1

U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE )

PRESIDENT, )

441 North Lee Street, Suite 205 )

Alexandria, VA 22314 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )

1050 First Street, NE )

Washington, DC 20463, )

)

Defendant, )

_______________________________________)

SUPPLEMENTAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE PRESIDENT brings this action for injunctive 

and declaratory relief and alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. This lawsuit seeks to compel the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) to take action on 

an administrative complaint the Committee to Defend the President (“CDP”) filed with the 

FEC over a year ago—even excluding the period during which the federal government was 

shut down—disclosing the existence of an unprecedented nationwide scheme to violate 

federal campaign finance law in which $84 million was effectively laundered over more 

than a year by the Hillary Victory Fund (“HVF”) through dozens of state political party 

committees to the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) and, ultimately, to Hillary for 

America (“HFA”).

2. The 2016 Democratic Presidential nominee Hillary Rodham Clinton; Hillary Victory Fund,

Clinton’s joint fundraising committee; Hillary for America, Clinton’s campaign 

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 1 of 20
2

committee; the DNC; and dozens of Democratic state parties across the country entered 

into the exact type of arrangement the Supreme Court declared in McCutcheon v. FEC

would so flagrantly violate campaign finance law that it was “unlikely” to occur. The Court 

was unable to anticipate the extent and sheer audacity with which Democrats would 

conspire to circumvent, evade, and effectively nullify candidate contribution limits.

3. Federal law does not permit the FEC to investigate alleged violations of campaign finance 

law unless and until the Commission votes there is “reason to believe” a violation occurred 

based on an Administrative Complaint and any responses filed by the respondents. 52 

U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2). This standard is far lower than either “probable cause,” cf. id. 

§ 30109(a)(3), or the preponderance standard a district court would apply, cf. id. 

§ 30109(a)(6).

4. The Administrative Complaint CDP filed with the FEC contained detailed spreadsheets 

and explanations citing to the hundreds of specific line-item entries in scores of publicly 

available FEC filings that demonstrate:

a. virtually every single reported disbursement from HVF to a state party resulted in an

immediately reported transfer of the same amount of funds from the state party to the 

DNC; and 

b. over 99% of funds reportedly transferred through HVF to state parties wound up at the 

DNC.

5. CDP’s Administrative Complaint also contained public statements from both the then 

Chairwoman of the DNC, Donna Brazile, and HFA’s Chief Financial Officer, Gary 

Gensler, confirming HFA controlled the DNC’s finances, strategy, and expenditures. That 

is, the funds raised through HVF ended up under the direction and control of HFA. Press 

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 2 of 20
3

accounts reveal the Clinton campaign controlled the transfer of funds into and out of state 

party accounts, and some state party officials were unaware of transfers until after the fact. 

6. The state parties’ reports also contain dozens of inconsistencies with HVF’s and DNC’s 

reports that both violate federal reporting requirements on their own and raise troubling 

questions about whether the transactions being reported even occurred. 

7. In light of the magnitude of this unprecedented conspiracy to flout federal campaign 

finance law in a failed attempt to secure the Presidency for Hillary Rodham Clinton, the 

amount of money involved, the nationwide scope, and the fact that the 2020 presidential 

cycle is already underway, it is imperative this Court ensure the FEC take appropriate 

enforcement action in a timely manner pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8). In particular, 

the FEC’s failure to find “reason to believe” federal campaign finance law has been 

violated, despite the voluminous evidence set forth in CDP’s complaint is arbitrary, 

capricious, and contrary to law.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8. This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201, because 

it arises under a federal statute and seeks, in part, declaratory relief. 

9. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) because Defendant is an entity of 

the U.S. Government. 

PARTIES

10. Plaintiff COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE PRESIDENT (“CDP”) is a non-connected 

hybrid PAC headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia.

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 3 of 20
4

11. Defendant FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (“FEC”) is the federal agency charged 

with enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) and is located in 

Washington, D.C. 

