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22–648 PDF 2006

S. HRG. 109–457

TO REVIEW BIOSECURITY PREPAREDNESS AND

EFFORTS TO ADDRESS AGROTERRORISM THREATS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, 

NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 20, 2005

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.agriculture.senate.gov 

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Chairman 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas 

JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

MICHEAL D. CRAPO, Idaho 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

KENT CONRAD, North Dakota 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

BLANCHE L. LINCOLN, Arkansas 

DEBBIE A. STABENOW, Michigan 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

KEN SALAZAR, Colorado

MARTHA SCOTT POINDEXTER, Majority Staff Director 

DAVID L. JOHNSON, Majority Chief Counsel 

STEVEN MEEKS, Majority Legislative Director 

ROBERT E. STURM, Chief Clerk 

MARK HALVERSON, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

HEARING(S):

To Review Biosecurity Preparedness and Efforts to Address Agroterrorism 

Threats .................................................................................................................. 01

Wednesday July 20, 2005

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY SENATORS 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, a U.S. Senator from Georgia, Chairman, Committee 

on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry ............................................................. 01

Roberts, Hon. Pat, a U.S. Senator from Kansas ................................................... 03

Salazar, Hon. Ken, a U.S. Senator from Colorado ................................................ 23

WITNESSES 

Panel I

Conner, Hon. Charles, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 05

Brackett, Robert, Ph.D., Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition Food & Drug Administration, Rockville, MD ............................................. 10

Lewis, John E., Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC ......................................................... 08

McCarthy, Maureen, Ph.D., Director, Office of Research and Development 

Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC ....................................... 06

Panel II

Cheviron, Mark J., Corporate Vice President and Director of Corporate Security and Services Archers Daniels Midlane Company, Decatur, IL ................. 35

Lane, James, Ford County Undersheriff, Dodge City, Kansas ............................ 39

Roth, James A., DVM, Ph.D., Director, The Center for Food Security and 

Public Health Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa ............................................ 31

Sherwood, James, Ph.D., Head, Department of Plant Pathology University 

of Georgia, Athens, Georgia ................................................................................ 29

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Conner, Hon. Charles ....................................................................................... 44

Salazar, Hon. Ken ............................................................................................ 93

Brackett, Robert, Ph.D ..................................................................................... 71

Cheviron, Mark J .............................................................................................. 114

Lane, James ...................................................................................................... 105

Lewis, John E ................................................................................................... 67

McCarthy, Maureen, Ph.D ............................................................................... 58

Roth, James A ................................................................................................... 101

Sherwood, James, Ph.D .................................................................................... 96

DOCUMENT(S) SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Harkin, Hon. Tom ............................................................................................ 118

Page

IV

DOCUMENT(S) SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD—Continued

Cochran, Hon. Thad ......................................................................................... 119

Statement of Mary Upchurch Kruger, Director, Office of Homeland Security Office of the Administrator ................................................................... 121

Statement of Edwin Quattlebaum, Ph.D., Chairman, President, and Chief 

Executive Officer MetaMorphix, Inc ........................................................... 126

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby .................................................................................... 134

Harkin, Hon. Tom ............................................................................................ 137

Cochran, Hon. Thad ......................................................................................... 148

Grassley, Hon. Charles .................................................................................... 150

McConnell, Hon. Mitch .................................................................................... 153

Roberts, Hon. Pat ............................................................................................. 154

Salazar, Hon. Ken ............................................................................................ 161

(1)

TO REVIEW BIOSECURITY PREPAREDNESS 

AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 

AGROTERRORISM THREATS 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 2005

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SR–328a, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Saxby Chambliss, 

chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present or submitting a statement: Senators Chambliss, Roberts, 

Thomas, Dayton, Cochran, and Salazar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM GEORGIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, 

NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. I welcome you this morning to 

this hearing to review the efforts by public and private entities to 

increase biosecurity and agroterrorism preparedness. I appreciate 

our witnesses and members of the public being here to review this 

very important topic as well as those who are listening through our 

web site. Agriculture is a significant sector within the U.S. economy, accounting for 13 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product 

and 18 percent of domestic employment. A deliberate attack on the 

U.S. food supply and agriculture operations would cause severe economic loss from farm to plate. 

As we have seen with naturally occurring plant and animal disease, these losses could be particularly severe where States where 

animal and crop production is connected and largely responsible for 

the majority of economic activity. For example, three states, Arkansas, Alabama, and my home State of Georgia account for 31 percent of the chickens produced in the United States. North Carolina, 

Iowa, and Minnesota account for 53 percent of hog production; and 

five others, Nebraska, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and California 

produce 35 percent of the cattle. Four States, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, and Minnesota produce 54 percent of the corn; and three 

of those, Illinois, Iowa and Minnesota, produce 39 percent of all 

soybeans. 

Current Federal efforts to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack are governed by two main Presidential directives. We will 

hear testimony from representatives of the Department of Agriculture, Department of Homeland Security, and the Food and Drug 

Administration outlining existing efforts and capabilities and what 

2

we must do to deter, detect, and respond effectively to an attack. 

I am particularly interested in hearing a status report on the implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directives 7 and 9 

and what, if any, additional authorities are necessary to prevent 

and deter a terrorist attack on the food supply. 

While the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Bioterrorism 

Act of 2002 increased biosecurity efforts, it is clear that more needs 

to be done. This hearing will serve as a useful dialog as this committee works with Senators Burr and Enzi and members of the 

Health Committee in drafting follow-up legislation to the Project 

Bioshield Act passed and signed by the President last year. 

And while we are talking about that, I want to take a minute 

to commend the leadership of Senator Burr in this respect. He was 

a colleague and friend of my mine in the House. He was a leader 

during his House days, and now he has brought that same leadership and that knowledge and experience to the Senate and is providing real positive direction on this issue. 

As we will hear, the responsibility to counter an agroterrorist attack spans the various agencies with different regulatory functions; 

however, a new partner and often overlooked component in any response is the integration of national and local law enforcement 

agencies. A recent symposium on agroterrorism hosted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation highlighted the need for our nation to 

respond quickly and to ensure local producers and first responders 

are a part of any national response plan. I welcome our colleagues 

from the law enforcement community to the Agriculture Committee 

and look forward to your testimony. 

As anyone in agriculture knows, farmers, ranchers, extension 

agents, and many others are an integral part of detecting and responding to any disease outbreak, whether naturally occurring or 

deliberate. The second panel highlights this important partnership 

between public and private sectors, and we will hear what is being 

done to increase our preparedness at the local level in coordination 

with farmers and ranchers, the scientific community, and industry. 

No effort to prepare for an attack can be successful without a 

healthy and strong public-private partnership. 

This will be the third hearing in the Senate since 1999 devoted 

to biosecurity and agroterrorism. My friend and colleague, Senator 

Roberts, who is with us this morning, held the first hearing in 

1999. I think it is fair to say that he recognized early on the need 

to address the issue and, in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate 

Intelligence Committee, has continued to highlight the need for direction relative to this issue. 

The events of September 11, 2001, propelled the Government 

into action and forced the Federal agencies to re-think the threats 

facing agriculture and the need to take steps to prevent 

agroterrorist attacks. Later, Senator Talent, also a member of this 

committee, highlighted the importance of the topic at a hearing before the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee 

chaired by Senator Collins almost 2 years ago. I look forward to 

working with members of this committee to make sure that this aspect of homeland security receives the attention and the resources 

it deserves. To do otherwise would place a critical sector of the 

economy at risk. 

3

Before we proceed, I would like to request unanimous consent to 

insert testimony submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency for the record, and without objection, that will be done. 

[The EPA statement follows:] 

The CHAIRMAN. I would ask my colleagues, Senator Thomas, Senator Roberts, if you would like to make any opening statement at 

this point. 

Senator THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for having this. 

This is an important issue. I have no statement. I am anxious to 

hear the testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Roberts. 

Senator ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I also would like to 

hear from the witnesses, but I do have an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PAT ROBERTS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

KANSAS 

Senator ROBERTS. Let me just say thank you for your very kind 

remarks and for holding this hearing. This is one of the most important issues that we face in agriculture, and it is true back in 

1999, as Chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, we held it so important that it we held it in the Armed 

Services Committee. That was the first hearing on the topic, and 

at that time, our president of Kansas State University testified on 

the real need and urgency to really try to accelerate the research 

and response to efforts in this area. I argued at the time that this 

was a topic we couldn’t ignore because it was simply too easy a target and would create absolute havoc and chaos in our food supply 

and our ag markets if it were to occur. 

You know, at first, quite a few people wanted to ignore the issue 

or at least they didn’t want me to talk about the issue. I know on 

one visit to western Kansas, I had a farmer come up to me and say, 

Pat, you have got to quit talking about all this agroterrorism stuff; 

you are scaring the dickens out of people here and you are hurting 

the markets. Actually, he put it a little more colorfully than that, 

but I think you get the picture. That was the reaction I got until 

the tragic events of 9–11. Obviously, we started to pay a lot more 

attention after that. 

We have since learned that several of the 9–11 hijackers had agriculture training. I think four of them—no six, and we know that 

they had an interest in crop dusters. It is my belief those crop dusters may have never been intended for people, but possibly could be 

used on agriculture. The threat is real. We know the former USSR 

had worked to try and simply weaponize many agriculture diseases, including foot and mouth disease and glanders and wheat 

rush, just to name a few. In many instances, these stockpiles still 

remain in loosely guarded facilities. That is what the non-limiter 

program is all about, and we don’t know whose hands some of it 

may have ended up in. 

We traveled to Ordzhonikidze in Russia to take a look. That was 

one of the centers where if you looked at what they were making, 

it gave a real true picture, I think, of what President Ronald 

Reagan said in terms of the evil empire in terms of what they were 

making in terms of stockpiles. By the way, you didn’t open up any 

4

refrigerator doors and take a good look or take a breath. Then they 

invited you for lunch, which made you think a little bit. 

I sit here today as Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and I can tell you that while we have no details of a specific 

threat against the food and agriculture sectors, as my colleague 

who sits in and is a valued member of that committee knows, but 

an attack is certainly possible, if not probable. It is so easy to do. 

In many instances, in the case of foot and mouth disease, it takes 

little, if any, scientific training. You just put a handkerchief under 

a diseased animal in Afghanistan, put it in a zip-lock bag, put it 

in your suitcase, come to the United States and drop it in any one 

of our feed lots, and we are in a lot of trouble. 

[Telephone interruption.] 

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Kansas State fight song, in case anybody missed that. 

Senator ROBERTS. Actually, I tried to put the Marine Corps hymn 

on there, but I haven’t got it done yet. And my wife is not going 

to be pleased that I just cut her off. She is, in fact, the speaker of 

my house. 

I am pleased since 9–11 we have made major strides in this area. 

We have created new diagnostic networks. We have increased research. Most importantly, our intelligence agencies and also our 

relevant food and agriculture agencies are talking to each other 

and sharing information. We have come a long way. 

A terrorist attack on the ag sector, as you know, Mr. Chairman, 

need not be large in scale to have a devastating impact on our markets. Simply put, we cannot allow that to happen, and that is why 

I thank you again for holding this hearing today. So thank you and 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. We are now joined by Senator Dayton. 

Senator Dayton, do you have any opening comments you wish to 

make? 

Senator DAYTON. I wish I could slim down the way this table did. 

Other than that, no, but you fooled me. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We are glad you are here. 

Our first panel this morning consists of the following individuals: 

The Honorable Charles Conner, Deputy Secretary of the United 

States Department of Agriculture. 

Chuck, I am glad we got you confirmed because you have been 

a busy guy and you have spent a lot of time over here with us, 

which we appreciate and we are glad to have your expertise and 

your knowledge here this morning. 

Maureen McCarthy, Director, Office of Research and Development from the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. McCarthy, 

welcome. 

Mr. John Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Lewis, welcome. 

Dr. Robert Brackett, Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition from the Food and Drug Administration. Dr. 

Brackett, we certainly welcome you here this morning. 

We will certainly insert your full statement in the record, but we 

will turn to each of you now. We will start with Chuck and move 

5

down this way. Any opening comments you wish to make, we look 

forward to hearing from you. 

Chuck. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES CONNER, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. CONNER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to be 

here today. I appreciate the invitation and the opportunity to represent the Department of Agriculture on this very timely hearing. 

Today, the committee raises an important issue, food and agricultural security. It is an issue that the U.S. Department of Agriculture considers essential to our mission. We seek to provide leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, and related issues 

based on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management. In light of the recent global events and the 

growing focus on the security of our food and agricultural systems, 

we appreciate the opportunity to provide you with an update on 

USDA’s homeland security-related efforts. 

