J-A02016-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

WILLIAM GLENN STECKMAN III 

Appellant

v.

WALLACE SHERWOOD SCOTT

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 731 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered April 25, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Civil Division at No(s): 2019-SU-002139

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: MAY 29, 2024

Appellant, William Glenn Steckman III, appeals from the order entered 

in the York County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment 

in favor of Appellee, Wallace Sherwood Scott. We affirm. 

The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural history 

of this appeal as follows: 

The facts of this case revolve around a defamation claim 

first filed July 18, 2019 by former Berks County employee 

[Appellant] against [Appellee], former mayor of the City of 

Reading.... In September of 2016, [Appellant], as the 

Managing Director for the City of Reading, set up a 

committee that oversaw the bidding processes for the 

selection of a construction manager which would oversee 

construction of two new fire stations in the City of Reading. 

By September of 2018, after all bids were submitted, the 

Committee ranked the bids based upon an established 

criterion. [Appellant] argues he was terminated from his 

position thereafter because, as he claims, [Appellee] was 

upset that [he] had restarted the bidding process. This 
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statement by [Appellant] stems from the allegation that 

[Appellee], during the bidding process, wanted to bypass 

the City’s established criteria and instead select the 

Committee’s lowest ranked bidder based upon his personal 

belief that the lowest ranked bidder was also the lowest 

bidder for the job. [Appellee] denies this. After, and upon 

review of the lowest bid, [Appellant] alleges he determined 

its bid was open ended and thus noncompliant with the 

City’s bidding requirements. [Appellee] was notified of 

[Appellant’s] termination on or about September 18, 2018, 

denying any personal vendetta1towards him or his 

termination. 

1 Rather, [Appellee] states that, in his opinion, he had 

a great working relationship with [Appellant] 

throughout the course of his employment. 

After his termination with the City of Reading, [Appellant] 

sought and was eventually offered a position as Business 

Administrator for the City of York, contingent—at least in 

part—upon a background check. Thereafter, [Appellee] 

claims he was contacted through his office by an 

investigator from the City of York to conduct an interview as 

part of that background check. [Appellee] eventually met 

with an investigator in Reading who worked through the 

York City Police Department, Investigator Michael Davis, to 

do so. Importantly, Inspector Davis testified that he 

considered the meeting with [Appellee] to be some sort of 

official city business with the Mayor of Reading because 

[Appellee] was the sitting acting mayor, during normal 

business hours in his office, and would have direct 

knowledge to answer ... questions. Later, [Appellee] 

engaged in a phone call with York City Council President, 

Henry Nixon, shortly after [Appellant] was introduced to 

York City Council but before he was considered for its 

business administrator position.[1] There, [Appellee] 

apparently indicated there was some history of personnel 

issues with [Appellant]. 

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1 We will address the timing of Inspector Davis’s meeting with Appellee and 

Appellee’s phone call with Mr. Nixon in our discussion of Appellant’s second

issue on appeal. 
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[Appellant] claims that, as a result of that meeting and just 

before he was going to be endorsed for the position with 

York,2 [Appellee] intentionally, falsely and maliciously told 

the York City Mayor, Michael Helfrich, and members of the 

York City Council that [Appellant] had engaged in bid rigging 

while employed by the City of Reading and that he was 

under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI). [Appellant] further alleges those statements were 

made by [Appellee] in hopes the City of York would cancel 

its decision of employment with respect to his application. 

Still, [Appellant] was only told that a highly placed source 

from the City of Reading contacted the City of York. 

Additionally, Mr. Nixon had allegedly only contacted 

[Appellee] regarding [Appellant] based on a rumor he heard 

about a possible FBI investigation. Still, [Appellant] does 

recognize that [Appellee] did not directly acknowledge that 

[Appellant] was being investigated by the FBI to Inspector 

Davis. 

2 [Appellant] alleges his employment was contingent 

upon approval by the York City Council, with a vote 

regarding his hiring scheduled to take place on 

January 2, 2019. Further, he alleges [Appellee] 

defamed him after becoming aware of [Appellant’s] 

acceptance of the position and just before the York 

City Council was scheduled to vote to endorse his 

hiring. [Appellee] specifically denies such allegation 

and alleges he was never made aware as to 

[Appellant’s] acceptance of the position with the City 

of York. 

Ultimately, [Appellant] claims the City of York retracted its 

job offer because he could not get enough votes from city 

council to approve his job placement only after, and because 

of, [Appellee’s] alleged informing to Mr. Nixon via phone 

about an FBI investigation for bid rigging. [Appellant] 

alleges this false information was then passed on to other 

City Council members, hence the denial of his hiring. 

