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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

CINCINNATI DIVISION 

) 

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL ) 

COMMITTEE, et al., ) 

) Civ. No. 22-639 (DRC) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) MOTION TO DISMISS OR 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., ) TRANSFER 

) 

Defendants. ) 

) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE 

OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TRANSFER 

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants Federal 

Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) and the six Commissioners of the FEC, each 

named in their official capacity, hereby move for an order dismissing the Complaint filed by 

plaintiffs National Republican Senatorial Committee, National Republican Congressional 

Committee, James David Vance, and Steven Joseph Chabot for improper venue. Plaintiffs 

invoke 52 U.S.C. § 30110, which provides for special judicial review of challenges to the 

constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) “in the appropriate district 

court of the United States[.]” The majority of the facts relevant to plaintiffs’ facial constitutional 

challenge to FECA’s coordinated expenditure limits originate in the District of Columbia, and 

virtually all of the parties in this case reside or at least do most of their business in that District. 

The two Ohio individuals included in the complaint invoke a special judicial review provision 

limited to voters and national party committees but explain their standing in their capacity as 

candidates rather than voters. Further, plaintiffs fail to justify why this District is the appropriate 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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laboratory for their challenge to a nationally applicable statute, rather than all the others 

throughout the country in which the national party committees, the principal plaintiffs in interest 

here, transact business. Accordingly, this is not the “appropriate district court” for this dispute, 

and this action should be dismissed. 

In the alternative, the Commission seeks an order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 

transferring this action to the District Court for the District of Columbia for the convenience of 

parties and witnesses, and in the interests of justice. In light of the factors described above, and 

the fact that that District has greater familiarity with the controlling law, it is by far the best one 

in which to fully and efficiently evaluate plaintiffs’ claims. This District has no unique 

connection to the matter in controversy and plaintiffs’ choice of forum is accordingly entitled to 

little deference. A supporting memorandum and a proposed order accompany this motion. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Acting General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley (Mass. Bar No. #644486) 

Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

/s/ Harry J. Summers 

Harry J. Summers (Cal. Bar No. 147929) (Trial Attorney) 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

Christopher H. Bell (D.C. Bar No. 1643526) 

Attorney 

chbell@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

1050 First Street NE 

Washington, D.C. 20463 

January 9, 2023 (202) 694-1650 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

CINCINNATI DIVISION 

) 

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL ) 

COMMITTEE, et al., ) 

) Civ. No. 22-639 (DRC) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

v. ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 

) MOTION TO DISMISS OR 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., ) TRANSFER 

) 

Defendants. ) 

) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S MEMORANDUM 

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE 

OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TRANSFER 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Acting General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley (Mass. Bar No. 644486) 

Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

Harry J. Summers (Cal. Bar No. 147929) 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

Christopher H. Bell (D.C. Bar No. 1643526) 

Attorney 

chbell@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

1050 First Street NE 

Washington, D.C. 20463 

January 9, 2023 (202) 694-1650 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Plaintiffs bring a broad challenge to the longstanding limits on coordinated expenditures 

by the national party committees, like plaintiffs National Republican Senatorial Committee 

(“NRSC”) and National Republican Congressional Committee (“NRCC”), in support of their 

federal candidates. Plaintiffs challenge the facial validity of those limits, which apply and are 

enforced nationwide. The vast majority of the facts relevant to these claims originate in the 

District of Columbia, where virtually all the parties in the case reside or at least do most 

business. Indeed, defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”), the 

principal plaintiffs in interest NRSC and NRCC, the office of a majority of counsel for plaintiffs, 

and the federal courthouse in D.C. are all located less than two miles from each other. Rather 

than avail themselves of that forum, which has an expertise in campaign finance law by virtue of 

multiple provisions of federal law, the NRSC and NRCC have included in their complaint two 

Ohio individuals and filed here. But they invoke a special judicial review provision limited to 

voters and national party committees and explain standing for the two individuals in their 

capacity as candidates rather than voters. And they fail to explain the rationale for choosing this 

district rather than all the others throughout the country in which the NRSC and NRCC transact 

business. The lack of particular connection to this District means that the risk of a perception of 

forum-shopping must be avoided, and plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to little deference. 