I have summarized at your request, Mr. Chairman, my testimony 

to 5 minutes, but I would ask unanimous consent that my entire 

testimony be included in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. CONNER. This year, agriculture exports, as you know, are 

projected to reach approximately $59 billion, thereby making 2005 

the third largest export sales year in our history. Our nation’s food 

system contributes almost $1.24 trillion or over 12 percent to our 

gross domestic product, and it employs approximately 17 to 18 percent of our entire workforce, as you have noted, Mr. Chairman. 

With such a large stake in our nation’s economy, agriculture and 

the security of our agricultural sector is our No. 1 concern. 

As a department, we face many challenges in protecting this important infrastructure. The food and agriculture sector is particularly vulnerable to threats because agribusiness is not constrained 

by political boundaries and, as we all know, diseases and pathogens do not acknowledge State or national borders. The collective 

nature of the global food system is our strength, but it is also a disadvantage in the event of an attack or natural disease outbreak. 

Additionally, one of the agricultural sector’s greatest contributions 

to the quality of life is the fact that our products flow quickly and 

easily via interstate commerce. Contaminated products, whether 

intentionally contaminated or unintentionally contaminated, could 

spread a pest, disease, or other agent very quickly and have a devastating effect on our economy. 

Since September 11, 2001, USDA has made great progress to 

focus and expand our mission to include security for the first time. 

What has not changed is our conviction that the threat to agriculture is very real. We believe that the department is playing a 

critical role in protecting the nation’s food supply. Chairman 

Chambliss, our intention is to be proactive in maintaining a safe 

food supply and excellent detection mechanisms for animal and 

plant diseases and to be on the forefront of research and development to identify, contain, and eradicate animal and plant threats 

before they are able to have a major impact on our agricultural systems or our nation’s economy. 

6

USDA remains committed to sustaining the strong relationships 

we have established with our partners on the Federal level as well 

as with the State and local governments. Our work with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and 

Human Services, and other agencies is absolutely paramount. Additionally, we have taken broad measures to educate producers, 

processors, and consumers on the importance of identifying and 

preventing security threats. We realize that protecting America’s 

food supply is a momentous task, and that is why we value the opportunity to work in partnership with other agencies, governments, 

including this committee, suppliers and consumers on maintaining 

a secure food supply. 

My submitted testimony will also highlight the advances that the 

department is making to implement both Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 as well as 9 from our focus on surveillance and 

monitoring diseases and outbreaks to response and recovery following an incident. USDA is thoroughly implementing the HSPD 

directives. We will continue to work closely with other agencies to 

ensure that we have the safest agriculture and food supply in the 

world. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you for holding, again, such a timely 

hearing, and after my colleagues’ testimony, I would be happy to 

respond to questions the committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conner can be found in the appendix on page 44.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Conner. 

Dr. McCarthy. 

STATEMENT OF MAUREEN McCARTHY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Good morning, Chairman Chambliss, Senator 

Harkin, and distinguished members of the committee. I am very 

pleased to appear before you today to discuss the progress the 

Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security is making in close cooperation with our other agency 

partners to increase the Nation’s ability to prevent, protect, 

against, and respond to acts of bioterrorism against our agriculture 

and food supply. 

Last week, Secretary Chertoff announced a six-point agenda to 

enhance the department’s ability to manage risks, prioritize policy, 

share information, and conduct operations with a strong focus on 

preparedness. We must accomplish our mission with a continued 

sense of urgency. Our enemies constantly change and adapt. So we 

as a department must be nimble and decisive. We are adopting a 

risk management approach which integrates threats, 

vulnerabilities, and consequences to prioritize our actions and assess our performance. 

A major initiative of the department is the integration of activities that increase the Nation’s preparedness against present and 

future threats. Protecting the Nation’s agriculture and food supply 

is a critical element of these efforts. Our work must be guided by 

the understanding that effective security is built upon a network 

of systems that spans all levels of government and the private secVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:36 Jul 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\22648.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
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tor. DHS does not own or control all of these systems. We must set 

a clear national strategy and design an architecture in which separate roles and responsibilities for security are fully integrated 

amongst the public and private stakeholders. 

We must draw on the strength of our considerable network of assets, functioning as seamlessly as possible with other Federal agencies, State and local leadership, law enforcement, emergency management personnel, first responders, the private sector, our international partners, and the general public. Building effective partnerships must be at the core of every mission of the department. 

The Science and Technology Directorate is responsible for a 

broad range of agrodefense, research, development, test evaluation, 

and facility operations. These include accelerating the development 

of new veterinary countermeasures, establishing new university 

centers of excellence for agriculture and food security, and developing in close coordination with USDA a plan to provide facilities 

for farm animal disease and zoonotic defense, diagnostics, forensics, 

training, and countermeasure develop. 

The S and T Directorate in partnership with USDA has developed a joint strategy and program for farm animal disease defense 

with an initial focus and emphasis on the development of veterinary countermeasures for foot and mouth disease. Within this 

strategy, ARS from USDA leads the basic research and early development of diagnostics, vaccines and immunomodulators. Promising 

countermeasure candidates are then transferred to DHS for targeted advance development in cooperation with industry. The overall goal of this work is to expedite the transition of new validated 

diagnostic tools to the national animal health laboratory network 

and new vaccines and immunomodulators to the national veterinary stockpile. 

A significant achievement of our agricultural security preparedness program was the establishment of two new university homeland security centers of excellence. Through these homeland security centers and their extensive networks, we are engaging both the 

research and education capabilities of the Nation’s academic community to protect our agricultural security and food infrastructure. 

The Plum Island Animal Disease Center is a unique and critical 

facility for the Nation’s foreign animal disease defense. To facilitate 

overall coordination of the programs and operations of Plum Island, 

a board of directors has been established which is chaired by DHS 

and has the administrators of both ARS and APHIS as members. 

In 2004, Plum Island celebrates its fiftieth anniversary. The facility 

is now well beyond its originally planned life span and is in need 

of recapitalization. This year , we are conducting a conceptual design study for the next generation of a biological and agro facility. 

This process involving gathering requirements and developing options for the state-of-the-art facility that will support the Nation’s 

critical mission to protect our agriculture infrastructure well into 

the twenty-first century. The study is being done in collaboration 

with USDA and HHS. 

The Secretary is committed to enhancing our preparedness and 

protecting the critical agriculture infrastructure. This is a high-priority mission for the department and one we conduct in strategic 

8

partnerships with our colleagues from USDA, other government 

agencies, and the private sector. 

This concludes my prepared statement, and with the committee’s 

permission, I request my formal statement be submitted to the 

record. Mr. Chairman, and all the members of the committee, I 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and would be 

happy to take any of the questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. McCarthy can be found in the 

appendix on page 58.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. McCarthy. Your statement will 

be put into the record. 

We now turn to Mr. Lewis. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN E. LEWIS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. LEWIS. Good morning, Chairman Chambliss, Senators. 

Thank you for the invitation to come today and discuss with you 

this topic of agroterrorism. 

Since the tragedy of 9–11, the FBI has necessarily sharpened its 

focus on unconventional methods of future terrorist attacks, including a potential for some manner of terrorist event aimed at our 

food or ag sector, but mainly the previous and much publicized terrorist events including the Oklahoma City bombing, 9–11, Madrid, 

and now just recently London. We must make it our business not 

to let these series of events create for us something of a pattern 

that might preclude the type of proactive activity needed to prevent 

the next event. 

Most people do not equate terrorist attacks on people, public 

transportation, and buildings with attacks on plants and animals. 

We understand this threat to be real and we know the impact can 

be could be devastating. Our gathering here this morning is important. It sheds light on an area of our work that, frankly, is not all 

that often the leading topic around the terrorism discussion table. 

The absence of any direct attack on our food supply does not 

minimize the possibility that such an event could occur. We know 

from the body of intelligence collected to date that al Qaeda is 

aware of our agriculture industry along with other potential targets. To counter this particular terrorism threat, whether from an 

international or domestic terrorist, we are actively engaged and 

growing more so with our counterparts, not only across government, but across industry to share information, technology, and resources. Let me touch on some of these areas. 

One of the ways we are collaborating is through an entity known 

as the Agricultural Intelligence Working Group. Members of this 

group from across the U.S. intelligence community and beyond 

meet regularly to exchange information and ideas about food security and how best to maximize our combined skills, technology, and 

resources. The FBI is also a member of the National Bioforensic 

Analysis Center. This center is one of four components of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasure Center. We are 

working with multiple Federal partners in the area of case attribution, that is identifying and exploiting any signatures or characteristics of a biological agent. 

9

The second group identified is a scientific working group on 

microbioforensics led by our laboratory division down in Quantico. 

It is engaged, again, with our Federal partners in multiple areas 

of research, the results of which all can be used 1 day to improve 

the tool set we rely upon to carry out our counterterrorism mission. 

In addition to partnerships that begin here inside the beltway, 

we are expanding our partnerships to include those in industry. We 

are reaching out to farmers, cattle ranchers, food producers, and 

distributors, among others. In the Counterterrorism Division here 

at FBI headquarters, we are directing the formation of a program 

called Agri-Guard as well as the formation of agroterrorism working groups nationwide. The Agri-Guard program will be modelled 

after our existing Infraguard initiative. The Infraguard initiative 

was started back in 1996 and today serves as a virtual and secure 

link with a vetting national membership of approximately 12,000 

representatives of companies throughout the U.S., representing not 

only the computer industry for which this was started, but beyond. 

Using the Infraguard technology backbone, we are moving forward today to create this very same informational exchange within 

the food and ag sector. We have the money and resources now dedicated to this task, and we are working with our Federal partners 

to maximize the degree of coordination that both the States and industry expect from us. 

Beyond this initiative, just in the past several year weeks, I communicated with our 56 field offices and directed each to establish 

formal agroterrorism working groups within their respective territories. This directive will lead to a more formal and recurring meeting of key figures from the food and ag sector in each of the 56 field 

office territories. Although some of this is already in place in certain areas of the United States, my intention is to strengthen and 

to a degree standardize our partnerships across the country. We 

are working with our Federal partners and looking forward to recognizable progress in this area by bringing together on a regular 

basis for the purposes of prevention, awareness, intelligence, investigative response, and crisis management, State-level groups whose 

membership will include the State Secretary of Agriculture , for instance, the State’s chief veterinarian, leading law enforcement figures, public health officials, and pertinent representatives of the 

food and ag sector. 

If I may depart just for a moment, I can tell you that from the 

State of Georgia as well as from your State, Senator Roberts, we 

have outstanding participation from across the food and ag sector, 

and, frankly, we could use those as models to push out to the rest 

of the country for how to bring these groups together. 

On another front, the FBI has partnered with DHS, USDA, FDA, 

and private industry to conduct site surveys of specific and significant food and ag sites throughout the United States. I call this program the Strategic Partnership Program. The aim of this initiative 

conducted closely with our industry counterparts is to bring together subject matter experts whose analysis of a specific site can 

lead to the identification of potential vulnerabilities that could represent the opening a terrorist might exploit to plan for and carry 

out some sort of attack. This project is also intended to educate and 

raise a level of awareness of area law enforcement, lead to the deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:36 Jul 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\22648.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
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velopment of intelligence collection strategies around these sites 

and/or vulnerabilities, and to facilitate discussions and planning to 

develop mitigation strategies for early detection, deterrence, disruption, interdiction, and prevention. The sites will include the entire production cycle from farm to fork. 

Finally, the FBI today operates 105 joint terrorism task forces 

geographically dispersed throughout the United States. As you 

probably know, each of these are comprised of municipal, county, 

State, and Federal law enforcement personnel. These JTTFs are 

the focal point for counterterrorism efforts here in the United 

States and respond to all manner of threats. 

The JTTFs in each field office are aided by highly trained WMD 

coordinators, weapons of mass destruction coordinators. Each of 

these WMD coordinators maintain their own liaison network within law enforcement and public safety personnel and in their respective territories, and it is through this network that all manner of 

information passes. The WMD coordinators are, in turn, closely 

connected to our headquarters-based WMD domestic terrorism section where substantive multi-discipline scientific guidance and expertise is available 24–7. If we don’t have the scientific guidance 

resident at FBI Headquarters, our WMD team maintains an excellent array of partnerships across the community, including those 

folks seated here today that we can get answers from. 

We also operate the hazardous materials response unit and 27 

strategically located hazardous materials response teams throughout the United States. These response capabilities significantly enhance our ability to collect samples and effectively support threat 

assessments when needed. 

