al-Qaeda The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat

Report of the House Permanent Select Commit tee on Intelligence 

J u n e 2 0 0 6

109th Congress Union Calendar No. 355

2d Session Report 109-615

al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat

___________________

REPORT OF THE

U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED: JUNE 2006

TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

SUBMITTED: SEPTEMBER 2006

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://intelligence.house.gov/

September 6, 2006.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

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ii

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PETER HOEKSTRA, MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN

J. DENNIS HASTERT, ILLINOIS, EX OFFICIO MEMBER

NANCY PELOSI, CALIFORNIA, EX OFFICIO MEMER

RAY LAHOOD, ILLINOIS JANE HARMAN, CALIFORNIA

TERRY EVERETT, ALABAMA ALCEEL. HASTINGS, FLORIDA

ELTON GALLEGLY, CALIFORNIA SILVESTRE REYES, TEXAS

HEATHER WILSON, NEW MEXICO LEONARD L. BOSWELL, IOWA

JO ANN DAVIS, VIRGINIA ROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, JR., ALABAMA

MAC THORNBERRY, TEXAS ANNAG. ESHOO, CALIFORNIA

JOHN M. MCHUGH, NEW YORK RUSH D. HOLT, NEW JERSEY

TODD TIAHRT, KANSAS C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, MARYLAND

MIKE ROGERS, MICHIGAN JOHN F. TIERNEY, MASSACHUSETTS

RICK RENZI, ARIZONA DARRELL ISSA, CALIFORNIA
iii

PETER HOEKSTRA, MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN

RAY LAHOOD, ILLINOIS, VICE CHAIRMAN

TERRY EVERETT, ALABAMA

ELTON GALLEGLY, CALIFORNIA

HEATHER WILSON, NEW MEXICO

JO ANN DAVIS, VIRGINIA

MAC THORNBERRY, TEXAS

JOHN M. MCHUGH, NEW YORK

TODD TIAHRT, KANSAS

MIKE ROGERS, MICHIGAN

RICK RENZI, ARIZONA

DARRELL ISSA, CALIFORNIA

JANE HARMAN, CALIFORNIA, 

 RANKING MEMBER

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA

SILVESTRE REYES, TEXAS

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, IOWA

ROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, JR., ALABAMA

ANNA G. ESHOO, CALIFORNIA

RUSH D. HOLT, NEW JERSEY

C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, MARYLAND

JOHN F. TIERNEY, MASSACHUSETTS

J. DENNIS HASTERT, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE

NANCY PELOSI, DEMOCRATIC LEADER

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCE

H-405, THE CAPITOL

WASHINGTON, DC 20515

(202) 225-4121

MICHAEL MEERMANS

STAFF DIRECTOR

DAVID BUCKLEY,

MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

September 6, 2006

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert

Speaker of the House 

The Capitol 

Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

By direction of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I submit herewith a committee report 

entitled “al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat.” 

Sincerely,

Peter Hoekstra

Chairman
iv

109th Congress Union Calendar No 355

2d Session Report 109-615

Mr. Hoekstra, from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

submitted the following report

Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat

REPORT

by the

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

together with ADDITIONAL and minority views

September 6, 2006.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State

of the Union and ordered to be printed

On June 28, 2006, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence approved and adopted

a report entitled “al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat.” The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to 

the Speaker of the House.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 2006
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY 5

UNDERSTANDING THE STRATEGIC THREAT 6

AL-QAEDA 8

THE GROWING INSURGENCY IN IRAQ 12

OTHER SUNNI ISLAMIST EXTREMIST GROUPS 13

HOMEGROWN TERRORISM 16

SUNNI EXTREMIST GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES 19

EXPLOITATION OF THE INTERNET 20

CONCLUSION 21

APPENDIX 1 23

ADDITIONAL and MINORITY VIEWS 27
al-Qaeda

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“The call to wage war against America was made because America has spearheaded the crusade 

against the Islamic nation, sending tens of thousands of its troops to the land of the two Holy 

Mosques over and above its meddling in its affairs and its politics, and its support of the oppressive, 

corrupt and tyrannical regime that is in control. These are the reasons for singling America out as a 

target (August 23, 1996).” 1

“It is a duty for the Umma [nation] with all its categories, men, women and youths, to give 

away themselves, their money, experiences and all types of material support....Jihad today is an 

imperative for every Muslim. The Umma will commit sin if it did not provide adequate material 

support for jihad (April 24, 2006).” 2

“The battles that are going on in the far-flung regions of the Islamic world, such as Chechnya, 

Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Bosnia, they are just the groundwork for the major battles which have 

begun in the heart of the Islamic world....If our intended goal in this age is the establishment of a 

Caliphate in the manner of the Prophet and we expect to establish its state predominantly according 

to how it appears to us in the heart of the Islamic world, then your efforts and sacrifices, God 

permitting, are a large step towards that goal (July 9, 2005).” 3

“As for similar operations taking place in America, it is only a matter of time. They [the terrorists] 

are in the final stages, and you will see them in the heart of your land as soon as the planning is 

complete (January 20, 2006).” 4

Statements made by al-Qaeda leaders Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri

1 Usama bin Laden. “Declaration of War Against the United States,” August 23, 1996.

2 Usama bin Laden. “Bin Laden accuses the West,” April 24, 2006.

3 “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Press Release 3-05, October 11, 2005.

4 Usama bin Laden, “There is No Shame in This Solution,” http://www.jihadunspun.com, January 20, 2006.

The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat

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Summary

Almost five years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States remains a nation at war. 

Al-Qaeda and Islamist extremist terrorist groups with like-minded goals and ideologies remain one of the most 

immediate strategic threats to the national security of the United States. Nonetheless, the threat we face today is 

quite different from the terrorist threat that we faced prior to September 11, 2001. America’s intelligence agencies 

are in agreement that: 

n Al-Qaeda leaders and their terrorist affiliates remain committed to global jihad against the West. 

Currently, this is the single most important terrorist threat to U.S. national security.

n Al-Qaeda’s terrorist campaign has attracted a global support and recruitment network. Despite 

the loss of key lieutenants, Jihad retains its global appeal.

n Al-Qaeda leaders wait patiently for the right opportunity to attack. 

n Al-Qaeda has metastasized its scale of influence by reaching out to like-minded Islamist extremist 

groups and inspiring new groups and individuals to emerge and carry out independent attacks. 

n Iraq has become the front line for the global war on terrorism. Prior to his death in 

June 2006, Abu Musab Zarqawi aligned his group with Al-Qaeda.

n The United States must be concerned about the threat of homegrown terrorism.

n The Islamist extremist threat will continue to grow through the exploitation and use of the Internet. 

The United States has taken positive steps to enhance our national security against the threat of future terrorist 

attacks. However, the threat of terrorism is still very real, and in many ways more alarming than the threat that 

existed prior to September 11, 2001. There are a growing number of groups building the capability to attack the 

United States, our allies, and our interests abroad. The United States must remain vigilant in the face of these threats 

and provide our intelligence, law enforcement and military personnel the necessary legal authorities, resources and 

tools to protect our national security. 

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Understanding the Strategic Threat

Today, the remnants of al-Qaeda and radical Islamist terrorist groups with like-minded goals and ideologies remain 

the single most important threat to the national security of 

the United States. Although al-Qaeda has suffered significant setbacks since 9/11, the organization is constantly 

evolving, and its leaders patiently wait for the right opportunity to direct another attack against the United States. As 

evidenced by Usama bin Laden’s statement from January 

2006, al-Qaeda’s leadership still possesses the desire to carry 

out further attacks. Breaking a fourteen-month silence, bin 

Laden said: 

“As for similar operations taking place in America, it 

is only a matter of time. They [the terrorists] are in the 

final stages, and you will see them in the heart of your 

land as soon as the planning is complete.” 5

The enemy we face today is not the same enemy that attacked 

the United States in 2001. Al-Qaeda has been forced to adapt 

to its changing environment and has relinquished some of its 

operational control to an extended network of like-minded 

terrorist groups to ensure the movement’s longevity. Today, 

the war on terrorism is being fought on multiple fronts. First, 

we are fighting al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization led by 

Usama bin Laden. Usama bin Laden formally declared war 

against the United States in a 1996 letter urging Jihad against 

America. In his 1996 letter, and in subsequent statements, 

Usama bin Laden cites the United States and its allies for their 

military presence in the Middle East, support for Israel and 

the occupation of Iraq as reasons to attack the U.S. His 1998 

statement expanded on the 1996 fatwa to sanction attacks on 

all Americans, including civilians. Usama bin Laden justified 

attacks against the American people because “they are the 

ones who pay the taxes which fund the planes that bomb us 

in Afghanistan, the tanks that strike and destroy our homes 

in Palestine, the armies which occupy our lands in the Arabian Gulf, and the fleets which ensure the blockade of Iraq.” 

He further states, “The American people are the ones who 

employ both their men and their women in the American 

Forces which attack us.” 6

Successful operations against al-Qaeda’s core have created new problems in the sense that al-Qaeda is no longer 

a hierarchical organization run by bin Laden. Rather, the 

terrorist threat has evolved into what some experts refer 

to as “franchised” terrorism. In this new phase, previously 

identified al-Qaeda leaders serve as examples and provide 

ideological rather than organizational and material support 

to terrorist operatives around the world. Al-Qaeda acts as 

an inspiration to groups from Chechnya to the Palestinian 

territories, as well as to individuals in Canada, Australia and 

the United Kingdom that have minimal contact with the 

network. 7

Al-Qaeda’s ability to export its ideology to terrorist organizations around the world has created a second front in the 

war on terrorism. In addition to the central group, “al-Qaeda” has become a network of loosely affiliated individuals 

that subscribe to its ideology, but have little, if any, contact 

with its core leaders and sometimes differ on end goals and 

agendas.8 In Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed 

by Coalition forces on June 8, 2006, declared allegiance to 

bin Laden, al-Qaeda and an extreme interpretation of Islam. 

Although bin Laden and al-Zarqawi’s supporters in Iraq 

have their differences, they share the same end goal and 

are willing to put these disagreements aside as they work to 

create a Muslim state under a new Caliphate.9 Al-Qaeda has 

also benefited from the rise of homegrown terrorist cells in 

Europe and North America, as well as its ability to exploit 

the Internet to increase support among Muslims and other 

sympathizers worldwide. 

We are no longer fighting a war against just al-Qaeda. 

Rather, we are now fighting a war against various entities 

inspired by al-Qaeda and radicalized in various areas around 

the world, including in the United States. Al-Qaeda’s ability to 

recruit large support networks should not be overlooked. As 

long as al-Qaeda can spread its ideology to other groups, the 

movement will continue to grow and threaten to change the 

way the Islamic world is governed. To win the war on terrorism, the United States and our allies will have to not just kill 

and capture key terrorist operatives, but also identify ways 

to discredit the radical ideology that supports these groups. 

Organizations like Jemaah Islamiyah, the Libyan Islamic 

5 Usama bin Laden, “There is No Shame in This Solution,” http://www.jihadunspun.com, January 20, 2006.

6 Usama bin Laden, “Usama bin Laden’s Letter to the America,” Observer Worldview, November 24, 2002.

7 Raymond Whitaker, “Bin Laden Hunt Stepped Up,” Canberra Times, March 22, 2004.

8 Kenneth Katzman, “Al-Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment,” Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2005, pp. 7-8.

