65148 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 215 / Tuesday, November 7, 2006 / Notices 

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, 

South Carolina Public Service 

Authority, Docket No. 50–395, Virgil C. 

Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, 

Fairfield County, South Carolina 

Date of application for amendment: 

November 15, 2005, as supplemented 

May 31, August 31, and September 29, 

2006. 

Brief description of amendment: The 

amendment revises the Virgil C. 

Summer Nuclear Station Technical 

Specifications (TS) 3/4.3 for the reactor 

trip instrumentation and the engineered 

safety feature actuation system 

instrumentation to implement the 

allowed outage time and bypass test 

time changes approved in WCAP–

14333–P–A, Revision 1, ‘‘Probabilistic 

Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS 

Test Times and Completion Times,’’ and 

makes several additional changes to TS 

outside of the scope of WCAP–14333. 

Date of issuance: October 24, 2006. 

Effective date: As of the date of 

issuance and shall be implemented 

within 60 days. 

Amendment No. 177. 

Renewed Facility Operating License 

No. NPF–12: Amendment revises the 

Technical Specifications. 

Date of initial notice in Federal 

Register: December 20, 2005 (70 FR 

75496). 

The supplemental letters provided 

clarifying information that was within 

the scope of the initial notice and did 

not change the initial proposed no 

significant hazards consideration. The 

Commission’s related evaluation of the 

amendment is contained in a Safety 

Evaluation dated October 24, 2006. 

No significant hazards consideration 

comments received: No. 

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. 

50–259 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, 

Unit 1, Limestone County, Alabama 

Date of application for amendment: 

November 10, 2003 (TS–430), as 

supplemented by letter dated November 

8, 2004. 

Brief description of amendment: The 

amendment incorporates the necessary 

Technical Specification (TS) changes for 

the planned replacement of the power 

range monitoring portion of the existing 

Neutron Monitoring System with a 

digital upgrade. These changes expand 

the current allowable operating domain 

to the Maximum Extended Load Line 

Limit region of the power/flow chart. 

Date of issuance: September 27, 2006. 

Effective date: Date of issuance, to be 

implemented within 30 days. 

Amendment No.: 262. 

Facility Operating License No. DPR–

33: Amendment revised the TSs. 

Date of initial notice in Federal 

Register: February 3, 2004 (69 FR 

5208). The November 8, 2004, 

supplement, contained clarifying 

information and did not change the NRC 

staff’s initial proposed finding of no 

significant hazards consideration 

determination. 

The Commission’s related evaluation 

of the amendment is contained in a 

Safety Evaluation dated September 27, 

2006. 

No significant hazards consideration 

comments received: No. 

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket 

Nos. 50–327 and 50–328, Sequoyah 

Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton 

County, Tennessee 

Date of application for amendments: 

February 6, 2006. 

Brief description of amendments: The 

amendments modify Technical 

Specification (TS) requirements for 

inoperable snubbers by adding Limiting 

Condition for Operation 3.0.7. This 

operating license improvement was 

made available by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) on May 

4, 2005 (70 FR 23252) as part of the 

consolidated line item improvement 

process and is consistent with NRC 

approved Technical Specification Task 

Force (TSTF) standard TS change 

TSTF–372, Revision 4. 

Date of issuance: October 4, 2006. 

Effective date: As of the date of 

issuance and shall be implemented 

within 45 days. 

Amendment Nos. 312/301. 

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–

77 and DPR–79: Amendments revised 

the technical specifications. 

Date of initial notice in Federal 

Register: March 28, 2006 (71 FR 

15487). 

The Commission’s related evaluation 

of the amendments is contained in a 

Safety Evaluation dated October 4, 2006. 

No significant hazards consideration 

comments received: No. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day 

of October 2006. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Catherine Haney, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. E6–18595 Filed 11–6–06; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Notice of Availability of Model License 

Amendment Request and Safety 

Evaluation on Technical Specification 

Improvement Regarding Revision to 

the Completion Time in STS 3.6.6A, 

‘‘Containment Spray and Cooling 

Systems’’ for Combustion Engineering 

Pressurized Water Reactors Using the 

Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Process 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of availability. 

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that 

the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has prepared a 

model license amendment request 

(LAR), model safety evaluation (SE), and 

model proposed no significant hazards 

consideration (NSHC) determination 

related to changes to the completion 

times (CT) in Standard Technical 

Specification (STS) 3.6.6A, 

‘‘Containment Spray and Cooling 

Systems,’’ contained in NUREG–1432 

(Standard Technical Specifications for 

Combustion Engineering Plants, Rev. 

3.0). The proposed changes would 

revise STS 3.6.6A by extending the CT 

for one containment spray system (CSS) 

train inoperable from 72 hours to seven 

days, and add a Condition, Required 

Actions and associated CT when one 

CSS train and one containment cooling 

system (CCS) train are inoperable. These 

changes are based on analyses provided 

in a joint applications report submitted 

by the Combustion Engineering Owner’s 

Group (CEOG). The CEOG participants 

in the Technical Specifications Task 

Force (TSTF) proposed these changes to 

the STS in Change Traveler No. TSTF–

409, Revision 2. 

The purpose of these models is to 

permit the NRC to efficiently process 

amendments to incorporate these 

changes into plant-specific STS for 

Combustion Engineering pressurized 

water reactors (PWRs). Since TSTF–409 

involves a risk-informed approach to 

extending the CT for one CSS 

inoperable, the NRC staff must verify 

that licensees who apply for this TS 

change have a valid, up-to-date 

probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) 

model that employs PRA principles to 

ensure that public health and safety are 

maintained when the CSS CT of 7 days 

is implemented. Therefore, the model 

LAR contains several conditions 

requiring licensees to make specific 

validations of their plant PRA quality 

and methods. The intent of using the 

CLIIP to adopt TSTF–409 is to eliminate 


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the need for additional technical review 

and requests for additional information 

(RAIs) on plant-specific amendments. 

Licensees of nuclear power reactors to 

which the models apply can request 

amendments conforming to the models. 

In such a request, a licensee should 

confirm the applicability of the model 

SE and NSHC determination to its plant, 

and provide the expected supplemental 

information requested in the model 

LAR. 

DATES: The NRC staff issued a Federal 

Register Notice (71 FR 18380, April 11, 

2006) which provided for public 

comment a model SE, model LAR, and 

NSHC determination related to changes 

to the CT for one CSS train inoperable 

in STS 3.6.6A. The NRC staff herein 

provides a revised model SE, revised 

model LAR, and NSHC determination. 

The NRC staff can most efficiently 

consider applications based upon the 

model LAR, which references the Model 

SE, if the application is submitted 

within one year of this Federal Register 

Notice. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim 

Kobetz, Mail Stop: O–12H2, Division of 

Inspection Program Management, Office 

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone 

301–415–1932. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Regulatory Issue Summary 2000–06, 

‘‘Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Process [CLIIP] for Adopting Standard 

Technical Specifications Changes for 

Power Reactors,’’ was issued on March 

20, 2000. The CLIIP is intended to 

improve the efficiency and transparency 

of NRC licensing processes. This is 

accomplished by processing proposed 

changes to the STS in a manner that 

supports subsequent license amendment 

applications. The CLIIP includes an 

opportunity for the public to comment 

on proposed changes to the STS 

following a preliminary assessment by 

the NRC staff and finding that the 

change will likely be offered for 

adoption by licensees. The CLIIP 

includes NRC staff evaluation of any 

comments received for a proposed 

change to the STS. In several instances, 

the staff’s evaluation did result in 

changes to the model LAR and/or model 

SE. Those licensees opting to apply for 

the subject changes to TSs are 

responsible for reviewing the staff’s 

evaluation, referencing the applicable 

technical justifications, and providing 

any necessary plant-specific 

information. The model LAR shows 

licensees the expected level of detail 

that needs to be included in order to 

adopt TSTF–409, Rev. 2, as well as 

guidelines for staff review. The NRC has 

established an internal review plan that 

designates the appropriate staff and 

approximate timelines to review plantspecific LARs that reference TSTF–409, 

Rev. 2. Each amendment application 

made in response to the notice of 

availability will be processed and 

noticed in accordance with applicable 

NRC rules and procedures. 

This notice involves an increase in 

the allowed CT to restore an inoperable 

CSS train on Combustion Engineering 

PWRs. By letter dated November 10, 

2003, the CEOG proposed this change 

for incorporation into the STS as TSTF–

409, Revision 2. This change is based on 

the NRC staff-approved analyses 

contained in CE NPSD–1045–A, ‘‘Joint 

Applications Report: Modification to the 

Containment Spray System, and Low 

Pressure Safety Injection System 

Technical Specifications,’’ dated March 

2000, as approved by the NRC in a SE 

dated December 21, 1999, accessible 

electronically from the Agencywide 

Documents Access and Management 

System’s (ADAMS) Public Electronic 

Reading Room on the Internet (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML993620241) at the 

NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who 

do not have access to ADAMS or who 

encounter problems in accessing the 

documents located in ADAMS, should 

contact the NRC Public Document Room 

Reference staff by telephone at 1–800–

397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by e-mail 

to pdr@nrc.gov. 

This notice, along with TSTF–409, 

Rev. 2, will be posted on the NRC Web 

site at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/ 

operating/licensing/techspecs/changesissued-for-adoption.html. 

Applicability 

This proposed change to revise the 

Technical Specification (TS) CT for one 

inoperable CSS train is applicable to 

Combustion engineering PWRs. 

To efficiently process the incoming 

license amendment applications, the 

NRC staff requests that each licensee 

applying for the changes addressed by 

TSTF–409, Revision 2, use the CLIIP to 

submit a LAR that adheres to the 

following model. Any deviations from 

the model LAR should be explained in 

the licensee’s submittal. When applying, 

licensees should ensure they address 

the eight conditions and one regulatory 

commitment listed in the model LAR 

and model SE. 

The CLIIP does not prevent licensees 

from requesting an alternative approach, 

proposing changes without providing 

the information described in the eight 

model LAR conditions, or making the 

requested commitment. Variations from 

the approach recommended in this 

notice may, however, require additional 

review by the NRC staff and may 

increase the time and resources needed 

for the review. Significant variations 

from the approach, or inclusion of 

additional changes in the LAR, will 

result in staff rejection of the submittal 

under the CLIIP. Instead, licensees 

desiring significant variations and/or 

additional changes should either submit 

a LAR that does not claim to adopt 

TSTF–409, or specifically state in their 

LAR that they are adopting TSTF–409 

without using the CLIIP. 

