United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Government Management, Finance, and 

Accountability, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

MARITIME SECURITY

Information-Sharing Efforts 

Are Improving 

Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Acting Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT

Monday, July 10, 2006

 

GAO-06-933T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 10, 2006

MARITIME SECURITY

Information-Sharing Efforts Are 

Highlights of GAO-06-933T, a testimony Improving 

before the Subcommittee on Government 

Management, Finance, and Accountability

of the Committee on Government Reform, 

U.S. House of Representatives

Sharing information with 

nonfederal officials is an important 

tool in federal efforts to secure the 

nation’s ports against a potential

terrorist attack. The Coast Guard 

has lead responsibility in 

coordinating maritime information

sharing efforts. The Coast Guard

has established area maritime 

security committees—forums that 

involve federal and nonfederal 

officials who identify and address 

risks in a port. The Coast Guard 

and other agencies have sought to

further enhance information

sharing and port security

operations by establishing 

interagency operational centers—

command centers that tie together 

the efforts of federal and

nonfederal participants. 

This testimony is a summary and 

update to our April 2005 report,

Maritime Security: New 

Structures Have Improved 

Information Sharing, but Security 

Clearance Processing Requires 

Further Attention, GAO-05-394. It 

discusses the impact the 

committees and interagency 

operational centers have had on 

improving information sharing and 

identifies any barriers that have

hindered information sharing. 

Area maritime security committees provide a structure that has improved 

information sharing among port security stakeholders. At the four port 

locations GAO visited, federal and nonfederal stakeholders said that the 

newly formed committees were an improvement over previous informationsharing efforts. The types of information shared included assessments of 

vulnerabilities at port locations and strategies the Coast Guard intends to 

use in protecting key infrastructure. GAO’s ongoing work indicates that 

these committees continue to be useful forums for information sharing. 

Interagency operational centers also allow for even greater information 

sharing because the centers operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis, and they 

receive real-time information from data sources such as radars and sensors. 

The Coast Guard has developed its own centers—called sector command 

centers—at 35 port locations to monitor information and to support its 

operations planned for the future. As of today, the relationship between the 

interagency operational centers and the sector command centers remains to 

be determined. 

In April 2005 the major barrier hindering information sharing was the lack of 

federal security clearances for nonfederal members of committees or 

centers. In April 2005, Coast Guard issued guidance to field offices that 

clarified their role in obtaining clearances for nonfederal members of 

committees or centers. In addition, the Coast Guard did not have formal 

procedures that called for the use of data to monitor application trends. As 

of June 2006, guidance was put in place and according to the Coast Guard, 

was responsible for an increase in security clearance applications under 

consideration by the Coast Guard. Specifically, as of June 2006, 188 out of 

467 nonfederal members of area maritime security committees with a need 

to know received some type of security clearance. This is an improvement 

from February 2005, when no security clearances were issued to 359

nonfederal members of area maritime security committees members with a 

need to know security information.

Harbor Patrols Coordinated by Interagency Operational Centers 

Source: GAO.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-933T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Stephen L. 

Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or 

CaldwellS@gao.gov. 
Maritime Security

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the improvements made in the 

practice of sharing maritime-related security information. Securing the 

nation’s ports against a potential terrorist attack has become one of the 

nation’s security priorities since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001. Factors that make ports vulnerable to a terrorist attack include their 

location near major urban centers, their inclusion of critical 

infrastructures such as oil refineries and terminals, and their importance 

to the nation’s economy and trade. Although no port-related terrorist 

attacks have occurred in the United States, terrorists overseas have 

demonstrated their ability to access and destroy infrastructure, assets, and 

lives in and around seaports. 

Ports are sprawling enterprises that often cross jurisdictional boundaries;

therefore, the need to share information among federal, state, and local 

agencies is central to effective prevention and response. Since the 

September 11 terrorist attacks, the federal government has taken a 

number of approaches designed to enhance information sharing.1

 One of 

these approaches provides the Coast Guard with the authority to create 

area maritime security committees at the port level.