Moreover, since plaintiffs’ complaint was filed one of the candidate-plaintiffs has declared that 

he does not plan to run for office again, undermining the sole apparent basis for his Article III 

standing to participate in this proceeding. The federal courthouse that is within walking distance 

of the FEC, NRSC, NRCC, and most of plaintiffs’ attorneys is the appropriate venue here. 

This action should be dismissed for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, transferred to the District Court for the 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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District of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Plaintiffs seek to avail themselves of the 

special judicial review provision at 52 U.S.C. § 30110, which provides for review of certain 

challenges to the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) “in the 

appropriate district court of the United States[.]” Under section 30110, several categories of 

plaintiffs are entitled to request that the district court certify constitutional questions to the 

Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, after the district court first establishes a factual record 

sufficient to support such review, and provided that the court determines that the proposed 

questions are not frivolous. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 192 n.14 (1981). 

Plaintiffs here claim that a Watergate-era provision of FECA that governs the conduct of 

political parties in federal elections, a provision which the Supreme Court upheld more than two 

decades ago, is unconstitutional. But the District of Columbia is the most convenient district in 

which to efficiently evaluate plaintiffs’ claims. If not dismissed, this matter should be 

transferred for the convenience of parties and witnesses and the interests of justice. 

BACKGROUND 

This complaint was filed by plaintiffs NRSC, NRCC, James David (“J.D.”) Vance, and 

Steven Joseph Chabot on November 4, 2022, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant 

to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs NRSC and NRCC are 

“national committee[s]” pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30101(14). (Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.) By definition, 

they operate in numerous states and engage in activities like get-out-the-vote on an ongoing 

basis. See Adv. Op. 2006-36 (Green Senatorial Campaign Committee) at 4 (Feb. 9, 2007), 

https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/60350.pdf. They serve as the Republican Party’s senatorial 

campaign committee and congressional campaign committee, respectively. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.) 

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The NRSC and the NRCC are located at 425 2nd St. N.E. and 320 First Street S.E., respectively, 

in Washington, D.C. 

Plaintiff J.D. Vance was the 2022 Republican nominee for the U.S. Senate in Ohio, and 

he is currently a U.S. Senator for that state. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff Steven Joseph Chabot was 

the 2022 Republican nominee for the U.S. House of Representatives from Ohio’s First 

Congressional District, and he was the sitting U.S. Congressman in that District at that time, 

although he did not prevail in the general election. Id. ¶ 16; see infra pp. 11-12 & n. 3. Plaintiffs 

allege that “one or more Plaintiffs resides in this District,” apparently referring to Chabot and 

Vance. (Compl. ¶ 12.) 

Defendant Federal Election Commission is an independent agency of the United States 

government with jurisdiction over the administration, interpretation, and civil enforcement of 

FECA, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-46. See generally 52 U.S.C. §§ 30106(b)(1), 30107(a), 30109. 

Congress provided for the Commission to “prepare written rules for the conduct of its activities,” 

52 U.S.C. § 30106(e), “formulate policy” under FECA, see, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1), and 

make rules and issue advisory opinions, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30107(a)(7), (8); id. §§ 30108; 

30111(a)(8); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 110-11 (1976) (per curiam). The 

Commission is also authorized to institute investigations of possible violations of FECA, 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1)-(2), and to initiate civil enforcement actions in the United States district 

courts, id. §§ 30106(b)(1), 30107(a)(6), 30107(e), 3019(a)(6). The Commission is led by six 

Commissioners, all of whom are named as defendants to this suit in their official capacities. 1 

The Commission notes that the Complaint caption names Commissioner Allen Dickerson 

as Chair and Commissioner Dara Lindenbaum as Vice Chair. Those titles were correct at the 

time the Complaint was filed. Currently, Commissioner Lindenbaum serves as Chair and 

Commissioner Sean Cooksey serves as Vice Chair. 

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The Commission’s sole office is located at 1050 First Street, N.E. in Washington, D.C. 

