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23–331PS 2006

NOAA HURRICANE FORECASTING

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 7, 2005

Serial No. 109–26

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

KEN CALVERT, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

JOHN J.H. ‘‘JOE’’ SCHWARZ, Michigan

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

VACANCY

VACANCY

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

BRAD SHERMAN, California

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

JIM MATHESON, Utah

JIM COSTA, California

AL GREEN, Texas

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

(III)

C O N T E N T S

October 7, 2005

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 14

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 15

Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 15

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22

Statement by Representative Vernon J. Ehlers, Chairman, Subcommittee on

Environment, Technology, and Standards, Committee on Science, U.S.

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 23

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 23

Statement by Representative Charlie Melancon, Member, Committee on

Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................. 24

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 25

Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 26

Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 26

Prepared Statement by Representative Russ Carnahan, Member, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 26

Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 27

Witnesses:

Brigadier General David L. Johnson (ret.), Assistant Administrator for

Weather Services; Director, The National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 28

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 30

Biography .......................................................................................................... 41

Mr. Max Mayfield, Director, NOAA Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 41

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 43

Biography .......................................................................................................... 53

Discussion

Lessons Learned ................................................................................................... 53

Communication With Emergency Management Officials ................................. 54

Directing Hurricanes ........................................................................................... 62

Communication With Emergency Management Officials (cont.) ..................... 64

Hurricane Multi-decadal Cycle ........................................................................... 65

Funding for Hurricane Research ........................................................................ 66

Local Forecasts ..................................................................................................... 67

Evacuation Decision ............................................................................................. 67

Hurricane Liaison Team ...................................................................................... 68

Page

IV

Facilities and Equipment .................................................................................... 70

Long-Term Outlook .............................................................................................. 70

Timeline ................................................................................................................ 71

Five-Day Forecasts ............................................................................................... 73

Rebuilding New Orleans ...................................................................................... 74

Communicating With Media ............................................................................... 75

Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................ 83

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Brigadier General David L. Johnson (ret.), Assistant Administrator for

Weather Services; Director, The National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce .......... 86

Mr. Max Mayfield, Director, NOAA Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center ........................................................................................................ 108

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) Briefing, August 28, 2005 .................................. 118

(1)

NOAA HURRICANE FORECASTING

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.

Boehlert (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOAA Hurricane Forecasting

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2005

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose:

On October 7, 2005 at 10:00 a.m., the House Science Committee will hold a hearing on hurricane forecasting by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The Committee is holding the hearing to better understand the prediction of hurricanes and the outlook for the remainder of the 2005 hurricane season.

The Committee plans to explore several overarching questions:

1. What are the different responsibilities of the National Hurricane Center and

local weather forecast offices when a tropical storm or hurricane threatens

the United States?

2. What were the timelines of Katrina and Rita progressing from tropical depressions to major hurricanes and when were warnings issued to the public

and to federal, State, and local officials? Was there any difference in how the

National Weather Service forecast and issued warnings for these two major

hurricanes?

3. What is the outlook for the remainder of the 2005 hurricane season and for

the next five to 10 years? Are we in a period of increased hurricane frequency and/or intensity? If so, what is the likely cause of this increase?

4. What can be done to improve prediction of hurricanes, both in the short-term

and in the long-term?

Witnesses:

Brigadier General David L. Johnson (ret.), Director of NOAA’s National Weather Service.

Mr. Max Mayfield, Director of the National Weather Service’s National Hurricane

Center.

Background:

What Are Hurricanes?

The terms ‘‘hurricane’’ and ‘‘typhoon’’ are regionally specific names for a strong

‘‘tropical cyclone.’’ A tropical cyclone is the generic term for a low-pressure weather

system over tropical or sub-tropical waters with organized thunderstorm activity.

Tropical cyclones with maximum sustained surface winds of less than 39 mph are

called ‘‘tropical depressions.’’ Once the tropical cyclone reaches winds of at least 39

mph, it is called a ‘‘tropical storm’’ and assigned a name. If winds reach 74 mph

then the storm is called a ‘‘hurricane’’ in the Atlantic Ocean or a ‘‘typhoon’’ in the

Pacific Ocean. Typically, the more intense a tropical cyclone is, the less area it covers. Hurricane Katrina was unusual in that it both was very intense and very large

(400 miles across).

The United States utilizes the Saffir-Simpson hurricane intensity scale to give an

estimate of the potential flooding and damage to property given a hurricane’s estimated intensity. The scale is summarized in Appendix A.

How Hurricanes Are Forecast

In the United States, the Atlantic hurricane season is from June 1 to November

30. The National Weather Service (NWS), which is part of the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce, has responsibility ‘‘to provide weather, hydrologic, and climate forecasts and warnings for the

United States, its territories, and adjacent waters, for the protection of life and

property and the enhancement of the national economy.’’ The National Hurricane

4

Center in Miami, which is part of NWS, monitors and forecasts tropical storms and

hurricanes in the Atlantic and Northeast Pacific oceans.

The National Hurricane Center (NHC) compiles data about ocean temperature,

wind speed and direction, barometric pressure, and other factors and enters that

data into computer models to forecast hurricanes. This data is obtained from satellites, ocean buoys and radars. Also, a large amount of data comes from sensors

dropped by ‘‘hurricane hunter’’ airplanes as they fly into the storms. Hurricane

hunters are flown by the Air Force and NOAA out of Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi and MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. The planes are modified to carry

weather instruments to measure wind, pressure, temperature and dew point and to

drop instrumented sensors into hurricanes. When a storm is within three days of

potential landfall, hurricane hunters fly into the storm once every six hours.

When tracking a tropical storm or hurricane, the NHC issues official forecasts and

warnings every six hours. As a storm nears landfall, the forecasts are updated more

frequently. The information goes out to the public via the Internet (http://

www.nhc.noaa.gov/) and through NOAA Weather Radio. NOAA Weather Radio is a

nationwide network of radio stations broadcasting continuous weather information

from nearby National Weather Service offices. Every six hours, the NHC also provides (via conference calls and the Internet) ‘‘technical discussion products’’ tailored

to federal, State, and local emergency managers and decision-makers. Local weather

forecast offices use the information from the NHC to provide advisories tailored to

their region. An example of a tailored hurricane advisory from the New Orleans

weather forecast office is provided in Appendix B. Whenever a hurricane threatens

U.S. territory, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) activates the

Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT). This team consists of federal, State and local emergency managers, NWS meteorologists and computer specialists who help the NHC

rapidly exchange information with federal, State and local emergency managers.

The HLT works directly out of the NHC in Miami. For Hurricane Katrina, the HLT

was activated on Wednesday, August 24.

Timeline of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita and NWS Warnings to Federal,

State and Local Officials

Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the southeast corner of Louisiana at 6:10 am

Central Daylight Time (CDT) on Monday, August 29 as a Category 4 storm (maximum sustained winds of 145 mph) that was unusually large, measuring approximately 400 miles across. At 5:00 pm (CDT) on Friday, August 26, 56 hours before

Katrina made landfall, the National Weather Service forecast the storm hitting near

New Orleans as a Category 4 or 5 hurricane. NWS was very accurate with its forecast and the final landfall location was only 20 miles off from Friday’s forecast.

Since meteorological conditions that affect the track and intensity of the storm were

relatively stable, NWS was especially accurate in forecasting Katrina.

Between 7:00 and 8:00 pm CDT on Saturday August 27, 35 hours before landfall,

the Director of the National Hurricane Center called State officials in Louisiana,

Mississippi, and Alabama. At 7:00 am on Sunday, August 28, NWS advisories stated

that Katrina was a ‘‘potentially catastrophic’’ storm. A more detailed description of

Katrina’s development from tropical storm to hurricane and the associated warnings

are provided in Appendix C.

Hurricane Rita made landfall near Port Arthur, TX around 2:30 am CDT on Saturday, September 24 as a Category 3 storm (maximum sustained winds of 120 mph)

and measuring 170 miles across. At 4:00 pm CDT on Tuesday, September 20, the

National Weather Service began warning that northwestern regions of the Gulf of

Mexico should prepare for a major hurricane.

Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita Compared to Previous Major Storms

While Hurricane Katrina was over the Gulf of Mexico, NOAA measured winds

reaching 175 mph, making it the strongest hurricane ever measured in the Gulf of

Mexico. By the time it hit the Gulf Coast, Katrina’s winds decreased to 145 mph,

down to a Category 4 level but still a very strong storm. There have been three previous Category 5 storms (1935 Labor Day storm, Florida Keys; 1969 Camille, Mississippi; and 1992 Andrew, south Florida) to hit the U.S. and six previous Category

4 storms (2004 Charley, 1989 Hugo, 1961 Carla, 1960 Donna, 1957 Audrey, 1954

Hazel) to hit the U.S. The last major storm affecting New Orleans was Hurricane

Betsy in 1965, during which winds hit 125 mph before equipment failed. Hurricane

Camille (August 1969) was also a major hit but made landfall east of the city and

was a more compact storm than either Betsy or Katrina. Hurricane Katrina was unusual in that it was both very intense and large.

Typically, major hurricanes begin in the eastern Atlantic ocean near Cape Verde

in western Africa, providing forecasters many days to track, study, and warn of the

5

1K.A. Emmanuel, Nature, 436, 686 (2005) 2P.J. Webster, G.J. Holland, J.A. Curry, H.R. Chang, Science 309, 1844 (2005)

storms before they threaten U.S. coasts. Since records have been kept, 85 percent

of major Atlantic hurricanes have originated from the eastern Atlantic. However,

this year all nine tropical depressions that developed intro hurricanes did not form

until the systems were west of 55 degrees longitude (near Barbados), providing forecasters only a couple of days to study the storms and citizens less time to prepare

their homes.

The last time such a large percentage of hurricanes formed in the western Atlantic was in 1969, when 10 of 12 hurricanes formed west of 55 degrees latitude. That

was the year Hurricane Camille struck New Orleans. Scientists can determine after

the fact that the factors favoring quick formation of hurricanes in the Caribbean are

a combination of favorable wind patterns and sea surface temperatures, but scientists cannot predict these patterns ahead of time.

Outlook for Future Hurricanes

Hurricane Rita was the 13th named storm of the 2005 hurricane season. Typically

the month of September is the peak month for hurricane activity. Through November 30 (end of hurricane season), NOAA expects seven to 10 additional named

storms, of which one to three could be major hurricanes of Category 3 strength or

higher. The chance of one of those major hurricanes making landfall somewhere in

the U.S. is 21 percent. However, it is difficult to predict exactly where a hurricane

would hit because the path of a hurricane is primarily determined by day-to-day

weather patterns. Historically, weather patterns in October push tropical storms

north from the Caribbean and back out to sea, decreasing the chances that the Gulf

Coast will be hit by another hurricane. However, there is still a chance that the

Gulf could see another storm this year.

Most scientists agree that the Atlantic Ocean is currently in a period of increased

hurricane activity, which is part of a natural 25- to 40-year cycle known as the ‘‘Atlantic multi-decadal signal,’’ a shift in the sea surface temperatures in the Atlantic.

Warmer sea surface temperatures combined with optimal wind conditions cause

more tropical depressions to develop into hurricanes. Scientists are unsure of the

cause of the natural temperature and wind shifts in the Atlantic. The last period

of high tropical Atlantic activity was 1920–1966. The average number of hurricanes

in a warm period is 10 per year, while the average number of hurricanes in a cold

period is six storms per year. Today, many more people live in hurricane prone

areas than during the last period of high tropical activity, meaning that today’s

storms will affect more people and cause more damage than historical storms. Appendix D contains more detail on the Atlantic multi-decadal signal and hurricane

frequency.

While most scientists agree that the current increase in hurricane frequency is

not due to global climate change, over the next 50 years hurricane intensity (not

frequency) could increase as ocean temperatures rise. Also, two recent studies have

shown some evidence that current hurricane intensity has slightly increased since

1970. The first study, published in Nature in July, looked at the North Atlantic

Ocean and found that hurricane intensity has increased 50 percent in the past 50

years.1 The second study, published in Science in September, looked globally at all

oceans and found that the number of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes has nearly doubled each decade since 1970, while the total number of hurricanes has remained

constant.2

Improving Hurricane Forecasts

In 1954, the NHC first issued one-day forecasts of hurricanes. Since 1964, the

NHC has provided three-day hurricane forecasts. In 2003, the forecasts were extended to include five-day predictions. Appendix E contains examples of the fiveand three-day forecasts for Hurricane Katrina. Today, a three-day forecast is as accurate as those issued for a two-day prediction in the late 1980s. While NHC has

significantly improved the forecast of where a hurricane is likely to go, the forecasts

of hurricane intensity have not improved at the same pace.

NOAA currently supports research in its own labs and provides grants to universities to try to improve hurricane forecasts. Other agencies that support this type

of research include the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration. The most useful information to researchers comes from

taking observations from hurricane hunter airplanes and ocean buoys during a real

hurricane, which can be used to develop new forecasting models. As Congress debates supplemental spending and regular agency budgets, some experts think an additional hurricane hunter airplane equipped with research sensors would help reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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searchers improve computer models of hurricane intensity. (Also, NOAA lost some

facilities during Hurricane Katrina and may require additional funding to rebuild

those facilities.)

Witness Questions:

The witnesses were asked to address the following questions in their testimony.

1. What are the different responsibilities of the National Hurricane Center and

local weather forecast offices when a tropical storm or hurricane threatens

the United States?

2. What were the timelines of Katrina and Rita progressing from tropical depressions to major hurricanes and when were warnings issued to the public

and to federal, State and local officials? Was there any difference in how the

National Weather Service forecast and issued warnings for these two major

hurricanes?

3. What is the outlook for the remainder of the 2005 hurricane season and for

the next five to 10 years? Are we in a period of increased hurricane frequency and/or intensity? If so, what is the likely cause of this increase?

4. What can be done to improve prediction of hurricanes, both in the short-term

and in the long-term?

7

8

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Appendix C: Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita Timelines

Hurricane Katrina

• 4:00 pm CDT Tuesday August 23: First public advisory of Tropical Depression

Twelve.

• 7:00 am CDT Wednesday August 24: FEMA activated the Hurricane Liaison

Team.

• 10:00 am CDT Wednesday August 24: Tropical Depression Twelve develops

into Tropical Storm Katrina over the Bahamas.

• 2:30 pm CDT Thursday August 25: Tropical Storm Katrina develops into Hurricane Katrina, located 15 miles off the coast of Ft. Lauderdale, FL.

• 5:30 pm CDT Thursday August 25: Hurricane Katrina makes landfall as a

Category 1 hurricane on the southeast coast of Florida. As it passes over Florida it weakens back down to a tropical storm and moves into the Gulf of Mexico.

• 4:00 am CDT Friday August 26: After passing over Florida, Katrina regains

hurricane status over the Gulf of Mexico.

• 5:00 pm CDT Friday August 26: Every NWS warning beginning Friday

evening, 56 hours before landfall, showed Hurricane Katrina making landfall

in southeastern Louisiana as a Category 4 or 5 hurricane.

• 10:00 am CDT Saturday August 27: At 44 hours before landfall, the NWS

issued a hurricane watch including New Orleans. A hurricane watch advises

of possible hurricane conditions, with the objective of providing 36 hours notice. The watch for Katrina surpassed that objective by eight hours.

• 4:00 pm CDT Saturday August 27: At 42 hours before landfall, the hurricane

watch was extended to Mississippi and Alabama.

• 7:25 pm CDT Saturday August 27: Max Mayfield (Director of the National

Hurricane Center) called Gov. Blanco of Louisiana.

• 7:35 pm CDT Saturday August 27: Max Mayfield called Bill Filter, Chief of

Operations for Alabama Emergency Management Agency.

• 7:45 pm CDT Saturday August 27: Max Mayfield called Gov. Barbour of Mississippi.

• 8:00 pm CDT Saturday August 27: Max Mayfield called Mayor Nagin of New

Orleans.

• 10:00 pm CDT Saturday August 27: At 32 hours before landfall, the NWS

issued a hurricane warning that included New Orleans. A hurricane warning

advises that a hurricane will likely hit, with the objective of providing 24

hours lead time. The watch for Katrina surpassed that objective by eight

hours. Every NWS warning beginning Saturday evening, 32 hours before

landfall, stated that ‘‘Preparations to protect life and property should be

rushed to completion’’ and predicted coastal storm surge of at least 15 to 25

feet.

• 7:00 am CDT Sunday August 28: Every NWS warning beginning 23 hours before landfall, began with the headline indicating that Hurricane Katrina could

be ‘‘Potentially Catastrophic.’’ Due to the advanced warning provided by

NWS, a mandatory evacuation was put in place for New Orleans on Sunday

morning (24 hours before landfall) and the President declared a state of emergency on Sunday, meaning that Louisiana could use federal resources before

the hurricane hit. Typically, the President waits until after an event.

Hurricane Rita

• 10:00 pm CDT Saturday September 17: First public advisory of Tropical Depression 18.

• 6:00 am CDT Sunday September 18: FEMA activates the Hurricane Liaison

Team.

• 4:00 pm CDT Sunday September 18: Tropical Depression 18 develops into

Tropical Storm Rita.

• 10:00 pm CDT Sunday September 18: Hurricane and tropical storm warnings

issued for southern Florida.

• 10:00 pm CDT Monday September 19: Rita is predicted to strengthen to a

Category 2 hurricane before hitting Florida.

10

• 10:00 am CDT Tuesday September 20: Rita elevated to a Category 1 hurricane.

• 1:00 pm CDT Tuesday September 20: Rita elevated to a Category 2 hurricane

as it moves over Florida.

• 4:00 pm CDT Tuesday September 20: At 82 hours before landfall, NWS warns

that ‘‘all indications are that Rita as an intense hurricane will be approaching

the Texas Coast in about three days.’’

• 10:00 pm CDT Tuesday September 20: NWS warns that Rita could reach Category 4 status by Wednesday evening.

• 1:00 am CDT Wednesday September 21: Rita elevated to a Category 3 hurricane.

• 6:00 am CDT Wednesday September 21: Rita elevated to a Category 4 hurricane.

• 10:00 am CDT Wednesday September 21: At 64 hours before landfall, NWS

states that ‘‘interests in the northwestern Gulf of Mexico should monitor the

progress of dangerous Hurricane Rita. . .Rita is extremely dangerous category four hurricane. . .some additional strengthening is forecast during the

next 24 hours and could reach category five intensity in the central Gulf of

Mexico.’’

• 4:00 pm CDT Wednesday September 21: At 58 hours before landfall, Rita elevated to a Category 5 hurricane. Hurricane and tropical storms watches are

posted for Louisiana and Texas.

• 11:00 am CDT Thursday September 22: At 39 hours before landfall, Rita

downgraded to a Category 4 hurricane. Hurricane and tropical storms warnings issued for Texas and Louisiana.

• 10:00 am CDT Friday September 23: At 16 hours before landfall, Rita predicted to hit early Saturday morning as either a Category 3 or 4 hurricane.

Rita is expected to come ashore as ‘‘a dangerous hurricane.’’

• 2:30 am CDT Saturday September 24: Rita makes landfall in extreme southwest Louisiana as a Category 3 hurricane (with top winds of 120 mph).

• 7:00 am CDT Saturday September 24: Rita downgraded to Category 2 hurricane.

• 10:00 am CDT Saturday September 24: Rita downgraded to Category 1 hurricane.

• 1:00 pm CDT Saturday September 24: Rita downgraded to a tropical storm.

• 8:00 pm CDT Saturday September 24: Rita downgraded to a tropical depression. Last NHC advisory.

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Chairman BOEHLERT.Thank you for being here today at this long

awaited hearing. We had hoped to have this hearing back in September but we postponed it twice, once because Hurricane Ophelia

was developing and once to give the chance for the Select Committee to get started with its investigation.

I participated in the Select Committee’s hearing and I made clear

then that the Science Committee retained all of its jurisdiction and

interest in this subject and that we would be rescheduling our

hearing today and that is why we are here today. Unfortunately,

because of the Energy Bill on the Floor, my attendance today will

be intermittent, but my focus will not. And incidentally, that is

calling the attention of so many of our colleagues because of the

significance of the bill on the Floor.

The National Weather Service is probably the agency we oversee

that has the most impact on the every day lives of our constituents,

and we want to make sure we do everything we can to make sure

it is in top form. Based on its recent performance trialed by water

one might say, I do not think we have too much to worry about

when it comes to the Weather Service. Let me repeat what I said

at the Select Committee’s hearing. The National Weather Service

performed magnificently in tracking Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

and in providing information before, during, and after the hurricanes made landfall. Max Mayfield was the indispensable man in

the lead up to the storms and we owe the entire staff of the National Weather Service a debt of gratitude and that comes with all

the sincerity that I can command.

The men and women of the Weather Service and the men and

women of the Armed Forces who fly into hurricanes to get data on

storms get no special perks if they have had a rough couple of days

or a bad season. They have to be ready for the next storm.

I was talking the other day to Deputy Secretary Sampson of the

Commerce Department and he had just been down to visit the National Hurricane Center. He said that morale at the center was suffering because the staff felt so saddened that Katrina had produced

such suffering. That speaks volumes about the kind of people we

have working for us down there.

In all reality, all the Weather Service can do is provide the best

information they can, which in the case of Katrina happened to be

especially accurate because conditions were ideal for monitoring

the storm. In short, the Weather Service can lead officials to information but they cannot make them think or act, I might add. Now

that does not mean of course that nothing can be improved, we will

want to see and hear today about any steps the Weather Service

is taking to ensure that Federal, State, and local officials are receiving the information that the Weather Service is putting out.

But it is not the Weather Service’s job and it can’t be to ensure

that others are heeding its warnings.

So I hope we will not be asking our witnesses today questions

that fall beyond their purview. I also hope that we can ask questions beyond rehearsing the prelude to the most recent storms. We

should be looking for information about the rest of the hurricane

season, it is not over yet, about what is behind the increased frequency and intensity of hurricanes. And most important, about

what tools the National Weather Service needs to continue to imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
15

prove its ability to forecast and track storms. If nothing else, the

horrifying events of recent weeks have underscored the value of the

National Weather Service. We need to work together to make sure

that the Weather Service can provide the best information possible.

With that, it is my pleasure to recognize the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Gordon of Tennessee.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT

I want to thank everyone for being here today at this long awaited hearing. We

had hoped to have this hearing back in September, but we postponed it twice—once

because Hurricane Ophelia was developing and once to give the Select Committee

a chance to get started with its investigation.

I participated in the Select Committee’s hearing, and I made clear then that the

Science Committee retained all its jurisdiction—and interest—in this subject and

that we would be rescheduling our hearing. And that is why we are here today.

Unfortunately, because of the Energy Bill on the Floor, my attendance today will

be intermittent, but my focus is not. The National Weather Service is probably the

agency we oversee that has the most impact on the everyday lives of our constituents, and we want to do everything we can to make sure it is in top form.

Based on its recent performance—trial by water, one might say—I don’t think we

have too much to worry about when it comes to the Weather Service. Let me repeat

what I said at the Select Committee’s hearing: the National Weather Service performed magnificently in tracking Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and in providing information before, during and after the hurricanes made landfall. Max Mayfield was

the indispensable man in the lead-up to the storms, and we owe the entire staff of

the National Weather Service a debt of gratitude.

The men and women of the Weather Service and the men and women of the

armed forces who fly into the hurricanes to get data on storms get no special perks

if they’ve had a rough couple of days or a bad season. They have to be ready for

the next storm.

I was talking the other day to Deputy Secretary Sampson of the Commerce Department, and he had just been down to visit the National Hurricane Center. He

said that morale at the Center was suffering because the staff felt so saddened that

Katrina had produced such suffering. That speaks volumes about the kind of people

we have working for us down there.

For in reality, all the Weather Service can do is provide the best information they

can—which in the case of Katrina happened to be especially accurate because conditions were ideal for monitoring the storm. In short, the Weather Service can lead

officials to information, but they can’t make them think. Or act, I might add.

Now that doesn’t mean, of course, that nothing can be improved. We’ll want to

hear today about any steps the Weather Service is taking to ensure that federal,

State and local officials are receiving the information that the Weather Service is

putting out. But it’s not the Weather Service’s job, and it can’t be, to ensure that

others are heeding its warnings. So I hope we won’t be asking our witnesses today

questions that fall beyond their purview.

I also hope that we can ask questions that go beyond rehearsing the prelude to

the most recent storms. We should be looking for information about the rest of the

hurricane season, about what is behind the increased frequency and intensity of

hurricanes, and most important, about what tools the National Weather Service

needs to continue to improve its ability to forecast and track storms.

If nothing else, the horrifying events of recent weeks have underscored the value

of the National Weather Service. We need to work together to make sure that the

Weather Service can provide the best information possible. Thank you.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me concur with your comments and certainly your compliments to the Weather Service and the team they have put together.

This hearing today is vitally important. We have recently been

reminded of both the power of weather and weather prediction and

I look forward to exploring these topics. Over the years, we have

spent billions of dollars on the Weather Service to improve our capacity to predict the weather. We do it not simply because it is

16

good science, but because we can save lives if we provide accurate

warnings for severe weather events. We have also spent hundreds

of billions of dollars on homeland security. We do it to enhance our

capacity to stop terrorist attacks and to mobilize our nation’s forces

in cases of catastrophic incidents, whether by terrorists or by natural disaster.

The goal of both of these sets of expenditures is to keep Americans secure and to come to their aid when they most need it. In

the last few weeks, it appears that one of these systems worked

and one of these systems failed. And failure has consequences. In

this case, some of those who died, and we do not yet know how

many, they died because the Federal Government did not get there

in time. As Walter Maestri, the Emergency Management Chief of

the Louisiana Jefferson Parish put it, ‘‘The cavalry did not arrive.’’

Information regarding the power of Hurricane Katrina went

right to the top. One of our witnesses here today conducted briefings that included President Bush, Secretary Chertoff, and Under

Secretary Brown. May I have the first chart?

17

The other witness heads an agency which has placed an employee inside the nerve center for the Federal Government’s response to catastrophic events, Homeland Security Operations Center.

18

Chart 2. As the graph on the screen demonstrates, Secretary

Chertoff is the head of that center and information is supposed to

flow up to the secretary from its work and also to President Bush.

So the information from the Weather Service was flowing to our

emergency response leaders through two paths, and yet our Government seemed taken by surprise. FEMA Head, Michael Brown

said on CNN on August 31 and I quote, ‘‘I must say, this storm is

much bigger than anyone expected.’’

Is it possible that the Weather Service simply wasn’t being articulate about the nature of the threat posed by Katrina? I do not

19

think that to be true, but we have a chance today to confirm it. Apparently, one of our witnesses didn’t think it was true either. Mr.

Mayfield, according to the St. Petersburg Times story on August 30

based on an interview with Max Mayfield in Chart 3 and I will

quote that. ‘‘On Sunday night, Mayfield was so worried about Hurricane Katrina that he called the Governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Mayor of New Orleans. On Sunday, he even

talked about the forces of Katrina during a video conference call to

President Bush at his ranch in Crawford Texas.’’ ‘‘I just wanted to

be able to go to sleep that night knowing I did all I could do,’’ said

Mr. Mayfield.

On Sunday, Mr. Mayfield conducted his regular presentation to

the Hurricane Liaison Team/FEMA conference call. According to

20

Mr. Mayfield’s press account and the government’s records, the

President and Secretary Chertoff and Undersecretary Brown were

on the calls either Saturday or Sunday and we know from other

sources that President Bush and Chertoff were both on the line on

the August 28 briefing.

On the screen is a photograph released by the White House of

the President participating in this video conference. On the screen

in front of the President is Max Mayfield and over Mr. Mayfield’s

shoulder is an image of a powerful storm.

21

22

In an article printed in the September 4 Times Picayune of New

Orleans, Mr. Mayfield said reacting to the claims by some that the

storms surprised them in its veracity and consequences, Chart 5,

and I quote, ‘‘We were briefing them way before landfall. It is not

that this is a surprise. We had advisories that the levee could be

topped. I kept looking back to see if there was anything else we

could do, could have done, and I just don’t know what it would be.’’

So I hope today in your testimony, Mr. Mayfield, you can address

whether anything else has come to your mind that could have been

done to get the attention of our emergency response leaders.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BART GORDON

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

This hearing today is vitally important. We’ve recently been reminded of both the

power of weather and weather prediction, and I look forward to exploring these topics.

Over the years, we’ve spent billions of dollars on the Weather Service to improve

our capacity to predict the weather. We do it not simply because it is good science,

but because we can save lives if we provide accurate warnings of severe weather

events.

We have also spent hundreds of billions of dollars on homeland security. We do

it to enhance our capacity to stop terrorist attacks and to mobilize our nation’s

forces in cases of catastrophic incidents—whether by terrorism or by natural disaster.

The goal in both sets of expenditures is to keep Americans secure and to come

to their aid when they most need it.

In the last few weeks, one of these systems worked and one of these systems

failed. And failure has consequences—in this case some of those who died, and we

do not yet know how many, they died because the Federal Government did not get

there in time. As Walter Maestri, the Emergency Management Chief for Louisiana’s

Jefferson Parish put it: ‘‘the cavalry didn’t arrive.’’

The information regarding the power of Hurricane Katrina went right to the top.

One of our witnesses here today conducted briefings that included the President,

Secretary Chertoff and Under Secretary Brown.

The other witness heads an agency which has placed an employee inside the

nerve center for the Federal Government’s response to catastrophes: the Homeland

Security Operations Center (HSOC).

As the graphic on the screen demonstrates, Secretary Chertoff is the head of that

center and information is supposed to flow up to the Secretary from its work and

also to the President.

So the information from the Weather Service was flowing to our emergency response leaders through two paths and yet our government seemed taken by surprise.

FEMA head Michael Brown said on CNN on August 31, ‘‘I must say, this storm

is much bigger than anyone expected.’’

Is it possible that the Weather Service simply wasn’t being articulate about the

nature of the threat posed by Katrina? I don’t think that to be true, but we will

have a chance today to confirm it.

Apparently one of our witnesses didn’t think it was true. Mr. Mayfield. According

to a St. Petersburg Times story on August 30, based on an interview with Max

Mayfield:

‘‘On Saturday night, Mayfield was so worried about Hurricane Katrina that he

called the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi and the Mayor of New Orleans. On Sunday, he even talked about the force of Katrina during a video conference call to President Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas.’’

‘‘I just wanted to be able to go to sleep that night knowing that I did all I could

do,’’ Mayfield said.

On Sunday Mr. Mayfield conducted his regular presentation to the Hurricane Liaison Team/FEMA conference call. According to Mr. Mayfield’s press account and

government records the President, Secretary Chertoff and Under Secretary Brown

23

were on calls either Saturday or Sunday and we know from other sources that the

President and Chertoff both were on line for the August 28 briefing.

On the screen is a photo released by the White House of the President participating in this video teleconference. On the screen in front of the President is Max

Mayfield and over Mr. Mayfield’s shoulder is an image of a powerful storm: Hurricane Katrina.

In an article printed in the September 4 Times Picayune of New Orleans Mr.

Mayfield said, reacting to the claims by some that the storm surprised them in its

ferocity and consequences.

‘‘We were briefing them way before landfall.. . . It’s not like this is a surprise.

We had the advisories that the levee could be topped. I keep looking back to see

if there was anything else we could have done, and I just don’t know what it would

be.’’

I hope in your testimony Dr. Mayfield you can address whether anything else has

come to mind that you could have done to get the attention of our emergency response leaders.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

Dr. Ehlers.

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the last six weeks, two of the strongest hurricanes ever recorded in the Gulf of Mexico hit the Gulf Coast region. Hurricanes

Katrina and Rita left a wake of devastation and destroyed the

homes and disrupted the livelihoods of countless Americans. My

prayers continue to go out to the victims of these horrible events.

