and ready 

campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. My intent is to 

communicate the Army senior leadership’s view of how the Army will fulfill its 

mission to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant 

Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies... 

Become familiar with the ideas presented here so that you can contribute to 

improving our Army. Are you wearing your dog tags? 

 General Peter J. Schoomaker, U.S. Army Chief of Staff 

24
Complex visions captured in a few words, a sentence, or a paragraph can inspire 

and guide large organizations; for example: 

An Army at War: Relevant and Ready: A Campaign Quality Army with a 

Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. 

U.S. Army Vision Statement 

 The vision statement is flexible enough to accommodate a range of plausible futures 

and contains values that make it worthy of the effort required to achieve it; for example: 

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, 

poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working 

economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social 

conditions in which free institutions can exist. 

 George Catlett Marshall, Secretary of State 

 A very brief vision statement can convey a conceptual image broad and 

powerful enough to give authority and validity to more detailed, but less easily 

remembered, descriptions of the vision. For example, consider this title from a 

Navy/Marine Corps strategy statement: 

Power and Access...From the Sea. 

Before the vision is implemented, the leader evaluates it for accuracy, consistency, 

and utility. When the vision statement accurately depicts organizational goals and values, 

is consistent with requirements, and communicates the leader's intent, the vision is ready 

for implementation. 

 

U.S. NAVY VISION STATEMENT 

A Networked, Jointly Integrated, Sea-Based Power Projection Force, Assuring 

Coalition and Joint Force Access and Protecting America’s Interests Anywhere in 

the World

Emerging operational concepts, technologies, processes, and organizations will 

transform the capability of America's naval services of the 21st century to conduct 

multi-dimensional joint, allied, and coalition warfare. The transforming U.S. 

Navy-Marine Corps Team will be fully integrated into the Joint Team across the 

full expanse of a unified battlespace. Naval forces will provide unique and 

complementary warfighting capabilities from the sea to joint force commanders to 

support their ability to enhance deterrence; secure swift, decisive military victory; 

and strengthen the peace that follows in support of the critical operational goals 

25
outlined in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Secretary of Defense’s 

Defense Planning Guidance. 

 U.S. Navy Vision Statement

STRATEGY FOR CHANGE. 

Vision without action is merely a dream.

Action without vision just passes the time.

Vision with action can change the world. 

Joel A. Barker 

 Vision is a critical element in three essential organizational processes: 

development of culture, management of change, and interaction with the environment. 

The purposes for which leaders implement the vision are to: 

(1) Shape the organizational culture: Create, revise, or reaffirm organizational 

purpose, direction, energy, identity, and values. 

(2) Create change: Move the organization toward a more effective future state. 

(3) Positively influence: Shape the environment of the organization. 

This list implies three concurrent vision-related tasks for the leader, two internal to 

the organization and one external. 

Within the organization, leaders work to gain member acceptance of the vision, 

appeal to shared values to make the vision personally relevant to members, and 

demonstrate actions that are consistent with the vision. But, members of the organization 

need time to analyze and understand fully the implications of a new vision. Therefore, 

leaders seek to convince key players within the organization that the vision is correct and 

viable. Leaders communicate the vision to all members in a clear, concise, and believable 

manner. 

To implement a vision, Sashkin and Sashkin describe a four step vision process. First, 

expressing the vision. The leader must be able to express their vision in action, to think 

through what specific actions they must take and to carry them out. Expressing a vision 

requires that the leaders understand and perform the sequence of cause and effect actions 

required to make the vision real. Second, explaining a vision. The leader who can 

express the vision still may not succeed in implementing it. Unless the leader can explain 

the vision to others, constant uncertainty will arise as to steps and handling of problems 

and issues. Explaining is more than restating the vision end state or aim and must result 

in understanding how individual actions link together to attain the goal. Third, extending 

a vision. Applying the sequence of activities to a variety of situations so that the vision 

can be implemented in several ways and places. Finally, expanding the vision. Applying 

it not just in one limited way and not even in a variety of similar ways, but in many 

different ways in a wide range of circumstances.7

 

26
Achieving commitment of the members of the organization is easiest when they have 

contributed to development of the vision. However, many worthwhile visions require 

radical change and are initially unacceptable to members of the organization. Leaders 

anticipate resistance to change and work to overcome it. As an example, George C. 

Marshall approached the establishment of an autonomous Army Air Corps with caution. 

He successfully avoided resistance to his vision by taking an incremental approach that 

focused on preparing the organization for change. 

 MARSHALL'S VISION FOR THE ARMY AIR CORPS 

As Deputy Chief of Staff, he had observed that air officers had almost no 

representation on the General Staff and that most General Staff officers had little 

interest in air-related matters. In fact, there was a strong anti-air bias...Marshall 

found this situation deplorable, but decided to move cautiously. In his view, the 

Air Corps formed a particularly critical part of the combined-arms team to be 

forged. Ground and air officers had to grow to understand and respect each 

others' roles if anything approaching the necessary teamwork between them could 

be realized. This mutual understanding and respect could not be dictated; it had 

to be nurtured so it could flourish of its own accord. This was Marshall's 

approach. He intended to increase incrementally the autonomy of the Air Corps 

within the Army, in the process developing its leaders so they could perform 

respectably as senior commanders and staff officers. In fact, Marshall aimed to 

give the Air Corps all the autonomy it could handle. However, he kept this 

intention fairly close-hold, making it really a semi-hidden aspect of his strategic 

vision. To have articulated this openly would have ignited a fire storm of 

attention, under-mining his efforts to effect subtly, almost imperceptible 

attitudinal and organizational changes. Marshall thus envisioned an 

 autonomous Air Corps, working harmoniously with ground forces to form the 

'perfect combined-arms team,' in addition to performing strategic bombing 

missions apart from the ground forces.8

 If successful, the vision is integrated into the permanent culture of the 

organization; members internalize the vision and behave in ways which are consistent 

with it. To the extent that subordinate organizations and leaders embrace the topdown vision, their visions align with the vision of senior leaders. 

To create permanent change in the organization, leaders plan the ways and means 

necessary to achieve the end state of the vision; otherwise, the change will not survive 

the tenure of the leader. Institutionalizing the vision in structural change ensures that it 

will endure. An excellent example of this is the restructuring of the Army under Chief 

of Staff General Abrams. 

27
ABRAMS ON THE RESERVE COMPONENTS 

One of the most fateful decisions of the war in Vietnam had been 

Lyndon Johnson's refusal to call up the reserves. All the Joint 

Chiefs, but especially Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of 

Staff, had found this a very traumatic thing; Johnson even 

coming close to resigning in protest--and at the end of his life 

describing his failure to do so as his greatest regret. Abrams as 

Vice Chief of Staff during the buildup for Vietnam had to cope 

with the disabilities induced by the lack of mobilization. Now, as 

Chief of Staff, he appeared determined to ensure that never 

again would a President be able to send the Army to war 

without the reserves maintained for such a contingency. The 

vehicle for doing this was a revised force structure that 

integrated reserve and active force elements so closely as to 

make the reserves virtually inextricable from the whole.9

 External to the organization, leaders build consensus for the validity of their 

organizational vision. An accepting environment enhances the success of the 

organization; influential visions attract resources and interest. At the highest levels of 

military organization, the vision relates to the national military strategy and the national 

security strategy. Such visions compete for influence and resources in the democratic 

institutions. 

 At the strategic level, leaders need to acquire resources and build consensus in a 

variety of constituencies that include other Services, national political leaders, Congress, 

the press, and the public at large. The resources essential to pursuing the vision are 

influenced by these members of the organizational external environment. There, leaders 

obtain approval and resources by demonstrating that the vision is a correct, necessary, 

and viable element of the national military strategy. 

SUMMARY. 

Vision is the leader-focused, organizational process that gives the organization its 

sense of purpose, direction, energy, and identity. This process exists at every level and in 

every type of organization; its content is the desired end state of the organization. For that 

reason, vision adds value by providing the means for the organization to anticipate and 

move toward the future. 

 Visions generally increase in complexity and extend in time frame at successively 

higher levels of organizations. Strategic vision competes for influence and resources in 

the development of national strategy. 

 Leaders at every level of organizations are the custodians, developers, and 

articulators of vision. From the small section leader to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

28
Staff, leaders guide the organizational definition of the desired end-state. Only leaders 

possess the decision authority, perspective, position, and experience to derive a vision 

from the environment, values, and potential of the organization. 

Leaders also cause continual evaluation and refinement of the vision in response to 

changes both internal and external to the organization. The measure of merit of the vision 

is both objective and subjective--the degree to which the organization accomplishes its 

mission, at present and in the future. 

29
CHAPTER 4 

 STRATEGIC CULTURE 

Organizational Culture is a pattern of shared basic assumptions, values, 

 beliefs, and norms that the organization has learned over time and that unite 

the members of an organization. 

Edgar Schein 

The nature of strategic leadership is that the impact of leaders is often not directly on 

individuals, but on systems and processes used by the organization to achieve desired 

results. One of these “indirect” methods of leading is through organizational culture. 

Culture is defined in many ways, with the simplest being “the way we do things around 

here.” Culture is a powerful concept. People who have “bought into” a culture see the 

current way of doing things as “correct” and “right.” This can facilitate smooth and 

effective functioning of the organization if the current way is, in fact, right. However, 

culture can be an obstacle to change when the way things are done now cease to be 

effective for the future. Additionally, there are components of an organizational culture 

that have significant symbolic meaning. Leaders who fully understand culture also 

understand the meaning that people place either on events (changes of command, for 

example) or on “things” (the unit guidon). Managing culture also implies management of 

the meaning people place on these important events and things. 