Public Notices 

In a notice in the Federal Register 

dated April 11, 2006 (71 FR 18380), the 

staff requested comment on the use of 

the CLIIP to process requests to revise 

the CE PWR TS regarding Containment 

Spray System completion time 

extensions as discussed in TSTF–409. In 

response to this notice, the staff 

received one set of comments 

(developed by the PWR Owners Group, 

and submitted by the Nuclear Energy 

Institute in a letter dating May 10, 2006 

(ADAMs Accession No. ML061570029)). 

Specific comments on the model LAR 

and model SE were offered. These 

comments, along with the NRC staff’s 

responses, are summarized and 

discussed below. 

1. Comment: Based on discussions 

with the author regarding the intent of 

the ‘‘Model SE,’’ [i.e., to allow 

acceptance review without RAIs while 

satisfying the CLIIP] it is recommended 

that additional explanatory information 

be included. * * * At the very 

minimum, a clear preamble to the FRN 

should be provided that places the 

scope of the FRN in perspective. 

Response: The following preamble 

has been inserted after the first sentence 

of the second paragraph of the FRN. 

‘‘Since TSTF–409 involves a risk-informed 

approach to extending the CT for one CSS 

inoperable, the NRC staff must verify that 

licensees who apply for this TS change have 

a valid, up to date probabilistic risk 

assessment (PRA) model that employs PRA 

principles to ensure that public health and 

safety are maintained when the CSS CT of 7 

days is implemented. Therefore, the model 

LAR contains several conditions requiring 

licensees to make specific validations of their 

plant PRA quality and methods. The intent 

of using the CLIIP to adopt TSTF–409 is to 

eliminate the need for additional technical 

review and requests for additional 

information (RAIs) on plant-specific 

amendments.’’

2. Comment: [The FRN] should 

equally note that existing strategies for 


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approval are valid and may also be 

used. 

Response: The second to last 

paragraph of the FRN discusses how a 

licensee should proceed if it desires to 

deviate from the approach outlined in 

the CLIIP. The NRC’s position is that, if 

a licensee is going to submit a LAR that 

adopts TSTF–409 using the CLIIP, then 

the plant-specific LAR should provide 

all the information requested in the 

model LAR. Any variations/deviations 

should be explained, and may require 

additional review by the staff (including 

issuance of RAIs). Significant variations 

from the CLIIP methodology should be 

submitted as normal license amendment 

requests. The staff has changed the last 

sentence of second to last paragraph of 

the FRN to read: 

‘‘Instead, licensees desiring significant 

variations and/or additional changes should 

either submit a LAR that does not claim to 

adopt TSTF–409, or specifically state in their 

LAR that they are adopting TSTF–409 

without using the CLIIP.’’

This will correctly define the scope of 

the review for the staff when processing 

an incoming LAR that does not conform 

to the CLIIP. 

3. Comment: The essence of the 

proposed CSS TS change focuses on a 

single CSS train. Thus, the mention of 

ACTION G (regarding two CSS trains 

out-of-service) seems unnecessary. 

Response: The staff agrees with this 

comment. Mention of ACTION G has 

been removed from Section 4.1 of the 

model LAR, and Section 3.1 of the 

model SE. 

4. Comment: The last paragraph of 

section 4.2.1 item 1 notes that ‘‘If a zero 

maintenance PRA model is used * * * 

in performing these calculations, then 

the licensee must commit to performing 

no other maintenance during the 

extended CSS CT * * *’’. This 

restriction has no technical merit. The 

risk of maintenance is generated as 

incremental risks from the baseline. The 

initial submittal noted that for plants 

with emergency grade fan coolers (most 

of the applicants), the actual risk 

increases as a result of removing a CSS 

out of service is very low. Furthermore, 

CSS have very little (if any) overlap 

with other systems. Because the risk 

important function of CSSs is to 

maintain the containment pressure 

within acceptable limits (and control 

sump temperature to ensure adequate 

NPSH for ECCS equipment—a function 

left out of FRN Section 3), those 

functions can be accommodated by the 

redundant CS train or the fan coolers. 

Furthermore, by using RG 1.177 to 

support low risk, the risk impact of 

removal of the CSS for the duration of 

the 7 day AOT is small. Because plants 

perform maintenance on a frequent 

basis, not allowing repair or 

maintenance on another system (which 

is likely to be of greater risk importance 

than the CSS) is unnecessary and likely 

to have worse risk. 

Another unusual aspect of the 

restriction implies that the incremental 

risk calculated using zero maintenance 

conditions is significantly different from 

that calculated using annualized plantwide system out-of-service values. 

While the baseline PRA for zero 

maintenance is less than the baseline 

PRA value for nominal maintenance, its 

impact on incremental risk will be 

small. 

Response: The staff accepts NEI’s 

comment in that it creates a regulatory 

condition that is overly restrictive to 

plants using a zero maintenance PRA 

model. The staff has inserted alternate 

wording (from RG 1.177 Section 2.3.4. 

#2) to the last sentence of condition 1 

in Section 4.2.1 of the model LAR as 

follows: 

If the licensee utilizes a ‘‘zero 

maintenance’’ PRA model for the assessment, 

they should state they are using a ‘‘zero 

maintenance’’ model in the evaluation, and 

provide a discussion as to the ability of that 

model to produce comparable results to the 

‘‘average maintenance’’ assessment. 

5. Comment: It is understood that 

documented quantitative external event 

information for the plants may be 

limited. However, reference to plant 

individual plant examination (IPE) and 

individual plant examination for 

external events (IPEEE) and the 

requirements to explain the evolution of 

the PRA since 1988 as identified in 

Section in item 4.2.1 part 2.b is 

unnecessary. Item 2.c requires that the 

peer review results be discussed along 

with the overall disposition of relevant 

facts and observations (F&Os) and item 

e (which includes an overall 

determination of the adequacy of the 

plant specific PRA with respect to this 

application). These assessment[s] are 

current and of more importance to the 

application. Where external events rely 

on IPEEE vintage information, a 

discussion/statement of the risk 

significance of the spray system in 

mitigating external events should be 

performed. 

Response: The staff agrees that peer 

reviews of plant-specific PRA are 

important. However, it is equally 

important to have an understanding of 

PRA updates and upgrades since the 

IPE, IPEEE, and peer reviews were 

conducted, especially if plant 

improvements and/or commitments are 

cited and credited in the analyses as 

being implemented. Licensees who have 

given this information in prior 

submittals may incorporate the 

information by reference. 

6. Comment: Section 4.2.1 item 3 

requirements on consideration of fire 

and external events and the associated 

EXPECTATIONS are too restrictive and 

do not correspond to safety benefits. 

The CSS has limited risk overlap with 

fires or external initiating events. 

Challenges to power induced by 

tornadoes, high winds or seismic events 

have limited importance to the spray 

system and [are] more appropriate with 

AOTs associated with AC-power related 

components. It was our understanding 

that the intent of this restriction was to 

assure the regulator that the overall 

combined plant risk remains below a 

CDF of 10 ¥4 per year (per requirements 

of RG 1.174). The intent of this section 

should be clarified. This requirement 

should be reduced to providing 

information regarding the reasons 

underlying low risk associated with this 

system. 

Response: The staff acknowledges 

that, for many plants, the impact of the 

CT extension on external event risk will 

be minimal. If this is the case, the 

licensee needs to confirm this in its 

submittal and explain why there is 

limited overlap. 

7. Comment: Section 4.2.1 item 3 

ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA requires 

‘‘combining internal events, internal 

flooding, external events and shutdown 

PRA results.’’ The requirements for the 

combination of events should be 

modified to have the utility provide a 

technical basis for demonstrating the 

plant CDF to be less than 10 ¥4 per year 

or has no plant specific vulnerabilities 

(per SECY–88–20). Requirements for a 

fully quantified external events 

(including fire) PRA and shutdown PRA 

[are] beyond the state of the art. Few 

plants have all the above. The Fire PRA 

standard is just undergoing peer review 

and no shutdown PRA standard has 

been written. Methods for combining 

these PRA results [are] also not defined 

(particularly merging shutdown and ‘‘at 

power’’ PRA results). Instead, it should 

be noted that the utility may use 

existing external event evaluations 

including IPEEE results and qualitative 

external event assessments, where 

appropriate, to provide confidence that 

the overall plant CDF is not within RG 

1.174 risk region 1. 

Response: The staff is requesting that 

licensees provide DCDF and DLERF 

calculations for those external events for 

which the licensee has a PRA. For 

external events for which the licensee 

does not have a PRA, the licensee will 

need to confirm there are no 

vulnerabilities that would indicate that 


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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 215 / Tuesday, November 7, 2006 / Notices 65151 

the total CDF is >10¥4 or the total LERF 

is >10¥5 yr. this stipulation allows the 

staff to ensure that plans whose DCDF 

or DLERF calculation puts them in 

Region II of either Figure 3 or Figure 4 

of RG 1.174 are still within the RG 1.174 

Section 2.2.4 acceptance guidelines for 

total plant risk (CDF and LERF). 

With regard to NEI’s comments on a 

fully-quantified external events 

(including fire) PRA and shutdown PRA 

being beyond state-of-the-art, the staff 

believes the wording in the 

EXPECTATIONS for Section 4.2.1 

condition 3 was misinterpreted. The 

wording has been revised to read 

‘‘(quantitatively and/or qualitatively, as 

appropriate).’’ However, the staff notes 

that while fire and shutdown PRA 

standards have not yet been endorsed, 

there are available methods to quantify 

fire and shutdown PRA. Therefore, the 

staff does not believe such evaluations 

are beyond the state of the art. Rather, 

they are areas where some evaluation is 

still ongoing. 

8. Comment: EXPECTATIONS 

supporting 4.2.1 item 4. The TS is 

structured to have a revised CT. Once 

the new CT is adopted the old CT will 

disappear as a regulatory item. Thus, 

there is no entry into an extended CSS 

CT. It is simply an entry into the CT. 

There are no significant external event 

interactions and the outage is limited to 

a single spray train. Therefore, The Tier 

2 requirement should be limited to one 

CSS out of service, which is already 

governed in the TS with a cautionary 

note that Maintenance rule or tier 3 

guidance to not simultaneously disable 

both the emergency grade fan coolers 

and the sprays. 

