United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Further Management 

and Oversight 

Changes Needed for 

Efforts to Modernize 

Cheyenne Mountain 

Attack Warning 

Systems 

July 2006 

 

GAO-06-666 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2006

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Further Management and Oversight 

Changes Needed for Efforts to Modernize 

Cheyenne Mountain Attack Warning 

Systems 

Highlights of GAO-06-666, a report to 

congressional committees 

The Cheyenne Mountain 

Operations Center houses

numerous complex computer

systems for tracking air, missile, 

and space events that could

threaten homeland security or 

undermine military operations in 

theater. To ensure this mission can

be met, the systems require

ongoing upgrades. 

The most recent upgrade program 

—the Combatant Commanders’ 

Integrated Command and Control

System (CCIC2S)—was initiated in 

2000. Given the critical missions 

supported by Cheyenne Mountain 

systems, GAO initiated a review to 

(1) determine the status of the 

CCIC2S program in terms of 

meeting its cost, schedule, and 

performance goals; (2) gauge the

extent to which DOD has followed

best practices in managing program 

requirements; and (3) assess DOD’s

control and oversight mechanisms 

for CCIC2S. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD 

designate CCIC2S as a major 

acquisition program; establish 

effective management controls; and 

conduct an affordability

assessment, economic analysis, 

and independent estimate of lifecycle costs. DOD agreed to

designate CCIC2S as a major 

acquisition program and establish 

management controls. In addition, 

DOD stated that it will conduct the

affordability assessment and other 

analyses on future CCIC2S

development activities. 

Like its predecessor, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) CCIC2S program is 

over cost, behind schedule, and some capabilities have been deferred 

indefinitely which could pose risks to performing some future operations. 

The Air Force, which has overall responsibility for the program, currently 

estimates program costs will total about $707 million through fiscal year

2006—about a 51 percent increase over initial estimates. Schedules have also 

expanded significantly, and most critical mission capabilities will not be 

delivered in fiscal year 2006, as initially planned. The deferral of capabilities 

and performance shortfalls has significant implications for future missions—

especially if program dollars are needed to maintain legacy systems longer 

than expected. The tracking of space objects could be particularly affected,

given that none of the work on CCIC2S’s critical space mission capabilities 

has been completed, and estimated completion dates for this work have yet 

to be determined. 

Comparison of Initial and Current Estimates of CCIC2S Program Costs from Inception 

through Fiscal Year 2006 (Then-Year Dollars in Millions) 

0

30

60

90

120

150

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Source: Air Force data, GAO analysis.

Estimate as of

Program costs

July 2000 February 2006

Unstable program requirements and the failure to match requirements to 

available resources have contributed to the program’s cost and schedule 

overruns. Since the program began in 2000, the Air Force has added, deleted, 

and modified requirements without adequately determining the effect of 

these changes on resources. To control cost growth, the Air Force has

frequently deferred work to later years and has yet to determine when and at 

what cost development is to be completed. 

Several key controls needed to mitigate the CCIC2S program’s cost and 

schedule problems are not in place. First, DOD did not designate the CCIC2S

program as a major automated information system acquisition—a 

designation that would have required high-level oversight other than that 

provided by the Air Force, which has been ineffective. In addition, the Air 

Force’s contracting approach has limited the program’s ability to thoroughly 

assess the reliability of the contractor’s cost and schedule performance 

information and the impact of defining, prioritizing, and adding capabilities.

Despite this risky approach, the Defense Contract Management Agency did 

not independently monitor contractor performance. According to DOD 

officials, actions are being taken to implement better controls and to 

determine whether the CCIC2S program should be categorized as a major 

automated information system acquisition. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-666.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Lisa Shames at 

(202) 512-4841 or shamesl@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

CCIC2S Program Has Experienced Cost and Schedule Overruns 

and Performance Shortfalls 8 

Cost and Schedule Overruns Caused by Not Adhering to Best 

Practices for Managing Program Requirements 11 

CCIC2S Program Oversight and Controls Have Been Ineffective 16 

Conclusions 22

Recommendations for Executive Action 23 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 27 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 29 

Appendix III Software Development Capability Maturity Model 34 

Appendix IV DOD Acquisition Categories, Thresholds, 

and Oversight 35 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 37 

Related GAO Products 38 

Page i GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
Tables 

Table 1: Cheyenne Mountain Mission Centers, Operations, and 

Systems 6

Table 2: Comparison of Initial and Current Estimates of CCIC2S 

Program Costs from Inception through Fiscal Year 2006 

(Then-Year Dollars in Millions) 8 

Table 3: Air Force Cost Estimate for CCIC2S through Fiscal Year 

2007 Before Program Initiation and Designation of

Acquisition Category Level (Fiscal Year 1996 Constant 

Dollars in Millions) 17 

Table 4: Software Capability Maturity Model®

 Scale 34 

Table 5: DOD Acquisition Categories and Decision Authorities (as 

of March 15, 1996, When the Air Force Initiated the 

CCIC2S Program) 36 

Figures 

Figure 1: Cheyenne Mountain Systems Time Line of Upgrade 

Efforts 7

Figure 2: Status of Critical Capabilities to Be Delivered 9 

Figure 3: CCIC2S Program Rebaselines and Their Impacts on 

Program Schedule 15 

Page ii GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
Abbreviations 

ACAT acquisition category 

CMU Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade 

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

EVM earned value management 

MAIS Major Automated Information System 

MDAPS Major Defense Acquisition Programs 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

RAIDRS Rapid Attack Identification Detection and 

 Reporting System 

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation 

SPADOC Space Defense Operations Center 

TSPR Total System Performance Responsibility 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

July 6, 2006

Congressional Committees 

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Cheyenne Mountain Operations 

Center, built in the early 1960s, currently houses numerous complex 

computer systems intended to help monitor, process, and interpret air, 

missile, and space events that could threaten North America or have 

operational impacts on U.S. forces or capabilities. New threats have 

emerged over time that have necessitated improved capabilities from 

Cheyenne Mountain systems. Examples of these evolving threats include 

events such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. and 

attacks on space assets that could negatively impact military operations as 

well as the economy. 

These systems—which are housed in three major centers: Air Warning, 

Missile Correlation, and Space Control—require ongoing upgrades in order 

to incorporate new mission capabilities and technologies and reduce the 

cost of maintaining older systems. However, our reviews over the past 

2 decades have found that DOD’s efforts to modernize and integrate 

Cheyenne Mountain systems have been fraught with cost increases, 

schedule delays, and performance shortfalls due, in large part, to poor 

program management and oversight. For example, in September 1994, we

reported that upgrade efforts were 8 years behind schedule and 

$792 million over budget, due to development and integration problems 

stemming from management shortfalls.1

While DOD declared the most recent Cheyenne Mountain upgrades to be 

operational in 1998, that same year, it determined that some of the 

systems’ components were not well integrated, were becoming 

unsupportable because they were no longer produced, and would be 

unresponsive to future mission needs. Subsequently, DOD initiated a 

program in 2000 to modernize and integrate Cheyenne Mountain systems 

under a program called the Combatant Commanders’ Integrated Command 

and Control System, or CCIC2S, and assigned overall responsibility for the 

program to the Air Force. 

 1

GAO, Attack Warning: Status of Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Program, 

GAO/AIMD-94-175 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 1, 1994). 

Page 1 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
We have recently testified that DOD’s costly current and planned 

acquisitions are running head-on into the nation’s unsustainable fiscal 

path.2

 DOD starts more programs than it can afford and sustain, and in the 

past 5 years, it has doubled its planned investments in programs. 

However, these programs continue to experience recurring problems with 

cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. Our work has

shown that DOD will continue to experience such problems until it is able

to make oversight and management control improvements, including 

making sure programs are executable, locking in requirements before 

programs are initiated, and making clear who is responsible for what and 

holding people accountable when these responsibilities are not fulfilled.