An organization that has a well-established history also has a mature, well-developed 

organizational culture. In large complex organizations like the Army there will be many 

different subordinate organizations that have developed their own organizational 

subcultures. For example, the cultures of the Army's heavy and light forces, special 

operating forces, civilians, and reserve components all differ somewhat, but they embody 

the same basic values and beliefs of the “holistic” Army culture. Subcultures developed 

within these formal or informal groups, like those in the various components, branches, 

and functional areas, must express and share the core of the Army’s strategic culture, our 

values. A major challenge of strategic leadership, therefore, is to ensure that all these 

subcultures are compatible with the desired core culture. The purpose of this chapter is to 

describe organizational culture, discuss its importance, and provide insights on how 

strategic leaders manage it. 

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE. 

Organizational culture is the set of institutional, stated, and operating values, beliefs, 

and assumptions that people have about their organization that are validated by 

experiences over time. It evolves in consonance with the values, beliefs, and assumptions 

of the society in which the organization exists. The importance of understanding the 

culture is that, because of its informal power within the organization, it is often taught to 

new people, deliberately or by influence, as the “correct” way to think and act in response 

to both internal and external problems. 

30
Values are statements of what is important to an organization. Organizational culture 

is built on values that are derived from and deemed essential by the strategic leadership 

of the organization. Our nation's culture derives from a unique set of values expressed in 

the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. These values influence every facet 

of society, its laws, domestic programs, and foreign relations. The Army’s core cultural 

values are expressed in FM 3-1 and FM 22-100. 

 Throughout the Army's history, successive strategic leaders have identified and 

defined institutional values. These values are presented, described, and promulgated in 

doctrinal literature. The core and institutional values serve as the foundation on which 

strategic leaders develop stated values. In turn, these stated values form the basis for the 

development of policies, programs, and procedures within the organization. These 

policies, programs, and procedures reflect the operating values of the institution. 

Operating values are communicated in a variety of ways, both verbally and in writing, 

and many eventually evolve into revised institutional values. 

 

 Strategic leaders must be sensitive to the fact that statements of values alone have 

little impact on organizational culture unless the members internalize them through a 

process that includes experience-based validation. Only then will stated values result 

in the desired effect on members' attitudes and behavior. 

 Individual perceptions of what is important form members' operating values that in 

turn effect the shaping of the Army's organizational culture. These individual perceptions 

are effected by the members' interpretation of the cause and effect relationship between 

the institutional and stated values and what is actually happening within the organization. 

This is the experience-based validation process. 

Institutional values, stated values, and operating values should be consistent so that 

they reflect the same underlying beliefs and assumptions. The greater the difference 

between what is espoused and what leaders do, the greater the degree of distrust and loss 

of confidence between the leadership and the followers. This, in turn, results in a 

decrease of organizational effectiveness. Carried to extreme, the differences could 

negatively affect the public's trust and confidence in the organization. Therefore, building 

and sustaining a culture based on trust and confidence, vertically and horizontally, are 

key responsibilities of strategic leadership. The strategic leader’s personal example in 

conduct and actions is extremely important to demonstrate the consistency between 

espoused values and enacted values. Actions truly do speak louder than words when 

values and culture are at stake. Strategic leaders must ensure institutional and stated 

values are consistent with the values of both the larger society and the needs of the 

organization. They must also ensure through policy, doctrine, regulations, and 

implementing procedures that they produce the desired results. 

 Over time, the culture becomes so embedded within the organization that much of it 

is second nature and often taken for granted. Culture establishes a basic sense of what the 

organization stands for and how it functions. It enables members of the organization to 

31
understand and cope with the internal and external environment while accomplishing 

organizational goals. It also influences how members perceive, think, and act in relation 

to each other as well as to internal and external challenges and opportunities. 

 Cultural values define the boundaries of acceptable thought and behavior from 

such simple acts as the wearing of the uniform to more complex actions such as 

conducting combat operations. Culture influences how individuals talk to each other, 

approach problems, anticipate and judge situations, develop expectations, determine 

right from wrong, establish priorities, and react to many other aspects of 

organizational and interpersonal behavior. Finally, in a VUCA environment described 

in Chapter 2, culture influences the behavior of subordinates when they are faced with 

a unique situation that lacks “standard” operating procedures. 

 The following vignette from an action report of a conversation with a ground force 

commander demonstrates the culture of embedded Army values (e.g., selfless service, 

personal courage, and loyalty) and quiet professionalism that resides in the U.S. Army 

and, in this instance, in the U.S. Army Special Forces. 

 

After years of operational experience in ". . . the jungle-like world of multiple 

dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises, and moral ambiguities . . ." a culture 

has developed within Special Forces that recognizes the strategic implications of 

allowing any American, alive or dead, to fall into the hands of the enemy. So, on 3 

October 1993, while on a mission in Mogadishu, Somalia, two Special Forces 

Noncommissioned Officers, MSG Gary Gordon and SFC Randall Shughart, had a 

very brief conversation with their commanding officer. Having seen another 

helicopter shot down, they circled above it in the helicopter they were in, and 

directed fire on the enemy who was rapidly maneuvering toward the crash site. 

They recognized the extreme hazard to the Americans on the ground and to 

anybody attempting to intervene on their behalf. Nevertheless, in quiet, professional 

conversation, they requested authority to insert themselves at the crash site. 

Initially, their commander refused their request in anticipation of a larger force 

maneuvering to within striking distance of the site. MSG Gordon and SFC 

Shughart, recognizing the needs at the site, repeated their request. Their 

commander accepted their appraisal and authorized their insertion. Unfortunately, 

the complexities of urban maneuver prevented the larger force from arriving in 

time to support MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart before they were overwhelmed by 

the advancing Somali militiamen. For their selfless service and quiet 

professionalism in defense of their countrymen, MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart 

were awarded the Medal of Honor. They saw their duty and, in a disciplined 

response, they did it. 

Because of the culture shared between these non commissioned officers and their 

commander, the entire conversation was conducted in three brief radio calls and 

a handful of words. 

 Customs and traditions of the Service, doctrine promulgated through field manuals, 

32
policies established in regulations, standard operating procedures, and the stated 

philosophy that guides the organization are some important ways that culture is made 

visible. Culture is also conveyed through professional journals, historical and 

biographical publications, audiovisual media, ceremonies, and the folklore of the 

organization. All these things carry some aspect of the Army's organizational culture. 

CULTURE vs CLIMATE. 

 We should not confuse climate with culture, although the two are mutually 

reinforcing. Climate is a short-term phenomenon created by the current leadership. 

Consequently, dramatically different climates may exist simultaneously among the 

various elements of the organization. The most important determinant of climate is the 

behavior of leaders. Their behavior directly reflects their perception of people; leadership 

and management style; skills, knowledge, and attitudes and priorities. Every member of 

the organization knows that leaders, by their action and inaction, signal what they will or 

will not tolerate. The leader's behavior creates a climate that influences everyone in the 

organization. 

 On the other hand, culture is a long-term, complex phenomenon that generally 

endures through multiple leaders. Individual leaders cannot easily create or change 

culture. It is part of the organization. It influences the characteristics of the climate by its 

effect on the behavior and the thought processes of the leader. 

While strategic leaders focus their attention on organizational culture, they are also 

responsible for the climate of the organization over which they exert the most direct 

influence. The leader contributes to creating a positive climate when his or her behavior 

reflects competence and the underlying values, beliefs, and assumptions of the 

organization. Unit members, committed to the organization's culture, will not accept a 

climate imposed upon them by a leader if it contradicts cultural values, beliefs, and 

assumptions. Erratic swings in the organization's climate, or a persistently negative 

climate, erode the trust and confidence of the members and adversely affect the 

organization's readiness and effectiveness. 

CULTURES AND SUBCULTURES. 

It is generally clear to anyone who has moved between units, posts, or services that 

“the way we do things here” can vary dramatically at different locations. Each 

organization, and each military service, responds to their requirements by establishing 

policies that are most effective for that time and place. One should not expect the culture 

in the Army to be exactly the same as that in the Air Force or Navy. 

 

The same arguments can be made internally within the Army. Heavy and light 

divisions have different “ways of doing things”. Cavalry regiments and special operating 

forces are different still. Effective strategic leaders understand and appreciate those 

33
differences within the military, as well as the cultural differences other stakeholders bring 

to the military’s external environment. 

A means to effectively operate when faced with multiple subcultures is to focus not 

on what separates the different organizations, but instead on what unites them. The 

integrating “glue” of the different subcultures, most often, is the organizations’ values. 

Processes and procedures may differ among organizations for very good reasons. In the 

end, many organizations, especially in the military domain, are interested in the same 

value-laden end state: peace, stability and individual rights. When appropriate, strategic 

leaders must understand and reinforce that value congruency between organizations and 

appreciate the potentially different perspective that both military and non-military 

organizations bring. 

CULTURAL CHANGE. 

There is a significant interdependence between the current culture and the “desired” 

culture that might be necessary for future unit effectiveness. The engine for this cultural 

change is the vision of the strategic leader. The ability of strategic leaders to shape 

organizational culture and values to support the vision while retaining the trust and 

confidence of all concerned is a major challenge for strategic leaders. There is an 

interactive dynamic between the development of a vision and cultural change. The 

process of formulating a vision is greatly influenced by culture and values; conversely, 

the pursuit and achievement of vision influences culture and values. External influences 

also initiate cultural change. Laws passed by Congress, executive decisions, changes to 

national military strategy, and technology advancements are some of the more significant 

ways to influence cultural change. Culture cannot be managed in the traditional sense. It 

is deeply embedded within the psyche of the people and the structure and functions of the 

organization. However, the actions and behaviors of strategic leaders can influence, 

direct, and sustain the culture over time. 

