U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Doubletree Hotel Fire

New Orleans, Louisiana

USFA-TR-008/July 1987

Homeland

Security

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

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to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

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who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

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technology, and other related areas.

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For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Doubletree Hotel Fire

New Orleans, Louisiana

Investigated by: Jeffrey M. Shapiro, P.E.

This is Report 008 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-86-C-2277 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

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Table of Contents

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Codes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Fire Protection Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Fire Department Actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Emergency Medical Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Fire Protection Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Human Behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Building Construction and Contents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Fire Protection Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Construction Features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

LIST OF APPENDICES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

APPENDIX 1: FD 200 – Field Incident Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

APPENDIX 2: FD 500 – Casualty Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

APPENDIX 3: New Orleans Health Department Injury Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

APPENDIX 4: New Orleans Fire Department Selected Fire Prevention Records. . . . . . . . . . . . 35

APPENDIX 5: Slides Of Doubletree Hotel Fire Investigation New Orleans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

1

SUMMARY

Doubletree Hotel Fire

New Orleans, Louisiana

A six-alarm arson fire on the tenth floor of the Doubletree Hotel in New Orleans, Louisiana, on 

July 19, killed a security guard, injured ten others, and proved to be yet another example of 

the need for improved fire safety for high-rise hotels. The U.S. Fire Administration conducted 

an investigation of this fire as part of its Major Fire Investigation Program TriData Corporation of 

Arlington, Virginia, performed the investigation.

The fire occurred on a Sunday just after 10:00 p.m. and started in a corridor serving guest rooms 

on the tenth floor. The floor was unoccupied and undergoing renovation at the time. The cause of 

the fire was arson. Due to the failure of the automatic fire alarm system, the fire gained significant 

headway before being detected. The hotel’s partial sprinkler system did not cover the area of origin. 

The delay in detection allowed smoke to spread to at least two other floors before the manual fire 

alarm was sounded by the guard, who ultimately was killed. Behavior of guests ranged from panic 

on the smoky floor above the fire to apathy elsewhere due to recent false alarms.

The performance of the building’s fire-resistive assemblies and finishes was noteworthy. Fire damage was limited to a single floor; however, smoke damage affected several floors. The fire department effectively used the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage and ultimately control the 

incident.

Many key issues were identified in this fire pertaining to such areas as fire protection equipment, 

building construction, fire department operations, and human behavior. A summary of these issues 

is presented in Table 1. A report is available from the U.S. Fire Administration.

3

DOUBLETREE HOTEL FIRE

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

JULY 19, 1987

Local Contacts: Chief William J. McCrossen

Captain George H. Rigamer, Jr.

City of New Orleans Fire Department

317 Decatur Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

(504) 581-6200

OVERVIEW

On July 19, 1987, a six-alarm fire on the unoccupied tenth floor of the Doubletree Hotel in downtown New Orleans resulted in the death of a hotel security guard and the injury of ten others, including hotel guests, hotel staff, and police officers. The fire, which resulted in a total of $175,000 in 

damage, was caused by arson. Factors contributing to the loss were the failure of the automatic fire 

alarm system, the lack of automatic sprinkler system protection in the guest room areas, storage in 

exit corridors, and improper action by an untrained employee. In the shadow of the tragedy, though, 

resides a success: an estimated additional 150 people were evacuated without injury because of the 

effective operation of the manual fire alarm system, successfully performance of fire-resistive construction, light fire loading in the exit corridors, and a well organized suppression effort by the City 

of New Orleans Fire Department.

This report describes and evaluates significant issues pertaining to the fire exclusive of the cause 

and origin investigation. A summary of key issues is presented in Table 1. The report is divided 

into five major sections: Overview, Background, The Fire, Analysis of Significant Issues, and Lessons 

Learned.

This report is not intended to place blame or fix liability upon those individuals or corporations 

involved in this incident.

BACKGROUND

Construction

The Doubletree Hotel was previously operated as the International Hotel and was constructed in 

1973 at 300 Canal Street in downtown New Orleans adjacent to the famous French Quarter (see 

Figure 1; Figure 2 shows where photos were taken to furnish a frame of reference). The building is a 

17-story high-rise and contains 363 guest rooms. The building is constructed of reinforced concrete 

and appears to qualify as Type 1 construction: non-combustible/fire-resistive. Each typical guest 

room floor is L-shaped, contains approximately 18,000 square feet, and has 31 guest rooms. The 

L-shaped corridor connects to three 2-hour fire-resistive stairways, one at each end and one near the 

corner (See Figure 3).
4

Corridor walls are made of 5/8 inch gypsum wallboard mounted on 3-5/8 inch metal studs located 

24 inches on center. Since the wallboard is not marked to indicate its qualification for use in a 

rated wall assembly, it is uncertain whether the wall would have qualified as 1-hour fire- resistive 

construction.

TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issue Comments

Occupancy High-rise hotel – 17 stories

Built in 1973

Approximately 50 percent occupied at the time of the fire

 The Fire Caused by arson

Occurred in tenth-floor corridor (unoccupied floor)

Killed one and injured ten

Ignition involved combustibles stored in corridor

Large volume of smoke spread to other floors

Fire Protection Equipment Automatic alarm failed

Manual alarm facilitated evacuation

Building was only partially sprinklered (none in area of origin)

Building Construction Fire-resistive construction helped contain fir

Limited combustibility of corridor carpeting and finishes helped inhibit fire spread

Ventilation ducts allowed smoke to spread into several floors

Fire Department Operations ICS effectively used

Human Behavior “Convergence cluster” occurred – frightened people grouped and took refuge

Apathy to fire alarm due to previous false alarms delayed evacuation of some occupants

Unwise action by a hotel staff member may have contributed to his death

Corridor doors leading to guest rooms are 1-3/4 inch thick (apparently solid core) wood doors set 

in steel frames without self-closing devices. Such doors are typically accepted as equivalent to 20-

minute fire-resistive assemblies in existing buildings.

At the time of the fire incident, the hotel was undergoing a 5 million dollar renovation, which 

included mostly cosmetic upgrades and new furnishings.

