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24–251PDF 2005

HURRICANE KATRINA: ASSESSING THE PRESENT

ENVIRONMENTAL STATUS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND 

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 29, 2005

Serial No. 109–77

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

Vice Chairman 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, 

Mississippi, Vice Chairman 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho 

SUE MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

Ranking Member 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BUD ALBRIGHT, Staff Director 

DAVID CAVICKE, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel 

REID P.F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio, Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO, California 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho 

SUE MYRICK North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

JOE BARTON, Texas, 

(Ex Officio) 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

Ranking Member 

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

TAMMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, 

(Ex Officio) 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Testimony of: 

Falk, Henry, Director, National Center for Environmental Health and 

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, Department of Health and Human Services ..... 14

Gautreaux, Karen K., Deputy Secretary, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ......................................................................................... 37

Olson, Erik D., Senior Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council ......... 86

Peacock, Hon. Marcus C., Deputy Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency .................................................................................................... 8

Ragone, Stephen E., Director of Science and Technology, accompanied 

by John H. Schnieders, Member, National Ground Water Association ... 79

Rutledge, William, Mayor, City of Pontotoc, on behalf of National Rural 

Water Association ......................................................................................... 73

Verchick, Robert R.M., Gauthier-St. Martin Eminent Scholar, Chair in 

Environmental Law, Loyola University, New Orleans .............................. 105

Woodley, John Paul, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army Civil Works, 

Department of the Army .............................................................................. 22

Wright, Beverly, Executive Director, Xavier University of Louisiana, Deep 

South Center for Environmental Justice .................................................... 95

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Falk, Henry: 

Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor ........................... 196

Written response to questions from Hon. John D. Dingell ........................... 202

Gautreaux, Karen K.: 

Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor ........................... 203

Peacock, Hon. Marcus C.: 

Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor ........................... 210

Written response to questions from Hon. John D. Dingell ........................... 215

Written response to questions from Hon. Tammy Baldwin .......................... 220

Olson, Erik D.: 

Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor ........................... 221

Ragone, Stephen E.: 

Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor ........................... 231

Verchick, Robert R.M.: 

Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor ........................... 235

Woodley, John Paul, Jr.: 

Written response to questions from Hon. Paul E. Gillmor ........................... 239

Written response to questions from Hon. John D. Dingell ........................... 244

(III) 

(1)

HURRICANE KATRINA: ASSESSING THE 

PRESENT ENVIRONMENTAL STATUS 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT

AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:40 p.m., in room 

2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Gillmore 

(chairman) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Gillmor, Hall, Deal, Bass, 

Murphy, Barton (ex officio), Solis, Wynn, Capps, Allen, and Green. 

Staff present: Mark Menezes, chief counsel for energy and environment; Tom Hassenboehler, majority counsel; Nandan 

Kenkeremath, majority counsel; Jerry Couri, policy coordinator; 

Peter Kielty, clerk; and Dick Frandsen, minority senior counsel. 

Mr. GILLMOR. The committee will come to order, and I will recognize myself for the purpose of an opening statement. 

One month ago, Mother Nature forcefully and violently visited 

the Gulf Coast of our country in the form of Hurricane Katrina. 

This storm caused widespread flooding and significant property 

and infrastructure damage in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. 

In the process, the storm caused public health and environmental 

problems for the residents that live and work in that region. 

Katrina may well have been the largest single environmental disaster that our country has ever faced. We would like to learn the 

extent of the environmental damage, how long it will take to restore that environment, and even to what extent it is possible to 

do so. We are still close in time to the disaster, and at this stage, 

I do not expect that it will be possible to have complete answers 

to those questions. 

And also, as I made it clear when I called this hearing, I did not 

want to pull anyone out of the field who is participating in the 

cleanup or actively involved in these efforts, but as people began 

to wade back into the Gulf Coast to recover from this catastrophe, 

several reports have variously characterized the state of the environment in the areas damaged by Hurricane Katrina, and hopefully, this hearing can help to distinguish between the rumors and 

the facts concerning the status and the safety of the water and soil 

along the Gulf Coast, and what is being done currently to address 

the situation by public and private sources. 

In the past, our subcommittee has explored issues that have general importance to environmental protection. The matters that we 

2

examine today, I think, are clearly the most significant and urgent 

since our committee, in the wake of September 11, helped establish 

Federal anti-terrorism provisions for drinking water utilities in 

Title IV of the Public Health, Security, and Bio-Terrorism Preparedness and Response Act. That work, which became law 3 years 

ago, was bipartisan, and I believe that should serve to instruct all 

of us that Hurricane Katrina, like the terrorists piloting those 

planes, did not sort out their victims by political party. 

We are concerned about one thing, getting help to the people impacted by the storm, and this hearing isn’t a forum for pointing fingers. I don’t think it matters to the thousands of people who no 

longer call New Orleans or Bay St. Louis their home where blame 

lies. Now, I recognize a total understanding of what has happened 

in these communities, and all the needs to be met to remedy the 

environmental problems will take more time, and that is going to 

require significant future oversight. 

I want to thank our witnesses, who have taken time to be with 

us today. Each of your expert testimony is valuable to us in understanding the situation as it is now, not as how it may have been 

portrayed. And I especially want to thank our witnesses from Louisiana and Mississippi, who have made themselves available, 

whether in person or via the teleconference arrangement we have, 

to give firsthand accounts, and put a face on the real problems of 

people that are facing in this area. You not only have our thanks, 

but also, our best wishes, as you return to your work in reconstructing a vital part of our Nation. 

That concludes my opening statement, and I would like to yield 

5 minutes to the gentlelady from California, Ms. Solis, for the purpose of an opening statement. 

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you, and good afternoon. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, Chairman Gillmor, for holding this very important 

hearing today on the environmental impact of Hurricane Katrina. 

I also want to thank the panelists that are here, and all the witnesses that will be speaking. I know this is an item that all of us 

are deeply, deeply concerned about. We know that Hurricane 

Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters faced by our country. 

The Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael 

Chertoff recently commented: ‘‘We are going to have to clean probably the greatest environmental mess we have ever seen in this 

country.’’ It left in its wake a range of serious environmental problems, including flooded and contaminated drinking water and multiple oil spills, leaking underground storage tanks, flooded sewage 

treatment plants, flooded buildings, debris and contaminated sediment, and other sludge. 

Hurricane Katrina impacted, as we know, more than 1,000 

drinking water systems, and 172 sewage treatment plants, and at 

least 2.4 million people were without access to safe drinking water. 

Initial testing by EPA found elevated levels of E. coli bacteria and 

lead levels that exceeded public health standards. Based on the biological and the chemical water testing data, EPA and CDC recommended that the public and emergency responders avoid contact 

with the floodwaters and the sediment deposited by the flood. 

3

In all, though, Hurricane Katrina affected all populations, the 

hardest hit area was in low income and underrepresented communities. More than 100,000 in New Orleans, mostly poor blacks and 

Latino residents, were without cars and were stranded. Together 

with the elderly, disabled, and infirm, they were unable to evacuate 

themselves. They were the ones who lived in the greatest proximity 

to the major industrial facilities and toxic waste sites, who suffered 

most from the injustices of society’s failure to consider the cumulative impacts of living and working conditions prior to Hurricane 

Katrina. These vulnerable communities are suffering tremendously 

in the wake of this natural disaster. Hurricane Katrina left hundreds of thousands of people without their livelihood and their 

homes, and in many cases, their dignity. 

I am concerned about the rush to waive health provisions, safety, 

environmental, and social protections. This would undercut longstanding health and environmental standards in the name of hurricane recovery. The city’s poor and other cities that were affected 

will pay the price if we weaken those cleanup rules. Cleanup and 

rebuilding efforts must ensure that the burden of exposure to toxic 

releases does not fall solely on minority and underrepresented communities. 

All environmental justice and public health regulations should be 

met during testing, monitoring, cleanup, recovery, and reconstruction. Federal public health and environmental statutes provide 

many opportunities to address environmental risks and hazards in 

these communities. The crisis of this hurricane and other such disasters should not be used to weaken, waive, or roll back current 

Federal public health and environmental protections. Weakening, 

waiving, or rolling back Federal public health and environmental 

protections would further threaten the heavily damaged area of the 

Gulf Coast, negatively impacting the public health of those already 

affected communities. 

The public has a right to know about the cleanup and the rebuilding effort and should be informed and involved in the decisions on cleanup, recovery, and building. Hurricane Katrina should 

be an opportunity for us here in the Congress to begin the process 

of writing the wrongs of environmental justice, not an opportunity 

to guarantee another generation that will live under these current 

circumstances. 

Today, I hope we learn more about the ongoing cleanup, and the 

damage assessments, and about how long-term effects to protect 

the health of all our communities needs to be taken care of. We 

have an opportunity to rebuild these communities and the economy 

in the Gulf region, and as a model of the integrated, diverse, and 

sustainable society that all Americans deserve. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and I personally 

want to just share briefly that in Los Angeles, we also had some 

victims come visit us that are staying there. We hope that they will 

get the attention that they need, and be able to come back to their 

particular neighborhoods, but many were concerned about cleanup, 

and what will happen to the waste, to their homes that were destroyed, and to their livelihoods. 

4

So I hope that each of you, the panelists, will be able to help us 

to discern that information. Thank you very much, and I yield 

back. 

Mr. GILLMOR. The gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. HALL. Chairman Gillmor, thank you. 

I want to come from two areas. First, personally, I want to thank 

each of you who are giving of your time here, not just the time you 

spend in this room with us, but the time you spent leading up to 

this, the time you spent preparing, the time you will spend returning to where you go, because we rely on you, folks like you, to give 

us testimony. You know more about it than we do, and from your 

information and your knowledge and your skill, we glean information with which we write the rules of the road up here, so you are 

very valuable to us, your time is valuable, and that is my opening 

statement. 

Now, it is likely that the chairman of the Committee on Energy 

and Commerce, Chairman Joe Barton, may not make this. He several others going underway right now, and he was here until 12:45 

last night on the Energy Bill. So if he comes, it will just be special, 

but he has asked me to go ahead and give you his statement. 

So thank you, Chairman Gillmor, for holding this very important 

hearing to assess the present environmental damage and current 

situation in the Gulf South. Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita 

have devastated the lives of residents in Louisiana, Mississippi, 

Texas, Alabama, and Florida, and destroyed parts of our environment on an unprecedented scale. 

Our hearts go out to all the citizens of these areas whose lives 

have been forever changed by this horrific tragedy. We are here 

today to try and put politics aside, and get a real world glimpse at 

the current state of our environment in these devastated regions. 

While I realize many of the cleanup efforts are just beginning in 

New Orleans and in southwest Louisiana and Texas from Hurricane Rita, one thing should be clear. The health and safety of all 

the citizens of these areas who were displaced and devastated, 

should have the necessary assistance from the Federal Government 

to return to their normal lives. 

As I have said before, I plan on using all the authority I have 

as chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee to 

help in any way I can. Having said that, our greatest assets are 

people. Immediately following Hurricane Katrina, EPA sent teams 

and equipment down to the area to assess the environmental impact of the storm. Important as their job was to investigate water 

and air contamination. Many of EPA’s personnel and equipment 

were used to rescue the lives of hundreds of people from certain 

death. And I want to recognize their courage and self-sacrifice to 

go beyond their normal duties, to save our citizens in time of extreme danger. Our environment is important, but not as important 

as the lives of those that live within our environment. 

I look forward to hearing testimony from all the witnesses today, 

including EPA, the Corps of Engineers, and the Agency for Toxic 

Substances and Disease Registry, and would like to especially recognize Mayor Rutledge from Pontotoc, Mississippi, and Karen 

Gautreaux, Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, joining us by teleconference, who represent 

5

areas of the country that have been completely devastated by these 

storms. 

Once again, our hearts go out to you and to your citizens in this 

very difficult time. With that, I yield back on behalf of Chairman 

Barton, his time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you, Mr. Hall, and let me also ask unanimous consent that all members’ statements, after the conclusion of 

opening statements, be entered into the record. 

Gentleman, the other gentleman from Texas. Were you next? The 

gentlelady from California, I apologize. Texans are always trying to 

be first. 

Ms. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and——

Mr. GREEN. We are also gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, so——

Ms. CAPPS. I should say, Mr. Green is an ultimate gentleman. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, and I thank 

the panel of witnesses, both panels, actually. 

It is essential that this committee devote whatever time is needed to review what has happened when Hurricane Katrina and Rita, 

hit the Gulf Coast. The timing of this hearing, however, is unfortunate; in fact, one could say alarming. It would have been appropriate to hold this hearing before yesterday’s markup of new energy legislation in the Energy Subcommittee, which under the 

guise, I would say, of the need to streamline and weaken environmental, health, and safety regulations, to get energy production 

back online as quickly as possible—I say under the guise of, because it has never been demonstrated that these regulations have 

interfered with energy production and distribution—but that markup has already occurred with decisions made to relax standards, 

standards in an area that is clearly impacted by toxic waste spills, 

all kinds of hazardous materials, that are now strewn throughout 

the environment in the region that the hurricane impacted. And 

another committee has already produced legislation, the Resources 

Committee, that will be presented to the floor in the next several 

days, that does the same thing. So we see, once again, that the 

Federal Government’s response to this whole situation has been inconsistent at best; nevertheless, here we are today, and this information that will be shared by our witnesses is critically important 

to all of us as we make decisions. 

People’s lives are at stake. In this process of responding to the 

hurricane, the Coast Guard did an admirable job. The response of 

FEMA was pathetic and has cost lives. We don’t want to cost any 

more lives. The jury is still out on how we will assess EPA’s overall 

response to this tragedy, and it is ongoing. As we look back at what 

has happened, we cannot take our eyes off the present and ongoing 

response. Specifically, we need to take a close look at the environmental health risks left behind, to ensure that more people are not 

harmed. 

As a public health nurse, I believe that it is important to remember that environmental protection measures are an important component of basic public health and safety. From the date Katrina 

passed over the Gulf, report after report from residents and the 

media has described oil spills and fires, leaks from plants and storage tanks, the toxic water and chemicals, raw sewage and sludge 

are a major cause for concern. Yet we are only receiving vague and 

6

piecemeal information about what threats to the public actually 

exist, what actions are being taken and should be taken to protect 

the public, and what measures people in the area should take to 

safeguard themselves. 

EPA has acknowledged that there is great uncertainty over toxic 

hazards that remain in the flooded parts of New Orleans, yet people are reentering the area. Their initial testing found out elevated 

bacteria and lead levels, as well as some amounts of long-banned 

pesticides in the water. Yet EPA’s ‘‘response to Katrina’’ webpage 

offers far too little information to ease any uncertainty citizens 

might have. For example, an EPA press release acknowledged the 

presence of fuel oils in soil deposits left behind from the floodwaters, but EPA has not released data, detailed data about which 

chemicals have been found in the soil. Many fuel oils and other petroleum byproducts are known carcinogens and can breach certain 

protective gear, yet to my knowledge, EPA has given no warning 

of potential cancer risks of exposure. 

Over the next several months, EPA, the Coast Guard, CDC, and 

State and local officials will be working to clean up this mess. 

Throughout the process, we must guarantee that workers and evacuees have the right to know about what they are encountering, 

about the toxics found in the air and the soil and the water. We 

must ensure that all cleanups are completed to the highest possible 

health standard. How tragic it would be, after one disaster, to have 

an additional disaster to be uncovered years from now, as incidence 

of cancer and other horrible situations arise when preventable 

measures are a part of our knowledgebase. The public deserves the 

best that a government has as it relies on information in the first 

line of protection in such a crisis. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. GILLMOR. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman from 

New Hampshire. 

Mr. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for scheduling this hearing, and we obviously all extend our sympathies to 

the victims of both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, and I 

know that it is difficult right now for you guys to be here. You have 

got a lot to do, and we appreciate the fact that you have taken time 

to appear here today. 

However, I do think it is essential for us, as soon as possible in 

this committee, to assess the possible public health and long-term 

environmental threats to the Gulf Region. As you all know, the 

hurricane, both of them, stretched over 90,000 square miles. A lot 

of infrastructure has been destroyed, drinking water and waste 

treatment facilities are in peril, and there is evidence of, obviously, 

release of chemicals, oil spills, hazardous materials, and to the air 

and soil in the area. 

I am hopeful, and in fact, I believe it is imperative, that we have 

a coordinated plan of recovery to deal with, I guess there are over 

575 Katrina-related spills of petroleum and hazardous chemicals. 

There are 24 Superfund sites within the affected areas, and of 

course, there are hundreds of thousands of wells and water systems 

and waste treatment plants and so forth that have been compromised. And I hope there is a plan in place to properly remove 

and treat these areas, given the fact that we have citizens moving 

7

back into these areas, and we really may not be 100-percent sure 

how safe it is for them to be there. 

So it is a very timely hearing. I thank you all for being here 

today. I know it is a sacrifice to do so, but we need to know this 

information. I yield back. 

Mr. GILLMOR. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from 

Texas. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to have my 

full statement placed into the record, and just say——

Mr. GILLMOR. Without objection. 

Mr. GREEN. Having a district in east Harris County in the city 

of Houston, and seeing what damage we had just from Hurricane 

Rita, our hearts go out again to the folks in Mississippi and Louisiana, and also southeast Texas or southwest Louisiana. 

The environmental concern we have for the New Orleans area, 

and I know that is the focus of our hearing, but I will just give an 

example in our own community. Baytown, Texas, in the east part 

of Harris County, is part of our district, lost their power supply for 

their water system, and so, we were concerned that they would not 

have enough water for not only the residences, but all the industry 

that is also in and served by the Baytown community. On very 

short notice, things were done, and they were able to restore the 

power, actually having a different electricity provider serve across 

the boundary lines, as we do in Texas, because we have our different providers, to make sure, so not only do we have water for 

our residences, but we had water for our industry, who are trying 

to get the refineries back up, Exxon Mobil has a huge, the largest 

refinery in the country in our district, and they needed water to 

produce that gas, that we know we need it for our cars and also 

aviation fuel. 

But again, I am glad you are holding this hearing, so hopefully, 

we can learn what we didn’t do, and there but for the grace of God, 

we won’t have that problem in east Harris County, where we also 

have some of the same industries that are along the Mississippi 

River, but also in Southwest Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you. We will now go to the gentleman from 

Georgia, to whom I apologize for having skipped over earlier. 

Mr. DEAL. That is all right, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for recognizing me. 

I just simply wanted to say thank you to the witnesses, who have 

taken time to be here. I think all of us recognize that no community is going to be environmentally perfect at any point in time. I 

am sure the area we are talking about here was not environmentally perfect before this disaster, and certainly is not now, and 

all of us want to simply know what is the best we can do to correct 

the situation as soon as possible, and how can we best put our resources to work? 

I would be remiss if I did not express appreciation to all of you, 

and to those who work with you, for the efforts you have made in 

these very serious and drastic times that have just preceded this 

hearing. Thank you for being here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

8

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you. I want to once again welcome our witnesses, and tell you how much, we very much appreciate you being 

here, and giving us your knowledge and expertise. 

We will go first to Marcus Peacock, who is the Deputy Administrator of EPA. 

STATEMENTS OF HON. MARCUS C. PEACOCK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; HENRY 

FALK, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 

HEALTH AND AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 

PREVENTION; AND JOHN PAUL WOODLEY, JR., ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY CIVIL WORKS, DEPARTMENT OF 

THE ARMY 

Mr. PEACOCK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. There we 

are. And good afternoon to you, and to members of the subcommittee. 

On September 6, 2005, I was appointed as the lead coordinator 

at EPA for response activities related to Hurricane Katrina, and I 

appreciate the opportunity to provide for today with an update of 

EPA’s response. Mr. Chairman, I request, if it is all right, that my 

full statement be included in the record. 

Our hearts go out to the people of the Gulf region, and we share 

with you a sense of duty and obligation to restore the communities 

affected by Hurricane Katrina, and most recently, Hurricane Rita. 

The response will require sustained long-term coordination across 

all Federal agencies with the affected State governments. My testimony today will provide you with a brief description of EPA’s immediate response to Katrina, and I will then tick off our primary 

environmental concerns at this point in time, including such issues 

as debris management, the status of drinking water facilities, 

wastewater facilities, and the like. 

Just let me, first of all, talk about EPA’s early response to Hurricane Katrina. We pre-deployed personnel to the National Response 

Coordination Center, and sent on-scene coordinators to Florida, 

Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi before Hurricane Katrina 

made landfall. After the hurricane hit, EPA joined other organizations in urgent rescue needs, putting over 60 watercraft—these 

were EPA watercraft that are otherwise used for environmental 

monitoring to work as search-and-rescue vessels. But as soon as 

possible after that, EPA turned its attention to its primary responsibilities under the National Response Plan. These include providing guidance for debris issues, assisting with the restoration of 

drinking water and wastewater infrastructure, addressing hazardous releases and oil spills, and providing environmental monitoring and assessment support. 

Just let me tick off the particular environmental concerns we are 

dealing with today, and the first is debris. We are working very 

closely with the Corps of Engineers to provide guidance on disposing of debris that may contain, for instance, PCBs or asbestos, 

and we will continue to provide site-specific technical assistance in 

the disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous wastes. 

Let us next talk about drinking water. Many drinking water systems were affected in the three States. The map showing the sysVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
9

tems is up there. All those dots are drinking water systems that 

were in the swath of Hurricane Katrina. As of yesterday, the states 

were reporting that approximately 80 percent of the drinking water 

systems in the region are operational. Those are all mostly the 

green dots. I know that may sound pretty good, but we believe that 

an estimated 2.3 million people served by facilities before the hurricane are not currently being served by operational drinking water 

facilities. 

Let us talk about wastewater. We have here similar map on 

wastewater—these are wastewater facilities in the declared disaster area. Based on what we know, as of yesterday, approximately 

90 percent of wastewater facilities in the affected area are operational. Once again, while that sounds good, we think there is an 

estimated population of 1.8 million people that were being served 

by these facilities before the hurricane that currently are not being 

served by operating wastewater facilities. They are red dots on the 

map, which includes, for instance, New Orleans. And getting 100 

percent of these dots, if you will, green, is a very high priority. 

Let me talk about oil and chemical spills. EPA and the United 

States Coast Guard are working together to address what, so far, 

are about 400 oil and hazardous waste material releases that have 

been reported to the National Response Center or otherwise observed by emergency responders. Now, I know this subcommittee 

in particular is interested in Superfund sites, so let me address 

those. There are 24 Superfund sites, as shown on the chart here, 

or NPL sites, located in the region affected by the hurricane. We 

are working together with State health and environmental agencies, and I just want to say here, the relationship between EPA and 

the State agencies, including LDEQ, has just been spectacular. We 

are really working side by side, literally side by side. And both 

EPA and the states have conducted rudimentary inspections—well, 

we conducted rudimentary inspections of all these sites as soon as 

they were accessible. Now, we recognize this was only a first look 

at the sites, and we are in the process of assessing each one of 

these in greater detail. Initial visual inspections and the additional 

inspections we have been able to do to date indicate a number of 

downed fences and some damage to groundwater treatment piping. 

Thus far, no sites have been identified as suffering significant damage, however, monitoring and assessment are not over by any 

means. 

Let us talk about floodwaters. In the aftermath of Katrina, contamination of floodwaters was one of our leading concerns, and of 

particular concern to rescue workers and residents who might have 

still been in the area. The results to date, as indicated before, show 

that floodwater has high levels of E. coli and other bacteria. These 

are markers that you might find in raw sewage. W ealso have 

found some contaminants which exceeded drinking water assessment standards. Fortunately, other than the bacterial elements we 

found, the contaminants detected thus far have not been at levels 

that would pose an immediate risk to human health. They could 

pose a long-term risk, but the main issue here is, of course, the 

bacterial contaminants, which could cause an infection. 

Let me talk about sediments. As the floodwaters of New Orleans 

have begun to recede, we are analyzing the sediment. This map 

10

shows all the sediment sites we have sampled thus far. Preliminary 

results from sediment sampling collected by both EPA and once 

again, Louisiana, indicate that some sediments are heavily contaminated with fuel oil, and once again, with bacteria, which is not 

a surprise, since we found it in the floodwaters. Human health 

risks may therefore exist from contact with sediment deposited 

from receding floodwaters. 

Let me just touch briefly on air monitoring. We have been doing 

air monitoring. It will be of increasing importance to continue to 

do that. This slide shows a number of the tools we are using, including aircraft, as well as mobile monitors on the ground and stationary monitors. As people start coming back into the area, particularly rescue workers, we will continue to monitor for contaminants, as well as possible dangers from particulates. 

Looking ahead, much remains to be done to help address the 

public and health impacts of Hurricane Katrina, and some of you 

may know I am fairly new to EPA, although on some days, it 

doesn’t feel that way to me. But the dedication with which EPA 

employees have responded to this crisis makes me very proud to be 

counted among them. As Senator Jeffords recently noted after 

hearing what EPA personnel had done in response to Katrina, he 

said: ‘‘We have heard so much about what went wrong in Katrina’s 

aftermath. This is one example of what went right. These EPA employees have my utmost respect and gratitude.’’ 

Thank you very much for letting me appear today. 

[The prepared statement of Marcus C. Peacock follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARCUS C. PEACOCK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Sub-Committee. My name is 

Marcus Peacock and I serve as the Deputy Administrator at the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA). On September 6th, the Administrator formally appointed 

me to lead the coordination of the Agency’s response activities for Hurricane Katrina 

and I appreciate the opportunity to provide you today with an update on EPA’s response. 

Our hearts go out to the people of the Gulf region, and we share with you an urgent sense of duty to help restore the communities affected by Hurricane Katrina—

and most recently by Hurricane Rita. Over the past few weeks, natural disasters 

have left their mark on the Gulf region; the loss of life and destruction is staggering. 

The magnitude of Hurricane Katrina will require sustained, long-term coordination 

across all federal agencies and with the affected state and local governments. My 

testimony today will provide you with an overview of EPA’s role and activities in 

the affected Gulf region, our impressive coordination with federal, state and local 

partners and a snapshot of our primary environmental concerns. Early Response for 

Hurricane Katrina 

First, I want to briefly touch on EPA’s early response to Hurricane Katrina. Beginning on August 25th, EPA pre-deployed personnel to the FEMA National Response Coordination Center and sent On-Scene Coordinators to the Florida, Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi Emergency Operations Centers before Hurricane 

Katrina made landfall. The On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) is the federal official responsible for monitoring or directing responses to all oil spills and hazardous substance releases reported to the federal government. We sent additional personnel to 

the affected areas as soon as travel into the region was possible. In anticipation of 

Hurricane Rita, EPA also dSeptember 20th. he number of EPA staff and contractors 

assisting with recovery efforts is more than 500 in the affected Gulf region, as indicated on the deployment map. 

When EPA personnel arrived in New Orleans, it was clear that saving lives was 

the first priority, and EPA joined other federal, state, and local responders in urgent 

rescue needs, putting over sixty EPA watercraft otherwise used for environmental 

11

monitoring to work as search and rescue vessels. Our field staff and contractors—

mostly environmental experts equipped to address oil and hazardous substances releases—joined the fire fighters, police, and other first responders and rescued nearly 

800 people in Louisiana. 

EPA ROLE IN FEDERAL RESPONSE

After helping with urgent rescue needs, EPA turned its attention to its primary 

responsibilities under FEMA’s National Response Plan. EPA is the lead federal 

agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #10, which addresses oil and hazardous materials, and works with other agencies to provide support for a number 

of other Emergency Support Functions, including ESF #3, which addresses Public 

Works and Engineering. Specifically, our responsibilities include preventing, minimizing, or mitigating threats to public health, welfare, or the environment caused 

by the actual or potential releases of hazardous materials; testing the quality of 

flood waters, sediments, and air; and assisting with the restoration of the drinking 

and waste water infrastructure. Also under ESF #3, the Agency anticipates a growing role working with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to address final 

disposition of the large volumes of debris from homes, buildings and other structures damaged by Hurricane Katrina. EPA, in coordination with the States, is providing information to both workers and the public about test results, as well as assisting communities with debris disposal and hazardous waste issues. 

DEBRIS MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL

The volume of debris left behind by Hurricane Katrina is huge. EPA is working 

closely with other federal agencies (particularly the US Army Corps of Engineers), 

state agencies, and local governments to facilitate the collection, segregation, and 

management of household hazardous waste, containers, and the larger debris. 

To date, we have provided guidance on: identifying electrical equipment that may 

contain PCBs; marking and storage of electrical equipment that may contain PCBs; 

disposal of electrical equipment that may contain PCBs; and handling and disposal 

of debris containing asbestos. EPA has also provided the affected states with guidance on burning debris. EPA personnel continue to provide site-specific technical assistance in the disposal of hazardous waste and a wide array of waste management 

debris left behind by the storm. 

DRINKING WATER AND WASTE WATER INFRASTRUCTURE

EPA is working closely with state and local officials and private experts to assess 

damage and provide technical assistance to water infrastructure systems in the 

FEMA designated areas. Two maps are included which indicate the current status 

of these facilities. EPA’s mobile laboratories and regional labs in Mississippi and 

Louisiana are also available to provide on-going water testing capabilities. 

Many drinking water systems were affected in the three states. According to local 

officials, many were disabled or impaired by the loss of electrical power but the majority of systems are now operating, some with ‘‘boil water’’ notices. Nonetheless, 

there are still some systems that remain inoperable or in unknown condition. As 

of September 27th, the states reported that approximately 80% of the drinking 

water systems in the region were operational. Prior to the hurricane, we believe 

that an estimated population of 2.3 million people were served by facilities that are 

not currently operational. Additionally, because there are many private well owners 

in the affected region, EPA has begun to distribute water testing kits in affected 

parishes in Louisiana. EPA has issued a local advisory to let home owners know 

that these kits are available. 

Many wastewater facilities were affected, mostly in Louisiana and Mississippi. 

Based on what we know as of September 27th, approximately 90% of these facilities 

in the affected area are operational. While the information on wastewater treatment 

plants is not as readily available as for drinking water facilities, we believe that an 

estimated population of 1.8 million people were served by facilities that are not currently operational. 

Getting 100% of these facilities operational is a high priority. EPA plans to maintain a strong partnership with health and environmental agencies in Louisiana, 

Mississippi and Alabama as we move forward. 

OIL SPILLS AND HAZARDOUS RELEASES

There are hundreds of chemical and petrochemical facilities as well as other sites 

of potential concern which are being inventoried and assessed. EPA and the United 

States Coast Guard (USCG) are working together to address oil and hazardous maVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
12

terial releases reported to the National Response Center or otherwise observed by 

our emergency responders. As of September 21st, EPA and the USCG have responded to over 400 reported incidents. Of these, there were five major oil spills in 

the New Orleans area resulting in releases of over 8 million gallons. These spills 

are also being addressed by EPA and the USCG. 

SUPERFUND SITES

There are twenty-four Superfund sites located in the region affected by Hurricane 

Katrina. As indicated on the map of the Federally declared disaster areas as of September 26th, there are fifteen National Priority List (NPL) sites in Louisiana, three 

in Mississippi, and six in Alabama. Working together with state health and environmental agencies, EPA conducted initial visual inspections of each NPL site as soon 

as they were accessible. Recognizing this was only a ‘‘first look’’ at these sites, we 

are assessing the condition of all of the affected NPL sites in greater depth as recovery continues. The initial visual inspections indicated a number of downed fences 

and damage to some groundwater treatment piping, however, to date, no sites have 

been identified as having suffered significant damage. 

SEDIMENT IN NEW ORLEANS

As flood waters in New Orleans again recede, we are analyzing the sediment left 

behind. We are conducting biological and chemical testing, specifically for volatile 

organic compounds, semi-volatile organic compounds, total metals, pesticides, and 

total petroleum hydrocarbons. Preliminary results from sediment sampling collected 

by EPA and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) indicate 

that some sediments are contaminated with bacteria and fuel oils. Human health 

risks may therefore exist from unprotected contact with sediment deposited from receding flood waters and exposure to sediment should therefore be avoided if possible. E. coli was detected in sediment samples, which implies the presence of fecal 

contamination. Some of the semi-volatile organic compounds, common to diesel and 

fuel oils, were also detected at very elevated levels. The levels of metals detected 

thus far have been below levels that would be expected to produce immediate adverse health effects. Extensive sediment sampling continues in the flooded areas of 

New Orleans. 

FLOOD WATER

In the immediate aftermath of Katrina, the potential contamination of flood waters was among our leading concerns. EPA’s initial plans to collect water samples 

in the New Orleans flood zone were set aside to assist in rescue operations, and 

were further delayed by limited access due to security concerns. Nonetheless, EPA, 

in close coordination with the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, 

began water sampling on September 3rd, and we continue to conduct biological and 

chemical testing of the flood waters. Planned and actual sampling sites to date are 

reflected on the map which shows the extent of the flood waters in New Orleans 

as of August 30th. 

The flood waters continue to be analyzed for over 100 chemical priority pollutants 

as well as for bacteria. Results to date indicate that the flood water has high levels 

of E. coli, and that some locations tested had lead and arsenic levels which exceeded 

drinking water assessment levels. Although other contaminants were detected, none 

have been at levels that would pose an immediate risk to human health. Throughout this process, EPA has taken great steps to ensure scientific accuracy. EPA solicited the assistance the Science Advisory Board to review the flood water sampling 

plan, and EPA and CDC have routinely conducted a thorough data review, and interpreted the data for potential human health affects. 

WATER QUALITY

EPA is working closely with its federal and state partners to mitigate environmental impacts to Lake Pontchartrain caused by the flood waters. As the Corps continues un-watering operations, skimming booms are deployed to remove oil and debris from water prior to pumping. After pumping, additional booms are being deployed in the canals leading to the Lake to further reduce oil, debris, and solids. 

Aerators are also being used in the canals to raise dissolved oxygen levels in the 

water, prior to outfall to the Mississippi River. 

Contaminated flood waters and sediment may adversely impact coastal aquatic resources. As such, EPA and USACE are actively evaluating options for directing the 

floodwaters. In addition, EPA is coordinating water quality monitoring efforts with 

USGS, NOAA and our state partners in the Mississippi Sound and the Gulf of MexVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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ico. The poster behind me reflects the coordinated post-Hurricane plans to monitor 

water quality in the Gulf of Mexico. 

AIR MONITORING

Air monitoring networks normally in place for monitoring particulate matter, 

ozone, sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, and carbon monoxide under the Clean Air 

Act were mostly destroyed in New Orleans and damaged and disrupted in coastal 

Mississippi. EPA is working to restore monitoring systems in those regions, as well 

as to deploy new monitors designed specifically to address potential air quality impacts during the recovery from Hurricane Katrina. For instance, as sediments from 

the floodwaters dry, EPA has conducted air screening sampling with special monitors to assess potential inhalation risks from particulates. 

Specific to New Orleans, EPA, in coordination with our government partners in 

Louisiana, makes daily tactical decisions regarding air monitoring needs and works 

with an agency-wide team of air monitoring professionals to address both emerging 

and source or location specific issues as well as longer term regional air quality 

issues. 

EPA has a number of tools to measure air quality. These include DataRam 400, 

personal air monitoring devices, as well as use of a remote sensing aircraft known 

as ASPECT to locate chemical spills that needed emergency response to protect both 

water and air quality. EPA’s environmental surveillance aircraft were in operation 

since the early days of the emergency, and the effort has now transitioned into deployment of specific ground based preliminary screening over the larger New Orleans area. We anticipate that ASPECT may also be used in the areas affected by 

Hurricane Rita. 

EPA’s real-time mobile laboratory—the Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer 

(TAGA)—is sampling air quality in the New Orleans area. Initial screening results 

from the TAGA represent the beginning of extensive sampling efforts. As this is a 

dynamic situation, general conclusions should not be made regarding air safety 

based on results from snapshots of data. 

EPA and the affected states will continue to monitor for potential inhalation risks 

and have plans to enhance their temporary monitoring networks in the coming 

weeks to monitor and evaluate the air impacts of recovery activities including the 

burning of debris. 

REOCCUPATION OF NEW ORLEANS

EPA and CDC formed a joint task force to advise local and state officials of the 

potential health and environmental risks associated with returning to the City of 

New Orleans. Their report, titled Environmental Health Needs and Habitability Assessment, was issued on September 17th and identifies a number of challenges and 

critical issues for consideration prior to the reoccupation of New Orleans. The task 

force is now incorporated into the Federal New Orleans Reoccupation Zip Code Assessment Group (Zip Code Assessment Group), which will provide information on a 

broad range of issues, ranging from infrastructure to health issues. Their recommendations will assist State and Local officials in their decisions regarding when 

to allow residents to reoccupy the city. As part of this larger group, EPA will continue to work to identify potential health and environmental risks associated with 

returning to the city based on the Agency’s ongoing efforts to assess the quality of 

the air, water and sediment. 

FUEL WAIVERS

EPA, in conjunction with the Department of Energy, responded quickly to address 

disruptions to the fuel supply that have occurred due to the damage to refinery and 

pipeline infrastructure in the Gulf Region. To increase the supply of fuel and minimize potential supply disruptions, the Agency has issued emergency waivers of certain federal and state fuel standards. On August 30th, EPA granted waivers applying to low sulfur diesel fuel requirements, Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) standards 

that control the volatility of gasoline during the summer months, state gasoline sulfur limits, or reformulated gas (RFG) requirements. On September 21st, EPA expanded this effort in order to minimize potential fuel supply disruptions caused by 

Hurricane Rita. To address each fuel supply situation, waivers have been granted 

for various periods of time and have been applicable at the national, state or local 

level, to the extent necessary to alleviate the fuel supply disruption. 

In taking these actions, EPA used a Clean Air Act waiver provision recently 

signed into law as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 signed into law this year. 