Plaintiffs challenge the limits on expenditures that political parties may make in 

coordination with their federal candidates under FECA. (Compl. ¶ 2.) Under a unique provision 

in FECA, political parties are permitted to engage in such expenditures in excess of their 

otherwise applicable contribution limits, despite the fact that such expenditures are considered 

in-kind contributions to the candidate. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(d); 11 C.F.R. § 109.37. Under the 

current inflation-adjusted limits, parties may make coordinated expenditures with their general 

election candidates up to an amount ranging from $55,000 to $109,900 in races for the U.S. 

House of Representatives, and from $109,900 to $3,348,500 in U.S. Senate races. Id.; 11 C.F.R. 

§ 109.33; see FEC, Coordinated Party Expenditure Limits, https://bit.ly/3DcUySP (last visited 

Jan. 6, 2023). Plaintiffs do not argue that these limits are unreasonably low, but rather that they 

are unconstitutional per se because they implicate political parties’ First Amendment interests to 

participate in the electoral process and associate with the candidates of their choice. (Compl. ¶¶ 

90-103.) Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of these provisions on their face (id. ¶¶ 90-99), 

and in the alternative as applied to a subset of such expenditures known as party coordinated 

communications, as defined in an FEC regulation, 11 C.F.R. § 109.37. (Compl. ¶¶ 100-103.) 

The Supreme Court previously upheld the limits in what is now 52 U.S.C. § 30116(d) on 

their face, explaining that “there is no significant functional difference between a party’s 

coordinated expenditure and a direct party contribution to the candidate.” FEC v. Colorado 

Republican Fed. Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431, 464 (2001). Prearrangement and 

coordination with a candidate means that there is a “danger that expenditures will be given as a 

quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” Id. (quoting Buckley, 518 U.S. at 

47). 

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Plaintiffs here invoke 52 U.S.C. § 30110 (formerly codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h). That 

provision provides a special procedure for certain categories of plaintiffs, including eligible 

voters and national party committees, to bring suits “to construe the constitutionality of any 

provision of [FECA],” and for the district court to certify questions of constitutionality to the 

court of appeals sitting en banc. This certification procedure was enacted in 1974 to provide 

special consideration of anticipated constitutional challenges to the extensive amendments made 

to FECA that year. See Fed. Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 

§ 208(A), 88 Stat. at 1285-86 (1974). 

Section 30110 claims are “circumscribed by the constitutional limitations on the 

jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 192 n.14. If a section 30110 

claim passes that and other threshold inquiries, district courts perform three functions. First, a 

record for appellate review must be made, including findings of fact. Bread Political Action 

Committee v. FEC , 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982). Second, district courts determine whether the 

constitutional challenges are “frivolous.” Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 192 n.14. And third, 

assuming any constitutional questions meet the above standards, the district court then certifies 

the record and all non-frivolous questions to the en banc court of appeals. Id.; see 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30110. 

ARGUMENT 

I. APPLICABLE STANDARDS 

Under Rule 12(b)(3) a defendant may move to dismiss for improper venue. On such a 

motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper. Schmidt v. City of 

Lima, Civ. No. 20-4971, 2022 WL 874923, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2022) (citing Centerville 

ALF, Inc. v. Balanced Care Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1046 (S.D. Ohio 2002)). The 

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plaintiff’s burden at this stage is to make a prima facie showing that venue is proper. Alter v. 

Schafer, Civ. No. 16-785, 2017 WL 4168352, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2017) (citations 

omitted). If the Court decides that the motion to dismiss can be decided without an evidentiary 

hearing, it “must consider the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.” J4 Promotions, Inc. v. Splash Dogs, LLC, Civ. No. 08-977, 2009 WL 385611, at *25 

(N.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2009) (quoting Centerville, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 1046). The plaintiff must 

show that venue is “proper for each claim and as to each defendant in order for the court to retain 

the action.” Alter, 2017 WL 4168352, at *2. 