Farmers, ranchers, food distributors and producers are as much 

a first line of defense as our efforts need to be. If a rancher sees 

unusual symptoms of illness in a herd, if a food distributor notes 

suspicious activity in one of their distribution centers, we must be 

able to rely upon rapid and effective coordination so that all of us, 

including those here at the table who may be potentially involved, 

have the head start we need. All of us here are working to improve 

that. 

Our goal is to impress upon those in the food and ag sector, and, 

frankly, those of us who need to work closely with them, of the 

need for increased cooperation, increased awareness, and the recognition that given the prevailing threat conditions, we need to 

chart in a more collaborative course. We have been met with excellent cooperation from all areas of the food and ag sector where we 

have been recently. I am very optimistic that as we work here to 

improve our own positions, the food and ag sector is ready, willing, 

and able to fully cooperate with us and where needed improve 

theirs. 

Thank you, sir. I would be happy to respond to any questions 

when they come. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis can be found in the appendix on page 67.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. 

11

STATEMENT OF ROBERT BRACKETT, Ph.D, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, FOOD 

AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND 

Dr. BRACKETT. Good morning, Chairman Chambliss and members of the committee. I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues from the United States Department of Agriculture, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. FDA appreciates the opportunity to discuss our food 

counterterrorism activities. 

A great deal has been done in the last few years to enhance the 

safety of our food supply. FDA has worked with food safety agencies as well as law enforcement, intelligence gathering agencies, 

and the private industry to significantly strengthen the Nation’s 

food safety system across the entire distribution chain from farm 

to table to better protect our food supply against deliberate and accidental threats. This cooperation has resulted in greater awareness of vulnerabilities, the creation of more effective production 

programs, new surveillance systems, and faster outbreak response 

capabilities. 

FDA is the Federal agency that regulates everything we eat except meat, poultry, and processed egg products, which are regulated by our partners at USDA. FDA’s responsibility often extends 

to live food animals and animal feed, and FDA is also responsible 

for ensuring that human drugs, human biological products, medical 

devices, and radiological products, as well as veterinary drugs are 

safe and effective and that cosmetics are safe. 

In our food safety and defense efforts, FDA has many partners: 

Federal, State, local agencies, academia and industry. We are 

working closely with our Federal partners such as USDA, DHS, 

Homeland Security, Counsel to the White House, Department of 

State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the FBI, but I want to 

especially emphasize our close working relationship with our sister 

public health agency, CDC, Customs and Border Protection at 

DHS, and USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service. FDA is working 

closely with DHS and other Federal agencies to implement the 

President’s Homeland Security Presidential Directives, HSPDs. The 

President has issued HSPD–7,–8, and–9 which identify critical infrastructures, improve response planning, and establish a national 

policy to defend the agriculture and food systems against terrorist 

attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. 

The HHS and USDA Secretaries or their designees exercise key 

responsibilities as sector-specific agencies. DHS serves as the coordinator of the food and agricultural sector with HHS and USDA as 

co-leads for the food sector, and the USDA is the lead for the agriculture sector. This collaborative effort combines expertise from 

several Federal agencies as well as that of State and local officials 

and the private sector. 

Over the last past 3 years, FDA has been busy implementing the 

Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Protection Act of 2002. The Bioterrorism Act provided the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services with significant new authorities to 

protect the Nation’s food supply against the threat of intentional 

contamination and other food-related emergencies. These authorities improve our ability to act quickly in responding to a threatVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:36 Jul 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\22648.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
12

ened or actual terrorist attack as well as well as other food-related 

emergencies. 

I would like to mention just a few of the provisions of the Bioterrorism Act. Section 305 of the Bioterrorism Act requires registration of foreign and domestic food facilities that manufacture, process, pack, or hold food for consumption by humans or animals in 

the U.S. Thanks to this provision, FDA for the first time has a roster of foreign and domestic food facilities that provide food for 

American consumers. In the event of an emergency, the registration information will help FDA quickly identify, locate, and notify 

the facilities that may be affected. 

Section 307 requires the submission to FDA of prior notice of 

food, including animal feed, that is offered for import into the 

United States. This advance information enables FDA, working 

closely with CBP, to more effectively target inspections at the border to ensure the safety of imported foods before they move into the 

U.S. 

Section 306 authorizes FDA to access certain records when the 

agency has a reasonable belief than an article of food is adulterated 

and presents a threat of serious adverse health consequences or 

death to humans or animals. This enhances FDA’s ability to track 

and contain foods that pose a threat to American consumers from 

accidental or deliberate contamination of food. 

I would like also like to briefly mention a few of our other programs. FDA has issued guidance on the security measures the food 

industry may take to minimize the risk of food that would be subject to tampering or other malicious criminal or terrorist activities 

or actions. To increase laboratory surge capacity, FDA has worked 

in close collaboration with the Food Safety Inspection Service to establish the food emergency response network to include a substantial number of laboratories capable of analyzing food for agents of 

concern. To enhance coverage of imported food shipments, FDA has 

expanded FDA’s presence at ports of entry, increased surveillance 

of imported food, increased domestic inspection, and enhanced our 

laboratory analysis capacity. We have conducted extensive scientific vulnerability assessments of different categories of foods, determining the most serious risks of intentional contamination with 

different biological and chemical agents during the various stages 

of food production and distribution. 

FDA has established an Office of Crisis Management to coordinate the preparedness and emergency response activities within 

FDA and with our Federal, State, and local counterparts. We have 

embarked on an ambitious research agenda throughout FDA to address potential terrorist threats. 

In conclusion, due to the enhancements being made by FDA and 

other agencies and due to the close coordination between the Federal food safety, public health, law enforcement, and intelligencegathering agencies, the United States food supply and the defense 

system is stronger than ever before; however, we are continuously 

working to improve our ability to prevent, detect, and respond to 

terrorist threats. 

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss FDA’s counterterrorism 

activities to protect the food supply. I would be happy to respond 

to any of your questions. 

13

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brackett can be found in the appendix on page 71.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks to each of you for those opening comments. 

The Government Accounting Office released a report in March 

reviewing efforts to protect agriculture from terrorist attacks. 

While the report acknowledges the efforts and progress currently 

underway at USDA and DHS, it cites certain shortcomings that 

need to be addressed. Can each witness address what your respective agencies are doing to address the conclusions and recommendations in the GAO report, what corrective actions are being 

taken in regard to the conclusions of the report? 

Dr. McCarthy, I am particularly concerned about the dramatic 

drop in the number of agriculture inspections following the transfer 

of inspectors from APHIS to DHS. Has DHS determined the reason 

or reasons for the decline in inspections, and what is being done 

to correct the problem? 

Mr. Conner, the report also notes the inability of the national 

veterinary stock pile to respond to a threat like foot and mouth disease within 24 hours. What are the limits to the development of 

the stockpile and what is needed to address animal disease issues 

to ensure an outbreak does not spread across a large geographic 

area and cause catastrophic economic loss? 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Thank you, sir, and we will certainly give you 

a more detailed description of the corrective action plans to the response to GAO for the record, because I would like to get those 

facts straight for you, and we have taken that report very seriously 

and have many actions that are undergoing across the department 

to respond to that. 

In particular on your question of inspections, and I will get back, 

again, the more specific details for you on the record, the approach 

that the Department of Homeland Security is taking on the inspections, though, is a risk-based approach. So we have increased the 

inspections on what we consider to be high-risk cargo coming into 

the country, and that has resulted in potentially less inspections on 

what we consider to be lower risk things coming into the country. 

The specifics on the number of inspections that are done at any 

place, I will certainly get back to you on the record, but I can tell 

you that the department as a whole has taken the issue of risk 

management at its core for everything that we do, and that is part 

of what is driving the changes in the inspection protocols at the 

borders. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CONNER. Mr. Chairman, we take the report and the recommendations of the GAO very, very seriously. I think one of the 

issues they identified for the Department of Agriculture was our 

stockpile of vaccines, and the issue that we have there is that the 

department acknowledges that we do not have large stockpiles of 

the user-ready vaccines, particularly for issues like foot and mouth 

disease. What we do have, though, are significant stockpiles of the 

products that are necessary to develop the particular vaccines that 

will be used in the event that we would have an outbreak. 

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the department is confident that 

we have contracts with manufacturers where in the event that we 

14

have a particular strain of hoof and mouth disease outbreak in a 

particular region, we are prepared to analyze that strain very, very 

quickly and determine the precise vaccine that would be necessary 

to manufacture that vaccine. We believe our contract specifies that 

within two or 3 days, you know, we have the ability then to receive 

the production of the vaccine tailored to that particular event, 

which can vary. Not all vaccines are applicable to every particular 

outbreak, and so we have the parent material. We have the contracts in place for the production of the vaccine that become necessary, but then let me also stress that the vaccine part of the control of this outbreak is an important aspect, but it is not the only 

aspect, and obviously the department continues to rely upon our 

traditional methods of quarantine and depopulation as the first line 

of defense in the event that we have a particular outbreak, be it 

hoof and mouth disease or some other incident. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lewis, Dr. Brackett, do you have a comment 

on the GAO report? 

Mr. LEWIS. Mine is going to be very brief, sir. I am not familiar 

with this report, but I am going to get a hold of it, and if there 

is any corrective action required at DOJ or FBI, I will certainly get 

back to you on that and do so promptly. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. BRACKETT. Mr. Chairman, although the report dealt primarily with agriculture issues, we looked very closely to find out 

what parts that we can take lessons from. Several things, one of 

which is that we do participate on the steering committee on the 

national veterinary stockpile and although it is primarily being 

concerned with biologics and vaccines at this time, our Center for 

Veterinary Medicine, which has oversight over drugs and devices 

that might be used with animal diseases, is looking to see how that 

might fit in the future. 

Also an important part has to do with communicating what we 

have learned from the many exercises that we have done over the 

years, including such things as Top-Off–3, and we are in the process of writing up our lessons learned and contributing that to the 

DHS web site so that the other agencies can see what our perspective has been on that particular issue. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Dr. McCarthy, you made mention of the 

work at Plum Island, which I think we would all agree with you 

are very much outdated, particularly with respect to the new types 

of potential biological agents that we need to make sure that we 

protect our food system from. 

Mr. Conner, I will have to tell you there is some apprehension. 

I have a feeling that Senator Dayton is going to ask you about why 

we were not able to determine the BSE issue more quickly than we 

were able to in recent weeks or, actually, recent months, and I am 

a little bit concerned about the fact that since September 11th, we 

have spent billions and billions of dollars on the issue of homeland 

security, but yet we don’t have a lab in the United States of America that is capable of making an instantaneous decision on BSE, 

which is a fairly common disease in livestock. So I am a little bit 

concerned about where we are going relative to updating Plum Island, building a new lab, or whatever the answer may be to this 

issue. 

15

And I would appreciate it, Dr. McCarthy, you and Mr. Conner, 

addressing that a little more in detail. 

Mr. CONNER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will go first. On the issue 

of Plum Island, I will defer to Dr. McCarthy on that, but I will just 

simply note that since the transfer of that facility from APHIS over 

to the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, we have had excellent cooperation with DHS on this. They consult with us. We 

still have mission areas occurring within the Plum Island facility 

and the relationship and working together has been a great, and 

I will let her more specifically address future plans they may have 

for Plum Island. 

On the issue of anticipating Senator Dayton’s concern, Mr. Chairman, I will just say the decision to go to Waybridge for the 

verification, the tests that were completed there, I believe we have 

the facilities within our laboratory system in this country to conduct the same tests that were conducted in Waybridge, England. In 

terms of a final call, if you will, in this situation where just for review of the committee, we did have the IHC test, which was negative, and the Western Bott test on the same animal showing positive some months later. We felt in this particular case given the 

experience that Waybridge has had in this issue because of all of 

the BSE situations in Europe and in England, which are many 

times the magnitude of the problems that we have seen here in 

North America, that we felt it would be best for them to be sort 

of the referree in the case of this situation where we had two conflicting results. 

But I don’t believe there was actually any testing done by 

Waybridge that could not have been conducted in the U.S. if we 

would have chosen that option, but we felt it was best to go to the 

one institution that has probably had more experience with this 

than any place else, and I am thankful that our institutions here 

do not have a lot of experience in this situation as Waybridge has 

had. 

The CHAIRMAN. HSPD–9 established national policy to protect 

against terrorist attacks on agriculture and food systems. Specifically, the directive calls for both FDA and USDA to develop vulnerability assessments for agriculture and food sectors. What is the 

status of these respective assessments and how are the conclusions 

reached in them helping your agencies develop technology intervention and countermeasures to potential threats? Mr. Conner? Dr. 