This provision authorizes the Administrator of EPA to temporarily waive fuel standards due to ‘‘extreme and unusual’’ circumstances ‘‘that are the result of a natural 

14

disaster, an Act of God, pipeline or refinery equipment failure, or another event that 

could not reasonably have been foreseen or prevented and not the lack of prudent 

planning’’ on the part of fuel suppliers. 

INFORMING THE PUBLIC

We view communication to the public, workers, and other agencies to be a critical 

component of our response effort. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) was on-scene early in the response effort, distributing over 3,500 fact 

sheets by hand in the first two weeks and conducting interventions that removed 

more than 850 workers from serious or life threatening hazards. OSHA continues 

these activities and on a daily basis, EPA response personnel and contractors receive health and safety instructions regarding field conditions and safe work practices. EPA’s preliminary sampling results are also provided to On-Scene Coordinators to facilitate field decisions and ensure health and safety of workers. 

EPA posts advisories on our website and also distributes them through the Incident Command Post in Baton Rouge. We also have been alerting communities 

through AM and FM radio broadcasts, particularly on aerial mosquito spraying and 

how to avoid vector borne illnesses such as the West Nile Virus. 

FUTURE CHALLENGES

Looking ahead, much remains to be done to help address the public health and 

environmental impacts of Hurricane Katrina. The safe management of debris remains a high immediate priority, and the Agency will assist our federal, state and 

local partners as they move forward on debris removal. For its part, the Agency will 

strive to provide sound and practical advice, participate in hazardous waste removal 

where appropriate, and monitor air quality where open burning is occurring. EPA 

will also continue to work with the USACE and others to support the States and 

local governments in their efforts to repair and restore public facilities including 

drinking water, waste water, and waste treatment facilities. We will also continue 

to monitor air, water, and sediment quality in the region and make sure that this 

information is readily available to federal, state and local officials, other responders, 

and the public. 

CONCLUSION

The nation faces an enormous task in restoring and rebuilding the affected areas. 

Simply meeting many basic needs of people in the region—including shelter, safe 

drinking water, sanitation, and protection from disease and hazards—will require 

a broad partnership across government agencies, the private sector and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). We expect that citizens and government agencies will 

look to EPA and our Federal partners for technical expertise, scientifically sound 

data, and practical advice on environmental and public health conditions in the region for some time to come. We are focused on meeting that challenge. 

Finally, as local communities undertake the task of reviving their economies and 

helping businesses restart their operations, EPA, in partnership with other federal, 

state, and local agencies, will provide technical expertise and guidance to assist in 

the recovery. Some of you may know that I’m quite new to the EPA, but what I’ve 

seen in the past few weeks makes me proud to be counted among them. I’d like to 

end by reiterating a statement made by Senator Jim Jeffords after our briefing of 

the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee: ‘‘We’ve heard so much about 

what went wrong in Katrina’s aftermath, and this is one example of what went 

right. These EPA employees have my utmost respect and gratitude.’’ 

At this time I welcome any questions you may have.

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you very much. We will go to Dr. Henry 

Falk, who is the Director of the National Center for Environmental 

Health and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Dr. 

Falk. 

STATEMENT OF HENRY FALK 

Mr. FALK. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, 

and Congresswoman Solis, and members of the subcommittee. My 

name is Dr. Henry Falk, and I am the Director of the Coordinating 

Center for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention at the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Agency for Toxic SubVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
15

stances and Disease Registry, ATSDR. ATSDR is a sister agency to 

the CDC, and is part of the Department of Health and Human 

Services. Because of our responsibilities under the Superfund program, we work very closely with EPA, as well as State and local 

governments, and with communities across the country. 

Hurricane Katrina is a huge public health emergency. It is an 

unparalleled challenge to the public health community and particularly to those of us in environmental health as we grapple with so 

many complex and interwoven environmental health issues. In 

New Orleans, the environmental health system needed to support 

a major metropolitan area was severely disrupted. This has also 

been true for many other cities and communities in the storm’s 

path. In addition, a substantial proportion of residential structures, 

the homes for so many people in New Orleans and elsewhere, have 

sustained severe structural damage from flooding. On a personal 

level, we all keep in mind the heart-wrenching nature of this tragedy and its broad impact. 

Shortly after Hurricane Katrina hit, Health and Human Services 

Secretary Michael Leavitt and EPA Administrator Steve Johnson 

asked me to go to New Orleans, Louisiana, to lead a CDC/ATSDR 

and EPA taskforce to identify the overarching environmental 

health and infrastructure issues facing New Orleans. My first actual view of New Orleans was in a flyover by helicopter. It was essentially an empty city still very much underwater, and with great 

evidence of storm damage. For many of us at ATSDR, CDC, HHS, 

and elsewhere, these scenes have served as an overwhelming stimulus to respond to the best of our abilities. 

The 13 environmental health issues we initially identified include drinking water, wastewater, solid waste and debris, sediments, soil contamination, toxic chemicals, power and natural gas, 

housing, the unwatering and flood waters, occupational safety and 

health, vector rodent animal control, road conditions, underground 

storage tanks such as gasoline, and food safety. 

The most striking feature of this disaster is the vast array of key 

environmental needs and infrastructure services that have been affected. These are complex and interrelated, and they will need to 

be assessed by local elected officials when making decisions about 

re-inhabiting New Orleans. 

ATSDR staff have been valiant and dedicated in their efforts, 

and worked tirelessly to assist the people affected by Hurricane 

Katrina. At least 15 percent of our staff have been deployed directly to Hurricane Katrina activities through the CDC Emergency 

Operations Center or through HHS and the U.S. Public Health 

Service auspices. Probably an equivalent number have been backing them up at headquarters in Atlanta, and those numbers continue to grow. 

ATSDR staff works closely with EPA. We have staff stationed in 

EPA regional offices, and we are assisting EPA in the field and 

around the clock to mitigate environmental health issues, including 

possible chemical exposures. CDC/ATSDR staff in the field and at 

HHS and CDC headquarters are collaborating with Federal, state, 

and local health officials to evaluate and analyze the environmental data. 

16

ATSDR is also actively participating on the Environmental Impacts and Clean-Up Working Group, as part of a White House 

taskforce on Hurricane Katrina. That working group is co-chaired 

by the Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Services, and by my 

colleague to the right, Marcus Peacock, Deputy Administrator of 

the EPA. The working group is particularly focused on policy, has 

served as an important locus for interagency discussions. ATSDR 

is particularly engaged with the group, providing technical input by 

neighborhood and zip code, on environmental issues related to the 

return of residents to New Orleans. 

In the future, ATSDR will continue to provide technical assistance on issues related to potential exposure of the public and of response workers to hazardous substances. We will continue to provide toxicological expertise, and make recommendations about 

ways to eliminate or control exposures to hazardous substances in 

the environment. We will continue to work closely with Federal, 

state, and local partners in working through these difficult issues, 

and as the recovery progresses, we hope to effectively serve the 

needs of the many people and communities affected by the hurricanes. 

Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Henry Falk follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRY FALK, DIRECTOR, COORDINATING CENTER FOR EN- VIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND INJURY PREVENTION, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL

AND PREVENTION/AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. My name is Dr. 

Henry Falk and I am the Director of the Coordinating Center for Environmental 

Health and Injury Prevention at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

(CDC)/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). ATSDR is an 

independent agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 

and a sister agency to the CDC. Its relationship with the CDC’s National Center 

for Environmental Health (NCEH) is especially strong, because the Director of 

ATSDR, Dr. Howard Frumkin, also directs NCEH. ATSDR also partners extensively 

with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 

This afternoon I will describe ATSDR’s ongoing contribution to the Hurricane 

Katrina response, based on its unique expertise and experience in responding to 

emergency releases of hazardous substances under Superfund. 

ATSDR was established under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), to assess and prevent or limit potential exposures to hazardous substances and associated adverse health effects. 

Each year ATSDR conducts assessments of potential exposures to hazardous substances, and potential associated health impacts, at hundreds of sites around the 

Country. 

Frequently these assessments are conducted in connection with an emergency response, where ATSDR is called on to support response work in communities impacted by acute releases of toxic chemicals. Through 25 years of experience in emergency response under Superfund the Agency has developed a workforce with experience and expertise that is directly applicable to assessing potential exposures and 

human health threats from exposure to contaminated floodwater, soil and sediment 

in the wake of a natural disaster. 

The wealth of skills in our multidisciplinary workforce—from physicians to toxicologists to epidemiologists to environmental engineers to health education specialists and risk communicators—coupled with the location of ATSDR field staff in EPA 

regional offices around the country, allow ATSDR to mobilize quickly and coordinate 

effectively with HHS and CDC and other agencies within the Department, and with 

EPA and other government agencies, in a strategic response to emergency situations. ATSDR staff in the EPA regional offices work collaboratively with EPA and 

17

state partners to prepare for and respond to chemical and other public health emergencies. 

ATSDR performs emergency response activities under the National Response 

Plan. ATSDR collaborates extensively with other federal partners as part of the 

Emergency Support Functions (ESF) dedicated to public health and medical services 

as well as oil and hazardous materials responses. These correspond to ESF 8 and 

10, respectively. 

ATSDR RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA

Working in close coordination with HHS and CDC, as well as with EPA, ATSDR 

is providing critical expertise, resources and assistance to the multi-level public 

health response to Hurricane Katrina. The discussion below describes three primary 

components of ATSDR’s ongoing contribution to the response: (1) Participation in 

task forces and work groups established by the Administration to assess environmental health needs and related policy issues; (2) Playing an integral role in the 

CDC Emergency Operations Center, and deploying staff to emergency operations 

centers in HHS, FEMA and EPA; and (3) Working in the field to assess the potential for exposure to hazardous substances that may adversely impact human health. 

(1) Environmental Health Needs & Habitability Assessment Joint Task Force of 

CDC/ATSDR and EPA, and the Environmental Impacts and Cleanups Working 

Group of the White House Hurricane Katrina Task Force 

One unique contribution by CDC/ATSDR to the Hurricane Katrina response was 

leading a joint CDC/ATSDR and EPA task force that developed an initial assessment report identifying the overarching environmental health and infrastructure 

issues related to reinhabiting New Orleans. 

At the request of Secretary Michael Leavitt of HHS and Administrator Steve 

Johnson of EPA, CDC/ATSDR and EPA established the joint taskforce to conduct 

the assessment. I had the privilege of serving as Chair of that joint taskforce, which 

was made of a multidisciplinary and multiagency team with expertise in environmental health science, environmental engineering, medicine, health and risk communication, and administration/logistics. The initial eight-member team consisted of 

personnel from CDC/ATSDR and EPA. 

The team began its work on September 6, 2005, and completed it on September 

12, 2005. Our work was guided by six key questions:

1. What are the core environmental health issues to be addressed? 

2. Which agencies and organizations at the federal, state, or local level are responsible for, or involved in, the various environmental health issues? 

3. What progress has been made and what challenges exist? 

4. What is the timetable to address these environmental health issues? 

5. What resources exist or need to be brought to bear to address these environmental health issues? 

6. What are the key milestones and endpoints that define success? 

Initially we made contacts with CDC leadership on the ground in New Orleans, 

and with other key federal, state and local public health and environment leadership. In addition, we completed air and surface level tours of New Orleans to see 

firsthand the impact of Hurricane Katrina. In conducting the assessment, CDC/

ATSDR and EPA collaborated extensively with a diverse group of federal, state and 

local officials with expertise in public health and the environment, including the 

New Orleans City Public Health Department, the Louisiana Department of Health 

and Hospitals, and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. 

The taskforce identified 13 environmental health and public health infrastructure 

issues to address. This initial assessment includes drinking water, wastewater, solid 

waste/debris, sediments/soil contamination (toxic chemicals), power, natural gas, 

housing, removal of flood water, occupational safety and health/public security, vector/rodent/animal control, road conditions, underground storage tanks (e.g., gasoline), and food safety. The report also identifies a number of barriers to overcome 

and critical decisions to make prior to reinhabiting New Orleans. The mayor and 

city officials who will make these decisions will be able to draw on the expertise 

of the participants in the Joint Task Force and other partners. Dr. Howard 

Frumkin, the new Director of ATSDR, was recently deployed to Louisiana to continue the Agency’s work. 

ATSDR also is participating actively in the Working Group on Environmental Impacts and Cleanup, which is part of the White House Task Force on Hurricane 

Katrina. The Deputy Secretary of HHS and the Deputy Administrator of EPA cochair this working group. I have served as co-chair of the New Orleans Subcommittee of this group, and other ATSDR and CDC staff are members of the 

18

Guidelines, Sampling, and Communications Subcommittees. The Working Group is 

particularly focused on policy issues related to Environmental Impacts and Cleanup, 

and has served as an important locus for inter-Agency discussions. The Environmental Health Needs & Habitability Assessment Joint Taskforce that I headed in 

Baton Rouge has now been consolidated within the New Orleans Zip Code Assessment Group; this interagency group is providing technical input by neighborhood or 

zip code on environmental issues related to the return of residents to New Orleans. 

(2) Emergency Operations Center 

ATSDR leadership and staff serve as incident managers; provide GIS mapping 

and services, tools we regularly use to identify areas of potential or actual chemical 

exposure; and subject matter expertise for public health and risk communication. 

For example, Dr. Tom Sinks, Acting Deputy Director of ATSDR, served as CDC’s 

public health lead in the CDC Emergency Operations Center in Atlanta during the 

initial phases of the hurricane response. Captain Scott Deitchman, USPHS, M.D., 

ATSDR’s Associate Director for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response, 

has taken over in this capacity in the on-going CDC/ATSDR response. 

As of September 23, 2005, at least 55 ATSDR staff have been deployed to Hurricane Katrina response activities in the CDC Emergency Operations Center or into 

field operations including the FEMA Regional Resource Command Centers and the 

HHS Secretary’s Emergency Response Team. As an HHS agency, ATSDR has deployed many Commissioned Officers through the Office of Force Readiness and Deployment/Commissioned Corps Readiness Force. 

Also, currently ATSDR regional representatives are located within the EPA Headquarters Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Washington, D.C., EPA Region IV 

EOC in Gulfport, Mississippi, EPA Region IV EOC in Atlanta, Georgia, Region VI 

Joint Field Office (JFO), Baton Rouge, Louisiana and in the EPA Region VI EOC, 

Dallas, Texas. 

In addition, a significant number of staff at ATSDR headquarters in Atlanta have 

been supporting a variety of Hurricane Katrina response activities and back up 

those deployed into the field. 

(3) Deployments to the field to assess potential for exposure to hazardous substances 

with adverse health impacts 

A significant number of CDC/ATSDR staff members have been deployed into the 

field or serve as subject matter experts in the areas of toxicology, sanitation, food 

and water safety, vector control issues pertaining to aerial spraying of pesticides for 

mosquito abatement, evacuation center operations, emergency response, epidemiology, environmental engineering and public health infrastructure, community relations, public affairs, and health education. 

In addition, ATSDR regional representatives in Mississippi and Louisiana are in 

the field with the EPA on scene coordinators investigating chemical spills and providing technical assistance as needed to resolve questions about the potential for exposure to hazardous chemicals, and to assist the CDC senior management official. 

ATSDR has been working with EPA to assess the condition of Superfund sites and 

other industrial sites in the affected areas, and will continue to participate in more 

detailed assessments in the future. 

In the Joint Field Office in Baton Rouge, ATSDR staff is providing support to 

EPA field deployed staff, serving on the debris removal and health and safety committees formed by FEMA, and assisting the environmental unit of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. In Texas, ATSDR regional representatives are 

coordinating with EPA at the Dallas EOC on sampling and chemical release issues. 

ATSDR also is working closely with CDC and the New Orleans Public Health Department to re-establish basic public health services to the residents of New Orleans 

at temporary facilities. 

ATSDR will remain in close contact with federal, state, and local partners to ensure that the public health expertise of this Agency most effectively serves the needs 

of the people and the communities in the affected areas. ATSDR will continue to 

provide technical assistance on issues related to potential exposure to hazardous 

substances by the public and response workers. We anticipate this need will continue for at least several months. Additionally, ATSDR will continue to address 

issues related to the assessment of potential health effects resulting from exposure 

to hazardous substances in the environment. 

Amidst the hurricane response work, ATSDR continues to focus resources on priority Superfund activities. ATSDR is continuing to pursue these activities, but recognizes that there may be some delays as a result of on-going deployments and hurricane-related support. ATSDR is taking steps to minimize disruption to other parts 

of its program. 

19

Thank you for the opportunity to talk to you today about ATSDR’s participation 

in the response to Hurricane Katrina. 

At this time, I welcome your questions. 

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/hurricanes/katrina/pdf/envassessment.pdf 

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH NEEDS AND HABITABILITY ASSESSMENT

Joint Taskforce, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention & U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency, September 17, 2005

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Hurricane Katrina made landfall on Monday, August 29, 2005, as a category 4 

hurricane and passed within 10 to 15 miles of New Orleans, Louisiana. The storm 

brought heavy winds and rain to the city, and the damage breached several levees 

protecting New Orleans from the water of Lake Pontchartrain. The levee breaches 

flooded up to 80% of the city with water reaching a depth of 25 feet in some places. 

Among the wide-scale impacts of Hurricane Katrina, the storm caused significant 

loss of life and disrupted power, natural gas, water, and sewage treatment, road 

safety, and other essential services to the city. 

Early in the disaster response and recovery, federal, state, and local elected officials and public health and environmental leaders recognized the significant role of 

environmental health in the post-hurricane rebuilding of New Orleans. 

At the request of the Secretary Michael Leavitt of the Department of Health and 

Human Services (DHHS) and Administrator Steve Johnson of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC), Dr. Julie Louise Gerberding, created the Environmental Health 

Needs Assessment and Habitability Taskforce (EH-NAHT). The taskforce was 

charged with identifying the overarching environmental health issues faced by New 

Orleans to reinhabit the city. 

The EH-NAHT collaborated extensively with a diverse group of federal, state, and 

local partners, including the New Orleans City Public Health Department, the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (LADHH), and Louisiana Department 

of Environmental Quality (LDEQ), Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). 

The team was guided by the following questions:

1. What are the core or fundamental environmental health issues to be addressed; 

2. Which agencies and organizations at the federal, state, or local level are responsible for, or involved in, the various environmental health issues; 

3. What progress has been made and what challenges exist; 

4. What is the timetable to address these environmental health issues; 

5. What resources exist or need to be brought to bear to address these environmental health issues; andWhat are the key milestones and endpoints that define success. 

The team identified 13 environmental health issues and supporting infrastructure 

to address. This initial assessment included drinking water, wastewater, solid 

waste/debris, sediments/soil contamination (toxic chemicals), power, natural gas, 

housing, unwatering/flood water, occupational safety and health/public security, vector/rodent/animal control, road conditions, underground storage tanks (e.g., gasoline), and food safety. 

After the initial assessment, the EH-NAHT categorized these issues by increasing 

time and complexity to full restoration of services (Level 4, most complex and requiring the most time to restoration). Part of the complexity relates to how specific 

and explicit the criteria for the end points are for each function. 

Level 1

• Unwatering 

• Power 

• Natural Gas 

• Vector/Rodent/Animal Control 

• Underground storage tanks (e.g., gasoline) 

• Food Safety 

Level 2 

• Drinking Water 

• Wastewater 

• Road Conditions 

20

Level 3

• Solid Waste/Debris • Sediments/Soil Contamination (Toxic Chemicals) 

Level 4

• Housing 

Occupational safety and health as well as public security was identified as crosscutting all the other areas. 

Long-term solutions to these many issues are critical to allow resumption of normal life in New Orleans and to prevent reoccurrence of such an event in this area. 

The EH-NAHT has the following conclusions based upon our initial assessment: • A complex array of environmental health problems exists in New Orleans. The most striking feature of the disaster is the array of key environmental 

health and infrastructure factors affected all at once. All key environmental 

health and related services are being reestablished, and this work needs to be 

done in a very coordinated and well-planned way. • The unwatering of New Orleans is a critical first step. 

The unwatering is an essential first step to allow access for assessment and 

repair of all basic services and habitability barriers. Some significant assessments are not yet started because of the continued unwatering, which could 

take an additional 4 weeks to complete. These assessments may impact the timing, resources and scope of the needed repairs/replacements. • It is important to bring infrastructure systems in New Orleans back on 

line. 

Different timeframes are necessary to bring the various infrastructure systems (e.g., drinking water, wastewater, power, and natural gas) on line with 

varying degrees of capabilities. Restoring drinking water systems and wastewater treatment systems needs a planned approach, but full restoration will be 

delayed by the many breaks in the distribution and collection systems and by 

the need for upgrade and repairs in older systems. Unanticipated delays must 

be kept in mind in the process of unwatering and the scope and complexity of 

the interdependent systems. • The cleanup of debris (including housing debris) and potentially contaminated soil/sediment in New Orleans are rate-limiting factors. 

The timeline for debris treatment, disposal, containment, and transport, as 

well as for the testing of potentially contaminated soils/sediment, will slow or 

accelerate the rate at which the city can be reinhabited. The potential contamination of soils/sediments has great uncertainty attached to it. A comprehensive 

sampling and testing of a broad array of toxic chemicals will be required to 

identify any widespread contamination or selected hot spots and to ensure the 

safety of returning inhabitants or for redevelopment. 

• Intense interest will exist to reinhabit New Orleans. 

Significant pressure will occur to allow rehabitation. A single decision will not 

be made to reinhabit the whole city at one time. Rehabitation is expected to be 

done neighborhood by neighborhood IF it is possible to prevent access to the 

closed areas of the city. Worker safety and health as well as public safety and 

security are mandatory enablers for all of the activities. 

• It is critical to address the housing issues in New Orleans. 

Housing is likely the most critical issue in reinhabiting the city because of 

the 

• Large percentage of city housing that was flooded and is not likely to be viable; 

• Intense personal connection an individual has to their home; 

• Legal, jurisdictional, and procedural issues involved in the decision-making 

process; 

• Large proportion of the city population that is displaced. Some residents are 

a significant distance away from New Orleans or may not intend to return; 

• Difficulty in establishing and maintaining communications with the widely 

dispersed population; 

• Challenge of identifying acceptable methods and resources for assessing such 

a large number of homes; and the 

• Scope of the demolition process and safe and efficient removal of debris. 

• An immediate need exists to allow temporary or transient entry of 

recoveryworkers, residents, and business owners. 

In the immediate period, explicit guidelines are being developed for safe entry 

of recovery workers to New Orleans, for brief entry by residential and business 

owners to retrieve key household or business items in neighborhoods of the city 

21

where it is safe to do so, and for reinhabiting the least impacted areas of the 

city where key environmental health and infrastructure conditions are met. • Ensuring worker safety and health and public safety and security are essential. 

Public security and intensive efforts to achieve worker safety and health for 

the very large recovery workforce, working often in extraordinarily difficult and 

challenging conditions, is essential to rebuilding New Orleans. • The criteria for short-term and long-term return to New Orleans should 

be tailored to the timeframe and population. 

Different criteria will be necessary for the short-term and long-term return 

to the city e.g., use of bottled water in the absence of potable water will be acceptable for recovery workers and select others on a limited short-term basis 

versus the general population, which includes children and the elderly over the 

long-term). 

The EH-NAHT has the following recommendations based on our initial assessment:

• It is important to involve state, local, and other stakeholders in decisionmaking. 

All the issues in reinhabiting New Orleans are interwoven, complex, and cannot be addressed individually. It is extremely important that decisions are made 

involving state, local, and federal staff as well as all other stakeholders, particularly the local population. • Developing a shared vision for the rebuilding (including infrastructure) 

is critical. 

Because of the magnitude of the devastation, it is critical that decisions be 

guided by a clear, shared vision by all stakeholders of what the rebuilt New Orleans should be. As devastating as this event is, the vision of the future of the 

city is critical in guiding development for such a widely impacted area. • Federal, state, and local decision-makers should explore processes used 

by other areas in devastating circumstances. 

New Orleans should draw upon the experiences of other localities that addressed devastating events—areas such as New York (World Trade Center), 

Florida (repeated hurricanes), and San Francisco (earthquake). Their experiences and solutions might serve as examples to New Orleans on processes that 

can be used for creating a broad vision for redevelopment, for identifying key 

decisions and strategies, and for involving all stakeholders (including the displaced population) in the broad-impact, critical decisions that will have to be 

made. • Maintaining collaboration with involved agencies is essential. 

Maintain, through FEMA and other mechanisms, broad collaboration and a 

true sense of partnership in developing a very coordinated and sustained effort 

to recovery. • Attending to the housing decisions is critical. 

A number of critical decisions need to be made about housing. These decisions 

include 

• Developing explicit guidelines for entry by recovery workers, for brief periods 

of entry by residents and business owners to retrieve essential belongings, 

and for reinhabiting relatively undamaged neighborhoods of the city. • Creating a neighborhood-by-neighborhood approach for assessing housing, 

cleanup/demolition, and reinhabiting/rebuilding. • Selecting method(s) for assessing large amounts of damaged housing, with 

rapid methods necessary for severely damaged housing. • Resolving legal, administrative, and procedural issues. • Fostering and maintaining ongoing contact with the large displaced population—particularly for any actions that might require owner authorization. • It is necessary to maintain a systems-level perspective. 

Monitoring the progress in all key areas of environmental health and infrastructure is important because reinhabiting New Orleans depends on success in 

all areas. This initial assessment identified 13 key areas that need to be 

tracked. • Resolving potential toxic chemical exposures is important. 

It is important to resolve the questions about the potential for toxic chemical 

exposure as quickly as possible. This issue has the widest degree of uncertainty. 

• Officials should ensure public safety and security and worker health and 

safety. 

Maintain a central focus on public safety and recovery worker health and 

safety throughout the rebuilding of New Orleans. 

• Engage and communicate with the displaced population. 

22

Develop a mechanism to regularly and substantively engage and communicate with the displaced population to provide a progress update on city-wide 

activities as well as activities related to neighborhoods and individual homes. 

This work could involve the use of GIS, the Internet, and other innovative strategies. 

• Maintain a broad vision on issues affecting the rehabitation of the city. 

This initial assessment from the EH-NAHT focused on the immediate issues 

related to reinhabiting the city—primarily those issues that affect essential systems for safe living. As these immediate issues are dealt with, it will be important to focus on issues related to quality of life and social well-being and how 

they are integrated into a redevelopment plan. 

• Create a long-term habitability strategy. 

The long-term solution to the risk of flooding and the viability of New Orleans 

depend on fully protective levee and unwatering systems for the population returning to and reinhabiting the city. It is extremely important to address the 

long-term protection of the city from another such event of this magnitude. 

Federal, state, and local agencies and relief organizations are responding heroically to the disaster. All organizations, including the agencies represented on this 

task force, should be doing their utmost to assist in recovery and rebuilding. 

These conclusions and recommendations are current at the time of writing. Because the situation is dynamic and changing daily, updates on various topics will 

be given periodically by various organizations.

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you, Dr. Falk, and next witness is the Honorable John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army 

Civil Works. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN PAUL WOODLEY, JR. 

Mr. WOODLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I have a brief 

oral statement, and ask that my written statement be included in 

the record. 

Mr. GILLMOR. It will be so included. 

Mr. WOODLEY. Today, I am here to provide a brief background 

update to the subcommittee on the environmental management 

techniques the Army Corps of Engineers is using during the ongoing unwatering, debris removal, and cleanup missions in the greater New Orleans area. 

Working with the city of New Orleans Water and Sewer Board, 

private contractors, and even some foreign governments, Mr. Chairman, the Corps continues to make steady progress on pumping out 

floodwaters from the city of New Orleans. The current estimate is 

that the city is more than 80 percent unwatered, but the overall 

unwatering estimated to be finished in early to mid-October, with 

a number of parishes actually completed by tomorrow. 

As the water drains to its final amounts, there may be more concentrated levels of contaminants that will require special attention 

and handling. The Corps is coordinating with EPA and State agencies regarding this possibility. An interagency technical group identified recommendations for preventive and remedial mitigation 

management actions during unwatering. The Corps has deployed 

booms at appropriate intake points, and I have a photograph of the 

boom deployed on the 17th Street Canal for the committee. The orange boom is the boom that is intended to collect the debris. The 

white and somewhat discolored boom is actually an absorbent boom 

that will absorb floating contaminants, and skim floating contaminants from the water. We have also deployed artificial aeration devices in the major channels. This is a photograph of that at the 

London Avenue Canal. This is intended to aerate the water, and 

23

provide treatment for low levels of dissolved oxygen and also provide the treatment benefits that aeration will provide. 

After suspending pumping operations during Hurricane Rita, the 

Corps resumed the aeration operations, and is coordinating with 

the U.S. Coast Guard to deploy additional booms, skimmers, and 

suction at pumping stations where oil has been observed. Based on 

input from EPA, as Deputy Secretary Peacock indicated, the Corps 

is also addressing bacteria, suspended solid, and petroleum in the 

storm water runoff. 

In support of FEMA, the states, and communities, the Corps is 

also conducting an extensive debris removal effort in the areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina. There is a very strong communication among Federal, state, and local agencies associated with this 

mission. The Corps also participates in a multi-agency working 

group established by the EPA to coordinate innovative debris management issues for recycling and reuse. 

With respect to household hazardous waste, the Corps and the 

EPA are assisting, collecting, and disposing of this material. Again, 

the Corps is working closely with State and Federal regulators on 

matters dealing with all types of debris, including contaminated debris. As public rights of way are cleared, and segregation of materials at curbside and staging areas gets in full swing, recycling will 

increasingly become a key component of debris strategy. Light 

goods, automobiles, marine vessels, and clean, woody debris should 

be common targets for recycling. Recycling can be effective in reducing the volume of debris, and reducing the impact on landfills. 

The Corps is implementing preventive management actions during pumping to minimize additional ecological impact during the 

balance of the unwatering effort, and also, is implementing remedial management actions into the receiving waters to continue to 

minimize ecological impacts of the floodwater discharge. And we 

will continue to work with EPA, State and local authorities to plan 

and manage potentially contaminated residuals following the first 

flush of the region following the rainfall. The current promising 

outlook for environment and health, human safety and health, 

would not be possible without the combined efforts of EPA, other 

Federal, state, and county agencies, as well as the Corps of Engineers. 

And Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for you, and to the subcommittee for the opportunity of appearing today. 

[The prepared statement of John Paul Woodley, Jr. follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN PAUL WOODLEY, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE

ARMY CIVIL WORKS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am John Paul 

Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works). I am honored to be testifying before your subcommittee today, on the environmental aspects of the United 

States Army Corps of Engineers’ recovery activities related to Hurricane Katrina. 

My testimony today will provide a brief background and update the Subcommittee 

on the environmental management techniques the Corps of Engineers is using during the on-going unwatering and debris removal and cleanup missions in the greater 

New Orleans area. These efforts are a collaborative effort of the Corps of Engineers, 

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, the Sewage and Water Boards, Louisiana Department of Health 

24

and Hospitals and contractors to ensure impacts upon human and environmental 

well-being are minimized to the greatest extent possible. 

BACKGROUND

The Corps of Engineers is doing everything it can to get the water out of New 

Orleans as quickly as possible, in an environmentally acceptable manner. Everyone 

is concerned about the quality of water being moved from New Orleans to Lake 

Pontchartrain, but the first priority is health and safety of residents of New Orleans 

and all responders as water is drained from the city. The Corps is working with the 

EPA, including its on-scene coordinator, and state agencies to ensure human health 

and safety. EPA is continually monitoring and testing the water. Corps of Engineers 

personnel in New Orleans and Baton Rouge are co-located with the EPA and the 

Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, and other state agencies since 

shortly after Katrina to facilitate close interaction and coordination. The headquarters and forward field offices of the Corps and EPA are fully engaged in this 

collaborative effort. 

STATUS OF UNWATERING MISSION

Working with the city of New Orleans Water and Sewage Board, private contractors and even some foreign governments (Dutch and German dewatering teams), the 

Corps of Engineers continues to make steady progress on pumping out floodwaters 

from the city of New Orleans and immediate vicinity into Lake Pontchartrain. The 

current estimate is that the New Orleans area is more than 80 percent unwatered, 

with the overall unwatering effort estimated to be completed in early to mid-October, with a number of parishes completed by September 30th. As the water drains 

to its final amounts, there may be more concentrated levels of contaminants that 

will require special attention and handling. The Corps is coordinating with EPA and 

state agencies regarding this possibility. The unwatering effort will remove most, 

but not all the water. The remaining isolated pockets of water should not hamper 

recovery efforts such as debris removal, structural assessments and restoration of 

critical services. 

PREVENTATIVE AND REMEDIAL MANAGEMENT ACTIONS

An interagency technical sub-group (water quality/ecosystem restoration management experts) collaboratively identified an array of recommendations for preventative and remedial mitigation management actions during unwatering for both inside 

and outside the levees. Inside the levees the Corps has deployed sorbent booms with 

sorbent skirts at appropriate intake points. There is a special management strategy 

for appropriate containment and treatment of HOT-SPOT areas identified by personnel on the ground as the water lowers. Though most of the City is dry, the Corps 

still is treating water in the three main canals, Orleans, London and 17th Street. 

The Corps has deployed artificial aeration devices in major channels to reduce biological oxygen demand (BOD) and support healthy dissolved oxygen concentrations 

in the water column. Two aerators in each of the three main channels draining to 

Lake Pontchartrain were strategically placed and operating successfully prior to 

Hurricane Rita and 20 more aerators are being placed in these and other strategic 

locations, even in the outfall areas of Lake Pontchartrain. More aerators also are 

being planned—about an additional 20, or total of 40. After a suspension of pumping 

operations during Hurricane Rita the Corps has resumed the aeration operations, 

and are coordinating with the U.S. Coast Guard to deploy booms, skimmers, and 

suction at pumping stations where oil was observed. Based on input from EPA, the 

Corps is doing its best to address bacteria, suspended solids, and petroleum in storm 

water runoff. Options include more booms, silt screens, aerators, and possibly adding some mobile treatment plants. EPA and the Corps are formulating approaches 

to manage known and suspected areas of hazardous materials production and storage, and areas with contaminant sequestration materials such as flocculation, disinfection, and sorption. The Corps is working with EPA who is developing a comprehensive non-point source control program to manage the first flush of rainfall 

from contaminated residuals as well as developing and executing program to clean 

streets, canals, storm drains of contaminated residuals to minimize their flushing 

from receiving waters during rainfall events. This approach is being formulated collaboratively between the Corps and EPA to be coordinated with State and Local governments and water boards. 

In addition to the floodwaters, the EPA and State of Louisiana are sampling and 

monitoring the sediments left behind from the New Orleans floodwaters for possible 

contaminants and infectious agents. Appropriate sampling and analysis are critical 

to effective evaluation and characterization to assure proper handling and disposal. 

25

The Corps and its contractors are working closely with the EPA and the state of 

Louisiana to assure that this is achieved in a safe manner. 

WATER QUALITY RESULTS

EPA emergency response personnel are working in partnership with FEMA and 

state and local agencies and the Corps to help assess the test results and evaluate 

health and environmental conditions related to water quality from Hurricane 

Katrina. In emergency situations such as this, EPA serves as the lead Agency for 

water quality including the cleanup of hazardous materials such as oil and gasoline. 

EPA national and regional Emergency Operations Centers are currently activated 

24 hours a day. The Corps has employees embedded with the EPA/LDEQ team in 

Baton Rouge and onsite teams locally in New Orleans for rapid and effective communication regarding water quality issues. 

More than 190 water quality data parameters are constantly being updated, reviewed and validated through an EPA quality assurance process to ensure scientific 

accuracy. Fuel oils, as they are encountered, are being skimmed by floating booms 

or other pick-up mechanisms as monitored by the Corps, EPA, LDEQ and Coast 

Guard, but contact with fuels and oils absorbed onto sediment is always a possibility. With any of these water quality constituents, it is recommended that contact 

with the area water be avoided, and if contact is made, use soap and water to clean 

areas and remove contaminated clothing. 

The Corps teams in the field and at the Baton Rouge office will continue to follow 

interagency guidance and accepted doctrine and continue working collaboratively 

with the entire suite of human health agencies to respond to health and human 

safety issues. The Corps will follow OSHA/CDC guidance pertaining to human 

health and safety risk associated with New Orleans floodwaters, sediment and related microbial issues and continues to operate in the field under that guidance and 

its internal guidance for emergency work zones. 

DEBRIS MANAGEMENT PLAN

In support of FEMA, the states and localities, the Corps is conducting a comprehensive debris removal effort in the areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina. There 

is very strong interagency communication between the federal agencies, states and 

local agencies both vertically and horizontally. Additionally, the Corps is a participant in a multi-agency working group established by the EPA that meets twice 

weekly to coordinate innovative debris management issues such as recycling and 

reuse. That working group also includes state and private non-profit and for profit 

entities. An output of this coordination is management plans (by state) for hazardous materials and other debris. 

With respect to household hazardous waste, while the collection and disposal of 

this material is an Emergency Support Function (ESF)-10 task, it is being conducted 

by both the Corps and EPA. We expect that most hazardous and toxic waste will 

consist of containers filled with fuel oil and propane tanks, containers of unidentified material, paint, pesticides, spoiled food, freon removal and batteries. The Corps 

is working closely with state and federal regulators on all matters dealing with all 

types of debris including contaminated debris 

As public rights of way are cleared and segregation of materials at curbside and 

at staging areas gets in full swing, the Corps realizes that recycling will increasingly become a key component of the debris strategy. White goods, automobiles, marine vessels, and, in areas not impacted by the Formosan Termite, clean woody debris should be common targets for recycling. Recycling can be effective in reducing 

the volume of debris and reducing the impact on landfills. 

