a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2006 WEAPONS 

ACQUISITION

DOD Should 

Strengthen Policies for 

Assessing Technical 

Data Needs to Support 

Weapon Systems

GAO-06-839
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2006

WEAPONS ACQUISITION 

DOD Should Strengthen Policies for 

Assessing Technical Data Needs to 

Support Weapon Systems 

Highlights of GAO-06-839, a report to 

congressional committees 

A critical element in the life cycle

of a weapon system is the 

availability of the item’s technical 

data—recorded information used 

to define a design and to produce, 

support, maintain, or operate the 

item. Because a weapon system

may remain in the defense

inventory for decades following 

initial acquisition, technical data 

decisions made during acquisition 

can have far-reaching implications

over its life cycle. In August 2004, 

GAO recommended that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

consider requiring program offices 

to develop acquisition strategies

that provide for future delivery of 

technical data should the need 

arise to select an alternative source

for logistics support or to offer the 

work out for competition. For this 

review, GAO (1) evaluated how 

sustainment plans for Army and Air 

Force weapon systems had been

affected by technical data rights

and (2) examined requirements for 

obtaining technical data rights 

under current DOD acquisition 

policies. 

What GAO Recommends

To ensure that DOD can support 

sustainment plans for weapon 

systems throughout their life cycle,

including revisions to these plans

aimed at achieving cost savings and

complying with legislative

requirements, GAO recommends 

improvements in DOD’s acquisition 

policies regarding the acquisition of

technical data. DOD concurred with

GAO’s recommendations.

The Army and the Air Force have encountered limitations in their 

sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems because they lacked 

needed technical data rights. The lack of technical data rights has limited 

the services’ flexibility to make changes to sustainment plans that are aimed 

at achieving cost savings and meeting legislative requirements regarding 

depot maintenance capabilities. GAO identified seven weapon system 

programs that encountered such limitations—C-17, F-22, and C-130J aircraft, 

Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, Stryker family of 

vehicles, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and M4 carbine. 

Although the circumstances surrounding each case were unique, earlier 

decisions made on technical data rights during system acquisition were cited 

as a primary reason for the limitations subsequently encountered. As a 

result of the limitations encountered, the services had to alter their plans for 

developing maintenance capability at public depots, developing new sources 

of supply to increase production, or soliciting competitive offers for the 

acquisition of spare parts and components to reduce sustainment costs. For 

example, the Air Force identified a need to develop a core maintenance 

capability for the C-17 at government depots to ensure it had the ability to 

support national defense emergencies, but it lacked the requisite technical 

data rights. To mitigate this limitation, the Air Force is seeking to form 

partnerships with C-17 sub-vendors. However, according to Air Force 

officials, some sub-vendors have declined to provide the needed technical 

data needed to develop core capability. Although GAO did not assess the 

rationale for the decisions made on technical data rights during system

acquisition, several factors, such as the extent the system incorporates 

technology that was not developed with government funding and the 

potential for changes in the technical data over the weapon system’s life 

cycle, may complicate program managers’ decisions. 

Current DOD acquisition policies do not specifically address long-term 

technical data rights for weapon system sustainment. For example, DOD’s 

policies do not require program managers to assess long-term needs for 

technical data rights to support weapon systems and, correspondingly, to 

develop acquisition strategies that address those needs. DOD, as part of the 

department’s acquisition reforms and performance-based strategies, has 

deemphasized the acquisition of technical data rights. Although GAO has 

recommended that DOD emphasize the need for technical data rights, DOD 

has not implemented these recommendations. The Army and the Air Force 

have recognized weaknesses in their approaches to assessing and securing

technical data rights and have begun to address these weaknesses by

developing more structured approaches. However, DOD acquisition policies 

do not facilitate these efforts. Unless DOD assesses and secures its rights for 

the use of technical data early in the weapon system acquisition process 

when it has the greatest leverage to negotiate, DOD may face later 

challenges in sustaining weapon systems over their life cycle. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-839.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis

at (202) 512-5140 or solisw@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-839 Technical Data

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 4

Army and Air Force Encountered Limitations in Their Sustainment 

Plans for Some Fielded Weapon Systems 6

DOD Acquisition Policies Do Not Specifically Address Long-term 

Needs for Technical Data Rights 11

Conclusions 18

Recommendations for Executive Action 19

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20

Scope and Methodology 20

Appendixes

Appendix I: GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the Department of 

Defense’s Acquisition of Technical Data to Support Weapons 

Systems 22

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 43

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 45

Abbreviations

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

DAPWG Defense Acquisition Policy Working Group

DOD Department of Defense

HMMWV High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle

NAVAIR Naval Aviation Systems Command

NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

SSTS sustainment systems technical support

TACOM Tank-automotive and Armaments Command

USD/ATL Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics)
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-839 Technical Data

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Page 1 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 14, 2006 Letr

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

A critical element in the life cycle of a weapon system is the availability of 

the item’s technical data—that is, recorded information used to define a 

design and to produce, support, maintain, or operate the item.1

 The 

Department of Defense (DOD) negotiates its rights to weapon system 

technical data when it contracts with defense equipment manufacturers. 

During the acquisition process, DOD determines what technical data rights 

it requires from the manufacturer in order to meet its future weapon 

support needs. Because a weapon system may remain in the defense 

inventory for decades following initial acquisition, decisions made at the 

time of acquisition can have far-reaching implications for weapon system 

support over the system’s life cycle, and the failure to negotiate adequate 

technical data rights may impede the government’s ability to sustain the 

weapon system. For example, DOD would need technical data rights to 

develop new sources of supply, to recompete follow-on procurements of 

equipment, or to develop depot-level maintenance capabilities. In an 

August 2004 report,2

 we recommended that DOD consider requiring 

1

Section 252.227-7013 of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement defines 

technical data as recorded information, regardless of the form or method of the recording, 

of scientific or technical nature, including computer software documentation. Technical 

data for weapon systems include drawings, specifications, standards, and other details 

necessary to ensure the adequacy of item performance, as well as manuals that contain 

instructions for installation, operation, maintenance, and other actions needed to support 

weapon systems.

2

GAO, Defense Management: Opportunities to Enhance the Implementation of 

Performance-Based Logistics, GAO-04-715 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2004).
Page 2 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

program offices to develop acquisition strategies that provide for a future 

delivery of technical data should the need arise to select an alternative 

source for logistics support or to offer the work out for competition. DOD 

concurred with our recommendation.

This report responds to a provision in a House Report for the fiscal year 

2006 Defense Authorization Bill3

 that we follow up on our August 2004 

report and review DOD’s technical data policies affecting the sustainment 

of fielded weapon systems, as well as other issues related to technical data. 

In February 2006, we briefed your offices on our preliminary observations 

(see app. I). This report updates and expands on the information in that 

briefing and provides recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. 

Specifically, our objectives were to (1) evaluate how Army and Air Force 

sustainment plans for fielded weapon systems had been affected by 

technical data rights and (2) examine requirements for obtaining technical 

data rights under current DOD acquisition policies. The House Report also 

asked us to review the military services’ access to technical data to support 

field maintenance of weapon systems and to examine the costs for gaining 

such access. These issues are addressed in appendix I.

To conduct our review, we met with Army and Air Force acquisition and 

logistics officials to identify sustainment plans for fielded weapon systems 

that may have been affected by the technical data rights available to the 

government. We discussed, and obtained supporting documentation on, 

the circumstances surrounding these cases, the extent that a lack of 

technical data rights for these systems was a factor, and the effect on the 

systems’ sustainment plans. We did not assess the rationale for the 

decisions made on technical data rights during system acquisition, nor did 

we determine the extent that program offices complied with acquisition 

policies regarding technical data that existed at the time of the acquisition. 

