United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

COAST GUARD 

Observations on the 

Preparation, 

Response, and 

Recovery Missions 

Related to Hurricane 

Katrina 

July 2006 

 

GAO-06-903 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2006

COAST GUARD

Observations on the Preparation, 

Response, and Recovery Missions 

Related to Hurricane Katrina 

Highlights of GAO-06-903, a report to 

congressional committees 

Hurricane Katrina was one of the 

largest natural disasters in our 

nation’s history. Significant federal,

state, and local resources were

mobilized to respond to the 

Hurricane Katrina disaster, 

including those of the U.S. Coast

Guard. The Coast Guard played a

key role in the planning, response, 

and recovery efforts for Hurricane

Katrina in three mission areas: 

search and rescue, marine

pollution response, and

management of maritime

commerce. This report discusses 

the activities undertaken by the 

Coast Guard, as well as the

challenges and lessons learned as a 

result of the agency’s efforts. More

specifically, it focuses on (1) the

factors that prepared the Coast 

Guard to perform these three

mission areas in the aftermath of

Hurricane Katrina; (2) the Coast 

Guard’s response to Hurricane

Katrina, the challenges it faced in 

performing its missions, and its 

efforts to mitigate these challenges; 

and (3) the implications and 

lessons learned, as identified by the 

Coast Guard, regarding the effect

of Hurricane Katrina surge 

operations on its people, assets, 

financial resources, and operations. 

To determine the Coast Guard’s

preparation factors, the challenges

and lessons learned we interviewed

officials responsible for preparing, 

and responding to disasters, and 

reviewed the Coast Guard’s

disaster guidance and plans.

GAO is not making any 

recommendations in this report. 

Of the estimated 60,000 people left stranded by Hurricane Katrina, over 

33,500 were saved by the Coast Guard. Precisely identifying why the Coast 

Guard was able to respond as it did may be difficult, but underpinning these 

efforts were factors such as the agency’s operational principles. These

principles promote leadership, accountability, and enable personnel to take 

responsibility and action, based on relevant authorities and guidance. 

Another key factor was the agency’s reliance on standardized operations and 

maintenance practices that provided greater flexibility for using personnel 

and assets from any operational unit for the response. Up-to-date and 

regularly exercised hurricane plans were also key—preserving Coast Guard 

personnel and resources first, so they could then respond to search and 

rescue, marine environmental protection, and facilitation of commerce 

needs after the storm. These various factors are consistent with previous 

GAO findings on lessons learned from past catastrophic disasters. 

GAO’s work shows that the Coast Guard was most relevant in search and 

rescue, marine environmental protection, and management of maritime 

commerce missions. While the Coast Guard performs these missions daily,

the severity of Hurricane Katrina presented the agency with several 

challenges that required innovative approaches. The Coast Guard was able 

to mitigate challenges caused by Hurricane Katrina’s damage as a result of 

planning, preparation, and assistance from Coast Guard Auxiliary members. 

According to Coast Guard officials, the agency incurred no significant 

damage to personnel, assets, operations, or financial resources as a result of 

sending people and assets to the Gulf region. Although continuing operations

at ports nationwide while conducting Katrina operations presented 

challenges, these challenges have been addressed to mitigate negative 

impacts on the Coast Guard. Finally, the Coast Guard has collected afteraction reports from Hurricane Katrina and has made them available to Coast 

Guard personnel through an internal database. 

Helicopter Rescue Stranded Vessel in the Greater New Orleans Area 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard. Source: GAO.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-903.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Stephen L. 

Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or 

CaldwellS@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 4

Several Factors Prepared Coast Guard for Hurricane Katrina 

Operations 9

Coast Guard Performed Hurricane Katrina Missions and Faced 

Several Challenges It Was Largely Able to Mitigate 17 

Coast Guard Managed the Impact of the Hurricane Response and 

Collected Information to Improve Future Responses 31 

Agency Comments 38 

Appendix I GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 42 

Related GAO Products 43 

Tables 

Table 1: Coast Guard Active Duty, Civilian, Reserve, and Auxiliary 

Personnel Compared to Number of Personnel Operating in 

the Gulf Coast region during Peak Response, 

August 26—September 16, 2005 8 

Table 2: Coast Guard Asset Type, Homeport, and Number That 

Responded to the Gulf Coast Region during the Peak 

Response, August 26–September 16, 2005 34 

Table 3: Summary of Coast Guard Stafford Act Reimbursement 

Requests for Missions Conducted in Response to 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as of April 12, 2006 37 

Page i GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Figures 

Figure 1: Coast Guard C-130 Aircraft Used as a Communication 

Platform, Also the Type of Aircraft Used to Transport 

Food, Water, and Supplies to the Gulf Coast Region 12 

Figure 2: Map of Coast Guard Area Commands and Districts, 

Detail of Gulf Coast Region 14 

Figure 3: Area Map of New Orleans, Louisiana 20 

Figure 4: Helicopter Rescue in Response to Hurricane Katrina 22 

Figure 5: Stranded Vessel in the Greater New Orleans Area 26 

Figure 6: Coast Guard Personnel Servicing Aids to Navigation 29 

Abbreviations: 

ARSC Aircraft Repair and Supply Center 

ATC Aviation Training Center

COTP Captain of the Port 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

NRP National Response Plan 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

July 31, 2006

Congressional Committees

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our nation’s 

history. In terms of its combined casualties, damage, and disruption to the 

population, environment, and economy, Hurricane Katrina was clearly a 

catastrophe and arguably the most devastating natural disaster in United 

States history. More than 1,300 people lost their lives; damage stretched 

over a 90,000 square mile area; more than a million people were driven 

from their homes; buildings, bridges, roads, and power and 

communications infrastructure were destroyed or severely damaged; and 

millions of gallons of oil were spilled into the environment. We may never 

fully know the financial cost of Hurricane Katrina, but one projection has 

put it at more than $200 billion. 

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our nation’s 

history. In terms of its combined casualties, damage, and disruption to the 

population, environment, and economy, Hurricane Katrina was clearly a 

catastrophe and arguably the most devastating natural disaster in United 

States history. More than 1,300 people lost their lives; damage stretched 

over a 90,000 square mile area; more than a million people were driven 

from their homes; buildings, bridges, roads, and power and 

communications infrastructure were destroyed or severely damaged; and 

millions of gallons of oil were spilled into the environment. We may never 

fully know the financial cost of Hurricane Katrina, but one projection has 

put it at more than $200 billion. 

Two congressional committees that investigated and reported on 

Hurricane Katrina activities were critical of several federal agencies’ 

response.1

 In contrast to some other federal agencies, the Coast Guard has 

generally escaped criticism by these two investigations. Our work 

indicates that the Coast Guard’s major response to Hurricane Katrina was 

in three mission areas: search and rescue, marine pollution response, and 

management of maritime commerce. 

Two congressional committees that investigated and reported on 

Hurricane Katrina activities were critical of several federal agencies’ 

response.1

 In contrast to some other federal agencies, the Coast Guard has 

generally escaped criticism by these two investigations. Our work 

indicates that the Coast Guard’s major response to Hurricane Katrina was 

in three mission areas: search and rescue, marine pollution response, and 

management of maritime commerce. 

This report discusses the activities undertaken by the Coast Guard, as well 

as the challenges and lessons learned as a result of the agency’s efforts. 

More specifically, it focuses on 

This report discusses the activities undertaken by the Coast Guard, as well 

as the challenges and lessons learned as a result of the agency’s efforts. 

More specifically, it focuses on 

• the factors that prepared the Coast Guard to perform in these three 

mission areas during Hurricane Katrina; 

• the factors that prepared the Coast Guard to perform in these three 

mission areas during Hurricane Katrina; 

 

 1

 House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to

Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane Katrina, 

(Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2006), and Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: 

May 2006). These committees were also critical of nonfederal entities, including state and 

nongovernmental organizations. 

Page 1 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
• the Coast Guard’s response to Hurricane Katrina, the challenges it 

faced in performing its missions, and its efforts to mitigate the 

challenges; and 

• the implications and lessons learned, as identified by the Coast 

Guard, regarding the effect of Hurricane Katrina operations on its 

people, assets, financial resources, and operations. 

In addition, we have undertaken a large body of work to address 

preparation, response, recovery, and rebuilding efforts related to 

Hurricane Katrina. Because of the widespread congressional interest in 

these subjects, our work is being completed under the Comptroller 

General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.2

 

To determine the factors used by the Coast Guard to prepare for Hurricane 

Katrina, we interviewed officials responsible for planning, preparing for, 

and responding to disasters, including Hurricane Katrina, as well as city 

and state officials in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina and assisted by 

the Coast Guard. In addition, we reviewed documents provided by two 

Coast Guard districts, the Atlantic Area Command, and Coast Guard 

headquarters, including national plans; Coast Guard severe weather, 

continuity-of-operation, and mission-specific response plans; and Coast 

Guard guidance and directives. 

To obtain a more detailed understanding of the Coast Guard’s response 

and challenges related to Hurricane Katrina, we visited and conducted 

interviews at Coast Guard locations, including districts and units that 

supported the Hurricane Katrina response effort, as well as the affected 

district and units in the Gulf Coast region. We also spoke with local 

government and port officials. We selected these specific locations based 

on several factors, including the proportion of Coast Guard assets 

allocated to respond to Hurricane Katrina; proximity to the area physically

affected by the hurricane, specifically the Gulf Coast region; and the Coast

Guard’s responsibility for response, including the Atlantic Area Command 

and Coast Guard headquarters. 