McCarthy? 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will touch on the 

response to HSPD–9 in the context of the previous question on 

Plum Island as well, because one of the recommendations out of 

HSPD–9 was to assess the Nation’s facility capability to respond to 

not only our current agricultural mission responsibility, but what 

we may see as future emerging needs, particularly with 

agroterrorism. 

We at the Department of Homeland Security in close partnership 

with USDA have taken the issue of ensuring that the Nation maintains the critical national assets that it has in order to be able to 

be responsive to both the research, the diagnostics, and the operations that are necessary to protect the agriculture of this country. 

As a result of the studies that we have undertaken in the past and 

16

the assessment that we have undergone with state of the facility 

at Plum Island, we have underway right now internally a study 

that will conduct—a feasibility study that will be conducted to assess the requirements the Nation has for agriculture security and 

in particular the merging of those requirements from agricultural 

protection and into zoonotic diseases. 

We are working right now, we are working with the conceptual 

study, gathering the requirements in partnership not only with 

USDA, but also with our colleagues from HHS to determine what 

is needed in this nation in order ensure that we have that base for 

the future, the next 50 years. Plum Island has served us well, don’t 

get me wrong, but the facility itself is not really what this is about. 

It is understanding the capability the Nation needs. 

In that respect, we have taken the recommendations of HSPD–

9 very seriously and have worked on that particular one in very 

close partnership with our colleagues from USDA and HHS. We 

were also tasked in HSPD–9 to reach out to the academic community, and to that end, we have created two university centers of excellence focused on agricultural security. The National Center for 

Foreign Animal Disease and Zoonotic Defense is led by Texas A & 

M and is very engaged with our work on developing agricultural 

countermeasures for not only foot and mouth disease, but Rift Valley Fever, avian influenza, and brucellosis. 

We also created the National Center for Food Protection and Defense which is led by the University of Minnesota, and they are 

very engaged in assessing the vulnerabilities of our food supply and 

developing mechanisms for modeling and also understanding protection of the nodes in our food supply. We have been engaged extensively with USDA in our joint research and development strategy to enhance the ability of the research community to respond to 

the emerging needs that we have in agricultural terrorism. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CONNER. Mr. Chairman, I think I would just echo what my 

colleague has said, but to put a fine point on it from the Department of Agriculture’s standpoint, I am advised we have completed 

seven assessments through our Food Safety and Inspection Service. 

I believe four assessments have been completed by APHIS, and I 

think we are working cooperatively on some others with FDA, obviously for the purpose of then sharing the results of these assessments across not only mission areas within USDA, but the various 

agencies that are involved in this. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thomas and to my colleagues, with just 

three of us here, we will be a little liberal with the 5–minute rules, 

unless somebody has a time crunch. 

So Senator Thomas. 

Senator THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess I have not been involved in this as closely as many have, 

but we have always had drug inspections to make sure that they 

are safe. We have had food inspections always. We have always 

checked things that are imported. Foot and mouth disease is not 

anything that is new. So I guess I am saying what are the most 

vulnerable areas? What is new? What are you doing differently? 

This is on bioterrorism. It has been awfully general, as you said, 

17

things that we have been doing forever. What are the highest priorities now that are different than what you did five to 10 years ago? 

Mr. CONNER. Well, I will start out. 

Senator THOMAS. You have reacted a little bit to what is being 

done differently because apparently we are in a different time, but 

you said a lot of it is not new. 

Mr. CONNER. Well, I will start and then turn it over to my colleagues, Senator Thomas. I will speak only from the Department 

of Agriculture’s perspective. What we are doing at the Department 

of Agriculture is, indeed, new. It is not a same ole-same ole that 

has been dressed up in now a homeland security package, if you 

will. The work that we are putting into these assessments, particularly working with the private sector in terms of making these assessments and providing recommendations on how they can help us 

in protecting the safety of the food supply, I mean the government 

is not——

Senator THOMAS. You have been doing that for years. 

Mr. CONNER. Well, we have been involved in the safety of food 

in terms of inspection for pathogens, those kinds of situations. 

What we haven’t been involved in is assessing the vulnerabilities 

of these particular institutions involved in food production, and I 

can give you a couple of props here, Mr. Thomas, just in terms of 

activities that would not have been part of anything the Department of Agriculture was doing before. 

For example, we have recently published, and I believe shared 

through the American Trucking Association, guides to security 

practices for transporting agricultural and food commodities. This 

is not about safety in the traditional sense of is there e. coli on the 

meat or something like that. This is about making sure that once 

those products are put on your truck, that there is no chance of 

someone or something somehow contaminating those products. This 

was not done before. This was not a traditional role of the Department of Agriculture. 

Through our web site, we have done a number of things. I just 

brought, again as a prop, brochure, the Threat to the American 

Livestock Industry that we are publishing. That, again, is not 

about the traditional methods of contamination, but about how you 

can make sure that the product that you are sending from farm to 

table is secure and that there is not an opportunity for those kinds 

of contaminations, be it intentional but possibly unintentional as 

well. That type of communication out to the local level has just not 

been a traditional role of the Department of Agriculture as well. 

So certainly, yes, we have always had communication with local 

people, but it has not been focused upon these threat matrixes as 

we now have, and this is all new activity for us. I point to the 

amount of money that has been spent at Ames, Iowa in that facility 

for upgrading so that we are on the cutting edge in terms of rapid 

detections of these. I point to the networking that we have among 

all of our laboratories to share information so that if something is 

detected in Ames, Iowa, that almost instantaneously a laboratory 

in North Carolina is aware of that so that they know what to be 

looking for. All of that kind of instantaneous type of communication 

and coordination was not present before. So it is new from our 

standpoint. 

18

Ms. MCCARTHY. Sir, I think you make a very good point, which 

is the fact that we are leveraging off of a huge base that this country has invested in for many, many years to protect the agriculture 

of the Nation, no question about it. I think what has happened in 

particular from the Department of Homeland Security’s perspective, is we come with the sense of urgency of what must be done 

faster, what things must be accelerated and why. 

In particular, let me touch on one point, and that is the issue of 

understanding the difference between a potential natural outbreak 

and an intentional introduction, for instance the possible intentional introduction of foot and mouth disease into this country. If 

it is intentionally introduced in multiple places around the country, 

the potential economic impact could be much greater. Our responses could be overwhelmed much more quickly. So we need to 

be able to understand whether or not there are different types of 

responses. We need to be able to apply our tools in ways that 

haven’t been done before because of the sense of urgency. 

It is also the matter that it may hop over borders. So the fact 

that we have FMD-free borders surrounding us may be not the paradigm we are working with now. If the material can, indeed, be put 

in a plastic bag and carried over from a foreign country and introduced, then our protection strategies may not be as robust. 

So we come with a sense of urgency. We come with the notion 

that we need to accelerate alternative response mechanisms. We 

also come with the notion that we merge in intelligence, and that 

is new. We hadn’t been in that business in the agricultural business quite as much, and we work very closely now with our partners particularly in the law enforcement community. 

We have established for the first time an agricultural forensics 

capability. That is different from just diagnostics. That is the ability to do forensics in such a way that our law enforcement colleagues could use that information in a court of a law in a prosecution so that we could actually understand quickly who possibly perpetrated an event if it was intentional. That is an additional set 

of capabilities that we have brought to bear since the sense of urgency came into place with agroterrorism. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CONNER. Senator Thomas, if I could just add one additional 

comment to my earlier statement as well, I was reminded that we 

have worked with FSIS-regulated industries to develop model food 

security plans for those individual plants, and I believe as of early 

May of this year, our Agricultural Marketing Service agency that 

is involved in the substantial procurement of those commodities for 

various uses within the Department of Agriculture is only procuring commodities from those plants that actually have the security plans in place. Again that is a relatively recent change for us. 

Senator THOMAS. Thank you. I guess we need to make it a little 

more clear to everyone that if this is a different situation, we need 

to be doing something a little unique and a little different than we 

have been doing in the past and not simply talk about doing the 

investigation of drugs and food and everything we have always 

done. That doesn’t seem to show that need for change. 

I appreciate it. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Roberts. 

19

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My first question is to Chuck. Chuck, welcome home. 

Mr. CONNER. Thank you, sir. Thank you. 

Senator ROBERTS. It is good to see you and we appreciate you 

here for the first time since your confirmation and your swearing 

in. My first question to you is who is in charge of the food security 

policy down at the department? I know that Mr. Stump is the head 

of your homeland security activities at the staff level. Jim Moseley 

has gone off to Afghanistan and is doing good work over there. I 

know Secretary Johanns is very interested in this. Is it you? Who 

is the lead dog? 

Mr. CONNER. I will just tell you that the Secretary of Agriculture 

is closely involved in this effort, Senator Roberts, and I think that 

that is reflected in the time that he took to go to Kansas City this 

past May for the International Symposium an Agroterrorism. He 

was out there with you participating in that, and the Secretary is 

certainly in charge of this. We have an important team where I 

play a role in that as well, Jeremy Stump, and we have——

Senator ROBERTS. So you are sort of a troika? 

Mr. CONNER. Well, it is a big task, Senator Roberts. 

Senator ROBERTS. OK. Are you, the Secretary, and others receiving intelligence briefings that you need, and if so, how often do you 

receive these briefings? 

Mr. CONNER. I believe we are. I think the briefings are available 

to us weekly, and if we need more than that, that is available as 

well. So I certainly have no complaints at this point. 

Senator ROBERTS. Dr. McCarthy, your testimony today mentioned several of the divisions within the Department of Homeland 

Security that are involved with food and agricultural security. I am 

going to ask you the same question. Who is the head of the policy 

over there at DHS? Is it the Secretary? Deputy Secretary? Under 

Secretary You? Who do we talk to? 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Yes, sir. Well, as you may have noticed in the 

Secretary’s plan for reorganization, he has culled out specifically a 

policy office, which he is in the process of establishing right now. 

The Secretary, though, I can tell you personally takes the issue of 

agricultural security very seriously, and that is one of the major 

sectors of protection that we have deemed as a high-priority sector 

that needs to be protected. 

Our information analysis, currently our information analysis an 

infrastructure protection division of the department is responsible 

for coordinating the agricultural security interface that we have 

with the public and private sectors through the government and 

sector coordinating councils. They coordinate all the dialog that we 

have. We in the Science and Technology Directorate support them 

and support the Secretary through our ability to do research and 

development and through our operations of the facilities, and obviously in the border protection, the inspection work is done in the 

borders, but we work very closely with our colleagues in NIAIP because they have the lead in communicating and coordinating the 

activities, not only inside of the Government, but with the public 

and private sectors. 

Senator ROBERTS. I don’t want to call an acronym. I want to call 

somebody. Is that you? 

20

Ms. MCCARTHY. Sir, you would have to call—I would recommend 

you call the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

Senator ROBERTS. He is a pretty busy fellow. 

Back in 2002, I joined an exercise held by the department called 

Crimson Sky. That was sort of a misnomer because it followed the 

experience of Great Britain in regards to their problems with their 

livestock herds. They used that method in regards in incinerating 

the animals, which is probably the worst thing you could have 

done, as we found out. 

There wasn’t anybody else in town, so I played the role of President in this exercise, and it simulated the intentional introduction 

of foot and mouth disease in five different locations. By the way, 

the person who did that was from Iraq, at least in the exercise. The 

impact was incredible. In 6 days, if you do not detect the disease, 

that is when this or the effects of the disease first become obvious, 

and then it is too late. All of our exports stop. People in the cities 

discovered that their food doesn’t come from grocery stores, and 

panic set in. The markets went crazy. 

Basically, we had States calling out the National Guard. That is 

when we had the National Guard in the States, not over in Iraq 

and in Afghanistan and everywhere else, setting up all sorts of border situations so livestock in Texas couldn’t go to Oklahoma; Oklahoma couldn’t go to Kansas; Kansas couldn’t go to Nebraska; etc., 

etc. It got pretty rough except everybody finally realized that all of 

the States were involved and we had to do something. 

As President, I stopped the movement of all livestock. The Secretary of Commerce said you couldn’t do that. So I fired him, and 

it felt very good. But it was absolute chaos and not only for 1 year 

and not only for livestock, but every crop. So if you talk about a 

real problem, that was a real problem. 

So, Chuck, can you tell me are you still conducting these kind of 

exercises? You probably don’t want to have me play President, but 

at any rate, are we doing the exercises that we need to do in conjunction with your compatriots up there on the panel, and has that 

impacted the way you do business? 