Culture is influenced by what is paid attention to, measured, and controlled. The 

established priorities, along with the policies and systems to deal with them, send clear 

signals about what is important and what the leader expects of the members of the 

organization. Clearly, “the unit does well those things that the boss checks.” For 

example, strategic leaders can convey to the organization that leader development is an 

important part of the Army's culture by establishing a system and process to control and 

measure how effectively it is being accomplished. By contrast, when leader 

development processes are never “checked” by leaders, then subordinates will most 

likely put less energy into developmental activities and concentrate on those activities 

perceived to be more important. 

The allocation of resources can change or influence culture. Resourcing patterns 

clearly determine what the organization deems as important. The full spectrum of 

activities associated with the routine of running the Army is continually evaluated for its 

relative importance, as indicated by how well they are resourced. People are more 

34
attentive to those programs or policies that they perceive to be higher in priority by 

virtue of those programs or policies receiving a greater share of resources. 

The structure of the organization also changes or sustains the culture. How the 

organization is structured has a significant effect on its culture and its capability to 

express the vision. For example, multi-layered organizations tend toward more 

bureaucracy, less flexibility and innovation, and more cumbersome communications than 

those with fewer layers. Decision-making authority tends to be retained at higher levels, 

and empowerment downward becomes more difficult. If more empowerment and greater 

freedom of action are necessary in achieving the organization's vision, then the strategic 

leader should design structures and processes to reflect this. The strategies designed to 

achieve the vision need complementing, supportive organizational structure, and 

processes to support them. 

Criteria for rewards and sanctions emphasize culturally desirable behavior. 

Members learn about their organization's culture through its personnel selection, 

promotion, development, and separation systems. Rewards and sanctions associated 

with different skills, knowledge, attitude, and behavior from entry level onward clearly 

demonstrate the cultural values and priorities of both the chain of command and the 

organization. 

Leaders are always role models. Members of the organization, and society in general, 

closely scrutinize the behavior of strategic leaders. How strategic leaders conduct 

themselves during routine periods and especially in times of crisis demonstrates their 

personal values, beliefs, and assumptions. Therefore, their behavior affects certain 

aspects of the organization's culture as subordinates react to strategic leaders' behavior. 

Changing organizational culture is difficult but not impossible. In fact cultural 

change is imperative if an organization is to grow, develop, and adapt to the changing 

environment within which it exists. However, it takes time to change an organization’s 

culture, usually between five and ten years, so the strategic leadership of an organization 

must have patience to see change through. Some examples of significant cultural 

changes that have occurred in the Army since World War II are listed below: 

• Integration of black soldiers into all skills, branches, and units of the Army. 

• Development of recruiting, training, sustainment, and separation systems to 

support an all-volunteer force. 

• Abolition of the Women's Army Corps and integration of women into 

all skills, branches, and units other than those involved in direct combat. 

• Adopting the beret as standard headgear for the Army. 

• Transformation from heavy vehicles to Stryker Brigades. 

• Modularity and changing the Army’s structure from Division-based to 

smaller, more expeditionary sized units. 

35
The cultural changes connected with each of these developments evolve over long 

periods, several years in most cases. In the case of the last three, the changes are still 

evolving. External forces triggered some of them, while other changes occurred because 

of a perceived need for change within the Army. Whatever the reason behind them, farreaching actions by a succession of strategic leaders helped, or will help, bring about the 

desired cultural change. 

 SUMMARY. 

The Army's culture is defined by institutional, stated, and operating values, and the 

beliefs and assumptions of its members. Culture influences norms of thought and 

behavior and establishes a basic understanding of what the Army stands for and how it 

functions. Strategic leaders cannot easily manipulate culture. However, the essence of 

strategic leadership is the ability to understand the existing culture and then to shape that 

organization's culture and values to support a vision while retaining the trust and 

confidence of subordinates and members of the greater society. 

 The Army reflects the vision of our forefathers and their culture, which was 

validated through experience and articulated in the Constitution and its amendments. Its 

culture of selfless service is reflected in the following observation by General Dick 

Cavazos. 

War is always and will ever be obscene, but faced with a greater 

obscenity, slavery, I would fight. While war is obscene, those who charge 

the machine guns, who bleed, who go down to the aid stations and who 

are put in body bags are not obscene; their sacrifices have no measure—

theirs has a purity where mankind shines and is beyond corruption. I am 

not blasphemous when I say that in the brutality and evil of war, soldiers 

who have offered themselves up, so that their buddies may live, have in 

them the likeness and image of God. And damn those who debunk 

courage, valor, fidelity, love of country, and love of home, family, hopes 

and dreams for a better tomorrow. Our soldiers give up much that others 

may live—not only in freedom but even in luxury. They deserve our great, 

great gratitude and affection because they are willing to serve. They are 

some of God’s noblest people. 

 General Dick Cavazos 

36
CHAPTER 5 

STRATEGIC LEADER COMPETENCIES 

Competencies are the knowledge, skills, attributes, and capacities that enable a leader 

to perform his required tasks. A competency may be based on natural ability or may be 

derived from education, training, or experience. 

In general, strategic leader competencies are built on the foundation of leadership 

requirements at lower levels. In some cases, they are simply the same skills applied at 

higher levels. For example, the best leaders at all levels have a remarkable capacity to 

care for subordinates and to respect their dignity as individuals. But some strategic leader 

competencies are qualitatively different and new. As an example, leaders at direct and 

organizational levels do not generally need the capacity to envision long-range future 

requirements in order to set in motion very long development programs. Further, they do 

not need the level of integrative thinking skills required of strategic leaders. 

 The major categories of leadership competencies can be grouped as conceptual, 

technical, and interpersonal. Strategic conceptual competencies include the thinking 

skills needed to understand and deal with the complex and ambiguous strategic world. 

Technical competencies include knowledge of external political, economic, and cultural 

systems that impact the organization. Interpersonal competencies include consensus 

building, both internal and external to the organization, and the capacity to 

communicate effectively. For a more detailed examination of competencies see 

Appendix A. 

CONCEPTUAL COMPETENCIES. 

Strategic leaders require the capacity to deal with extraordinary complexity. Theirs is 

an environment of tough, competing issues, few of which have clear solutions and all of 

which pose risks. Many issues have more than one feasible solution, but no one solution 

may be totally acceptable while all incur costs. It is important to understand such issues 

fundamentally and accurately to determine the underlying threads that may connect 

apparently unrelated issues and to chart actions that will have the best long-term 

outcomes. In so doing, an understanding of second- and third-order effects is necessary to 

resist actions that may appear reasonable in the short run but are detrimental in the long 

term. Strategic conceptual competencies include frame of reference development, 

problem management, and envisioning the future. 

Frame of Reference Development. Every leader builds a complex knowledge 

structure over time from schooling, experience, and self-study. For the strategic leader, 

this knowledge structure is a “map” of the strategic world; it is a dynamic 

representation of the significant factors in the strategic environment with cause-and37
effect interrelationships. A frame of reference acts as a basis of observation and 

judgment. 

Three attributes are essential for building a good frame of reference. First, the leader 

must be open to new experiences and to input from others including subordinates. 

Second, the leader must be reflective, not afraid to rethink past experiences and learn 

from them. Third, he must be comfortable with abstracts and concepts common in the 

strategic environment. 

A frame of reference cannot be taught by conventional classroom methods. It is 

developed by the individual over time as he reflects and makes sense of new knowledge 

and experience. Frames of reference form as leaders progress from the direct through 

the organizational to the strategic leadership levels. Individual initiative is important in 

developing a broad frame of reference. Consequently, part of becoming a strategic 

leader is approaching this mental activity as intrinsically interesting and rewarding. In 

the following vignette General Lynch explains the value of the fighting level frame of 

reference that characterized then Colin Powell’s service as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. 

One of your greatest challenges in the Pentagon is trying to explain to 

other people the problems down at the fighting level. So many of those 

guys started out as vice presidents and worked their way up. They never 

had an appreciation of what goes on down there at the lowest level. 

Powell had the advantage of going up through those levels. For the 

younger leaders in Vietnam, there was a tremendous moral and ethical 

challenge that was never faced by the commanders in World War II. When 

a guy is steeped in the moral and ethical issues down at the fighting level 

he’s more inclined to back off from gross solutions and try to equate what 

they are saying to how difficult it would be to implement it down where he 

remembers it. Powell was the first Chairman who had that experience and 

was able to carry it up through the ranks.

10 

General Mike Lynch, U.S. Army (Ret.) 

 

Much like the intelligence analyst, the strategic leader, equipped with a welldeveloped frame of reference, templates events that may have no discernable pattern to 

his subordinates. He is more able to understand the true situation and, most importantly, 

know where these events are likely to lead if no intervention occurs. Such leaders are 

uniquely equipped to deal with events having complex causes and to envision creative 

solutions. This enables timely and proactive decision-making. 

A well-developed frame of reference also gives the strategic leader a thorough 

understanding of organizational subsystems. This understanding enables visualizing the 

interactive dynamics of the total system. Appreciation for these interdependencies 

helps to ensure that decisions taken in one area will not have an unanticipated adverse 

38
impact in others. Without this capacity, changes in policy, regulation, or action may 

indirectly produce other changes that are neither anticipated nor desired. 