We analyzed current DOD acquisition policies and guidance, interviewed 

DOD and service officials, and collected DOD correspondence addressing 

our August 2004 recommendation. We met with Army and Air Force 

logistics officials to obtain information on their efforts to review 

acquisition policies and practices regarding technical data rights. We 

determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

We conducted our review from October 2005 through May 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

3

H.R. Rep. No. 109-89 at 302.
Page 3 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

The Scope and Methodology section contains more detailed information 

about the work we performed.

Results in Brief The Army and the Air Force have encountered limitations in their 

sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems because they lacked 

needed technical data rights. The lack of technical data rights has limited 

the services’ flexibility to make changes to sustainment plans that are 

aimed at achieving cost savings and meeting legislative requirements 

regarding depot maintenance capabilities. During our review we identified 

seven Army and Air Force weapon system programs where these military 

services encountered limitations in implementing revisions to sustainment 

plans—C-17 aircraft, F-22 aircraft, C-130J aircraft, Up-armored HighMobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), Stryker family of 

vehicles, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, and M4 

carbine. Although the circumstances surrounding each case were unique, 

earlier decisions made on technical data rights during system acquisition 

were cited as a primary reason for the limitations subsequently 

encountered. As a result of the limitations encountered due to the lack of 

technical data rights, the services had to alter their plans for developing 

maintenance capability at public depots, new sources of supply to increase 

production, or competitive offers for the acquisition of spare parts and 

components to reduce sustainment costs. For example, the Air Force 

identified a need to develop a capability to perform maintenance on the 

C-17 at government depots but lacked the requisite technical data rights. 

Consequently, the Air Force is seeking to form partnerships with C-17 subvendors to develop its depot maintenance capability. Its efforts to form 

these partnerships have had mixed results, according to Air Force officials, 

because some sub-vendors have declined to provide the needed technical 

data. Although we did not assess the rationale for the decisions made on 

technical data rights during the acquisition of these seven systems, there 

are several factors that may complicate program managers’ decisions 

regarding technical data rights. These factors include the contractors’ 

interests in protecting their intellectual property rights, the extent the 

system being acquired incorporates technology that was not developed 

with government funding, the potential for changes in the technical data 

over the weapon system’s life cycle, the extent to which long-term 

sustainment strategies may require rights to technical data versus access to 

the data, the numerous funding and capability trade-offs program managers 

face during the acquisition of a weapon system, the long life cycle of many 

weapon systems, and changes in DOD policies regarding the acquisition of 

technical data and the implementation of performance-based logistics.
Page 4 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

Despite the challenges faced by program managers in determining longterm needs for technical data rights and the implications of their decisions 

for weapon system sustainment, current DOD acquisition policies do not 

specifically address long-term technical data rights for weapon system 

sustainment. For example, DOD’s current acquisition policies do not 

require program managers to assess long-term needs for technical data 

rights to support weapon systems and, correspondingly, to develop 

acquisition strategies that address those needs. DOD guidance and policy 

changes, as part of the department’s acquisition reforms and performancebased strategies, have deemphasized the acquisition of technical data 

rights. DOD also has not implemented our August 2004 recommendation 

for developing technical data acquisition strategies, although it has recently 

reiterated its intent to do so. In the absence of a DOD-wide policy on 

technical data rights, the Army and the Air Force are working 

independently to develop structured approaches for assessing technical 

data requirements and securing rights to these data. Their efforts, as well 

as our prior and current work, show that it is during the development of the 

solicitation and the subsequent negotiation of a proposed contract that the 

government is in the best position to negotiate and secure required 

technical data rights. In addition, the Air Force is pursuing the use of 

priced options—negotiated in weapon system acquisition contracts—to 

retain the option for acquiring technical data rights at some point later in 

the weapon system’s life cycle. Army and Air Force logistics officials told 

us that their efforts would benefit from having a DOD policy that 

specifically addresses long-term needs for technical data rights supporting 

weapon system sustainment.

To ensure that DOD can support sustainment plans for weapon systems 

throughout their life cycle, we are recommending improvements in DOD’s 

acquisition policies regarding the acquisition of technical data. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our report and 

recommendations. DOD’s response is included in appendix II.

Background In recent years, DOD has taken steps to improve its processes for acquiring 

and sustaining weapon systems. As part of these improvements, program 

managers are now responsible for the total life-cycle management of a 

weapon system, to include the sustainment of the system. In addition, 

DOD has directed weapon system program managers to develop 

acquisition strategies that maximize competition, innovation, and 

interoperability and the use of commercial, rather than military-unique,
Page 5 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

items to reduce costs.4 Within the area of weapon system sustainment, 

DOD is pursuing the use of performance-based logistics as the preferred 

support strategy for its weapon systems. Performance-based logistics, a 

variation on other contractor logistics support strategies calling for the 

long-term support of weapon systems, involves defining a level of 

performance that the weapon system is to achieve over a period of time at a 

fixed cost to the government.

Technical data rights can affect DOD’s plans to sustain weapon systems 

throughout their life cycle. For example, DOD would need technical data 

rights if it opts to reduce spare parts costs by developing new sources of 

supply, to meet wartime surge requirements by contracting with additional 

equipment suppliers, or to reduce system acquisition costs by recompeting 

follow-on procurements of the equipment. In addition, DOD may need to 

develop depot-level maintenance capabilities for its weapon systems at 

government depots in order to meet legislative requirements. DOD is 

required under 10 U.S.C. 2464 to identify and maintain within governmentowned and government-operated facilities a core logistics capability, 

including the equipment, personnel, and technical competence identified as 

necessary for national defense emergencies and contingencies. Under 

10 U.S.C. 2466, not more than 50 percent of the funds made available in a 

fiscal year to a military department or defense agency for depot-level repair 

and maintenance can be used to contract for performance by nonfederal 

personnel. These provisions can limit the amount of depot-level 

maintenance that can be performed by contractors. Finally, DOD would 

also need technical data rights for a weapon system should a contractor fail 

to perform, including a contractor working under a performance-based 

logistics arrangement. DOD has referred to this contingency as an “exit 

strategy.”

4

DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003.
Page 6 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

Army and Air Force 

Encountered 

Limitations in Their 

Sustainment Plans for 

Some Fielded Weapon 

Systems

The Army and the Air Force have encountered limitations in their 

sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems because they lacked 

needed technical data rights. The lack of technical data rights has limited 

the services’ flexibility to make changes to sustainment plans that are 

aimed at achieving cost savings and meeting legislative requirements 

regarding depot maintenance capabilities. During our review we identified 

seven weapon system programs where these military services encountered 

limitations in their sustainment plans. Although the circumstances 

surrounding each case were unique, earlier decisions made on technical 

data rights during system acquisition were cited as a primary reason for the 

limitations subsequently encountered. As a result, the services had to alter 

their plans for developing maintenance capability at public depots, new 

sources of supply to increase production, or competitive offers for the 

acquisition of spare parts and components to reduce sustainment costs. In 

at least three of the cases, the military service made attempts to obtain 

needed technical data subsequent to the system acquisition but found that 

the equipment manufacturer declined to provide the data or that acquiring 

the data would be too expensive. We did not assess the rationale for the 

decisions made on technical data rights during the acquisition of these 

systems.