Additionally, our work has shown that once a program is initiated, 

inevitable changes to the requirements baseline need to be controlled in 

terms of assessing the cost, schedule, and performance implications of the 

changes. As part of these assessments, the risks associated with these 

factors need to be identified and mitigated.3

Within this context, we initiated this engagement under the authority of 

the Comptroller General of the United States to (1) determine the status of 

the CCIC2S program in terms of meeting its cost, schedule, and 

performance goals; (2) gauge the extent to which DOD has followed best 

practices with regard to managing program requirements, including 

matching requirements to available resources; and (3) assess DOD’s 

oversight and control mechanisms for Cheyenne Mountain systems 

modernization and integration efforts under way and planned. We are 

addressing this report to you because of your committees’ and 

subcommittees’ jurisdictions. 

In conducting our work, we spoke with officials from appropriate DOD, 

Air Force, and contractor offices. We also reviewed DOD and Air Force 

acquisition policies; planning documents; and program requirements, cost, 

and schedule data. Additional information on our scope and methodology 

is in appendix I. We conducted our work from July 2005 to April 2006 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 2

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on Weapons Systems 

Investments, GAO-06-585T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2006).

3

GAO, Information Technology: DOD’s Acquisition Policies and Guidance Need to 

Incorporate Additional Best Practices and Controls, GAO-04-722 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 30, 2004). 

Page 2 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
As with previous Cheyenne Mountain upgrade efforts, the CCIC2S 

program is over cost, behind schedule, and some capabilities have been 

deferred indefinitely. This deferral could pose risks to performing some 

future operations. The Air Force initially estimated the CCIC2S program 

would complete upgrades of critical air, missile, and space warning 

capabilities in fiscal year 2006 at a program cost (including sustainment 

activities) of approximately $467 million. However, the Air Force currently

expects the program to cost about $707 million through the same year—

about a 51 percent increase—with no estimated completion date and

without delivering most mission critical capabilities. The deferral of 

capabilities has significant implications for future missions—especially if 

program dollars are needed to maintain legacy systems longer than 

expected or to modify these systems. Operations to track man-made space

objects could be particularly affected, given that none of the work on 

CCIC2S’s space mission critical requirements has been completed and that

estimated completion dates for this work have yet to be determined. 

Deferring expected capabilities may also affect programs that rely on 

CCIC2S for their implementation, such as a defensive counterspace system 

that the Air Force is developing, which is expected to use Cheyenne

Mountain systems information to help thwart attacks against valuable 

DOD space assets. 

Results in Brief 

The ineffective management of CCIC2S’s requirements has contributed to 

the program’s cost and schedule overruns. In contrast to best practices, 

which call for stabilizing requirements and matching them to available 

resources, CCIC2S’s requirements were not established until 2004, more 

than 3 years after the program began. The Air Force—which was 

responsible for managing CCIC2S—did not effectively assess the 

appropriateness of the program’s requirements prior to initiating the 

program. Since the program began in 2000, the Air Force has made 

significant additions, deletions, and modifications to the initial 

requirements. At the same time, the Air Force did not determine the effect 

of these changes on resources. Consequently, the Air Force has 

rebaselined CCIC2S’s cost and schedule goals annually; currently, the 

program is undergoing its fifth rebaselining. While rebaselining can 

provide an important perspective on a program’s current status, it can also

obscure how programs perform over time because a rebaseline shortens 

the period of reported performance and, more importantly, resets the 

measurement of cost and schedule growth to zero. With each rebaseline of

the CCIC2S program, significant amounts of work have been deferred to 

address cost increases. As a result, the Air Force has implemented the 

program without reliable expectations of what capabilities are to be 

delivered, when, and at what cost. 

Page 3 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
The oversight and control mechanisms of the CCIC2S program have been

inadequate to mitigate many of the problems it has experienced. 

Specifically, (1) DOD did not designate the CCIC2S program as a major 

automated information system acquisition, which would have required 

high-level oversight and comprehensive and independent assessments of 

the program; (2) the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition—

the CCIC2S milestone decision authority with overall responsibility for the 

program—did not provide effective oversight; and (3) the Air Force’s 

contract management approach limited the program office’s ability to 

thoroughly assess the reliability of the contractor’s cost and schedule 

performance information and the impact of defining, prioritizing, and 

adding capabilities. Additionally, the Defense Contract Management 

Agency did not independently monitor contractor performance, although it 

signed a memorandum of agreement with the program to do so in 2003. 

According to DOD officials, actions—such as initiating a formal systemlevel technical review process—are being taken to implement better 

controls and DOD is in the process of determining whether to categorize 

the CCIC2S program as a major automated information system acquisition. 

To ensure the program addresses current shortcomings and proceeds on a

successful path, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Secretary of the Air Force to maintain Cheyenne Mountain’s 

essential operation and maintenance activities and limit future CCIC2S 

development activities to those deemed critical to national security until 

DOD (1) approves an acquisition approach that designates the program as 

a major automated information system acquisition and delineates 

oversight and accountability responsibilities, and (2) conducts an 

affordability assessment, economic analysis, and independent estimate of 

life-cycle costs. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense should direct the 

Secretary of the Air Force to establish and implement effective 

management controls for the program by implementing an approach to 

manage requirements and resource changes and ensure program cost and 

performance data are reliable. 

DOD agreed with designating the program as a major automated 

information system acquisition, delineating responsibilities, and 

establishing and implementing effective management controls for the 

program. In addition, DOD agreed with conducting an affordability 

assessment, economic analysis, and independent estimate of life-cycle 

costs on future development activities but not with the current activities 

due to potential mission impacts. We do not disagree with this approach to

the extent that continuing these development activities is critical to 

national security. However, continuing CCIC2S development without 

Page 4 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
establishing a match between requirements and available resources may 

also hinder DOD’s ability to satisfy national security needs because of the 

increased risk that the program fails to achieve its promised capability. 

DOD comments on a draft of this report appear in appendix II. 

DOD built the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center in the early 1960s at

Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, Colorado. Throughout its history, 

its mission has continually evolved to adapt to changing threats—which 

have ranged from a perceived Soviet nuclear threat after the 1957 launch 

of Sputnik, the first man-made satellite successfully placed in orbit, to 

theater ballistic missiles in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm 

in the early 1990s. Currently, Cheyenne Mountain’s mission is to help 

monitor, process, and interpret air, missile, and space events that could 

threaten North America or have operational impacts on U.S. forces or 

capabilities, using air, ground, and space-based sensors that link to the 

complex’s computer systems located more than 2,000 feet under ground. 

The President, Secretary of Defense, combatant commanders, and the 

Prime Minister of Canada rely on Cheyenne Mountain systems to provide 

accurate, timely, and unambiguous information essential for determining 

courses of actions warfighters are to carry out. Air Force Space Command 

is responsible for operating, funding, and setting requirements for the 

systems, and Air Force Materiel Command’s Electronic Systems Center is 

responsible for maintaining the systems and for acquiring new systems 

and capabilities. 

Background 

Table 1 provides a summary of Cheyenne Mountain’s three mission 

centers, operations, and systems. 

Page 5 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
Table 1: Cheyenne Mountain Mission Centers, Operations, and Systems 

Mission centers Operations Systems 

Air warning

Supports the North American

Aerospace Defense Command

(NORAD) and United States Northern 

Command (USNORTHCOM) in their 

missions to monitor and secure North 

American airspace 

Monitors North America’s airspace to detect aircraft or 

cruise missiles that might violate airspace or represent a 

threat, which now includes warning of events such as the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 

Air and ground-based

radars inside and along the 

periphery of North America 

Missile correlation

Supports NORAD, USNORTHCOM, 

and United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM) in their strategic and 

theater missions to protect U.S. and 

Canadian interests from ballistic missile 

attacks 

Provides warning of missile attacks launched against the 

United States and its territories, possessions, and forces 

overseas and supports USSTRATCOM in its mission to 

defend against strategic and theater missile attacks.a

A worldwide 

communications and 

ground- and space-based 

sensor network

Space control 

Supports USSTRATCOM in its mission 

to protect U.S. space assetsb

Detects, tracks, identifies, and catalogs all man-made

space objects orbiting the Earth that are larger than about 4

inches in size. 