Experts agree that the Atlantic Ocean is in a natural period of

increased tropical storm activity. The last time were in an active

period like this was 1920 to 1966. Obviously, these are very longterm cycles. However, today many more people live in hurricaneprone areas. To help prepare and respond better in the future, it

is urgent for us to understand the forecasting of Katrina and Rita

and what future hurricane seasons may hold. In that vein, I am

pleased that Chairman Boehlert organized today’s hearing about

NOAA’s hurricane forecasting.

As the Chairman of the Environment and Technology and Standards Subcommittee, I am proud of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Weather Service. The Weather Service,

in particular through its National Hurricane Center in Miami,

Florida, did an excellent job forecasting Katrina and Rita. Weather

Service employees worked countless long hours to ensure that federal, State, and local officials and the public have the most accurate and up to date information about dangerous weather events.

I applaud their hard work and look forward to learning more about

how they do it. And I also am very anxious to find out how we can

possibly alert the public anymore than has already been done to

make certain the public responds and doesn’t take it for granted.

I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ehlers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE VERNON J. EHLERS

In the last six weeks, two of the strongest hurricanes ever recorded in the Gulf

of Mexico hit the Gulf Coast region. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita left a wake of devastation and destroyed the homes and disrupted the livelihoods of countless Americans. My prayers continue to go out to the victims of these terrible events.

Experts agree that the Atlantic Ocean is in a natural period of increased tropical

storm activity. The last time we were in an active period like this was 1920–1966.

However, today many more people live in hurricane-prone areas. To help prepare

and respond better in the future, it is urgent for us to understand the forecasting

of Katrina and Rita and what future hurricane seasons may hold. In that vein, I

24

am pleased that Chairman Boehlert organized today’s hearing about NOAA’s hurricane forecasting.

As Chairman of the Environment, Technology, and Standards Subcommittee, I am

proud of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National

Weather Service. The Weather Service, in particular through its National Hurricane

Center in Miami, Florida, did an excellent job forecasting Katrina and Rita. Weather Service employees work countless long hours to ensure that federal, State and

local officials, and the public, have the most accurate and up-to-date information

about dangerous weather events. I applaud their hard work and look forward to

learning more about how they do it.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Dr. Ehlers.

Mr. Wu.

Mr. WU. As Ranking Member of the Environment, Technology,

and Standards Subcommittee, I would like to begin by yielding

time to one of my several good friends who were affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, in this case, Mr. Melancon, the gentleman

from Louisiana.

Mr. MELANCON. Thank you, Mr. Wu, I appreciate it.

As you all know, my district suffered catastrophic losses and

damage, lots of lives during Hurricane Katrina. It is hard to relate

in words the situation that Katrina left behind. The challenges to

rebuilding and putting the South Louisiana area back together

again are complex and the progress will be slow.

The loss of life, livelihood, homes and communities defy description but the courage and the resilience of the people of South Louisiana is all evident. We have taken a mighty blow from Mother

Nature and we are stunned, but we are still standing and we are

going to recover from this and restore our communities but we

have a long and hard road ahead. The Federal Government must

work with the State and local governments to rebuild our communities, our livelihoods, and the natural and manmade structures

that protect us from these storms.

We have heard criticism of the Government’s response at all levels. In the midst of all this finger pointing, however, I think it is

important that we highlight the many local officials who took care

of their people when the network to support them collapsed. If not

for the efforts of these heroes, many people would not have been

evacuated and many of those who did not evacuate would not have

survived. My constituents are not interested in partisan bickering

or Monday morning quarterbacking. They need their immediate

needs addressed and they need to have help to rebuild their lives.

As federal officials, we need to ensure the Federal Government

is ready to respond rapidly to future situations where citizens are

victimized by natural or manmade disasters. State and local governments cannot be expected to provide sustained response and assistance from within a vast devastated area. The Federal Government is the only organization with the resources to provide the

type of emergency assistance our citizens need.

We can learn from some of the federal agencies that did perform

well, such as the National Weather Service and the U.S. Coastguard. The National Weather Service worked cooperatively with

State and local officials and with the media to get information out

to the public. Their forecasts were accurate and their warnings

were clear. Without these forecast and warnings and the lead time

they provided, we would not have been able to evacuate as many

people as we did and the loss of life would have been much greater.

25

Their performance emphasizes the need for Congress to ensure

that this agency stays adequately funded.

To the American people and my fellow Members on this committee, I thank you. You have reached out to me and my district

these past days and your generosity has not gone unnoticed. Rest

assured with your help, Louisianans will survive. We will rebuild

and our state will be strong again.

On behalf of my constituents, I thank you, Mr. Mayfield and the

other employees of the Hurricane Center and the National Weather

Service for your fine work. I am anxious to work with my colleagues on the Committee to ensure that NOAA has the resources

it needs to continue to improve hurricane forecasting. Additionally,

I would also want to ensure that NOAA’s other branches have the

resources they need to help us rebuild our coastal wetlands and our

fisheries.

On behalf of the people of Louisiana and I would believe on behalf of the people of the entire Gulf Coast, I thank you.

With that, I yield back my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Melancon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLIE MELANCON

As you all know, my district suffered catastrophic damage and tragic loss of life

due to Hurricane Katrina. It’s hard to relate in words the situation that Katrina

left behind. The challenges to rebuilding and putting South Louisiana back together

again are complex and the progress is slow. The loss of life, livelihood, homes, and

communities defies description.

But, the courage, resilience, and strength of Louisiana’s citizens is also evident.

We have taken a mighty blow from Mother Nature and we’re stunned, but we’re

still standing. We are going to recover from this and restore our communities, but

we have a long hard road ahead. The Federal Government must work with the

State and local governments to rebuild our communities, our livelihoods and the

natural and the man-made structures that protect us from these storms.

We’ve heard criticism of the government response at all levels. In the midst of

all this finger-pointing, however, I think it is important that we highlight the many

local officials who took care of their people when the network to support them collapsed. If not for the efforts of these heroes, many people would not have evacuated

and many of those who did not evacuate would not have survived.

My constituents are not interested in partisan bickering or Monday-morning quarterbacking. They need their immediate needs addressed and they need help to rebuild their lives. As federal officials, we need to ensure the Federal Government is

ready to respond rapidly to future situations where citizens are victimized by natural or man-made disasters. State and local governments cannot be expected to provide sustained response and assistance from within a vast devastated area. The

Federal Government is the only organization with resources to provide the type of

emergency assistance our citizens need.

We can learn from some of the federal agencies that did perform well—the National Weather Service and the U.S. Coast Guard are two examples.

The National Weather Service worked cooperatively with State and local officials

and with the media to get information out to the public. Their forecasts were accurate, and their warnings were clear. Without these forecasts and warnings, and the

lead time they provided, we would not have been able to evacuate as many people

as we did and the loss of life would have been much greater. Their performance emphasizes the need for Congress to ensure that this agency stays adequately funded.

To the American people and my fellow Members on this committee—thank you.

You have reached out to me and my district these past days and weeks and your

generosity has not gone unnoticed. Rest assured, with your help, Louisianians will

survive; we will rebuild; and our state will be strong again.

On behalf of my constituents; thank you Dr. Mayfield, and the other employees

of the Hurricane Center and the National Weather Service for your fine work. I am

anxious to work with my colleagues on the Committee to ensure that NOAA has

the resources it needs to continue to improve hurricane forecasting. Additionally, I

26

would also want to ensure that NOAA’s other branches have the resources they

need to help us to rebuild our coastal wetlands and our fisheries.

Thank you, and I yield back my time.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much for those heartfelt

remarks and I think we all identify with them.

And without objection, all other Members will be able to offer

opening statements at this juncture in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO

Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before our committee

to examine hurricane forecasting by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The devastating affects of hurricanes are familiar to all of us. In

the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it is important to gain a better understanding of the prediction of hurricanes and determine what can be done to improve

prediction of hurricanes, both in the short-term and the long-term.

Within the NOAA, the National Weather Service (NWS) and the National Hurricane Center (NHC) predicted the severity of Hurricane Katrina and issued multiple

warnings for the Gulf Coast as early as 5 pm on Thursday, August 25th. By late

Sunday night, early Monday morning, August 29th, the National Hurricane Center

issued an advisory stating ‘‘coastal storm surge flooding of 18 to 22 feet above normal tide levels. . .locally as high as 28 feet.. . .Some levees in the greater New Orleans could be overtopped.’’ This is not an instance where science failed us. The

science of hurricane prediction has increased dramatically with observational work

and research done by NOAA.

For decades FEMA, the Army Corp of Engineers, academics and other federal,

State and local agencies have performed simulations and analyses to determine the

affect of a hurricane on the New Orleans area. These analyses overwhelming concluded that should a Category 3, or higher, hurricane strike New Orleans, the result

would be catastrophic flooding, loss of property and life with or without a levee

breach. Simple overtopping of the levees alone was predicted by the Red Cross to

result in between 25,000–100,000 lives.

Hurricane Katrina revealed that despite billions of dollars in emergency response

preparation and a complete overhaul of the federal domestic security system embodied in the Department of Homeland Security, Americans are not secure today

from the ravages of nature. Thus, within this chaos, one thing is clear; this disaster

was not the fault of the NOAA or their sub-components the NWS or the NHC. The

aftermath was not due to a failure of science to predict. The aftermath was a failure

of emergency response to act on sound engineering, oceanographic and atmospheric

science that predicted that Katrina could be devastating and the Gulf region in particular, New Orleans, because the city sits below sea level and is dependent on levees and pumps to keep the water out.

I thank the witnesses for their testimony and look forward to hearing what the

outlook is for the remainder of the 2005 hurricane season and for improving hurricane predictions in the short- and long-term.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated thousands of lives in New Orleans,

southern Louisiana, Mississippi, and other parts of the Southeast.

I am anxious to hear about how NOAA and the National Weather Service predict

hurricanes and how we as legislators can remove barriers so that you can do your

important work to the best of your ability.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carnahan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RUSS CARNAHAN

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for hosting this hearing.

I am pleased that the Science Committee is taking this very important step to

exercise its oversight role, particularly after such horrific natural disasters have occurred. We owe it to the American public to do everything possible to make sure

this type of tragedy never happens again.

27

After reviewing the written testimony of our witnesses it is clear to me that

NOAA, the National Weather Service and the National Hurricane Service did an

outstanding job predicting the course of Hurricane Katrina and the ensuing devastation that followed. To prevent another Katrina, we must equip the National Hurricane Center and keep it as strong as it is today. But, we must also look outside

this committee and revisit many of the policies promoted by the Bush Administration, reform FEMA and ensure that funds directed toward emergency management

are held accountable.

General Johnson and Dr. Mayfield, we are pleased to have you with us and I look

forward to hearing your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

Mr. Chairman, let me first thank you for holding this important hearing on hurricane forecasting.

It was about five weeks ago that we first heard reports of a hurricane building

in the Atlantic Ocean and heading towards our coast. We had heard this warning

many times before, but the size and the scale of this one was different. There hasn’t

been a hurricane this big and this powerful in decades, and it was heading toward

one of the most vulnerable cities in the country. We have since witnessed the awesome destructive power Mother Nature still commands over mankind. Few could

have imagined the immense devastation and human suffering Katrina would bring

to our shores.

If there is something positive we can take from this disaster, however, it will be

our collective national resolve to never allow this to happen again. While this event

is still fresh in our memories, we must learn from what we did wrong, strengthen

what we did right and strive to find new ways to ensure the safety of the citizens

of this country.

On the forefront of this effort, of course, are the fine people of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Their state-of-the-art forecasting, detection

and tracking systems saved hundreds, if not thousands of lives this past month.

Their accuracy in the forecasting of Katrina was outstanding, and very impressive

in Rita as well. Questions remain to be answered regarding what the proper response to NOAA’s warnings should have been, but it is very apparent that in the

case of Rita and Katrina, NOAA performed extremely well, and we commend them

for that.

NOAA’s impressive performance in this instance, however, serves only to further

emphasize the need for more work in the area of hurricane forecasting. We can’t

ever expect to conquer Mother Nature, or turn back hurricanes with the press of

a button. In the wake of this disaster, however, we need to constantly be asking

each other ‘‘What more could we have done?’’

The Committee posed some very difficult questions for our distinguished panel,

that I hope we can explore today. I hope those questions are appropriately addressed, with special attention to what can be done to improve forecasting of hurricanes in the future.

Thank you very much for being here today. I am sure this hearing will be very

productive, and I look forward to hearing the testimony from the panelists as well

as from my fellow colleagues.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Let me welcome our two distinguished visitors, Brigadier General David L. Johnson, who is Director of the

NOAA National Weather Service; and Mr. Max Mayfield, who is

the Director of NOAA’s Tropical Prediction Center and National

Hurricane Center. And let me say to both of you gentlemen, I can

speak, I think, for my colleagues of all persuasions from all regions

of the country, we appreciate the magnificent performance of your

people in this tragic incident and we are so proud of what you do

and do so well.

The purpose of this hearing, though, is not to give you additional

pats on the back, well deserved though they are. It is to go forward

and to try to determine what more you might need, what assistance we might be able to provide. But I stress my strong, personal

feeling that you have been magnificent in the performance of your

28

job. I cannot say that about every other official at every level of

government but I can say it about you two and all the people that

you represent. Thank you.

With that, our first witness, General Johnson, Director of the National Weather Service. General, the Floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID L. JOHNSON

(RET.), ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR WEATHER SERVICES; DIRECTOR, THE NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I

am David Johnson, the Assistant Administrator for Weather Services at NOAA and Director of the National Weather Service. Thank

you very much for inviting me here today to discuss NOAA’s role

in forecasting and warning the public about hurricanes. And Mr.

Chairman, I would like to thank you personally and all of the

Members of the Science Committee for your leadership in this area

and for your support last year when you provided funding to get

us seven additional buoys and provide dollars for the Air Force Reserve to put some urgently needed instrumentation on their airplanes. They are working towards getting me one airplane for the

’06 season and then additional airplanes after that.

I am accompanied by Max Mayfield, my Director of the National

Hurricane Center. He will be focusing on Hurricane Katrina and

Rita, communicating our forecasts, as well as the outlook for the

future. I will be focusing on our role in hurricane tracking and forecasting, as well as, ongoing and future research efforts.

NOAA’s forecast and warnings for Hurricane Rita and Katrina

pushed the limits of state-of-the-art hurricane prediction and our

current continuous research efforts including observations, modeling, and expanded computational resources at NOAA and in partnership with other federal agencies lead to our current predictive

capabilities and improved ways of describing uncertainty in prediction. But NOAA’s work does not stop there. NOAA assesses

damage from storms and evaluates waterways to assist dredging

operations, reopening our nation’s ports and waterways impacted

by the storms. NOAA also assesses the impact to area fisheries,

supports hazardous materials containment and abatement efforts,

and we provide environmental data critical for post storm recovery

operations.

The mission of the National Weather Service is to issue weather,

water, and climate forecasts for the protection of life and property

and the enhancement of the economy. Nowhere is that more evident than in the hurricane program. Various components of the

National Weather Service play important roles in the overall hurricane forecasting and warning process and the National Hurricane

Center within the NWS has been the centerpiece of our nation’s

Hurricane Forecast and Warning Program for 50 years.

The National Hurricane Center, ably led by Max Mayfield, is responsible for predicting the path and intensity of the storm, issuing

coastal hurricane watches and warnings, and describing broad impacts to the areas impacted, including projected storm surge levels.

29

After each hurricane season, your Weather Service undertakes

an effort to improve how we can communicate our information

more clearly. For example, after the 2004 season, we focused on

how to improve the communication of uncertainty. Again this year,

we have several experimental products on our website for review.

We will do a hot wash after this season to see how we can do our

job better.

Local National Weather Forecast Offices and River Forecast Centers also play a critical role in this process. They use their local expertise to refine National Hurricane Center advisories and provide

specific detailed information about storm impacts from the hurricane to their local forecast area of responsibility.

Weather forecast office staffs have detailed knowledge of the

local terrain and impacts and provide this information through direct interaction with local emergency managers via their local forecast products and messages. This detailed information is used by

local emergency managers in their evacuation and other preparedness decisions.

Using a combination of atmospheric and ocean observations from

satellites, aircraft, and all available surface data over the ocean,

NOAA conducts experiments to better understand internal storm

dynamics and interactions between a hurricane and the surrounding atmosphere and oceans. Through greater understanding

of the physical processes in advanced hurricane modeling, NOAA

continually improves models for predicting hurricane intensity and

track. These numerical modeling improvements, once demonstrated, are then transitioned into operations. Our track forecasts have shown consistent improvement; however, we have not

seen a comparable improvement in our intensity forecasts.

From a scientific point, the gaps in our capabilities fall into two

broad categories. First, our ability to measure and assess the current state of hurricane and its environment doing that analysis,

and second, our ability to predict the hurricane’s future state, that

is the forecast. We need to enhance our observation network. Many

of the enhancements required to improve hurricane analyses particularly over the data sparse ocean areas will be addressed

through such programs as the Global Earth Observation System of

Systems or GEOSS, a ten-year international endeavor of which the

United States is a member and NOAA a key participant.

Predicting hurricane intensity remains an acute challenge. Even

though we knew conditions were favorable for the storms to intensify, we do not know why the storm underwent its rapid intensification once it passed the Florida Peninsula and reentered the

gulf. We are now at the point in improving intensity forecasts that

we were at a decade ago with the track forecast. Our 2005 version

of our high resolution model improved some of the intensity forecasts over the current statistical models when we run them on last

year’s 2004 hurricanes. So we have potential there.

To advance hurricane prediction, especially hurricane and size

forecasts, NOAA is developing the Hurricane Weather and Research Forecasting System. The Weather Service works with the

research community to incorporate advanced model physics into a

hurricane model which integrates the physical interactions of the

atmosphere, land, and oceans into a single model. Our goal here is

30

to couple an advanced wave model with a dynamic storm surge

model to better predict coastal impacts of waves and the storm

surge.

Mr. Chairman, while there are no quick fixes, we are very optimistic that we will continue to make advances in our operational

forecast of tropical cyclone intensity, wind structure, size and rainfall in the near future.

So in conclusion, the government’s ability to observe, predict, and

respond quickly to storm events is critical to public safety. At

NOAA, we will continue our efforts to improve hurricane track and

intensity forecasting including wind, storm surge, and rainfall

amounts. We will also continue to provide the technical tools and

planning expertise to states and local governments to help mitigate

future natural disasters and provide our assistance for response

and recovery.

With that, sir, I am happy to answer any questions you may

have.

[The prepared statement of Brigadier General Johnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID L. JOHNSON

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am General David L. Johnson,

Assistant Administrator for Weather Services at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss NOAA’s role in forecasting, and warning the public

about hurricanes, as well as NOAA’s essential role and activities following landfall.

The devastation along the Gulf Coast from Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita

is like nothing I have witnessed before. It is catastrophic. Words cannot convey the

physical destruction and personal suffering in that part of our nation. However,

without NOAA’s forecasts and warnings, the devastation and loss of life would have

been far greater.

NOAA’s forecasts and warnings for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita pushed

the limits of state-of-the-art hurricane prediction. In partnership with DOD, NASA,

NSF, and other federal agencies, the long-term continuous research efforts, including observations, modeling, and expanded computational resources have led to

NOAA’s current predictive capabilities and improved ways of describing uncertainty

in prediction. But NOAA’s work does not end there. NOAA assesses damage from

storms and evaluates waterways to assist dredging operations, allowing our nation’s

ports and waterways impacted by the storm to open. NOAA also assesses the impact

to the areas’ fisheries, supports hazardous materials containment and abatement efforts, and provides necessary data critical for post storm recovery operations.

The Role of the National Weather Service in Tracking, Forecasting and

Communicating the Threats of Hurricanes

The mission of the National Weather Service (NWS) is to issue weather, water

and climate forecasts and warnings for the protection of life and property and the

enhancement of the national economy. Nowhere is that more evident than in the

hurricane program. Various components of the NWS play important roles in the

overall hurricane forecasting and warning process. The National Hurricane Center

(NHC) within the NWS has been the centerpiece of our nation’s hurricane forecast

and warning program for 50 years. The mission of the NHC is to save lives, mitigate

property loss, and improve economic efficiency by issuing the best watches, warnings, and forecasts of hazardous tropical weather and by increasing the public’s understanding of these hazards.

NHC tropical cyclone forecasts are issued at least every six hours, more frequently during landfall threats, and include text messages as well as a suite of

graphical products depicting our forecasts and the accompanying probabilities and

‘‘cone of uncertainty,’’ as it has become known. The NHC is responsible for predicting the path and intensity of the system, issuing coastal hurricane watches and

warnings, and describing broad impacts to the areas impacted, including projected

storm surge levels.

Local National Weather Service Weather Forecast Offices (WFO) also play a critical role in this process. The WFOs use their local expertise to refine NHC

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ricane to their local forecast area of responsibility. Weather forecast staff have detailed knowledge of the local terrain and impacts, and provide this information

through direct interactions with local emergency managers and via their local forecast products and messages. This detailed information is used by local emergency

managers when making their evacuation and other preparedness decisions. The effects of hurricanes can reach far inland and it is the responsibility of the local WFO

to issue inland hurricane and tropical storm warnings and describe the local impacts here as well. These inland impacts include flood and flash floods as well as

tornadoes.

Tracking and Forecasting Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina began as a tropical depression near the southeastern Bahamas

on Tuesday, August 23, 2005. The National Hurricane Center accurately predicted

it would become a Category 1 hurricane before making landfall near Miami. The

storm deluged southeast Florida with 16 inches of rain in some places, causing

downed trees, flooding, and extended power outages as it passed across the southern

portion of the state.

Once Katrina re-emerged into the Gulf of Mexico, NOAA hurricane forecasters

correctly predicted re-intensification of the storm. Katrina intensified more quickly

and became stronger than initially predicted. Within nine hours, Katrina intensified

from a tropical storm, with winds of 70 miles per hour, to a Category 2 storm with

100 mile per hour winds.

As you can see in the graphic below, our forecast track from Friday night (August

26), about 56 hours before landfall, had the storm curving northward and headed

directly toward southeastern Louisiana and Mississippi. The projected path of

Katrina aimed directly at southeast Louisiana, and the prediction was for Katrina

to make landfall as a Category 4 hurricane. The actual track would deviate little

from this and subsequent forecasts for the rest of Katrina’s approach. On average,

NOAA forecasts of where Katrina would go were more accurate than usual, with

all of the forecast tracks during the last 48 hours lining up almost directly on top

of the actual track. This forecast beats the Government Performance and Results

Act goal established for NOAA hurricane forecasts this year.

At 10:00 am Central Daylight Time (CDT) Saturday morning, August 27, the National Hurricane Center posted a hurricane watch for southeast Louisiana, including

the city of New Orleans. The hurricane watch extended eastward to Mississippi and

Alabama that afternoon. A hurricane watch means hurricane conditions are possible

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cane Center highlighted the potential for this storm to make landfall as a Category

4 or Category 5 storm.

Tracking and Forecasting Rita

Rita began as a tropical depression at 10:00 pm CDT Saturday, September 17,

2005, east of the Turks and Caicos Islands north of the Caribbean. The National

Hurricane Center accurately predicted the center of the storm to pass just south of

the Florida Keys as a hurricane on Tuesday, September 20, and predicted it to become a major hurricane as it moved over the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico.

Hurricane Rita continued to intensify in the Gulf of Mexico and became a Category

5 hurricane at 4:00 pm CDT Wednesday, September 21 with winds of 165 miles per

hour.

On Thursday, September 22, approximately two days before landfall, the forecast

track was shifted eastward to just west of the Louisiana/Texas border. Rita’s actual

track would deviate little from this and subsequent projections. As Hurricane Rita

neared landfall, the National Hurricane Center accurately predicted its decrease in

intensity. Hurricane Rita made landfall as a Category 3 storm just east of Port Arthur, Texas, near the Texas/Louisiana border.

Storm Surge

Storm surge has caused most of this country’s tropical cyclone fatalities, all too

vividly evident in the past several weeks, and represents our greatest risk for a

large loss of life in this country. Following Hurricane Camille in 1969, NOAA established a group that developed and implemented a storm surge model called SLOSH

(Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes). The SLOSH model calculates

storm surge heights resulting either from historical, hypothetical or actual hurricanes. SLOSH incorporates bathymetry and topography, including bay and river

configurations, roads, levees, and other physical features that can modify the storm

surge flow pattern. Comprehensive evacuation studies, conducted jointly by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

NOAA, and State and local emergency managers, are based on the simulated surges

computed by SLOSH.

The National Hurricane Center introduced storm surge forecasts for the Gulf

Coast in public advisories at 10:00 pm CDT Saturday—32 hours prior to Katrina’s

landfall in Louisiana. The initial forecast (10:00 pm CDT, Saturday, August 27) for

storm surge was predicted at 15 to 20 feet, locally as high as 25 feet, and that forecast was updated the following morning to a range of 18 to 22 feet, locally as high

33

as 28 feet, when the forecast intensity for landfall was increased. ‘‘Large and battering’’ waves were forecast on top of the surge. In addition, the 4:00 pm CDT public

advisory issued by the National Hurricane Center on Sunday, August 28, stated

that some levees in the greater New Orleans area could be overtopped. Actual storm

surge values are being determined at this time.

Storm surge values for Rita were also issued well in advance of landfall. At

10:00am CDT on September 22, 40 hours before landfall, the National Hurricane

Center predicted a storm surge of ‘‘. . .15 to 20 feet above normal tide levels, along

with large and dangerous battering waves, can be expected near and to the right

of where the center makes landfall.’’ While exact levels of the surge are still being

determined, the damage from the surge was similar to damage witnessed in Mississippi and Louisiana with Katrina.

In the case of Hurricane Katrina, there have been news reports that Max

Mayfield, the Director of the National Hurricane Center, notified FEMA that the

New Orleans’ levees would be breached. In fact, he did not say this. He indicated

in his briefings to emergency managers and to the media the possibility some levees

in the greater New Orleans area could be overtopped, depending on the details of

Katrina’s track and intensity. This possibility was also indicated in the National

Hurricane Center advisory products and local weather office Hurricane Local Statements and has been discussed at conferences and briefings with emergency managers, media, and the public for many years.

Communicating Our Forecasts

The FEMA/NWS Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT), established in 1996, coordinates

communications between NOAA and the emergency management community at the

federal and State levels. Membership consists of FEMA Hurricane Program Managers and Disaster Assistance employees as well as National Weather Service meteorologists and hydrologists. The Hurricane Liaison Team is activated by FEMA, at

the request of the Director of the National Hurricane Center, or his or her designee.

The HLT is activated a few days in advance of any potential U.S. hurricane landfall.

Once activated, FEMA hosts the daily HLT audio or video conference calls. FEMA

invites State and local emergency managers in the potential impact area to participate in these calls. The National Hurricane Center, as an invited participant, opens

each call by providing an updated forecast. After consulting with our local weather

service offices and the National Hurricane Center, emergency managers make evacuation and other preparedness decisions. The HLT provides an excellent way to

communicate with the large number of emergency managers typically impacted by

a potential hurricane. This is a critical effort to ensure emergency managers and

first responders know what to expect from the hurricane.

The reported evacuation rate during Hurricane Katrina of near 80 percent, however, far exceeds the 25–50 percent rates usually noted. This large evacuation saved

many lives and did not happen by accident. Rather, it resulted from a long working

relationship and open communication between NOAA, the emergency management

community at all levels, and the media. This collaboration is especially close and

complementary during a hurricane threat. For example, since the 1970s, NOAA has

been delivering and updating thousands of storm surge simulations it generates for

the entire vulnerable coast from Texas to Maine long before any specific event.

These simulations are the basis for the evacuation plans and storm-specific decisions made by the communities there. In addition, NOAA provides real-time storm

surge information.

I believe the high evacuation rate for Katrina was also due to the broad distribution and diverse formats of National Weather Service text and graphical forecast

and warning products, the 471 media interviews conducted by NHC staff, the more

than 2.3 billion ‘‘hits’’ the National Weather Service forecast products received on

our public website, and the interactions of local National Weather Service offices

and the National Hurricane Center with emergency managers in the days prior to

landfall. For Hurricane Rita, National Hurricane Center staff provided 935 media

interviews. In addition, National Weather Service web activity, as supported by

NOAA’s web-mirroring project, registered over 2.9 billion ‘‘hits’’ during Hurricane

Rita.

On Saturday evening, August 27, Max Mayfield personally called the Chief of Operations at the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, as well as the Governors

of Louisiana and Mississippi and the Mayor of New Orleans, to communicate the

potential meteorological and storm surge impacts from Hurricane Katrina.

NOAA Aircraft Support Efforts

NOAA Aircraft, the W–P3 Orions and the Gulf Stream IV ‘‘Hurricane Hunters,’’

provided essential observations critical to the National Hurricane Center forecasters

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and supplement U.S. Air Force Reserve Command’s 53rd Weather Reconnaissance

Squadron flights. A specialized instrument flown on one of the W–P3s, the Stepped

Frequency Microwave Radiometer (SFMR), provided essential hurricane structure

and surface wind data to hurricane forecasters for both hurricanes. The Military

Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108–324) provided $10.5M to the Air Force to outfit the complete fleet of Hurricane Hunters with this instrument, the first of these additional

units should be available during the 2006 Hurricane Season.

The Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 also provided funding to NOAA for seven hurricane

buoys, which NOAA deployed this past year in the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico,

and the Atlantic. These new buoys provided us with critical information during this

active hurricane season.

NOAA’s Activities After Hurricane Katrina’s and Hurricane Rita’s Landfall

Immediately following Hurricane Katrina’s second landfall, and also following

Hurricane Rita’s landfall, several NOAA ships and aircraft were tasked with assisting in the hurricane response. Our aircraft flew damage assessment flights using

a sophisticated digital camera to collect imagery to assess damage. Over 10,000

high-resolution images were collected by NOAA aircraft for the areas impacted by

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These images are assisting emergency managers and

other agencies in recovery operations and long-term restoration and rebuilding decisions. They are also publicly available on NOAA’s website to allow those displaced

by the storms to view their homes and neighborhoods via the Internet.

It is also NOAA’s responsibility to assess the damage to the commercial fishing

industry in those sections of the Gulf of Mexico. We are working closely with each

of the impacted State resource agencies and commercial entities to assess the

storm’s impacts to the longer-term social and economic viability of local fishing communities. NOAA employees also are assisting recovery efforts by working with other

federal agencies in planning, organizing, and conducting oil spill and hazardous material response and restoration in the impacted areas of the Gulf.

NOAA vessels are tasked with surveying critical ports and waterways for depths,

wrecks and obstructions for navigational safety. NOAA Navigation Response Teams

were on the scene before both hurricanes hit to survey for hazards and help the U.S.

Coast Guard and the Army Corps of Engineers re-open waterways to commercial

and emergency traffic. Our ships use highly specialized hydrographic equipment to

survey near shore and mid-water areas to assess potential obstructions to navigation caused by Hurricane Katrina, and Rita. The efforts of these NOAA ships are

critical to rebuilding the Gulf’s economic infrastructure by enabling vessels of all

sizes to pass safely through these waterways thereby allowing emergency materials,

oil, and commercial goods to make it to their destinations.

Outlook for the Future

Today is October 7; to date we have had seventeen tropical storms, nine of which

have become hurricanes, five of those have been major hurricanes at Category 3 or

stronger. We believe we will continue to have an active season, with a total of l8–

21 tropical storms. We believe this heightened period of hurricane activity will continue due to multi-decadal variance, as tropical cyclone activity in the Atlantic is

cyclical and tied to fluctuations in sea surface temperatures and other characteristics of the coupled ocean-atmosphere system. The 1940’s through the 1960’s experienced an above average number of major hurricanes, while the 1970’s into the mid1990’s averaged fewer hurricanes. The current period of heightened activity could

last another 10–20 years. The increased activity since 1995 is due to natural fluctuations/cycles of hurricane activity, driven by the Atlantic Ocean itself along with

the atmosphere above it. The natural cycles are quite large with 3–4 major hurricanes a year on average during active periods and only about 1–2 major hurricanes

annually during quiet periods, with each period lasting 25–40 years.

Current and Future Research Efforts

Through greater understanding of physical processes and advanced hurricane

modeling, NOAA continually improves models for predicting hurricane intensity and

track, in collaboration with federal partners, academic researchers, and commercial

enterprises. These numerical modeling improvements, once demonstrated, are

transitioned into operations.

NOAA is focused on improving the forecasting of hurricane frequency, track, and

intensity as well as predicting hurricane impacts on life and property. We depend

on numerous critical research activities inside and outside NOAA. Our track forecasts have shown continued improvement. However, we have not seen a comparable

improvement in our intensity forecasts.

35

From a scientific standpoint, the gaps in our capabilities fall into two broad categories: first, our ability to measure and assess the current state of a hurricane and

its environment (analysis), and second, our ability to predict a hurricane’s future

state (the forecast).

36

Many of the enhancements required to improve hurricane analyses, particularly

over the data-sparse ocean areas, will be addressed through such programs as the

Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS), a 10-year international endeavor of which the United States is a member and NOAA, NASA, and USGS are

key participants.

Using a combination of atmospheric and ocean observations from satellites, aircraft, and all available surface data over the oceans, NOAA, NASA, NSF and other

federal agencies conduct experiments to better understand internal storm dynamics

and interactions between a hurricane and the surrounding atmosphere and ocean.

Much of NOAA’s improvement in tropical cyclone forecasting is attributed to advances in Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP). In collaboration with many scientists and developers in the domestic and international operational NWP centers,

the NOAA Environmental Modeling Center develops state-of-the-art numerical modeling systems. Predicting hurricane intensity remains one of our acute challenges.

For example, even though we knew conditions were favorable for the storms to intensify, and we forecast strengthening, there was some error for both storms in the

intensity forecast for the eastern Gulf due to their rapid intensification. Through

our NWP advancements, our 2005 version of our high-resolution model improved

some intensity forecasts over the statistical models when run on several 2004 Atlantic storms. To advance hurricane prediction, especially hurricane intensity and size

forecasts, NOAA is developing the Hurricane Weather and Research Forecasting

(HWRF) system. The HWRF system uses a collaborative approach among the research community and will apply advanced model physics as HWRF couples the atmosphere, land, and ocean into an integrated model. Our goal is to couple an advanced wave model with a dynamic storm surge model to better predict coastal impacts of waves and storm surge.

We have increased our efforts to transfer research into operations. The United

States Weather Research Program (USWRP) Joint Hurricane Testbed (JHT) was

formed in late 2000. The mission of the JHT is to facilitate the transfer of new technology, research results, and observational advances of the USWRP, its sponsoring

agencies, the academic community, and the private sector for improved operational

tropical cyclone analysis and prediction.

While there are no quick fixes, we are very optimistic that we will continue to

make advances in operational forecasts of tropical cyclone intensity, wind structure,

size, and rainfall in the near future.

Conclusion

The government’s ability to observe, predict, and respond quickly to storm events

is critical to public safety. We must now look ahead to post-storm redevelopment

strategies for communities impacted by Katrina, Rita and future storms, to help

manage and anticipate these extreme events. NOAA has the expertise in coastal

management and hazard mitigation, and is committed to working with our partners

to reduce the Nation’s vulnerability to hurricanes and other coastal storm events.

It is critical that we work to protect and restore natural features along the Gulf

Coast, such as dunes, wetlands, and other vegetated areas that offer protection

against coastal flooding and erosion.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will not be the last major hurricanes to hit a vulnerable area, and New Orleans is not the only location vulnerable to a large disaster

from a land-falling hurricane. Houston/Galveston, Tampa Bay, southwestern Florida, the Florida Keys, southeastern Florida, New York City/Long Island, and New

England, are all especially vulnerable. And New Orleans remains vulnerable to future hurricanes.

In partnership with NASA, NSF, and other agencies, NOAA we will continue efforts to improve hurricane track, intensity, rainfall and storm surge forecasting.

NOAA will also continue to provide technical tools and planning expertise to States

and local governments to help mitigate future natural hazards and provide our assistance for response and recovery efforts.

With that, I’ll be glad to answer any questions Members may have.

37

NOAA National Hurricane Center

Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline

TUESDAY, AUGUST 23, 2005

1600 CDT: Katrina forms as a Tropical Depression 12, near Nassau in the Bahamas. Tropical Depression 12 Advisory 1 issued: ‘‘A TROPICAL STORM OR HURRICANE WATCH MAY BE REQUIRED FOR PORTIONS OF SOUTHERN FLORIDA

LATER TONIGHT.’’

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 24, 2005

0400 CDT: The National Hurricane Center’s five-day forecast puts the projected

path of Katrina in the southeast Gulf of Mexico (as the system is still a tropical

depression in the central Bahamas).

0700 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Tropical Storm.

1000 CDT: Tropical Storm Katrina Advisory 4 is issued: ‘‘. . .A TROPICAL STORM

WARNING AND A HURRICANE WATCH HAVE BEEN ISSUED FOR THE

SOUTHEAST FLORIDA COAST. . .’’

THURSDAY, AUGUST 25, 2005

1430 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 1 Hurricane.

1730 CDT: Katrina makes landfall in Florida as a Category 1 Hurricane.

WEDNESDAY/THURSDAY, AUGUST 24/25:

Hurricane Liaison Team conference calls were conducted both days, and included

Florida emergency managers, FEMA Headquarters (FEMA HQ), and Region IV.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 26, 2005

0200 CDT: Katrina entered the Gulf of Mexico as a Tropical Storm.

0400 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 1 Hurricane.

1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 12 is issued: ‘‘KATRINA IS A CATEGORY ONE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME

STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS. . .AND

KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY TWO HURRICANE ON SATURDAY.’’

1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

1030 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 2 Hurricane. Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 13 is issued: ‘‘. . .KATRINA RAPIDLY STRENGTHENING AS IT

MOVES SLOWLY WESTWARD AWAY FROM SOUTH FLORIDA AND THE

FLORIDA KEYS. . .KATRINA IS MOVING TOWARD THE WEST NEAR SEVEN

MPH. . .AND THIS MOTION IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR THE NEXT 24

HOURS. . .RECENT REPORTS FROM AN AIR FORCE RESERVE UNIT HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT NOW INDICATE MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS

ARE NEAR 100 MPH. . .WITH HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA IS NOW A CATEGORY TWO HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME

STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS. . .AND

KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY THREE OR MAJOR HURRICANE ON

SATURDAY.’’

1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with FEMA

HQ, Region IV, FL, AL, and GA.

1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 14 is issued: ‘‘. . .THE MODELS

HAVE SHIFTED SIGNIFICANTLY WESTWARD AND ARE NOW IN BETTER

AGREEMENT. THIS HAS RESULTED IN THE OFFICIAL FORECAST TRACK

BEING SHIFTED ABOUT 150 NMI WEST OF THE PREVIOUS

TRACK. . .HOWEVER. . .PROJECTED LANDFALL IS STILL ABOUT 72 HOURS

AWAY. . .SO FURTHER MODIFICATIONS IN THE FORECAST TRACK ARE

POSSIBLE. KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO BE MOVING OVER THE GULF LOOP

CURRENT AFTER 36 HOURS. . .WHICH WHEN COMBINED WITH DECREASING VERTICAL SHEAR. . .SHOULD ALLOW THE HURRICANE TO REACH

CATEGORY FOUR STATUS BEFORE LANDFALL OCCURS.’’

1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 15 is issued: ‘‘THE OFFICIAL

FORECAST BRINGS THE CORE OF THE INTENSE HURRICANE OVER THE

NORTH CENTRAL GULF OF MEXICO IN 48 HOURS OR SO. IT IS WORTH

NOTING THAT THE GUIDANCE SPREAD HAS DECREASED AND MOST OF

THE RELIABLE NUMERICAL MODEL TRACKS ARE NOW CLUSTERED BEVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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TWEEN THE EASTERN COAST OF LOUISIANA AND THE COAST OF MISSISSIPPI. THIS CLUSTERING INCREASES THE CONFIDENCE IN THE FORECAST.’’

SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, 2005

0400 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 3 Hurricane. Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 16 is issued: ‘‘KATRINA BECOMES A MAJOR HURRICANE WITH

115 MPH WINDS. . .SOME STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE

NEXT 24 HOURS. . .RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT DATA AND SURFACE OBSERVATIONS INDICATE THAT KATRINA HAS BECOME A LARGER HURRICANE. . .’’ Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 16 is issued: ‘‘DUE TO THE DECREASING SPREAD IN THE MODELS. . .THE CONFIDENCE IN THE FORECAST TRACK IS INCREASING.’’

1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 17 is issued: ‘‘A HURRICANE

WATCH IS IN EFFECT FOR THE SOUTHEASTERN COAST OF LOUISIANA

EAST OF MORGAN CITY TO THE MOUTH OF THE PEARL

RIVER. . .INCLUDING METROPOLITAN NEW ORLEANS AND LAKE

PONCHARTRAIN. . .A HURRICANE WATCH WILL LIKELY BE REQUIRED

FOR OTHER PORTIONS OF THE NORTHERN GULF LATER TODAY OR TONIGHT. INTERESTS IN THIS AREA SHOULD MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF

KATRINA. . .SOME STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24

HOURS. . .AND KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE. . .’’ Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 17 is issued: ‘‘. . .IT IS NOT

OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT KATRINA COULD REACH CATEGORY 5 STATUS AT SOME POINT BEFORE LANDFALL. . .’’

1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with FEMA

HQ, Region IV and VI, FL, LA, MS, AL, and GA.

1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 18 is issued: ‘‘THE HURRICANE

WATCH IS EXTENDED WESTWARD TO INTRACOASTAL CITY LOUISIANA

AND EASTWARD TO THE FLORIDA-ALABAMA BORDER. A HURRICANE

WATCH IS NOW IN EFFECT ALONG THE NORTHERN GULF COAST FROM INTRACOASTAL CITY TO THE ALABAMA-FLORIDA BORDER. A HURRICANE

WARNING WILL LIKELY BE REQUIRED FOR PORTIONS OF THE NORTHERN

GULF COAST LATER TONIGHT OR SUNDAY. INTERESTS IN THIS AREA

SHOULD MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF KATRINA.’’ Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 18 is issued: ‘‘THE INTENSITY FORECAST WILL CALL FOR

STRENGTHENING TO 125 KT AT LANDFALL. . .AND THERE REMAINS A

CHANCE THAT KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE

BEFORE LANDFALL.’’

1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

1925 CDT: Louisiana Gubernatorial Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of NOAA’s

Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a briefing to Kathleen Babineau Blanco.

1935 CDT: Max Mayfield, Director of NOAA’s Tropical Predication Center/National

Hurricane Center provides a briefing to Bill Filter, Chief of Operations, Alabama

Emergency Management Agency.

1945 CDT: Mississippi Gubernatorial Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of NOAA’s

Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a briefing to Haley

Barbour.

2000 CDT: New Orleans Mayoral Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of NOAA’s Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a briefing to Ray Nagin.

2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 19 is issued: ‘‘. . .DANGEROUS

HURRICANE KATRINA THREATENS THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF

COAST. . .A HURRICANE WARNING ISSUED. . .AT 10 PM CDT. . .0300Z. . .A

HURRICANE WARNING HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR THE NORTH CENTRAL

GULF COAST FROM MORGAN CITY LOUISIANA EASTWARD TO THE ALABAMA/FLORIDA BORDER. . .INCLUDING THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND

LAKE PONCHARTRAIN. . .PREPARATIONS TO PROTECT LIFE AND PROPERTY SHOULD BE RUSHED TO COMPLETION. . .COASTAL STORM SURGE

FLOODING OF 15 TO 20 FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .LOCALLY

AS HIGH AS 25 FEET ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS BATTERING

WAVES. . .CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF WHERE THE

CENTER MAKES LANDFALL. . .HEAVY RAINS FROM KATRINA SHOULD

BEGIN TO AFFECT THE CENTRAL GULF COAST SUNDAY EVENING. RAINVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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FALL TOTALS OF FIVE TO 10 INCHES. . .WITH ISOLATED MAXIMUM

AMOUNTS OF 15 INCHES. . .ARE POSSIBLE ALONG THE PATH OF

KATRINA.’’ Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 19 is issued: ‘‘. . .DESPITE

THESE CHANGES IN THE INNER CORE. . .THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT

KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO BE AN INTENSE AND DANGEROUS HURRICANE

HEADING TOWARD THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST. . .AND THIS HAS

TO BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY.’’

1500–2230 CDT: Media pool operated; TPC/NHC provided 12 television and two

radio interviews. In addition, TPC/NHC participated in 51 telephone briefings or

media contacts on August 27th.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 28, 2005

0040 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 4 Hurricane.

0100 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Special Advisory Number 20 is issued:

‘‘. . .KATRINA STRENGTHENS TO CATEGORY FOUR WITH 145 MPH

WINDS. . .’’

0400 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 21 is issued: ‘‘THE SPREAD IN

THE MODEL TRACKS ALONG THE NORTHERN GULF COAST IS AT MOST 90

MILES. . .SO CONFIDENCE IN THE OFFICIAL FORECAST IS RELATIVELY

HIGH.’’

0615 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 5 Hurricane.

0700 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 22 is issued:

‘‘. . .KATRINA. . .NOW A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY FIVE

HURRICANE. . .HEADED FOR THE NORTHERN GULF COAST. . .MAXIMUM

SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 160 MPH. . .WITH HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA

IS A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE ON THE

SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME FLUCTUATIONS IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY

IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS.’’

1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 23 is issued: ‘‘. . .POTENTIALLY

CATASTRPHIC HURRICANE KATRINA. . .EVEN STRONGER. . .HEADED FOR

THE NORTHERN GULF COAST. . .REPORTS FROM AN AIR FORCE HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT INDICATE THAT THE MAXIMUM SUSTAINED

WINDS HAVE INCREASED TO NEAR 175 MPH. . .WITH HIGHER WIND

GUSTS. . .HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 105 MILES

FROM THE CENTER AND TROPICAL STORM FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARDS UP TO 205 MILES. . .COASTAL STORM SURGE FLOODING OF 18 TO

22 FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .LOCALLY AS HIGH AS 28 FEET

ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS BATTERING WAVES. . .CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF WHERE THE CENTER MAKES LANDFALL. Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 23 is issued: ‘‘. . .HURRICANE

FORCE WINDS ARE FORECAST TO SPREAD AT LEAST 150 N MI INLAND

ALONG PATH OF KATRINA. CONSULT INLAND WARNINGS ISSUED BY THE

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE FORCAST OFFICES. . .’’

1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with FEMA

HQ, Region IV and VI, FL, LA, MS, AL, GA, TX.

1300 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 23A is issued: ‘‘SIGNIFICANT

STORM SURGE FLOODING WILL OCCUR ELSEWHERE ALONG THE CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF OF MEXICO COAST.’’

1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 24 is issued: ‘‘KATRINA IS MOVING TOWARD THE NORTHWEST NEAR 13 MPH. . .AND A GRADUAL TURN

TO THE NORTH IS EXPECTED OVER THE NEXT 24 HOURS. ON THIS TRACK

THE CENTER OF THE HURRICANE WILL BE NEAR THE NORTHERN GULF

COAST EARLY MONDAY. HOWEVER. . .CONDITIONS ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO DETERIORATE ALONG PORTIONS OF THE CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF COASTS. . .AND WILL CONTINUE TO WORSEN THROUGH

THE NIGHT. . .KATRINA IS A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY

FIVE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME FLUCTUATIONS

IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY UNTIL LANDFALL. KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO

MAKE LANDFALL AT CATEGORY FOUR OR FIVE INTENSITY. WINDS AFFECTING THE UPPER FLOORS OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY STRONGER THAN THOSE NEAR GROUND LEVEL. . .SOME LEVEES

IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS AREA COULD BE OVERTOPPED.’’

1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

40

2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 25 is issued: ‘‘A HURRICANE

WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST FROM

MORGAN CITY LOUISIANA EASTWARD TO THE ALABAMA/FLORIDA BORDER. . .INCLUDING THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND LAKE

PONCHARTRAIN. PREPARATIONS TO PROTECT LIFE AND PROPERTY

SHOULD BE RUSHED TO COMPLETION.’’

MONDAY, AUGUST 29, 2005

0200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina is downgraded to a Category 4.

0400 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26 is issued: ‘‘EXTREMELY DANGEROUS CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE KATRINA MOVING NORTHWARD

TOWARD SOUTHEASTERN LOUISIANA AND THE NORTHERN GULF

COAST. . .SOME FLUCTUATIONS IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY PRIOR TO

LANDFALL. . .BUT KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO MAKE LANDFALL AS A CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE.’’

0600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26A is issued: ‘‘KATRINA REMAINS A VERY LARGE HURRICANE. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND

OUTWARD UP TO 120 MILES FROM THE CENTER. . .AND TROPICAL STORM

FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 230 MILES.’’

0610 CDT: Hurricane Katrina makes landfall in southeastern Louisiana as a Category 4 hurricane.

0800 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26B is issued: ‘‘. . .THE CENTER

OF HURRICANE KATRINA WAS LOCATED...ABOUT 40 MILES SOUTHEAST OF

NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA AND ABOUT 65 MILES SOUTHWEST OF BILOXI

MISSISSIPPI. . .MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 135 MPH. . .WITH

HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA IS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS CATEGORY

FOUR HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. WEAKENING IS FORECAST AS THE CIRCULATION INTERACTS WITH LAND TODAY. . .COASTAL

STORM SURGE FLOODING OF 18 TO 22 FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS BATTERING WAVES. . .CAN

BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF THE CENTER. STORM SURGE

FLOODING OF 10 TO 15 FEET. . .NEAR THE TOPS OF LEVEES. . .IS POSSIBLE IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS AREA. SIGNIFICANT STORM

SURGE FLOODING WILL OCCUR ELSEWHERE ALONG THE CENTRAL AND

NORTHEASTERN GULF OF MEXICO COAST.’’

1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina makes a second landfall at the LA/MS border as a

Category 3 hurricane.

1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with FEMA

HQ, Region IV and VI, LA, MS, AL, FL, TX.

1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, 2005

1000 CDT: Katrina is downgraded to a tropical depression with winds of 35 mph,

25 miles south of Clarksville, TN. The final TPC/NHC advisory is issued at this

time; the Hydrometeorological Prediction Center assumes inland public advisories.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 2005

2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina has dissipated; remnants absorbed by a front in

southeast Canada.

NOTES:

• Timeline highlights the major aspects of NOAA’s Tropical Prediction Center/

National Hurricane Center (TPC/NHC). All advisories (graphic and text) are

available on the Katrina archive page: http://www/nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/

KATRINA/shtml?

• Storm surge is a consistent concern and associated threat with any land-falling hurricane, especially a major hurricane.

• Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination calls included the State emergency

management officials for the states listed; calls with the State of Florida included both local and State emergency management officials.

• For Katrina (including for Florida) NOAA’s Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provided a total of 471 television and radio interviews, through their media pool or via telephone.

41

BIOGRAPHY FOR DAVID L. JOHNSON

David L. Johnson serves as the Assistant Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for Weather Services (National Weather Service).

Johnson heads the Nation’s weather service and is responsible for the day-to-day

management of NOAA’s domestic weather and hydrology operations.

Prior to joining NOAA, Johnson served as the U.S. Air Force director of weather.

He retired from the Air Force as a brigadier general, after a 30-year military career.

As Director of Weather, he was one of ten directors at the Headquarters Air Force,

Air and Space Operations, and was responsible for developing doctrine, policy, requirements and operational organizations to support Air Force and Army operations

worldwide. He also served as one of NOAA’s military deputies.

Notably, he organized, trained and equipped forces for the war in Afghanistan and

the war in Iraq, and managed a steady flow of accurate and focused environmental

information to battlefield commanders. He was a key advisor in the development of

the National Polar-orbiting Environmental Operational Satellite System (NPOESS).

Johnson’s career is marked by his strong management and fiscal capabilities. During his time as Director of Weather, he led a massive re-engineering effort that revised the organizational structure, training and operations of the 4,000-person career field. Under Johnson’s steady hand, retention of weather-career airmen and officers grew to 97 percent, up from 74 percent previously.

Johnson guided the planning, programming and budgeting process implementation at the highest levels in the Air Force and in the Department of Defense. He

has a world-wide perspective, having served in leadership positions on the Joint

Staff with planning portfolios in Europe/NATO and Asia/Pacific. He secured funding

for a new facility for the Air Force Weather Agency to house collection, analysis,

modeling and career-field supervision functions.

Prior to his service as the Director of Weather, Johnson flew fighter, transport

and special operations aircraft. He has over 3,800 flying hours including 78 combat

sorties. Johnson commanded airdrop and air/land operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina

and was deputy commander of the Joint Task Force for Operation Support Hope in

Rwanda. He was selected for early promotion three times.

Johnson is an honor graduate from the University of Kansas with a degree in geography, and earned his Master’s degree in human relations from Webster’s University. He is a graduate of the National War College, Maxwell School of Citizenship

and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, and from the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. Mayfield.

STATEMENT OF MR. MAX MAYFIELD, DIRECTOR, NOAA TROPICAL PREDICTION CENTER/NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER

Mr. MAYFIELD. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I

am Max Mayfield, the Director of the Tropical Prediction Center

and National Hurricane Center which is a part of the National

Weather Service at NOAA. Thank you for inviting me here today

to discuss NOAA’s National Weather Service role in forecasting

and warning the public about hurricanes.

The catastrophic devastation along the Gulf Coast from Hurricane Katrina is like nothing I have ever witnessed. Words cannot

convey the physical destruction and the personal suffering in that

part of our nation. However, without NOAA’s National Weather

Services forecasts and warnings, the loss of life could have been far

greater.

Hurricane Katrina began as a tropical depression near the

Southeast Bahamas on Tuesday, August 23rd. The National Hurricane Center’s tropical cyclone forecasts were routinely issued every

six hours with intermediate updates as necessary and included text

and graphical products. The National Hurricane Center accurately

predicted Katrina would become a Category 1 hurricane before

making landfall near Miami.

42

Chairman BOEHLERT. Sorry for the interruption.

Mr. MAYFIELD. That is okay.

Chairman BOEHLERT. We are just getting these buzzers now. You

conclude your opening statement and then we will have to take a

recess and go to the Floor and vote and we will be back shortly

thereafter.

Mr. MAYFIELD. Thank you.

Once Katrina emerged into the Gulf of Mexico, the National Hurricane Center forecast correctly predicted a re-intensification of the

storm. Within nine hours, Katrina intensified from a tropical storm

to a Category 2 hurricane. It later reached Category 5 status. Our

forecast track from Saturday morning, August the 27th, about two

days before landfall, had the storm curving northward and heading

directly towards Southeast Louisiana and Mississippi. And the prediction was for Katrina to make landfall as a Category 4 hurricane.

The actual track would deviate little from this and subsequent forecasts for the rest of Katrina’s approach.

The intensity forecast would also prove to be very good. At 10:00

a.m. central daylight time, Saturday, August 27th, the National

Hurricane Center posted a hurricane watch for Southeast Louisiana, including the City of New Orleans. We issued additional

watches and warnings for Louisiana to the Florida panhandle soon

thereafter. After reaching Southeast Louisiana, Katrina made final

landfall along the Louisiana/Mississippi border on Monday morning

as a Category 3 hurricane.

I should also briefly mention the tracking forecasting on Hurricane Rita. Rita began as a tropical depression on Saturday, September 17th over the Atlantic east of the Turks and Caicos Islands.

The National Hurricane Center accurately predicted the center of

the storm to pass just south of the Florida Keys as a hurricane on

September 20 and predicted it to become a major hurricane as it

moved over the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Later, Rita,

just like Katrina, strengthened to Category 5 status. On Thursday,

approximately two days before landfall, the forecast track was

shifted eastward to just west of the Louisiana/Texas border. Rita’s

actual track would deviate little from this and subsequent projections. The National Hurricane Center accurately predicted Rita

would weaken before landfall but still come ashore as a Category

3 hurricane.

It is critical that we effectively communicate our forecast information to everyone. The Hurricane Liaison Team is a partnership

between the National Weather Service and FEMA. The team is a

cadre of federal, State, and local emergency managers and National

Weather Service meteorologists and hydrologists. As tropical systems threaten the United States, the HLT deploys at the request

of the National Hurricane Center to assist in coordination efforts.

The team’s mission is to support hurricane response operations

through the rapid exchange of critical information between the National Hurricane Center and emergency managers at all levels.

Once activated, FEMA hosts and facilitates audio and national

video conference calls. On these calls, FEMA advises State and

local emergency managers in the potential impact area to participate.

43

The National Hurricane Center is an invited participant and

opens each call providing an updated forecast. The Hurricane Liaison Team provides an excellent way to communicate with the large

number of emergency managers potentially impacted by an approaching hurricane. After consulting with our local weather service offices and the National Hurricane Center, emergency managers make evacuation and other preparedness decisions.

The media is also an essential partner and helps us get the information widely distributed to the public. The media provided an invaluable service to the people of the impacted Gulf Coast by communicating National Hurricane Center forecasts and warning information about Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition, National

Weather Service web activity as supported by NOAA’s premiering

project registered over 2.3 billion hits during Katrina and 2.9 billion hits during Rita.

Today is October 7, hopefully on the downside of this year’s hurricane season. To date, we have had 19 tropical storms, 10 of which

have become hurricanes and five of those have been major hurricanes of a Category 3 or stronger. This season has already been

one of the most active on record and we still have another seven

weeks to go. We believe the heightened period of hurricane activity

that we are in will continue due to multi-decadal variations, because tropical cyclone activity in Atlantic is cyclical and tied to

fluctuations in sea surface temperatures. For example, the 1940’s

through the ’60s experienced an above average number of major

hurricanes while the ’70s into the mid-’90s averaged fewer hurricanes. The current threat of heightened activity could last another

10 to 20 years. These natural cycles are quite large in amplitude

with an average of three to four major hurricanes per year in active periods and only one to two major hurricanes annually during

the quiet periods with each period lasting 25 to 40 years.

While we must focus our energy on addressing the impacts of

Hurricane Katrina, we also need to look at the future. Katrina will

not be the last major hurricane to hit a vulnerable area. And New

Orleans is not the only location at risk to a large disaster from a

hurricane. Galveston/Houston, Tampa Bay, southwestern Florida,

the Florida Keys, southeastern Florida, New York City and Long

Island, and believe it or not, New England are especially vulnerable. And of course, New Orleans will be hit again by a hurricane

some day.

At NOAA, we will continue our efforts to improve our hurricane

track, intensity, precipitation and storm surge forecasting and

work with our partners to ensure the best possible outcome during

future hurricane events.

With that, I will be glad to answer any questions from the Members of the Committee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mayfield follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAX MAYFIELD

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Max Mayfield, Director of

the Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center. The National Hurricane

Center is a part of the National Weather Service (NWS), of the National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce. Thank

you for inviting me here today to discuss NOAA’s role in forecasting, and warning

44

the public about hurricanes, as well as NOAA’s essential role and activities following landfall.

The devastation along the Gulf Coast from Hurricane Katrina is like nothing I

have witnessed before. It is catastrophic. Words cannot convey the physical destruction and personal suffering in that part of our nation. However, without NOAA’s

forecasts and warnings, the devastation and loss of life would have been far greater.

NOAA’s forecasts and warnings for Hurricane Katrina pushed the limits of the

state-of-the-art of hurricane prediction. Our continuous research efforts at NOAA,

and in partnership with other federal agencies, have led to our current predictive

capabilities and improved ways of describing uncertainty in prediction. But NOAA’s

work does not end there. NOAA does extensive work assessing damage from storms

and evaluating waterways to assist dredging operations, to open our nation’s ports

and waterways impacted by the storm. NOAA also assesses the impact to the areas’

fisheries, supports hazardous materials containment and abatement efforts, and

provides necessary data critical for post storm recovery operations.

Tracking and Forecasting Hurricane Katrina

The National Hurricane Center (NHC) within the NWS has been the centerpiece

of our nation’s hurricane forecast and warning program for 50 years. The mission

of the NHC is to save lives, mitigate property loss, and improve economic efficiency

by issuing the best watches, warnings, and forecasts of hazardous tropical weather,

and by increasing the public’s understanding of these hazards.

NHC tropical cyclone forecasts are issued every six hours and include text messages as well as a suite of graphical products depicting our forecasts and the accompanying probabilities and ‘‘cone of uncertainty,’’ as it has become known. Hurricane

Katrina began as a tropical depression near the southeastern Bahamas on Tuesday,

August 23. The National Hurricane Center accurately predicted it would become a

Category 1 hurricane before making landfall near Miami. The storm deluged southeast Florida with 16 inches of rain in some places, causing downed trees, flooding,

and extended power outages as it passed across the southern portion of the state.

Once Katrina re-emerged into the Gulf of Mexico, NOAA hurricane forecasters

correctly predicted re-intensification of the storm. Katrina intensified more quickly

and became stronger than initially predicted. Within nine hours, Katrina intensified

from a tropical storm, with winds of 70 miles per hour, to a Category 2 storm with

100 mile per hour winds.

As you can see in the graphic below, our forecast track from Saturday morning,

August 27, about two days before landfall, had the storm curving northward and

headed directly toward southeastern Louisiana and Mississippi. The projected path

of Katrina aimed directly at southeast Louisiana, and the prediction was for Katrina

to make landfall as a Category 4 hurricane. The actual track would deviate little

from this and subsequent forecasts for the rest of Katrina’s approach. On average,

NOAA forecasts of where Katrina would go were more accurate than usual, with

all of the forecast tracks during the last 48 hours lining up almost directly on top

of the actual track. This forecast beats the Government Performance and Results

Act goal established for NOAA hurricane forecasts this year.

45

At 10:00 am Central Daylight Time (CDT) Saturday morning, August 27, the National Hurricane Center posted a hurricane watch for southeast Louisiana, including

the city of New Orleans. The watch extended eastward to Mississippi and Alabama

that afternoon. A hurricane watch means hurricane conditions are possible in the

specified area, usually within 36 hours. Messages from the National Hurricane Center highlighted the potential for this storm to make landfall as a Category 4 or Category 5 storm.

Predicting hurricane intensity remains a challenge. Even though we knew conditions were favorable for the storm to intensify, there was some error in the intensity

forecast for the eastern Gulf due to its rapid intensification. While we accurately

predicted the intensity at landfall, there is still more work to be done in improving

intensity prediction, especially for rapidly intensifying or rapidly weakening storms.

Storm Surge

Storm surge has caused most of this country’s tropical cyclone fatalities, all too

vividly evident in the past two weeks, and still represents our greatest risk for a

large loss of life in this country. Following Hurricane Camille in 1969, NOAA established a group that developed and implemented a storm surge model called SLOSH

(Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes). The SLOSH model calculates

storm surge heights resulting either from historical, hypothetical or actual hurricanes. SLOSH incorporates bathymetry and topography, including bay and river

configurations, roads, levees, and other physical features that can modify the storm

surge flow pattern. Comprehensive evacuation studies, conducted jointly by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

NOAA, and State and local emergency managers, are based on the simulated surges

computed by SLOSH.

The National Hurricane Center introduced storm surge forecasts for the Gulf

Coast in public advisories at 10:00 am CDT Saturday—32 hours prior to Katrina’s

landfall in Louisiana. The initial forecast (10:00 am CDT, Saturday, August 28) for

storm surge was predicted at 15 to 20 feet, locally as high as 25 feet, and that forecast was updated the following morning to a range of 18 to 22 feet, locally as high

as 28 feet, when the forecast intensity for landfall was increased. ‘‘Large and battering’’ waves were forecast on top of the surge. In addition, the 4:00 pm CDT public

advisory issued by the National Hurricane Center on Sunday, August 28, stated

46

that some levees in the greater New Orleans area could be overtopped. Actual storm

surge values are being determined at this time.