2

 These committees—

with representatives from the federal, state, local, and private sectors—

offer a venue to identify and deal with vulnerabilities in and around ports, 

as well as a forum for sharing information on issues related to port 

security. Another approach developed to share information is the creation 

of interagency operational centers at certain port locations.3

 These centers 

are command posts that tie together intelligence and operational efforts of 

various federal and nonfederal participants. Often information regarding 

 1

For the purposes of this testimony, “homeland security information sharing” is defined as

an exchange of information, including intelligence, critical infrastructure, and law 

enforcement information, among federal, state, and local governments, and the private 

sector (industry) to establish timely, effective, and useful communications to detect, 

prevent, and mitigate potential terrorist attacks. 

2

The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), P.L.107-295, contains many of

the homeland security requirements related specifically to port security. The area maritime 

security committees are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, as codified at 46 U.S. C. § 

70112(a)(2) and implemented at 33 C.F.R. Part 103. 

3

We use the term “interagency operational centers” to refer to centers where multiple 

federal (and in some cases, state and local) agencies are involved in monitoring maritime 

security and planning related operations. Members of these interagency operational centers

include the Department of Homeland Security (through the U.S. Coast Guard), the

Department of the Navy, and the Department of Justice. 

Page 1 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

port security is classified, and requires security clearances for those who 

need access to this information. Lacking access to such information 

through a security clearance can disadvantage officials in their efforts to 

respond to or combat a terrorist threat. 

My testimony today is a summary of and update to our April 2005 report, 

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information 

Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention,

GAO-05-394. That report provides additional background and examples 

related to our findings. Specifically, my testimony provides an examination 

of the efforts that the Coast Guard and other federal agencies have made 

in improving information sharing among federal, state, local, and industry 

stakeholders, including (1) the impact of area maritime security 

committees on information sharing, (2) the impact of interagency 

operational centers on information sharing, and (3) the barriers, if any, 

that have hindered improvements in information sharing among port 

security stakeholders. 

To obtain this information, we reviewed the activities of area maritime 

security committees at four ports, selected to provide a diverse sample of 

security environments and perspectives. The ports were Baltimore, 

Maryland; Charleston, South Carolina; Houston, Texas; and Seattle, 

Washington. To review the activities of the interagency operational 

centers, we visited and interviewed participants at the three centers in 

operation at the time of our published report. We also discussed 

information-sharing issues with nonfederal stakeholders, including private 

sector officials, officials from port authorities, and local law enforcement. 

We examined the Coast Guard’s procedures for processing security 

clearances for members of area maritime security committees. We 

reviewed legislation and congressional committee reports related to 

information sharing, interviewed agency officials, and reviewed numerous 

other documents and reports on the issue. We interviewed Coast Guard 

officials involved in sharing information and received updated information 

about their efforts in 2006. All of our work has been conducted in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Judging from the four ports we visited for our 2005 report, area maritime 

security committees have provided a structure to improve the timeliness, 

completeness, and usefulness of information sharing between federal and

nonfederal stakeholders. Stakeholders said the newly formed committees 

were an improvement over previous information-sharing efforts because 

they established a formal structure for communicating information and 

Summary 

Page 2 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

established new procedures for sharing information. Stakeholders stated 

that, among other things, the committees have been used as a forum for 

sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing information on illegal or 

suspicious activities, and providing input on portwide security plans—

called area maritime security plans—that describe the joint strategies of 

the Coast Guard and its partner agencies for protecting key infrastructure 

against terrorist activities. Nonfederal stakeholders, including state 

officials, local port authority operators, and representatives of private 

companies, said the information sharing had increased their awareness of 

security issues around the port and allowed them to identify and address 

security issues at their facilities. Likewise, Coast Guard officials said the 

information they received from nonfederal participants had helped in 

mitigating and reducing risks. While committees at each of the locations 

we visited had the same guidance, they varied in such ways as the size of 

the membership and the types of stakeholders represented. 

The three interagency operational centers we visited for our 2005 report 

allow for even greater information sharing because the centers operate 24 

hours a day and receive real-time operational information from radars, 

sensors, and cameras, as well as classified data on personnel, vessels, and

cargo, according to center participants. In contrast, the area maritime 

security committees, while they have a broader membership, primarily 

provide information through meetings, documents, and other means that 

are often used for long-term planning purposes rather than day-to-day 

operations. The three operational interagency centers and two additional 

centers under construction should fulfill varying missions and operations, 

and thus share different types of information. For example, the center in 

Charleston, South Carolina, focuses on port security alone and is led by 

the Department of Justice (DOJ). In contrast, the center in San Diego 

supports the Coast Guard’s missions beyond port security, including drug 

interdiction, alien migrant interdiction, and search and rescue activities, 

and is led by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard also has developed its own 

operational centers—called sector command centers—at 35 port 

locations, including four sector command centers with enhanced 

surveillance and collaboration capabilities,4

 to monitor maritime 

information and to support Coast Guard operations. 