9 James Phillips, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2006. The Caliphate is the system of succession in Islam that combined both religion and 

 state under the rule of one Caliph (the term or title for the Islamic leader of the Umma, or community of Islam). The dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey in 1924 by the 

 British signaled the end of the pan-Islamic Caliphate system.
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Fighting Group and the Salafist Group for Preaching and 

Combat have shown willingness to support al-Qaeda’s global 

operations. Although the core element of al-Qaeda is still 

dangerous, it may increasingly look to leverage support from 

affiliates to carry out attacks against the United States. Today, 

al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda associated groups maintain a presence in dozens of countries worldwide, including the United 

States (See Figure 1).

Of particular concern is a relatively new phenomenon—

the rise of homegrown Islamist extremism. In London, Casablanca, Madrid, the Netherlands and elsewhere, homegrown 

terrorist cells comprised of second and third generation radicalized Muslims have proven difficult for authorities to track 

or preempt their activities.10 Such homegrown cells have 

been able to train and prepare in secrecy, escaping detection 

even from the local community. Although the United States 

has not yet seen this phenomenon on the same scale as our 

European allies, the potential for America to face homegrown 

terrorism is real. This threat calls for a more robust, capable, 

and empowered Intelligence Community. 

Islamist extremism, as it is discussed throughout this 

report, refers to the political philosophy that says that, in 

order to defend a carefully defined vision of Islam and 

protect pious Muslims around the world, one has to impose, 

essentially, a 7th century political structure over the people 

of the Islamic world, and that this political structure must 

be implemented by violent Jihad, or Holy War. We are not 

looking at Muslims who practice their faith fundamentally 

—there is nothing wrong with practicing religion in a fundamental way. 11

In preparing this report the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence held numerous hearings (both 

open and closed), briefings and meetings with representatives from the Intelligence Community, academia, and the 

private sector to enable Members and staff to better understand the threat presented by Islamist extremist groups. Due 

to the unclassified nature of this report, the Committee has 

only drawn from publicly available sources. In no way does 

this undermine the threat facing the United States—the 

Committee would reach the same findings and conclusions 

using classified information.

10 Bruce Hoffman, Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, February 16, 2006.

11 Ambassador Francis Taylor, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, “Emerging Threats to Homeland Security,” May 10, 2004.

Map provided by the Investigative Project

Figure 1

Presence of Radical Islamist Cells 1996-2006

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al-Qaeda

AL QAEDA’S ROOTS IN SALAFI ISLAM 

Most Sunni Islamist extremist movements follow a conservative Islamic tradition known as Salafism. Salafism is 

rooted in the belief that the Koran and the teachings of 

the Prophet Muhammad and his companions are the most 

legitimate sources of religious conduct and reasoning, and 

as such should be emulated and put into practice in contemporary Islamic communities. The movement has a long 

and varied history, and there are notable methodological 

differences among today’s Salafis and those we might call 

Salafis from generations past. However, active opposition 

to Western encroachment in the Muslim world remains a 

constant.12

Some contemporary Salafists believe violence is a legitimate means of reasserting control of the world’s Islamic 

community. Salafi Jihadists represent a small percentage of the 

overall Salafi population, but they 

are very influential and al-Qaeda’s 

distorted interpretation of Salafi 

Islam has attracted Muslims from 

around the world.13

Usama bin Laden’s message 

is taken from the Salafi Jihadist 

tradition that calls for a global Islamic state under the control of the 

Muslims and the teachings of the 

Prophet Muhammad. When alQaeda’s message is interpreted in 

light of an extremist’s intentions, 

such words are intended to polarize 

the Islamic world into two clearly 

delineated factions: one that is 

against the West and the other that 

is closely tied to the United States 

and its allies. Usama bin Laden has 

called for a war against the United 

States and the West to remove their 

presence from Muslim territories 

as the first step to restoring the Muslim Caliphate, ruled by 

one Caliph (See Figure 2).14 Bin Laden urged Muslims to 

find a leader to unite them and establish a “pious Caliphate” 

that would be governed by Islamic law and follow Islamic 

principles of finance and social conduct.15 Bin Laden 

repeatedly argued that Afghanistan had become a model 

Islamic state under his Taliban hosts and used religious 

rhetoric to solicit support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda.16

A NEW GENERATION OF AL-QAEDA OPERATIVES

Al-Qaeda has suffered significant setbacks since the 

start of the war (See Figure 

3), but the organization is 

extremely resilient and remains a major threat to the 

United States, our allies and 

Figure 2

Bin Ladin’s Notional Caliphate (U//FOUO)

12 “Who Wages Terror and Jihad: Pros and Cons of Frequently Used Terms,” DCI Counterterrorist Center and Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program, May 31, 2005.

13 According to the recent Gallup Organization World Poll, only 8% of Muslims consider themselves to be militant or sympathetic to militant activity. 

14 Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2002.

15 “Pakistan Interviews Usama Bin Laden,” (Islamabad, Pakistan), Mar. 18, 1997; see also CRS Report RL32759, Al-Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology by Christopher M. 

 Blanchard, p. 3.

16 “Website Publishes Bin Laden ‘Speech’” Internet Supporters of Shariah, June 22, 2000; and “Al Jazirah Program on Bin Laden” Al Jazirah Television (Doha, Qatar), June 10, 1999.

Open Source Center

Photo provided by the National 

Counterterrorism Center
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U.S. interests abroad. Although Coalition forces have killed 

or captured several of al-Qaeda’s top leaders, these vacancies 

have been filled by a new generation of extremists. Most of 

these new leaders have obscure backgrounds, and the Intelligence Community lacks knowledge about their particular 

methods of operating. As a result, our understanding of the 

evolving network is incomplete. There are concerns that we 

could see a new-generation of terrorists that are more willing than their predecessors to act autonomously. They may 

also look to capitalize on experience gained in Afghanistan 

and Iraq to lead subsequent attacks against the United 

States and our interests abroad. In addition, al-Qaeda’s core 

elements, including Usama bin Laden and his key deputy 

Ayman al-Zawahiri, continue to elude capture and claims to 

prepare terrorist strikes against the West.17

Al-Qaeda understands the importance another attack 

on the United States would mean for its movement. The 

importance of such a strike cannot be overstated. For Islamist 

extremist groups, 9/11 was the “shot heard around the world.” 

Al-Qaeda looks to capitalize on this attack to further undermine and challenge western ideals and the 

United States position as a world power. In 

addition, successful attacks against Western 

countries aid its recruiting and ensure financial support by keeping al-Qaeda’s message 

relevant and in the news. Al-Qaeda uses 

these attacks in its propaganda to show disempowered and rudderless youth throughout the Middle East that they too can strike 

a powerful blow for the global Jihad. 

A weakened al-Qaeda still presents a 

greater threat to our security than most 

other terrorist groups. Its remaining members still has the ability to reach the United 

States and Europe and has repeatedly 

demonstrated the capacity to recruit on a 

global scale.18

DISRUPTED AL-QAEDA PLOTS

Although there has not been a successful 

al-Qaeda attack in the United States since 

2001, there is corroborated information that 

al-Qaeda continues to plan attacks, in particular against the 

U.S. homeland. On October 6, 2005, President Bush reported 

that the United States has helped disrupt ten al-Qaeda attacks 

since 2001, including three attacks against targets inside the 

United States.19 One of the disrupted plots was devised by 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), the mastermind of the 

9/11 attacks. KSM’s plan involved flying a hijacked plane 

into a target in California.20 Interrogations of KSM in July 

2003 indicate that there were at least two potential attackers: 

Abderraouf Jdey (a.k.a Faruq al-Tunisi) and Zaini Zakaria 

(a.k.a Mussa). This plot most likely was part of KSM’s plan to 

carry out a “second wave” of attacks after September 11, 2001. 

The Committee is aware of other credible plans by al-Qaeda 

members to attack the United States, but cannot discuss these 

plans in an unclassified report. 

The disruption of these plots, the President reminded 

America, “means the enemy is wounded, but the enemy 

is still capable of global operations.”21 Where the American public tends to have a relatively short time horizon 

and want results right away, al-Qaeda has never lacked 

Figure 3

Key al-Qaeda Members Killed or Captured since September 11, 2001

Coalition forces have killed or captured hundreds of al-Qaeda members 

and associates. This list represents some of al-Qaeda’s key operatives 

who can no longer participate in terrorism. 

Captured

Abu Faraj al-Libi—Senior Operational Manager

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad—Senior al-Qaeda External Operations Chief

Riduan bin Isomuddin—Senior al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Planner

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri—Al-Qaeda Operational Chief for Arabian Peninsula

Issa al-Hindi—Western al-Qaeda Operative

Abu Bakr al-Azdi—Al-Qaeda Operational Planner and Saudi Arabian Cell Leader

Abu Zubaydah—Al-Qaeda-associate Logistics Coordinator

Sharif al-Masri—Facilitator and Operational Manager

Mustafa Setmariam Nasar—Jihadist theorist

Killed

Muhammad Atef—Al-Qaeda Deputy

Hamza Rabia—Senior al-Qaeda External Operations Chief

Abu Hajir al-Najdi—Senior Operations Planner in the Persian Gulf

Yusif al-Uyayri—Facilitator and propagandist in Saudi Arabia

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq

17 Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” Statement before the Senate Select Committee on 

 Intelligence, February 2, 2006.

18 James Phillips, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2006.

19 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy,” October 6, 2005.

20 Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, “Bush says 10 Plots by al-Qaeda Were Foiled,” Washington Post, October 7, 2005.

21 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy,” October 6, 2005.
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patience in both the operational 

planning and execution of its 

attacks. Recall, for example, that 

the first, moderately successful 

al-Qaeda-associated attack against 

the World Trade Center (WTC) 

occurred in 1993. Rather than an 

immediate second attempt, al-Qaeda waited almost a decade before 

striking the U.S. homeland again. 

Even after Khalid Sheik Mohammed formulated the plan in 1998, 

al-Qaeda leaders were willing to wait patiently as operatives 

received the necessary training and resources. The United 

States cannot afford to assume that the absence of another 

terrorist act means al-Qaeda has lost either the will or the 

ability to attack—terrorist operatives might simply be in the 

planning phase of their next strike. 

Al-QAEDA PLANS FOR A “SPECTACULAR” ATTACK

So long as al-Qaeda is capable of hitting the United States, 

it may look to carry out another “spectacular” attack of 9/11 

proportions. Past threat alerts suggest al-Qaeda may favor 

attacks that meet certain criteria, including high symbolic 

value, mass casualties, severe damage to the U.S. economy 

and maximum psychological trauma.22 However, a battered and weakened al-Qaeda, new counterterrorism laws, 

and heightened security at our borders and ports of entry 

have made it more difficult for al-Qaeda’s core elements to 

carry out a large-scale attack. As a result, there are ongoing 

discussions of what al-Qaeda’s leadership considers “spectacular.” Today, target vulnerability and likelihood of success 

may be as important to al-Qaeda as the target’s prominence.23 Major subway systems, nuclear plants, and national 

landmarks could be attractive targets if they are perceived 

as “soft.” Regardless of the target, any plan by al-Qaeda will 

look to achieve at least one of the following: mass casualties, 

damage to the U.S. economy and maximum psychological 

trauma on the American public. 