Codes

The building code in effect at the time of construction was the City of New Orleans Building Code, 

which was originally written in 1949 and periodically amended. The New Orleans Building Code 

appears to have been based on an early version of the Uniform Building Code. In addition, the city 

currently uses the 1985 National Fire Codes, published by the National Fire Protection Association, 

as a supplement. Other code requirements, according to the New Orleans Fire Marshal, include the 

1967 edition of the National Fire Codes, which was adopted by the State of Louisiana as retroactive 

to all existing buildings within the State. The City of New Orleans has now established a formal 

program for general enforcement of the retroactive State law.

It is also noteworthy that New Orleans adopted a high-rise provision for new construction in the city’s 

building code in 1975 that required automatic sprinkler protection throughout such buildings. The ordinance did not have any retroactive provisions, and therefore did not apply to the Doubletree Hotel.
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 5

Fire Protection Systems

At the time of the fire, the hotel was equipped with a substantial complement of fire protection systems, considering its age. In addition to a partial automatic sprinkler system, the hotel was provided 

with a combination standpipe for both occupant and fire department use, automatic and manual fire 

alarm systems, and portable fire extinguishers. Figure 3 shows the location of these systems on a 

typical floor.

The sprinkler and standpipe systems were fed by a 750-gpm/125-psi fire booster pump located on 

the third floor. The hotel’s sprinkler system protected primarily non-guest areas, including the storage, maids’, and janitors’ closets on each floor; the lobby; assembly areas; and kitchen areas. Guest 

room floor corridors and guest rooms were not protected by automatic sprinklers.

The standpipe system consisted of a 6-inch riser in each stairwell with 2-1/2 inch outlets at each floor 

landing. Three 1-1/2 inch hose cabinets for occupant use were provided on each floor, one immediately outside each stairwell. A 4A-30BC fire extinguisher was provided in each hose cabinet.

Two separate fire alarm systems were installed in the building, one manual and one automatic. The 

manual system included three pull stations per floor (one at each exit), a buzzer above each pull 

station, and a control panel in a closet on the third floor. The control panel connected to a remote 

annunciators, which was located behind the front desk.

According to hotel management, the automatic fire alarm system was installed after the hotel was 

completed. It included two photoelectric smoke detectors located in the corridor of each guest 

room floor and combination fixed-temperature/rate-of-rise heat detectors in each guest room and 

in various other areas. The automatic detectors connected to a control panel that was reported to 

have been located in the same closet as the manual alarm control panel. The automatic alarm control 

panel had been removed prior to this investigation. Based on visual observation and the statements 

of hotel employees, it appeared that the automatic alarm system did not connect to any alarm-indicating devices (e.g., bells, buzzers). No determination could be made what, if anything, would happen if the automatic alarm system detected a fire. This subject will be discussed later in this report. 

The system wiring consisted of four-conductor telephone cable with solid-core conductors, which 

does not meet any nationally recognized fire alarm standards.

THE FIRE

On the weekend of July 18-19, the Doubletree Hotel experienced numerous problems with mischievous pranks. During the day and evening of Saturday, July 18, two false alarms were activated 

on the manual system. On Sunday, the elevators became the pranksters’ targets. Several times on 

Sunday, elevators were left stopped at various floors with the emergency stop alarm sounding. At 

approximately 10:15 p.m., Sunday, another elevator alarm began to sound. 

At the time, approximately 143 of the hotel’s 363 rooms were occupied. Included among the guests 

were a family reunion group with numerous youngsters and a church group consisting of teenagers. 

In response to the elevator alarm, the building engineer and security guard on-duty were dispatched 

to find the stopped elevator, each taking a portion of the building. The engineer started at the ninth 

floor and was to work downward. The guard started at the sixteenth floor and was to work down 

to the ninth floor. When the engineer arrived at the ninth floor, he found the stalled elevator and 

silenced the alarm. He then proceeded by elevator to the eleventh floor, where he knew the church 

group was staying, to look around, apparently thinking that they may have been responsible for the 

stalled elevator.
6

When the engineer arrived on the eleventh floor, several of the church group members were in the 

corridor talking (see Figure 4 for a picture of the corridor). As the engineer moved down the corridor toward Stairway 1, he noticed smoke coming from the ventilator opening adjacent to the stairway door (see Figure 5). Thinking the smoke might be from an air handling unit fire in the shaft, 

the engineer discharged a fire extinguisher from the adjacent cabinet into the shaft and radioed the 

PBX operator that he had a fire on the eleventh floor. The operator acknowledged, as did the security 

guard, who responses, “OK.”

Smoke on the eleventh floor quickly became very thick and began to bank down off the ceiling. A 

church group member reported later that as the smoke continued to build, the group members in 

the corridor began running to one stairway and then another, being forced back by smoke. Forced 

to the ground by the descending smoke layer, these occupants began to crawl about, seeking to 

escape. As panic ensued, a member of the church group assumed command and led approximately 

15 of the members into Room 1109, where they attempted to calm each other through prayer. The 

engineer indicated that he directed some of the occupants to crawl to Stairway 2, then left for the 

lobby in an elevator to direct the fire department. It did not appear that the fire alarm had activated 

at this point.

Simultaneously, three guests – a man, a woman, and their teenage son – were in the passenger elevator lobby preparing to leave the ninth floor to check out. As the woman held an elevator and was 

preparing to put baggage inside, she smelled smoke. She told her husband about the odor, and he 

told her to get out of the elevator. As she did, she apparently pushed the emergency stop button, 

sounding the elevator alarm bell. Since they had smelled smoke, the family believed the bell to be a 

fire alarm, and the man proceeded to the house phone in the elevator lobby to report the alarm and 

the smoke. The hotel operator advised them to evacuate.

As the man hung up the telephone, the security guard entered the elevator lobby area. Presumably, 

the guard heard the elevator alarm and was attempting to locate the stalled elevator. The son advised 

the guard that this was not a false alarm and that he had seen smoke in the elevator. The guard advised 

them to leave at once, and they exited, apparently via Stairway 2. By this time, a haze of smoke at the 

end of the long corridor was visible, and smoke was apparently coming from the ventilator opening 

adjacent to Stairway 3. The son reported that the guard headed in the direction of Stairway 1.

As the family exited, they began to encounter additional occupants in the stairway on floors below 

the fire floor. Because of this, one can deduce that the fire alarm was probably sounded shortly after 

they left the ninth floor. On their way down, the family passed two hotel staff members walking up 

the stairs, whom they told, there really was a fire. Apparently somewhat surprised, the staff members then began to run upstairs. As the family arrived in the lobby, the first due units from the fire 

department were arriving.

