Allen Dickerson (pro hac vice)

Tyler Martinez (pro hac vice)

Owen Yeates (Utah Bar No. 13901)

INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH

124 S. West Street, Suite 201

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Telephone: 703.894.6800

Facsimile: 703.894.6811

adickerson@ifs.org

tmartinez@ifs.org

oyeates@ifs.org

Scott C. Williams (Utah Bar. No. 6687)

SCOTT C. WILLIAMS, LLC

43 East 400 South

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Telephone: 801.220.0700

Facsimile: 801.364.3232

scwlegal@gmail.com

Scott E. Thomas (pro hac vice)

BLANK ROME, LLP

1825 Eye Street N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone: 202.420.2601

Facsimile: 202.420.2201

sthomas@blankrome.com

Counsel for Defendant John Swallow

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEREMY JOHNSON and 

JOHN SWALLOW,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:15-cv-00439-DB

DEFENDANT JOHN SWALLOW’S 

REPLY MEMORANDUM 

IN SUPPORT OF

PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT

District Judge Dee Benson

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 126 Filed 08/23/18 Page 1 of 12
1

This Court has granted Defendant John Swallow’s Motion to Dismiss and vacated the ultra 

vires regulation that is the sole basis of the Federal Election Commission’s case. Mem. Decision 

and Order at 10 (April 6, 2018), ECF No. 120 (“Order”). The only question now is one of timing: 

should this Court’s Order be made permanent now, or years from now, once the FEC’s claims 

against Mr. Johnson resolve. There is no just reason for delay, and the FEC’s Opposition cites no 

relevant legal authority for tarrying. Partial Final Judgment is appropriate. 

I. The FEC has not shown a common set of facts entwining Mr. Swallow’s case 

with Mr. Johnson’s. 

The Commission’s argument depends upon showing that the facts of Mr. Swallow’s and 

Mr. Johnson’s cases are intertwined. They are not. The FEC brought only a single claim against 

Mr. Swallow, and that claim failed as a purely legal matter. There is no factual controversy—

intertwined or otherwise.

The FEC relies upon its allegation that Mr. “Swallow ‘caused, helped, and assisted 

Johnson.’” Pl. FEC Opp. to Def. John Swallow’s Mot. for Partial Final J. at 4 (Aug. 8, 2018), ECF. 

No. 125 (“FEC Opp.”) (quoting Amend. Compl. ¶ 1 (Feb. 24, 2016), ECF No. 36); id. at 5 (relying 

upon only two paragraphs of Amended Complaint to show factual nexus). This merely begs the 

question. The Commission’s claim has been dismissed because even if these allegations were true, 

the FEC has no valid authority to prohibit them pursuant to its unlawful regulation. Order at 10. 

In opposing Mr. Swallow’s motion, the Commission primarily relies upon an unpublished 

opinion1from the District of Colorado. FEC Opp. at 5-6. But Medved v. DeAtley concerned

 

1 The Commission frequently relies on unpublished opinions, but often fails to follow this Court’s 

local rules requiring them to be labeled as such. DUCivR 7-2(b). This deprives this Court and 

those before it of the chance to properly assess those rulings’ precedential value. DUCivR 7-2(a).

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 126 Filed 08/23/18 Page 2 of 12
2

conspiracy and racketeering under Colorado’s version of RICO, explicitly based on the “same 

facts and legal theories” for each party. No. 12-cv-03034-PAB-MEH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

125792, at *4 (D. Colo. Sep. 9, 2014) (unpublished). Such is not the case here. Order at 2 (“The 

case against Defendant Swallow rests entirely on 11 C.F.R. §110.4(b)(1)(iii) . . . .”). The 

remaining Medved claims were based on aiding and abetting liability, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

125792, at *5, a theory already rejected by this Court under Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 

Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). Order at 8-10. 

The Commission’s remaining unpublished authority is no more helpful. FEC Opp. at 5.

Albright v. Attorney’s Title Insurance Fund, for example, was another RICO conspiracy case. No. 