 4

 The four sector command centers with enhanced surveillance and collaboration 

capabilities are Miami, Florida; San Diego, California; Charleston, South Carolina; and 

Hampton Roads, Virginia. The Coast Guard told us that the long-term goal is to provide all 

sector command centers with enhanced surveillance and collaboration capabilities. 

Page 3 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

One barrier to sharing information—the lack of security clearances among 

nonfederal officials—is being addressed by the Coast Guard. In our April 

2005 report, we noted that while information sharing has generally 

improved, a major barrier mentioned most frequently by stakeholders as 

hindering information sharing was the lack of federal security clearances

among port security stakeholders. This lack of security clearances may 

limit the ability of state, local, and industry officials, such as those 

involved in area maritime security committees or interagency operational 

centers, to deter, prevent, and respond to a potential terrorist attack. By

February 2005—or over 4 months after the Coast Guard had developed a 

list of 359 nonfederal area maritime security committee participants as 

having a need for a security clearance—only 28 had submitted the 

necessary paperwork for the background check. As of June 2006, Coast 

Guard identified 467 nonfederal area maritime security committee 

participants with a need to know security information. Of the 467 

nonfederal participants, 197 security clearance applications were 

received—20 received interim clearances, and 168 received final security 

clearances. Therefore, according to the Coast Guard, 188 out of 467 area 

maritime security committee participants with a need to know have 

received some type of clearance. Although we reported in 2005 that 

progress in moving these officials through the application process had 

been slow, it appears that as of June 2006, the Coast Guard’s efforts have 

improved considerably. However, continued management attention and 

guidance about the security clearance process would strengthen the 

program, and it would reduce the risk that nonfederal officials may have 

incomplete information as they carry out their law enforcement activities.

Background 

Ports Are Important and 

Vulnerable

Ports play an important role in the nation’s economy and security. Ports 

are used to import and export cargo worth hundreds of billions of dollars; 

generating jobs, both directly and indirectly, for Americans and our 

trading partners. Ports, which include inland waterways, are used to move 

cargo containers, and bulk agricultural, mineral, petroleum, and paper 

products. Ports are also important to national security by hosting naval 

bases and vessels and facilitating the movement of military equipment and 

supplying troops deployed overseas.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the nation’s 361 seaports have 

been increasingly viewed as potential targets for future terrorist attacks. 

Ports are vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven with complex 

Page 4 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and easily 

accessible. Ports contain a number of specific facilities that could be 

targeted by terrorists, including military vessels and bases, cruise ships, 

passenger ferries, terminals, dams and locks, factories, office buildings, 

power plants, refineries, sports complexes, and other critical 

infrastructure. 

The responsibility for protecting ports from a terrorist attack is a shared 

responsibility that crosses jurisdictional boundaries, with federal, state, 

and local organizations involved. For example, at the federal level, the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has overall homeland security 

responsibility, and the Coast Guard, an agency of the department, has lead 

responsibility for maritime security. Port authorities provide protection 

through designated port police forces, private security companies, and 

coordination with local law enforcement agencies. Private sector 

stakeholders play a major role in identifying and addressing the 

vulnerabilities in and around their facilities, which may include oil 

refineries, cargo facilities, and other property adjacent to navigable 

waterways. 

Multiple Jurisdictions Are 

Involved 

Information Sharing Is 

Important 

Information sharing among federal, state, and local officials is central to 

port security activities. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 recognizes that 

the federal government relies on state and local personnel to help protect 

against terrorist attacks, and these officials need homeland security 

information to prevent and prepare for such attacks.5

 

Information sharing between federal officials and nonfederal officials can

involve information collected by federal intelligence agencies. In order to 

gain access to classified information, state and local law enforcement 

officials generally need to apply for and receive approval to have a federal

security clearance. As implemented by the Coast Guard, the primary 

criterion for granting access to classified information is an individual’s 

need to know, which is defined as the determination made by an 

authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient

requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or 

assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.6

 To obtain a 

 5

P.L. 107-296, § 891 (Nov. 25, 2002). 

