Sparks v. Hoffman, No. S0367-05 CnC (Norton, J., Aug. 4, 2005) 

[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been 

reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the 

accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is 

not guaranteed.] 

STATE OF VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT 

Chittenden County, ss.: Docket No. S0367-05 CnC 

SPARKS 

v. 

HOFFMAN 

 

ENTRY 

 Petitioner and the Department of Corrections seeks summary 

judgment in their respective favors for a V.R.C.P. Rule 75 complaint. 

Petitioner argues that his conditional reentry was wrongly revoked and that 

he was saddled with an improper punishment. Corrections disagrees. 

 Petitioner is an inmate currently serving a sentence of 16 months to 

eight years for multiple convictions, including domestic assault, simple 

assault, theft, passing a bad check, and reckless endangerment. In February 
of this year, Corrections deemed Petitioner eligible for conditional reentry 

furlough. This program is authorized by 28 V.S.A. § 808(a)(6) and is one 

of a number of furlough programs of various length and restrictions that 

inmates may be eligible for depending on their circumstances. As part of 

this program, Corrections allowed Petitioner to leave his correctional 

facility on February 25 to meet his “community correctional officer,” 

whose role was to monitor Petitioner’s adherence to his conditional reentry 

conditions, his general behavior, and his progress at re-integrating with the 

community. This meeting, known as an intake interview, would also mark 

the beginning of Petitioner’s furlough. 

 This intake interview, which is a standard part of the conditional 

reentry program, may best be characterized as the final stage in the 

conditional reentry approval process. Among other things, it was an 

opportunity for Corrections to review with Petitioner the 22 general 

conditions of his initial conditional-reentry agreement, which included 

condition C that required Petitioner “not [to] engage in threatening, violent 

or assaultive behavior.” This was also the point where Petitioner would 

have been given his more specific conditions and where he would have 

been expected to sign his final agreement. 

 In most cases, this intake meeting appears to be more ceremony and 

formality than negotiation and formation. Inmates are expected to come, 

meet their community correctional officers, review the conditions of their 

reentry, agree to any final conditions that Corrections has added, and go on 

their furloughed way. Unfortunately when Petitioner arrived at his 

February 25 meeting, he saw an ex-girlfriend in the parking lot whom he 

threatened, assaulted, and acted toward in a violent manner. Petitioner’s 

community correctional officer, after consulting with a supervisor, 

suspended Petitioner’s conditional reentry and sent Petitioner back to his 
correctional facility. Five days later, Petitioner had a hearing at which he 

admitted to violating the terms of his conditional reentry agreement. The 

hearing officer subsequently revoked Petitioner’s conditional reentry. 

 Under the relevant statute, Corrections may, at its discretion, put 

inmates into the conditional reentry program. 28 V.S.A. § 723. This grant 

is permissive and gives Corrections the authority to determine who shall be 

eligible and to what conditions they will be subject. 28 V.S.A. § 808(a)(6). 

Neither Petitioner nor Corrections dispute that Petitioner violated the terms 

of his conditional reentry. Their initial dispute and the threshold question 

in Petitioner’s unusual situation is whether he was formally on “conditional 

reentry,” as defined in §§ 723 and 808(a)(6), when he acted against his exgirlfriend. By formulating the question this way, the court seeks to avoid 

the pitfall that Corrections has fallen into by defining Petitioner as 

simultaneously violating the terms of his conditional reentry while he was 

not technically in the program. 

 Petitioner argues that he was on conditional reentry from the 

moment he left the correctional facility, even if it was not exactly the same 

program that he would have been in if he had successfully completed the 

intake interview. The facts of Petitioner’s limited release on February 25 

contradict this position. On that day, Petitioner had a restricted “one-way” 

pass to go from the correctional facility to the offices of his future 

community corrections officer. Petitioner was not, by the terms of this 

furlough, permitted to stop by a friend’s house, grab a bite to eat, or any 

other innocuous activity that he would be able to enjoy after his intake 

meeting as part of his broader conditional reentry. 

 These limitations are particularly telling in determining Petitioner’s 

status on February 25. He was in a no-man’s land between incarceration 

and furlough. While Corrections and Petitioner can give this many 
different names, both parties can agree that it was a limited status with 

more rights than an incarcerated inmate (ability to leave the facility) but 

less than a furloughed one. For the purposes of the present motion, the 

court views this status as indistinguishable from incarceration. 

 The simple problem with Petitioner’s argument is that he had not 

passed through all of the prerequisites of conditional reentry. The intake 

meeting may or may not be the most important step that an inmate takes 

toward conditional reentry, but regardless of its ultimate function in the 

process, it is still a necessary part. Whatever ceremonial function the intake 

meeting might serve elsewhere, it was an effective last review in this case, 

giving Corrections one final and important opportunity to evaluate 

Petitioner’s fitness for the program. As Petitioner had not signed his final 

agreement, complied with all of the pre-requirements of the program, he 

was still an incarcerated inmate, albeit one with a foot out the prison gate. 