Finally, to determine the implications of sending people and assets to 

respond to Hurricane Katrina and lessons learned, we spoke to officials 

responsible for identifying and prioritizing the people and assets to send to 

 2

 31 U.S.C. § 717(b)(1). 

Page 2 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
the Gulf Coast region, to personnel sent to the region to respond to 

Hurricane Katrina, and to personnel who were stationed in the region. We 

reviewed resource allocation data, and financial guidance and documents, 

and spoke with officials responsible for these areas within the Coast 

Guard. To assess the reliability of the personnel, asset, and financial data,

we spoke with agency officials knowledgeable in these specific areas. We

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. 

We conducted our work between October 2005 and June 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters to afflict the 

United States. Of the estimated 60,000 people needing to be rescued from 

rooftops and flooded homes, over 33,500 were saved by the Coast Guard.

Precisely identifying why the Coast Guard was able to respond as it did to

this disaster may be difficult, but underpinning these efforts were the 

agency’s operational principles that promote leadership, accountability, 

and enable personnel to take responsibility and action, based on relevant

authorities and guidance. Another significant factor that allowed the 

Coast Guard to confront the destruction brought on by Hurricane Katrina 

was the agency’s reliance on standardized operations and maintenance 

practices that allowed the Coast Guard to respond with greater flexibility 

using a mix of personnel and assets from any operational unit. Having upto-date and regularly exercised hurricane plans was another factor that the 

Coast Guard employed to prepare for Hurricane Katrina enabling the 

agency to implement its plans to confront the hurricane by first preserving 

Coast Guard personnel and resources and then quickly responding with 

search and rescue assistance, marine environmental protection response, 

and facilitation of commerce measures—missions that the Coast Guard 

conducts every day. GAO findings on lessons learned from past 

catastrophic disasters have highlighted similar factors including such 

things as the critical importance of (1) clearly defining and communicating 

leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority; (2) conducting 

strong planning and robust training and exercise programs; and 

(3) strengthening response and recovery capabilities.

Results in Brief 

The Coast Guard’s mission response to Hurricane Katrina centered most 

on three mission areas: search and rescue, marine environmental 

protection and management of maritime commerce. While the Coast 

Guard performs these missions daily, the severity of Hurricane Katrina 

presented the agency with several challenges that required innovative

approaches—for example, conducting a full scale search and rescue 

Page 3 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
mission without its full communications capacity. The Coast Guard was 

able to mitigate the communication challenges caused by Hurricane 

Katrina’s damage as a result of advance planning and preparation, as well

as assistance from the Coast Guard Auxiliary. For example, to overcome 

challenges resulting from communications outages following the storm, 

Coast Guard personnel implemented plans that they had developed prior

to the storm that were not dependent upon communication systems to 

execute, and they also relied on pre-staged communications equipment, 

pre-distributed satellite and cell phones. In addition, Coast Guard 

auxiliarists provided a critical communications relay for search and rescue 

operations. 

According to Coast Guard officials, the agency incurred no significant 

losses to personnel, assets, operations, or financial resources as it moved 

people and assets to the Gulf Coast region in response to Hurricane 

Katrina. The Coast Guard conducted surge operations—which are highintensity efforts often launched at short notice to address an emergency 

situation—in response to Hurricane Katrina while it continued operations 

at the homeports from where personnel and assets were borrowed. To 

address the health effects stemming from the mental stress that Coast 

Guard personnel experienced responding to Hurricane Katrina, the Coast 

Guard deployed Critical Incident Stress Management teams. These teams 

provided treatment to Coast Guard response personnel as well as to other 

Coast Guard personnel from the region whose homes had been damaged 

or destroyed. Finally, the Coast Guard has developed after action reports 

related to the Hurricane Katrina response and has disseminated this 

information to its personnel for use on other contingency planning efforts 

through the agency’s Contingency Preparedness System database—known 

as CG SAILS. 

There are several federal legislative and executive provisions that support 

preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. 

Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act)3

primarily establishes the programs and processes for the federal 

government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states, 

local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private 

nonprofit organizations. The Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Background 

 3

 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206. 

Page 4 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
(FEMA), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has 

responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act. 

For Hurricane Katrina, the President issued emergency declarations under 

the Stafford Act for Louisiana on August 27, 2005, and Mississippi and 

Alabama on August 28, 2005. The President made major disaster 

declarations for Florida on August 28, 2005, and Louisiana, Mississippi, 

and Alabama on August 29, 2005, the same day that Hurricane Katrina 

made final landfall in the affected states. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the DHS to consolidate 

existing federal government emergency response plans into a single, 

coordinated national response plan. In December 2004, DHS issued the 

National Response Plan (NRP), intended to be an all-discipline, all-hazards 

plan establishing a single, comprehensive framework for the management 

of domestic incidents where federal involvement is necessary. At the time 

of Hurricane Katrina, the NRP applied only to incidents of national 

significance, defined as actual or potential high-impact events that require 

a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of 

federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, or private sector entities in

order to save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis for longterm community recovery and mitigation activities.4

 The NRP includes 

planning assumptions, roles and responsibilities, concept of operations, 

and incident management actions. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic 

Incident Annex, which provides an accelerated, proactive national 

response to a “catastrophic incident”—defined as any natural or manmade 

incident, including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary levels of mass 

casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, 

 4

On May 25, 2006, DHS revised the NRP to address certain weaknesses or ambiguities 

identified following Hurricane Katrina. The revised NRP makes clear that the Secretary of

Homeland Security is responsible for declaring and managing incidents of national 

significance such as Hurricane Katrina. Incidents of lesser severity requiring federal 

involvement are also subject to the NRP, but implementation of the NRP is to be scaled and 

flexible depending on the nature of the event.

Page 5 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government 

functions.5

 

The Coast Guard’s authority under federal law to conduct maritime 

operations, such as search and rescue and port security, is continuously in 

effect, rather than dependent upon a presidential Stafford Act declaration 

or the implementation of the NRP. This ongoing authority uniquely 

positioned the Coast Guard to respond to Hurricane Katrina before the 

President made emergency or major disaster declarations under the 

Stafford Act, or the Secretary of Homeland Security designated Katrina an

incident of national significance under the NRP. Concurrent with the 

Coast Guard’s historical missions and authorities, the NRP identifies the 

Coast Guard as a primary agency in the oil and hazardous materials 

response, and the support agency in six other emergency support 

functions, including urban search and rescue, and aspects of clearing 

waterways. 

The Coast Guard is responsible for performing a variety of homeland and 

non-homeland security missions, including ensuring security in territorial 

and international waters, and within U.S. ports, conducting search and

rescue, interdicting illegal drug shipments and illegal aliens, enforcing 

fisheries laws, ensuring the safety and facilitation of commerce, and 

responding to reports of marine pollution. According to Coast Guard 

officials, they train for and perform these missions every day, in units 

located all over the United States. 

To conduct these missions, the Coast Guard employs a wide range of 

personnel. In 2005, the Coast Guard consisted of about 39,000 active duty, 

7,000 civilian, and 8,100 reserve members, for a total of approximately 

54,100 personnel. The Coast Guard also has access to approximately 

 5

The responsibility for determining whether an incident of national significance meets the

NRP’s definition of a “catastrophic incident” rests with the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

The Secretary makes a “catastrophic incident” designation to activate the provisions of the

annex. The Secretary declared Hurricane Katrina an incident of national significance on 

August 30, 2005, but never declared it a catastrophic incident. The revised NRP makes 

explicit that the Secretary could activate the annex to address events that are projected to 

mature to catastrophic proportions, such as strengthening hurricanes. 

Page 6 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
31,000 volunteer auxiliary members.6

 During the peak response time 

period for Hurricane Katrina, August 26—September 16, 2005, the Coast 

Guard had approximately 5,600 personnel in the Gulf Coast region. About

53 percent of these were active duty and civilian personnel who came 

from other parts of the United States to assist in the response. 

Table 1 shows the total number of personnel within the Coast Guard by 

type, compared to the number of personnel who responded in the Gulf 

Coast region during the August through September 2005 period. 

 6

The Coast Guard Auxiliary is a nonmilitary volunteer organization administered by the

Commandant of the Coast Guard under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland 

Security. The Coast Guard Auxiliary was created to assist the Coast Guard to promote 

safety and effect rescues on and over the high seas and on navigable waters; promote

efficiency in the operation of motorboats and yachts; foster a wider knowledge of, and 

better compliance with, the laws, rules, and regulations governing the operation of

motorboats and yachts; and facilitate other operations of the Coast Guard. 

Page 7 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Table 1: Coast Guard Active Duty, Civilian, Reserve, and Auxiliary Personnel Compared to Number of Personnel Operating in

the Gulf Coast region during Peak Response, August 26—September 16, 2005 

Coast Guard

personnel 

Approximate total number of

personnel Number of personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina

Active duty 39,000 4,026

This includes Coast Guard personnel stationed in Alabama, Mississippi, 

and Louisiana (2,045); and the number of Coast Guard personnel sent to 

Gulf Coast region from other geographical areas (1,981) 

Civilian 7,000 733

This includes Coast Guard personnel stationed in Alabama, Mississippi, 

and Louisiana (170); and number of Coast Guard personnel sent to 

Gulf Coast region from other geographical areas (563) 

Reserve 8,100 541

Auxiliary 31,000 305

Total 85,100 5,605

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. 