Mr. CONNER. President Roberts——

Senator ROBERTS. No. That is Brownback. That is not me. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. CONNER. First of all, we did appreciate the role that you 

played in that. I think that was a very important simulation for us 

and we learned a great deal from that. I would just harken back 

to some of the experiences and, again, what we learned from that 

just in terms of the importance of quarantine and the role that that 

plays in an event like this, and I think others mentioned earlier 

the GAO report, this focus upon the vaccines. I think one of the 

problems you have with relying upon the vaccines to control situations like this is the fact that it does not do much for you in terms 

of international. 

Senator ROBERTS. We had to terminate almost every herd in 

America. I mean that was the end result. It was an incredible experience when you really finally got down to the final answer to stop 

what was going on. We had to call out the National Guard and call 

out the military. Quite frankly, we ran out of ammunition. It was 

21

a mess, and then you had PETA on television, and I can’t describe 

the utter chaos that happened. 

Mr. CONNER. I was there, if you recall, sir. 

Senator ROBERTS. It was something that I had quite not expected 

all of the ramifications to happen. If we have that, we don’t have 

the vaccines to do that. 

Mr. CONNER. No. 

Senator ROBERTS. We had to dig ditches miles long out of the 

water supply to get rid of the animals, and it was just absolutely 

devastating, which really gets back to the intelligence factor and 

are we getting enough intelligence. 

Your prepared testimony discusses the Food and Agricultural 

Government Coordinating Council as the Department of Homeland 

Security, USDA, and HHS, along with Federal, State, and local officials, and I know that the DHS is the lead agency. How often do 

you meet? 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Well, sir, there is actually a meeting with the 

full coordinating council next week. 

Senator ROBERTS. Good. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. And the subgroups meet regularly. There are 

lots of discussions that go out across the community both internal 

to the Federal Government and also across into the private sector. 

Senator ROBERTS. Chuck, your prepared testimony talks about 

rapid test kits, and there is a lot of that in some legislation. I know 

Senator Cochran has been very interested in this. Can you tell me 

do we have the rapid test kits? I am talking about livestock here. 

Have they been distributed to the States? Are they located at the 

State labs? At the universities? At law enforcement, so on and so 

forth? Is there training? Where are we with that? 

Mr. CONNER. Well, I think the rapid test kits are an important 

part of that, Senator Roberts, and I may need to supplement and 

get some APHIS people to give you the precise answer just in 

terms of their development, but let me just say the simulation, 

Crimson Sky situation that we had, underscored for us the importance of that rapid communication and knowing that if you get a 

positive hit somewhere in America, that information needs to be 

out there and distributed to our laboratory network very, very 

quickly so that we can get those containment measures in place before it does what happened in the simulation and gets too far away 

from us. 

That has been a big part of what we have done with the additional resources that have been given us, is to improve this rapid 

communication and coordination among our labs so that we know 

almost instantaneously when something like this happens and then 

provide the appropriate notification to our colleagues at Homeland 

Security. FBI has been tasked to work with our I.G. so that they 

are involved in the event if it is a law enforcement-type issue. 

Senator ROBERTS. That is after he reads the GAO report? Right? 

Mr. CONNER. That is right. 

Senator ROBERTS. All right. We have heard a lot lately. We even 

had a vote on the Senate floor regarding the distribution of homeland security funding, high threat versus lower threat areas, city 

versus rule. That is what it was about. 

22

So, Dr. McCarthy, what priority is given to threats that are related to food and agriculture security when making these designations? Do you weigh in on that? 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Yes, sir, we do, and I can tell you the riskedbased approach that we are taking right now looks at the integration of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. We are concentrating heavily, though, on things that we think can have a catastrophic impact to the country, a national scale impact. So threats 

to the agriculture are things that we take very seriously. Actually, 

many of those wind up falling in the catastrophic category. Catastrophic doesn’t include not only casualties to humans, but it includes potential economic impact or societal disruption. 

So right now, the department has embarked on integrating a 

very solid rigorous risk-based approach to looking at those things 

that fall into the most catastrophic category, and those are the 

highest priority items that we are looking at, and there are all elements of the agricultural sector that are very important. Obviously, 

our big concern with foot and mouth disease reflects that. 

Senator ROBERTS. I am glad to hear that. 

On the Intelligence Committee, we are reminded daily in the national press that the al Qaeda is seriously looking at soft targets, 

and when we do the analyzing, first the collection and then the 

analyzing, we usually weigh intent and capability in trying to determine where best to focus our counterterrorism resources. Dr. 

McCarthy, do you believe we have enough information to determine 

the true threat? 

You mentioned the Agriculture Intelligence Working Group. Can 

you tell me how often that group meets? 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Sir, I would defer to my colleagues from the FBI 

to answer the issues specifically on intelligence. 

Senator ROBERTS. OK. 

Mr. LEWIS. It is a once-a-month meeting, sir. 

Senator ROBERTS. All right. I will push for twice. 

The last question that I have, and I am very happy that the 

Chairman has returned, tomorrow the Intelligence Committee is 

going to hold a confirmation hearing for Vice Admiral Redd to be 

the first confirmed Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, and this is going to be—already is—the primary entity in the 

U.S. Government responsible for both the strategic operational 

planning on counterterrorism and fund food security. Obviously, 

this is a very critical issue, as you have all have indicated. 

Do you, and you meaning the USDA and FDA, currently have 

representatives assigned to the National Counterterrorism Center, 

and if so, are there plans to expand your agency’s presence there? 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Sir, yes, we do, and we work very closely with 

them on a regular basis, and we will more engaged with them, obviously, with the implementation of the WMD commission reports 

and the stand-up at DNI. 

Senator ROBERTS. I thank you for your response. 

And I have gone on for about 8 minutes, doing a soft shoe while 

you went to wherever you went, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like a blow by blow? 

Senator ROBERTS. I think that is classified, sir, if you will remember. 

23

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dayton has left us. 

Senator Cochran. 

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for organizing the hearing. I am here to thank the witnesses for their witness efforts to help us identify the threat that could be posed to our 

agricultural resources by bioterrorism and to emphasize the importance of research in figuring out ways to better protect the food security of our country. 

I compliment all of you for your efforts to work across department jurisdictions and include the private sector as well as public 

sector agencies in this national effort. We appreciate the work that 

you are doing and we hope that through this hearing, we will learn 

more about how we can more helpful in supporting your efforts. If 

it means passing new authorizing legislation, then I am sure the 

chairman will call us together and put that challenge before the 

committee. If we are talking about appropriating funds that are 

necessary for new research facilities or for the empowerment of 

universities or other research capabilities in our country to do a 

better job in this effort, we would like to have the benefit of your 

advice and counsel in that way as well. 

Mr. Chairman, I have some specific questions which I will simply 

ask that we submit for the record. One thing I will ask, though, 

and that is about the facilities at Plum Island. I know that the capabilities there are limited, and what is your assessment of this facility in terms of its capacity to meet our national needs in regards 

to these potential threats? 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Thank you, sir, and we certainly are grateful for 

all the support that your committees have given us as well. As I 

stated earlier in my statements, we have assessed, obviously, the 

Plum Island Animal Disease Center, which is a facility whose lifetime, it has exceeded its useful lifetime as a facility. The Nation 

needs that critical capability. It needs the ability to have both the 

research, the diagnostics, the forensics, the training, and all the capabilities we need out 50 years in order to provide the Nation with 

a base to be responsive to the agricultural missions and the agriculture security mission that we are all in. 

We have undertaken this year a feasibility study that will look 

at the requirements potentially for a new facility, merging those requirements with the requirements for mission responsibility from 

the DHS, from our colleagues at USDA, and from our colleagues at 

HHS, and we are building facility options from that set of requirements. So we take this very seriously and we take it as a national 

responsibility that the Nation needs to assess what it needs. We 

need to be able to provide the base that allows us to not only do 

the missions that we have done historically for the last 50 years, 

but also the missions that we have into the future. 

Thank you. 

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Salazar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KEN SALAZAR, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

COLORADO 

Senator SALAZAR. Thank you very much, Chairman Chambliss 

and, in his absence, Ranking Member Harkin. Thank you for holdVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:36 Jul 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\22648.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
24

ing this hearing on the issue of bioterrorism, because it is very 

much an important part of providing homeland security as well as 

making sure that we are protecting agricultural and rural America. 

I recognize the huge contribution that agriculture makes to our 

economy in this country and in my own State of Colorado, and I 

know that without agriculture, much of what I call the forgotten 

America would go by the wayside. So I appreciate you putting a 

focus on the issue of agroterrorism. 

And picking up on the comment from outgoing HHS Secretary 

Tommy Thompson, last year he said that we were extremely vulnerable to an agroterrorism attack, and in his statement about the 

threat, he said that it worried him, quote, every single night. I believe that he was right to worry. 

I have an opening statement that is much longer, and I will submit that for the record, Mr. Chairman, if there is no objection, and 

I have a couple of questions that I would like to ask. 

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will be inserted without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Salazar can be found in the 

appendix on page 93.] 

Senator SALAZAR. This is a question for Deputy Secretary Conner 

and for Dr. McCarthy, and that is a question on how we are coming 

together in the integration of DHS and the agriculture inspection 

services. I am trying to work my way through reviewing Secretary 

Chertoff’s analysis on how the DHS organization is going and the 

recommendations that he has on how we ought to move forward 

with that. I recognize that whenever there was a major overhaul 

of government in the way that we have overhauled our government 

to deal with the challenge of homeland security, that there are 

very, very significant management challenges that we need face. 

Here on this particular issue, my understanding is we had some 

3200 inspector positions that we had at USDA, that those inspector 

positions have been moved over to DHS, and my question is how 

is that integration going with respect to what these inspectors are 

currently doing? A question that is part of that as well is I believe 

there was an authorization to hire an additional 500 inspectors, 

and I would like a report on where we are, on the status of the hiring of those inspectors, all coming down, basically, to the question 

do we have enough horsepower within DHS, men and women 

power, to be able to deal with the inspections at our ports and 

making sure that we have the readiness to be able to have those 

inspections done on a timely basis. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. 

I do hope that the reorganization plan that the Secretary presented last week helps clarify some things, because it should give 

you insight into the importance he is putting on very specific functional areas, less so on the management structure, how the department is managed, but more so on the fact that there is an attention 

and a high priority put on given functional areas, and one of those 

functional areas is border protection. So you will see the department align itself so that all of us who participate in things that 

have to do with border protection are working together in a more 

seamless fashion. So it doesn’t matter whether it is somebody out 

of my office that is doing research and development or it is someVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:36 Jul 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\22648.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
25

body out of the intelligence unit or somebody out of Customs and 

Border Patrol or one of the other organizations. We will be working 

on teams that are focused on those functional areas. 

The border protection integration took place within the Customs 

and Border Patrol part of the department, and in the new organization, that has stayed together. So each port is responsible for 

doing that integration, and it is coming along, and I will certainly 

take back for you the question for the record of where we are on 

the hiring of inspectors. I can tell you it has been a challenging job 

internally for DHS across the board to recruit and retain the qualified people that we need to do in many of the jobs, but I can tell 

you that we have taken the integration of border security as a topmost priority in the department, and the Secretary is very committed to pooling the resources not only from the traditional elements that came into the department initially, but merging additional capabilities against those mission responsibilities into the future. 

Senator SALAZAR. If I may, Dr. McCarthy, a follow-up question 

in terms of the qualifications of the individuals that you are hiring 

or who are already on board to provide this kind of security, what 

kind of people are you looking for when you are trying to provide 

us the kind of border security that we want from the potential 

entry of some agroterrorist material that would come across our 

borders? 

Ms. MCCARTHY. That is a very fair question, sir, and I will take 

back the question for the record on the specifics of the qualifications because I am not in that business, but I do know that they 

have held a very high standard of bringing people in and making 

sure that they were properly qualified and properly vetted for the 

positions that are involved, and I will be happy to respond to you 

in writing on the specifics of the qualifications for those inspectors, 

sir. 

Senator SALAZAR. Just a follow-up, Mr. Conner, for you in terms 

of the USDA, to lose 3200 employees from this agency that has significant responsibility of making sure that we are protecting our 

consumers and our agricultural products, what kind of impact has 

that had to the historical pre-9–11 function within USDA? 

Mr. CONNER. Well, it has not removed, if you will, Senator 

Salazar, our role in this process within this matrix. We continue 

to have jurisdiction on meat, poultry, and egg inspection. We have 

a significant role in that process for imported product, and that extends way beyond just simply at the point of entry into the United 

States. Our Food Safety and Inspection Service personnel are located in the foreign countries that are shipping the product to us 

before it even is destined for the U.S. There has to be a certification that the standards used in that production are equivalent or 

as strong as what they are in the U.S. We certify that equivalency 

and then audit at the point of processing in the foreign country. 

So our role begins and, as well, our FSIS inspectors are present. 