6

 Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information, Section 1.1(h). 

Page 5 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

security clearance, an applicant must complete a detailed questionnaire 

that asks for information on all previous employment, residences, and 

foreign travel and contacts that reach back 7 years. After submitting the 

questionnaire, the applicant then undergoes a variety of screenings and 

checks. 

The Maritime Transportation Security Act, passed in the aftermath of the 

September 11 attacks and with the recognition that ports contain many 

potential security targets, provided for area maritime security 

committees—composed of federal, state, local, and industry members—to 

be established by the Coast Guard at ports across the country.7

 A primary 

goal of these committees is to assist the local Captain of the Port—the 

senior Coast Guard officer who leads the committee—to develop a 

security plan—called an area maritime security plan—to address the 

vulnerabilities and risks in that port zone.8

 The committees also serve as a 

link for communicating threats and disseminating security information to 

port stakeholders. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard organized 46 area

maritime security committees, covering the nation’s 361 ports.

9

Area Maritime Security 

Committees 

Interagency Operational 

Centers 

Another approach at improving information sharing and port security 

operations involves interagency operational centers—command centers 

that bring together the intelligence and operational efforts of various 

federal and nonfederal participants. These centers are to provide 

intelligence information and real-time operational data from sensors, 

radars, and cameras at one location to federal and nonfederal participants

24 hours a day. These interagency operational centers represent an effort

to improve awareness of incoming vessels, port facilities, and port 

operations. In general, these centers are jointly operated by federal and

nonfederal law enforcement officials. The centers can have command and 

control capabilities that can be used to communicate information to 

 7

See 46 U.S.C. § 70112(a)(2). Prior to MTSA, some port locations had harbor safety 

committees that had representatives from federal, state, and local organizations. In

addition, port security committees had been organized and still exist at ports where 

substantial out-load and in-load of military equipment occurs. 

8

 See 33 C.F.R. § 103.500. 

9

Because some ports are located close to one another, some committees cover several 

ports. For example, the Puget Sound area maritime security committee includes the ports 

of Seattle, Tacoma, Bremerton, Port Angeles, and Everett. 

Page 6 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

vessels, aircraft, and other vehicles and stations involved in port security 

operations. 

While area maritime security committees and interagency operational 

centers are port-level organizations, they are supported by, and provide 

support to, a national-level intelligence infrastructure. National-level

departments and agencies in the intelligence and law enforcement 

communities may offer information that ultimately could be useful to 

members of area maritime security committees or interagency operational 

centers at the port level. These intelligence and law enforcement agencies

conduct maritime threat identification and dissemination efforts in 

support of tactical and operational maritime and port security efforts, but

most have missions broader than maritime activities as well. In addition, 

some agencies also have regional or field offices involved in information 

gathering and sharing.10

Port-Level Information 

Sharing Supported by 

National-Level Intelligence 

Area Maritime 

Security Committees 

Have Improved 

Information Sharing 

Ports Reviewed Showed 

Improvements in 

Timeliness, Completeness, 

and Usefulness of Shared 

Information 

Area maritime security committees have provided a structure to improve

the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information sharing. A 

primary function served by the committees was to develop security plans 

for port areas—called area maritime security plans. The goal of these 

plans was to identify vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack in and around a 

port location and to develop strategies for protecting a wide range of 

facilities and infrastructure. In doing so, the committees established new 

procedures for sharing information by holding meetings on a regular basis, 

issuing electronic bulletins on suspicious activities around port facilities,

and sharing key documents, including vulnerability assessments and the 

portwide security plan itself, according to committee participants. Also, 

participants noted that these committees allowed for both formal and 

 10 For a more detailed description of the departments and agencies/components involved in 

maritime information sharing at the national and port levels, see appendix II of Maritime

Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance 

Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2005). 

Page 7 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

informal stakeholder networking, which contributes to improvements in 

information sharing. 