THE FEC’S FAILURE TO TAKE ACTION 

ON CDP’S ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT

12. On December 15, 2017, CDP filed a Complaint (hereafter, “Administrative Complaint”) 

with the FEC against Hillary Rodham Clinton, the 2016 Democratic nominee for President 

of the United States; Hillary for America (“HFA”), Clinton’s principal authorized 

candidate committee; DNC Services Corp. / Democratic National Committee (“DNC”); 

William Q. Derrough, Treasurer of the DNC; 38 state political party committees; Hillary 

Victory Fund (“HVF”), the joint fundraising committee formed by HFA, the DNC, and 

those state party committees; and Elizabeth Jones, HVF’s Treasurer. 

13. The Administrative Complaint was written, signed, notarized and verified under penalty of 

perjury as required by 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1).

a. Exhibit 1 to the Complaint is an Excel spreadsheet containing citations to the 

specific FEC filings, page numbers, and transaction identification numbers for each 

step of each transaction through which HVF funneled contributions it received to 

the DNC. 

b. Exhibit 2 to the Complaint is an Excel spreadsheet identifying all of the DNC’s 

coordinated expenditures with HFA.

14. A true and complete copy of the Administrative Complaint and all exhibits is appended to 

this Complaint as Exhibit 1.

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 4 of 20
5

15. On or about December 21st, 2017, The FEC acknowledged it received the Administrative 

Complaint on December 15, 2017. A true and complete copy of the FEC’s 

acknowledgement is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit 2.

16. On or about December 21, 2017, the Enforcement Division of the FEC’s Office of General 

Counsel (“OGC”) assigned Matter Under Review (“MUR”) number 7302 to the 

Administrative Complaint.

17. On information and belief, the FEC notified the respondents of the Administrative 

Complaint within five days of its receipt, pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 111.5(a), and provided 

them with an opportunity to submit a response within 15 days, pursuant to 11 C.F.R. 

§ 111.6(a). On information and belief, OGC has not yet prepared a report for the 

Commission pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 111.7 containing a preliminary legal and factual 

analysis of the Administrative Complaint based on the Administrative Complaint itself, 

attached exhibits, and any responses received. On information and belief, despite an 

abundance of detailed documentary evidence consisting almost entirely of public filings 

with the FEC, and a surfeit of time, the Commission has not yet voted on whether there 

exists “reason to believe” a “possible violation” of federal campaign finance law exists to 

authorize an investigation into the Administrative Complaint’s allegations. CDP’s 

Administrative Complaint has been pending before the FEC for over a year. 

THE ALLEGATIONS IN CDP’S ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT

18. The Administrative Complaint CDP filed with the FEC alleges the existence of a 

conspiracy to funnel—effectively launder—nearly $84 million from an undetermined 

number of unnamed individual contributors to HVF (Clinton’s joint fundraising 

committee), and then through a series of nearly 40 state parties to the DNC. Public 

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 5 of 20
6

statements from the DNC’s former chairwoman Donna Brazile reveal that the DNC 

transferred the HVF funds it received through the state parties to HFA. She further 

disclosed that the Clinton campaign also directly controlled the DNC’s funds. And the 

DNC made coordinated expenditures with HFA, which campaign finance law treats as 

contributions to HFA. 

19. As the Administrative Complaint explains:

Based on publicly available FEC records, repeatedly throughout the 2016 

presidential campaign, HVF would purportedly transfer funds to its 

constituent political committees, which included between 34 and 40 state 

parties. On the very same day each of these transfers supposedly occurred, 

or occasionally the very next day, every single one of those state parties

purportedly contributed all of those funds entirely to the DNC. The 

uniformity, regularity, magnitude, immediacy, and extent of these reported 

transfers—every single state party transferring every single disbursement it 

received from HVF, in its entirety, exclusively to the DNC, immediately 

upon receipt—inexorably leads to the compelling inference, supported by 

public statements, HVF’s members had an understanding or agreement to 

automatically funnel funds they received through HVF to the DNC. 

Exh. 1 at 8; see also id. at 10 (“[T]he virtually unbroken pattern demonstrates state parties 

were being used as intermediate pass-through entities to funnel over 80 million dollars in 

contributions HVF received to the DNC, in violation of federal contribution limits, 

earmarking restrictions, and reporting requirements.”).