I know there have been recent news reports that I notified FEMA that the New

Orleans’ levees would be breached. In fact, I did not say that. What I indicated in

my briefings to emergency managers and to the media was the possibility that some

levees in the greater New Orleans area could be overtopped, depending on the details of Katrina’s track and intensity. This possibility was also indicated in our advisory products.

Communicating Our Forecasts

The FEMA/NWS Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT), which is activated at NHC a few

days in advance of any potential U.S. hurricane landfall, coordinates communications between NOAA and the emergency management community at the federal and

State levels. The HLT was established in 1996. After consulting with our local

weather service offices and the National Hurricane Center, emergency managers

make evacuation and other preparedness decisions. The HLT provides an excellent

way to communicate with the large number of emergency managers typically impacted by a potential hurricane. This is a critical effort to ensure emergency managers and first responders know what to expect.

The media is our most essential partner and helps us get the information to the

public. Without the media, it would be very difficult to get the information as widely

distributed. The media provided an invaluable service to the people of the impacted

Gulf Coast by communicating National Hurricane Center forecast and warning information about Hurricane Katrina. From Thursday, August 25, through Katrina’s

landfall in Mississippi on Monday, August 29, NOAA’s Tropical Prediction Center/

National Hurricane Center provided a total of 471 television and radio interviews,

through their media pool or via telephone.

On Saturday evening, August 27, I personally called the Chief of Operations at

the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, as well as the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi and the Mayor of New Orleans, to communicate the potential

meteorological and storm surge impacts from Hurricane Katrina. In addition, the

47

National Hurricane Center web activity, as supported by NOAA’s web-mirroring

project, registered 900 million hits during Katrina.

NOAA Support Efforts

NOAA is focused on improving the forecasting of hurricane frequency, track, and

intensity as well as predicting hurricane impacts on life and property. Using a combination of atmospheric and ocean observations from satellites, aircraft, and all

available surface data over the oceans, NOAA conducts experiments to better understand internal storm dynamics and interactions between a hurricane and the surrounding atmosphere and ocean. Through greater understanding of physical processes and advanced hurricane modeling, NOAA continually improves models for predicting hurricane intensity and track, in collaboration with federal partners, academic researchers, and commercial enterprises. These numerical modeling improvements, once demonstrated, are transitioned into operations at the National Hurricane Center.

NOAA Aircraft, the W–P3 Orions and the Gulf Stream IV, provided essential observations critical to the National Hurricane Center forecasters and supplement

U.S. Air Force Reserve Command’s 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron flights.

A specialized instrument flown on one of the W–P3s, the Stepped Frequency Microwave Radiometer (SFMR), provided essential hurricane structure, surface wind and

rain rate data to hurricane forecasters right up to and following landfall in Louisiana and Mississippi. The Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency

Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108–324) provided $10.5M

to the Air Force to outfit the complete fleet of Hurricane Hunters with this instrument, the first of these additional units should be available during the 2006 Hurricane Season.

The Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 also provided funding to NOAA for seven hurricane

buoys, which NOAA deployed this past year in the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico,

and the Atlantic. Those new buoys provided us with critical information during this

active hurricane season.

NOAA’s Activities After Hurricane Katrina’s Landfall

Immediately following Hurricane Katrina’s second landfall, several NOAA ships

and aircraft were tasked with assisting in the hurricane response. Our aircraft flew

damage assessment flights using a sophisticated digital camera to collect imagery

to assess damage. Over 5,000 high-resolution images collected by NOAA aircraft are

assisting emergency managers and other agencies in recovery operations and longterm restoration and rebuilding decisions.

It is also NOAA’s responsibility to assess the damage to the commercial fishing

industry in that section of the Gulf of Mexico. We are working closely with each of

the impacted State resource agencies and commercial entities to assess the storm’s

impacts to the longer-term social and economic viability of local fishing communities. NOAA employees also are assisting recovery efforts by working with other

federal agencies in planning, organizing, and conducting oil spill and hazardous material response and restoration in the impacted areas of the Gulf.

NOAA ships are tasked with surveying critical ports and waterways for depths,

wrecks and obstructions for navigational safety. NOAA Navigation Response Teams

were on scene before the hurricane hit to survey for hazards and help the U.S.

Coast Guard and the Army Corps of Engineers re-open waterways to commercial

and emergency traffic. The THOMAS JEFFERSON, a highly specialized hydrographic survey ship equipped with multi-beam and side scan sonar and two 28-foot

launches for near shore and mid-water surveys will be surveying the entrances to

Pascagoula and Gulfport, Mississippi. Another NOAA ship, the NANCY FOSTER,

is outfitted with survey technology and is presently conducting wreck and obstruction surveys in Mobile Bay, Alabama. The efforts of these NOAA ships are critical

to rebuilding the Gulf’s economic infrastructure by enabling vessels of all sizes to

pass safely through these waterways thereby allowing emergency materials, oil, and

commercial goods to make it to their destinations. Other NOAA ships and aircraft

are assisting directly with the recovery effort by providing fuel, communications,

and supplies to NOAA facilities as well as temporary office space for local emergency responders.

Outlook for the Future

Today is September 21, near the historical peak of the hurricane season. To date

we have had fifteen tropical storms, seven of which have become hurricanes, four

of those have been major hurricanes at Category 3 or stronger. We believe we will

continue to have an active season, with a total of l8–21 tropical storms. We believe

this heightened period of hurricane activity will continue due to multi-decadal variVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
48

ance, as tropical cyclone activity in the Atlantic is cyclical. The 1940’s through the

1960’s experienced an above average number of major hurricanes, while the 1970’s

into the mid-1990’s averaged fewer hurricanes. The current period of heightened activity could last another 10–20 years. The increased activity since 1995 is due to

natural fluctuations/cycles of hurricane activity, driven by the Atlantic Ocean itself

along with the atmosphere above it and not enhanced substantially by global warming. The natural cycles are quite large with on average 3–4 major hurricanes a year

in active periods and only about 1–2 major hurricanes annually during quiet periods, with each period lasting 25–40 years.

While we have made significant progress in hurricane forecasting and warnings,

we believe we have more work to do. From a scientific standpoint, the gaps in our

capabilities fall into two broad categories: first, our ability to assess the current

state of a hurricane and its environment (analysis), and second, our ability to predict a hurricane’s future state (the forecast). Finally, we would like to improve public preparedness.

Conclusion

The government’s ability to observe, predict, and respond quickly to storm events

is critical to public safety. We must also now look ahead to post-storm redevelopment strategies for communities impacted by Katrina and future storms to help

manage and anticipate these extreme events. NOAA has the expertise in coastal

management and hazard mitigation, and is committed to working with out partners

in reducing vulnerability to hurricanes and other coastal storm events. It is critical

that we work to protect and restore natural features along the Gulf Coast, such as

dunes, wetlands, and other vegetated areas that offer protection against coastal

flooding and erosion.

While we must focus our energy on addressing the impacts of Hurricane Katrina,

we also need to look to the future. Katrina will not be the last major hurricane to

hit a vulnerable area, and New Orleans is not the only location vulnerable to a large

disaster from a land-falling hurricane. Houston/Galveston, Tampa Bay, southwest

Florida, Florida Keys, southeast Florida, New York City/Long Island, and believe it

or not, New England, are all especially vulnerable. And New Orleans remains vulnerable to future hurricanes.

At NOAA we will continue our efforts to improve hurricane track, intensity, and

storm surge forecasting, as well as provide technical tools and planning expertise

to states and local governments.

With that, I’ll be glad to answer any questions Members may have.

49

NOAA National Hurricane Center

Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline

TUESDAY, AUGUST 23, 2005

1600 CDT: Katrina forms as a Tropical Depression 12, near Nassau in the Bahamas. Tropical Depression 12 Advisory 1 issued: ‘‘A TROPICAL STORM OR HURRICANE WATCH MAY BE REQUIRED FOR PORTIONS OF SOUTHERN FLORIDA

LATER TONIGHT.’’

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 24, 2005

0400 CDT: The National Hurricane Center’s five-day forecast puts the projected

path of Katrina in the southeast Gulf of Mexico (as the system is still a tropical

depression in the central Bahamas).

0700 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Tropical Storm.

1000 CDT: Tropical Storm Katrina Advisory 4 is issued: ‘‘. . .A TROPICAL STORM

WARNING AND A HURRICANE WATCH HAVE BEEN ISSUED FOR THE

SOUTHEAST FLORIDA COAST. . .’’

THURSDAY, AUGUST 25, 2005

1430 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 1 Hurricane.

1730 CDT: Katrina makes landfall in Florida as a Category 1 Hurricane.

WEDNESDAY/THURSDAY, AUGUST 24/25:

Hurricane Liaison Team conference calls were conducted both days, and included

Florida emergency managers, FEMA Headquarters (FEMA HQ), and Region IV.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 26, 2005

0200 CDT: Katrina entered the Gulf of Mexico as a Tropical Storm.

0400 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 1 Hurricane.

1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 12 is issued: ‘‘KATRINA IS A CATEGORY ONE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME

STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS. . .AND

KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY TWO HURRICANE ON SATURDAY.’’

1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

1030 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 2 Hurricane. Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 13 is issued: ‘‘. . .KATRINA RAPIDLY STRENGTHENING AS IT

MOVES SLOWLY WESTWARD AWAY FROM SOUTH FLORIDA AND THE

FLORIDA KEYS. . .KATRINA IS MOVING TOWARD THE WEST NEAR 7

MPH. . .AND THIS MOTION IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR THE NEXT 24

HOURS. . .RECENT REPORTS FROM AN AIR FORCE RESERVE UNIT HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT NOW INDICATE MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS

ARE NEAR 100 MPH. . .WITH HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA IS NOW A CATEGORY TWO HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME

STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS. . .AND

KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY THREE OR MAJOR HURRICANE ON

SATURDAY.’’

1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with FEMA

HQ, Region IV, FL, AL, and GA.

1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 14 is issued: ‘‘. . .THE MODELS

HAVE SHIFTED SIGNIFICANTLY WESTWARD AND ARE NOW IN BETTER

AGREEMENT. THIS HAS RESULTED IN THE OFFICIAL FORECAST TRACK

BEING SHIFTED ABOUT 150 NMI WEST OF THE PREVIOUS

TRACK. . .HOWEVER. . .PROJECTED LANDFALL IS STILL ABOUT 72 HOURS

AWAY. . .SO FURTHER MODIFICATIONS IN THE FORECAST TRACK ARE

POSSIBLE. KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO BE MOVING OVER THE GULF LOOP

CURRENT AFTER 36 HOURS. . .WHICH WHEN COMBINED WITH DECREASING VERTICAL SHEAR. . .SHOULD ALLOW THE HURRICANE TO REACH

CATEGORY FOUR STATUS BEFORE LANDFALL OCCURS.’’

1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 15 is issued: ‘‘THE OFFICIAL

FORECAST BRINGS THE CORE OF THE INTENSE HURRICANE OVER THE

NORTH CENTRAL GULF OF MEXICO IN 48 HOURS OR SO. IT IS WORTH

NOTING THAT THE GUIDANCE SPREAD HAS DECREASED AND MOST OF

THE RELIABLE NUMERICAL MODEL TRACKS ARE NOW CLUSTERED BEVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
50

TWEEN THE EASTERN COAST OF LOUISIANA AND THE COAST OF MISSISSIPPI. THIS CLUSTERING INCREASES THE CONFIDENCE IN THE FORECAST.’’

SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, 2005

0400 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 3 Hurricane. Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 16 is issued: ‘‘KATRINA BECOMES A MAJOR HURRICANE WITH

115 MPH WINDS. . .SOME STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE

NEXT 24 HOURS. . .RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT DATA AND SURFACE OBSERVATIONS INDICATE THAT KATRINA HAS BECOME A LARGER HURRICANE. . .’’ Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 16 is issued: ‘‘DUE TO THE DECREASING SPREAD IN THE MODELS. . .THE CONFIDENCE IN THE FORECAST TRACK IS INCREASING.’’

1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 17 is issued: ‘‘A HURRICANE

WATCH IS IN EFFECT FOR THE SOUTHEASTERN COAST OF LOUISIANA

EAST OF MORGAN CITY TO THE MOUTH OF THE PEARL

RIVER. . .INCLUDING METROPOLITAN NEW ORLEANS AND LAKE

PONCHARTRAIN. . .A HURRICANE WATCH WILL LIKELY BE REQUIRED

FOR OTHER PORTIONS OF THE NORTHERN GULF LATER TODAY OR TONIGHT. INTERESTS IN THIS AREA SHOULD MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF

KATRINA. . .SOME STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24

HOURS. . .AND KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE. . .’’ Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 17 is issued: ‘‘. . .IT IS NOT

OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT KATRINA COULD REACH CATEGORY 5 STATUS AT SOME POINT BEFORE LANDFALL. . .’’

1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with FEMA

HQ, Region IV and VI, FL, LA, MS, AL, and GA.

1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 18 is issued: ‘‘THE HURRICANE

WATCH IS EXTENDED WESTWARD TO INTRACOASTAL CITY LOUISIANA

AND EASTWARD TO THE FLORIDA-ALABAMA BORDER. A HURRICANE

WATCH IS NOW IN EFFECT ALONG THE NORTHERN GULF COAST FROM INTRACOASTAL CITY TO THE ALABAMA-FLORIDA BORDER. A HURRICANE

WARNING WILL LIKELY BE REQUIRED FOR PORTIONS OF THE NORTHERN

GULF COAST LATER TONIGHT OR SUNDAY. INTERESTS IN THIS AREA

SHOULD MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF KATRINA.’’ Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 18 is issued: ‘‘THE INTENSITY FORECAST WILL CALL FOR

STRENGTHENING TO 125 KT AT LANDFALL. . .AND THERE REMAINS A

CHANCE THAT KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE

BEFORE LANDFALL.’’

1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

1925 CDT: Louisiana Gubernatorial Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of NOAA’s

Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a briefing to Kathleen Babineau Blanco.

1935 CDT: Max Mayfield, Director of NOAA’s Tropical Predication Center/National

Hurricane Center provides a briefing to Bill Filter, Chief of Operations, Alabama

Emergency Management Agency.

1945 CDT: Mississippi Gubernatorial Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of NOAA’s

Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a briefing to Haley

Barbour.

2000 CDT: New Orleans Mayoral Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of NOAA’s Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a briefing to Ray Nagin.

2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 19 is issued: ‘‘. . .DANGEROUS

HURRICANE KATRINA THREATENS THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF

COAST. . .A HURRICANE WARNING ISSUED. . .AT 10 PM CDT. . .0300Z. . .A

HURRICANE WARNING HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR THE NORTH CENTRAL

GULF COAST FROM MORGAN CITY LOUISIANA EASTWARD TO THE ALABAMA/FLORIDA BORDER. . .INCLUDING THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND

LAKE PONCHARTRAIN. . .PREPARATIONS TO PROTECT LIFE AND PROPERTY SHOULD BE RUSHED TO COMPLETION. . .COASTAL STORM SURGE

FLOODING OF 15 TO 20 FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .LOCALLY

AS HIGH AS 25 FEET ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS BATTERING

WAVES. . .CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF WHERE THE

CENTER MAKES LANDFALL. . .HEAVY RAINS FROM KATRINA SHOULD

BEGIN TO AFFECT THE CENTRAL GULF COAST SUNDAY EVENING. RAINVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
51

FALL TOTALS OF FIVE TO 10 INCHES. . .WITH ISOLATED MAXIMUM

AMOUNTS OF 15 INCHES. . .ARE POSSIBLE ALONG THE PATH OF

KATRINA.’’ Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 19 is issued: ‘‘. . .DESPITE

THESE CHANGES IN THE INNER CORE. . .THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT

KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO BE AN INTENSE AND DANGEROUS HURRICANE

HEADING TOWARD THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST. . .AND THIS HAS

TO BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY.’’

1500–2230 CDT: Media pool operated; TPC/NHC provided 12 television and two

radio interviews. In addition, TPC/NHC participated in 51 telephone briefings or

media contacts on August 27th.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 28, 2005

0040 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 4 Hurricane.

0100 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Special Advisory Number 20 is issued:

‘‘. . .KATRINA STRENGTHENS TO CATEGORY FOUR WITH 145 MPH

WINDS. . .’’

0400 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 21 is issued: ‘‘THE SPREAD IN

THE MODEL TRACKS ALONG THE NORTHERN GULF COAST IS AT MOST 90

MILES. . .SO CONFIDENCE IN THE OFFICIAL FORECAST IS RELATIVELY

HIGH.’’

0615 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 5 Hurricane.

0700 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 22 is issued:

‘‘. . .KATRINA. . .NOW A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY FIVE

HURRICANE. . .HEADED FOR THE NORTHERN GULF COAST. . .MAXIMUM

SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 160 MPH. . .WITH HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA

IS A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE ON THE

SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME FLUCTUATIONS IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY

IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS.’’

1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 23 is issued: ‘‘. . .POTENTIALLY

CATASTROPHIC HURRICANE KATRINA. . .EVEN STRONGER. . .HEADED

FOR THE NORTHERN GULF COAST. . .REPORTS FROM AN AIR FORCE HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT INDICATE THAT THE MAXIMUM SUSTAINED

WINDS HAVE INCREASED TO NEAR 175 MPH. . .WITH HIGHER WIND

GUSTS. . .HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 105 MILES

FROM THE CENTER AND TROPICAL STORM FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARDS UP TO 205 MILES. . .COASTAL STORM SURGE FLOODING OF 18 TO

22 FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .LOCALLY AS HIGH AS 28 FEET

ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS BATTERING WAVES. . .CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF WHERE THE CENTER MAKES LANDFALL. Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 23 is issued: ‘‘. . .HURRICANE

FORCE WINDS ARE FORECAST TO SPREAD AT LEAST 150 N MI INLAND

ALONG PATH OF KATRINA. CONSULT INLAND WARNINGS ISSUED BY THE

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE FORECAST OFFICES. . .’’

1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with FEMA

HQ, Region IV and VI, FL, LA, MS, AL, GA, TX.

1300 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 23A is issued: ‘‘SIGNIFICANT STORM SURGE FLOODING WILL OCCUR ELSEWHERE ALONG

THE CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF OF MEXICO COAST.’’

1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 24 is issued: ‘‘KATRINA IS MOVING TOWARD THE NORTHWEST NEAR 13 MPH. . .AND A GRADUAL TURN

TO THE NORTH IS EXPECTED OVER THE NEXT 24 HOURS. ON THIS TRACK

THE CENTER OF THE HURRICANE WILL BE NEAR THE NORTHERN GULF

COAST EARLY MONDAY. HOWEVER. . .CONDITIONS ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO DETERIORATE ALONG PORTIONS OF THE CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF COASTS. . .AND WILL CONTINUE TO WORSEN THROUGH

THE NIGHT. . .KATRINA IS A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY

FIVE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME FLUCTUATIONS

IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY UNTIL LANDFALL. KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO

MAKE LANDFALL AT CATEGORY FOUR OR FIVE INTENSITY. WINDS AFFECTING THE UPPER FLOORS OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY STRONGER THAN THOSE NEAR GROUND LEVEL. . .SOME LEVEES

IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS AREA COULD BE OVERTOPPED.’’

1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

52

2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 25 is issued: ‘‘A HURRICANE

WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST FROM

MORGAN CITY LOUISIANA EASTWARD TO THE ALABAMA/FLORIDA BORDER. . .INCLUDING THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND LAKE

PONCHARTRAIN. PREPARATIONS TO PROTECT LIFE AND PROPERTY

SHOULD BE RUSHED TO COMPLETION.’’

MONDAY, AUGUST 29, 2005

0200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina is downgraded to a Category 4.

0400 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26 is issued: ‘‘EXTREMELY DANGEROUS CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE KATRINA MOVING NORTHWARD

TOWARD SOUTHEASTERN LOUISIANA AND THE NORTHERN GULF

COAST. . .SOME FLUCTUATIONS IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY PRIOR TO

LANDFALL. . .BUT KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO MAKE LANDFALL AS A CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE.’’

0600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26A is issued: ‘‘KATRINA REMAINS A VERY LARGE HURRICANE. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND

OUTWARD UP TO 120 MILES FROM THE CENTER. . .AND TROPICAL STORM

FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 230 MILES.’’

0610 CDT: Hurricane Katrina makes landfall in southeastern Louisiana as a Category 4 hurricane.

0800 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26B is issued: ‘‘. . .THE CENTER

OF HURRICANE KATRINA WAS LOCATED. . .ABOUT 40 MILES SOUTHEAST

OF NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA AND ABOUT 65 MILES SOUTHWEST OF BILOXI MISSISSIPPI. . .MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 135

MPH. . .WITH HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA IS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS

CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. WEAKENING IS FORECAST AS THE CIRCULATION INTERACTS WITH LAND

TODAY. . .COASTAL STORM SURGE FLOODING OF 18 TO 22 FEET ABOVE

NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS BATTERING WAVES. . .CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF THE

CENTER. STORM SURGE FLOODING OF 10 TO 15 FEET. . .NEAR THE TOPS

OF LEVEES. . .IS POSSIBLE IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS AREA. SIGNIFICANT STORM SURGE FLOODING WILL OCCUR ELSEWHERE ALONG

THE CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF OF MEXICO COAST.’’

1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina makes a second landfall at the LA/MS border as a

Category 3 hurricane.

1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with FEMA

HQ, Region IV and VI, LA, MS, AL, FL, TX.

1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, 2005

1000 CDT: Katrina is downgraded to a tropical depression with winds of 35 mph,

25 miles south of Clarksville, TN. The final TPC/NHC advisory is issued at this

time; the Hydrometeorological Prediction Center assumes inland public advisories.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 2005

2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina has dissipated; remnants absorbed by a front in

southeast Canada.

NOTES:

• Timeline highlights the major aspects of NOAA’s Tropical Prediction Center/

National Hurricane Center (TPC/NHC). All advisories (graphic and text) are

available on the Katrina archive page: http://www/nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/

KATRINA/shtml?

• Storm surge is a consistent concern and associated threat with any land-falling hurricane, especially a major hurricane.

• Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination calls included the State emergency

management officials for the states listed; calls with the State of Florida included both local and State emergency management officials.

• For Katrina (including for Florida) NOAA’s Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provided a total of 471 television and radio interviews, through their media pool or via telephone.

53

BIOGRAPHY FOR MAX MAYFIELD

Max Mayfield has served as the Director of NOAA’s Tropical Prediction Center,

National Hurricane Center, which is part of NOAA’s National Centers for Environmental Prediction/National Weather Service since 2000 and has been a NOAA employee since 1972.

Mr. Mayfield is a Fellow of the American Meteorological Society (AMS) and has

presented invited papers at several scientific meetings and lectured in several World

Meteorological Organization (WMO) sponsored training sessions, as well as provided

numerous interviews to electronic and print media.

In 1996, he was awarded the Francis W. Reichelderfer Award from the AMS for

exemplary performance as coordinator of hurricane preparedness presentations by

the National Hurricane Center to emergency preparedness officials and the general

public. He received an Outstanding Achievement Award at the 2000 National Hurricane Conference for the development of an innovative approach to expand the educational opportunities to State and local officials in hurricane preparedness, and

was awarded the Richard Hagemeyer Award at the 2004 Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference for his contributions to our nation’s Hurricane Warning Program.

Also in 2004, Mr. Mayfield was presented the Governor’s Award by the National

Academy of Television Arts and Sciences’ Suncoast Chapter. This Emmy Award is

given to someone who has made extraordinary contributions to television and who

is not otherwise eligible for an Emmy.

Mr. Mayfield has been recognized by the Department of Commerce with Gold

Medals for his work during Hurricanes Andrew and Isabel, with a Silver Medal during Hurricane Gilbert, and was awarded a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Bronze Medal for the creation of a public/private partnership in support of disaster preparedness for the Nation.

He is the current Chairman of the WMO’s Regional Association—IV Hurricane

Committee which consists of 26 members from the international community. He has

played a key role in forecast and service improvements at the National Hurricane

Center.

Mr. Mayfield is married, has three children, and resides in Miami, Florida.

Chairman. BOEHLERT. Thank you for your testimony.

We will have to recess briefly to allow Members to go to the Floor

to vote. We have two votes so we will presumably be gone 15 to

20 minutes. We will reconvene as soon as the vote is over.

[Recess.]

DISCUSSION

Mr. EHLERS. [Presiding] We will call the hearing to order. We

thank the gentlemen for their testimony. We will begin the questioning period. Five minutes per Member for questions and answers. And because there are quite a number of Members here and

I know they are anxious to have their questions answered, we will

attempt to stick to the five minute rule as much as possible and

I will try to be ruthless. And the Ranking Member laughs.

LESSONS LEARNED

General Johnson, based on lessons learned from Katrina and

Rita is the National Weather Service going to change anything

about the way you communicate forecasts and warnings to federal,

State, and local officials?

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.

At the end of each hurricane season, we do a pretty extensive hot

wash. We go through and review all of our procedures and——

Mr. EHLERS. Could you explain for the record what a hot wash

is?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We get people who participate in communicating those threats, those warnings, those watches to the American public. We get media, we get emergency managers, we get peoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
54

ple from the Hurricane Center all together and say how could we

better communicate?

I appreciate very much Mr. Melancon’s characterization of us as

accurate and clear this year but I believe, sir, that there is always

room for improvement. And last year, we had a pretty unprecedented significant season, probably a better word, in five land falling hurricanes. And at the end of last year, we decided that we

needed special emphasis on the communication of uncertainty. I

think you remember, sir, the assertion of the skinny black line. We

wanted to address uncertainty so we redoubled our efforts on uncertainty. At the end of this season, sir, we will go through and review all of our procedures and see if there is a better way to——

COMMUNICATION WITH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

OFFICIALS

Mr. EHLERS. Okay. The question then is, to my understanding

there is no mechanism in place for NOAA and the Hurricane Center to confirm that officials at agencies such as FEMA and other

State and local agencies have received all the national and local

hurricane forecasts issued by the Weather Service. Shouldn’t there

be some sort of confirmation mechanism that you get affirmation

or confirmation from these folks that they got the message, that

they are going to act on it? Is there anything you can do along that

line?

Mr. JOHNSON. I will defer to Max on the specific operation of the

Hurricane Liaison Team. But the weather forecast offices also communicate with local emergency managers and we participate in for

example the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center and actually

have people positioned in that facility to facilitate the communications of that environmental information. So we routinely provide

discussion in trying to further the understanding of the message at

different intervals always at the six hour intervals when the hurricane center issues.

Mr. EHLERS. Mr. Mayfield, would you expand on that? And also

if it appears useful, do you have intermediate reports between the

six hour reports? I would appreciate your comments on this.

Mr. MAYFIELD. Right. The National Hurricane Center takes the

big picture and we routinely issue a five-day forecast every six

hours. When we have watches and warnings in effect, we will go

to a two or three-hour cycle, depending on how close it is and how

well defined it is on radar. If there is something unexpected in the

track or intensity, we will do what we call a special advisory and

we did that, we certainly did that a few times on both Katrina and

Rita. So there is a continual flow of information from the hurricane

center and as General Johnson said, it is really important, too, to

get down to those local decision-makers. And the local weather

forecast offices do a tremendous amount of handholding with the

commanders in their local area. They are under their area responsibility.

Mr. EHLERS. Now do you get confirmation from everyone that

they have received the message and the warning?

Mr. MAYFIELD. They are actually talking to them. I mean these

are actually telephone——

55

Mr. EHLERS. Do you do some sort of a role call to make sure they

are actually on the phone and listening?

Mr. MAYFIELD. That is for the local office, I am not sure how

they do that but I—we can find out about that. But the National

Hurricane Center, we are indeed an invited participant on those

Hurricane Liaison Team briefings. And FEMA headquarters, as far

as I know, they do not take an individual role call but they do take

an office role call. In other words, they will—when I come in, I will

hear them say, you know, it is the hurricane center on line, FEMA

Region 6, FEMA Region 4, Louisiana Emergency Operating Center

are you on line? So they at least do that, yes, sir.

Mr. EHLERS. And when you come back two hours later, do they

report at all what they have done to——

Mr. MAYFIELD. I do not listen—I do not participate on that part.

Mr. EHLERS. Okay.

Mr. MAYFIELD. We are there to provide the, you know, the best

forecast we can.

Mr. EHLERS. Yeah.

Mr. MAYFIELD. And then often I will do that and then I will go

back to work.

Mr. EHLERS. All right. My time has expired.

I will turn to the Ranking Member, Mr. Gordon.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think with all the information, it is on the public record now,

it has become pretty evident of two things. One, that the Weather

Service did an excellent job in predicting the hurricane and in the

accuracy of doing so. I think we also know that FEMA and the Federal Government did not react well. And I am trying to find where

was that disconnect. And so, Mr. Mayfield, I am wondering whether that in addition to the accuracy of the forecast there was also

adequate information about the consequences of the hurricane. And

as you know, we have asked you to bring your briefing materials

from the August 28 briefing with President Bush and Secretary

Chertoff. And if you would present that to us at this time, we

would appreciate it.

Mr. MAYFIELD. I would be glad to if we can get that—okay. This

is exactly what—these are the briefing slides that I used on that

Sunday, August the 28th briefing, you know, from the National

Hurricane Center. And I do not have a transcript but I am pretty

sure I will be very, very close and the briefing I would give today

would be very close to the briefing I gave before, although probably

a little condensed version here.

56

That first slide, I showed just to demonstrate the—or make sure

they knew the size of the hurricane and not only is it well defined

but it is not a small hurricane, it is a very, very large hurricane.

The next slide, please.

57

That was a visible picture. This one is an infrared and very, very

distinct eye. When you have that, you always have a powerful hurricane and, in fact, this was a Category 5 hurricane. And I said

that not only is this a Category 5 hurricane like Andrew, but there

is a big, big, difference. And the difference is that it is a much larger hurricane than Andrew was.

And I also made a comparison to Hurricane Lily back in 2002

that struck Louisiana. Lily had been a Category 4 hurricane in the

middle of the Gulf of Mexico. It weakened down to a Category 1

hurricane. There was a big difference. With Lily, we had a very,

very small eye. We call it a pinhole eye. And when you have those

small eyes like that, typically they just do not persist for very long.

And I did say that given this more typical sized eye, we really do

not expect significant weakening like Lily did. The wise thing to do

here would be to prepare for a Category 5 hurricane.

58

The next slide is a water vapor loop and we were also showing

animations of these I might add on the video teleconference. And

I show this one just to talk about the future motion. There was a

trough coming in from the west that was eventually going to turn

this up more to the north and eventually northeast. And the computer models differed somewhat on when that turn will occur and

it makes a big, big difference whether it happens, you know, right

at landfall, or before landfall, or well inland there. And what I

would have said was that no one can tell you exactly, you know,

where Katrina’s going to make landfall but again I emphasized it

was a large hurricane and wherever it made the actual landfall, it

was going to impact a very large area.

59

Then the next slide is—this is a Hurrevac slide and that is a

software program actually developed by a former Weather Service

employee paid for by FEMA after he retired and this is a really

nice package here that you can animate this, you can do all types

of displays here. And I would not have taken the time to—I mean

they use this—we show this at every single briefing we give but for

your information, that red area there that you see, the bright red

from Morgan City, Louisiana over to the Florida/Alabama border,

that was where the coastal hurricane warning was in place. We

had tropical storm warnings and hurricane watches on either side

of that. And then you can see the forecast track of the center of

the hurricane and we always and General Johnson mentioned

there, we do not like to poke attention to that skinny black line.

We have that cone of uncertainty based on our previous 10-year

forecast errors showing where the center of the hurricane can be.

And when I showed this, I said that this is not just a coastal event,

the strong winds, the heavy rains, the tornadoes will spread well

inland. But—and I am also sure that I said this, I want to make

absolutely clear that the greatest potential for large loss of life is

also from the storm surge. And that transitions over to the next

slide.