CLOSING

The Corps is implementing preventative management actions during pumping inside the levees to minimize additional ecological impact during the balance of the 

unwatering effort. The Corps also is implementing remedial management actions in 

the receiving waters to continue to minimize the ecological impacts of the discharge 

of flood waters. The Corps of Engineers is seeking a balance between pumping all 

the water out of the city and minimizing ecological impacts during the unwatering 

process. Strategies are being developed by the Corps and EPA to manage the postpump down flushes of potential pollutants and potentially contaminated residuals. 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers appreciates the tremendous cooperation of the 

EPA, Coast Guard, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and other local 

officials and agencies to carry out all of our public works missions under Emergency 

Support Function #3. The current promising outlook for the environment and 

26

human safety and health would not be possible without the combined efforts of all 

that were mentioned. 

This concludes my statement. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you very much, Mr. Woodley. And also, we, 

at this hearing, as we always do, are probably going to run out of 

time for questions. I would appreciate it if you would be willing to 

answer any questions in writing that might be submitted later. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WOODLEY. Delighted. 

Mr. GILLMOR. We have been joined by the chairman of the full 

committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Barton, for questions. 

Chairman BARTON. Thank you, Chairman Gillmor, and I will say 

at the outset that I think this is one of the most important hearings of all the hearings we are going to do on the aftermath of 

Katrina and Rita, because this directly impacts public health, and 

it is not the sexiest hearing, but I think it is one of the most important hearings. 

I want to thank you three gentlemen for being here, and the 

other panelists in the second panel. My first question would be to 

Mr. Peacock and also to Dr. Falk. Given what we know today about 

the status of the contaminants in the water that is in the flood 

areas, or the areas that have been flooded, are there any long-lasting, negative health effects of those areas, once the waters recede? 

Mr. PEACOCK. Well, Dr. Falk, I will let you, perhaps, grab that 

first. 

Mr. FALK. You know, I think there are several factors we have 

to consider. The potential for any long-term effects depends on the 

degree of exposure, and I think it is very important, as we work 

through this process, to assess carefully exactly what the exposures 

are, and how significant they are. 

So first off, there is the issue of the floodwaters, which have contained, as Deputy Administrator Peacock pointed out, bacteria from 

sewage, and it has contained some chemicals, and then, there is 

material in the sediments as that dries out, and I think it is particularly important to think of how long people will be exposed to 

those sediments. Are those readily cleaned up, so that the exposures are short-lived, and in which case, they would not be, you 

know, as significant for the long term? 

But I think also, one has to think of the broad area sampling, 

that there are a lot of neighborhoods in an area such as New Orleans. There are maybe localized exposures from submerged sites, 

and I think it is important to actually fully assess the area, and 

determine whether there are significant exposures on an ongoing 

basis. So I think from what we have seen so far, I don’t think we 

would be able to say that there are definite long-term effects, but 

I think it is important both for us in assessing, and for everybody 

who lives there, to be reassured that that sampling be comprehensive, that it fully look at, particularly in areas where there might 

have been localized exposures, for example, a Superfund site. We 

really have to look at this, I think, in an intelligent fashion, to 

make sure there aren’t ongoing, persistent exposures that affect 

people for the long term. 

Chairman BARTON. Dr. Peacock. 

27

Mr. PEACOCK. Yes, Emily, if you could put up the flood sampling 

map, where the samples have been taken. Dr. Falk touched on the 

important issues. There has been a lot of sampling of the floodwaters done, but the fact of the matter is, in any particular instance, you may have contaminants that may have not been caught 

by the sampling. Also, you can see this is based on a scientific sampling method where we not only try and get a representative sample, but also focus on particular sites where we think there may be 

a problem. But you can see that, by no means, is the entire area 

covered. We may not know the chronic effects for quite some time. 

Chairman BARTON. Okay. Is there anything that we need to do 

at the Federal level, in terms of reestablishing safe drinking water 

supplies, in terms of special funds for new purification plants, or 

anything like that? 

Mr. PEACOCK. Well, right now—and Emily, if you would put the 

drinking water plant map up. I am not sure the chairman was here 

to see that. All those dots represent drinking water plants. The 

green dots are plants we know are operational. These were plants 

in the swath of Hurricane Katrina, but the red dots and the yellow 

dots are plants where we know there is a problem, or where we 

don’t know whether things are right. And in each of those cases, 

there is a team of people, including EPA and State and local officials. I know CDC and the Corps of Engineers send teams of people 

to each of these plants to do assessments, and it is not just the 

plant, but it also includes the distribution system, and it is going 

to be very difficult to figure out what the needs are until those assessments are done. And I think the time period for that is measured more in weeks than it is in days. 

Chairman BARTON. My final question is to Mr. Woodley. I am 

told that back in the early 1960’s, Congress has approved the Corps 

to build a hurricane-barrier project across Lake Pontchartrain, and 

that got held up by some environmental lawsuits. Finally, the 

Corps just gave up on it, but that had been project been completed, 

it has at least been alleged that we wouldn’t have had the flooding 

in New Orleans. Can you comment on that? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Mr. Chairman, there was litigation concerning an 

original 1960’s-era plan, that was advanced by the Corps of Engineers, and there was an injunction issued by the Federal Court in 

New Orleans against elements of that plan, which included a hurricane barrier, or storm surge barrier at the mouth, or the outlets 

of Lake Pontchartrain. Subsequent to that time, for that reason, 

and also, because of very substantial local opposition that existed, 

that element of the plan was rejected, and a new plan formulated 

that called for higher levees along the shore of Lake Pontchartrain. 

Chairman BARTON. But if that plan had been implemented, has 

the Corps or anybody else modeled what would have happened 

with this hurricane? 

Mr. WOODLEY. No, sir. We have not. And——

Chairman BARTON. Is that something you could do? 

Mr. WOODLEY. I believe that that is something that——

Chairman BARTON. If this committee——

Mr. WOODLEY. [continuing] could be done. 

Chairman BARTON. [continuing] directed that it be done. 

28

Mr. WOODLEY. I believe that that is within our capability of modeling the effect of that, the storm that would, that occurred on a 

hypothetical system of that nature. I believe that could be done, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BARTON. My time has expired. I thank the Chairman. 

Mr. GILLMOR. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Falk, first, I would 

like to thank both the CDC and the HHS, because it was amazing 

in Houston when we first received 150,000-plus evacuees from Louisiana, and the effort on the ground from the CDC, and also, from 

the Public Health Service. I just couldn’t tell you how many I met. 

It seemed like it was a couple dozen of folks, both at the quick 

medical facility at the Reliant Arena area, and then, later on, at 

the George R. Brown a couple days later. 

One of my concerns that day was we found out that the folks 

that were being triaged, because again, Houston area had no idea 

who was on the buses, or what illnesses they had, is the vaccinations that we were doing, you know, when people came off those 

buses, any kind of vaccines to protect both the evacuees, but also, 

for the medical personnel that were there trying to treat them. And 

is there a certain list that you know of, or what vaccinations you 

consider most important, both for the evacuees, but also for the 

workers in the shelters and those on the ground, affected even 

those folks who were still, are in the New Orleans area? 

Mr. FALK. Thank you very much, and I know Dr. Gerberding 

spoke to the Health Subcommittee last Thursday, and she has spoken to much of the CDC effort on the public health response, and 

broadly is supporting the shelters, the local medical facilities, and 

the guidelines. 

I think, in particular, the greatest concern, I know for all of us 

who went there, we all had to have, you know, diphtheria, tetanus 

shots, and so Dr. Gerberding, I think, has testified to that, and 

spoke exactly to those recommendations. 

Mr. GREEN. Because I wasn’t here. I actually went home——

Mr. FALK. Yes. 

Mr. GREEN. [continuing] to prepare for Rita. 

Mr. FALK. Yes. 

Mr. GREEN. I know tetanus was the biggest concern, but——

Mr. FALK. Right. That is the main concern, and I think in selected areas, there have been questions about hepatitis, but I think 

it has been particularly in terms of the tetanus. And I could get 

back to you exactly the guidance that they use in all of the shelters. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. I would appreciate it. 

Mr. FALK. We have had, I think, roughly 500-plus people from 

CDC, ATSDR, that have participated in those various efforts across 

the Gulf Coast region. 

Mr. GREEN. I have to admit, I wanted to clone that clinic that 

was put together on a day’s notice at both facilities, and move it 

into our district, because I was impressed at both locally and all 

our hospital systems, and medical schools, and again, the Federal 

effort from the CDC and the Public Health Service. 

Mr. Woodley, I mentioned in my opening statement about our experience with Rita with water plants, and of course, I know in MisVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
29

sissippi and Louisiana, it was much worse, because our problem 

was the electricity to the reservoir, that they couldn’t send the 

water, you know, to Baytown, and ultimately, to the residents and 

the industry. Does the Corps work directly with this critical infrastructure? In fact, I think the Wallisville Reservoir is originally a 

Corps project, and if so, what steps does the Corps go through to 

respond to problems like we saw with this, and again, it is probably magnified so much more in the Louisiana and Mississippi 

area? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Yes, sir. We have the mission under the National 

Response Plan to provide temporary emergency power for critical 

infrastructure. 

Mr. GREEN. Do you have to get anybody’s permission to do that? 

Local, State officials, or even FEMA? 

Mr. WOODLEY. Yes, sir. We produce, or we perform that mission 

under the direction of FEMA and in cooperation with the local 

emergency management agencies and local authorities. 

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we might be able 

to somehow speed that decisionmaking along, because one of our 

problems we found was that the local community, for example, the 

mayor, the city manager had to go to the State, and the State was 

dealing with such a big issue, but somehow, we can short circuit 

that process that you have to go through, so the Corps could actually be more responsive, and I know you want to be, but you still 

have to go through everything that is required, and I would hope 

one of the things we learn out of this is we need to short circuit 

some of the bureaucracy, so the people who can actually get the job 

done have that opportunity to get out there, without 3 or 4 or 5 

days delay. And I would assume the mayor from Mississippi, and 

I apologize for him having to sit through the first panel, but I know 

that is the frustration that my local community feels, and again, 

we weren’t devastated near—our problems are nowhere near what 

Mississippi and Louisiana did. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you. I have a question for Mr. Peacock. 

There have been some stories in the press stating that the EPA Administrator, Mr. Johnson, has said that the agency does not need 

any other authority to respond to the disaster in the Gulf Course, 

or the Coast, or the situation that is created, but there have been 

some other press articles suggesting that, in fact, EPA would be 

seeking some additional authority. 

Could you tell me what the position of the agency and the administration is as to whether you need additional legislative authority? 

Mr. PEACOCK. Sir, absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Not long after the 

hurricane hit, we started looking at, particularly given its scope 

and its unprecedented impact, started looking at whether or not 

there were any legislative barriers to getting our work done. And 

we continue that effort. We have not offered, or sent up, any legislative changes or additional authorities that we think we need yet, 

but we continue to review whether or not that may be necessary. 

Mr. GILLMOR. Well, along that line, let me ask you, after the activities of September 11, Congress created specific legislative authority to help EPA guide drinking water, utilities, in getting ready 

to prevent and respond to terrorism activities. My question is, do 

30

you have similar direct authority you can draw on for natural disasters, like a hurricane, a tornado, or do you rely on just cobbling 

together authorities under various provisions? 

Mr. PEACOCK. Yes, I think you are probably referring to the 

Water Sentinel Program, which helps in assessments, first of all, 

and then helps local water authorities determine ways to protect 

water supply sources, and drinking water plants. I am not aware 

of any similar authority for natural disasters, but I can certainly 

double check on that and get back to you. 

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. Dr. Falk, 

what are your recommendations for State and local officials, with 

respect to health and safety issues, as they consider allowing residents back into New Orleans or other areas, and how do you go 

about communicating those recommendations? 

Mr. FALK. So, we feel that there are a number of factors that 

have to be considered, and this is a very complex environmental 

situation, where there are issues with drinking water, sewage 

treatment, chemicals and sediments, housing issues, mold, and debris removal, and so on. So, I think first off, you know, there is a 

sense, for say in local officials, you have to consider the group of 

these various effects at, you know, the decisions about return and 

so on are not based on a single criterion, or a single issue. One 

really has to make sure that the complex number of services that 

are sort of necessary for urban living, or whatever, really are met. 

So, in that sense, we try to emphasize going through the series of 

issues and actually making sure that they are all addressed. 

Second, the conditions vary. For example, within New Orleans, 

they vary from one part of the city to the next, and so, we have 

emphasized this is not like a single decision for a whole metropolitan area, but this really has to be done, in a sense, neighborhood 

by neighborhood, area by area, as the conditions differ from site to 

site. So, and we have, you know, tried to emphasize approaching 

it systematically, for the different environmental issues, and addressing those, and approaching that by the particular areas, and 

the particular problems that are represented in each area. 

Through EPA and ourselves and others, we have tried to set up 

a Federal effort whereby we can discuss between the agencies how 

we collectively come up with information on those areas, and provide that technical input up the chain at the Federal level, and 

working with our colleagues at the State and local levels, so we are 

trying to share information that we have, and provide technical 

input, and make sure that we are able to convey whatever information we have that would be helpful. 

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you. One more question for EPA, Mr. Peacock. One of the sadder stories of the elevated lead concentrations 

we had in drinking water in the District of Columbia, was how 

badly the City Water and Sewer Administration had bungled its 

public outreach efforts, particularly threat communication and 

water testing and water purifying kits. 

You had mentioned that EPA is trying to both communicate information and distribute water testing kits in the affected parishes 

in Louisiana. Would you be able to tell us what parishes and how 

many, and what EPA is doing to program for threat communication 

and kit testing? 

31

Mr. PEACOCK. Yes. And actually, a lot of this work is being done 

by EPA and the state. Once again, there is just a very close relationship there. I know there were, and this information is now a 

few days old, so I will have to update it for you, there were at least 

700 test kits that were handed out. There were also purification 

tablets for people who had private wells, which I believe the State 

gave to people. 

The interesting aspect of this is one of the lessons learned from 

9/11 is to improve risk communication, and particularly, try and 

reach the people that need to get the information. We are now communicating through AM and FM radio, by going door to door, handing out flyers, and working through neighborhood networks such as 

churches, local school districts, and other means, to try and reach 

people. 

But Mr. Chairman, I can get the detailed information regarding 

test kits to you after the hearing. 

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you very much. The gentlelady from California. 

Ms. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Falk, I have two questions for you, and one for you, Mr. Peacock, so of necessity, I would 

hope that your answers would be brief. 

The emergency responders, Dr. Falk, to Hurricane Katrina, have 

been and will continue to be exposed to extremely dangerous environments since the first day of rescue operations, wading through 

contaminated waters filled with sewage and hazardous materials. 

Following 9/11, the Federal Government created a medical monitoring program for responders to the World Trade Center tragedy. 

Last week, I asked Director Gerberding if the CDC will be setting up a long-term monitoring program for responders to Katrina. 

She expressed openness to such a program, but indicated they have 

not taken any steps in that direction. I would ask you, does ATSDR 

intend to create a health registry for first responders? 

Mr. FALK. I think in terms of Dr. Gerberding’s response, clearly 

over the last several weeks, there has been a large effort on the 

part of NIOSH, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health, which is a part of CDC, to provide guidance for emergency 

response workers and others in the area. 

Ms. CAPPS. I am talking about a registry. 

Mr. FALK. Right. And as she said, then, they have not made any 

decisions in terms of a registry. 

Ms. CAPPS. And that is still the case? 

Mr. FALK. And I think, in terms of ATSDR, we primarily work 

around hazardous waste sites, particularly with the communities, 

and the active work at CDC that relates to workers is really done 

through the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. 

So, I think the most likely place where that would be considered 

would be where the occupational safety and health expertise is located, and that would be probably at the NIOSH portion, so that 

is where that is likely to be considered. 

Ms. CAPPS. Okay. Next question. The Joint Taskforce, Dr. Falk, 

on Environmental Health Needs and Habitability Assessment, 

issued on September 17, 2005, was a useful and helpful document 

on understanding the issues related to the Katrina response. One 

of the key issues identified that affects the rate at which New OrleVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
32

ans can be re-inhabited is the testing of potentially contaminated 

soil. The report calls for, ‘‘a comprehensive sampling and testing of 

a broad array of toxic material, that will be required to identify any 

widespread contamination of selected hotspots.’’ In your opinion, is 

there a comprehensive sampling and testing plan that is fully funded, either yours, or one that you know of? 

Mr. FALK. I think that at this point, we are working closely with 

the EPA. We are evaluating the information so far. We are looking 

at the sampling plans, and I think Deputy Administrator Peacock 

has described, you know, their development of sampling plans, and 

having them reviewed. We are in the process of working with them 

on the sampling plan. 

Ms. CAPPS. Okay. 

Mr. FALK. So, my hope is that we will, you know, we will be able 

to answer that question. 

Ms. CAPPS. So the answer is no right now. And like, I am thinking of a specific citizen or a family. 

Mr. FALK. Right. Right. 

Ms. CAPPS. They don’t know yet whether it is actually, literally, 

safe to return to their neighborhoods without short or long-term 

health effects? 

Mr. FALK. I think that is something we are all working on now, 

and you know, it has only been so recently that some of the areas 

of New Orleans, for example, have been unwatered. 

Ms. CAPPS. And they are returning. Okay, Mr. Peacock. Under 

statutes like the Solid Waste Disposal Act and Superfund, the EPA 

is charged with protecting public health. In the face of widespread 

oil and hazardous chemical release and contaminated sediments in 

neighborhoods, is it EPA’s responsibility to protect the citizens’ 

health? I am looking for——

Mr. PEACOCK. You are talking about a specific statute. I see. I 

see. If they are——

Ms. CAPPS. I am looking for primary responsibility. I just asked 

Dr. Falk similar kind of questions. Who is in charge? 

Mr. PEACOCK. If you are looking at a person who wants to reoccupy——

Ms. CAPPS. Yes. 

Mr. PEACOCK. [continuing] New Orleans, and who is protecting 

them. There are three layers of protection. There is the mayor. 

There is the Governor. And then, there is Thad Allen, all of whom 

are located in New Orleans, and have daily discussions regarding 

whether or not a particular—and the mayor is using zip code 

areas—whether or not a particular zip code area can, for instance, 

have businessmen come in on a daily basis, or perhaps, have residents come in on a daily basis. 

Ms. CAPPS. Well, now, I have heard, and this is only anecdotal, 

but evacuees have reported that they are getting different information from different officials, and from the EPA. So——

Mr. PEACOCK. Well, I hope that is not the case. 

One of the reasons those three people are in such close contact 

is to make sure they are all on the same page. The mayor, as you 

probably know, published a plan late yesterday, and we have, 

across agencies, it is not just EPA and the CDC, have been helping 

the mayor evaluate environmental and other endpoints in those 

33

particular zip codes. And there is an updated assessment, I think 

it was issued, that was given to the mayor last night, which I 

would be happy to provide to you. I hope you have the impression 

there is a systematic process——

Ms. CAPPS. Right. 

Mr. PEACOCK. [continuing] for looking across these areas. 

Ms. CAPPS. I guess that, first of all, I don’t have a clear answer 

as to whether the sample is complete, or if there is a registry——

Mr. PEACOCK. I think I can help you with that, if, for instance, 

for the sediment sampling, these are where we have taken samples. There is a sampling plan in place. 

Ms. CAPPS. Is there a result? 

Mr. PEACOCK. Yes. And if you go, for instance, on our website, 

and hit sediment samples, you will get the raw data. And——

Ms. CAPPS. Right. It doesn’t tell the citizen if it is safe. Who is 

going to interpret the data, and issue a report saying it is——

Mr. PEACOCK. That is up to the local health official and the city’s 

office, to determine whether or not a particular house or room or 

neighborhood is safe for someone to go back into. I mean, for instance, EPA, regardless of floods in the past, has never gone into 

a particular neighborhood, house, property, state, commercial property, and said it is safe to go back in. 

Ms. CAPPS. Mr. Chairman, I know I am going over time, but 

could I finish this line of questioning? I just want to find out, the 

mayor, you have the capability of analyzing, between the Corps——

Mr. PEACOCK. Yes, and actually, the Corps and others. 

Ms. CAPPS. And the Corps is—well, the three of you are here because of expertise in sampling, creating data bases——

Mr. PEACOCK. Correct. 

Ms. CAPPS. [continuing] and information. I understand——

Mr. PEACOCK. Yes. 

Ms. CAPPS. [continuing] that the dispensing of it and issuing 

the—yes, you can come, or no, you shouldn’t, and here is why. 

Somebody else needs to do that, but——

Mr. PEACOCK. Right. 

Ms. CAPPS. [continuing] how does the mayor, does he have access 

to your data? Is someone informing him——

Mr. PEACOCK. Yes, now this——

Ms. CAPPS. [continuing] on a regular basis? 

Mr. PEACOCK. [continuing] is the zip code assessment group 

Henry was referring to in his testimony. There is a group of individuals down in New Orleans, Federal officials who, by zip code, 

are assessing—it is currently six key areas; it is going to be 13 key 

areas. And that information is provided to Thad Allen, who then 

provides it to the mayor and to the state. 

Ms. CAPPS. And advises them, so that there is one, so there 

shouldn’t be confusing information? 

Mr. PEACOCK. There should not be confusing information. 

Ms. CAPPS. They should know to whom they can go and that they 

can trust that this has been fully vetted information——

Mr. PEACOCK. That is right. In fact——

Ms. CAPPS. [continuing] and substantiated. 

34

Mr. PEACOCK. [continuing] we make sure any of the information 

we provide goes through a rather rigorous, as Henry would say, a 

quality assurance and quality control process. 

Ms. CAPPS. Okay. Now, I guess one final question, and this isn’t 

your job, but we need to find out how the public knows how to do 

this, how they, and all of us have to, even though we are just in 

the background, we have to take responsibility that these affects 

people’s lives. 

Mr. PEACOCK. Right. 

Ms. CAPPS. And so, how is it getting to the public? 

Mr. PEACOCK. Well, I can only speak for the Federal level—and 

Emily, if you can show just the EPA advisories—I mean, these are 

a list of advisories, announcements, EPA has done, often in coordination with CDC, and once again, we tend to use radio, we tend 

to use flyers, we have gone door to door. Of course, we have a 

website, but a lot of people don’t have access to it. 

Ms. CAPPS. And you are doing that part——

Mr. PEACOCK. We do have a crosslink, for instance, to CDC. All 

of these advisories, for instance, are on our website, and we have 

provided the information through, once again, press announcements and radio. 

Ms. CAPPS. So you are telling citizens what to do. 

Mr. PEACOCK. Yes, that is exactly right. 

Ms. CAPPS. But you just said you don’t. 

Mr. PEACOCK. No, we are telling people, for instance, if someone 

is going to go into their home, we provide caution, in terms of what 

they should look out for in their home. But in terms of defining 

whether or not it is safe to go into a particular house or neighborhood, we are not going to be doing that. 

Ms. CAPPS. Boy. Somebody is going to have to do that. 

Mr. PEACOCK. Well, the only person who can lift an evacuation 

is the person who has the power to put it in place, and that is the 

mayor, and perhaps the Governor. I know less about the State authorities. 

Mr. GILLMOR. The gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to 

thank the panel for being here on this important issue. 

I want to do a little follow-up on the question the gentlelady from 

California was just asking. And that has to do with, when someone 

is returning to their home, what would be the checklist that you 

advise people to be aware of, what they—let us say, just want to 

go there to get some belongings, at least. What checklist do you 

want them to keep in mind as they are approaching that, whoever 

would—Dr. Falk? 

Mr. FALK. Let me start by saying that I think for all of us, in 

addition to headquarters people that are involved, we have a number of staff who are in New Orleans, who are in the State of Louisiana, who are trying to work closely with the Louisiana public 

health officials and with the New Orleans public health officials in 

those areas. 

So as they approach this on an area-by-area, neighborhood-byneighborhood, or zip-code approach, specific guidance is developed 

for people going in, and I think that the staff that we have in the 

field are trying to work closely with the local officials in preparing 

35

that. So there is guidance that is given out to people as they come 

back to those areas. 

Mr. MURPHY. That is not something that you would necessarily 

recommend, but let the locals give that guidance onsite? 

Mr. FALK. Well, I think we are trying hard to make sure that the 

local people will give that guidance on the site, but we are trying 

to work with them, and provide the——

Mr. PEACOCK. Yes. The mayor’s plan for reoccupation, which was 

issued, I think, late yesterday, includes a long list, it is really, you 

can look at it, it is a checklist of things for citizens to be careful 

of. Make sure they bring water, for instance, things like that, and 

that was informed by information provided by the Federal partners 

and the state. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, then let me step back, and then, say, from 

your standpoint, so you are not—let us take it from a broader perspective. With all that standing water in the region with chemicals 

in it, what chemicals are we seeing there? Is there any evidence 

of problems with exposure to that? 

Mr. PEACOCK. The main problem, particularly with the standing 

floodwaters, is the bacterial contamination, E. coli and coliforms, 

which are indicative of what you would find in raw sewage. It is 

a serious problem, and people should avoid the water if they can. 

There have been, in particular places, and once again, these are 

the floodwater sampling sites, where there have been elevated levels of chemicals, and in some, I think we have detected, of the over 

100 chemicals, 47. In a number of cases, lead, for instance, and arsenic, both have exceeded drinking water assessment levels. Now, 

those levels are set for someone who is drinking a fair amount of 

water every day, and so, definitely nobody should be drinking the 

floodwater. What the long-term effects of those chemicals are is 

more of a question mark, but the main point is no one should be 

in contact with the floodwater, particularly because of the possibility of bacterial infection. Would you agree with that, Dr. Falk? 

Mr. FALK. Yes, and in addition, I think, for example, in New Orleans, the health department itself has been severely impacted by 

this whole disaster, and there is a lot of support coming from CDC, 

Health and Human Services, EPA, and——

Mr. MURPHY. Do we have sufficient support to monitor? No? 

Mr. FALK. Sufficient support on the field, and to help assist in 

various ways. So there are occupational safety and health experts, 

say, from NIOSH and CDC, who are helping prepare guidance for 

workers and emergency responders there. 

Mr. MURPHY. Are you also looking for particular groups who may 

be at risk, pregnant mother, the elderly, people with certain disease entities? 

Mr. FALK. Yes, and I think in the first wave, we are, you know, 

the mayor’s guidance has been children and elderly are probably 

not appropriate for the first people who are going in, and so, I 

think that is probably very critical. You know, in a sense, if there 

is guidance, for example, that we don’t have potable water, people 

can’t use the water in their tap for drinking. They have to use bottled water, boiled water, and so on, you can’t expect small children, 

maybe elderly, who might be confused, to follow. So I think you 

have to tailor these recommendations, and I think we have all been 

36

trying to work with the local officials in developing that kind of 

guidance. 

Mr. MURPHY. Let me ask one other area, and that is, as people 

go back to their homes, and even though there are standing floodwaters, but as those subside, mold in the houses. What sort of risks 

do we see with that? 

Mr. FALK. Well, mold is a very critical area, particularly in New 

Orleans, but I am sure in many other areas along the Gulf Coast. 

Homes that have had standing water for some period of time, there 

is extensive amounts of mold, and far greater than we have probably seen in most any other situation. So, I think the guidance, you 

know, for dealing with mold is very critical, in terms of protection 

of skin surfaces, in terms of respiratory protection. We just yesterday did a teleconference, you know, for guidance on that. We have 

been working very much with the local officials on assuring available information for people as they enter the city on the appropriate ways to work with mold, and when it is not appropriate to 

do it, and if they are exposed to the mold, how they should do it, 

and the kind of respiratory protection they should have. 

So, I think that is really very critical. And we are also very concerned that people who have preexisting respiratory disease or 

asthma not be the persons doing the primary work on mold. There 

are people who will certainly be more sensitive to the mold, that 

really need extra precautions. So, we try to convey that kind of information, how to approach those areas, who should and who 

should not, what kind of protection, gloves, skin covering, and respiratory protection for people who do do this, and for homeowners 

who are going back and then, particularly, for emergency responders or construction workers on the occupationsite, who may be 

doing far more extensive work with the mold. So that is a very critical point for us, in terms of developing guidance, that we are doing 

together with the local officials. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Doctor, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you, and that will conclude our first panel, 

and once again, I want to express my appreciation to all of you for 

your help. Thank you. 

We will now proceed to our second panel, and to begin that, I will 

be turning the Chair over to the gentleman from New Hampshire, 

Mr. Bass, and we will get underway. 

Mr. BASS [presiding]. Good afternoon. We are pleased to have the 

second panel here, and the following individuals are going to be 

testifying before the committee. 

Ms. Karen Gautreaux, who is up on the video in front of us here, 

Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Environmental 

Quality in Baton Rouge. To her left on the screen, but obviously 

not physically, Mr. William Rutledge, who is the mayor of the city 

of Pontotoc. Is that correct? On behalf of the National Rural Water 

Association, Dr. Stephen Ragone, Director of Science and Technology, accompanied by Dr. John H. Schnieders, Member of the National Ground Water Association. Mr. Erik Olson, in the center 

here, Senior Attorney of the Natural Resources Defense Council. 

Ms. Beverly Wright, Executive Director of Xavier University of 

Louisiana, and Mr. Robert R. M. Verchick, Gauthier-St. Martin 

Eminent Scholar, Chair in Environmental Law, Loyola University 

37

New Orleans. Is that you in the screen, sir? The screen on the left, 

are you Mr. Rutledge? Okay. Good enough. Thank you. 

Mr. RUTLEDGE. Yes, sir. Right here. 

Mr. BASS. I saw the Tulane sign behind you. I want to advise 

members that we are expecting votes around 3:45 this afternoon, 

so we will proceed as quickly as possible with our testimony. I hope 

that you will confine your remarks to 5 minutes, and submit your 

record, which we will accept by unanimous consent, your full testimony for the record. 

We will begin with Karen Gautreaux. Would you please proceed? 

STATEMENTS OF KAREN K. GAUTREAUX, DEPUTY SECRETARY, 

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; 

WILLIAM RUTLEDGE, MAYOR, CITY OF PONTOTOC, ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL RURAL WATER ASSOCIATION; STEPHEN 

E. RAGONE, DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN H. SCHNIEDERS, MEMBER, NATIONAL 

GROUND WATER ASSOCIATION; ERIK D. OLSON, SENIOR ATTORNEY, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL; BEVERLY WRIGHT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, XAVIER UNIVERSITY 

OF LOUISIANA, DEEP SOUTH CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 

JUSTICE; AND ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, GAUTHIER-ST. MARTIN EMINENT SCHOLAR, CHAIR IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY, NEW ORLEANS 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. Thank you, Mr. Bass, and good afternoon, Mr. 

Chairman and ladies and gentlemen of the subcommittee. I am 

Karen Gautreaux, Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Department 

of Environmental Quality, and I want to thank you all very much 

for allowing us to participate in this hearing, and especially for allowing us to do so by teleconference. 

Exactly 1 month ago today, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 

Buras, Louisiana, and forever changed the physical, cultural, and 

economic landscape of our state, as well as delivering severe blows 

to our neighbors to the east in Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. 

Last Sunday, Hurricane Rita made landfall in the western side of 

the State in Cameron Parish, severely impacting that portion of 

our coast, as well as areas that had previously escaped the wrath 

of Katrina. Our neighbors in Texas who had been kind enough to 

send 24 members of a strike team to assist us had to return home 

and continue their response efforts in their own state. No part of 

the Gulf Coast has remained untouched this hurricane season. 

Today, I will limit my remarks to our Hurricane Katrina assessment and response efforts to date, as this is the focus of your hearing. First, I would like to share with you an observation about Hurricane Katrina that has been repeated by experienced emergency 

responders from our staff and those of other State and Federal 

agency partners. Simply, they have seen nothing like it. The magnitude and diversity of the environmental challenges presented by 

this storm have not been seen before in the United States. I will 

attempt to give a brief overview of those challenges, how they are 

being addressed, and actions anticipated in the future. 

One of the first things our department and our agency partners 

did in order to best position themselves to assess and respond to 

storm impacts was to establish and house a Unified Command 

38

Center at LDEQ headquarters in Baton Rouge. This center includes representatives from our staff, a large contingency from the 

U.S. EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Coast Guard, U.S. Geological Survey, NOAA, the Texas Commission on Environmental 

Quality, the Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinators Office, and the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. Local government has 

also been involved. These representatives are coordinating emergency response, hazard assessment, and environmental sampling 

and planning activities. We better recognize the value of that coordination in the degree of readiness that we have experienced in 

response to Hurricane Rita. 

One of the key differences between the aftermath of Katrina and 

other hurricanes was the continued presence of floodwaters in the 

storm-impacted area. Because much of the area in New Orleans is 

below sea level, water that falls or enters the city must evaporate 

or be pumped out. As a result of the breaches and overtopping of 

the flood protection systems, namely floodwalls and levees, approximately 80 percent of the New Orleans area and some of Jefferson 

Parish remained flooded until the failed parts of the flood protection system could be patched and those areas pumped out. This led 

to the floodwater bowl that you may have heard referred to in the 

lowest elevations of the city, where water sat for weeks. Hurricane 

Rita re-flooded the areas that had most recently been dewatered. 

In St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, low-lying areas also suffered from overtopping and breaches of the levee system, leaving 

them basically at sea level and subject to the tides until the levees 

could be repaired and the dewatered, now for the second time. 

The areas north of Lake Pontchartrain experienced high winds 

and flooding, and although the damage was significant, in general, 

those areas are recovering more quickly than Southeast Louisiana. 

I will briefly go through a few of the results of the first month’s 

assessment and response activities—again this is the first month—

and mention issues that are being addressed, and those that will 

continue to be priorities for the future. 

First, the waters in the bowl in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes: 

this water flooded homes, businesses, streets, wastewater treatment facilities, and drinking water systems. Initially DEQ and 

many of our agency partners, especially EPA, focused on search 

and rescue. As people were trapped by the floodwaters, and search 

and rescue efforts were hampered by access, dewatering the area 

was an urgent public health and safety priority. The decision was 

made to pump the floodwaters to Lake Pontchartrain. EPA and 

DEQ coordinated sampling efforts, excuse me, to characterize the 

floodwaters, and measure the potential short- and long-term environmental impacts to the lake. EPA sampled the floodwaters, and 

as DEQ had a good deal of historical water-quality information on 

Lake Pontchartrain, we took responsibility for sampling in the lake 

and in two canals that are sites in the State’s ambient water quality program. USGS is currently sampling for bacteria in the lake, 

and all the results are being shared by the agencies and are available on the Internet. 

To date, the sampling has revealed that the floodwaters had 

characteristics common to most urban storm water events, with 

contaminants of concern being high levels of fecal coliform bacteria 

39

and levels of lead that would be a health concern if a child were 

to ingest a liter of the floodwater a day for 6 years every day. 

These results are not surprising in an area with a flooded wastewater treatment system, submerged vehicles with lead batteries, 

and older flooded structures with lead paint. I would like to mention that Lake Pontchartrain is not a drinking water source for any 

community; it is a salty upstream lake. 

Early results of the lake sampling indicate common water quality 

impacts caused by vegetative debris thrown into the water by hurricane winds and storm surge. This has caused low dissolved oxygen and fish killed in Northshore streams feeding into Lake Pontchartrain. Fecal coliform bacteria counts are slightly elevated in 

some of these areas as a result of flooded sewage treatment facilities, flooding of urban sewage lines, and flooding of pastures. 

Organic compound sampling and analysis has shown mostly nondetect results. Where detected, concentrations have not exceeded 

water quality standards. Metals have been below water quality 

standards, with the exception of one sample taken from a New Orleans drainage canal. In general, Lake Pontchartrain is maintaining good water quality, and the impacts to the lake have been 

minimal. We are hopeful that the lake will be back to normal within months, not years, but we will be monitoring for years to come 

to ensure that is the case. More detail has been provided here to 

particularly address the concern about the so-called toxic soup 

being dumped into the lake. The floodwaters were unhealthy, but 

to date, results show this to be an inaccurate and alarmist characterization. 

Initial sediment samples in the flooded areas indicate that there 

are no acute health issues that would be expected from the concentration of compounds to date. A summary of the sediment sampling results is included for the record, and sample results are 

available on the EPA website. 

The results of 23 air toxic and particulate canister samples in the 

storm-impacted area have also been encouraging. One sample 

taken near a fire in New Orleans contained 56 parts per billion 

benzene, the ATSDR minimum risk level is 50. Three canisters in 

St. Bernard Parish showed slightly elevated levels of benzene and 

some other related pollutants, but none exceeded the ATSDR/MRL 

screening levels in the hydrocarbon profile resembled gasoline and 

diesel. The sample was taken in an area impacted by a spill. A 

summary of the air sampling results is also attached to your 

record. 

Of great concern are the impacts of a number of oil spills resulting from Katrina. Currently, five major and five minor oil spills are 

the subject of response efforts. It is estimated that over 6.5 million 

gallons of oil have been released into the environment, with more 

spills expected as pipelines and facilities resume operations. Over 

2.5 million gallons of oil have been recovered as of September 28, 

with the Coast Guard and LOSCO being the lead agencies in that 

effort. 

One major priority is the reestablishment of the large wastewater treatment plants. Out of the 25 in this area, five are now inoperable. The Orleans Eastbank System, alone, was capable of 

treating 144 million gallons of wastewater per day, so this is a 

40

huge loss in capacity. Four other major facilities that are currently 

inoperable are located in St. Tammany, St. Bernard, and 

Plaquemines Parishes. One of the big challenges of restoring these 

facilities is rebuilding the infrastructure associated with them, including miles of conveyances and numerous lift stations. 

