United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on International 

Terrorism and Nonproliferation, 

Committee on International Relations, 

House of Representatives 

BORDER SECURITY

Investigators Transported 

Radioactive Sources 

Across Our Nation’s 

Borders at Two Locations 

Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director 

Forensic Audits and Special Investigations 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:00 a.m. PDT 

Wednesday, July 5, 2006

 

GAO-06-939T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 5, 2006

BORDER SECURITY

Investigators Transported Radioactive 

Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at 

Two Locations 

Highlights of GAO-06-939T, testimony 

before the Subcommittee on International 

Terrorism and Nonproliferation, 

Committee on International Relations, 

House of Representatives

Given today’s unprecedented 

terrorism threat environment and 

the resulting widespread

congressional and public interest in 

the security of our nation’s borders, 

GAO conducted an investigation 

testing whether radioactive sources 

could be smuggled across U.S.

borders. 

Most travelers enter the United

States through the nation’s 154 land

border ports of entry. Department 

of Homeland Security U.S. Customs

and Border Protection (CBP) 

inspectors at ports of entry are 

responsible for the primary

inspection of travelers to determine

their admissibility into the United

States and to enforce laws related 

to preventing the entry of

contraband, such as drugs and

weapons of mass destruction.

GAO’s testimony provides the 

results of undercover tests made by

its investigators to determine

whether monitors at U.S. ports of 

entry detect radioactive sources in 

vehicles attempting to enter the 

United States. GAO also provides 

observations regarding the 

procedures that CBP inspectors 

followed during its investigation. 

GAO has also issued a report on 

the results of this investigation 

(GAO-06-545R). 

For the purposes of this undercover investigation, GAO purchased a small

amount of radioactive sources and one secure container used to safely store 

and transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. 

One of GAO’s investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company 

located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase was to 

use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detection pagers. 

The purchase was not challenged because suppliers are not required to 

determine whether prospective buyers have legitimate uses for radioactive

sources, nor are suppliers required to ask a buyer to produce an NRC 

document when purchasing in small quantities. The amount of radioactive 

sources GAO’s investigator sought to purchase did not require an NRC 

document. Subsequently, the company mailed the radioactive sources to an 

address in Washington, D.C. 

The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of radioactive 

material when our two teams of investigators conducted simultaneous 

border crossings. Our investigators’ vehicles were inspected in accordance

with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and southern borders. 

However, GAO’s investigators, using counterfeit documents, were able to 

enter the United States with enough radioactive sources in the trunks of 

their vehicles to make two dirty bombs. According to the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, a dirty bomb is a mix of explosives, such as 

dynamite, with radioactive powder or pellets. When the dynamite or other 

explosives are set off, the blast carries radioactive material into the 

surrounding area. The direct costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade 

and business in the contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs 

are generally considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of 

weapons of mass destruction. GAO investigators were able to successfully 

represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company present a 

counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document during the 

secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors never 

questioned the authenticity of the investigators’ counterfeit bill of lading or 

the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive, acquire, possess, 

and transfer radioactive sources. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-939T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gregory D. 

Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. 
 Border Security

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation of potential 

security weaknesses associated with the installation of radiation detection 

equipment at U.S. ports of entry. To address the threat of dirty bombs and 

other nuclear material, the federal government has programs in place that 

regulate the transportation of radioactive sources and to prevent illegal 

transport of radioactive sources across our nation’s borders. The 

Department of Homeland Security through the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) uses radiation detection equipment at ports of entry to 

prevent such illicit entry of radioactive sources. The goal of CBP’s 

inspection program is to “...thwart the operations of terrorist 

organizations by detecting, disrupting, and preventing the cross-border 

travel of terrorists, terrorist funding, and terrorist implements, including 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and their precursors.” Deploying radiation 

detection equipment is part of CBP’s strategy for thwarting radiological

terrorism and CBP is using a range of such equipment to meet its goal of 

screening all cargo, vehicles, and individuals coming into the United 

States. 

Most travelers enter the United States through the nation’s 154 land border 

ports of entry. CBP inspectors at ports of entry are responsible for the 

primary inspection of travelers to determine their admissibility into the 

United States and to enforce laws related to preventing the entry of 

contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass destruction. 