Regarding the FBI investigation rumor, the FBI agent that 

investigates public corruption could neither confirm nor 

deny that there was a current FBI investigation into the City 

of Reading or [Appellant]. 

As such, [Appellant] argues that as a direct result of 
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[Appellee’s] alleged publication of false and defamatory 

statements about him, York City Council delayed its vote to 

approve his employment agreement and later decided 

against hiring him in reliance on [Appellee’s] statements. 

Consequently, [Appellant] asserts a claim of defamation 

constituting defamation per se, believing [Appellee’s] 

statements falsely implicated [Appellant] in criminal activity 

and falsely implicated that he was the subject of a federal 

criminal investigation. Importantly, [Appellant] believes 

[Appellee’s] statements were both unsolicited by the City 

of York and made outside the scope of his duties as Mayor 

(as a private citizen).3 Further, [Appellant] asserts the 

statements were made with the specific intent to 

sabotage his employment opportunity and reputation, 

without regard for the truth, and to cause financial 

and economic harm to him. 

3 [Appellant] asserts that the City of Reading 

maintains a policy of providing only neutral

references for former employees and as such, 

[Appellee] failed to abide by that practice. 

[Appellant] filed his Complaint on July 18, 2019, and 

[Appellee] filed Preliminary Objections on September 16. In 

response, [Appellant] filed an Amended Complaint on 

September 23, and [Appellee] answered on October 22, 

2019. On December 6, 2021, [Appellee] moved for leave of 

[c]ourt to file an Amended Answer with Counterclaim, which 

the [c]ourt granted on December 2[2], 2021. [Appellee] 

later filed an Amended Answer with Counterclaim on 

January 12, 2022, and a final Case Management Order was 

issued.[2] Discovery ended November 21, 2022, dispositive 

motions were due by January 9, 2023, and [Appellee] filed 

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2

In his counterclaim, Appellee argued that Appellant signed an “Authorization 

for Release of Personal Information” for the City of York to perform the 

background check in conjunction with Appellant’s job application. 

(Counterclaim, filed 1/12/22, at ¶5). As part of the authorization, Appellant 

agreed to “indemnify and hold harmless the person to whom this request is 

presented ... against all claims, damages, losses, and expenses....” (Id. at 

¶6). Thus, Appellee insisted that the authorization was designed to protect 

him from Appellant’s lawsuit, and Appellant “should be required to indemnify 

[Appellee] pursuant to the Authorization.” (Id. at ¶10). 
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his Motion for Summary Judgment the following day. 

Subsequent briefing by the parties took place, and Oral 

Argument requested in this matter was held on March 27, 

2023. 

(Order and Opinion Granting Appellee’s Summary Judgment Motion, filed 

4/25/23, at 1-5) (record citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in 

original). 

By order and opinion entered April 25, 2023, the court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Appellee. Significantly, the court found that Appellee 

was a “‘high public official’ as acting mayor of the City of Reading when the 

alleged defamatory statements were made,” and “absolute privilege does 

apply to [Appellee’s] circumstances based on the specific facts of the case and 

the evidence presented.” (Id. at 17). Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal 

on May 16, 2023.3 On May 26, 2023, the court ordered Appellant to file a 

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3 “Generally, this Court’s jurisdiction extends only to review of final orders. A 

final order is defined as any order that: (1) disposes of all claims and of all 

parties; (2) is explicitly defined as a final order by statute; or (3) is entered 

as a final order pursuant to [Pa.R.A.P. 341(c)].” McGrogan v. First 

Commonwealth Bank, 74 A.3d 1063, 1075 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the order granting summary 

judgment did not expressly mention Appellee’s counterclaim. The court’s 

opinion, however, specifically determined that the authorization for release of 

personal information applied to Appellee’s comments about Appellant. (See

Order and Opinion Granting Appellee’s Summary Judgment Motion at 17-18). 

Moreover, the order granting summary judgment had the practical effect of 

rendering Appellee’s counterclaim moot. See Friia v. Friia, 780 A.2d 664, 

667 (Pa.Super. 2001) (explaining that “we must consider whether the 

practical ramification of the order will be to dispose of the case, making review 

appropriate”); Cardinal Midstream II, LLC v. Energy Transfer LP, 295 

A.3d 284, (Pa.Super. 2023) (reiterating that “[a]n issue before a court is moot 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Following an extension, Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on 

June 21, 2023. 