Problem Management. Management of strategic problems deals with issues that are 

competing, that have manifold implications which are often difficult to understand 

completely, and that have potentially catastrophic outcomes if not resolved carefully. 

There are no “right” answers. Many issues are not so much a choice between “right and 

wrong” as a choice between “right and right”. Strategic leaders must be able to think 

families of issues through as systems so that decisions move the problem as a whole 

toward resolution. This involves applying past experiences, identifying and creating 

patterns, discarding nonuseable data, understanding second- and third-order effects, 

maintaining flexibility, and knowing what is an acceptable outcome for the system as a 

whole. It also involves working and thinking interactively and not solving problems 

piecemeal. 

Problem management and decision making are two distinct activities. The first 

involves managing the problems towards the desired outcome--making adjustments, 

modifying the initial approach, and discarding alternatives that inhibit progress. Many of 

the most significant problems at the strategic level require this approach because simple 

and direct alternative courses of action do not exist. The second involves developing 

alternative courses of action, assessing probability of success, and pursuing the selected 

course of action. This differentiation between problem management and decision-making 

is a major element in the transition from direct to more indirect leadership. Most past 

training and work experiences at the direct level are based on developing short-term 

solutions and deciding on relatively well structured problems by choosing among 

alternative courses of action. Long-term, ill-defined problems for which it is difficult to 

envision desired outcomes are not frequently encountered at lower levels. These are the 

problems, however, that strategic leaders frequently encounter. 

Strategic leadership requires a refined ability to recognize and avoid irrelevant and 

marginal issues. An important ability in working strategic issues is to see beyond the 

immediately obvious in information received and to know what information is missing. 

This includes recognizing multiple paths to the same goal, understanding the opportunity 

costs for each path, and foreseeing the indirect effects of each. 

Additionally, acceptance of some degree of risk is essential. Strategic issues are 

generally ill-defined, and most information available is ambiguous and incomplete. 

Most possible courses of action have such complex second- and third-order effects that 

completely accurate prediction of their outcomes is not possible. This necessitates 

committing to decisions and operating effectively under conditions of uncertainty. In the 

face of risk, the ability to recognize and seize opportunities is evident most clearly in the 

effectiveness with which the strategic leader identifies relevant information, understands 

the significance of projects or activities of others to his strategic direction, and discards 

distracters. 

39
Envisioning the Future. The capability to formulate and articulate strategic aims 

and key concepts is perhaps the strategic leader’s most significant capacity, the 

application of which was discussed in Chapter 3, Strategic Vision. He must lead the 

organization in the development of strategic plans to address mid- and long-term 

programs designed to achieve the strategic aims. This demands an understanding of the 

interaction of ends, ways, and means as they work to form a strategy. A staff of 

strategists may develop and refine the strategy, but the strategic leader provides the 

direction, the concept, and the focus. 

This involves not only the ability to envision the future but also to work proactively 

to shape the future environment to enhance goal attainment. At the strategic level, goals 

may be far-reaching and should be formulated to accommodate contingencies that reflect 

the organization’s relationship to a changing environment. This requires the thinking and 

processing of information creatively outside the established boundaries. It is an ability to 

see the organization and environment not as it is but rather as it should be. 

TECHNICAL COMPETENCIES. 

Strategic leader technical competencies differ significantly from those skills required 

at the direct or organizational level. While the technical skills used at lower levels are 

important elements of the strategic leader’s frame of reference, they usually are not 

directly relevant to the specific tasks at the higher level. At the strategic level, technical 

competencies include an understanding of organizational systems, an appreciation of 

functional relationships outside the organization, and knowledge of the broader political 

and social systems within which the organization operates.11 Success at the strategic level 

is a matter of continuous learning as exemplified by George Washington. 

 

The crucial military difference (apart from levels of innate ability) between 

Washington and the commanders who opposed him was that they were sure 

they knew all the answers, while Washington tried every day and every hour 

to learn. 

James Thomas Flexner 

Systems Understanding. At the organizational level, leaders understand how their 

organizations operate and how to foster conditions that enable them to be more 

effective. At the strategic level there is decreased concentration on internal process and 

system integration and increased concentration on how the organization fits within the 

total Department of Defense (DOD) framework and into the broader international arena. 

Organizational systems at these levels have complex inter-relationships, and strategic 

leaders may have numerous reporting and coordinating relationships. Thus the leader 

must understand the separate roles he plays, the boundaries of these roles, their demands 

and constraints, and the expectations of other departments and agencies. 

Joint, Interagency, Multi-national and Intra-agency (JIMI) Relationships. 

National force projection necessitates an understanding of joint and combined operations. 

Different nations have different operating practices and principles which impact 

40
operations of a combined force. Similarly, each Service has developed a different culture, 

vocabulary, and expectation for its members. Strategic leaders must know how to operate 

in a multicultural environment to gain the full understanding and commitment of their 

subordinates. 

Political and Social Competence. The ability to participate effectively in the 

interdepartmental process inherent in national security policy formulation and execution 

is fundamental. Just as important is the capacity for interacting with the legislative 

branch. It is necessary to have this political and social competence to advise in 

developing the policy, preparing the strategy, and working to secure adequate resources 

to implement the strategy. Leaders at the strategic level function as members of the 

policy formulation team, helping to determine national interest and objectives. They 

present a balanced argument of national security requirements, benefits, costs, and risks. 

Thus General Powell became Chairman determined to reshape national military 

strategy and the Armed Forces to meet the new environment. He had found when 

he was National Security Adviser that what the military produced often did not 

meet policymaker’s needs, and he resolved that this would not happen during his 

tenure as Chairman. He believed that, as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols 

reform, it was his responsibility as Chairman to initiate a change in strategy, and 

he did not wish to be accused of not responding to world events. 

Lorna S. Jaffe 

 

INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCIES. 

Strategic leader interpersonal competencies include the ability to build consensus 

within the organization, the ability to negotiate with external agencies or organizations in 

an attempt to shape or influence the external environment, and the ability to communicate 

internally and externally. 

Consensus Building. In contrast with organizational-level leaders, strategic leaders 

devote far more of their time dealing with outside organizations and with leaders of other 

Services or nations. Consensus on an issue is necessary if coordinated and effective 

action is to be taken. Consensus building is a complicated process based on effective 

reasoning and logic, which may take place over an extended period. Consensus is not 

unanimous agreement. It is more about what all parties can live with than what any one 

party would prefer. It is arriving at a decision that results in the absence of sabotage or 

interference in an activity and allowing some amount of time for the issue to resolve 

itself. It requires involving all stakeholders, encouraging input, making problems visible 

and resolving them, and making decisions collaboratively. Even when consensus is 

achieved, the leader and organization must continuously work to ensure that “apparent” 

consensus bears out in the actions of the consensus stakeholders. Strategic leaders must 

be persuasive yet willing to compromise when necessary. Consensus building is different 

from directing or commanding. While strategic leaders, like organizational leaders, may 

41
issue direct orders, such orders have less force in the complex strategic world. In working 

with peers, it is imperative to reach consensus. Peers will not respond to orders. In 

essence, the process of consensus building ensures that effective reasoning has taken 

place and that contentious issues have been resolved. This gains commitment to longterm goals that likely extend well into the future. 

The hindsight of the historian can only reinforce Washington’s conviction 

that the crucial battles of the war were in the arenas of public opinion. There 

can be no doubt that the British were totally outclassed in the warfare for the 

minds of men. It was in those mental arenas that the civilian-soldier George 

Washington shone the brightest. He kept forever in mind, as more radical 

statesmen of either the right or the left could not do, that the fundamental 

objective was not to foster division but to increase unity.12

James Thomas Flexner 

 

Negotiation. As stated earlier, many relationships at the strategic level are lateral 

and without clear subordination. In many of these relationships strategic leaders must rely 

heavily on negotiating skills. Successful negotiation requires a range of interpersonal 

skills. Perhaps the most important is the ability to stand firm on nonnegotiable points 

while simultaneously communicating respect for other participants. Personal attributes 

underlying this ability are skill in listening, skill in diagnosing unspoken agendas, and the 

capacity to detach oneself personally from the negotiation process. The essence of 

successful negotiating is communicating a clear position on an issue while still conveying 

willingness to compromise. 

Communication. Internal to the organization, strategic leaders communicate 

through a variety of direct and indirect means. Their actions and statements are always 

carefully analyzed. Observers are keenly sensitive to nuances of meaning. Effective 

communication within the organization is important to changing, or even maintaining, 

direction or policy. If change is desired, large organizations can be steered on a new 

course only very deliberately because of their inertia. When leaders attempt change 

through policy, regulation, or vision, their communications are interpreted at every 

level. Thus, care in choice of words is essential to ensuring the desired message is 

received. 

 External to the organization, strategic leaders communicate with Congress, 

government agencies, national political leaders, and their constituents. This is 

accomplished through a variety of means. Through writing, meetings, interviews for 

news media, or through public speaking engagements, strategic leaders communicate for 

the organization. This requires clarity of thought, direction, and process. Possessing these 

communicative attributes, coupled with a high degree of persuasiveness, provides the 

leader with the necessary tools to build support, build consensus, and negotiate 

successfully. Communicating in a brief, clear, and persuasive manner--a considerable 

42
challenge when dealing in a vague, uncertain environment--is a competency strategic 

leaders must master. 