Our investigation was conducted as a result of widespread congressional 

and public interest in the security of our nation’s borders, given today’s 

unprecedented terrorism threat environment. Our investigation was 

conducted under the premise that given today’s security environment, our 

nation’s borders must be protected from the smuggling of radioactive 

sources by terrorists. 

This testimony will provide the results of our work related to testing 

whether the radiation portal monitors installed at the U.S. ports of entry 

would detect radioactive sources transported in vehicles attempting to 

enter the United States. We will also provide our observations regarding 

the procedures that CBP inspectors followed when the radiation portal 

monitors detected such material. In addition, at the request of the 

Chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, we issued in 

March 2006 a detailed report with corrective action briefings to CBP and 

Page 1 GAO-06-939T
 Border Security

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on the results of our 

undercover border crossing tests.1

We selected two land ports of entry that had radiation portal monitors 

installed: one at the U.S.-Canadian border and one at the U.S.-Mexican 

border. Radiation portal monitors are large pieces of stationary equipment

that CBP uses as part of its overall strategy to thwart radiological 

terrorism by detecting the presence of radioactive sources by screening 

people, vehicles, and cargo as they pass through ports of entry. In order to

safely plan and execute our undercover operation, several of our 

investigators attended training at the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) in Gaithersburg, Maryland. Our investigators received

training on the safe handling, storage, and transport of radioactive 

sources. 

When considering the type of radioactive sources to use in our undercover 

operation, we decided to use one of the most common radioisotopes used 

in industry for its strong radioactivity and also used in medical therapy to 

treat cancer. After consulting with an outside expert, we used an amount 

of radioactive sources that we determined was sufficient to manufacture a 

dirty bomb.2

 A dirty bomb would most likely result in small radiation 

exposures and would typically not contain enough radiation to kill people 

or cause severe illnesses. However, by scattering the radioactive material, 

the dirty bomb has the effect of contaminating an area. The extent of local 

contamination depends on several factors, including the size of the 

explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and weather 

conditions. While there could be an increase in the cancer risk among 

those exposed to radiation from a dirty bomb, the more significant effect 

of a dirty bomb could be the closing of contaminated areas. The direct 

costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade and business in the 

contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs are generally 

considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of weapons of mass 

destruction. 

 1

GAO, Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive Sources

Across Our Nation’s Borders at Selected Locations, GAO-06-545R (Washington, D.C.: Mar.

28, 2006). 

2

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a dirty bomb is a mix of 

explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive powder or pellets. When the dynamite or

other explosives are set off, the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area. 

Page 2 GAO-06-939T
 Border Security

As part of our investigation, we purchased a small quantity of the 

radioactive sources from a commercial source by posing as an employee

of a fictitious company. This was to demonstrate that anyone can purchase 

small quantities of radioactive sources for stockpiling because suppliers 

are not required to exercise due diligence to determine whether the buyer 

has a legitimate use for the radioactive sources and suppliers are not 

required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC document when making 

purchases in small quantities. We then deployed two teams of 

investigators to the field to make simultaneous border crossings at the 

northern and southern borders in an attempt to transport radioactive 

sources into the United States. 

While making our simultaneous crossings, we focused our investigation on 

whether the radiation portal monitors would detect the radioactive 

sources we carried and whether CBP inspectors exercised due diligence to 

determine the authenticity of paperwork presented by individuals 

attempting to transport radioactive sources across our borders. Although 

we offer observations on the procedures that CBP inspectors followed for 

our two border crossings, we did not evaluate the adequacy of the design 

or effectiveness of those procedures. Our investigation also tested whether 

an NRC document could be counterfeited using data easily accessible and

available to the public. We conducted our investigation from July 2005 

through December 2005 in accordance with quality standards for 

investigations as set forth by the President’s Council on Integrity and 

Efficiency. 

For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small 

amount of radioactive sources and one container used to store and 

transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One 

of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company located 

in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the 

radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detection pagers. The 

purchase was not challenged because suppliers are not required to 

determine whether a buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive 

sources, nor are suppliers required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC 

document when making purchases in small quantities. 

Summary 

The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of 

radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted 

simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators’ vehicles were inspected

in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and 

southern borders. However, our investigators, using counterfeit 

documents, were able to enter the United States with enough radioactive 

sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty bombs. 