Even when venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) empowers courts to transfer an action to 

another court “where it might have been brought” if, in the court’s discretion, it finds that 

transfer would ultimately favor “the convenience of parties and witnesses [and] the interest of 

justice.” The section 1404(a) analysis hinges on an “individualized, case-by-case consideration 

of convenience and fairness” which seeks to determine whether, based on various private and 

public interests, litigating the plaintiff’s action in her chosen forum would be “unnecessarily 

burdensome.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. 

Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)); see Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 

492 (6th Cir. 2016). For this analysis, “[t]he onus of showing that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is 

unnecessarily burdensome falls on the defendant.” Hefferan, 828 F.3d at 498. 

II. VENUE IS IMPROPER IN THIS DISTRICT 

This case should be dismissed for improper venue because the “appropriate district court” 

to hear the case under section 30110 is in the District of Columbia. The parties and the evidence 

relevant to this constitutional challenge to a federal campaign finance statute are overwhelmingly 

located in that District. By contrast, the matter has little connection to this District. 

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Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30110, which provides special 

procedures for limited classes of plaintiffs to bring constitutional challenges to FECA. See supra 

p. 5. For private parties, the classes of eligible plaintiffs are limited to eligible voters and 

national party committees. 52 U.S.C. § 30110. In addition to limiting the class of plaintiffs who 

may invoke those procedures, section 30110 contains the venue requirement that such actions be 

brought “in the appropriate district court of the United States[.]” Id. (emphasis added). This 

language does not mandate that all section 30110 challenges be brought in a particular court, but 

it does call for an independent determination as to whether this district, or some other, is in fact 

“the appropriate district” for this case, a constitutional challenge to a longstanding statute 

impacting elections nationwide. 

Such discretion is particularly appropriate given the critical role that the Supreme Court 

has assigned to the district courts in section 30110 proceedings. Section 30110 creates a class of 

cases that command the attention of “the courts of appeals sitting en banc, displacing existing 

caseloads and calling court of appeals judges away from their normal duties.” Bread Political 

Action Comm., 455 U.S. at 580. The district court is required to ensure that there is Article III 

jurisdiction for a case, develop a record for appellate review by making findings of fact, and 

determine whether the constitutional challenges are frivolous, and only then certify the record 

and any nonfrivolous constitutional questions to the en banc court of appeals. See supra p. 5. 

Screening out frivolous claims reduces “the burden [the special review procedure places] on the 

federal courts” and prevents its “potential abuse.” Cal. Med., 453 U.S. at 192 nn.13-14. Given 

the potential for these tasks to disrupt the dockets of both the district court and the court of 

appeals sitting en banc, it is entirely fitting that such actions proceed only “in the appropriate 

district court of the United States[.]” 52 U.S.C. § 30110. 

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As for this proceeding, the District Court for the District of Columbia is “the appropriate” 

district to hear plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to FECA. Id. § 30110. As detailed infra pp. 

10-11, virtually all parties have their sole or primary place of business in that district. The 

NRSC and NRCC, the two principal plaintiffs in interest, are both located in Washington, D.C. 

The two additional persons included in the complaint who apparently reside in this District do 

not even base their claim for standing on their participation as voters, the predicate for their 

participation in the special judicial review provision. After making pro forma references to their 

eligibility as voters, plaintiffs Vance and Chabot proceed to explain their interest in participating 

in the proposed conduct at issue as candidates, not voters. (Compl. ¶¶ 15-16.) In addition, 

plaintiffs fail to offer any reason why this District has more significance to the issues the NRSC 

and NRCC seek to litigate than all the other many districts throughout the country in which they 

routinely transact business. When all the principal parties to the dispute are located in another 

district, two plaintiffs have questionable claims to participation in the special review provision 

they invoke, and plaintiffs fail to explain their decision not to file this suit in an obviously 

preferable alternative district, courts should find plaintiffs’ selected venue inappropriate.2 

Plaintiffs rely not only on section 30110 for venue, but also on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). 

(Compl. ¶ 12.) Venue under the latter provision has been admitted and accepted by some courts 

in previous section 30110 cases. E.g., Holmes v. FEC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 123, 138 (D.D.C. 2015), 

aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded 823 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2016). There do not, however, 

appear to have been troubling venue assertions in past cases that required careful analysis and 

contested rulings by courts. 