The engineer on-duty had since arrived at the lobby and called the chief engineer for the hotel, who 

instructed him to shut off the air handling units. The engineer attempted to go up the stairway with 

the firefighters, but was told to go back. He then returned to the lobby, boarded an elevator, and 

went to the seventeenth floor to shut off the building’s fans. Although the elevator filled with smoke 

on the way up, he was able to get to the seventeenth floor and access the fan controls. Now trapped 

by smoke, he called the lobby for help. The chief engineer had arrived and advised him of a means 

to access a second stairway, which the engineer finally used to escape.

The security guard’s actions following his departure from the ninth floor are not known for certain. The 

most likely sequence of events, as determined by witness statements and physical evidence, is as follows.
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 7

In the process of or after departing the ninth floor using Stairway 1, the guard probably doubled 

back and went into Stairway 2 to access the tenth floor. It is believed that the guard entered the unoccupied tenth floor at Stairway 2 because the manual alarm was only activated at a single location – on 

the tenth floor immediately adjacent to Stairway (see Figures 6 and 7). Given conditions likely to be 

present on the tenth floor at this point, it is assumed that the guard would have pulled the alarm as 

quickly as possible. The timing of the guard initiating the alarm in this sequence is relatively consistent with the other aspects of this scenario, since the family who had exited the ninth floor before 

the alarm had sounded began to encounter other guests entering the stairwell one or two minutes 

after leaving the ninth floor. This would have been enough time for the guard to go into Stairway 1, 

double back to Stairway 2, and get to the tenth floor.

As the guard entered the tenth floor, he probably encountered heavy smoke (considering the volume 

of smoke that had already spread to the ninth and eleventh floors) but tolerable temperatures. From 

the pull station at Stairway 2, he was probably able to see the fire through the smoke, which was 

burning in front of Room 1001.

Fire department investigators speculated that after pulling the fire alarm, the guard may have used 

one or both of the occupant use fire hoses adjacent to Stairways 1 and 2, which fire investigators 

found partially removed from their racks but uncharged. However, this investigation indicated that it 

may have been fire department personnel who removed these hoses during firefighting activity. Fire 

department investigators also believed that the guard may have entered Room 1029 at some point to 

seek refuge. Handprints found on the glass were assumed to have been those of the guard perhaps 

trying to open the window, which in fact was inoperable by design. It is almost certain, that, at some 

point, the guard actually passed the fire, since he was eventually discovered collapsed and in cardiac 

arrest on the opposite side of the fire from the pull station at Stairway 2.

The fire is estimated to have originated sometime between 10:00 p.m. and 10:15 p.m., and is 

believed to have been caused by arson. The fire department determined that there were no other 

possible ignition sources present and that there was no possibility of an accidental smoldering fire 

because an eleventh-floor guest had been on the tenth floor to get ice less than ten minutes before 

the fire alarm sounded and had detected no sign of a fire. Figures 8 and 9 show the area of origin.

At the time of the fire, the tenth floor was unoccupied and undergoing renovation. As part of the 

renovation process, large wooden cabinets were being provided in each room. The cabinets were 

packaged in cardboard boxes and were packed with sheets of solid foam. Employees who had been 

installing the cabinets had stored the empty packaging material, most of which had been flattened 

and stacked against the wall, in the corridor (see Figure 10). An estimated 10 to 20 boxes that were 

stacked outside Room 1001 were probably burning when the guard entered the tenth floor.

Fire Department Actions

The fire department received its first call from the hotel operator and dispatched first alarm units at 

10:32 p.m. The first companies that arrived on the scene at 10:33 p.m. heard alarm bells ringing 

and saw some guests evacuating. While en route, they had been advised that a fire was in progress on 

the ninth floor, a message relayed by the hotel operator to fire dispatch that was probably based on 

the initial telephone call from the elevator lobby on the ninth floor. Upon entering the building, the 

first arriving crew ascended toward the ninth floor using Stairway 2. At about the sixth-floor level, 

they encountered smoke in the stairway and donned breathing apparatus. Continuing upward, they 

checked each floor along the way. When they entered the ninth floor, there was a haze restricting vis-
8

ibility to approximately 50 feet, but no fire. They then continued to the tenth floor. Smoke became 

very heavy in the stairway between floors nine and ten.

After checking the tenth floor by cracking the stairway door and determining that there was a working fire in progress, the crew entered the tenth floor with a handline connected to the standpipe. The 

officer indicated that temperatures at the 3-foot level were only marginally tolerable even with protective clothing. He and his firefighters advanced into the corridor in a crawling position, attempting 

to locate the area of origin. Some combustion was taking place in the smoke layer over their heads 

at this time, but they were quickly able to locate and extinguish the isolated fire located in front of 

Room 1001. The combustion appeared to be mostly smoldering as opposed to open flame.

In the meantime, other arriving units had begun to establish the New Orleans ICS, locating the command post in the security office at the lobby level. By establishing command in this location, the 

Incident Commander was able to have ready access to resources such as a telephone, floor plans, the 

hotel manager and engineer, and keys.

Command assigned six sectors to supervise fireground operations: lobby control, ninth-floor sector, tenth-floor sector, reconnaissance sector, rehabilitation sector, and staging. Lobby control was 

responsible for controlling elevator deployment and maintaining a record of all personnel in the 

building. As the Incident Commander was advised by the reconnaissance sector of the conditions on 

various levels of the building, companies were directed to evacuate remaining occupants from floors 

ten through seventeen, using the ninth floor as the equipment staging area.

Following extinguishment, companies began to require rest breaks, and the rehabilitation sector was used 

to monitor the status and condition of personnel on break. By maintaining a smooth flow of personnel 

from staging to lobby control to deployment to rehabilitation, the fireground operation was effective and 

efficient. The incident was terminated at 03:17 on Monday morning after nearly 5 hours.

Fire damage was contained to the immediate area of origin. In addition, there was heavy smoke damage on the tenth floor, light smoke damage above the tenth floor, and some water and smoke damage 

on the ninth floor. The total loss was estimated to be $125,000, to the structure and $50,000, to 

contents, according to the fire department’s investigator.

Following the fire, the fire department issued citations to the hotel for illegal storage in an exit corridor and for failure to properly maintain the fire alarm system.