Of more immediate concern to General Powell, however, was mounting 

press and congressional pressure for a ‘peace dividend.’ The Chairman 

wished to counter criticism that the Department’s planning ignored changes 

in the world. Determined to convince the American people and the Congress 

of the need for continued U.S. engagement worldwide, General Powell had 

already begun publicly to articulate his strategic vision.13

Lorna S. Jaffe 

SUMMARY. 

 Strategic leader competencies fall under the three rubrics of conceptual, technical, 

and interpersonal. These competencies are supported by a broad and rich frame of 

reference developed throughout the leader's life, and this enables the leader to deal with 

tremendously complex issues and events. 

43
CHAPTER 6 

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP TASKS 

The volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous nature of the environment tends to focus 

strategic leaders' attention on tasks associated with the present. However, if strategic 

leaders become enmeshed in short-term requirements, they cannot focus on the mid- and 

long-term tasks that only they have the authority to perform. Strategic leaders must 

concentrate their efforts on long-term tasks while simultaneously addressing short-term 

requirements in the context of the organization's long-term direction. 

The Army's strategic leaders operate in at least two domains: The first is 

in the organization they command or lead. The second is the Army as an 

institution where they act similar to a board of directors. 

 General Frederick Franks, Former Commander, TRADOC 

No single leader performs all the tasks associated with strategic-level leadership. 

Key strategic leadership tasks include the following major areas of responsibility: 

• Provide vision. 

• Shape culture. 

• Build and shape joint, interagency, multi-national and intra-agency 

relationships. 

• Build and shape national-level relationships. 

 

• Represent the organization. 

• Lead and manage change. 

PROVIDE VISION. 

 A primary task of strategic leaders is to create a vision for their organizations. The 

vision, which sets the tone for the future of the organization, is the first step in the 

development of plans and strategies for change. For a military organization, creation of 

the vision should include future required operating capability by considering 

developing concepts of future battle, emerging threat capabilities and intentions, and 

technology advances. 

The strategic leader's vision sets the long-term direction for an organization. The 

solutions to short-term requirements should be consistent with the articulated vision. A 

44
strategic leader will institutionalize a strategy to implement the vision, including the 

selection and mentoring of subordinate leaders to carry on the strategic vision. The o

key strategic leadership tasks should be rela

ther 

ted to communicating, developing, and 

implementing the strategic leader's vision. 

SHAPE CULTURE. 

at supports and helps to communicate the vision. Tasks within this area 

include: 

• lture is built on values deemed essential by the 

members of the organization. 

•

ed throughout the organization and are internalized by its 

members. 

• support for goals and 

objectives that support and implement the vision. 

• s and programs with distant completion dates that 

must be institutionalized. 

• ment to train other leaders by picking 

the right people for the right jobs. 

• Ensuring the reward structure reinforces desired values and behaviors. 

ENCY, MULTI-NATIONAL AND 

INTRA-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS. 

th 

her countries, and government agencies in both 

peace and war. Major tasks include: 

•

es and, in turn, understanding goals and objectives of other national 

• ined action to be 

undertaken in pursuit of shared goals and objectives. 

 The strategic leader must take steps to shape the organization's culture in a 

manner th

Ensuring that organizational cu

Ensuring that stated values, as related to the strategic vision, are 

communicat

Building consensus within the organization to gain

Initiating structural change

Ensuring an organizational commit

BUILD AND SHAPE JOINT, INTERAG

 Strategic leaders develop and manage joint and combined lateral relationships wi

strategic leaders of other Services, ot

Creating understanding and acceptance of organizational goals and national 

objectiv

forces. 

Creating consensus required to enable joint and comb

45
• knowledge and resource base that the organization 

requires to envision future desired outcomes and negotiating to make 

 in a 

al environment requires an international perspective. This task requires the 

strategic leader to understand the political, economic, and social factors of other 

cou

nd 

joint operations. The strategic leader must view the organization from a joint perspective 

and

as 

ess 

 sensitive to the cultures within which their 

fellow strategic leaders operate to effectively accomplish these tasks in the unified, 

joi

e joint obligations, and appreciating the roles and missions of 

other organizations in the joint arena are tasks that assist in implementing and achieving 

BUILD

of 

 and support Armies,...To provide and 

maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of 

the land and naval Forces. 

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 

United States. 

 U.S. Const., Article II, Section 

Maintaining the

them happen. 

 Strategic leaders must actively participate in the development and sustainment of 

coalitions and alliances that are central to national strategy. Operating effectively

multination

ntries. 

 Managing the organization to achieve joint obligations is also a major task. 

Fulfillment of this task requires the strategic leader's commitment to joint doctrine a

 design internal policy and organizational structure to meet joint requirements. 

 Strategic leaders must also articulate the roles and missions of the organization 

they apply to the joint arena. This task requires an appreciation for the roles and 

missions of other Services and an understanding of their goals and objectives. The 

organization must be designed, equipped, trained, and maintained at a state of readin

that allows it to participate fully in joint and combined operations. This means that 

strategic leaders must understand and be

nt, combined, and interagency arena. 

Because the future portends increased emphasis on joint and combined operations in 

peace and war, the strategic leader's vision should identify and develop the 

organization's role in those arenas. Developing and sustaining coalitions, managing the 

organization to achiev

the strategic vision. 

 AND SHAPE NATIONAL-LEVEL RELATIONSHIPS. 

The Congress shall have Power To ... provide for the common Defense...

the United States; ...To raise

U.S. Const, Article I, Section 8 

46
Managing relationships between the organization as a component of the nation's 

total defense force and the overarching national policy apparatus is a major responsibility 

of strategic leaders. They use their national and international frames of reference to 

fluence opinion and build consensus for organizational roles, missions, and objectives. 

They garner the support of diverse players to allow the vision to be achieved. 

 Req

ation. 

• Planning for the maintenance of the military capability required to 

ments for resources and capabilities. 

• e gap between political decisions made as part of the national 

security decision process and individuals that ultimately carry out those 

on 

 interpret and reflect 

national security objectives. These programs and directives prepare the organization to 

r peace or war. 

RE

The strategic leader represents the organization in its relationships with the larger 

society h

Regularly communicating with elements of the Legislative, Executive, 

• Acting as a spokesperson for the organization with other Federal agencies, 

rge. 

• Building and maintaining a network of information sources that can 

in

uirements in this area include: 

• Providing advice and counsel in national policy formul

• Interpreting national policy guidelines and directions. 

implement national policy in the joint, combined, and interagency arenas. 

• Presenting the organization's require

• Developing competitive strategies. 

Bridging th

decisions. 

 Strategic leaders are responsible to ensure that the leadership of the organizati

understands national security policy. To accomplish this task, they formulate 

organizational programs and policy directives that accurately

respond to all security requirements in eithe

PRESENT THE ORGANIZATION. 

. T ese responsibilities include: 

•

and Judicial Branches. 

the media, influential people at the national level, and the public at la

be used to understand and influence the environment. 

47
To accomplish these tasks, strategic leaders' frames of reference must include a 

thorough understanding of our national culture, values, and interests and the political, 

economic, and military elements of national power. Strategic leaders must also be expert 

in t

f 

ttitudes toward the military. An awareness of the outlook, values, and priorities 

of political leaders and those who influence public opinion requires an understanding of 

American n, but 

also for sh e total 

society. 

 whom 

you serve. You've got to be persuasive with both major and minor 

bureaucrats in the Department of f your 

own service.... You've got to be pe

be persuasive with the Congress and with the general public. 

. To achieve the organizational short-term 

objectives and to implement the long-term vision, strategic leaders must understand how 

the 

ing 

f 

personality are keys to accomplishing this consensus-building task. Strategic leaders 

ho have the ability to persuade others, who know how and when to compromise 

without abandoning principles, and who gain and maintain the trust of other influential 

ecision-makers will go a long way toward achieving the organization's objectives. 

he processes and procedures for developing national security objectives, national 

military strategy, and the development, deployment, and use of the nation's military 

forces. 

 An understanding of current and projected national and international situations is 

necessary for credibility in testimony to Congress and for interactions with executives o

other Federal and state agencies and leaders, the media, and others who influence 

national a

society. This perspective is necessary not only for public representatio

aping the culture and values of the organization as an integral part of th

In the arena in which the senior leader of the United States military 

exists, you've got to be persuasive with a variety of audiences. You've 

got to be persuasive to the internal audience of military people

Defense and the Secretariat o

rsuasive in-house. Then you've got to

General Maxwell Thurman 

Former SOUTHCOM Commander 

No organization operates in a vacuum

organization fits into the national security framework. They must also build 

consensus within that framework, and with the nation, on the role of the organization, 

fitting the role to their strategic vision. 

The best method to achieve consensus in a multifaceted, pluralistic system is 

through networking. Informal contacts with knowledgeable, influential people hold

key positions in other organizations and agencies assist in gathering the diverse 

support that allows the organization's vision to be achieved. Integrity and the power o

w

d

48
MANAGE CHANGE. 

Strategic leaders proactively manage change through the processes associated with

embedding their vision within the organization and shaping organizational culture to 

support the vision. Achieving the vision requires change to bridge the gap between t

present and the future. External environmental factors, such as the changing nature

military threats, adjustments to national military strategy, legislation affectin

changes in international alliances, and budget considerations, generate the need for 

change within the organization. Internally, improvements in warfighting doctrine, 

equipmen

he 

 of 

g DOD, 

t modernization, resource adjustments resulting from technology 

advancements, and other factors also drive organizational change. These factors and 

changes on be 

revised.