Note: The number of auxiliary personnel is an estimate based on a total of 13,510 hours (563 days

based on a 16-hour day) of operational and administrative support for Hurricane Katrina operations. 

Of the Coast Guard’s 11 mission program areas identified in the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002, 7 three are particularly relevant to the Hurricane 

Katrina response.8

 They are the following: 

 7

 See 6 U.S.C. § 468(a). The Coast Guard’s 11 mission program areas include ports, 

waterways, and coastal security; illegal drug interdiction; undocumented migrant 

interdiction; defense readiness; other law enforcement; search and rescue; living marine 

resources; aids to navigation; ice operations; marine environmental protection; and marine

safety. 

8

 The Coast Guard noted that activities associated with its ports, waterways, and coastal 

security mission program—which focus on protecting the maritime domain, preventing

terrorist attacks, and responding to and recovering from those that do occur—were also 

heightened following Hurricane Katrina. Activities performed under this mission program

include aerial, waterborne and shore surveillance patrols, vessel security boardings, vessel 

escorts, and enforcement of international and domestic security standards and regulations. 

According to the Coast Guard, ports, waterways, and coastal security program activities 

were heightened, both within the Gulf region and elsewhere, in recognition of the increased 

regional vulnerability and national risk that could have resulted from the consequences of

an attack on the oil and chemical sector during this time. However, the scope of our 

review focused on the three mission programs that were most closely aligned and directly 

involved with the immediate response to the natural disaster presented by Hurricane

Katrina. 

Page 8 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
• Finding and rescuing mariners in distress—a mainstay of Coast 

Guard operations under its search and rescue mission. To conduct 

this mission, the Coast Guard operates aircraft and boats 

throughout the nation’s coastlines and interior waterways. The 

Coast Guard also operates a national distress and response 

communication system that facilitates communication with 

mariners in danger. 

• Marine environmental protection—a program area focused on

preventing and responding to oil and chemical spills in the 

maritime environment, preventing the illegal dumping of plastics 

and garbage, and preventing biological invasions by aquatic 

nuisance species. The Coast Guard typically conducts this mission 

with locally based staff but also has specially trained and equipped 

teams that travel nationally and worldwide to attend to this 

mission when needed. 

• Managing waterways and providing a safe, efficient, and accessible 

marine transportation system—a mission area that includes such 

activities as maintaining the extensive system of navigation aids 

and monitoring and inspecting merchant vessels, among other 

activities.9

Several factors, including operational principles, the use of standardized 

practices, and planning, contributed to preparing the Coast Guard to 

conduct its missions following Hurricane Katrina. The Coast Guard 

promotes principles of leadership and accountability, whereby personnel 

are trained to take responsibility and action, as needed, based on relevant 

authorities and guidance. Organizational structure and standardization—of 

training, assets, and exercises—allowed the Coast Guard to send 

personnel and assets to the Gulf Coast region from units across the United 

States. Also, the Coast Guard’s focus on planning enabled personnel to 

learn emergency processes and procedures to respond to situations like 

that of Hurricane Katrina. These factors, which prepared the Coast Guard 

Several Factors 

Prepared Coast Guard 

for Hurricane Katrina 

Operations 

 9

 One of the Coast Guard’s key functions involves the facilitation of maritime commerce 

and ensuring the security of waterways and waterside facilities. These activities are 

typically conducted under several Coast Guard mission programs, including marine safety; 

ports, waterways, coastal security; and aids to navigation. Port security and commerce 

functions within ports resides with the Coast Guard Captain of the Port, whose 

responsibilities are summarized at 33 C.F.R. §1.01-30. 

Page 9 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
to conduct its Hurricane Katrina missions, are also reflected in previous 

GAO findings on lessons learned from past catastrophic disasters.10

Coast Guard Operational 

Principles Aided in 

Hurricane Katrina 

Preparations 

The Coast Guard response was aided by basic operational principles. 

Throughout our fieldwork, Coast Guard officials referred to the seven 

principles of Coast Guard operations that guide the agency’s operations, 

and though they were not necessarily always referred to by name, the 

themes were relayed to our staff frequently, and Coast Guard personnel 

view these principles as instrumental in their preparation for Hurricane 

Katrina. These principles collectively form the foundation of Coast Guard 

culture and actions during operations.11

• The Principle of Clear Objective directs every operation toward a 

clearly defined and attainable objective. The Commander’s Intent, a 

commanding officer’s general instruction to his/her subordinates, 

defined the objectives for Coast Guard units with regard to 

hurricanes, including to ensure the safety of personnel and assets, 

respond to statutory responsibilities (e.g., search and rescue), and 

reopen waterways as soon as possible. 

• The Principle of Effective Presence requires that the right assets 

and capabilities be at the right place at the right time. This also 

reflects the importance of assigning units depending on the 

anticipated need. For example, during the Hurricane Katrina 

response, the Coast Guard recognized the need to send security 

units to address security concerns during rescue operations. 

• The Principle of Unity of Effort describes the performance of 

cooperative operational objectives, by working in concert with

different Coast Guard units and coordinating these efforts with a 

diverse set of governmental and nongovernmental entities. For

example, the Coast Guard units worked with members of local area 

 10 GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, 

Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2006). 

11 U.S. Department of Transportation, Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. Coast Guard: 

America’s Maritime Guardian, (Washington, D.C.: 2002). 

Page 10 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
maritime security committees to address maritime-related issues 

and coordinate security planning efforts.12

• The Principle of On-Scene Initiative involves Coast Guard 

personnel being given latitude to act quickly and decisively within 

the scope of their authority, without waiting for direction from 

higher levels in the chain of command. For example, during the 

initial response to Hurricane Katrina, a junior-level C-130 pilot, who 

first arrived on-scene in New Orleans with the planned mission of 

conducting an environmental inspection overflight, recognized that 

search and rescue helicopters in the area could not communicate 

with officials on the ground, including those located at hospitals 

and at safe landing areas. This pilot took the initiative to redirect 

her planned mission, changing it from an environmental flight to 

creating the first airborne communication platform in the area. 

Doing so helped ensure that critical information was relayed to and 

from helicopter pilots conducting search and rescue so that they 

could more safely and efficiently continue their vital mission. Figure 

1 is a picture of the type of aircraft flown by this Coast Guard pilot. 

 12 Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), the Secretary of

Homeland Security has authority to create area maritime security committees at ports 

across the country to assist the Coast Guard in addressing vulnerabilities and risks at the

port level. See 46 U.S.C. § 70112(a) (2), 33 C.F.R. § 103.310. Composed of representatives 

from the federal, state, local and private sector, these committees provide a forum for

sharing information on issues related to port security. See 33 C.F.R. § 103.305. 

Page 11 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Figure 1: Coast Guard C-130 Aircraft Used as a Communication Platform, Also the

Type of Aircraft Used to Transport Food, Water, and Supplies to the Gulf Coast 

Region 

Source: GAO.

• The Principle of Flexibility describes how the Coast Guard pursues 

multiple missions with the same people and assets by adjusting to a 

wide variety of tasks and circumstances. Following this principle 

allows the Coast Guard to conduct “surge operations,” which are 

high-intensity efforts often launched at short notice in response to 

an emergency situation. The effect of surge operations is not only 

on people and units directly involved; it demands that the entire 

service adapt to find the resources to meet the needs of the surge 

operation while still continuing critical day-to-day operations. 

During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard found 

ways to send people and assets to the Gulf Coast region while 

maintaining required levels of readiness in homeports. For example, 

in District 1, Air Station Cape Cod, worked with Canadian 

counterparts to cover search and rescue needs in the area to 

minimize the impact of sending some air assets to respond to 

Hurricane Katrina. 

• The Principle of Managed Risk involves two dimensions: First, the 

commander is obligated to ensure that units are properly trained, 

equipped, and maintained, and second, the commander is obligated 

to assess the crew and equipment capabilities against the 

Page 12 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
operational situation to determine whether and how to execute a 

mission. For example, Coast Guard units in District 8 are required 

to develop and exercise hurricane plans. Figure 2 illustrates Coast 

Guard Area Commands and Districts. In the face of an oncoming 

storm, the District Commander will order Coast Guard personnel 

and dependents to evacuate. Finally, once the storm passes, 

commanding officers have the discretion to assess the safety of 

deploying Coast Guard personnel and assets. 

• The Principle of Restraint reflects the obligation of Coast Guard 

personnel to act with good judgment and treat American citizens 

and foreign visitors with dignity. For example, Coast Guard rescue 

swimmers we spoke to indicated that they made efforts to keep 

evacuated families together and to handle frustrated evacuees with 

sensitivity. 

Page 13 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Figure 2: Map of Coast Guard Area Commands and Districts, Detail of Gulf Coast Region

Source: U.S. Coast Guard and GAO.

13th District

11th District

8th District

9th District

7th District

5th District

1st District

17th District

14th District

New Orleans

LOUISIANA

MISSISSIPPI TEXAS

MISSISSIPPI

ALABAMA

Baton Rouge

Lafayette

Galveston

Gulf of Mexico

Mobile

Pacific Area (PACAREA)

Atlantic Area (LANTAREA)

Page 14 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Building upon its principles of operations, the Coast Guard’s organization 

and practice of standardization streamlines operations processes and 

works to efficiently maintain assets. The Coast Guard has a broadly 

dispersed organization and asset structure—that is, having personnel and 

assets located throughout the United States to expedite the movement of 

assets to respond to disasters.13 This organizational structure, coupled with 

the Coast Guard’s standardized training, allows the mixing of personnel 

and assets from anywhere in the country to form operational response 

teams. For Coast Guard asset mechanics, standardization means that they 

can assess, repair, and maintain the same type of Coast Guard asset at any

unit at any time because they are required to have a common 

understanding of the Coast Guard’s standard maintenance and repair 

requirements for its assets. 