Appellant now raises three issues for this Court’s review: 

Whether the trial court committed reversable error in 

granting [Appellee’s] motion for summary judgment on 

Appellant’s defamation claim when [Appellee] published the 

defamatory statements during an informal private 

unscheduled phone call from a person whom [Appellee] did 

not know and never met, and, pursuant to the Reading, PA 

Ordinances, [Appellee] was not authorized to provide 

information about employees? 

Whether the trial court’s major mistake of fact concerning 

the original forum in which the defamatory statements were 

first published by [Appellee] (i.e., the trial court concluded 

that an in-person meeting which took place on December 

31, 2018, preceded a phone conversation between Henry 

Nixon and [Appellee] which, based on sworn testimony, 

occurred prior to or on December 28, 2018, and which is 

when the defamatory statements concerning a possible FBI 

investigation of Appellant were first published) should

necessitate a remand of this matter back to the trial court 

for reconsideration of its decision to grant summary 

judgment. 

Whether the trial court committed reversible error or abused 

its discretion in determining that Appellant waived [his]

claim of verbal defamation by signing an authorization for 

the City of York to obtain documents in furtherance of its 

background check, by failing to consider: (1) that City of 

York had superior bargaining power as his prospective 

employer; (2) that the sole drafting party of the 

authorization was the City of York; (3) that the authorization 

was ambiguous as to whether or not it authorized anything 

____________________________________________

when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot 

have any practical effect on the existing controversy). Under these 

circumstances, we deem the instant appeal to be proper. 
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other than records and attorney recollections; and (4) that 

the authorization never specifically authorized the receipt of 

any verbal information? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 2-3).4 

Our role in cases involving a grant of summary judgment is as follows: 

On appellate review, an appellate court may reverse a grant 

of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or 

an abuse of discretion. But the issue as to whether there 

are no genuine issues as to any material fact presents a 

question of law, and therefore, on that question our 

standard of review is de novo. This means we need not 

defer to the determinations made by the lower tribunals. To 

the extent that this Court must resolve a question of law, 

we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the 

context of the entire record. 

Valley National Bank v. Marchiano, 221 A.3d 1220, 1222 (Pa.Super. 2019) 

(quoting Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294, 307, 997 A.2d 1152, 

1159 (2010)). Our scope of review is plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa. 

407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 122 S.Ct. 

2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002). 

In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, 

[w]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing 

all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists 

a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts 

as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must 

be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be 

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4 We have reordered Appellant’s issues for ease of disposition. 
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resolved against the moving party. 

Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly 

implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of 

action. Summary judgment is proper if, after the 

completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including 

the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will 

bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce 

evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense 

which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted 

to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no genuine 

issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the 

cause of action or defense, which could be established by 

additional discovery or expert report and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary 

judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports 

summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are 

undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to 

make out a prima facie cause of action or defense. 

Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s 

conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions. 

Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

In his first issue, Appellant acknowledges that Appellee was the mayor 

of Reading at the time of the alleged defamatory statements, and Appellee 

qualified as a high public official for purposes of analyzing the doctrine of 

absolute privilege. Nevertheless, Appellant contends that a high public official 

is not protected by absolute privilege if his remarks were: “(1) not made 

within the course of the high public official’s official duties; and (2) not made 

within the scope of the high public official’s authority.” (Appellant’s Brief at 

15) (emphasis in original). Under this standard, Appellant asserts that 

Appellee was not protected by absolute privilege “when he falsely implicated 
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[Appellant] in an FBI investigation for bid rigging during his phone 

conversation with Nixon.” (Id.) 

Regarding Appellee’s official duties, Appellant posits that the 

“impromptu” phone call between Appellee and Mr. Nixon “was about as 

informal as could be.” (Id. at 16). Appellant emphasizes that the “call was a 

private closed conversation between the two men and was not disclosed to or 

made accessible to the public or other governmental officials of the City of 

Reading.” (Id.) During the phone call, Appellant maintains that Appellee 

“was only responding to an unexpected inquiry from a stranger seeking 

information on a job candidate in another city—a matter that was not of public 

concern to the people of the City of Reading, whom [Appellee] served.” (Id.

at 18). Moreover, “[t]he conduct of [Appellee] was also not ‘closely related’ 

to the performance of his official duties because [Appellee] interfered with the 

pending contractual relations between [Appellant] and the City of York.” (Id.

at 22). 