I have conceived of many plans, but I was n e of 

them. For all that I held the rudder, and with a strong hand, the waves 

Napoleon Bonaparte 

); the Joint 

ogramming, 

Budgeting and Execution Process (PPBE); and the Services' systems integration 

proces

Managem nge at the strategic level includes the following: 

ilitary 

• Preparing strategies and plans for the use of military forces across the 

• Creating, resourcing, and sustaining organizational structures, systems, and 

rograms, and 

 may be so extensive that they periodically require that the strategic visi

 

ever free to execute on

were always a good deal stronger. 

If you don’t like change, you will like irrelevance even less. 

 General Eric Shinseki 

 Former Army Chief of Staff 

DOD, Joint Staff, and Service-unique strategic-level planning systems provide

strategic leaders the processes to manage change in the environment of strategic 

leadership. Decisions made within the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS

Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES); the Planning, Pr

ses provide purpose and direction to lower levels of the organization. 

ent of cha

• Identifying the necessary force capabilities to accomplish the national m

strategy. 

• Identifying and assigning strategic and operational roles and missions, 

including priorities for allocating resources. 

operational continuum in the unified, joint, combined, and interagency 

arenas. 

processes, including essential C4I systems, force modernization p

requisite personnel and equipment. 

49
• Developing and improving operating doctrine and the associated 

training methodologies to support the doctrine. 

hange. 

ecisions based on incomplete or inadequate information. Systems must be designed to 

be t

n. 

lons to implement the 

strategies and policies within the established framework. Effective, systematic feedback 

is e

and policies. Because the tenure of any individual strategic leader is limited, subordinate 

leaders ry of the 

United rdinates. 

es 

 to 

ar N. Bradley, George S. Patton, Jr., and 

Matthew B. Ridgway among them. Sc ch 

taught their subordinates their profession; and, more importantly, they 

gave them room to grow.

General Gordon R. Sullivan 

• Understanding and planning for second- and third-order effects of 

actions to implement c

• Maintaining effective leader development programs and other human 

resources programs. 

Decision-making at the strategic level almost always requires major resource 

commitments that cannot easily be reversed. Continual analysis of requirements, 

capabilities, and risks associated with capability shortfalls is essential to the decisionmaking process. Strategic leaders rely on timely, accurate feedback to prevent making 

d

op-driven and bottom-fed. Purpose, direction, and motivation are provided from the 

top, while information and recommendations flow upward from within the organizatio

 The management of change demands that strategic leaders focus primarily on future 

mid- and long-range issues while dealing with current short-term requirements. This 

means that strategic leaders must empower subordinate eche

ssential to provide strategic leaders information on which to judge the progress and 

ultimate results of desired changes within the organization. 

 Empowering subordinate leaders in this fashion helps to perpetuate and implement 

the strategic vision. Because short-term solutions should be consistent with the long-term

vision, subordinates must understand and internalize the vision to implement strategies

 must be selected, mentored, and trained to carry on the vision. The histo

States Army has been built on great leaders who produced great subo

Great leaders produce great subordinates who, in turn, become great 

leaders in their own time. Our Army has built its reputation on this 

process. Winfield Scott developed a generation of superb officers: Ulyss

S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, William T. Sherman, and Thomas J. Jackson,

name just a few. George C. Marshall learned leadership from John J. 

Pershing, and Marshall's followers became great captains themselves: 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Om

ott, Pershing, and Marshall ea

50
SUMMARY. 

Strategic leaders have the challenge and responsibility to lead large, complex 

organizations which change very slowly, with great expenditure of energy. The tas

required to meet this challenge begin with the strategic leader providing a vision to the 

organization. With this vision and well-articulated organizational values, strategic leaders 

then influence and shape their organization's culture. They also lead the organizat

daily basis, ensuring it meets all requirements in the unified, joint, combined, and 

interagency arenas. This task requires strategic leaders to deal with short-term challe

including operational contingencies, consistent with mid- and long-term objectives. They 

also manage the organization's relationships with all national-level agencies and 

organizations, representing the organization before Congress, the media, and other 

influential opinion groups. The objective is to gain consensus among these various 

ks 

ion on a 

nges, 

groups and organizations in support of the roles and missions, goals, and objectives of the 

rganization. Such consensus is essential to achieving the organization's vision in the 

rategic environment. Finally, by facilitating the management of change, strategic 

aders guide the organization today while molding it to meet tomorrow's challenges. 

o

st

le

51
CHAPTER 7 

THE STRATEGIC LEADER AND 

THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF COMBAT 

se 

and his 

readiness to resort to the expedient, he becomes, when he has attained a 

proficiency in all the normal techniqu . Yet 

even he has his limits; the preservation of his individual and collective 

ation 

an combat is 

ke no other activity in which mankind engages. Within the crucible of armed conflict, 

tho

rom the 

an 

ssary to 

e often 

e in 

nal influences from 

onstricting those policies and associated resources dedicated to enhancing the 

psycho

intentio inistrative 

efficien

While technology has helped the Army become more lethal and effective, 

he 

human dimension...Warfare fundamentally is a human endeavor. It’s a 

test of wills. It’s a test of things deep within us. 

The trained American possesses qualities that are almost unique. Becau

of his initiative and resourcefulness, his adaptability to change 

es of battle, a formidable soldier

strength is one of the greatest responsibilities of leadership.14

General Dwight D. Eisenhower 

 No matter how involved strategic leaders may become in working to further their 

vision for the Army, they must always be mindful that they are leaders of an organiz

whose fundamental purpose is to serve the national interest which can involve 

committing its personnel to the violence of battle. The phenomenon of hum

li

se who participate are dramatically affected by the fear of death or maiming, the 

trauma of participating in and witnessing violent death and destruction, the grief f

loss of comrades, and the deprivation of even the simplest of life's needs. 

 The psychological impact of battle and the prospect of battle have a tremendous 

influence upon the performance of individuals and of the units of which they are 

members. Individuals and units that are properly conditioned, supported, and trained c

minimize the adverse effects of facing and participating in sustained combat. 

Unfortunately, the costs of creating and sustaining the institutional processes nece

conserve the psychological capacity of our Army to function effectively in battl

have little perceived value in the day-to-day administration and training of the forc

peacetime. Thus, it is essential that strategic leaders have an appreciation for the human 

dimension of combat, so that they will stop external and inter

c

logical staying power of our Army in battle. Too often and with the best of

ns, this psychological staying power is undermined in the quest for adm

cy, cost-effectiveness, and peacetime mission focus. 

individual soldiers still do the fighting...technology has to enhance t

 General Peter J. Schoomaker, 

Army Chief of Staff 

52
A fundamental understanding of this human dimension can only be achieved 

rough personal study and contemplation. Although such appreciation and 

und l 

rote of 

such experiences. Every decision of each of these two strategic leaders was made only 

afte o 

mbat 

n 

iverse topics as: the value 

system of a society and its military; how individual values are influenced or changed; the 

psy and 

al 

e, now or in the future, must be 

ade with consideration of the impact of that decision on the psychological staying 

ower of our soldiers and units in battle. To permit our Army to lose the proper focus on 

psychological readiness for sustained combat is to break faith with those soldiers who 

will commit themselves in current and future conflicts. 

th

erstanding can result from personal combat experience, there is no level of persona

experience that cannot be significantly reinforced with an analysis of the experiences of 

others. 

 Strategic leaders such as Generals Eisenhower and Arnold possessed no personal 

experience in the human dimension of combat before they assumed significant strategic

leader responsibilities at the outset of World War II. Yet both of these distinguished 

strategic leaders had by that time achieved an understanding of this dimension of warfare 

through years of reading and reflecting upon the commentaries of those who w

r consideration of the consequences of the decision on the soldiers and airmen wh

bore the brunt of battle. Each of these leaders understood the human dynamics of co

and its relationship to the psychological staying power of the forces they led. 

 Achieving an understanding of the human dimension of combat is a continuing 

professional commitment of any Army leader, but most especially the leader at the 

strategic level. It is a subject area that is as rich and as complex as any quest for a

understanding of human nature. As such, it encompasses such d

chological and physical manifestations of combat stress; the influences of training 

conditioning to prevent or ameliorate the stress of combat; the dynamics of unit 

performance and cohesion; and numerous other related topics. 

 In the best of all worlds, leaders will achieve the strategic level without personal 

experience in the human dimension of combat, because our nation is blessed with a long 

period of peaceful engagement. But even in the best of worlds, strategic leaders must

possess a fundamental appreciation for this dimension of warfare for the very reason that 

our Army must always be prepared to commit its forces to combat to protect our nation

interests. Every decision that Army strategic leaders mak

m

p

53
APPENDIX A 

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES 

On December 21, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) tasked the U.S. Army 

War College (USAWC) to identify the strategic leader skill sets for officers required in 

the post-September 11th environment . A research group of four students and a faculty 

advisor completed the following report after extensive research and analysis. Research 

visits conducted by the team included the Center for Army Leadership, the Objective 

Force Task Force office, the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 

Sciences, U.S. Army Cadet Command, the U.S. Military Academy, Training and 

Doctrine Command headquarters and schools, and the leader development offices in the 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 and G-3. Additionally, the group consulted with 

leader development experts in organizations such as the Center for Creative Leadership, 

Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Strategic Leadership Solutions. 

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP. 

