UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________

)

LEIGH BROWN ) Civil Case No.

4711 Myers Lane )

Harrisburg, NC 28075, )

)

LEIGH BROWN FOR CONGRESS )

4711 Myers Lane )

Harrisburg, NC 28075, )

)

LEIGH BROWN & ASSOCIATES )

24 Cabarrus Avenue East )

Concord, NC )

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION )

1050 First Street, NE )

Washington, DC 20463, )

Defendant. )

_________________________________________ )

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, Leigh Brown, Leigh Brown & Associates, and Leigh Brown for Congress 

(“Plaintiffs”), bring this verified complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, and complain as 

follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a pre-enforcement, as-applied challenge to a Federal Election Campaign Act 

definitional Statute at 52 U.S.C. 30104(f)(3)(A)(i) and the Federal Election Commission’s parallel 

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 1 of 19
implementing regulations at 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.29 (“electioneering communications”), 104.5(j), 

104.20, 114.10(b)(2), 110.11(a)(4) (electioneering communications disclaimer and reporting 

requirements), which impact Plaintiffs’ ability to engage in constitutionally protected speech.

2. This case challenges a law that, as interpreted and applied by the Federal Election 

Commission (“FEC”), abridges the freedom of speech and association guaranteed under the First 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. These challenges are brought as applied against 52 

U.S.C. 30104(f) and its implementing regulations.

3. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution Protects Plaintiffs’ right to run for 

federal office and to continue to advertise her longstanding business without unwarranted 

governmental intrusion and restrictions. Wishing to exercise that right, Plaintiffs would like to 

engage in certain speech and know in advance the compliance obligations under the Federal 

Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).

4. Disclosure and disclaimer requirements are subject to “exacting scrutiny.” See, e.g., 

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366-67 (2010) (“The Court has subjected [disclosure] 

requirements to ‘exacting scrutiny’”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam); accord 

Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 187-88 (2010). As a result, there must be a “‘substantial relation’ 

between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” Citizens 

United, 558 U.S. at 366-67 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66).

5. To survive exacting scrutiny, “the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the 

seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 

(2008) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68).

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6. One governmental interest cited in Citizens United is “‘[P]rovid[ing] the electorate with 

information’ about the sources of election-related spending.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 315

(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66).

7. In this case, Plaintiffs submit that their proposed advertisements are not election-related 

because they do not constitute “electioneering communications” involving “clearly identified 

candidates.” Instead, they are commercial in nature, constituting pleas for business as for any other 

realty firm.

8. Exacting scrutiny is not simply a way to force judicial approval of government regulations 

regarding the First Amendment. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66 (describing exacting scrutiny as 

a “strict test” requiring more than “a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest”); 

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) (noting the “[s]tate may not choose means that 

unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty” nor choose a regulatory scheme broadly

stifling speech if the state has available a “less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests”) 

(quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Laws that 

are “no more than tenuously related to the substantial interests disclosure serves . . . fail exacting 

scrutiny.” Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 204 (1999) (internal marks omitted).

9. In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Buckley v. Valeo that a “clearly identified 

candidate” under the FECA has a very specific meaning:

Section 608 (e)(2) defines "clearly identified" to require that the candidate's name, 

photograph or drawing, or other unambiguous reference to his identity appear as 

part of the communication. Such other unambiguous reference would include use 

of the candidate's initials (e.g., FDR), the candidate's nickname (e.g., Ike), his office 

(e.g., the President or the Governor of Iowa), or his status as a candidate (e.g., the 

Democratic Presidential nominee, the senatorial candidate of the Republican Party 

of Georgia).

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Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43 n. 51; see also FEC v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 713 F. Supp. 428, 433 

(D.D.C. 1989) (“An explicit and unambiguous reference to the candidate must be mentioned in 

the communication . . . .”).

10. This language has since been incorporated into federal regulations 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.29, 

104.5(j), 104.20, 114.10(b)(2), 110.11(a)(4), and federal statute, 52 U.S.C. 30104(f)(3)(A)(i). 

11. In 2002, Congress enacted The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), 

defining the term “electioneering communication” as:

any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which – (I) refers to a 

clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is made within – (aa) 60 

days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the 

candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a 

convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a 

candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and (III) in the case of a 

communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President 

or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate. 

52 U.S.C. 30104(f)(3)(A)(i) (emphasis added).

12. Under the FECA, any person who makes an electioneering communication is subject to a 

number of disclosure, disclaimer, and reporting obligations with the Federal Election Commission.

13. The Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), upheld these disclosure and 

disclaimer rules against a facial challenge because, as the Court explained, they were “both easily 

understood and objectively determinable”:

[W]e observe that new FECA § 304(f)(3)’s definition of “electioneering 

communication” raises none of the vagueness concerns that drove our 

analysis in Buckley. The term “electioneering communication” applies only 

(1) to a broadcast (2) clearly identifying a candidate for federal office, (3) 

aired within a specific time period, and (4) targeted to an identified audience 

of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners. These components are both easily 

understood and objectively determinable. 

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194.

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14. FECA also exempts four categories of communication from the statutory definition, 

including “any other communication exempted under such regulations as the Commission may 

promulgate . . . to ensure appropriate implementation of this paragraph, except that under such 

regulation a communication may not be exempted if it meets the requirements of this paragraph 

and is described in section 30101(20)(A)(iii) of this title.” 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(B)(iv). The 

provision referenced refers to “a public communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate 

for Federal office . . . and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes 

a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote 

for or against a candidate).” 52 U.S.C. §30101(20)(A)(iii).

15. It is well established that Congress’ motivation in enacting the “electioneering 

communications” provisions was to regulate so-called “sham issue ads” that were paid for with 

non-federal funds. There is no suggestion anywhere in the legislative record that Congress 

intended to include bona fide commercial advertisements.

16. In the first electioneering communications rulemaking, the Commission noted that "the 

principal Congressional sponsors of BCRA explained the exemption authority would 'allow the 

Commission to exempt communications that 'plainly and unquestionably' are 'wholly unrelated' to 

an election and do not 'in any way' support or oppose a candidate." Final Rule on Electioneering 

Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,190, 65,198 (October 23, 2002). In 2002, the Commission 

considered adopting a regulatory exemption for business advertisements, specifically, "an 

exemption for communications that refer to a clearly identified candidate in the context of 

promoting a candidate's business, including a professional practice, for example." Id. at 65,202. 

The Commission, however, declined to adopt a business advertisement exemption, explaining:

The Commission has determined that a narrow exemption for such ads is not 

appropriate and cannot be promulgated consistent with the Commission's authority 

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under 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(B)(iv). Based on past experience, the Commission 

believes that it is likely that, if run during the period before an election, such 

communications could well be considered to promote or support the clearly 

identified candidate, even if they also serve a business purpose unrelated to the 

election.

Id.

17. In 2004, the Commission determined that it could consider through the advisory opinion

process, on a case-by-case basis, whether particular advertisements referenced a clearly identified 

candidate or not. See Advisory Opinion 2004-31 (Russ Darrow Group, Inc.) at 4 ("The decision 

not to adopt a blanket exemption for such communications, however, does not preclude the 

Commission from making a determination that the specific facts and circumstances of a particular 

case indicate that certain advertisements do not refer to a clearly identified Federal candidate and, 

hence, do not constitute electioneering communications."). In the Russ Darrow matter, the 

Commission concluded that commercial advertisements for Russ Darrow-branded car dealerships 

did not refer to a clearly identified candidate for federal office, and thus, were not "electioneering 

communications." Rather, under "the factual circumstances presented," "the use of the name 'Russ 

Darrow' refers to a business or to another individual who not a candidate." Advisory Opinion 2004-

31 at 3. The Commission explained:

The Commission concludes that your proposed advertisements refer to RDG's 

[Russ Darrow Group, Inc.] car dealerships or Russ Darrow III, and not to the 

Candidate. First, the Candidate himself does not speak or appear on screen in any 

of the advertisements. Second, another individual, Russ Darrow III, does speak and 

appear in the advertisements. You indicate that he, not the Candidate, has been the 

public face of the company for more than ten years. Third, "Russ Darrow" is part 

of the name of all of RDG' s dealerships, which RDG has worked for a decade to 

develop as a brand name for all its dealerships. Finally, while the name "Russ 

Darrow" is used throughout the proposed advertisements, most of these references 

include the full name through which a particular dealership does business (e.g., 

Russ Darrow Toyota, Russ Darrow Kia, Russ Darrow Cadillac). While a couple of 

the proposed advertisements also include a single reference to "Russ Darrow," 

rather than the full name through which the dealership does business, these 

references, taken together with the other references in the advertisement, also refer 

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to the business entity and not to the Candidate. Therefore, the Commission 

concludes that RDG's television and radio advertisements do not refer to a clearly 

identified candidate under 11 CFR 100.29(b )(2).

Id.

18. In 2012, the Commission considered a request to grant an exemption for a commercial 

advertisement that everyone agreed included references to a clearly identified candidate. In 

Advisory Opinion Request 2012-20, Markwayne Mullin sought an electioneering communication 

exemption for televised business advertisements for his company, Mullin Plumbing, Inc. The 

Commission was unable to approve a response, but the applicable legal standard appears to be 

clear.

19. First, a majority of Commissioners agreed that the Commission had the authority to grant 

an exemption through the advisory opinion process, although the issue was not settled definitively. 

Two Commissioners voted to approve a draft that would have granted the exemption sought, while 

two other Commissioners wrote, "[w]e agree that the Commission may grant such exemptions," 

while noting that there was legislative history in support of that position. Statement on Advisory 

Opinion Request 2012-20 (Mullin) of Vice Chair Ellen L. Weintraub and Commissioner Cynthia 

L. Bauerly. Vice Chair Weintraub and Commissioner Bauerly wrote: "We are prepared to revisit 

this issue where the facts presented warrant an exemption." Id.

20. Second, the path to concluding that an exemption is warranted requires showing that the 

communications at issue are "plainly and unquestionably not related to the election." Id.; see also 

Advisory Opinion 2012-20, Response Draft B. In 2012, two Commissioners concluded that "[t]he 

Mullin Companies have become intertwined with the Mullin campaign to the point where it can 

no longer be said that the companies' ads are plainly and unquestionably not related to the 

election."' Id. These Commissioners also noted commenters claimed to have "difficulty 

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distinguishing between the Mullin campaign literature and the Mullin Companies' ads" and that "it 

seemed that the Mullin Companies' ads had become more frequent since Mr. Mullin began running 

for Congress." Id. While the former comment may have been traceable to an opposing candidate, 

and the latter comment was not substantiated in any way, we do not believe either issue is present 

in this matter.

21. This case presents just the opposite circumstance.

22. On April 11, 2019 the FEC considered but failed to grant affirmative responses to any of 

the advertisements presented in an advisory opinion request by Plaintiffs. The request sought a 

declaration that the proposed communications would not be deemed to refer to “clearly identified 

candidates,” and therefore not be electioneering communications.

23. Plaintiff Leigh Brown & Associates’ planned advertisements, attached in the Request for 

Advisory Opinion (Exhibit 1), filed on March 21, 2019 (just eight days after becoming a candidate)

consist of current advertisements promoting Leigh Brown & Associates real estate business, and 

a proposed alternative version of the advertisements. 

24. Plaintiff Leigh Brown is also a candidate for election in the current special election being 

held in North Carolina’s Ninth Congressional District, with a special primary election on May 14.

25. Accordingly, since the advertisements will be aired during the electioneering 

communication window for the upcoming special primary election on May 14 which begin 

Sunday, April 14, 2019, Ms. Brown sought the FEC’s guidance on the application of the statute 

and regulations to the advertisements and proposed alternative advertisements.

26. The current advertisements at issue here present circumstances where the statute is 

unconstitutional as applied, or are entitled to exemption from the statute. 

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 8 of 19
27. The proposed alternative advertisements are not electioneering communications, and the 

Plaintiffs seek a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment on the proposed advertisements.

28. Because of the FEC’s failure to faithfully apply the FECA and controlling Supreme Court 

opinions, Plaintiff Leigh Brown & Associates may need to refrain from speech in which it had 

previously engaged, alter its means and methods of communications, or change the existing and 

proposed speech to comply with FECA content, disclaimer and reporting requirements, all of 

which are because of a legitimate fear of civil and criminal enforcement by the government.