Every container of these products that does enter the country, you 

know, is visually inspected to make sure that it shows no signs of 

tampering or anything at that point. I believe we have just added 

26 new people at our ports of entry for that specific purpose. 

26

So it has by no means eliminated our role, and we take this 

whole issue of equivalency and assurance of the meat, poultry, and 

egg product coming into this country quite seriously. 

Ms. MCCARTHY. With respect, sir, if I might add one thing, I 

would encourage you to view Homeland Security as the steward of 

the homeland security mission. The fact that people move between 

one agency and another does not negate the fact that we have a 

national mission, and we are the stewards of a national mission, 

and our responsibility is to provide the Nation with the best capability and we work closely in partnership in a different way than 

this government has ever done with our partners in the Federal 

Government and also the State and local and private sector. 

Mr. CONNER. If I could add, Senator Salazar, as well, actually, 

I believe in the legislation APHIS continues to set the policy for the 

employees that are under the jurisdiction of the Department of 

Homeland Security as well. So it is a strong cooperative relationship. 

Senator SALAZAR. Thank you very much, and Mr. Chairman, just 

one concluding comment, and that is for those of us who come from 

rural States, and all us who sit on this committee I think have a 

special place in our heart for the rural communities. When I travel 

in my own State of Colorado and I go to the small communities and 

see the water tanks and the grain elevators and the potato warehouses, and I see those all over my native valley in the southern 

part of Colorado, I think it is just important for us to continue to 

look at the challenges that we face in homeland security, because 

it will be one of our major challenges for this twenty-first century 

and making sure that we are putting the right kind of resources 

and the right kind of attention out in those wide expanses of America. 

So I think this hearing dealing with agroterrorism is particularly 

important in addressing at least a part of that issue. So I appreciate you holding this hearing very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator, for your keen insight 

and your interest in this issue, and I think in Chairman’s Cochran’s Appropriations Committee, we appropriately dealt with the 

exact issue you are talking about, and that is where to put the resources. We simply can’t forget rural America, and I think we did 

that in the homeland security bill last week. 

Mr. Lewis, I want to kind of switch gears a little bit here. I know 

you testified before the Environment and Public Works Committee 

recently relative to ecoterrorism, and it is my recollection that over 

the last several years, we have had some incidents relative to 

ecoterrorism such as the physical destruction of some facilities in 

the western part of the country as well as some environmental 

groups who are really extremist-type groups who have done things 

such as putting blades in trees and not allowing our loggers out 

there to harvest trees and whatnot. I know that we have identified 

those groups. I assume we are continuing to monitor those folks. 

Have the number of these instances decreased in the last several 

years? 

Mr. LEWIS. Ecoterrorism, sir, is the No. 1 priority of the domestic 

terrorism portion of our counterterrorism division. It is so because 

when you look at the last 10 years of activity from the 

27

ecoterrorists, what they have run up in terms of numbers of incidents and dollars worth of destruction far exceeds anything else 

going on in this country in terms of domestic terrorism or domestic 

base. 

With respect to this issue here today, we have seen very limited 

incidents, two I think in the last five or 6 years, not of any substance at all. They are much more oriented today toward things 

like housing developments, condominium developments, animal releases. SUVs, of all things, are on their scope. Because we characterize this back at headquarters as part of the domestic terrorist 

program, it sits on the JTTFs just like international terrorism matters do all across the country. It gets the same push in my every 

single field office as does international terrorism matters. I think 

that is important. It is on the radar all across the country. 

Let me also tell you that up here, not only with the committee 

that you have mentioned, but the Senate Judiciary which I have 

testified before and most recently talked to staffers on, there is an 

interest, and I hope it continues, in amending legislation that I 

think we need to strengthen the toolbox that we use to take to 

these people. At the present time, I would consider the threat of 

agroterrorism from this side of the domestic terrorism problem to 

be minimal, based on what we know today. There is an awful lot 

going on in this country in this area from an investigation intelligence collection standpoint. I can’t go into that, obviously, during 

this type of hearing, but we have a very good lens, I think, through 

which we look to see what is going on around the United States, 

what they are interested in, and what we see as their planned activity over the next several months. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Roberts. 

Senator ROBERTS. Dr. Brackett, we can’t let you leave without a 

question. You mentioned in your testimony you have issued some 

specific guidelines, security guidelines, for the milk industry. I 

want to know what kind of response you have received from the industry and how well they are working with you to address your 

concern. I think there has been a little push-back on behalf of the 

producers. 

Mr. BRACKETT. Well, Senator Roberts, actually we have been 

working very close with that particular industry at their request, 

I might add, to help them in several different ways, first of all, to 

the develop the guidance documents that you refer to, but also to 

share with them what we know about what their potential 

vulnerabilities might be and how they might take actions to avoid 

that. What we are hearing is that, for the most part, the industry, 

processing industry, is adopting much of the guidance. It is a process. It is in process. On the production side, I think that that is 

coming as well, and I do know that the associations that represent 

the dairy farmers are working with them to try to assist them in 

adopting some of the guidance documents that we provided on specific issues or specific parts of the guidance documents that are relevant to them. 

Senator ROBERTS. So it is a good news situation? 

Mr. BRACKETT. It is. There is always room for improvement, and 

we are working with the industries and with the associations to 

28

help do that, but we have gotten good response from them, we 

think. 

Senator ROBERTS. We talk about the livestock industry. If you 

really want to look at something where we talk about a soft target 

or whatever kind of target it is, you know, obviously milk would 

really be one that somebody could choose. 

Chuck, I have one final question. A lot of people are concerned 

in the world health and agriculture arena that we have not received any complete information from China in regards to the true 

scope of the avian influenza outbreak in that country. So on the 

issue of this nature that could have a major consequence for both 

animal health and also human health, who is the lead agency? Is 

that you or the Department of Homeland Security? FBI? Or is it, 

again, a concerted effort, working closely together, of course? 

Mr. CONNER. DHS would be the lead on this, working with us 

is my understanding, Senator Roberts. 

Senator ROBERTS. Well, I have a suggestion. Back in 2002, you 

used some of your supplemental funding provided by Senator Cochran to establish what is called plant disease and animal health 

monitoring networks, and there are labs located at several universities, and I want to give you kudos, because it is my understanding that this network was used to quickly diagnose the discovery of the soybean rust last week in the U.S., and you alerted 

all the producers and they knew about it and they watched for it 

and they could treat it if, in fact, it happened. We really limited 

what could have been a real tough problem. 

So my plea to you is take a look at these labs and these networks, more especially with something like this avian influenza, 

which according to some could be absolutely a very serious outbreak not only for this country, but for around the world. 

And I thank you for your efforts in that regard and I thank the 

panel. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me also thank you for being here this morning and providing great insight and educating the members of the 

committee on this issue. Some of you have already been told that 

you have written questions that will be coming to you. There may 

be others as well. The record will be held open. I would ask that 

you get us your responses as quickly as possible. Again, thank you 

for your service to our country. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will now move to our next panel. The next 

panel consists of Dr. John Sherwood, head of the Department of 

Plant Pathology at the University of Georgia in Athens; Dr. James 

A. Roth, Director of the Center for Food Security and Public Health 

at Iowa State University; Mr. James Lane, Ford County Undersheriff, Dodge City, Kansas; Mr. Mark J Cheviron, Corporate Vice 

President and Director of Corporate Security and Services at Archer Daniels Midland Company in Decatur, Illinois. 

Mr. Roberts, I understand you have an introduction. 

Senator ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot today from 

our Federal officials on this topic. As you know, one of the most important topics in this fight is that to deter and to detect one of prevention. An important player in this role would be our farmers, our 

ranchers, our agribusinesses, our veterinaries, and law enforcement at the local level. 

29

We had a hearing before 9–11. The Intelligence Committee, the 

Armed Services Committee, and we have even had appropriators 

there. It was that important. We asked 41 agencies in the Federal 

Government who is in charge, are you ready in regards to international security and any kind of a terrorist attack. Of course, everybody said they were in charge and they were ready. The last 

person to testify was in charge of the Sheriffs Association, and he 

was from Arapaho County, Colorado, and he said, Well, boys, all 

these feds are here already, but it is going to take you 72 hours 

to get out to Arapaho County, and I just want to tell you one thing: 

Until you all get there, I am in charge. 

So I think that is an important point to make, and I am proud 

to say that one of the most significant undertakings in this area 

has been undertaken by the Ford County, Kansas Sheriff’s Office 

and the Kansas Bureau of Investigation and also Kansas State 

University, and they have been led by the Ford County undersheriff, James Lane. 

The chairman just asked me, James, if we have an oversheriff as 

well as an undersheriff. You can speak to that. 

James is with us today. His efforts have led to a substantive research report funded by the National Institute of Justice. This report has just been completed. I believe it includes many recommendations that will be a blueprint for other law enforcement 

folks around the country. 

I am not going to steal James’s thunder, so I will not go into all 

the details of their efforts, but I say that group has done just remarkable work. I am very proud of the effort of James and my 

home county, and, more importantly, I am very proud to say that 

he comes from Dodge City America, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’ll tell you, Mr. Sheriff, any secrets you want to 

share with the committee about the Chairman of the Intelligence 

Committee while you are here will be welcomed. 

Senator ROBERTS. James, you know that is all classified. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being 

here to dialog with us on this very critical issue, and, Dr. Sherwood, I won’t go into a formal introduction of you, but obviously 

you probably noticed my hand over my heart when I said you were 

from the University of Georgia. We are very pleased to have you 

here, and we will start with you and come right down the row. 

All of your statements will be submitted for the record, but we 

would appreciate and look forward to any opening comments you 

have. Dr. Sherwood. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN SHERWOOD, PH.D., HEAD, DEPARTMENT 

OF PLANT PATHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, ATHENS, 

GEORGIA 

Mr. SHERWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me here today to comment on biosecurity preparedness and efforts to address agroterrorism threats posed by plant diseases that 

impact the food, feed, and fiber of our nation. 

My name is John L. Sherwood, and I am professor and head of 

the Department of Plant Pathology at the University of Georgia. I 

am also representing the American Phytopathological Society, or 

30

APS, the premier organization of scientific leaders who work to 

keep plants heathy. Our member scientists are employed in universities, private industry, and agencies within the State and Federal 

Governments. 

The U.S. has been blessed with vast tracks of productive land, 

but at times plant diseases have had significant economic and social impact. Today, plant pathologists are facing soybean rust and 

sudden oak death among other diseases that affect the vitality of 

our fields and forests. As with the diseases affecting animals and 

humans, new diseases of plants are regularly encountered here and 

abroad. 

Positive steps to protect U.S. crops have been taken. Examples 

are the National Plant Diagnostic Network, the regulatory activities toward mitigating exotic pathogens by APHIS and State Departments of Agriculture. The EPA approval of Section 18 requests 

to provide expanded management tools to minimize the potential 

impact and damage caused by soybean rust, and the establishment 

and revitalization of crop biosecurity panels or centers within various government agencies. 

Four key components of an effective approach to mitigate acts of 

crop terrorism and maintain safe and productive crop systems are 

strategic anticipation of potential threats, prevention of a bioterrorist attack, preparedness to respond to an attack, and coordination of these strategies. The foundation of security is identifying potential threats through strategic anticipation. Each year, plant pathologists in the public and private sector prepare to thwart diseases that may affect our nation’s plant production systems. Fundamental to any aspect of plant biosecurity is understanding the 

biology of how plants get sick. This is why support of basic and applied research in a competitive grants process is essential for the 

security of our nation’s feed, food, and fiber production system. 

Prevention efforts must be directed toward securing the Nation 

against pathogens not yet in the U.S. Currently, much effort is 

spent on regulating pathogens that are widespread and endemic in 

the U.S. These pathogens pose no more threat in regard to biosecurity than they annually cause in naturally occurring epidemics. 

Such natural epidemics may be devastating in a given locale during any growing season, but extensive regulation of such endemic 

pathogens limits the ability of the scientific community to investigate and develop appropriate management strategies and results 

in squandered resources. 

Effective communication between Federal agencies and scientific 

societies such as the APS will provide a solid foundation to 

prioritize these needs. As 100 percent prevention is impossible, we 

must be prepared for the introduction of pathogens. The recent establishment by the USDA CSREES of the National Plant Diagnostic Network that is dispersed among the land grant universities 

is working to establish coordinated efforts in APHIS, State Departments of Agriculture, and private seed companies to minimize the 

impact of plant diseases. 

The elements for an effective national response plan and crop 

biosecurity are coming into place across State and Federal Governments. While the greatest consideration must be given to threats 

that directly impact human and animal health, we emphasize that 

31

long-term human and animal health is dependant on sustainable 

agriculture production systems in the U.S. 