The seven weapon system programs we identified where a lack of technical 

data rights affected the implementation of sustainment plans are 

summarized below:

• C-17 aircraft: When the Air Force began acquisition of the C-17 aircraft, 

it did not acquire technical data rights needed to support maintenance 

of the aircraft at public depots. According to a program official, the Air 

Force did not consider the aircraft’s depot maintenance workload as 

necessary to support DOD’s depot maintenance core capability. 

Subsequently, however, the Air Force’s 2001 depot maintenance core 

assessment identified the C-17 aircraft workload as necessary to 

support core capability. The Air Force determined that it did not have 

the technical data rights needed to perform the required maintenance. 

According to C-17 program officials, the C-17 prime contractor did not 

acquire data rights for C-17 components provided by sub-vendors and 

consequently was not able to provide the needed data rights to the Air 

Force. The prime contractor has encouraged its sub-vendors to 

cooperate with the Air Force in establishing partnerships to accomplish 

the needed core depot maintenance. Under these partnerships, Air 

Force depots would provide the facilities and labor needed to perform 
Page 7 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

the core depot maintenance work, and the sub-vendor would provide 

the required technical data. According to Air Force officials, there are 

some instances where the sub-vendor is unwilling to provide the needed 

technical data. For example, in the case of the C-17’s inertial navigation 

unit, the sub-vendor maintains that the inertial navigation unit is a 

commercial derivative item and the technical data needed to repair the 

item are proprietary. As of April 18, 2006, the sub-vendor was declining 

to provide the technical data needed to the Air Force. Without the rights 

to the technical data or a partnership with the sub-vendor, the Air Force 

cannot develop a core maintenance capability for this equipment item.

• F-22 aircraft: The acquisition of the Air Force’s F-22 aircraft did not 

include all of the technical data needed for establishing required core 

capability workload at Air Force depots. Early in the F-22 aircraft’s 

acquisition, the Air Force planned to use contractors to provide needed 

depot-level maintenance and therefore decided not to acquire some 

technical data rights from sub-vendors in order to reduce the aircraft’s 

acquisition cost. Subsequently, however, the Air Force determined that 

portions of the F-22 workload were needed to satisfy core depot 

maintenance requirements. The Air Force is currently negotiating 

contracts for the technical data rights needed to develop depot-level 

maintenance capability. While the Air Force has negotiated contracts to 

acquire technical data for four F-22 aircraft components, F-22 program 

officials expressed concern that it may become difficult to successfully 

negotiate rights to all components.

• C-130J aircraft: The Air Force purchased the C-130J aircraft as a 

commercial item and, as such, did not obtain technical data rights 

needed to competitively purchase C-130J-unique spare parts and 

components or to perform depot-level maintenance core workload.5

 

The C-130J shares many common components with earlier versions of 

the C-130 for which the government has established DOD and 

contractor repair sources. In 2004, the DOD Inspector General reported 

that the Air Force’s use of a commercial item acquisition strategy was

5

Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 12, Sec. 12.211, states, “Except as provided by agencyspecific statutes, the Government shall acquire only the technical data and the rights in that 

data customarily provided to the public with a commercial item or process.”
Page 8 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

unjustified to acquire the C-130J aircraft.6 In response to the Inspector 

General’s findings and added congressional interest, the Air Force is 

converting its C-130J acquisition to traditional defense system 

acquisition and sustainment contracts. However, because the Air Force 

did not acquire the necessary technical data during the acquisition 

process, it has less leverage to negotiate rights to data. In 2005, the Air 

Force approached the aircraft manufacturer to purchase technical data 

rights for C-130J-unique components, but the aircraft manufacturer 

declined to sell the data rights. Because of its lack of the needed 

technical data, the Air Force is planning to establish partnerships with 

C-130J sub-vendors that have technical data rights to components of the 

C-130J. Under these partnerships, Air Force depots would provide the 

facilities and labor needed to perform the core depot maintenance work, 

and the sub-vendors would provide the required technical data. C-130J 

program officials expressed concerns that in some instances subvendors may not be willing to partner. The Air Force currently expects 

to develop approximately 90 partnerships with as many different 

vendors on approximately 300 C-130J core candidate components. 

Program officials expressed concern about the proliferation of 

partnerships and said the Air Force will incur additional costs to 

develop, manage, and monitor these partnerships, but they had not 

determined what these costs will be.

• Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles: When the 

Army first developed the up-armored HMMWV in 1993, it did not 

purchase the technical data necessary to develop new sources of supply 

to increase production. Army officials anticipated fielding these 

vehicles to a limited number of Army units for reconnaissance and 

peacekeeping purposes. At that time, the Army did not obtain technical 

data required for the manufacture of up-armor HMMWVs. With the 

increasing threat of improvised explosive devices during operations in 

Iraq, demand for up-armored HMMWVs increased substantially, from 

1,407 vehicles in August 2003 to 8,105 vehicles by September 2004. 

According to Army officials, the manufacturer declined to sell the rights 

to the technical data package. Because of the lack of technical data 

rights to produce up-armored HMMWVs, program officials explained 

they were unable to rapidly contract with alternate suppliers to meet the 

wartime surge requirement. 

6

Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Acquisition: Contracting for and 

Performance of the C-130J Aircraft, D-2004-102 (Arlington, Va.: July 23, 2004).
Page 9 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

• Stryker family of vehicles: When acquiring the Stryker, the Army did not 

obtain technical data rights needed to develop competitive offers for the 

acquisition of spare parts and components. Following the initial 

acquisition, the program office analyzed alternatives to the interim 

contractor support strategy for the weapon system and attempted to 

acquire rights to the manufacturer’s technical data package. The 

technical data package describes the parts and equipment in sufficient 

technical detail to allow the Army to use competition to lower the cost 

of parts. The contractor declined to sell the Stryker’s technical data 

package to the Army. Further, according to an Army Audit Agency 

report, the project office stated that the cost of the technical data, even 

if available, would most likely be prohibitively expensive at this point in 

the Stryker’s fielding and would likely offset any cost savings resulting 

from competition.7

 

• Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft: The Air Force lacked 

technical data for the AWACS needed to develop competitive offers for 

the purchase of certain spare parts. When the Air Force recently 

purchased cowlings (metal engine coverings) for the AWACS, it did so 

on a noncompetitive, sole-source basis. The Defense Contract 

Management Agency recommended that the cowlings be competed 

because the original equipment manufacturer’s proposed price was not 

fair and reasonable and because another potential source for the part 

was available. Despite the recommendation, however, the Air Force 

said it lacked the technical data to compete the purchase. We noted that 

while the Air Force and the original equipment supplier have a contract 

that could allow the Air Force to order technical drawings for the 

purpose of purchasing replenishment spare parts, the contractor had 

not always delivered such data based on uncertainties concerning the 

Air Force’s rights to the data.8

• M4 carbine: When the Army purchased its new M4 carbine, it did not 

acquire the technical data rights necessary to recompete follow-on 

purchases of the carbine. The M4 carbine is a derivative of the M16 rifle 

and shares 80 percent of its parts with the M16. However, because the 

remaining 20 percent of parts were funded by the developer, the Army 

7

U.S. Army Audit Agency, Stryker Contract Logistics Support Costs, A-2006-0028-ALM 

(Alexandria, Va.: Dec. 6, 2005).