Response: The staff agrees that 

‘‘extended CT’’ should not be used in 

the model LAR. Appropriate changes 

will be made here and in other sections 

of the FRN where appropriate. 

The staff believes that a tier 2 

justification by the licensee is warranted 

with regard to removing one CSS train 

from service due to scheduled 

‘‘preventive’’ maintenance for the 7-day 

period. If there are no risk-significant 

configurations or risk-significant 

external event conditions identified in 

the tier 2 evaluation, then the licensee 

should include a statement that there 

are no risk-significant configurations or 

external event conditions that would 

preclude them from using the 7-day CT. 

9. Comment: End of [Section 4.2.1 

item 7]. Note that the RGs provide 

guidelines. Risk values are not rigid 

thresholds. Thus small deviations to the 

guidance can be and are somewhat 

fuzzy to allow for the mathematical 

uncertainties inherent in these studies. 

Response: The staff agrees that RG 

1.174 and 1.177 guidelines are not rigid 

standards, and has revised condition 7 

to delete the second paragraph of the 

EXPECTATIONS section. Note that 

Condition 5 of the model LAR requires 

licensees to confirm that their CRMP or 

associated (a)(4) program meets all 

aspects of Section 2.3.7.2 or RG 1.177. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland; this 19th day 

of October 2006. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Timothy J. Kobetz, 

Branch Chief, Technical Specifications 

Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional 

Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

FOR INCLUSION ON THE 

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WEB 

PAGE THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE OF 

A LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST 

(LAR) WAS PREPARED BY THE NRC 

STAFF TO FACILITATE THE 

ADOPTION OF TECHNICAL 

SPECIFICATIONS TASK FORCE (TSTF) 

TRAVELER TSTF–409, REVISION 2 

‘‘CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM 

COMPLETION TIME EXTENSION (CE 

NPSD–1045–A).’’ THE MODEL 

PROVIDES THE EXPECTED LEVEL OF 

DETAIL AND CONTENT FOR A LAR 

TO ADOPT TSTF–409, REVISION 2. 

LICENSEES REMAIN RESPONSIBLE 

FOR ENSURING THAT THEIR PLANTSPECIFIC LAR FULFILLS THEIR 

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS 

AS WELL AS NRC REGULATIONS. 

lllllllllllllllllll

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Document Control Desk 

Washington, DC 20555 

SUBJECT: [PLANT NAME] 

APPLICATION FOR TECHNICAL 

SPECIFICATION IMPROVEMENT 

TO EXTEND THE COMPLETION 

TIME FOR CONTAINMENT SPRAY 

SYSTEM INOPERABILITY IN 

ACCORDANCE WITH TSTF–409, 

REVISION 2 

Dear Sir or Madam: 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 50.90 of Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.90), 

[LICENSEE] is submitting a request for 

an amendment to the technical 

specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME, 

UNIT NOS.]. 

The proposed changes would revise 

TS 3.6.6A, ‘‘Containment Spray and 

Cooling Systems,’’ by extending from 72 

hours to seven days the completion time 

(CT) to restore an inoperable 

containment spray system (CSS) train. 

In addition, a Condition would be 

added to the TS to allow one CSS train 

and one containment cooling system 

(CCS) train to be inoperable for a period 

of 72 hours. 

The changes are consistent with NRCapproved Industry Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) 

Standard Technical Specification 

Change Traveler, TSTF–409, Revision 2, 

‘‘Containment Spray System 

Completion Time Extension (CE NPSD–

1045–A).’’

Enclosure 1 provides a description 

and assessment of the proposed changes 

and confirmation of applicability. 

Enclosure 2 provides the existing TS 

pages marked-up to show the proposed 

changes. Enclosure 3 provides the 

existing TS Bases marked-up to reflect 

the proposed changes (for information 

only). Final TS Bases will be provided 

in a future update to the Updated Final 

Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) in 

accordance with the Bases Control 

Program. Attachments 1 through 8 

provide the discussions of 

[LICENSEE’S] evaluations and 

supporting information with regard to 

the conditions stipulated in Section 

4.2.1 of Enclosure 1. 

[LICENSEE] requests approval of the 

proposed license amendment by 

[DATE], with the amendment being 

implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 

DAYS]. in accordance with 10 CFR 

50.91, a copy of this application, with 

enclosures, is being provided to the 

designated [STATE] Official. 

I declare under penalty of perjury 

under the laws of the United States of 

America that I am authorized by 

[LICENSEE] to make this request and 

that the foregoing is true and correct. 

[Note that request may be notarized in 

lieu of using this oath or affirmation 

statement]. If you should have any 

questions regarding this submittal, 

please contact [ ]. 

Sincerely, 

Name, Title 

Enclosures: 

1. Description and Assessment of 

Proposed Changes 

2. Proposed Technical Specification 

Changes 

3. Proposed Technical Specification 

Bases Changes (if applicable) 

Attachments: 

1. Licensee’s supporting information 

for condition 1 

2. Licensee’s supporting information 

for condition 2 

3. Licensee’s supporting information 

for condition 3 

4. Licensee’s supporting information 

for condition 4 

5. Licensee’s supporting information 

for condition 5 

6. Licensee’s supporting information 


ycherry on PROD1PC64 with NOTICES
65152 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 215 / Tuesday, November 7, 2006 / Notices 

for condition 6 

7. Licensee’s supporting information 

for condition 7 

8. Licensee’s supporting information 

for condition 8 

cc: 

NRR Project Manager 

Regional Office 

Resident Inspector 

State Contact 

ITSB Branch Chief 

1.0 Description 

The letter is a request to amend 

Operating License(s) [LICENSE 

NUMBER(S)] for [PLANT/UNIT 

NAME(S)]. 

The proposed changes would revise 

Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.6A, 

‘‘Containment Spray and Cooling 

Systems,’’ by extending from 72 hours 

to seven days the completion time (CT) 

to restore an inoperable containment 

spray system (CSS) train to operable 

status, and would add a Condition 

describing the required action and CT 

when one CSS train and one 

containment cooling system (CCS) train 

are inoperable. 

The changes are consistent with NRC 

approved Industry Owner’s Group 

Technical Specification Task Force 

(TSTF) Standard Technical 

Specification Change Traveler TSTF–

409, Revision 2 (Rev. 2), ‘‘Containment 

Spray System Completion Time 

Extension (CE NPSD–1045–A).’’ TSTF–

409, Rev. 2 was approved by the NRC 

on [DATE]. 

2.0 Proposed Change 

Specifically, the proposed revision 

extends the CT (or allowed outage time) 

that one CSS train is permitted to 

remain inoperable from 72 hours to 

seven days based on Reference 1, as 

accepted by, and subject to the 

limitations specified in, Reference 2. 

TSTF–409, Rev. 2 states that the longer 

CT will enhance overall plant safety by 

avoiding potential unscheduled plant 

shutdowns and allowing greater 

availability of safety significant 

components during shutdown. In 

addition, TSTF–409, Rev. 2 states that 

this extension provides for increased 

flexibility in scheduling and performing 

maintenance and surveillance activities 

in order to enhance plant safety and 

operational flexibility during lower 

modes of operation. 

The revision also adds a Condition to 

allow one CSS train and one CCS train 

to be inoperable for up to 72 hours. 

Since Reference 1 did not evaluate the 

concurrent inoperabilities of one CSS 

train and one CCS train, the CT for this 

Condition was limited to 72 hours. 

[LICENSEE] also proposes to make 

changes to the supporting TS Bases in 

accordance with TSTF–409, Rev. 2. 

Changes to the Bases include supporting 

information justifying the addition of 

the Condition for one CSS train and one 

CCS train inoperable. The Bases changes 

also include a reviewer’s note that 

requires [LICENSEE] to adopt Reference 

1 and meet the requirements of 

References 1 and 2 prior to utilizing the 

7-day CT for one inoperable CSS. 

Finally, a reference to Reference 1 is 

added to the Bases. Markups of the TS 

Bases are provided in enclosure 3. 

Changes to the Bases will be 

implemented in accordance with 

[LICENSEE’s] bases control program. 

In summary, [LICENSEE] proposes to 

extend the CT for one inoperable CSS 

train from 72 hours to 7 days based on 

Reference 1, and add a Condition to 

allow one CSS train and one CCS train 

to be inoperable for up to 72 hours. 

3.0 Background 

The function of the containment heat 

removal systems under accident 

conditions is to remove heat from the 

containment atmosphere, thus 

maintaining the containment pressure 

and temperature at acceptably low 

levels. The systems also serve to limit 

offsite radiation levels by reducing the 

pressure differential between the 

containment atmosphere and the 

external environment, thereby 

decreasing the driving force for fission 

product leakage across the containment. 

The two containment heat removal 

systems are the CCS and the CSS. The 

CCS fan coolers are designed to operate 

during both normal plant operations 

and under loss-of-coolant accident 

[LOCA] or main steam line break 

(MSLB) conditions. The CSS is designed 

to operate during accident conditions 

only. 

The heat removal capacity of the CCS 

and CSS is sufficient to keep the 

containment temperature and pressure 

below design conditions for any size 

break, up to and including a doubleended break of the largest reactor 

coolant pipe. The systems are also 

designed to mitigate the consequences 

of any size break, up to and including 

a double-ended break of a main stream 

line. The CCS and CSS continue to 

reduce containment pressure and 

temperature and maintain them at 

acceptable levels post-accident. 

The CCS and CSS at [PLANT NAME] 

each consist of [Substitute plant-specific 

configuration if it differs from the 

following description] two redundant 

loops and are designed such that a 

single failure does not degrade their 

ability to provide the required heat 

removal capability. Two of four 

containment fan coolers and one CSS 

loop are powered from one safetyrelated bus. The other two containment 

fan coolers and CSS loop are powered 

from another independent safety-related 

bus. The loss of one bus does not affect 

the ability of the containment heat 

removal systems to maintain 

containment temperature and pressure 

below the design values in a postaccident mode. 