Emergency Medical Services

The New Orleans Health Department provides emergency medical services to the city. Upon arrival 

at the scene, the first unit established a triage program. The program created a Level 1 staging area in 

the hotel lobby for patient assessment and care of critical cases. Lower priority patients were referred 

to the secondary treatment area outside the hotel.

In all, ten patients were treated. The only critical case was the security guard, who was delivered to 

the staging area in cardiac arrest. Firefighters and EMS crews were unable to revive him. The guard 

was 35 years old, slightly overweight, and had been found by a firefighting crew in the corridor of 

the tenth floor. The cause of death was smoke inhalation in combination with a pre-existing cardiovascular condition. Two guests were transported to the hospital suffering from minor smoke inhalation, and a third guest was transported with a burned hand (not directly related to the fire incident). 

The other six patients, who were treated at the scene, included a hotel employee, two police officers, 

and three other guests, all of whom had minor injuries.
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 9

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

Fire Protection Systems

Fire Alarm Systems

The manual fire alarm system is credited with giving the early warning that prompted evacuation of 

occupants from the building. The system was activated at a single location adjacent to Stairway 2 on 

the tenth floor by the security guard. Once activated, the system sounded buzzers throughout the 

building and indicated the tenth-floor zone on the annunciator panel behind the front desk.

In contrast, the automatic fire alarm system’s apparent failure to detect and alarm probably was the 

single most significant factor allowing the fire to become a major incident. Based on an analysis of 

code requirements, it appears that the automatic fire alarm system was not required at the time of 

construction, nor was it required retroactively; therefore, the system would not have been required 

to meet any standard. Had the system been properly installed and functional, smoke detectors 

located in the corridor should have detected the fire long before it became life-threatening. An earlier alarm would have provided additional time for occupants to evacuate before the smoke spread 

to the upper floors and would have allowed staff the time to investigate and perhaps extinguish the 

fire before it became severe.

The governing standards dealing with installation of automatic fire alarms in New Orleans are NFPA 

72A, “Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Local Protective Signaling Systems for 

Guard’s Tour, Fire Alarm, and Supervisory Service.” And NFPA 72E, “Standard on Automatic Fire 

Detectors,” published by the National Fire Protection Association. Although the system had been 

partially dismantled at the time of this investigation, it is still fairly conclusive that the automatic 

alarm failed to operate. A representative of the fire department – assisted by representatives of a local 

fire alarm company – attempted to activate the system by blowing smoke into the system’s smoke 

detectors on the day after the fire but was unable to cause an alarm even though the photocell light 

sources were illuminated. This suggests that smoke detectors probably were not connected to the 

alarm panel or that the panel had malfunctioned. Furthermore, the automatic alarm system did not 

appear to connect to any audible alarms, nor did it appear to connect with the manual system, which 

had audible devices. Therefore, it seems that even if the smoke detectors had been able to detect a 

fire and the control panel had been functional, the system may only have been capable of indicating 

a fire at the control panel, which was located in an unoccupied closet on the third floor. Additional 

significant deficiencies included the use of telephone wire connecting all initiating devices to the 

control panel, and the placement of all corridor smoke detectors in “dead air” locations in the corridor (within 4 inches of a wall); see Figures 11 and 12 for detector locations.

One other issue although acceptable based on Nationally recognized standards, raises concern regarding the design of smoke detectors. The smoke detectors installed in the Doubletree – Ademco Model 

527, listed by Underwriters Laboratories – were a four-wire photoelectric type. The light source for 

the photocell on this detector was designed to be clearly visible through a large lens located on the 

bottom face of the detector. According to the building engineer, these lights were always illuminated 

and were still on when the system was tested the day after the fire. One might well be led to believe 

that because the detectors were issuing a light from the lens, the alarm system was operational; 

however, this was not the case.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Typically, a four-wire detection circuit will use two wires for powering detectors and two wires for 

initiating an alarm. Supervision of the power circuit can be either directly at the alarm panel or at 

each individual detector. Normally, in this arrangement, a trouble signal will sound at the control 

panel if power is interrupted or if detectors are disconnected. However, if detectors are powered 

from a source that is independent of the alarm control panel, the control panel could be disconnected or fail, disabling the trouble signal and alarm-initiating capability, and the detectors could still 

have power. In such a situation, detectors with a power-indicating lamp would appear functional 

due to the illuminated lamp but would be incapable of initiating an alarm because of the disabled 

or disconnected alarm panel. It appears that the automatic alarm system in the Doubletree fit this 

scenario.

It is difficult to say how long the automatic alarm system had been disabled, since no test records 

were available. However, it is speculated that the problem may have been present for some time. Fire 

department records included a complaint that was received on November 11, 1986, which reported 

that the central station was not manned 24 hours and that smoke detectors were not operational. 

The subsequent fire department inspection report dated December 4, 1986, stated that the central 

control station for the fire alarm was located in the PBX room, which was manned 24 hours that all 

smoke detectors were operating at the time of the inspection and that the alarm system was under a 

maintenance agreement for annual inspections (see Appendix 4). However, these inspection results 

are possibly subject to question.

Since the hotel changed ownership between the time of the fire department’s inspection and the 

time of the fire, this investigation could not determine whether the alarm panel was in fact in the 

PBX room at the time of the fire department inspection, nor could it be determined how the fire 

alarm was tested by the inspector. Addressing the issue of the alarm panel location, the current 

building engineer reported that the automatic alarm control panel was removed from a closet on 

the third floor after the fire, not from the PBX room. This closet was well away from the PBX room, 

which was at the lobby level. Furthermore, the engineer stated that, to his knowledge, neither the 

panel nor the PBX room had been moved recently. Therefore, it is possible that the manual alarm 

annunciator panel behind the front desk was assumed by the inspector to have been connected with 

the automatic system.

Addressing the issue of the operability of smoke detectors, one could speculate that a fire inspector who acted on this complaint may have visually inspected smoke detectors, seen the illuminated 

lens, and assumed that the automatic alarm system was operational. Because of these factors, it is 

not unreasonable to believe that the automatic alarm may have been out of service as much as eight 

months prior to the fire.

In summary, one can say that one or more of the following factors may have contributed to the 

automatic alarm system’s failure to operate properly at the time of the fire: the malfunctioning or 

possibly disconnected control panel located in an unoccupied area and perhaps not connected to 

audible devices, improper wiring, poor detector placement, and a misleading appearance of the 

operational status of smoke detectors.