2:03CV00517, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10879, at *1 (D. Utah Feb. 11, 2008) (Benson, J.) 

(unpublished). Thus, unsurprisingly, this Court found “that the remaining claims are not distinct 

and separable from the resolved claims” because “the facts that form the basis of Plaintiffs’ [civil]

claims are, in many instances, the same facts that give rise to the predicate acts of the now 

dismissed . . . claims.” Id. at *5-6. Furthermore, the 54(b) motion addressed in that opinion was 

one of several partial summary judgment motions that were “fully briefed and ready for oral 

argument and/or this Court’s ruling” and granting 54(b) would “potentially prolong the litigation 

between the parties” rather than reduce delay. Id. at *7. There are no such concerns here.

Diaz v. King involved a pro se litigant who filed a flurry of claims against several state 

judicial officers in New Mexico and, when the federal district court held that some of the claims 

were subject to judicial immunity, immediately filed for Tenth Circuit review before the district 

court could rule on a pending motion for interlocutory review. Slip op. at 2, No. 14-1086 KG/SCY 

(Jan. 13, 2016), ECF No. 81 (unpublished). The pro se plaintiff later filed a Rule 54(b) motion, 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 126 Filed 08/23/18 Page 3 of 12
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but the court ruled that the dismissed defendants were relevant to the common issue of judicial 

immunity for all defendants. Id. at 7-8. That is not the case here, where the vacated regulation has 

no bearing on the Commission’s pursuit of Mr. Johnson for principal liability.

The Commission’s asserted legal authority over Mr. Swallow is invalid, and its claims 

against Mr. Johnson are wholly distinct. No factual question is relevant, let alone intertwined.

II. The FEC fails to show that granting Mr. Swallow’s motion will create any 

appellate burden.

The Commission has not said whether it will appeal this Court’s ruling if the Motion is 

granted. But such an appeal will not unduly inconvenience the Commission or courts. FEC Opp. 

at 6-7. The narrow appellate question has no bearing on any future appeal in Mr. Johnson’s case.

2

The FEC suggests that the validity of Mr. Swallow’s secondary liability somehow impacts 

a hypothetical future appeal of Mr. Johnson’s primary liability. Id. at 7. But the Commission has 

things precisely backwards. Secondary liability relies upon the fact patterns required to find 

primary liability, not the other way around. See, e.g., Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 167 (describing 

secondary liability as applying to “those who do not engage . . . but who aid and abet” those who 

do). Put simply, even if its regulation were valid, the FEC has accused Mr. Johnson and Mr. 

 

2 The FEC believes that the Tenth Circuit may broaden any resulting appeal, ignoring doctrines 

such as constitutional avoidance. FEC Opp. at 6 n.1. In Wells v. City & County of Denver, the 

Tenth Circuit indeed held that, on constitutional claims under de novo review, it may rule on 

different grounds from the district court. 257 F.3d 1132, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 2001). But Wells

centered on constitutional claims involving holiday displays on public property; there was no 

means of avoiding constitutional issues. Id. at 1138. By contrast, this Court ruled on Chevron Step 

I, and “at the first step of Chevron, [the Tenth Circuit] examine[s] solely ‘whether Congress has 

directly spoken to the precise question at issue.’” Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 

2015) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)

and applying Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014)). That would be the 

question on appeal. Cf. Collard v. United States, 10 F.3d 718, 719 n.1 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Courts 

do not decide what is not before them.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 126 Filed 08/23/18 Page 4 of 12
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Swallow of different legal violations. In any eventual appeal, the scope of Mr. Swallow’s case will 

remain limited to the order he now seeks to make permanent. That is because the FEC has declined 

to pursue an interlocutory appeal of this Court’s order, and treats Mr. Swallow as dismissed from 

the case, so further developments involving Mr. Johnson will necessarily proceed independently.

Moreover, there is no just cause of delay, and the equities tilt in Mr. Swallow’s favor. His

liability remains uncertain, which the FEC’s filings only compound. The Commission has taken 

contradictory positions on this harm, even in its Opposition to this Motion. The FEC claims that 

Mr. Swallow has been dismissed, and he need not be informed of future developments. FEC Opp. 

at 11. But the Commission does not release Mr. Swallow. It still claims a right to appeal. Id. at 12. 

That appeal would drag Mr. Swallow back into this litigation, potentially years from now. In the 

interim, his legal team will not have been involved in the case.3

By contrast, the FEC, a federal agency, points to no harm other than the potential appeal 

itself, a burden that would be shared by both parties. FEC Opp. at 12. In fact, the Commission

takes the peculiar position that granting this Motion would create “stronger incentives to seek 

appellate review,” id. at 7,

4

even though this Court’s injunction already exists, and the FEC 

 

3 The FEC insists that that Mr. Swallow show hardship from a delay while continuing to seek stays 

without his consent. Of course, the resolution of Mr. Swallow’s motion to dismiss was explicitly 

excluded from the larger stay in this case—precisely because it is a separate question. Joint 

Stipulation and [Proposed Order] to Extend or Clarify Stay at 1 n.1 (June 4, 2018), ECF No. 122.

Neither R. M-G for A.R. v. Las Vegas City Sch., No. CV 13-0350 KBM/KK, 2016 WL 10592142

(D.N.M. Feb. 25, 2016), nor Diaz, No. 14-1086 KG/SCY, are applicable where a losing party seeks 

delay of final judgment, not because it is justified in the context of a particular case, but rather 

because it wishes to continue using an unlawful regulation without hazarding an appeal.

4

It takes four affirmative votes for the Commission to authorize an appeal. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30106(c) 

and 30107(a)(6). Currently, there are precisely four commissioners. FEC, Leadership and 

Structure: Commissioners https://www.fec.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/. It is of course 

possible that the FEC did not seek interlocutory review of the Order because at least some 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 126 Filed 08/23/18 Page 5 of 12
5

declined to exercise its right to an interlocutory appeal. 

The FEC invokes case law, but none applies, because each case would have created 

redundant appeals. Stewart v. Gates centered on the dismissal of individual defendants in a sexual 

harassment lawsuit, leaving the other institutional employer defendants, creating “the possibility 

of multiple appeals in this same case.” 277 F.R.D. 33, 34, 37 (D.D.C. 2011). A Rule 54(b) motion 

failed in U.S. ex rel. Fent v. L-3 Communications Aero Tech LLC because it “would [have] required 

plaintiff to appeal the same claim for the same reasons in two separate appeals.” Slip Op. at 4-5, 

No. 05-cv-0265-CVE-SAJ (N.D. Ok. Mar. 12, 2008) (unpublished). Patriot Manufacturing, LLC 

v. Hartwig, Inc., No. 10-1206-EFM-KGG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127229, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Sept. 

11, 2014) (unpublished), does not apply because Mr. Swallow is not seeking to preserve any future 

merits claims. He wants this ordeal to be over.5

The Commission relies on Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 

288 (7th Cir. 1985), dealing with the entry of attorneys’ fees pursuant to a promissory note. FEC 

Opp. at 11-12. The trial court decision in Daniels did not mention Rule 54(b); instead, the losing 

party sought reconsideration under FRCP 59(e). 763 F.2d at 288. The appeal centered on the 

finality of the attorneys’ fees order. Id. at 289. The Seventh Circuit found that “when a district 

court enters a judgment on the merits and reserves questions about fees, the aggrieved party must 

appeal at once or lose the right to an appeal on the merits.” Id. at 291. This is nothing like Mr. 

 

commissioners agreed with this Court’s reasoning. Regardless, if the FEC’s Opposition is intended

to accommodate the FEC’s internal dynamics, it provides no authority that this would be a “just 

reason for delay” within the meaning of Rule 54(b).

5 Mr. Swallow is unsure of the reason for the FEC’s citation to Onyx Properties, LLC v. Board of 

County Commissioners, but that case centered on the legality of a zoning decision challenged by 

multiple parties. 916 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1210 (D. Colo. 2013).

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 126 Filed 08/23/18 Page 6 of 12
6

Swallow winning dismissal, and then waiting years for that victory to have any meaning.

III. The FEC’s belated attempt to modify this Court’s order is procedurally 

improper and legally mistaken.

Rather than limiting its opposition to Mr. Swallow’s Rule 54(b) motion, the Commission

asks for reconsideration and/or modification of this Court’s Order, without offering any new facts 

or legal authority for reconsideration. FEC Opp. at 7 n.3; id. at 13 n.5 (asking to treat its response 

as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration). This attempt violates this Court’s rules and 

sheds no light on the questions here: whether an “appellate court would have to decide the same 

issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals,” and “whether there is any just 

reasons to delay.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).

A motion for either reconsideration or modification violates this Court’s rules. DUCivR 7-

1(b)(1)(A) (“No motion, including but not limited to cross-motions . . . may be included in a 

response or reply memorandum.”). This tactic puts “moving targets in the papers” and complicates

the consideration of claims under different Rules of Civil Procedure. Braun v. Medtronic Sofamor 

Danek, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1192 (D. Utah 2015). This Court should not consider the parts 

of the FEC Opposition that ought to have been a separate motion, nor should there be any surreply. Roundy v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 2:12-cv-01032-DN-DBP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114070, 

at *4 (D. Utah June 27, 2013) (unpublished) (“Given these procedural errors [under DUCivR 7-

1(b)(1)(A)], the Court CANNOT CONSIDER the relief Plaintiffs request in their response 

memorandum.”) (all emphasis in original). 

But even on the merits, the arguments fail. The Commission is regularly subject to vacatur 

of its regulations. See, e.g., Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 130 (D.D.C. 2004) (striking fifteen

regulations under Chevron or other APA review) aff’d 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Just this 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 126 Filed 08/23/18 Page 7 of 12
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month, the Commission had a regulation vacated under Chevron Step I. Citizens for Responsibility 

& Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, No. 16-259 (BAH), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130774 at *156 (D.D.C. 

Aug. 3, 2018) (“In particular, the FEC regulation . . .is declared invalid and is vacated”).6

This Court properly ordered 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(iii) vacated because it failed at every 

level of Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) analysis. This Court clearly ruled that the 

regulation failed Chevron Step I, in part because the Supreme Court made clear in Central Bank 

that secondary liability cannot be created without clear statutory authority, which 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30122 lacks. Order at 7-10. The regulation is simply bad law. Vacatur was warranted here, just 

as it has been in many other cases.

But the FEC does not even oppose vacatur. Instead, it makes much of the effect of an 

injunction against use of its ultra vires rule. FEC Opp. at 7-10.7It is important to note, however, 

that “the District Court in exercising its equity powers may command persons properly before it 

 

6 The CREW court stayed its ruling “for 45 days to provide time for the FEC to issue interim 

regulations that comport with the statut[e].” Id. That was because the FEC had failed to carry out 

an explicit Congressional command. Here the FEC acted without authority. There is no statute 

with which the FEC must comport, and nothing for it to do if there were a remand. 

7 The Commission claims that Mr. Swallow “did not request any injunction,” id. at 8, which is not 

accurate. Mr. Swallow’s argument centered on the ultra vires nature of 11 C.F.R. 

§ 110.4(b)(1)(iii)—as an affirmative defense—and sought vacatur of the regulation and any “such 

other relief as this Court deems appropriate.” Def. John Swallow’s Ans. to Amend. Compl. at 37-

38, 40 (May 16, 2016), ECF No. 45; Def. Swallow’s Opp. to FEC Cross-Motion at 25 (Jan. 12, 

2018), ECF No. 114 (“[T]his Court should grant judgment on the pleadings and vacate 11 C.F.R. 

§ 110.4(b)(1)(iii)”).Of course, this Court has plenary authority to enforce its rulings. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2202. Vacatur without an injunction to enforce it is a somewhat empty declaration, especially 

where the FEC has shown that it will not voluntarily cease enforcement of the vacated regulation. 

In any event, the parties adequately litigated this question in connection with Mr. Swallow’s 

motion to dismiss. Def. John Swallow’s Mot. to Dismiss, J. on the Pleadings and Mem. in Supp. 

at 17-18 (Oct. 23, 2017), ECF No. 98; Pl. FEC’s Mem. in Opp. to Def. John Swallow’s Mots. to 

Dismiss and for J. on the Pleadings and in Supp. of Cross-Motion for Partial J. on the Pleadings at 

29-30 (Nov. 20, 2017), ECF No. 103; Def. Swallow’s Opp. to FEC Cross-Mot. at 24-25.

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 126 Filed 08/23/18 Page 8 of 12
8

to cease or perform acts outside its territorial jurisdiction.” Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 

280, 289 (1952) (collecting cases). Indeed, this doctrine is recognized by the FEC’s own case of 

United States v. AMC Entertainment, Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 770 (9th Cir. 2008). FEC Opp. at 10

(quoting case).

8 AMC explicitly recognizes the validity of universal injunctions. 549 F.3d at 770 

(“[T]he court has the power to enforce the terms of the injunction outside the territorial jurisdiction 

of the court, including issuing a nationwide injunction.”) (citing Steele, 344 U.S. at 289 ).

9

But even assuming, arguendo, that the FEC is correct that general injunctions are 

disfavored as a matter of policy, such an injunction is proper here. Much of the Commission’s 

legal authority is devoid of context or taken from unpublished opinions. Emblematic of this misuse 

of case law, the FEC relies upon Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), dealing with the 

constitutionality of criminal bans on homosexual activity, and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 

(1971), the landmark case on federal abstention in favor of state judicial proceedings. FEC Opp. 

at 8. But the Commission’s ultra vires rule does not possess the dignity of a legislative act (which 

it, in fact, violates), and these cases have nothing to do with the FEC’s civil claims.

Moreover, while Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 684 (1979), did address nationwide 

class actions and related remedies, the FEC’s quote is not the holding of the Supreme Court. FEC 

Opp. at 7. It is a synopsis of a party’s view. Califano, 442 U.S. at 702 (“the Secretary . . . argues 

 

8 AMC dealt with an injunction enforcing disability-access construction laws that compelled, at 

great cost, a chain to change movie theater accessibility features to comply with conflicting rulings. 

Id. at 767. By contrast, all the FEC must do here is delete, and cease using, an unlawful regulation.

9 Cf. City of N.Y. v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 146 n.30 (2d Cir. 2011) (a “federal 

court sitting as a court of equity having personal jurisdiction over a party has power to enjoin him 

from committing acts elsewhere”) (collecting cases); United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 

1016 n.17 (9th Cir. 1981) (Kennedy, then-Circuit Judge) (“When a district court has jurisdiction 

over all parties involved, it may enjoin the commission of acts outside of its district.”).

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 126 Filed 08/23/18 Page 9 of 12
9

that nationwide class relief is inconsistent with the rule that injunctive relief should be no more 

burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs”) (emphasis 

added). The Court rejected that argument in the very next paragraph. Id. (“[T]he fact that the class 

is nationwide in scope does not necessarily mean that the relief afforded the plaintiffs will be more 

burdensome than necessary to redress the complaining parties.”); id. (holding that “the scope of 

injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established”).

10 The Secretary lost.

In any event, Mr. Swallow is not a plaintiff aggressively pursuing the FEC and seeking to 

hamstring its enforcement of campaign finance law. The Commission initiated this suit, and the 

Commission continues to insist that it be permitted to use its improper regulation. For that reason, 

Virginia Society for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2001), and Hospice of New

Mexico, LLC v. Sebelius, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (D.N.M. 2010), are inapposite.11 Instead, this case 

is much more like Richmond Tenants Organization, Inc. v. Kemp, where the government was

overstepping its authority and an injunction was needed to protect potential defendants. 956 F.2d 

1300, 1308 (4th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases).

 

10 The FEC also uses a “see” cite to Justice Thomas’ concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii, 585 

U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2424-29 (2018). FEC Opp. at 7. Justice Thomas wrote only for himself 

and does not speak for the Court on that point. This Court should issue an injunction of sufficient 

scope to prevent the FEC from continuing to act contrary to law.

11 And contrary to the quote supplied at FEC Opp. at 9, the Commission is not in the position of

the Solicitor General, carefully weighing which cases to bring before the Supreme Court on 

immigration due process issues. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160-61 (1984)

(rejecting collateral estoppel). As already explained, Defendant John Swallow’s Opposition to 

FEC Cross-Motion at 1, the Commission makes very little use of the relevant regulation and will 

not be unduly inconvenienced by ceasing those minimal efforts. See also Order at 8 (“The six 

enforcement efforts the Commission cites are all internal to the FEC itself.”).

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10

IV. The FEC’s desire to use 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(iii) in another forum is 

insufficient justification for delay or modification of this Court’s order.

Clarity surrounding this regulation is paramount, both here and, apparently, in the Southern 

District of Florida. Indeed, the FEC specifically invited the Florida court to apply 11 C.F.R. 

§ 110.4(b)(1)(iii) “absent further developments in Swallow.” Notice of Supp. Auth. at 5, FEC v. 

Rivera, No. 1:17-cv-22643-MCG (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2018), ECF No. 30 (attached as Exhibit A).

The FEC suggested that “the Court may wish to do so without a motion from the Commission”

because the FEC is subject to this Court’s injunction. Id.

12

But this is beside the point. The FEC seldom invokes 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(iii), and even 

when it has done so in an ongoing case, it can easily abide by this Court’s injunction. Its actions 

in Rivera prove as much. There, 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(iii) is a side show; Mr. Rivera is being 

accused of principal liability as well. All an injunction will do is prevent the FEC from using its 

unlawful regulation against Mr. Swallow, and those like him, engaged in core First Amendmentprotected political activity in the future. It will not disrupt ongoing, valid enforcement activities.

* * *

The FEC is welcome to defend its regulation before the Court of Appeals. But it should not 

be allowed to put off that question for years until Mr. Johnson’s fate is determined on separate 

facts and legal claims. The Commission has identified no just reason to delay Mr. Swallow’s 

successful defense in this Court. Partial Final Judgment is warranted.

 

12 Before the Florida court, the FEC acknowledged that the Commission could have sought review 

of this Court’s decision “within 60 days of the April 5 order” or “when final judgment is entered, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).” Id. at 4. The FEC told the Florida district court, however, that such activity 

“will not occur for some time,” id., without disclosing its intent to actively delay resolution of this

proceeding by fighting Mr. Swallow’s 54(b) Motion and seeking stays. 

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 126 Filed 08/23/18 Page 11 of 12
11

Scott C. Williams (Utah Bar. No. 6687)

SCOTT C. WILLIAMS, LLC

43 East 400 South

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Telephone: 801.220.0700

Facsimile: 801.364.3232

scwlegal@gmail.com 

Scott E. Thomas (pro hac vice)

BLANK ROME, LLP

1825 Eye Street N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone: 202.420.2601

Facsimile: 202.420.2201

sthomas@blankrome.com 

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Allen Dickerson

Allen Dickerson (pro hac vice)

Tyler Martinez (pro hac vice)

Owen Yeates (Utah Bar No. 13901)

INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH

124 S. West Street, Suite 201

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Telephone: 703.894.6800

Facsimile: 703.894.6811

adickerson@ifs.org

tmartinez@ifs.org

oyeates@ifs.org

Counsel for Defendant John Swallow

Dated: August 23, 2018

Case 2:15-cv-00439-DB Document 126 Filed 08/23/18 Page 12 of 12