Coast Guard 

Organizational Structure 

and Standardization 

Practices Supported 

Hurricane Katrina 

Preparations 

To ensure this consistency, the Coast Guard conducts on-site 

inspections—called standardization reviews—at air and boat stations to 

evaluate crew members’ skills and knowledge and to inspect air and boat 

assets. Standardization review teams are composed of experienced 

operators whose mission it is to teach, examine, and evaluate the 

principles of sound operations. For air operations, teams review 

standardized training to ensure that flight operations are conducted in the 

safest possible manner consistent with flight mission requirements, Coast 

Guard-wide. According to the Coast Guard’s air operations manual, 

standardization also permits randomly selected aviators to form a 

disciplined, coordinated crew on any aircraft. This directly supports the 

Coast Guard’s ability to provide a surge capability to meet rapidly 

escalating situations. Similarly, for boat operations, teams conduct 

inspections to evaluate the condition of boats and to review crew member 

proficiency in boat operations. For the Hurricane Katrina response, 

standardization enabled Coast Guard personnel from anywhere in the 

country to form unified crews to perform operations and maintenance. For 

example, a helicopter pilot from Florida, a copilot from Alabama, and a 

rescue swimmer from Alaska formed a crew to perform numerous search 

and rescue operations. Additionally, mechanics arriving at Aviation 

Training Center (ATC) Mobile in the days after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall 

 13 The Coast Guard is organized into two major commands that are responsible for overall 

mission performance: one in the Pacific area and the other in the Atlantic area, including

the Gulf of Mexico region. These commands are divided into nine districts, which in turn

are organized into over 20 air stations and 35 sectors that provide more localized command 

and control of field units and resources, including approximately 188 multimission stations

and 119 patrol boats. 

Page 15 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
were able to perform maintenance on air assets deployed to the Gulf Coast 

region from various Coast Guard units. 

Coast Guard Contingency 

Planning and Exercises 

Contributed to Hurricane 

Katrina Preparations 

Based on the Coast Guard’s organizational structure and its practice of 

standardization, plans and complementary exercises are developed to 

clarify processes and procedures (to learn which elements of a plan work 

or need to be made more efficient) and to identify opportunities that 

benefit from the Coast Guard’s unique characteristics. According to Coast 

Guard officials, prior to every hurricane season, specific severe weather 

guidance is provided to Coast Guard units to describe procedures for 

responding to a hurricane. For example, in the Gulf Coast region, units 

within District 8 rely on guidance from their leadership (known as the 

Commander’s Intent), as well as the District Severe Weather/Hurricane 

Plan and their own unit-focused hurricane plans, which would include 

plans for continuity of operations in the event of an ordered evacuation.14

Coast Guard officials stated that these plans are reviewed annually in the 

spring to ensure an opportunity to practice evacuation, continuity of 

operations, and personnel and facility preparedness. 

According to the guidance, during a pending storm situation, the Coast 

Guard maintains its ability to conduct search and rescue missions until it 

is unsafe to do so; efforts are made to warn boaters of the impending bad

weather; dependents of Coast Guard personnel are evacuated in 

accordance with the continuity of operations plans; units and their 

equipment are secured; and assets (e.g., aircraft, including helicopters and 

planes, and cutters, and other smaller boats) are moved away from the 

storm. Once the storm clears the area, personnel and assets that were 

scattered will reconstitute forces and return to the affected area to begin 

search and rescue, homeland security, and other mission activities. 

Consistent with these plans, before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Coast 

Guard units in the Gulf Coast region moved their command and control 

centers out of the threat area, and staged assets and crews outside the 

predicted storm path. For example, District 8 headquarters moved from 

New Orleans, Louisiana, to St. Louis, Missouri, and Sector New Orleans 

Command moved from New Orleans to Alexandria, Louisiana. Air assets 

 14 The Coast Guard mandates annual exercises for these Severe Weather/Hurricane plans. 

For example, Districts 1 (New England), 5 (mid-Atlantic), 7 (Florida), and 8 (Gulf Coast 

region) must exercise their Hurricane Plan; while District 9 (Great Lake region) must

exercise its Heavy Weather/Flood Plan. 

Page 16 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
were moved from Coast Guard air stations in the Gulf Coast region to 

locations in Shreveport, Louisiana, and Jacksonville, Florida. Cutters 

located in the Gulf Coast region moved to avoid the storm and into 

positions to assist with poststorm efforts. The Coast Guard also activated

its mission-specific plans in preparation for Hurricane Katrina. For 

example, in the marine environmental protection area, the Coast Guard 

activated its area contingency plan and integrated the assistance of a

Coast Guard Strike Team with its specialized environmental response 

capabilities. In particular, the Strike Team provided assistance in the 

response to Hurricane Katrina, using its inventory of specialized pollution

response equipment and highly trained first response teams to combat 

environmental pollution.

Many of the lessons emerging from Hurricane Katrina are similar to those 

GAO identified in past work on Hurricane Andrew, which destroyed much 

of South Florida. Based on our previous review of preparing for and 

responding to catastrophic disasters, we noted several critical factors 

necessary to confront catastrophic disasters: (1) clearly defined and 

communicated leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority; 

(2) strong planning and robust training and exercise programs; and 

(3) strong response and recovery capabilities.15 In our review of the Coast 

Guard’s hurricane preparation practices, it seems many of the factors we 

raised in the past, have been addressed by the Coast Guard.

During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard performed 

several functions, including search and rescue, marine pollution response, 

and management of maritime commerce—missions it performs every day. 

As the most destructive natural disaster in American history, Hurricane 

Katrina caused tens of thousands of people to be rescued during several 

weeks after the storm made landfall; spilled over 8 million gallons of oil, 

and produced considerable debris, which polluted the Gulf Coast region; 

and in the days following the storm, threatened maritime commerce. While 

conducting its missions during Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard 

experienced several unique challenges that required quick and innovative 

thinking. The Coast Guard was able to mitigate communication challenges

caused by Hurricane Katrina’s damage to communications infrastructure 

as a result of planning, preparation, and assistance from Coast Guard 

Previous GAO work

identifies critical disaster 

preparation factors 

Coast Guard 

Performed Hurricane 

Katrina Missions and 

Faced Several 

Challenges It Was 

Largely Able to 

Mitigate 

 15 GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, 

Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2006). 

Page 17 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Auxiliary members. Another challenge included the need to provide 

security protection, particularly for search and rescue operations. 

Logistics also proved a challenge as the Coast Guard worked to address 

food and water needs of rescuees, as well as its own need for fuel. 

Search and Rescue Was 

Coast Guard’s Initial 

Hurricane Katrina Mission 

After Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the primary mission was search and 

rescue. As Hurricane Katrina caused damage and destruction for 90,000 

square miles and precipitated an overwhelming flood in New Orleans, 

Louisiana, tens of thousands of people needed to be rescued from their 

homes. Some estimates are that about 60,000 people were rescued by 

federal, state, and local officials after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, and 

approximately 33,500 of them were rescued by the Coast Guard.16 The 

military, of which the Coast Guard is a member, sent massive resources to 

the Gulf Coast region to assist in Hurricane Katrina’s response and 

recovery.17 According to data from Coast Guard officials, during the peak 

response period, the Coast Guard deployed approximately 4,000 of its 

39,000 active duty personnel and deployed more than 45 percent of its air 

assets to the Gulf Coast region from across the United States. Notably, 

Coast Guard officials reported that air and boat operations, which 

involved rescuing or evacuating over 33,500 people, were conducted over 

a period of 17 days without any accidents or casualties. Rescue operations

began quickly, with the first rescue occurring approximately 9 hours 

following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall on August 29, 2005. By 12 hours 

after landfall, approximately 29 Coast Guard helicopters were conducting

rescues over New Orleans. 

Search and rescue operations, including both air and boat rescues, were 

conducted by a number of agencies. Coast Guard officials involved in boat 

operations told us that they worked closely with federal, state, and local 

officials to conduct rescues. According to Coast Guard officials, the 

 16 Beginning on August 29, 2005 and continuing for about 17 days, Coast Guard officials 

reported conducting 24,135 rescues of people by boat and helicopter, and evacuating 9,409

people from hospitals, as a result of Hurricane Katrina. By comparison, for all of 2004, the

Coast Guard responded to more than 32,000 calls for rescue assistance and saved nearly 

5,500 lives. 

17 To learn more about the Department of Defense and the National Guard response to

Hurricane Katrina, please see GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises 

Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 

(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

Page 18 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
agency leveraged approximately 130 boats and worked with FEMA teams 

to conduct urban rescues in flooded New Orleans neighborhoods. 

Attempts were also made to partner local responders with out-of-area 

responders in order to share local knowledge and facilitate rescues. 

According to Coast Guard officials involved in boat operations, personnel 

used Zephyr Field in Jefferson Parish, as a base of operations and 

deployed boat convoys from launching points such as bridges and highway 

overpasses. The boat rescues that they were involved with continued 

through September 16, 2005, almost 3 weeks after the storm. 

Page 19 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Figure 3: Area Map of New Orleans, Louisiana

GULF OF MEXICO

St. Bernard Parish

Jefferson 

Parish

St,Charles

Parish

Orleans

Parish

Plaquemines Parish

Lafourche Parish

Lake Ponchartrain

Tangipahoa 

Parish

St.Tammany 

Parish

LOUISIANA

MISSISSIPPI

Zephyr Field

Source: USGS.