Mr. BASS. Ms. Gautreaux. 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. The health risks associated with untreated 

water and wastewater——

Mr. BASS. If you could summarize, that would be great. 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. Okay. Well, let me just go into——

Mr. BASS. Sorry. 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. [continuing] our current remaining challenges. 

I will summarize. I apologize. But one of our big remaining challenges are railcars. We have between 1,000 and 5,000 railcars that 

were displaced or we are unable to locate, because of the storm. We 

ended up issuing administrative orders and are planning to review 

that process, so that we are more prepared to act in the event of 

another incident like this. 

There are about 1,000 potentially impacted underground storage 

tanks in the area, that will probably cost between $39 million and 

$97 million to repair and remediate. 

And finally, the last challenge, but definitely not least is the 

management of tons of debris, especially with the social, legal, and 

personal issues associated with the management of debris that 

have been referenced so far. To just to give you an idea of the volume, normally, the Orleans Parish Landfill disposes of about 1 million tons per year. In that parish alone, the estimate is 12 million 

tons due to the storm. 

We are working with local governments and our Federal partners 

to try to get a debris management plan, and exercise it, that 

matches the challenge. I wanted to particularly thank EPA for the 

ability to prioritize our response efforts, such as oversight, the ASPECT plane equipment that allowed us to pick up hydrocarbons 

that are invisible to the naked eye, and it helped us prioritize our 

response. So in general, we certainly are still looking. We are now 

moving into the serious assessment and response beyond the immediate storm phase, and we are very grateful to our partners, and 

we look forward to working with you and your committee, and I 

just guess one of the last things that I would like to suggest to the 

committee is that the coastal ecosystem that protects many of the 

issue areas over which your subcommittee has jurisdiction, has 

been severely damaged, and I hope that Congress will commit to 

the rehabilitation of this fragile system soon. 

And with that, I will apologize for running over, perhaps, and 

ask that my comments be put into the record, and I will be available for questions. 

[The prepared statement of Karen K. Gautreaux follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KAREN K. GAUTREAUX, DEPUTY SECRETARY, LOUISIANA

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and Ladies and Gentlemen of the Committee. I’m 

Karen Gautreaux, Deputy Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Environmental 

Quality. Thank you very much for allowing us to participate in this hearing, and 

especially for allowing us to do so by teleconference. 

41

Exactly one month ago today, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Buras, Louisiana, and forever changed the physical, cultural, and economic landscape of our 

state, as well as delivering severe blows to our neighbors to the East in Mississippi, 

Alabama and Florida. Last Sunday, Hurricane Rita made landfall in the western 

side of the state in Cameron Parish, severely impacting that portion of our coast, 

as well as areas that had previously escaped the wrath of Katrina. Our neighbors 

in Texas who had sent 24 members of a ‘‘strike team’’ to assist us, had to return 

home and continue their response efforts in their own state. No part of the Gulf 

coast has remained untouched this hurricane season. 

Today I will limit my remarks to our Hurricane Katrina assessment and response 

efforts to date, as this is the focus of your hearing. 

First, I’d like to share with you an observation about Hurricane Katrina that has 

been repeated by experienced emergency responders from our staff and those of 

other state and federal agency partners. Simply, ‘‘they have seen nothing like it.’’ 

The magnitude and diversity of the environmental challenges presented by this 

storm have not been seen before in the United States. I will attempt to give a brief 

overview of those challenges, how they are being addressed, and actions anticipated 

in the future. 

One of first things our department and our agency partners did in order to best 

position ourselves to assess and respond to storm impacts was to establish and 

house a Unified Command Center at LDEQ headquarters in Baton Rouge. The center includes representatives from LDEQ, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

(EPA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast 

Guard), the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Agency (NOAA), the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), the Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinators Office (LOSCO), and the Louisiana Department of 

Health and Hospitals (LDHH). Local government has also been present at the Center. These representatives are coordinating emergency response, hazard assessment, 

and environmental sampling and planning activities. We better recognize the value 

of that coordination in the degree of readiness that we have experienced in response 

to Hurricane Rita. 

One of the key differences between the aftermath of Katrina and other hurricanes 

was the continued presence of floodwaters in the storm impact area. Because much 

of the area in New Orleans is below sea level, water that falls or enters the city 

must evaporate or be pumped out. As a result of the breaches and overtopping of 

the flood protection systems, namely floodwalls and levees, approximately 80 percent of the New Orleans area and some of Jefferson Parish remained flooded until 

the failed parts of the flood protection system could be patched and those areas 

pumped out. This lead to the floodwater ‘‘bowl’’ in the lowest elevations of the city 

where water sat for weeks. Hurricane Rita re-flooded areas that had most recently 

been dewatered. In St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes, low-lying areas also suffered from overtopping and breaches of the levee system, leaving them basically at 

sea level and subject to the tides until the levees could be repaired and the area 

dewatered, now for the second time. 

The areas north of Lake Pontchartrain experienced high winds and flooding. Although the damage was significant, in general those areas are recovering more 

quickly than Southeast Louisiana. 

I’ll briefly go through a few the results of the first month’s assessment and response activities, and mention issues that are being addressed, and those that will 

continue to be priorities for the future. 

First, the waters in the ‘‘bowl’’ in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes. This water 

flooded homes, businesses, streets, wastewater treatment facilities, drinking water 

systems. Initially DEQ and many of our agency partners, including EPA, focused 

on search and rescue. As people were trapped by the floodwaters and search and 

rescue efforts were hampered by access, dewatering the area was an urgent public 

health and safety priority. The decision was made to pump the floodwaters to Lake 

Pontchartrain. EPA and DEQ coordinated sampling efforts to characterize the floodwaters and measure the potential short and long-term environmental impacts to the 

lake. EPA sampled the floodwaters, and as DEQ had a good deal of historical water 

quality information on Lake Pontchartrain, we took responsibility for sampling in 

the lake and in two canals that are sites in the state’s ambient water quality monitoring network. USGS is currently sampling for bacteria in the Lake. All results are 

being shared by the agencies and are available on the internet. 

To date the sampling has revealed that the floodwaters had characteristics common to most urban storm water events, with the contaminants of concern being high 

levels of fecal coliform bacteria and levels of lead that would be a health concern 

if a child were to ingest a liter of the floodwater a day for 6 years. These results 

42

are not surprising in an area with a flooded wastewater treatment system, submerged vehicles with lead batteries, and older flooded structures with lead paint. 

Early results of lake sampling indicate common water quality impacts caused by 

vegetation debris thrown into the water by hurricane winds and storm surge. This 

has caused low dissolved oxygen and fish kills in Northshore streams feeding into 

Lake Pontchartrain. Fecal coliform bacteria counts are slightly elevated in some 

areas as a result of flooded sewage treatment facilities, flooding of urban sewage 

lines, and flooding of pastures. 

Organic compound sampling and analysis has shown mostly non-detect results. 

Where detected, concentrations have not exceeded water quality standards. Metals 

have been below water quality standards with the exception of one sample taken 

from a New Orleans drainage canal. In general Lake Pontchartrain is maintaining 

good water quality, and the impacts to date to the Lake have been minimal. We 

are hopeful that the lake will be back to normal within months, not years, but we 

will be monitoring for years to ensure that is the case. More detail has been provided here to particularly address the concern about the so called ‘‘toxic soup’’ being 

dumped into the Lake. To date our results show this to be an inaccurate and alarmist characterization. 

Initial sediment samples in the flooded areas indicate that there are no acute 

health issues that would be expected from the concentrations of compounds observed 

to date. A summary of the sediment sampling results is included for the record, and 

sample results are available on the EPA web site. 

The results of twenty three air toxic and particulate canister samples in the storm 

impact area have also been encouraging. One sample taken near a fire in New Orleans contained 56 ppb of benzene, the ATSDR MRL is 50. Three canisters in St. Bernard showed slightly elevated levels of benzene and some other related pollutants, 

but none exceeded the ATSDR MRL screening levels, and the hydrocarbon profile 

resembled gasoline and diesel. The sample was taken in an area impacted by a spill. 

A summary of the air sampling results in attached. 

Of great concern are the impacts of a number of oil spills resulting from Katrina. 

Currently 5 major and 5 minor oil spills are the subject of response efforts. It is 

estimated that over 6.5 million gallons of oil have been released into the environment, with more spills expected as pipelines and facilities resume operations. Over 

2.5 million gallons of oil have been recovered as of September 28, with the Coast 

Guard and LOSCO being the lead agencies in that effort. 

One major priority is the reestablishment of drinking water and wastewater treatment systems. Five of the large waste water treatment systems are now inoperable. 

The Orleans Eastbank system alone was capable of treating 144,000,000 gallons of 

wastewater per day, so this is a huge loss in capacity. Four other major facilities 

that are currently inoperable are located in St. Tammany, St. Bernard and 

Plaquemines Parishes. One of the big challenges of restoring these facilities is rebuilding the infrastructure associated with them, including miles of conveyances 

and numerous lift stations. The health risks associated with untreated water and 

wastewater make restoring these services a top priority. The Corps is working with 

local government, LDEQ and LDHH, and other federal agencies to restore these 

functions as quickly as possible. 

Another remaining challenge is locating, assessing and addressing between one 

and five thousand railroad cars that could have been displaced by Katrina. LDEQ 

had difficulty in quickly obtaining sufficient information from railroad companies to 

determine potential threats to public safety and the appropriate response. As a result, LDEQ issued 17 administrative orders demanding that information. While 

more information has since been provided to us, the result of delays in getting that 

information could have been tragic. LDEQ is continuing efforts to locate and assess 

displaced railcars, as well as considering how to improve this process in the future. 

There are about 1000 potentially impacted underground storage tanks (USTs) in 

the storm affected areas, with potential costs of between $39,000,000 and 

$97,000,000 to repair and remediate underground storage tanks. Final costs will depend upon the level of damage to sites from the storm, as well as disrupted efforts 

and additional damage at sites that were being remediated. LDEQ is continuing reconnaissance efforts in the storm impact areas, and has developed a draft UST 

Evaluation Plan to help UST owners and operators identify and address storm related problems. 

Finally, not the last challenge by any means, but probably the most daunting task 

of all, the management of the tons of debris in the storm impact area. Current estimates of the amount of woody waste and construction and demolition debris are 

about 22,000,000 tons. To give an appreciation of the volume, the landfill used by 

Orleans Parish disposed of about 1 million tons in an entire year, and in that parish 

alone the estimate is 12,000,000 tons. The total does not include approximately 

43

350,000 vehicles from which fuel tanks, oil, batteries and mercury switches must 

be removed, about 60,000 boats. OF The140,000 to 160,000 homes likely include materials that have to be segregated prior to disposal. 

In addition to the sheer logistics challenge, much of this total is or was the personal property of someone who may or may not be with us anymore, or may or may 

not be able to come back to Louisiana. The property may have been left behind in 

an evacuation with an intention to return, it might or might not be insured, and 

perhaps is the property of a person who is now a thousand miles away. There are 

a myriad of issues to be addressed, and a plan that balances public safety, the environment, and legal and social considerations will have to be the ultimate goal. A 

FEMA debris management team, of which LDEQ is a partner has developed a debris management plan. LDEQ has responsibility for technical support primarily in 

evaluating sites that have been identified by local government for debris management. DEQ is also responsible for ensuring that disposal is in accordance with existing regulatory requirements and emergency declaration requirements. Local government will play a large role in the management of debris, particularly with regard 

to recommending sites and protocols for this effort. 

EPA is the lead for the collection of hazardous wastes, both orphaned containers 

and household materials. Hazardous waste collections have been on-going on the 

Northshore, and collections will begin soon in the other impacted areas. 

With regard to RCRA or hazardous wastes, our initial efforts have been to identify 

permitted facilities, our large quantity generators, and the Tier II facilities. To date, 

we’ve contacted facilities to determine which are operating, in the process of reopening, or shut down, and will determine what future actions need to take place. 

One of the benefits of our response efforts has been the use of fairly new technologies that allowed early and effective reconnaissance when access to sites was 

an issue. Access continues to be an issue in some areas. EPA arranged for overflights with a helicopter equipped with a HAWK camera that can detect hydrocarbons that are invisible to the eye. Leaks that might otherwise go unnoticed can 

be detected and response prioritized. Similarly, the EPA ASPECT plane could detect 

compounds from the air, which was especially useful with fires in determining what 

compounds were being emitted and the appropriate response. EPA also has provided 

two TAGA vans with house very sophisticated air monitoring instruments. We 

shared this information with other response agencies, and this information was very 

valuable in the days immediately following the storm. 

It is very difficult to encapsulate the environmental issues associated with 

Katrina. To help in that regard, I have also provided the committee with a copy of 

the preliminary estimates of costs for response, assessment and recovery from environmental damages from Katrina. This was an estimate we were asked to provide 

to our Congressional Delegation within a week or so after the storm. We are currently reviewing those numbers in light of our experience, and would be pleased to 

forward to the committee a revised version when that work is complete. Besides the 

numbers, I think one of the values of the document is the systematic identification 

of issues, that go beyond my time for testimony. 

The only other thing I’d like to add that we did not address in our costs estimates 

document, but are very much concerned about, is the dramatic loss of coastal habitat from the winds and waves of Katrina. We believe that the blow sustained by 

this fragile ecosystem will likely be among the greatest negative long term impacts 

to our state and nation, and are hopeful that efforts to rehabilitate this system will 

commence soon. We realize this is out of the committee’s direct jurisdiction, but 

please be aware that this system provides protection in areas that are directly 

under your jurisdiction. 

With that I’ll thank you again for allowing the state of Louisiana to participate 

in your hearing today, and look forward to your questions and comments.

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Mr. BASS. Your comments will be made a part of the record. I 

thank you for your very important testimony. I understand that 

you have a lot to say, and we will review it very carefully. I appreciate your testimony. Mr. Rutledge. 

STATEMENT OF BILL RUTLEDGE 

Mr. RUTLEDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Bass and the 

committee. First off, I would like to introduce myself. My name is 

Bill Rutledge. I am the mayor with the city of Pontotoc, in the 

northern part of the state. The population of my small town is 

5,253, but what makes this so close to home, back in 2001, we had 

a devastating tornado that came through our community. It destroyed 10 percent of our town. By saying that, one of the sister 

cities that we have, that we started in the State of Mississippi 

through the Municipal League is adopt a city program. One of 

those cities, the city of Pontotoc, along with other towns have 

adopted Bay St. Louis. Unfortunately, my mayor brother couldn’t 

be here with us today, Mayor Eddie Favre, but Mayor Favre wanted me to share with you, his town, which is made up of 8,200 people, actually 5,000 of those families’ homes were on the Bay and 

60 percent of those were totally destroyed, most of them with the 

25 foot tidal wave, or surge, or whatever you want to call it. 

Saying all this, I want to bring something very clear to you, that 

a number of comments have been made about the local government, and who is in charge, or what should we do. The one thing 

that I want the people to realize is for the first 2 or 3 days, you 

have got to depend on your local people. And we found that out 

very quickly, and that is why one of the things that the small cities 

in north Mississippi did, we strictly went past the red tape, crossed 

the line, went straight to the officials of those communities ourselves to find out what their grocery needs were, buster pumps or 

chlorinators, backhoe tires for backhoes, water, food, whatever they 

needed, and what we did collectively, of all of north Mississippi, we 

provided those supplies to bring down. 

But another thing that we need to make clear, though, that we 

have got so many good resources in the State of Mississippi that 

how we work together, and one of those that I want to bring attention to is the Rural Water Association. The technical assistant program, which actually brings in and helps evaluate with the local 

officials. We know what the problems are, we just need to know 

where to get the parts, and have the resources to go out there and 

get those parts. Rural Water, the Operators Association in other 

towns around is actually, we came first response with them. 

I can’t say enough good things about the military. The military 

did an outstanding job. In fact, it really helped us coordinate all 

of the efforts out there, but one of the problems that we run into, 

it seemed like there was so much paperwork or so many strings attached to everything that we are having to wait on somebody to tell 

us this is what we can do. Well, I can promise you small communities, we know what to do, we just need to know how where to 

get the supplies from and you know, how we are going to get them 

to us, and again, another source of resources that we had was the 

local churches, how they came together, how they provided the supplies and the needs that they have, and without the churches feedVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
74

ing them, bringing in the materials and stuff, and supplies, we 

don’t know. 

Right now, kind of give you some background on where the State 

of Mississippi is right now, during the hurricane that hit, 97 percent of the 43 counties, the wastewater systems were out of operation. Today, as of about 2 hours ago, there is only one public 

wastewater facility that is not in operation. Now, I am not saying 

all of them are 100 percent, but I am saying that they are treating 

our public waste. Out of the 1,369 water systems, 486 were affected. Today, 82 of those systems are still under a rural water notice, but most of those are on a voluntary, so one of the things that 

we wanted to make sure was just like you all are, is to make sure 

we got treated, good quality drinking water, and a place to discharge. 

And like with Bay St. Louis, instead of discharging into the bay 

or into the channels, they have a backup system where they can 

discharge into a lagoon, which is actually held until it can be discharged in their regional wastewater facilities. But again, I would 

like to only suggest that maybe—is you all meeting, is you all come 

up with ideas and selections. We need to never forget about the 

local officials, and the local folks there, because having strangers 

coming in and making decisions, you know, the people are going to 

be looking for the mayors. They will be looking for their aldermen 

or their supervisors, because that is who they trust. That is who 

lives there. 

And I want to thank you for allowing me to be here. I thank you 

for all your prayers and your comments about the coastal area, and 

we do need those. 

[The prepared statement of Bill Rutledge follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAYOR BILL RUTLEDGE, CITY OF PONTOTOC AND MAYOR

EDDIE FAVRE, CITY OF BAY ST. LOUIS ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL RURAL WATER

ASSOCIATION

[Note: This testimony was completed in one day, while we concurrently operated a full-time 

relief operation, and we ask the Committee for all deference in our ability to document and assess the situation and make our points. We believe we can appear before the Committee without 

compromising our relief operations and appreciate the opportunity to testify.] 

Background of Mayor Rutledge 

Mr. Chairman, my name is Bill Rutledge; I have been the mayor of the City of 

Pontotoc, Mississippi, since 1997 (currently in my third term). Pontotoc is the northern part of the state and has a population of 5,200. I am vice president of the Mississippi Municipal League, one the board of directors of the Mississippi Rural Water 

Association, and a member of the Northern Mississippi Mayors Association. My 

background includes 27 years of military service, including the National Guard. Before becoming mayor, I was a Circuit Rider, a job that required me to travel to over 

500 drinking water supplies in the state and assist those communities with operation, maintenance, and compliance with their drinking water systems. My city has 

had firsthand experience with disasters. In 2001, a tornado hit my community (and 

county) and devastated us; it wiped out 10% of our downtown area, killed six citizens, cut a swath a mile wide for 23 miles across the county, and destroyed 350 

homes (not counting businesses). 

Objective of My Comments 

I hope to provide the Committee with the following key points in my comments:

• Illustration of what many communities experienced that were hit by hurricane 

Katrina. 

• Explanation of what communities face in recovering from Katrina’s impact. 

• An attempt to provide a status of recovery of the communities in the region. 

75

• Explanation of what the local communities see as the public health and environmental conditions of the region, and the progress that is being made on that 

front. 

• Our (from the local perspective) initial thoughts on what has worked for recovery 

and why, and what we think federal policy makers should know in order to be 

better able to enhance federal emergency policy (both preparedness and response). 

For much of my testimony, I will use the example of the City of Bay St. Louis, 

Mississippi, to illustrate my points and give a clear example of the situation. Bay 

St. Louis was one of the harder hit communities on the Gulf Coast. My community 

has been working with Bay St. Louis on response and recovery from the initial 

hours after the hurricane hit. Through our state municipal association, our cities 

have been paired up to provide this assistance in our ‘‘Adopt a City’’ initiative which 

has been a key effort to aide Bay St. Louis and which I will expand upon later. I 

am joined here today by my friend and colleague, Eddie Favre, who is the mayor 

of Bay St. Louis. I will read a joint statement to the Committee and both of us are 

happy to answer any questions. 

A key objective of both of us, here today, is not to gratuitously criticize relief operations and/or federal agencies. We don’t think that would be of any service to our 

communities. We are interested detailing what did work and providing the Committee with a local perspective of public health and environmental conditions. 

Background of Mayor Favre 

Eddie Favre is in his fifth term as mayor. Before he became mayor, Eddie worked 

in the city administration and is a certified public accountant. Bay St. Louis is a 

community of 8,200 (currently 5,000) population on the Bay of St. Louis (on the Gulf 

Coast). The community’s water supply is provided by two wells and the wastewater 

service is maintained by 40 lift stations (sewer pumps) of varying sizes, located 

around the communities, with the effluent pumped to a regional wastewater system 

for treatment. 

Summary of Katrina Impacts in Bay St. Louis 

The night before the hurricane, the city staff was preparing for the water and 

wastewater system for the hurricane by checking the generators at the well sites 

and moving equipment and sensitive electrical facilities to secure areas. However, 

the hurricane flooded the community more than any imaginable level (significantly 

more than hurricane Camille, which had been the previous standard for flooding 

maps). Almost all of the city was under water of varying depths, some areas as 

much as 25 feet. Mayor Favre’s own home was in the one of the hardest hit portions 

of the city and all that is left now are a few pilings. He has been living in the fire 

station since the Sunday before the hurricane, where city officials and police stayed 

through the storm, and where they are staging relief operations. The extreme flooding lasted approximately five hours and, combined with the approximately 150-milean-hour winds, devastated the city: ripping up roads, piling houses on top of each 

other, toppling the largest trees, destroying a few thousands homes, destroying approximately 75% of the tax base, making approximately 60% of the homes in the 

community uninhabitable, etc. 

The hurricane knocked out electrical service and flooded all 40 sewer lift stations, 

making them inoperable and destroying almost all the electrical components in the 

lift stations. One lift station was thought to be safe and emergency response equipment was stored there. However, even this station was flooded, destroying approximately $500,000 of equipment (generators and backup electrical systems which the 

city desperately needed in the aftermath. 

Immediately after the worst of the impacts (approximately midday on Monday), 

the condition of the water and wastewater system was dire. There were numerous 

breaks in lines; thousands of houses had been destroyed which tore lines from the 

ground; downed trees brought up lines; washed out roads left main lines exposed 

and damaged; both wells were down without power; etc. City officials started assessing damage and repairing the water supply by Monday afternoon. By Tuesday 

morning they were valving off lines and restoring the wells from generated power. 

Valving off lines is the first measure taken in restoring the water supply (restoring 

water pressure to portions of the system). This simply prevents the water from flowing out of the system through the breaks (which there were too many to count). Contamination can flow into the system through line breaks, and lack of pressure 

makes it very difficult or impossible to maintain the necessary disinfectant in the 

system. Of course, through this process, the entire system was under a boil water 

order. By Wednesday (day 2), some portion of the water supply was being restored 

to houses that were inhabited. The process of valving off sections of the communities 

76

in order to maintain pressure and find/fix leaks continued round the clock for the 

next 3-4 days. This process was very labor intensive. Any particular valve which 

needed to be shut off to return water service could be buried under a series of 

houses (many feet deep), buried by very large trees, or ripped from the earth from 

collapsed buildings. Much of this work required heavy machinery (backhoes, tree removal cranes, numerous chain saws, etc.) and it could sometimes take a crew the 

better part of a day to remove all the stacked houses and dig for the valve. 

After initially stabilizing the water system, the city public works staff began assessing the needs of the wastewater systems. Each lift station had to be rebuilt, as 

the electrical control panels had been destroyed by water. New parts had to be ordered and installed in each station to begin wastewater service. Waste service was 

partially restored in a week (at approximately 2:00 am the following Monday, the 

primary lift station was in service). Another 25 stations were operational by the following Friday. Every control panel had to be changed in the lift stations. 

Wastewater has to go somewhere in a disrupted system—it was impossible to control all untreated effluent from the wastewater system at all times. The wastewater 

system was inundated with flood water. This, combined with restored water service 

and torn up sewer lines (opening them to be filled by sand, wood, kitchen sinks, 

tires, bricks, debris, etc), caused some isolated overflows or untreated wastewater. 

This overflow was highly diluted with rainwater, and the city initiated some ad hoc 

emergency treatment of the overflows by placing chlorine tablets directly into the 

overflow streams as they ran off from the wastewater system. Much of the runoff 

was being absorbed by receiving waters contaminated by the hurricane with dead 

animals, vehicles, and other debris washed into them. The city posted notices to stay 

out of the bay waters that had been contaminated from the general runoff and dead 

animals in the bay. Some people in distress had been washing items and bathing 

in the bay water. 

Electrical power was restored 10 days after Katrina hit—for those 9 days the systems were operated on emergency generated power. 

Current Status of Water and Sanitation 

Currently, the water system is up and pressurized; however, we are finding new 

leaks every day and, as we restore new portions of the system and increase pressure, new breaks occur. The stress that is being placed on the water distribution 

system makes it fragile and prone to breaks. Loss of pressure means safety of the 

drinking water could be compromised. The water quality tests for coliform contamination have been met—the water has passed those tests, and the pressure is adequate, however fragile. And we are maintaining the necessary residual amount of 

chlorine disinfectant in the system. All this means the boil water order could be lifted. However, it is the decision of the local city officials not to lift the boil order at 

this time because the distribution system is (in the mayor and public works staff’s 

opinion) still too fragile and vulnerable. The order could be lifted in the coming 

days. As recently as Monday of this week, a main pump had electrical failure, which 

caused loss of pressure. Almost all the people in the area (upwards of 5,000) are 

drinking bottled water and only using the city water for washing, toilets, and household needs. 

Currently, the wastewater system is operating, pumping all sewage possible to 

our regional treatment works. The wastewater system has experienced limited, isolated overflows from broken or backed-up service lines; however, this is minimal and 

decreasing each day. There is a backup system for all the centrally collected sewage, 

in the event that the regional treatment plant can’t accept our wastewater stream. 

As a backup, the old lagoon is available to store and treat practically any wastewater overflow from the central collection systems. This backup could handle a 

number of days of the sewage without any discharge to the environment. 

Immediate Technical Assistance and Equipment Is Needed (Environmental Regulation is Not Needed, Nor Appropriate) 

Bay St. Louis has been helped through the recovery from the initial moments following the hurricane. Numerous technical response crews have been working in the 

community to restore water and sanitary service. The city has had Mississippi Rural 

Water Circuit Riders working every day for two weeks without break. Rural Water 

organized most of the personnel logistics in Bay St. Louis and in the other coastal 

counties. Rural Water Director Pete Boone and his staff were responsible for coordinating much of the recovery and providing technical personnel. Numerous utility 

crews have been working in Bay St. Louis from the City of Pontotoc; Clearwater, 

Florida; Fort Myers, Florida; Davenport, Iowa; Navy electricians (Seabees); Air 

Force Red Horse Squadron; American Gas Association; Yankee Gas; the Town of 

Cornett, Mississippi; and others that should mentioned. 

77

What is needed in this crisis and future crises is immediate access to technical 

personnel and equipment. Communities know the water is not safe long before it 

is declared not in compliance, and no one wants to restore safe water more than 

the local officials. We don’t need someone to tell us we must comply, but rather, we 

need the help and know-how to fix the problem. The problem to solve is purely a 

RESOURCE problem not a REGULATORY problem. This is why regulators are of 

little help in these situations. The type of people that are needed are: experienced 

operators, electricians, machinery crews, machine repair crews, expert pipe repair 

personnel, contractors, etc. Mandating progress is easy; it is the ‘‘how-to’’ that is 

hard and essential to limiting harm to public health and the environment. For the 

‘‘how-to,’’ the city relied on the help from the previously mentioned volunteers. 

From the mayor’s perspective, water is about the most important service for public welfare. Sanitation is critical, however, a community can get by for some time 

with loss of sanitation. Electricity is perhaps equally as critical as water, and the 

return of electrical power is typically the sign that things are being pulled together, 

but drinking water is an immediate and essential public health and welfare service. 

I was the second person Mayor Favre called after Katrina’s impact in Bay St. 

Louis. Using resources from the City of Pontotoc, our crews loaded cargo trucks and 

city vehicles with backhoe tires and parts, washers, refrigerators, buster pumps, 

chlorinator parts, baby food, baby clothes, blankets, plastic tarp coverings, diesel 

fuel, oil, gas cans, grills, cooking trailers, etc., along with four-man crews, and immediately headed for Bay St. Louis. Pontotoc has been shifting in three-man crews 

to Bay St. Louis and the neighboring hard hit city of Waveland every four days. 

These crews and the technical crews from the mentioned organizations can operate heavy machinery, repair the machinery, isolate and fix leaks, install and repair 

pumps, dig up mains, etc. These crews have the experience to bring the water pressure up without damaging other parts of systems. The process of valving off sections 

of the system, repairing the lines, bleeding out the air, and returning pressure takes 

skilled technical personnel. Repairing of backhoe tires proved to be a desperately 

needed service and critical to recovering water and sewer. 

One technical field person from Florida reported the following when asked what 

common technical assistance is needed in damaged communities: 

‘‘Much more complicated [than just generators]. Electrical components cleaned 

and replaced; control panels rebuilt; electric motors and pumps replaced or rebuilt; bypass pumps installed; generators wired direct; lift stations cleaned with 

vacuums or jet cleaned; leaks located and repaired with backhoes brought out 

from Florida; valves located and closed/opened or valves inserted to isolate 

areas of system; lift stations rebuilt; wastewater plants made to work with 

baling wire, rubber bands, bubble gum, or anything laying around. For example, 

wire is needed to bypass missing electrical controls so crews can go into rubble 

of destroyed houses and pull out wire to rewire water and wastewater plants. 

Think in terms of 50 McGuyvers doing whatever it takes to get water to folks 

and stop wastewater in the streets, in the Gulf, etc. At one plant, Florida crews 

walked around the destroyed warehouse/supply building to find circuit boards, 

fuses, whatever they needed and could find to get plant online. They even took 

circuit boards found and cleaned up best they could, so they could be used. 

These are master electricians, instrument techs, and top professionals in there 

areas.’’ 

Other crews from Pervis, Lamar County, and Monticello have responded to other 

Gulf Coast communities. In all of their cases of critical response, there was no approval process, forms, or red tape—just neighboring communities (already familiar 

with each other through participation in common associations, including municipal 

leagues and rural water associations) responding with the know-how and immediacy 

regardless of potential reimbursement. 

What we have witnessed in this relief operation is the necessity of familiarity 

among the needy and contributing communities. It has been apparent that strangers 

can’t have the relationship, familiarity, and trust needed to be helpful in an emergency situation. Our two cities have been working cooperatively for years, eliminating any learning curve which could cause delayed response and the trust deep. 

Working with partners in professional associations resulted in access to a network 

of experts. The Rural Water Circuit Riders were able to use their contacts across 

the state to acquire parts, plumbers, gas technicians, pipe, etc., that only comes 

from networking in the association of water and wastewater utilities. By networking 

within the association of mayors, Bay St. Louis and other cites were able to find 

immediate expert contractors and volunteer crews. 

This familiarity and peer assessment/review also acts as a check against any 

fraud. Because we have all of the leadership of the communities in the state cooperVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
78

ative looking at the actions of all the other communities, it acts as an effective selfpolicing filter (a system of checks and balances). 

Structural reasons that these volunteer and professional associations were so critical and effective in responding to the crises include:

• The fact that the associations’ functions are directly accountable to their members 

(the communities), ensuring that they act in a manner most favored and beneficial to the membership. 

• An understanding that time is a function of success (i.e., delayed response can significantly harm the public). In Louisiana, the EPA is conducting an in-depth assessment of every water supply (even communities with no reported problems). 

This type of inquiry has delayed what the communities believed was their immediate pressing need for equipment and technical assistance—to maximize 

public health protection. For example, while the EPA was just starting their intensive reporting assessment, communities where seeking out help where they 

could get it, and couldn’t wait for EPA to complete its assessment. In Livingston 

Parish, a Circuit Rider found much of the parish’s utilities without energy immediately following the hurricane. After coordinating with local officials, including fire officials and parish emergency offices, to target the most severely impacted utilities, the Circuit Rider was able to communicate with those operators 

via Nex-Tel (all phone communications were lost). Unable to procure water 

bladders from FEMA or emergency organizations, he was able to find approximately 20 water storage tanks and a colleague with a flatbed tow truck and 

started delivering the filled, large potable water storage containers to at least 

seven communities (Port Vincent, Paradise Ponte Island, Springfield, Head of 

Island, Killian, Bayview, and Vincent Acres). Working around the clock to keep 

the containers filled (10-hour supply), the pressure in the water systems was 

maintained. The tow truck operator was able to lift the main container on the 

truck high enough to create a siphon to fill the container left on-site. 

• All authority is localized. There is no need to seek approval from a centralized 

hierarchy that is not in the middle of the situation—and real-time changes to 

plans and polices can be made to react to local conditions and variables. 

What I have just described is the relief operations for communities’ environmental 

services. However, there has been an allegorical response to our citizens’ immediate 

individual human needs. The local churches have been the main response on this 

level. We have seen churches providing widespread operations to assist families and 

individuals. I personally witnessed a caravan of 71 church vehicles bringing relief 

to the Gulf Coast communities on one drive down highway 49 to Biloxi. In these 

communities, churches have been preparing meals for citizens and law enforcement 

officials tired of eating MREs, cooking on-site, carrying meals to people who won’t 

leave their houses, taking in refugees, and all other acts of human kindness. There 

is not a church in my county that hasn’t contributed to the relief. 

Overall Assessment of Region’s Environmental Impacts From Loss of Water and 

Sewer Service 

The assessments from Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are detailed in the following appendix. 

79

Mr. BASS. I thank you very much, Mayor Rutledge, and I just 

want you to know on a personal note, I established, in my hometown of Peterborough, New Hampshire, a program to adopt the city 

of Collins, Mississippi. We have sent an assessment team from 

Peterborough, New Hampshire down there. I wish you would convey my best regards to Mayor V. O. Smith, who is a wonderful fellow. My hometown of Peterborough is going to provide them, we 

hope, with $100,000 in cash to help rebuild the town by the end 

of October. 

With that, I would like to move Dr. Ragone, please, sir. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN E. RAGONE 

Mr. RAGONE. Mr. Chairman, just a correction. I am the Director 

of Science and Technology with the National Ground Water Association, and Dr. Schnieders is a member of the National Ground 

Water Association. 

Mr. BASS. Fair enough. Please accept my apologies. 

Mr. RAGONE. Oh, I like that other group very much. Just for the 

record, too, the NGWA is an organization of approximately 15,000 

scientists, engineers, contractors, manufacturers, and suppliers. 

Our overall mission is to provide and protect groundwater. 

What we have learned so far is that the situation resulting from 

Hurricane Katrina is understandably chaotic. Our members report 

that many of the hardest hit communities still do not have electricity, generators, or operational water pumps. Some report that 

access to these communities has been restricted. 

We have learned that difficulties remain in contacting local 

water supply employees. People with private wells, we are told, 

have been left on their own to fix their water problems. More than 

230,000 residents in the impacted area rely on private wells for 

drinking water. So far, we have heard that saltwater is in some of 

these wells. NGWA members are in the process of addressing these 

situations. We anticipate that complaints of contamination, or 

water supply problems will be reported as residents return home, 

and find they have no water or poor water quality. 

Reports from areas less impacted by the storm indicate that 

strides are being made to return public and private water systems 

to operation. A concern is whether the municipal distribution infrastructure, the water pipes, remains intact, as contamination could 

result through breaks in the distribution pipes. Our members expect that the impact of the hurricane will be minimal even in the 

heavily inundated areas, for those who have properly constructed 

and maintained wells. 

We are aware of efforts being taken to obtain baseline information and provide assistance, and we have included that in our 

longer written testimony. However, it is our general impression 

from contacts with our members in the affected region that communication problems, citizen displacement, and other storm-related 

disruptions, have slowed efforts to determine the scope of the problem, and to take corrective measures. It appears that improved predisaster planning, training, and coordination between government 

officials and private sector water well professionals could have improved response time. Planning, coordination, and training of local 

officials and private sector entities prior to the disaster seems to 

80

be a critical missing component in helping to make recovery efforts 

more effective. 

Although standard disinfection protocols are being distributed by 

many agencies in the area, we believe that additional disinfection 

protocols may be required, in order to mitigate the varying levels 

of contamination. For example, shock chlorination, the traditional 

approach to well disinfection, does not always solve the problem for 

those with inundated wells, or where general groundwater quality 

has been impacted. In fact, shock chlorination can cause more longterm harm than good. This is especially true when floodwaters contain very high loads of sediment, debris, or chemical and biological 

contaminants. Also, and very importantly, studies have shown that 

older wells are more susceptible to contamination and flooding, and 

may require different decontamination protocols than more modern 

wells. 

The National Ground Water Association, under a contract with 

FEMA, presented a report to the agency in 2002, entitled ‘‘Field 

Evaluation of Emergency Well Disinfection for Contamination 

Events.’’ This field study examined Hurricane Floyd’s impact on 

wells in North Carolina and adjacent Atlanta coastal areas, and 

specifically, well-disinfection efficacy. Some of the recommendations 

included in that report are attached to my written testimony as Appendix 1. 

The recommendations highlight our concern that a more strategic, community-based approach is needed to prepare for and respond to natural disasters and terrorist acts. If you would like a 

copy of this report, we would be happy to provide it. The NGWA 

has been working to provided needed information and protocols for 

emergency response. We have developed website products, certified 

professionals, offered training programs and materials, as well as 

undertaken our own research to help prepare the industry, well 

owners, and government officials. 