If for nothing else, another attack against the United 

States or our allies would help the group to recruit new 

supporters. Islamist extremist groups use terrorist attacks to 

propagate the organization’s ideology among its supporters 

and potential recruits. If al-Qaeda can no longer effectively 

recruit supporters from around the world, it will cease to 

exist as the dangerous network that we know today. 

AL-QAEDA’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS 

OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Any successful attack with weapons of mass destruction 

(chemical, biological, or nuclear) would, in addition to 

causing mass casualties, have an impact on both the U.S. 

psyche and the U.S. economy. As an example, the still 

unsolved anthrax attacks that occurred in the wake of 9/11 

produced only a limited number of deaths, but disrupted 

mail and sowed fear throughout the country. 

The Intelligence Community continues to be concerned 

about al-Qaeda’s efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In a December 1998 interview with Time, Usama bin 

Laden was asked whether he, as the U.S. had alleged, was 

attempting to obtain chemical or nuclear weapons. In his 

response he stated: 

“Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a 

religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And 

if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a 

duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to possess the 

weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.”24

There is a detailed public record of al-Qaeda’s interest in 

obtaining chemical and biological weapons. According to the 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, al-Qaeda sought 

to obtain nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and 

“remains interested in using a radiological dispersal or dirty 

bomb, a conventional explosive designed to spread radioactive material.”25 In addition, in 2004, then-Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet warned Congress 

that “al-Qaeda’s effort to produce deadly anthrax is one of the 

most immediate terrorist threats.”26 There is little doubt that 

if Usama bin Laden were successful in acquiring WMD, he 

would use these weapons against the West. 

22 FBI Director Robert Mueller, “War on Terrorism,” Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 11, 2003.

23 FBI Director Robert Mueller, “War on Terrorism,” Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 11, 2003.

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Wrath of God: Osama bin Laden Lashes Out Against the West,” Time, January 11, 1999.

25 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Twelth Public Hearing, June 16, 2004. 

26 Director of the CIA George Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 2004.

Associated Press
11 R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6

AL-QAEDA’S METHODS OF RAISING MONEY

Prior to September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda built a vast, sophisticated and elusive network to raise money to support itself, 

terrorist operations and its supporters around the world. 

Trailing Usama bin Laden’s funds was complicated and alQaeda was able to move money around the world without 

compromising its security and secrecy. One reason it was 

so difficult to track terrorist finances was because Usama 

bin Laden preferred not to operate with banks that charged 

interest since usury is prohibited by the Koran. Al-Qaeda 

did, however, use banks that operate according to Islamic 

principles, such as the Dubai Islamic Bank in the United 

Arab Emirates (it was not until after September 11, 2001 

that the United Arab Emirates enforced tighter restrictions 

on its banking system). In addition, al-Qaeda relies on 

couriers and the venerable hawala system of interlocking 

money changers—it would not be uncommon for money to 

switch hands several times before the delivery reached its 

final destination.27 The result was a layered system that kept 

the United States in the dark, unable to determine how, and 

more importantly to whom, al-Qaeda was providing funds. 

The CIA estimates that al-Qaeda spent about $30 million a year to sustain its activities.28 Contrary to popular 

belief, Usama bin Laden did not use his personal wealth 

that he inherited from the Bin Laden construction company 

when his father passed away. Instead, al-Qaeda’s activities 

were supported largely through various fundraising efforts 

worldwide, including contributions from mosques, nongovernmental organizations, the Internet, wealthy donors 

and charitable foundations. 

It is difficult to determine how much funding has been 

channeled from the United States to al-Qaeda. Members of 

the Intelligence Community have reported, and we have no 

reason to believe otherwise, that al-Qaeda has not used the 

United States as a primary source of its funding. Still, intelligence experts agree that the funding to al-Qaeda amounts 

to much less than is raised by other terrorist groups, such as 

Hamas and Hezbollah.29 We will look at some U.S.-based 

charities with links to al-Qaeda later in this report. 

Figure 4

al-Qaeda Financing 2004-2006

27 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, The Free Press, 2001, p. 103-104. 

28 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Monographs, “Al-Qaeda’s Means and Methods to Raise, Move, and Use Money,” August 21, 2004.

29 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Monographs, “Al-Qaeda’s Means and Methods to Raise, Move, and Use Money.” August 21, 2004.

Map provided by the Investigative Project
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Since September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda’s fundraising network has been damaged by new laws and increased efforts 

to disrupt the international terror finance network. However, terrorism does not require a huge sum of money. The 

estimated cost of the bomb used to attack the World Trade 

Center in 1993 was $3,000. This attack killed six people, 

injured a thousand more, and caused more than a half a 

billion dollars in damage. Further, estimates suggest the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 cost somewhere from 

$200,000 to $500,000.30 This amount of money can easily be 

raised from al-Qaeda supporters and sympathizers around 

the world (See Figure 4 on page 11). 

The Growing Insurgency in Iraq

THE FIGHT FOR IRAQ

In 1998, Usama bin Laden laid out his reasons for formally 

declaring war against the United States. In addition to the 

United States’ continued support for Israel, bin Laden said: 

“for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, 

the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its 

neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into 

a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring 

Muslim peoples.”31 

In subsequent statements, Usama bin Laden repeatedly returns to the issue of America’s military presence in Muslim 

countries. These statements suggest al-Qaeda feels obligated 

to confront Western forces present in the region. Al-Qaeda 

also felt compelled to engage the 200,000 coalition forces 

entering Iraq, which it considers part of the sacred Muslim 

world. Usama bin Laden said, “terrorizing you, while you 

are carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally 

demanded duty.”32 Al-Qaeda views a ground war in Iraq, 

similar to the Jihad in Afghanistan in the early 1980’s, as a 

critical opportunity to drive Western forces from the region. 

In his July 2005 letter to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 

Ayman al-Zawahiri discussed al-Qaeda’s goals in Iraq, 

which he believed could be accomplished in four stages. 

First, expel the Americans from Iraq. Second, establish an 

Islamic authority, then develop it and support it until it 

achieves the level of a Caliphate-over as much territory as 

you can to spread its power in Iraq. Third, extend the jihad 

wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq. And finally, 

eliminate Israel and the possibility that an Israeli state 

would challenge any new Islamic entity.33

If Islamist extremist groups are successful in preventing a legitimate government from flourishing in Iraq, the 

country could become a permanent base for al-Qaeda to 

recruit, train and conduct operations against non-Islamic 

governments in the region, and eventually the United 

States. It would be seen as a tremendous success for Islamist 

extremist groups and boost terrorists ability to recruit new 

members far beyond the current rate. 

ABU MUSAB al-ZARQAWI’S TERRORIST NETWORK

In December 2004, Usama 

bin Laden named Abu Musab 

al-Zarqawi as emir in charge 

of al-Qaeda operations in 

Iraq.34 Zarqawi rose from 

the ranks of mediocrity to 

become the most dangerous 

terrorist in Iraq, and subsequently the leader of Tawhid 

and Jihad (Monotheism and 

Holy War) in Iraq. Zarqawi’s 

group is responsible for a number of attacks against Westerners in Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed on June 7, 2006 

by Coalition forces. This is a tremendous success story for 

Coalition forces. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a committed 

terrorist, who was planning further attacks against innocent 

Iraqis, as well as Western civilians. However, Zarqawi’s death 

will not affect the long term fight in which we are involved. In 

fact, it did not take al-Qaeda in Iraq much time to name Abu 

Hamza al-Muhajir as al-Zarqawi’s replacement. 

Although Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Usama bin Laden 

shared a similar ideology, the two differed on how to remove U.S. and Western influence from Muslim territories 

and restore a Caliphate in the region. In September 2005, 

30 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, The Free Press, 2001, p. 104. 

31 Usama bin Laden. “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” February 23, 1998. 

32 Usama bin Laden. “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” August 1996. 

33 Ayman al-Zawahiri. “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” Reprinted by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, October 11, 2005. 

34 Usama bin Laden, Audio Tape, December 2005. 
13 R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6

Zarqawi declared an all out war on Shia Muslims in Iraq, 

and is believed to be responsible for masterminding suicide 

attacks targeting Shias across Iraq. This drew criticism from 

core al-Qaeda officials and other Sunni Muslims. In his 

July 2005 letter, Usama bin Laden’s chief lieutenant Ayman 

al-Zawahiri warned al-Zarqawi that his actions were eroding support for al-Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Zawahiri questioned 

whether it was a wise decision to open another front, especially with over 100 al-Qaeda personnel being held by the 

Iranians, who are predominantly Shia. 

Although he declared an all out war against Shia Muslims in Iraq, al-Zarqawi apparently listened to advice and 

showed a willingness to change some of his tactics to retain 

his stature and influence as the leader in Iraq. Prior to his 

death, Zarqawi apparently directed his supporters to change 

certain tactics to deflect negative press from al-Qaeda and 

other extremist groups. For example, al-Zarqawi created 

a Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) in Iraq to downplay 

al-Qaeda’s role in these attacks and put an Iraqi face on the 

insurgency. In addition, he directed his supporters not to 

indiscriminately attack Shias, but only to target Shia who 

support the Iraqi government. With Zarqawi dead, it is unclear how his followers will treat Shia Muslims in the future. 

Regardless, Usama bin Laden continues to capitalize on 

the popularity of the insurgency in Iraq to muster further 

support for al-Qaeda and the defeat of the Coalition. With 

the loss of its major training camps in Afghanistan the war 

in Iraq became a major rally point and a fertile recruiting 

ground for al-Qaeda.35

In addition, Usama bin Laden may use Islamist extremists 

fighting in Iraq to launch attacks outside of the country. A

memo from bin Laden to Zarqawi in 2005 indicates that bin 

Laden was encouraging Zarqawi and his group to consider 

plotting terrorist attacks in the United States.36 Although 

there is nothing to suggest Zarqawi’s supporters currently are 

preparing attacks within the United States, they eventually 

may look to target the United States, or our interests abroad. 

In August 2005, al-Qaeda supporters claimed responsibility 

for firing three missiles from a Jordanian port that missed a 

U.S. Naval ship in the area. Then, in November 2005, three 

suicide bombers conducted simultaneous attacks in Amman, 

Jordan that left sixty dead. Jordanian officials report that 

Zarqawi’s group in Iraq is responsible for the attacks.37 

THE FOREIGN FIGHTER NETWORK

Besides Zarqawi’s group, al-Qaeda benefits from the support it receives from foreign fighters who have traveled to 

Iraq to destabilize the region and prevent Coalition forces 

from spreading democratic values to Iraq and its neighbors. 