A network of ground-based 

radars and optical sensors 

as well as a space-based 

sensor 

Source: DOD. 

a

Missile attacks can be characterized as strategic (long-range), such as intercontinental ballistic

missiles launched against the United States as well as theater (short- and medium-range), such as 

the Scud missiles used by Iraq during the Gulf War.

b

A key element of this mission is space situational awareness, which involves identifying man-made 

objects orbiting the Earth and determining whom they belong to and their purposes.

Previous Cheyenne 

Mountain Upgrade Efforts 

In 1981, the Air Force began efforts to modernize its Cheyenne Mountain 

systems under five separate programs scheduled to be completed in 1987 

at a total estimated cost of $968 million. Subsequently, the Air Force 

consolidated the five separate Cheyenne Mountain upgrade programs into 

a single Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade (CMU) program. Beginning in the 

late 1980s, we issued a dozen reports on the program’s cost, schedule, and

performance problems. For example, we reported that the Air Force did 

not adequately define program requirements which resulted in an 

underestimation of the upgrade efforts’ cost and schedule goals. In its 

attempts to maintain short-term cost and schedule goals, the Air Force 

continually deferred requirements and problem resolution to the future, as 

well as relaxed performance requirements. (See Related GAO Products at 

the end of this report.) 

Page 6 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
Despite not meeting original performance expectations for the program, in 

1998, the Air Force declared the Cheyenne Mountain upgrades to be 

operational—almost $1 billion over cost and 11 years late. That same year, 

DOD determined that some of the systems were not well integrated, would 

be unresponsive to future mission needs, and some components were 

becoming unsupportable. As a result, in 2000, the Air Force initiated the 

CCIC2S program to modernize and integrate Cheyenne Mountain systems.4

Figure 1 depicts the timeline of Cheyenne Mountain upgrades. 

Figure 1: Cheyenne Mountain Systems Time Line of Upgrade Efforts

1981 1987 1998 2000 2006

Overall schedule delay: 11 years

Source: GAO.

Air Force 

starts

Cheyenne 

Mountain 

upgrades with 

estimated costs of 

$968 million

Air Force 

estimated 

completion 

of upgrades

Air Force 

declares

upgrades

operational 

at total cost 

of about 

$1.8 billion

Air Force 

starts

CCIC2S

program

Air Force 

estimated 

completion of

CCIC2S

program 

development

On September 19, 2000, the Air Force awarded a cost-plus award fee 

contract5

 to Lockheed Martin Mission Systems6 to begin work on the 

CCIC2S program. The initial period of performance was for 6 years, with 

annual options for operations and maintenance activities for an additional 

9 years. 

 4

The program was initially known as the North American Aerospace Defense

Command/United States Space Command Warfighting Support System. The Air Force

changed the name of the program to CCIC2S in 2002. Also, in that same year, DOD merged

the responsibilities of the United States Space Command into the United States Strategic 

Command. 

5

A cost-plus award fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee

consisting of a base amount fixed at inception of the contract and an award amount, based 

upon a judgmental evaluation by the government, sufficient to provide motivation for 

excellence in contract performance. 

6

Lockheed Martin Mission Systems is now Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems & 

Solutions. 

Page 7 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
Like its predecessor, the CMU program, the CCIC2S program is over cost, 

behind schedule, and some capabilities have been deferred indefinitely.

This deferral could pose risks to performing some future operations. The 

Air Force’s current program cost estimates through fiscal year 2006 

represent about a 51 percent increase over its initial estimate. Additionally, 

while the Air Force initially estimated CCIC2S upgrades to be completed 

in fiscal year 2006, most critical mission capabilities will not be delivered 

by this time, and for some of these capabilities, the Air Force has yet to 

estimate a completion date. The deferrals of capabilities and performance 

shortfalls could have implications for future missions. 

CCIC2S Program Has 

Experienced Cost and 

Schedule Overruns 

and Performance 

Shortfalls 

The CCIC2S Program Is 

Over Cost and Behind 

Schedule 

As shown in table 2, the Air Force initially estimated the CCIC2S program 

to complete upgrades in fiscal year 2006 at an estimated cost of about 

$467 million.7

 However, program cost estimates through the same year 

have increased about 51 percent to nearly $707 million. Air Force officials 

said they never estimated the life-cycle cost of delivering all CCIC2S 

validated requirements. 

Table 2: Comparison of Initial and Current Estimates of CCIC2S Program Costs from Inception through Fiscal Year 2006 

(Then-Year Dollars in Millions) 

Fiscal year 

Time frame of cost estimate 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total

Initial (July 2000) $4.7 $77.5 $78.4 $76.1 $78.6 $75.7 $76.0 $467.0

Current (February 2006) 4.7a 102.0a 107.0a 94.4a 133.4a 132.7 132.7 706.9

 Source: Air Force data, GAO analysis. 

a

Actual expenditures. 

Along with the increases in estimated program costs, schedules have 

expanded significantly. The Air Force initially estimated development 

activities to be completed in fiscal year 2006, but only a fraction of the 

expected capabilities have been delivered (see fig. 2). Of the three mission

areas—air, missile, and space—the Air Force has delivered only initial air 

and some initial missile mission critical capabilities. DOD considers these 

critical capabilities to be the most essential for the program—failure to 

provide these capabilities can be cause for a program to be reassessed or 

 7

This figure includes the development cost for the system as well as sustainment activities 

through this period. 

Page 8 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
terminated. The remaining missile warning critical capabilities are now 

expected to be delivered in fiscal year 2007—over 3 years later than 

initially estimated. The Air Force has postponed the delivery of all critical

space mission capabilities to some undetermined point in the future. 

According to Air Force officials, the space mission capability deliveries 

will not be scheduled until future investment decisions are made. 

Figure 2: Status of Critical Capabilities to Be Delivered 

Critical capability Air mission Missile mission Space mission 

Air mission

evolution

Processing

display system

migration

Missile analysis

and reporting

system

Space

Assessment time NA

Display accuracy

Distinguish between

real, test, and exercise

events

Down time NA

Interoperability

Node processing NA NA 

Trajectory identification NA NA NA 

Object identification NA NA NA 

 Work completed 

 Work planned for completion in fiscal year 2007 

 Undetermined

NA not applicable

Source: Air Force data, GAO analysis.

According to the CCIC2S program office and other DOD officials, one of 

the reasons the program’s initial cost and schedule estimates differ from 

current estimates is that work that was not included in the original 

estimates was added to the program. Examples of work added to the 

program include replacing an aging missile warning processing and display 

system as well as developing a computer operational status monitoring 

system. We did not assess the cost and schedule impacts of these added

capabilities. Also, as a result of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the 

U.S., the Air Force diverted a portion of CCIC2S funding and personnel to 

make improvements to other Cheyenne Mountain systems so that aircraft

traffic within the U.S. could be monitored by the air warning center. 

However, according to DOD officials, the impacts of the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks on the CCIC2S program were not significant 

because monitoring aircraft traffic within the U.S. is not a required 

upgrade under the CCIC2S program. Prior to these improvements, the 

Page 9 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain 
focus of the air warning system was to monitor aircraft traffic outside the 

North American border. 

Deferral of Capabilities 

and Performance 

Shortfalls Have 

Implications for Future 

Missions 

The deferral of capabilities and performance shortfalls that have resulted 

from cost and schedule overruns in the CCIC2S program could 

significantly impact future missions—especially if program dollars are 

needed to maintain legacy systems longer than expected. 

USSTRATCOM—responsible for protecting U.S. space assets—could be 

particularly affected, given that none of the work on CCIC2S’s critical 

space mission capabilities has been completed and that estimated 

completion dates for this work have yet to be determined. 