However, we recognize that much more needs to be done. We 

look forward to working with Federal, state, local, private sector 

partners to fill research, training, and information gaps. The 

NGWA is happy to have had the chance to participate in this hearing. An important reason for being here, beyond our concern about 

the immediate crisis caused by Hurricane Katrina, is to encourage 

the development of a strategy that will ensure immediate, cost effective, and appropriate community-based responses to future disasters and terrorist acts that may disrupt our drinking water supplies. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Stephen E. Ragone follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN E. RAGONE, DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY, THE NATIONAL GROUND WATER ASSOCIATION

INTRODUCTION

Good morning. My name is Dr. Stephen Ragone. I am the Director for Science and 

Technology for the National Ground Water Association (NGWA). The NGWA is an 

organization of approximately 15,000 scientists, engineers, contractors, manufacturers and suppliers. The NGWA’s overall mission is to provide and protect ground 

water. I would first like to thank the Committee for this opportunity to speak and 

acknowledge my colleague, Dr. John Schnieders, principal chemist for Water Systems Engineering, Inc. who helped me prepare these remarks. 

81

1 U.S. Geological Survey, March 2004 report on 2000 water use 

2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. A Survey of the Quality of Wter Drawn from 

Domestic Wells in Nine Midwest States. September 1998. 

Approximately 52% of Alabama’s, 100% of Mississippi’s and 75% of Louisiana’s 

populations regularly depend on ground water for their drinking water supply.1

Over 513,000 wells are used to provide drinking water to the three states’ residents 

(Table 1). Of those, an estimated 234,545 household well systems in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi counties are estimated to be in areas impacted by Hurricane 

Katrina and are eligible for individual disaster assistance funds from FEMA (Table 

2). At this time we cannot provide the Committee with a number of wells that have 

been flooded versus other levels of impact. 

WHAT DO WE KNOW

What we have learned so far is that the situation is, understandably, chaotic. Our 

members report that many in the hardest hit communities still do not have electricity, generators or operational water pumps. Some report that access to these 

communities has been restricted. There also have been reports of saltwater in some 

wells. NGWA members are in the process of addressing these situations. However, 

as more residents return, it is anticipated that complaints will continue to come in 

when people find they have no water or poor quality water. Reports from areas less 

impacted by the storm are that strides are being made to return public and private 

water systems to operation. A top concern is whether the municipal distribution infrastructure—the water pipes ‘‘remains intact as contamination could result through 

breaks in the distribution pipes. We’ve heard that difficulties remain in contacting 

water system employees. Members expect that the impact of the hurricane will be 

minimal—even in heavily inundated areas—for those who have properly constructed 

and maintained wells. 

We are also aware of efforts being undertaken to obtain baseline information or 

provide assistance. For example the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, 

in conjunction with the U.S. EPA and the Louisiana Rural Water Association, are 

offering free water testing to residents in certain Louisiana parishes with flooded 

household wells. As part of this effort, residents are being provided with information 

on sample collection and water system disinfection. The U.S. EPA and the Louisiana 

Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) have information regarding well-testing and disinfection on their website. Additionally, the U.S. Geological Survey is 

testing wells in inundated areas to assess whether brackish water has entered into 

the subsurface. We also have reports that Louisiana DEQ is in the initial stages 

of doing some VOCs testing. A report we received from the Louisiana Department 

of Transportation and Development indicate they are currently testing public water 

supplies but an inventory of flooded, and or damaged domestic wells is not yet available. However, our members in the Louisiana Ground Water Association reported 

that well drillers are working around the clock to return household wells to potability. 

It is our general impression from contacts with our members in the region that 

communication problems, other relief efforts, and citizen displacement remain challenges to identifying the scope of the problem and remediating affected wells. It appears that improved pre-disaster planning, training, and coordination between government officials and private sector water well professionals could have lessened the 

challenges. 

Planning, coordination, and training of local officials and private sector entities 

prior to the disaster seem to be critical missing components in helping to make existing efforts more effective. Beyond initial and standard protocols being distributed, 

long-term strategies should ensure that appropriate de-contamination protocols are 

available for varying levels of contamination, well design, well size, and 

hydrogeologic variables. For example, shock chlorination—the traditional approach 

to well disinfection—does not always solve the problem for those with inundated 

wells or where general ground water quality has been impacted. In fact, shock 

chlorination can cause more long-term harm than good. This is especially true when 

floodwaters contain very high loads of sediment, debris, as well as, chemical and biological contaminants. In such cases the wells, both public and private, may require 

different and/or additional cleaning procedures. This concern is exacerbated in several areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina where refineries and other industries are 

present. Studies have also shown that older wells are more susceptible to contamination and flooding, and may require different approaches than more modern wells.2

82

FUTURE STRATEGIES REQUIRE COORDINATION

The National Ground Water Association, under a contract with FEMA, presented 

a report to the agency in 2002 entitled ‘‘Field Evaluation of Emergency Well Disinfection for Contamination Events.’’ This field study examined the 1999 Hurricane 

Floyd’s impact on North Carolina and adjacent Atlantic coastal areas—specifically 

well disinfection efficacy. We also included in the report recommendations on how 

to address household water wells in future natural and manmade disasters. If you 

would like a copy of this report please let us know. (Appendix I). 

Our recommendations outline a plan that educates and trains local private sector 

personnel to complement government efforts in a forward thinking manner. We discuss the development of county/district teams trained and equipped to evaluate, 

help and conduct needed immediate repairs of wells as needed to restore private 

water supply function and potability. These teams would include local government 

environmental health staff, private-sector personnel experienced in well and pump 

service and other people with specific knowledge of local ground water quality and 

occurrence, such as hydrogeologists. The teams would be trained in both evaluation 

and pump repair. Additionally, these teams would work to train retail workers and 

‘‘neighborhood helpers’’ who work with pumps, plumbing, chemical selection and/or 

generally mechanical to aide in post-emergency efforts. As for disinfection efficacy, 

as discussed previously, there are standard disinfection methods but it will be important that residents and water suppliers follow the appropriate protocols for the 

appropriate water supply and take into account contaminants present, size of well, 

aquifer hydraulic conductivity, and flood water depth and quality. Local health and 

water entities, both governmental and private-sector, should have this information 

readily available for themselves and the public at large. 

The NGWA has been working in this area. We have developed web site products, 

certified professionals, offered training programs and materials, as well as undertaken research to help prepare the industry, well owners and government officials. 

However, more has to be done. We are looking forward to working with our federal, 

state, local and private sector partners to fill research, training and information 

gaps and enhance state and local response planning. 

The NGWA is happy to have had the chance to participate in this hearing. An 

important reason for being here, beyond our concern about the immediate crisis 

caused by Hurricane Katrina, is to encourage this country to develop a strategy that 

will ensure immediate, cost-effective and appropriate responses to future natural 

disasters or terrorist’s acts that disrupt our drinking water supplies. We look forward to working with you and serving as a resource as more information on the impacts of Katrina on ground water supplies is collected and analyzed.

Table 1

State Well Numbers 

State Community Wells 3 Household Wells 4 Total for State 

Alabama .......................................................................................... 764 201,111 201,875

Mississippi ...................................................................................... 2,712 122,452 125,164

Louisiana ......................................................................................... 3,338 182,926 186,264

Total ................................................................................................ 6,814 506,489 513,303

3 US EPA, 2004

4 Based on 1990 Census data, last year in which household wells were counted. 

Table 2

Estimated Household Wells in Designated Disaster Counties 

(counties where individual assistance available) 

Alabama Louisiana Mississippi 

Baldwin ................................ 11,902 Acadia ................................. 6,279 Adams ................................. 378

Greene .................................. 1,034 Ascension ............................ 9,942 Amite ................................... 1,755

Hale ..................................... 1,301 Assumption ......................... 92 Attala .................................. 807

Mobile1 ................................ 4,708 Calcasieu ............................ 10,012 Choctaw .............................. 200

Pickens ................................ 1,378 Cameron .............................. 472 Claiborne ............................. 162

Tuscaloosa ........................... 3,446 East Baton Rouge ............... 1,031 Clarke .................................. 1,144

Washington .......................... 2,941 East Feliciana ..................... 1,041 Copiah ................................. 674

Iberia ................................... 4,392 Covington ............................ 414

Iberville ............................... 638 Forrest ................................. 853

83

Table 2—Continued

Estimated Household Wells in Designated Disaster Counties 

(counties where individual assistance available) 

Alabama Louisiana Mississippi 

Jefferson .............................. 54 Franklin ............................... 1,280

Jefferson Davis .................... 1,904 George ................................. 4,289

Lafayette ............................. 13,311 Greene ................................. 1,323

Lafourche ............................ 3 Hancock ............................... 5,424

Livingston ............................ 7,874 Harrison ............................... 12,726

Orleans ................................ 1,024 Hinds ................................... 1,246

Plaquemines ........................ 37 Jackson ................................ 8,723

Pointe Coupee ..................... 1,162 Jasper .................................. 199

St. Bernard .......................... 10 Jefferson .............................. 142

St. Charles .......................... 33 Jefferson Davis .................... 352

St. Helena ........................... 1,016 Jones ................................... 640

St. James ............................ 56 Kemper ................................ 184

St. John ............................... 239 Lamar .................................. 1,470

St. Martin ............................ 2,482 Lauderdale .......................... 2,276

St. Mary ............................... 441 Lawrence ............................. 483

St. Tammany ....................... 21,787 Leake ................................... 860

Tangipahoa ......................... 14,035 Lincoln ................................. 4,372

Terrebonne ........................... 23 Lowndes .............................. 3,167

Vermilion ............................. 9,867 Madison ............................... 506

Washington ......................... 6,594 Marion ................................. 1,757

West Baton Rouge .............. 147 Neshoba .............................. 599

West Feliciana ..................... 59 Newton ................................ 1,603

Noxubee ............................... 1,128

Oktibbeha ............................ 320

Pearl River .......................... 5,957

Perry .................................... 870

Pike ..................................... 4,344

Rankin ................................. 871

Scott .................................... 487

Simpson .............................. 736

Smith ................................... 329

Stone ................................... 1,594

Walthall ............................... 2,204

Warren ................................. 389

Wayne .................................. 1,388

Wilkinson ............................. 499

Winston ............................... 180

Yazoo ................................... 474

36,710 116,057 81,778

APPENDIX I 

EXCERPT FROM FIELD EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY WELL DISINFECTION FOR

CONTAMINATION EVENTS: FINAL PROJECT REPORT

PLAN FOR RETURNING WATER SUPPLY WELLS INUNDATED BY FLOOD

The following is a set of recommendations for planning and implementing a program of returning water supply wells inundated by flood to potable status. Implementing these activities will require coordination among county departments and 

among local jurisdictions, the state, and supporting federal agencies such as FEMA, 

and also with the private sector. An appropriate organizational umbrella under 

which this process could operate is state/county emergency management. 

1. In each county/district of local government environmental health, teams will be 

trained and equipped to evaluate, help and conduct needed immediate repairs of 

wells as needed to restore private water supply function and potability. The team 

should include government environmental health staff, private-sector personnel experienced in well and pump service, and other people with specific knowledge of 

local ground water quality and occurrence, such as hydrogeologists. The teams need 

to be trained in both a) evaluation and expedient fixes (pump repair) and b) human 

interaction (customer relations). Private sector team’s members should be on retainer or standing purchase order. 

84

2. These teams in turn should train a) retail workers, such as those working in 

hardware stores and home-improvement superstores who work with pumps, plumbing, and chemical selection and b) ‘‘neighborhood helpers’’—those people found in 

any neighborhood or community who are capable, helpful and competent in fixing 

things—to assist people with basic pump repair and well disinfection. Train them 

to safely and effectively deal with the well problems that do not require contractor 

equipment, such as jet pump repair or shallow well disinfection, the specifics of safety issues, and water sampling. Such trained personnel, upon passing a practical examination, would be awarded a limited-time certification in emergency water supply 

assistance. The local environmental health agency would maintain and publicize a 

current list of stores with such certified personnel available. Certified neighborhood 

helpers would identify themselves to emergency response personnel and neighbors, 

and be known to well ERP team members. All such responders must be insured or 

otherwise protected under state ‘‘good Samaritan’’ provisions to the extent appropriate. 

3. Draft and supply simply worded and illustrated fact sheets with detailed recommendations for safe pump function restoration, well flushing, and well disinfection, with versions in both English and widely used secondary languages such as 

Spanish. 

4. In support of activities triggered under the local well restoration ERP:

A. Have wells spotted and located on county GIS plat maps, with a database of essential well characteristics (type, depth, diameter). Hard-copy maps and GIS 

electronic file backups should be generated regularly, made available to the well 

response teams, and stored safely in case of emergency. 

B. Collect data on hydrogeology (aquifer tapped by wells, protective layers, water 

tables) and a suite of physical-chemical and microbial ecology parameters that 

provide a basis for understanding an ambient baseline condition. With such an 

ambient baseline recorded, deviations from the expected hydrogeochemical profile of a well can be recognized, even if basic regulatory parameters are negative 

or inconclusive. Include this hydrogeochemical data in the GIS database and as 

map layers for use by the well ERP team. 

C. The plan should include a well triage strategy for use in the event of an emergency, as follows: 

• Start with a rapid survey (aided by having wells finely located) to assess the 

situation and to formulate a response. 

• Accurately mark and bypass 2-in. deep wells with in-line jets, and 2-in. jetted 

or driven wells, and other wells requiring specific training and equipment to 

restore. Have people pump them, but leave treatment or replacement to an 

equipped contractor. 

• Instruct people on how to treat shallow bored wells. 

• Sample wells for total coli form once restored to function and pumped. Certified helpers would supplement environmental health in this. 

• Plan and implement follow-up testing and additional response, such as ordering and assisting impaired well replacement. 

5. Equip response teams as follows: 

A. A supply of pump sets for circulating chlorine and pumping, equipped as needed 

(hoses, valves, fittings) and working. Include a generator, tools, parts and instructions to install functional systems on typical installations. Provide and periodically update reliable telephone numbers for troubleshooting and installation assistance. 

B. As only Ca(OCl)2 has a lengthy shelf life (when stored cool and dry), keep some 

of this on hand in various forms for use until trucks can bring in sodium hypochlorite. Include any associated treatment chemicals such as vinegar for 

acidizing. Rotate stocks semiannually. Have on hand measuring cups and laminated sheets with information on dosing volumes for wells by diameter and 

depth. 

C. Well water testing equipment similar to that used in this study—maintained, 

calibrated, and with fresh batteries—and sampling supplies for (limited) onsite 

and laboratory analysis of TC, nitrates, and selected other contaminants. Testing should be part of triage and follow up. 

6. Local environmental health jurisdictions should aggressively work to reduce the 

number of substandard and unsafe private water supplies vulnerable to flooding inundation.

A. Begin a public information campaign to educate well owners and users about safe 

and unsafe or vulnerable water supplies and how they can be tested and improved. 

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B. Deficiencies in specific well and pump installations (poorly designed, vulnerable 

to inundation or damage during credible flooding events, or otherwise unsafe in 

addition to not meeting state rules) identified during mapping efforts should be 

called to the attention of property owners and responsible parties, with procedures and schedules for resolution provided. 

7. This inspection and response plan should have a regular review and revision 

cycle with measurable goals set. 

Immediate Response and Prioritizing Follow-up Response 

1. Determine that an emergency exists, assess its magnitude and implement the 

well restoration ERP elements appropriate to the emergency. 

2. Broadcast instructions for safely restoring well function and activate the network of certified well responders and professional contractors. Make instructions for 

disinfection that can be attempted by well owners and contacts for assistance available to affected residents. 

3. As soon as it is safe, well ERP teams begin the reconnaissance to determine 

necessary responses for specific wells and assign them to the appropriate responders. Use the predetermined well designations from disaster-preparedness inspections 

(Section 7.1).

A. Inform residents of the response plan and schedule. Provide a point of contact 

for residents, and assist them as needed in obtaining emergency potable and 

wash water. 

B. In a site visit: 1) Identify and record (narrated video or by photography with notation) problems for follow up later. 2) As soon as possible, restore well function 

and instruct residents to pump wells several hours to clear contamination. 3) 

Sample for contamination parameters. 

4. If analysis results indicate that contamination has occurred (or may have occurred), implement disinfection as follows. 

Emergency Disinfection Methods 

While disinfection procedures are somewhat specific to the individual well’s dimensions, design and conditions, the following are general requirements of emergency disinfection in response to inundation. 

1. As needed, restore pump function as needed and pump inundated wells clear 

for several hours to clear dirt and flood water contaminants. Do not pump flush 

water through treatment and distribution systems, but discharge from the first 

flushing tap. The time required is dependent on well size, aquifer hydraulic conductivity, and flood water depth and quality. As few as three hours and as many as 

24 may be needed, and reasonable numbers should be determined for local conditions. 

2. In a clean mixing tank or container, mix a solution with 100 mg/L (ppm) chlorine, maximized for hypochlorous acid: In the appropriate volume (one well bore volume—determine by well diameter, depth, and depth to water level) of clean water, 

acidify with white distilled food-grade vinegar or more concentrated food-grade acetic acid to approximately pH 5.9 (varies according to water pH and buffering capacity). Then mix in the sodium hypochlorite solution (generally 5-12 %) volume needed 

to make a 100-ppm solution. Adjust pH as needed to pH 6.5 or less. Alternative: 

Use powdered or granular calcium hypochlorite for chlorine and muriatic or sulfamic acid for acidifier. People conducting this mixing must be trained in the specific 

chemical safety issues of these chemicals and mixtures and their use and be 

equipped to avoid injury and to respond to spills. 

3. Drain or pump to the bottom of the well. 

4. Start agitation or pumping to pull solution upward throughout the water column. 

5. Allow to react up to 24 hr. 

6. Pump off to waste, avoiding environmental harm, until measured total chlorine 

is <0.2 mg/L. 

7. Conduct water system disinfection per state rules or recommendations. 

8. After one week, test for total coli form bacteria and nitrates. In the interim, 

instruct residents to boil water for drinking and cooking. Exception: Boiling should 

be avoided if a history of high nitrates exists, substitute filtration. 

9. If wells are substandard at inspection, or do not respond to treatment, follow 

up with action to require replacement or repair, and provide the appropriate assistance to make this happen. 

Specific steps for a 2-in in-line jet well) 

1. Pump clear 3 well volumes or fresh ground water by parameters 

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2. Mix in large plastic tubs: vinegar for acidifying and sufficient NaOCl to treat 

2 well volumes 

3. Pull in-well pipe and jet (inspect and clean) 

4. Displace in chlorine solution: Air used to displace solution downward and a 

bailer to pull solution upward through the water column 

5. Wait 24 hr 

6. Reinstall pump components and hook up jet pump 

7. Pump off to clear 

8. Pump one well volume + after Cl is < 0.2 mg/L and test for TC and ion parameters. 

9. In one week, test for indicator parameters. 

Specific steps for a bored well: 

1. In clean, new 32-gallon plastic trash cans, mix vinegar and NaOCl or Ca(OCl)2 

to make a well-bore volume of 100-mg/L solution, and permit residues to settle. 

2. Pump well down and clear. 

3. Dose with chlorine solution and brush well walls 

4. Let refill if slow to respond after emptying 

5. Recirculate with jet pump 

6. Wait 24 hr 

7. Pump clear (to < 0.2 mg/L by chlorine test kit) 

8. Pump more than one well volume, then test for indicator parameters 

Follow up 

1. Take steps to replace vulnerable and substandard well water supplies, with 

specific plans, goals and schedules, developed through consultation with the public, 

regulatory officials, stakeholders, and funding sources, and prevent installation of 

at-risk private water supplies in the future. 

2. Review the well restoration ERP and its implementation and make adjustments 

needed. 

The above recommended protocols should be viewed as being preliminary and subject to review and revision by the implementing agencies.

Mr. BASS. Thank you very much, Dr. Ragone. Mr. Olson, you are 

next. 

STATEMENT OF ERIK D. OLSON 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for inviting me to testify. I am with the Natural 

Resources Defense Council, but I also wanted to mention that we 

have been working closely with a variety of organization from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, to get input in daily calls and so 

on, with Dr. Beverly Wright, to my left, and with a variety of other 

groups, including Louisiana Environmental Network and many 

others that are expert in observing what is happening every day. 

We believe that Katrina really is, perhaps, the single worst environmental catastrophe that has ever befallen the United States 

from a natural disaster. And obviously, there have been many environmental disasters, but the impacts of this, we are just beginning 

to learn. We have heard a lot of anecdotal reports, at least, of 

health effects in people that have been exposed, police officers, first 

responders, and the public that are reporting rashes and blisters, 

as a result of touching some of the water. Open sores that are not 

responsive to antibiotics. Fumes that are causing asthma and respiratory problems. 

We strongly believe that this shouldn’t just be anecdotal reporting. There should be ongoing surveillance of people that are going 

back into these communities. We have heard about a young man 

who went into some of the water with hip waders, and had a small 

amount of water splashed into his hip wading boots, and came out 

with blisters the same day. So, clearly, there are problems. There 

87

is not safe drinking water, as we just heard EPA testify, for, I believe they said 2.3 million people to this day. In New Orleans proper, the water is not safe to drink, yet hundreds of thousands of people are being told that they can come back into town. 

American Water Works Association last week released an estimate that it was going to cost $2.25 billion just to rehabilitate the 

drinking water supplies in this area. There are widespread toxins 

as well. What I have primarily been talking about are some of the 

bacterial and related problems, but the toxic problems and the oil 

spills are a serious issue. By some counts, we heard just moments 

ago a witness say that it was around 400 oil and hazardous chemical spills. Previous estimates posted on government websites were 

there were 575 recorded oil and hazardous chemical spills, over 7 

million gallons being spilled. 

Just imagine 350,000 automobiles that have been destroyed by 

this. How much oil, how much gasoline, how many toxic substances 

are released there? Also, hundreds of industrial facilities, dozens of 

hazardous waste and other related facilities that were inundated. 

We are very concerned about the long term effects of this. 

I wanted to mention a couple of important points. One is the air 

monitoring that has been released. I have in my testimony a table, 

which is derived directly from the EPA’s website. On page 3 of our 

testimony, we compare the levels of benzene, a known human carcinogen, and a toxin to the human system, we compare the levels 

measured by EPA in New Orleans proper, to the 2 week safety 

standard, in other words, the standard that you could be safely exposed to for around 2 weeks. That safety standard is five parts per 

billion, and over half of the samples taken in the city were over 

that standard. And we list many sites where it was more than double the safety standard. 

We are very concerned that some public statements of the agency 

official suggest that it is safe to return, yet their own monitoring 

is showing that it is well over the 2 week, or so-called intermediate 

safety standard. It might be safe to go in for a day and come back 

out, but it is not safe to stay there for a period of time. 

In addition, returning citizens are really not getting the kind of 

information they need about what is safe and what is not. We just 

heard witnesses say that it is the local government’s responsibility 

ultimately. We strongly disagree with that. We believe that the 

Federal Government, the Federal EPA, has the legal authority and 

the responsibility, both as a legal matter and as a moral matter, 

to make sure that when people are returning to these communities, 

that they are going to get accurate information, and that they will 

be safe. 

Certainly, I am sure as Dr. Wright will testify to, we are very 

concerned about the disproportionate effects of some of these toxins. We are concerned that cleanup be certain to clean up the low 

income and African-American communities, as well as the rest of 

the community. We want to make sure there is full community involvement in those cleanup decisions. 

We need expanded testing. The testing EPA showed up on the 

map just moments ago is certainly, there are a lot of samples that 

have been taken in New Orleans proper. What about the hundreds 

of other locations where there are industrial facilities, all across 

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the three states? What about all of the locations where we know 

drinking water supplies are knocked out? What about all the underground storage tanks that have been knocked out? What about 

the millions of gallons that have been spilled elsewhere? Are we 

monitoring that, and making that information available to the public in Mississippi, in Alabama, in locations other than New Orleans? 

And finally, I wanted to summarize the other major concerns we 

have, including the enormous amount of debris, 100 million cubic 

yards by some estimates, of debris. Is that going to be burned, as 

some are suggesting? It is a very deep concern that if there is going 

to widespread open burning. And in addition, we are very concerned that the cleanup standards be very high, and that we not 

adopt wide waivers. We heard EPA say that they have not yet 

identified any need for broad waivers. We have identified no need, 

and we are happy to submit to the record the numerous examples 

of waivers that are already allowed under current law. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Erik D. Olson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIK D. OLSON, SENIOR ATTORNEY, NATURAL RESOURCES

DEFENSE COUNCIL

Introduction 

Thank you for the opportunity to present testimony today. I am Erik D. Olson, 

a Senior Attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a national 

non-profit public interest organization dedicated to the protection of public health 

and the environment, with over 500,000 members. As part of my work at NRDC, 

I have been helping to coordinate our response to Katrina. We have been working 

closely in this effort with a large number of other environmental, environmental justice, public health, medical, water industry [what’s ‘‘water industry’’??], and other 

groups, including many organizations from Louisiana and Mississippi. I am in daily 

touch with hurricane survivors and with experts and others who are tracking the 

effects of this devastating storm, including my son who is assisting with hurricane 

relief efforts in Louisiana. In addition, I serve as chair of the Campaign for Safe 

& Affordable Drinking Water, an alliance of over 300 public health, consumer, medical, nursing, environmental, and other groups that works to ensure that all Americans have safe drinking water, and that has taken a special interest in the impacts 

of Katrina. Today, however, I appear only on behalf of NRDC. 

Mr. Chairman and other members of the Subcommittee, Katrina is perhaps the 

single worst environmental catastrophe ever to befall the United States as a result 

of a natural disaster. As any of the brave and stalwart citizens of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama who survived Hurricane Katrina will tell you, this disaster 

has left an indelible mark on them and their families, communities, and environment. The loss of human life and widespread human misery that Katrina caused 

and continues to cause as we sit in this room today, are simply unfathomable. 

I have been asked today to focus on the environmental effects of Katrina—and 

in particular on the potential effects of toxins in the storm-ravaged area. Specifically, I intend to focus primarily on the known and potential human health effects 

of the widespread releases of raw sewage, petroleum, and other toxins into the environment. 

Reports of Severe Pollution and Illnesses 

We are receiving regular, albeit anecdotal, reports of police, rescue workers, and 

ordinary people who have returned to or stayed in flooded areas and have become 

ill after contact with the flood water or muck. Reports of rashes and blisters where 

skin has contacted polluted water, infected sores that are not responsive to antibiotics, nausea, and vomiting are legion. Respiratory problems—including asthma 

among many people exposed to fumes in contaminated areas—also are being reported. 

One woman’s brother returned to his home to try to recover a few belongings, only 

to vomit three times upon entering the home due to the stench of sewage, decay, 

and chemicals. I spoke to the mother of a young man who wore hip waders into 

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floodwaters, but whose skin came in contact with the toxic water. The same day, 

he developed a rash and blisters where his skin had touched the water. We have 

heard from many local citizens about police officers and other emergency workers 

who have come into contact with the polluted flood water, only to develop rashes 

and other symptoms. The long-term effects of this toxic exposure are unknown, and 

of profound concern to us and to many local citizens. 

One public health nurse working with the Red Cross spoke to us and reported 

that she had seen, by her count, over a thousand evacuees in Mississippi, but she 

had no tetanus or hepatitis vaccine to give to evacuees who were planning to return 

home to their water-soaked communities. 

As the flood water recedes, and the toxin-laced sediment and residue dries, a fine 

dust begins to swirl with wind or disturbance. This fine, toxic dust presents a serious risk to citizens if inhaled. 

In many of the hardest-hit areas, people returning home do not have access to 

emergency medical services, nor to nearby health clinics, physicians, or hospital 

emergency rooms. Communications also remain difficult. It is therefore difficult to 

determine how widespread and serious these problems are, but it is likely that 

many people are suffering without appropriate medical care. There is an urgent 

need for better-coordinated and more comprehensive medical care and for ongoing 

disease surveillance. 

There are enormous health hazards from the runoff, which contains staggering 

quantities of untreated human and animal waste and decaying plants and animals. 

These risks are particularly pronounced as hundreds of thousands of people return 

to areas where the muck and standing water are a teeming stew of parasites and 

dangerous bacteria. 

Spills and Leaks of Oil and Toxic Chemicals are Numerous and Widespread 

According to U.S. Coast Guard and EPA data, as of September 18, 575 Katrinarelated spills of petroleum or hazardous chemical had been reported. Just eleven 

significant spills released approximately 7 million gallons of oil, a portion of which 

was contained or cleaned up, but much of which was not. 

We also understand that there are 350,000 or more ruined automobiles and other 

vehicles caught by the flooding that will have to be dealt with. The amount of gasoline and toxic fluids in these vehicles alone is enough to give one pause; if each gas 

tank contained approximately 8 gallons of gasoline, this adds nearly 3 million additional gallons to the 7 million-gallon total noted above. By comparison, 11 million 

gallons of oil were released in the Exxon Valdez disaster. 

Moreover, at least four Superfund hazardous waste sites in the New Orleans area 

were hit by the storm. Across the storm-ravaged areas of Louisiana, Mississippi, and 

Alabama dozens of other toxic waste sites, major industrial facilities, ports, barges, 

and vessels that handle enormous quantities of oil and hazardous chemicals took 

a direct blow from Katrina. 

In addition to oil and chemical spills, and potential releases from toxic waste or 

industrial facilities, one major source of toxins that has received very little public 

attention to date is the toxic sediment that has accumulated at the bottom of many 

of the lakes, rivers, and streams in industrialized areas over many decades due to 

industrial spills. These toxic underwater hotspots have long been of concern to state 

and federal officials. According to experts with whom we have spoken in Louisiana, 

many of these toxic hotspots have now been stirred up, and toxic sediment has been 

re-suspended, and re-deposited across large land areas, including in residential communities, by storm surge and floodwater. 

To date, virtually no public information is available about toxic chemical levels 

in areas outside of New Orleans area. Moreover, there have been virtually no public 

reports of the results of chemical testing or inspections of storm-damaged industrial 

facilities outside of this immediate area. 

EPA Monitoring Shows Dangerous Levels of Air Contamination from Spills 

& Releases, but Agency Public Statements Offer Misleading Reassurances to the Public About Safety 

Agency data also show that elevated levels of toxic chemicals such as benzene and 

xylene, in some cases levels above the 24-hour safety limits, have been found in the 

air adjacent to spills. 

Perhaps more troublingly, EPA has released air monitoring data from its Trace 

Atmospheric Gas Analyser (TAGA) buses and other monitors used across New Orleans, showing that contaminants are at unsafe levels for rehabitating certain parts 

of the city. NRDC has reached this conclusion by comparing benzene monitoring results, posted on EPA’s web site, to levels that the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) established to protect people from intermediateVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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term (e.g., two-week) exposures to this chemical—a level of 4 ppb. Significantly, in 

25% of the areas sampled in New Orleans, EPA monitoring shows levels of benzene 

more then twice this NIEHS intermediate safety level. Yet EPA’s charts and discussions on its website only compare elevated air pollution levels to the much higher 

(50 ppb) acute NIEHS safety level—that is, to a level that is only considered safe 

for very short-term (e.g., 24-hour) exposure. Moreover, no air or other sampling has 

been publicly reported for most areas around spills or chemical facilities outside of 

New Orleans.

New Orleans Sampling Locations with More than Twice the NIEHS Safe Level of Exposure for 

Benzene 

Location PPB 

Murphy Oil Refinery .................................................................................................................................................. 88.0-170.0

LaSalle and Tulane Ave ........................................................................................................................................... 8.2

Weidman and Monroe ............................................................................................................................................... 8.5

Tall Timbers before Silver Maple Ct. ....................................................................................................................... 8.6

Cleveland St. and South Johnson ............................................................................................................................ 18.0

Barataria Blvd between Jessie St. and Rt. 18 ........................................................................................................ 11.0

N. Rampart and Canal ............................................................................................................................................. 14.0

Wall Blvd and Pace .................................................................................................................................................. 15.0

Tullis and Woodland near Cypress Grove Ct. .......................................................................................................... 15.3

Glenwood Drive & Fairmont ..................................................................................................................................... 11.0

Avenue A and Hector ................................................................................................................................................ 21.0

Duplessis St. and Park St. ....................................................................................................................................... 16.5

E. Maple Ridge Dr. and Maple Ridge Oak .............................................................................................................. 9.0

Convention Center Blvd. ........................................................................................................................................... 9.8

Oak Lawn and Veterans ........................................................................................................................................... 8.5

Note: NRDC compared sampled concentrations to safe levels (4 ppb) for exposure over a two week period as calculated by NIEHS. This 

comparison is discussed in our testimony. 

Despite the inadequacy of these test results, EPA asserts in its public materials 

that, ‘‘[t]he screening results indicated that chemical concentrations in most areas 

are below ATSDR health standards of concern.’’ http://www.epa.gov/katrina/

testresults/air/taga.html. These kinds of agency statements have undoubtedly led to 

widespread confusion and may have misled the public and local officials about the 

safety of returning to polluted areas. 

Returning Citizens and Many Responders Do Not Understand the Risks 

and Are Not Using Protective Clothing or Gear 

In light of the lack of adequate and accurate public information, people are returning to toxin-soaked areas without understanding the risks, and without being 

provided the proper protections, warnings, or knowledge. We are extremely concerned that there may be widespread illnesses and toxic exposure effects as toxinsoaked areas are repopulated. 

Many citizens are returning to petroleum or other toxin-tainted areas, generally 

using no masks or special protective clothing. EPA data show that not only does air 

pollution present a risk, but flood waters contain high levels of bacteria and other 

waterborne pathogens from raw sewage, and in many areas contain elevated levels 

of petroleum, lead, and other toxins. 

Many people—both ordinary citizens and emergency workers or police personnel—

are breathing petroleum vapors, swishing through petroleum and other toxin-polluted water, or cleaning up polluted homes, businesses, and debris, with little or no 

personal protection. Whereas contract cleanup workers don Tyvek ‘‘moon suits’’ to 

go about their business of cleaning up oil and hazmat spills, the public generally 

is using no protection even though they may well experience dangerous levels of exposure. The National Contingency Plan and EPA and OSHA regulations require 

that anyone working on response to an oil or hazardous substance spill be provided 

with appropriate protective gear, and contract cleanup workers are in some cases 

wearing protective gear. But according to reports we have received, many local police and other emergency workers in the area are not wearing protection such as 

respirators and protective clothing. 

Environmental Injustices Will be Exacerbated Unless Cleanup and Rebuilding Changes 

There is a longstanding legacy of unfair and disproportionate toxic exposures to 

low income, predominantly African American communities in the New Orleans area 

91

and in much of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. This has resulted from years 

of industrial activity and waste disposal practices that hit these communities far 

harder than higher income, predominantly white communities. TRI and superfund 

facilities are located more often in low income areas and therefore are at greater 

risk to post-Katrina exposure. As cleanup proceeds and rebuilding begins, every effort must be made to remedy these environmental injustices through full cleanup, 

fair rebuilding practices, and full partnership with affected communities. 

Toxics Testing Must Be Enormously Expanded, and Results Must Be Widely 

and Immediately Disseminated in a Publicly Accessible Format 

EPA has released a limited amount of water, sediment, and air testing for the 

New Orleans area. There are literally hundreds of reported oil and toxics spills, industrial waste dumps, and industrial facilities that handle substantial quantities of 

toxic chemicals across Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama that were hit hard by 

Katrina, but for which there has been no reported toxics testing. 

In addition, even in those areas around New Orleans that were tested, often only 

a few samples have been reported for most locations, triggering concern that as 

water recedes or washes in from other locations, as re-flooding from Rita occurs, as 

leaks or spills spread, as waste leaches, or as other conditions change, toxic levels 

are likely to change as well. 

We also are deeply concerned that EPA has delayed reporting many of its test 

results. As hundreds of thousands of people are returning to evacuated communities, it is critical that EPA release its data immediately upon receiving them, to 

assure that the public and local officials are informed about the risks. 

In addition, we have heard from many local citizens that EPA’s method of releasing the test results—on the web—is not an effective way to get information to the 

vast majority of evacuees who do not have internet access and are often not able 

to digest and understand the data. EPA and CDC’s press conference warning of the 

risks of coming into contact with the flood waters was helpful, but came so long ago 

that it is for many a distant memory that does not touch upon the hazards today 

from the water, sediments, mold and other toxins citizens are likely to encounter 

as they return. 

The lack of regular, understandable, and repeatedly-reiterated information 

through the mainstream media about the toxics threats and the need to take appropriate precautions (e.g. rubber boots, Tyvek suits, masks or respirators, impermeable gloves) is likely to lead to continued widespread misunderstandings and 

health threats. 

EPA and Federal Officials Have ‘‘Punted’’ Their Responsibility to Assure 

the Safety of Returnees 

EPA is the nation’s primary repository of expertise and regulatory and enforcement authority for controlling and responding to environmental toxin threats to the 

public’s health. As such, the agency must assume the responsibility for assuring, 

after the massive spills and releases of oil and hazardous substances in the wake 

of Katrina, that the health of citizens living in or returning to the affected communities is fully protected. 

Under such laws as the Clean Water Act (CWA), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, or Superfund), and Oil Pollution Act (OPA), and under its own 

National Contingency Plan (NCP) regulations, EPA bears the lead responsibility for 

evaluating and acting to remedy environmental health threats. With respect to the 

Katrina response, EPA has the legal authority and both the moral and legal obligation to ensure that the health of citizens potentially exposed to toxic chemicals as 

a result of hazardous substance or oil releases is fully protected. 

The NCP regulations impose numerous obligations on the agency to ensure that 

its response to releases of hazardous substances or oil protect exposed citizens. For 

example, the NCP requires that after an oil spill, ‘‘[d]efensive actions shall begin 

as soon as possible to prevent, minimize, or mitigate threat(s) to the public health 

or welfare of the United States or the environment.’’ 40 C.F.R. 

§ 300.310(a)(emphasis added). Similarly, if ‘‘the discharge poses or may present a 

substantial threat to public health or welfare of the United States, the [EPA representative] shall direct all federal, state, or private actions to remove the discharge 

or to mitigate or prevent the threat of such a discharge, as appropriate.’’ Id. 

§ 300.322(b)(emphasis added). 

Similarly, under RCRA section 7003(c)(emphasis added), 

Upon receipt of information that there is hazardous waste at any site which has 

presented an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the 

environment, the [EPA] Administrator shall provide immediate notice to the apVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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propriate local government agencies. In addition, the Administrator shall require notice of such endangerment to be promptly posted at the site where the 

waste is located. 

Thus, it is not only EPA’s moral obligation to assure that citizens potentially at 

risk from an oil or hazardous substance release are adequately warned and protected, but also the agency’s legal obligation. 

Unfortunately, EPA apparently has decided to ‘‘punt’’ to local authorities the responsibility to protect citizens’ health in the wake of the massive Katrina-related 

oil and hazardous chemical releases. Generally, these local authorities do not have 

a significant staff of environmental health experts available, nor do they enjoy access to the array of expertise and scientific information that EPA has. They also are 

under enormous political pressure to allow rapid repopulation of the toxin-soaked 

areas. 

EPA has repeatedly stated that it is not the agency’s obligation to decide whether 

environmental conditions in New Orleans and other areas affected by toxins and oil 

pollution are so dangerous as to warrant continued quarantine or additional cleanup 

prior to general repopulation of the affected areas. Instead, EPA and FEMA say 

these decisions are a local responsibility. EPA has even refused to make an explicit 

public statement about whether it is safe for the public to return to New Orleans 

and other hard-hit areas. The agency has neither the legal nor the moral right to 

pass the buck in this way, particularly since local authorities are working under difficult conditions, with communication limitations, displaced staff and other unimaginable challenges. 

Enormous Debris Disposal Operations, Including Proposals for Open Burning, Pose Huge Hazards 

According to recent reports, an estimated 100 million cubic yards of debris have 

been generated by Katrina—enough to cover over 1,000 football fields 50-feet-deep 

with waste. This far exceeds the waste generated by any previous hurricane, and 

dwarfs the 1.5 million tons of debris from the World Trade Center attacks on 9/

11.While some of this debris is merely downed trees or vegetation, much of it is destroyed housing, commercial buildings, 350,000 ruined vehicles, and a wide array 

of other detritus, much of which has been soaked by petroleum or other toxic chemicals, and much of which is intermixed with plastics and other materials that will 

become toxic if burned. Disposal of this material presents an enormous challenge 

with no easy answers. 

Clearly, every effort must be made to recycle what can be salvaged. For example, 

‘‘white goods’’ such as refrigerators, washers, dryers, air conditioners, etc., should, 

if possible, be recycled and any Freon removed. Steel and scrap metal from ruined 

vehicles and many destroyed structures also can be recycled. But clearly, there is 

not yet a disposal site for much of the rest of the waste. Reportedly, contracts for 

over a billion dollars for debris hauling and disposal have been issued. 

The open burning of some debris has already begun, according to eyewitness accounts. In addition, state officials have begun to waive air pollution requirements 

and open burning bans. Much of the burning will occur in open pits with ‘‘air curtains,’’ which have been advertised to control air emissions. Yet air curtains do not 

collect the air pollution—they blow air over the fire to improve oxygen flow and 

burning efficiency, but they do not collect the fumes or smoke. There are a few mobile incinerators with air pollution controls, but clearly these incinerators do not 

have adequate capacity to handle most of the debris. 

We are deeply concerned about the public health impacts of widespread open 

burning of materials that are likely to generate large amounts of toxic gases and 

particulate matter. There are anecdotal reports that open burning of debris after 

previous hurricanes lead to increases in admissions to hospitals due to respiratory 

ailments. People whose health is already threatened by immediate exposure to toxins from spills and leaks and polluted water will only be put at greater risk. 

Waste industry experts report that waste is being hauled to staging areas across 

Mississippi and Louisiana, and that Katrina waste disposal will occur not only in 

these states but also throughout the South. It is important that such disposal not 

add to the health threats and environmental injustices already suffered by many 

low-income and minority communities. For example, the Agriculture Street landfill 

in New Orleans, a controversial Superfund site that already threatened the health 

of a low income, predominantly African American community, received much of the 

waste from previous hurricanes, and was flooded after the recent levy breaks. As 

we plan the disposal strategy for wastes left by Katrina, we must consider the very 

real possibility that future storms will similarly inundate local disposal sites. 

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Ecological Impacts of Katrina and Rita 

We are not only concerned about the enormous public health risks posed by 

Katrina and exacerbated by Rita, but also the ecological effects of these storms. The 

associated spills, storm surge, and floodwaters often have carried salt water and pollution into sensitive and ecologically important waters and marshes that serve as 

the nursery for many rare birds, as well as fish, shrimp, and other forms of life. 

Reports are beginning to trickle in that serious saltwater contamination of freshwater wetlands is widespread in the storm-ravaged areas. In addition, huge oil and 

hazardous substance spills are likely to add to the adverse impacts. It is important 

that recovery efforts address these problems, and that natural resource damage assessments are funded and completed to determine the extent of the harm. 

Cleanup and Rebuilding Should Proceed With Strong Health Protections; 

Waivers of Environmental Laws Would Kick Hurricane Victims While 

They Are Down 

New Orleans and the other storm-ravaged areas of Louisiana, Mississippi, and 

Alabama must be cleaned up and rebuilt to become healthy, thriving communities 

once again. Throughout this effort, cleanup standards and other health safeguards 

must be kept strong, to assure that people made vulnerable by the storm are not 

further threatened by inadequate cleanups or irresponsible reconstruction practices. 

Accordingly, we and the local citizens with whom we have been in constant contact strongly oppose proposals to weaken cleanup or pollution standards—in the 

Gulf states or anywhere else in the country. Such an approach would kick these 

communities while they are down. It also would unnecessarily and unjustifiably 

threaten public health and the environment in other parts of the country. Already, 

there are several harmful bills introduced in Congress that would allow further 

harm to the health of the hurricane victims, while jeopardizing public health and 

environmental safeguards across the nation. While there may be the need for very 

limited, time-restricted waivers of certain requirements in consultation with the 

public, current law provides such authorities to EPA and often to state authorities. 

Sweeping waivers or weakening of current health and environmental protections are 

ill-advised and will only further hurt the victims of Katrina and Rita. 

Local Citizens, Including Low-Income and Predominantly African-American Communities, Should Be Fully Informed and Integrated into 

Cleanup and Rebuilding Decisions 

It is critically important that local citizens be fully informed about the risks they 

face, and that these citizens be included as full partners in cleanup and rebuilding 

decisions. Involvement of all communities, including the low-income and predominantly African American communities hardest hit by Katrina, is critically important 

to a successful rebuilding effort. The National Contingency Plan requires public disclosure of information and involvement in cleanup and response efforts, and many 

federal laws, such as RCRA and CERCLA, as well as the National Environmental 

Policy Act (NEPA), require public involvement in government decision making about 

environmental cleanup, waste disposal, or rebuilding efforts. Without this involvement, there will be widespread suspicion and anger from the very communities that 

the response actions and rebuilding are intended to help. Further disenfranchisement of already disenfranchised communities will seriously undermine the success 

of any government cleanup and rebuilding program. 

AFTER KATRINA: NEW SOLUTIONS FOR SAFE COMMUNITIES AND A SECURE ENERGY

FUTURE

NRDC recently published a report, 

After Katrina: New Solutions for Safe Communities and a Secure Energy Future, 

which I am attaching to this testimony. This report addresses many of the reasons 

why past poor environmental policies made Katrina worse, and makes a series of 

recommendations for responding to the disaster, rebuilding better and safer communities, and developing a more responsible energy program that would reduce the 

threat that such catastrophic disasters pose to our energy supply and nation. Below, 

we summarize this report. 

Katrina’s Lessons 

Hurricane Katrina exposed shocking holes in both our social fabric and our security safety net when she tore through the Gulf Coast. The storm also carried important lessons about management—or mismanagement—of essential health and environmental safeguards. 

Hurricanes are a fact of life on the Gulf Coast, and, invariably, some turn deadly. 

But decisions made by policymakers and elected officials have tremendous influence 

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on our ability to absorb a storm’s brute force. Their choices will also determine how 

quickly and how well communities cope with Katrina’s environmental fallout, and 

whether low-income people of color will suffer as disproportionately in the aftermath 

as they did in the storm itself. 

A century of poor planning and industrial abuse has stripped away much of the 

Gulf Coast’s natural protection against storms and flooding. More than 1 million 

acres of coastal wetlands in Louisiana have been drained, lost to development, or 

starved of the Mississippi River sediments they need to survive. 

These wetlands could have absorbed storm surge and floodwaters, substantially 

reducing the storm’s impact. When the storm came ashore, it swamped aging, underfunded drinking water and sewage systems and hit more than 60 major industrial facilities and four Superfund waste sites hard in New Orleans alone, adding 

unknown toxins to the stinking, toxic flood. 

Katrina caused nine oil spills totaling more than 7 million gallons, together ranking as one of the biggest U.S. spills in history. By contrast, the price shocks still 

rippling though the oil markets are not ultimately of Katrina’s making. Rather they 

are due to soaring energy demand caused by years of official refusal to tackle our 

nation’s energy dependence by diversifying our energy sources and improving fuel 

economy performance standards. 

Fixing these problems will make Gulf Coast communities safer and more secure 

and reduce the longterm cost of coping with the disaster. Lessons from Katrina will 

pay dividends in other regions subject to extreme weather disasters as well. 

Planning for a Change 

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) has assembled a team of its best 

experts on public health, toxic waste, urban design, coastal protection, energy security, and global warming to present a set of policies and practices to protect the 

safety and well-being of Gulf Coast residents—today, during the recovery, and onward into a healthier, more sustainable future. 

Protect Gulf Coast Communities from Toxic and Biological Hazards 

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, and independent experts should immediately broaden toxicity testing of 

water, sediments, and soils, as well as biomonitoring and health surveillance of responders and the public. Immediate widespread testing of water, sediment, and 

dried mud is critical to ensuring the safety of cleanup workers and returning residents, and for identifying toxic hot spots for containment and cleanup. Big industrial facilities, Superfund sites, and other toxic hotspots should be catalogued and 

evaluated, and any dangerous releases contained immediately. Immediate public 

disclosure of all information is also critical. 

Quickly Restore Safe, Clean Drinking Water Supplies 

More than two weeks after Hurricane Katrina hit land on September 17, 2005, 

186 public water treatment systems in Louisiana and 229 in Mississippi were seriously compromised, completely out of commission, or unaccounted for; and 172 sewage treatment plants were not fully functioning. Hundreds more in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama were operational but expected to need repair or reconstruction. New Orleans’ drinking water system was completely knocked out but has 

started pumping non-potable water in some areas for fire control. 

All told, at least 2.4 million people were without access to safe drinking water and 

bacteria levels in floodwaters greatly exceeded public health standards shortly after 

Katrina. All these systems will need financial and technical assistance to get back 

into full, safe operation. 

Restore Natural Coastal Buffers to Protect Against Storms 

Natural coastal barriers on the Gulf have nearly been destroyed by decades of industrial misuse and government-sponsored re-engineering gone awry. We must 

adopt a major coastal wetland restoration program in the wake of Katrina to build 

back what we ourselves destroyed. It is also critical to ensure that flood control 

projects ordered by Congress and developed by the Army Corps of Engineers are 

prioritized to protect population centers and serve legitimate flood control purposes, 

not the call of pork-barrel politics. 

Rebuild for a Safe, Secure, Sustainable Future 

Now is a chance to restore New Orleans’ 19th century elegance using today’s 

know-how and technology. That means energy-efficient, weather-resistant housing 

designed according to voluntary federal standards that save money and improve 

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ily-friendly, mixed-use, mixed income walkable communities like many affected 

areas had in earlier days. 

Maintain Health and Environmental Safeguards 

Lobbyists and their congressional allies are already lining up hoping to undercut 

long-standing health and environmental safeguards in the name of hurricane recovery. In a few select cases, it may make sense to make temporary accommodations 

in federal health and environmental rules to address legitimate needs. But nearly 

all of these can be accommodated without changes in current law, much less the 

blanket suspension legal safeguard being proposed by special interests. 

Repair the Racial and Economic Inequity of Health and Environmental 

Risk 

Environmental injustices have long plagued New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region. Cleanup efforts should adhere firmly to the standing Federal Executive Order 

designed to ensure environmental justice for communities of low income and color 

that are exposed to inequitable amounts of toxic pollution. In the rebuilding process, 

local governments’ exercise of eminent domain powers should not be used to take 

properties in low-income communities of color. 

Permanently Protect American Consumers from Energy Price Spikes 

In the wake of Katrina, oil and natural gas prices were skyrocketing. Although 

the worst of the panic induced run-up has abated, prices remain extremely high and 

experts are predicting a painfully expensive winter heating season. We cannot drill 

our way to energy security. The only real solution is to reduce the amount of energy 

we need to keep the economy humming. That means stronger fuel economy standards and rules requiring more efficient heating and air conditioning equipment and 

other energy conservation technologies. 

Prevent the Added Threat of Global Warming 

Global warming didn’t cause Katrina. But experts agree the warming climate 

caused by heat-trapping pollution is adding fuel to tropical storms—elevating category 3 storms into category 4 and so forth. Hotter climate also means more flood 

risk due to rising sea levels. There is growing bipartisan support in Congress and 

many states for concrete, market-based limits on global warming pollution.

Mr. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Olson. Ms. Wright, Dr. 

Wright. 

STATEMENT OF BEVERLY WRIGHT 

Ms. WRIGHT. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Good 

morning, Mr. Chairman. I am Dr. Beverly Wright, Director of the 

Deep South Center for Environmental Justice at Dillard University 

in New Orleans, Louisiana, formerly at Xavier University. Regrettably, both of these historically black colleges are underwater now, 

and temporarily closed due to Hurricane Katrina. I have prepared 

a statement to present, taken from my testimony, but after listening to Mr. Olson, I decided that I would just, rather just give you 

some additional information that is of great concern to me and the 

people that I work with. 

I am a lifelong resident of New Orleans, Louisiana, went away 

to school to New York, but always loved that city, and found my 

way back. Today, I find myself extremely distressed over what has 

happened to my city, and what has happened to my people. Some 

of you may be aware, and may be not, but the majority of the city, 

two thirds of that city, that has, in fact, been destroyed, where 

some of us believe we may be permanently displaced, were where 

African-Americans lived. 

And there were two significant areas that were impacted, the 

Lower Ninth Ward, that you hear so much about, and what people 

may not know is that those person in the Lower Ninth Ward, 

though poor, were working poor, and they owned all of those 

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houses in that area, and have been there for many years, and it 

was a very strong voting population. The other part of the city that 

was destroyed is where I lived, and where everybody that I know 

and love lived, and that is Eastern New Orleans, which was made 

up of most of your black professionals, doctors, lawyers, teachers, 

and even those of us who had managed to become extremely 

wealthy. That particular part of the city has also been destroyed. 

I hear all kinds of conversations about testing and people going 

back in, but no one is talking about New Orleans East or the 

Lower Ninth Ward, and just how devastated those areas are. The 

fact that we have been displaced will dramatically change the racial composition of that particular city, a city that I, where I can 

trace my ancestry back to Free Coloreds. Me and my family have 

lived there all my life, and never planned to leave. We have now 

been forced out. 

One of the real concerns that I have is what is happening as it 

relates to persons going back into the city to try to recoup any or 

all of what they can of their lives. For example, my mother passed 

away in April. I was in the process of collecting all of her pictures 

from childhood, and those pictures have been destroyed completely. 

I have nothing left of her. So, when you hear people talk about 

wanting to go home, even when things are dangerous, you have to 

understand the emotions that go along with trying to get back to 

your house. I am concerned, because no one seems to be telling people how dangerous it is. The reports of the mold are unbelievable, 

reports of mold are unbelievable. I mean, they have completely consumed our homes, and it is now climbing upstairs. If you had a two 

story house, it is moving upstairs. It is covering every piece of furniture, and the mold is of every color that you can imagine. And 

of course, we are wondering about black mold. 

People in New Orleans will be returning there on the 5th of September. I believe that is part of this supposed organized plan, I can 

tell you that plan is chaotic. There are meetings once a week at the 

City Capital and people are just turning up at those meetings in 

hundreds, trying to find out when they can get in, how they can 

get in, but no one is giving them any real scientific information 

about what the place is like. I am hearing words of people who are 

going in and then becoming extremely depressed, because they are 

going in expecting to see what they saw after Betsy, because as you 

know, people in New Orleans are kind of used to hurricanes and 

water rising, but this is not like anything that we have ever seen. 

I am very concerned that people will become ill. People are taking out clothing covered with mold. They are finding back ways 

into the city. Any way that they can get in, they are going. We really and truly need to have some kind of Katrina survivor kit, or 

something that people are given before they go into the communities. I am told that they are given a handout. I have not seen it. 

Nobody has any information that I know. People that I know have 

nothing to warn them about what is going on, what the hazards 

are when they get there, or what they should do once they are inside. 

There is almost terror in the eyes of so many people, when they, 

in fact, think about never returning home. Some kind of structured 

response needs to go forward, and African-Americans in the city of 

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New Orleans, those of us who have worked all our lives for what 

we have, and we have lost it, need to be told something. I am really 

begging the Environmental Protection Agency to do a better job 

than what it is doing. I have worked with EPA for years. I have 

fought with them, and fought with them. On this particular issue, 

I have to tell you I am very disappointed. 

I hear words about Lake Pontchartrain. Well, you know, that is 

a really big lake, and so if a lot of nasty stuff flows into it, it may 

survive, but my house won’t. And so, all of those chemicals that 

were going into a huge lake that is a lot of water, have also gone 

through my house, and I have nothing to wash it away. There is 

nothing to decrease the amounts of the contaminants in my house, 

or the houses of those people that I love. 

I know I am forgetting something really important, because I am 

getting a little emotional, but I thank you for allowing me to speak. 

And this one last thing: I almost forgot. There are counties in Mississippi, and we have been getting calls from them, who have not 

received any help from the Red Cross or anybody. They have no 

electricity. They have no water. They have no ice. They have no 

food. And we are getting these calls, and people are trying to respond. We would like to know how we can advocate on their behalf, 

to make sure that these communities in Mississippi, rural communities, that are sitting way back someplace that most people don’t 

know about, trees are down, wires are down, and they are really 

suffering. 

Mississippi was hit very hard, just as Louisiana was, and so was 

Alabama. New Orleans was hit in a different kind of way, one that 

is really devastating for us, but all of the people of the Gulf Coast 

need to have better attention made, given to them, especially as it 

is related to them, their being able to return home. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Beverly Wright follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BEVERLY WRIGHT, DIRECTOR, DEEP SOUTH CENTER FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND CO-CHAIR, NATIONAL BLACK ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE NETWORK

Good morning Mr. Chairman. I am Dr. Beverly Wright, Director of the Deep 

South Center on Environmental Justice at Dillard University, formerly at Xavier 

University. Regrettably, both of these Historically Black Colleges are underwater 

now and temporarily closed due to Hurricane Katrina. I am also here today representing the National Black Environmental Justice Network (NBEJN), which was 

founded in New Orleans, LA in December 1999. People of African descent in the 

United States organized ourselves in response to what we know is a State of Emergency in Black America. 

NBEJN members founded the organization in New Orleans because we felt then, 

as now, that Louisiana and the Chemical Corridor between the City and Baton 

Rouge are under siege from and epitomize environmental and economic assaults. 

These assaults are costing Black people their very lives. NBEJN believes in the sacred value of every human life regardless of race, ethnicity, religion or socioeconomic 

status. We see in the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita and the aftermath a unique opportunity to shape the conversation and dialogue about rebuilding 

of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region with the goals of environmental and economic justice for everyone. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on critical 

issues of concern in the aftermath of the hurricanes. My professional and personal 

experiences of growing up, living and working in the City of New Orleans greatly 

influence my perspective and testimony. 

98

Who We Are 

The Deep South Center for Environmental Justice (DSCEJ), at Dillard University 

in New Orleans, formerly at Xavier University of Louisiana, is now temporarily relocated in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 

The Deep South Center was launched in 1992 in collaboration with community 

environmental groups and other universities within the southern region to address 

environmental justice issues. DSCEJ provides opportunities for communities, scientific researchers, and decision makers to collaborate on programs and projects 

that promote the rights of all people to be free from environmental harm as it impacts health, jobs, housing, education, and general quality of life. A major goal of 

the Center is development of minority leadership in the areas of environmental, social, and economic justice along the Mississippi River Chemical Corridor. The Deep 

South Center for Environmental Justice is a powerful resource for environmental 

justice education and training. 

DSCEJ has developed and embraces a model for community partnership that is 

called ‘‘communiversity.’’ The essence of this approach is an acknowledgement that 

for effective research and policy-making, valuable community life experiences regarding environmental impacts must be integrated with the theoretical knowledge 

of academic educators and researchers. The Deep South Center for Environmental 

Justice has three components in terms of reaching our objectives: (1) research and 

policy studies, (2) community outreach assistance and education; and (3) primary, 

secondary, and university education. 

Target Aea and Population Served 

DSCEJ is national in scope with emphasis on the Mississippi River Chemical Corridor and Gulf Coast Region and global emphasis on communities impacted by the 

petrochemical industry. The major populations served include people of color with 

special concentration on African Americans and the African Diaspora, students and 

faculty at Historically Black Colleges And Universities/Minority Serving Institutions 

(HBCU/MSI) and public school teachers in urban areas. DSCEJ has forged collaborations with other major research institutions and governmental agencies that can 

assist in the development and implementation of the center’s work. 

Center Objectives 

DSCEJ principal objectives include: (1) development of minority leadership in the 

field of environmental justice; (2) development of culturally sensitive training models for minority residents in at-risk communities; (3) development and distribution 

of culturally sensitive environmental justice education materials and training modules; (4) increasing environmental justice literacy among college students at HBCU/

MSI’s; (5) development of a pipeline creating a new generation of environmental justice leaders at HBCU/MSI’s; (6) development and implementation of a K-12 teacher 

training program in environmental justice; (7) conducting research to determine the 

impact and extent of toxic exposure for minority communities as it affects health 

and the environment; (8) investigating means of addressing these problems (i.e., 

brownfields redevelopment, toxics use reduction, climate change, clean production 

and green chemistry, and economic development; and (9) creating linkages between 

impacted communities, scientific researchers, and government officials to address 

environmental justice issues as they impact health, jobs, housing, and overall quality of life. 

Katrina Aftermath 

As the floodwaters recede in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region, it is clear 

that the lethargic and inept emergency response immediately following this devastating storm was the real disaster that nearly overshadowed the actual storm. We 

were all left nearly paralyzed in front of our television sets completely unable to 

continue with our daily lives watching the unbelievable events unfold right before 

our eyes. Americans were shocked beyond belief that this could happen in America, 

to Americans. It also raised lingering questions and doubts about our overall security. Is government equipped to plan for, militate against, respond to, and recover 

from natural and manmade disasters? Can the public trust government’s response 

to be fair? Does race matter? 

Examination of historical data reveals that emergency response reflects the preexisting socioeconomic and political structures of a disaster area and is based on 

race and class differentials. Generally communities of color receive less priority in 

response time than do their white counterparts where emergency response is required. 

99

Before Hurricane Katrina—Pre Existing Vuknerabilities 

Katrina struck a region that is disproportionately African American and poor. For 

example African Americans make up twelve percent of the United States population. 

New Orleans is nearly 68 percent black. The African American population in the 

Coastal Mississippi counties where Katrina struck ranged from 25 percent to 87 percent black. Some 28 percent of New Orleans residents live below the poverty level 

and more than 80 percent of those are black. 50 percent of all New Orleans children 

live in poverty. The poverty rate was 17.7 percent in Gulfport, Ms. And 21.2 percent 

in Mobile, Al. in 2000. Nationally, 11.3 percent of Americans and 22.1 percent of 

African Americans live below the poverty line in 2000. 

New Orleans is prototypical of environmental justice issues in the Gulf Coast region. Before Katrina, the City of New Orleans was struggling with a wide range of 

environmental justice issues and concerns. Its location along the Mississippi River 

Chemical Corridor increased its vulnerability to environmental threats. The City 

had an extremely high childhood environmental lead poisoning problem. There were 

ongoing air quality impacts and resulting high asthma and respiratory disease rates 

and frequent visits to emergency rooms for treatment by both children and adults. 

Environmental health problems and issues related to environmental exposure was 

a grave issue of concern for New Orleans residents. 

The African American community in New Orleans was already grappling with the 

nationally identified health disparities for minorities reported by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). These conditions were exacerbated by environmental conditions triggering asthma and exposing children to lead. High blood pressure, diabetes 

and cancer were also prevalent in the African American community. 

Displacement Post Katrina 

Residents in the Gulf Coast region fled the hurricane zone. More than a million 

Louisiana residents fled Hurricane Katrina. An estimated 100,000 to 300,000 Louisiana residents alone could end up permanently displaced. Nearly 100,000 Katrina 

evacuees are in 1,042 shelters scattered in 26 states and the District of Columbia. 

Katrina has left environmental contamination in Gulf Coast neighborhoods that will 

have to be cleaned up before residents can move back. An estimated 150,000 houses 

may be lost as a result of standing in water from Katrina. We are still grappling 

with understanding the full impacts of both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Thousands of hurricane survivors along the Gulf Coast must now cope with the 

loss of relatives and friends, homes, and businesses and, what we term, loss of community. Katrina displaced just under 350,000 school children in the Gulf Coast. An 

estimated 187,000 school children have been displaced in Louisiana, 160,000 in Mississippi and 3,118 in Alabama. Katrina closed the entire New Orleans school system 

indefinitely. One hundred and twenty-five thousand New Orleans children alone are 

attending schools elsewhere. Over 93 percent of New Orleans schools students are 

African American. Evacuees’ children are being enrolled in schools from Arizona to 

Pennsylvania, including almost 19,000 who will be attending schools in Texas. 

For the survivors who lost everything, it involves coping with the stress of starting all over. Two weeks after Katrina struck, more than 2,500 children were still 

separated from their families. One can only imagine the mental anguish these families are going through. On the heels of this disaster, Hurricane Rita struck the 

coastal areas again. 

Environmental Damage 

New Orleans and outlying areas suffered severe environmental damage during 

Katrina, the extent to which has yet to be determined. The post-Katrina New Orleans has been described as a ‘‘cesspool’’ of toxic chemicals, human waste, decomposing flesh and surprises that remain to be uncovered in the sediments. Massive 

amounts of toxic chemicals were used and stored along the Gulf Coast before the 

storm. Literally thousands of sites in the storms path used or stored hazardous 

chemicals, from the local dry cleaner and auto repair shops to Superfund sites and 

oil refineries in Chalmette and Meraux, La, where there are enormous stores of 

ultra-hazardous hydrofluoric acid. In the aftermath of the storm some sites were 

damaged and leaked. Residents across the Gulf Coast and the media reported, ‘‘oil 

spills, obvious leaks from plants, storage tankards turned on end and massive 

fumes.’’

Short-term rebuilding objectives must not outweigh long-term public health protection for all Americans and the environment they depend upon. Some of the legislative proposals now under consideration in the aftermath of Katrina do not adhere 

to this principle. Congress must act now to protect our most vulnerable populations 

and preserve our most unique and irreplaceable resources. It is imperative that 

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1 Craig E. Colten and John Welch. ‘‘Hurricane Betsy and Its Effects on the Architecture Integrity of the Bywater Neighborhood: Summary.’’ May 2003. 2See Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Public Health Assessment—Agriculture Street Landfill, New Orleans, Orleans Parish, Louisiana, Atlanta, GA: ATSDR (June, 

1999); Alicia Lyttle, Agriculture Street Landfill Environmental Justice Case Study, University 

of Michigan School of Natural Resources, Ann Arbor, Michigan (January 2003). 3 Robert D. Bullard, The Quest For Environmental Justice: Human Rights and the Politics of 

Pollution (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 2005. 

canes Katrina and Rita. It is also important, to temper our haste to rebuild with 

balance in our response to ensure appropriate respect for public health and the environment. Moreover, the public has a right to clean air and water and it must be 

protected. 

There is much speculation about what the new New Orleans will look like: whether the Mississippi Gulf Coast should now consider land-based Casinos versus riverboats; the social economic and political structure of ‘‘New’’ New Orleans; rebuilding 

a green and sustainable Gulf Coast region that embraces innovative green building 

technologies and principles; construction of a levee system that will protect New Orleans; and development of environmentally and economically sustainable communities must all be explored simultaneously. None of these concepts are relevant unless the cleanup in the region is properly conducted and completed. This conclusion 

is not based on speculation. The community of Agriculture Street Landfill in the 

City of New Orleans has lived the nightmare of discovering that their homes were 

built on top of a landfill that was reopened to dispose of the tons of debris resulting 

from Hurricane Betsy. 

Hurricane Betsy—New Orleans, Louisiana 

Hurricane Betsy struck the State of Louisiana and the City of New Orleans in 

1965. Betsy was then the ‘‘most destructive hurricane on record to strike the Louisiana coast.’’ 1 The damage and flooding throughout the State covered 4,800 square 

miles, killed 81 persons, caused the evacuation of 250,000 persons, and disrupted 

transportation, communication, and utilities services throughout the eastern coastal 

area of Louisiana for weeks. Betsy hit the mostly Black and poor New Orleans 

Lower Ninth Ward especially hard. This is the same neighborhood that was inundated by floodwaters from Katrina and then suffered the indignity of a second flooding by Rita. Over 98 percent of the Lower Ninth Ward residents are Black and a 

third live below the poverty level. 

Many Black New Orleans residents still believe that white officials intentionally 

broke the levee and flooded the Lower Ninth Ward to save mostly white neighborhoods and white business districts. In 1965, a disproportionately large share of 

Lower Ninth Ward residents did not receive adequate post-disaster financial assistance in the form of loans and other support to revitalize the area. Betsy accelerated 

the decline of the neighborhood and out-migration of many of its longtime residents. 

Debris from Betsy was buried in the Agricultural Street Landfill—located in a predominately Black New Orleans neighborhood. Over 390 homes were built on the 

northern portion of the site from 1976-1986. The Agricultural Street Landfill neighborhood was added to the National Priorities List as a Superfund site in 1994.2

New Orleans Agriculture Street Landfill Community 

Dozens of toxic time bombs along Louisiana’s Mississippi River petrochemical corridor, the 85-mile stretch from Baton Rouge to New Orleans, make the region a 

major environmental justice battleground. The corridor is commonly referred to as 

Cancer Alley. Black communities all along the corridor have been fighting against 

environmental racism and demanding relocation to areas away from polluting facilities.3

Two largely Black New Orleans subdivisions, Gordon Plaza and Press Park, have 

special significance in terms of environmental justice and emergency response. Both 

subdivisions are built on a portion of land that was used as a municipal landfill for 

more than 50 years. The Agriculture Street Landfill, covering approximately 190 

acres, was used as a city dump as early as 1910. Municipal records indicate that 

after 1950, the landfill was mostly used to discard large solid objects, including trees 

and lumber, and it was a major source for dumping debris from the very destructive 

1965 Hurricane Betsy. It is important to note that the landfill was classified as a 

solid waste site and not a hazardous waste site. 

In 1969, the federal government created a home ownership program to encourage 

lower income families to purchase their first home. Press Park was the first subsidized housing project of this program in New Orleans. The federal program allowed tenants to apply 30 percent of their monthly rental payments toward the purchase of a family home. In 1987, seventeen years later, the first sale was completed. 

101

4 Alcia Lyttle, ‘‘Agricultural Street Landfill Environmental Justice Case Study,’’ University of 

Michigan School of Natural Resource and Environment found at http://www.umich.edu/snre492/

Jones/agstreet.htm. (Accessed on October 6, 2004). 5 Robert D. Bullard, The Quest For Environmental Justice: Human Rights and the Politics of 

Pollution. 

In 1977, construction began on a second subdivision, Gordon Plaza. This development was planned, controlled, and constructed by the U.S. Department of Housing 

and Urban Development (HUD) and the Housing Authority of New Orleans 

(HANO). Gordon Plaza consists of approximately 67 single-family homes. 

In 1983, a portion of the Agriculture Street Landfill site was purchased by the 

Orleans Parish School Board as a site for a school. The fact that this site had previously been used as a municipal dump prompted concerns about the suitability of 

the site for a school. The school board contracted engineering firms to survey the 

site and assess it for contamination and hazardous materials. Heavy metals and 

organics were detected. Despite the warnings, Moton Elementary School, an $8 million state-of-the-art 

public school opened with 421 students in 1989. In May 1986, EPA performed a site 

inspection (SI) in the Agriculture Street Landfill community. Although lead, zinc, 

mercury, cadmium, and arsenic were found at the site, based on the Hazard Ranking System (HRS) model used at that time, the score of 3 was not high enough to 

place them on the National Priority List (NPL). 

On December 14, 1990, EPA published a revised HRS model in response to the 

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986. At the request of 

community leaders, in September 1993, an Expanded Site Inspection (ESI) was conducted. On December 16, 1994, the Agriculture Street Landfill community was 

placed on the NPL with a new score of 50. 

The Agriculture Street Landfill community was home to approximately 900 Afri- can American residents. The average family income is $25,000 and the educational 

level is high school graduate and above. The community pushed for a buy-out of 

their property and to be relocated. However, this was not the resolution of choice 

by EPA. A cleanup was ordered at a cost of $20 million, the community buy-out 

would have cost only $14 million. The actual cleanup began in 1998 and was completed in 2001.4

The Concerned Citizens of Agriculture Street Landfill filed a class action suit 

against the City of New Orleans for damages and relocation costs. It took nine years 

to bring this case to court.5 The case was still pending before Katrina struck. It is 

ironic that the environmental damage wrought by Katrina may force the cleanup 

and relocation of the Agriculture Street Landfill community. But nothing can give 

them back their health and well being, or replace the family members and friends 

who might still be with them were it not for the health effects of living on a landfill. 

Have we learned anything over the last 40 years, since Hurricane Betsy struck, 

that should guide our decisions after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? Much of the proposed legislation concerning rebuilding the Gulf Coast region strongly suggests that 

we have not. In fact, it seems that some are using the crisis of Hurricane Katrina 

to advance their political and policy agenda, including weakening, waiving and 

rolling back public health, environmental justice and environmental laws 

and regulations. 

It is ironic that the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina is being used to justify sweeping 

waivers of public health, safety and environmental laws. S. 1711 would confer on 

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sole and absolute authority to 

waive federal or state laws anywhere in the country for up to one and a half years. 

In addition, the waiver authority would extend well beyond environmental laws. 

EPA need only claim such waiver is in the public interest and is somehow linked 

to Hurricane Katrina. The Agency need not demonstrate that waivers are required 

to protect public health and safety, and there is no requirement that EPA provide 

any public health protection in exchange for granting waivers. 

Foremost, Senate Bill 1711 and other legislation of this ilk threatens the most 

vulnerable communities in the Gulf Coast, and those living in the shadows of oil 

refineries, by authorizing the elimination of protection that ensures that residents 

have clean water to drink, clean air to breathe, and the right to live in a toxic-free 

community. With the hurricane devastation disproportionately hurting poor and minority residents already, this bill adds insult to injury by allowing private industry 

to operate above the law and risks more suffering on the part of people most affected by the hurricane. Remember the lessons of Betsy and remember the Agriculture Street Landfill community. 

EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson told Congress on September 13, 2005 that 

the Agency has all the authority needed under existing law to respond to Hurricane 

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Katrina and has already used that authority to relax some environmental programs. 

Granting EPA unlimited waiver authority and opening the door to risking the 

health and safety of millions of Americans is not the way to help Gulf Coast states 

recover from Hurricane Katrina. 

According to EPA tests, the biological threats from the flood include elevated levels of E coli bacteria and toxic mold. Contamination from industrial facilities pose 

a more troubling long-term concern with more than 40 oil spills recently reported 

in Louisiana by the Coast Guard and thousands of chemical containers spotted bubbling in the region’s flood water. The oozing sediments that coat flood impacted 

areas may yield an even greater danger in the coming months as the ground dries, 

releasing airborne contaminants like harmful organic gases such as the highly toxic 

methane and fuel vapors. The potential health effects range from allergic reaction 

to organic damage. 

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has released test results for toxic 

chemicals in floodwaters for less than 30 sampling sites, all in downtown New Orleans, far from hot spots in outlying areas. Even these ‘‘limited results were weeks 

old despite’’ ever-increasing numbers of clean-up crews and residents pouring into 

surrounding parishes. EPA’s Response to Katrina web page indicates only a ‘‘few 

hazardous’’ chemicals having been found in quantities over their acceptable limits 

none of which present a substantial risk to the public. 

Also, risk to human health posed by hazardous chemicals likely to be present in 

flood-ravaged areas is conspicuously absent from publicly available information. 

EPA’s website provides no information that would help someone identify symptoms 

of potentially life threatening or debilitating exposures to hazardous chemicals as 

they do for bacterial contaminant exposures such as E coli. 

In closing, and speaking as a life long resident of the City of New Orleans, for 

the last fifteen years, I have fought for a better quality of life for New Orleans citizens and those living along the Mississippi River Chemical Corridor, infamously 

known as Cancer Alley. I have worked with government to ensure environmental 

protection for communities. I have fought against environmental racism and for environmental justice for all, and I am greatly concerned about what I have seen in 

response to Katrina. What local communities in the Gulf coast region need now from 

government agencies is the truth even if it hurts. Please level with the American 

people before we return to our homes or send our children back to school, so that 

we can make the best possible choices under these circumstances. 

The right thing to do is to expand chemical testing, provide more timely and 

forthcoming test results, and engage stakeholders, especially those from the 

impacted region. Under this approach, EPA and other government agencies might 

be successful this time in carrying out their charge of protecting the public. If 

Katrina has taught us nothing else, it has shown us how essential access to information is to our ability to deal with crises. By not being forthcoming with information and not providing transparency in the process, agencies endanger American 

lives and further tarnish their own credibility. 

In the wake of Katrina, there should be:

• Timely and accurate information about risk and a coherent plan to address hazards; • EPA and Congress should provide enhanced air and water quality monitoring to 

both inform the clean-up process and to give confidence to citizens and businesses returning and rebuilding New Orleans and the Gulf Coast; • Citizens should know that their health is being protected by EPA and government 

agencies; and • Citizens should be given clear and accurate instruction on procedures for reentering the City and other areas in the Gulf Coast region to protect their health. 

I have attached for your consideration a Resolution issued by the National Black 

Environmental Justice Network which outlines the full range of issues and recommendations that should be addressed in this post-hurricane cleanup and rebuilding process. We urge Congress to oversee federal agencies responding to the hurricanes in terms of: (1) prohibiting discrimination based on race, income, religion and 

national origin; (2) compliance with the Executive Order 12898 on Environmental 

Justice; and (3) compliance with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which, in general, prohibits discrimination in programs funded by federal dollars. 

Finally, I to draw your attention to the many vulnerable communities of color that 

exist in the shadow of chemical and petro chemical facilities along the Alabama, 

Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas Gulf Coast, who are especially in harms way at 

this time. Don’t forget those places in assessing the devastating impacts of both 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Too much focus is on the structural integrity of chemical plants, oil refineries, and oil rigs and insufficient attention is focused on the 

devastating impact that communities have suffered as a result of proximity to these 

103

facilities. These people may never be able to return to their homes. These communities warrant our attention, our resources, and the full efforts of all branches of 

government to ensure their survival and protection in the future. 

NATIONAL BLACK ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE NETWORK 

RESOLUTION ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN THE GULF COAST RE- GION ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP, RESTORATION AND REBUILDING SUSTAINABLE

COMMUNITIES POST-HURRICANE KATRINA AND BEYOND

The National Black Environmental Justice Network (NBEJN) was founded in 

New Orleans, Louisiana in December 1999 in response to a State of Emergency in 

Black America. New Orleans was selected as the ideal location to launch NBEJN 

since the City of New Orleans, Louisiana and the Chemical Corridor, encompassing 

the area up to Baton Rouge, are under siege due to wide ranging environmental and 

economic assaults. These assaults are costing Black lives. 

NBEJN values as sacred every human life regardless of race, ethnicity, religion 

or socio-economic status. We view the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath as a unique opportunity to shape the conversation and dialogue about rebuilding the Gulf Coast region including Gulf Coast states and Greater New Orleans in 

ways that provide environmental and economic justice for the entire affected population. 

WHEREAS, race and class intersected with the Katrina disaster in ways that 

compound the impacts on Black communities and issues of race and class will affect 

environmental cleanup and restoration, public and environmental health, regional 

equity, community development and economic recovery; 

WHEREAS, NBEJN is committed to alleviating and remedying the impacts of 

Hurricane Katrina on Black families, in particular, environmental, public health 

and economic consequences of the storm and its aftermath on the health and well 

being of survivors; 

WHEREAS, the NBEJN post-hurricane focus centers on research, policy development and education advocacy, communications and media, outreach and networking 

in the areas of environmental justice; economic justice; environmental health; protection of public health; regional equity, sustainable development; cultural preservation; climate justice; homeland insecurity; and emergency responses; 

WHEREAS, NBEJN and its members will monitor hearings and investigations 

convened by Congress, state legislatures and governmental agencies about Hurricane Katrina to ensure that the environmental and economic justice aspects of the 

disaster are prominent; 

WHEREAS, there are urgent needs in hundreds of Black communities throughout the Gulf Coast region in terms of moving forward on environmental cleanup, 

habitability, restoration and rebuilding those areas devastated and/or destroyed by 

Hurricane Katrina and the Lake Pontchatrain levee breaches; 

WHEREAS, worker safety and health and public safety and health and public security are essential; 

WHEREAS, concern about homeland insecurity among African American communities pre-dates Hurricane Katrina and these communities are uniquely affected due 

to their close proximity to petrochemical and chemical plants and other environmentally harmful facilities; 

WHEREAS, all local, state and regional emergency preparedness plans must be 

designed to address the needs of people with low-incomes who don’t have resources 

to evacuate themselves and their families in the event of natural and other disasters; 

WHEREAS, there must be a governmental inventory, assessment of and response 

to the impacts of Hurricane Katrina on potentially hazardous permitted and nonpermitted operations including treatment, storage and disposal facilities, Superfund 

sites, chemical weapons stockpiles, pesticide and chemical storage facilities, refineries and manufacturing plants, and other existing and potential environmental 

hazards in the Gulf Coast region; 

WHEREAS, local zoning ordinances must be promulgated to prohibit siting, permitting and operation of heavy industrial facilities adjacent to, in or near residential 

areas, 

WHEREAS, there must be continuous testing and monitoring of drinking water 

and water quality in and around Greater New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region 

and testing must occur short- medium- and long-term; 

WHEREAS, global warming and climate change have dire health and environmental consequences in vulnerable African-American communities in the Gulf Coast 

region and elsewhere; 

104

WHEREAS, wetlands preservation, restoration and erosion control must be accelerated to protect the Gulf Coast Region and in the Mississippi River chemical corridor; 

WHEREAS, in consultation with affected communities, the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers and engineering experts should be delegated the responsibility of designing, constructing and maintaining a better, more effective system of levees, improved drainage, and rerouting of the flood control systems that continually inundate the lower 9th Ward community; 

WHEREAS, the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the 

U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Interior and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency should ensure that these re-engineering, wetlands preservation and restoration, and flood prevention and drainage efforts are fully funded; 

WHEREAS, expediency in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina cannot be a pretext to weaken or waive environmental authorities in the Gulf Coast region or elsewhere in the United States including all existing local, state, regional and federal 

environmental laws and regulations; 

WHEREAS, environmental cleanups must be conducted fairly and equitably in 

every affected community including decisions about areas wherein the most stringent cleanup levels will be applied during restoration, redevelopment and rebuilding; 

WHEREAS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security must comply with Executive Order 12898 on Environmental Justice including immediate action on new disaster preparedness models that address the needs and challenges of the lowest income person in every community; 

WHEREAS, fair and equitable access to and distribution of resources is paramount in all post-hurricane operations and activities, minority businesses in the environmental, community development and construction sectors must be utilized in 

the short- medium- and long-term cleanup and rebuilding efforts; 

WHEREAS, there must be a public process to develop a broad, socially and equitably just vision for a new, revitalized Gulf Coast region and Greater New Orleans, 

encompassing prominent roles for poor, low and moderate income African-Americans 

in designing and implementing the vision and the rebuilding plans; 

WHEREAS, economic parity is a cardinal objective in a revitalized and renewed 

Gulf Coast region and Greater New Orleans, cultural preservation, poverty alleviation and sustainable development are highly valued, central facets of every revitalization strategy; 

WHEREAS, local jurisdictions in the Gulf Coast region must not use eminent domain in the rebuilding process in ways that result in taking of properties in Black 

communities in order to convert them to public or other uses; 

WHEREAS, redevelopment and revitalization plans and rebuilding infrastructure 

must benefit those communities most affected by the hurricane, these efforts cannot 

exacerbate gentrification in ways that result in more residential and commercial displacement for Black people, many or whom are poor; 

WHEREAS, rebuilding activities in the Gulf Coast region must first deploy local 

businesses and hire local Black workers and local low-income workers to participate 

in the rebuilding efforts; 

WHEREAS, jurisdictions in the Gulf Coast region must focus on creating sustainable low and moderate income housing (concentrating on historic and cultural preservation), and address the fair housing issues embedded in the temporary and longterm resettlement of surviving evacuated Black families; 

WHEREAS, the private sector must exercise caution in real estate and business 

financing and property-casualty insurance practices to prevent insurance and lender 

redlining and price-gouging and to ensure that insurance claims are paid fairly and 

equitably; 

WHEREAS, local, state, regional and federal government agencies must exercise 

oversight to ensure that post-hurricane insurance and banking practices are fair 

and equitable; 

WHEREAS, continuing the education of the young survivors of the hurricane, 

children and youth, must be a priority at the levels of pre-kindergarten, elementary, 

high school, secondary and post secondary education; 

WHEREAS, full employment, job placement, job training and worker re-training 

programs are key to restoring the lives of Gulf Coast survivors and achieving economic justice; 

WHEREAS, a Reparations And Victims Compensation Fund should be established to benefit all persons displaced by Hurricane Katrina and African-Americans 

should receive just and equitable compensation from such a fund; 

105

WHEREAS, special outreach efforts must address and assist undocumented persons and other immigrants in a time of disaster including those who don’t speak 

English; 

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the National Black Environmental Justice Network (NBEJN) is committed to rebuilding the Gulf Coast Region including 

Greater New Orleans in collaboration with stakeholders, local, state, regional and 

federal elected officials, governmental agency officials and other entities in the public and private sectors; 

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the National Black Environmental Justice 

Network calls on stakeholders, local, state, regional and federal elected officials, governmental agency officials and other entities in the public and private sectors to 

adopt environmental and economic justice principles and approaches in the Gulf 

Coast Region cleanup, restoration and rebuilding efforts; and 

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that all federal and state efforts should comply 

with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Executive Order 12898 on Environmental Justice, and United Nations directives on displaced persons.

Copyright 2005 All Rights Reserved.

Mr. BASS. Thank you, Dr. Wright. Mr. Verchick. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK 

Mr. VERCHICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I 

testify as an expert in environmental law and policy, a resident of 

New Orleans, and a board member of the Center for Progressive 

Reform. 

Last week, or rather, earlier this week, the Center released a 56 

page report titled ‘‘An Unnatural Disaster: The Aftermath of 

Katrina,’’ along with a separate report on the Army Corps’ proposed barrier project, which was talked about earlier in the first 

panel. I ask that both of these reports, along with my oral testimony today, be entered into the Congressional Record. 

I am an evacuee, like Dr. Wright, and lost part of my house. I 

am teaching in Houston now, my family is in Washington State, 

and I am hoping to return in January. I have three young boys, 

and I am not sure they will be able to. And part of that is what 

is motivating me to be here today. 

The first thing I would like to do is talk about something that 

occurred in the panel just before, because as a law professor, I am 

especially sensitive to legal inaccuracies, and I want to just make 

one thing perfectly clear. It is, I think, false to suggest, in terms 

of the Army Corps’ sea gate barrier project, it is false to suggest 

that a small, grassroots organization in the 1970’s overturned the 

will of the Department of Defense and the Army Corps of Engineers. I want to explain exactly, as a legal matter, what happened 

about that. It involved a 1977 lawsuit against the Army Corps of 

Engineers, in a proposal to build a sea gate. They were required, 

the Army Corps was, to have an environmental impact statement. 

Their impact statement was based on models 10 years old. All of 

its biological analysis was based exclusively on a phone call with 

a single marine biologist, and the Corps’ chief engineer himself 

wanted more information about the sea gates and the models. 

Based on this information, a court in 1977 struck the EIS, the environmental impact statement, and invited the Corps to update the 

hydrological models so that the plan could move forward. Then, instead of fixing the EIS, the Corps in the 1980’s, under a different 

Administration, dropped the barrier plan entirely in favor of an upgraded levee plan because, among other reasons, it was, and this 

106

is according to the GAO, it was: ‘‘It would cost less to do the levee 

system instead.’’ I simply want to make the point that whether or 

not you favor sea gates, one has to understand that the decision 

about sea gates belonged to the Army Corps of Engineers and no 

one else. And if Congress is interested in more sea gate technology, 

it should know that the Army Corps last year, in fact, has another 

sea gate proposal, that it is working on planning, and it may or 

may not be something that the Congress wants to fund. But I simply want to point that out. 

I want to move on now to what I originally planned on talking 

about, which is points having to do with the toxins, and I have 

three points that I want to make. One, the environmental contamination left in the wake of Katrina is extremely serious. It must be 

investigated thoroughly, and remedied adequately before people are 

allowed to occupy the city again. 

My second point is that to have credibility, and to accomplish 

this difficult task, the investigation must ask questions that are 

conducted by an independent, bipartisan taskforce, similar to the 

September 11 commission. 

And third, now is not the time to repeal, roll back, waive, any 

of our crucial environmental laws, as some members of regulatory 

industries have suggested. This is not a time for anti-regulatory 

profiteering at Louisiana’s expense. We need the Clean Air Act, the 

Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, RCRA, Superfund, 

and so on, and we need them funded. The problem with the floods 

has something to do with the fact that a lot of the controlled industries in that area did not adequately have charge of the contaminants to begin with. To talk just a little bit about the contaminants, in the small time that I have left, I want to just point out 

a few things. There is no way for anyone to know if the risk is tolerable or safe at this point. I know this, because Dr. Falk and Mr. 

Peacock said as much. In fact, there has been little or no testing 

on long-term contaminants, so it doesn’t do any good to say the 

mayor and the Governor and Mr. Allen will get together and decide 

if it is safe. They can’t, because we don’t have the information yet, 

and until we have that information, with a city that had a population of a quarter disabled, we should not bring those people back 

into the city, when there is no information. 

I have been there. I have unloaded basements, helped my neighbors. Nobody knows anything about what is going on. No one has 

the gear. A lot of people can’t afford the gear. You go to Wal-Marts 

up and down the state, you won’t find rubber boots and rubber 

gloves. There is no way to do it. My time is up, but I simply want 

to reinforce the idea that I desperately, along with many others, 

want to go back to my city with my children, and I have no idea 

whether it is safe or not, because the government has no idea 

whether it is safe or not, and they owe that explanation to the people before they allow or encourage people to move into the city of 

New Orleans. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Robert R.M. Verchick follows:]

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1 All of the figures in this paragraph were reported in EPA, Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Update (Sept. 19, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/katrina/activities.html#sep13 [hereinafter EPA, RESPONSE KATRINA]. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, GAUTHIER-ST. MARTIN EMINENT

SCHOLAR CHAIR IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today to testify on Hurricane Katrina, its historic roots, and 

its current status. I testify today as an expert in environmental law and policy and 

a resident of New Orleans. 

As you know, I am an evacuee. My wife and children are living this fall in the 

state of Washington, and I have taken up temporary residence in Houston, Texas, 

where my Law School, Loyola New Orleans, is about to begin its fall semester in 

space donated by the University of Houston. Several days ago, I was lucky enough 

to be able to return to New Orleans to check on our house (partially flooded, but 

remarkably intact) and my university’s campus (now partially occupied by the National Guard). I do not know when my family or I will be able to return, nor do 

I know for certain when the Law School will be able to resume its mission in its 

own building. 

Like most New Orleans evacuees, my heart and my mind remain with the City. 

I monitor the worldwide Web constantly, I speak on the phone or e-mail with people 

who have remained in the area several times a week, and I regularly read the local 

blogs, including those associated with my city’s newspaper, television stations, and 

schools. This is a tragedy that will stay with my family and me for quite a long 

time and, it now appears, with the country. 

My testimony today focuses on the environmental ramifications of Katrina that 

involve the dispersal of toxic chemicals throughout the environment. Although I understand you want and need a briefing on conditions as they stand today, I am also 

going to trace some of the history of how we ended up in this mess. Mother Nature 

is overwhelmingly powerful, to be sure, but we made mistakes that rendered the 

situation much worse, and that must be corrected before we rebuild the city. My 

message today boils down to three points: 

One. The environmental contamination left in the wake of Katrina is very serious 

and must be investigated thoroughly and remedied adequately before people are allowed back into affected areas of New Orleans. We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the past, many of which were rooted in the policies of neglect and racial 

and economic discrimination that were on full display in the immediate aftermath 

of the hurricane. 

Two. To have credibility and to accomplish this difficult task, the investigation 

must ask the right questions and be conducted by an independent, bipartisan 

taskforce modeled along the lines of the September 11 Commission. A major goal 

of my testimony is to suggest the critical questions such an investigation must address. 

Three. Now is not the time to repeal, roll back, or waive any of our crucial environmental laws, as some opportunistic members of regulated industries have suggested. We need the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water 

Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Superfund law more than 

ever to make sure that people and natural resources are safe as New Orleans is 

rebuilt. 

Katrina’s Environmental Aftermath 

Katrina left nine categories of environmental problems in her wake:

1. flooded and contaminated drinking water supplies; 

2. several oil spills, typically from above-ground tanks; 

3. leaking underground tanks containing fuel and other chemicals; 

4. flooded sewage treatment plants; 

5. flooded buildings, lagoons, lots, and individual containers containing a wide array 

of toxic chemicals that were washed out into the ambient environment; 

6. the concentrated residue of many fires spread into the environment; 

7. building debris that is cultivating harmful molds; 

8. contaminated sediment and other sludge throughout the city; and 

9. toxic exposure of cleanup and other workers as a result of this pollution. 

On September 19, 2005, EPA estimated that in Louisiana, 498 of 683 drinking 

water facilities are operational and meeting EPA standards; 26 are operating on a 

‘‘boil water notice’’; and 159 are either inoperable or their status is unknown.1 Together, the 683 facilities serve 2.5 million people. In Mississippi, 1,073 of the 1,368 

drinking water systems are operational; 231 are operating on a boil water notice; 

108

2 Id. 

3Marla Cone and Ashley Powers, EPA Warns Muck Left by Floodwaters Is Highly Contaminated, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/

la-091605nola—lat,0,5316762.story?coll=la-home-headlines (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). 4 Id. 

5 Ryan Parry, Mississippi Burning: Pollution Hells as Fires, Explosions and Oil Spills Follow, 

The Daily Mirror (U.K.), Sept. 3, 2005, at 6, 7; see also Sewell Chan & Andrew Revkin, Water 

Returned to Lake Pontchartrain Contains Toxic Material, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A1. The 

two spills occurred at a Bass Enterprise storage depot in Venice and at a Murphy Oil facility 

in Chalmette. The Bass spill was estimated at about 68,000-78,000 barrels and the Murphy spill 

at about 10,000 barrels. See Reuters, Jim Loney, It’s Almost Unimaginable, the Things We Are 

Going to Have to Deal With, Sept. 6, 2005, available at http://hartmannwatchwatch.blog

spot.com/2005/09/its-almost-unimaginable-things-we-are.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2005); Susanne Pagano, EPA Finds Louisiana Floodwaters Contaminated with Lead, Coliform, 36 Env’t 

Rep. (BNA) 1870 (Sept. 9, 2005). 6 Associated Press, Katrina and the Environment, Sept. 16, 2005, available at http://

www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/16/katrina/main855409.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). 7The Administrator of the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has indicated that 

all tests conducted by EPA of waters in the flooded residential areas of New Orleans exceed 

by at least ten times the levels determined by EPA to be safe for human exposure for bacteria 

that include E. coli and fecal coliform. See Pagano, supra note 5 (indicating that EPA stopped 

measuring the amount of bacteria in the water when the levels reached the ten-fold point). See 

also Press Release, EPA, EPA and LDEQ Report Potential Health Risks from Sediments (Sept. 

16, 2005), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d9bf8d9315e942578525701c005e573c/387f

99c6a7a0b7808525707e0062479d!OpenDocument. By some accounts, fecal coliform has been 

found in some of the floodwaters at levels thousands of times higher than the levels designated 

by EPA as safe. Dina Cappiello, Tainted Water, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 13, 2005, available at

http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/nation/3351081 (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). Several 

people have already died from exposure to bacteria closely linked to cholera and some people 

have fallen ill with Vibrio vulnificus, a common marine bacteria. Genevieve Roberts, Bacteria 

in Floodwater Blamed for Three Deaths, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 8, 2005, available at http:/

/news.indephttp://www.ezilon.com/information/article—9255.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2005); 

CNN, At Least 30 Found Dead in Nursing Home, Sept. 8, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/

2005/US/09/07/katrina.impact/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2005); Pagano, supra note 5. 8See Cappiello, supra note 7. 9Marla Cone, Floodwaters a Soup of Pathogens, EPA Finds, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A18, 

available at http://www.latimes.com/features/health/medicine/la-me-bacteria8sep08,1,7707135.

story?coll=la-health-medicine (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). 10Pagano, supra note 5. 11 Cone, supra note 9. 

and 64 are either inoperable or their status is unknown. The 1,368 systems serve 

3.2 million people. In Alabama, 72 drinking water systems serve approximately 

960,000 people. Seventy-one are operational, and one is operating on a boil water 

notice. 

EPA estimates that there were five major oil spills in the New Orleans area to 

date; 2 one newspaper reported that six spills had occurred.3 The Coast Guard has 

estimated that the spills involved 160,000 barrels, and that it has recovered 50,000 

barrels to date (a barrel holds 42 gallons).4 Additional petroleum contamination has 

resulted from the flooding of an estimated 350,000 vehicles. The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality reported that oil storage tanks located near the Mississippi River, with a combined capacity of two million barrels, appeared to be leaking.5 The Coast Guard has estimated that more than seven million gallons of oil 

may have been spilled from industrial plants, storage depots, and other facilities in 

southeastern Louisiana as a result of Katrina.6 These spills have caused as-yet unclear damage to the Gulf and the River. 

As for the floodwaters that swept New Orleans and coastal communities in Mississippi and Alabama, the most immediate threat to human health is biological contamination.7 Experts have likened the bacterial concentrations in the floodwaters to 

untreated sewage.8 EPA also stated on September 19, 2005 that E. coli levels in 

flood waters are ‘‘greatly elevated’’ and remain ‘‘much higher’’ than EPA’s recommended levels for contact. Those exposed to the bacteria-laden floodwaters could 

contract diseases such as hepatitis-A and salmonella poisoning.9 Intestinal diseases 

can be transmitted by ingesting sewage or simply by being in the water without 

adequate protective clothing.10 These risks are particularly acute for children, the 

elderly, or those with compromised immune systems. 

The bacterial contamination that creates these risks of infectious disease resulted 

in part from damage to sewage treatment plants located in the three states most 

directly affected by the storm, hundreds of which were damaged or rendered inoperable. Leaking sewage lines added to the problem.11 The decomposition of dead people and animals contributed still further bacterial contamination to the floodwaters. 

109

12 E.g., Andrew Gumbel & Rupert Cornwell, After Katrina: The Toxic Timebomb, THE INDE- PENDENT, Sept. 7, 2005, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0907-03.htm 

(last visited Sept. 21, 2005). 13See Cappiello, supra note 7. 14 Associated Press, EPA: Bacteria, Lead in New Orleans Floodwaters, Sept. 15, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/science/09/14/katrina.environment.ap/ (last visited Sept. 

21, 2005). 15 Juliet Eilperin, Flooded Toxic Waste Sites Are Potential Health Threat, WASH. POST, Sept. 

10, 2005, at A15. 16 Cone, supra note 9. Some of these chemicals are known to cause or are suspected of causing 

adverse health effects such as cancer, birth defects, and neurological problems. Rebecca Claren, 

‘‘The Entire Community Is Now a Toxic Waste Dump,’’ SALON, Sept. 9, 2005, available at http:/

/www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/09/09/wasteland/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2005). 17Sewell Chan & Andrew Revkin, Water Returned to Lake Pontchartrain Contains Toxic Material, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A1. 18 EPA, RESPONSE KATRINA, supra note 1. 19 A few days after the hurricane hit New Orleans, an explosion occurred at a chemical factory 

located 15 blocks from the French Quarter and two miles from the Superdome and the Ernest 

N. Morial Convention Center, which housed the bulk of the city’s refugees. Ryan Parry, Mississippi Burning: Pollution Hells as Fires, Explosions and Oil Spills Follow, THE DAILY MIRROR

(U.K.), Sept. 3, 2005, at 6, 7. 20See Reuters, Jim Loney, Few Choices to Rid New Orleans of Poisoned Water, Sept. 6, 2005. 21Gumbel & Cornwell, supra note 70. 22 Amy Althans, Presentation to Focus on Revival of Lake Basin Foundation, Chief Talks to 

AAUW, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 13, 2005; Leslie Williams, Beach Group Has Game 

Plan, Natural Feel Desired for Area Along Lake, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 6, 2004. 

The waters covering New Orleans’ streets are also contaminated by a range of 

toxic chemicals, 12 posing significant health and safety risks. Significant amounts of 

lead, a heavy metal that creates risk of brain damage in young children, have been 

detected in the floodwaters. At one location, lead was detected at concentrations 

nearly 700 times higher than EPA standards for safe drinking water.13 Tests conducted by EPA and the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality also found 

high levels of arsenic and hexavalent chromium.14 Other chemicals discovered in the 

floodwaters have been a variety of heavy metals and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, all of which have been linked to cancer risk or developmental problems.15

Some experts have stated that they would be surprised if continued testing fails to 

detect unsafe levels of some of these contaminants.16

Some of these contaminants came from the kinds of products found in most homes 

and commercial businesses, such as chemical cleaners, bleach, and pest control 

products.17 EPA reports that it has collected 20,934 ‘‘orphan’’ containers with unknown contents—barrels lying in common areas with no apparent owner—throughout the affected region.18 Others undoubtedly originated from inundated industrial 

facilities subject to environmental regulatory programs or from sites that managed 

hazardous chemicals improperly in the past.19

These problems are daunting, and will take months, even years, to clean up. 

Chemical contamination in many areas is likely to return existing hazardous waste 

sites to ‘‘imminent endangerment’’ status, and create brownfield sites that are unsuitable for redevelopment. Although our immediate focus is properly on the significant risks to human health and safety, it is worth noting that in the ensuing 

months, we will have to also confront the environmental impacts of this contamination: reports of a toxic plume moving through the Gulf of Mexico are already raising 

serious concerns about the environmental consequences for pristine and fragile resources surrounding south Florida, including its coral reefs and areas surrounding 

the Dry Tortugas. 

Government officials responsible for removing the floodwaters from the city face 

a Hobson’s choice: they could wait to pump the water out of the city until a mechanism was put in place to remove at least some of the contamination, or they could 

pump the contaminated water back into Lake Pontchartrain and the Gulf of Mexico. 

Both the risks that would result from waiting to remove the water until it could 

be decontaminated and the costs of constructing the necessary bioremediation facilities were deemed unacceptably high.20 The pumping of floodwater with so much bacterial waste, however, is likely to lower the dissolved oxygen content of the Lake 

and the Gulf, creating a risk that many fish and other water-dependent organisms 

will die.21 Moreover, the intentional discharge of this contamination is a sad sequel 

to hard-won success in cleaning up Lake Ponchartrain to the point that portions 

were recently deemed safe for swimming.22

EPA has deployed hundreds of workers to the Gulf Coast and is working against 

the clock to test floodwaters, soil, air, and drinking water sources to determine 

whether they pose unreasonable risks to the environment. When the Agency discovers hazardous conditions, it will face the challenging tasks of figuring out to reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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23 Eilperin, supra note 15. 24Ms. Subra is a nationally recognized expert who testified before the U.S. Senate Environment & Public Works Committee on Superfund Reauthorization in 1997. The testimony is available at http://epw.senate.gov/105th/sub—9-04.htm. She can be reached at either (337) 367-2216 

or (337) 578-3994. 25 It operated from 1912 until 1959, but was reopened in 1965 to receive debris created by 

Hurricane Betsy. The combination of garbage and service station oil waste often caused fires 

at the site, and during that period, local residents called it ‘‘Dante’s Inferno.’’ 26 Among the issues surrounding the site, in addition to the inadequacy of the remedy, explains Darryl Malek-Wiley, an environmental justice organizer with the Sierra Club, is the government’s role in the 1970s in ‘‘encouraging first-time black homebuyers’’ to settle in a development that residents later learned to be on top of the former landfill. Eilperin, supra note 15. 

move, neutralize, or contain the contamination before people return to the area. All 

decisionmakers should defer to this expert judgment. 

ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND SUPERFUND

Two fundamental issues warrant serious investigation in the wake of this disaster: first, could any of the harm to health and the environment have been avoided; 

and second, how to conduct and fund an adequate cleanup of the contamination. 

Compliance Issues 

On the first question, one important inquiry is into the degree of compliance with 

the Clean Water Act requirement that facilities that store petroleum products in 

above-ground containers prepare Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure 

Plans. Such plans must include physical containment, as necessary, to prevent oil 

spills because, among other things, it is a civil and criminal violation of the Act to 

allow such spills either intentionally or negligently. Similarly, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requires virtually all facilities that manage, store, or 

dispose of hazardous waste to have emergency plans that prevent the waste from 

escaping into the environment in the event of an accident, including foreseeable 

events like a hurricane. Once again, the aftermath of Katrina must include an investigation of the compliance by New Orleans businesses with these important requirements. 

With hindsight, it also seems appropriate to consider questions such as: Were factories and oil storage facilities located too close to the Coast? Did responsible industries secure them sufficiently in anticipation of a natural disaster that had been predicted for years? Were efforts to clean up toxic waste dumps before the hurricane 

adequate, or did superficial cleanups leave these dangerous sites vulnerable to the 

inevitable floods? The Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery 

Act could have prevented the environmental damage caused by Katrina if they had 

been implemented effectively, 

Superfund Sites 

Finally, there is the troubling question of flooded Superfund sites, with damage 

that was exacerbated by poor initial cleanups. There are three National Priorities 

List sites that lay in the path of the hurricane, and the Washington Post reported 

on September 10, 2005 that one site in the northeast section of New Orleans is submerged in water and that two sites are flooded, with their dangerous contents joining the sewage and household hazardous chemicals in the water that will soon be 

pumped into the Gulf of Mexico or Lake Ponchartrain.23

As you are well aware, the National Priorities List (NPL) is limited to the 1238 

worst abandoned toxic waste sites in the country. In an interview with CPR, longtime Louisiana environmental consultant Wilma Subra confirmed the accuracy of 

the Post story, as well as the following analysis of its implications.24

Agriculture Street Landfill—The Black Love Canal 

The site that was the hardest hit by Katrina is the Agriculture Street Landfill, 

sometimes referred to as the ‘‘black Love Canal.’’ The 95-acre site, located three 

miles south of Lake Pontchartrain in a community that is 60-80 percent AfricanAmerican, is an old municipal landfill where ordinary garbage was mixed together 

with liquid hazardous waste to a depth of between two and 32.5 feet.25 In 1969, the 

City of New Orleans built a low-income housing project on top of the site, as well 

as the Moton Elementary School.26 In 1993-94, after community leaders demanded 

that EPA conduct a full investigation of the site, the Agency decided that contamination at the site warranted an emergency cleanup and placement on the NPL. 

In a health assessment prepared for the site by the Agency for Toxic Substances 

and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a unit of the Centers for Disease Control, experts 

concluded that the undeveloped portions of the site posed a ‘‘public health hazard’’ 

111

27 AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, PUBLIC HEALTH ASSESSMENT: AGRI- CULTURE STREET LANDFILL, available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/PHA/agriculturestreet/

asl—p1.html. 28 EPA picked up 52,615 tons of soil, or an average of 86 tons per acre, and put down 177,293 

cubic yards of clean fill in its place. See EPA, AGRICULTURE STREET LANDFILL NPL UPDATE

(Sept. 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/earth1r6/6sf/pdffiles/0600646.pdf. 29For an account of the trip, see http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/unchr—ej.htm. For further information about environmental justice issues at Superfund sites, see infra The Two Americas: Race, 

Class, and Injustice; ALICIA LYTTLE, AGRICULTURE STREET LANDFILL: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

CASE STUDY (U. Mich., Jan. 2003, available at http://www.umich.edu/snre492/Jones/ag

street.htm; http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/POCEG-02.PDF; and Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice in the 21st Century (Envtl. Justice Res. Ctr.), available at http://assets.cambridge.org/

052166/0629/sample/0521660629ws.pdf. 30See EPA, MADISONVILLE CREOSOTE WORKS NPL UPDATE (Sept. 2005), available at http://

www.epa.gov/region06/6sf/pdffiles/0600653.pdf [hereinafter EPA, MADISONVILLE CREOSOTE

WORKS]. 31See LA DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, FISH CONSUMPTION AND SWIMMING ADVISORIES (Jan. 11, 

2005), available at http://www.deq.state.la.us/surveillance/mercury/fishadvi.htm#table. 32See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, PUBLIC HEALTH ASSESSMENT: BAYOU BONFOUCA, available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/PHA/bonfouca/bon—p3.html. 33See EPA, MADISONVILLE CREOSOTE WORKS, supra note 30. 

and that if the land was ever used for residential housing, exposure to lead, arsenic, 

and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) in the soil could pose an ‘‘unacceptable 

health risk.’’ 27 All of those toxic materials are now floating through the streets of 

New Orleans. 

EPA’s choice of a remedy for the site has significantly exacerbated this damage. 

Instead of excavating the site, treating contaminated soil in situ, or even installing 

a liner that would prevent the landfill’s contents from washing away, EPA decided 

that its final remedy would be limited excavation of less than two-thirds of the site 

and the placement of two feet of ‘‘clean fill’’ on top of the buried waste.28

Residents asked to be relocated from their housing on top of the site, a project that would have cost approximate $12 million, and have even filed suit demanding 

that relocation. EPA refused and has instead spent $20 million on the cleanup described above. In desperation, a delegation traveled to Geneva Switzerland in 1999 

to ask for help from the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.29

Bayou Bonfouca 

This 54-acre site located in Slidell, Louisiana, was a wood treatment facility using 

creosote that operated since the late 1800s. Some 26,000 people live in the community, and the house nearest the site is 400 feet away.30 Even though the site is supposedly cleaned up, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality warns citizens not to swim, and to avoid contact with over seven miles of Bayou Bonfouca, 

identifying the pollutant of concern as creosote.31 The ATSDR health assessment 

concluded that the site is a ‘‘public health hazard’’ and worries that because swimming advisories are ‘‘voluntary,’’ the potential for immediate skin burns and longterm illnesses is ongoing.32 The companies that created the site paid to install a 

fence around it. EPA then used the site to burn hazardous wastes from another 

nearby Superfund site, ultimately burying the concentrated ash from that process 

in Bayou Bonfouca. The only ‘‘remedy’’ installed at Bayou Bonfouca was the construction of a plastic and clay cap over the top of the creosote piles, the remnants 

of which were likely washed out in the flooding. 

Madisonville Creosote Works 

This 29-acre site is also a former wood treatment facility.33 EPA excavated some 

contaminated soil, treated it, and put it back down at the site. To cope with the 

thousands of gallons of creosote waste still under the surface, the Agency installed 

‘‘recovery’’ trenches beneath the surface that would capture the creosote waste, 

keeping it out of local drinking water supplies. Flooding is likely to have disrupted 

those trenches, potentially spreading contamination into the community’s water. 

Why did the cleanup of these three sites turn out to be so vulnerable to a foreseeable and foreseen natural disaster like Katrina? The Superfund created under that 

statute was intended to provide the necessary legal authority to enable an adequate 

response to releases of hazardous substances into the environment. However, the 

Superfund program has been critically weakened in recent years, just when it must 

play a central role in cleaning up after the disaster. 

Among the sources of revenue for the Superfund toxic waste cleanup program 

were taxes on the production of crude oil and the manufacture of feedstock chemicals, as well as general tax revenues. The industry taxes that provide the bulk of 

the program’s funding expired in 1995. Since the taxes expired, the program has 

limped along on limited funds from general tax revenues and cost recovery actions 

112

34 Unfortunately, there are no ‘‘deep pocket’’ corporations in evidence around the three sites 

described above, and the only alternative is for the Superfund to pick up the tab. 35Meredith Preston & Susan Bruninga, Amendment to Reinstate Industry Tax to Support 

Trust Fund Defeated in Senate, 35 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 536. For more information on the battle 

to reinstate the tax, see Dean Scott, Senators Criticize Cut in EPA Water Fund, Challenge Pace 

for Superfund Cleanups, 36 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 263. 36President Bush has recommended holding Superfund spending level, adding only $32 million to the program in his most recent budget. Because of the missing money, EPA will only 

be able to address 40 sites in the upcoming year, down from an average of 80 during the Clinton 

Administration. Id. 37 Jason DeParle, Broken Levees, Unbroken Barriers: What Happens to a Race Deferred, The 

New York Times, Section 4, Page 1 (Sunday, Sept. 4, 2005). 38 U.S. Census, ‘‘Louisiana Quick Facts,’’ (2000), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/

states/22/2255000.html. 39 U.S. Census, ‘‘Poverty Status in 1999 by Sex by Age,’’ (2000), available at http://

factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?—bm=y&context=dt&-re . . . -geo—id=16000US2255000

&-search—results=01000US&-format=&-—lang=en. 40 U.S. Census, ‘‘Social Characteristics: 1990,’’ available at http://factfinder.census.org/servlet/

QTTable?—bn=n&lang=eng&qr—name=DEC—1990—STF3—DP2&ds—name=DEC-1990—

STF3&geo—id=05000US22071. 41 City of New Orleans Health Department, ‘‘Homeless Healthcare,’’ available at http://

www.cityofno.com/portal.aspx?portal=48&tabid=6. 42 Jason DeParle, supra note 37 (quoting Craig E. Colten, Louisiana State University). 43 Id.; Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, ‘‘Lower Ninth Ward Neighborhood: Income & Poverty,’’ available at http://gnocdc.org/orleans/8/22/income.html (poverty rates in the 

Lower Ninth Ward ten percent higher than in Orleans Parish generally). 44Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, ‘‘Lower Ninth Ward Neighborhood: People 

and Household Characteristics,’’ available at http://gnocdc.org/orleans/8/22/people.html. 45 Jason DeParle, supra note 37. 46See, e.g., Catherine A. O’Neill, Risk Avoidance, Cultural Discrimination, and Environmental 

Justice for Indigenous Peoples, 30 Ecology L. Q. 1 (2003). 

against companies that created the sites.34 The industry taxes provided about $1.45 

billion in annual funding from 1990-1995.35 Current levels of general revenue fund- ing are $1.3 billion.36 The cost of the remediation of toxic waste washed out by 

Katrina remains to be determined. 

The result of this disastrous set of policies has been to shift a significant share 

of the burden of financing hazardous substance cleanups away from the industries 

that generate the bulk of the substances found at contaminated sites and onto the 

shoulders of the taxpaying public. The limited funds available in the Superfund 

have unintended consequences, it can delay cleanups and lead EPA to choose remedies that are not adequately protective of human health. With reduced funding, 

EPA may be tempted to reduce its expenses by choosing remedies that are temporary and very vulnerable to bad weather along the Gulf Coast. Indeed, the remedies installed at the three sites in the New Orleans area were fated to fail. 

THE TWO AMERICAS: RACE, CLASS, AND INJUSTICE

The devastating effects—the lost lives, the demolished homes, the shattered communities, the affronts to dignity—were suffered disproportionately by people of color 

and low-income people in New Orleans. ‘‘Natural disasters’’ such as hurricanes, 

earthquakes, and floods are sometimes viewed as ‘‘great social equalizers:’’ they 

strike unpredictably and at random, affecting black and white, rich and poor, sick 

and well alike. However, as Katrina has laid bare, the harms are not visited randomly or equally in our society. A reporter for The New York Times put it bluntly: 

‘‘The white people got out. Most of them, anyway . . . it was mostly black people who 

were left behind.’’ 37

Twenty-eight percent of people in New Orleans live in poverty.38 Of these, 84 percent are African-American.39 Twenty-four percent of the adults living in New Orleans are disabled.40 An estimated 15,000 to 17,000 men, women and children in the 

New Orleans area are homeless.41 The lowest lying areas of New Orleans tend to 

be populated by those without economic or political resources.42 The city’s Lower 

Ninth Ward, for example, which was especially hard hit and completely inundated 

by water, is among its poorest and lowest lying areas.43 Ninety-eight percent of its 

residents are African-American.44 As Craig E. Colten, a geologist at Louisiana State 

University and an expert on New Orleans’ vulnerable topography explains: ‘‘[I]n 

New Orleans, water flows away from money. Those with resources who control 

where the drainage goes have always chosen to live on the high ground. So the people in the low areas were the hardest hit.’’ 45

Moves to eviscerate government protection of health, safety—and the environment 

are most tenable where those burdened can be viewed as ‘‘other’’ or where their—

circumstances are not lived or imagined—by many Americans.46 The current AdminVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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47 Id. 48See, e.g., Michael Janofksy, Bill Would Let E.P.A. Relax Rules for Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, 

Sept. 16, 2005, at A18 (national edition). 

istration in particular has endorsed a shift in responsibility for basic health, safety 

and environmental protections. It has sought to diminish the government’s role in 

assuring even minimally healthful conditions for all, leaving it to those at risk to 

protect themselves. The effect of this shift is to burden people of color and the 

poor—because these groups are disproportionately the ones who are most exposed 

and most vulnerable, they will be the ones left to fend for themselves.47 They are 

also the ones with the fewest resources to do so. 

Katrina also raises questions of justice in cleanup and rebuilding. Community 

members and environmental justice leaders have raised concerns about when and 

how these contaminants will be cleaned up, citing evidence of inequities in environmental cleanups more generally. They and others have also questioned the rush to 

waive standard health, safety, environmental and social protections. While it might 

have been important to waive normal Clean Water Act permits to allow the waters 

to be pumped out of a flooded city as quickly as possible, other waivers are unjustified.48

CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of Katrina, we must rethink our past policies and priorities in 

order to avoid similar disasters in the future. We must be sure that EPA and other 

relevant agencies have adequate resources to respond to the unavoidable consequences of future disasters. We urge the Committee to support the creation of an 

adequately funded, bipartisan, and independent commission to address the following 

critical questions: 

CRITICAL QUESTIONS

1. Katrina caused serious damage to the infrastructure that supports oil and gas 

production, as well as hundreds of facilities handling significant quantities of hazardous chemicals.

a. How does EPA plan to conduct an independent assessment of the environmental 

releases that occurred at such facilities, including air emissions, spills of chemical product and waste, and fires caused by such events? 

b. What monitoring is being undertaken and what additional monitoring should be 

planned to adequately determine the nature and extent of hazards to health 

and environmental contamination? 

c. Is information from all appropriate government and non-governmental sources 

being incorporated into assessment of the releases? 

2. What are the protocols for testing drinking water for the broader suite of 

chemicals likely to have migrated into supplies as a result of the storm and how 

are federal and state authorities ensuring that such testing gets done? 

3. What plans have been made to rebuild the area’s publicly owned treatment 

works so that they can deliver adequate services before the city is re-populated? 

4. How will EPA ensure that the re-habitation of New Orleans, Mississippi, and 

other areas affected by Katrina is safe in light of remaining toxic deposits in soil 

and water? 

5. Is all information relevant to public health and safety being shared with the 

public in a timely fashion? 

6. To what extent did the chemical and biological contamination that has been 

discovered in New Orleans since Katrina result from noncompliance with or inadequate enforcement of the federal environmental laws described above? 

7. Have the EPA and Congress undertaken the necessary assessment of the funding needed to fully implement and enforce federal environmental laws in order to 

protect public health and the environment in cases of natural and manmade disasters and reduce potential future cleanup costs? 

8. Had state and local officials complied with their planning responsibilities under 

EPCRTKA, and, if not, did inadequate planning exacerbate the risks to health and 

safety now facing New Orleans? 

9. A long, intentional, and successful effort to weaken the Superfund program has 

left it without adequate funds to address the new dimensions of risk posed by 

Superfund sites that Hurricane Katrina has made apparent. In addition, the aftermath of the hurricane has created need for an emergency response and may produce 

new sites that warrant cleanup under Superfund. 

114

a. What is the vulnerability of all Superfund sites, including those near waterbodies, 

to natural and manmade disasters? Does EPA have adequate funding to undertake such an assessment? 

b. How will EPA and the states deal with the potentially responsible parties who 

created the sites in the first place, and either never stepped forward to pay for 

cleanup, or paid for a remedy that now appears inadequate? 

c. What sources of funding will EPA employ in its broader response to the contamination in the wake of the hurricane? 

10. What steps must be taken to ensure that race or class disparities don’t affect 

the cleanup methods selected and used in different areas? 

11. What steps are being taken to ensure that the affected communities have adequate opportunities to participate in the relevant decision-making processes? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity 

to appear before you today. 

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Mr. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Verchick. You asked for 

unanimous consent to add some information to the record. Is there 

objection? Without objection, so ordered. 

I am going to ask just one question. Mr. Verchick has already answered it. I would like to ask it of Mr. Olson, Dr. Wright, and Secretary Gautreaux. Is it safe for people to move back into New Orleans today? Mr. Olson? 

Mr. OLSON. Well, I would agree. I would agree with what Mr. 

Verchick said just moments ago, which is that for many areas, 

there is no data available at all to answer that question. For some 

areas, the data available suggests that it is not safe, for example, 

some of the air monitoring data that is in my testimony shows that 

for someone to stay for more than 2 weeks is not safe, according 

to Federal guidelines. So, some areas, maybe it is, if we did additional testing, but we are not. 

Mr. BASS. Dr. Wright. 

Ms. WRIGHT. Based on the information that I have, which is 

none, I would have to say it is not safe, because we don’t know. 

And also, the fact that there is so much mold around, just growing 

everywhere, I think that that is a problem in homes across the 

river in Algiers, where people, some people never left, and people 

are still there. I have a distant relative there, and her house just 

reeks of mold, and she didn’t even get the water that others got. 

That can’t be a good thing. I don’t believe it is. 

Mr. BASS. Secretary Gautreaux. 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. I would just say that in general, where you 

don’t have potable drinking water and wastewater treatment, there 

are health risks associated with that. There are some areas where 

that is available, and I think you have to consider that, as well as 

individual risk factors, respiratory problems, pregnancy, anyone 

who immuno-compromised. If you are going for health reasons, consider those things, and I think the population should also consider 

things like the communications 911 network, available hospitals, 

and other factors. I read a statistic the other day that 75 to 70 percent of hurricane injuries are typically associated with the recovery. So, I think all of that has to be considered. 

Mr. BASS. Thank you very much, Secretary Gautreaux. The 

Chair now recognizes the ranking member, the gentlelady from 

California, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you very much. Sorry I came in late to hear 

some of your testimony, but I know that the concerns that you 

have are very similar to what some of the members I know on our 

side of the aisle have as well. I am interested to get your opinion 

on quality and access of information from EPA. Either one of you 

on the panel can respond. EPA talked about getting out information, they handed out 3,500 fact sheets in the first 2 weeks, conducting interventions that removed more than 850 workers from 

serious, life-threatening hazards. I am wondering if there was any 

other materials or outreach efforts on the part of EPA regarding 

households, not just the workplace, but households, and what kind 

of information are you aware of that was put out there? I know 

they have a website. I don’t know how many people are able to access that website, and second, have you seen any of these handouts 

or kits that were given out? Dr. Wright, why don’t you start? 

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Ms. WRIGHT. Yes. I would just like to say that there is a serious 

problem with communication, especially for many of the 200,000 

people who have been scattered across the United States, who also 

would like to have some information about what is going on at 

home. We haven’t gotten any. Now, I am a little more mobile than 

most people that I know, and so, I am here in Washington, D.C. 

I am on the phone with enviros every day, so yes, I have seen one 

flyer put out by our Governor, but that was given to me by one of 

the enviros, and I was able to pull it down off of the website. 

There are a lot of people who don’t have access to any of those 

kinds of things. Another important thing that I would like to say 

is that there are some cultural differences between blacks and 

whites, and sometimes, the way that information is delivered determines whether or not it is received properly. I haven’t seen any 

what I would consider culturally sensitive materials delivered on 

Katrina. I do know, because of the groups that we work with, that 

local organizations have been working to develop information. The 

Deep South Center, and the National Black Environmental Justice 

Network are, in fact, as we speak, trying to develop flyers to disseminate in different places where large numbers of evacuees are. 

I would say that is a real weakness of the whole rebuild, return, 

come back home project, whatever you would like to call it. 

Mr. VERCHICK. My experiences reflects what Dr. Wright would 

say. I would simply say walking the city, as I have been, in many 

different areas, and talking to lots of people who have been there, 

no one really has any idea of the type of environmental contamination, especially the kind that could be airborne, when it dries up, 

on that sludge, and then floats around. 

A really good indication, if you want, is to look at the local blogs, 

which I do daily. Channel 4, a local TV station, and the Times-Picayune both have excellent blog sites. You can look and see what 

people are talking about. That is where they trade all kinds of information about what they do in the city. It is rarely talked about. 

The people that do talk about contamination are very misinformed 

much of the time. They are misinformed about a lot of things, incidentally, on those blogs. And I look at it, and it makes my blood 

run cold, because I know that people are operating a set of instructions. Whether or not that stuff is on EPA’s site, I have seen it. 

It takes me a while to find it. I am not convinced that many people 

are getting it. What does trouble me about the CDC, EPA sites is 

sometimes, they will say things like we have no evidence of X, but 

what they don’t say is we haven’t tested for it yet. And that is a 

very misleading statement to say there is no evidence of long-term 

health risks when they haven’t tested for long-term health risks. 

Ms. SOLIS. My time is running short, but I want to throw this 

out there as well. We heard earlier from the EPA representative 

that about 80 percent of the drinking water system is back. However, 2.3 million people still don’t have access, so my question is 

directed at our water experts here, was our system adequate before 

Katrina, and what is it that we could have done to help, knowing 

that Katrina was coming? 

Mr. RAGONE. Well, I think the real reason, as I said in the last 

paragraph of my written testimony, for being here, is to start 

thinking proactively about the next one. Certainly, Katrina is a terVerDate 0ct 09 2002 18:34 Jun 07, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00189 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 F:\DOCS\24251.TXT HCOM1 PsN: JOEP
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rible disaster. We have to take advantage of what we have learned 

there, and get a proactive strategy in place that prevents these 

things from happening anywhere in the country, be it natural disaster or terrorist act. We have to think proactively. 

One of the concerns in many places in the country, with regard 

to household wells, is that poor people living in old houses have inadequate wells. What we have to do as a proactive measure is provide poor people with adequate wells, and some understanding of 

how to maintain them. If we do that, if we could keep people in 

their place, if they had drinking water, the catastrophe in the 

Katrina-affected area would have been lessened. 

We don’t want to make vagrants of our communities if we don’t 

have to. If we installed a deep well in a firehouse, with a stand 

alone generator that was safe from floodwaters, raised up some 

way, we could have provided a water resource for these people, and 

we wouldn’t have people migrating, swimming for tens of miles 

through muck and this contaminated sediment, to get somewhere 

that was nowhere. 

We just have to start thinking proactively. And the last point is, 

we have two types of water in this country that are managed differently, surface water, and groundwater. If you put them together, 

they have a complementary function that can save us during disasters. If we use ground water when surface water is contaminated, 

we benefit. If there is excess surface water, we can put it in the 

ground. We benefit. We have a bureaucracy now, a national and 

local bureaucracy, that separates those functions, and takes away 

that complementary benefit, and that is put at risk in places. 

Ms. SOLIS. They even compete with each other. 

Mr. RAGONE. They can help each other. 

Ms. SOLIS. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. RAGONE. And right now, they are not. They are competing 

with each other. 

Mr. BASS. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Dr. Murphy, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am certainly moved 

by your testimony, Dr. Wright. My dad was born in Louisiana, and 

when I traced the Murphy family roots, I look back in the 19th 

Century, the thousands of Irish that came to New Orleans and 

died, because they were seen as animals, and even lower than 

slaves, as they helped to build that city in the list of the thousands 

who died there trying to do that. So, my heart, and that of Pennsylvanians, also go out to all of you, in as I want to make sure that 

we don’t re-victimize the victims, and by that, I mean that we look 

to the people throughout the entire area affected by Hurricane 

Katrina as survivors and not victims. And to me, it is important, 

the way we don’t re-victimize them is to turn this into a political 

game of who is to blame. And let us attack, and let us talk about 

it has to be an independent commission, as opposed to something 

Congress can do? Because I believe that automatically assumes 

that people in Washington, or Members of Congress, do not have 

the care and compassion to do that. And I would like to get that 

away from politics, and let us just talk about finding the right answers here, because I think you both are from Jesuit universities, 

187

too, which I am, as well, and I respect that, because of a need to 

ask questions. 

But let me ask a very tough question on this, of this panel. Well, 

some of you have said the health problems are so bad, it is no way 

habitable now, and I believe I am not sure when it will be in a situation to be habitable. In the North, we have areas of brownfields, 

where mills have been for years, where perhaps some oil and gas 

work have done, and basically, the EPA and the Department of Environmental Protection in Pennsylvania comes in and says you 

know what, it is never habitable for homeowners. Maybe you can 

do an industrial site here, maybe you can do some commercial development here, and pave it all over, but it is never going to be 

right for homeowners again, so don’t consider that. If it is so serious, I mean, I think of the, what, hundreds of thousands of vehicles, that as the water came into the gas tanks, the gas flowed out. 

As the chemicals leaked from there, and all of the everything else, 

is it really to the point where someone has to ask that question, 

will it ever be habitable? I open it up to the panel. 

Ms. WRIGHT. Well, I have been working in this area with people 

who have lived on top of hazardous waste site, Superfund sites, 

and all kinds of sites, and each time, we have been told by EPA 

that there is a possible cleanup for these types of sites. So, I don’t 

believe that the city of New Orleans is so contaminated that it will 

never be habitable again. But I do know that if we don’t clean it 

up right, we will end up with two thirds of the city being a Superfund site, as we have, in fact, experienced with the Agriculture 

Street Landfill community in the city of New Orleans, that was 

built on top of the New Orleans Landfill, where all of the debris 

from Hurricane Betsy was put. And 20 years later, you know, it is 

a Superfund site, with people sick and dying. So, my real concern 

is that the appropriate testing is done, and the right remediation 

is put in place and completed, and that there are no differentials 

in the way that is done, based on race and class. Those things, I 

am very interested in. 

Mr. MURPHY. Are you suggesting Congress would act that way, 

based on race and class? 

Ms. WRIGHT. No, I am not. I am saying that things have been 

done that way where I live. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, we want to make sure that doesn’t——

Ms. WRIGHT. I wasn’t talking about Congress. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I want to make sure we don’t do that, but 

part of it, as we are looking at tens of billions of dollars here, I am 

real concerned, as you are, about the safety of the folks, and I want 

to make sure we protect them, and part of the question is, and people are raising it around the country, and because you are there, 

it is so important for me to hear directly from you on this, all of 

you on this. Are we better off relocating the city, rather than rebuilding it there? I am opening it——

Ms. WRIGHT. Are you asking me that? 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I am asking all of you that. I mean, certainly, 

if I lived there, I would say I want to go home, but part of it is 

I am really very concerned about the public health issue you are 

raising, and what it would take, and if it is not—I don’t know. I 

am asking you as experts in these issues, if it is solvable, asking 

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all of you that. And that is a question Congress has to ask. How 

do we make it safe for the public, so people go home there, but we 

are not just simply saying—because here is the thing: I would 

think there is a couple issues. We would be wrong if we simply said 

well, we will fix it up, but go back there. We know you are going 

to get sick again. I think that would be a terrible thing. Or what 

is it going to take to fix it to the level where people can be protected, or their health. I need to know the answers——

Ms. WRIGHT. Are we asking everyone in California to leave, because of earthquakes and all of these things that we deal with 

every year? I mean, that is really a strange question to me. 

Mr. MURPHY. Let me answer this, because I mean no harm in 

this. I am trying to find out—it is much like when people live along 

the Mississippi River and it floods, and FEMA comes in and pays 

them, and it floods again, and FEMA says you are in high-risk 

area. We can’t keep doing this. It is a matter, because we have 

such a huge public health concern there, I want to make sure we 

are not sending back to an area where they are going to get 

harmed. I think that would be the worst thing that we could put 

them in a harmful situation, and yet, we want to be compassionate, 

because they want to go home. I would love to see that. I am trying 

to find the balance. I don’t mean harm in that. Please understand. 

I want to find how we can solve that. 

Mr. VERCHICK. I think the short answer is we have to save New 

Orleans, and that we can. We can protect it through engineering 

from the floods. We can scoop up, change, pull up the contaminated 

areas, and over time, as we learn more, we will know what we are 

dealing with, and I think we will be able to do it. 

One difference between the Mississippi coast and the Alabama 

coast and New Orleans is that New Orleans is a city over 300 years 

old, a cultural gem in the world, just like Venice, and just like the 

Netherlands, both of which are also sinking. We have the technology to save it. 

Mr. BASS. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has expired. The Chair would——

Ms. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BASS. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. WRIGHT. I would like to be excused. I have to catch a plane 

at 5. 

Mr. BASS. Absolutely. 

Ms. WRIGHT. Thank you. 

Mr. BASS. The Chair will excuse Dr. Wright. Thank you very 

much for your testimony. I would also like to ask unanimous consent for members to submit questions to witnesses in writing. If 

there is no objection, so ordered. And the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maine, Mr. Allen, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for 

being here today. A special thanks to Secretary Gautreaux and 

Mayor Rutledge. I have done what you are doing today. Sometimes, 

it is like watching grass grow, to not be in the room during this 

kind of conversation. I very much appreciate your being here. 

I would like to ask some questions growing out of Mr. Olson’s 

testimony, about EPA’s role and how EPA is acting, and whether 

or not it is living up to its responsibility, to basically make sure 

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that you all are safe, and the public is safe. EPA has said that it 

is doing testing, but the decision on whether or not it is safe to return will be left to local authorities. It is unclear, from Mr. Peacock’s testimony, who would do the analysis upon which to base 

those decisions. 

I mean, is this a case where we have multiple people out trying 

to analyze a smattering of data, or what? I mean, how are we going 

to get there? And built into this question is really another question 

about, I guess this is probably for the mayor and Secretary 

Gautreaux, what your experience has been dealing with the EPA 

in the course of your efforts to get your feet back on the ground. 

And so, I guess maybe, Ms. Gautreaux, why don’t we begin with 

you? 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. Okay. Well, today, again, repeating what we 

said earlier, when you can officially come back in, a complex one 

that involves a lot. I will tell you from our perspective in Louisiana, 

EPA has been very helpful to us. We have decided on long and 

short-term sampling strategies. We are coordinating on information, and these are the types of things that we are providing to the 

public officials. We have the same concerns that have been expressed earlier about the water, drinking water systems down. People do need to be careful, especially if they are sensitive, when they 

go in the areas. From our perspective, EPA has not only helped in 

terms of strategizing and helping carrying out sampling, they also 

provided equipment, such as the TAGA monitoring vehicles that go 

through neighborhoods, planes that are able to fly over and detect 

leaks in facilities, and also, different components in fires. Actually, 

we have about 100 EPA employees over here, and we meet, and it 

is not just a meeting. We have them throughout the day, but every 

day, we get together with our other State and Federal partners, 

and say what is the issue, how are we going to approach it? How 

are we making progress in the areas that we think are directly related to public health and safety? 

So, I hope that answers some of your questions. 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you very much. Mayor Rutledge, I don’t know 

if you have had similar kind of contact, but can you comment on 

what it is like from your community? 

Mr. RUTLEDGE. Well, sir, the monitoring is very important. The 

key to it is, is we are getting those tests back, or those results 

back. It is important for us to know what they are, because we can 

turn around and share that with the public. What is happening 

right now, there is a gap, because the people, they are looking for 

somebody to give those answers. And of course, what they are 

doing, they are calling the local officials, and they are calling their 

local people, saying well, where are they? How safe are we? No one 

is going to allow anyone to go back in their home. No one is going 

to allow anyone to go back into the community unless it is safe. 

And I think we all need to be thinking about that, No. 1, but you 

know, when you talk about people that don’t have a home any 

more, that don’t have a place to go, then it is going to be hard for 

you to keep that person out of that little block of land. It belongs 

to that person. Because a lot of times, you know, you adapt to the 

situation regardless if you want to or not. 

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Mr. ALLEN. Okay. Thank you. Other panelists here, any reaction 

to that? Mr. Olson? 

Mr. OLSON. Well, I will just say a couple things. One is that I 

don’t think there is anybody that would argue that EPA should not 

be much more comprehensive testing. Well, there probably are people that would argue that. But that there needs to be fair testing, 

wherever people are going to be returning. And that testing needs 

to not just be released on a website. Most of the folks that have 

been displaced can’t log onto the web, and even if you read what 

is on their website, you know, you would practically have to have 

a Ph.D. in chemistry to understand some of what is in there. So, 

it is important to have understandable information accessible to 

people, and to be public with that, and much more comprehensive 

in the testing. 

And we believe EPA, under the National Contingency Plan and 

other legal requirements, does have a legal obligation to decide 

whether it is safe or not. If you have got 2.3 million people with 

unsafe drinking water and no sewage treatment, I mean, is it really safe to be sending people into that with toxic muck, we have 

heard, four feet deep in many communities. You know, is that really a place people should be returning. Maybe you don’t block them, 

but certainly, you give them protective gear, and you give them the 

information they need. 

Mr. ALLEN. So your bottom line is you don’t think EPA is fulfilling all those responsibilities. 

Mr. OLSON. Well, they certainly have been trying, and I don’t 

want to say that they are not doing anything. They certainly have 

got a lot of people there that are working very hard. The problem 

has been communications and extent of the testing, and making 

sure the information is getting put forward in an accurate way, and 

ultimately, stepping up to the plate and saying, yes, it is safe, or 

no, it is not. And we don’t think they have really been fulfilling 

that obligation. 

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I wondered if any 

of the other panelists could just answer the question? 

Mr. RAGONE. Just one thing. I think there is a matter of distribution of labor here that has to be considered. I used to be with U.S. 

Geological Survey, and I was happy to know that we provided information to the benefit of society. EPA’s research has to do the 

same kind of thing, and one of the limitations of funding with EPA 

is maybe what are the health implications of compounds A, B, C, 

D, and that list gets longer and longer. I think EPA has a major 

responsibility to know health implications of a variety of contaminants that we are facing all over the world. I think, in terms of distribution of labor, it should be the local communities, the health departments. 

Mayor Rutledge said this. He wants his own people and his own 

communities solving the problems, but that requires training and 

opportunities to gain knowledge, and to exchange that research caliber information with EPA, it is just another organization, CDC 

and the like, and put it on the ground locally, so those communities 

can solve the problems in the context of their community. You will 

never get enough money to any Federal agency or to any community. 

191

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BASS. Thank you very much. I would like to ask one more 

question. We apparently haven’t had votes yet, so we got a couple 

more minutes. If you ladies and gentlemen would be good enough 

to wait around for a second. 

Long-term impact on Lake Pontchartrain and the Gulf of Mexico. 

Do we have any idea what the assessment is at this point? Any 

brief observations as to what our options are, and what the impact 

is going to be? I didn’t even know Lake Pontchartrain existed a 

month and a half ago, and now, we understand exactly what the 

problems are and the priorities. It is my understanding that prior 

to the hurricane, it was swimmable, there had been a long history 

of trying to clean it up. Is that gone now? Perhaps. Secretary? 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. Would you like me to address that? 

Mr. BASS. Yes, please. 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. Okay. We have actually been a partner with the 

local governments in the parishes that surround Lake Pontchartrain and others in improving water quality. We were very disappointed, although we understood the priority had to be to get the 

water off of the flooded areas in New Orleans, for public health and 

safety reasons. 

To date, what we have seen has actually been very encouraging. 

The water quality samples that have been taken have been pretty 

parallel with big storm water events, and we are confident that the 

fecal bacteria will die off within a couple of days. It is salty water 

in Lake Pontchartrain. It is an estuarine lake. Organics will eventually decompose. We may see some fish kills associated with the 

oxygen being eaten up during the decomposition process, for lack 

of a technical explanation, and also, that metals will ultimately adhere to sediments and be buried. This wouldn’t have been our preference, but we are very encouraged, as are the local citizens organizations. I say citizens—elected officials, a group, a cross-section of 

people of the Lake Pontchartrain Basin have been very encouraged 

about the results to date, that we will see a healthier lake in a few 

months, but we are certainly setting up, and they are helping us 

with a fairly comprehensive monitoring strategy in case we do see 

something that needs to be addressed. But so far, we are very encouraged, actually surprisingly so at the resilience of the lake, and 

the results of sampling to date. 

Mr. BASS. Thank you. 

Mr. OLSON. Could I just add one thing? There are a couple of significant issues here that need to be addressed. One is the sediments that were just mentioned. We are very concerned about the 

heavy metals and other organics and so on, that are going to be 

adhered to the sediments, some of which washed up into the Lower 

Ninth Ward and elsewhere, and people are going to be exposed to 

this. So some of it that dries up is going to turn into dust, and people may inhale it, but at the bottom of Lake Pontchartrain, we are 

also very worried about what is going to happen with those sediments. 

The other point, you asked about the Gulf. As you probably 

know, there is already an area in the Gulf that is known as the 

Dead Zone, which grows and shrinks, but at some points is, I have 

heard, larger than your state, which is a pretty significant size of 

192

an area that is sort of unfishable. A lot of that is from the upper 

Midwest pollution coming down, and too many nutrients. The concern is, of course, that may have been exacerbated by this flood, 

and I don’t know if you had more to say about that. 

Mr. VERCHICK. The only thing that I would add is that more testing has to be done about the heavy metals that are in Lake Pontchartrain to say that if they sink to the bottom and get buried in 

the sand, that neutralizes them somehow is not true, particularly 

when you consider that the lake itself is very shallow, about 15 

feet, 20 feet deep maximum. And so, if you have got dredging going 

on, or other things going on, that will affect the bottom, you are 

going to have all that stuff coming back up in the water. 

Mr. BASS. Thank you very much. The Chair recognizes the 

gentlelady from California for a second round for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you. I missed my opportunity to ask EPA regarding testing around Superfund sites and landfills, and I would 

like to get feedback from you all. If you feel that, you know, what 

your opinion is about what EPA has or has not been doing in those 

particular areas, given that we have such a large number of Superfund sites in this area. 

Mr. Olson. 

Mr. OLSON. Well, we feel that the testing that has been done so 

far has not been adequate, not just with Superfund sites. I believe 

there are four in Orleans Parish, one of which was the Agriculture 

Street Landfill that we have heard about, and they did do testing, 

at least one test, right around there. We think you need to do ongoing testing, first of all, and make sure you are testing the whole 

area for a suite of chemicals. 

But what we are worried about is all these other areas that nobody is talking about. There are a large number of areas with industrial waste, with industrial facilities, tanks that have been 

floated and crumpled, as a result of the flooding, where there are 

no tests whatsoever that have been announced. We are very concerned about what that means, and what all these toxic sediments 

being washed up means. So that is where there needs to be independent testing, we believe, and more comprehensive testing. 

Ms. SOLIS. One of the concerns I have is if we are going to be 

having a lot of reconstruction going on, obviously, and I am very 

fearful of what I am hearing, that we are not doing enough testing. 

We are going to be bringing people in there, to relocate and help 

us restore—and what kind of appropriate safety measures are we 

taking for this new influx of people, who are coming from different 

parts or regions of the United States, to come in there and work, 

and we are, at the same time, lowering standards. We are relaxing 

some of those environmental standards, as well as prevailing 

wages. 

So I am very concerned, and would love to get your opinion, from 

any one of the panelists. 

Mr. VERCHICK. One thing to watch, when you have got a lot of 

construction going on, and I noticed this the last time I was in New 

Orleans, is you have got this dried muck now, that may have heavy 

metals in it, it certainly has bacterial things and so on. And you 

have got lots of large machinery moving through the city now, 

Humvees, big trucks, you are going to have, of course, more and 

193

more of that as construction begins. That pushes all that dust up 

into the air, and it is landing, now, in places that look like they 

had no standing water before. I mean, places that never got water, 

and that looked completely normal, under the circumstances, EPA 

has found through its air monitoring, has alarming levels of particulate matter in them. And so you know, where my kids used to go 

to school, which didn’t get flooding, now has air that children are 

told they shouldn’t be breathing. And you have got to keep an eye 

on that, and that is going to be happening many months from now, 

with all of the construction going on. 

Ms. SOLIS. Any other comments on infrastructure? That, for me, 

is a big issue area. We have had some discussions in our subcommittee on the fact that, perhaps, the Congress could have done, 

or could do much more, in terms of helping to develop a better infrastructure, and underground storage tank protections, and a lot 

of things, obviously, that are going to affect our drinking water 

supply. 

Mr. RAGONE. Yes, we didn’t have time to put everything in our 

testimony, but even such things as strategic ground water reserves, 

that you identify well in advance of any need, as a place to go when 

you need water, when surface water is contaminated, you have a 

strategic groundwater reserve in a deep, confined aquifer, protected 

from environmental issues. Put a well into that. Secure that well 

from terrorists, from hurricanes, from everything. And then, when 

you need it, you go there, you put it on, you pump that water, just 

like a strategic oil reserve. It is an emergency source of water. It 

could be brackish water. It doesn’t have to be the best water. You 

know, oh, it tastes a little salty. As long as the people have something to drink, to flush out distribution lines, to fight fires, we don’t 

think about that. New York City relies on a surface water supply 

only. What happens there if that goes down for some reason? What 

are they going to drink? If they had a backup groundwater system 

that they could rely on, not nearly as much water, not nearly as 

good quality, they would be safe in their place. And that is a big 

issue. 

Regarding the first point you make, this is a little bit out of the 

national ground water, but it is my old USGS hat. I think Congressman Murphy brought up brownfields. There might be, in New 

Orleans, a redefinition of what a Superfund is, in terms of its geographical distribution, and what a brownfield is, in terms of its 

geographical distribution. These contaminants you talk about floating in the air, coming back down in the soils, you could be redefining the boundaries of a brownfields based on the redistribution 

of a contaminant load. You could be redefining a Superfund site 

based on the redistribution of a contaminant load, and I think you 

don’t want anybody living in a brownfield, you don’t want anybody 

living in a Superfund site, and so that is part of the considerations 

of where do you rebuild, and where you don’t rebuild, and what do 

you remediate, and what you don’t remediate. You have to set priorities, and I think the best way to set a priority is define your 

zones of contamination, define the risks to people in those zones of 

contamination, and design a remediation plan for the city of New 

Orleans, with an understanding of how to protect people with these 

zones of contamination residing all around them. 

194

Mr. BASS. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Dr. Murphy, for another 5 minutes. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one question, because I didn’t get Secretary Gautreaux’s response to the 

question I was asking before, if she thought that the New Orleans 

area, with all these contaminants that we have heard about, and 

bacterial issues, if that area would be reinhabitable, and how long 

that would take, and I would love to have your response, please. 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. It will definitely depend on why the area is not 

being inhabited at the time. People are correct when they said we 

don’t have a lot of sampling information in some areas, particularly 

industrial areas. Actually, those were some of the last areas we 

could get access to. We were preparing to go in those areas when 

Rita struck, so I think you will see a lot more sampling throughout 

the city. We may very well find areas that need to be remediated, 

and that needs to be noted, and properly remediated. In terms of 

large areas, I have heard references to the new Love Canal. We 

have not seen that to date, but we fully expect to find contaminated areas that need to be remediated. That is part of the assessment that is the next level of effort right now. So I hope that helps, 

but to date, we have not seen, especially in residential areas, indications that people will not be able to return to those areas. There 

may not be structures there, but so far, we have not seen large 

areas that won’t be inhabitable. 

Mr. MURPHY. So you are saying that—Mayor, it looks like you 

are nodding your head. Do you have similar thoughts, or you are—

Mayor Rutledge? 

Mr. RUTLEDGE. Yes, I would have to agree with that in Mississippi, also. Right now, is it being monitored and surveyed? Right 

now, there is not any place that the people can’t come back home, 

but like the lady said, there might not be anything to come back 

home to. 

Mr. MURPHY. And so my understanding is, from what you are 

saying, Secretary, is that you will be evaluating that. It is too soon 

to tell, but you will be watching that, and make decisions based 

upon that? Okay. Thank you. 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. Exactly. We expect to find areas that need to 

be remediated. 

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. And we will make decisions. 

Mr. BASS. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maine for 5 

minutes. It is my feeling—are there going to be any more questions 

after this, or are we done? Okay. Very well. This is the last 5 minutes, and then we will adjourn the hearing. The gentleman from 

Maine. 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask a question based on the daily printout from the EPA. There is a printout 

here, which speaks to debris assessment and collection, and it says 

that EPA personnel continue to offer technical assistance in the 

disposal of hazardous wastes and other debris left behind by the 

storm. This is throughout the area. As of 9/22, EPA has collected 

over 37,500 orphaned containers throughout the affected region, 

that are household hazardous wastes. I don’t know if that is a bottle of bleach, or if it is an oil tank, really, and I wondered if anyone 

195

could—I mean, I don’t mean an oil tank. I mean, a barrel of oil. 

And I wondered if anyone on the panel could speak to that. 

Ms. GAUTREAUX. Well, I can volunteer that EPA has been very 

active, particularly in the parishes north of Lake Pontchartrain, 

where access has been possible. They have been very aggressive in 

terms of collecting orphaned containers. You are right, it might be 

a barrel of pesticide. It could be something you would normally find 

beneath your sink, that qualifies as a household hazardous waste. 

They are preparing to do similar sweeps in the parishes that have 

been more heavily impacted by the floodwaters. As they get strategies to move into neighborhoods in New Orleans, they are preparing to do the same, and in St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes. They have also been going to places like Home Depot, some 

of their public information officers, just an example where people 

would go when you are typically rebuilding and repairing, handing 

out literature, so that has actually been a very active effort to date, 

and it will step up as access is increased. 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you. Anybody else? Mr. Olson? 

Mr. OLSON. Yes, I would just like to add the point, which is we 

have also heard anecdotal reports of widespread small spills and 

small sheens all over the place. It might be from underground storage tanks that are leaking. It might be from cars. It might be from 

a variety of things. We are very concerned about the long-term effects of that. 

And I just wanted to add one point, which hasn’t been raised, 

which is directly responsive to a previous question. EPA and the 

State of Louisiana were both under an obligation, under the Safe 

Drinking Water Act, there hasn’t been much discussion of this, 

since 1996, to adopt and implement an adequate plan for provision 

of safe drinking water under emergency circumstances, including 

earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes. That was supposed to be in 

place after the 1996 law. It will be interesting to see why that 

never happened, and what is going on in other states that might 

have a similar situation in the future. 

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Allen, and I want to thank 

all of our witnesses here today. I want to especially thank the two 

of you who have been very patient. It isn’t easy to conduct the kind 

of testimony that we have had, but it has been exceedingly informational and helpful to us. We have some big challenges ahead of 

us. That is clear. And I want to thank the members who were here 

today. And we will be submitting some questions in writing. So if 

there is no business to come before the subcommittee, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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