Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 1 of 15 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

AB PAC, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civ. No. 22-2139 (TJK)

)

v. )

) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) OF PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

)

Defendant. )

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S REPLY MEMORANDUM

IN SUPPORT OF ITS PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

Lisa J. Stevenson Jacob Siler (D.C. Bar No. 1003383)

(D.C. Bar No. 457628) Assistant General Counsel

Acting General Counsel jsiler@fec.gov

lstevenson@fec.gov

Shaina Ward (D.C. Bar No. 1002801)

Kevin Deeley Attorney

Associate General Counsel sward@fec.gov

kdeeley@fec.gov

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

December 2, 2022 1050 First Street NE

Washington, DC 20463

(202) 694-1650
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 2 of 15 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................1

ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................................2

I. TRUMP’S ALLEGED REPORTING VIOLATIONS DO NOT

ESTABLISH AB PAC’S STANDING TO PURSUE AN

EXCESSIVE CONTRIBUTION CLAIM .....................................................................2

A. The Commission’s Alleged Failure to Act on

an Administrative Complaint Within 120 Days

is Not a Sufficient Injury Under Article III .......................................................2

B. AB PAC Must Establish Standing for Each

Administrative Claim on which it Asserts the

Commission has Unlawfully Failed to Act........................................................5

II. AB PAC CANNOT CLAIM STANDING DUE TO

COMPETITOR OR INFORMATIONAL INJURY......................................................7

A. Plaintiff Lacks Competitor Standing .................................................................7

B. Plaintiff Lacks Informational Standing to Pursue its

Excessive Contribution Claim .........................................................................10

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................11

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 3 of 15 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 860 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2021) .................................................... 3

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 31 F.4th 781 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ........................................................ 4

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Am. Action Network,

410 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019)................................................................................................. 9

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Am. Action Network,

2022 WL 612655 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022) .................................................................................... 9

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. FEC,

363 F. Supp. 3d 33 (D.D.C. 2018)............................................................................................... 9

Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ................................................................ 4

Finca Santa Elena, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng’rs,

873 F. Supp. 2d 363 (D.D.C. 2012)............................................................................................. 5

Free Speech for People v. FEC, 442 F. Supp. 3d 335 (D.D.C. 2020).......................................... 11

Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991)....................................................................... 7, 8

Gottlieb v. FEC, 143 F.3d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1998)......................................................................... 7, 8

Jud. Watch v. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2003).................................................................. 4

LaRoque v. Holder, 650 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ..................................................................... 10

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ............................................................................. 3

Nat. Law Party of U.S. v. FEC, 111 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2000)............................................... 8

Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) .................................................................................. 7

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) .................................................................................. 3

Stockman v. FEC, 138 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 1998)............................................................................. 4

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) ...................................................................... 3

Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2001)................................................................... 11

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 4 of 15 

Statutes and Regulations

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8).......................................................................................................... 1, 6, 7

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A)................................................................................................ 3, 4, 5, 6

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C) ........................................................................................................ 3, 6

52 U.S.C. § 30116......................................................................................................................... 10

52 U.S.C. § 30116(f)................................................................................................................. 1, 11

11 C.F.R. § 111.4............................................................................................................................ 6

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 5 of 15 

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff AB PAC alleges that an administrative complaint it filed with the Federal

Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) asserted that former president Donald J. Trump

violated the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) in the following ways: (1) by making

expenditures to advance his 2024 presidential campaign without filing a statement of candidacy

with the FEC or disclosing those expenditures, and (2) by accepting excessive contributions from

his leadership Political Action Committee, or PAC, and a joint fundraising Committee in

violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(f). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Docket No. 14) seeks relief

from this Court pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8) for the Commission’s alleged failure to act

on this administrative complaint.

As the Commission demonstrated in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of Its Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (“Mem.”) (Docket 16-

1), however, AB PAC cannot show any concrete or particularized injury to obtain relief on its

claim that Trump accepted excessive contributions because AB PAC is not a competitor of

Trump. Furthermore, because AB PAC only identified Trump as a respondent in its

administrative complaint, there is no jurisdiction to consider any allegations about other PACs,

and any claim that the FEC’s lack of enforcement against Trump on the alleged excessive

contribution claims increased competition from other PACs is too remote and speculative to

support Article III standing.

Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the FEC’s Partial

Motion to Dismiss (“Opp.”) (Docket No. 17) makes two arguments, both of which fail to rebut

the Commission’s Motion. First, AB PAC incorrectly asserts that the FEC’s alleged failure to

act on its administrative complaint is all that the Court must consider for standing purposes and
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 6 of 15 

that the administrative complaint’s allegations of excessive contributions are irrelevant to

determining AB PAC’s standing. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, AB PAC merely asserts a

general interest in seeing the agency enforce the law promptly. A concrete and particularized

injury, rather than a mere right to sue, is required for Article III purposes. Second, AB PAC

separately argues that even if the excessive contribution allegations are considered, AB PAC has

standing because it has sufficiently alleged a competitor and informational injury. It has not.

AB PAC, an organization unable to run for office, does not compete with Trump in any election

and, therefore, cannot establish competitor standing as to him. It also cannot establish that any

competition with non-respondent PACs supports standing here, because no fine against Trump

would remedy the allegedly excessive fundraising that has gone to those entities. Nor has AB

PAC set forth a cognizable informational injury that would support its pursuit of relief related to

its excessive contribution claim. Even were the Commission to pursue enforcement of the claim

that Trump has accepted excessive contributions, AB PAC would not obtain any additional

information to which it claims it is entitled.

At bottom, to the extent AB PAC seeks an order compelling the Commission to act on

the excessive contributions claim, the Amended Complaint reveals an interest only in making the

Commission comply with FECA’s requirements. This is insufficient for Article III standing, and

the FEC’s Partial Motion to Dismiss should be granted.

ARGUMENT

I. TRUMP’S ALLEGED REPORTING VIOLATIONS DO NOT ESTABLISH AB

PAC’S STANDING TO PURSUE AN EXCESSIVE CONTRIBUTION CLAIM

A. The Commission’s Alleged Failure to Act on an Administrative Complaint

Within 120 Days is Not a Sufficient Injury under Article III

In its Partial Motion, the Commission explained that AB PAC lacks Article III standing

to compel the Commission to act on its excessive contribution claim. (Mem. at 6-12.) In

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 7 of 15 

response, plaintiff asserts that because AB PAC does not seek an order directing the FEC to act

on this specific allegation in its administrative complaint, as opposed to the entire administrative

complaint as a whole, the FEC’s alleged inaction alone confers standing sufficient for Article III

purposes. (Opp. at 7.) Plaintiff claims that “[t]his Court’s standing inquiry therefore begins and

ends with determining whether AB PAC has standing to press this [delay] claim and obtain this

relief.” (Id.) However, the theory plaintiff articulates has already been rejected by clear Circuit

precedent.

52 U.S.C. §§ 30109(a)(8)(A) and (C) allow “[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of the

Commission dismissing a complaint filed by such party . . . or by a failure of the Commission to

act on such complaint during the 120-day period beginning on the date the complaint is filed” to

file a lawsuit arguing that the Commission’s dismissal or delay is “contrary to law.” Id.

However, “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory

violation.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016). And “[t]he Supreme Court has

ruled repeatedly that the ‘deprivation of a procedural right’ alone, like an agency’s failure to

process an administrative complaint, ‘is insufficient to create Article III standing.’” Campaign

Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 860 F. App’x 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting Summers v. Earth

Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009)). Instead, the plaintiff must identify “some concrete

interest that is affected by the [procedural] deprivation[.]” Id. (alterations in original); see also

Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 342 (a plaintiff “cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a

bare procedural violation.”); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n.8 (1992) (rejecting

claims of Article III standing grounded solely on “a ‘procedural right’ unconnected to the

plaintiff’s own concrete harm”).

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 8 of 15 

Accordingly, as the FEC previously explained, the statutory 120-day period is simply a

jurisdictional threshold before which suit may not be brought, not a timetable within which the

Commission must resolve an administrative complaint. (See Mem. at 7-8); Stockman v. FEC,

138 F.3d 144, 152 (5th Cir. 1998) (FECA “does not create a deadline in which the FEC must act”

on administrative complaints). For example, in Common Cause v. FEC, the plaintiff claimed

that the FEC’s failure to provide “a prompt and lawful resolution of the complaint” deprived the

plaintiff of “a statutorily promised benefit that is personal to the complainant.” 108 F.3d 413,

418 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). The D.C. Circuit rejected that argument for standing,

explaining that it paralleled the kind of “procedural injury” that Lujan had found insufficient. Id.

“The [D.C. Circuit] made clear that while the FEC’s failure [to] act within the 120-day period of

[section 30109(a)(8)(A)] conferred a right to sue, it did not also confer standing.” Jud. Watch v.

FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41, 48 (D.D.C. 2003) (emphasis in original). Thus, the provision “confers

a right to sue upon parties who otherwise already have standing.” Id. (quoting Common Cause,

108 F. 3d at 419) (emphasis added by Judicial Watch). Applying Common Cause, the Judicial

Watch court concluded that the plaintiff before it had presented only a “procedural injury” and

that an administrative complainant could not “establish standing merely by asserting that the

FEC failed to process its complaint in accordance with law.” Id. (quoting Common Cause, 108

F.3d at 419). As this precedent establishes, AB PAC’s argument that the administrative

complaint’s allegations of excessive contributions to Trump are thus “irrelevant” to AB PAC’s

standing in a failure to act case, (Opp. at 9.), is misplaced.

Plaintiff also cites Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, 31 F.4th 781 (D.C. Cir. 2022) “CLC II”

to argue that a “plaintiff had standing to pursue its enforcement action against the FEC alleging

that the FEC had improperly dismissed the plaintiffs’ administrative complaint based on

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 9 of 15 

informational injury alone,” and that “[n]othing in that decision suggests that the plaintiff must

demonstrate a separate injury-in-fact for each of its underlying administrative allegations as

opposed to the claim actually filed in the district court.” (Opp. at 10.) As an initial matter, the

Commission did not appear in this case and therefore did not itself assert a partial lack of

standing as it has in the instant matter. However, more to the point, AB PAC must demonstrate

standing to sue beyond mere inaction.1 Section 30109(a)(8)(A) did not create a substantive right;

a plaintiff must still demonstrate that it has suffered a discrete, underlying injury separate and

apart from any mere procedural violation stemming from a dismissal or failure to act.

B. AB PAC Must Establish Standing for Each Administrative Claim on which it

Asserts the Commission has Unlawfully Failed to Act

The fact that AB PAC may have an informational injury with respect to its separate claim

in its administrative complaint to the FEC that Trump should have earlier declared his candidacy

and filed required reports does not mean it also has standing to seek a court order compelling the

Commission to act on other administrative claims for which it lacks constitutional injury.

Though its court complaint asserts a single cause of action, that does not eliminate AB PAC’s

requirement to demonstrate jurisdiction over each portion of its single claim. For example,

courts regularly dismiss portions of claims that have jurisdictional defects, while permitting the

plaintiff to pursue other portions of those same claims. See Finca Santa Elena, Inc. v. U.S. Army

Corps. of Eng’rs, 873 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371 (D.D.C. 2012) (granting motion to dismiss claims as

unripe only “to the extent those claims” challenge a certain aspect of a project).

As further explained infra pp. 10-11, AB PAC has not set forth an informational injury

on its excessive contribution claim. This is distinct from its disclosure claim, for which the FEC

has not contested standing. Thus, plaintiff’s claim that it has been deprived of “filings detailing

Mr. Trump’s campaign committee organization and its activities,” which has caused plaintiff an

“informational injury” (Opp. at 7), is relevant as to the latter not the former.

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 10 of 15 

AB PAC’s argument that it need only demonstrate that any single portion of its

administrative complaint establishes sufficient constitutional injury (see Opp. at 9-10) proves far

too much. Following AB PAC’s line of reasoning, an administrative complainant could evade

the standing rule for at least some allegations through artful pleading of disparate violations. The

Commission’s procedures for submitting administrative complaints contain no rules limiting the

joinder of disparate claims. See 11 C.F.R. § 111.4. Under AB PAC’s approach, a savvy litigant

could strategically allege any reporting violation to join with a claim over which no

informational injury exists and obtain access to judicial review of both as a result. Such a rule

would also apply with equal logical force to a claim that a Commission dismissal was contrary to

law. The same statutory provision — 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8) — creates both failure to act and

dismissal claims against the Commission. Similar to a failure to act case (see Opp. at 9-10), that

provision provides a cause of action to challenge “an order of the Commission dismissing a

complaint.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) (emphasis added). It similarly limits the available relief

in such a case to a declaration “that the dismissal of the complaint . . . is contrary to law,” not any

specific underlying alleged claims. Id. at § 30109(a)(8)(C) (emphasis added). If AB PAC’s

argument is correct, then administrative complainants would be entitled to judicial review of

every violation asserted in a multi-count administrative complaint by establishing an injury on

any small part.

Should the Court in this matter ultimately rule in this case that the Commission’s

handling of the administrative complaint was contrary to law, the practical import of this

standing dispute is to affect the scope of conduct the Commission could be required to address

under court order. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C). Allowing section 30109(a)(8) complainants

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 11 of 15 

to establish standing in gross would have the downstream effect of broadening the allegations the

agency would be under order to address beyond Article III powers.

In sum, even if delay suits are authorized by FECA, an allegation of a failure to act under

§ 30109(a)(8) alone does not provide a plaintiff with Article III standing. AB PAC must instead

show how the Commission’s alleged delay has caused particularized injury. Because AB PAC

has shown no concrete or particularized injury on its excessive contribution claim, it lacks

standing as to that claim.

II. AB PAC CANNOT CLAIM STANDING DUE TO COMPETITOR OR

INFORMATIONAL INJURY

As explained above, AB PAC must demonstrate Article III standing independent of the

FEC’s alleged failure to act on its excessive contribution claim. AB PAC alternatively relies on

two grounds for standing: competitor and informational standing. (Opp. at 10.) But plaintiff has

neither under binding D.C. Circuit precedent.

A. Plaintiff Lacks Competitor Standing

AB PAC asserts that it “has competitor standing because FEC’s failure to act on its

complaint has infringed on its right to participate in a fair competitive environment.” (Opp. at

11.) Plaintiff principally relies on Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005), but that case

explains that “candidates” are those who “suffer[] more directly when political rivals get elected

using illegal financing[.]” Id. at 83 (emphasis added); see also id. at 85 (finding standing for

members of Congress who challenged FEC regulations applicable to candidates and political

parties). Shays does not stand for the broad proposition that Article III standing can be

established for non-candidates for the alleged campaign-finance violations of others. See

Gottlieb v. FEC, 143 F.3d 618, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Only another candidate could make such

a claim” of competitor standing.); Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 12 of 15 

(finding a minor party candidate lacked standing where she was not in competition for alleged

benefit). Indeed, plaintiff does not offer a single case in which a non-candidate suffered a

cognizable injury because a hypothetical candidate it intends to support will be at a fundraising

disadvantage. See Gottlieb, 143 F.3d at 621 (a plaintiff must “show that he personally competes

in the same arena with the same party to whom the government has bestowed the assertedly

illegal benefit”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff also cites Natural Law Party v. FEC, for its contention that “political parties”

have competitor standing to challenge “the exclusion of the candidates they support from

presidential debates.” (Opp. at 12 (citing 111 F. Supp. 2d 33, 45-47 (D.D.C. 2000)).) But the

plaintiffs in Natural Law Party “directly competed for the alleged benefit of participating in the

presidential debates.” Id. at 47. AB PAC, in contrast, is not subject to the contribution limits it

alleges should be enforced against Trump. (See Mem. 10-11.) The Natural Law Party court also

noted that the party plaintiffs were “direct ‘competitors’ of the Republican and Democratic

parties and their nominees, and therefore, they are unlike the plaintiffs in Fulani and Gottlieb.”

Id. Here, however, AB PAC is a hybrid PAC independent of any party or candidate. The only

circumstance courts in this Circuit have recognized competitor standing involved candidates or

entities tied directly to candidates; none recognize a cognizable injury for non-candidates in the

manner suggested by AB PAC.

AB PAC alternatively argues that it has competitor standing because it competes with

“Super PACs supporting Mr. Trump” that would have received unlawfully raised funds prior to

Trump announcing his candidacy when he was “not required to comply with the strict limits that

apply to candidates when they fundraise for Super PACs.” (Opp. at 13.) But as the Commission

has explained, AB PAC lacks standing to assert any injury stemming from lack of enforcement

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 13 of 15 

against any Trump-supporting PACs because it does not allege it asked the Commission to

pursue anyone other than Trump. See Mem. at 13 (citing Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in

Washington v. FEC, 363 F. Supp. 3d 33 (D.D.C. 2018); Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in

Washington v. Am. Action Network, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2019), on reconsideration,

No. 18-CV-945 (CRC), 2022 WL 612655 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022)). AB PAC responds by arguing

that its “administrative complaint . . . repeatedly refer[s] directly to AB PAC’s rival PACs.”

(Opp. at 13-14.). But it does not dispute that its administrative complaint did not name anyone

other than Trump as a respondent. (See Pl.’s Am. Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Exh. 1 at 1 (Docket No. 14-2) (listing “Donald J. Trump” as sole respondent).) Similarly, AB

PAC’s administrative complaint requested the Commission take action only as to Trump,

requesting that it compel Mr. Trump to disclose expenditures to further his candidacy, “enjoin

Mr. Trump from further violations, and fine Mr. Trump the maximum amount permitted by law.”

(Id. at 11.) In contrast, AB PAC did not ask the Commission to take any action against any other

entity. (See id.)

Now that Trump has declared his candidacy and filed relevant forms with the FEC, it is

even more clear that there is no competitive harm to AB PAC from any rival PAC.2 AB PAC

argues that obtaining the relief it seeks “would prevent Mr. Trump from raising unlimited sums

of money for [the PACs] and thus ensure that these PACs can no longer gain an unfair and illegal

fundraising advantage over AB PAC.” (Opp. at 13.) Whatever the merit of that argument prior

to Trump’s candidacy announcement, it has no force now that Trump has acknowledged he is

subject to FECA’s limits on candidates going forward. With respect to funds that these PACs

As AB PAC acknowledges (Opp. at 12 n.3), Trump announced his candidacy and filed a

Statement of Candidacy with the FEC on November 15, 2022. See Donald J. Trump, Statement

of Candidacy (Nov. 15, 2022), https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/forms/P80001571/1661552/.

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 14 of 15 

allegedly unlawfully raised to date, AB PAC identifies no relief it sought before the Commission

that would remedy its alleged competitive disadvantage. The only relief it cites is its request that

“the FEC fine Mr. Trump” (Opp. at 12 n.3 (emphasis added)), but that relief would not disgorge

any money raised by any PAC plaintiff could claim as a competitor.3

B. Plaintiff Lacks Informational Standing to Pursue its

Excessive Contribution Claim

AB PAC also lacks informational standing with respect to its allegations that Trump

accepted excessive contributions from his leadership PAC and a joint fundraising committee.

(See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 53; Mem. at 8-9.) AB PAC now suggests that Trump’s acceptance of

excessive contributions caused it to “suffer[] an informational injury” (Opp. at 15), but it fails to

link the alleged violation to a deprivation of information. Indeed, the Commission does not

dispute that plaintiff has an informational injury with respect to its alleged reporting violations,

and the FEC’s Partial Motion does not take issue with those allegations for standing purposes.

And while it is true that even excessive contributions must also be reported, those are distinct

legal violations. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116 (establishing limits on contributions); id. § 30104

(establishing reporting requirements).

Outside of its reporting violation allegations, all AB PAC seeks is for the Commission to

make a legal conclusion as to whether Trump has accepted excessive contributions and impose a

fine, which the D.C. Circuit has long held does not give rise to an Article III informational

Plaintiff also cites LaRoque v. Holder, 650 F.3d 777, 787 (D.C. Cir. 2011) to argue that it

need not show that these rival PACs have gained a competitive advantage over plaintiff, but

similar to Shays, LaRoque held only that “candidates may have standing to challenge ‘illegally

structured’ campaign environments even if ‘the multiplicity of factors bearing on elections’

prevents them from establishing ‘with any certainty that the challenged rules will disadvantage

their ... campaigns.’” Id. (citing Shays, 414 F.3d at 90-91; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (“The

person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that

right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”)).

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Case 1:22-cv-02139-TJK Document 18 Filed 12/02/22 Page 15 of 15 

injury. See Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Free Speech for

People v. FEC, 442 F. Supp. 3d 335, 343 (D.D.C. 2020). Even if the Commission acted

precisely as AB PAC requests on that portion of its administrative complaint, FECA would not

require any additional information to be disclosed. The Commission’s alleged delay as to any

excessive contribution allegations has not, therefore, caused AB PAC any informational injury.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the FEC’s Partial Motion to Dismiss

and dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint to the extent it seeks an order compelling the

Commission to act on any administrative complaint alleging Trump accepted excessive

contributions in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(f).

Respectfully submitted,

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628)

Acting General Counsel

lstevenson@fec.gov

Jacob Siler (D.C. Bar No. 1003383)

Assistant General Counsel

jsiler@fec.gov

Kevin Deeley

Associate General Counsel

kdeeley@fec.gov

December 2, 2022

/s/ Shaina Ward

Shaina Ward (D.C. Bar No. 1002801)

Attorney

sward@fec.gov

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

1050 First Street NE

Washington, DC 20463

(202) 694-1650

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