Coast Guard officials operating in the Gulf Coast region told us that 3 days

into the response, approximately 43 aircraft and over 2,000 personnel had 

arrived at the Aviation Training Center in Mobile, Alabama, from other 

parts of the United States to join the Hurricane Katrina response. Rescue 

Page 20 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
swimmers—80 of whom were operating out of Air Station New Orleans at 

the peak of air operations—worked among power lines, flying debris, and 

other obstacles not routine to maritime rescues to hoist individuals from 

rooftops. Helicopter crews also conducted search and rescue operations

in Mississippi, which, according to officials at the Aviation Training Center 

in Mobile, Alabama, were completed within the first 36 hours following 

Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. Pilots who conducted rescues in Mississippi 

explained that the first responder infrastructure in Mississippi was not 

destroyed, as it was in New Orleans, and thus Mississippi police and fire

personnel were able to conduct many of the ground search and rescue 

operations—allowing for quicker completion of the mission. 

Coast Guard officials told us that they coordinated closely with various 

responders for search and rescue operations. Specifically, the Louisiana 

State Police provided police escorts and shared information regarding 

911 calls, and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries provided 

local knowledge of areas to be searched. The Louisiana Department of 

Transportation also assisted response operations by providing two ferries 

that were used to evacuate individuals across the Mississippi River to 

higher ground. Coast Guard officials also explained that the Louisiana Air 

National Guard provided assistance with transportation of evacuees by air 

in some locations, and both were located at Zephyr Field delivering large 

quantities of ready-to-eat meals and water to survivors at various 

locations. Coast Guard officials explained that at the local level, the New 

Orleans fire and police personnel accompanied search teams to provide 

assistance and local knowledge. In addition, sheriff’s office officials from 

Jefferson Parish provided police escorts, and St. Bernard Parish police and 

fire departments provided boat assets to Coast Guard disaster assistance 

teams. On the north side of Lake Pontchartrain, the Coast Guard 

coordinated search and rescue operations with the St. Tammany Parish 

Sheriff. Figure 4 shows a Coast Guard helicopter hoisting a rescuee to 

safety. 

Page 21 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Figure 4: Helicopter Rescue in Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

However, some aspects of search and rescue operations were not as 

efficient as they could have been. 18 For example, different organizations 

involved in search and rescue did not always coordinate with each other. 

In New Orleans, there were two separate command centers for search and 

rescue operations, one being run by the Louisiana National Guard and one 

being run by the Coast Guard. In addition, there was a lack of clear search

and rescue guidance across agencies because the National Response Plan 

and the National Search and Rescue Plan had never been fully integrated.19 

Coast Guard Responded 

and Continues to Address 

Environmental Concerns 

The Coast Guard oversaw the cleanup of over 8 million gallons of oil 

spilled as a result of Hurricane Katrina.20 As the oil and chemical

manufacturing industries have a significant presence in the Gulf Coast 

region, particularly in Louisiana, the potential for an unprecedented level 

 18 GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s

Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 

2006). 

19 The National Search and Rescue Plan (1999) describes the roles and responsibilities of 

federal agencies during different search and rescue situations. The National Response Plan

(2004), also provides guidance regarding search and rescue; it did not fully incorporate the 

roles previously described in the National Search and Rescue Plan. 

20 To put this amount into perspective, the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill was around 11 million 

gallons. 

Page 22 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
of oil and hazardous substance contamination, especially in and around 

New Orleans, grew as Hurricane Katrina approached. To manage this 

response, unified commands were set up with the Coast Guard and its 

partners in advance of the storm.21 These commands were involved in a 

range of decisions that allowed them to collectively assess the 

environmental situation and make tactical decisions. Coast Guard and 

state officials noted that persons representing federal, state, local, and 

industry entities were involved in these commands, and they worked 

together to manage the marine environmental protection response. As a 

result, Coast Guard officials told us that they were as prepared as possible 

to manage pollution events stemming from Hurricane Katrina.

According to Coast Guard and Louisiana Department of Environmental 

Quality officials, the initial response to environmental concerns following 

Hurricane Katrina involved multi-agency assessment teams. Following the

hurricane’s landfall, these teams surveyed the entire coastal zone, 

including all area ports, marinas, and related facilities. A state official 

noted that assessment teams recorded the location and size of oil spills 

and assessed the damage.22 He stated that it took two helicopters, flying 

full-time for 3 weeks, to document all the debris to be cleaned up. Coast 

Guard officials said they coordinated their environmental mission 

priorities with other pressing Coast Guard missions by contracting for 

rented commercial planes for their pollution assessment overflights, rather 

than competing for aircraft needed to conduct pressing search and rescue 

missions. In addition, boat crews involved in search and rescue missions 

collected water samples to help document the damage to infrastructure 

and threats to human health, such as sewage plant flooding.

Oil cleanup efforts were complicated by the magnitude of the spills and 

the location of the spills. According to the Coast Guard, the oil appeared 

as black film, covering dozens of neighborhoods and protected marshes 

and swamps along the Mississippi River. Most spills occurred south of 

 21 Unified command is a unified team that manages an incident by establishing a common 

set of incident objectives and strategies. It is a structure that brings together the incident

commanders of all major organizations involved in an incident and provides a forum for 

these agencies to coordinate an effective response and make consensus decisions. This is 

accomplished without loss or abdication of agency or organizational authority, 

responsibility, or accountability. 

22Photographs of the oil spills and debris were taken to document their location and size.

The photographs not only showed the progress of the cleanup but established a record of 

the pollution and discouraged illegal dumping of oil or hazardous material that could be 

intentionally released and then attributed to the storm. 

Page 23 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
New Orleans as a result of ruptured and spilled oil tanks. The Coast Guard 

estimated that 8 million gallons of oil were released, including 6 major 

spills, 4 medium spills, and about 1,000 minor spills.23 For example, 1 spill 

in the city was notable because it affected approximately 1,800 homes. The 

oil residue could be seen on vacated homes months later, when the odor 

of oil in the earth and debris still permeated the air. Another significant 

spill came from the discharge of about 3 million to 4 million gallons of oil 

dispersed into remote marshes, which were difficult to reach and 

therefore difficult to clean up. In addition, the storm destroyed 115 oil 

platforms offshore, significantly damaged 52, and set 19 adrift. Although, 

according to Coast Guard officials, there were no spills of significance 

offshore. 

To address the many spills, the Coast Guard reported that each pollution 

incident was prioritized, investigated, and resolved either through a 

private owner taking action to get it cleaned up or a rapid response team 

providing on-site mitigation. However, clean up in many cases was 

complicated by a number of environmental conditions, according to the 

Coast Guard. For example, responders faced heat stress and dehydration 

as well as a profusion of insects, poisonous snakes, and alligators as they 

conducted clean up operations in remote locations. Responders also faced 

uncertain communications, impassible roadways, and clogged waterways. 

Overall, about 1,000 personnel from federal, state, and local agencies and

private industry were involved in the response to oil spills resulting from 

Hurricane Katrina. At one sector, Mobile, Alabama, over 400 active duty 

and reserve personnel were brought in from Coast Guard commands 

throughout the United States, at various times, to assist with marine 

environmental protection response. Recognizing the Coast Guard’s role in

the prevention of spills, a Coast Guard official reported that numerous 

medium and major hazardous material releases and oil spills were 

prevented by response personnel. For example, response personnel 

removed oil and hazardous materials with the potential to be released into

navigable waters from grounded vessels. In addition, Coast Guard Strike 

team members repaired piping, and multi-agency entry teams conducted 

entries into laboratories and chemical plants to recover hazardous 

 23 A major spill contains at least 100,000 gallons, and a medium spill contains at least 10,000

gallons, while amounts less than 10,000 gallons would be considered minor spills. 

Page 24 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
materials.24 Larger issues were addressed first, such as leaking propane 

tanks that posed a threat to human health. Coast Guard officials also noted

that response personnel disposed of thousands of containers and drums, 

some filled with petroleum products and pesticides. 

In addition to undertaking the oil pollution response, the Coast Guard also 

helped to address marine debris problems resulting from the over 

620 commercial and recreational vessels that were sunk or grounded in 

the aftermath of the storm. A Coast Guard official described “piles” of 

shrimping vessels on dry ground. Figure 5 shows a damaged vessel 

stranded on a front lawn. The Coast Guard established a Vessel Recovery 

Branch to address those vessels leaking oil or having the potential to 

release oil into navigable waters. A vessel database was also developed 

and provided current information regarding vessel status and tracking 

information on vessel owners. At the height of the vessel recovery 

operations, 82 Coast Guard personnel supported this mission. 

 24 The U.S. Coast Guard National Strike Force is composed of 168 highly trained 

professionals with specialized skills for combating environmental pollution from oil 

discharges, hazardous substance and biological releases, and weapons of mass destruction

events. The Strike Force is composed of three Strike Teams located in the Atlantic, Pacific, 

and Gulf Coast regions to allow for rapid deployment. 

Page 25 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Figure 5: Stranded Vessel in the Greater New Orleans Area 

Source: GAO.

According to Coast Guard officials, marine pollution response, which 

began after Hurricane Katrina moved through the region, is ongoing, with

full recovery not expected until at least 2007. For example, as of spring 

2006, in Mississippi, marine pollution cleanup was 50 percent complete. 