60

This is a storm surge simulation from the actual forecast that

was available at that time. This went along with the 11:00 a.m.

eastern daylight time advisory and this was for that noontime eastern daylight time Hurricane Liaison Team briefing. And I think

you can see Lake Pontchartrain there and certainly the Mississippi

coastline and much of the Louisiana coastline. The colored areas

are areas that are indeed inundated from that specific forecast.

Now again, we are doing this every six hours based on the most

recent forecast but the point here is that those, the light greens

and the yellows, those were all storm surge valves of over 20 feet.

And I would have explained the circulation around the eye of the

hurricane goes counterclockwise so that means that we would have

northerly flow over Lake Pontchartrain. And I did say that no one

can tell you with absolute confidence if the levees would be overtopped but it was obviously a very grave concern there. And I also

would have said that if the track had shifted a little bit to the west

or to the left there, it would have been even worse than on our current forecast track there. I really do not want anyone to think that

we could give a perfect forecast.

61

And then the last two very quickly here, the storm surge in Mobile. This showed seven to eight feet of surge there. I was concerned that we had that much with Hurricane George in 1998 and

that was only a Category 2 hurricane. So I did not know for sure

62

if the storm surge model really did justice to that. Wind speed also,

I asked that that be run a little further to the east. And the next

to the last slide there, this actually shifted the track, I believe 15

to 30 miles to the east and this gave us 10 to 11 feet of storm surge

even up into the northern portion of Mobile Bay, Dolphin Island,

portions of the Gulf Shores. Most of the Gulf Shores are under

water. So those are the exact slides that I shared on that Sunday

briefing.

This was a FEMA conference call and they invited the Hurricane

Liaison Team to participate. This was a daily call and it was held

during Katrina. Every day it was held at noon eastern time.

Mr. GORDON. At noon. And when did Katrina actually hit the

City of New Orleans with its maximum force?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Well the first landfall there on the mouth of the

Mississippi and south of Buras, Louisiana was about 7:10 a.m. on

Monday morning, the 29th and then by the time it made the final

landfall near the Louisiana/Mississippi border, that would have

been about 10:00 or 11:00 a.m., so shortly before that.

DIRECTING HURRICANES

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, all right. Thank you very much. Mr.

Chairman, first of all let me apologize.

I have a mark up in another committee, International Relations

Committee that I will have to attend afterwards. This has been so

enlightening already and I hate to miss the rest of the questions

but let me just proceed with a few of my own.

Let me note, these photographs and the tracking that NOAA and

the National Weather Service forecasts have been utilizing are

based on space based assets that this committee has supported

over the years and have given the American people a tremendous

leverage in terms of preventing the death and destruction from

hurricanes like this. And I want to pat us on the back, Congress

on the back for actually doing their job in terms of providing this

type of technology and also a pat on the back for the National

Weather Service and NOAA for the terrific job that they did in this

and in other weather based dangers that we faced during my two

decades of service here in Congress. You have always done a terrific job and this is yet another example.

Where we seem to have had a breakdown as we have indicated

by the Ranking Member’s comments that there may have been

some sort of breakdown somewhere on the governmental level outside of the knowledge base but in terms of the coordination base.

I would not put that all on the Federal Government; however, I do

believe that the President by the time of this briefing at noon had

already talked to the Major of New Orleans and asked that people

be evacuated and that the efforts on the part of the people in

charge at that level of government, did not move forward with the

type of speed that was consistent with the danger that was being

explained. So although let us just say whether it is the local level

or the national level, there needs to be better coordination on both

sides.

And this is not towards you folks but it just appears that there

is not an emergency plan. We have got an emergency warning system but we do not have an emergency plan that is in place that

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you go this is Step 1, 2, 3, 4 and this is what has happened. Now

much of that has to be done at the local level but the Federal Government could have or our FEMA directors could have had that

plan in place to be working with the local officials and said are you

now on Stage 2, Stage 3, Stage 4. That obviously did not happen

especially considering the 2,000 buses that were parked in New Orleans rather than used for evacuation purposes.

There has been a lot of talk about whether or not these hurricanes while we cannot, you know, everybody says you can talk

about the weather, you cannot do anything about it. I have actually

seen some reports and some in Scientific American and other magazines suggesting that in the future we might be able to direct the

path of hurricanes and what do you guys have to say about that?

Mr. MAYFIELD. You know that question has been around for a

long, long time if man can, you know, mitigate the hurricanes and

it is very difficult to get some people to understand both the size

and the tremendous power of a hurricane. And you know, nature

can do a lot of things on its own. The United States Government

used to have a program called Project Storm Fury where we would

see, we would fly the NOAA hurricane hunter aircraft through the

hurricane, seed silver iodide on the outside of the eye wall of the

hurricane with the intent being to weaken——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, before my time totally runs out, let me

ask you specifically.

Mr. MAYFIELD. Sure.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have already, you know, seen what

science can do to alert us and give us emergency signs of these hurricanes to understand they are coming. Do you think in 20 years

from now we will be able to use space-based assets perhaps to

warm the water or cloud seeding to actually help direct the path

of a hurricane to prevent the type of landfall that we just had in

Katrina?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Well, it is great to have a vision to do something

like that but I am a very pragmatic type of guy and I am certainly

not going to hold my breath for that.

Mr. EHLERS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah, could I ask unanimous consent to have

the general answer that question for less than a minute?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. There is a massive amount of energy in

a hurricane and I think the efforts of man will be a very small infinitesimal amount of the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, General.

You now have told us that we—to alter the course of that hurricane, we are going to have to all learn how to pray, I think. Thank

you very much.

Mr. JOHNSON. A higher power, yes, sir.

Mr. EHLERS. I suspect that is good advice. As a physicist, I can

tell you that you could explore 120 megaton bombs in that and the

hurricane would not even notice it so, a very depressing thought.

On that cheery note, we will turn to the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Udall.

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COMMUNICATION WITH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

OFFICIALS (CONT.)

Mr. UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to also extend my gratitude to the panel for your presence

here today and your compelling and enlightening testimony.

I intend to yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Gordon, but I did

want to just remind all the Committee Members here in the audience that in my district which includes the City of Boulder where

we are fortunate to have a NOAA facility which is a tremendous

asset. I cannot think of a harder working cohort of people and I

want to pay tribute to them and the good work they do and the

role they play in weather forecasting, as well as, the climate studies that are undertaken in Boulder.

So thanks again to the panel. With that, I would like to yield the

remaining amount of my time to the gentleman from Tennessee,

Mr. Gordon.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Udall.

Once again, Mr. Mayfield, you have been mentioned a variety of

times, thank you for your service to the country, thank you for that

powerful presentation.

Let me ask you, you told them to prepare for a Category 5. Is

that correct in that presentation?

Mr. MAYFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. GORDON. Did you explain or did they understand the consequences of a Category 5? Did you explain that to them?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Those briefings, Congressman, are not—you

know, it is really not the time to, you know, to teach a course in

meteorology 101 but they, the folks on that, the emergency management folks on that conference call certainly should understand

what a Category 5 hurricane can do.

Mr. GORDON. And though just a short time before that, through

that PAM exercise, they had a chance. It was not a five but a four

so you would know what was going on there.

So would you tell us, then, would you describe what are the consequences to that region for a Category 5?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Well you have to deal with all the hazards of the

hurricane. The first is the storm surge. It is a dome of water that

comes in near to where the center makes landfall. Very unique set

of circumstances there in Louisiana that it is just so low lying and

of course the city itself being like a bowl and much of the city

below sea level. That has always been a concern with a storm surge

in that area.

Number two, of course, are the strong winds and the winds were,

you know, a Category 4 or 5 hurricane can do tremendous wind

damage. And we have also learned over the years that the winds

are stronger aloft. We put a statement in our advisories on Sunday

saying that being that the windows could be blown out in, you

know, high rise structures. Then you have to worry about the rainfall. And this is a team effort. We have the rainfall experts within

NOAA, the Hydro Meteorological Prediction Center. And I did not

mention this earlier but they actually were on those Hurricane Liaison Team briefings with us every day. I would do the basic meteorology and then they would chime in on the rainfall forecast. And

65

then, of course, the fourth main hazard would be the tornadoes

that can spread well inland and can be well removed from the eye

of the hurricane.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, sir.

As I quoted earlier, Michael Brown said, ‘‘I must say, this storm

is much bigger than anyone expected.’’ Was it bigger than you expected and bigger than you predicted?

Mr. MAYFIELD. We briefed routinely and then in every advisory

we issued, we would give the size. Are we, you know, differentiating between the size of the hurricane and the intensity? There

is a difference. You can have a large powerful hurricane or a large

weak hurricane or a small powerful hurricane or small, you know,

weak hurricane so those are two different things. I am not sure exactly what Mike Brown meant by that if he—I suspect he meant

it was, you know, an extreme event. I am not sure he really meant

large in terms of size, but that I will think you will have to ask

him what he actually meant from that.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Udall.

Mr. BONNER. [Presiding] I believe the Chair controls the time but

the gentleman from Minnesota has another appointment so I would

now recognize Mr. Gutknecht.

HURRICANE MULTI-DECADAL CYCLE

Mr. GUTKNECHT. I thank the Chair.

Mr. Mayfield, I would like to switch gears for just a minute because we have heard from some other experts and I would like to

hear it right from the top guns here. That we may expect more

hurricanes this year and we are in a hurricane cycle where we may

see more. First, a simple question, how many more hurricanes

should we expect this year?

Mr. MAYFIELD. I wish I could tell you for sure about that. I cannot be exact. Our seasonal forecasters were calling even back in

early August 18 to 21 named storms, we have already had 19. We

were calling for nine to 11 hurricanes and we have had ten. And

we were calling for five to seven major hurricanes and we have had

five. I think the best way I could answer that, if you go back the

last 40 years or so, we typically averaged two or three named

storms in October and November. I would like to say we could

count Stan and Tammy on that but I really do not think we can.

I think a reasonable expectation would be for another two to three

named storms. One or two of those might be hurricanes. I think

one of the important things is that and I just checked on this. If

you go back to 1995 when this active period began, we have had

eight major hurricanes in the month of October, two major hurricanes in the month of November so we are averaging, you know,

one major hurricane per year in October and November in this active period.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Now you have just touched on this and I am

sorry, I had an agricultural hearing and a markup and some of us

are in and out and that does not mean that it is not important, but

can you talk a little bit about those cycles? I mean, we hear about

that on the news. Where do you think we are in the cycle and how

long will it last?

66

Mr. MAYFIELD. Well we have got some not very good news here.

These cycles, you know, will go 10 to 30 or 40 years and you can

go well back in the record books here to look at these cycles. And

if, for example, the ’50s and ’60s indeed were very, very active with

a lot of major hurricanes. And we need to remember that most of

the loss of life and most of the damage occurs from these major

hurricanes, Categories 3, 4, and 5 on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane

Scale. Then in 1995, somebody seems to have thrown a switch here

and it has really gotten active. We have had a tremendous number

of major hurricanes. And the research meteorologists unfortunately

are telling us that this active period will very likely last another

10 or 20 years or more.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BONNER. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.

Miller.

FUNDING FOR HURRICANE RESEARCH

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I agree with Mr. Gordon that certainly NOAA’s performance was

probably the best one we had in the Federal Government.

General Johnson, when you count your life’s blessings, count the

fact that there was never a moment on National television that

President Bush said to you, Johnny, you are doing a heck of a job.

You all certainly did a much better job than other agencies of the

Federal Government. But I am very concerned about our continued

ability to do a good job and to do a better job. And certainly there

seems to be room for improvements in the technology, in the

science forecasting even if we do not look to that millennial day

when we can actually control hurricanes, we certainly could do better in forecasting their exact path, their intensity, their rainfall,

the inland flooding that they cause.

General Johnson, the difference between the House and the Senate budget for NOAA is $1 billion. What would the House budget

due to NOAA’s ability to improve upon the science or even maintain what you have, to maintain or improve the buoy system, to improve upon science? I understand that the scientists at NC State

by the way did a better job of forecasting the path and intensity

of the storm because they are using more advanced methodology.

General Johnson, what would that budget difference due to

NOAA’s ability to improve or even keep what you got?

Mr. JOHNSON. I have had the opportunity to look at the House

mark and the Senate mark at a very conceptual level.

Mr. MILLER. I sort of thought that would get your attention,

yeah.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. There is a significant different there and

we are anxiously awaiting the conference and what really comes

out of that. There is always an opportunity to do better and to improve. And I think in my opening statement, we talked about observations, opportunities in modeling, and my written statement I

highlight some of those as well.

I appreciate the support in the Science Committee overall and

right now we are anxiously awaiting what comes out of that to see

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how we can continue to serve the American public with accurate

and timely advise and forecasts like we have been.

Mr. MILLER. What are your feelings, Mr. Mayfield?

Mr. MAYFIELD. If I could just say one thing and I need to say this

very carefully for the folks who were impacted. In both Katrina and

Rita, to some extent, we were fortunate because they were both

major hurricanes, in fact, Category 5 hurricanes well before they

made landfall. You know, if you look at all the storms and hurricanes that hit the United States, only about 20 percent of them are

major hurricanes, Category 3, 4, and 5, yet that 20 percent causes

over 80 percent of the damage. Most major hurricanes become

major hurricanes by going through some rapid intensification cycle

that we simply do not understand yet. And both Katrina and Rita

did this rapid intensification fortunately well, you know, away from

that landfall point. If that rapid intensification had happened right

at the time of landfall, in other words, people are going to bed preparing for let us say a Category 1 or 2 hurricane and then if they,

you know, awaken to a Cat 4, I would not be sitting here today I

suspect.

Anyway, we do need help especially with that rapid intensification.

LOCAL FORECASTS

Mr. MILLER. You would be testifying before the Government Reform Committee rather than the Science Committee.

Mr. Mayfield, in my state, you said someone threw a switch in

1995. My district, not just my state, but my district and, in fact,

my house has been affected by Fran and Floyd. And the great bulk

of the damage has been inland flooding, tornadoes. It has been a

local forecast that would be most helpful in preparations and in response. How important or what is the current status of our ability

to do local forecast and how will the proposal to cut the number

of the local offices from I think 122 to maybe 20 or 30, how will

that affect your ability to do the local forecasting?

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me take that one.

Mr. MILLER. Okay.

Mr. JOHNSON. We are constantly looking at opportunities to improve the way we provide products and services. And one of the

things that I am looking at is our concept of operations. We have

122 weather forecast offices and 13 river forecast centers that provide services for America. I am looking at economies and efficiencies in how can we best provide those products and services.

There is no proposal to cut the number of offices at this time. We

are looking at how we can use the resources we have and be good

stewards of the taxpayers dollars. So there is no proposal out there

to cut numbers of offices.

EVACUATION DECISION

Mr. BONNER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

I will reclaim my time and I want to express as others have. I

would be remiss if I did not. As someone who lives in Mobile, Alabama and since last September with Hurricane Ivan, has experienced the good fortune of relying on both of you two gentlemen and

68

the many men and women who work with you, our thanks for the

great job you all do and for the service you render our entire country in terms of giving us adequate warning that a storm is imminent.

I would like to go back to a question I think Mr. Gordon raised,

but others have as well, and that deals with the issue of shelters.

Because we experienced during Hurricane Ivan and we certainly

did during Hurricane Dennis where the Governor of our State, Bob

Riley ordered a mandatory evacuation of Mobile County, Alabama

and the coastal area of Baldwin County and turned both lanes of

I–65 northbound, the first time we had done that. It was successful

in terms of evacuating a lot of people. Fortunately for us in Alabama, Dennis veered a little bit to the right, unfortunately for our

friends in Florida, but as a result, we had a good lesson on evacuation.

But General Johnson, Mr. Mayfield, is there ever a time when

a community, a state, or the Federal Government should encourage

people to stay in an area when a Category 4 or a Category 5 storm

is coming. Using New Orleans as an example, should any official

of government have recommended that people stay in a city with

a Hurricane 4 or a Hurricane 5 coming into that city?

Mr. JOHNSON. The role of the National Weather Service is to provide that accurate timely and focused information. We refer to our

colleagues over in Emergency Management side on evacuation decisions and whether they should shelter in place. We do work with

them in the off season to see how much time would be required and

available. That is part of the hot wash at the end because evacuations from certain areas take much longer than others depending

on the infrastructure but I would defer to them.

Mr. MAYFIELD. And that doesn’t mean we do not care about those

things. I mean it is a real team effort, the Nation’s Hurricane

Warning Program, you know, it consists of the forecasters, the

emergency management, the community, and the media. The

media is a big part of this. And we certainly care about that and

our message has been so consistent in urging every individual,

every family, every business, and every community to develop that

hurricane plan and know what to do. But as General Johnson said,

the roles are defined. And our role is to provide the best forecast

that we possibly can.

Mr. BONNER. But even with your role, you still have a wealth of

knowledge. Mr. Mayfield if you had been in New Orleans watching

TV, the reports that your office and that you in fact were the one

that was on national TV recommending, would you have stayed in

that city?

Mr. MAYFIELD. I think that I would hope that the mayors and

the governors were not telling me how to forecast and I am sure

they would appreciate me not telling them how to evacuate.

Mr. BONNER. The next question goes to the gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey.

HURRICANE LIAISON TEAM

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you very much.

First of all, congratulations for both of your agencies for providing—using federal funds. And we have to take credit for that.

69

We invested in the right thing so that you had weather service. Information that was timely, accurate, and focused. And thank you,

thank you. It proves, I believe, that we can achieve our goals.

When there is a will, there is a way. And now I think we have the

opportunity to know how your good information was used. So I

have a couple questions about that.

Mr. Mayfield, I know you do not keep a log of who is on the daily

Hurricane Liaison Team, the HLT, on the calls, but would you say

there is good participation or there was by the State and local folks

on these calls in general? Could you tell? Did you know?

Mr. MAYFIELD. I am not sure if you were in here, Congresswoman, but as far as I know, FEMA does not take, you know, an

individual role call but they do and I mean I am talking about

these daily video teleconferences now. I mean, there is a lot of additional coordination. But they do have a role call of offices. In other

words, they would come and ask, ‘‘hurricane center, are you on

line? FEMA Region 6, are you on line? Mississippi EOC, are you

on line?’’ They would do that so that information I would think

would be available from FEMA. I did not take role though.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Okay. Well, we have used this process for a long

time now and you know so much more know than we ever knew,

you know, in previous—in years passed. So would you say this

process has provided a good forum of information or an exchange

between the various levels of government or is there a way that

you would suggest changing the process based on the post hurricane season and get local government more involved?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Congresswoman, you know if there is anything

that we could have done differently or better on our end, I assure

you that I want to know exactly what that is. I can tell you that

FEMA sponsored a briefing, the noontime video teleconference involving the Hurricane Liaison Team. That was done the same way

in Hurricane Katrina that it was done in all the hurricanes, all

four of those hurricanes that hit Florida last year, and done exactly

the same way with Hurricane Rita. That process did not change.

Ms. WOOLSEY. But should it go lower to get the local folks more

involved?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Oh, you are asking should the local folks be on

that video teleconference?

I have absolutely no objection to that. If I could give you my own

opinion on that, this is a big picture of sort of the real big picture,

the overview. The locals, I think are best served by that

handholding going on in their local community by the local National Weather Service offices. Right before every forecast is issued

from the National Hurricane Center, we have a hurricane hot line

call with all of our potential impacted local Weather Service forecast offices, the river forecast centers, the rainfall forecasters of the

Hydro Meteorological Prediction Center, the tornado forecasters

and the Storm Prediction Center. The Department of Defense is online. They would be Norfolk, Jacksonville, Pensacola, and others.

NASA is on that line. So we do a tremendous amount of coordination. And those local forecasters, you know, in the local communities, they know everything we do right before the advisory goes

out. And then they turn around and do that handholding with the

local emergency management and other officials. And I know these

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folks in Slidell and in Mobile and I have known them for years and

I know that they did their job. If there is something else that could

have been done, I am sure they will want to know that too.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Okay, thank you very much. Thank you.

FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

Mr. EHLERS. [Presiding] The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

General Johnson, were any of your vital facilities or equipment

damaged or destroyed in Katrina and Rita? If so, what is the status

of those facilities today and what are you doing to maintain capabilities in the short-term?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We had some significant damage to facilities. We had a back up plan in place so that when we lost power

in the Slidell office for example, the Mobile office picked up those

requirements. I was down there yesterday, Mr. Chairman, checking

out how operations were going and there is some roof damage and

some other things that we need to address. I know we lost services

of a couple of buoys, some NOAA weather radios, those kinds of

things, sir, and we are in the process of assessing those right now.

Mr. EHLERS. Do you have the resources to do—to make these repairs and get back on line during the rest of the hurricane season?

Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, with the start of the fiscal year and a continuing resolution I am going through an assessment right now and

we are looking forward to the ’06 ability to get an infusion of funds

to address those.

Mr. EHLERS. All right.

LONG-TERM OUTLOOK

Mr. Mayfield, I am interested in a little futurism here. What is

the future outlook with respect to both hurricane frequency and intensity during the next 50 to 100 years? Do you have any—and I

know that is very long-term but what factors contribute to the frequency and intensity and what do you see developing that could

have an impact on both frequency and intensity?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Well, I would like to jump right to the bottom line

but I will hold that for a little bit. One of the biggest correlations

that we have with hurricane activity in the Atlantic is the sea surface temperatures. And just as the sea surface temperatures have

cycles of warm and cold, warm and cold, so does the hurricane activity so I cannot tell you with any certainty what the future will

hold other than these cycles will very, very likely continue. Ten to

40 year cycles are active and then, you know, followed by inactive

periods there.

But this is important, too. We need to remember that you do not

have to be in an active period to have that one powerful hurricane.

And 1992 was well below the average number of storms and hurricanes. This was not in a warm period, it was—we only had six

storms that year, only four of those were hurricanes, but yet we

had that one little hurricane called Andrew. So no matter what period we are in, active or inactive, the bottom line from my perspective is that we need to be prepared. We need to have those hurricane plans in place. And everyone down to that individual taking

71

that personal responsibility needs to know what to do before the

next one comes.

Mr. EHLERS. So in other words, the frequency follows certain cycles but there is no relationship between intensity and frequency?

Mr. MAYFIELD. No, there is, I am sorry, sir. I did not understand

that. Yeah, in the active periods, we do tend to have more major

hurricanes so that obviously is a concern. I was just trying to say

that even in the inactive periods you can still have that——

Mr. EHLERS. Right, okay. But there is some correlation between

frequency and intensity. Okay.

And much of it is related then to the cycling of the surface temperatures in the gulf and in the western Atlantic. Is that correct?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Right. We typically look at our main development

region, the tropical Atlantic, the Caribbean and part of the Gulf of

Mexico.

You know, you can correlate a lot of different things with, you

know, the activity and that sea surface temperature is one of the

best things that we have.

Mr. EHLERS. Well at least you have not tried to correlate it with

full moons which seemed to be the favorite thing people like to correlate things with.

My time has expired. We recognize the gentlewoman from Texas,

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee.

TIMELINE

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for what

I think is both a vital and timely hearing, and allow me to thank

both General Johnson and Mr. Mayfield for, I know a grateful

America for the existence of NOAA but also its technology. For that

reason, allow me for a line of questioning that again may take you

over the timeline that I view is so very crucial to the component

of saving lives.

Backtrack for me again if you would, the time that you began to

assess Hurricane Katrina. And I may interrupt you and forgive me

only because I have a series of questions and I know my time is

short. So when I look at sort of the end of August, how far back

did you begin tracking Hurricane Katrina?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Well we were tracking the disturbances, the tropical waves come off the coast of Africa every three or four days just

like clockwork all through the hurricane season and we were tracking a tropical wave that really did not form. It became a depression

on Tuesday, the 23rd of August. I asked for activation of the Hurricane Liaison Team to start on the 24th. It was activated at 7:00

a.m. on Wednesday, the 24th, became a storm on the 24th, and

then it became a hurricane just before it made landfall on the 25th

near Miami.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And it was what category at that point?

Mr. MAYFIELD. A Category 1 hurricane when it made landfall

there. And it became at Cat 1 just an hour or two before landfall.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. A measure or two.

At that time, were you on any kind of large conference calls with

all necessary parties including the President or his representatives

starting at that point?

72

Mr. MAYFIELD. I honestly do not remember when the President

was on it except I know for a fact that he was on that Sunday, August the 28th as it was in the Gulf of Mexico. I do not remember

and quite honestly some time ago on the video teleconference monitor will have nine or more little pictures there and it may say the

White House or it may say, you know, Louisiana Emergency Operations Center and I really cannot see exactly who is there in each

of those offices. But the video—well on Wednesday the 24th, we

had a telephone conference call with FEMA and by the time it hit

Florida there on the 25th, we had the video teleconferences going

daily at noontime. And I am sorry but I cannot tell you exactly, you

know, which individuals were on there.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But you know that he was on on the 28th,

which was that Sunday?

Mr. MAYFIELD. That is correct.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And were local officials on as well?

Mr. MAYFIELD. The local officials were not on but the States,

Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia emergency operation centers were on that big picture. Again, that the

big picture called there on that video teleconference. Of course

FEMA headquarters facilitated the call and then FEMA Region 4

out of Atlanta, Georgia and FEMA Region 6 out of Denton, Texas.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. How much guidance do you give as you are

providing the science of these Cats 1, 2, 3, and 4, and 5? How much

direction can you give to FEMA or how much direction are they

seeking from you as partly the agency dealing with natural disasters, the National FEMA as opposed to State emergency agencies?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Well, a fair question but the roles are defined

here and our role is to provide the best forecast that we can. So

we would be reporting, I would be briefing on, you know, the current location and strength of the hurricane, the future track of the

hurricane, the future intensity forecast, the potential storm surge,

rainfall, tornado activity. Our role is to provide the best, you know,

weather information that we possibly can.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But at some point, the human factor must

play in where somebody takes a deep breath to say guys this is a

Cat 5, we have got to move. I am sure sometimes in the course of

conversation that happens. Is that correct?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Well, we certainly said that this was a Cat 5, you

know, when it became a Cat 5 and I did, I mean, I firmly believe

that people understood the potential that this hurricane held.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. General, let me ask you this. With the work

that you have done, my understanding is that there is a difference

of $1 billion between the Senate’s mark and the House mark as it

relates to NOAA. This Committee has always been a strong advocate of funding for NOAA but it baffles me as to what you will do

with that shortfall.

And then let me raise this with you. Clearly as Mr. Mayfield,

said there is a point where there is an exasperation or an exasperated voice saying, you know, this is a Cat 5 and you are speaking to I call it level folk that are at the level of State government

but the Federal Government is there. Do we need to legislate, if

you will, a stronger role for NOAA as it relates to the interaction

between agencies like FEMA because we all know that despite the

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local responsibility and the state in natural disasters when NOAA

is on the line saying with its refined science there is a Cat 5, somebody at the top level should act. In the case of Hurricane Katrina,

it is well known that they did not act. Do we need to provide some

greater cohesion so that the Federal Government can be working

more effectively together and get people out and save lives. But I

ask that question in the cut in your seemingly proposed cut in the

dollars that are going to you this time around.

Mr. EHLERS. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. Please give a

brief answer.

Mr. JOHNSON. Ma’am, we are an important part of the team and

weather service characterizes the storm and provides that accurate

timely information. We also pay very much attention to the National Hurricane Center that takes that very big picture and takes

the larger view. The local weather forecast offices translate that

view into specific local topography, bathymetry, and specific events.

You know, characterizing, you know, where the effects are going to

be held. We also in the messages that we put out through NOAA

weather radio and all of our communication techniques and capabilities, emphasize paying attention to your local emergency manager because they are an important part of the team as well.

Right now, I am hopeful that the Conference Committee will find

a good accommodation and take care of the requirements for NOAA

and the Weather Service and allow us to continue to do the job that

we are capable of doing.

FIVE-DAY FORECASTS

Mr. EHLERS. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

Question for either one of you, you can decide who is to answer.

But you have introduced a five-day hurricane track prediction,

where as I recall last year you were doing three-day. What has

your experience been so far and I am curious why do you believe

the data has improved sufficiently you can now give accurate fiveday reports and do you plan to continue to do that or have you discovered some weaknesses?

Mr. MAYFIELD. Mr. Chairman, we really do listen to our users.

You know, most coastal states now have a yearly hurricane conference. We have a national hurricane conference, we have interdepartmental hurricane conference. There are a lot of venues that

allow customers to, you know, share with us what they would like.

And that five-day went well into effect here in 2003, I believe after

a couple of years of testing. And that was actually stated as a requirement by the United States Navy. And, you know, we cannot

produce a product with taxpayer money and just give it to a few

chosen people. With the public/private partnership we have when

we create our product, we make that available to, you know, anyone and everyone.

The feedback that I have gotten on the five-day has been on the

most part very positive though the truth is a five-day forecast is

as accurate as the three-day forecast was just 15 or so years ago.

We put out on our graphical products a cone. That cone at the extended periods of four and five days is very, very large because we

have these large areas. But for most people, for the public, the only

thing I ask is that if you are within that large cone at those exVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tended time periods, just start thinking about what you might do

if the hurricane continued to head toward your community. Most

people do not need that four- and five-day lead time there but there

are some users, NASA if the Space Shuttle is on the launch pad

or the Navy with all their aircraft carriers in Norfolk for example

and they have to get people back from shore leave and get the

ships ready and underway and away from the coast before the arrival, you know, of high seas and storm force winds. So there are

some customers who indeed make very good use of that four- and

five-day forecast.

REBUILDING NEW ORLEANS

Mr. EHLERS. And may I ask both of you, do you have any involvement in the rebuilding of New Orleans? Are you making any

recommendations? What is your relationship with the local officials

on that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, NOAA is actively involved in restoration,

clearing the shipping channels to allow the port to reopen, looking

at the ecosystems and what needs to be done to restore those. Your

weather service continues to provide information on post-Katrina,

the Rita impacts, as well as, the daily forecast to all the people who

are down there working. And sir, they are paying attention to the

forecast. So, yes, sir, we are actively involved at all levels of NOAA.

Mr. EHLERS. It would be nice also if you could persuade them not

to rebuild in areas below sea level but I will leave that to your discretion.

My time has nearly expired. Mr. Davis?

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for recognizing

me. I will not make a large speech.

But I think as we observed what happened with the hurricane

that came through the gulf, perhaps tells all of us in Congress, as

well as, those who live in the area and certainly NOAA that we

need to make a serious visit to the predictions. Obviously, the ability that you have and a way to protect those who live in an area

where the hurricanes often frequent in the gulf or other areas in

Florida.

I represent an area that is in Tennessee. Obviously, we get a

goodness many times from the hurricanes because we get rainfall

that comes in that helps our farmers have the rainfall that is needed. But also coming with those many times are tornadoes that are

spawned from the high winds and as a result of that, we have

small footprint of damage and destruction that was observed in a

large footprint across the gulf—down the road would be the wooly

warm would be dark on one or the other or all the way through

would mean a rough winter. The thickness on the bark of a tree

or where a wasp or a hornet would hang their nest, how low in the

trees it would be.

Obviously, we have greatly expanded and improved upon predicting the weather and how forceful, how almighty it can be, how

damaging, and how harmful it can be. And it is my hope that those

of us who serve in Congress realize that continued funding for the

predictability of weather that will save lives is certainly a homeland security issue to us. I do believe that people throughout this

nation today have had a taste of the damage of the hurricane for

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a reason. The lesser amongst us who lived along the coast in Alabama, Mississippi, and New Orleans have been displaced because

their economic conditions would not permit them to rebuild or did

they live in an area where they could move to a family. And as a

result of that, we have seen evacuees throughout this nation be dislodged from their home. I do not believe there is a state in this nation that has not accepted evacuees. Those who have lost their

homes and everything that they have and the ability even to survive and in many cases, the retirees, their small Social Security

check that can help them have some means of living in many cases

to them what would appear to be almost a foreign country moving

from their home in the gulf inland to states all across this nation.

I think all of us have felt and have been made aware of and can

see the damage that has occurred.