Occupant Use Hoses

Although it was originally suspected that the security guard had attempted to fight the fire with 

occupant use hoses, subsequent investigation revealed that it may have been fire department personnel who removed the hoses from their racks. Given the inconsistency of the statements of the 
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 11

various individuals questioned, it will probably never be known for certain whether the guard actually attempted to fight the fire or not. In any case, this example opens for discussion the issue of 

occupant use fire extinguishing equipment.

Over the years, pressure has been mounting by many fire officials to eliminate occupant use hoses 

from buildings unless a fully trained and equipped fire brigade is present. Since occupant use hoses 

are typically inadequately inspected and tested and may encourage untrained occupants to fight fires 

that are beyond the capability of a small-capacity handline, they argue for limiting occupant use 

equipment to portable fire extinguishers. Fire extinguishers can generally control fires that are small 

enough for occupants to confront. Unlike occupant hoses, though, fire extinguishers encourage 

the user to abandon firefighting if they expire before a fire is extinguished. Codes- and standardsmaking bodies should begin to take a closer look at requirements for occupant hoses, given their 

somewhat controversial history.

Human Behavior

Convergence Clusters

A “convergence cluster” is a group of occupants who converge into a room with the intent of using 

it as a place of refuge until such time as they are able to escape or be rescued. The act of convergence 

apparently serves to reduce the anxiety and tension of group members. The concept of convergence 

clusters was first brought into significance by Dr. John L. Bryan of the University of Maryland. 

Clusters have been demonstrated to have occurred in fires such as in the Georgian Towers fire in 

Maryland in 1979 and in the MGM Grand Hotel fire in 1980. 1, 2

In the incident at the Doubletree Hotel, a convergence cluster appears to have occurred on the eleventh floor, based on a written statement and a news interview with an eleventh-floor occupant. As 

stated previously, members of the church group were in the hallway conversing when smoke began 

to issue from the corridor ventilation opening adjacent to Stairway 1. The group, unable to exit from 

the floor due to smoke and beginning to panic, apparently formed a social unit, as one individual 

took command and led approximately 15 people into Room 1109. According to the news report, 

group members calmed each other through prayer to reduce anxiety and tension until they were led 

to safety by hotel staff. The act of individuals deciding to remain in buildings during a fire incident 

rather than risking escape is significant in designing buildings for fire safety.

Lack of Belief in the Reality of Fire Alarms

Some occupants said they failed to evacuate when the fire alarm went off because of the previous 

series of false alarms. These occupants complained that they were not aware that there was an actual 

fire until they smelled smoke or were later told to evacuate.

Staff Actions

It is apparent that the security guard acted improperly by entering the tenth floor, given the conditions likely to have been present at the time. Proper action would have been to go to another floor, 

initiate an alarm, and assist with evacuation of guests. Also, the building engineer rode an elevator, 

which filled with smoke, to the seventeenth floor without any protective equipment; he could have 

been overcome in the elevator and should not have been using it in the fire, even though he was 

trying to shut off fans to help the problem.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Building Construction and Contents

As demonstrated in prior hotel fires such as the La Posada Hotel fire in McAllen, Texas,3 the combination of light fire loading and fire-resistive construction can play a key role in limiting fire damage 

when automatic fire extinguishing systems are not present. In the Doubletree incident, as was true 

at the La Posada, the wall coverings, carpeting, and contents in the corridor did not significantly 

contribute to the spread of the fire. The packing materials involved in the hallway of the Doubletree 

were therefore somewhat isolated, and the fire was small enough so as not to pose a significant challenge to the building’s fire-resistive construction.

Although the Doubletree lacked self-closing guest room doors, such closing devices would not have 

made much difference in this incident because the fire floor was unoccupied, and most or all of the 

doors were closed at the time of the fire. Performance of the doors was noteworthy: the guest rooms 

and storage areas on the tenth floor that had closed doors sustained only minor smoke damage in 

most cases (see Figures 13-15). The possible exception to door performance may have been the 

stairway doors, which apparently leaked significant quantities of smoke into the stairways.

The other primary means of smoke travel appeared to be the corridor ventilation system, which 

included air ducts adjacent to Stairway 1 and Stairway 3. Each floor had a fire-dampered (but not 

smoke-dampered) duct opening at either end of the corridor. The initial entry of smoke to the eleventh floor was reported to be through the duct located at Stairway 1. Fire department sources indicated that one of the two fire dampers on the tenth floor did not close completely when the fusible 

link operated, which would have allowed large quantities of smoke to continue spreading. Physical 

examination of the fire scene did not reveal additional significant means of smoke spread.

LESSONS LEARNED

The loss experienced in the Doubletree incident lends additional support to some already wellknown lessons and also brings to light some emerging issues in providing fire safety to the public. 

These lessons address the areas of fire protection systems, building construction, fire prevention, fire 

department tactics, staff training, and human behavior.

Fire Protection Systems

1. Partial Protection by Automatic Sprinklers Is Just That

The Doubletree Hotel was protected in many areas by an automatic sprinkler system, but the 

unsprinklered area provided an arsonist with the opportunity to create a major fire incident by 

simply lighting a match. There are many jurisdictions throughout the United States that are 

reducing the reliability of sprinkler systems by permitting compromises to the completeness of 

sprinkler protection. It should be emphasized that eliminating an area from sprinkler coverage 

has a direct impact on the risk of a major fire and provides an easy target to an arsonist. If corridor areas in the Doubletree had been protected as currently required by Nationally recognized 

standards, the magnitude of the incident would likely have been little more than an inconvenience to guests.

2. Automatic Fire Alarm Systems Should Be Installed In A Reliable Manner And Should Be 

Regularly Inspected And Tested

The automatic fire alarm system installed in the Doubletree was not installed in compliance with 

the Nationally recognized standards that were in effect at the time of construction. Although 
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 13

there was no code requirement for the system to comply with any standards, this incident raises 

the issue of an owner’s responsibilities when providing protection in excess of minimum code 

requirements. Traditionally, the model codes have held that protection in excess of the minimum requirements called for by code need not comply with any standards. Because there is 

likely to be a reliance on fire alarms when they are present, whether required or not, any fire 

alarm system should be required to be reliable.

