Filed 7/26/22 In re Janessa A. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re JANESSA A., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B312475

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP05683D)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LORRAINE A. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Linda L. Sun, Judge. Affirmed.

Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant, Lorraine A.

Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for

Defendant and Appellant, Faustino A.
2

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant 

County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

Lorraine A. (mother) and Faustino A. (father) appeal from orders 

in which their child, Janessa A., was declared a dependent of the court

and removed from parental custody. Parents contend there is 

insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that 

Janessa was at risk of abuse or neglect based on prior sustained 

findings that mother had previously abused and neglected Janessa’s 

older half-siblings, and based on father’s use of marijuana. Parents also 

contend that the court erred by denying father’s oral request to continue 

the disposition hearing. We reject parents’ arguments and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After Janessa was born in February 2021,the Los Angeles 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a 14-count 

petition on behalf of the child under Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 300.

1 In the petition, DCFS alleged that Janessa was at risk of 

suffering serious physical harm based on father’s current marijuana use 

and history of substance abuse, and based on sustained findings in a 

prior dependency proceeding in which mother’s children and Janessa’s 

older half-siblings (Miguel L. Jr., Makaila L., and Leonel L.) were 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 
3

declared dependents of the court.

2 In the prior dependency case, the 

court found that mother had physically abused Miguel, Makaila, and 

Leonel; failed to make appropriate plans for the three children; placed 

Leonel in an endangering home environment; and allowed an 

“unidentified male companion” later identified as father to use 

marijuana inside the family home. 

In a March 2021 detention report filed in this case, DCFS reported 

that Miguel, Makaila, and Leonel had observed mother and father use 

drugs. In one undated incident, Leonel was sitting inside a car with 

“mother, father[] and a friend and the car would get very stuffy. The 

child reported they were ‘sniffing white stuff’ while [Leonel] was . . . in 

the back seat” of the vehicle. In another incident occurring in October 

2020 (several months before Janessa’s birth), Leonel was inside a car 

with parents when the car crashed into a dumpster. According to 

Leonel, the car had crashed because mother and father were “high on 

drugs” and fighting each other. Leonel further reported that mother 

and father abused drugs and alcohol “on a daily basis”; Leonel had to 

“collect cans to get money for food every day”; and parents had been 

living out of a car for the last two years. 

As of the time DCFS filed its detention report, mother had 

inconsistently reportedher housing situation and whereabouts.3 When 

2 Miguel (born June 2008), Makaila (born March 2010), and Leonel (born 

October 2012), all share the same father, Miguel L. Sr. Miguel, Makaila, and 

Leonel are not subject to this appeal.

3 When first interviewed in this case in February 2021, mother reported 

that she and father had been living with maternal grandmother since 
4

initially interviewed for this case on February 11, 2021, mother denied 

abusing Janessa’s half-siblings, andminimized the prior dependency 

case by stating that “she has an open case for being homeless.” She also 

blamed the prior case on “coach[ing]” by the paternal side of Janessa’s 

half-siblings. Nevertheless, mother informed DCFS that she was 

attending parenting and anger management meetings twice a week.

4 

She also admitted that father smoked marijuana “probably once per 

week” outside the presence of Janessa. 

Father denied having any criminal history during his interview in 

this case. While he admitted smoking marijuana “after work and before 

he goes to sleep,” father stated that he kept marijuana out of the reach 

of children and did not care for Janessa while under the influence. 

When asked if he could provide the basic needs for Janessa on his own, 

father affirmedhe was willing to care for the child, but stated that he

“would need a lot of help” from his family. 

Janessa was removed from parental custody and suitably placed 

in foster care on March 10, 2021. On March 17, 2021, the court 

detained Janessa, ordered monitored visitation and services for the 

parents (mother was to continue to comply with prior orders; father was 

September 2020. In the prior dependency proceeding however, mother 

reported that she had either lived with maternal great-grandmother or lived 

with father and paternal grandparents. 

4 DCFS contacted mother’s program on February 24, 2021, and was 

informed that while mother had enrolled in parenting and anger 

management programs, she had not attended any classes. 
5

to be referred to his own services), and provided parents with housing 

resources and transportation assistance. 

A combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing was conducted on May 

6, 2021. In a jurisdiction/disposition report filed April 20, 2021, DCFS 

reported that mother continued to deny and minimize the sustained 

findings in her dependency case. Father also denied the sustained 

findings, stating that the reports of mother’s prior abuse and neglect 

were “made up.” In April 2021, father reported that he had abstained 

from using marijuana in the month prior (i.e. between March and April 

2021). 