Foreign fighters use Iraq to gain battle experience before 

returning home to conduct terrorist attacks against governments and civilians. They appear to be working to make 

the insurgency in Iraq what Afghanistan was to the earlier 

generation of jihadists—a melting pot for jihadists from 

around the world.38 Unlike the mujahideen who returned 

home from Afghanistan in the 1980’s trained in rural guerilla warfare, the fighters who leave Iraq will have acquired 

first-hand experience in urban warfare—including the use 

of improvised explosive devices. Upon returning home, they 

have the potential to use their knowledge, credibility and 

popularity to recruit and train younger generations to fight 

against the United States and our allies. 

At this time, there is no reason to believe foreign fighters 

are ready to withdraw from Iraq. Iraq continues to provide 

al-Qaeda and its supporters the best opportunity to attack 

the United States and our interests. Although the death of 

Abu Musab Zarqawi represents a huge symbolic victory, the 

insurgency is still very dangerous and terrorist attacks continue. These terrorist groups continue to present a considerable threat to coalition forces, Iraq’s new government and 

neighboring countries.

Other Sunni Islamist Extremist Groups

THE GLOBAL TERRORIST NETWORK

Coalition success in the global war on terrorism has forced 

al-Qaeda’s core elements increasingly to reach out to other 

Sunni Islamist extremist groups for support. Historically, 

these “other” groups have focused their efforts against local 

targets, but there is growing evidence that these groups are 

more willing to work with bin Laden. This is especially true 

when working with al-Qaeda serves their own particular interests. Some of these groups have received training, weapons and funding from al-Qaeda.39 Others have received 

35 James Phillips, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2006.

36 Bret Baier and Nick Simeone, “Officials: Bin Laden Urges Zarqawi to Hit U.S.,” www.foxnews.com, March 1, 2005.

37 James Phillips, “Zarqawi’s Amman Bombings: Jordan’s 9/11,” The Heritage Foundation, November 18, 2005.

38 State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2004,” April 2005, p.7. 

39 James Phillips, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2006.
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only ideological inspiration while remaining organizationally and operationally distinct. Although these groups pose 

less danger to the U.S. homeland than al-Qaeda’s core elements, they are increasingly a threat to our interests abroad. 

Such groups also could look for an opportunity to attack 

the United States in the future.40 Even if Usama bin Laden 

is captured or killed tomorrow, Sunni extremist groups may 

seek to attack U.S. interests for decades to come.41

Open source information has identified at least nineteen 

Sunni extremist organizations that both share al-Qaeda’s 

ideology and have the capability to reach the United States 

and our interests overseas.42 However, the likelihood that all 

nineteen groups will look to carry out independent attacks 

against the United States is believed to be low. It is likely 

that most of these groups will continue to focus their 

efforts on launching attacks in their respective regions. 

There are, nonetheless, certain groups the Intelligence Community monitors with increasing scrutiny because they have 

demonstrated the capacity to carry out successful terrorist 

attacks. This list is not exclusive of other Sunni extremist 

groups, such as Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. We 

offer this list as an example to show the public how certain 

groups that were “off the radar screen” of many intelligence 

analysts just a few years ago have become more dangerous 

under the influence of al-Qaeda’s ideology. 

JEMAAH ISLAMIYA 

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a Southeast Asia-based radical 

Islamist group that began plotting violent attacks against 

regional targets in the 1990s. JI’s stated goal is a pan-Islamic state across much of the region. JI is not a stranger 

to violence, and has shown the willingness to inflict mass 

casualties against innocent civilians and those it believes 

to be allied with Western interests.43 JI is responsible for 

recent attacks in Indonesia, including the Bali bombing in 

2002 that killed 202 people and wounded some 300 others, 

the J.W. Marriott bombing in 2003, the 2004 bombing of 

the Australian Embassy and the second attack on Bali in 

2005. In addition, we know through information received 

from Khalid Sheikh Mohammad that JI operatives were 

supporting al-Qaeda attacks against U.S. interests after 9/11, 

including plans to attack sites in California using a hijacked 

plane.44

The Indonesian Government has successfully disrupted 

terrorist operations since the 2002 Bali bombing. Of noteworthy success, Indonesian courts have convicted at least 

100 members of JI or affiliated groups on terrorism charges. 

Indonesian forces killed Azahari bin Husin, JI’s chief 

bomb-maker. In addition, JI operations chief Hambali, was 

arrested in Thailand in 2003. Hambali is tied to several of 

the major attacks, and was thought to be Jemaah Islamiyah’s 

main link to al-Qaeda.45

The death of JI’s chief bomb-maker and arrest of Hambali 

are major breakthroughs in the battle against terrorism in 

Southeast Asia, but the network is still robust. JI operatives 

Noordin Top, Dulmatin and Umar Patek remain at large 

and have the capability and experience to carry out largescale attacks against U.S. interests in the region.46

Two events have the potential to further escalate JI’s 

militancy in the region and against the United States. First, 

JI’s spiritual leader, Emir Abu Bakar Bashir (also Abubakar 

Ba’asyir), recently was released from prison. Bashir was 

serving thirty-three months for his involvement in the 2002 

Bali bombing. It is unclear what role Bashir will take now 

that he has been released, but in the past he has expressed 

support for bin Laden’s struggle. Bashir once said, “His is 

40 Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” Statement before the Senate Select Committee on 

 Intelligence, February 2, 2006.

41 James Phillips, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2006.

42 “Al-Qaeda,” GlobalSecurity.org

43 “Jemaah Islamiya,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3613.

44 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy,” October 6, 2005.

45 “Hambali Captured,” http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=924.

46 “Jemaah Islamiya,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 3, 2005.

Associated Press
15 R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6

the true struggle to uphold Islam, not terror—the terrorists 

are America and Israel.”47

Second, depending on what takes place in Iraq, al-Qaeda 

members and other terrorist operatives could migrate to 

Indonesia. As the world’s most populous Muslim country, 

Indonesia appears to be an obvious place for al-Qaeda to 

migrate. Indonesians traditionally have practiced a more 

moderate interpretation of Islam, but an increasingly 

militant element has emerged in some local schools. The 

country’s porous maritime borders, weak central government, separatist movements and loosely regulated financial 

system make it a fertile ground for terrorist activities.48 

The threat of a JI attack against U.S. interests is greatest in 

Southeast Asia. In the past, JI assisted al-Qaeda with attacks 

outside Southeast Asia and continues to share al-Qaeda’s 

ideology.49 As was the case with al-Qaeda’s plot to attack the 

United States using JI operatives, some terrorists increasingly are tied to the ideology rather than the group. These 

individuals are willing to support terrorist attacks that 

support their particular beliefs regardless of the affiliation to 

any specific organization. 

LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP

The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in 

the early 1990s among Libyans who fought against Soviet 

forces in Afghanistan. Initially organized to overthrow the 

Qadhafi regime and install a Shari’a-based government, the 

LIFG subsequently has embraced the global jihadist agenda 

of al-Qaeda. Some LIFG members still strictly adhere to the 

original cause (anti Libyan/Qadhafi activities), while others 

have aligned themselves to Bin-Laden causes. Some senior 

members of LIFG are believed to be or have belonged to 

al-Qaeda’s senior command structure. The LIFG itself calls 

upon Muslims inside and outside of Libya to take part in 

what it terms the fight of Islam against its enemies.50 Evidence suggests that the LIFG provided guidance in the planning of the 2003 bombing in Casablanca, Morocco.51 LIFG

maintains a presence in Asia, Africa and Europe, primarily 

in the United Kingdom.52

The LIFG constitutes the most serious threat to potential 

U.S. investment and business in Libya. In addition, LIFG

has called on Muslims everywhere to fight against the U.S. 

in Iraq. In response to this threat, President Bush signed 

Executive Order 13224 freezing the assets of the LIFG in the 

U.S. citing the group as a threat to America’s national security. The LIFG has been added to the terrorism exclusion 

list and in December 2004, the U.S. designated the LIFG as 

a foreign terrorist organization. Most recently, on February 

8, 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated five 

individuals and four entities for their role in financing the 

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The individuals were supporting LIFG’s activities through a sophisticated charitable 

front organization. According to the Department of the 

Treasury, “the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group threatens 

global safety and stability through the use of violence and its 

ideological alliance with al Qaeda and other brutal terrorist 

organizations.”55

SALAFIST GROUP FOR PREACHING AND COMBAT

The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) 

is an extremist group based in Algeria. The organization 

was formally created in 1996 when it broke away from the 

Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which was the primary terrorist organization in Algeria. It has been linked to an external 

network of extremists in Western Europe.56

Some GSPC members favor a global Jihad, and look to 

expand the group’s reach beyond its current area of focus. 

The GSPC issued several communiqués on its website 

threatening foreigners in Algeria and pledged renewed allegiance to al-Qaeda and global Jihad.57 Kamel Bourgass, a 

GSPC member convicted in April 2005 in the United Kingdom (where he already is serving a life sentence for murdering Detective Constable Stephen Oake in 2003) for “conspiracy to cause public nuisance by use of poisons and/or 

47 “Profile: Abu Bakar Bashir,” Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org. June 14, 2006. 

48 Ibid.

49 Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” Statement before the Senate Select Committee on 

 Intelligence, February 2, 2006.

50 Moshe Terdman, “The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),” The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM), Volume 3, Number 2, June 2005.

51 US Department of State, “Libya,” Country Reports on Terrorism, April 2005, p. 89.

52 “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,” Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School, May 11, 2005.

53 Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” Statement before the Senate Select Committee on 

 Intelligence, February 2, 2006.

54 US Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designation Table,” December 2004.

55 The United States Department of Treasury, “Treasury Designates UK-Based Individuals, Entities Financing Al Qaida-Affiliated LIFG,” Press Room, February 8, 2006.

56 “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, December 2005.

57 US Department of State, “Algeria,” Country Reports on Terrorism, April 2005, pp. 58-9.
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explosives,” was connected with London-based GSPC leader 

Abu Doha, a known Jihadist linked with the foiled plot to 

blow up Los Angeles International Airport.58 There also are 

financial links between GSPC cells in Europe and Algeria.59

LASHKAR-E-TAIBA

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) is a Pakistani-based militant group 

seeking a pan-Islamic state in South Asia. Although the 

group is focused primarily on the secession of Jammu and 

Kashmir, an ambitious sect of the group is calling for a 

worldwide Jihad.60 There are several reports that al-Qaeda 

used LET to fill some of its operational gaps after the United 

States successfully targeted al-Qaeda members following 

the attacks on September 11, 2001. The State Department 

annual terrorism report states that a top al Qaeda-associate 

Abu Zubaydah was captured at a Lashkar-e-Taiba safe house 

in March 2002.61

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has made the 

difficult and potentially regime threatening decision to 

support the global war on terrorism. The Pakistani Government has targeted militant Islamic groups and apprehended 

or detained a number of important al-Qaeda supporters. At 

the same time, Pakistan historically has been supportive of 

Kashmiri separatist movements such as LET. There is strong 

popular support for LET’s activity in Jammu and Kashmir.62

This support has provided an opening for LET to continue 

operations in Pakistan. 

Since 9/11, the United States has been concerned about 

the reportedly large number of LET members in the United 

States and Canada. In 2003, U.S. officials charged eleven 

men, nine of whom are Americans, with preparing to 

wage Jihad combat overseas on behalf of Lashkar-e-Taiba. 