8

GAO, Contract Management: The Air Force Should Improve How It Purchases AWACS 

Spare Parts, GAO-05-169 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2005).
Page 10 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

did not have all the rights needed to compete subsequent manufacture 

of the M4. The Army estimated that the unit cost is about twice as much 

for the M4 compared with the M16, despite increases in procurement 

quantities for the M4 and the large commonality of parts. According to 

Army officials, having the technical data rights for the M16 allowed the 

Army to recompete the procurement of the rifle, resulting in a 

significantly decreased unit procurement cost.

Although we did not assess the rationale for the decisions made on 

technical data rights during the acquisition of these systems, several 

factors may complicate program managers’ decisions on long-term 

technical data rights for weapon systems. These factors include the 

following:

• The contractor’s interests in protecting its intellectual property rights. 

Because contractors need to protect their intellectual property from 

uncompensated use, they often resist including contract clauses that 

provide technical data rights to the government. 

• The extent to which the system being acquired incorporates technology 

that was not developed with government funding. According to DOD’s 

acquisition guidance,9

 the government’s funding of weapon system 

development determines the government’s rights to technical data. 

Weapon systems are frequently developed with some mix of contractor 

and government funding, which may present challenges to DOD in 

negotiating technical data rights with the contractor.

• The potential for changes in the technical data over the weapon system’s 

life cycle. The technical data for a weapon system may change over its 

life cycle, first as the system’s technology matures and later as the 

system undergoes modifications and upgrades to incorporate new 

technologies and capabilities. The potential for changes in technical 

data present challenges concerning when the government should take 

delivery of technical data, the format used to maintain technical data, 

and whether the data should be retained in a government or contractor 

repository.

9

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement, Section 227.7103-5, Government 

Rights.
Page 11 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

• The extent to which the long-term sustainment strategy may require 

rights to technical data versus access to the data. According to Army 

officials, access to contractor technical data is sometimes presented as 

an alternative to the government taking delivery of the data. These 

officials noted that while access to technical data may allow for 

oversight of the contractor and may reduce the program manager’s data 

management costs, it may not provide the government with rights to use 

the technical data should a change in the sustainment plan become 

necessary.

• The numerous funding and capability trade-offs program managers face 

during the acquisition of a weapon system. Program managers are 

frequently under pressure to spend limited acquisition dollars on 

increased weapon system capability or increased numbers of systems, 

rather than pursuing technical data rights.

• The long life cycle of many weapon systems. With weapon systems 

staying in DOD’s inventory for longer periods—up to 40 years, it may be 

difficult for the program manager to plan for future contingencies such 

as modifications and upgrades, spare parts obsolescence, diminishing 

manufacturing support, and diminishing maintenance support.

DOD Acquisition 

Policies Do Not 

Specifically Address 

Long-term Needs for 

Technical Data Rights

DOD’s acquisition policies do not specifically address long-term needs for 

technical data rights to sustain weapon systems over their life cycle, and in 

the absence of a DOD-wide policy, the Army and the Air Force are working 

independently to develop structured approaches for defining technical data 

requirements and securing rights to those data. DOD’s current acquisition 

policies do not specifically require program managers to assess long-term 

needs for technical data rights to support weapon systems and, 

correspondingly, to develop acquisition strategies that address those needs. 

DOD guidance and policy changes, as part of the department’s acquisition 

reforms and performance-based strategies, have deemphasized the 

acquisition of technical data rights. DOD concurred with but has not 

implemented our August 2004 recommendation for developing technical 

data acquisition strategies, although it has recently reiterated its intent to 

do so. Army and Air Force logistics officials are working independently to 

develop structured approaches for determining technical data rights 

requirements and securing long-term rights for use of those data. Logistics 

officials told us that their efforts would benefit from having a DOD policy 

that specifically addresses long-term technical data needs for weapon 

system sustainment.
Page 12 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

DOD Acquisition Policies 

Do Not Specifically Require 

Program Managers to 

Assess Long-term Needs for 

Technical Data Rights or 

Develop Corresponding 

Acquisition Strategies

Current DOD acquisition policies do not specifically require program 

managers to assess long-term needs for technical data rights to sustain 

weapon systems, and, correspondingly, to develop acquisition strategies 

that address those needs. DOD Directive 5000.1, the agency’s policy 

underlying the defense acquisition framework, designates program 

managers as the persons with responsibility and authority for 

accomplishing acquisition program objectives for development, 

production, and sustainment to meet the users’ operational needs.10 The 

directive, however, does not provide specific guidance as to what factors 

program managers should consider in developing a strategy to sustain the 

weapon system, including considerations regarding technical data. DOD 

Instruction 5000.2, the agency’s policy for implementing DOD Directive 

5000.1, requires program managers to ensure the development of a flexible 

strategy to sustain a program so that the strategy may evolve throughout 

the weapon system’s life cycle.11 In addition, DOD provides non-mandatory 

guidebooks to assist program managers with acquisition and product 

support. However, DOD acquisition policy does not specifically direct the 

program manager, when acquiring a weapon system, to define the 

government’s requirements for technical data rights, an important aspect of 

a flexible sustainment strategy.

DOD guidance and policy changes, as part of the department’s acquisition 

reforms and performance-based strategies, have deemphasized the 

acquisition of technical data rights. For example, a 2001 memorandum 

signed by DOD’s senior acquisition official stated that the use of 

performance-based acquisition strategies may obviate the need for data or 

rights.12 Also in 2001, DOD issued guidance on negotiating intellectual 

property rights and stated that program officials should seek to establish 

performance-based requirements that enhance long-term competitive

10DOD Directive 5000.1.

11DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003.

12Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology; Memorandum for—Service 

Acquisition Executives, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) and Director, Defense Procurement; Reform of 

Intellectual Property Rights of Contractors (Jan. 5, 2001).
Page 13 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

interests, in lieu of acquiring detailed design data and data rights.13 In a

May 2003 revision of its acquisition policy, DOD eliminated a requirement 

for program managers to provide for long-term access to technical data and 

required them to develop performance-based logistics strategies.14

Even prior to the May 2003 revision of DOD’s acquisition policy, we had 

raised concerns about whether DOD placed sufficient emphasis on 

obtaining technical data during the acquisition process. We reported in 

2002 that DOD program offices had often failed to place adequate emphasis 

on obtaining needed technical data during the acquisition process.15 We 

recommended that DOD emphasize the importance of obtaining technical 

data and consider including a priced option for the purchase of technical 

data when considering proposals for new weapon systems or modifications 

to existing systems. While DOD concurred with the recommendation, it 

subsequently made revisions to its acquisition policies in May 2003, as 

noted above, that eliminated the prior requirement for the program 

manager to provide for long-term access to data. 

DOD also has not implemented a prior recommendation we made for 

developing technical data acquisition strategies, although it has recently 

reiterated its intent to do so. In August 2004, we reported that adoption of 

performance-based logistics at the weapon system platform level may be 

influencing program managers to provide for access only to technical data 

necessary to manage the performance-based contract during the 

acquisition phase—and not to provide a strategy for the future delivery of 

technical data in case the performance-based arrangement failed.16 We 

recommended that DOD consider requiring program offices to develop 

acquisition strategies that provide for a future delivery of sufficient 

13Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Intellectual Property: Navigating Through Commercial Waters (Oct. 15, 2001).

14Prior to this May 2003 revision, the program manager, as part of the acquisition strategy, 

was required to develop and document a support strategy for life-cycle sustainment that 

addressed all applicable support requirements, to include long-term access to data to 

support competitive sourcing decisions. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mandatory 

Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) and Major Automated 

Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs, DOD 5000.2-R (Apr. 5, 2002).