The [PLANT NAME] CSS consists of 

[Substitute plant-specific configuration 

if it differs from the following 

description] two independent and 

redundant loops each containing a spray 

pump, shutdown heat exchanger, 

piping, valves, spray headers, and spray 

nozzles. It has two modes of operation, 

which are: 

1. The injection mode, during which 

the system sprays borated water from 

the refueling water tank (RWT) into the 

containment, and 

2. The recirculation mode, which is 

automatically initiated by the 

recirculation actuation signal (RAS) 

after low level is reached in the RWT. 

During this mode of operation, the 

safety injection system (SIS) sump 

provides suction for the spray pumps. 

Containment spray is automatically 

initiated by the containment spray 

actuation signal coincident with the 

safety injection actuation signal and 

high containment pressure signal. If 

required, the operator can manually 

activate the system from the main 

control room. 

Each CSS pump, together with a CCS 

loop, provides the flow necessary to 

remove the heat generated inside the 

containment following a LOCA or 

MSLB. Upon system activation, the 

pumps are started and the borated water 

flows into the containment spray 

headers. When low level is reached in 

the RWT, sufficient water has been 

transferred to the containment to allow 

for the recirculation mode of operation. 

Spray pump suction is automatically 

realigned to the SIS sump upon a RAS. 

During the recirculation mode, the 

spray water is cooled by the shutdown 

heat exchangers prior to discharge into 

the containment. The shutdown heat 

exchangers are cooled by the component 

cooling water system. Post-LOCA pH 

control is provided by [Substitute plantspecific configuration if it differs from 

the following description] trisodium 

phosphate dodecahydrate, which is 

stored in stainless steel baskets located 

in the containment near the SIS sump 

intake. 

The longer CT for an inoperable CSS 

train will enhance overall plant safety 

by avoiding potential unscheduled plant 


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shutdowns and allowing greater 

availability of safety significant 

components during shutdown. In 

addition, this extension provides for 

increased flexibility in scheduling and 

performing maintenance and 

surveillance activities in order to 

enhance plant safety and operational 

flexibility during lower modes of 

operation. 

4.0 Technical analysis 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed References 

1 and 2, as well as TSTF–409, Rev. 2, 

and the model SE published on [DATE] 

([] FR []) as part of the CLIIP Notice of 

Availability. [LICENSEE] has applied 

the methodology in Reference 1 to 

develop the proposed TS changes. 

[LICENSEE] has also concluded that the 

justifications presented in TSTF–409, 

Rev. 2 and the model SE prepared by 

the NRC staff are applicable to [PLANT 

NAME], and justify this amendment for 

the incorporation of changes to the 

[PLANT NAME] TS. 

In determining the suitability and 

safety impact of its adoption of TSTF–

409, Rev. 2, [LICENSEE] analyzed the 

effect of increasing the CT for one CSS 

train to remain out of service using both 

traditional engineering considerations 

and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) 

methods. 

4.1 Traditional (Deterministic) 

Engineering Analysis 

The functions and operation of the 

CSS and CCS were described in Section 

3.0 of this application. Based on a 

review of the design-basis requirements 

for the CSS, [LICENSEE] concluded that 

the loss of one CSS train is well within 

the design-basis analyses. This 

conclusion is based on the fact that each 

CSS pump, together with a CCS loop, 

provides the flow necessary to remove 

the heat generated inside the 

containment following a LOCA or 

MSLB. Therefore, the combination of 

one CSS pump and one CCS loop can 

carry out the design functions of 

maintaining the containment pressure 

and temperature at acceptably low 

levels following a design-basis accident 

(DBA), and limiting offsite radiation 

levels by reducing the pressure 

differential between the containment 

atmosphere and the external 

environment, thereby decreasing the 

driving force for fission product leakage 

across the containment. 

The plant status with one CSS train 

and one CCS train inoperable is covered 

by TS 3.6.6A, ACTION [D], which 

states: 

‘‘[With] one containment spray and one 

containment cooling train inoperable, restore 

containment spray train to OPERABLE status 

within 72 hours, or restore containment 

cooling train to OPERABLE status within 72 

hours.’’

ACTION [D] ensures that the iodine 

removal capabilities of the CSS are 

available, along with 100 percent of the 

heat removal needs after an accident. 

The supporting analyses performed in 

Reference 1 did not evaluate the 

concurrent inoperabilities of one CSS 

train and one CCS train, therefore, the 

current CT of 72 hours is retained in 

Condition [D]. The 72 hour Completion 

Time was developed taking into account 

the redundant heat removal capabilities 

afforded by combinations of the CSS 

and CCS, the iodine removal function of 

the CSS, and the low probability of a 

DBA occurring during this period. 

4.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 

Evaluation 

[LICENSEE] evaluated the proposed 

CT extension for the CSS using 

Reference 3 and Reference 4. This is the 

same methodology that the NRC staff 

used in Reference 2. The Key Principles 

of A Risk-Informed Integrated 

Decisionmaking Process listed in 

Reference 3 are as follows: 

Principle I: The proposed change meets 

the current regulations. 

Principle II: The proposed change is 

consistent with the defense-indepth philosophy. 

Principle III: The proposed change 

maintains sufficient safety margin. 

Principle IV: When the proposed change 

results in an increase in core 

damage frequency or risk, the 

increase should be small and 

consistent with the Commission’s 

Safety Goal Policy Statement. 

Principle V: The impact of the proposed 

change should be monitored using 

performance measurement 

strategies. 

In Reference 2, the NRC staff found, 

and [LICENSEE] agrees, that in riskinformed TS CT applications, Principle 

I is met, since regulations do not require 

specific CTs, but, rather, require 

‘‘remedial actions’’ when an LCO cannot 

be met. Additionally, in its analysis of 

Principle III, the NRC staff found, and 

[LICENSEE] agrees, that the proposed 

CT extension maintains sufficient safety 

margins, For [PLANT NAME], the loss 

of one CSS train is well within the 

plant’s design basis. 

In Reference 2, the NRC staff 

determined that the intent of Principles 

II, IV, and V would be met by a threetiered approach to evaluate the plantspecific risk impact associated with the 

proposed TS changes, consistent with 

the requirements of Reference 4. The 

first tier evaluates the plant-specific 

PRA model and the impact of the 

proposed CT extension on plant 

operational risk. The second tier 

addresses the need to preclude 

potentially high risk configurations by 

identifying the need for any additional 

constraints or compensatory actions 

that, if implemented, would avoid or 

reduce the probability of a risksignificant configuration during the time 

when one CSS train is out of service. 

The third tier evaluates [LICENSEE’S] 

proposed Configuration Risk 

Management Program (CRMP) to ensure 

that the applicable plant configuration 

will be appropriately assessed from a 

risk perspective before entering into or 

during the proposed CT. 

In addition, the NRC staff determined 

in Reference 2, that the risk analysis 

methodology and approach used by the 

CEOG to estimate the risk impact of 

increasing the CT were reasonable. For 

most plants that participated in the joint 

application report, the NRC staff found 

that the risk impact was shown to be 

consistent with the acceptance 

guidelines for change in core damage 

frequency (DCDF), change in large early 

release frequency (DLERF), incremental 

conditional core damage probability 

(ICCDP), and incremental conditional 

large early release probability (ICLERP) 

specified in References 3 and 4 and 

Chapters 19.0 and 16.1 of Reference 5. 

However, not all Combustion 

Engineering (CE) plants participated in 

the joint application report, and the 

estimated risk impacts for some plans 

exceeded the Reference 3 and/or 

Reference 4 acceptance guidelines, 

which would require additional 

justifications and/or compensatory 

measures to be provided for these plants 

to be determined to have acceptable risk 

impacts. 

In addition, the NRC staff found that 

the Tier 2 and Tier 3 evaluations, as 

described in Reference 4, could not be 

approved generically since they were 

not complete, which would require that 

each individual plant-specific license 

amendment seeking adoption of TSTF–

409, Rev. 2 would need to include an 

assessment with respect to the Tier 2 

and Tier 3 principles of Reference 4. 

4.2.1 Conditions and Supporting 

Information 

The following conditions are 

provided to support adoption of TSTF–

409, Rev. 2 by [PLANT NAME]. 

Responses to the conditions are 

contained in Attachments 1 through 8 to 

this application: [NOTE: Licensees who 

cannot meet the Expectation and 

Acceptance Criteria listed in these 

conditions, or choose not to submit the 

associated information, should not 


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submit an application to adopt TSTF–

409, Rev. 2 under the CLIIP.] 

1. As shown in Attachment 1, the 

plant-specific Tier 1 information 

associated with extending the CSS CT 

meets the acceptance guidelines of 

References 3 and 4 associated with 

DCDF, DLERF, ICCDP, and ICLERP. 

[EXPECTATIONS/ACCEPTANCE 

CRITERIA: the licensee’s submittal 

must provide the DCDF, DLERF, ICCDP, 

and ICLERP values related to the CSS 7- 

day CT and confirm that these values 

meet the associated acceptance 

guidelines of References 3 and 4 as no 

more than a small risk increase (i.e., are 

in Region II or III of the acceptance 

guidelines figures). The licensee should 

utilize an ‘‘average maintenance’’ PRA 

model for this assessment. If the 

licensee utilizes a ‘‘zero maintenance’’

PRA model for the assessment, they 

should state they are using a ‘‘zero 

maintenance’’ model in the evaluation, 

and provide a discussion as to the 

ability of that model to produce 

comparable results to the ‘‘average 

maintenance’’ assessment.] 

2. As shown in Attachment 2, the 

technical adequacy (quality) of [PLANT 

NAME’S] plant-specific PRA is 

acceptable for this application in 

accordance with the guidance provided 

in Reference 3. Specifically, the 

supporting information addresses the 

following areas: 

a. Justification that the plant-specific 

PRA reflects the as-built, as-operated 

plant. 

b. Discussion of plant-specific PRA 

updates and upgrades since the 

individual plant examination (IPE), 

individual plant examination of external 

events (IPEEE), and subsequent peer 

reviews and self-assessment. Reference 

to past submittals discussing this 

information is acceptable. 

c. Discussion of plant-specific PRA 

peer reviews and/or self-assessments 

performed, their overall conclusions, 

any facts and observations (F&Os) 

applicable to this application, and the 

licensee evaluation and resolution (e.g., 

by implementing model changes and/or 

sensitivity studies) of these F&Os to 

demonstrate the conclusions of the 

plant-specific analyses for this 

application are not adversely impacted 

(i.e., continued acceptability of the 

proposed extension of the CSS CT). 

d. Description of the licensee’s plantspecific PRA configuration control 

(quality assurance) program and 

associated procedures. 

e. Overall determination of the 

adequacy of the plant-specific PRA with 

respect to this application. 