28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) is the default provision governing venue for civil actions against 

federal agencies and officers but it does not apply to statutes with their own venue provisions. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (“except as otherwise provided by law”); see also id. § 1391(a) (same). 

Section 30110’s venue provision thus governs. See, e.g., Bolar v. Frank, 938 F.2d 377, 378 (2d 

Cir. 1991) (Section 1391 inapplicable to Rehabilitation Act claims); Johnson v. Payless Drug 

Stores Nw., Inc., 950 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Switkes v. Laird, 316 F. Supp. 358, 

362 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (habeus corpus); Johnson v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 

2d 236, 240 (D.N.H. 2009) (Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act). 

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The district court’s mandatory fact-finding exercise, prior to certification to the en banc 

court of appeals, illustrates why the District of Columbia is the appropriate venue. Plaintiffs 

have made a facial challenge to FECA’s party coordinated spending limits, which apply 

nationwide. Much of the evidence necessary to resolve that challenge will be sought by the 

D.C.-based FEC from the D.C.-based NRSC and NRCC, who coordinate the party’s efforts on 

behalf of its candidates for 33 Senate and 435 congressional seats on a biannual basis. To the 

extent witnesses are required to testify or provide evidence, many would be found in Washington 

D.C., where Congress is located and all sitting Senators and Members of Congress are regularly 

found. It would appear to make little sense for a forum hundreds of miles away to superintend 

discovery disputes in such a case. 

In light of the foregoing, this Court should dismiss this proceeding pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(3), or at a minimum, transfer it to the District Court for the District of Columbia, as 

discussed below. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a 

case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of 

justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”). 

III. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT SHOULD TRANSFER THIS MATTER 

TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

Even if this Court finds that venue is proper in this District, it should nonetheless exercise 

its discretion to transfer this action to the District Court for the District of Columbia for “the 

convenience of parties and witnesses [and in] the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The 

factors in that analysis weigh heavily in favor of a transfer to that District, the focus of relevant 

evidence where virtually all parties reside or at least do most of their business, in a case 

challenging the facial validity of a federal statute that applies nationwide. And plaintiffs’ choice 

of this District is entitled to little deference where “the vast majority of operative facts giving rise 

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to the lawsuit took place outside of Ohio.” U.S. ex rel. Kairos Scientia, Inc. v. Zinsser Co., Civ. 

No. 10-383, 2011 WL 127852, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan.14, 2011). 

When evaluating a motion to transfer, the court weighs the private interests of the parties 

as well as public-interest concerns. See Moses v. Bus. Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1137 

(6th Cir. 1991). Private interests include the convenience of potential witnesses, “the relative 

ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling 

[witnesses], the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses . . . and all other practical 

problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Robinson v. Chertoff, 

Civ. No. 06-329, 2007 WL 708616, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2007) (quoting Jamhour v. 

Scottsdale Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945 (S.D. Ohio 2002)). Public-interest concerns 

include “systemic integrity and fairness.” Moses, 929 F.2d at 1137. Pertinent interests also 

include concerns about “docket congestion, the burden of trial to a jurisdiction with no relation to 

the cause of action, the value of holding a trial in a community where the public affected live, 

and the familiarity of the court with the controlling law.” Robinson, 2007 WL 708616, at *2 

(quoting Jamhour, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 945). Finally, “[i]t is well established that the decision 

whether to transfer venue is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court.” EdgePoint Cap. 

Holdings, LLC v. Apothecare Pharmacy, LLC, Civ. No. 18-2155, 2019 WL 1255205, at *6 (N.D. 

Ohio Mar. 19, 2019) (quoting Midwest Motor Supply Co., Inc. v. Kimball, 761 F. Supp. 1316 

(S.D. Ohio 1991)). 

Here the private interests of the parties weigh heavily in favor of transfer to the District of 

Columbia. Virtually every party in this matter resides in or at least does business in Washington, 

D.C. The Commission has its sole office in the District, where the Commission administratively 

enforces the laws plaintiffs challenge. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30106(e), 30109. It is thus also the 

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principal place of business of defense counsel. Both plaintiffs NRSC and the NRCC have their 

principal place of business in Washington, D.C. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.) Seven of the eight attorneys 

on plaintiffs’ complaint likewise have their offices in D.C. 