15GAO, Defense Logistics: Opportunities to Improve the Army’s and Navy’s Decisionmaking Process for Weapon System Support, GAO-02-306 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 28, 2002).

16GAO-04-715.
Page 14 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

technical data should the need arise to select an alternative source or to 

offer the work out for competition. In response to our recommendation, 

DOD concurred that technical, product, and logistics data should be 

acquired by the program manager to support the development, production, 

operation, sustainment, improvement, demilitarization, and disposal of a 

weapon system. Furthermore, the department recognized the need to take 

steps to stress the importance of technical data by its stated intent to 

include a requirement in DOD’s acquisition policies (DOD Directive 5000.1 

and DOD Instruction 5000.2) for the program managers to establish a data 

management strategy that requires access to the minimum data necessary 

to sustain the fielded system; to recompete or reconstitute sustainment, if 

necessary, to promote real time access to data; and to provide for the 

availability of high-quality data at the point of need for the intended user. 

In the case of performance-based arrangements, that would include 

acquiring the appropriate technical data needed to support an exit strategy 

should the arrangement fail or become too expensive. Despite DOD’s 

concurrence with our recommendation, however, efforts to implement 

these changes have been delayed.

Army and Air Force Are 

Working to Develop 

Structured Approaches for 

Assessing Technical Data 

Needs and Securing Longterm Rights to Those Data

Army and Air Force logistics officials are independently developing 

structured approaches for determining when and how in the acquisition 

process the service should assess its requirements for technical data and 

secure its long-term rights for use of those data. The aim of these efforts is 

to ensure future sustainment needs of weapon systems are adequately 

considered and supported early during the acquisition process. Logistics 

officials from each service told us that their efforts would benefit from 

having a DOD policy that specifically addresses long-term technical data 

needs for weapon system sustainment. In the absence of a mandatory DOD 

requirement to address technical data, service officials said, program 

managers may not fully consider and incorporate long-term requirements 

for technical data rights during system acquisition.

According to Army and Air Force officials, their reviews of current policies 

and practices indicate that it is during the development of the solicitation 

and the subsequent negotiation of a proposed contract that the government
Page 15 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

is in the best position to secure required technical data rights.17 This point 

in the acquisition process is likely to present the greatest degree of 

competitive pressure, and the weapon system program office can consider 

technical data as a criterion for evaluating proposals and selecting a 

contractor. In addition, the Air Force is pursuing the use of priced options 

negotiated in contracts for new weapon systems or modifications to 

existing systems. A priced option retains the option for acquiring technical 

data rights at some point later in the weapon system’s life cycle. According 

to Air Force officials, priced options for technical data may ensure the 

government’s rights to the data and control the cost of technical data in the 

future. The Air Force is attempting to incorporate priced options for 

technical data in two new weapon system acquisitions. We have previously 

recommended that DOD require the military services to consider the merits 

of including a priced option for the purchase of technical data when 

proposals for new weapon systems or modifications to existing systems are 

being considered.18

Army Technical Data Efforts The Army established a working group in March 2005 to serve as a forum 

for determining requirements for and resolving issues associated with the 

management and use of technical data.19 One task of the working group is 

to develop a structured process for determining what technical data are 

needed for any given system. Another task is to clarify technical data policy 

and reconcile the best practices of acquisition reform with the need for 

technical data rights in support of weapon system acquisition and 

sustainment. The group is also reviewing pertinent federal and DOD policy 

17DOD’s acquisition process is structured into discrete phases separated by major decision 

points (called milestones or decision reviews), with a number of key activities to provide 

the basis for comprehensive management and informed decision making. The number of 

phases and decision points are tailored to provide a management structure for reviewing 

and approving acquisition programs as they move from concept refinement to system 

development and demonstration. In the acquisition process, a contract solicitation is 

ultimately used to communicate the government’s requirements. 

18As discussed earlier, DOD has not incorporated this recommendation into its acquisition 

policy. See GAO-02-306.

19To focus on Army activities related to the management of engineering and technical data, 

product data, and the reduction of total ownership costs for weapon systems, the Assistant 

Secretary of Army for Acquisitions, Logistics and Technology in April 2004 delegated 

authority and responsibilities for managing these activities to the Commander, U.S. Army 

Materiel Command. In March 2005, the Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 

chartered the product data and engineering working group, which consists of 

representatives from Army headquarters, major commands, program executive officers, and 

Army Materiel Command subordinate commands.
Page 16 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

and guidance, as well as instruction materials used by the Defense 

Acquisition University for acquisition career training, with the aim of 

identifying ambiguities or inconsistencies. This effort focuses on areas of 

the acquisition process where technical data and acquisition intersect, such 

as systems engineering, configuration management, data management, 

contracting, logistics, and financial management. Some anticipated 

products from the group include the following proposed items:

• changes to integrate and clarify policy on technical data and weapon 

system acquisition policy,

• draft instruction material to better define and explain the value of 

technical data rights and the uses of technical data throughout the 

weapon system life cycle, and

• a comprehensive primer to provide the acquisition professional a guide 

for ensuring that there is a contract link between weapon system 

acquisition and sustainment strategies on the one hand and the 

technical data strategy on the other. 

According to members of the working group, if the government’s rights 

have not been protected in the contract, then it may be necessary to 

negotiate the rights to use the data at a later date, which could be costprohibitive. Army Materiel Command officials told us that having a DOD 

policy on when and how in the acquisition process technical data rights 

should be addressed would help them as they revise their policy and 

guidance. The product data working group plans to complete its 

preliminary work by the end of fiscal year 2006.

In January 2006, the U.S. Army’s Tank-automotive and Armaments 

Command completed a study evaluating the importance of technical data 

over the life cycle of a weapon system, with particular emphasis on 

sustainment. While the Army had not yet approved and released the final 

report, members of the study team indicated the following:

• Previous DOD guidance on the data rights required for performancebased logistics contracts has been ambiguous and open to 

misinterpretation. This ambiguity has resulted in many programs’ not 

acquiring rights to technical data for long-term weapon system 

sustainment. Lack of technical data rights leads to risks associated with 

the inability to broaden the industrial base to support Global War on 

Terrorism surge requirements.
Page 17 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

• The current process to identify the government’s technical data rights is 

ad hoc and unstructured.

• The government’s rights to technical data are independent of the 

logistics support strategy—whether government (organic) support, 

traditional contract logistics support, or performance-based logistics.

According to team members, potential recommendations from the study 

are to establish a new policy requiring the program manager to complete a 

technical data rights decision matrix and to weigh the cost of acquiring 

technical data against program risk. The technical data rights should be 

negotiated as early as possible in the contracting process and ideally 

should be used as a source selection factor. The study team further states 

that the government should ensure that rights to use the data are secured in 

the system development and demonstration contract.