 In this respect, the court agrees with Corrections that Petitioner’s 

situation is best understood as analogous to a parolee who has been 

approved for parole but had not signed his final parole agreement. Under 

28 V.S.A. § 502c, parole may be withdrawn anytime before the final parole 

agreement has been signed; after that, Corrections must follow certain 

procedures to effectively suspend parole. Here Petitioner had not signed 

his final conditional reentry agreement. His actions just prior to doing so 

caused Corrections to withdraw his conditional reentry, and he was 

returned to the correctional facility. 

 Much of the confusion in this case stems from Correction’s postincident treatment of Petitioner and its explanation of revocation as being 

due to a violation of Condition C. While Petitioner was not officially in the 
program, Corrections chose to give him due process consistent with what it 

understood to be the rights of an inmate on conditional reentry. Corrections 

appears to have taken this course of action less out of any recognition of 

Petitioner’s status and more for the strategic desire to protect any decision 

from future Rule 75 challenges. As a withdrawal of conditional reentry, 

Corrections did not owe Petitioner any specific process in its revocation. 

The directives that Corrections has adopted, rightfully or wrongfully 

outside the Vermont Administrative Procedures Act, for dealing with 

inmates that violate the terms of their conditional release do not apply in 

this situation. As with § 502c, Corrections actions amount to a preagreement revocation of conditional reentry based on Petitioner’s failure to 

abide by the terms of his future agreement while he was still incarcerated. 

 Notwithstanding the fact that the same violation after the intake 

meeting—perhaps in the parking lot directly afterwards—might have 

represented a different question of due process and liberty interest, 

Petitioner had no inherent right to conditional reentry prior to his final 

agreement. See Conway v. Cumming, 161 Vt. 113, 118–19 (1993) (an 

inmate has no constitutionally protected interest in furlough). Instead of 

looking to the procedure that Corrections followed and its validity under 

the VAPA, this review is limited to merely finding “some evidence” to 

support Correction’s decision to withdraw its offer of conditional reentry. 

LaFaso v. Patrissi, 161 Vt. 41, 49–51 (1993). 

 The record shows that Corrections had an abundance of evidence to 

establish Petitioner’s behavior, including Petitioner’s own admission of 

guilt. While Petitioner’s admission of guilt demonstrates a certain amount 

of self-awareness and perhaps burgeoning maturity, it does not lessen his 

offense or his guilt. Corrections chose to punish this infraction, and it is not 

the function of this court to question that discretionary action. In 
challenging his due process, Petitioner’s arguments are a bit disingenuous. 

Petitioner admits that he acted in a hostile, threatening, and violent manner 

toward an ex-girlfriend, within an hour of leaving prison. Whatever 

process Petitioner claims to lack in this situation is irrelevant; there is no 

doubt that he violated the expected standards of his incipient furlough. Any 

process potentially missing does not undercut this well established fact. 

Nor do any of Petitioner’s arguments establish that he was hurt by any 

deficiencies in Correction’s process. Petitioner’s hearing was held soon 

after his return. He was able to present evidence, raise questions, and 

respond to the charges. Regardless of his status, Petitioner had the process 

he was due. 

 Finally, Petitioner’s main concern is really about the loss of his 

furlough. Aside from the statutory right Corrections had in withdrawing his 

furlough, there are sound public policy reasons to uphold Correction’s 

decision to punish Petitioner in this manner. Conditional release and other 

types of long-term furlough and parole programs are designed to help an 

inmate ease back into society after incarceration. They are attractive to 

society because they ease prison overpopulation and give inmates 

incentives to turn away from the anti-social behaviors that landed them in 

trouble in the first place. For inmates, they are coveted opportunities to 

leave prison and regain some freedoms. They also offer them the chance to 

reintegrate with society, adjust to freedom, and rebuild work and personal 

connections. 

 Given these benefits, it would only be logical that inmates would 

have the greatest incentive to be on their best behavior at the intake 

interview when furlough is a fresh possibility and prison is close at hand. 

Petitioner’s failure to adhere to the strictures of his conditional reentry 

within an hour of his release from prison did not bode well for his future 
success. When an inmate cannot adhere to the rules in Correction’s facility, 

when he is mere moments away from conditional reentry furlough and 

greater freedom, then both he and society are best served by his return to 

prison where he may learn from his mistakes. 

 Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment 

is Denied. Department of Correction’s motion for summary judgment is 

Granted. Case is Dismissed. 

 Dated at Burlington, Vermont________________, 2005. 

 _________________________________ 

Richard W. Norton, Judge