More specifically, defendant Federal Election Commission, the principal plaintiffs in 

interest NRSC and NRCC, the office of the majority of counsel for plaintiffs, and the federal 

courthouse in D.C. are all located less than two miles from each other. Indeed, since the federal 

courthouse is within walking distance of the FEC, NRSC, NRCC, and the office for most of 

plaintiffs’ counsel, there may be no need to use other means of transport for court appearances. 

While plaintiff J.D. Vance may maintain a residence in this district, following his 2022 

Senate campaign his principal place of business with regular in-person requirements will be in 

Washington, D.C. for the next six years. He thus would not be inconvenienced by this transfer 

of venue. 

Plaintiff Steve Chabot did not prevail in his 2022 campaign, and thereafter he announced 

that he would retire and not run for public office again.3 The effect is that he lacks standing as a 

candidate because any purported injury cannot be redressed and, even if he could satisfy the 

requirements for standing, his claims are now moot. E.g., La Botz v. FEC, 61 F. Supp. 3d 21 

(D.D.C. 2014) (finding a lack of jurisdiction for former candidate for Senate in Ohio who could 

no longer run for office there to challenge sponsorship of televised debates by consortium of 

newspapers in Ohio); see also Nader v. FEC, 725 F.3d 226, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding 

See, e.g., Taylor Popielarz, Spectrum News 1, “Rep. Steve Chabot reflects on 26 years in 

Congress,” available at https://spectrumnews1.com/oh/columbus/politics/2022/12/05/stevechabot-reflects-26-years-congress (last visited Jan. 7, 2023) (“I have no intention on running 

again. I plan on retiring.”). (Compare Compl. ¶ 45 (“At this time, in addition to his 2022 

candidacy, Candidate Chabot intends to run for federal office again in the future. He wants to 

engage in core First Amendment activities in excess of FECA’s coordinated party expenditure 

limits, including those under 52 U.S.C. § 30116(d), when he does so.”).) 

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candidate’s allegation that he “may” run for office again insufficient to constitute the actual or 

imminent injury required for standing) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 

(1992)). Without apparent standing to remain in the case, plaintiff Chabot’s situation should not 

be part of the Court’s venue analysis. 

Thus every party with a live claim, and their counsel, could conveniently litigate in the 

District of Columbia. Indeed, with respect to the convenience of the parties and the availability 

of evidence, it is not clear that there is any advantage to litigating in the Southern District of 

Ohio. 

The public’s interest in the fair administration of justice also weighs heavily in favor of 

transfer. Proceeding with this matter in this District would “burden” a jurisdiction with no 

unique relationship to the cause of action. Robinson, 2007 WL 708616, at *2. Indeed, because 

the “public affected” by the challenged laws is distributed evenly in the various jurisdictions 

nationwide where federal candidates compete in a given election cycle, no district has any claim 

to unique local concerns in that regard. Id. On the other hand, judges in the District of Columbia 

are uniquely qualified to consider constitutional challenges to broadly applicable federal 

legislation. See Dearth v. Gonzales, No. 2:06-CV-1012, 2007 WL 1100426, at *4 (S.D. Ohio 

Apr. 10, 2007) (where “[p]laintiffs are challenging the constitutionality of federal legislation[,]” 

the District of Columbia “would appear to be an obvious choice.”) (quoting Seariver Mar. Fin. 

Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 455, 462 (S.D. Tex. 1996)). 