[EXPECTATION: The licensee’s 

submittal must describe the scope of the 

plant-specific PRA and must justify its 

technical adequacy (quality) for this 

application in accordance with the 

guidance provided in Reference 3. 

Specifically, the supporting information 

must address each area in sufficient 

detail as shown in the following 

ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: 

a. The licensee must provide a 

justification that confirms that the plantspecific PRA reflects the as-built, asoperated plant. This should include a 

description of the licensee’s data and 

model update process, and the 

frequency of these activities. The 

licensee should also describe how the 

plant/corporate PRA staff are involved 

in (and/or made aware of) plant and 

operational/procedural modifications. 

b. The licensee must provide a 

summary description of the plantspecific PRA updates and upgrades 

since the IPE and peer review of their 

plant and confirm that the changes 

identified during the IPEEE have been 

implemented or otherwise 

dispositioned. 

c. The licensee must discuss their 

plant-specific PRA peer reviews and/or 

any self-assessments performed 

(especially noting those conducted per 

the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 

industry peer review guidelines and 

American Society of Mechanical 

Engineers (ASME) PRA Standard), their 

overall conclusions, any A&B level 

F&Os applicable to this application, and 

the licensee’s evaluation and resolution 

(e.g., by implementing model changes 

and/or sensitivity studies) of these A&B 

level F&Os to demonstrate the 

conclusions of the plant-specific 

analyses for this application are not 

adversely impacted (i.e., continued 

acceptability of the proposed extension 

of the CSS CT). 

d. The licensee must describe their 

plant-specific PRA configuration control 

(quality assurance) program and 

associated procedures. 

e. The licensee must make an overall 

determination of the adequacy of their 

plant-specific PRA, confirming it is 

adequate with respect to this 

application.] 

3. Attachment 3 provides supporting 

information verifying that the plant risk 

impact associated with external events 

(e.g., fires, seismic, tornados, high 

winds, etc.) does not adversely impact 

or has no impact on the conclusions of 

the plant-specific analyses for this 

application and that the overall 

combined plant CDF and LERF are 

expected to be within the acceptance 

guidelines as identified in References 3 

and Reference 4 (i.e., total CDF <1E–4/ 

year and total LERF <1E–5/year) 

[EXPECTATIONS: The licensee’s 

submittal must discuss the plant risks 

associated with external events and 

specifically identify (quantitatively and/ 

or qualitatively, as appropriate) that the 

impact of CSS train CT extension on the 

risks associated with external events is 

small. The NRC staff acknowledges that 

any increase in the external event risk 

associated with the CSS train CT 

extension should be minimal. The 

licensee must address this impact and 

discuss why the risk overlap with 

external events (including internal fires) 

is negligible. Key insights from the 

IPEEE screening or quantitative 

approaches may be used to support 

qualitative arguments. 

If the licensee has performed updated 

analyses of an external event since the 

staff review and acceptance of their 

IPEEE, and a quantitative PRA 

demonstration is used to support the 

submittal, the licensee must describe 

the significant changes involved in their 

updated analyses and the impact of 

these changes on plant risk associated 

with this external event and with 

respect to this application. 

ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: For the 

NRC staff to conclude the quantified 

risk associated with the extension 

request is acceptable, the total CDF and 

LERF values must meet Reference 3 and 

Reference 4 acceptance guidelines. For 

external events for which the licensee 

has a PRA, and the licensee provides 

those risk values (i.e., CDF and LERF) 

and risk metrics (i.e., DCDF, DLERF, 

ICCDP, and ICLERP) associated with the 

specifically analyzed external events, 

the licensee must also provide the total 

‘‘at-power’’ plant risk and total ‘‘atpower’’ change in risk due to all PRAanalyzed contributors (combining 

internal events, internal flooding, 

internal fires, and external events. 

Results may be provided as a 

summation of values from separate PRA 

analyses or as a result of an integrated 

analysis (using a common PRA model 

for all contributors) or a combination of 

the above. 

For external events for which the 

licensee does not have a PRA (and it is 

not screened out as above), but rather 

relies on a non-PRA method (e.g., 

seismic margins analysis (SMA) or fireinduced vulnerability evaluation 

(FIVE)), to determine if the plant risk is 

acceptable, the licensee must confirm 

for this application that there were and 

still are either no vulnerabilities or 

outliers associated with these external 

events, or confirm that any 

vulnerabilities or outliers that were 

identified in their documented analyses 

(most likely in their IPEEE) have been 

resolved and, as needed, the appropriate 


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plant/procedural modifications have 

been implemented as described in their 

documented analyses.] 

4. Supporting information is provided 

in Attachment 4, consistent with the 

evaluation summary and conclusions 

(Sections 7 and 8) provided in Reference 

2, in which licensees discuss 

implementation of procedures that 

prohibited entry into a 7-day CSS CT for 

scheduled maintenance purposes if 

external event conditions or warnings 

(e.g., severe weather warnings for ice, 

tornados, high winds, etc.) are in effect 

or confirm that these external events do 

not impact the submittal. [LICENSEE’S] 

discussion confirms that [PLANT 

NAME’S] procedures include 

compensatory measures and normal 

plant practices that help avoid 

potentially high risk configurations 

during the proposed extension of the 

CSS CT. This supporting information 

must also address the Tier 2 aspects of 

Reference 4. 

[EXPECTATIONS: The licensee’s 

submittal must discuss (including 

licensee commitments related to) 

implementation of procedures that 

prohibit entry into a 7-day CSS CT for 

scheduled maintenance purposes if 

external event conditions or warnings 

are in effect. If the licensee does not 

want to implement this prohibition for 

specific severe weather conditions or 

warnings, the licensee must explicitly 

identify these event conditions/ 

warnings and provide a justification for 

not including them. If there are no risk 

significant configurations or risk 

significant external event conditions 

identified in the Tier 2 evaluation, then 

the licensee should include a statement 

that there are no risk significant 

configurations that would preclude 

them from using a 7-day CT. 

The licensee must also confirm that 

its procedures include compensatory 

measures and normal plant practices 

that help avoid potentially high risk 

configurations during the proposed 

extension of the CSS train CT. This 

supporting information must also 

address the Tier 2 aspects of Reference 

4. The Tier 2 evaluation is meant to be 

an early evaluation (at the license 

submittal stage) to identify and preclude 

potentially high-risk plan configurations 

that could result if equipment, in 

addition to that associated with the 

proposed license amendment, is taken 

out of service simultaneously, or if other 

risk-significant operational factors, such 

as concurrent system or equipment 

testing, are also involved. 

ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: The Tier 2 

evaluation needs to identify, as part of 

the licensee’s submittal, potentially 

high-risk plant configurations associated 

with the CSS train CT extension that 

need to be precluded, if any, and 

identify how this is implemented (i.e., 

typically these aspects result in 

licensees establishing compensatory 

measures/commitments to ensure these 

configurations are precluded). If, in 

conducting the evaluation, the licensee 

identifies no high-risk plant 

configurations, then the licensee needs 

to explicitly state this fact.] 

5. Attachment 5 provides supporting 

information, consistent with the 

evaluation summary and conclusions 

(Sections 7 and 8) provided in Reference 

2, that describes the plant-specific riskinformed CRMP to assess the risk 

associated with the removal of 

equipment from service during the 7- 

day CSS CT. If the licensee utilizes the 

Maintenance Rule (a)(4) program to 

evaluate the risk significance of 

configurations, it should state so in its 

submittal. In this description, 

[LICENSEE] confirms that the program 

provides the necessary assurances that 

appropriate assessments of plant risk 

configurations are sufficient to support 

the proposed CSS CT extension request. 

This supporting information also 

addresses the Tier 3 aspects of 

Reference 4. 

[EXPECTATIONS/ACCEPTANCE 

CRITERIA: The licensee’s submittal 

must describe its CRMP or associated 

(a)(4) program (as appropriate), 

including how it reflects the current 

plant PRA model (specifically 

identifying any deviations and 

simplifications in the CRMP model from 

the plant-specific PRA model) and how 

the CRMP is updated to remain 

consistent with the plant-specific PRA. 

The licensee’s submittal must also 

describe how the CRMP or associated 

(a)(4) program provides the necessary 

assurances that appropriate assessments 

of plant risk configurations are 

sufficient to support the proposed CT 

extension request for the CSS. 

Finally, the licensee’s submittal must 

address the Tier 3 aspects of Reference 

4, including he description of the 

CRMP, and must confirm that its CRMP 

or associated (a)(4) program meets all 

aspects of Section 2.3.7.2 of Reference 4, 

specifically describing how its program 

meets each of the four Key Components 

identified in this Section. The Tier 3 

evaluation ensures that the CRMP or 

associated (a)(4) program is adequate 

when maintenance is about to 

commence, as opposed to the early 

(submittal stage) evaluation performed 

for Tier 2.] 

6. Attachment 6 provides supporting 

information, consistent with the 

evaluation summary (Section 7) 

provided in Reference 2, describing the 

relationship between components of the 

CSS and the shutdown cooling system 

(SDCS). For plants where components of 

the two systems may be used as backup 

to the other, the licensee must either 

confirm that Tier 2 conditions exist in 

the licensee’s CRMP or associated (a)(4) 

program that will not allow ‘‘at power’’

maintenance of the CSS and SDCS at the 

same time or that the risk significance 

of such maintenance configurations is 

low. If the CSS and SDCS have backup 

components, the plant should also 

describe how this backup capability is 

considered as part of the plant’s 

shutdown operations program (SOP). If 

this backup feature is not considered 

when one train of the SDCS is in 

maintenance or otherwise unavailable, 

it should be stated in the licensee’s 

application. 

[EXPECTATION: The licensee’s 

submittal must describe the 

relationship/interfaces between the CSS 

and SDCS. 

ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA: If the 

SDCS can be used as a backup to the 

CSS, then the licensee must confirm 

that ‘‘at power’’ maintenance of the CSS 

and SDCS will not be allowed at the 

same time and describe how this is 

controlled (e.g., specifically identified 

in the CRMP as a configuration that is 

not allowed) or provide justification that 

the risks associated with a simultaneous 

‘‘at-power’’ outage of one SDCS train 

and one CSS train is small. If the SDCS 

cannot be used (and is not credited) as 

a backup to CSS, then the licensee 

needs to explicitly state this fact. 