Page 3 GAO-06-939T
 Border Security

Specifically, they were able to successfully represent themselves as 

employees of a fictitious company and present a counterfeit bill of lading 

and a counterfeit NRC document during the secondary inspections at both 

locations. The CBP inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the

investigators’ counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document 

authorizing them to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive

sources. 

As part of our undercover investigation, we produced counterfeit 

documents before sending our two teams of investigators out to the field.

We found two NRC documents and a few examples of the documents by 

searching the Internet.3

 We subsequently used commercial, off-the-shelf 

computer software to produce two counterfeit NRC documents 

authorizing the individual to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer 

radioactive sources. 

To support our investigators’ purported reason for having radioactive 

sources in their possession when making their simultaneous border 

crossings, a GAO graphic artist designed a logo for our fictitious company 

and produced a bill of lading using computer software. 

Our two teams of investigators each transported an amount of radioactive 

sources sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb when making their recent, 

simultaneous border crossings. In support of our earlier work, we had 

obtained an NRC document and had purchased radioactive sources as well 

as two containers to store and transport the material. 

For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small 

amount of radioactive sources and one container for storing and 

transporting the material from a commercial source over the telephone. 

One of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company, 

stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources 

to calibrate personal radiation detectors. Suppliers are not required to 

exercise any due diligence in determining whether the buyer has a 

legitimate use for the radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask 

the buyer to produce an NRC document when making purchases in small 

quantities. The amount of radioactive sources our investigator sought to 

purchase did not require an NRC document. The company mailed the

radioactive sources to an address in Washington, D.C. 

Documentation Was 

Produced to Support 

Undercover 

Investigation 

With Ease, 

Investigators 

Purchased, Received, 

and Transported 

Radioactive Sources 

Across Both Borders 

 3

None of these documents were available on NRC’s Web site. 

Page 4 GAO-06-939T
 Border Security

Two Teams of 

Investigators 

Conducted 

Simultaneous 

Crossings at the U.S.-

Canadian Border and 

U.S.-Mexican Border 

Northern Border Crossing On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of 

radioactive sources into the trunk of their rental vehicle. Our investigators 

– acting in an undercover capacity – drove to an official port of entry 

between Canada and the United States. They also had in their possession a 

counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a fictitious company and a 

counterfeit NRC document. 

At the primary checkpoint, our investigators were signaled to drive 

through the radiation portal monitors and to meet the CBP inspector at the 

booth for their primary inspection. As our investigators drove past the 

radiation portal monitors and approached the primary checkpoint booth,

they observed the CBP inspector look down and reach to his right side of 

his booth. Our investigators assumed that the radiation portal monitors 

had activated and signaled the presence of radioactive sources. The CBP 

inspector asked our investigators for identification and asked them where 

they lived. One of our investigators on the two-man undercover team 

handed the CBP inspector both of their passports and told him that he 

lived in Maryland while the second investigator told the CBP inspector 

that he lived in Virginia. 

The CBP inspector also asked our investigators to identify what they were

transporting in their vehicle. One of our investigators told the CBP 

inspector that they were transporting specialized equipment back to the 

United States. A second CBP inspector, who had come over to assist the 

first inspector, asked what else our investigators were transporting. One of 

our investigators told the CBP inspectors that they were transporting 

radioactive sources for the specialized equipment. The CBP inspector in 

the primary checkpoint booth appeared to be writing down the 

information. Our investigators were then directed to park in a secondary 

Page 5 GAO-06-939T
 Border Security

inspection zone, while the CBP inspector conducted further inspections of 

the vehicle.

During the secondary inspection, our investigators told the CBP inspector 

that they had an NRC document and a bill of lading for the radioactive 

sources. The CBP inspector asked if he could make copies of our 

investigators’ counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery as well as 

their counterfeit NRC document. Although the CBP inspector took the 

documents to the copier, our investigators did not observe him retrieving 

any copies from the copier. 

Our investigators watched the CBP inspector use a handheld Radiation 

Isotope Identifier Device (RIID), which he said is used to identify the 

source of radioactive sources, to examine the investigators’ vehicle. He 

told our investigators that he had to perform additional inspections. After 

determining that the investigators were not transporting additional 

sources of radiation, the CBP inspector made copies of our investigators’

drivers’ licenses, returned their drivers’ licenses to them, and our 

investigators were then allowed to enter the United States. At no time did 

the CBP inspector question the validity of the counterfeit bill of lading or 

the counterfeit NRC document. 

On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of 

radioactive sources into the trunk of their vehicle. Our investigators drove 

to an official port of entry at the southern border. They also had in their 

possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a fictitious company 

and a counterfeit NRC document. 

Southern Border 

Crossing 

At the primary checkpoint, our two-person undercover team was signaled 

by means of a traffic light signal to drive through the radiation portal 

monitors and stopped at the primary checkpoint for their primary 

inspection. As our investigators drove past the portal monitors and 

approached the primary checkpoint, they observed that the CBP inspector 

remained in the primary checkpoint for several moments prior to 

approaching our investigators’ vehicle. Our investigators assumed that the

radiation portal monitors had activated and signaled the presence of 

radioactive sources. 

The CBP inspector asked our investigators for identification and asked 

them if they were American citizens. Our investigators told the CBP 

inspector that they were both American citizens and handed him their 

state-issued drivers’ licenses. The CBP inspector also asked our 

investigators about the purpose of their trip to Mexico and asked whether 

they were bringing anything into the United States from Mexico. Our 

Page 6 GAO-06-939T
 Border Security

investigators told the CBP inspector that they were returning from a 

business trip in Mexico and were not bringing anything into the United 

States from Mexico. 

While our investigators remained inside their vehicle, the CBP inspector 

used what appeared to be a RIID to scan the outside of the vehicle. One of

our investigators told him that they were transporting specialized 

equipment. The CBP inspector asked one of our investigators to open the 

trunk of the rental vehicle and to show him the specialized equipment. Our 

investigator told the CBP inspector that they were transporting radioactive 

sources in addition to the specialized equipment. The primary CBP 

inspector then directed our investigators to park in a secondary inspection 

zone for further inspection. 

During the secondary inspection, the CBP inspector said he needed to

verify the type of material our investigators were transporting, and another 

CBP inspector approached with what appeared to be a RIID to scan the 

cardboard boxes where the radioactive sources was placed. The 

instrumentation confirmed the presence of radioactive sources. 

When asked again about the purpose of their visit to Mexico, one of our 

investigators told the CBP inspector that they had used the radioactive 

sources in a demonstration designed to secure additional business for 

their company. The CBP inspector asked for paperwork authorizing them 

to transport the equipment to Mexico. One of our investigators provided 

the counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery, as well as their 

counterfeit NRC document. The CBP inspector took the paperwork 

provided by our investigators and walked into the CBP station. He 

returned several minutes later and returned the paperwork. At no time did 

the CBP inspector question the validity of the counterfeit bill of lading or 

the counterfeit NRC document. 

We conducted corrective action briefings with CBP and NRC officials 

shortly after completing our undercover operations. On December 21, 

2005, we briefed CBP officials about the results of our border crossing 

tests. CBP officials agreed to work with the NRC and CBP’s Laboratories 

and Scientific Services to come up with a way to verify the authenticity of

NRC materials documents. 

Corrective Action 

Briefings 

We conducted two corrective action briefings with NRC officials on 

January 12 and January 24, 2006, about the results of our border crossing 

tests. NRC officials disagreed with the amount of radioactive material we 

determined was needed to produce a dirty bomb, noting that NRC’s 

“concern threshold” is significantly higher. We continue to believe that our

Page 7 GAO-06-939T
 Border Security

purchase of radioactive sources and our ability to counterfeit an NRC 

document are matters that NRC should address. We could have purchased 

all of the radioactive sources used in our two undercover border crossings 

by making multiple purchases from different suppliers, using similarly 

convincing cover stories, using false identities, and had all of the 

radioactive sources conveniently shipped to our nation’s capital. 

Further, we believe that the amount of radioactive sources that we were 

able to transport into the United States during our operation would be 

sufficient to produce two dirty bombs, which could be used as weapons of 

mass disruption. Finally, NRC officials told us that they are aware of the 

potential problems of counterfeiting documents and that they are working 

to resolve these issues. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 

statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other 

members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D. 

Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this testimony. 

Page 8 GAO-06-939T

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