Muhammad Aatique, one of the eleven men charged, told 

the federal judge hearing the case that he and his co-conspirators may have taken up arms against the United States 

had they not been arrested.63 In addition, Canadian officials 

arrested Raja Ghulam Mustafa, a Pakistani national and 

suspected LET captain with links to al-Qaeda and Usama 

bin Laden.64 Still, the Intelligence Community lacks a clear 

understanding of the group’s activities in the United States. 

Homegrown Terrorism

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 

Responses to Terrorism (START), a University of Maryland 

database that contains information on worldwide terror 

incidents since 1970, reports that one of every seven terrorist attacks is carried out by a homegrown extremist.65 The 

July 2005 bombings in London support this trend, and may 

provide further insight into the future of terrorist activities. These terrorists were homegrown, born or raised in the 

United Kingdom. Although their ties to al-Qaeda remain 

unclear, they were willing to conduct attacks to support alQaeda’s global jihad. 

London is not the only place where homegrown terrorists 

have carried out attacks against innocent people. In 2004, 

the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh brought 

this issue to the forefront. Van Gogh was murdered by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch citizen of Moroccan decent, who 

belonged to the Hofstad Group, a radical extremist group 

made up of mainly Dutch citizens of North African decent. 

Attacks in Casablanca, Morocco and Madrid, Spain were 

Next-Generation Jihadist: A Case Study

Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, aka Abu Musab al-Suri, is a Syrian 

native who fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan 

He later became an acquaintance of Usama bin Laden, but 

remained an independent minded ideologue. Nasar spent several 

years living in Europe and is believed to be the architect for 

terrorist cells operating in Europe. After September 11, 2001, 

Nasar called for a “third generation” of Salafi Jihadists—one 

that works primarily on its own with guidance from roving 

operatives acting on behalf of the broader movement. Nasar 

published thousands of pages on the Internet, using lessons 

learned from past conflicts, on how small independent groups 

of Islamist extremists can effectively conduct operations against 

the West. He authored a 1,600-page document titled, “The 

Call for a Global Islamic Resistance,” which was posted on the 

Internet and is believed to be used by some terrorist groups 

worldwide.

58 “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, December 2005.

59 US Department of State, “Algeria,” Country Reports on Terrorism, April 2005, pp. 57-58. 

60 “Kashmir Militant Extremists,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 2005.

61 U.S. Department of State Global Pattern of Terrorism 2002, April 30, 2003.

62 “Lashkar-e-Taiba,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, March 10, 2006.

63 Jerry Markon and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Indictment Expands “VA. Jihad” Charge,” Washington Post, September 26, 2003. 

64 Sarah Kennedy, “Anti-terror Bust Targets T.O. Home,” The Calgary Sun, March 31, 2006.

65 Statistic provided by the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START), Gary LaFree, www.start.umd.edu/.
17 R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6

also the work of homegrown terrorist cells. On November 4, 

2005, Pakistani security forces captured Mustafa Setmariam 

Nasar (aka Abu Musab al-Suri), a jihadist theorist suspected 

of planning the 2004 and 2005 bombings in Madrid and 

London. Whether it is an individual assassination or a large 

scale attack, both represent religious-inspired terrorism as 

propounded by al-Qaeda since the late 20th Century.66

The presence of “homegrown” Islamist extremist cells 

in Europe is of particular concern to the United States. 

Most Western European countries participate in the Visa 

Waiver Program, which allows citizens of those countries to 

visit the United States without a visa. There is concern that 

Islamist extremists who have citizenship in these countries 

could now gain entry to the United States with relative ease. 

Recent events demonstrate that Europe is not the only 

location where Islamic militants can establish themselves. 

There are legitimate concerns about the terrorist threats 

orchestrated by cells in Mexico or Canada, countries with 

whom we share some 5,000 miles of border. For many 

reasons, security along the border with Mexico has been 

a primary focus. However, the border to the north, which 

in many places is porous and unattended, must also be addressed. Disturbingly little attention has been paid to this 

3,100 mile border despite the fact that terrorist groups have 

made previous attempts to enter the United States from 

Canada (the Millennium Plot). A Customs and Border Protection spokeswoman recently stated that “fewer than ten 

percent—approximately 1,000—of the nation’s border patrol 

agents are deployed to the Canadian border.”67

On June 4, 2006, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

arrested 17 Canadian suspects on terror charges. The group, 

which ranged in age from 19-43, is charged with purchasing three tons of ammonium nitrate for the manufacture of 

bombs to attack Canadian government buildings. The group 

also appears to have links with Islamic militants in the 

United States. The people involved seem to meet the criteria 

of the growing homegrown terrorism threat that we in 

America may not be following as closely as we should. The 

individuals arrested by the Canadian police are educated, 

come from well-established families and have no criminal 

record—there is nothing in their past to draw the attention of law enforcement officials. This group met in relative 

anonymity and was able to spread support for violent Jihad. 

The fact that it was able to do so is a fundamental national 

security threat. 

Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was killed by Mohammed Bouyeri, 

who is a member of a radical terrorist group in the Netherlands 

called the Hofstad Group.

De Telegraaf

Associated Press

On March 11, 2004 devastating terrorist attack in Madrid, Spain 

killed 191 people. 

66 Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat, Report produced by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, The Hague: Netherlands,

 March 2006, p.7. 

67 “Homegrown Terrorists Under Close Watch in the U.S.” Associated Press, June 22, 2006. 
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The Dutch intelligence agency, AIVD, recently conducted 

a study that found certain Muslim youth groups in the 

Netherlands are not only receptive to radicalization, but 

perceive violent Jihad as positive and “cool.”68 The study 

found several factors associated with the radicalization of 

Muslims. First, Western nations have struggled with only 

limited success to integrate Muslim immigrant communities into the rest of society. This lack of integration leaves 

some Muslims feeling disenfranchised and alienated from 

Western society. This is particularly true among second 

and third generation Muslims in Europe who feel discriminated against and rarely leave their Muslim enclaves. The 

international community is also seeing a Muslim youth that 

is becoming keenly aware of his heritage and is equally interested in Muslim affairs globally. The increasing use of the 

Internet allows Muslim youth to communicate with other 

Muslims worldwide. They see what is happening to fellow 

Muslims in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq and are 

angry and frustrated at what they consider to be Western 

policies toward Muslims. Usama bin Laden continually 

speaks along these lines when he says, “Muslims are being 

humiliated, tortured and ruthlessly killed all over the world, 

and its time to fight these satanic forces with the utmost 

strength and power.”69 Islamist extremists have capitalized 

on events like the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal and 

Guantanamo Bay to rally Muslim support against the West. 

Other factors that may lead Muslims to feel a sense of cultural alienation include their social status, lack of employment opportunities and imprisonment. 

It should be noted that homegrown cells aligning their 

beliefs with al-Qaeda or radical Islam are not unique to 

Europe. While the United States has not seen a major attack 

by homegrown terrorists, it does not mean we are immune 

from such an attack. Following the July 2005 bombings in 

London, FBI Director Robert Mueller admitted, “The United States could face attacks from homegrown terrorism very 

similar to bombings in London that killed 52 people and 

wounded another 700.” The plot carried out by four men 

in London may be a “likely model for future U.S. attacks.” 

The bombers, all British citizens, had no criminal records, 

weren’t on any watch lists and had no extremist pasts.70

U.S. prisons and universities continue to be used as 

potential recruitment centers for Islamist extremists. In 

addition, some mosques have been used by extremist 

groups to recruit new members. The radicalization of Islamic inmates in prison is not a recent phenomenon. Prison 

systems throughout the world have been and continue to be 

breeding grounds for radicalism and facilities for the planning and training of radical activities. Concerns regarding 

the radicalization of Muslim inmates were heightened after 

former inmates Richard Reid and Jose Padilla were arrested 

for allegedly attempting to commit terrorist acts against the 

United States. 

In July 2005, law enforcement officials uncovered a 

California-based homegrown Islamic terrorist cell, known 

as Jamiyyat Ul Islam Is Saheeh (JIS). This group was planning attacks against military facilities, religious institutions 

and other facilities in the United States. Kevin James (a.k.a. 

Shakyh Shahaab Murshid), the founder of JIS, recruited 

fellow prison inmates to join JIS. The group preached it was 

the duty of members to target for violent attack any enemies 

of Islam, including the U.S. Government and Jewish and 

non-Jewish supporters of Israel. Upon release from prison, 

JIS members sought to establish cells of JIS members 

outside of prison who were willing to plot terrorist acts and 

commit armed robberies.71 While the group did not actively 

work on behalf of Usama bin Laden, it did swear allegiance 

to al-Qaeda. 

Associated Press

The July 2005 attacks in London killed 52 people. Subsequent 

investigations discover attacks were the work of homegrown terrorists.

68 Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat, Report produced by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, The Hague: Netherlands, 

 March 2006, p.8.

69 Usama bin Laden, “Message to Muslim Youth,” Markaz al-Dawa (Internet), December 13, 2001.

70 Charlotte Sector, “Experts Say Suicide Mission in the U.S. is Inevitable,” ABC News, July 18, 2005.

71 “Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges Related to Conspiracy to Attack Military Facilities, Other Targets,” U.S. Department of Justice, www.usdoj.gov, August 31, 2005. 
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SUNNI EXTREMIST GROUPS 

IN THE UNITED STATES

Sunni extremist organizations that have expressed an interest in attacking the United States have maintained a presence here for years. These groups use America’s openness to 

establish roots in our communities and focus on training, 

recruiting and fundraising, rather then carrying out terrorist attacks. For these groups, the value of fundraising and 

recruiting far outweighs the benefit of an attack. 

Since September 11, 2001, Federal authorities have raided and shut down at least twenty-five charities contributing 

to terrorist activities, including some that served as front 

companies for al-Qaeda.72 For example, on October 13, 

2004, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Islamic 

African Relief Agency (IARA), also known as the Islamic 

American Relief Agency, as a supporter of terrorism. The 

designation froze all accounts, funds and assets of IARA, a 

charity that belongs to a larger network with headquarters 

in the Sudan. According to the Treasury Department, the 

charity funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to Usama 

bin Laden and al-Qaeda. In addition, in 2002 U.S. authorities raided the offices of the Benevolence International 

Foundation (BIF). The Government charged various people 

tied to the organization with trying to obtain chemical and 

nuclear weapons on behalf of al-Qaeda. 

Since the 1980s, terrorist organizations have developed a 

sophisticated and diverse financial infrastructure within the 

United States. It is widely known that almost every terrorist 

organization from Hamas to al-Qaeda has accessed America’s financial resources and institutions to their benefit. 

They have leveraged magazines, mosques and charities as 

front organizations to support terrorist activities overseas. 

Although these groups do not share all the same objectives, they have shown the willingness to work together in 

the United States to raise money for terrorist activities (See 

Figure 5).73

Figure 5

The Terrorist Network in America 1991-2005

Map provided by the Investigative Project

72 “Islamic African Relief Agency,” U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, October 13, 2004. 