If CSS pumps can be used as a backup 

to the SDCS pumps, then the licensee 

must confirm that at least one CSS 

pump is required to be operable when 

maintenance of the CSS is performed in 

lower modes of operation (consistent 

with the plant’s Technical 

Specifications) and must describe how 

this is controlled or demonstrate that 

the SOP provides adequate risk 

management for that configuration. If 

CSS pumps cannot be used (and are not 

credited) as a backup to SDCS pumps in 

lower modes of operation, then the 

licensee needs to explicitly state this 

fact.] 

7. Attachment 7 provides supporting 

information confirming that the 

licensee’s Maintenance Rule program 

includes the ability to compute ICDP 

(incremental core damage probability), 

and ILERP (incremental large early 

release probability). 

[EXPECTATIONS/ACCEPTANCE 

CRITERIA: The licensee must confirm 

that their CRMP quantitative model 

(e.g., model used to provide quantitative 

assessments in support of 10 CFR 50.65 

(a)(4)) calculates ICDP and ILERP, and 


ycherry on PROD1PC64 with NOTICES
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that their CRMP quantitative model 

(e.g., model used to provide quantitative 

assessment in support of 10 CFR 50.65 

(a)(4)) explicitly models the CSS or has 

been modified to include the CSS, 

which will be used whenever CSS 

components are made unavailable. 

8. Attachment 8 provides information 

addressing how plant-specific systems, 

structures and components (SSC) are 

monitored and assessed at the plant 

under the Maintenance Rule (i.e. 10 CFR 

50.65). Maintenance Rule unavailability 

and unreliability targets for CSS are also 

provided. These targets will be 

monitored in accordance with 

provisions of the Maintenance Rule. 

[EXPECTATIONS/ACCEPTANCE 

CRITERIA: The licensee must describe 

how plant-specific SSC reliability and 

availability are monitored and assessed 

at the plant under the Maintenance Rule 

(i.e., 10 CFR 50.65) to confirm that 

performance continues to be consistent 

with the analyses used to justify the 7- 

day CT. In providing this description, 

the licensee should also indicate how it 

periodically assesses previous riskinformed licensing action decisions to 

ensure that these decisions remain valid 

(i.e., continue to meet the Reference 3 

and Reference 4 acceptance guidelines) 

for the current plant operations and 

plant-specific PRA and what actions it 

takes if a previously-approved riskinformed licensing action decision is 

determined to no longer meet these 

acceptance guidelines.] 

4.2.2 Regulatory Commitment 

The Reference 4 Tier 3 program 

ensures that, while the plant is 

following the TS ACTIONS associated 

with a 7-day CT for restoring an 

inoperable CSS to operable status, 

additional activities will not be 

performed that could further degrade 

the capabilities of the plant to respond 

to a condition that the inoperable CSS 

is designed to mitigate and, as a result, 

increase plant risk beyond that 

determined by the Reference 1 analyses. 

[LICENSEE’s] implementation of 

Reference 4 Tier 3 guidelines generally 

implies the assessment of risk with 

respect to CDF. However, the proposed 

CSS 7-day CT impacts accident 

sequences that can be mitigated 

following core damage and, 

consequently, impacts LERF as well as 

CDF. Therefore, [LICENSEE] has 

enhanced its CRMP, [OPTIONAL: as 

implemented under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), 

the Maintenance Rule,] to include a 

LERF assessment to support this 

application. 

5.0 Regulatory Analysis 

5.1 No Significant Hazards 

Consideration 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the 

proposed no significant hazards 

consideration determination published 

in the Federal Register on [DATE] ([ ] 

FR [ ]) as part of the CLIP. [LICENSEE] 

has concluded that the proposed 

determination presented in the notice is 

applicable to [PLANT NAME] and the 

determination is hereby incorporated by 

reference to satisfy the requirements of 

10 CFR 50.91(a). 

5.2 Applicable Regulatory 

Requirements/Criteria 

Based on its answers to the Section 

4.2.1 questions provided in Attachments 

1 through 8 to this application 

[LICENSEE] determines is based on the 

following: 

1. The traditional engineering 

evaluation reveals that the loss of one 

CSS train is well within [PLANT 

NAME’s] design basis analyses. Key 

principles 1,2,3, and 5 in Section 2 of 

Reference 3 are met. 

2. By meeting the conditions 

identified in Section 4.2.1, [LICENSEE] 

believes that its PRA model is 

acceptable for this application and also 

concludes that there is minimal impact 

of the CT extensions for the CSS system 

on plant operational risk (Tier 1 

evaluation). 

3. By meeting the conditions 

identified in Section 4.2.1, [LICENSEE] 

will ensure that its implementation will 

identify potentially high risk 

configurations and the need for any 

additional constraints or compensatory 

actions that, if implemented, would 

avoid or reduce the probability of a risksignificant configuration (Tier 2 

evaluation), or state that no Tier 2 

limitations have been identified. 

4. By meeting the conditions 

identified in Section 4.2.1, [PLANT 

NAME] will ensure that its riskinformed CRMP will satisfactorily 

assess the risk associated with the 

removal of equipment from service 

during the proposed CSS CT (Tier 3 

evaluation) and the CRMP and plant 

risk will be managed by plant 

procedures, including implementation 

and monitoring of SSCs (CSS). 

In conclusion, based on the 

consideration discussed above, (1) there 

is reasonable assurance that the health 

and safety of the public will not be 

endangered by operation in the 

proposed manner, (2) such activities 

will be conducted in compliance with 

the Commission’s regulations, and (3) 

the issuance of the amendment will not 

be inimical to the common defense and 

security or to the health and safety of 

the public. 

6.0 Environmental Consideration 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the 

environmental evaluation included in 

the model safety evaluation as pat of the 

CLIIP. [LICENSEE] concluded that the 

staff’s findings presented in that the 

evaluation are applicable to [PLANT 

NAME] and the evaluation is hereby 

incorporated by reference for this 

application. 

7.0 References 

[Licensee should include an 

applicable list of references, including 

but not limited to] 

1. Joint Applications Report: 

Modification to the Containment Spray 

System, and Low Pressure Safety 

Injection System Technical, CE Owners 

Group, CE NPSD–1045, March 2000. 

2. Safety Evaluation by the Office of 

Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to 

CE Owners Group CE–NPSD–1045, 

‘‘Joint Application Report, Modification 

to the Containment Spray System, and 

the Low Pressure Safety Injection 

System Technical Specifications, 

December 21, 1999.’’

3. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.174, 

‘‘An Approach for Using Probabilistic 

Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed 

Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to 

the Licensing Basis,’’ Revision 1, 

November 2002. 

4. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.177, 

‘‘An Approach for Plant-Specific, RiskInformed Decisionmaking: Technical 

Specifications,’’ August 1998. 

5. NUREG–0800, ‘‘Standard Review 

Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis 

Reports for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ June 

1996. 

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (MARK-UP) 

Enclosure 2 

CHANGES TO TS BASES 

Enclosure 3 

CONDITION (1) 

[LICENSEE’S] EVALUATION AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 


ycherry on PROD1PC64 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 215 / Tuesday, November 7, 2006 / Notices 65157 

1PSA and PRA are used interchangeably herein. 

Attachemnt 1 

CONDITION (2) 

[LICENSEE’S] EVALUATION AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 

Attachemnt 2 

CONDITION (3) 

[LICENSEE’S] EVALUATION AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 

Attachemnt 3 

CONDITION (4) 

[LICENSEE’S] EVALUATION AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 

Attachemnt 4 

CONDITION (5) 

[LICENSEE’S] EVALUATION AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 

Attachemnt 5 

CONDITION (6) 

[LICENSEE’S] EVALUATION AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 

Attachemnt 6 

CONDITION (7) 

[LICENSEE’S] EVALUATION AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 

Attachemnt 7 

CONDITION (8) 

[LICENSEE’S] EVALUATION AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 

Attachemnt 8 

MODEL SAFETY EVALUATION 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Technical Specification Task Force 

TSTF–409, Revision 2 

‘‘Containment Spray System 

Completion Time Extension’’

1.0 Introduction 

By letter to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC, Commission) dated 

[DATE] (Agencywide Documents Access 

and Management System (ADAMS) 

Accession Number MLXXXXXXXXX), 

[LICENSEE] (the licensee) requested 

changes to the Technical Specifications 

(TSs) for [PLANT NAME]. The proposed 

changes would revise TS 3.6.6A, 

‘‘Containment Spray and Cooling 

Systems,’’ by extending from 72 hours 

to seven days the completion time (CT) 

to restore an inoperable containment 

spray system (CSS) train to operable 

status, and would add a Condition 

describing the required action and CT 

when one CSS train and one 

containment cooling system (CCS) train 

are inoperable. 

The changes are based on Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change 

Traveler, TSTF–409, Revision 2 (Rev.), 

‘‘Containment Spray System 

Completion Time Extension (CE NPSD–

2045–A)’’ and associated TS Bases. 

TSTF–409, Rev. 2, submitted to the NRC 

by the TSTF in a letter dated November 

10, 2003 (ADMS Accession Number 

MLO33280006), was approved by the 

NRC on [DATE]. 

TSTF–409, Rev. 2 is based on 

Combustion Engineering Owner’s Group 

(CEOG) Joint Application Report CE 

NPSD–1045–A, ‘‘Joint Applications 

Report for Modifications to the 

Containment Spray System Technical 

Specifications,’’ dated March 2000 

(Reference 1), as accepted by, and 

subject to the limitations specified in, 

the associated NRC safety evaluation 

(SE), dated December 212, 1999 (ADMS 

Accession Number ML993620241) 

(Reference 2). 

In TSTF–409, Rev. 2, the CEOG states 

that the longer CT for restoring an 

inoperable CSS train to operable status 

will enhance overall plant safety by 

avoiding potential unscheduled plant 

shutdowns and allowing greater 

availability of safety significant 

components during shutdown. In 

addition the CEOG states that this 

extension provides for increased 

flixibility in scheduling and performing 

maintenance and surveillance activities 

in order to enhance plant safety and 

operational flexibility during lower 

modes of operation. 