DOD has been counting on CCIC2S to replace the Space Defense 

Operations Center (SPADOC)—Cheyenne Mountain’s current space object 

tracking system—and provide a system capable of processing larger 

volumes of data. Some DOD officials have stated that CCIC2S is to be the 

foundation for carrying out future space awareness functions. SPADOC’s 

capabilities are currently overtaxed. It currently handles about 400,000 

space object observations per day from sensors—about 167 percent more 

than it was designed to handle. The Air Force has implemented an 

inefficient workaround to address SPADOC’s limited processing 

capabilities. Specifically, the Space Control Center is using CaveNet, an

off-line tool, to assist with analyzing and processing space object 

observations. However, to analyze and process the information in 

CaveNet, Space Control Center operators must first download information 

from SPADOC and then manually type the processed information back

into SPADOC. Air Force officials stated that manually typing CaveNet 

information back into SPADOC has recently become significant enough to

request an automated interface. 

According to Air Force officials, efforts are on-going to assess the mission 

impact of SPADOC performing beyond design specifications. With other 

programs to improve data collection sensors that feed data into CCIC2S—

such as the Space Fence and Space Based Space Surveillance system8

—

the number of observations and processing requirements will increase 

significantly in the future, taxing the current system further. In a 2005 

study, the CCIC2S contractor determined that SPADOC’s processing 

 8

The Space Fence is to replace the aging Air Force Space Surveillance System, a groundbased radar, that currently performs detection and tracking of orbiting space objects. The

Space Based Space Surveillance project is developing a constellation of optical sensing 

satellites to find, fix, and track objects in Earth orbit. 

Page 10 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
capacity will not be able to handle the increased number of observations 

predicted beginning in 2012. For the near term, according to Air Force 

officials, the CCIC2S contractor has identified operations and maintenance 

changes for SPADOC to handle increases in the number of observations. 

However, DOD has not made a decision on when to pursue upgrades for 

SPADOC and cost estimates for upgrading SPADOC have not been 

finalized. With the delay of CCIC2S space capabilities and no decision on 

when SPADOC will be replaced, USSTRATCOM will have to continue 

relying on pushing SPADOC to its limits. 

Delays in the delivery of expected CCIC2S capabilities also affect 

programs that are not directly part of the program but are relying on 

CCIC2S for their implementation. For example, the Air Force’s Rapid 

Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS)—a 

defensive counterspace system—is expected to use information provided 

by Cheyenne Mountain systems to aid in the detection, reporting, 

identification, location, and classification of attacks against valuable space 

assets. However, according to a DOD official, the CCIC2S space capability 

delays have presented a serious acquisition dilemma for the RAIDRS 

program because it is dependent on the CCIC2S space segment. Funding 

has not been made available for the CCIC2S space segment that is to 

support RAIDRS, according to Air Force Space Command. Furthermore, 

other programs will experience the same acquisition dilemma because Air 

Force Space Command has instructed all of its sensor, satellite, and 

weapon programs to be able to integrate with CCIC2S. 

The CCIC2S program’s failure to match requirements and resources before

its start has contributed to the cost and schedule overruns that have 

forced the program to defer delivery of CCIC2S capabilities. For each year 

since the program’s inception, the Air Force has rebaselined CCIC2S’s cost 

and schedule goals. The unreliable cost and schedule estimates that 

resulted have forced the program to frequently defer work to later years to

control cost growth. The Air Force has yet to determine when and at what 

cost development is to be completed.

Cost and Schedule 

Overruns Caused by 

Not Adhering to Best 

Practices for 

Managing Program 

Requirements 

Page 11 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
Our body of work on best practices has shown that matching program 

requirements to resources—that is, time, funding, technology, and 

personnel—is key to successful outcomes.9

 We have also reported that the

requirements-setting phase is one of the most important for softwareintensive acquisitions.10 Missing, vague, or changing requirements tend to 

be a major cause of poor outcomes in these programs. For example, 

according to Air Force officials, the major causes for the delay in the Air 

Mission Evolution system11—a CCIC2S system that was delivered in 

January 2004, over 2 years behind schedule—included problems with 

software development and integration. Additionally, the contractor stated 

that changing priorities within the program as well as added requirements 

contributed to the delay.12

Match Not Made between 

Program Requirements 

and Available Resources 

Without a stable set of requirements, the Air Force could not appropriately 

estimate program costs and in hindsight, the resources needed to satisfy 

program requirements were severely underestimated. To better ensure 

programs are affordable and fully funded before they are initiated, DOD 

guidance calls for every acquisition program to stabilize requirements and 

determine the program’s total costs before program start.13 Despite best 

practices and DOD policy, the Air Force initiated the CCIC2S program 

without establishing a stable set of program-specific requirements and did 

 9

GAO, Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed to

Improve Outcomes, GAO-06-110 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2005). 

10GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to Improve 

DOD’s Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions, GAO-04-393 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1,

2004). 

11The Air Mission Evolution system was to replace the legacy air warning system, called 

Granite Sentry, and provide new communications systems and processing capability. The 

Air Mission Evolution system has not been tested for interoperability with other CCIC2S 

systems; interoperability was cited as one of the key shortcomings of the Granite Sentry 

legacy system. 

12Other aspects of requirements management which could contribute to cost and schedule 

problems, include, for example, validating the completeness and correctness of 

requirements, tracing and verifying contractual requirements to higher-order program

requirements, and delineating mandatory versus optional requirements in deciding what 

requirements can be eliminated or postponed to meet other project goals. We did not 

assess these other aspects of requirements management and their impacts on program

execution. 

13Memorandum for the Defense Acquisition Community, Subject: Update of the DOD 5000

Documents, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 15, 1996. Currently, this guidance is 

located in DOD, Department of Defense Instruction Number 5000.2, Operation of the 

Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003). 

Page 12 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
not do so until January 2004—more than 3 years after program start. In 

that time, the Air Force made numerous additions, deletions, and 

modifications to CCIC2S’s requirements. For example, the Air Force 

deleted, added back, and then modified a requirement for multiple security

levels. According to an Air Force review of program requirements, some

deleted requirements were duplicative or conflicting. 

Assessments of available resources were also inadequate. According to 

DOD guidance, every acquisition program should rigorously address issues

such as the program’s life-cycle costs and whether it is affordable and fully 

funded.14 By not conducting these rigorous assessments, DOD and the Air 

Force did not have the information needed to commit to the program over 

its life cycle. Although the CCIC2S program acquisition plan refers to the 

development of a life-cycle cost estimate before the program was initiated, 

it did not include the operations and maintenance costs of sustaining 

existing systems through the program’s entire life cycle.15

Additionally, software development capabilities of the contractor should 

also be assessed. The contract for CCIC2S development specifies that the 

contractor be rated at the highest level (level 5) using the Capability 

Maturity Model®

 for Software developed by Carnegie Mellon University’s 

Systems Engineering Institute.16 At this most mature level, quantitative 

feedback about performance and innovative ideas and technologies 

contribute to continuous process improvements. A senior program official 

stated that the CCIC2S contractor was rated at a level 5 for software 

development. According to DOD documentation, Capability Maturity 

Model®

 assessments are typically performed at an organization wide level 

and may not necessarily apply to a project team associated with any given 

acquisition program. We did not examine the program’s software 

development efforts and the capabilities of the contractor. For more 

information on this model, see appendix III. 

 14Memorandum for the Defense Acquisition Community, Subject: Update of the DOD 5000

Documents, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 15, 1996. Currently, this guidance is 

located in DOD, Department of Defense Instruction Number 5000.2, Operation of the 

Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003). 

15Air Force, Single Acquisition Management Plan for the NORAD/USSPACECOM 

Warfighting Support System (N/UWSS) Program (July 28, 2000). 

16Capability Maturity Model is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by 

Carnegie Mellon University. 

Page 13 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
Furthermore, DOD has not funded the program at requested levels since 

the program began due to other priorities. We have previously reported 

that program funding instability often occurs because DOD starts too 

many programs, creating severe budget constraints. Another factor we 

have reported that contributes to funding instability is that DOD’s 

programs are funded annually, requiring competition among other 

programs for limited available funding.

17 The CCIC2S program has not 

been an exception to these factors. For example, prior to initiating the 

CCIC2S program in 2000, DOD reduced the program’s initial estimated 

resource requirements by a total of $75 million. In 2002, DOD decided not

to increase requested program funding. According to DOD, funding was 

limited to program baseline levels because the program was a lesser 

priority. Furthermore, in 2005, DOD and Congress reduced CCIC2S 

program funding estimates over the next 6 years by about $135 million, 

citing higher priority funding needs and poor program performance. 

The Air Force Has 

Implemented the CCIC2S 

Program without Solid 

Expectations of What 

Capabilities Are To Be 

Delivered, When, and at 

What Cost 

According to the acquisition strategy for the CCIC2S program, annual 

rebaselines18 were to be conducted on the program to review and approve 

program implementation plans, including cost and schedule baselines. 

However, because the Air Force failed to make a match between 

requirements and resources, including not effectively assessing the 

impacts of adding unanticipated work to the program, the result of 

CCIC2S’s annual rebaselines has been to defer significant amounts of 

work to the future in order to address cost increases. As a result, the Air 

Force has implemented the program as a “level of effort”—that is, without 

solid expectations of what capabilities are to be delivered, when, and at 

what cost. Currently, the CCIC2S program is undergoing its fifth 

rebaseline. According to program officials, after this fifth rebaseline, 

CCIC2S will no longer plan for annual rebaselinings, but would only 

rebaseline the program when necessary. Figure 3 depicts the effects of 

each of the rebaselines on the program. 

 17GAO, DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change, GAO-06-257T (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 15, 2005). 

18Rebaselining can occur at any time and cover any phase of a defense acquisition program.

All rebaselines must be approved by the milestone decision authority, which has overall 

responsibility for the program. 

Page 14 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
Figure 3: CCIC2S Program Rebaselines and Their Impacts on Program Schedule 

2001

1

1

2

2

3

3 4

1 2 3 4

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Fiscal year

Air mission

To be determined

Fifth rebaseline estimate

Source: Air Force data, GAO analysis.

Initial operational delivery estimate

Previous rebaseline delivery estimate

The program has

delivered this capability

Missile mission

Space mission

The fifth and current rebaseline was prompted by efforts to complete 

development of the program’s critical missile warning mission capabilities.

To free up resources for the missile warning development efforts, the Air 

Force stopped work on many other aspects of the CCIC2S program in late

2004 and subsequently began rebaselining the program in early 2005. Air 

Force officials stated the rebaseline was to be finalized by August 2005; 

however, it has yet to be approved as of June 2006. According to Air Force 

officials, pending changes in program oversight as well as recent DOD and 

congressional funding estimate reductions are reasons for the delay in

approving the rebaseline. As currently structured, the rebaseline would 

again significantly defer the amount of capability scheduled to be 

delivered. Specifically, missile warning critical requirements would not be 

delivered until fiscal year 2007, and the schedule for the work on the space 

portion is undetermined. 

Page 15 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
The oversight and control mechanisms of the CCIC2S program have been

inadequate to prevent or mitigate many of the problems it has 

experienced. Additionally, the Air Force’s contract management approach

limited the program office’s ability to thoroughly assess the reliability of 

the contractor’s cost and schedule performance information and the 

impact of defining, prioritizing, and adding capabilities. Furthermore, the 

Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) did not independently 

monitor contractor performance. According to DOD officials, actions are 

being taken to implement better controls. 

CCIC2S Program 

Oversight and 

Controls Have Been 

Ineffective 

DOD Did Not Designate 

CCIC2S as a Major 

Acquisition 

Placement into a specific acquisition category (ACAT) determines the 

accountability level and analysis requirements of a program. DOD policy 

requires major automated information system acquisitions to have highlevel oversight and comprehensive and independent assessments of lifecycle cost estimates and benefits to ensure they are reasonable and built 

on realistic program and schedule assumptions.19 In determining whether 

an automated information system acquisition program warrants a “major” 

designation, DOD applies dollar value thresholds. If a program does not 

meet these thresholds, it can be designated as a major acquisition based 

on other factors such as technical complexity. (See appendix IV for more 

detail on the designation criteria for acquisition programs that were in 

place when the Air Force initiated the CCIC2S program.) 

The CCIC2S program met the dollar threshold criteria for designation as a 

major automated information system acquisition program. However, DOD 

did not designate the program as a major automated information system 

acquisition. According to a senior Air Force Space Command official, the

program was initially considered to be a weapon system acquisition and 

therefore below the threshold criteria for designating the program as a 

major defense acquisition program. At this lower acquisition category, 

oversight for the program was assigned to Air Force headquarters. 

Initial cost estimates for CCIC2S indicated that it should have been 

designated as a major automated information system acquisition. 

Specifically, at program initiation, CCIC2S’s program cost estimate of 

about $463 million well exceeded DOD’s threshold of $360 million (fiscal 

year 1996 constant dollars)—DOD’s then-threshold for total life-cycle 

 19Independent reviews are typically conducted by offices such as the Office of the Director, 

Program Analysis and Evaluation and its Cost Analysis Improvement Group.

Page 16 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
costs—for designation as a major automated information system program 

(see table 3).

20

Table 3: Air Force Cost Estimate for CCIC2S through Fiscal Year 2007 Before Program Initiation and Designation of

Acquisition Category Level (Fiscal Year 1996 Constant Dollars in Millions) 

FISCAL YEAR 

FUNDING TYPE 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 TOTAL

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation $0.4 $13.0 $10.4 $10.2 $11.9 $11.5 $10.6 $10.7 $78.7

Procurement 0.9 15.3 13.6 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 91.8

Operations and Maintenance 3.1 42.4 45.9 43.6 42.5 38.8 38.4 38.1 292.8

Total 4.4 70.7 69.8 66.2 66.7 62.8 61.4 61.2 463.2

Source: Air Force and modified by GAO to fiscal year 1996 constant dollars. 

Additionally, the CCIC2S program is a technically challenging and 

complex acquisition. For example, one of the primary goals of the program 

is to integrate 40 stovepiped systems into a single common architecture. 

The complexity of the CCIC2S effort is further illustrated by our previous 

work which showed that the CMU program had experienced longstanding, serious integration problems, as well as software development 

problems with incorporating new technologies.21

DOD and Office of Management and Budget have issued guidance22 on 

conducting analyses that can help decision making on major automated 

information system acquisitions. These analyses include 

• an affordability assessment to demonstrate that the program’s 

resources (including projected funding and manpower requirements) 

 20Department of Defense Regulation Number 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major

Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information System 

(MAIS) Acquisition Programs (Mar. 15, 1996). 

21GAO, Attack Warning: Lack of System Architecture Contributes to Major Development 

Problems, GAO/IMTEC-92-52 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 1992) and Attack Warning: 

Better Management Required to Resolve NORAD Integration Deficiencies, 

GAO/IMTEC-89-26 (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 1989). 

22DOD, Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Version 1.0 (Oct.17, 2004); DOD, Department of 

Defense Instruction Number 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 

2003); and Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-11: Planning, Budgeting, 

Acquisition and Management of Capital Assets (June 21, 2005) and Circular No. A-94: 

Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (Oct. 29, 

1992). 

Page 17 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
are realistic and achievable in the context of the DOD component’s 

overall long-range modernization plan to ensure full funding and 

funding stability for the program; 

• an economic analysis to determine the best program acquisition 

alternative by assessing the net life-cycle costs and benefits of the 

proposed program; and 

• an independent estimate of program life-cycle costs. 

Taken together, such reviews can give DOD the knowledge it needs to 

prevent or mitigate many of the types of problems the CCIC2S program 

has experienced. 

We have consistently reported that the decision to invest in any system 

should be based on reliable analyses of estimated system costs and 

expected benefits over the life of the program.23 Without designation as a 

major acquisition, the CCIC2S program lacked the high-level oversight and 

independent analyses and review that could have identified key program 

weaknesses, including 

• funding instability; 

• program cost, schedule, and performance problems; 

• the mismatch between requirements and available resources; and 

• the inability to prioritize and commit to the program within the context 

of other acquisition programs and long-range investment plans. 

CCIC2S Milestone 

Decision Authority Did Not 

Provide Effective 

Oversight 

DOD acquisition policy states that overall program responsibility rests 

with the milestone decision authority. In this role, the milestone decision

authority is responsible for ensuring accountability and maximizing 

credibility in program cost, schedule, and performance reporting by 

reviewing the program throughout its acquisition life cycle, including 

(1) whenever the program reaches a milestone decision point;

24 

(2) whenever costs, schedule, or performance goals are baselined or must 

be changed; and (3) periodically through review of program status reports. 

 23For example, see GAO, DOD Systems Modernization: Planned Investment in the Naval 

Tactical Command Support System Needs to Be Reassessed, GAO-06-215 (Washington,

D.C.: Dec. 5, 2005) and DOD Systems Modernization: Continued Investment in the 

Standard Procurement System Has Not Been Justified, GAO-01-682 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 31, 2001). 

24According to DOD guidance, a milestone is a point at which a recommendation is made

and approval sought regarding starting or continuing an acquisition program. 

Page 18 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
While the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition—the 

designated milestone decision authority for the CCIC2S program—played 

an active oversight role from 2000 to 2001, its program oversight thereafter 

was minimal, including during the numerous program rebaselines and 

attempts to address cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls. The 

Assistant Secretary’s oversight appears to have been limited to brief 

program status updates provided by the program executive officer as part 

of a weekly reporting on all programs under the program executive 

officer’s purview, and, according to DOD officials, annual and semi-annual 

program execution and budget reviews. According to Air Force officials,

the Assistant Secretary delegated its milestone decision authority 

responsibilities for the program to the program executive officer level. 

However, officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Acquisition and the Office of the Program Executive Officer 

were unable to provide us documentation of a formal delegation of these 

responsibilities, or explain why this delegation took place. 

Program Lacked Sufficient 

Management Controls over 

the Contractor

In addition to matching requirements to resources, our best practices 

work has shown that to better ensure programs deliver capabilities within 

expected costs and schedules, program offices must have in place certain

controls, including: (1) assessments of the effects of any changes in 

requirements on cost, schedule, and performance goals and (2) insights 

into contractor activities and progress to ensure commitments are 

implemented.25 The contract to develop CCIC2S was awarded under a 

Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) approach, which 

transfers certain government management responsibilities from the 

program office to the contractor. 

In the mid-1990s, DOD began making sweeping changes to its acquisition 

policy and procedures to streamline its acquisition infrastructure. One of 

these reforms was the introduction of the TSPR concept, which gave a 

contractor total responsibility for the integration of an entire weapon 

system and for meeting DOD’s requirements. According to DOD officials, 

the Air Force no longer uses TSPR for its acquisition programs due to the 

shortcomings resulting from using this management concept. We have

previously reported that TSPR contracts often result in the government’s 

lacking accurate cost, schedule, and performance information needed to 

 25GAO, Information Technology: DOD’s Acquisition Policies and Guidance Need to 

Incorporate Best Practices and Controls, GAO-04-722 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004). 

Page 19 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
adequately manage programs because it had to rely on unverified 

contractor data.26

For CCIC2S, the risks inherent in a TSPR approach were exacerbated by

the program office’s lack of sufficient staffing to oversee the definition and

prioritization of needed capabilities. Because the Air Force reduced the 

number of personnel in the program office from 200 to between 15 and 

30 in an effort to achieve efficiencies, it lacked the personnel to assess the 

cost and schedule impacts of defining and prioritizing requirements on the 

program. Without such information, the program office was not in a 

position to make trade-off decisions between different types of needed 

capabilities. According to the program office, as a result of its inability to 

manage the requirements definition and prioritization process, the 

contractor ended up communicating directly with the users to help define 

and prioritize requirements, sometimes without the knowledge of the 

program office. 

Program officials also noted that they lacked sufficient staff with the 

technical knowledge to determine whether contractor cost, schedule, and

performance data were reliable. For example, according to the program 

office and the CCIC2S contractor, the program initially called for a 

contractor outside of the CCIC2S program to develop air mission software 

and provide it to the CCIC2S contractor for integration into the program. 

However, shortly after the Air Force initiated the CCIC2S program, it 

terminated the air mission software development contract due to 

unsatisfactory performance. Subsequently, the users recommended, and 

the program office added, the unfinished work to the CCIC2S program as 

part of the re-baseline process in January 2001. However, according to the 

program office, it was not able to effectively assess the cost and schedule 

impacts of this change on the program. 

TSPR does not relieve the government of its oversight responsibilities. 

Also, according to DCMA officials, the government should conduct 

contract surveillance and gauge contractor performance using specific 

performance metrics. However, the CCIC2S program office was not 

always aware of the contractor’s decisions or performance. For example, 

 26GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Demonstrate That Performance-Based 

Logistics Contracts Are Achieving Expected Benefits, GAO-05-966 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 9, 2005). 

Page 20 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
program office officials acknowledged that they were not aware of some 

re-prioritization of work done by the contractor to meet the users’ needs. 

Acquisition programs commonly use DCMA to monitor higher risk 

contracts. Typically, after DOD awards a contract, DCMA can monitor 

contractors’ information systems to ensure that cost, performance, and 

delivery schedules are in compliance with the terms and conditions of the 

contract. According to DCMA officials, however, their involvement in the 

CCIC2S program from inception through 2004 was minimal because 

DCMA lacked resources and the CCIC2S program office did not request 

DCMA assistance until that time. This is despite the fact that in January 

2003, the Air Force and DCMA signed a memorandum of agreement calling 

for DCMA assistance on the contract for the CCIC2S program. 

The agreement called for DCMA to analyze the contractor’s earned value

management (EVM) systems to verify that monthly cost performance 

reports and related documents present a valid picture of contract cost and 

schedule progress. This type of analysis could have identified problems 

with the EVM system and led to corrective actions sooner. Since 2004,

DCMA has been working with the program office and Air Force systems 

engineering officials to improve the quality of metrics to assess cost, 

technical performance, and risk, as well as to make improvements to the 

contractor’s EVM system. 

Program Lacked 

Independent Contractor 

Performance Assessment 

Needed Management 

Controls and 

Redesignation of CCIC2S 

Program Are Being 

Considered 

DOD is reconsidering CCIC2S’s current designation as a non-major 

automated information system program. In September 2005, the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration notified 

the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition that it intended to 

recategorize the CCIC2S program as a major automated information 

system acquisition because of increased funding levels, national interest in 

the program, and our review of the program. Designating the CCIC2S 

program as a major automated information system acquisition would put 

in place the high-level oversight and rigorous analyses needed to help 

ensure (1) the program has top-level accountability and support for the 

program, (2) DOD has the knowledge necessary for making trade-offs in 

program requirements so that they match available resources, and 

(3) DOD has the ability to prioritize and commit to the program within the 

context of its other acquisition programs and long-range investment plans. 

As of June 2006, however, the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Networks and Information Integration has yet to formally make a 

Page 21 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
decision on whether to designate the program as a major automated 

information system acquisition. 

According to Air Force and DCMA officials, the program office has taken

several steps, which we did not assess, to address some management 

control problems, including the following actions: 

• Prohibited direct contact between the contractor and users—which 

they acknowledge had a direct impact on program cost and schedule 

performance—to keep the contractor from reprioritizing work to meet 

the immediate needs of the users, in 2004. Additionally, the program 

office and the contractor implemented an engineering review board 

process to evaluate any proposed change in terms of its validity in 

relation to validated requirements as well as its impact to program cost 

and schedule estimates. 

• Initiated a User Feedback Control Board process to identify where 

deliverables are not meeting users’ needs and assess identified 

solutions in terms of their relationship to validated requirements as 

well as program cost and schedule implications, beginning in the spring 

of 2005. 

• Adopted a planning approach that is to more realistically account for 

program risks through a consideration of limiting factors such as test 

resources and the complexities surrounding installing and testing 

hardware and software in Cheyenne Mountain’s operational 

environment. 

• Took steps to add technical staff to assess the effects of changes in 

requirements on cost, schedule, and performance goals and provide 

additional insight into contractor activities. 

• Implemented a formal system-level technical review process consisting 

of milestones, or gates, each of which have entrance and exit criteria. 

For example, deficiencies identified under the formal review must be 

addressed prior to proceeding into the next development phase. 

Cheyenne Mountain systems—which are to warn the U.S. and Canada of 

air, missile, and space attacks—are critical to national security. However, 

since the 1980s, DOD’s efforts to modernize these systems have been 

fraught with cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. 

Under the current development effort, the Air Force continues to defer the 

completion of key critical space requirements, placing the DOD’s ability to 

perform air and missile defense and space situational awareness missions 

at risk. Without matching requirements to available resources, the CCIC2S 

program will continue to flounder. Failing to conduct this match at the 

onset of this complex effort led DOD to develop unrealistic cost and 

Conclusions 

Page 22 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
schedule estimates as well as to over-promise capability. Specifically, the 

Air Force did not ensure that the program had stable requirements and a 

sound process for clarifying and controlling them, and thus the resources 

to satisfy the requirements were severely underestimated. The minimal 

top-level and external oversight and accountability of the program 

contributed to the problems. Failure to make course corrections now 

without correcting the shortfalls will put the program at risk of failing to 

achieve promised capability. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Air Force to maintain Cheyenne Mountain’s essential operation and 

maintenance activities and to limit future development activities to those 

deemed critical to national security needs until the Department takes the 

following five actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Designate the program as a major automated information system 

acquisition.

• Conduct an affordability assessment to demonstrate that the program’s 

resource estimates are realistic and achievable in terms of DOD’s 

overall long-range modernization priorities and investment plans for 

Cheyenne Mountain. Such an assessment would require ensuring the 

requirements baseline is verified and validated and making a match 

between these requirements and available resources. 

• Conduct an economic analysis to assess the life-cycle costs and 

benefits of the program. 

• Conduct an independent estimate of program life-cycle costs, to 

provide a basis for relying on the cost estimates. 

• Determine and clearly delineate oversight responsibilities and 

accountability for the successful implementation of CCIC2S. 

Additionally, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the 

Air Force to take the following three actions: 

• Develop and implement an approach that requires a rigorous analysis 

of resource impacts of any change in requirements for continuously 

making trade-offs between requirements and resources to ensure a 

match is maintained. 

• Ensure management controls are in place so that changes to 

requirements are decided on the basis of costs, benefits, risks, and 

affordability. 

• Develop and implement an approach for ensuring program cost and 

performance data are reliable. 

Page 23 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. 

DOD agreed that the CCIC2S program be designated as a major automated 

information system with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks 

and Information Integration as the milestone decision authority with 

oversight responsibility and accountability for its successful 

implementation. In addition, DOD agreed with conducting an affordability 

assessment, economic analysis, and independent estimate of life-cycle 

costs on future development activities but not with the current activities 

due to potential mission impacts. Specifically, DOD stated these 

assessments should be conducted on future delivery blocks of the CCIC2S 

program, but not on the current block.27 DOD asserted that its recent 

$127 million CCIC2S funding reduction across the Future Years Defense 

Program (FYDP)28 pared down CCIC2S development activities to those 

essential to national security needs. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

We do not disagree with this approach to the extent that continuing these 

development activities is critical to national security. However, continuing

CCIC2S development without establishing a match between requirements 

and available resources may also hinder DOD’s ability to satisfy national 

security needs because of the increased risk that the program fails to 

achieve its promised capability. While DOD raises the issue of the cost of 

delaying the program, it does not address the cost of proceeding as 

planned. Our work has shown that in numerous programs, continuing to 

spend money on development programs without sufficient knowledge or 

clear direction results in cost overruns and schedule delays. Further, given 

recent congressional concerns over DOD’s management of CCIC2S,29

demonstrating on a timely basis how requirements and available resources 

are to be matched while protecting national security is especially 

 27Under the draft rebaseline plan, the current development block is to deliver critical 

missile warning capabilities in fiscal 2007 as well as communications and space command 

and control infrastructure upgrades by the end of fiscal year 2008. 

28The FYDP is a DOD centralized report consisting of thousands of program elements that 

provides information on DOD’s current and planned out-year budget requests and is one of 

DOD’s principal tools to manage the spending for its transformation of strategic 

capabilities. The FYDP provides visibility over DOD’s projected spending and helps inform 

DOD and Congress about resource data relating to identifying priorities and trade-offs.

29House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2007: Report of 

the Committee on Appropriations, Report No. 109-504 (June 16, 2006) and House of

Representatives, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007: Report of the

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives on H.R. 5122, Report No. 

109-452 (May 5, 2006). 

Page 24 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
important. Since an assessment of CCIC2S’s specific operational risks to 

national security was beyond the scope of our review, we clarified our 

recommendation to read that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary

of the Air Force to limit future development activities to those deemed 

critical to national security needs until the Department takes the actions 

discussed above. 

DOD agreed to take actions relating to establishing and implementing 

management controls and approaches to analyze the resource impacts of 

changes in requirements and to ensure reliable program data. DOD stated 

that these changes had already been implemented or are being planned. 

During our review, program and DCMA officials told us that some 

changes—such as prohibiting the contractor from reprioritizing work 

without Air Force approval and implementing an engineering review board

to assess requirements changes—had been made. However, they also 

noted that other measures to manage requirements and institute better 

management controls—such as increasing program office management 

staffing and capabilities, modifying the work breakdown structure and 

earned value management system, and implementing a new approach and 

metrics to track program progress—were under way or planned. Given 

DOD has not fully demonstrated the effectiveness of the changes it has 

made or is making, and that it is planning to make other changes, we are 

retaining our recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees and the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force. We will also 

provide copies to others on request. In addition, this report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, 

please call me at (202) 512-4841 (shamesl@gao.gov). Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix V. 

Lisa Shames 

Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 25 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 26 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 27 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the status of the Combatant Commanders’ Integrated 

Command and Control System, or CCIC2S, in terms of meeting its cost, 

schedule, and performance goals, we reviewed our past work to determine 

whether the CCIC2S program has continued to experience the problems 

previous Cheyenne Mountain upgrade efforts had experienced. We also 

reviewed program status reports and budget data and spoke with 

Department of Defense (DOD) and contractor officials to assess program 

cost, schedule, and performance progress to date. Additionally, we spoke 

with CCIC2S users to determine their level of satisfaction with CCIC2S 

program performance. Specifically, we reviewed documentation from and 

interviewed officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Networks and Information Integration; National Security Space Office; 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group; 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation; 

Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; Office of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff; Defense Contract Management Agency’s CCIC2S Program 

Support Team; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Acquisition; Air Force Space Command; Air Force Air Combat Command; 

Office of the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Command and 

Control and Combat Support; Air Force Electronic Systems Center; Air 

Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center; United States Strategic 

Command; United States Northern Command; North American Aerospace 

Defense Command; and Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems & Solutions. 