Furthermore, because this District has no unique connection to the matter in controversy, 

plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to little deference. The laws plaintiffs challenge impact all 

states, parties and candidates equally, and on a national basis. Plaintiffs do not allege that 

Senator Vance, former Congressman Chabot, or any other persons in this District suffer unique 

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harm from the laws challenged here. Plaintiffs NRSC and NRCC support congressional 

candidates nationwide on a biannual basis, but they, like all the defendants, operate from the 

District of Columbia. Rather than bring this challenge there, plaintiffs elected to bring it in a 

district some 500 miles away. While a plaintiff’s choice of forum is generally entitled to 

deference, such deference need not apply where the forum “has no connection with the matter in 

controversy.” Tech-Sonic, Inc. v. Sonics & Materials, Inc., Civ. No. 12-263, 2012 WL 4343103, 

at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2012) (quoting St. Joseph Solutions, LLC v. Microtek Medal, Inc., Civ. 

No. 11-388, 2011 WL 5914010, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Nov.28, 2011)); see also U.S. ex rel. Kairos 

Scientia, Inc., 2011 WL 127852, at *2 (according less weight to plaintiff’s choice of forum 

where “the vast majority of operative facts giving rise to the lawsuit took place outside of 

Ohio”); JFE Steel Corp. v. ICI Americas, Inc., Civ. No. 06-2386, 2008 WL 4449080, at *1 (N.D. 

Ohio Sept. 30, 2008) (“Where plaintiff’s choice of forum bears no relationship to the case, too 

much deference or weight given to that choice creates an unnecessary risk of forum shopping.”).4 

Finally, the relative “familiarity of the court with the controlling law” also militates in 

favor of transfer. Robinson, 2007 WL 708616, at *2 (quoting Jamhour, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 945). 

Federal campaign finance cases are very unusual in this District. The District Court for the 

District of Columbia and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand, are uniquely 

positioned to resolve the issues plaintiffs raise. Judges in that district are well-versed in federal 

Transferring would preempt any public concerns regarding counsel for plaintiffs filing in 

this Division during a time when there were only two active judges including this Court, a 

former partner at their firm. See “Judge Douglas R. Cole,” Southern District of Ohio 

https://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2023); Alex Botoman, Divisional JudgeShopping, 49 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 297, 327 (2018) (explaining that “divisional judgeshopping has the potential to seriously undermine public confidence in the judiciary, especially 

when procedures allow plaintiffs to judge-shop in politically charged cases challenging generally 

applicable laws, regulations, or policies”). 

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campaign finance law, as four FECA judicial review provisions route cases there. FECA 

requires that all challenges to the Commission’s enforcement proceedings take place in that 

district. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(8)(A) (“Any party aggrieved by an order of the Commission 

dismissing a complaint ... may file a petition with the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia.”). The two provisions for review of FEC action on public financing 

matters require that petitions for review be filed with the D.C. Circuit. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9011, 

9041. In addition, Section 403 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”), which 

amended FECA, provides that actions challenging the constitutionality of any of its provisions 

may be filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge court 

that would include one judge from the Court of Appeals. See BCRA § 403(a)(1), 116 Stat. 113.5 

If, as this District has previously noted, the District of Columbia “would appear to be an obvious 

choice” where “[p]laintiffs are challenging the constitutionality of federal legislation” generally, 

that is doubly true for challenges to federal campaign finance laws. Dearth, 2007 WL 1100426, 

at *4. The judges in the District of Columbia have greater familiarity with controlling law in this 

area. 

CONCLUSION 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for improper 

venue or, in the alternative, transfer this matter to the District Court for the District of Columbia. 

Section 403 was required in the initial post-enactment period, and has been optional but 

used routinely since. See BCRA § 403(a)(1), 116 Stat. 113. 

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Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Acting General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley (Mass. Bar No. 644486) 

Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

Christopher H. Bell (D.C. Bar No. 1643526) 

Attorney 

chbell@fec.gov 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Harry J. Summers 

Harry J. Summers (Cal. Bar No. 147929) 

(Trial Attorney) 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

1050 First Street, N.E. 

Washington, D.C. 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

January 9, 2023 

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Case: 1:22-cv-00639-DRC Doc #: 10 Filed: 01/09/23 Page: 19 of 19 PAGEID #: 99 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on January 9, 2023, I served the foregoing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

5(b)(2)(E) on counsel of record, as a registered ECF user, through the Court’s ECF system. 

/s/ Harry J. Summers 

Harry J. Summers (Cal. Bar No. 147929) 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov