[Cite as Kirkner Elec., Inc. v. Rydarowicz, 2020-Ohio-3362.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COLUMBIANA COUNTY

KIRKNER ELECTRIC INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN RYDAROWICZ, JENNIFER RYDAROWICZ 

Defendants-Appellants.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 19 CO 0041 

 

Civil Appeal from the 

Columbiana County Municipal Court of Columbiana County, Ohio 

Case No. 2018 CV F 000420 

BEFORE: 

Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Affirmed 

Atty. Fredric Kannensohn, Atty. Samuel Jordan, 4531 Belmont Avenue, Suite 2C, 

Youngstown, Ohio 44505, for Plaintiff-Appellee and 

Atty. Mark Lavelle, 940 Windham Court, Suite 7, Youngstown, Ohio 44512, for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

 
 – 2 – 

Case No. 19 CO 0041

Dated: 

June 12, 2020 

 

Donofrio, J. 

{¶1} Defendants-appellants, John and Jennifer Rydarowicz, appeal from a 

Columbiana County Municipal Court judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Kirkner 

Electric, Inc., on appellee’s claim for unjust enrichment, following a bench trial. 

{¶2} Appellants began construction of their new home in 2016. Appellants 

hired Digger Quality Homes (Digger) to frame the house. On Digger’s recommendation, 

appellants contacted appellee to handle the electrical work. 

{¶3} In March 2016, appellants met with Brant Griffith. Griffith has worked as 

an electrician for appellee for over 18 years and was in charge of this project. The parties 

agreed that appellee would do the electrical work for the new home. But they never 

entered into a written contract. 

{¶4} According to Griffith, appellant John Rydarowicz initially told him the house 

was going to be approximately 2,000 square feet. Griffith estimated the project at $5 per 

square foot and gave appellants an estimate of $10,000 to complete the electrical work. 

When Griffith later went to the site of the new house, after it had been framed, he saw 

that the house was actually closer to 3,000 square feet. Griffith then told appellants that 

the project was going to cost more than the $10,000 he initially quoted them. 

{¶5} According to John, when he and his wife met with Griffith, Griffith told him 

the price would be $10,000 “give or take.” He stated that Griffith never told him a price 

per square foot. John also stated he gave every contractor who worked on his house a 

set of blueprints, which listed the square footage of the house as 2,912 square feet. 

{¶6} In October 2016, appellee sent appellants the first bill in the amount of 

$7,452.42. Appellants paid the first bill in full. At that point, the project was not yet 

complete and appellants knew they still owed more for the electrical work. 

{¶7} In March 2017, the project was complete. Appellee sent appellants the 

second bill in the amount of $9,633.09. According to John, they were surprised at the 

amount appellee said they owed. John stated that he contacted Griffith, who told him 

they would work something out. John further stated that he contacted appellee’s owner 
 – 3 – 

Case No. 19 CO 0041

who told him to pay what he thought was fair. Appellants made payments of $2,500 and 

$3,000 on the second bill. 

{¶8} Appellee then filed a complaint against appellants asserting a claim for 

unjust enrichment and seeking judgment in the amount of $4,133.09, the balance 

remaining on the second bill, plus interest. 

{¶9} The matter proceeded to a bench trial where the court heard testimony 

from Griffith, John, and Jenna. The court found that appellee competently performed the 

electrical work and billed appellants in accordance with industry standards. The court 

determined it would be unjust to permit appellant to benefit from the work without 

payment. Therefore, the court awarded judgment in favor of appellee in the amount of 

$4,133.09 with interest. 

{¶10} Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on October 15, 2019. They now 

raise a single assignment of error for this court’s review. 

{¶11} Appellants’ assignment of error states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE MANIFEST WEIGHT 

OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES [sic.] EVIDENCE PROVED ALL THE 

ELEMENTS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 

{¶12} Appellants agree that appellee conferred a benefit on them and that they 

knew of the benefit. But they argue that the trial court’s finding that it would be unjust for 

them not to make an additional $4,133.09 payment to appellee was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. Appellants contend the court accepted Griffith’s testimony as 

truthful and disregarded John’s testimony. They assert the court accepted John’s 

testimony that the work was completed as expected but that it disregarded John’s 

testimony that appellee’s owner told him to pay what was fair. Moreover, appellants argue 

the trial court rewarded appellee for “sloppy business practices” by awarding it a 70-

percent increase beyond the initial quote when there was no written contract for the job. 

{¶13} When reviewing civil appeals from bench trials, an appellate court applies 

a manifest weight standard of review. Revilo Tyluka, L.L.C. v. Simon Roofing & Sheet 

Metal Corp., 193 Ohio App.3d 535, 2011-Ohio-1922, 952 N.E.2d 1181 (8th Dist.), citing 

App.R. 12(C), Seasons Coal v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). 
 – 4 – 

Case No. 19 CO 0041

Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the material 

elements of the case must not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578, 

syllabus (1978). See, also, Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield, 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 226, 638 N.E.2d 

533 (1994). Reviewing courts must oblige every reasonable presumption in favor of the 

lower court's judgment and finding of facts. Gerijo, 70 Ohio St.3d at 226 (citing Seasons 

Coal Co., supra). In the event the evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation, 

we must construe it consistently with the lower court's judgment. Id. In addition, the 

weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the 

trier of the facts. Kalain v. Smith, 25 Ohio St.3d 157, 162, 495 N.E.2d 572 (1986). 

{¶14} We must examine the evidence presented at trial in examining whether the 

trial court’s judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶15} Griffith was appellee’s sole witness. Griffith testified that he first met with 

appellants in March 2016. (Tr. 9). He stated that there was no general contractor on the 

job. (Tr. 10). Instead, he simply met with appellants and they told him what they wanted 

in their new home. (Tr. 10). Griffith guesstimated that he met with appellants on three 

occasions before he started work at their new house. (Tr. 11). Griffith testified that he 

never saw a set of plans for the house during these meetings. (Tr. 11). 

{¶16} Griffith testified that the parties never entered into a written contract. (Tr. 

12). He stated that appellants told him the house was going to be 2,000 square feet. (Tr. 

12). Believing the house would be approximately 2,000 square feet, Griffith estimated a 

cost of $10,000 to $12,000 based on $5 per square foot. (Tr. 12, 29). 

{¶17} Griffith stated that he realized the house was more than 2,000 square feet 

when he went to the house to start the “rough in.” (Tr. 14). This occurred in June 2016. 

(Tr. 15). At that point, Griffith stated he told appellants the project was going to cost more 

than he had originally quoted but he did not tell them how much more at that time. (Tr. 

15, 30). He stated that appellants did not voice any complaints to him at that time. (Tr. 

17). 

{¶18} Griffith testified that $5 per square foot was an industry average for 

Mahoning and Columbiana County at that time for this type of electrical work. (Tr. 31). 
 – 5 – 

Case No. 19 CO 0041

{¶19} As to the money paid to appellee, Griffith testified that appellee sent 

appellants a bill in September 2016, for $7,452 after the “rough in” was complete, which 

appellants paid in full. (Tr. 17; Ex. A). Appellee sent appellants a second bill in March 

2017, after the entire job was complete for $9,633.09. (Tr. 17; Ex. A). Appellants paid 

$2,500 toward the second bill in July 2017 and another $3,000 toward the second bill in 

September 2017. (Tr. 17; Ex. A). Griffith stated there still remained a balance of 

$4,133.09, which appellants have not paid. (Tr. 17; Ex A). 

{¶20} Griffith also testified regarding Exhibit E, which included copies of the work 

cards for the three electricians who worked on appellants’ house. The work cards 

reflected 289 total hours worked. (Tr. 19-20; Ex. E). And Griffith testified as to Exhibits F 

and G, which were invoices from YESCO and receipts from Home Depot for materials for 

the project. (Tr. 21-22; Ex. F, G). Finally, he testified that the standard markup on 

supplies is 15 percent. (Tr. 22-23). 

{¶21} Next, John testified for appellants. John stated that he and Jenna were the 

general contractors for their new house. (Tr. 35-36). They contacted appellee to do the 

electrical work based on a referral from a contractor they had hired to frame the house. 

(Tr. 36). John stated that they met with Griffith and Griffith told them the project would 

cost $10,000 “give or take.” (Tr. 38). John testified that was the only time the parties 

discussed the price before the final bill. (Tr. 38). He stated that the original plans were 

never modified. (Tr. 38). He stated that he gave every contractor a set of plans that 

showed the house was to be 2,912 square feet. (Tr. 46-47). John testified that Griffith 

never gave him a specific price per square foot and never told him there was a 15 percent 

markup on supplies. (Tr. 39). 

{¶22} John testified that when he received the first bill for $7,452, he paid it. (Tr. 

39). He believed the first bill was for the “roughing” and he knew that there would still be 

another bill when the project was completed. (Tr. 40). When he received the second bill 

for $9,633.09, however, he was surprised by the amount. (Tr. 40). John testified that he 

contacted Griffith, who told him they would work something out. (Tr. 40). Several months 

later, John stated that he spoke with appellee’s owner who told him to pay what he thought 

was fair. (Tr. 41). John stated that after they paid $5,500 toward the second bill, he 

thought the matter was settled. (Tr. 41). 
 – 6 – 

Case No. 19 CO 0041

{¶23} Finally, John testified that he was not taking issue with the quality of the 

work or the number of hours worked. (Tr. 47). 

{¶24} Jenna also testified. She stated the only time Griffith ever mentioned that 

the project would cost more than $10,000 was when they were walking through the house 

and she informed him of where she wanted lights located and he told her it would be “a 

little more than” $10,000. (Tr. 50). 

{¶25} Unjust enrichment exists when the plaintiff demonstrates: (1) a benefit to 

the defendant conferred by the plaintiff; (2) knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; 

and (3) retention of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances where it would be 

unjust to do so without payment. Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183, 

465 N.E.2d 1298 (1984). 

{¶26} In this case, appellants concede that elements one and two were met. 

They agree that appellee conferred a benefit on them and they knew of the benefit. 

Furthermore, appellants do not take issue with the quality of appellee’s work or the 

number of hours it took to complete the project. 

{¶27} The only issue then is whether there is competent, credible evidence 

supporting the trial court’s finding that retention of the benefit by appellants without 

payment of the remainder of the bill would be unjust. 

{¶28} Appellants’ argument here is that the trial court erred in believing Griffith’s 

testimony in full and not believing all of John’s testimony. But the trier of fact is free to 

believe all, part, or none of each witnesses' testimony. State v. Matthews, 7th Dist. 

Mahoning No. 08-MA-49, 2009-Ohio-3254, ¶ 55, citing State v. Nichols, 85 Ohio App.3d 

65, 76, 619 N.E.2d 80 (4th Dist.1993). Thus, it was up to the trial court, as the finder of 

fact, to determine whether Griffith’s and John’s testimonies were accurate as to each of 

the matters they testified to. 

{¶29} Griffith testified that the $10,000 price he quoted appellants was based on 

appellants’ representation that their new house was to be 2,000 square feet. He further 

testified that once he learned that the house was actually almost 3,000 square feet, he 

told appellants the price was going to increase. Appellee then billed appellants in 

accordance with industry standards for the amount of hours worked. 
 – 7 – 

Case No. 19 CO 0041

{¶30} Because Griffith’s testimony supports the trial court’s judgment, the court’s 

judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We are to give every 

reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court’s judgment and finding of facts. Gerijo, 

70 Ohio St.3d at 226 (citing Seasons Coal Co., supra). In conducting a manifest weight 

of the evidence review in a civil case, “[a] finding of an error of law is a legitimate ground 

for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of witnesses and evidence is not.” 

Seasons Coal, 10 Ohio St.3d at 81. Thus, even if this court may have reached a different 

conclusion, we could not reverse on that basis. 

{¶31} Accordingly, appellants’ sole assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶32} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed. 

Waite, P. J., concurs. 

Robb, J., concurs. 
[Cite as Kirkner Elec., Inc. v. Rydarowicz, 2020-Ohio-3362.]

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the sole assignment of 

error is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment 

of the Columbiana County Municipal Court of Columbiana County, Ohio, is affirmed. 

Costs to be taxed against the Appellants. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.