DCFS provided the court with father’s drug tests. Father tested 

positive for marijuana on October 26, 2020, and March 1, 2021 (3,679 

ng/ml and greater than 4,000 ng/ml, respectively), and was a no show 

for testing on April 16 and April 29, 2021. On May 6, 2021, father 

stated that he was no longer using marijuana, as he had recently been 

prescribed medication for anxiety and depression.5

DCFS assessed Janessa to be at very high risk for future abuse 

based on mother’s homelessness, prior dependency history, and lack of 

participation in services, and based on father’s denial of substance 

abuse, positive drug test for high levels of marijuana, and his inability 

to care for the child on his own. To assist parents with housing, DCFS 

recommended that the court refer them to the Family Reunification 

5 In reports subsequently filed with the court, it was reported that father 

had not enrolled in any services, had tested positive for marijuana in May 

2021, and was a no show for drug testing in June 2021. 
6

Housing Subsidy (FRHS) program. However, because “the child[’s] 

safety and well-being cannot be ensured without removing her from the 

care and custody of [her] parents,” DCFS recommended that Janessa 

“be removed from the custody of the parents” and suitably placed in 

“out of home care.” 

Mother and father appeared at the May 17, 2021

jurisdiction/disposition hearing. After finding notice of the hearing to 

be proper, the court admitted various documents into evidence, 

including two letters confirming that in May 2021, mother completed 

parenting and anger managementand attended one intake session and 

one individual therapy session.

During the hearing, counsel for both parents argued that DCFS 

failed to meet its burden of establishing a current risk to Janessa based 

on parents’ conduct. The court sustained the petition as amended and 

declared Janessa a dependent of the court under section 300, 

subdivisions (b) and (j).6 The court reasoned that mother had not 

resolved the issues necessitating court intervention in her prior 

dependency case, and father had not resolved his marijuana use at 

“significantly high level[s].” 

Proceeding to disposition, mother’s counsel requested that Janessa 

be placed in her care, and if needed, the court could order mother to live 

with maternal grandmother “or other DCFS-approved home.” Father’s 

counsel requested that Janessa either be placed with both parents in 

6 The court struck all of the subdivision (a) allegations, and all but one 

subdivision (b) allegation based on father’s history of substance abuse. 
7

maternal grandmother’s home or placed with father there. Counsel 

continued: “So if the court is not going to return this child today, I think 

that perhaps the only appropriate thing to do would be, maybe, to put 

disposition over to either confirm an appropriate plan for the child to be 

returned either to the parents or to the mother or to put disposition 

over for this [FRHS program] referral to be ordered.” Counsel for DCFS 

requested that Janessa be removed from parental custody. 

The court removed Janessa from parental custody. The court 

found Janessa was at substantial risk of harm in parental custody due 

to parents’ unstable housing, mother’s unresolved issues from the prior 

dependency case, and father’s unresolved substance abuse. The court 

also questioned whether maternal grandmother could adequately care 

for Janessa. In light of its findings, the court placed Janessa under the 

supervision of DCFS with an order to assess maternal grandmother’s 

home for placement, and ordered reunification services, monitored 

visitation, and housing and transportation assistance for parents. 

Mother and father filed timely notices of appeal from the 

jurisdiction and disposition orders. In subsequent reports filed with the 

juvenile court, DCFS reported that mother had made substantial 

progress in therapy. After liberalizing mother’s visitation in June 2021, 

the court terminated its suitable placement order and ordered Janessa 

home of mother “on condition that mother’s home is approved by 

DCFS.”
8

DISCUSSION

1. Jurisdiction

Parents challenge the sufficiency ofthe evidence to support the

juvenile court’s jurisdictionalfindings as to Janessa. Under section 300, 

subdivision (j), the juvenile court may exercise dependency jurisdiction 

over a child if “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as 

defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial

risk that the childwill be abused or neglected.” The court “shall 

consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the 

sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or 

neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, 

and any other factors the court considers probative in determining 

whether there is a substantial risk to the child.” (Ibid.; see In re I.J. 

(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 774 (I.J.).)

Here, neither parent contests the fact that Janessa’s older halfsiblings were abused or neglected by mother. Instead, they contend 

only that substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that 

there was a substantial risk that Janessa would also be abused or 

neglected. (See In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 566–569 

[the fact a child’s siblings are dependents of the court is alone

insufficient to justify a jurisdiction under subd. (j)].) In their view, the 

court relied almost exclusively on the fact that parents were homeless, a 

ground which they contend is insufficient to support exercising 

jurisdiction. 