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation 

Since the mid-1980’s, the NRC has 

been reviewing and granting 

improvements to TS that are based, at 

least in part, on probabilistic risk 

assessment (PRA) insights. In its final 

policy statement on TX improvements 

dated July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132), the 

NRC stated that it: 

* * * expects that licensees, in preparing 

their Technical Specification related 

submittals, will utilize any plant-specific 

PSA [probabilistic safety assessment] 1 or risk 

survey and any available literature on risk 

insights and PSAs * * * Similarly, the NRC 

staff will also employ risk insights an PSAs 

in evaluating Technical Specifications 

related submittals. Further, as a part of the 

Commission’s ongoing program of improving 

Technical Specifications, it will continue to 

consider methods to make better use of risk 

and reliability information for defining future 

generic Technical Specification 

requirements. 

The NRC reiterated this point when it 

issued the revision to 10 CFR 50.36, 

‘‘Technical Specifications,’’ in July 

1995. In August 1995, the NRC adopted 

a final policy statement on the use of 

PRA methods in nuclear regulatory 

activities that encouraged greater use of 

PRA to improve safety decision-making 

and regulatory efficiency. The PRA 

policy statement included the following 

points: 

1. The use of PRA technology should 

be increased in all regulatory matters to 

the extent supported by the state-of-theart in PRA methods and data, and in a 

manner that complements the NRC’s 

deterministic approach and supports the 

NRC’s traditional defense-in-depth 

philosophy. 

2. PRA and associated analyses (e.g., 

sensitivity studies, uncertainty analyses, 

and importance measures) should be 

used in regulatory matters; where 

practical within the bounds of the stateVerDate Aug<31>2005 14:44 Nov 06, 2006 Jkt 211001 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\07NON1.SGM 07NON1

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of-the-art, to reduce unnecessary 

conservatism associated with current 

regulatory requirements. 

3. PRA evaluations in support of 

regulatory decisions should be as 

realistic as practicable and appropriate 

supporting data should be publicly 

available for review. 

In March 1998, the CEOG submitted 

a joint applications report for the NRC 

staff’s review entitled, ‘‘Joint 

Applications Report for Modifications to 

the Containment Spray System and Low 

Pressure Safety System Technical 

Specifications.’’ The NRC review 

accepting this joint applications report 

for referencing in license applications 

for Combustion Engineering (CE) plants, 

including appropriate exclusions, 

conditions, and limitations, is 

documented in Reference 2. The final, 

NRC-approved joint applications report, 

(Reference 1) is dated March 2000. 

3.0 Technical Evaluation 

The NRC staff evaluated the licensee’s 

proposed amendment to extend the TS 

CT for one CSS train out of service from 

72 hours to seven days using insights 

derived from traditional engineering 

considerations and the use of PRA 

methods to determine the safety impact 

of extending the CT. 

3.1 Traditional Engineering Evaluation 

The function of the containment heat 

removal systems under accident 

conditions is to remove heat from the 

containment atmosphere, thus 

maintaining the containment pressure 

and temperature at acceptably low 

levels. The systems also serve to limit 

offsite radiation levels by reducing the 

pressure differential between the 

containment atmosphere and the 

external environment, thereby 

decreasing the driving force for fission 

product leakage across the containment. 

The two containment heat removal 

systems are the CCS and CSS. The CCS 

fan coolers are designed to operate 

during both normal plant operations 

and under loss-of-coolant accident 

(LOCA) or main stream line break 

(MSLB) conditions. The CSS is designed 

to operate during accident conditions 

only. 

The heat removal capacity of the CCS 

and CSS is sufficient to keep the 

containment temperature and pressure 

below design conditions for any size 

break, up to and including a doubleended break of the largest reactor 

coolant pipe. The systems are also 

designed to mitigate the consequences 

of any size break, up to and including 

a double-ended break of a main stream 

line. The CCS and CSS continue to 

reduce containment pressure and 

temperature and maintain them at 

acceptable levels post-accident. 

The CCS and CSS at [PLANT NAME] 

each consist of [Substitute plant-specific 

configuration if it differs from the 

following description] two redundant 

loops and are designed such that a 

single failure does not degrade their 

ability to provide the required heat 

removal capability. Two of four 

containment fan coolers and one CSS 

loop are powered from one safetyrelated bus. The other two containment 

fan coolers and one CSS loop are 

powered from another independent 

safety related bus. The loss of one bus 

does not affect the ability of the 

containment heat removal systems to 

maintain containment temperature and 

pressure below the design values in a 

post-accident mode. 

The [PLANT NAME] CSS consists of 

[Substitute plant-specific configuration 

if it differs from the following 

description] two independent and 

redundant loops each containing a spray 

pump, shutdown heat exchanger, 

piping, valves, spray headers, and spray 

nozzles. It has two modes of operation, 

which are: 

1. The injection mode, during which 

the system sprays borated water from 

the refueling water tank (RWT) into the 

containment, and 

2. The recirculation mode, which is 

automatically initiated by the 

recirculation actuation signal (RAS) 

after low level is reached in the RWT. 

During this mode of operation, the 

safety injection system (SIS) sump 

provides suction for the spray pumps. 

Containment spray is automatically 

initiated by the containment spray 

actuation signal coincident with the 

safety injection actuation signal and 

high containment pressure signal. If 

required, the operator can manually 

activate the system from the main 

control room. 

Each CSS pump, together with a CCS 

loop, provides the flow necessary to 

remove the heat generated inside the 

containment following a LOCA or 

MSLB. Upon system activation, the 

pumps are started, and borated water 

flows into the containment spray 

headers. When low level is reached in 

the RWT, sufficient water has been 

transferred to the containment to allow 

for the recirculation mode of operation. 

Spray pump suction is automatically 

realigned to the SIS sump upon a RAS. 

During a recirculation mode, the 

spray water is cooled by the shutdown 

heat exchangers prior to discharge into 

the containment. The shutdown heat 

exchangers are cooled by the component 

cooling water system. Post-LOCA pH 

control is provided by [Substitute plantspecific configuration if it differs from 

the following description] trisodium 

phosphate dodecahydrate, which is 

stored in stainless steel baskets located 

in the containment near the SIS sump 

intake. 

Based on a review of the design-basis 

requirements for the CSS, the NRC staff 

concluded that the loss of one CSS train 

is well within the design-basis analyses. 

The plant status with one CSS train and 

one CCS train inoperable is covered by 

TS3.6.6A, ACTION D, which states: 

‘‘[With] one containment spray and one 

containment cooling train inoperable, restore 

containment spray train to OPERABLE status 

within 72 hours, or restore containment 

cooling train to OPERABLE status within 72 

hours.’’

ACTION D ensures that the iodine 

removal capabilities of the CSS are 

available, along with 100 percent of the 

heat removal needs after an accident. 

The supporting analyses performed in 

Reference 1 did not evaluate the 

concurrent inoperabilities of one CSS 

train and one CCS train. Therefore, the 

current CT of 72 hours is retained in 

Condition D. The 72-hour CT was 

development taking into account the 

redundant heat removal capabilities 

afforded by combinations of the CSS 

and CCS, the iodine removal function of 

the CSS, and the low probabilities of a 

DBA occurring during this period. 

3.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 

Evaluation 

The proposed extension of the CSS 

CT for one inoperable train from 72 

hours to seven days affects plant risk by 

impacting: 

1. Accident sequences that can be 

prevented from leading to core damage. 

2. Accident sequences that can be 

mitigated following core damage. 

The CSS therefore affects both core 

damage frequency (CDF) and large early 

release frequency (LERF). This is 

because the CSS performs the critical 

function of controlling containment 

temperature and pressure to cool the 

reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory 

that is spilled in the sump as a result of 

a LOCA (core damage prevention role) 

and preventing the release of 

radionuclides subsequent to a core 

damage event (core damage and 

radionuclide release mitigation role). 

[The following paragraph will contain 

plant-specific information based on the 

plant’s ability to use the shutdown 

cooling system (SDCS) as a backup to 

the CSS. The licensee should provide a 

plant-specific system configuration 

description based on whether its SDCS 

can be used a backup to the CSS pump.] 

The proposed CT extension also 

impacts the long-term cooling function 


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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 215 / Tuesday, November 7, 2006 / Notices 65159 

that can be provided by the SDCS 

following a small-break LOCA, steam 

generator tube rupture (SGTR), or 

MSLB. If entry into the 7-day CT is 

caused by a CSS pump outage, the 

plants with the ability to use the SDCS 

as a backup to the CSS pump can still 

preserve the spray function of the 

affected train. If, however, a SDCS heat 

exchanger is removed from service, then 

both the CSS and SDCS capability of the 

affected train would be lost unless 

cross-connect capability with another 

unaffected system (e.g., service water) is 

possible. However, this cross-connect 

capability should not be credited unless 

it is proceduralized. 

The NRC staff used a three-tiered 

approach to evaluate the plant-specific 

risk impact associated with the 

proposed TS changes. The first tier 

evaluates the plant-specific PRA model 

and the impact of the proposed CT 

extension on plant operational risk. The 

second tier addresses the need to 

preclude potentially high risk 

configurations by identifying the need 

for any additional constraints or 

compensatory actions that, if 

implemented, would avoid or reduce 

the probability of a risk-significant 

configuration during the time when on 

CSS train is out of service. The third tier 

evaluates the licensee’s proposed 

Configuration Risk Management 

Program (CRMP) to ensure that the 

applicable plant configuration will be 

appropriately assessed from a risk 

perspective before entering into, or 

during, the proposed CT. 

In Reference 2, the NRC staff found 

that the risk analysis methodology and 

approach used by the CEOG to estimate 

the risk impact were reasonable. In its 

SE, the NRC staff also stated that, for 

most plants that participated in the joint 

application report, the risk impact can 

be shown to be consistent with the 

acceptance guidelines for change in CDF 

(DCDF), change in LERF (DLERF), 

incremental conditional core damage 

probability (ICCDP), and incremental 

large early release frequency (ICLERP) 

specified in Regulatory Guide (RG) 

1.174 (Reference 3) and RG 1.177 

(Reference 4) and the associated 

Standard Review Plan (SRP) Chapters 

19.0 and 16.1 of NUREG–0800 

(Reference 5). However, not all CE 

plants participated in the joint 

application report, and the estimated 

risk impacts for some plants exceeded 

the Reference 3 and/or Reference 4 

acceptance guidelines, which would 

require additional justifications and/or 

compensatory measures to be provided 

for these plants to be determined to 

have acceptable risk impacts. 