It is incumbent upon fire and building departments to identify fire protection systems inadequacies and seek correction of these inadequacies even when such systems are installed voluntarily. 

There is need for fire departments to employ fore inspectors or fire protection engineers with a 

level of expertise in fire protection systems adequate to perform system inspections.

3. Smoke Detector Systems Should Be Designed So That A Detector Cannot Appear Functional 

When The Alarm Panel Is Disabled

The physical appearance of smoke detectors to the casual observer should be such that a detector 

does not display a light or signal that would lead one to believe the detector is functional when 

it is not.

A two-wire detector circuit that provides power and alarm-initiating capability simultaneously 

from a single pair of wires meets this need, as opposed to a four-wire circuit in which power is 

supplied by a separate power source. Fire protection professionals should consider whether the 

standard for smoke detection systems should be revised.

Construction Features

4. Interior Finishes, Carpeting, And Contents In Corridors Make A Difference In Fire Safety

By providing corridors with low flame spread finishes, ignition-resistant carpeting, and little or 

no combustible furnishings, the growth and intensity of a corridor fire can be limited, which 

provides extra escape time for occupants and keeps the fire severity manageable for arriving fire 

suppression forces.

5. Subdivision of Corridors In Multi-Family Residential And High-Rise Occupancies Is Useful 

To Limit The Spread Of Smoke And Fire

Smoke often travels unchecked through corridors, making escape routes impassable and allowing hazardous conditions to quickly permeate entire floors. In occupancies where people sleep 

or are disabled, the fire protection design that incorporates smoke doors and perhaps fire doors 

to subdivide corridor areas would prevent uncontrolled fire growth and smoke spread within 

corridors. The Doubletree Hotel did not have any such subdivisions, with the result that entire 

floors filled quickly with smoke from a relatively small fire and trapped a number of people.

6. Vertical Shafts That Open To More Than One Floor Level In High-Rise Buildings, Especially 

Residential-Use High Rises, Should Have Smoke Dampers Installed At Each Floor Level

Fire deaths in high-rise buildings are often caused by the inability of the building to contain 

smoke to a single floor level. A common path for smoke spread, which emerged again in the 

Doubletree incident, is a vertical ventilation duct. By installing smoke dampers at each floor 

level, this significant means of smoke spread would be controlled and the risk to occupants 

significantly reduced.
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Fire Prevention and Public Education

7. Effective Hotel Staff Training Is Essential To Ensure The Safety Of Staff And Guests Alike

Although it will never be known conclusively what actions are taken by the security guard after 

he arrived on the tenth floor, it seems likely that he could have avoided serious injury with better 

training. Staff members who occupy buildings where a high risk of life or property loss exists 

should be fully trained in emergency procedures. Such procedures should include properly 

reporting a fire, initiating evacuation procedures, when to use fire extinguishers and hoses, and 

when to escape. In the La Posada Hotel fire, inappropriate action by the staff was also a major 

factor contributing to a fire’s severity.4

8. Fire Prevention And Public Education Programs For Hotels Should Emphasize The Danger 

Of Storing Combustibles In Corridors

Given the many occurrences of major fires in hotels that involve combustible storage in corridors, the fire service should place additional emphasis on prohibiting this practice. Such storage 

poses a quick target for a would-be arsonist and, when ignited, can almost immediately block 

the primary egress route. Although not in a corridor, the disastrous Du Pont Plaza Hotel fire in 

Puerto Rico in 1986 also was started by an arsonist lighting new hotel furniture stored in its 

packing materials in a ballroom.

Fire Department Operations

9. High-Risk Occupancies Should Be Adequately Pre-Fire Planned

The fire scene is not the place to begin thinking of the resources and tactics necessary to handle 

a fire incident in a high-risk occupancy. Fire departments should identify high-risk occupancies during planning exercises and develop a course of action to be followed when an incident 

occurs. Such a plan should include resources necessary, resource deployment, incident command considerations such as locations for command and staging areas, and use of elevators 

that will be available on emergency power. In the Doubletree incident, the fire department’s 

familiarity with the hotel aided them in controlling the incident; however, they also identified 

problems such as arranging for master keys to be immediately available during emergencies. 

Pre-arranging for resources such as keys, building plans, and owner’s representatives to be available at a fire incident can be invaluable to conducting successful fire department operations.

10. Using A Supervised Rehabilitation Area Allows The Fireground Commander To Have Control 

Over Personnel Resources At All Times

It is becoming increasingly popular for fireground commanders to establish a rehabilitation 

sector at major fire incidents. The practice allows for personnel to be accounted for throughout 

a major incident, allows for supervision of the condition of personnel during rest periods, and 

provides a means to effectively monitor the availability of crews to return to service. The use of 

a rehabilitation sector in the New Orleans incident proved to be effective.

11. Videotaping Critiques Of Major Incidents Can Be Beneficial

Although not done for this fire, the New Orleans Fire Department indicated that it would have 

been beneficial to videotape the critique of this incident. Personnel who did not participate in 

the incident would then have a means to review the critique and gain valuable training. 
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 15

CONCLUSIONS

The Doubletree Hotel fire in New Orleans will be remembered as an incident that taught us new 

lessons and reinforced old ones. Fire incidents in high-rise hotels should come as no surprise as 

long as these occupancies lack basic components of good fire protection, such as complete and functional protection by sprinklers and automatic fire alarm systems. Risk analysis and problem-solving 

tools such as those taught in the National Fire Academy’s “Fire Risk Analysis” and “Community Fire 

Defenses” courses are readily available for fire service personnel to learn to identify, quantify, evaluate, and reduce the risk posed by high-risk occupancies such as high-rise hotels.

The traditional attitude about fire protection is retrospective, or “fix it after a fire occurs.” This attitude must be changed to use foresight to identify existing hazardous situations and correct them. 

Only now has the Doubletree decided to install automatic sprinklers throughout the building.

REFERENCES

1. Bryan, John L., and Philip J. DiNenno, “An Examination and Analysis of the Dynamics of Human 

Behavior in the Fire Incident at the Georgian Towers on January 9, 1979.” Washington, DC: 

Center for Fire Research, National Bureau of Standards, Department of Commerce, NBS-GCR79-187, April 30, 1979.