The search for strategic leader competencies(knowledge, skills, attributes, and 

abilities) is a natural progression of the research in the field of leadership. In the late 

1980s, some social science researchers began to question whether leadership actually 

made a difference in organizations while others suggested that perhaps the study of 

leadership had reached its nadir. Rather than disappearing, however, the study of 

leadership took on new energy with an emphasis on leadership of organizations, rather 

than the traditional leadership approaches that focused on face-to-face interaction at 

lower levels. Studies of transformational leadership, organizational culture, visionary 

leadership, organizational change, and charismatic leaders re-invigorated the field of 

leadership. Thus, the notion of strategic leadership was introduced. While lists of 

leadership competencies were very popular in the 1980s, the most recent literature distills 

strategic leadership to a few key skills and competencies, or a process. 

 

In 1991, the U.S. Army War College hosted a conference on the fledgling field of 

strategic leadership. At that conference, strategic leadership aspects were based on 

Jaques’s Stratified Systems Theory (SST). SST essentially argues that there are critical 

tasks that must be performed by leaders in effective organizations. At each higher level in 

an organization, these tasks become increasingly complex and qualitatively different. 

Consequently, leaders at the strategic level must have higher levels of cognitive 

complexity– the ability to deal with abstract, longer timeframe concepts. The influence of 

SST on the War College (and Army) is evident with the emphasis on cognitive 

complexity that permeates much of the strategic leadership instruction. 

 In its Strategic Leadership Primer, 1998 Edition, the War College provided a list of 

strategic leader competencies using the Be, Know, Do typology. The list is 

comprehensive and appears to capture every possible aspect of leadership. 

54
BE (Disposition - values, attributes): 

• The Values Champion- the standard bearer; beyond reproach 

• Master of the Strategic Art- ends, ways, means 

• Quintessential Student of History 

• Comfortable with Complexity 

• High Personal Stamina- physical, mental, stress management 

• Skilled Diplomat 

• Possesses Intellectual Sophistication- alternative frames of reference, 

pattern recognition, and able to see 2d, 3rd, and 4th-order effects 

KNOW (Disposition - skills): 

Conceptual 

• Envisioning- anticipating the future, proactive thinking - practices critical, 

creative, reflective thinking 

• Frame of Reference Development- including systems understanding, scanning, 

pattern recognition 

• Problem Management- competing issues, no right answers, ability to recognize 

and ignore irrelevant issues 

• Critical Self-Examination 

• Critical, Reflective Thought 

• Effective within Environment of Complexity 

• Skillful Formulation of Ends, Ways, Means 

Interpersonal 

• Communication- to a much broader audience; negotiations, consensus- 

 building across a variety of stakeholders; systems knowledge; sophisticated 

persuasion skills 

• Inspires Others to Act 

• Organizational Representation- to internal and external audiences/ 

 stakeholders 

• Skillful Coordination of Ends, Ways, Means 

• Master of Command and Peer Leadership 

Technical 

• Systems Understanding- political, economic, cultural, logistical, force 

management, and joint/combined interrelationships, etc. 

• Recognizes and Understands Interdependencies - systems, decisions, 

organizations, etc. 

• Information-age Technological Awareness - next generation awareness, 

sophisticated time/space selection 

• Skillful Application of Ends, Ways, Means 

55
DO (Action - influencing, operating, and improving) 

• Provide for the Future- visioning (long-term focus, time span, perspective) 

• Initiate of Policy and Directive 

• Shape the Culture- Values-based organization, leverage diversity, 

understanding and accepting differences, multiple perspectives 

• Teach and Mentor the Strategic Art 

• Manage Joint/Combined and Interagency Relationships 

• Manage National-Level Relationships 

• Represent the Organization 

• Leverage Technology 

• Lead and Manage Change- creating and building "learning organizations" 

• Build Teams and Consensus at Strategic Level (can't dictate action at this 

level)- co-opting, coalition building, negotiating, etc. 

• Practice the Strategic Art- allocates resources; develops and executes strategic 

plans derived from the inter-agency process 

Similarly, in FM 22-100, Army Leadership, the Army’s doctrinal leadership manual, 

the skills and actions required of strategic leaders are a cumulative list of forty-one 

competencies addressing the direct, organizational, and strategic levels. Twenty-one 

competencies are provided for the strategic level alone: 

FM 22-100, Army Leadership 

Strategic Level Skills and Actions 

• Communicating 

• Using dialogue 

• Negotiating 

• Achieving consensus 

• Building staffs 

• Envisioning 

• Developing frames of reference 

• Strategic art 

• Motivating 

• Leveraging technology 

• Executing 

• Communicating a vision 

• Decision making 

• Leading change 

• Strategic planning 

• Learning 

• Strategic assessing 

• Translating political goals into military objectives 

• Building 

• Dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity 

56
In one sense, the War College and FM 22-100 lists of strategic leader competencies 

are too comprehensive. At the individual level, it is difficult to assess one’s leadership 

ability when the lists suggest that a strategic leader must be, know, and do just about 

everything. At the institutional level, the lack of parsimony makes it difficult to focus an 

institution’s attention and resources on leader development when such a broad array of 

competencies is advocated. Hence, the task of identifying the competencies of future 

strategic leaders becomes one of reducing the lists to a few metacompetenciesthat will 

prove useful in: a) directing leader development efforts in the process of producing 

leaders with strategic leader capability, and b) facilitating self-assessment by officers of 

their strategic leader capability. 

 

Looking across the existing literature on strategic leadership, the current lists of Army 

strategic leader competencies, and the environment of the future force, six 

metacompetencies were derived: identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy,

interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness. Before 

addressing each metacompetency, it should be noted that concentrating on just six 

metacompetencies does provide focus, but there are some associated disadvantages. First, 

some skills and abilities are not explicitly described by a metacompetency label. For 

example, strategic leaders need to be politically savvy – knowing when to compromise, 

understanding that many strategic decisions are not black and white, and knowing what is 

best in the long run for the Nation and the Army. This ability is captured in the 

professional astuteness metacompetency description, but is not obvious in the words 

professional astuteness. Understanding the meaning and intent behind each 

metacompetency is much more important than creating a catchy mnemonic containing 

the first letter of each of the six labels. Similarly, the metacompetency labels may be 

misinterpreted if separated from their descriptions. For example, cross-cultural savvy 

includes the ability to work across organizational boundaries, but the metacompetency 

can be narrowly misinterpreted to refer to working only across national boundaries. In 

other words, the six metacompetency labels were not developed as a stand-alone list. The 

concepts behind the labels, not the labels themselves, are the focal points for leader 

development and assessment. 

The following section describes each of the six metacompetencies. This report is not 

intended to be an exhaustive explanation of strategic leadership – the civilian literature 

does that adequately. It is also not intended as a blueprint to overhaul the Army’s entire 

leader development system. Instead, this report contrasts the future environment with the 

current status of strategic leader development and suggests some aiming points for leader 

development efforts. 

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP METACOMPETENCIES 

Identity. This metacompetency is derived from the work of Douglas Hall who 

heavily influenced the conclusions of the Army Training and Leader Development PanelOfficer (ATLD Panel). According to Hall, identity is “the ability to gather self- feedback, 

to form accurate self-perceptions, and to change one’s self-concept as appropriate.”15 

57
The ATLD describes self-awareness, and describes it as the ability to understand how to 

assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn 

how to correct those weaknesses. The metacompetency of identity moves beyond simply 

knowing one’s strengths and weaknesses as connoted by self-awareness. It includes the 

understanding of one’s self-concept as an officer in the Army. Identity also includes an 

understanding of one’s values and how they match up to the values of the Army. Identity 

implies maturation beyond self-awareness as officers come to an understanding of who 

they are, not just how well they do things. 

Identity, as opposed to self-awareness, also brings in aspects of development over a 

career. As senior leaders gain responsibility, they focus less on their own contributions 

and more on the accomplishments of others. The metacompetency of identity 

acknowledges that as an officer develops strategic leadership capability, his role extends 

beyond personal contributions and shifts to serving as a catalyst for success for 

subordinates. 

Mental agility. In addition to self-awareness, the ATLD report recommends that the 

Army focus on developing the enduring competency of adaptability that includes the 

predisposition and readiness to scan and recognize changes in the environment; to 

determine what is new and what must be learned to be effective; and the willingness to 

modify to a given situation. Mental agility builds on the ability to scan and adjust 

learning based on the environment, and brings aspects of cognitive complexity, 

improvisation, and lightness found in the strategic leadership literature. Strategic leaders 

operate in an environment of ambiguity and uncertainty. Typical strategic situations lack 

structure, are open to varying interpretations, and potentially pertinent information is 

often far flung, elusive, cryptic, or even contradictory. Mentally agile strategic leaders 

possess the requisite cognitive skills to navigate in this milieu and be adaptable enough to 

alter their actions and those of their organizations to function in this complex 

environment. 

From a cognitive perspective, strategic leaders must learn how to scan the 

environment, understand their world from a systems perspective, and eventually envision 

different futures and directions for their organization. Scanning involves a constant 

search for information that affects current assumptions, along with the future of the 

organization. Officers with mentally agility search for more information and spend more 

time interpreting it. They also analyze large amounts of sometimes conflicting 

information and try to understand why things happen and identify possible courses of 

action to affect events. Mentally agile leaders know which factors really matter in the big 

picture; they identify root causes quickly, display a keen sense of priority, relevance and 

significance, and integrate information from a variety of sources while detecting trends, 

associations, and cause-effect relationships. Just as important, mentally agile leaders 

translate complex situations into simple, meaningful explanations that others can grasp. 