Our continuing work on the Coast Guard and maritime security, while not 

specifically focused on information sharing, has continued to indicate that 

area maritime security committees are a useful tool for exchanging 

information. For example, we have done work at eight additional ports 

and found that stakeholders were still using the committees as a 

structured means to regularly share information about threat conditions 

and operational issues. In addition, Coast Guard personnel and port 

stakeholders are using the area maritime security committees to 

coordinate security and response training and exercises. Also, in the wake 

of Hurricane Katrina, Coast Guard officials shared information 

collaboratively through their area maritime security committees to 

determine when it was appropriate to close and then reopen a port for 

commerce. 

While the committees are required to follow the same guidance regarding

their structure, purpose, and processes, each of the committees is allowed 

the flexibility to assemble and operate in a way that reflects the needs of 

its port area. Each port is unique in many ways, including the geographic 

area covered and the type of operations that take place there. These portspecific differences influence the number of members that participate, the 

types of state and local organizations that members represent, and the way

in which information is shared. 

Committees Have 

Flexibility in Their 

Structure and in the Way in 

Which They Share 

Information 

Interagency 

Operational Centers 

Have Also Improved 

Information Sharing 

Centers Process and Share 

Information on Operations 

Information sharing at interagency operational centers represents a step 

toward further improving information sharing, according to participants at

the centers we visited. They said maritime security committees have 

improved information sharing primarily through a planning process that 

identifies vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies, as well as through 

development of two-way communication mechanisms to share threat 

information on an as-needed basis. In contrast, interagency operational 

Page 8 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

centers can provide a continuous flow of information about maritime 

activities and involve various agencies directly in operational decisions 

using this information. Radar, sensors, and cameras offer representations 

of vessels and facilities. Other data are available from intelligence sources 

and include data on vessels, cargo, and crew. 

Greater information sharing among participants at these centers has also 

enhanced operational collaboration, according to participants. Unlike the 

area maritime security committees, these centers are operational in 

nature—that is, they have a unified or joint command structure designed 

to receive information and act on it. At the centers we visited, 

representatives from the various agencies work side by side, each having

access to databases and other sources of information from their respective 

agencies. Officials said such centers help leverage the resources and 

authorities of the respective agencies. For example, if the Coast Guard 

determines that a vessel should be boarded and inspected, other federal 

and nonfederal agencies might join in the boarding to assess the vessel or 

its cargo, crew, or passengers for violations relating to their areas of 

jurisdiction or responsibility. 

Variations across Centers 

Affect Information Sharing 

The types of information and the way information is shared vary at the 

centers we visited, depending on their purpose and mission, leadership 

and organization, membership, technology, and resources, according to 

officials at the centers. In our report of April 2005, we detailed three 

interagency operational centers at Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk, 

Virginia; and San Diego, California. As of June 2006, the Coast Guard has 

two additional interagency command centers under construction in 

Jacksonville, Florida, and Seattle, Washington. Both are being established 

as Sector Command Centers—joint with the U.S. Navy—and are expected

to be operational in 2006. 

Of the interagency centers we visited, the Charleston center had a port 

security purpose, so its missions were all security related. It was led by 

DOJ, and its membership included 4 federal agencies and 16 state and 

local agencies. The San Diego center had a more general purpose, so it had 

multiple missions to include not just port security, but search and rescue, 

environmental response, drug interdiction, and other law enforcement 

activities. It was led by the Coast Guard, and its membership included 2 

federal agencies and 1 local agency. The Norfolk center had a port security 

purpose, but its mission was focused primarily on force protection for the 

Navy. It was led by the Coast Guard, and its membership included 2 

federal agencies and no state or local agencies. As a result, the Charleston 

Page 9 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

center shared information that focused on law enforcement and 

intelligence related to port security among a very broad group of federal,

state, and local agency officials. The San Diego center shared information 

on a broader scope of activities (beyond security) among a smaller group 

of federal and local agency officials. The Norfolk center shared the most 

focused information (security information related to force protection) 

among two federal agencies. 