2. National Fire Protection Association, “An Examination and Analysis of the Dynamics of the 

Human Behavior in the MGM Grand Hotel Fire.” Quincy, MA, 1981.

3. U.S. Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “USFA Fire Investigation, La 

Posada Hotel Fire (McAllen, Texas).” Washington, DC, February 25, 1987.

4. Ibid.
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Figure 1. The Doubletree Hotel, a 17-story high-rise.
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 17

Figure 2. PHOTOGRAPH KEY
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series Figure 3. FLOOR PLAN: 10th FLOOR
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 19

Figure 4. View of short corridor from area of origin toward 

Stairway 1 – 9th floor.

Figure 5. Entrance to exit Stairway 1 – 10th floor. Note the ventilator 

opening (upper left) and fire hose/extinguisher cabinet (lower left).
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Figure 6. Entrance to exit Stairway 2 – 9th floor. Compare with 

Figure 7 after fire.

Figure 7. Entrance to exit Stairway 2 – 10th floor. Note pull station at 

left used to initiate local alarm by guard.
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 21

Figure 8. Area of origin on 9th floor, for comparison.

Figure 9. Area of origin on 10th floor.
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Figure 10. Debris similar to that involved as first material 

ignited – 10th floor.

Figure 11. Telephone wire used for automatic fire alarm system,

 security system, and public address system.
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 23

Figure 12. Location of corridor smoke detector (dark spot on ceiling).

Figure 13. Guest rooms on 10th 

floor sustained minimal damage 

due to performance of doors.
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Figure 14. Fire door protected 

linens in closet only 20 feet 

from area of origin.

Figure 15. Sprinkler in maid’s closet immediately adjacent to 

area of origin was not activated due to performance of fire door.
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 25

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 1: FD 200 – Field Incident Report

Appendix 2: FD 500 – Casualty Report

Appendix 3: New Orleans Health Department Injury Report

Appendix 4: New Orleans Fire Department Selected Fire Prevention Records

Appendix 5: Slides of Doubletree Hotel Fire Investigation (slides with 

USFA master file copy only)

Appendix 6: Videotape with News Segment (file copy only)
26

APPENDIX 1: FD 200 – FIELD INCIDENT REPORT
27

APPENDIX 2: FD 500 – CASUALTY REPORT
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

APPENDIX 2: FD 500 – CASUALTY REPORT continued
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 29

APPENDIX 2: FD 500 – CASUALTY REPORT continued
30

APPENDIX 3: NEW ORLEANS HEALTH DEPARTMENT 

INJURY REPORT
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 31

APPENDIX 3: FD 500 – Injury REPORT continued
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

APPENDIX 3: FD 500 – Injury REPORT continued
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 33

APPENDIX 3: FD 500 – Injury REPORT continued
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

APPENDIX 3: FD 500 – Injury REPORT continued
35

APPENDIX 4: NEW ORLEANS FIRE DEPARTMENT 

SELECTED FIRE PREVENTION RECORDS
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

APPENDIX 4: Fire prevention records continued
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 37

APPENDIX 4: Fire prevention records continued
38

APPENDIX 5: SLIDES OF DOUBLETREE HOTEL 

FIRE INVESTIGATION NEW ORLEANS

Slide 1 The area of origin. The room behind the area of origin is a small utility and maid’s closet. 

The boxes that were ignited were stacked on the right side looking into the slide. The floor 

was unoccupied at the time of the fire and was undergoing renovation. The cardboard 

boxes with some foam padding were flattened and stacked against the wall. About eighteen to twenty cartons were there, in a space about 4 feet by 6 feet.

Slide 2 Area of origin looking down the long corridor. The smoke detector in the picture has been 

added since the time of the fire.

Slide 3 Inside of a utility closet immediately adjacent to the area of origin. The smoke and fire 

did not fully penetrate into the room. This shot also highlights that the floor penetrations 

were very well sealed, which would help prevent the passage of smoke from floor to 

floor.

Slide 4 The interior of the door jamb on the same utility closet as in the last slide. There was some 

heat and smoke damage above the door, but it was extremely limited.

Slide 5 Similar to 4.

Slide 6 A cross-section of the door jamb leading to the utility closet in the previous slide. Shows 

the heavy charring on the outer side and how the inner side (behind the door) is relatively 

less damaged.

Slide 7 The inside of Room 1001, which is adjacent to the area of origin. Again, you can see that 

the heat and smoke damage is very limited around the top of the door.

Slide 8 A closer shot of the same room highlights the smoke and heat damage around the top of 

the door.

Slide 9 This shot is the elevator lobby in the short corridor that is immediately adjacent to the area 

of origin.

Slide 10 This shows the wall construction of the typical corridor wall, being 2-by-4 metal studs 

that were approximately 24 inches on center. The drywall was 5/8 drywall, but we were 

unable to determine whether it was Type X, as required for fire-resistant assemblies. There 

was no marking indicating that.

Slide 11 This is another shot of the same elevator lobby in the short corridor, showing the heat 

damage to the elevator doors. Obviously, the drywall has been stripped, but the elevator 

doors give an indication as to how bad the damage was.

Slide 12 The door remaining on Room 1026 at the time of the investigation. At the time of the 

investigation, the doors had been removed from most of the rooms on the tenth floor 

except Room 1026. As you can see, the damage to the door here was relatively limited, as 

the door was well away from the area of origin. Later investigations determined that the 
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 39

doors were 1-3/4-inch solid-core wood.

Slide 13 Side view of the same door showing the minor level of damage of the door going through 

the jamb.

Slide 14 Typical HVAC draws return air from within the room foyer and exhausts supply air into 

the room through the grill.

Slide 15 This is a rate-of-rise heat detector that is typical for all of the guest rooms. The location 

is not preferable because it is in an area that is close to a dead air space, in a corner, but it 

does meet code.

Slide 16 This is a shot of the end of the short corridor adjacent to the area of origin. Note that 

the hose was partially pulled off at the time of the fire and completely pulled off later on. 

Above the hose cabinet is an air-circulating duct for the corridor, which was significant in 

the smoke spread from floor to floor. Again, notice that the damper there is closed. The 

fusible link had fired on that particular damper and closed it. However, the smoke still 

penetrated. To the side of the door is a manual pull station.

Slide 17 This is a closer shot of the hose cabinet and the air damper.