20. The Administrative Complaint further alleges, “The DNC, in turn, contributed most of 

those funds to HFA, made coordinated expenditures with HFA and otherwise transferred 

control of its money to HFA, as both the DNC’s own public filings and former DNC 

Chairwoman Donna Brazile’s public confessions make clear.” Id. at 8. 

21. The Administrative Complaint reiterated, “[V]irtually every single disbursement HVF 

[made] to a state party resulted in an immediate transfer of the same amount of funds from 

the state party to the DNC. Over 99% of funds transferred through HVF to state parties 

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 6 of 20
7

wound up at the DNC (which, as explained below, made coordinated expenditures with 

HFA and otherwise spent its funds subject to the oversight, direction, and control of HFA).”

Id. ¶ 52.

22. Each row in the spreadsheet labeled Exhibit 1 to the Administrative Complaint identifies a 

distinct series of transactions through which funds collected by HVF were reported to flow 

directly through a series of state parties to the DNC, almost always on the same day. The 

spreadsheet documents each step in each transaction by citing the particular FEC report 

documenting it.

23. Each transaction identified in the spreadsheet is structured in substantially the same 

manner:

a. HVF reported transferring a certain amount of funds to its state party members on 

a particular day. For example, HVF reported transferring a total of $505,000 to 17 

of its state party members on November 2, 2015, including $19,500 to the 

Mississippi Democratic Party. See Admin. Complaint, Exhibit 1, Row 33 (citing 

FEC Report # FEC-1180810 (amended), page 1390, Transaction ID # D22497). 

b. Most of those state party members reported receiving transfers in the identical 

amounts of funds from HVF on the very same day. The Mississippi Democratic 

Party did not report receiving any funds from HVF on or about that day, however.

c. Most of HVF’s state party members then reported contributing the same amount of 

money they received from HVF to the DNC on the very same day (or occasionally 

the next day). The Mississippi Democratic Party did not report transferring any 

funds to the DNC on or about that day, however. 

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 7 of 20
8

d. Finally, the DNC reported receiving the same amount of funds, also generally on 

the same day. For example, the DNC reported receiving $19,500 from the 

Mississippi Democratic Party on November 2, 2015. See Admin. Complaint, 

Exhibit 1, Row 33 (citing FEC Report # FEC-1039017 (amended), page 6208, 

Transaction ID # C32017326). This particular example, in which the Mississippi 

Democratic Party did not report receiving funds from HVF or transferring funds to 

the DNC, shows many of the transfers in this complex scheme were inconsistently 

or inaccurately reported. 

e. Each transfer of funds from HVF, allegedly through a state party committee, to the 

DNC is recorded in a separate row of Exhibit 1 to the Administrative Complaint. 

The last cell in each row cites the specific FEC reports that document—or fail to 

document—each step of the transaction. For example, Row 33 of Exhibit 1 to the 

Administrative Complaint sets explains the $43,500 transfer through the Alaska 

Democratic Party:

f. Through hundreds of transactions with this identical structure outlined in Exhibit 1

to the Administrative Complaint, HVF funneled over 80 million dollars through 

state parties directly to the DNC, starting in October 2015.

24. Paragraph 101 of the Administrative Complaint summarizes the total amounts of the passthrough transfers from HVF through the state parties to the DNC (where the funds were 

then either controlled by HFA, used for coordinated expenditures with HFA, and/or 

transferred to HFA):

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 8 of 20
9

DATE TOTAL AMOUNT 

TRANSFERRED TO DNC

TRANSACTIONS 

ON CHART

October 1-2, 2015 $216,000 Rows 2-10

October 1-2, 2015 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$48,000 Rows 12-13

November 2-3, 2015 $505,000 Rows 15-31

November 2-3, 2015 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$102,000 Rows 33-36

December 1-7, 2015 $799,400 Rows 38-63

December 1-7, 2015 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$83,600 Rows 65-66