The centers also shared different information because of their 

technologies and resources. The San Diego and Norfolk centers had an 

array of standard and new Coast Guard technology systems and access to 

Coast Guard and various national databases, while the Charleston center 

had these as well as additional systems and databases. For example, the 

Charleston center had access to and shared information on Customs and 

Border Protection’s databases on incoming cargo containers from the 

National Targeting Center. In addition, Charleston had a pilot project with 

the Department of Energy to test radiation detection technology that 

provided additional information to share. The Charleston center was 

funded by a special appropriation that allowed it to use federal funds to 

pay for state and local agency salaries. This arrangement boosted the 

participation of state and local agencies, and thus information sharing 

beyond the federal government, according to port stakeholders in 

Charleston. While the San Diego center also had 24-hour participation by 

the local harbor patrol, that agency was paying its own salaries. 

Coast Guard Continues to 

Develop Sector Command 

Centers at Ports 

In April 2005, we reported that the Coast Guard planned to develop up to

40 of its own operational centers—called sector command centers—at 

additional ports. These command centers would provide local port 

activities with a unified command and improve awareness of the maritime 

domain through a variety of technologies. As of June 2006, the Coast 

Guard reported to us that 35 sector command centers have been created,

and that these centers are the primary conduit for daily collaboration and 

coordination between the Coast Guard and its port partner agencies. The 

Coast Guard also reported that it has implemented a maritime monitoring 

system—known as the Common Operating Picture system—that fuses 

Page 10 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

data from different sources.11 According to the Coast Guard, this system is 

the primary tool for Coast Guard commanders in the field to attain 

maritime domain awareness. 

In April 2005, we also reported that the Coast Guard requested in fiscal 

year 2006 over $5 million in funding to improve awareness of the maritime 

domain by continuing to evaluate the potential expansion of sector 

command centers to other port locations, and requested additional 

funding to train personnel in Common Operating Picture deployment at 

command centers and to modify facilities to implement the picture in 

command centers.12 In June 2006, the Coast Guard reported to us that no 

additional funding for this program was requested for fiscal year 2007. 

Coast Guard Report on 

Interagency Operational 

Centers 

Congress directed the Coast Guard to report on the existing interagency

operational centers, covering such matters as the composition and 

operational characteristics of existing centers and the number, location, 

and cost of such new centers as may be required to implement maritime 

transportation security plans and maritime intelligence activities.13 This 

report, called for by February 2005, was issued by the Coast Guard in April 

2005. While the report addresses the information sought by Congress, the 

report did not define the relationship between interagency operational 

centers and the Coast Guard’s own sector command centers. 

Port stakeholders reported to us the following issues as important factors 

to consider in any expansion of interagency operational centers: (1) 

purpose and mission—the centers could serve a variety of overall 

 11 The Coast Guard reported to us that some of the data systems included in its maritime 

monitoring system include data from the Department of Defense, Shipboard Command and 

Control System; data from Integrated Deepwater Systems; imagery from aircraft; data from 

Vessel Traffic Service, Ports and Waterways Safety Stems, Joint Harbor Operations 

Commands, Automated Identification Systems, Inland Rivers Vessel Movement Center, and 

the Vessel Monitoring System. However, according to the Coast Guard, not all of these data 

are available to all units; full integration is a future goal of the Coast Guard. 

12 The Common Operational Picture is primarily a computer software package that fuses 

data from different sources, such as radar, sensors on aircraft, and existing information 

systems.

13See the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, P.L. 108-293, § 807 (August 

9, 2004). While the statute uses the term “joint operational centers,” we are using the term 

“interagency operational centers” to denote centers where multiple agencies participate. 

According to Coast Guard officials, the term “joint” refers to command centers where the 

Coast Guard and Navy are involved in carrying out the responsibilities of the center. 

Page 11 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

purposes, as well as support a wide number of specific missions; (2) 

leadership and organization—the centers could be led by several potential 

departments or agencies and be organized a variety of ways; (3) 

membership—the centers could vary in membership in terms of federal, 

state, local, or private sector participants and their level of involvement; 

(4) technology deployed—the centers could deploy a variety of 

technologies in terms of networks, computers, communications, sensors, 

and databases; and (5) resource requirements—the centers could also vary 

in terms of resource requirements, which agency funds the resources, and 

how resources are prioritized. 