Slide 18 This is a shot of the stairwell entry area on the center stairwell closest to the area of origin. 

Again, you can see the level of heat damage on the door. To the left of the entry foyer to 

the stairway door is a fire hose cabinet, which had 1-1/2-inch hose inside. To the other 

side is the manual pull station that was used to originally alarm the occupants.

Slide 19 Same as 18, but with a different exposure.

Slide 20 Close-up of the manual pull station that was first used to alert the occupants from the 

center stairwell.

Slide 21 The area immediately adjacent to the center stairwell. It is a storage room that was 

sprinklered.

Slide 22 The main passenger elevator lobby, which is somewhat remote from the area of origin. 

The level of damage here was not great.

Slide 23 One of the storerooms on the tenth floor. You can see the heat damage above the door. 

However, the sprinkler did not fuse. The sprinkler system in the building was limited to 

small storage rooms, maids’ closets, and the public assembly areas and the kitchen on the 

upper levels.

Slide 24 The doorway entering the room adjacent to the center stairway.

Slide 25 Another shot of the same jamb.

Slide 26 The center stairwell door, shot at a reverse angle showing the storage closet on the side.

Slide 27 A shot down the long corridor taken from the location of the center stairway in the back 

across the elevator lobby.

Slide 28 One of the other doors that have remained on the floor after the attorney had subpoenaed 

all the doors. Again, you can see that this was remote from the area of origin, and the level 

of damage on this particular door is somewhat limited.
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Slide 29 This is a shot taken in the commercial kitchen on the sixteenth floor of the building, 

which is the highest occupied floor under the mechanical penthouse. Notice the sprinkler 

system and the range hood system.

Slide 30 The public assembly area located on the sixteenth floor, which was unoccupied at the time 

of the fire. This area was sprinklered. However, had this area been occupied at the time of 

the fire, the occupants might have been in some danger because they were above the fire 

and there was smoke in all three stairwells of the building.

Slide 31 The inside of the stairwell from the seventeenth floor, looking back to the sixteenth floor. 

It shows the standpipe system and that the construction of the stairway is noncombustible 

masonry, with concrete walls. On the back wall is the sprinkler valve assembly for the 

sixteenth floor.

Slide 32 Heat detector located in the stairway. It was part of the automatic system, which was 

nonfunctional at the time of the fire.

Slide 33 The ventilation opening at the top of the stairway. One was located in each stairway. It 

did not have a power fan on it; it just allowed any air that gravitated into the stairway to be 

exhausted to the outside. It would also have allowed smoke to exit.

Slide 34 The seventeenth-floor mechanical penthouse. The main fan controls were upstairs. 

Fortunately, at the time of the fire, the person on-duty was able to shut down the fans 

when directed to do so by the fire department. However, he was trapped for a short while 

on this floor and was unable to get out from the stairway due to heavy smoke. At the 

instruction of the maintenance manager, who was on the ground level, he was able to go 

through a penthouse area to another stairway and escape.

Slide 35 The stain left by the location of the smoke detector that was located in an alcove about 

midway down each corridor, the alcove being the area where four guest rooms open onto 

the corridor. As you can see, the smoke detector was located in a dead air space that does 

not meet code because it is too close to both walls in the corner.

Slide 36 Another shot of the same stain.

Slide 37 A typical guest room floor showing the condition before the fire. This was shot looking 

down the short corridor from the area of origin.

Slide 38 This is again on a typical guest room floor showing the original appearance of the center 

stairway entrance with the exit sign, the pull station, the horn above the pull station, the 

fire hose cabinet on the right wall, and the fire extinguisher cabinet on the left wall.

Slide 39 This shows how the area of origin would have appeared before the fire. The doorway 

straight ahead was the doorway into the maids’ closet.

Slide 40 This shows how the floor of origin would have appeared looking down the short corridor 

from the area of origin. The service elevators are partway down the hall.

Slide 41 The carpeting and wall covering used in the corridors, immediately adjacent to the service 

elevator. There is a relatively low-nap less-combustible carpet, and the wall covering is 

extremely thin glued directly to noncombustible drywall. The carpeting and wall covering 

performed very well in limiting the extent of fire damage in the corridor.
USFA-TR-008/July 1987 41

Slide 42 Close-up of typical wall covering used in the corridor.

Slide 43 The fire alarm control panel for the manual Simplex system, which was installed about 

1973. It was a high voltage non-power limited system that used all relays. It was not 

solid-state. The system did function at the time of the fire and was credited with alerting 

many of the occupants. 

Slide 44 The area where, according to the maintenance man, the automatic fire alarm control panel 

had been located. Both of the fire alarm panels were located in the storage closet on the 

third floor. To the best of the investigator’s determination, the automatic alarm panel was 

not connected to any audible alarm, nor was it monitored in any location other than this 

closet. Subsequent testing by the fire marshal and the Simplex Fire Alarm Company the 

day after the fire included blowing smoke into smoke detectors on the floors, but was 

unable to cause the alarm panel to go into alarm.

Slide 45 Close-up of the fire alarm wiring. According to the visual examination of the detectors, 

the wiring consisted of a single-conductor telephone wire that would not meet code. The 

panel did appear to have correct connections.

Slide 46 According to the maintenance man, this was one of the modules that were part of the fire 

alarm system. It appeared to be part of a public address system. A final determination 

could not be made at the scene.

Slide 47 The mechanical room containing the fire pump for the building. The fire pump supplies 

the occupant-use hose cabinets and the fire department standpipe.

Slide 48 The front side of the building, main entrance, giving a perspective of the total building. 

The lower portion is wider than the tower containing the lobby and reception areas.

Slide 49 The type of material involved in the ignition. You can see the cardboard box and the padding that was used to pack the furniture. These particular boxes contained wardrobes or 

some large piece of furniture that was being placed in each room during the renovation.

Slide 50 One of the guest room doors taken from the inside by the fire marshal. It appears to be in 

an area not too distant from the area of origin. As you can see, the leakage around the door 

was minimal. Damage to the front and the jamb of the door was significant. However, the 

door did hold during the fire.

Slide 51 The linen storage closet. Note that there was no real heat damage inside the closet at all. 

The towels are still intact and clean. The door, which was metal, appeared to be a 1-1/2-

hour rating. Even though it was substantially damaged on the outside, it did not allow the 

fire to pass into the closet.