As I indicated, there are many activities underway. What appears still to be lacking today as a scientist from outside the Government, and the biggest void to assuring success in all our efforts 

is effective communication, coordination, and strategic planning 

among the many entities that are charged to protecting plant 

health. Following 2 years of planning and solicitation of stakeholder input, in the fall of 2004 the APS released its proposal for 

the establishment of the National Center for Plant Biosecurity 

(NCPB) within the USDA as a Federal coordinating office staffed 

by Federal employees and administrated at the level of Office of 

the Secretary of Agriculture to coordinate efforts in crop biosecurity. The NCPB will function as a visionary strategic planning and 

coordinating entity, link Federal agencies and staff responsible for 

plant biosecurity, and not duplicate efforts underway. 

This proposal has received wide support and endorsed by many 

scientific societies. The NCPB will provide a strong framework and 

leadership for anticipating, protecting, responding to, managing, 

and recovering from disease outbreaks as mandated in Presidential 

Directive HSPB–9. 

In conclusion, the geographical expanse and economic importance 

of the U.S. agriculture enterprise creates a vulnerability for the intentional or unintentional introduction of plant pathogens that 

could directly affect crop yield and the viability of our crop production systems in our fragile rural economies. New investments in infrastructure and resources necessary to protect and maintain plant 

health will have significant social and economic impact both in the 

immediate future and for generations to come. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sherwood can be found in the 

appendix on page 96.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Roth. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES A. ROTH, DVM, Ph.D, DIRECTOR, THE 

CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA 

STATE UNIVERSITY, AMES, IOWA 

Dr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and thank you for holding this important hearing today and 

for the opportunity to testify before you. 

I am the Director of the Center for Food Security and Public 

Health in the College of Veterinary Medicine at Iowa State University. Our center’s mission is to increase national preparedness for 

accidental or intentional introduction of disease agents which 

threaten food security or public health. I would like to thank Senator Harkin for his vision in providing funding to establish the center so that we can work to carry out this important mission. 

U.S. agriculture is highly vulnerable to the accidental or intentional introduction of foreign animal diseases. Many of the foreign 

animal diseases are zoonotic, meaning that they also infect people, 

and can cause serious public health problems. Agents against animals have been considered as a component of nearly every nationsponsored offensive biowarfare program. 

Significant progress has been made in recent years to better prepare U.S. agriculture and public health. The national animal I.D. 

32

system is being developed. Expert working groups have been convened to establish research and vaccine development priorities. A 

number of States have organized or are working to organize animal 

emergency response teams. Veterinary diagnostic laboratories are 

networking to enhance national capacity and to better share information, and Congress has nearly completed funding for the modernization of the National Center for Animal Health in Ames, Iowa. 

These activities need to continue. 

Despite the progress, the U.S. continues to have inadequate infrastructure for prevention, detection, response, and recovery from 

foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. The national academies are 

finalizing two reports that detail current needs for prevention, detection, and diagnosis of animal diseases and for veterinary research facilities and training. The significant challenges that I will 

focus the rest of my testimony on are the vulnerabilities and needs 

I consider the most important for protecting public health, animal 

health, and U.S. agriculture from disease threats. These priorities 

include the rapid development of vaccines and anti-virals for highpriority foreign and zoonotic diseases, correcting major deficiencies 

in the laboratory capacity for animal health research and disease 

diagnosis in the U.S., and strengthening the human resources 

needed to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from a devastating foreign animal or zoonotic disease. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive–9 calls for the creation 

of a national veterinary stockpile. Rift Valley Fever, Nipah Virus, 

and avian influenza are especially significant threats because of 

their contagious nature and the fact that they can cause serious illness and death in humans. A relatively modest investment could 

result in the development and production of vaccines for these 

three diseases for the national veterinary stockpile. Animal vaccines can be developed for a small fraction of the cost of developing 

human vaccines and can be approved for use much quicker and 

with less risk than human vaccines. 

Project Bioshield calls for $5.6 billion over a 10–year period for 

the development of vaccines and therapeutics for use in humans. 

A portion of that funding should be designated to develop vaccines 

and other preventatives for zoonotic diseases in animals. This will 

effectively reduce exposure of humans to these diseases, provide 

protection much sooner than is possible through the development 

of human vaccines, and reduce the need to vaccinate humans. 

The second area I want to address is the deficiency in laboratory 

capacity for foreign animal and zoonotic disease defense. As has already been discussed today, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center does not have adequate capacity for the foreign animal disease 

research and diagnostic needs of the Nation. Planning should begin 

immediately for replacement of Plum Island animal disease center 

facilities, including biosafety level four facilities, and funding for 

new facilities should be appropriated as soon as soon as possible. 

I was very pleased to hear earlier today that that planning is beginning. 

There are no biosafety level four facilities for livestock disease research in the U.S. I am currently coordinating a project to develop 

a vaccine for the Nipah Virus, a biosafely level four pathogen which 

causes serious illness and death in pigs and in people. Our collaboVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:36 Jul 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\22648.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
33

rators in Canada are using their biosafety level four facility to test 

the vaccine in pigs because the U.S. does not have facilities for this 

research in food animal species. 

The third major deficiency is a shortage of personnel trained in 

veterinary medicine. There is a serious and acute shortage of veterinarians in rural agricultural areas, in Federal Government 

agencies, and in disciplines such as public health and food safety. 

There is also a critical shortage of DVM-Ph.D research scientists 

and teachers to train future scientists, especially in high-priority 

areas of veterinary infectious diseases. Funding of a National Veterinary Medical Services Act, which was signed by the President in 

2003, but not funded, and the Veterinary Workforce Expansion Act 

of 2005 is critical to developing the human resources needed for 

foreign animal and zoonotic diseases defense. 

Thank you for your commitment to protecting U.S. animal agriculture, and I will be happy to attempt to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Roth can be found in the appendix on page 101.] 

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES LANE, FORD COUNTY UNDERSHERIFF, 

DODGE CITY, KANSAS 

Mr. LANE. Senator Roberts, I am honored to provide testimony 

concerning the threats of agroterrorism and ongoing effort to protect American agriculture. Thank you for this opportunity and also 

thank you for your earlier comments. 

My remarks today will be from the local law enforcement perspective. I will offer the committee an overview of the 

agroterrorism preparedness activities that are occurring at the 

local level in the State of Kansas. Further, I will speak briefly 

about our experiences, interaction, and initiatives with State and 

Federal officials, and I want to emphasize that we are never satisfied with our current level of preparedness as this is a continuing 

process. 

The threat of agroterrorism is real. From recent events, we know 

there are forces that are seeking to harm America in any possible 

manner and that our agriculture is particularly vulnerable. We 

know that those who seek to harm us constantly change their tactics. We cannot overlook the threats to agriculture and our food 

supply. 

In 2002, a group of local committed agriculture leaders volunteered to join our community’s first responders to develop a comprehensive plan in response to threats of terrorism. This group of 

leaders recognized the importance of preventing an attack on our 

base. This coalition continues to assess any animal and public 

health issues that pose a threat to our community. The Ford County Sheriffs Office, Kansas Bureau of Investigation, and the National Agriculture Biosecurity Center at Kansas State recently 

completed a 2–year research project that was sponsored by the 

NIJ. Senator Roberts referred to this project a little earlier. 

Previous writings and research identified the dire consequences 

of agroterrorism, but information related to law enforcement’s roles 

and responsibilities were virtually non-existent. This project establishes a baseline for law enforcement to better understand the liveVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:36 Jul 27, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\22648.TXT TOSHD PsN: LAVERN
34

stock industry and define its role in working together in the common cause of prevention. Further research is required to answer 

many of the unanswered questions related to this topic. 

During the research project, several proactive initiatives were developed for law enforcement to specifically protect agriculture from 

criminal threats, including acts of terrorism. Local, State, and Federal agencies, including USDA and FBI, and industry participated 

in the research activities. The overall conclusion of this research 

project centered on the fact that terrorism, regardless of its former 

origin, is a local crime and preventive issues should be developed 

by local law enforcement in partnership with the livestock industry. Recently, a consortium of State and local animal health law enforcement emergency management and academia officials met in 

Kansas City to discuss strategies and prevention and emergency 

response issues related to agroterrorism. Representatives from 

South and North Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, 

Colorado, and Iowa were present for this important planning session with the overall goal of sharing information and developing 

strategies that will work beyond State boundaries. 

Our Agri-Guard program is the community policing strategy with 

the goal of bringing sheriffs and industry leaders together to encourage reporting of and education for front-line industry personnel 

in suspicious activity. Because of the interdependence of the industry, this program reaches across all facets of ag from pre-harvest 

to post-harvest stakeholders. Many States have shown interest in 

this concept developed by front-line industry personnel and local 

law enforcement. 

You made mention of the ISA conference held in Kansas City, 

the International Symposium on Agroterrorism, and I think that 

offers a step toward the global initiative on preventing and responding to agroterrorism with that endeavor. 

Across-the-country planning activities such as field exercises, 

other training, and communication is occurring. These food chain 

homeland security efforts must continue with a high degree of urgency. Further, because of the potential consequences associated 

with an interruption of the food supply, we cannot become complacent. Most importantly, all communities must understand that they 

are not immune from such an event. 

Local first response agencies are far better equipped to respond 

to a WMD event because of funding from the Office of Domestic 

Preparedness. Agencies who just a few years ago could not offer 

their personnel protective equipment can now do so. In my perspective, the importance of intelligence information being thwarted 

from the ground up and the from the top down is critical. The local 

deputy sheriff responding to a report of suspicious activity thwarted by an alert industry professional is equally likely to identify and 

prevent agroterrorism as is the development of intelligence information at the national or international level. Lacking too, the industry must realize the importance of reporting such activity and 

being an equal partner in protecting itself. 

In closing, I testified before a congressional field hearing at Abilene, Kansas in 2002. Significant process has been made since that 

hearing, but there are many threats and challenges that have yet 

to be addressed. In my opinion, the costs of response are far too 

35

high and our focus must be on prevention. From the most simplistic initiatives of preventative policing to the most complex of 

disease surveillance and food safety technology , the need for prevention cannot be overstated. Federal grants and homeland security funding must be available to promote local preventative initiatives, research, and technology to protect against acts of 

agroterrorism. To eliminate confusion, miscommunication, and redundancy, it is essential that a national homeland security strategy 

addressing the threats of agroterrorism be developed and coordinated. 

It has been an honor for me to represent local law enforcement 

in presenting this testimony. Thank you, and I will answer any 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lane can be found in the appendix on page 105.] 

Senator ROBERTS. Mark, it is ADM’s time. 

STATEMENT OF MARK J. CHEVIRON, CORPORATE VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF CORPORATE SECURITY AND SERVICES, ARCHERS DANIELS MIDLAND COMPANY, DECATUR,

ILLINOIS 

Mr. CHEVIRON. Good morning, Senator Roberts. I would like to 

thank you and the other honorable members of this committee for 

inviting me to address this issue. 

I am Mark Cheviron, Corporate Vice President and Director of 

Corporate Security for the Archer Daniels Midland Company. Archer Daniels Midland, or ADM, is an integrated agricultural processor. We buy farm products, corn, soybeans, wheat, oats, cocoa, 

and produce food ingredients like edible vegetable oils, flour, animal feeds, and renewable fuels along with other industrial products. In order to produce and sell more than $36 billion worth of 

products each year, we rely on over 250 processing plants, more 

than 500 grain elevators, and a workforce of 26,000 employees 

worldwide. 

Keeping our facilities secure and our people safe is my job. I have 

held this position for over 25 years. The threats I confront have 

changed over this period. While I used to worry primarily about 

threats of theft, fraud, vandalism, and workplace violence, I must 

now also be concerned about bioterrorism, and I am glad that you 

share that concern. America has made progress in hardening our 

defenses of traditional terrorist targets, military bases, government 

facilities, and commercial air travel. Only recently has our country 

turned its attention to better protecting crops, livestock, and the 

other products that flow from the farm communities. 

As President Bush has said, ‘‘agriculture ranks among the most 

crucial of our Nation’s industry, yet its reliability and productivity 

are often taken for granted.’’ Protecting ADM from agroterrorism 

is my responsibility, but one that I cannot do alone. Business and 

government must work in partnership, and with each day, this 

partnership strengthens. We are grateful for the assistance we 

have received through the collaboration with organizations represented on today’s first panel as well as with our local authorities. 

We are moving in the right direction, but more can be done. 

36

Let me outline four areas in which I see room for improvement. 