“In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

jurisdictional finding, the issue is whether there is evidence, 
9

contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the finding. In making that 

determination, the reviewing court reviews the record in the light most 

favorable to the challenged order, resolving conflicts in the evidence in 

favor of that order, and giving the evidence reasonable inferences.” (In

re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 450–451 (Alexis E.).) “Evidence 

of past conduct, without more, is insufficient to support a jurisdictional 

finding under section 300. There must be some reason beyond mere 

speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R.

(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 (James R.).) But “‘[t]he court need not 

wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction 

and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’” (I.J., supra, 56 

Cal.4th at p. 773, quoting In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.)

Contrary to parents’ claim in this case, the juvenile court referred

to various factors beyond parents’ housing situation when exercising

jurisdiction over Janessa under section 300, subdivision (j). One of the

factors consideredwas mother’s prior acts of abusing and neglecting

Janessa’s older half-siblings. In one incident occurring less than six 

months before Janessa was born, mother and father appeared high on 

drugs and crashed a car while Leonel was in their care. “A parent’s 

past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior.” (In re T.V. (2013) 

217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133; In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 

993.) 

Yet another factor the court considered was mother’s inability to 

fully address the issues necessitating the prior dependency case. 

Mother had made recent progress in parenting, anger management, and 
10

individual therapy. But she also denied and minimized the prior 

sustained findings during several interviews with DCFS in this case, 

and was not forthright when reporting her attendance in court-ordered 

services. (See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197; In re

D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 329–330 (D.B.); In re A.F. (2016) 3 

Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“‘denial is a factor often relevant to determining 

whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future 

without court supervision’”].) 

By focusing on favorable evidence tendingto establish she was not

a danger to Janessa, mother essentially requests that we reweigh the

evidence in her favor. (Alexis E., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 450–

451.) Moreover, mother relies on inapposite authority that did not

involve prior abuse or neglect of a child’s sibling. (See, e.g., James R., 

supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 136 [mother “had not abused or neglected 

the minors in the past”]; In re Ricardo L., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 567–569 [no evidence demonstrated parents’ history of neglecting

child’s half-siblings]; In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 

1399 [same].)

We also conclude that the record supports the jurisdictional 

finding that father’s issues with marijuana use impaired his ability to 

appropriately care for Janessa, and that mother failed to protect the 

child from father’s drug use. A court may exercise jurisdiction under 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1) if, among other things, “there is a 

substantial risk that [a] child will suffer[ ] serious physical harm or 

illness[ ] as a result of . . . the inability of the parent . . . to provide 
11

regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . or substance abuse.” 

(§ 300, subd. (b)(1); see In re Travis C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219,

1225.) 

Janessa’s half-siblings had observed mother and father use drugs 

in their presence, and while appearing high on drugs in October 2020,

parents crashed a car that was carrying Leonel, then an eight-year-old 

boy. The same month, father tested positive for “high” levels of 

marijuana. Then, in March and April 2021, father reported he had 

abstained from using marijuana, yet tested positive on March 1, 2021 

and was a no show for testing on April 16 and April 29, 2021. (See In re 

Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1217 [missed drug tests

are “properly considered”the equivalent of positive test results]; In re 

E.A. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 648, 657, fn. 6 [“[c]ommon sense suggests 

that a parent who consistently refuses to drug test without an adequate 

explanation does so because he or she knows the results will show 

substance abuse”].) The foregoing amply supports the court’s finding 

under section 300, subdivision (b), as to father’s drug use and mother’s 

failure to protect. (Accord, In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 

186; In re K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 593, 601–602; see In re Travis C., 

supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1226.) In sum, we conclude that substantial 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings.

2. Disposition

Parents also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

disposition order removing Janessa from parental custody and suitably 

placing the child under the supervision of DCFS. Despite the court’s 
12

subsequent order returning the child to mother’s custody after parents 

filed this appeal, we consider their contention on the merits.7 

Before ordering a child removed from parental custody, the 

juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that there is,

or would be, a substantial danger to the child’s physical health, safety, 

or well-being if the child were returned home, and there are no 

reasonable means by which the child’s health could be protected 

without removal from parental custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) 

“In determining whether a child may be safely maintained in the 

parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court may consider the parent’s 

past conduct and current circumstances, and the parent’s response to 

the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.” (D.B., 

supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 332.) The court “must also consider 

whether there are any reasonable protective measures and services that 

can be implemented to prevent the child’s removal from the parent’s 

physical custody.” (Ibid.)