So it is my hope that those of us here in Congress realize that

it is our responsibility as a nation to be sure that we adequately

fund the weather predictors which is NOAA and that we do not cut

dollars in that area. I applaud the efforts, I applaud the accuracy

of the agency that has provided us with a safety net in many cases

for those to escape. That happened when Rita visited the area of

Texas and we saw lesser at least personal harm done to those.

Having said that, I would yield the remainder of my time to a

Ranking Member with permission from the Chairman to Representative Bart Gordon from Tennessee.

COMMUNICATING WITH MEDIA

Mr. GORDON. I thank my friend from Tennessee.

There is a variety of things that we do not know but I think a

couple of things that we do know is that it is unfortunately inevitable that there will be another catastrophe of this magnitude or

worse whether it is by force of nature or force of man. And the

other thing that we know is that on the federal, State, and probably local level, our governments did not serve us as well as they

should and we would hope for them to do. So it is important that

we look at what went right, look at what went wrong, try to make

preparations for the future to get the wrongs to the right. I think

in doing that, it is important that we have transparency. I think

it is also important that we have an independent commission that

will review the various information and try to make non-partisan,

non-bias suggestions. But again to do that, it has got to be transparent.

And so I want to get a few things on the record because I am

confident that in trying to do the right thing we will have this

independent commission later. So General, if you would, let us see,

would you put up the memo, please?

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General, just again, just for the record, I cannot speak to the

truth or not of this. This was on a blog supposedly leaked from

NOAA staff. It is concerning a memo that went out on Thursday,

the 29th of September 2005 from a Jim T-e-e-t, is that how you

pronounce that, his name?

Mr. JOHNSON. I believe so, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. And you can tell me whether this is accurate. ‘‘Good day all. I have been informed that any request for an

interview with a national media outlet reporter must now receive

prior approval by DOC, Department of Commerce. Please ensure

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everyone on your staff is aware of this requirement. Any request

for an interview requires that the following information to be forwarded to me immediately so this process may begin. The name of

the reporter and their affiliation, their deadline, the contact number, the name of the individual being requested for the interview,

the purpose of the interview, additional background information

about the interview subject, and expertise of the requested

interviewee on the subject. The request will be forwarded through

NWS, NOAA to DOC. However, the individual to be interviewed ultimately will be determined by DOC.’’

Is that an accurate memo?

Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, I would say that memo did go out. It is, in

fact, a——

Mr. GORDON. That is fine. This was what I wanted to know

whether that was accurate so it was not just something very——

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir. It is a statement of a long standing policy.

The term now is an unfortunate choice of——

Mr. GORDON. I think it is also unfortunate that as we try to have

transparency and find out what went wrong that apparently members of your organization have to go through some type of a buffer.

I think that is unfortunate, too but let me continue to try to get

some things on the record here.

I want to note that we asked on this side for several things that

we have not been delivered. We have requested for the reports in

whatever form they may take that are produced by NOAA employee who works at the NOAA desk in the Homeland Security Operations Center. My understanding is the Department of Homeland

Security is raising objections to this request as are counsel at the

department. So I want to deliver a formal request for those documents today and they will be given to you. Go ahead, Leigh Ann.

This letter also asks that the department make available to our

staff the person who was assigned to the HSOC desk so that we

may interview that person. We asked that earlier but again there

has been national security objections hinted in the refusals. General Johnson, I hope you will do all you can to shake these things

loose. It is silly to think that there is anything referred to in

NOAA’s work on Hurricane Katrina that could in any way compromise national security.

Further, I ask that two letters be entered into the record. I have

written to the White House asking for the transcript of the HLT

briefing the President participated in. I also asked for the names

of any White House staff who communicated with NOAA regarding

Katrina.

In the second letter, you will see that I have asked FEMA to release any reports they maintain of the HLT briefing from August

27 and August 28. I have not received any sort of response to either letter. [See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record.]

Now General, my interest is not playing a game of got you. It is

trying to do legitimate oversight. As we said, this is going to happen again in some way or the other. We need to be prepared. My

wife and daughter live here in the District and I suspect that a variety of your employees, maybe your family, Members here today

have family here. It is very likely that this region could be one of

those hit with a catastrophe, more likely the man kind than the

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natural kind. So it is very important that we again learn our lessons, try to prepare. This is a matter of life and death.

Thank you, General.

[The information follows:]

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CONCLUDING REMARKS

Mr. EHLERS. The gentleman’s time has more than expired. I was

generous in giving him extra time because as a Ranking Member

he is entitled to a closing statement. That may not have been a

wise decision but we appreciate your efforts to get at some of these

issues.

Just a quick question to wrap it up and then I will have a closing

statement. I would like to ask you is there anything that you need

from the Congress, anything that the Congress could do that would

help you do a better job forecasting and warning about hurricanes.

In other words, do you in your experience of the past few years of

this, has anything come to mind where we are getting in the way

rather than helping the process?

Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, in my opening oral testimony I thanked you

and the Committee for your support after last year. The oral remarks also talked about modeling and observing and we can always do a better job. I am anxious for the Air Force to get the sensors modified and airplanes up to speed. And I look forward to the

’06 budget, as well as the other activities that can help support us

overall. We are very appreciative of what you have already done.

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you.

Mr. Mayfield, do you have anything to add?

Mr. MAYFIELD. No. We certainly appreciate everything that you

have done. And those buoys that the Congress helped us get at the

end of last year have been very, very, very useful already in several

storms and hurricanes already. And we certainly will appreciate

the additional support here as we continue to improve.

Mr. EHLERS. Well thank you.

And I would like to just make a few closing comments along the

lines of Mr. Rohrabacher and Mr. Davis pointing out how far we

have come. We often neglect that, but I must say as I watched this

unfold on my own TV screen, I could not help but marvel at the

changes from my childhood. I grew up on the plains of Minnesota

and we used to have what we called cyclones then not tornadoes.

No warning whatsoever. Everyone just watched the sky and when

it got bad enough, you headed for the basement. And sometimes

you miscalculated. Some real tragedies occurred as a result. Today,

we have tremendous warning systems for hurricanes, floods, tornadoes and particularly the satellites. And we often hear complaints

from the public about wasting our tax money, et cetera. I think this

is a good example of good use of tax money. Obviously it costs

much, much more to run the National Weather Service relatively

speaking than it did 40 years ago, but I would maintain that investments in science such as we are doing in this case have a very

good rate of return. I am certain that the lives saved even property

damage averted as a result of the work that you do and that you

have done not just in forecasting but making us aware of the dangers of nature, the tax money has more than paid for itself and the

extra information provided in particularly in the saving of lives.

And I think that is a very important point to note.

I also would comment there was some comment made earlier

about the lack of funding for NOAA and what happens in the budget. Unfortunately, NOAA frequently in the past has been the target

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of what we politely here call earmarks in which money is diverted

from a good cause such as the Weather Service or other areas and

assigned to some other cause which in the eyes of the earmarked

is more appropriate and more important. I think it is time that the

Congress and the Nation wake up and realize NOAA is really important. This is not a little pork barrel that people can dip into and

move the pork somewhere else. The work you do is extremely important to the livelihood of our nation, particularly in agriculture

and shipping but in other ways as well and we certainly appreciate

what you have done.

I hope that the new satellites we are putting up are going to help

you even more and do a better job. The new supercomputers which

this committee has initiated the funding for will help you do a

more accurate reporting and forecasting. I think if you hold a similar hearing ten years from now, I do not expect to be here but I

am sure that my successors will find even more astonishing results

and even better forecasting in the future.

So I want to thank you for being here today, for testifying before

the Committee. It has been a highly educational hearing. And you

have given this committee a lot to consider about the role of NOAA

in hurricane prediction. If there is no objection, the record will remain open for additional statements from the Members and for answers to any follow up questions the Committee may ask of the

panelists. Without objection so ordered. The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(85)

Appendix 1:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Brigadier General David L. Johnson (ret.), Assistant Administrator for

Weather Services; Director, The National Weather Service, National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce

Questions submitted by the Majority

Q1. What are the various notification systems the National Weather Service uses to

disseminate weather warnings and information? For each notification system,

please explain how Federal, State and local government officials receive the information. For each level of government (Federal, State and local), please explain how the National Weather Service (including its local weather forecast offices) confirms that government officials received emergency messages. Do these

procedures change in case of an ‘‘incident of national significance’’ declared by

the Department of Homeland Security?

A1. National Weather Service (NWS) warnings are distributed through a vast dissemination network. These systems include NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards

(NWR), which can reach anyone in the area who has a NWR receiver; NOAA

Weather Wire Service; Emergency Managers Weather Information Network

(EMWIN); Internet; local paging systems to emergency managers; high-speed direct

communications with users of large volumes of weather data (i.e., commercial meteorological firms) connected by landlines (Family of Services), by satellite broadcasts

(NOAAPORT), or both. The media uses one or more of these feeds to receive the

information and then rebroadcast it. Federal, State, and local officials typically receive weather warnings and information from different combinations of the above

systems. Some officials also obtain information from the private sector.

These dissemination systems do not have a mechanism in place to verify the user

received the message. However, each state emergency operations center has a direct

feed from the NOAA Weather Wire Service, paid for by the NWS, to help ensure

NWS warnings and other information are received by emergency managers. The

State emergency managers then redistribute the data and information, as appropriate, to local emergency managers. Government officials also typically receive messages from several systems (listed above). During major weather situations, many

NWS offices or regional headquarters send a meteorologist to State emergency operations centers, or place phone calls to these centers to ensure emergency managers

have the most current information and interpretation possible.

These procedures do not change for an ‘‘incident of national significance.’’

Q2. For each notification system described in the answer to question one, please explain how often the National Weather Service and its local forecast offices test

the systems to make sure they are working. Are the notification systems redundant to such a degree that no significant communications capability would be

lost if any one of the notification systems fails to function during a severe weather event?

A2. Each local weather forecast office tests the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards

(NWR) Network in its local area once a week to ensure the system is operating.

Other dissemination systems are monitored continuously at the National Weather

Service Telecommunication Gateway and any communications outages are addressed immediately.

If a NWR transmitter becomes inoperable, messages are not transmitted to the

NWR receivers. NOAA is working to further increase the reliability of NOAA

Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR) transmitters to allow operation in adverse conditions, when normal communications systems can fail. Nearly $5M in funding provided to NOAA in the FY 2006 hurricane supplemental will be used to provide

backup electrical power for NOAA Weather Radios and Automated Surface Observing Sites in coastal areas. Not only is NWR network reliability important, increasing

the number of individuals who own NWR receivers is also critical. NOAA works

with the private sector to promote the use of NWR receivers and recently worked

with FEMA and the Department of Education to distribute 16,000 NOAA Weather

Radios to public schools across the country. Also, with $1M in additional funding

provided in the supplemental, NOAA will expand the NWS Weather Wire Satellite

Communication System to improve communications capability at coastal Weather

Forecast Offices for timely transmission of weather warnings to the public and the

media.

One benefit of having multiple dissemination systems is redundancy. If one method is non-operational, others still disseminate important information. However, this

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strategy is successful only when recipients have access to multiple dissemination

systems. Redundancy is one of the items stressed in the National Weather Service

StormReady program, to ensure communities and emergency managers can receive

warnings and information different ways. Communities can receive NWS and emergency messages through NWS dissemination systems which include NOAA Weather

Radio All Hazards (NWR), which can reach anyone in the area who has a NWR receiver; NOAA Weather Wire Service; Emergency Managers Weather Information

Network (EMWIN); Internet; local paging systems to emergency managers; and via

commercial meteorological or communication (e.g., phone) companies.

Q3. What are NOAA’s back-up procedures during severe storms if a radar, buoy, or

entire local weather forecast office is destroyed or cannot communicate? Please

explain the circumstances that would trigger back-up procedures. Were any

back-up procedures triggered during Hurricanes Katrina or Rita? If so, please

explain what happened and what NOAA is doing to fix any damage.

A3. The National Weather Service (NWS) has robust backup procedures in place to

ensure continuity of operations. The NWS radar network was designed to provide

radar coverage for the contiguous United States to ensure radar coverage for severe

weather, including hurricanes. Should a radar fail, adjacent radar stations and

other observation systems provide sufficient coverage. Other observation systems,

such as satellites and surface observation stations, provide a sufficient level of coverage to assist meteorologists in the forecast and warning function. NOAA operated

WSR–88D radars have an operational availability of 99.1 percent.

NOAA/NWS recently added connection to four Federal Aviation Administration

Terminal Doppler Weather Radars—Orlando, FL; West Palm Beach, FL; New Orleans, LA; and Houston, TX—in hurricane-prone areas as another mechanism to ensure weather radar data are available to forecasters. During both Hurricanes

Katrina and Rita all radars remained operational, providing data to the local weather forecast offices.

NOAA/NWS buoys have redundant wind sensors and barometers that provide

data if the primary instrument fails. Several of the large buoys, including three in

the Gulf of Mexico and the seven new buoys deployed with FY04 Hurricane Supplemental funds have a complete second operational system on board that serves as

a back-up. Should a buoy suffer catastrophic damage, which rarely occurs, NOAA

maintains a network of large buoys which provide some overlapping coverage. Further, other weather observation systems (for example satellites and hurricane reconnaissance flights) also provide coverage. Repairing buoys is a high priority but depends on ship availability. NOAA fixes damaged buoys within the Atlantic Hurricane Basin as quickly as possible, usually within a few months. NOAA/NWS can

also provide manual backup should an automated surface observing system fail at

a Weather Forecast Office (WFO) or major airport.

During Hurricane Katrina, the NWS implemented backup coverage for the New

Orleans, Louisiana; Lake Charles, Louisiana; and Jackson, Mississippi offices when

communications to and from the offices were lost due to an MCI/communications

backbone failure. The FY 2006 Hurricane Katrina/Rita Emergency Supplemental

provides NOAA $1M to improve (harden) hurricane-prone WFOs communication capabilities via backup satellite communications. The NWS offices in Mobile, Alabama;

Houston, Texas; and Huntsville, Alabama assumed forecast and warning responsibility for the area normally covered by the New Orleans, Lake Charles, and Jackson

offices, respectively. During Hurricane Rita, the NWS implemented backup operations for the Lake Charles, Louisiana WFO when the office lost its communications

just after landfall. The backup service was provided by the WFO in Houston, Texas.

Q4. In your testimony you mentioned that at the end of each hurricane season NOAA

leads a ‘‘hot wash’’ to review all of its hurricane procedures with emergency

managers and weather forecasters. Please provide the following information

about the annual hot wash:

Q4a. Who from Federal, State, and local government agencies participates in the annual hot wash? Who from the private sector participates? Do you solicit input

and/or participation from non-governmental organizations and the public?

Q4b. What is the process for selecting participants?

Q4c. What is the process for reviewing and prioritizing recommendations that result

from the hot wash?

Q4d. What is the process for providing resources, if needed, for implementing priority recommendations?

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Q4e. What ‘‘hot wash’’ recommendations were made in the last three years? Which

of these recommendations have been implemented and which have not been implemented? If applicable, please explain why recommendations were not implemented.

A4a,b,c,d,e. Answer: The ‘‘hot wash’’ (a colloquialism for a series of agency-directed

reviews) is a review and analysis of the past hurricane season and occurs on many

levels. The first is an internal NOAA examination of operations and procedures to

see what went well and where improvements could be made. The second is the

Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference, an internal Federal Government review,

which includes NOAA, the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, NASA, the National Science Foundation, and others. And finally, a

National Hurricane Conference is conducted which includes all levels of government,

as well as emergency managers, private sector meteorologists, and media representatives. Participation in the National Hurricane Conference is open to everyone.

Local Weather Forecast Offices also conduct more informal analyses of hurricane operations and work with their local emergency management counterparts to identify

best practices and where improvements in the overall hurricane program can be

made.

Attached are summaries of the recommendations from the NOAA review and the

Federal Government review for the past three years (included as Appendix 1 and

2, respectively). It is a high priority for NOAA and the NWS to implement as many

of the recommendations as possible for the next hurricane season using existing resources and follow normal funding request procedures if necessary.

Q5. Is the ability to forecast marine wave height and wind speed important for predicting storm surge and inland flooding? If so, please explain why. What are the

current capabilities of NOAA to forecast marine wave height and wind speed?

Does NOAA require additional observational equipment to improve wave forecasts?

A5. Storm surge predictions are based on the size of the storm, the strength of the

winds and the bathymetry of the ocean. Predicting the size and strength of the

storm remains most critical to storm surge prediction. Winds push water ahead of

the storm, causing the water level to rise along the shoreline. The stronger the wind

and the larger the wind field, the larger the storm surge will be. Waves are also

driven by surface wind speed. NOAA’s operational numerical computer wave model

(WAVEWATCH) provides predictions of wave height for NOAA forecasters to use as

they prepare storm surge forecasts. Wave predictions from the WAVEWATCH model

at 24 hours are accurate to within about 1@ feet during the summer and about 2c

feet on average during the stormy winter months. The WAVEWATCH model will

eventually be coupled to the Hurricane Weather Research and Forecasting Model

to provide an advanced storm surge model. Battering coastal waves also push water

up along the coastline. In fact, the battering waves that were on top of the storm

surge were responsible for the extensive damage along North Carolina during Isabel

and the catastrophic damage along the Northern Gulf of Mexico coastline during

Katrina. $2.5M was provided in the FY 2006 hurricane supplemental to accelerate

storm surge forecasting, which includes improvements to the Sea Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) model.

Additional observations, such as those planned under the Global Environmental

Observation System of Systems (GEOSS), will help improve model predictions.

NOAA is working with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to develop new observing technologies, such as a scanning radar altimeter. When flown

on the NOAA P–3 aircraft, this new technology can provide valuable information as

was demonstrated during Hurricane Rita. Data from the instrument were used to

help measure significant wave height and transmit that information directly the National Hurricane Center.

Inland flooding associated with hurricanes is generally due to freshwater flooding

from hurricane-related rainfall, not wind driven storm surge or waves. With funding

provided in the FY 2006 hurricane supplemental ($2.5M), we are accelerating the

development of new localized flood-forecast products and services for hurricaneprone states.

Q6. What is the status of all marine buoys in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico?

According to an article in the Miami Herald on October 9, 2005, the National

Hurricane Center needs 13 additional marine buoys ($250,000/buoy) to improve

its hurricane forecasts. Why has NOAA not requested funding for additional

buoys?

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A6. All of the marine buoys in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico are operational.

NOAA used funding from the Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency

Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108–324) to deploy seven

buoys in the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean. These buoys provided critical data to help forecasters accurately track and predict the intensity and

path of hurricanes during the 2005 hurricane season. With incorporation of the

eight buoys provided in the FY 2006 hurricane supplemental, NOAA believes the

current configuration is adequate. Additional observations, are also being planned

under the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) to further improve

predictions.

Q7. According to an article in the Miami Herald on October 9, 2005, older

dropwindsondes fail at least half the time in strong winds but it would only cost

$1 million to fully upgrade to newer, more resilient dropwindsondes. What are

the failure rates for old and new dropwindsondes in high winds? When will

NOAA’s old supply of dropwindsondes be depleted such that the agency will only

rely on newer dropwindsondes? If NOAA has known that it would only take $1

million to upgrade the dropwindsondes, why didn’t NOAA fix this problem sooner?

A7. Failure of older dropsondes in high winds occurs primarily in the very lowest

level winds (about 500 feet altitude), when wind speeds exceeded 100–112 miles per

hour. NOAA worked with the National Center for Atmospheric Research and the Air

Force Reserve Command to test an updated dropsonde in 2004 that performed more

reliably in these high wind situations. These new dropsondes were mass produced

by the primary vendor (Vaisala) and used for most of the 2005 hurricane season.

Preliminary indications are that the new dropsondes performed in 2005 as well as

they did in the tests in 2004, with no failures reported in high winds. However, we

are still evaluating their performance to ascertain whether these new dropsondes

have any limitations of their own. NOAA has only 220 of the older dropsondes in

stock which will be used before the next hurricane season.

Q8. For the past five years, what is the annual number of Doppler radar failures

due to lightning strikes? Where did these failures occur geographically? What is

the justification for not pursuing the $3.5 million fiber optic solution for protecting Doppler radars from lightning strikes? What lightning protection projects

has NOAA completed or is NOAA planning to complete in lieu of the fiber optic

solution? What has been or is predicted to be the cost of those projects?

A8. On average, 25 of 158 operational WSR–88D radar systems have been damaged, apparently due to lightning strikes, annually during the last five years (17

in 2005; 33 in 2004; 27 in 2003; 34 in 2002; and 12 in 2001). Radars in all areas

of the contiguous United States have received lightning damage; this type of damage is not any more or less prevalent in any one geographical location. Radar towers

are usually the tallest structure in the local area, making them a likely target for

lightning strikes. NOAA operated WSR–88D radars have an operational availability

of 99.1 percent. The average time to repair a radar is about 6.5 hours.

Recognizing early in the program that radars are susceptible to lightning strikes,

NOAA/NWS took aggressive action to make the radars more robust. We focused on

actions that would have the most immediate and largest payback. NOAA/NWS has

completed several lightning mitigating projects as part of sustaining engineering

and retrofit actions:

(1) Stocking lightning sensitive spare parts at field sites and in a ‘‘lightning kit’’

maintained at our logistics centers, to reduce radar down time due to awaiting parts delivery.

(2) A retrofit of the grounding grid at radar sites in 1993–1998 ($1.9 million)

greatly reduced lightning susceptibility and reduced the number of lightning-damaged radar parts by an estimated 50 percent.

(3) Surge protection devices were added to the radar shelters in three different

projects ($732,000).

(4) Replacement of aging copper communication lines with fiber optic communication lines which are less susceptible to lightning damage/interruption in

2004–2005 ($1.6 million).

(5) Preventative maintenance inspections have been refined to mitigate lightning impacts.

(6) Depot-level engineering visits to the occasional sites that appear to have an

unusual susceptibility to lightning have corrected a number of small issues

and subsequently reduced the occurrences of lightning induced damage. A

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visit of this type was conducted at the Miami WSR–88D last year after we

noticed an anomalously high number of lightning failures. Since the engineering team visit, there have been no lightning failures.

(7) Transition power maintenance systems were installed in 1998–2003 ($45.3

million). These systems enable the ‘‘ride through’’ of commercial power outages until engine generator power becomes available and they condition the

commercial power to eliminate ‘‘spikes’’ due to nearby lightning strikes.

These features reduce the likelihood of lightning induced radar damage.

(8) A National Severe Storm Laboratory study in 2000 showed the current radome lightning rod configuration is the most effective design.

These initiatives have been very effective and made the radars more resilient

under lightning conditions. It is important to note that it is not possible to make

the radars lightning proof against a direct strike. However, we are taking all steps

necessary to mitigate the effects of lightning. On those occasions when radars fail

due to a direct lightning strike, the adjacent radars are positioned to provide backup

coverage.

Q9. Please provide a funding history, including number of full-time employees, for

the Hurricane Research Division for the past twenty years.

A9. The first table below summarizes the funding history of the Hurricane Research

Division for the past twenty years. Non-base support includes other NOAA support

received through funded proposals to Hurricane Research Division scientists

through projects such as the Joint Hurricane Testbed. Non-base support also includes extramural support from other federal agencies, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The second table summarizes Hurricane Research Division staff history broken into

FTEs and cooperative institute (CI)/contract personnel.

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NOAA conducts hurricane research not only at HRD, but also at its Geophysical

Fluid Dynamics Laboratory and Environmental Modeling Center. Through its hurricane research program, NOAA develops new technologies for observing hurricanes,

further improves its models for predicting hurricane track and intensity, and provides critical assistance to forecasters at the National Hurricane Center. All together, these efforts resulted in the vast track improvements over the past 20 years.

Q10. According to an article in the Miami Herald on October 10, 2005, Hurricane

Research Division scientists use sensors called Airborne Expendable

Bathythermographs to measure the temperature of the ocean down to 1,000 feet.

But, researchers can’t get the data to forecasters because they need to develop

software to use the data (estimated software cost is $200,000). Is this characterization accurate, and if so, why has NOAA not provided the funding for the

software development?

A10. The October 10, 2005 Miami Herald article is correct per se, in that software

needs to be developed to get the data to forecasters; however the article is inaccurate in its implication that NOAA has neglected to fund software development as

there is no current operational requirement for the observations/data from the ocean

probes. The ocean probes used were acquired from the Navy surplus by the Hurricane Research Division (HRD) for use in research missions. The HRD maintains

software to process and quality-control these data for research purposes. After these

data are collected and processed for quality control, they are sent to NOAA’s operational modeling center to determine utility of the data.

Q11. When does NOAA plan to completely upgrade all 102 stations in the weather

balloon observation network? What is the failure rate for weather balloons and

what could be done to reduce the failure rate?

A11. NOAA oversees 102 upper air stations in the United States and throughout

the Caribbean. Our FY 2006 operating plan supports the upgrade of 78 of those

sites, which are scheduled to be upgraded by the end of Fiscal Year 2010.

During the period of October 2004 through October 2005, 98 percent of launches

have reached the minimum successful height of 400 hecto Pascals* (standard is 90

percent), and 66 percent of launches have reached 10 hecto Pascals* (standard is

60 percent). The system is meeting the NWS performance requirements. (*Hecto

Pascals is a standard of pressure measurement used by the National Weather Service. At 10 hecto Pascals, the balloon is at a height of approximately 100,000 feet.)

Q12. NOAA has acknowledged that some hurricane research software still runs on

old computers because the software has not been converted to run on newer machines. Are there plans to update the software to run on newer computers? If

so, when will that update be completed? If not, why not?

A12. The Hurricane Research Division manages a 4–5 year information technology

(IT) strategy to upgrade and replace all IT equipment in order to meet NOAA’s IT

security requirements. NOAA completed the third year of this strategy in 2005 and

we have replaced or upgraded our complete network infrastructure, most of our

servers, and 67 percent of our desktop computers. Our strategy calls for completion

of the server and desktop upgrades in 2006, and completing the software update in

2007. All of our processing software runs on our recently upgraded UNIX servers,

and we currently are upgrading some of the software that will run on the aircraft

to process and quality control observations in real time to run under LINUX (Aircraft Operations Center’s preferred operating system). Last year, the Aircraft Operations Center provided a LINUX server for HRD to use and we are purchasing a

new LINUX server this year to accommodate this transition. NOAA is working to

streamline and upgrade the SATCOM data transfer from the aircraft to the ground

as part of our strategy to provide more data from the aircraft to our operational

partners. As part of this upgrade we are working to define requirements for data

transfer and quality control of the data to ensure the IT infrastructure on the aircraft meet all NOAA’s needs.

Questions submitted by the Minority

Q1. For Hurricane Katrina, the weather forecasting offices that were in the main

path of the hurricane were the New Orleans forecast office in Slidell, LA; the

Mobile forecast office in Mobile, AL; Jackson, MS; and Lake Charles, LA. For

Hurricane Rita, Houston, TX and Lake Charles, LA were in the main path of

the storm.

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According to NOAA’s daily Incident Coordination Center reports for Katrina, at

least four other local offices were at-the-ready or engaged to provide backup for

these offices—Shreveport, LA; Huntsville, AL; Houston, TX; and Tallahassee,

FL. For Rita, it appeared to be the Fort Worth, TX WFO acting as the backup

office.

The Southern Region Headquarters also provided additional personnel to the

local forecast offices, the State emergency operations centers, and coordinated

the backup plan and response for the offices in the hurricane path.

It appears NWS met its goal of maintaining continuity of weather forecasting

capabilities overall for the affected areas during these hurricanes even as some

of the local offices were experiencing communication and other equipment failure

problems. It appears NWS had a good internal preparation and response plan.

What is your assessment of the performance of the NWS internal preparation

and response plan for these storms? What changes, if any, are you considering

to further improve the procedures for maintaining continuous NWS forecasting

capabilities during hurricanes? What is the current status of the impacted

NOAA offices and equipment damaged by these two storms?

A1. The National Weather Service (NWS) plans for continuity of forecast and warning operations worked well during Hurricane Katrina. Our procedures worked well

but we are working to address some technical issues, such as phone line failures,

to make these systems even more robust during natural disasters.

The National Data Buoy Center (NWS), the National Coastal Data Development

Center (NESDIS), and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) laboratory located at John C. Stennis Space Center in Bay St. Louis, MS, sustained damage. The

NWS Weather Forecast Office (WFO) in Slidell, LA, was constructed to be able to

withstand a Category 3 hurricane (with an internal room able to withstand a Category 5), and sustained minimal damage from the storm. Power and communications were quickly restored to the facility. NWS WFOs in Mobile, Lake Charles, and

Houston provided backup forecast and warning services while communications were

compromised.

Additional NOAA facilities/equipment which sustained damages include the

NMFS lab in Pascagoula, MS, and the Office of Marine and Aviation Operations

(OMAO) port office and warehouse, personal offices co-located at Halter Marine, and

the NOAA ship, OREGON 11, all located in Pascagoula. Also, two NOAA lab facilities in Miami, FL, sustained damage and two National Water Level Observation

Network (NWLON) stations are being replaced.

Ten NWS Automated Surface Observing Systems (ASOS) were impacted by

Katrina, mainly by loss of communications or power. Two systems were destroyed;

two systems sustained damage and continue to have intermittent communications

and power problems. The Doppler radar at Slidell remained operational throughout

the storm. Once communication was restored, data were available to all users. Five

buoys and four Coastal Marine Automated Network (C–MAN) stations were damaged or destroyed by the two storms. The buoys and one of the C–MAN stations

have been repaired. The offshore platforms containing the other three C–MAN stations were demolished, and will be repaired. The FY 2006 Hurricane Katrina Supplemental provides funding to repair or replace the ASOS and C–MAN stations that

remain down. We are currently awaiting local infrastructure restoration (restoration

of commercial power and communications to the area) before we can address these

repairs.

Q2. How does the declaration of an Incident of National Significance by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) change the operations of

the National Weather Service with respect to regional forecasting, participation

in HLT conference calls, local forecasting or the other standard operations of

NWS for a hurricane?

How does the flow of information between NOAA and the Homeland Security

Operations Center (HSOC) at DHS change if an Incident of National Significance is declared for a hurricane?

A2. The operations of National Weather Service (NWS) units do not change when

an Incident of National Significance is declared. Our operation procedures are designed to ‘‘automatically’’ include incident escalation. NOAA/NWS responds to similar situations whenever a thunderstorm becomes severe or produces a tornado, or

when a strong winter storm develops. To keep up with the latest information, the

NOAA Watch Desk at the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) coordinates closely with the NOAA Incident Coordination Center (NOAA ICC) or the apVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00097 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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propriate NWS Regional Operations Center. Important products such as watches,

warnings and advisories especially for significant meteorological events such as tornadoes, flash floods, and blizzards—are automatically routed directly from the main

NWS communications center, the NWS Telecommunication Gateway, and transmitted via e-mail to the NOAA Watch Desk. Additionally, for a selected group of

these products, such as tornado warnings, flash flood warnings, hurricane forecasts

and statements, information is sent directly to the Department of Homeland Security Senior Watch Officer in the HSOC.

Q3. The Slidell office managed to get a flash flood message out about the levee

breach in New Orleans at 8:14 am Central Daylight Time the morning Hurricane Katrina made landfall. The office lost its communication capability a short

time later.

The top of the Bulletin has a line that reads: EAS Activation Requested. What

action does that request set into motion?

What systems would transmit this message and who would receive a flash flood

message of this type (e.g., the Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge; the

Region VI FEMA office; NWS Southern Regional Headquarters)? Please trace

the path of this message.

A3. Transmitting the message ‘‘EAS Activation Requested’’ initiates the Emergency

Alert System. The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is designed to provide the President with a means to address the American people in the event of a national emergency. Through the EAS, the President would have access to thousands of broadcast

stations, cable systems, and participating satellite programmers to transmit a message to the public. The EAS and its predecessors, CONELRAD and the Emergency

Broadcast System (EBS), have never been activated for this purpose. But beginning

in 1963, the President permitted State and local level emergency information to be

transmitted using the EBS (now EAS).