According to Coast Guard personnel, members of the Gulf Strike Team 

continue to support marine hazardous material recovery operations 

involving abandoned drums and containers in Mississippi and Alabama. 

The Coast Guard is also participating in an Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA)-led oil and hazardous waste removal and disposal effort 

inland along coastal states. As of February 2006, a Coast Guard official 

estimated that multi-agency environmental teams (consisting of Coast 

Guard, EPA, FEMA, and state and local agencies) had addressed over 

5,100 hazardous material cases. 

In addition, the Coast Guard has the mission assignment to remove all 

marine debris from along the entire coast of Mississippi. A team of federal 

and state partners identified over 235 sites in residential canals that 

required marine debris removal action. Cleanup work on the 9 worst sites 

has begun and is estimated to continue until at least 2007. 

Page 26 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Despite the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard 

reopened a few ports and restored the movement of some commerce 

within days after Hurricane Katrina struck. This quick response was 

important because U.S. ports and waterways handle over 2 billion tons of 

cargo annually. Much of that commerce flows through Louisiana, Texas, 

Alabama, and Mississippi—the same coastal areas affected by Hurricane 

Katrina. For example, the Port of New Orleans serves as the focal point for 

waterborne transportation of cargo to 28 states, and its cargo activity 

supported $37 billion in economic benefits to the country and generated 

$2.8 billion in federal tax revenue, according to the American Association 

of Port Authorities. Senior Coast Guard officials commanding certain 

Coast Guard units possess broad authorities in their role as the Captain of 

the Port (COTP). This authority includes the power to close or reopen 

ports within their jurisdiction—an action taken by COTPs at Sector New 

Orleans, Mobile, and Miami. To do this, a COTP typically works 

collaboratively with key stakeholders, including the local Area Maritime 

Security Committee, Harbor Safety Committee, port authorities, and 

industry officials to determine when it is appropriate to close and then 

reopen a port for commerce. In preparation for Hurricane Katrina, COTPs 

in the Gulf Coast region issued Marine Safety Information Bulletins to 

provide information regarding hurricane conditions at the various ports 

and projected timelines for port closures. The bulletins informed the port 

communities of specific time frames for prohibited and authorized 

operations at the ports. 

Limited Maritime 

Commerce Restored in 

Four Days 

Before a port is reopened, the COTP is to ensure that the waterways are 

safe and navigable. One element of ensuring the safe facilitation of 

commerce is the Coast Guard’s Aids to Navigation program and its system 

of aids. The aids to navigation system assists mariners in determining their 

position and a safe course of travel, and warns them of dangers and 

obstructions. The system typically consists of a series of devices, such as 

buoys, beacons, and lighthouses that facilitate safe navigation. Coast 

Guard officials reported that approximately 1,800 aids to navigation were 

missing, relocated, or destroyed because of Hurricane Katrina. The aids to 

navigation teams, which specialize in the maintenance of aids to 

navigation equipment, were deployed to assess the damage and repair the 

aids. Additionally, surveys conducted of the underwater and surface areas 

along the Gulf Coast were coordinated with the Coast Guard, the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, 

and the U.S. Navy and helped to determine the conditions of the 

waterways. According to Coast Guard officials, the aids to navigation 

teams assisted the COTPs to reopen the ports. The criteria used to close or

reopen ports consisted of a combination of factors such as the status of 

Page 27 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
the aids to navigation system, the status of various dock facilities, and the 

availability of electrical power and marine pilots.25 The Coast Guard’s 

Standard Operating Procedures for District 8 call for a prioritized list of 

aids to navigation in that district to help identify important repair 

decisions to ensure that the aids to navigation most critical to the 

waterways/facilitation of commerce are repaired first. 

The damaged aids to navigation from Hurricane Katrina were a 

contributing factor in the temporary closure of 11 ports in Louisiana, 

Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.26 Meanwhile, the Coast Guard was 

aware of the importance of the Mississippi River to the nation’s economy, 

particularly the export of bulk grain. Despite the shipping disruptions 

along the Gulf Coast, the Coast Guard reopened three ports 4 days after 

Hurricane Katrina struck. Both the Ports of New Orleans and Mobile 

reopened Friday, September 2, 2005, under travel restrictions.27 As of 

September 29, 2005, about 4 weeks after Hurricane Katrina struck, 850 of 

the 1,350 aids to navigation discrepancies identified by the Coast Guard 

were repaired with permanent or temporary aids, and as of late June 2006, 

Coast Guard officials stated that 149 aids to navigation discrepancies still 

needed to be permanently or temporarily repaired. Of the 149 outstanding 

aids to navigation discrepancies, Coast Guard officials reported that 

67 temporary repairs have been completed. The remaining discrepancies 

are planned for repair by the end of July 2006, contingent upon the 

completion of waterway dredging, calm weather, and availability of an 

appropriate inland construction cutter. Figure 6 shows the Coast Guard 

repairing aids to navigation. 

 25 For the purposes of this report, a marine pilot is a person licensed under state or federal

law who assumes responsibility for a vessel at a particular place for the purpose of

navigating it through a river or a channel or from or into a port. 

26 Affected ports included New Orleans, Mobile, Gulfport, Baton Rouge, Pensacola, Panama

City, Pascagoula, Biloxi, Bayou La Batre, Port Fourchon, and Morgan City. 

27 The COTP will activate maritime travel restrictions when waterways are difficult to 

navigate. These restrictions might include travel of ships only in the daytime or allowing 

only certain size ships to travel on the waterways. 

Page 28 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Figure 6: Coast Guard Personnel Servicing Aids to Navigation 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

 

Coast Guard Confronted 

Several Challenges in 

Conducting Hurricane 

Katrina Operations

The Coast Guard experienced personnel security, communications, and 

logistics challenges during the Hurricane Katrina response. However, it 

was able to adapt its existing capabilities to confront those challenges. 

• Personnel security concerns. District 8 officials explained that as 

the days of operations lengthened and citizens remained stranded, 

security capabilities became an important component of rescue 

operations. For example, Coast Guard rescue swimmers we 

interviewed told us that their own personal security became a 

Page 29 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
concern as stranded individuals became increasingly frustrated 

because they had no food or water. In some instances, tensions 

among survivors became heated when rescue swimmers had to 

prioritize rescues of children, women, and the elderly over ablebodied men. To address such concerns, rescue swimmers employed 

various tactics, including deploying 2 swimmers at one time (which 

is not standard procedure)—one swimmer to triage victims, and the 

other swimmer to assist in hoisting victims into the helicopter.

Rescue swimmers also learned to use their skills as negotiators by 

assigning a citizen leader from within a group of irritated survivors 

to promote order. For boat operations, officials explained that they 

deployed Coast Guard security teams to provide security coverage 

for both Coast Guard and FEMA search and rescue personnel.28

• Communication challenges. The Coast Guard was able to mitigate 

communications challenges caused by Hurricane Katrina’s damage 

to communications infrastructure as a result of planning, 

preparation, and assistance from Coast Guard Auxiliary members. 

Aware that communications systems could be heavily damaged or 

destroyed during a natural disaster, Coast Guard officials had 

developed plans that were not reliant on communications systems 

and allowed personnel to act independently or with limited 

guidance from commanding officers. In addition, Coast Guard 

personnel prestaged emergency communications equipment—such 

as a mobile communications unit—and distributed satellite phones 

and cell phones to mitigate communications infrastructure 

breakdowns.29 After the storm passed, Coast Guard personnel 

procured two-way radios, utilized text messaging when cell phones 

could not make calls, and opened commercial e-mail accounts when 

the agency’s own data network was down. In addition, the Coast 

Guard auxiliarists provided communications capabilities after the 

storm passed, including establishing a communications relay critical 

for conducting search and rescue operations. 

 28 The security teams consisted of Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs), which 

were established after September 11, 2001, and designed to provide quick-response 

capabilities to protect U.S. ports and waterways; and Port Security Units (PSUs), which are 

composed of Coast Guard reserve personnel and trained to provide port security and 

harbor defense duties for military assets overseas. 

29 Although Coast Guard after-action reports indicate that mobile communications units did

not provide communications capabilities needed for operations, officials in District 8 told 

us that these units were useful in providing communications support. 

Page 30 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
• Lack of food and water. According to Coast Guard officials, 

addressing food and water shortages in the days following Katrina’s 

landfall became an important part of rescue operations. To address 

these shortages, Coast Guard personnel from other regions flew 

food and water to New Orleans, and personnel at Air Station New 

Orleans distributed their own emergency food and water supplies to 

survivors. Helicopter crews loaded food and water onto helicopters 

and distributed these supplies to individuals awaiting rescue.

According to Air Station New Orleans’ commanding officer, 

shipments of water were also delivered to the Superdome on a daily 

basis. Coast Guard responders also provided food and water to 

individuals at evacuation sites. 

• Difficulties securing fuel. Coast Guard officials we interviewed 

explained that securing fuel was challenging in the days following 

Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. According to a senior official at Sector 

Mobile, fuel shortages presented a major obstacle to moving 

supplies into Mississippi. One response by the Coast Guard to the 

lack of fuel was to send responding units into the Gulf Coast Region 

with adequate fuel to conduct their missions. For example, aids to 

navigation teams sent from District 7, arrived in the Gulf Coast 

region as self-contained units with sufficient fuel, food, and other 

supplies to immediately begin work addressing compromised buoys 

and other navigational aids. Concurrent with this fuel shortage was 

the lack of electrical power, which rendered fuel pumps—

dependent on electricity—inoperable. As part of their lessons 

learned, officials told us that in the future, emergency vehicles and 

first responders need to bring fuel with them in order to be selfsufficient. Officials also explained that having battery-operated fuel 

pumps could address problems associated with power outages and 

that this lesson would be applied to future contingency planning. 