Air Force Technical Data Efforts Air Force officials are currently reviewing and developing proposed 

changes to weapon system acquisition and support policies to require that 

sustainment support and technical data rights decisions be made early in 

weapon system acquisition. These efforts are part of the Air Force Materiel 

Command’s product support campaign, an effort to better integrate the 

activities of the service’s acquisition and logistics communities.20 Air Force 

officials involved with the campaign said their efforts could be facilitated if 

DOD’s acquisition policy were revised to more clearly direct program 

managers when and how they are to define and secure the government’s 

data rights during weapon system acquisition. The campaign’s policy focus 

team is working on the efforts that would provide a more structured 

approach to early determination of the government’s technical data rights:

• revised polices to require that sustainment support decisions be made 

and technical data rights be defined during the technology phase of 

acquisition but prior to system development and demonstration;

20The Air Force product support campaign is one of three efforts that constitute the Air 

Force Materiel Command’s sustainment transformation initiative. The other two efforts are 

depot maintenance transformation and purchasing and supply chain management. The 

product support campaign is a partnership among the Air Force Materiel Command, 

Headquarters Air Force Acquisition Integration, and Logistics, Installations and Mission 

Support to establish six process focus teams to address information workflow, workforce 

development, supplier management, policy, processes, and expectation management.
Page 18 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

• a standard template for contract solicitations, to be used to guide the 

acquisition workforce in securing technical data rights;

• contract language to include a priced option for the delivery of technical 

data and rights for use of data, which would be negotiated and included 

as part of the system development and demonstration solicitation; and

• an independent logistics assessment process, to provide an objective 

review of the acquisition program office’s sustainment support plans 

before major milestone decisions.

In May 2006, the Secretary of the Air Force directed that the acquisition of 

technical data and associated rights be addressed specifically in all 

acquisition strategy plans, reviews, and associated planning documents for 

major weapon system programs and subsequent source selections. The 

Secretary stated these actions are needed to address challenges in meeting 

legislative requirements to maintain a core logistics capability and to limit 

the percentage of depot maintenance funds expended for contractor 

performance. The competitive source selection process, according to the 

Secretary, provides the best opportunity to address technical data 

requirements while at the same time brokering the best deal for the 

government in regard to future weapon systems sustainment. 

Conclusions Under current DOD acquisition policies, the military services lack 

assurance that they will have the technical data rights needed to sustain 

weapon systems throughout their life cycle. We have previously made 

recommendations that DOD enhance its policies regarding technical data. 

DOD has concurred with these recommendations but has not implemented 

them. In fact, DOD has de-emphasized the acquisition of technical data 

rights as part of the department’s acquisition reforms and performancebased strategies. Our current work, however, shows that the services face 

limitations in their sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems due 

to a lack of needed technical data rights. Furthermore, program managers 

face numerous challenges in making decisions on technical data rights—

decisions that have long-term implications for the life-cycle sustainment of 

weapon systems. Army and Air Force logistics officials have recognized 

weaknesses in their approaches to assessing and securing technical data 

rights, and each service has begun to address these weaknesses by 

developing more structured approaches. However, current DOD 

acquisition policies do not facilitate these efforts. Unless DOD assesses 

and secures its rights for the use of technical data early in the weapon 
Page 19 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

system acquisition process when it has the greatest leverage to negotiate, 

DOD may face later challenges in developing sustainment plans or 

changing these plans as necessary over the life cycle of its weapon systems. 

Delaying action in acquiring technical data rights can make these data costprohibitive or difficult to obtain later in the weapon system life cycle, and 

can impede DOD’s ability to comply with legislative requirements, such as 

core capability requirements.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To ensure that DOD can support sustainment plans for weapon systems 

throughout their life cycle, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics) to specifically require program managers to assess long-term 

technical data needs and establish corresponding acquisition strategies 

that provide for technical data rights needed to sustain weapon systems 

over their life cycle. These assessments and corresponding acquisition 

strategies should

• be developed prior to issuance of the contract solicitation;

• address the merits of including a priced contract option for the future 

delivery of technical data;

• address the potential for changes in the sustainment plan over the 

weapon system’s life cycle, which may include the development of 

maintenance capability at public depots, the development of new 

sources of supply to increase production, or the solicitation of 

competitive offers for the acquisition of spare parts and components; 

and

• apply to weapon systems that are to be supported by performancebased logistics arrangements as well as to weapon systems that are to 

be supported by other sustainment approaches.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to 

incorporate these policy changes into DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD 

Instruction 5000.2 when they are next updated. 
Page 20 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our report 

and recommendations. DOD stated that the requirement for program 

managers to assess long-term technical data needs and establish 

corresponding strategies will be incorporated into DOD Instruction 5000.2 

when it is next updated. If DOD updates its acquisition policy as stated, we 

believe this action will meet the intent of our recommendations. DOD’s 

response is included in appendix II. 

Scope and 

Methodology

We conducted work at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army, the 

Navy, and the Air Force. The specific offices and commands we visited are 

listed in the attached briefing slides contained in appendix I.

To identify sustainment plans for fielded weapon systems that may have 

been affected by the technical data rights available to the government, we 

met with Army and Air Force acquisition and logistics officials responsible 

for 11 weapon systems. We did not identify technical data issues affecting 

sustainment for three of these systems and excluded these systems from 

our subsequent review. We also excluded a weapon system—the Buffalo 

mine-protected route clearing equipment—that was acquired under the 

Army’s rapid fielding initiative to meet emergency needs. For the other 

seven weapon system programs—the C-17 aircraft, F-22 aircraft, C-130J 

aircraft, Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, Stryker 

family of vehicles, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and M4 

carbine—we obtained information on the service’s requirement for rights 

to use the data, their success in obtaining data rights from the 

manufacturer, and the effect that a lack of data rights had on system 

sustainment plans. We did not assess the rationale for the decisions made 

on technical data rights during system acquisition, nor did we determine 

the extent that program offices complied with acquisition policies 

regarding technical data that existed at the time of the acquisition. 

However, we collected comments from acquisition and logistics personnel 

on the factors that complicate program managers’ decisions on long-term 

technical data rights for weapon systems.

To examine the requirements for obtaining technical data rights under 

current DOD acquisition policies, we analyzed current DOD acquisition 

policies. Our review encompassed DOD-wide policies, including DOD 

Directive 5000.1 and DOD Instruction 5000.2, as well as service-specific 

policies. We discussed these policies with DOD and service officials 

responsible for developing acquisition and logistics policies, preparing 
Page 21 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

system acquisition strategies, and implementing sustainment plans to 

obtain their views on the importance of considering technical data 

requirements during the acquisition process. To determine DOD’s plans to 

revise acquisition policy in response to a previous recommendation we 

made on technical data, we reviewed DOD correspondence and met with 

officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics). 

We also met with Army and Air Force logistics officials to obtain 

information on their efforts to assess acquisition policies and make 

appropriate changes that would provide a structured process for assessing 

and securing government rights to technical data early in weapon system 

acquisition. We interviewed Army officials leading the Army Material 

Command’s Product Data Engineering Working Group and Air Force 

officials addressing acquisition and logistics policies as part of the Air 

Force Material Command’s Product Support Campaign. We also reviewed 

available documentation on the objectives and potential outcomes of these 

initiatives.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and to the 

Secretaries of the military services. Copies of this report will be made 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-5140 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III. 

William M. Solis

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 22 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the Apendxies

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems ApendxiI

1

Preliminary Observations on DOD’s 

Acquisition of Technical Data to Support 

Weapons Systems

Briefing for the House Committee on Armed Services

February 27, 2006
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 23 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

2

Introduction

• The House Committee on Armed Services asked whether DOD policies limit

the services from purchasing technical data when acquiring new weapons 

systems, and thereby increase the systems’ life-cycle sustainment costs and 

delay the repair of mission-essential items.

• The Committee requested in H.R. 109-89 that GAO review the services’ 

technical data policies and practices affecting life-cycle costs and availability 

of weapons systems.

• GAO previously examined this issue in a report on performance-based 

logistics (GAO-04-715, August 2004) and recommended policy changes for 

DOD. Specifically, DOD should:

“consider requiring program offices, during weapon system acquisition, to 

develop acquisition strategies that provide for a future delivery of sufficient 

technical data to enable the program office to select an alternative 

source—public or private—or to offer the work out for competition if the 

performance-based arrangement fails or becomes prohibitively expensive.”
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 24 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

3

Objectives

GAO will analyze and report on the following: 

• To what extent DOD policies limit the services from purchasing technical 

data when acquiring new weapons systems;

• The status of DOD’s plans to revise acquisition policy in response to the 

previous GAO recommendation on technical data; 

• The costs for obtaining access in order to view, modify, or distribute 

technical data relating to the sustainment of procured systems; and

• The amount of time required to reach back to the system manufacturer for 

technical data and what impact, if any, that delay has on repairing or 

modifying fielded systems. 
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 25 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

4

Synopsis of Observations

• Under DOD policy, program managers are not limited from obtaining tech 

data rights during acquisition– but neither are they required to do so.

• DOD has been slow in responding to our recommendation in GAO-04-715 

but has revised discretionary guidance that addresses tech data rights.

• Available budget figures indicate limited cost growth for technical data 

supporting fielded weapons systems.

• Although information on technical data issues affecting field maintenance is 

limited, our review showed maintenance units in Southwest Asia did not 

experience systemic problems in obtaining tech data. Army readiness data 

we reviewed did not indicate low equipment readiness rates due to 

maintenance.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 26 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

5

Scope and Methodology

• OSD USD/ATL, Logistics and Materiel Readiness

• Army Headquarters

• Army Materiel Command (AMC), Fort Belvoir, Va.

• Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), Warren, Michigan, and 

Rock Island, Ill.

• U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Fort McPherson, Ga.

• 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas 

• Navy Headquarters

• Naval Aviation Systems Command (NAVAIR), Patuxent River, Md.

• Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Washington, D.C.

• Air Force Headquarters

• Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

• Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 27 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

6

Scope and Methodology (cont.)

• To determine the status of DOD’s efforts to implement the recommendation of

our prior report, we analyzed DOD and service acquisition policy and guidance, 

interviewed DOD and service officials, and collected DOD correspondence 

addressing our recommendation.

• To determine costs for obtaining access to contractor technical data, we collected 

and analyzed operations and maintenance budget data from the services. Our 

review focused on costs associated with sustaining fielded systems. 

• To determine the impact of maintenance delays that might be caused by the

need to obtain technical data from the manufacturer, we collected and analyzed 

non-mission capable reports on equipment managed by the US Army TankAutomotive and Armaments Command. We also contacted logistics assistance 

representatives to collect information on experiences with technical data in the 

field.

• We also collected acquisition and logistic support information on 7 Army 

systems—Abrams, Bradley, HMMWV, M-88, Stryker, mine clearing equipment, 

and vehicle armor kits; and 4 Air Force systems—C-17, C-130J, F-117, and

the F22.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 28 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

7

Background

WHAT ARE TECHNICAL DATA?

Technical data are recorded information of a scientific or technical nature, 

regardless of the form or method of the recording. Typically, technical data 

refer to:

• Technical data packages: All applicable drawings, associated lists, 

specifications, standards, performance requirements, quality assurance 

provisions, and packaging details necessary to support an acquisition 

strategy and ensure the adequacy of item performance.

• Technical manuals: Publications that contain instructions for the 

installation, operation, maintenance, training, and support of weapons 

systems. A maintenance technical manual normally includes 

maintenance procedures, parts lists or parts breakdown, and related 

technical information or processes.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 29 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

8

Background (cont.)

WHY ARE TECHNICAL DATA IMPORTANT?

The private sector and the government often have important competing 

interests in technical data rights.

• A company’s interest in protecting its intellectual property (IP) from 

uncompensated exploitation is of paramount importance—such that 

they often resist including the contract clauses providing tech data 

rights to government.

• The government needs to have adequate rights to support its weapons 

systems, including developing repair and maintenance procedures,

selecting alternate repair sources, and procuring spare parts 

competitively.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 30 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

9

Background (cont.)

WHEN ARE TECHNICAL DATA RIGHTS ACQUIRED, AND HOW ARE 

THESE DATA MANAGED?

• Provision for acquiring weapons systems tech data rights, access, and 

delivery should be made early in acquisition.

• Tech data rights decisions made during acquisition will affect 

government’s ability to support weapons systems throughout 

increasingly longer life cycles—up to approximately 40 years.

• Delaying action in acquiring technical data rights can make them cost

prohibitive or difficult to obtain.

• Technical data are jointly managed and may be stored at either the 

government’s or contractor’s repository.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 31 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

10

To what extent do DOD policies limit the services from 

purchasing technical data when acquiring new weapons 

systems?

Under DOD policy, program managers are not limited from obtaining technical data 

rights during acquisition—but neither are they required to do so.

• DOD Directive 5000.1 and Instruction 5000.2 provide DOD’s overall acquisition 

policy. The Defense acquisition guidebook and product support guide offer 

additional discretionary guidance.

• 5000.1 “The Defense Acquisition System” —Designates the program 

managers as the persons with responsibility and authority for accomplishing 

acquisition program objectives for development, production, and 

sustainment to meet the users’ operational needs.

• 5000.2 “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System” —Instructs program 

managers to ensure development of a flexible strategy to sustain a program 

so that the strategy may evolve throughout the weapons system life cycle.

• Discretionary guidebooks—Guide program managers to determine minimum 

data needs to support sustainment strategy over life cycle of system.

• DOD policy does not require program managers to document their strategy for

ensuring long-term access to tech data over the life cycle of a weapon system.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 32 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

11

To what extent do DOD policies limit the services from 

purchasing technical data when acquiring new weapons 

systems? (cont.)

Services have adopted different policies regarding technical data.

• Army’s acquisition policy (AR 70-1 and AR 700–127)

• Requires program manager to develop logistics support strategy, including 

description of how tech data rights or long-term access to tech data is to be 

obtained.

• Navy’s acquisition policy (SECNAV Instructions 4105.1A and 5000.2c, and 

NAVSO P-3692)

• An independent team is required to assess the adequacy of the program 

manager’s logistics support plan, including technical data. However, there is 

no requirement compelling a system program manager to address how tech 

data rights or long-term access to technical data is to be obtained.

• Air Force’s acquisition policy (AF policy directives 63-1 and 20-5, and AF 

Instructions 63-107 and 63-101)

• Requires program manager to address tech data in a product support

strategy.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 33 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

12

To what extent do DOD policies limit the services from 

purchasing technical data when acquiring new weapons 

systems? (cont.)

The services’ continuing efforts to require program managers to develop tech data

requirements early in acquisition process highlight a gap in DOD policy:

• Army

• Product Data and Engineering Working Group

• TACOM’s draft technical data rights study

• Navy

• Planned revisions to 5000.2c

• Independent logistics assessment handbook

• Air Force

• Product Support Campaign

• Developing an independent logistics assessment process

Service officials responsible for these efforts believe their work would be facilitated 

by a DOD policy providing clear direction to the program managers to develop a 

tech data strategy early in the acquisition process.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 34 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

13

To what extent do DOD policies limit the services from 

purchasing technical data when acquiring new weapons 

systems? (cont.)

In the absence of DOD acquisition policy requiring a technical data strategy,

program managers may not adequately consider the need to acquire technical

data rights because:

• Program managers are under financial pressure to use available funds to buy 

more inventory or capability rather than technical data.

• DOD has deemphasized the requirement of acquiring rights to tech data:

• The “use of performance-based acquisition strategies...may obviate the 

need for data and/or rights.” USD (AT&L) memo on the reform of 

intellectual property rights of contractors, Jan. 5, 2001.

• “Finally, program officials should seek to establish performance-based 

requirements that enhance long-term competitive interests, in lieu of

acquiring detailed design data and data rights.” DOD guide to negotiating 

intellectual property rights, Oct. 15, 2001.

• DOD acquisition policy (revised May 2003) eliminated requirement for

program managers to ensure long-term access to technical data and 

required them to develop performance-based logistics strategies.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 35 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

14

What is the status of DOD’s plans to revise acquisition 

policy in response to the previous GAO recommendation 

on technical data?

DOD has been slow in responding to our recommendation to revise its technical 

data acquisition policy. 

• In August 2004, GAO compared the practices of DOD with those of the private 

sector for acquiring new systems. We found that the private sector typically

acquires the technical data for new systems, while DOD program managers

often do not acquire the technical data, opting instead to buy larger quantities 

or greater system capability with available funding. 

• GAO recommended that DOD consider requiring program offices to develop 

strategies providing for future delivery of technical data to allow selection of 

alternate sources or offering work for competition.

• DOD concurred, stating it would update its DOD 5000 regulations to include 

this requirement. This change was to be accomplished by the Defense 

Acquisition Policy Working Group (DAPWG).

• DOD has been delayed in updating its 5000 regulations due to other 

DAPWG priorities (i.e., the Quadrennial Defense Review). DOD recently 

reaffirmed its intent to implement our recommendation when DAPWG

returns to updating the 5000 regulations in May 2006.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 36 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

15

What are the costs for obtaining access in order to view, 

modify, or distribute technical data relating to the 

sustainment of procured systems?

There is limited visibility into technical data funding; available operation and 

maintenance budget figures for fielded systems indicate limited cost growth. 

Most changes that we analyzed for FY06 were due to a shift from 

procurement to sustainment funding as systems are fielded.

($ in millions) FY04 FY05 FY06

Army $11.9 $19.1 $33.8

NAVAIR** 10.3 14.0 11.7

NAVSEA * * *

Air Force 63.1 57.7 62.4

Total $85.2 $90.8 $107.9

Budget Requirements for Technical Data

* data not available

** Amounts for FY04 and FY05 are actuals

Source: Service operations and maintenance budget data.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 37 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

16

What are the costs for obtaining access in order to view, 

modify, or distribute technical data relating to the 

sustainment of procured systems? (cont.)

• Tech data budget requirements are often embedded in larger budget accounts. 

For example, the Army’s sustainment systems tech support (SSTS) program 

supports various engineering sustainment requirements, including tech data. 

The Army reported a $116 million increase in its fiscal year 2006 SSTS budget.

• Based on an analysis of the SSTS account by Army officials, only about $15 

million of increase is due to increased technical data requirements, which 

resulted primarily from cessation of Abrams Tank and Bradley Fighting 

Vehicle upgrade programs.

• Remaining $101 million of the increase is due to programs not involving

technical data requirements, such as obsolescence management of 

replacement parts and digitization of maintenance technical manuals.

• Even within individual contracts, technical data costs may not be apparent. 

According to service contracting officials, some weapon systems support

contracts do not separately price technical data. Examples are the Air Force’s 

C-130J and F117.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 38 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

17

What are the costs for obtaining access in order to view, 

modify, or distribute technical data relating to the 

sustainment of procured systems? (cont.)

Top five fiscal year 2006 technical data cost drivers account for approximately 

60 percent of the Army’s $33.8 million requirement. 

($ in million)

Army system FY04 FY05 FY06

Abrams Tank 1.37 $ 2.75 $ 6.76 $

Bradley Fighting Vehicle 0.74 0.80 6.13

Tow and Patriot Missiles 2.45 2.41 2.67

Hellfire Missile - - 2.48

M270 and M270A Launcher - 0.91 2.13

Source: Army operation and maintenance budget data.

Top 5 Technical Data Cost Drivers in FY06 for Army Systems

Total requirements
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 39 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

18

What are the costs for obtaining access in order to view, 

modify, or distribute technical data relating to the 

sustainment of procured systems? (cont.)

Top five fiscal year 2006 technical data cost drivers account for approximately 

67 percent of NAVAIR’s $11.7 million requirement.

($ in million)

NAVAIR system FY04* FY05* FY06**

AV-8 1.45 $ 2.48 $ 2.39 $

F-18 A/D 0.79 2.09 2.22

H-1 0.55 1.14 1.56

H-60 0.75 0.83 0.86

P-3 0.43 1.23 0.85

* - Cost data

** - Budget data

Source: Navy operation and maintenance budget and cost data.

Top 5 Technical Data Cost Drivers in FY06 for NAVAIR Systems

Total requirements
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 40 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

19

What are the costs for obtaining access in order to view, 

modify, or distribute technical data relating to the 

sustainment of procured systems? (cont.)

Top five fiscal year 2006 technical data cost drivers account for approximately 

46 percent of the Air Force’s $62.4 million requirement.

($ in million)

Air Force system FY04 FY05 FY06

F-16 9.77 8.50 8.81

F-15 5.10 5.27 5.53

C-130 5.50 5.03 4.80

Combat Rescue and Recovery Aircraft 2.15 2.15 5.10

B-1b 5.61 4.47 4.63

Source: Air Force operation and maintenance budget data.

Top 5 Technical Data Cost Drivers in FY06 for Air Force Systems

Total requirements
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 41 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

20

How much time is needed to return to vendor for 

technical data, and what impact do delays have on 

repairing or modifying fielded systems? 

Although information on technical data issues affecting field maintenance is 

limited, our review showed maintenance units in Southwest Asia did not 

experience systemic problems in obtaining tech data. Army readiness data we 

reviewed did not indicate low equipment readiness rates due to maintenance.

• Logistics assistance representatives’ reports indicated instances where 

field maintainers initially lacked technical data (e.g., repair manuals), but 

these cases were infrequent and subsequently resolved. Some new 

equipment items that were rapidly fielded into service lacked 

accompanying technical data.

• Readiness rates for equipment in Southwest Asia theaters of operations 

have not fallen below acceptable levels, except in four minor instances, 

according to recent Army data.
Appendix I

GAO’s Preliminary Observations on the 

Department of Defense’s Acquisition of 

Technical Data to Support Weapons Systems

Page 42 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

21

Conclusions

While DOD has issued discretionary guidance that addresses technical data 

rights, current DOD policy does not require program managers to document 

their strategy for ensuring long-term access to tech data. We continue to 

believe that our prior recommendation in GAO-04-715 for DOD to add a 

technical data requirement to its acquisition policy is valid. In the absence of 

such policy, the government may find itself unprepared to support its weapons 

systems over their lifecycle, to include developing repair and maintenance 

procedures, selecting alternate repair sources should existing support fail or 

become too expensive, and procuring spare parts competitively. Further, 

while the services have initiatives under way to address these shortfalls, the 

success of their efforts would be enhanced by clear DOD policy on developing 

tech data requirements.
Page 43 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 44 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

Now on pp. 18-19.

Now on p. 19.
Page 45 GAO-06-839 Technical Data

Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact William M. Solis, (202) 512-5140 or solisw@gao.gov

Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, Thomas Gosling, Assistant 

Director; Larry Junek; Andrew Marek; John Strong; Cheryl Weissman; and 

John Wren were major contributors to this report.

(350828)
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