UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-4696

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

SANDRA KAY CABELL, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, 

District Judge. (3:04-cr-00031-1) 

Submitted: November 4, 2009 Decided: November 12, 2009 

Before GREGORY and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, 

Appellate Counsel, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. 

Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington, West Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Sandra Kay Cabell appeals the eleven-month sentence 

she received after the district court revoked her supervised 

release. She argues that the sentence was plainly unreasonable 

because it was too long and did not further the purposes of 

sentencing. We affirm. 

 A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised 

release will be affirmed if it is within the applicable 

statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We 

first review the sentence for reasonableness, “follow[ing] 

generally the procedural and substantive considerations that 

[are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original sentences, . . . 

with some necessary modifications to take into account the 

unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences.” Id.

at 438-39; see United States v. Finley, 531 F.3d 288, 294 (4th 

Cir. 2008) (“In applying the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard, we 

first determine, using the instructions given in Gall [v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, __, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)], whether a 

sentence is ‘unreasonable.’”). 

 Although the district court must consider the Chapter 

7 policy statements and the requirements of 18 U.S.C.A. 

§§ 3553(a), 3853 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009), “the sentencing court 

retains broad discretion to revoke a defendant=s probation [or 

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supervised release] and impose a term of imprisonment up to the 

statutory maximum.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 

(4th Cir. 2007) (citing Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439).* In Cabell’s 

case, the statutory maximum revocation sentence was two years. 

 A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district 

court considered the Chapter 7 policy statements and the 

pertinent factors in § 3553(a). Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. A 

sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court 

stated a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should 

receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Id. 

Only if a sentence is found to be procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable will this court “decide whether the sentence is 

plainly unreasonable.” Id. 

 The district court considered the Chapter 7 policy 

statements, that is, the sentencing range of 5-11 months 

recommended by the probation officer. The court also considered 

Cabell’s history and characteristics, the need to deter further 

criminal conduct on her part, the need to protect the public, 

and her need for treatment that could help her to avoid drugs 

and crime in the future. 

 *

This court held in Moulden that the same standard of review 

applies to probation revocation sentences and supervised release 

revocation sentences. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656. 

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 Cabell argues that the district court’s rationale for 

an eleven-month sentence was “purely punitive,” and does not 

allow her to participate in the Bureau of Prisons residential 

drug treatment program or mandate that she take part in a longterm drug treatment program when she begins her new term of 

supervised release. She maintains that a shorter prison 

sentence would have been adequate, and a requirement that she 

participate in a long-term drug treatment program “would have 

addressed the underlying cause” of her prior criminal conduct 

and her supervised release violations. 

 Cabell has not shown that the sentence was either 

procedurally or substantively unreasonable. The district court 

considered the revocation range and the pertinent § 3553(a) 

factors. The court made an individualized assessment of what 

sentence would best serve the goals of sentencing and Cabell’s 

personal needs and imposed a sentence within the statutory range 

and the revocation range. 

 We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the 

district court. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED