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******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LORENZO ADAMS (AC 36704)
Lavine, Beach and Sheldon, Js. Argued September 18, 2015—officially released March 22, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Danbury, Roraback, J.)
Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
SarahHanna, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
onthe brief, wereStephenJ. SedenskyIII , state’s attorney, and Colleen P. Zingaro, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).Opinion SHELDON, J. The defendant, Lorenzo Adams, appeals fromthejudgment ofconvictionfor conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree, in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-481 and 53a-125b,2 which was rendered against him by the trial court on February 10, 2014, on the basis ofhis alleged conduct at a Microsoft store in Danbury with a named coconspirator, one Stacey Rossman, on December 13, 2012. The trial court found that on that date, the defendant conspired with another person to steal Beats by Dre (Beats) headphones from the Microsoft store in Danbury and that
one of them committed the overt act of stealing at least one pair of such headphones from the store in furtherance of that conspiracy. Following the trial, at which the court also acquitted the defendant, inter alia, of larceny in the sixth degree in connection with that
same alleged course of conduct, the court sentenced the defendant on the conspiracy charge to a term of ninety days in jail. This appeal followed.
The defendant claims on appeal that the evidence before the trial court was insufficient to support his convictionforconspiracyto commitlarcenyinthe sixth degree. He claims, more particularly, that the evidence admitted against him was insufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that (1) he conspired with anyone to commit the offense oflarceny in the sixth degree on December 13, 2012; (2) he had the intent to commit the crime oflarceny in the sixth degree on that date; or (3) while actingwiththatintent, he orRossman stole Beats headphones on that date in furtherance oftheir alleged conspiracy. We agree with the defendant that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree, and thus remand this case to the trial court with direction to vacate his conspiracy conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal on that charge.
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. This
case was tried on a three count long form information charging the defendant as follows: (1) with larceny in the sixth degree (‘‘on or about December 13, 2012

. . . [the defendant] did take the property of Microsoft to wit: headphones in violation of [§] 53a-125b’’); (2) with conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree (‘‘on

or about December 13, 2012

. . . [the defendant] with the intent to commit a larceny in the sixth degree, did agree with Stacey Rossman to commit larceny in the sixth degree by taking the property ofMicrosoft to wit: headphones in violation of [§§] 53a-48 and 53a-125b’’); and (3) with attempted larceny in the sixth degree (‘‘on

or about December 14, 2012

. . . [the defendant] attemptedto take headphones fromthe Microsoft store in violation of [§§] 53a-49 and 53a-125b’’). After the defendant waived his right to trial byjury and elected to be tried by the court, trial commenced on January16, 2014.
The state presentedtwo witnesses in its case-in-chief at trial. Only one of them offered any testimony concerning the events of December 13, 2012, upon which the defendant’s challenged conspiracy conviction was based. The sufficiencyofthe state’s evidenceto support that conviction thus depends directly upon the nature and substance of that witness’s testimony and of the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it. Nancy John, the manager of the Microsoft store in the Danbury Fair Mall, testified that the store was busy withholidaycustomersonDecember 13andwasstaffed with about fifteen employees. John noticed a male and
afemale customerenterthestore andwalktotheaccessory area at the back of the store. The accessory area contained small merchandise items and accessories for electronic equipment. John noticed these particular customersbecauseoneofthemwascarryingashopping bag from H&M, a store that was no longer in the mall,
a fact to which she had been trained to be alert. A few minutesafterthetwo customersleftthe accessoryarea, a store associate went overto the area and noticed that ‘‘a few’’ Beats headphones were missing. John testified that it would have been easy to determine that headphones were missing because the store only put one or two pieces of that type of merchandise out on the floor at atime. After the store associate informed John ofthe missingmerchandise, shepulledup securityfootage on her laptop. John testified as follows as to what she saw on the security footage, which was not produced for or introduced as evidence at trial: ‘‘I saw that the Beats had been

. . . picked up, moved around, held in hand, put back, and then one was pulled off and the
one toward the back was pulled forward

. . . to make it look like there wasn’t one missing at the time.’’
John later testified that Beats headphones had been stolen on December 13.3 Although John testified on cross-examination that she was able to track what specific items from the store’s inventory had been placed
onthe flooron December 13, and claimedthatthe store had given the numbers ofthose items to the police, the state never offered any such numbers or any other inventory records concerning the missing items into evidence.4 John admitted that, although a store employee had reported the headphones missing on December 13, it was possible that someone else was carrying them around the store at the time of the employee’s observation. Moreover, individual pairs of headphones did not have security devices on them that wouldhavesoundedanalarmorotherwisealertedstore employees ifsomeone were attemptingto remove them from the store without paying for them.
John also testified briefly as to events that allegedly occurred on two subsequent days, December 14 and 18. On December 14, she stated, the defendant againcameintothestorealongwiththesamefemale companion who was carrying the same H&M shopping bag and another female. They headed once again to the accessory area ofthe store, where they looked at headphones. Aftertheyleftthe store, store employees found that ‘‘items were missing once again.’’ John called the police and filed a report after the disappearance ofthe missing merchandise was discovered on December 14. Later, on December 18, the defendant came to the store
a third time, along with the same female companion who had accompanied him on December 13, and were in the accessory area of the store. After this visit as well, Beats headphones were reported to be missing. John immediately reported the events of December 18 to the police, who thereafter apprehended the defendant and his companion in the mall and arranged a showup to have John view them. John identified them
as the same individuals who had come into her store
on December 13, 14, and 18.
At trial, John was shown a still photograph taken from the store’s security footage on December 13, in which she pointed out the man and the woman whom she claimed to have stolen Beats headphones on that date. She specifically identified the defendant as the male customer depicted in the photograph. The state alsointroducedastillphotographtakenfromthestore’s security footage on December 14, which John claimed to show the defendant’s two female companions on that date but not the defendant.
Keith Leggiadro, a police officer with the Danbury Police Department, also testified for the state. He had respondedto alarceny complaintatthe Microsoft store
on December 14 and received two still photographs of the suspects from John, which had been taken from the store’s surveillance video on December 13 and 14. In addition, John showed himthe securityfootage from those two days. As aresult ofthis complaint, Leggiadro began to investigate the alleged incidents on December 13 and 14.5 Leggiadro responded to the Danbury Fair Mall again on December 18 to assist with an arrest. Upon his arrival, he sawthe two individuals in custody, whom he recognized as the male suspect and one of the female suspects shown in the photographs he had been given from the store’s security footage on December 13 and 14. The male suspect shown in the photograph from December 13 was the defendant. Upon conductingasearchincidenttoarrestofthedefendant’s clothing, the police found and seized a pair of pliers and a set of car keys. Officer Leggiadro used the keys to find the associated vehicle. In the vehicle, which the police then searched, theyfound an H&M shopping bag resembling the one reportedly carried by one of the suspects in the incidents on December 13, 14, and 18.
Other than the two still photographs, which did not show the defendant or either ofhis companions in pos-session of Beats headphones or other Microsoft merchandise, the state never introduced any security footage from the Microsoft store into evidence.
After John completed her testimony and the court returned from a lunch break, it announced that it had decided to exclude all of John’s testimony as to what she had seen on the unproduced security footage. The state objected to the exclusion of this evidence, and repeated the same objection the following day. The court, however, restateditsrulingasfollows: ‘‘Thereare threebasesunderwhichthe evidenceisbeingexcluded. The first is that it’s unduly prejudicial to the defendant to be defending against evidence which has neverbeen made available to the defendant to review, that the defendant hasn’t had an opportunity to see, and it’s not available.

. . . Basis number two is there really is a best evidence purpose if

. . . what’s seen on the videotape is what’s being relied on, thevideotape itselfought to be proffered.

. . . And it’s the court’s ruling that it’s not going to fall under any exception to the hearsay rule.’’ When the state asked for clarification as to what evidence had been excluded by virtue of its ruling, the court responded as follows: ‘‘What’s excluded is any testimony as to what the witness saw on anyvideotape after the fact.’’
In its closing argument, the state described the evidence in the following manner.6 First, it acknowledged the circumstantialnature ofits case, andthefactthatall testimony as to whatJohn had seen on the unproduced store video had been excluded. Then, however, it arguedthatthe court should considerthe actions taken byJohnandLeggiadro as aresultofwatchingthevideo, concluding, ‘‘Nancy John as well as Officer Leggiadro did watch that videotape, and it was based upon that information

. . . as well as other information that they put forth to verify not only the identification but that [thedefendant] aswellasMs. Rossmantooktheseitems from the store.’’ Thereafter, the court found the defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit larceny on December 13 but not guilty of larceny on that date or attempted larceny on the following day, December 14. In so ruling, the court specifically statedthatthe overt actthat hadbeen committed in furtherance of the conspiracy was a theft of merchandise from the Microsoft store. The court ruled in relevant part as follows: ‘‘I do find

. . . that the state has met its burden in provingbeyondareasonable doubtthat [the defendant] is guilty of conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree. And I do that because I found that the state proved beyond areasonable doubt that [the defendant] with intent [that]

. . . the conduct constituting a crime be performed, agreed with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and one of them committed an overt act in pursuanceof that conspiracy. ‘‘And the crime that an overt act that the court thinks
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt that an overt act was

. . . committed in furtherance of is the crime of violating § 53a-125b, larceny in the sixth degree. Namely, that [the defendant] or someone working with [him] with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself wrongfully took, obtained or withheld property from an owner. ‘‘And, specifically, larcenyasdefinedin § 53a-119subsection9, shoplifting. That [the defendant] and/orsomeone he was working in concert with was guilty of shoplifting when they

. . . intentionally took possession of any goods, wares or merchandise offered or exposedforsale byanystore or othermercantile establishment with the intention of converting the same to hisownusewithoutpayingthepurchasepricethereof.’’
On the basis ofthese facts, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish any of the elements of conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree on December 13. As to the overt act element, the defendant argues that the state failed to establish either that ‘‘Beats headphones were missing from the Microsoftstore’sinventory [or] that defendantorsomeone working with him took them.’’ We agree that the evidence was insufficientto prove beyond areasonable doubt that the defendant or his alleged coconspirator committedalarcenyonDecember 13. Becauseweagree that the evidence was insufficient to establish the overt actoflarcenyfoundbythetrialcourt, we donotaddress the other two elements of conspiracy.7
‘‘The standard of review of an insufficiency claim is twofold. We firstreviewthe evidence presented attrial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts expressly found by the trial court or impliedly found by the jury. We then decide whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the trial court or the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Milardo, 224 Conn. 397, 402–403, 618 A.2d 1347 (1993)

. . . .’’ (Internal quotations omitted.) State v. Reed, 56 Conn. App. 428, 432, 742 A.2d 1285, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 524 (2000).
We beginbysettingforththe elements ofthe crime of conspiracytocommitlarceny. GeneralStatutes § 53a-48 (a) defines conspiracy as follows: ‘‘A person is guilty ofconspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance ofsuch conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.’’ Larceny, the alleged object of the conspiracy in this case, requires proofthat the defendant committed a larceny in violation of General Statutes § 53a-119. The elements oflarceny are ‘‘(1) the wrongful taking or carrying away of the personal property ofanother; (2) the existence ofa felonious intent in the taker to deprive the owner of [the property] permanently; and (3) the lack of consent of the owner.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Saez, 115 Conn. App. 295, 302, 972 A.2d 277, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 909, 978 A.2d 1113 (2009). Larceny byshopliftingunder§ 53a-119 (9)8requiresthatthestate additionally establish that the property taken by the defendant was goods, wares or merchandise exposed for sale within the store. Id. Accordingly, to obtain a convictionforconspiracyto commitlarcenyinthe sixth degree, thestatewasrequiredtoprovebeyondareasonable doubt the following three elements: (1) that the defendant intended to and did agree with one or more otherpersonto engageinlarceny; (2)thatthe defendant specifically intended that every element of the crime of larceny be committed; see State v. Pond, 315 Conn. 451, 467–71, 108 A.3d 1083 (2015); and (3) that the defendant or a coconspirator committed the overt act of larceny pursuant to such agreement to commit the crime of larceny. Here, the trial court, sitting as the fact finder, specifically found that the overt act was a larceny—‘‘[n]amely, that [the defendant] or someone working with [the defendant] with intent to deprive another ofproperty or to appropriate the same to himself wrongfully took, obtained or [withheld] property from an owner.’’9
After the trial court excluded the evidence of what John saw on the security footage, only the following evidence remained for the court’s consideration as to the defendant’s alleged commission of conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree on December 13, 2012. John saw two individuals, one ofwhom was carrying a bag from a store no longer in the mall, walk into the store and head toward the accessory area. Within a few minutes of these individuals leaving the store, a store employee noticed that an unspecified number of Beats headphones were missing from the accessory area. After John later checked the store’s inventory, she concluded that ‘‘the headphones’’ had been ‘‘stolen.’’
We conclude that the evidence remaining after the court excluded testimony as to what John had seen on the security footage was insufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant or his alleged coconspirator stole Beats headphones from the Microsoft store in Danbury on December 13, 2012, either as the substantive crime oflarceny in the sixth degree, of which the court acquitted him, or as an overt act in furtherance ofthe inchoate crime ofconspiracyto commit larceny in the sixth degree on that same date. From John’s testimony, the fact finder reasonably could have inferred that when she checked the store’s inventoryafter the defendant and his alleged coconspirator had leftthe store, she was unableto accountforanunspecified number ofBeats headphones in the store. The fact findercouldnot, however, havemadeaninferentialleap from such evidence that the defendant or his alleged coconspirator, who had been in an area where some such headphones were displayed on December 13, but
were neverseeninpossession ofanysuchheadphones, let alone in possession of the missing headphones, on that day, had stolen the missing headphones from the store. ‘‘Although Connecticut law accepts the practice of allowing inferences based on other inferences

. . . [and]

. . . [the fact finder] determines if any reasonable inference in a particular case should be drawn

. . . [the fact finder] accomplishes this function

. . . only where there exists sufficient evidence to support reasonable inferences.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Estrada, 28 Conn. App. 416, 422, 612 A.2d 110, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 925, 614 A.2d 828 (1992). First, the fact finder would have had to infer that the missing headphones actually had been stolen by
someone and removed from the store, rather than lost
or misplaced within the store or taken into the possession of another customer who had not yet presented them to a sales clerk to be purchased. However, there
was insufficient evidence to support such an inference because John’s own testimony established that the opposite was true. According to John, although she believed that the headphones had been stolen, it was possible that another customer was walking around with them at the time their absence from the accessory area was first noticed by another store employee. Second, and more importantly, the fact finder would have had to inferthat the defendant or his codefendant not only took possession of the missing headphones, butremovedthemfromthe storewiththeintentto steal them. Again, however, there was insufficient evidence upon which to base such a conclusion. All that the evidenceshowedwasthatthe defendantandhisalleged coconspirator had engaged in the innocent, ordinary conduct of going to a public area of a retail establishmentwheregoodsweredisplayedforsalesomeunspecified period of time before particular goods they had not handled, much less taken possession of or concealedfromview, werereportedmissingfromthatlocation. To draw such an inference, the fact finder would have hadto inferthatthe innocent, ordinary conduct of the defendant and his alleged coconspirator—walking into the store together, going over to the accessory area, and carrying a shopping bag of a store no longer in the mall—provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to make a reasonable inference that they not only took possession ofthe headphones but also had stolenheadphones once displayed in that location but later found to be missing therefrom. Such conduct was indistinguishable from that of any other shoppers who passedthrough that area of the store on a busy day in the Christmas season. Moreover, the state did not present any evidence that anyone saw the defendant or his coconspirator take any headphones from the store or that the police later recovered the missing headphones in their possession or control after the incident.10
In sum, it was too great an inferential step for the court to take on this evidence to conclude that the defendantorhisallegedcoconspiratorstolethemissing headphones from the store. Cf. State v. Saracino, 178 Conn. 416, 417–18, 423 A.2d 102 (1979) (testimony of codefendants established scheme of fencing material from store and, although no merchandise was ever recovered, warehouseinventoryrevealedthatmerchandise was missing); State v. Saez, supra, 115 Conn. App. 304 (store employees testified that they saw defendant pushing merchandise out of store). We therefore concludethattheevidencewasinsufficienttoprovebeyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant or his alleged coconspirator committed an overt act of larceny. Accordingly, construing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to the state, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, the trial court could not reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect ofthe evidence established the defendant’s guilt of conspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thejudgment of conviction is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment of acquittal onthe charge ofconspiracyto commitlarceny in the sixth degree.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 53a-48 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, andanyone ofthemcommits anovertactinpursuance ofsuchconspiracy.’’

2 General Statutes § 53a-125b (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of larceny in the sixth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and the value of the property or service is five hundred dollars or less.’’

3 John testified as follows: ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And when you checked inventory later, the Beats had been stolen, correct? ‘‘[John]: Yes. We checked immediately.’’

4 John also testified as follows: ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: What—do you have any inventory control as to what the specific item is in the front of the store that’s for sale, do you? ‘‘[John]: Yes. ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: And what tracking is that? ‘‘[John]: It’s all through—through oursystem, through our—ourinventory control systems, and our demo blinders and buckets. Everything is—you know, has serial numbers so we know—we know what items are out on
our floor. ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: Okay. But you don’t have any—but you—you don’t know what specific set was taken on the night of the 13th, do you? Or— Let me withdraw that question. Did you give Danbury police any specific item numbers that were taken on December 13th? ‘‘[John]: Yes. We were able to determine that.’’

5 Contrary to John’s testimony, Leggiadro testified that John had told him that her fellow employees had thwarted a larceny on December 14.

6 The state’s closing argument was in relevant part as follows: ‘‘YourHonor, you did have an opportunity to sit and watch the testimony of both NancyJohn and OfficerLeggiadro before this court. Theygathered evidence and put it together, and Officer Leggiadro eventually did put together in a warrant affidavit for this defendant for larceny in the sixth degree. I think what’s important to remember is that not all crime solving or detection can be basedupon direct evidence. Infact, 98percentofthe evidence in criminal courts are circumstantial in nature. And in this case Nancy John did testify before the court that there w[ere] individuals from Microsoft Store as well

as herself that were watching this defendant and [Rossman] in the area of these headphones in the back corner of the Microsoft Store. She also indicated in hertestimony that this was not a[n] area that had a lot ofmerchandise stacked around in a confusing set up

. . . . She testified that there’s

a very limited amount of stock that’s on the floor in the Microsoft Store. And so ifthere is an item missing, it is very obvious that an item is missing. She testified that [the defendant] as well as Ms. Rossman were in the back

corner of the store, that the merchandise was on the shelf. And they were watching them because there were some things that drew their attention including bags that they were carrying and that they made a bee-line to the

area [in the] store that didn’t have larger items, but items that could be easily concealed and taken out of the store without much detection.

. . . She did testify that the items were on the shelf, that

. . . Ms. Rossman and [the defendant] were by the merchandise, that it was there, and then she looked back and it was gone.

. . . . However, I

. . . would indicate to the courtthat NancyJohn as well as OfficerLeggiadro didwatchthatvideotape, and it was based upon that information as well, as well as other information thattheyputforthtoverifynotonlytheidentificationbutthat [thedefendant]

as well as Ms. Rossman took these items from the store.