Because Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in our 

nation’s history, significant federal resources were mobilized to respond to 

the Hurricane Katrina disaster, including resources of the Coast Guard.

According to Coast Guard officials, they managed the surge of people and 

assets to the Gulf Coast region in response to Hurricane Katrina without 

significant damage to personnel, assets, operations, or financial resources. 

The Coast Guard is also reviewing its actions during the Hurricane Katrina 

response in order to address challenges and prepare for future hurricane 

seasons. 

Coast Guard Managed 

the Impact of the 

Hurricane Response 

and Collected 

Information to 

Improve Future 

Responses 

Page 31 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
As of late September 2005, Coast Guard personnel sent to respond to 

Hurricane Katrina had returned to their homeports, with the exception of 

Coast Guard personnel specially trained in environmental protection 

issues, who remained in the Gulf Coast region. Coast Guard officials told 

us that personnel were certainly exhausted during the surge response, but 

at no time did they violate required safety standards. For example, they 

said all pilots adhered to aviation standards, flying no more than the 

maximum 8 hours within a 24-hour period. However, Coast Guard 

personnel did report several health-related issues as a result of their 

response to Hurricane Katrina. For example, during the Katrina response 

rescue swimmers reported that they suffered an assortment of medical 

problems, including pink eye, respiratory issues, skin rashes, infections, 

cuts, and scratches from nails, flying fiberglass (from the helicopter 

swirling around homes with loose insulation), and other windswept 

articles. Although the rescue swimmers we spoke to noted that most of 

these medical concerns seemed to clear up a week or two after their 

experiences in the Gulf Coast region, it remains uncertain whether some 

ailments (e.g., respiratory issues) could have long-term effects. 

Response to Hurricane 

Katrina Seemed to Have 

Had Limited Impact on 

Coast Guard 

Health effects stemming from mental stress may also be a long-term issue 

for the Coast Guard Katrina responders. During the Katrina efforts, the 

Coast Guard recognized that personnel responding to Hurricane Katrina, 

as well as those personnel who experienced the loss of their homes, 

suffered from mental stress. Therefore, Critical Incident Stress 

Management teams were mobilized to treat those personnel who worked

in or lived in the ravaged Gulf Coast region. For example, after every 

flight, the rescue swimmers underwent an assessment for stress, including

a stress debriefing, in addition to a physical decontamination because of 

the pollutants they encountered in the flood waters of New Orleans. We 

were told that Critical Incident Stress Management teams also provided 

support to several District 8 staff who had lost their homes or had assisted 

colleagues in cleaning out their destroyed homes and are only now 

beginning to deal with the mental stress effects of the Katrina tragedy. 

Coast Guard officials also told us that they complied with asset 

maintenance standards. For example, they said all required maintenance 

of aircraft took place at one of the maintenance hubs set up in either 

Mobile, Alabama; Houston, Texas; or Elizabeth City, North Carolina. 

According to an engineering official we spoke to at the Aviation Training 

Center in Mobile, Alabama, visiting Coast Guard aircraft from around the 

country were returned to their homeports with updated maintenance 

completed. One Coast Guard official did note a concern for the future 

availability of replacement parts. For example, hoists that pulled up 

Page 32 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
rescuees are usually replaced every 3 to 5 years. However, given the 

number of hoist rescues performed during the Hurricane Katrina response,

the Coast Guard official speculated that replacement may need to occur in 

2 years, affecting the number of hoists in Coast Guard inventory. Coast 

Guard officials also noted that for the Hurricane Katrina response the 

agency complied with vessel maintenance standards, adding that some 

maintenance can be accomplished by the crew while ships are under way. 

However for responses that require surging assets from around the 

country, like that of Hurricane Katrina, officials said that only ships that 

are ready and able to be deployed or those that can safely delay 

maintenance are sent. For example, Coast Guard officials told us that the

cutter Oak delayed its maintenance for 10 days while it responded to 

Hurricane Katrina, because it could safely do so. 

Data show that in fiscal year 2005, during which the Hurricane Katrina 

response occurred, operational hours for Coast Guard assets (ships and 

aircraft) increased over the previous year’s total. For the fourth quarter of

2004, Coast Guard operational hours totaled 287,725 hours, while in the 

fourth quarter of 2005, they totaled 302,112 hours—a difference of 

14,387 hours, due in part to the Hurricane Katrina response. According to a 

senior Coast Guard official, no Coast Guard asset was affected by 

Hurricane Katrina, meaning that assets were returned to their homeports 

able to perform routine missions. 

A number of Coast Guard resources responded to Hurricane Katrina in the 

Gulf Coast region. Table 2 summarizes the types and total number of 

assets that the Coast Guard currently maintains, along with the number, 

name, and homeports of those assets that responded to the Gulf Coast 

region.30

 30 Along with assets, a wide range of Coast Guard operational and support teams were sent 

to assist in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Port Security Units, Law Enforcement

Detachment teams, and Maritime Safety and Security Teams assisted in security and force 

protection missions. Strike Teams addressed pollution concerns. Transportable MultiMission Communication Center and Transportable Multi-Agency Communication Center 

assets mitigated some of the communications challenges the Coast Guard experienced. 

Other teams deployed during the peak Coast Guard response included several Emergency

Response Teams, Civil Engineering Unit Damage Assessment Teams, and Incident

Management Assist Teams. 

Page 33 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Table 2: Coast Guard Asset Type, Homeport, and Number That Responded to the Gulf Coast Region during the Peak 

Response, August 26–September 16, 2005 

Coast Guard asset 

Total number of Coast 

Guard assets for each

category of asset 

Number of Coast Guard

assets responding in Gulf 

Coast region Assets and homeport 

Cutters

Medium-endurance 

cutter, 270-foot 

13 3 Harriet Lane from LANTa Portsmouth, Va. 

Northland from LANT/Portsmouth, Va. 

Spencer from LANT/Boston, Mass. 

Seagoing buoy 

tender, 225-foot

16 2 Cypress from D8b/Mobile, Ala.

Oak from D7/Charleston, SC 

Medium-endurance 

cutter, 210-foot 

14 2 Confidence from LANT/Cape Canaveral, Fla. 

Decisive from LANT/Pascagoula, Miss. 

Coastal buoy 

tender, 175-foot 

14 3 Barbara Mabrity from D8/Mobile, Ala. 

Harry Claiborne from D8/Galveston, Tex. 

Joshua Appleby from D7/St. Petersburg, Fla. 

Patrol coastals, 

179-foot 

4 2 Tornado from D8/Pascagoula, Miss. 

Shamal from D8/Pascagoula, Miss. 

Inland construction 

tenders, 160-foot 

4 3 Hudson from D7/Miami Beach, Fla. 

Pamlico from D8/New Orleans, La. 

Saginaw from D8/Mobile, Ala.

Inland construction 

tenders, 75-foot 

8 3 Clamp from D8/Galveston, Tex. 

Hatchet from D8/Galveston, Tex. 

Mallet from D8/Corpus Christi, Tex. 

Coastal patrol boat, 

87-foot 

65 9 Bonito from D8/Pensacola, Fla. 

Coho from D8/Panama City, Fla. 

Pelican from D8/Abbeville, La. 

Pompano from D8/Gulfport, Miss. 

Razorbill from D8/Gulfport, Miss. 

Seahawk from D8/Carrabelle, Fla. 

Stingray from D8/Mobile, Ala.

Sturgeon from D8/Grand Isle, La. 

Cobia from D8/Mobile, Ala. 

River buoy 

tender, 75-foot 

12 2 Greenbrier from D8/Natchez, Miss. 

Wedge from D8/Demopolis, Ala. 

Total cutters 150 29

Small boats 

Boats under 65 feet 825 131 Districts 8 and 9 

Aircraftc

HC-130 long-range 

surveillance aircraft 

27 18 4 from D5/Elizabeth City, NC 

5 from D7/Clearwater, Fla. 

3 from D11/Sacramento, Calif. 

1 from D17/Kodiak, Ark. 

5 from ARSCd

/Elizabeth City, NC 

Page 34 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Coast Guard asset 

Total number of Coast 

Guard assets for each

category of asset 

Number of Coast Guard

assets responding in Gulf 

Coast region Assets and homeport 

HU-25 medium-range 

surveillance aircraft 

23 19 5 from D1/Cape Cod, Mass.

5 from D7/Miami, Fla. 

3 from D8/Corpus Christi, Tex. 

2 from D11/San Diego, Calif. 

4 from ATC Mobile/Mobile, Ala.

HH-60 medium-range 

recovery helicopter 

41 19 4 from D1/Cape Cod, Mass.

3 from D5/Elizabeth City, NC 

9 from D7/Clearwater, Fla. 

3 from ATC Mobile, Mobile, Ala. 

HH-65 multimission 

cutter helicopter

95 30 2 from D5/Atlantic City, NJ 

1 D7/Savannah, Ga. 

6 from D7/Miami, Fla. 

1 from D8/Corpus Christi, Tex. 

5 from D8/New Orleans, La. 

5 from D8/Houston, Tex. 

2 from D9/Detroit, Mich. 

7 from ATC Mobile, Mobile, Ala. 