To gauge the extent to which DOD has followed best practices with regard 

to managing program requirements, including matching requirements to 

available resources, we reviewed DOD, Office of Management and Budget, 

and Air Force acquisition guidance, as well as our previous best practices 

work, to determine criteria for managing requirements. We also reviewed 

program requirements documentation and spoke with DOD officials on 

how DOD developed requirements for the CCIC2S program. Furthermore, 

we reviewed requirements management documentation and spoke with 

DOD and contractor officials to assess how the Air Force managed its 

requirements, including the process it used for defining and prioritizing the 

requirements. Specifically, we reviewed documentation from and 

conducted interviews with officials in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Cost Analysis Improvement Group; Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation; Office of the Director, 

Operational Test and Evaluation; Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

Defense Contract Management Agency’s CCIC2S Program Support Team; 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force 

Space Command; Office of the Air Force Program Executive Officer for 

Command and Control and Combat Support; Air Force Electronic Systems 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Center; Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center; United States 

Strategic Command; United States Northern Command; North American 

Aerospace Defense Command; and Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems & 

Solutions. 

To assess DOD’s oversight and control mechanisms for Cheyenne 

Mountain systems modernization and integration efforts underway and 

planned, we reviewed DOD and Air Force acquisition guidance and 

interviewed officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Networks and Information Integration; Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Cost Analysis Improvement Group; Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Program Analysis and Evaluation; Office of the Director, Operational Test 

and Evaluation; Defense Contract Management Agency’s CCIC2S Program 

Support Team; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Acquisition; Air Force Space Command; Office of the Air Force Program 

Executive Officer for Command and Control and Combat Support; Air 

Force Electronic Systems Center; Air Force Operational Test and 

Evaluation Center; United States Strategic Command; United States 

Northern Command; North American Aerospace Defense Command; and 

Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems & Solutions. 

We conducted our work from July 2005 through April 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 28 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 29 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 30 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 32 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
Appendix III: Software Development 

Capability Maturity Model 

Page 34 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain

Appendix III: Software Development 

Capability Maturity Model 

Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, a federally 

funded research and development center, has identified specific processes 

and practices that have proven successful in fostering quality software 

development. The Software Capability Maturity Model®a

 rates maturity 

according to the following five levels of maturity. See table 4 for a 

description of these maturity levels.

Table 4: Software Capability Maturity Model® Scale 

Level of Maturity Description

Level 1 (Initial) The software process is characterized as ad hoc. Success depends on individual effort. 

Level 2 (Repeatable) The basic process is in place to track cost, schedule, and functionality. Some aspects of the process can

be applied to projects with similar applications. 

Level 3 (Defined) There is a standardized software process for the organization. All projects use some approved version of 

this process to develop and maintain software. 

Level 4 (Managed) The organization uses and collects detailed data to manage and evaluate progress and quality. 

Level 5 (Optimizing) Quantitative feedback about performance and innovative ideas and technologies contribute to continuous 

process improvement. 

Source: Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University.

a

Capability Maturity Model is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by Carnegie Mellon 

University. 
Appendix IV: DOD Acquisition Categories, 

Thresholds, and Oversight 

Page 35 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain

Appendix IV: DOD Acquisition Categories, 

Thresholds, and Oversight 

Placement into a specific acquisition category (ACAT) determines the 

accountability level and analysis requirements of a program. As shown in

table 5, for a major automated information system acquisition, the 

milestone decision authority is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Networks and Information Integration, who is also the DOD Chief 

Information Officer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration may delegate the authority to the DOD component 

acquisition executive (such as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Acquisition). For non-major automated information system acquisitions, 

the milestone decision authority is the component acquisition executive or 

his or her designee. 
Appendix IV: DOD Acquisition Categories, 

Thresholds, and Oversight 

Table 5: DOD Acquisition Categories and Decision Authorities (as of March 15, 1996, When the Air Force Initiated the CCIC2S 

Program) 

Acquisition category 

(ACAT) 

Dollar value (fiscal year 1996 constant

dollars)a

Milestone decision authority 

ACAT I 

For major defense

acquisition programs

(not for automated 

information system 

acquisition programs)

• Total expenditure for research, 

development, test, and evaluation 

(RDT&E) of more than $355 million, or 

for procurement of more than $2.135 

billion 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 

Technologyb designates ACAT I programs as ACAT ID or IC 

• Milestone Decision Authority for ACAT ID: Under Secretary

of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 

• Milestone Decision Authority for ACAT IC: Head of DOD 

Component (such as the Secretary of the Air Force), or, if 

delegated, the DOD Component Acquisition Executive (such

as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition) 

ACAT IA 

For major automated 

information system 

acquisition programs

• Program costs in any single year in 

excess of $30 million 

• Total program costs in excess of $120 

million 

• Total life-cycle costs in excess of $360 

million 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence designates ACAT IA 

programs as ACAT IAM or ACAT IAC 

• Milestone Decision Authority for ACAT IAMc Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence 

• Milestone Decision Authority for ACAT IAC: DOD 

Component Chief Information Officer (such as the Air Force 

Chief of Warfighting Integration and Chief Information Officer, 

within the office of the Secretary of the Air Force) 

ACAT II 

For weapon system 

acquisition programs

(not for automated 

information system 

acquisition programs)

Does not meet ACAT I criteria 

Total expenditure for research, 

development, test, and evaluation 

(RDT&E) of more than $140 million, or for 

procurement of more than $645 million 

Component Acquisition Executive 

ACAT III Does not meet criteria for ACAT I, ACAT 

IA, or ACAT II

Designee of the DOD Component Acquisition Executive at the 

lowest level appropriate. 

Source: DOD 

a

If a program does not meet a dollar threshold, a program can be designated as a major acquisition 

based on other factors such as technical complexity. 

b

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology is now the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

c

Currently, the Milestone Decision Authority for ACAT IAM programs is the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Networks and Information Integration—this Assistant Secretary is also the DOD Chief 

Information Officer. 

Note: These criteria have since been superseded with updated criteria. This table is drawn from 

Department of Defense Regulation Number 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense 

Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition 

Programs (Mar. 15, 1996). 

Page 36 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 37 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Lisa Shames (202) 512-4841 

In addition to the contact named above, Art Gallegos, Peter Grana, 

Randolph C. Hite, Arturo Holguin, Rich Horiuchi, Gary Mountjoy, 

Karl Seifert, Karen Sloan, and Rona B. Stillman made key contributions to 

this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 38 GAO-06-666 Cheyenne Mountain

Related GAO Products 

Attack Warning: NORAD’s Communications System Segment

Replacement Program Should Be Reassessed. GAO/IMTEC-89-1. 

Washington, D.C.: November 30, 1988. 

Space Defense: Management and Technical Problems Delay Operations 

Center Acquisition. GAO/IMTEC-89-18. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 1989. 

Attack Warning: Better Management Required to Resolve NORAD 

Integration Deficiencies. GAO/IMTEC-89-26. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 

1989. 

Attack Warning: Defense Acquisition Board Should Address NORAD’s 

Computer Deficiencies. GAO/IMTEC-89-74. Washington, D.C.: September 

13, 1989. 

Defense Acquisition: Air Force Prematurely Recommends ADP 

Acquisitions. GAO/IMTEC-90-7. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 1990. 

Attack Warning: Costs to Modernize NORAD’s Computer System 

Significantly Understated. GAO/IMTEC-91-23. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 

1991. 

Computer Technology: Air Attack Warning System Cannot Process All

Radar Track Data. GAO/IMTEC-91-15. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 1991.

Attack Warning: Lack of System Architecture Contributes to Major 

Development Problems. GAO/IMTEC-92-52. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 

1992. 

Attack Warning: Status of the Survivable Communications Integration 

System. GAO/IMTEC-92-61BR. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 1992.

Granite Sentry. GAO/IMTEC-92-84R. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 

1992. 

Attack Warning: Status of the Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade Program.

GAO/AIMD-94-175. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1994. 

Defense Acquisitions: Status of Strategic C4 System Modernization and 

Plans To Integrate Additional Mission Capabilities. 

GAO/NSIAD-00-212R. Washington, D.C.: August 25, 2000. 

(120473) 
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