29. Plaintiff Leigh Brown & Associates is presently stymied in its ability to advertise

commercially and thus is cut off from its lifeblood income. 

30. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment from this court (a) finding 52 U.S.C. 

30104(f)(3)(A)(i) and the Federal Election Commission’s parallel implementing regulations at 11 

C.F.R. §§ 100.29 (“electioneering communications”), 104.5(j), 104.20, 114.10(b)(2), 110.11(a)(4) 

(electioneering communications disclaimer and reporting requirements) as applied to Plaintiff’s 

current communications are either unconstitutional as applied or entitled to and exemption, and a 

declaratory judgment that Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative advertisements are not subject to this 

statutory regime at all. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

31. This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201 as a 

challenge arising under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the judicial 

review provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2201-02.

32. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(c) because Defendant is an 

entity of the United States Government.

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 9 of 19
PARTIES

33. The FEC is the federal agency charged with enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign 

Act and is located in Washington, D.C.

34. Plaintiff Leigh Brown, a first-time federal candidate, is a partner with RE/MAX and the 

President and Chief Executive Officer of Leigh Brown & Associates.

35. Plaintiff Leigh Brown & Associates is a for-profit business entity that was incorporated in 

North Carolina under the name Mallard Creek Properties, Inc. on July 25, 2003. Leigh Brown & 

Associates provides real estate agent services in and around the Charlotte area in North and South 

Carolina. A total of eight other individuals work with Leigh Brown & Associates - four real estate 

agents and four administrative staff members - either as employees or independent contractors.

36. Plaintiff Leigh Brown for Congress is the candidate campaign committee for Ms. Brown’s 

candidacy for Congress in North Carolina’s Ninth Congressional District.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

37. For the past 13 years, Ms. Brown has aired radio advertisements publicizing Leigh Brown 

& Associates. Currently, all of these radio advertisements are run exclusively on WBT 1110, a 

commercial AM radio station serving the Charlotte metropolitan area, which includes parts of 

North Carolina and South Carolina. Leigh Brown & Associates has an annual contract with WBT 

to air her advertisements (Ms. Brown's current contract was entered into with Entercom Charlotte 

WBT AM/FM in December 2018 and covers calendar year 2019. The contract specifies 706 

broadcast spots for $48,204, or approximately 13.5 airings per week, further divided into a series 

of daily time ranges.) Ms. Brown develops the content of the advertisements herself without the 

use of a media production vendor, and she typically records two radio advertisements at a time at 

WBT's facilities. The two advertisements are then broadcast on a rotating basis. The length of time 

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 10 of 19
a particular advertisement remains on the air varies, but Ms. Brown typically creates and records 

new advertisements every 60 to 90 days. This radio advertising is a core component of Ms. Brown's 

efforts to generate business for herself and the other agents on her real estate team. At least 10% 

of her annual commission revenue is attributable to clients acquired as a result of the radio 

advertising. Accordingly, Ms. Brown spends approximately $50,000 on radio advertising each 

year.

38. The specific content of the radio advertisements that Ms. Brown runs has varied over the

years, but ads have followed a similar template. Advertisements generally are 60 seconds in length, 

and typically feature discussion of a real estate issue specific to the Charlotte real estate market 

(e.g., local property values and trends in housing prices). The advertisements typically note how 

many houses her team sells and consistently include two closing slogans: "I'm interviewing for a 

job I want to be your realtor" and "There is a difference when you call Leigh Brown." the past 

several years.

39. If Ms. Brown is unable to advertise for her business during the electioneering 

communications window, it will have a detrimental impact on her real estate firm and the 

employees/contractors who rely on it for their livelihood. Therefore, she seeks to continue airing 

the two radio advertisements, during the electioneering communication window for the upcoming 

special primary election on May 14. Ms. Brown began airing these specific commercial

advertisements in the Charlotte area on or about March 5, 2019, prior to her becoming a federal 

candidate. As of April 14, these advertisements will satisfy the basic statutory definition of 

"electioneering communication." Ms. Brown does not intend to change the content or advertising 

volume of these two advertisements during the rapidly approaching electioneering 

communications window.

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 11 of 19
40. The content of these two advertisements is consistent with the format of past 

advertisements. Ms. Brown's political campaign has engaged an entirely separate, political media 

vendor for campaign advertising and strategy purposes and that vendor played no role in the 

creation or airing of the commercial advertisements for Ms. Brown's real estate business.

41. Ms. Brown requested an advisory opinion from the FEC as to whether the un-altered and 

alternate versions of both Advertisements #1 and #2 would constitute “electioneering 

communication” when aired during the upcoming pre-primary period.

42. The FEC considered but did not approve any of the draft advisory opinions. The FEC voted 

2-2 on Agenda Document No. 19-14-B (attached hereto as Exhibit 2), 3-1 against on Agenda 

Document No. 19-14-A (attached hereto as Exhibit 3), and 3-1 in favor of a motion to approve the 

responses to Questions 2 and 3 in Agenda Document 19-14-A (Ex. 3). The affirmative vote of four 

members of the FEC is required to render and advisory opinion under FECA. See 52 U.S.C. 

§§30106(c), 30107(a)(7); see also 11 C.F.R. §112.4(a). Thus, the FEC was unable to render an 

opinion in this matter.

COUNT 1

Declaratory Judgment That the FEC’s Finding That Advertisement #1 and #2, As They 

Stand, Constitute Electioneering Communications Is Unconstitutional As Applied Or That 

the Advertisements are Entitled to an Exemption.

43. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in all of the 

preceding paragraphs.

44. The application of the statutory definition of “clearly identified” candidate at 52 U.S.C. 

30104(f)(3)(A)(i) and the Federal Election Commission’s parallel implementing regulations at 11 

C.F.R. §§ 100.29, 104.5(j), 104.20, 114.10(b)(2), 110.11(a)(4), to Advertisements #1 and #2 is 

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 12 of 19
inconsistent with law and severely burdens Plaintiffs’ right to freedom of speech free of 

government regulation

45. The two radio advertisements are "plainly and unquestionably not related to any election."

46. First, Ms. Brown has aired similar advertisements exclusively for the purpose of promoting 

her real estate business for years prior to her declaration of candidacy, and these two 

advertisements are no different in form or purpose than those she has previously aired. 

47. Second, the Advertisements do not promote or support Ms. Brown’s candidacy, or attack 

or oppose any other federal candidate. 

48. Accordingly, the FEC should have concluded that these communications are exempt from 

the definition of electioneering communication.

49. As applied by the FEC’s draft opinions (Ex. 2, 3), 52 U.S.C. 30104(f)(3)(A)(i) combined 

with 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.29, 104.5(j), 104.20, 114.10(b)(2), 110.11(a)(4), are the functional 

equivalent of a speech ban imposed by federal statute against individuals who happen to own a 

business sharing their name (a not uncommon occurrence) and simultaneously seek federal office 

who do not want and are not required to comply with the burdens of the disclaimer, disclosure and 

reporting requirements of the electioneering communications rules for their traditional business 

advertising.

50. But for operation of the law, Plaintiffs are prepared to run these advertisements and other 

communications similar to them consistently through the year.

51. This statutory scheme cannot constitutionally apply to these advertisements as applied, in 

violation of the First Amendment.

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 13 of 19
52. In the alternative, this Court should find that the current advertisements are entitled to an 

exemption from the statute for the reasons set forth in Questions 2 and 3 of Draft A of the Advisory 

Opinion, a position clearly supported by three of the four current FEC Commissioners.

COUNT 2

Declaratory Judgment That the Proposed Alternative Advertisements Do Not Constitute 

Electioneering Communications

53. Plaintiff reallege and incorporate by reference all of the allegations contained in all of the 

preceding paragraphs.

54. Plaintiffs seek a Declaratory Judgment from this Court stating that the proposed Alternative 

Advertisements do not constitute electioneering communications.

55. The two alternative radio advertisements are "plainly and unquestionably not related to any 

election."

56. Ms. Brown has aired similar advertisements exclusively for the purpose of promoting her 

real estate business for years prior to her declaration of candidacy, and these two advertisements 

are no different in form or purpose than those she has previously aired. 

57. The Alternative Advertisements do not promote or support Ms. Brown’s candidacy, or 

attack or oppose any other federal candidate.

58. The two alternative radio advertisements do not mention or contain references to any 

clearly identified candidate for federal office.

59. Accordingly, the FEC should have concluded that these communications do not fall under 

the definition of an electioneering communication.

60. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment that airing the Alternative Advertisements 

#1 and #2 during the electioneering communication window do not constitute “electioneering 

communications” under FECA.

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 14 of 19
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Plaintiff prays for the following relief:

1. A declaratory judgment that the application of 52 U.S.C. 30104(f)(3)(A)(i); 11 C.F.R. §§ 

100.29, 104.5(j), 104.20, 114.10(b)(2), 110.11(a)(4) to Plaintiffs’ proposed unaltered 

Advertisements is unconstitutional and void as applied; or in the alternative a declaratory 

judgement the current advertisements are entitled to an exemption;

2. A declaratory judgment that the proposed Alternative Advertisements do not constitute 

“Electioneering Communications” under 52 U.S.C. 30104(f)(3)(A)(i); 11 C.F.R. §§ 

100.29, 104.5(j), 104.20, 114.10(b)(2), 110.11(a)(4);

3. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendant FEC from enforcing 2 U.S.C. 

§§ 431(18) and 434(f), as well as any applicable rules and regulations regarding those 

provisions, against Plaintiffs;

4. An award of nominal damages of $1 for the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights;

5. Costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to any applicable statute or authority;

6. Any other relief that the Court deems just and appropriate. 

Date: April 11, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

/s/Jason Torchinsky

Jason Torchinsky (D.C. Bar No. 976033)

jtorchinsky@hvjlaw.com

J. Michael Bayes (D.C. Bar No. 501845)

jmbayes@hvjlaw.com

HOLTZMAN VOGEL JOSEFIAK TORCHINSKY 

PLLC

45 North Hill Drive, Suite 100

Warrenton, VA 20186

Tel: (540) 341-8808

Fax: (540) 341-8809

Counsel for Plaintiffs

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 15 of 19
LEIGH BROWN & ASSOCIATES VERIFICATION

I, Leigh Brown, declare as follows:

1. I am the authorized agent of Leigh Brown & Associates

2. I have personal knowledge of Leigh Brown & Associates, and its operations, including 

those set out in this Complaint, and if called upon to testify, I would testify competently 

as to the matters stated herein.

3. I verify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the 

factual statements in this Complaint concerning Leigh Brown & Associates, are true and 

correct.

Executed this 11th day of April, 2019

_____________________________

Leigh Brown & Associates

BY: Leigh Brown

ITS: Authorized Agent

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 16 of 19
LEIGH BROWN FOR CONGRESS VERIFICATION

I, Leigh Brown, declare as follows:

1. I am the authorized agent of Leigh Brown for Congress

2. I have personal knowledge of Leigh Brown for Congress, and its operations, including 

those set out in this Complaint, and if called upon to testify, I would testify competently 

as to the matters stated herein.

3. I verify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the 

factual statements in this Complaint concerning Leigh Brown for Congress, are true and 

correct.

Executed this 11th day of April, 2019

_____________________________

Leigh Brown for Congress

BY: Leigh Brown

ITS: Authorized Agent

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 17 of 19
LEIGH BROWN VERIFICATION

I, Leigh Brown, declare as follows:

1. I verify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the 

factual statements in this Complaint concerning Leigh Brown, are true and correct.

Executed this 11th day of April, 2019

_____________________________

Leigh Brown

Case 1:19-cv-01021-TJK Document 1 Filed 04/11/19 Page 18 of 19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that, on this 11th day of April 2019, the foregoing Complaint was filed

electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. The following parties were 

served either electronically on April 11th or by USPS First Class Mail on April 12, 2019.

/s/Jason Torchinsky

Jason Torchinsky (D.C. Bar No. 976033)

Federal Election Commission

1050 First Street, NE

Washington, DC 20463

Attorney General William Barr

c/o Assistant U.S. Attorney of Administration

Justice Management Division

950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

Room 1111

Washington, D.C. 20530

Jessie K. Liu

United States Attorney for the District of Columbia

Civil Process Clerk

555 4th St. N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20530

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