1 from ARSC Elizabeth City, NC 

Auxiliary aircraft unknown 14 aircraft Primarily from District 8 

Total aircraft 186 Coast Guard

operational plus any 

Auxiliary aircraft 

86 Coast Guard,

14 Auxiliary, which totals

100 responding aircraft

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by Coast Guard. 

a LANT refers to assets owned by Atlantic Area Command. 

b The Coast Guard is divided into geographical areas, or districts. D8 refers to District 8, which 

includes the Gulf Coast region and moves up the Mississippi River. D1 refers to Coast Guard’s 

District 1, in the New England area; D5 refers to District 5, the mid-Atlantic region; D7 refers to District 

7, southeastern region; D9 refers to District 9, Great Lakes region; and D11 refers to District 11, west 

coast area.

c Number of aircraft as of February 2006. 

d The Coast Guard’s Aircraft Repair and Supply Center (ARSC) in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, 

overhauls and makes major repairs and modifications to all Coast Guard aircraft and associated

equipment. 

With regard to operational impact, Coast Guard officials told us that in 

some cases, stations that sent personnel and assets to the Gulf Coast 

region experienced challenges in maintaining operations. Relative to other

Page 35 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
military services, the Coast Guard is small,31 and when resources are 

shifted to any one specific mission area, other mission areas may suffer. 

Although Coast Guard officials noted that they were generally able to

continue with their various missions across the nation, including boarding 

high-interest vessels approaching United States ports, there were 

instances where the movement of Coast Guard assets out of their normal 

areas of operation affected activity levels in these locations. For example, 

Coast Guard units in Florida sent many air and surface assets to the Gulf 

Coast region to respond to Hurricane Katrina, and while these assets were 

deployed to the Gulf Coast region, the Coast Guard observed a spike in the 

level of illegal migration activity off of the Florida coast. In response, 

according to Coast Guard officials, once the assets returned to the Florida 

region, the Coast Guard initiated a more intensive air and sea patrol 

schedule to markedly announce its return to the area and focus on 

interdicting illegal migrants. 

Coast Guard Satisfied with 

Reimbursement of 

Hurricane Katrina Mission 

Costs 

Part of Hurricane Katrina’s impact on Coast Guard personnel, assets, and 

operations at its districts nationwide was that the Coast Guard incurred 

unexpected costs conducting Hurricane Katrina missions.32 When we

discussed the amount of funding requested to reimburse the Coast Guard 

for its Hurricane Katrina activities, Coast Guard officials told us they were 

satisfied with the reimbursement process with both FEMA and EPA. 

According to these officials, as of April 12, 2006, the Coast Guard had 

received “dollar for dollar” the amounts requested for reimbursement, 

meaning that for every bill submitted and processed, the Coast Guard 

received the same amount in reimbursement. Coast Guard officials added

that the review of billing documentation by FEMA and EPA officials can 

 31Consisting of approximately 39,000 active duty personnel, the Coast Guard is a 

multimission agency with a long-standing federal leadership role in protecting life and 

property at sea, such as directing search and rescue operations. Furthermore, the Coast 

Guard is a military service responsible for protecting U.S. ports and waterways. As of 

December 2005, other U.S. military branches were the U.S. Army, with approximately 

489,000 active duty personnel; the U.S. Navy, with approximately 359,000 active duty 

personnel; the U.S. Air Force, with approximately 352,000 active duty personnel; and the 

U.S. Marines, with approximately 179,000 active duty personnel. 

32 Coast Guard officials reported that as of April 12, 2006, its FEMA-directed missions in 

response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had a funding ceiling of $191,913,001, meaning

FEMA authorized the Coast Guard to spend up to this amount to conduct missions in 

response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition, the EPA authorized the Coast Guard

to spend up to $171,327,000 to conduct specific pollution response missions. According to

Coast Guard officials, this amount is likely to grow as mission assignments in the area of 

pollution response continue to be added, and could take at least a year to complete. 

Page 36 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
take 30 to 60 days. Coast Guard officials also stated that they met with 

representatives from FEMA this year to reconcile Hurricane Katrina 

mission assignments, funding ceilings, and costs, and these accounting 

lines and totals were consistent. 

As table 3 shows, as of April 12, 2006, the Coast Guard reported that it had

spent $98,811,320 in its response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and had

billed FEMA and EPA $66,746,961 and received $48,634,090 in

reimbursements, given the 30-to 60-day delay in FEMA/EPA review of 

Coast Guard billing documentation. However, even with the delay, Coast 

Guard officials we spoke to were satisfied with the reimbursement process 

with both FEMA and EPA. 

Table 3: Summary of Coast Guard Stafford Act Reimbursement Requests for Missions Conducted in Response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita, as of April 12, 2006 

Stafford Act funding 

Description of mission 

assignments 

Amount of Coast

Guard

expenditures

Amount of

reimbursement 

request 

submitted 

Amount of

reimbursement

funding received as 

of April 12, 2006

Coast Guard mission assignments 

(reimbursement from FEMA) 

Search and rescue, wreck and

debris removal, and deployment 

of strike forces, among other 

activities 

$49,746,004 $34,701,729 $16,588,858

Coast Guard mission assignments 

(reimbursement from the EPA) 

Marine pollution response effort, 

including technical assistance,

and direct support to EPA, 

among other activities 

49,065,316 32,045,232 32,045,232

Total $98,811,320 $66,746,961 $48,634,090

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard and FEMA data. 

Note: Tables 1 and 2 focused exclusively on the Coast Guard response to only Hurricane Katrina; 

table 3 focuses on the financial impact of the Coast Guard response to both Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita missions. Coast Guard officials noted when accounting for costs associated with Hurricane 

Katrina, they included costs associated with Hurricane Rita. Note that table 3 does not include 

damages suffered by the Coast Guard, including the destruction of several stations, and damage to 

assets suffered during the storms. These infrastructure costs continue to be identified and updated by

the Coast Guard, and supplemental funding has been requested to address these damages. Also 

note that the amount of reimbursement request submitted to EPA, and the amount of reimbursement

funding received as of April 12, 2006, is the same. Coast Guard officials reported that the process of

reimbursement from EPA allows for quick reimbursement because the missions are more typical of 

the types of environmental response conducted by the Coast Guard. We did not verify the accuracy 

of the data provided by the Coast Guard. 

Page 37 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
According to Coast Guard officials, the agency has collected information 

regarding its response to Hurricane Katrina and included it in a Coast 

Guard database. In addition, while we conducted site visits for this review, 

we met with a wide range of Coast Guard personnel who participated in

the response to Hurricane Katrina who shared with us their views on 

certain actions that the Coast Guard could take in the future to further 

improve the agency’s response to an event like Hurricane Katrina. These 

actions include efforts to (1) improve the agency’s systems to track Coast 

Guard personnel in real time in order to better recall personnel when an 

evacuation is over and forces are sent to respond to the emergency event; 

(2) become more “expeditionary” in nature by having evacuating forces 

remove such things as certain tools and equipment that would allow them

to be more self-sustaining in order to assist in a disaster response; (3) be 

more flexible in identifying safe places for Coast Guard personnel to 

relocate to in the event of an evacuation; and (4) be flexible in drafting 

orders for personnel to report for duty at a specific time and place in order 

to respond to contingencies that may arise during the course of an 

emergency.

Furthermore, a senior Coast Guard official reported that the Coast Guard 

has developed a number of after-action reports that it has incorporated 

into its Contingency Preparedness System database—known as CG 

SAILS—the official Coast Guard database for lessons learned. According 

to this official, having these reports in this system allows Coast Guard 

personnel to access this information and incorporate it into other agency 

planning and contingency efforts.

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, including the Coast Guard, for 

comment. DHS and the Coast Guard provided technical comments, which 

have been incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

Coast Guard Collected 

Information to Improve 

Future Storm Preparations 

Agency Comments 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Commandant of the 

Coast Guard; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other 

interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on

the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Page 38 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix I.

Stephen L. Caldwell 

Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Page 39 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Co-Chairman 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe

Chair 

The Honorable Maria Cantwell

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Fisheries and the Coast Guard 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Judd Gregg

Chairman 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Don Young

Chairman 

The Honorable James L. Oberstar

Ranking Democratic Member 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

Page 40 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo

Chairman 

The Honorable Bob Filner

Ranking Democratic Member 

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Tom Davis

Chairman 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman

Ranking Member 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Peter T. King

Chairman 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Harold Rogers

Chairman 

The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 41 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Appendix I: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 42 GAO-06-903

Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Stephen L. Caldwell, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice 

Issues, (202) 512-9610, or CaldwellS@gao.gov

Individuals making key contributions to this report include Joel Aldape,

Nancy Briggs, Lisa Canini, Billy Commons, Christine Davis, 

Josh Diosomito, Michele Fejfar, Kathryn Godfrey, Dawn Hoff, and 

Lori Kmetz. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Coast Guard
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and 

Future Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.

Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and 

Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2005. 

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information 

Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.

GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 

Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and 

Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 

31, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 

Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: 

January 14, 2005. 

Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime

Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: 

December 10, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective

Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: 

September 30, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and 

Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.

GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New 

Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. 

Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004. 

Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year

2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004. 

Page 43 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
Related GAO Products 

Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting 

Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington,

D.C.: March 31, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target 

Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, 

D.C.: December 16, 2003.

Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. 

GAO-04-315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003. 

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be 

Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003.

Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require 

Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,

D.C.: July 25, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 

Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation 

Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and LongTerm Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New 

Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in 

Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. 

GAO-02-955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.

(440464) Page 44 GAO-06-903 Coast Guard
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