Our work identified other interagency arrangements that facilitate 

information sharing and interagency operations in the maritime 

environment. One example is a predesignated single-mission task force, 

which becomes operational when needed. DHS established the Homeland 

Security Task Force, South-East—a working group consisting of federal

and nonfederal agencies with appropriate geographic and jurisdictional 

responsibilities that have the mission to respond to any mass migration of 

immigrants affecting southeast Florida. When a mass migration event

occurs, the task force is activated and becomes a full-time interagency 

effort to share information and coordinate operations to implement a 

contingency plan. 

Another example of an interagency arrangement for information sharing 

can occur in single-agency operational centers that become interagency to

respond to specific events. For example, the Coast Guard has its own 

command centers for both District Seven and Sector Miami, located in 

Miami, Florida. While these centers normally focus on a variety of Coast 

Guard missions and are not normally interagency in structure, they have

established protocols with other federal agencies, such as the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, to activate a unified or incident command structure should 

it be needed. These Coast Guard centers make it possible to host 

interagency operations because they have extra space and equipment that 

allow for surge capabilities and virtual connectivity with each partner 

agency. 

Other Ad Hoc 

Arrangements for 

Interagency InformationSharing 

Interagency InformationSharing Concerns Go 

Beyond Maritime Area 

While our findings on maritime information sharing are generally positive,

we have some concerns regarding interagency information sharing that go 

far beyond the maritime issue area. In January 2005, we designated 

information sharing for homeland security as a high-risk area because the 

federal government still faces formidable challenges in gathering, 

Page 12 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

identifying, analyzing, and disseminating key information within and 

among federal and nonfederal entities.14 While we recognize the efforts 

that some agencies have undertaken to break out of information “silos” 

and better share information, we reported in 2006 that more than 4 years

after September 11, the nation still lacks comprehensive policies and 

processes to improve the sharing of information that is critical to 

protecting our homeland.15 We made several recommendations to the 

Director of National Intelligence, who is now primarily responsible for this 

effort, to ensure effective implementation of congressional information 

sharing mandates. 

We continue to review agencies and programs that have the goal of 

improving information sharing among federal, state, and local partners. 

For example, we have ongoing work assessing DHS’ efforts to enhance 

coordination and collaboration among interagency operations centers that 

operate around the clock to provide situational awareness. We plan to 

report on this later this year. Also, we have just begun work on state 

fusion centers--which are locations where homeland security-related 

information can be collected and analyzed--and their links to their relevant 

federal counterparts, which we plan to report on in 2007. 

Coast Guard Making 

Progress Granting 

Security Clearances 

Lack of Security 

Clearances May Limit 

Ability to Confront 

Terrorist Threats 

According to the Coast Guard and state and local officials we contacted 

for our 2005 report, the shared partnership between the federal 

government and state and local entities may fall short of its potential to 

fight terrorism because of the lack of security clearances. If state and local 

officials lack security clearances, the information they possess may be 

incomplete. According to Coast Guard and nonfederal officials, the lack of

 14GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington D.C.: January 2005). 

15 GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and 

Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information, 

GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 

Page 13 GAO-06-933T
Maritime Security

access to classified information may limit these officials’ ability to deter, 

prevent, and respond to a potential terrorist attack. 

While security clearances for nonfederal officials who participate in 

interagency operational centers are sponsored by DOJ and DHS, the Coast 

Guard sponsors security clearances for members of area maritime security 

committees. For the purposes of our 2005 report, we examined in more 

detail the Coast Guard’s efforts to address the lack of security clearances 

among members of area maritime security committees. 

Coast Guard Continues to 

Take Steps to Grant 

Additional Clearances to 

State, Local, and Industry 

Officials 

In April 2005, we reported that as part of its effort to improve information 

sharing at ports, the Coast Guard initiated a program in July 2004 to 

sponsor security clearances for members of area maritime security 

committees, but nonfederal officials have been slow in submitting their 

applications for a security clearance. We also reported that as of February

2005, only 28 of 359 nonfederal committee members who had a need to 

know had submitted the application forms for a security clearance. As 

shown in table 1, as of June 2006, of the 467 nonfederal committee 

members who had a need to know, 197 had submitted security clearance 

applications—20 received interim clearances, and 168 were granted a final

clearance, which allows access to classified material. 