January 4, 2016 $1,527,278.16 Rows 68-83

January 4, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$73,000 Row 85

April 2016 $707,000 Rows 87-90

May 2016 $900,000 Rows 92-95

May 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$100,000 Row 97

July 13, 2016 $5,000,000 Rows 99-106

July 26, 2016 $5,438,000 Rows 108-120

August 11, 2016 $4,795,000 Rows 122-138

August 11, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$700,000 Row 140

August 26, 2016 $5,500,000 Rows 142-157

September 12, 2016 $3,200,000 Rows 159-166

September 12, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$350,000 Row 168

September 26, 2016 $2,900,000 Rows 170 – 176

September 26, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$300,000 Row 177

October 6, 2016 $2,750,000 Rows 179-185

October 6, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$900,000 Row 187

October 7, 2016 $550,000 Row 189

October 11, 2016 $8,400,000 Rows 191-201

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 9 of 20
10

October 18, 2016 $4,000,000 Rows 203-205

October 18, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$275,000 Row 207

October 20, 2016 $8,435,000 Rows 209-229

October 24, 2016 $1,018,000 Rows 231-234

October 24, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$1,225,000 Rows 236-237

October 26, 2016 $7,115,000 Rows 239-265

October 26, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$125,000 Row 267

October 27, 2016 $2,075,000 Rows 269-290

October 27, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$15,000 Row 292

October 31, 2016 $2,862,000 Rows 294-321

October 31, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$247,000 Rows 323-324

November 2, 2016 $1,968,000 Rows 326-347

November 2, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$58,000 Row 349

November 3, 2016 $5,772,000 Rows 351-384

November 3, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$1,870,000 Rows 386-389

November 7, 2016 $789,000 Rows 391-423

November 7, 2016 (additional 

transactions w/ inconsistencies 

among reports)

$124,000 Rows 425-429

November 8, 2016 $974,000 Rows 431-456

TOTAL $84,791,278.20

25. The Administrative Complaint also drew three connections between HFA and the funds 

transferred from HVF through the state parties to the DNC:

a. First, former DNC Chairwoman Donna Brazile publicly admitted funds funneled 

from HVF through state parties to the DNC were then passed along to HFA. Exh. 

1, ¶ 104 (quoting Donna Brazile, Inside Hillary Clinton’s Secret Takeover of the 

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 10 of 20
11

DNC, POLITICO (Nov. 2, 2017), at 

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/02/clinton-brazile-hacks-2016-

215774). The article described HVF as “‘essentially . . . money laundering’ for the 

Clinton campaign.” Id. ¶ 105.

b. Second, between October 1, 2015 and Election Day, while funds were being 

funneled from HVF through state parties to the DNC, the DNC also made at least 

59 coordinated expenditures with the Clinton campaign (which campaign finance 

law treats as contributions to HFA), totaling $22,816,531.83. Id., ¶¶ 106-07.

c. Third, throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, Clinton and HFA exercised 

oversight, direction, and control over the expenditure of DNC funds, causing DNC 

accounts to be considered Clinton’s accounts for purposes of federal campaign 

finance law. Former DNC Chairwoman Donna Brazile publicly allocuted, “As 

Hillary’s campaign gained momentum, she resolved the party’s debt and put it on 

a starvation diet. It had become dependent on her campaign for survival, for which 

she expected to wield control of its operations.” 

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/02/clinton-brazile-hacks-2016-

215774. Brazile further revealed, “[T]he Joint Fund-Raising Agreement between 

the DNC, the Hillary Victory Fund, and Hillary for America. . . . specified that in 

exchange for raising money and investing in the DNC, Hillary would control the 

party’s finances, strategy, and all the money raised. Her campaign had the right 

of refusal of who would be the party communications director, and it would make 

final decisions on all the other staff. The DNC also was required to consult with 

the campaign about all other staffing, budgeting, data, analytics, and mailings.” 

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 11 of 20
12

Id. (emphasis added). Gary Gensler, the Chief Financial Officer of HFA, stated the 

Democratic Party was “fully under the control of the Clinton campaign . . . . The 

campaign had the DNC on life support, giving it money every month to meet its 

basic expenses, while the campaign was using the party as a fund-raising 

clearinghouse.” Id. In July 2016, Politico reported, “[W]hat happens to the cash in 

the Hillary Victory Fund after its initial distribution is left almost entirely to the 

discretion of the Clinton campaign’s chief operating officer, Beth Jones, who 

serves as the treasurer of the victory fund.” 

https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/dnc-leak-clinton-team-deflected-statecash-concerns-226191 (emphasis added). Consequently, Clinton and HFA 

exercised oversight, direction, and control over funds over the DNC’s funds, 

including funds the DNC obtained from HVF that were reported as flowing through 

the state parties. Exh. A, ¶¶ 111-15.

THE COUNTS IN CDP’S ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT

26. The Administrative Complaint alleges the hundreds of transactions it identifies violated 

campaign finance law in one or more different ways.

27. Count I, against all Respondents, alleges the use of Democratic state parties to funnel 

money from HVF, Clinton’s joint fundraising committee, to the DNC, and ultimately to 

HFA, Clinton’s campaign committee (whether in the form of contributions to HFA, 

coordinated expenditures with HFA that legally constitute in-kind contributions, or the 

grant of control over DNC funds to HFA personnel) constitutes illegal earmarking in 

violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8) and 11 C.F.R. § 110.6. Exh. 1, ¶¶ 123-30.

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 12 of 20
13

28. Count II, against Respondents DNC and its Treasurer, William Q. Derrough, alleges they 

accepted contributions made by one person in the name of another in violation of 52 U.S.C. 

¶ 30122, because over 99% of contributions to HVF, totaling over $80 million, were 

funneled from HVF through state parties to the DNC.

a. The uniformity, regularity, magnitude, immediacy, and extent of these hundreds of 

reported transfers show that, if those transactions actually occurred as reported, 

HVF’s member state party committees were playing an essentially ministerial role, 

acting as shells in a shell game, with no autonomy, agency, or control of their own.

b. In substance, contributions to HVF were not actually contributions to its member 

committees, but rather sham contributions papered through the intermediary state 

party committee members to the DNC itself (and ultimately HFA). The DNC 

nevertheless reported receiving contributions from HVF’s member state party 

committees, however, rather than reporting the actual sources of the funds: HVF’s 

contributors. Exh. 1, ¶¶ 131-38. 

29. Count III, against Respondents DNC and its Treasurer, William Q. Derrough, alleges they 

accepted excessive contributions in violation of 52 U.S.C. ¶ 30116(a)(1)(B), because 

contributions to HVF that were funneled through the state parties to the DNC should be 

deemed contributions to the DNC.

a. The uniformity, regularity, magnitude, immediacy, and extent of these hundreds of 

reported transfers show that, if those transactions actually occurred as reported, 

contributions to HVF were directly or indirectly earmarked to be transferred 

through HVF’s member state party committees to the DNC, and HVF’s member 

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 13 of 20
14

state party committees were playing an essentially ministerial role and acting as 

“straw man” intermediaries. 

b. These hundreds of virtually instantaneous transfers involving over $80 million were 

part of a longstanding, prearranged understanding, agreement, or arrangement 

among HVF, its member state party committees, the DNC, and HFA. Any 

contributions to HVF that would have resulted in more than $33,400 per contributor 

passing through its member state party committees to the DNC would violate 

federal limits on contributions from individuals to national political party 

committees, as adjusted for inflation. Exh. 1, ¶¶ 139-44. 

30. Count IV, against Respondents DNC and its Treasurer, William Q. Derrough, alleges they 

filed false, inaccurate, and/or incomplete reports in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30104. When 

funds were funneled through HVF and the state parties to the DNC, the DNC reported 

those funds as originating from the state parties rather than either HVF or its contributors.

Pursuant to 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(8) and 30122, contributions to HVF should not be 

treated as contributions to its member state party committees, but rather as contributions to 

the DNC. Exh. 1, ¶¶ 145-49. 

31. Count V, against all Respondents, alleges they violated 52 U.S.C. § 30104 by filing false 

reports, if the funds they reported as being transferred from HVF through the state parties 

to the DNC actually were transferred directly from HVF to the DNC.

a. It is reasonably possible HVF did not actually transfer contributions into its state 

party members’ accounts for moments before they were immediately re-transferred 

to the DNC, but rather transferred those funds directly to the DNC. 

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 14 of 20
15

b. In the alternative, it is reasonably possible based on published press accounts 

featuring quotes from state party committees that HVF, the DNC, and/or HFA, or 

their Treasurers, actually maintained control over contributions to HVF and 

executed the transactions to funnel those funds through the state party committees’ 

accounts to the DNC without the state party committees’ prior knowledge or 

consent concerning those transfers. In either case, Respondents’ reports to the FEC 

claiming the funds were transferred through HVF’s member state party committees 

were intentionally false. Exh. 1, ¶¶ 150-53.

32. Count VI, against the DNC, its Treasurer William Q. Derrough, HFA, and Clinton, for 

making and accepting excessive contributions in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B).

a. Based on public press accounts, including confessions from former DNC 

Chairwoman Donna Brazile and HFA Chief Financial Officer Gary Gensler, the 

DNC allowed HFA and its agents to exercise oversight, direction, and control over 

the expenditure of DNC funds, specifically including but not limited to funds the 

DNC obtained through HVF. 

b. Politico reports, “While state party officials were made aware that Clinton's 

campaign would control the movement of the funds between participating 

committees, one operative who has relationships with multiple state parties said 

that some of their officials have complained that they weren't notified of the 

transfers into and out of their accounts until after the fact.” Kenneth P. Vogel & 

Isaac Arnsdorf, Clinton Fundraising Leaves Little for State Parties, POLITICO (May 

2, 2016, 5:21 A.M.), at https://www.politico.com/story/2016/04/clintonfundraising-leaves-little-for-state-parties-222670.

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 15 of 20
16

c. By allowing Clinton and HFA to exercise direction, oversight, and control over the 

DNC’s funds, the DNC made a contribution of those funds to Clinton and HFA. 

The amount of DNC funds over which Clinton and HFA exercised oversight, 

direction, and control exceeded the amount of contributions and coordinated 

expenditures a national political party committee may make with a presidential 

candidate. Exh. 1, ¶¶ 154-60.

33. Count VII, against Respondent state political party committees, alleges they filed 

inaccurate and/or incomplete reports in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30104. 

a. The Administrative Complaint identified over 30 occasions on which HVF reported 

transferring funds to one or more state parties, or the DNC reported receiving funds 

from one or more state parties, yet those state parties’ reports did not contain 

corresponding disclosures. Contributions and receipts totaling $10,432,600 were 

missing from state party reports over a 13-month period.

b. These numerous violations of federal campaign finance law require no 

investigation, but rather are immediately apparent from the face of FEC filings from 

HVF, the DNC, and the state parties; it is indisputable that dozens of transfers HVF 

reported making to state parties did not appear as receipts on the state parties’ 

reports, and contributions the DNC reported receiving from state parties did not 

appear as such on the state parties’ reports.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT PROCEDURE

34. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1) authorizes any person to file a written, signed, sworn, and 

notarized complaint with the FEC alleging a violation of federal campaign finance law. 

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 16 of 20
17

35. Within 5 days of receiving the administrative complaint, the FEC must notify “any person 

alleged in the complaint to have committed such a violation.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1).

Any such person “shall have the opportunity to demonstrate, in writing, to the Commission 

within 15 days after notification that no action should be taken” pursuant to the Complaint.

Id.

36. After the respondents have been given an opportunity to submit a responsive filing, the 

Commission must vote on whether “it has reason to believe” a person violated federal 

campaign finance law. It takes the votes of four Commissioners to approve such a “reason 

to believe” (“RTB”) finding. The RTB vote is based solely on the administrative complaint, 

any responsive filings, and potentially public FEC records; the Commission is not 

permitted to undertake any investigation of the complaint or its allegations prior to an RTB 

finding. Id. § 30109(a)(2). 

37. Upon making an RTB finding, the Commission must notify the person alleged to have 

violated the law, and “make an investigation of such alleged violation, which may include 

a field investigation or audit.” Id. 

38. At the conclusion of the Commission’s investigation, OGC must prepare a report setting 

forth “the legal and factual issues of the case.” A copy of the report is provided to each 

respondent, and they have an opportunity to submit a responsive filing. Id. § 30109(a)(3). 

39. In most cases, upon receiving OGC’s report of the investigation, the Commission must 

vote whether “probable cause” exists to believe federal campaign finance law was violated.

It takes the votes of four Commissioners to make such a probable cause determination. Id. 

§ 30109(a)(3), (a)(4)(A)(i).

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 17 of 20
18

40. After the Commission makes a probable cause determination, it must attempt to enter into 

a conciliation agreement with the respondents for a period of 30-90 days. It takes the votes 

of four Commissioners to approve any such conciliation agreement. Id. 

§ 30109(a)(4)(A)(i).

41. If the Commission is unable to reach a conciliation agreement with the respondent, then 

upon a vote of four Commissioners it may seek monetary or injunctive relief in U.S. 

District Court. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(A).

42. In cases involving violations of certain disclosure requirements, including 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30104(a), (c), (e)-(g), (i); id. § 30105, in contrast, the Commission does not make 

“probable cause” determinations, but instead simply determines that the disclosure 

requirement was violated and imposes a civil monetary penalty. Id. 

§§ 30109(a)(4)(C)(i)(I)-(II), (a)(4)(C)(iv)(I)-(II). Such penalties are subject to judicial 

review. Id. § 30109(a)(4)(C)(iii).

COUNT I – FAILURE TO ACT UNDER 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A)

43. CDP hereby realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 

1 to 43 as if fully set forth herein.

44. CDP filed its Administrative Complaint alleging violations of federal campaign finance 

law with the FEC on December 15, 2017.

45. Over one year has elapsed since CDP filed its Administrative Complaint, and the FEC has 

failed to act. In particular, on information and belief, the FEC has not even made a “Reason 

to Believe” finding pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2), based on the Administrative 

Complaint, attached exhibits, and any responses received thereto.

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 18 of 20
19

46. Without a Reason to Believe finding, the FEC cannot even initiate an investigation into the 

Administrative Complaint’s verified, documentarily supported allegations. See 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(2).

47. CDP is aggrieved by the Commissions’ failure to act on its Administrative Complaint. 52 

U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) provides, “Any party aggrieved . . . by a failure of the Commission 

to act” on an Administrative Complaint “during the 120-day period beginning on the date 

the complaint is filed, may file a petition with the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia.” The Court may rule the Commission’s “failure to act is contrary to 

law, and may direct the Commission to conform with such declaration within 30 days.” 

48. The Commission’s failure to act on CDP’s Administrative Complaint is arbitrary, 

capricious, contrary to law, and an abuse of discretion. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff CDP is entitled to relief under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8). 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff CDP prays for the following relief:

1. A declaratory judgment that CDP is entitled to relief under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A), 

(C) and the FEC’s failure to act on the Administrative Complaint is arbitrary, capricious, 

contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. 

2. An injunction compelling the Commission, pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(C):

a. to vote pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2), no more than thirty (30) days from the 

date of this Court’s order, on whether there exists reason to believe each of the 

Respondents in the Administrative Complaint has violated the cited provisions of 

federal campaign finance law based on the Administrative Complaint’s allegations 

and supporting evidence, as well as any responsive filings; and

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 19 of 20
20

b. in the event the Commission makes one or more “reason to believe” findings in 

connection with the Administrative Complaint, to conduct its investigation, vote on 

whether probable cause exists to believe campaign finance laws have been violated 

pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(3), and take any other subsequent steps necessary 

to enforce the legal provisions at issue, without unreasonable delay.

3. Costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to any applicable statute or authority, including but not 

limited to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412; and

4. Such other relief as this Court deems just and appropriate.

Dated this 12th day of February, 2019. 

Respectfully submitted, 

___/s/ Dan Backer__________

POLITICAL.LAW PLLC

441 N. Lee Street, Suite 300

Alexandria, VA 22314

(202) 210-5431

dan@political.law

Counsel for Committee 

to Defend the President 

VERIFICATION

I, Dan Backer, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to 

the best of my personal knowledge. Executed on February 12, 2019. 

/s/ Dan Backer

Counsel for Committee 

to Defend the President

Case 1:18-cv-00888-RDM Document 17 Filed 02/13/19 Page 20 of 20