Regarding the scope of Appellee’s authority, Appellant cites Reading’s 

Code of Ordinances, which provides the mayor with express powers and 

duties. Relying on the ordinances, Appellant avers that Appellee was not 

authorized to provide information regarding former employees upon request. 

Rather, “requests for information with respect to an employee shall be made 

to the Managing Director for review with the City Solicitor to determine if 

response is appropriate.” (Id. at 20). Appellant argues that there was no 
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evidence that Appellee consulted with the city’s managing director prior to 

speaking with Mr. Nixon; therefore, Appellee acted outside the scope of his 

authority in speaking with Mr. Nixon about Appellant. Based upon the 

foregoing, Appellant concludes that this Court must reverse the order granting 

summary judgment in favor of Appellee and remand the matter for trial. We 

disagree. 

Our Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of absolute privilege for 

high public officials as follows: 

[A]s its name implies, [the doctrine] is unlimited and 

exempts a high public official from all civil suits for 

damages arising out of false defamatory statements 

and even from statements or actions motivated by 

malice, provided the statements are made or the 

actions are taken in the course of the official’s 

duties or powers and within the scope of his 

authority, or as it is sometimes expressed, 

within his jurisdiction. 

The doctrine of absolute privilege rests upon the ... idea that 

conduct which otherwise would be actionable is to escape 

liability because the defendant is acting in furtherance of 

some interest of social importance, which is entitled to 

protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to 

the plaintiff’s reputation. This sweeping immunity is not for 

the benefit of high public officials, but for the benefit of the 

public. Absolute privilege is 

designed to protect the official from the suit itself, 

from the expense, publicity, and danger of defending 

the good faith of his public actions before the jury. 

And yet, beyond this lies a deeper purpose, the 

protection of society’s interest in the unfettered 

discussion of public business and in full public 

knowledge of the facts and conduct of such business. 

As such, absolute immunity for high public officials from civil 
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liability is the only legitimate means of removing any 

inhibition which might deprive the public of the best service 

of its officers and agencies. Even though the innocent may 

sometimes suffer irreparable harm,

it has been found to be in the public interest and 

therefore sounder and wiser public policy to immunize 

public officials, for to permit slander, or libel ... suits 

where the official’s charges turn out to be false, would 

be to deter all but the most courageous or the most 

judgment-proof public officials from performing their 

official duties. 

Lindner v. Mollan, 544 Pa. 487, 490-91, 677 A.2d 1194, 1195-96 (1996) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 

“We have previously noted that our Supreme Court has never 

articulated a standard for determining when a high public official’s acts or 

statements are within the scope of his official duties.” Azar v. Ferrari, 898 

A.2d 55, 60 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2006).5 “Nevertheless, we have identified two 

factors that are relevant in reaching such a determination, including (1) the 

formality of the forum in which the alleged defamatory words were spoken 

and (2) the relationship of the legitimate subject of governmental concern to 

the person seeking damages for the defamatory utterance.” Id. (citing Appel 

v. Township of Warwick, 828 A.2d 469 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003), appeal denied, 

576 Pa. 725, 841 A.2d 532; Hall v. Kiger, 795 A.2d 497 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002), 

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5 See also Petow v. Warehime, 996 A.2d 1083, 1089 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2010), 

appeal denied, 608 Pa. 648, 12 A.3d 371 (2010) (stating: “This Court is not 

bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court. However, such decisions 

provide persuasive authority, and we may turn to our colleagues on the 

Commonwealth Court for guidance when appropriate”). 
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appeal denied, 572 Pa. 713, 813 A.2d 846 (2002)). 

Instantly, the trial court determined that Appellee’s statements fell 

within the scope of his official duties: 

[W]hile we do not believe [Appellee’s] comments about 

[Appellant] were at all excessive, even if they were deemed 

to be so, [Appellee’s] belief in an on-going investigation by 

the FBI about [Appellant] would render that belief closely 

related to a matter pending within a mayor’s office. 

Irrespective of whether there actually was an on-going 

investigation at the time the City of York investigator 

contacted the mayor, [Appellee] was offering comments 

about a former employee from the information he had (i.e.,

as mayor, he believed that the FBI had come and removed 

documents the day after [Appellant] left, etc.). 

Furthermore, even if [Appellee’s] comments to the City of 

York may have resulted from a failure to exercise reasonable 

care and diligence, that fact is immaterial to the invocation 

of an immunity that is intended to encompass even 

maliciously motivated comments. Indeed, even taking 

[Appellant’s] averments as true—that [Appellee’s] 

comments were only that he heard or understood that there 

was a possible investigation by the FBI for bid rigging 

against [Appellant]—such statements still fall under the 

immunity. 