In Reference 2, the NRC staff also 

found that the Tier 2 and Tier 3 

evaluations, as described in Reference 4, 

could not be approved generically since 

they were not complete from the 

perspective of addressing plant-specific 

Tier 2 and Tier 3 issues which would 

require that each individual plantspecific license amendment seeking 

approval through TSTF–409, Rev. 2 

would need to include an assessment 

with respect to the Tier 2 and Tier 3 

principles of Reference 4. 

Based on the above discussion, the 

NRC staff identified conditions that 

must be addressed in the licensee’s 

plant-specific application requesting 

adoption of TSTF–409, Revision 2. In its 

application dated [DATE], the licensee 

provided supporting information for 

each of the conditions which met the 

NRC staff’s expectations and acceptance 

criteria [with the following exceptions: 

list any exceptions to the conditions 

stated in the model LAR]. 

[Provide a discussion of any 

significant plant-specific exceptions to 

or modifications of the conditions 

described in the model LAR]. 

3.2.1 Commitment 

The Reference 4 Tier 3 program 

ensures that, while the plant is 

following the TS ACTIONS associated 

with a 7-day CT for restoring an 

inoperable CSS to operable status, 

additional activities will not be 

performed that could further degrade 

the capabilities of the plant to respond 

to a condition that the inoperable CSS 

is designed to mitigate and, as a result, 

increase plant risk beyond that 

determined by the Reference 1 analyses. 

A licensee’s implementation of 

Reference 4 Tier 3 guidelines indicates 

that it has assessed risk with respect to 

CDF. However, the proposed CSS 7-day 

CT impacts accident sequences that can 

be mitigated following core damage and, 

consequently, LERF as well as CDF. 

Therefore, the licensee enhnaced its 

CRMP [optional: as implemented under 

10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), the Maintenance 

Rule,] to include a LERF assessment. 

[The licensee should confirm that 

performance of LERF assessments is 

included in the plant’s Maintenance 

Rule program.] 

3.3 Summary 

On [DATE], ([ ] FR [ ]), the NRC 

announced the availability of TSTF–

409, Rev. 2 for adoption by licensees 

using the consolidated line item 

improvement program (CLIIP). In its 

model license amendment request 

(LAR), the NRC staff asked each licensee 

to verify several aspects of its plantspecific PRA program including: 1) 

verification of PRA quality, 2) plantspecific analyses of the impact of this 

TS change on overall risk, 3) 

Maintenance Rule and CRMP 

considerations associated with the 

proposed changes, and, 4) system 

interdependencies. In its [DATE] 

submittal, the licensee provided 

satisfactory information related to the 

eight conditions and one licensee 

commitments set forth in the model 

LAR. 

Having met the conditions identified 

in the model LAR, the NRC staff finds 

that the licensee’s plant-specific LAR is 

consistent with the previous NRC staff 

approval of Reference 1, as documented 

in Reference 2 and TSTF–409, Rev. 2, 

and thus is acceptable. This 

determination is based on the following: 

1. The traditional engineering 

evaluation reveals that the loss of one 

CSS train is well within the design-basis 

analyses. 

2. Since the licensee meets the 

conditions identified in the model LAR, 

the NRC staff finds that there is minimal 

impact of the CT extensions for the CSS 

system on plant operational risk (Tier 1 

evaluation). 

3. Meeting the conditions identified 

in the model LAR will ensure that the 

licensee’s implementation will identify 

potentially high risk configurations and 

the need for any additional constraints 

or compensatory actions that, if 

implemented, would avoid or reduce 

the probability of a risk-significant 

configuration (Tier 2 evaluation). 

4. Meeting the conditions identified 

in the model LAR will ensure that the 

risk-informed CRMP proposed by the 

licensee will satisfactorily assess the 

risk associated with the removal of 

equipment from service during the 

proposed CSS CT (Tier 3 evaluation) 

and the CRMP and plant risk will be 

managed by plant procedures. 

4.0 Regulatory Commitment 

The licensee’s letter dated [DATE], 

contained the following regulatory 

commitment: [STATE THE LICENSEE’S 

COMMITMENT AND ENSURE THAT IT 

SATISFIES THE COMMITMENT IN 

SECTION 3.2.1 OF THIS SE]. 

The NRC staff finds that reasonable 

controls for the implementation and for 

subsequent evaluation of proposed 

changes pertaining to the above 

regulatory commitment are best 

provided by the licensee’s 

administrative controls process, 

including its commitment management 

program. The above regulatory 

commitment does not warrant the 

creation of a license condition (item 

requiring prior NRC approval of 

subsequent changes). 


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5.0 State Consultation 

In accordance with the Commission’s 

regulations, the [STATE] State official 

was notified of the proposed issuance of 

the amendment[s]. The State official had 

[CHOOSE ONE: (1) No comments, OR 

(2) the following comments—with 

subsequent disposition by the staff]. 

6.0 Environmental Consideration 

The amendment changes a 

requirement with respect to the 

installation or use of a facility 

component located within the restricted 

area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The 

NRC staff has determined that the 

amendment involves no significant 

increase in the amounts, and no 

significant change in the types, of any 

effluents that may be released offsite, 

and that there is no significant increase 

in individual or cumulative 

occupational radiation exposure. The 

Commission has previously issued a 

proposed finding that the amendment 

involves no significant hazards 

consideration, and there has been no 

public comment on such finding [(XX 

FR XXXXX, dated Monthly DD, YYYY)]. 

Accordingly, the amendment meets the 

eligibility criteria for categorical 

exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 

no environmental impact statement or 

environmental assessment need be 

prepared in connection with the 

issuance of the amendment. 

7.0 Conclusion 

The Commission has concluded, 

based on the considerations discussed 

above, that (1) there is reasonable 

assurance that the health and safety of 

the public will not be endangered by 

operation in the proposed manner, (2) 

such activities will be conducted in 

compliance with the Commission’s 

regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 

amendment will not be inimical to the 

common defense and security or to the 

health and safety of the public. 

8.0 References 

1. Joint Applications Report: Modification to 

the Containment Spray System, and Low 

Pressure Safety Injection System 

Technical, CE Owners Group, CE NPSD–

1045, March 2000. 

2. SE by the Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation Related to CE Owners Group 

CE–NPSD–1045, ‘‘Joint Application Report, 

Modification to the Containment Spray 

System, and the Low Pressure Safety 

Injection System Technical 

Specifications,’’ December 21, 1999. 

3. U.S. NRC RG 1.174, ‘‘An Approach for 

Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in 

Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific 

Changes to the Licensing Basis,’’ Revision 

1, November 2002. 

4. U.S. NRC RG 1.177, ‘‘An Approach for 

Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed 

Decisionmaking: Technical 

Specifications,’’ August 1998. 

5. NUREG–0800, ‘‘Standard Review Plan for 

the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for 

Nuclear Power Plants,’’ June 1996. 

Model No Significant Hazards 

Consideration 

Description of Amendment Request: 

The proposed amendment would revise 

the technical specifications to extend 

the completion time (CT) from 72 hours 

to seven days to restore an inoperable 

containment spray system (CSS) train to 

operable status, and add a Condition 

describing the required Actions and CT 

when one CSS and one containment 

cooling system (CCS) are inoperable. 

Basis for proposed no significant 

hazards consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an 

analysis of the issue of no significant 

hazards consideration is presented 

below: 

1. Does the proposed change involve 

a significant increase in the probability 

or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change extends from 72 

hours to 7 days the CT for restoring an 

inoperable CSS train to operable status. 

Being in an ACTION is not an initiator 

of any accident previously evaluated. 

Consequently, the probability of an 

accident previously evaluated is not 

significantly increased. The 

consequences of an accident while 

relying on ACTIONS during the 7-day 

CT are no different than the 

consequences of an accident while 

relying on the ACTION during the 

existing 72-hour CT. Therefore, the 

consequences of an accident previously 

evaluated are not significantly increased 

by this change. Therefore, this change 

does not involve a significant increase 

in the probability or consequences of an 

accident previously evaluated. 

2. Does the change create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change extends from 72 

hours to 7 days the CT for restoring an 

inoperable CSS train to operable status. 

The proposed change does not involve 

a physical alteration of the plant (no 

new or different type of equipment will 

be installed) or a change in the methods 

governing normal plant operation. Thus, 

this change does not create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from any accident previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed change involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change extends from 72 

hours to 7 days the CT for restoring an 

inoperable CSS train to operable status. 

The licensee performed risk-based 

evaluations using its plant-specific 

probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) 

model in order to determine the effect 

of this change on plant risk. The PRA 

evaluations were based on the 

conditions stipulated in NRC staff safety 

evaluations approving both Joint 

Applications Report CE NPSD–1045–A, 

‘‘Joint Applications Report, 

Modifications to the Containment Spray 

System and The Low Pressure Safety 

Injection System Technical 

Specifications,’’ and Technical 

Specification Task Force Change 

Traveler, TSTF–409, Revision 2, 

‘‘Containment Spray System 

Completion Time Extension (CE NPSD–

1045–A).’’ The results of these plantspecific evaluations determined that the 

effect of the proposed change on plant 

risk is very small. Therefore, this change 

does not involve a significant reduction 

in a margin of safety. 

Based on the above, the proposed 

change involves no significant hazards 

consideration under the standards set 

forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and 

accordingly, a finding of no significant 

hazards consideration is justified. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this XX day 

of XXXXXXXX, 2006. 

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Project Manager 

Plant Licensing Branch [ ] 

Division of Operating Reactor Licensing 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 

[FR Doc. 06–9094 Filed 11–6–06; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

Proposed Collections; Comment 

Request 

Upon Written Request; Copies Available 

From: Securities and Exchange 

Commission, Office of Filings and 

Information Services, Washington, DC 

20549. 

Extensions: 

Rule 14f–1, OMB Control No. 3235–0108, 

SEC File No. 270–127. 

Rule 12g3–2, OMB Control No. 3235–0119, 

SEC File No. 270–104. 

Rule 13e–1, OMB Control No. 3235–0305, 

SEC File No. 270–255. 

Notice is hereby given that pursuant 

to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 


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