Mentally agile leaders efficiently gather and process relevant information in order to 

process it from a systems perspective and then envision feasible futures within 

increasingly longer time horizons. From a systems perspective, they challenge 

58
assumptions, facilitate constructive dissent, and analyze second- and third-order 

consequences of their decisions. Mentally agile leaders are comfortable making 

important decisions with only part of the information available. More importantly, they 

know when to act and when to experiment to validate beliefs or assumptions. Once 

mentally agile strategic leaders have scanned the environment, processed information 

from a systems perspective, and envisioned the future effect of that information on 

the organization, they then adapt and implement learning mechanisms to alter the 

processes, structure, and behaviors of their organization to accommodate their envisioned 

future. 

Cross-cultural savvy. With the increasing frequency of coalition warfare and an 

emphasis on theater security cooperation, the necessity for cross-cultural savvy is 

obvious. The Army’s future leaders clearly need to be well versed in interacting with 

cultures outside the U.S. borders. Cross-cultural savvy, however, refers to more than just 

the ability to work with non-U.S. militaries. The metacompetency, cross-cultural savvy, 

includes the ability to understand cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, 

religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries. A strategic leader with crosscultural savvy is comfortable interacting with and leading joint, international, 

interagency, or inter-organizational entities. Future strategic leaders must be able to work 

with a diverse group of people and organizations ranging from 24-year-old congressional 

staffers, to Northern Alliance warlords, to representatives from non-governmental 

organizations. 

While cross-cultural skills have been desirable in the past, they will be even more 

critical for future strategic leaders due to several factors. First, globalization has vastly 

increased interaction with other nations. Second, the global war on terrorism is 

illustrating that the Army must coordinate closely with other services, agencies, and 

organizations in the new national security environment. Third, the Army has traditionally 

been accused of being somewhat inept in its dealings with Congress and the media. As 

societal exposure to the military decreases, it becomes increasingly important for Army 

officers to tell the Army story to those outside the Army culture. Finally, although the 

U.S. remains the world’s only superpower, unilateral military action is becoming less 

common. Coalitions will continue to be vital to the security strategy. 

Cross-cultural savvy implies that an officer can see perspectives outside his or her 

own boundaries. It does not imply, however, that the officer abandons the Army or U.S. 

culture in pursuit of a relativistic worldview. Instead, the future strategic leader is 

grounded in National and Army values, but is also able to anticipate and understand the 

values, assumptions, and norms of other groups, organizations, and nations. 

Interpersonal maturity. Many of the interpersonal skills required of strategic 

leaders are basically the same attributes used at the organizational level applied at a 

higher level. For example, much like a junior leader, strategic leaders are expected to 

display compassion when dealing with subordinates on sensitive issues. However, there 

are several interpersonal skills that, although based on direct and organizational 

leadership characteristics, are qualitatively different at the strategic level. Strategic 

59
leaders must possess an interpersonal maturity that goes beyond face-to-face leadership. 

Strategic leaders devote far more of their time dealing with outside organizations and 

leaders of other services, agencies, and nations. The power relationship between the 

strategic leader and individuals from these entities is markedly different than the power 

relationship typically experienced at the direct and organizational level. 

Several interpersonal skills become very important at this level. Most important 

among these is empowerment. Strategic leaders need to share power with their 

subordinates, peers, and constituents. They must have the willingness and ability to 

involve others and elicit their participation based on the subordinate’s knowledge and 

skills because tasks will be too complex and information too widely distributed for 

leaders to solve problems on their own. An interpersonally mature strategic leader needs 

to be persuasive and rely less on fiat, asking others to join in rather than telling them.

Empowerment implies that the leader is a good listener; leadership at the strategic level is 

as much collaboration as it is authoritative leadership. Interpersonal maturity implies that 

strategic leaders do not feel compelled to do all the talking and resist imposing a solution 

on others. Because of the unique power relationships, the skills of consensus building 

and negotiation rise to the top of a strategic leader’s interpersonal maturity. Consensus 

building is a complicated process based on effective reasoning and logic that may take 

place over an extended period. Peers, outside agencies, foreign governments, and other 

services will not necessarily respond to orders. In essence, the process of consensus 

building is insurance that effective reasoning has taken place and that contentious issues 

have been resolved. As part of this process, or even separate, strategic leaders will find 

that they need to understand the art of negotiation. Again, because many relationships at 

the strategic level are lateral and without clear subordination, leaders will find themselves 

in difficult situations where success rests in their ability to negotiate an agreeable 

solution. 

Interpersonal maturity also includes the ability of officers to analyze, challenge, and 

change an organization’s culture to align it with the ever changing outside environment. 

Strategic leaders must therefore have skills in analyzing cultural assumptions, identifying 

functional and dysfunctional assumptions, and evolving processes that enlarge the culture 

by building on its strengths and functional elements. Strategic leaders then need to 

proactively manage change through the processes associated with embedding their vision 

within the organization and shaping organizational culture to support the vision. Noel 

Tichy posits, “As long as a culture fits the external environment, it succeeds, but when 

the external realities change, the culture has to change as well...at certain critical stages, 

radical cultural shifts are needed, and without leadership, they just don’t happen.”16 

Lastly, strategic leaders must have the interpersonal maturity to take 

responsibility for the development of the Army’s future strategic leaders. Therefore, 

strategic leaders need to teach, coach, and mentor, while creating an environment where 

other leaders may do the same. Interpersonal maturity includes the ability to ensure leader 

development does not get neglected in the pursuit of everyday mission accomplishment. 

60
World-class warrior. This is the simplest and most understandable of the six 

strategic leadership metacompetencies. As a world-class warrior, strategic leaders move 

beyond tactical and operational competence in the employment of the future force. They 

understand the entire spectrum of operations at the strategic level to include theater 

strategy; campaign strategy; joint, interagency, and multinational operations; and the use 

of all the elements of national power and technology in the execution of national security 

strategy. 

Professional astuteness. In their comprehensive study of the Army profession, Don 

Snider and Gayle Watkins arrive at an important conclusion concerning the current 

officer corps: 

The Army’s bureaucratic nature outweighs and compromises its 

professional nature. This is true in practice, but, of greater importance, it 

is regarded as true in the minds of the officer corps. Officers do not share 

a common understanding of the Army profession, and many of them accept 

the pervasiveness of bureaucratic norms and behaviors as natural and 

appropriate.17

Strategic leaders who are professionally astute understand that they are no longer 

merely members of a profession, but leaders in the profession as the Army serves the 

Nation. They see the need to develop the future leaders of the profession, work with 

stakeholders, and communicate this responsibility to future leaders of the profession. In 

his recent book, Good to Great, Jim Collins talks about Level 5 leaders – leaders who can 

transform a company. He writes, “Level 5 leaders channel their ego needs away from 

themselves and into the larger goal of building a great company. It’s not that Level 5 

leaders have no ego or self- interest. Indeed, they are incredibly ambitious - but their 

ambition is first and foremost for the institution, not themselves.”18 In contrast, Level 4 

leaders are often effective and charismatic, yet the company falls apart after they leave 

since Level 4 leaders put their personal success and egos ahead of institutional success. 

The future force will need strategic leaders who are Level 5 leaders – leaders who 

take responsibility for the Army as a profession. Leaders with professional astuteness get 

the mission accomplished, but they also have the insight to do what is best for the 

profession and Nation. This may include having political savvy, knowing when to 

compromise, or understanding the many constituents that the Army serves. Additionally, 

strategic leaders with professional astuteness seek to ensure the officer corps maintains its 

expertise in national defense as well as adhering to a professional ethic. Professional 

astuteness is a strategic leadership competency that insures that the Army deliberately 

takes the steps to insure the Army remains a profession, not merely a job, organization, 

bureaucracy, or occupation. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

In both the civilian and military literature, there is a plethora of material discussing 

strategic leadership and strategic leader competencies. Part of the difficulty encountered 

61
by anyone desiring to adjust leader development or education efforts is the broad array of 

competencies presented in the literature. This section combines what is known about 

strategic leadership competencies and integrates it with the characteristics of the officer 

corps and the future force environment. The result is a list of six metacompetencies for 

strategic leadership. 

62
ENDNOTES 

1 Richard Chilcoat, “Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders, p. ii. 

2 John Gardner, On Leadership, p. 98. 

3 John Lewis Gaddis, “And Now This: Lessons from the Old Era for the New One, in 

Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda, eds., The Age of Terror: America and the World After 

September 11, p. 17. 

4 Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, “Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the 

New Danger,” Foreign Affairs, p. 81. 

5 Edward Luttwak, Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, p. 137. 

6 Townsen Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James 

Forrestal, p. 161. 

7 Marshall Sashkin and Milly Sashkin, Leadership That Matters, pp. 99-102. 

8 John T. Nelsen, II, General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the 

Challenges of Reconstituting the Army, 1939-194, pp. 14-15. 

9 Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, pp. 

361-364. 

10 General Mike Lynch in Howard Means, Colin Powell: Soldier/Statesman – 

Statesman/Soldier, p. 266. 

11 James Thomas Flexner, George Washington in the American Revolution (1775-1875), 

p. 535. 

12 Ibid, p. 534. 

13 Jaffe, p. 28. 

14 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 453. 

15 Douglas T. Hall, Careers In and Out of Organizations, p. 161. 

16 Noel M. Tichy, The Leadership Engine, p. 26. 

17 Gayle L. Watkins and Don M. Snider, “Project Conclusions,” in Don M. Snider, Gayle 

L. Watkins, and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., The Future of the Army Profession, p. 537. 

63
18 Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap . . . and Others 

Don't, p. 21. 

64
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