* * *

This matter involving [Appellant] was government business. 

[Appellee’s] comments to the City of York investigator 

during normal business hours, in the mayor’s office, and to 

the York city council president on the phone, were closely 

related to that government business and to what had taken 

place during [Appellant’s] time as a former employee for the 

City of Reading. If allegations of bid rigging occurred, and 

the City of Reading terminated its employment with 

[Appellant], such information is of public concern as it 

corresponds to the suitability of a former employee for a 

public position in the City of York Administration. Indeed, 

absolute immunity is a means of removing any inhibition 

which might deprive the public of the best service of its 

officers and agencies. The doctrine of this privilege given to 
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public officials then, is to be used as a shield, not as a 

sword. In the current action, it is appropriately utilized as 

a shield by [Appellee]. 

(Order and Opinion Granting Appellee’s Summary Judgment Motion at 14-16)

(internal footnotes and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Here, the court correctly observed that Appellee’s phone call with Mr. 

Nixon related to governmental business. We agree that the possibility of an

investigation into bid rigging would impact Appellant’s suitability for another 

public position, and Appellee’s comments on the topic amounted to actions in 

furtherance of an interest of social importance. See Lindner, supra. To the 

extent Appellant cites Reading’s Code of Ordinances for the proposition that 

Appellee’s comments did not occur within the scope of his official duties, we 

also agree with the court’s determination that this conclusion “would be 

drawing the line of such immunity too narrowly.” (Order and Opinion Granting 

Appellee’s Summary Judgment Motion at 15). On this record, the court did 

not err in applying the doctrine of absolute privilege for high public officials. 

See Lindner, supra. See also Azar, supra (holding alleged defamatory 

statements made by intermediate school unit executive director and assistant 

director regarding former employee’s work and health problems were made 

within scope of their duties and authority; former employee had solicited 

school districts to provide management information systems services;

statements were made to school districts that were members of intermediate 

unit, and defendants’ duties included coordination of programs offered by 
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intermediate unit). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first 

claim. 

In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court resolved “a 

major issue of fact against [Appellant] despite the fact that there was evidence 

to the contrary.” (Appellant’s Brief at 11). Specifically, Appellant claims that 

Inspector Davis “testified at his deposition that he decided to meet with 

[Appellee] in Reading only after hearing about the infamous call between 

[York City Council President Henry] Nixon and [Appellee] on December 28, 

2018.” (Id.) (emphasis in original). Appellant complains, however, that the 

court incorrectly determined that the inspector’s meeting with Appellee 

occurred before Appellee’s phone call with Mr. Nixon. Appellant maintains 

“that the defamation arose solely from the phone conversation in which 

[Appellee] engaged in with Nixon,” and “[t]he forum in which [Appellee’s] 

slanderous phone call with Nixon took place was very different from the forum 

for the follow-up investigation.” (Id. at 14). Appellant concludes that the 

court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee where its 

reasoning was “wrongly focused on the meeting with [Inspector] Davis and 

[Appellee] at City Hall.” (Id. at 13). We disagree. 

Considering our resolution of Appellant’s first issue, we need not tarry 

long with Appellant’s allegation that the court confused this sequence of 

events. Regardless of whether the meeting with Inspector Davis occurred 

after Appellee’s phone call with Mr. Nixon, it does not alter our conclusion that 
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the court correctly applied the doctrine of absolute privilege for high public 

officials to Appellee’s statements. We do not accept Appellant’s assertion that 

the trial court committed an error of law by failing to interpret the facts in a 

light most favorable to Appellant as the non-moving party, and we conclude 

that Appellant is not entitled to relief on his second issue. See Chenot, 

supra. 

In his third issue, Appellant asserts that trial court erroneously 

concluded that Appellant waived his claims against Appellee by signing the 

authorization for the release of personal information. Because we have 

already determined that the trial court did not err in granting summary 

judgment in favor of Appellee, we need not address Appellant’s argument 

regarding the court’s waiver analysis. (See also Trial Court Opinion, filed 

7/19/23, at 2) (unnumbered) (recognizing that court’s determination of 

validity of authorization for release of personal information was secondary to 

initial determination of immunity). Therefore, we conclude that the court 

properly granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. See Valley 

National Bank, supra; Chenot, supra. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/29/2024