73 Richard Clarke, “Testimony before the United States Senate Banking Committee,” October 22, 2003. 
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Terrorists also exploit various venues to raise funds and 

spread their violent message to a wider audience, most 

unwitting of the source. For example, at the 1996 annual 

convention of the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) in 

Chicago, Abdurahman Alamoudi told the audience, “once 

we are here, our mission in this country is to change it. 

There is no way for Muslims to be violent in America, no 

way. We have other means to do it.”74 Alamoudi, who has 

been a guest at the White House on several occasions under 

the Clinton and Bush Administration’s, pleaded guilty to 

smuggling money into the country, as well as to participating in a plot to kill the then-crown prince of Saudi Arabia. 

Not all people who speak at these conventions are radical or 

favor violence against the United States. In fact, extremists 

account for only a very small percentage of the people who 

attend these functions, but the events also attract the worst 

of terrorists. In the past, these Muslim conferences have 

even hosted the likes of Ayman Zawahiri, who is believed 

to have attended a fundraising conference in Santa Clara, 

California for the Egyptian Islamic Jihad sometime after the 

first World Trade Center attack.75 This would have been alZawahiri’s second visit to the United States since 1989. 

Exploitation of the Internet

The art of terrorist strategic communication has evolved to 

a point where the terrorists themselves can now control the 

entire production process.76 In recent years, the Internet 

has become the primary tool used to project their extremist 

message. The increasing use of technology, especially the 

use of the Internet, by Islamist extremist groups has led to a 

new phenomenon known as “glocal” issues, whereas global 

issues are now becoming local issues. Usama bin Laden 

could not have his current, and increasing, level of success 

if Muslims did not believe their faith, brethren, resources, 

and lands to be under attack by the United States and, more 

generally, the West.77 The Internet has helped al-Qaeda 

reach Muslim communities around the world with this very 

message.

The Internet has provided al Qaeda a tool to proselytize its message to an international audience and convince 

Muslim communities that they are being threatened by their 

local government.78 Today, almost all terrorist organizations 

use the Internet in some capacity, and the majority of them 

maintain one or more websites. Easy access, lack of regulation and the ability to shape the message are all too alluring 

for terrorist groups to bypass. 

Terrorist groups increasingly are reliant on the Internet 

to accomplish several of their key objectives. First, the Internet provides a means for terrorists to reach out to a larger 

audience. The Internet allows terrorist groups to communicate not only with their supporters and members, but also 

to influence the opinion of the general public. The Internet 

also provides terrorist groups a new means to spread its 

propaganda and increase publicity. Through propaganda, 

terrorist seek to communicate a particular message to a 

particular audience.79 In certain circumstances we have 

come to learn that terrorists are targeting children as young 

as seven years old, sometimes younger. Young adults of the 

Muslim world rely less on the television, cable, or radio to 

get their news—but exclusively get their information from 

the Internet.80

Terrorist groups will continue to use the Internet to 

shape their image and the image of their enemies. They also 

will use the Internet to raise money for terror activities. In 

the past, terrorists have used their Websites to advertise 

bank account numbers that supporters can send money. 

The Internet is an ideal vehicle for recruitment. Although terrorists have experienced difficulty penetrating the 

United States since 9/11, the ability to recruit new members 

through the Internet poses new challenges for the Intelligence Community and law enforcement officials. Terrorists now can use the Internet to pass along operational 

guidance. Terrorist groups post messages on their websites 

letting potential terrorists know that they do not have to 

travel to other lands to join terrorist organizations or receive training.81 New recruits can now become radicalized 

without leaving the home. 

74 “United States of America v. Abdurahman Muhammad Alamoudi,” United District Court, Eastern District of Maryland (www.findlaw.com), September 30, 2003. 

75 “Egyptian Doctor Emerges as Terror Mastermind,” Profile of Ayman al-Zawahiri, www.cnn.com

76 Bruce Hoffman. “The Use of the Internet by Extremists,” Testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, May 4, 2006.

77 Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, Potomac Books, 2005, p. xi. 

78 Ambassador Francis Taylor, “Emerging Threats to Homeland Security,” May 10, 2004. 

79 Bruce Hoffman. “The Use of the Internet by Extremists,” Testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, May 4, 2006.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.
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Finally, terrorists exploit the Internet for intelligence-gathering and targeting. Today, anyone can go on the Internet and 

collect information against key infrastructure and sensitive 

components. Terrorists use these sites to conduct reconnaissance on potential targets without ever having to put 

feet on the ground to conduct surveillance. During raids in 

Afghanistan, U.S. forces came across computers in the homes 

of known terrorists that held information on important U.S. 

landmarks, such as the Hoover Dam, the New York financial 

sector and government buildings in Washington, D.C. 

Conclusion

We remain a nation at war. The United States is not safe 

simply because we have not seen an attack on U.S. soil since 

September 11, 2001. The loss of key personnel, training 

camps and lines of communication have had a significant 

impact on al-Qaeda’s near-term operational capabilities, 

but the group still remains the single, greatest threat to 

America, our allies and our interests abroad. Al-Qaeda has 

bridged some of these gaps by increasingly reaching out to 

other Sunni extremist organizations, as well as homegrown 

terrorist cells, to support local attacks against the United 

States and our allies. In addition, its ability to exploit the 

Internet has enabled the group to communicate with its 

followers, recruit new supporters and spread its message to 

a wider audience. These groups continue to plan for horrific attacks. The Intelligence Community is fighting a daily 

war against Islamist extremism—this can not be stressed 

enough. Just because terrorists are not conducting attacks 

does not mean they are not recruiting, fundraising, training and planning future attacks. Unfortunately, there are 

still gaps in our understanding of Islamist extremist groups, 

which leaves America vulnerable to future attacks. 

Since the September 11th terrorist attacks there have 

been numerous commissions, reports and studies to identify shortfalls in the Intelligence Community and recommend ways to improve the capabilities and effectiveness for 

all intelligence components to prevent future attacks against 

the United States. Some of the most noteworthy recommendations acted on by the Congress and the Bush Administration include the creation of the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence who serves as head of the Intelligence 

Community and acts as the principal adviser to the President. In addition, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act created the National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC) to integrate all intelligence possessed by the 

United States Government pertaining to terrorism. Finally, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established a 

National Security Branch (NSB) that integrates intelligence 

collection and analysis capabilities addressing the domestic 

terrorist threat. 

These reforms have strengthened America’s stance 

against Islamist extremist terrorist groups, and without 

question we are a safer nation than we were before 9/11. 

However, there are still significant shortfalls within the 

Intelligence Community. 

Recognizing this War is Different—The global war on terrorism is not a war of our choosing. America did not seek 

out this conflict, but it is upon us and must be won. It is a 

new type of war – one where the enemy is not a nation, but 

a movement. Our enemy seeks to inflict massive civilian 

casualties. We must be willing to use force when necessary, and the command and control of our forces much be 

sufficiently nimble to strike when the opportunity presents 

itself. In this war, intelligence and information are as important as military capability. Losing control of information can 

cost American lives.

Understanding Your Enemy—A successful U.S. strategy 

will ultimately depend on our ability to counter the ideological appeal of al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremist 

groups. To be successful, we first need to better understand 

the animosity and arguments that underpin al-Qaeda and 

the wider radical Jihad movement, and the region of the 

world from which its struggle emanated and upon which its 

argument still rests.82 Understanding the Islamist extremist 

ideology will not allow us to influence the terrorists—these 

extremists cannot be reasoned with. We cannot expect to 

win the hearts and minds of those who have already been 

indoctrinated into the jihadist cause. We, however, can look 

to influence younger generations that may be vulnerable to 

recruitment.83 

82 Ibid.

83 Richard Perle, Testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2005. 
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The Central Intelligence Agency created an office in 

September 2004 to look at political Islam and brief senior 

policy makers on the issue, as well as organize academic 

outreach programs around the world. These types of efforts 

are essential to help people better understand the terrorist, 

and how they use religion to justify and rationalize their actions. Still, this is not enough. This one program at the CIA

can only reach a finite number of people. In the years ahead, 

the Committee would like to see the Intelligence Community dedicate additional funding and resources to standing 

up similar offices to help people understand the challenges 

of Islamist extremism. Otherwise, we will continue to make 

the same mistakes. 

Domestically, we need a better understanding of the 

threat posed by homegrown terrorist groups. One of the 

things we have learned from the attacks in the Netherlands, 

Madrid, Casablanca and London is that there is not a “one 

size fits all” reason to answer why these individuals chose 

to adopt this violent form of Islam. The Department of 

Homeland Security should look to address the issue of radicalization, not just among Islamist extremist groups, but all 

terrorism groups within the United States. We need a better 

idea of who is vulnerable, where are people becoming radicalized and to what extent the threat already is ingrained in 

our communities. 

Winning the War of Ideas—The global war on terrorism is 

different than any other war in America’s history. However, 

as in most wars, America has been forced to engage in a 

“War of Ideas” against the enemy. This war against Islamist 

extremism can only be partially won through the military 

force, the rest must be accomplished with soft power, or 

diplomacy. The terrorists understand the importance of 

this tactic and are extremely adept at waging a war of ideas. 

Through the use of the Internet and other means, terrorists have had considerable success in spreading an antiAmerican message throughout the Muslim community. 

Terrorists utilize Internet websites to post comments and 

pictures that will incite their target audience—the younger 

Muslim population. They are distorting the truth to recruit 

new supporters. For the most part, they do this uncontested. America, with the help of our allies, in particular our 

Muslim partners, must increase its efforts to counter these 

anti-Western messages. 

Responding to the Enemy Presence within the United 

States—The Islamic Jihadist war against the West is a war 

without borders. Since 9/11, a number of jihadist cells 

have been identified within the United States, and terrorist 

plots have been thwarted in their initial phase of planning. 

Prudence demands that we remain alert to the very real 

possibility of terrorist attacks on the Homeland. U.S. law 

enforcement authorities must utilize all legal and constitutional tools to aggressively prevent domestic terrorist activity. Successfully combating terrorists or would-be jihadists 

who are already located within the United States will require 

the cooperation of all Americans. It is quite possible that the 

local police or highway patrol may get the first inklings of 

some terrorist activity. As a result, it is also absolutely essential that the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and 

other federal agencies work very closely with state and local 

authorities. The Joint Terrorism Task Forces that have been 

established throughout the country now serve an important 

coordination and communication function. 

The JIS case in California illustrates the importance of 

law enforcement partnerships and cooperation between 

state, local and federal authorities. In this particular case, 

local police officials uncovered critical information that they 

then shared with the FBI, and all levels of law enforcement 

worked together to protect our country from the threat of 

terrorism.84 We should continue to look for creative ways 

to capitalize on the expertise and knowledge of local law 

enforcement.

The Internet—The Internet has become a key enabler for 

Islamist extremist groups to recruit, train, raise money and 

propagate their message. Although the United States has 

done an adequate job of creating venues to reach and influence moderate Muslims with a pro-Western message, these 

same forums have proven ineffective at influencing persons 

who may already have been radicalized by the Internet.85

The Committee impresses upon the United Government 

the need to do a better job in this realm to counter terrorists’ unchallenged use of the Internet. We need to increase 

efforts to challenge the propaganda, distorted truths, messages of hate and calls for violence on the Internet.

84 “Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges Related to Conspiracy to Attack Military Facilities, Other Targets,” U.S. Department of Justice, www.usdoj.gov, August 31, 2005.

85 Bruce Hoffman. “The Use of the Internet by Extremists,” Testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, May 4, 2006.
23 R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6

Appendix 1

al-Qaeda: In Their Own Words

Since Usama bin Laden officially declared jihad on America in his August 23, 1996 message entitled: “Declaration of Jihad Against 

the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques; Expel Heretics from the Arabian Peninsula,” there have been numerous comments made by al-Qaeda leaders outlining their reason for jihad and calling for continued attacks against America 

and our interests abroad. 

Thanks to the help of dedicated analysts at the Open Source Center and the National Counterterrorism Center we have included 

several comments taken from statements released by al-Qaeda. For a better understanding and to put the comment in appropriate 

context, we recommend looking at the full statement. 

“Its [Saudi Government] failure to protect the country, opening it to the nation’s enemy, the 

American crusader forces who have become the main cause of all aspects of our plight (Usama 

bin Laden, Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy 

Mosques, August 23, 1996).”

“Muslims burn with anger at America. For its own good, America should leave [Saudi Arabia.] ... 

There is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land. ... The 

presence of the USA Crusader military forces on land, sea and air of the states of the Islamic Gulf 

is the greatest danger threatening the largest oil reserve in the world (Usama bin Laden, Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, August 23, 

1996).”

“Destruction of the oil industries, because the presence of the crusader and American military 

forces in the Islamic Gulf states, on land, in the air, and at sea, represents the greatest danger and 

harm and the greatest threat to the largest oil reserves in the world. That presence is a provocation 

to the people and an affront to their religion, feelings, and dignity, and has driven them toward 

armed struggle against the occupying invaders (Usama bin Laden, Declaration of Jihad Against 

the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, August 23, 1996).”

“Your brothers in the land of the two holy mosques and Palestine seek your help and ask you to 

participate with them in their jihad against their enemies and yours, the Israelis and the Americans, with everything that would drive them out of the Islamic holy places, defeated, with each of 

you doing what he can (Usama bin Laden, Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying 

the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, August 23, 1996).”
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“We declared jihad against the US government, because the US government is unjust, criminal 

and tyrannical. It has committed acts that are extremely unjust, hideous and criminal whether 

directly or through its support of the Israeli occupation (CNN interview with Osama bin Laden, 

March 1997).”

“For this and other acts of aggression and injustice, we have declared jihad against the US, because 

in our religion it is our duty to make jihad so that God’s word is the one exalted to the heights and 

so that we drive the Americans away from all Muslim countries (CNN interview with Osama bin 

Laden, March 1997).”

“For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of 

places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, 

terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to 

fight the neighboring Muslim peoples (Usama bin Laden, February 22, 1998).”

“All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, his 

messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the 

jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries (Usama bin Laden, Jihad 

against Jews and Crusaders, February 1998).”

“On that basis, and in compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: the 

ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every 

Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa 

Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of 

all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim (Usama bin Laden, Jihad against 

Jews and Crusaders, February 1998).”

“Hostility toward America is a religious duty, and we hope to be rewarded for it by God. To call us 

Enemy No. 1 or 2 does not hurt us. Osama bin Laden is confident that the Islamic nation will carry 

out its duty. I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the legend of the so-called superpower 

that is America (Time interview, December 23, 1998).”
25 R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6

“As for the United States, I tell it and its people these few words: I swear by Almighty God who 

raised the heavens without pillars that neither the United States nor he who lives in the United 

States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel 

armies leave the land of Muhammad, may God’s peace and blessing be upon him (Usama bin 

Laden, Speech following September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Al-Jazirah TV).” 

“Our message to our enemies is this: America and its allies should know that their crimes will not 

go unpunished, God willing. We advise them to hasten to leave Palestine, the Arabian Peninsula, 

Afghanistan, and all Muslim countries, before they lose everything. We addressed some messages 

to America’s allies to stop their involvement in its crusader campaign. The mujahid youths have 

addressed a message to Germany and another to France. If the measures have not been sufficient, 

we are ready, with the help of God, to increase them. As for America, it should expect to be reciprocated for its actions and for the Jews’ use of American weapons to destroy Palestinian homes 

with the residents inside. It should expect to be reciprocated for the Jews’ killing of Muhammad alDurrah and his peers with American weapons. Then, the American people will curse Bush and his 

Administration, while they are alive and after their death, for the grave scores that will be settled. 

God willing, we will continue to target the key sectors of the U.S. economy (Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

October 8, 2002).” 

“America and its allies have become aware of this reality and the earth has trembled under them. 

And they now know that the winds of jihad will wobble their thrones and shake their structures. 

They, therefore, have gathered themselves and formed a union to face the coming enemy: it is 

Islam under the true jihad banner . . . Now that jihad has raised its flag, and the arms of Islam’s 

heroes in Iraq have gotten more powerful, the hearts of the Islamic nation are beating with joy, 

awaiting a hopefully better morning, which will take away the long and heavy darkness of the 

humiliation, by the Jews, the Crusaders and their agents from our renegade leaders (Abu Musab 

al-Zarqawi, October 28, 2004).” 

“This is in addition to our having experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to 

fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the Mujahideen, bled Russia for ten years, until it 

went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat . . . So we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy (Usama bin Laden, November 1, 2004).” 
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“You tried to deny us the decent life, but you cannot deny us a decent death. Refraining from performing jihad, which is sanctioned by our religion, is an appalling sin. The best way of death for us 

is under the shadows of swords. Do not be deluded by your power and modern weapons. Although 

they win some battles, they lose the war. Patience and steadfastness are better than them. What is important is the outcome. We had patiently fought the Soviet Union for 10 years with our few weapons 

and we managed to drain their economy. Thus, they became a history, with God’s help. You should 

learn lessons from that. We will remain patient in fighting you, God willing, until the one whose time 

has come dies first. We will not escape the fight as long as we hold our weapons in our hands (Usama 

bin Laden, January 2006).”

“Look at what the mujahidin did for the Russians in Afghanistan and then in Chechnya. Look 

at what the mujahidin are doing for the Jews in Palestine. Look at what the mujahidin did to the 

Americans in Somalia and what the mujahidin are doing to them in Iraq and Afghanistan today. 

Look at what your 19 brothers did to America—which claimed that it can hear the crawling of 

ants, see what is inside the earth, and monitor its enemies day and night—in both the New York 

and Washington “raids”. Nineteen honest men exposed America’s incompetence and weakness 

(Ayman al-Zawahiri, December 2005).” 

 “I would like to tell you that the war is for you or for us to win. If we win it, it means your defeat 

and disgrace forever as the wind blows in this direction with God’s help. If you win it, you should 

read the history. We are a nation that does not tolerate injustice and seek revenge forever. Days 

and nights will not go by until we take revenge as we did on 11 September, God willing, and until 

your minds are exhausted and your lives become miserable (Usama bin Laden, January 19, 2006).”
27 R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has been a nation at war. Our enemy is not a nation, but a political movement that remains determined to destroy our country and kill as many Americans as possible. 

Followers of Usama bin Laden do not wear uniforms, and seek to remain as inconspicuous as possible until they strike. 

And, despite suggestion to the contrary, our enemy is in many ways a highly sophisticated adversary that utilizes technology and understands our legal system.

Some months ago I began to observe what I felt to be an alarming trend in the media reporting on the Global War on 

Terrorism. Journalists and former political officials have begun in increasing numbers to suggest that our nation is not truly 

at war with terrorism, and that terrorism should more properly be considered a law enforcement matter. Given the absolute 

commitment of al Qaeda and its affiliates to launch new attacks on America, I find this view to be disturbing, dangerous, 

and fundamentally incorrect. The fact that the United States has not been successfully attacked since 9/11 does not mean 

that Usama bin Laden and his followers have surrendered. Quite the opposite, the failure of follow-on attacks reflects our 

success in a very aggressive war against terrorism. Our nation is blessed with outstanding military and intelligence personnel who, empowered with expanded authorities, have taken the battle to the enemy. We have successfully disrupted much 

of al Qaeda’s support structure and eliminated many of their key figures. Despite our successes in the Global War on Terrorism, the enemy remains quite capable of launching additional attacks on the homeland. It is worth repeating -- we remain a 

nation at war.

How then, can the Committee best convey this concern? Preparing an unclassified document that highlights the 

continuing terrorist threat requires a delicate balancing act. While the attached report is based on unclassified sources, 

the data collected by the various elements of the Intelligence Community support its findings. As stipulated by the Rules 

of the House of Representatives, the Committee is routinely apprised of many possible threats to the United States. 

From entities such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC) we 

receive information regarding the plans and actions of terrorists. But to reveal these threats would be to disclose classified information, and could provide our enemy with valuable insights into our collection capabilities. The Intelligence 

Community already has sufficient problems with the unauthorized leaking of classified information, and the Committee 

has no wish to compromise sources and methods of intelligence collection.

As a result, the staff drew upon information that has previously been made public by the Executive branch, and is corroborated by information that we have received in the normal course of our oversight activity. For example, the report 

draws heavily upon information released in the public hearings of the Director of National Intelligence, as well as the 

annual unclassified worldwide threat testimony of former DCIA Goss and DCI Tenet. The National Counterterrorism 

Center has also released important and useful information, including key strategic details such as the captured letter 

from Ayman Al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For information related to domestic terrorist threats, the report 

utilizes the annual testimony of Director Mueller and other senior FBI personnel. The Department of Justice also has released important information regarding cases that they are prosecuting. The Committee also drew upon the Department 

of State publications such as the annual Patterns of Global Terrorism as well as speeches by senior officials from the 

Departments of State and Treasury. Where appropriate, the report cites official reports compiled by key allied partners.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF PETE HOEKSTRA, CHAIRMAN
R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6 28

The Committee conducts regular closed-session intelligence updates, at least on a bi-monthly basis, where Members 

are briefed by NCTC and CTC on the latest information related to the terrorist enemy. The Committee receives annual 

classified testimony on the worldwide threat, a responsibility that Director Negroponte has now assumed. As was the 

practice with his predecessors, DCIA Hayden continues to regularly brief the Committee on terrorist activity. In addition, we receive similar briefings on domestic terrorist threats and radicalization within the U.S. prison system from 

Federal law enforcement officials. The Committee has conducted closed-door hearings on the changing nature of the 

terrorist threat and the presence of domestic terrorism. The Committee also receives daily intelligence reporting, including detailed reporting on terrorist and counterterrorist activity. We receive lengthier intelligence products on specific 

aspects of the threat, as well analyses prepared by the National Intelligence Council. And, in a break with past tradition, 

the Committee has held several public hearings in the 109th Congress, including hearings on the Jihadist use of the 

Internet for strategic communications, and hearings on global threats to U.S. interests in the 21st Century. 

It should also be recognized that Members and staff of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have the privilege to travel to frontline locations in the Global War on Terrorism, where we meet with those exceptional military and 

intelligence officers whose task it is to ensure American security. Each Member of the Committee has traveled to hazardous 

locations and discussed various aspects of the counterterrorism mission. We meet with key liaison partners to solicit the 

views of our allies and to convey messages that support the Executive branch. All of this activity feeds our general understanding of the terrorist threat.

In preparing this report, staff met with various elements of the Intelligence Community, and coordinated closely with 

the NCTC. Meetings were held to elicit the views of outside experts at the RAND Cooperation and other organizations. 

In a number of instances, the report cites press reports of on the record briefings provided by senior government officials. For example, the White House briefed the press on ten terrorist events that had been interdicted prior to execution 

— events the Committee know to be accurate.

Every effort was made to ensure that the report was a bipartisan product. Regardless of party affiliation, interested 

staff with appropriate security clearances were invited to participate in briefings, visits, and inquiries. Drafts were circulated to staff at various stages, and Members were provided with two weeks to review and comment upon the document. 

Minority staff provided valuable input in the drafting phase, and Minority Members offered specific guidance that was 

incorporated into the report. I thank those who offered their constructive observations.

Questions have been raised as to why the Committee should be releasing an unclassified report on a matter upon 

which we all agree. The reason is quite simple — because a significant portion of the American public seems to have 

forgotten that the threat remains. We, as a nation, will be at greater risk if the utter sincerity of our enemy is forgotten.

Pete Hoekstra

Chairman
29 R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6

This paper is not a report of the Committee’s work. It is merely an assemblage of press clippings. It is a product of staff, 

not a bipartisan work product of the full Committee. It does not represent effective congressional oversight.

One of the most critical roles of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is to conduct oversight. In 

overseeing the Intelligence Community (IC), the Committee ensures that intelligence agencies have effective strategies, 

produce results, operate within the law, and make efficient use of the resources at their disposal.

It is clear that al-Qaeda and Islamic extremists pose a serious threat to U.S. national security. The American people do 

not need the House Intelligence Committee to remind them of this fact. But this “threat assessment” adds no new information to the nation’s understanding of the challenges or to the U.S. government’s ability to address them.

A valuable, bipartisan oversight report would be based on hearings and briefings that address the threat of Islamic 

extremism and the capabilities employed by the IC to counter that threat. The Committee could then have issued a report of findings and recommendations that the Director of National Intelligence could use as a road map to improve the 

Community’s performance. 

To better understand the Islamic extremist threat and the Intelligence Community’s collection, analysis, and operational response to that threat, the Committee should evaluate:

I. The Intelligence Community’s efforts to track and disrupt terrorist finance. The Committee must hold hearings on 

the Administration’s terrorist financing programs to assess whether the programs are legal, effective in thwarting

al-Qaeda and other terrorists, and adequately protective of innocent citizens’ privacy rights.

II. The implementation of the NCTC National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel. The Committee should assess the 

execution of directives designed to constrain and detect terrorists’ mobility, including hindering travel facilitators, 

building capacity of partner countries, and improving information-sharing.

III. IC efforts to identify and undermine “homegrown” terrorists. The Community works to identify “homegrown” 

terrorists who can operate under the radar in their home countries, including the United States. The Committee 

should assess the effectiveness of these initiatives, focusing on the collection and analysis of information and on 

collaboration across the U.S. government and with foreign partners.

IV. The value of the President’s Domestic Surveillance Program. The Committee has exercised too little oversight 

of this program to date. While the legality of the program is itself a matter for debate, other issues also merit 

aggressive congressional oversight: Has the program produced results? Are the private communications of 

innocent Americans adequately protected?

V. Intelligence support to counterterrorism initiatives. The Committee should assess the Intelligence Community’s 

support to counterterrorism analysis and operations and offer the IC recommendations for improvement.

VI. The impact of intelligence reforms. The Committee must continue to evaluate the stand-up of the DNI to ensure 

that reforms enhance, rather than complicate, the management of the Intelligence Community as it pertains to 

counterterrorism.

MINORITY VIEWS

on “Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamic Extremist Threat” 

issued by The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6 30

To date, the Committee’s examination of these issues has not been adequate. We urge the Majority to embark upon a 

serious oversight effort. We are eager to join an effort to produce a public report which accurately and seriously reflects 

the bipartisan conclusions we reach.

Jane Harman, Ranking Democrat Alcee L. Hastings

Silvestre Reyes Leonard L. Boswell

Robert E. (Bud) Cramer Anna G. Eshoo

Rush D. Holt C.A. (Dutch) Ruppersberger

John F. Tierney
31 R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE HASTINGS

Though I was present for the debate on this report, I was 

away from the hearing room on Rules Committee business 

when the vote was taken to adopt the report. Had I been 

present for the Committee vote, I would have voted “no.”

Alcee L. Hastings

Member of Congress

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE ESHOO

June 29, 2006

This paper tells us nothing new. It reminds the American 

public that terrorists and religious extremists are a threat. 

The paper offers no constructive recommendations or solutions, nor is it a tool for the Intelligence Community.

Furthermore, as my Minority colleagues have asserted, this 

paper does not reflect the Committee’s work. We are not intelligence analysts. Our job is not to produce threat assessments for the American public, as we cannot be experts on 

all subjects. Our job is to legislate and conduct oversight.

Committee Members and staff have traveled to all corners 

of the globe and met with representatives of every American intelligence agency to ensure that the U.S. intelligence 

apparatus functions effectively. Yet the Majority’s paper fails 

to incorporate information about the Intelligence Community’s capabilities that the Committee has learned in the 

course of its oversight efforts. For example:

n The paper asserts that counterterrorism initiatives and 

improved U.S. border security have made it more difficult for al-Qaeda to attack the United States. To some 

extent, this may be true. But no lessons from the Committee’s oversight of Intelligence Community counterterrorism capabilities are reflected in the paper.

n The paper notes in passing that prison extremism 

represents a security threat. Committee Members and 

staff have held several hearings and briefings with 

the FBI, Bureau of Prisons, and other agencies on the 

threat of prison inmates who become radicalized while 

incarcerated. Yet the paper addresses none of the issues examined by the Committee.

n Simply repeating Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s rhetoric 

provides no insight into the United States’ ability to 

address the insurgency in Iraq. The Committee has 

been repeatedly briefed on terrorist and insurgent activities in Iraq, yet this paper incorporates none of the 

Intelligence Community’s insights about the strength, 

composition, and financing of the insurgency; the 

selection of Zarqawi’s successor; the disputes between 

Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; and 

the extent to which U.S. policy failures and missteps 

– such as the decision to suspend the Geneva Conventions, the policy of endless detention at Guantánamo 

Bay, and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib – have 

contributed to the success of insurgents’ recruiting and 

propaganda.

On a positive note, I am pleased the meeting at which the 

Committee considered this report was held in open session. 

However, the meeting was noticed as a closed session, precluding the public from attending. Measures to improve the 

transparency of the Committee’s business are welcome, but 

they should not stop halfway.

Anna Eshoo

Member of Congress

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF 

REPRESENTATIVE RUPPERSBERGER

June 29, 2006

I concur with the Minority Views submitted by my colleagues.

I would like to emphasize that the best way for this Committee to exercise its oversight responsibilities would be for 

both Majority and Minority Members to agree on a plan of 

action, convene a series of hearings and briefings, and issue 

a joint, bipartisan report that thoroughly analyzes the threat 

and offers concrete recommendations to the Intelligence 

Community.

This report, while interesting, is not the product of a 

thoughtful, bipartisan, collaborative effort.

C.A. (Dutch) Ruppersberger

Member of Congress
R e p o rt o f t h e H o u s e P e r m a n e n t S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e o n I n t e l l i g e n c e • J u n e 2 0 0 6 32

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE TIERNEY

June 29, 2006

I agree with the views expressed by my Minority colleagues, 

but I wish to add the following additional thoughts.

First, the Majority made very clear to the Committee that its 

purpose in drafting this report is to remind the American 

public that Islamic extremists and terrorists continue to 

pose a threat to our security. But to repeat platitudes that 

“the United States must remain vigilant” or that “we remain 

a nation at war” is to oversimplify the issue. The Majority 

makes it appear as if the Committee is panicked that the 

United States will be overcome by a global wave of Islamic 

extremism, that Iraq will become a terrorist safe haven, or 

that Osama bin Laden is on the verge of acquiring weapons 

of mass destruction. The real threat is indeed significant but 

it is our charge to lead a rational, realistic response – not to 

lead into panic.

Second, the paper offers far too many conclusions based 

on an unsophisticated analysis of the facts; in some cases, 

information presented is simply incorrect. In the section on 

“The Growing Insurgency in Iraq,” for example, the majority 

demonstrates a shallow understanding of the relationship 

between Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

n The Majority states that while Osama bin Laden and 

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi “shared a similar ideology,” 

they had “some differences.” In fact, they had major 

differences. Bin Laden focused on the “far enemy” (the 

United States), while Zarqawi’s attention was fixed 

on the “near enemy” (infidels in Iraq and those who 

collaborated with the U.S.-installed government). Bin 

Laden also objected to Zarqawi’s targeting of Shi’ites, 

and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, strongly criticized 

Zarqawi’s gruesome beheadings of Westerners.

n The Majority presents Osama bin Laden and Abu 

Musab al-Zarqawi as fast partners. Yet bin Laden only 

jumped on the bandwagon in Iraq when he realized 

that Zarqawi was having a direct, violent impact on the 

United States for which he would not receive credit.

The same section exhibits an incomplete and unimaginative 

analysis of the insurgency in Iraq.

n The Majority describes the threat posed by battle-hardened foreign jihadis who gain combat experience in 

Iraq, but it fails to note that foreign fighters represent 

a small percentage of the insurgents fighting Coalition 

forces in Iraq. Furthermore, while these foreign fighters might use their training to fight against the United 

States, as the paper asserts, they are more likely to turn 

their vitriol against regional governments which they 

view as insufficiently Islamic. 

n The Majority proposes that extremists could prevent 

the emergence of a successful democratic government 

in Iraq and turn the country into “a permanent base 

for al-Qaeda to recruit, train, and conduct operations.” But not all Members of the Committee are such 

Cassandras. Ordinary Iraqis may eventually tire of the 

chaos caused by Islamists and foreign fighters and turn 

against them, as has already happened in parts of western Iraq. The ultimate end state may lie somewhere in 

between these two outcomes, yet the paper fails even to 

consider the more optimistic scenarios.

Finally, the paper demonstrates that the Majority’s views 

of the terrorist threat is out of touch with the perspective of 

mainstream national security experts. The Majority asserts 

in its paper, for example, that the reorganization of the 

Intelligence Community has “without question” made the 

nation more secure; yet in a recent survey (dubbed “the Terrorism Index) published by Foreign Policy magazine, more 

than half of 100 highly respected national security experts 

said that “creating the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence has had no positive impact in the war against 

terror.” Perhaps the Committee should consult some of 

these leading experts to develop a more realistic assessment.

In the course of our oversight work, this Committee has 

developed a sophisticated appreciation of the nature of the 

Islamic extremist threat and the Intelligence Community’s 

considerable abilities to address it; neither are effectively 

characterized in this report.

John Tierney

Member of Congress

al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat

Report of the House Permanent Select Commit tee on Intelligence

9 780160 768972

9 0 0 0 0

ISBN 0-16-076897-7