. . . So even though the direct evidence ofthe video was not able to be produced for the court nor referenced by the witnesses here, there is enough circumstantial evidence to determine thatthis defendant, in fact, didtake these items along with [Rossman]

. . . . That’s persuasive circumstantial evidence, and there is no doubt that this defendant and [Rossman] took it, and that nobody else could possibly have taken it based upon the evidence that’s before this court. I’d ask that the court find the defendant guilty.’’

7 The defendant also claims that the there was insufficient evidence to prove an agreement between him and the coconspirator identified in the information, Rossman. To that end, the defendant argues that the state

was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of his coconspirator as Rossman. The state concedes that it failed to prove that the name ofthe defendant’s alleged coconspirator was Rossman. The state argues, however, that even though it named Rossman in the information as the defendant’s alleged coconspirator, the name ofa coconspiratoris not an elementofconspiracythatthe stateisrequiredtoprovebeyondareasonable doubt. The issue, thus, is whether the state is required to establish the identity of a coconspirator whom it specifically named in the information when it does not allege that the defendant conspired with any other named

or unnamed coconspirators. Because we have decided that the evidence in the case was insufficient to establish a conspiracy, we will not address whether the state was required to establish the identity of a named coconspirator.

8 General Statutes § 53a-119 (9) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is guilty ofshoplifting who intentionally takes possession ofany goods, wares
ormerchandise offered or exposed for sale by any store or othermercantile establishment with the intention of converting the same to his own use, without paying the purchase price thereof.

. . .’’

9 The state concedes that the trial court was able to convict the defendant ofconspiracy to commit larceny in the sixth degree on the basis ofan overt act of larceny while acquitting him of the substantive crime of larceny in the sixth degree because the state had not proven whether it was the defendant or one of his alleged coconspirators who had taken the headphones.
10 The stateurgesusto considerthree additionalpieces ofevidence, which

we decline to do for the following reasons. First, the state urges us to rely upon testimony that John noticed the defendant and his companion lifting ‘‘Beats by Dre’’ headphones off the shelf, showing them to each other, and talking. This testimony, however,

was excluded as part of what John saw only in the unproduced security footage. Later, the state asked John questions about the individuals who had looked at and handled the headphones. Although these questions were not couched in terms of what John had seen in the security footage, the record as a whole makes it clear that John only saw the individuals handlethe headphones when viewing the security footage.

Second, the state argues that after the defendant and his companion left thestore, nooneelsewasintheareaofthestorewheretheBeatsheadphones

were displayed. The record, however, does not support this claim. At one point in her testimony, John described watching on the security footage thatnooneelsewasintheareaoftheBeatsheadphonesbeforethedefendant and his companion walked away. This testimony was excluded, however, and so the state directs our attention to an earlier part ofJohn’s testimony, when she testified as follows: ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: So when you saw—after you saw [the defendant] and this other individual in the area of the Beats headphones, and you guys
were keeping an eye on them, did you see right after [the defendant] and this other individual was there, before anybody else gets to the Beats headphones that the Beats were on the shelf? ‘‘[John]: Yes. ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Andjust after they walk away from those Beats headphones, are the Beats missing from the shelf? ‘‘[John]: Yes.’’ Even if this part of John’s testimony had not been excluded as part of what she had seen only on videotape, it would not have supported an inferencethatno one enteredtheareaafterthe defendantandhis companion leftitbutbefore anotheremployee observedthatthe headphonespreviously displayed there were missing. Third, the state asks us to consider that the defendant and his alleged coconspirator returned to the store on December 14 and December 18 and took Beats headphones. However, no thefts of headphones from the store
were alleged or proved to have occurred on either later date, and evidence ofsuchlaterthefts, haditbeen adduced, wouldnotin anyeventhaveproven
a theft by the defendant or his companion on December 13.