No. 1, agroterrorism is an international problem, infinitely more 

comprehensive than any one company or industry. In order to be 

better prepared, the private sector needs better access to 

counterterrorism units of the Federal Government which has the 

means and the expertise to identify emerging threats. I may know 

the most effective way to mitigate these risks for ADM, but I can 

only address these if I know the risks. Federal counterterrorism experts can help the private sector understand potential threats 

which will guide our development of effective and efficient countermeasures based on those risks. We can enhance our overall level 

of preparedness by working together and maximizing our collective 

strengths. 

Number two, a bioterrorist attack on our food supply can have 

a significant effect even when the amount of contaminant is small. 

The best response discovers and isolates a contaminant before it 

permeates and travels throughout the food chain. Today, the technology for detecting these threats is inadequate. 

Number three, certain food security regulations which are kneejerk, theoretical, uncoordinated, and counterproductive. Everybody 

agrees that agroterrorism is a complex problem, but regulatory approaches that proscribe across the board infrastructure changes or 

one size fits all procedural requirements are doomed to fail. 

Number four, in order to win this war on terrorism, we need to 

enhance the exchange of information and expertise between the 

public and private sectors. This is harder than it sounds. We need 

to think through what restrictions are absolutely necessary to protect business and to protect sensitive government information and 

then devise a system that works for all interested parties. Information sharing is the key. It seems obvious, but in reality it means 

that timely and accurate information must flow both ways 

unimpeded and without hesitation. 

Finally, we would welcome the designation of a single point of 

contact in the government for reporting suspicious activity. No time 

should be lost trying to determine who should be called when suspicions are raised. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and honorable members of this committee, for allowing me to speak to you today. Agricultural processing is ADM’s business. Ensuring the reliability and safety of our 

nation’s food supply is everyone’s business. We are proud to be 

your partner in the war against terrorism. 

This concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any 

questions you may give me. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheviron can be found in the appendix on page 114.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you very much. 

Dr. Sherwood, let me start with you. As you know, USDA is developing a national plant disease recovery system that will implement control measures and Develop resistant seed varieties; however, you propose the establishment of a national center for plant 

biosecurity in the secretary’s office. Do you see the two proposals 

as complementary, or are they duplicative? Would it be more efficient to have one agency like ARS or APHIS handle all plant biosecurity rather than establish a new entity? And what does last 

37

year’s detection of soybean rust tell us in terms of our preparedness to respond to a sudden outbreak of plant disease? 

Mr. SHERWOOD. Why don’t we start with soybean rust, because 

that leads to a good reason why APS and myself support the establishment of a National Center for Plant Biosecurity. Last year at 

this time, we were working toward finding that person that Senator Roberts has repeatedly asked for, who do I call, and it was 

very difficult to find within USDA who was the person who we 

were supposed to call that was responsible for coordinating everything in regards to soybean rust. 

I think currently, the present structure for the National Plant 

Disease Recovery Act being embedded within an agency is that essentially here you have another example of an add-on to an agency. 

Many of these agencies already have very directed missions. Certainly within APHIS, it is a regulatory mission. Within ARS, it is 

a research mission. Within the Department of Homeland Security, 

it deals with areas of security. 

What I think is we need an office above the agencies, particularly 

within USDA, that would be able to coordinate these efforts, and 

so it would be that office one could call when there is potentially 

an outbreak of another plant disease such as soybean rust. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Dr. Roth, you heard me talk or quiz the 

previous panel relative to the facilities in this country from an infrastructure standpoint that can respond quickly to an outbreak of 

any sort. In your testimony, you cite the need for biosafety level 

three and biosafety level four facilities as well as the need to replace the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. As you well know, 

the swift detection and diagnosis of disease is critical to preventing 

and/or limiting its spread, and this lack of research capacity greatly diminishes our efforts to detect, diagnose, and prevent disease 

outbreaks. Given the great exposure of these facilities, how would 

you prioritize our physical infrastructure needs in research and development? 

Dr. ROTH. I would agree with the other panel members that replacing Plum Island is a very high priority. The new National Centers for Animal Health Facilities in Ames, Iowa will have extensive 

biosafety level three capabilities. It is not allowed to be used for 

certain foreign animal diseases that need to be done currently on 

Plum Island. We have no biosafety level four facilities that are adequate or any that will house large animals in this country, and I 

would put that as an extremely high priority. It takes a fair 

amount of time to design and build those facilities. So we need 

begin that very soon. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Roberts. 

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Roth, I wish Senator Thomas could have been here to hear 

your testimony. I think it was very helpful, because I think I am 

struck on how you very clearly articulated the danger in regards 

to some animal diseases that also represent a threat to humans, 

and I thank you for your testimony. I don’t wish you any luck with 

the Cyclones this year, but that is another subject entirely. 

You talked about Plum Island and the resulting impact that it 

has on research and the diagnostic capabilities. The chairman had 

stressed this and the need to upgrade or replace this lab along with 

38

the need for additional BL–4 labs throughout the country to conduct this kind of animal research. Do you have an estimate of how 

many BL–4 labs you think we need to in the U.S. to conduct this 

research? 

Dr. ROTH. Currently, there are none that can house food animals, 

cattle. 

Senator ROBERTS. I know that. That is why I am asking. 

Dr. ROTH. I think one very good one would be sufficient. Canada 

does have in the Canadian Food Inspection Agency in Winnipeg a 

biosafety level four facility. They have one room that will hold food 

animals. That is the only one in this hemisphere that I am aware 

of. 

Senator ROBERTS. Depending on the research being conducted 

and the public reaction to that, are there areas where these labs 

should not be constructed or are the security and control features 

such at that location that it is not an issue? 

Dr. ROTH. The security and control features on the biosafety level 

three and four labs have to operate the way they are designed, and 

this is entirely possible. We have a number of biosafety level four 

labs with dangerous human pathogens in the middle of large cities, 

and we haven’t had a serious accident that I am aware of. 

Senator ROBERTS. But that was my point. 

Dr. ROTH. Yes, and I agree. These labs are designed to operate 

safely and contain the pathagens. We have foot and mouth disease 

in the lab in Winnipeg in Canada just north of the border. As was 

pointed out earlier, the border is not that much of a protection from 

animal diseases. 

Senator ROBERTS. I hope we can work this out. 

James, your testimony has discussed the Agri-Guard program 

you established as part of the National Institute of Justice grant, 

and you described it or I described it as something of a neighborhood watch program for agriculture. You know what has happened 

over the past several years when I would go out to Dodge and talk 

to producers and they would tell me to hush about agroterrorism, 

and I have literally been amazed by the breadth and the depth of 

the participation in the program in Ford County from the farm 

level to the processors. How did you get that to work so fast and 

so well? Could you give us some practical examples? You keep talking about processors and private industry and local law enforcement or whatever, but, you know, I complained about it. You 

turned it around. How did you do that? 

Mr. LANE. I don’t know that I have the whole answer to that, but 

on the surface, I think I can tell you that our community enjoys 

a great working relationship between all levels of government, and 

I guess maybe what motivated us to work together was the fact 

that after the response is over and everybody that comes in to take 

care of it leaves, we have to live in that community. So I think 

what it does is it motivates the industry. It motivates us as first 

responders to reach out. One thing that I am constantly amazed at 

is that with the politics in the industry, that we can put people 

from different facets of the industry in the same room together and 

they don’t brawl. They work toward the common good. 

I think what we did, and this is not to pat myself on the back, 

but I think what we did was we kept going to the door and banging 

39

on it and saying, you know, we want to work with you however we 

can, and I think that gave the industry the trust in the first response agencies that we did want to work for a common good. That 

is the only way I can answer that, sir. 

Senator ROBERTS. Well, I think you have developed a model that 

could be used throughout the United States. I don’t say that you 

are the only model, by any means, but what can we do to help you 

implement these programs on a national level? Although I guess 

that would be the Department of Justice and the previous panel. 

So I will let that go. 

Your prepared testimony mentions the need for a national data 

base that could be connected to the Federal Terrorist Tracking System. So based on what you heard from our Federal officials today, 

do you think we are moving in the right direction in that regard? 

Mr. LANE. I hope so. I think we have to stress the importance 

of intelligence information being forwarded from the ground level 

up and vice versa, but what is more important, I think, is that the 

people looking at that intelligence information understands what it 

means. Without a significant ag background or understanding of 

ag, that intelligence information may not mean anything and we 

may miss something. 

Senator ROBERTS. I really appreciate that insight. 

Mr. Cheviron, you said the private sector needs better access to 

the counterterrorism units of the Federal Government to which has 

the expertise to identify emerging threats, and you go on and say 

I know the most effective way to mitigate these risks for ADM, but 

I can only address those risks of which I am aware. Would you care 

to amplify on that in sync with the question I just asked James in 

regards to the fact are you aware? 

Mr. CHEVIRON. Sir, we are aware of a lot of problems, but again, 

it is more on a parochial level as opposed to a Federal level. I think 

that the cooperation we have with the government now, the fact 

that we are meeting with so many different entities that are working so well together, is helping us understand emerging trends not 

only in terrorism, but in regular criminal activity. I think that is 

being shared much better now with the private sector. 

Senator ROBERTS. I am glad to hear that. You, on No. 3, said certain food security regulations which are knee-jerk, theoretical, uncoordinated, counterproductive. You must be talking about the 

Congress. Everybody agrees that agroterrorism is a complex problem, but some will be required to spend needlessly to meet the 

mandates that neither efficiently nor effectively mitigate the real 

risks they face. Give me an example. 

Mr. CHEVIRON. An example would be having a mandate to put 

a security officer on a dock in Ama, Louisiana to make sure that 

products going out of the country were safe and having a company 

pay for that. 

Senator ROBERTS. Why is that unnecessary? 

Mr. CHEVIRON. Well, I think our first priority should be what is 

coming into the country as opposed to what is going out. 

Senator ROBERTS. I expected that you would say that. All right. 

So it is not so much what we are shipping out; it is the risk of what 

is coming in, and I don’t think we have paid enough attention to 

40

that, Mr. Chairman, and I know that you have been very concerned 

about it as well. 

Finally, let me make a suggestion. In the intelligence community, 

we are moving away from the concept of information sharing. Information sharing basically states that somebody owns it and they 

will share with you, but they have to push that button. You have 

to pull it from them. You may not even be aware that it is there 

even though you have a mission or a problem that directly affects 

you. Information access, however, means that you all work together 

and if you have the same mission, the same objective, the same 

problem, the same challenge that Dr. Roth is talking about that 

you do have access. My only suggestion would be that we need to 

be talking not only in the intelligence community, but also in regards to private business, information access; and, James, that is 

what you have been talking about as well. So that is just a suggestion. 

You say we have no easy avenue of recovery when this information is released inappropriately that causes hesitation. Senator 

Chambliss and I oversee 15 different intelligence agencies, not to 

mention the Department of Defense. That is like a wheel barrel 

with cats in regards to trying to get them to have access to information and see if we can’t pull that out. The thought all of a sudden occurred to me that you have the same challenge in regards 

to private sector-wide with regards to your trade secrets or your information that is very special you. Do you have any comment? 

Mr. CHEVIRON. No, sir. I think you have wrapped it up pretty 

well in what you just said. I think that there is some hesitation on 

private industry, not only with ADM, but the private sector in general, and that is because they want to protect proprietary information that they have developed and they don’t want to really share 

that. They want to make sure that if they do share that information with the government, it is protected. 

Senator ROBERTS. I appreciate that very much. 

Thank you very, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for an excellent 

panel. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cheviron, following up on that a little bit, 

when I put my intelligence hat on, information sharing is the top 

of my list. We talk a lot within the intelligence community about 

sharing information among Federal agencies, particularly law enforcement agencies, but what about in the private sector? Is the 

level of information sharing between the public sector and the private sector where it needs to be? Are we moving in the right direction or are you stone-walled there from the public side? 

Mr. CHEVIRON. No, sir. I think we are moving in the right direction. I think that there have been improvements, of course, the real 

basis for sharing information is trust. It has to do with people 

knowing each other, knowing what they can share and what they 

can’t, and I think that the Government and the private sector are 

working their way toward sharing information for the common 

good. I don’t think it has to do anything like it used to be with turf, 

with protecting the information and knowing something someone 

else doesn’t know. I have really seen a change in that in the last 

three or 4 years. 

41

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Well, gentlemen, thank you very much 

for your participation in this hearing and being here today and 

helping educate the committee. The record is going to be left open 

for 5 days. There may be additional written questions that will be 

submitted to you, and I would ask that you get responses to those 

questions back to us as soon as possible. 

Thank you very much, and this hearing is concluded. 

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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