Once activated, the EAS, depending on the message, generates tone alerts on

radio stations, crawls or programming interruptions for television broadcasts, and

immediate retransmissions by ‘‘intermediaries’’ (e.g., private weather companies, television stations, web-based organizations, etc.) to cell phones, e-mail messages,

Internet notifications, etc. The message is also immediately broadcast on NOAA

Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR). State Emergency Operations Centers are

equipped to receive these warning messages through various methods, including

NWR, Internet, Emergency Managers Information Network (EMIN), and NOAA

Weather Wire Service (NWWS). NOAA’s responsibility is complete once the message

is transmitted; we do not verify receipt of transmission.

The flash flood warning message was transmitted by the Slidell Weather Forecast

Office and routed immediately onto NOAA Weather Radio. From there, the Emergency Alert System was activated, with the message and EAS activation request

reaching media within seconds. The message was also transmitted through all other

NWS dissemination systems, including NOAA Weather Wire Service (NWWS),

Emergency Managers Weather Information Network (EMIN), NOAAPORT, Internet, Family of Services, and others.

Questions submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson

Q1. What role does NOAA play in providing information to the Army Corps of Engineers regarding the potential and magnitude of flooding and storm surge that

would factor into setting construction standards for the New Orleans levee system? How often is this information updated?

A1. NOAA’s National Weather Service (NWS) runs the SLOSH (Sea, Lake, and

Overland Surges from Hurricanes) model in simulation studies to estimate potential

hurricane storm surge flooding. This work is done as part of comprehensive hurricane evacuation planning. Data from these model simulation studies are used, in

addition to other relevant information, to develop evacuation plans. NOAA/NWS

also runs the SLOSH model for post-storm analysis, using the exact track of the

storm, to help assess storm impacts.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and FEMA are the primary Federal

agencies providing funding for these SLOSH simulation studies. NOAA is responsible for running the simulations. The Atlantic and Gulf coastlines of the United

States, from Texas to Maine, can be divided into 41 geographic regions, or basins.

SLOSH updates are generated for each of the 41 basins, including the New Orleans

area, according to a list of priorities established by the Interagency Coordinating

Committee on Hurricanes (ICCOH), of which the USACE, FEMA, and NOAA are

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members. The ICCOH determines when the SLOSH model studies are updated, and

makes the request to NOAA. These NOAA simulations are used primarily for evacuation studies and planning. NOAA conducted SLOSH model simulation studies for

the New Orleans area in 1989, 1994, and 2002. These studies are not done on a

scheduled basis, but when levee data or upgrades to the storm surge model physics

warrant, and as resources permit. SLOSH is used primarily by the USACE to support evacuation studies and emergency response activities.

For engineering studies and flood protection structure design the USACE uses

NOAA wind fields and other storm meteorological data as well as bathymetric map

products to drive high resolution storm surge and wave models.

At the request of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, NOAA’s Office of Oceanic

and Atmospheric Research provides post-storm analysis of wind fields to assist

USACE post-storm analysis of storm surge modeling and impact.

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Appendix I

Federal Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference (IHC)

Recommendations

57th IHC ACTION ITEMS (2002)

Recommendation: Amend NHOP to carry Internet address. Implemented.

Recommendation: Amend NHOP to reflect changes in tropical cyclone

breakpoints. Implemented.

Recommendation: Amend NHOP Appendices H and I when information is received from NOAA/NWS. Implemented.

Recommendation: Amend appropriate sections of NHOP to reflect forecasts extended to five days. Implemented.

Recommendation: Delete section A.1.7 of the NHOP. Implemented.

Recommendation: Add to Appendix L—Glossary section of NHOP. Implemented.

Recommendation: NOAA/NWS will provide OFCM further details. Add product to

appropriate section of NHOP. Implemented.

Recommendation: The name Isidore be retired and suggest replacement names Irving, Icaro, or Ike. Recommend the name Lili be retired and suggest replacement

names Lucy, Laura, or Lisette. Recommend the name Kenna be retired and suggest

replacement names Karina, Katherin, or Kayla. IHC to forward suggestions to the

RA–IV Hurricane Committee. Implemented.

Recommendation: Update NHOP to reflect changes by AFWA. Implemented.

Recommendation: Amend NHOP to reflect changes from 53 WRS. Implemented.

58th IHC ACTION ITEMS (2003)

Recommendation: Amend the NHOP to add the GPS dropwindsonde splash time

to the TEMP DROP 62626 section. Implemented.

Recommendation: Amend NHOP for deployment of drifting buoys. Implemented.

Recommendation: Amend NHOP to reflect replacement names for retired storm

names Fabian, Isabel, Juan and Lili. Implemented.

Recommendation: Ask the Navy to run the GFDN at 0, 6, 12, and 18Z out to 126

hours. Implemented—FNMOC will increase the run frequency and extend the forecast period of the GFDN, resources permitting.

Recommendation: Amend the 2004 NHOP to include approved recommended

changes from 53 WRS. Implemented.

59th IHC ACTION ITEMS (2004)

Recommendation: Have at least one of the two P–3s operationally configured and

available to respond within 24 hours to reconnaissance taskings from 1 June

through 30 November. The minimum operational configuration for the P–3 includes

the SFMR and the Airborne Vertical Atmosphere Profiling System. Modify the 2005

National Hurricane Operations Plan accordingly. Implemented.

Recommendation: Retire storm names Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne. Implemented.

Recommendation: Ask SAB to continue to provide Dvorak satellite classifications

for tropical weather systems in the Atlantic, eastern and central north Pacific basins. Implemented

Recommendation: Correct NHOP. Implemented.

Recommendation: Make the appropriate changes to NHOP section 5.5.4 to allow

the NRL P–3 to operate jointly with the other aircraft in the effected airspace. Implemented.

Recommendation: Revise the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in the NHOP

Appendix F, as needed, to reflect changes in agency contacts and approving officials

for 2005. Implemented.

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Recommendation: Update NHOP Table 6–2 and Appendices I and K. Implemented.

Recommendation: During the 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season, UBLOX

dropsondes are to be used in the eyewall of intense (Cat. 3–5) hurricanes and in

drop locations adjacent to land on any reconnaissance or surveillance flights.

GPS121 dropsondes should be used elsewhere to deplete the current inventory of

these sondes before becoming obsolete. Adopted—Coordination is ongoing between

TPC/HRD/AOC/53 WRS.

Recommendation: The OFCM should facilitate the identification of engineering

support necessary design, testing and replacement of components of the GPS dropsonde. Action—The OFCM will facilitate the development of an implementation

strategy to pursue the development and procurement of the next-generation

dropwindsonde.

OPEN ACTION ITEM (from 56th IHC)

Recommendation: Amend Section 3.3 of the NHOP to reflect designation of tropical and subtropical cyclones. Implemented.

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Appendix 2

NOAA 2003 Hurricane Conference Action Items

Recommendation: Add the GPS dropwindsonde splash time to the TEMP DROP

62626 section. Implemented.

Recommendation: Identify simplest mechanisms to get P–3 the data to the GTS.

Implemented.

Recommendation: Attendees to make decisions regarding Tropical Cyclone Wind

Team for: what type of 34-, 50-, and 64-kt wind distribution should be represented

for tropical depressions, tropical storms, and hurricanes; whether a wind team is

needed, and whether the team charter should be continued and why. Implemented.

Recommendation: Include three- to five-day tropical cyclone information in the

Offshore Waters Forecasts. Implemented.

Recommendation: NWS grids need to be consistent between coastal WFOs and

OPC. Implemented.

Recommendation: WFOs need to ensure consistent information when re-issuing

NHC products. Implemented.

Recommendation: Rerun the SLOSH model ‘‘MOMs’’ using larger storm wind

fields, farther west tracks, climatologically curved tracks, and for time periods that

extend well beyond the storm center’s passage. Implemented.

Recommendation: Redo the PC SLOSH version of the Chesapeake Basin used by

WFOs with these modifications. Implemented.

Recommendation: Make storm specific SLOSH output available to the field offices

24 hours prior to landfall. Output from several runs with tracks both to the left and

right of the official forecast track, and perhaps of different categories, would be valuable. Implemented.

Recommendation: Allow WFOs to run storm specific surge models locally. Not

Implemented—Computer resources not available locally, and differing solutions

could hamper preparedness actions.

Recommendation: Work in partnership with the academic sector to develop a

more sophisticated storm surge model. Implemented.

Recommendation: Work in partnership with the academic sector to develop probabilistic methods of displaying storm surge forecasts. Implemented.

Recommendation: Work in partnership with the academic sector to develop high

resolution storm surge inundation mapping. Implemented.

Recommendation: When forecasting positions over land, decay the winds according to model guidance. Implemented.

Recommendation: Reword Section 6.1.1 of NWSI 10–601 to clarify requirements

of offices designated as ‘‘inland’’ by regions, for issuing and updating NPWs for Inland Tropical Storm/Hurricane Watch/Warnings. Implemented.

Recommendation: An automated solution needs to be found so all approved break

points are handled by the NHC software and so in the future, it correctly plots

watches and warnings affecting the Chesapeake Bay area on the NHC Web site. Implemented.

Recommendation: Develop a method for allowing local offices to correct erroneous

tropical issuances, bearing in mind this includes web based products. Will be Implemented—Awaiting AWIPS software build to establish a national standard map

and removal process by product cancellation.

Recommendation: NWS internet software should use FFA to paint flood watch

maps and NPW to correctly plot wind warnings/advisories during tropical weather.

A product should be developed to correctly plot tropical weather flags. This would

also solve the problem of automated NOAA Weather Radio dissemination. Implemented, with modifications to use other products at this time.

Recommendation: Could TPC issue a product that would include the coastal county codes within the TC Watch and/or Warning areas, as well as a simple line of text

detailing the breakpoints of the watch/warning area? This product could then be

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sent over AWIPS and used by the appropriate WFOs to send to their CRS broadcast. Will be Implemented in a future AWIPS software load.

Recommendation: Make surface data received at NHC from mobile platforms

available to the coastal WFOs through AWIPS. Implemented to the degree possible—Supplemental/experimental wind information data from non-NOAA sources

will be accessible via the Internet, when possible.

Recommendation: Using input from TAFB, OPC and local WFOs, NHC advisories

should include a statement advising not just ‘‘marine’’ interests, but the public, to

be alert for dangerous surf conditions including rip currents. Implemented.

Recommendation: Once TPC commits to beginning an advisory package for a new

system, a DSA should always be issued to inform all users. Implemented.

Recommendation: TPC should be more diligent to place additive information

below the $$. NWR automation software could also be modified to search for key

words and remove such from being broadcast. NHC will make all efforts to place

product ID information regarding on-going storms at the bottom of the TWO. Implemented.

Recommendation: Determine if a national model/standardized gHLS format/software should be developed for use by all WFOs. If yes, work towards developing the

national model/standard. A team approach might be most effective to move this initiative along. Not Implemented—A national implementation of a gHLS or some

form of graphical hurricane hazard representation will not take place for the 2004

season. OS21 talking with regions about forming a team to look at implementation

of some form of graphical hurricane hazard product in 2005. Update of this team

will be made at the 2004 Hurricane Conference.

Recommendation: Initiating and receiving agencies should coordinate in the formulation of best-track positions to avoid discontinuities or discrepancies near the

point of transfer. Implemented.

Recommendation: Expand TCU and TCE product header information to associate

these products with the particular tropical cyclone they describe. Introduce

MIATCUATx, MIATCEATx, MIATCUEPx, MIATCEEPx, where x varies from 1–5

along with the associated tropical cyclone. Implemented.

Recommendation: TPC and WFOs will complete their coordination on the list of

secondary breakpoints. When complete for a given year, TPC will post the list on

its web page in a manner similar to the standard breakpoints. TPC will coordinate

with OCWWS, NCO, and FSL to develop a scheme for communicating via the WWA

product breakpoint information (e.g., county and lat/lon) for any site not on the

standard and secondary list. Implemented.

Recommendation: Change wording in last sentence of NWSI 10–601, 7.5 to ‘‘The

appropriate regions will ensure Tropical Cyclone Center(s) obtain significant information (e.g., deaths and damages) from WFOs not preparing formal post-storm reports.’’ WFOs should clearly label those reports which are unofficial in the PSH,

Internet and other information source outlets. Implemented.

Recommendation: Delete the definitions of ‘‘advisory’’ and ‘‘hurricane local statement’’ from NWSI 10–604. Implemented.

Recommendation: For a well forecasted storm, such as Isabel, it would appear the

New York City OEM would usually be best served if the storm that is handled in

a non-tropical fashion during the watch phase continued to be handled in a nontropical fashion during its warning stage. Similarly, tropical issuances should generally follow in the warning phase, if initially introduced during the watch stage.

However, all things considered, the New York City OEM would generally opt for

tropical versus non-tropical issuances if the situation is a ‘‘toss-up.’’ Implemented.

Recommendation: There needs to be a standard operating procedure to address

medium range tropical cyclone forecasting. Implemented.

Recommendation: Clarify the standard for handing off a tropical cyclone from the

TPC to the HPC. Implemented.

Recommendation: Change the National Hurricane Operations Plan (NHOP) regarding deployment of drifting buoys. Implemented.

Recommendation: Initiate an annual Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) review of the

past season’s ‘‘lessons learned’’ and implement suggested ‘‘best practices’’ prior to

the beginning of the tropical season. Implemented.

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Recommendation: Develop a comprehensive package of geographical locations,

pronunciations and tropical related impacts pertinent to each coastal WFO. Provide

the package to the detailed HLT prior to arrival at NHC. Not Implemented—Eastern and Southern Regions will provide WFOs and RFCs with templates for developing standardized information guides, to include tropical-related impacts and geographical pronunciations. Regions will complete guides prior to beginning of 2006

season with the final guides available to TPC/NHC for HLT activations.

Recommendation: Fabian, Isabel and Juan will be retired. Replacement names to

be decided at WMO RA–IV meeting. Implemented.

Recommendation: The Navy run the GFDN at 0, 6, 12, and 18Z out to 126 hours.

Forward to IHC. Implemented.

NOAA 2004 Hurricane Conference Action Items

Recommendation: Change NWSI 10–601 to establish a ‘‘Hurricane Eye-wall

Warning’’ product with unique PIL and EAS code to be issued by WFOs for

landfalling tropical cyclones with distinct eye-wall and inner rainband features with

destructive winds. Implemented.

Recommendation: To increase the visibility of the inland hurricane (wind) hazard,

create a new PIL (IHW?) for Inland Hurricane (Wind) Watches/Warnings to elevate/

distinguish the watch/warning from the more universal non-precipitation weather

(NPW) PIL. Not Implemented—Existing products must be more effectively used

to communicate the potential threats.

Recommendation: To better align terminology between the coastal and inland

watches/warnings, change the name for the (WFO issued) interior watch/warning to

‘‘Inland Tropical Storm/Hurricane Watch/Wanting.’’ Implemented.

Recommendation: Regions will identify WFOs exempt from the requirement of

section 7.3.3.3 of NWSI 10–601. Implemented.

Recommendation: To better align NHC and WFO product issuance times, change

watch/warning criteria in NWSI section 7.3.2.2. to read: A watch is valid up to 48

hours after the issuance time. The valid time (event start and end times) is described in the watch headline. A warning is valid up to 36 hours after issuance time.

The valid time (event start and end times) is described in the warning headline. Implemented.

Recommendation: To help direct customers to NWS WFO products that emphasize tropical storm hurricane impacts over non-coastal areas, NHC should include

a general reference within the TCP product of wind impacts occurring, or projected

to occur, along coastal and inland areas. Implemented.

Recommendation: Inland offices may issue HLS-type products using the HLS

when tropical cyclone conditions are expected within part or all of the CWA. Implemented.

Recommendation: Reinstate language in 10–601 Section 7.1.2.2 to allow WFOs to

issue HLSs as needed to dispel rumors or to clarify tropical cyclone related information for their CWA. Implemented.

Recommendation: Restructure NWSI 10–601 to encourage WFOs to write single

purpose HLSs, to emphasize a specific hazard which is imminent and/or will have

a potentially life-threatening impact, or to describe a significant and critical change

of short-term hazard impacts. Implemented.

Recommendation: All HLSs should include at least one headline. Implemented.

Recommendation: Allow WFOs the flexibility to issue Special Marine Warnings on

an as needed basis during tropical storm/hurricane watches. Implemented.

Recommendation: Use the standard tropical storm symbol for subtropical storms

on the NWS unified surface analysis. This will be consistent with warning headlines, which use the phrase ‘‘. . .Tropical Storm Warning. . .’’ for subtropical

storms in OPC/TPC high seas forecasts. Implemented.

Recommendation: Decide method to provide required information in header. Implemented.

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Recommendation: OS21 will investigate requirements needed to expand the product bins for NHC numbered products from 5 to 10. We will keep JTWC in mind.

Not implemented—Will be discussed at the 2005 NOAA Hurricane Conference.

Recommendation: At least one of the two P–3s will be operationally configured

and available to respond within 24 hours to reconnaissance taskings from 1 June

through 30 November. The minimum operational configuration for the P–3 includes

the SFMR and the Airborne Vertical Atmosphere Profiling System. Implemented.

Recommendation: Decide on a consistent and appropriate way of indicating wind

speeds for tropical cyclones in WFO text forecast products. Implemented.

Recommendation: TPC should stop producing the gridded TCM. If the current primary FSL hurricane wind tool does not work, the new generic cyclonic wind tool

could be used as backup. Implemented.

Recommendation: Allow TPC/NHC to declare Critical Weather Events. Implemented.

Recommendation: TPC coordinate with DOD contacts to develop document. Forward to Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference. Not implemented—Recommendation withdrawn.

Recommendation: Meet with Executive members of the NHC Electronic Media

Pool to assess the scope of costs and impact on local operations; explore means for

resolving the problem in the public interest (convenience and necessity). Realign or

redefine resources and rules of engagement, as necessary. Implemented.

Recommendation: Initiate a low-cost pilot project to demonstrate the feasibility of

a local (WFO) level II data archive. The Melbourne, Miami, and San Juan offices

will participate in the pilot project. TPC will coordinate among the participating offices and ROC. Implemented.

Recommendation: Retire 2004 storm names at the annual WMO RA–IV meeting.

It is likely that Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne will be retired. Implemented.

Recommendation: SAB continue to provide Dvorak satellite classifications for

tropical weather systems in the Atlantic, eastern and central north Pacific basins.

Implemented.

Recommendation: Determine best method to use NHC radius of maximum winds

in SPC tornado watches’ ‘‘Mean Vector’’ line. Implemented.

Recommendation: Ensure revised NWS Hurricane Directives are annually available to the field by June 1st. Implemented.

Recommendation: Include a landfall point in the TCM product. Both Hurrevac

and the TCM tool could be modified to incorporate this additional point and improve

the transition between water based points/radii and land based points which have

already taken land effects into account in their radii. Not Implemented—TPC/

NHC agrees to provide guidance on landfall intensity during the Hurricane Hotline

Coordination calls.

Recommendation: Reiterate the need to NWS headquarters for ASOS backup

power to ensure no loss of data. Implemented.

Recommendation: Make a request to the observation branch of OCWWS to upgrade the structural integrity of ASOS system in hurricane-prone areas, making

them more resistant to high winds. Implemented.

Recommendation: The need for a PSH in these circumstances should be based on

a stated need by TPC for the data, and not an all inclusive directive which takes

no notice of whether the data is actually needed or useful. Implemented.

Recommendation: Due to possible urgency implied in a Tropical Cyclone Update

(TCU), it is requested that TPC, using the Hurricane Coordination Hotline, alert

WFOs and other users that a TCU is about to be issued. Implemented.

Recommendation: Push SLOSH Rex files to WFOs via the AWIPS SBN. Not Implemented—Action forwarded to TPC communications specialists in the Technical

Support Branch for comment and feasibility due to band width limitations of SBN.

Recommendation: Port the SLOSH software to the LINUX environment and implement it for operational runs on AWIPS. Not Implemented—A LINUX version

of this program already exists, but it runs rather slowly. TPC will ask MDL (Will

Shaffer’s group) to work, as time and resources permit, to improve the efficiency of

the LINUX SLOSH display software, with the intent to migrate eventually to

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AWIPS. WFO Miami and TPC will investigate using an alternative data transmission mode via the AWIPS FTP server.

Recommendation: WFOs need clarification on the convention that NHC will use

in the SLOSH runs to ensure appropriate interpretation of the product. Implemented.

Recommendation: Make operational a probabilistic storm surge model available to

forecasters that can be relayed as information to customers farther in advance than

the current approximate 12-hour practice. Implemented.

Recommendation: Make corrections to NHOP. Implemented.

2005 NOAA Hurricane Conference Action Items

Note: The 2005 NOAA Hurricane Conference occurred in December, 2005. The following recommendations came from that meeting and are being addressed.

Recommendation: Discuss pros and cons of issuing tropical storm/hurricane/typhoon warnings when conditions are expected over land, or along the coast. Action—Change wording of first paragraph to ‘‘along the coast.’’ Make parallel

changes in NHOP if necessary.

Recommendation: Update the directives to formally extend lead time of tropical

cyclone watches to 48 or 60 hours. This will better support evacuation orders provided by local emergency management. Action—No action required.

Recommendation: Format the Repeat section of the Tropical Cyclone Public Advisory in the current paragraph form or a list. Whatever method is used, consistent

formatting, words, dots, spaces is required. Add wind gusts. Status—open.

1. TPC will not add gusts in the public advisory.

2. OS will provide documentation/examples on ‘‘Repeat’’ section inconsistencies

to TPC.

3. TPC will take steps to ensure the ‘‘Repeat’’ section is formatted consistently

in the current narrative fashion.

Recommendation: Add storm identification numbers to the TCP. Action—Accept

Recommendation for TCP. TPC will also add storm identification number to all TPC

text products. A Public Information Statement will be disseminated.

Recommendation: In 10–601, stipulate the use of English and metric system

measurements in the TCP. Recommend this include the storm direction in km/hr,

maximum sustained winds in km/hr and extent of hurricane and tropical storm

winds in km. Action—Section 1.1.3.3.a already specifies when TPC should use metric units in the public advisories. This section will be modified to delete the part

about ‘‘except when the United States is the only country threatened.’’

Recommendation: Delete the breakpoint at Fort Walton Beach. Action—Accepted. Fort Walton Beach will be deleted as a primary breakpoint, but will be retained

as a secondary breakpoint. Update NHOP.

Recommendation: Eliminate the Currituck Beach Light breakpoint, and replace

it with Duck, NC. Action—Accepted. ERH will provide latitude and longitude of

Duck breakpoint to OS21 and TPC. Update NHOP. Currituck Beach Light will be

retained as a secondary breakpoint.

Recommendation: Suggest substituting Card Sound Road Bridge as a replacement

break point. Card Sound Road Bridge is on the Miami-Dade/Monroe county line and

is a very tall bridge, well known by anyone in our area. By having Card Sound Road

Bridge, tropical cyclone watches and warnings can then specify the entire south

coast (Florida Bay coast) of mainland South Florida in an appropriate manner (for

example—East Cape Sable to Card Sound Road Bridge). Action—Florida City will

be deleted as a primary breakpoint and will be retained as a secondary breakpoint.

Card Sound Bridge will become a primary breakpoint. SRH will provide latitude and

longitude of Card Sound Bridge to OS21 and TPC. Update NHOP.

Recommendation: Provide SLOSH output (MEOWs) for east moving storms in the

Morehead City Basin. And include forward movements of 10 mph, 20 mph, and 30

mph as options available to choose from when selecting storm variables. Action—

This action will be prioritized with ICCOH with respect to other basin restudies.

When resources are available, NHC will work with MDL, WFO Morehead City, and

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emergency managers to test the Recommendations and incorporate those that are

critical in the next restudy of the Pamlico Basin.

Recommendation: Use zero (0) as the baseline water level during real-time

SLOSH runs, which would then provide output that is ‘‘pure’’ surge, and can be

more easily inserted into WFO products, and conveyed to the public. Action—TPC

previously agreed to make the real-time SLOSH runs at a 0 ft base tide level for

the U.S. East Coast. TPC accepts the Recommendation. Exceptions will be arranged

by TPC and the affected WFOs based on coordination during the, event.

Recommendation: Provide training material for real-time SLOSH runs. Update

SLOSH display manual to include clear explanation of tide datum used for real-time

runs, MEOWs and MOMs. Action—A Call for forecaster attendance at the Train

the Trainer course was provided to ERH and SRH in November 2005. Additionally,

written training material and distance learning formats will be explored by the

Warning Decision Training Branch for the Tropical Cyclone Operations Course.

ERH will work with NHC and MDL concerning updates to the SLOSH display manual, to be approved by NHC and MDL.

Recommendation: Based upon the work and Recommendations by the Tropical

Cyclone Extreme Wind Team, the conference needs to decide future actions. Action—For the 2006 season implement Phase II as follows:

• Add new VTEC Phenomenon Code EW,

• Develop template for WARNGEN ready by 2006 season,

• Change MND Product Type Line to Extreme Wind Warning,

• Ensure Standard Format of 1St Bullet by all WFOs,

• Use of the ‘‘Go to the lowest floor’’ Call to Action at WFO discretion,

• WFOs will follow guidance in Directive 10–601 section 7.2,

• Issue a Public Information Statement in early 2006,

• Make decision for experimental vice official product addressed by Headquarters, and

• Team to begin actions for Phase III.

Recommendation: Conference to decide the future direction the wind team should

pursue or disband the team. Action—The Wind Team should continue into 2006 to

address issues related to the usage of TPC’s wind speed probabilities product in

WFO products.

Recommendation: Modify the TCV to allow local input so the counties in question

can be removed as conditions warrant. Action—The action was subsequently overtaken by the next item. All WFOs to review the existing ‘‘county translation table’’

and respond to Michelle Mainelli (TPC) by 1 February 2006 if any changes are needed for 2006.

Recommendation: Consideration should be given to use ‘‘Zone’’ codes versus

‘‘County’’ FIP codes in the TCV before it is even considered to make the TCV official.

Action—For 2006 the TCV will use Zone codes instead of county codes, if the necessary software changes can be made. Regions will coordinate with their WFOs and

provide TPC with a list of zone codes to include in the TCV by 1 February 2006.

Recommendation: Just as SPC issues watches for Severe Weather for adjacent

coastal waters, NHC needs to, at minimum, issue guidance as to the appropriate

Watches and/or Warnings that need to be taken concerning coastal waters. In this

era of heightened awareness and coverage of Tropical events by the news media, a

more structured approach is required. STATUS: Closed (see next item).

Recommendation: There needs to be clarification in either 10–601, granting specific area responsibility for warnings (by zone definition, not just breakpoint), or in

10–310, which would grant the WFO authority over tropical cyclone watches and

warnings for coastal marine zones. Note that granting WFO authority over coastal

marine zones within 20 nm may result in increased consultation with NHC, since

there can be a serious perception issue when warnings from coastal marine zones

and adjacent coastal land zones disagree. It is the opinion of this WFO that the

warnings and watches between a coastal land zone and an adjacent coastal marine

zone (within 20 nm) must agree. Implemented—WFOs have full responsibility for

watches and warnings in their coastal waters, and will coordinate their issuance

with TPC and adjacent WFOs. NWS 10–310 2.3.5 will be clarified to reflect this policy.

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Recommendation: To preserve the existing policy in 10–310, there needs to be a

choice to use the phrase Small Craft Should Remain in Port that holds the active

Small Craft Advisory VTEC in a continuation until the tropical cyclone watch is upgraded to a warning. As a second less-preferred item, we can require that Small

Craft Advisories be maintained if necessary (and headlines as such) until the tropical cyclone watch is upgraded (if necessary) to a warning. Action—Issue will be

resolved through ongoing OS21 update of NWSI 10–310. Modify appropriate directives.

Recommendation: Seek agreement from OPC leading to OPC and TAFB products

stating ‘‘Maximum significant wave height XX ft. Some individual waves much higher.’’ Change marine directive as necessary. Action—For year-round High Seas Forecasts from OPC, TAFB, and WFO Honolulu, the following statement will be included in the synopsis portion: ‘‘Seas Given In Significant Wave Heights.’’

Recommendation: Allow WFO forecast grids to more closely match TCM grid output, even if it is in conflict with existing watches/warnings. Implemented—WFO

grids should match TCM gridded output.

Recommendation: NHC should be more judicious about and less apt to issue

watch/warning combinations. Action—None required. There will be occasions when

a Tropical Cyclone Warning/Hurricane Watch combination is needed.

Recommendation:

1. Enlist the assistance of NHC/TPC and their associations with the engineering/academic communities to aid NYC OEM towards incorporating up-to-date

information for residents of high rise buildings. This then needs to be incorporated into the official ‘‘hurricane plan’’ for NYC.

2. Address the ‘‘canyon effect’’ one would see down New York City main Avenues, which we haven’t yet seen with a landfalling hurricane. Could this

make a large difference in actual wind speed and ultimate destruction potential?

3. As a result of this, ascertain if each residential building in NYC should have

its own ‘‘hurricane plan’’ detailing the safe zones in that building, (e.g.,

. . .from the 3rd to the 8th floor hallways) and have this information delivered to all tenants annually?

Action—WFO Upton will contact several organizations, such as the NOAA Air Resources Laboratory, who have technical expertise in this area.

Recommendation: HPC generated forecast maps through Day 6 should include

remnants for tropical systems. Implemented.

Recommendation: Eliminate issuing separate products NPW/FFA except for short

fused warnings for inland areas. Action—Members of this conference, led by David

Manning, WFO Sterling, are tasked to write a short white paper that recommends

consolidation of the current suite of WFO tropical cyclone products, including segmentation of the HLS, and submit to OS21 by 1 February 2006.

Recommendation: Delete forecasting wind gust from cyclones after they transition

into an extra-tropical low. Action—OPC will check for user feedback before any

changes are made.

Recommendation: Improve hurricane local statements for clear headers, place

most important sections first, do not repeat the TCP advisory, omit sections not

needed, do not use headline ‘‘updated Storm Information,’’ and the HLS does not

need to have all sections. Will be Implemented for 2006 Hurricane Season.

Recommendation: Make the HLS a segmented product in time for the 2006 season. Action—It is desired for HLSs to become segmented in 2006. WFOs have the

option to produce single-segmented or multi-segmented HLS products. Eastern,

Southern and Pacific Regions will work with selected WFOs to provide examples of

both formats. Regions and WSH will seek customer input regarding segmented

HLSs. Mark Tew, OS22, will work with software developers to ascertain the level

of effort required for HLS segmentation, and provide a feasible implementation date

as soon as possible.

Recommendation: Require that ‘‘New Information’’ be the initial header in all but

the first HLS. Action—If used, ‘‘New Information’’ must be the initial section header in the HLS.

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Recommendation: Allow the flexibility to shorten the HLS to include only the New

Information header for life-threatening events within six hours of occurrence. Action—Will be Implemented for 2006 Hurricane Season.

Recommendation: Eliminate the requirement to include the entire CWA, for Florida counties, in an HLS that affects a small portion of the CWA. Recommendation

from OS21: Rewrite in directive 10–601, section 7.1.2.2 to read (changes in italics):

7.1.2.2 Issuance Criteria. The following WFOs will issue HLSs when their area of

responsibility is affected by a tropical cyclone watch/warning or evacuation orders.

HLSs may also be issued as needed to dispel rumors or to clarify tropical cyclone

related information for their CWA. Coastal WFOs have the option to include inland

counties in the HLS. WFOs also have the option to include or not include coastal

and inland counties not affected by a tropical cyclone watch or warning. Action—

Change 7.1.2.2 to read: The following WFOs will issue HLSs when their zone areas

of responsibility are affected by a tropical cyclone watch/warning or evacuation orders. HLSs may also be issued as needed to dispel rumors or to clarify tropical cyclone-related information for their CWA. Coastal WFOs have the option to include

inland counties in the HLS. WFOs may exclude zones not affected by a tropical cyclone watch or warning.