Table 1: Comparison of February 2005 Coast Guard Data Regarding Security 

Clearances and June 2006 Coast Guard Data Regarding Security Clearances 

Security clearance totals February 2005 June 2006

Nonfederal committee members verified as 

needing clearances 

359 467

Members who had submitted security 

clearance case paperwork 

28 

(8 percent of 359) 

197

(42 percent of 467)

Members granted interim clearances pending 

final investigations from Office of Personnel 

Management 

24 

(7 percent of 359) 

20

(4 percent of 467)

Members with final clearances at Secret level 0 

(0 percent of 359) 

168

(36 percent of 467)

Source: Coast Guard. 

Page 14 GAO-06-933T
A key component of a good management system is to have relevant, 

reliable, and timely information available to assess performance over time 

and to correct deficiencies as they occur. The Coast Guard has two 

databases that contain information on the status of security clearances for 

state, local, and industry officials. The first database is a commercial offthe-shelf system that contains information on the status of all applications

that have been submitted to the Coast Guard Security Center, such as 

whether a security clearance has been issued or whether personnel 

security investigations have been conducted. We reported in April 2005 

that the Coast Guard was testing the database for use by field staff, but 

had not granted field staff access to the database. As of June 2006, the 

Coast Guard granted access to this database—named Checkmate—to 

field staff. The second database—an internally developed spreadsheet on

the area maritime committee participants—summarizes information on 

the status of the security clearance program, such as whether officials 

have submitted their application forms and whether they have received 

their clearances. 

We reported in 2005 that these Coast Guard has databases could be used 

to manage the state, local, and industry security clearance program, but 

that formal procedures for using the data as a management tool to follow 

up on possible problems at the national or local level to verify the status of 

clearances had not been developed by the Coast Guard. While it is unclear

that the Coast Guard developed formal procedures, as of June 2006, the 

Coast Guard reported that it has developed guidance for using its data on

committee participants. According to the Coast Guard, the guidance 

released to field commands regarding the state, local, and industry 

security clearance program clarified the process for nonfederal area 

maritime security committee members to receive clearances and 

specifically outlined responsibilities for working with applicants on 

completing required paperwork, including the application packages. The

Coast Guard reported that as a result of this guidance, the number of 

received and processed security clearance packages for area maritime 

security committee members has increased. 

As we reported in April 2005, and reaffirm today, effective information 

sharing among members of area maritime security committees and 

participants in interagency operational centers can enhance the 

partnership between federal and nonfederal officials, and it can improve 

the leveraging of resources across jurisdictional boundaries for deterring, 

preventing, or responding to a possible terrorist attack at the nation’s 

ports. The Coast Guard has recognized the importance of granting security

Data Are Being Used to 

More Effectively Manage 

the Security Clearance 

Program 

Concluding 

Observations 

Page 15 GAO-06-933T Maritime Security
Maritime Security

clearances to nonfederal officials as a means to improve information 

sharing, and although we reported in 2005 that progress in moving these 

officials through the application process had been slow, it appears that as 

of June 2006 the Coast Guard’s efforts to process security clearances to 

nonfederal officials has improved considerably. However, continued 

management attention and guidance about the security clearance process 

would strengthen the program, and it would reduce the risk that 

nonfederal officials may have incomplete information as they carry out 

their law enforcement activities. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my 

prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you 

or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time. 

For information about this testimony, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell

Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-9610, 

or at caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found at the last page of this 

statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include 

Susan Quinlan, David Alexander, Neil Asaba, Juliana Bahus, Christine 

Davis, Kevin Heinz, Lori Kmetz, Emily Pickrell, Albert Schmidt, Amy 

Sheller, Stan Stenersen, and April Thompson. 

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 16 GAO-06-933T
Related GAO Products 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and 

Future Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006. 

Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and 

Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2005. 

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information 

Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.

GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 

Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and 

Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 

31, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 

Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: 

January 14, 2005. 

Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime

Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: 

December 10, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective

Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: 

September 30, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and 

Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.

GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New 

Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. 

Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004. 

Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year

2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004. 

Page 17 GAO-06-933T Maritime Security
Maritime Security

Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting 

Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington,

D.C.: March 31, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target 

Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, 

D.C.: December 16, 2003.

Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. 

GAO-04-315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003. 

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be 

Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003.

Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require 

Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,

D.C.: July 25, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 

Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation 

Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and LongTerm Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New 

Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in 

Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. 

GAO-02-955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.

Page 18 GAO-06-933T (440531) 
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