We conclude that there is substantial evidence from which a 

reasonable factfinder could find it highly probable that returning 

Janessa to either offending parent posed a substantial danger to the 

child’s health, safety, or well-being. (See Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 

7 Following our initial review of the case, we requested briefing on 

whether the court’s placement of Janessa in mother’s care rendered parents’ 

appeal from the disposition order moot. We agree with parents’ argument 

that their appeal from the disposition order is not moot. (See Carolyn R. v. 

Superior Court (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 159, 164 [“if a parent has received at 

least 12 months” of reunification and maintenance services after the child’s 

initial removal, “the court may set a section 366.26 hearing [if] it grants a 

section 387 petition removing a child from parental custody”].)
13

9 Cal.5th 989, 1011 [setting forth the standard of review for a finding of 

fact proved by clear and convincing evidence].) In addition to the 

reasons for dependency jurisdiction addressed above (see In re R.V., 

supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 849 [jurisdictional findings are prima facie 

evidence a child cannot safely remain in the home]), both mother’s and 

father’s living situation were demonstrablyunstable. Parents had not 

consistently lived in maternal grandmother’s home, but had at various 

times lived out of a car, lived with paternal grandparents, and as most 

recently reported in May 2021 by Janessa’s older half-siblings, both 

parents were renting a room together in a location unknown to DCFS. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, parents assert the court failed to 

determine whether placement of Janessa in their care in maternal 

grandmother’s home was a reasonable means to prevent removal. But 

parents fail to explain how such placement would ensure Janessa’s 

safety. At the time of disposition, maternal grandmother had not 

requested that Janessa be placed in her care, and there is no evidence 

establishing maternal grandmother’s fitness to support a young child or 

her ability to provide the child with an adequate home. (See §§ 361, 

subd. (c)(1)(B)(5), 361.2, subd. (e)(2), 361.4; see also In re Eli F. (1989) 

212 Cal.App.3d 228, 239 [“the suitability of the placement must be 

reflected in the record of the proceedings before the juvenile court”].) In 

sum, the court did not err by ordering Janessa removed from parental 

custody.
14

3. Continuance of the Disposition Hearing

Finally, parents contend that the juvenile court erroneously 

denied an oral request by father’s counsel to “maybe, to put disposition 

over.” We disagree.

After exercising jurisdiction over a child, “the court shall hear 

evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the 

child.” (§ 358, subd. (a).) Evidence the court shall consider includes 

“the social study of the child made by the social worker, . . . and other 

relevant and material evidence as may be offered.” (§ 358, subd. (b)(1).) 

The “social study and copies of it [must be sent] to the clerk at least 48 

hours before the disposition hearing is set to begin, and the clerk must 

make the copies available to the parties and attorneys. A continuance 

within statutory time limits must be granted on the request of a party 

who has not been furnished a copy of the social study in accordance 

with this rule.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(2); accord, § 358, 

subd. (a) [“[p]rior to making a finding required by this section, the court 

may continue the hearing on its own motion, the motion of the parent or 

guardian, or the motion of the child”].)

Citing only the foregoing provisions, parents contend that the 

court was required to continue the disposition hearing because DCFS 

changed its recommendation during the disposition hearing without 

providing them notice of such change in recommendation. Specifically, 

parents allege that DCFS had only recommended housing assistance 

through the FRHS program in its jurisdiction/disposition report, and 

changed its recommendation to remove Janessa from parental custody 

at disposition. 
15

DCFS contends, and we agree, that this argument is forfeited for 

the failure of either parent to request a continuance based on the failure 

of DCFS to provide parents with adequate notice. (In re P.A. (2007) 155 

Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 [applying forfeiture on appeal “[b]ecause 

defective notice and the consequences flowing from it may easily be 

corrected if promptly raised in the juvenile court”]; accord, In re A.B. 

(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358 (A.B.), 1366; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 

Cal.App.4th 494, 501–502.)

Even considering the merits, we reject parents’ contention. “We 

will reverse an order denying a continuance only upon a showing of 

abuse of discretion.” (A.B., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1366.) Parents 

do not dispute that they received timely notice of the 

jurisdiction/disposition report consistent with rule 5.690(a)(2) of the 

California Rules of Court. In that report, DCFS suggested referring 

parents to the FRHS program, and also expressly stated that DCFS was 

recommending that Janessa “be removed from the custody of the 

parents” and suitably placed in “out of home care.” Having had 

adequate notice of DCFS’s recommended disposition, parents have 

failed to demonstrate how the court abused its discretion by denying the 

oral request to continue the disposition hearing.

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16

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

COLLINS, J.