Recommendation: Require impact statements for both NPW and HLS, based on

life-threatening impacts of wind, surge, or inland flood. Emphasize judicious use for

each case. For wind, the lower limit should be sustained Category 2 (96 mph or

greater). Impacts for surge and inland flood may be locally defined. Action—WFOs

will have the option to include strongly-worded impact statements in NPW and HLS

products. Judicious use is recommended, commensurate with the threat, to ensure

the continued effectiveness of such statements.

Recommendation: Make improving tropical related GHG formatters by next hurricane season a top priority. Action—Recommendation accepted. OS21 will forward

to FSL. FSL to ensure function to capture text from previous HLS works correctly.

Recommendation: Tropical Storm/Hurricane Wind Impacts should be base lined

as a Cal 1To Actions¥Tropical¥Overrides file in future IFPS builds. Action—Recommendation accepted. WFO Slidell will forward files to OS21. OS21 will forward

to FSL.

Recommendation: Pursue an agency effort which builds upon the work undertaken at WFOs Miami and Melbourne to include enhanced wording within the ZFP

and CWT text products as generated by the GFE formatter. Action—Accepted.

Wind Team will coordinate the experimental use of probabilistic wind information

in the 2006 season. Team will make final Recommendations for the ZFP, CWT, and

PFM products.

Recommendation: Provide ‘Hurricane Hotlines’ for inland office commonly impacted by tropical systems. Action—SRH will submit a formal letter for these inland WFOs to OS21.

Recommendation: NWS directives need to better define areas which are included

in NHC watches/warnings, and areas which are considered inland, thereby falling

under the realm of inland tropical cyclone watches/warnings. Action—OS21 will

form a team with representatives from Southern, Eastern and Pacific Regions, and

TPC, to address this recommendation and the next, as well as associated issues.

Recommendation: To improve the delivery and clear communication of local WFO

tropical cyclone watch/warning information to customers in their area of warning responsibility, change the headline in segmented, VTEC ready, NPW products for

coastal zones. This improvement would extend to all local WFO issued NPWs for

tropical storm/hurricane watches and warnings that affect coastal zones. Action—

See previous item.

Recommendation: The NHC should provide appropriate error cone radius numbers for each forecast time on TCM and possibly TCD products. Also, NWS tropical

web sections (WFOs, NHC, Regional and National HQ, etc.) need to include a good,

concise definition and explanation of the error cone and how it should be used. This

explanation should be non-technical and geared more toward the public and EMC.

Action—TPC/NHC will modify their web page text description to include average

error values and a better definition of the cone of uncertainty.

Recommendation: TPC should produce an internal pre-TCM flat file just before

conference call time. This file would only be available to WFOs and would give them

an hour lead time on producing wind grids. If necessary, WFOs can run the

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TCMwind tool if there are changes between the preliminary pre-TCM flat file and

the final version of the TPC Tropical Cyclone Marine Forecast. Action—At conference call time, this forecast information is typically available only in hard copy

form on an advisory composition worksheet. TPC/NHC will investigate the possibility of using an electronic tablet to produce this worksheet, so that a file containing the information can be transmitted to the WFOs and the DOD, when available.

Recommendation: A simple solution to ‘‘retiring’’ Greek Alphabet names, if necessary, is to have a floating alternate or secondary name list available that could

be placed into service if the primary Atlantic Cyclone name list is exhausted.

Named storms from the secondary or alternate list that require retirement could

easily be replenished based on Recommendations from the WMO. Action—Recommendation accepted. Will be proposed at the upcoming WMO RA–IV hurricane

Committee meeting.

Recommendation: Add Pacific Region ASOS sites to be considered for backup

power. Action—Pacific Region will forward a list of ASOS sites for consideration

in this initiative.

Recommendation: Forward to IHC to request action completed by CARCAH,

USAF 53rd WRS and NOAA AOC prior to start of 2006 hurricane season. Action—

Recommendations accepted. Will be forwarded to IHC.

Recommendation: Forward to IHC to request action by Air Force prior to start

of 2006 hurricane season. For TP..10 KGWC WMO Fix Message. Action—Recommendation Accepted.

Recommendation: Obtain input from the coastal forecast offices, and deliver revised plan prior to start of 2006 hurricane season. Action—Recommendation accepted.

Recommendation: Change Subtropical Cyclone Definition in Operational Manuals.

Action—Recommendation Accepted. Forward to IHC and WMO RA–IV Hurricane

Committee.

Recommendation: Standardize Post-Tropical Cyclone Reports:

1) In all issuances of the PSH, follow the existing format in Instruction 10–601

unless and until the format is revised, in particular providing only wind observations with at least gusts of 34 kts or greater, wind speeds in kts, times

in UTC, anemometer heights, and sustained wind speed averaging durations.

2) Create a team of TPC, WFO, and NWS Headquarters personnel to agree

upon the format of a more standardized PSH and to recommend procedures

and/or any software enhancements needed to compose the product in the new

format. This could be similar to how WFOs input Local Storm Reports into

AWIPS. Recommended standardizations for the team to consider would include but are not necessarily limited to the following:

a. Standardize the placement of key data values, more specifically than

just the order of major sections, to facilitate automated parsing and conversion of the PSH product for multiple uses.

b. If an instrument failed during the event, or if data is otherwise incomplete, specify the time of the last available observation and the reason

for the data outage (e.g., power failure, storm surge, capsized).

c. For unofficial and/or mobile observation sources, provide the latitude and

longitude of the listed observation, if available.

3) Determine if it is possible for the National Data Buoy Center (NDBC) to

issue a PSH product or otherwise produce a text product in the same format

as the PSH. The product would include similar information in the same format as WFO-issued PSHs for each NDBC site with observed data satisfying

the same wind and/or pressure threshold criteria during the tropical cyclone

event.

Action—Recommendation (1) is already covered by existing policy. Recommendations (2) and (3) accepted. Dan Brown, TPC, will draft a proposed PSH template format and will forward to the Regions and NWS Headquarters. OS21 will contact

NDBC and make a request for them to generate a product in a format consistent

with the PSH when conditions warrant.

Recommendation: Correct Offshore Forecast Tropical Cyclone Warning information displayed on the NWS Watch/Warning/Advisory Web map.

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Action—

1. Recommended that Warnings for offshore waters not be displayed and a disclaimer/appropriate links be added to the web page. OS21 will forward the

Recommendation to the WWA Map Team.

2. Michelle Mainelli will work with Bob Bunge and Leon Minton to determine

how existing warning information can be properly displayed on the WWA

Map.

Recommendation: (1) Request AXBT deployments (minimum of 12), using present

second-hand inventory, on each WP–3D tasked reconnaissance mission. (2) Seek

funding support to establish inventory of new, reliable AXBTs. Action—Recommendation (1) accepted, and will be forwarded to the IHC. The conference supports Recommendation (2). Additional funds will be requested through the normal

program funding process and according to program priorities. Use of the AXBTs is

currently for research.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Max Mayfield, Director, NOAA Tropical Prediction Center/National

Hurricane Center

Questions submitted by the Majority

Q1. In your testimony you explained that while progress has been made forecasting

hurricane tracks, there is much room for improvement in forecasting hurricane

intensity. Non-governmental experts have suggested that the Federal Government

could improve its ability to forecast hurricane intensity by conducting additional

observations and research. Some of the additional activities suggested by these

experts include:

Q1a. Hurricane observation flights in the upper troposphere (current flights do not

go to that altitude);

Q1b. Improved numerical prediction models that include both ocean and atmospheric observations; and

Q1c. More or improved observations of hurricane cores.

Do you agree that conducting the additional observations/research listed above

would likely lead to an improved ability to forecast hurricane intensity in the

short-term and/or in the long-term? If not, why not?

A1a,b,c. Currently NOAA is pursuing all three of these activities to improve forecasts of hurricane intensity and structure.

• The NOAA Gulfstream-IV aircraft operates a high altitude sampling of the

upper troposphere surrounding hurricanes as part of operational surveillance

missions. We are also conducting special research flights into the inner portion of hurricanes including the upper regions in the eye of the hurricane.

NOAA has partnered with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on three experiments over the past seven years, the latest conducted this past summer, to obtain high altitude aircraft observations of the

inner core of a number of hurricanes and tropical storms from the NASA DC–

8 and ER–2 aircraft. These observations, combined with those from the NOAA

P–3 aircraft, have provided numerous insights into storm intensity and structure.

• NOAA currently is developing a next generation hurricane prediction system,

the Hurricane Weather and Research Forecasting system. The Hurricane

Weather and Research Forecasting system consists of (1) advanced high-quality observations for both atmosphere and ocean; (2) advanced data assimilation techniques; and (3) the next generation, coupled air-sea-land prediction

system with advanced representation of physical processes. This model is in

the testing stage with implementation planned for 2007.

• The NOAA P–3 aircraft operate in the core of the hurricane at altitudes between 1,000–20,000 feet. These aircraft have been used since 1976 to collect

research and operational data sets to improve our forecasts and understanding of tropical cyclone track, intensity, and structure. As a result of this

research, a number of new technologies, sampling strategies, and concepts

have been transitioned to operational use. The most recent of these is the

Stepped Frequency Microwave Radiometer (SFMR), which provides surface

wind estimates that are a direct measure of the storm structure and intensity. We are in the midst of transferring a new technology into operations,

the airborne Doppler radar, for use in initializing and evaluating the new

operational modeling system.

Q2. In your opinion, what other areas of additional research or observations are

needed to help understand and forecast hurricane intensity in the short-term

and in the long-term?

A2. Investing wisely in science and technology is the prudent approach toward improving hurricane understanding and prediction. Observations and research are essential for developing advanced operational numerical systems. Research and operations are linked to achieve improved understanding and prediction of hurricanes.

Requirements to better understand and forecast hurricane intensity include numerical weather prediction model guidance of high resolution derived from cutting edge

science and advanced data assimilation, as well as a real-time observing network

of greater resolution and reliability, especially over ocean areas for forecaster analVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ysis and short-term forecasts. The FY 2006 hurricane supplemental request included over $31M in new investments to improve hurricane warnings and forecasts.

Ocean observations will be expanded by deploying 8 new buoys and re-engineering

dropwindsones. The completion of the new Hurricane Weather and Research Forecasting System (HWRF) will be accelerated. The Global Forecast System (GFS) will

be enhanced to improve forecasts of hurricane intensity (strength) and structure

(size).

Q3. In your opinion, what are the five highest priority areas of additional research

or observations needed to improve hurricane intensity forecasts and models in

the short-term? Similarly, what are the five highest priority areas to improve

this capability in the long-term? What are the estimated costs of implementing

theses priority areas? Why has NOAA not implemented research or observations

in these areas? Are there plans to move ahead with these activities?

A3. NOAA is working to address its five highest priority areas for both short- and

long-term research and observations needed to improve hurricane intensity forecasts

and models. These areas include:

1. Increase computational capacity to run sophisticated high resolution numerical weather prediction models.

2. Research for more detailed representation of small scale features in hurricanes and coupling of the wave and hurricane prediction models.

3. Expand the current network of coastal and deep-ocean buoys.

4. Develop and deploy satellite sensors on NOAA geostationary and polar-orbiting satellites that would significantly improve wind force and vector measurements of hurricanes and severe storms.

5. Add additional flight hours for the high altitude NOAA Gulfstream-IV aircraft.

Hurricane modeling is necessary for studying storm dynamics and for forecasting

hurricane track, strength, and intensification. One of the limiting factors in hurricane modeling in both the short- and long-term is computational power. The development of higher resolution models that provide more detailed representations of

hurricanes is dependent on having the computational power to run these higher resolution models.

While the above list of priorities includes both short- and long-term research

goals, additional efforts in the long-term need to focus research on: the effect of

upper ocean processes on hurricane intensity and structure; the role the atmospheric environment plays in hurricane intensity and structure change (e.g., how

very low humidity in the lower troposphere or very strong vertical shear of the horizontal wind affect hurricane intensity and structure); improving observations of the

inner core (eyewall) processes; the role of rain bands in hurricane intensity and

structure change; and developing and testing of new advanced models that (1) provide a more detailed representation of the inner-core dynamics of the storm and the

interactions between the storm with its environment and (2) provide an optimal

forecast framework to help quantify the uncertainty in the forecasts.

Through the Joint Hurricane Testbed, funded primarily through the U.S. Weather

Research Program, the National Hurricane Center has devoted considerable time

identifying the most pressing needs and priorities. A complete list of program priorities can be found at http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/jht/

JHT¥FFO¥30June2004.pdf.

Sufficient resources for operations, research and observations have been provided.

We strive to continue to improve our products and services, particularly hurricane

intensity forecasting. NOAA continues to implement research to operations and programming, planning and budgeting activities have identified and include the necessary resources to keep up with this demand. We appreciate your continued support of the President’s annual budget requests.

Q4. In developing a hurricane forecast, you use weather data collected from a variety

of sources, including NOAA satellites, radar, buoys, hurricane hunters, etc. For

each of these sources of weather data, please briefly describe the nature of the

data you receive and what role it plays in developing a hurricane forecast. In

addition, please identify any weather data that is currently available to you

from only one source.

A4. There is a tremendous amount of Federal Government (and non-Federal) data

available on hurricanes. The sources and use of the data are described below.

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AIRCRAFT:

NOAA Gulfstream-IV

Deploys dropwindsondes, which measure pressure, wind speed, wind direction,

temperature and dew point, providing a vertical atmospheric profile from wherever

it is dropped by aircraft to sea surface. Data are used to increase accuracy in numerical model predictions.

NOAA P–3

Deploys dropwindosondes; provides radar images, visual report of sea surface and

estimated surface winds, center position and pressure, wind radii and maximum

winds/intensity; Stepped Frequency Microwave Radiometer (SFMR) provides surface

wind data; Expendable Bathythermograph (XBT) provides ocean temperature profiles. Some data is used by the forecasters, in numerical model predictions, and used

extensively for research activities to increase accuracy and improve physical understanding of ocean and marine interface. NOAA operates two P–3 aircraft, and will

purchase a third with funding from the FY06 hurricane supplemental.

U.S. Air Force Reserve C130–J

Deploys dropwindsondes; provides visual report of sea surface and estimated surface winds, center position and pressure, wind radii and maximum winds/intensity.

Data is used by numerical models as well as forecasters. The Military Construction

Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005

(P.L. 108–324) provided the U.S. Air Force $10.5M to install SFMRs on its fleet of

10 C130–J aircraft.

SATELLITES:

GOES—Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites

Primary data is provided by GOES–10, GOES–12, and METEOSAT–7 (VIS, IR,

WV every 15–30 min). Interpretation of the satellite data provides a classification

and analysis of the tropical system and helps determine the center of the storm and

its intensity. Images, or ‘‘pictures,’’ from GOES allow everyone to see what the hurricane looks like. It is these images that track the storms and are what is so prominently shown by the media.

POES—Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite

NOAA Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellites (POES) with the advanced microwave sounding unit (AMSU) and the advanced very high radiometer (AVHRR) provide: precipitation estimates, qualitative estimates of storm intensity trends, sea

surface temperatures, storm center position, convective structure and atmospheric

temperature/humidity profiles.

Note: POES are not always over the storm since these satellites orbit the globe;

this is in contrast to the GOES which are stationary relative to Earth surface.

Other Low-Earth Orbiting Satellites

• The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, using the special sensor microwave/imagery (SSMI) suite of instruments, provides information on ocean surface wind speed, precipitation, sea surface temperatures, center position and

convective structure.

• The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Tropical

Rainfall Mapping Mission (TRMM) satellites, using the TRMM microwave

imager (TMI), provide precipitation/rain rate, center position, convective

structure, ocean surface wind speed and sea surface temperatures.

• NASA’s OuikSCAT, using the SeaWinds scatterometer, provides wind speed,

wind direction, center location and wind radii.

• The NASA AQUA satellite mission uses the moderate resolution imaging

spectroradiometer, the advanced microwave scanning radiometer and the atmospheric infrared sounder to provide precipitable water, water vapor, sea

surface temperatures, center position, convective structure and atmospheric

temperature/humidity profiles.

• European Research Satellite (ERS–2), using a wind scatterometer and a radar

altimeter, provides the National Weather Service with wind speed and direction, storm center location, wind radii and wave heights.

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RADAR:

U.S. WSR–88D—Doppler NEXRAD network provides extensive data as the storm

approaches land. Wind speed data is available within 125 miles of the coast and

conventional reflectivity data is available out to 250 miles away from the radar.

UPPER AIR OBSERVATIONS:

Observations from soundings of the atmosphere are available from 10 U.S. stations along the Gulf Coast and Puerto Rico. These observations (taken twice per day

or every six hours when a hurricane is approaching land) provide temperature,

moisture, wind speed and direction from the Earth’s surface to as high as 10 miles.

Data is also available from other countries in the region covering Central and South

America and the Caribbean nations, although this data is not available as consistently as data collected from U.S. sites.

BUOYS:

Drifting

Drifting buoys provide sea surface temperature and some wind speed and direction data.

Moored

Moored buoys provide wind speed and direction, air and sea temperature, barometric pressure, and wave height; and the newer buoys provide wave direction.

These buoys provide coverage for the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and the Atlantic Coast. Specifically, NOAA operates and maintains 12 moored weather buoys in

the Gulf of Mexico, three in the Caribbean, and 14 along the Atlantic Coast from

Florida to New York, all critical to the Atlantic hurricane program. Forecasters use

data from moored buoys operated and maintained by other federal, State, local and

private entities as well.

LAND-BASED SURFACE OBSERVING EQUIPMENT:

Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS)

This system measures temperature, wind speed/direction, precipitation, present

weather, cloud height, visibility, and barometric pressure.

Private sector wind portable wind towers

These are portable towers, mostly deployed by universities involved in hurricane

research efforts. These data are used in post-storm analysis. Data are usually temperature, wind speed/direction, precipitation, present weather, and barometric pressure.

OIL PLATFORM OBSERVATION STATIONS:

Oil platform observation stations can provide data on temperature, wind speed/

direction, precipitation, and surface pressure.

SHIPS:

Data collected on ships can include temperature, wind speed/direction, wave

height, precipitation, present weather, cloud height, visibility, and pressure.

TIDE GAUGES:

Tide gauges provide information on the level/height of the water. This information

is most useful for observing, not forecasting, storm surge.

C–MAN:

C–MAN stations provide data on barometric pressure, wind direction, speed and

gust, and air temperature. Some C–MAN stations are designed to also measure sea

water temperature, water level, waves, relative humidity, precipitation, and visibility.

COMPUTER MODELS:

The National Hurricane Center relies extensively on computer model output from

various numerical weather prediction centers. These data provide guidance on the

future track and intensity of tropical cyclones. Other computer models used by the

National Hurricane Center help predict potential storm surge the storms could

produce.

While some sources of data are unique, NOAA has backup or contingency plans

in place to continue the stream of essential data. For example, there is overlapping

WSR–88D (NEXRAD) radar coverage—if one goes down, data is provided by an adjacent site; newer models of data buoys have redundant sensors; and NOAA uses

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FAA Terminal Doppler Radar data at coastal sites where data are available to provide another layer of backup information.

Q5. If data from polar-orbiting weather satellites was not available to you, how

would that affect your ability to forecast hurricanes?

A5. Data from polar-orbiting weather satellites provides information essential to

computer model forecasts. This data is the only source that provides information

from over the oceans. Internal studies show that lack of polar-orbiting satellite data

would have a negative impact on our forecasts, potentially reducing forecast accuracy by 15–20 percent.

Q6. If NOAA had a second Gulfstream jet for studying hurricanes, what improvements could be made to NOAA’s hurricane forecasting capability? How long

would it be before those improvements could be incorporated into operational

prediction models? How much would it cost to procure a second jet and what

funding would be required for annual operating costs for a second jet?

A6. NOAA routinely operates the Gulfstream-IV (G–IV) aircraft twice a day on successive 8.5 hour missions during hurricane season. Internal studies show data provided by the current Gulfstream-IV jet have improved track prediction by about 20

percent, primarily during the hurricane watch/warning phase (when the storm is

within a day or two of landfall). A second jet would allow more missions to be flown.

This could be valuable during an active hurricane season when numerous hurricanes threaten the United States and data from nearly continuous flights would improve predictions.

A new Gulfstream jet, complete with essential equipment, would cost approxi- mately $80 million, assuming the aircraft is purchased under an existing Air Force

contract. We estimate that it would cost $5 million per year in operating costs for

crew, maintenance, dropwindsondes and fuel.

Any single observational platform needs to be put into the proper context with

all other investments in observations. Currently the most important observations

needed to improve hurricane intensity and structure forecasts come from the radars

flown on NOAA’s P–3s. The U.S. Air Force will use funds from the FY 2005 hurricane supplemental to install these Stepped Frequency Microwave Radiometer sensors on its fleet of 10 aircraft, the first of which will be available late in FY 2006.

The FY 2006 hurricane funding supplemental provided $9M for an additional,

equipped P–3 aircraft to improve observations of hurricanes.

Q7. You have stated that today’s average hurricane track forecast errors are only 94

nautical miles, compared with average forecast errors of 230 nautical miles in

1987. Have we reached the theoretical limit of track forecasting with the 94 nautical miles error, or could that error become smaller? If the error could be made

smaller, what resources (i.e., observing equipment, computers, research funding,

etc.) does NOAA need to improve track forecasting and what is the estimated

cost of those resources?

A7. While we may be nearing the theoretical limit of track prediction, we continue

to work to improve our track forecasts. Track predictability depends on being able

to predict larger scale atmospheric conditions and, on average, we have been successful at predicting the features that ‘‘steer’’ the hurricane. However, storms like

Wilma (when it was in the southern Caribbean) and Ophelia (when stationary off

the coast of Florida) highlight that we have room for improvement when it comes

to predicting tracks for the ‘‘outlier’’ storms that stall or take very erratic paths.

To improve track forecasts we must continue our research efforts and computer

modeling development. NOAA is currently developing a next generation hurricane

prediction system, the Hurricane Weather and Research Forecasting (HWRF) system. We expect the improvements embodied in the HWRF system will lead to reduced track forecast error. Funding provided in the FY 2006 hurricane supplemental will accelerate the completion of the HWRF system. Additional observations,

such as those planned under the Global Earth Observation System of Systems

(GEOSS), would also help in defining the conditions for hurricane predictions.

Q8. A recent article in the Miami Herald asserts that key countries in the Caribbean

are not launching weather balloons regularly, despite an agreement with the

United States to launch balloons, because the countries did not have all the

equipment the U.S. had promised. Would additional funding or other actions

help ensure that weather balloon equipment is provided to Caribbean countries

in a timely manner and that the countries launch the balloons as needed?

A8. We face many different challenges when collecting meteorological data. All required equipment and supplies have been provided to the appropriate countries, in

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accordance with our agreements. During Hurricane Wilma, four of the sites experienced system malfunctions (hydrogen generator and/or tracking system), which have

now been corrected. Releasing weather balloons, using the tracking equipment, and

transmitting data back to the international data collection hubs is the responsibility

of each country. Issues such as local power, communications, and maintenance are

challenges that vary from country to country, which has at times made it difficult

to collect meteorological data from balloon launches. While these data are important

and NOAA will do all it can to ensure the data are available, dropwindsonde data

from hurricane reconnaissance flights provide similar types of data used by our hurricane forecasters and hurricane models.

Q9. In your opinion, if additional funding were available for hurricane forecasting,

what are the five highest priority areas of where additional resources would improve operational hurricane forecasts and models?

A9. The highest priority for hurricane forecasting is to improve our prediction of

storm intensity. There are many components accompanying that element, including

continued improvements in track forecasts and the prediction of the size of the

windfield, as well as being able to predict when and how quickly storms will intensify and how strong they will become. Additionally, we need to develop a better understanding of the uncertainty associated with our forecasts of storm intensity (in

particular rapid intensification of storms), as well as storm structure/size. These priorities can be addressed through continued research, increased development of our

next generation operational hurricane models, and additional observations, such as

those planned under the Global Environmental Observing System of Systems

(GEOSS). With funding provided in the FY 2006 appropriation, we will add four

new hurricane forecasters, who will also enhance operational hurricane forecasts.

Additional priorities are provided in Joint Hurricane Testbed Announcement of

Opportunity at the following Internet site: http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/

Landsea/jht/JHT¥FFO¥30June2004.pdf.

Q10. What is the difference between data received from hurricane reconnaissance

flights in NOAA’s Gulfstream jet, NOAA’s P–3 Orions, and the Air Force’s WC–

130 cargo planes? What factors determine which aircraft is flown to observe a

storm? What factors determine how frequently flights are made with each type

of aircraft?

A10. The Gulfstream-IV jet is used to obtain data from the environment surrounding the hurricane. These data are then assimilated into NOAA’s operational

forecast system to better define the atmospheric conditions and steering currents

that influence the future track of the hurricane. The data collected by the Gulfstream are also used to help forecasters identify general conditions for storm intensification.

In contrast, the P–3s and the WC–130s provide data from inside the hurricane,

including windspeed, and hurricane eye positions, among other vital information.

The P–3s are equipped with research instruments to help NOAA and other research

scientists develop a better understanding of the inner workings of hurricanes and

help to develop improved forecast capabilities, including hurricane intensity forecasts predictions. The P–3s also serve as platforms for testing new observing technologies, such as the Stepped Frequency Microwave Radiometer (SFMR), which

measures over-ocean wind speed and rain rate, and Global Positioning System

(GPS) dropsondes.

As outlined in the National Hurricane Operations Plan (NHOP), the National

Hurricane Center (NHC) requests aircraft reconnaissance data through the Chief,

Aerial Reconnaissance Coordination, All Hurricanes (CARCAH). The CARCAH then

allocates reconnaissance missions among the U.S. Air Force Reserve Command and

NOAA as appropriate. Typically, most missions are carried out by the U.S. Air Force

Reserve Command.

Q11. Do other missions for NOAA’s P–3 Orions, such as air quality research, interfere with the National Hurricane Center’s hurricane forecasting capabilities? If

not, why not?

A11. Flight hours for the P–3 Orions are assigned in accordance with NOAA’s Marine and Aviation Operations Allocation Plan and coordinated by NOAA’s Aircraft

Operations Center. In situations when there are competing requests for P–3 usage,

the National Hurricane Center has priority access to the P–3 flights for hurricane

reconnaissance. In many cases we are able to conduct hurricane research on these

reconnaissance flights. Additionally, non-hurricane research missions typically occur

in areas that would allow the P–3s to be recalled to MacDill AFB within the range

of one flight, so they could be redirected to conduct hurricane reconnaissance if

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needed. Further, the non-hurricane research missions are usually flown in the early

part of hurricane season, to reduce the number of competing requests for P–3 flight

time during the more active portion of the hurricane season. The FY 2006 hurricane

supplemental provides NOAA with an additional P–3 aircraft; this should help ensure adequate coverage.

United States Air Force Reserves’ 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron maintains and operates a fleet of 10 C130–J aircraft to conduct most hurricane reconnaissance missions and provide storm location and data, including hurricane intensity. The Air Force will use funding from the Military Construction Appropriations

and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108–324) to

outfit its ‘‘Hurricane Hunter’’ aircraft with Stepped Frequency Microwave Radiometer sensors beginning in late FY 2006. SFMR provides meteorologists with critical

data on the hurricane surface wind field, and in particular the estimation of wind

maxima, which has long been a requirement of the Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center (TPC/NHC).

Q12. Recent articles in the Miami Herald assert that ‘‘in 2004 before Hurricane

Charley. . .weather balloon readings were missing from countries all along its

path, leaving hundreds of miles of the atmosphere unmonitored.. . .Three

coastal weather-observing stations between the Florida Keys and northwest

Florida were malfunctioning, denying forecasters clues about ocean temperature and wind speed.’’ Is this assertion true and if so, why was this observation

data unavailable? Also, if the assertion is true, what was the impact on forecasting Hurricane Charley?

A12. We have encountered some difficulties in obtaining weather balloon releases

within the Caribbean region from the countries with which the United States has

agreements due to issues such as local power, communications, and maintenance.

These problems are being addressed. However, because there was nearly continuous

aircraft reconnaissance during Hurricane Charley, we do not believe the lack of data

from these sites impacted our forecasts. Our records indicate only one NOAA buoys

or Coastal-Marine Automated Network (C–MAN) sites was out of service prior to

the passage of Hurricane Charley. We believe lack of data from this one site did

not impact our forecasts.

Questions submitted by the Minority

Q1. What role do the local offices play in distributing and refining the forecast for

the hurricane prior to the storm and during the storm versus the role of the Hurricane Center?

A1. Local Weather Forecast Offices (WFOs) play an important role by providing

more detailed forecasts for their area of responsibility. For example, the National

Hurricane Center provides a broad range of values in its storm surge predictions;

the WFOs refine those storm surge predictions by identifying vulnerable areas and

associating particular values for the surge in those areas. Local WFOs also refine

the timing of the onset of hurricane conditions in their area, including information

on wind speed, storm surge, rainfall amounts and the potential for tornadoes. The

WFOs also coordinate with and brief local emergency managers to ensure the managers have the latest information available to make their preparedness and evacuation decisions.

Q2. The Hurricane Center participates in workshops and conferences after the hurricane season with FEMA and State and local emergency managers and other organizations. Does staff of the local forecast offices also participate in these

offseason activities? Why are multiple annual workshops useful in maintaining

skills in preparation and response for hurricanes?

A2. Time and resources permitting, local weather forecast offices participate in

workshops and conferences. Multiple workshops provide the opportunity to train

more individuals than a single training session. Our workshops are coordinated, to

the greatest extent possible, to allow emergency managers and National Weather

Service (NWS) forecasters from the same local area to attend the same session. This

creates a favorable learning environment, and builds/enhances relationships in

those local areas. Beginning in 2006, in partnership with the Federal Emergency

Management Agency, local weather forecast offices will participate in training sessions for emergency managers on how to use NWS products and how to interpret

and understand NWS predictions of storm surge. The emergency managers receiving this training will then return to their offices, where they will train their coVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:47 Jul 08, 2006 Jkt 023331 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL05\100705\23331 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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workers and other local officials. This method of training allows for efficient use of

funding and allows us to reach more local officials than possible otherwise.

Questions submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson

Q1. How would you characterize the participation by State and local emergency

managers in the Hurricane Liaison Team conference calls?

The HLT process has been used for a long time now. Would you say this process

has provided a good forum for information exchange between the various levels

of government?

I understand the Hurricane Center participates in a series of workshops and

conferences after the end of the hurricane season. How would you characterize

the feedback regarding the HLT process in the post-hurricane season from State

and local government people?

A1. The Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) conference calls serve as an excellent coordination tool and an efficient use of time. State emergency managers from potentially impacted locations participate on the call listening to the weather briefing and

then coordinating emergency management activities. The HLT briefings provide an

excellent forum for the National Hurricane Center (NHC) to share meteorological

information with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and State

Emergency Operations Centers, and also for the NHC to understand the concerns

of emergency managers. The National Hurricane Center has received positive feedback in its participation in the Hurricane Liaison Team, from workshops, the National Hurricane Conference, and State hurricane conferences.

The NHC is an invited participant in the HLT video teleconference briefings facilitated by FEMA. In addition to the NHC, FEMA typically includes State emergency

operations centers from the potential impact areas and regional FEMA offices on the

HLT briefings. The HLT briefings do not usually include local emergency managers.

Local emergency managers have access to National Weather Service (NWS) warnings distributed through a vast dissemination network including NOAA Weather

Radio All Hazards (NWR); NOAA Weather Wire Service; Emergency Managers

Weather Information Network (EMWIN); Internet; local paging systems to emergency managers; high-speed direct communications with users of large volumes of

weather data (i.e., commercial meteorological firms) connected by landlines (Family

of Services), by satellite broadcasts (NOAAPORT), or both. In addition there is close

coordination that occurs between the National Weather Service Weather Forecast

Offices and local emergency managers.

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Appendix 2:

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

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