United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Science, the 

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, 

and Related Agencies, Committee on 

Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives 

2010 CENSUS

Redesigned Approach Holds 

Promise, but Census Bureau 

Needs to Annually Develop 

and Provide a 

Comprehensive Project 

Plan to Monitor Costs 

Statement of Brenda S. Farrell 

Acting Director, 

Strategic Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT

Thursday, July 27, 2006

 

GAO-06-1009T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 2006 

2010 CENSUS

Redesigned Approach Holds Promise, 

but Census Bureau Needs to Annually 

Develop and Provide a Comprehensive 

Project Plan to Monitor Costs 

Highlights of GAO-06-1009T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Science, the 

Departments of State, Justice, and 

Commerce, and Related Agencies, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau)

estimates that the 2010 Census will 

cost over $11.3 billion, making it 

the most expensive in our history. 

The U.S. House of Representatives 

and Senate appropriation bills 

propose to reduce the Bureau’s 

fiscal year 2007 budget request, 

raising questions about the 

Bureau’s design of the 2010 Census 

and associated costs. Based on

issued GAO work, this testimony 

addresses the extent to which the 

Bureau has (1) made progress 

redesigning its approach, including

nonresponse follow-up, a key cost 

driver; and (2) developed a 

comprehensive project plan for the 

2010 Census, as well as timely,

detailed cost data for effective 

oversight and cost control. 

What GAO Recommends

A January 2004 GAO report 

recommended that the Bureau

develop a comprehensive project 

plan for the 2010 Census that

would include milestones, itemized 

costs, and measurable goals. While

the Bureau disagreed with the 

recommendation, it stated it would 

provide such a plan to Congress 

and GAO. More than 2 years 

passed and the Bureau did not 

provide this plan. In testimonies

during March and June 2006, GAO 

reemphasized the need for such a

plan. GAO still believes that in this 

era of serious budget challenges, it

is important for the Bureau to

implement this recommendation

not only for the upcoming fiscal 

year budget but every fiscal year of

the 2010 Census’ life-cycle.

Since 2000, the Bureau has made significant progress in redesigning the 2010

Census. Preparations for the 2010 Census appear to be further along than at 

a similar point of the 2000 Census; the Bureau plans to make the most 

extensive use of contractors in its history to implement such mission-critical 

tasks as data collection and processing, and updating addresses and maps; 

and it has developed new initiatives, such as changing to a short-form-only 

census and automating field operations to reduce nonresponse follow-up 

costs. Still, the Bureau will have to resolve challenges that could increase the 

costs of the census. For example, the Bureau will need to effectively monitor 

contracts, as $1.9 billion of the $11.3 billion life-cycle costs will be spent on 

seven major contracts. The Bureau has agreed to take steps to mitigate some

of these challenges, such as enhancing the ability of key contract project 

offices to better manage contracts through such actions as developing action 

plans with milestones for key activities and regularly briefing senior 

managers. Also, the use of hand-held mobile computing devices (MCD) to 

help reduce nonresponse follow-up costs by automating operations and 

managing the agency’s payroll is a key component of the redesigned census. 

However, the MCDs experienced reliability problems during testing. The 

Bureau maintains that those problems will be fixed by developing a new 

MCD through a contract awarded in March 2006; however, the new MCD will 

not be tested until the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, and little time will remain to 

develop, test, and incorporate refinements if the MCDs do not perform as 

expected. If after the Dress Rehearsal the MCD is found to be unreliable, the 

Bureau could be faced with the remote but daunting possibility of having to 

revert to the costly paper-based census used in 2000. 

The Bureau has not developed and provided a comprehensive, integrated 

project plan that details milestones, itemized costs, and measurable goals for 

completing key activities. Also, the Bureau’s $11.3 billion life-cycle cost 

estimate lacks timely and complete supporting data, because it does not 

contain the most current information from testing and evaluation nor does it 

provide sufficient information on how changing assumptions could affect 

costs. For example, one key assumption that has not been updated pertains 

to the use of the MCDs. The Bureau anticipates that their use could reduce 

administrative and support costs in its local census offices, including 50 

percent cost reductions for staff and office space. However, the 2004 

Census Test showed that more help desk staff and more storage space 

would be needed to support the devices. The Bureau did not change the lifecycle cost estimate because, in the view of Bureau managers, field tests are 

for operational purposes, not to inform cost estimates. However, using test 

results to update cost assumptions could assist the Bureau and external 

policymakers to oversee costs and make necessary resource allocations. 

Furthermore, absent a comprehensive plan and updated cost information, 

the effect of proposed 2007 budget reductions on the overall design and lifecycle costs of the 2010 Census cannot be determined. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1009T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Brenda S. 

Farrell at (202) 512-6806 or farrellb@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mollohan, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the overall

design of the 2010 Census and associated costs, in light of proposed 

budget reductions1

 totaling approximately $50 million from the U.S. 

Census Bureau’s (Bureau) $878 million fiscal year 2007 budget request. 

First, let me emphasize that the Bureau, which is a part of the Commerce 

Department, is aware of the need to contain 2010 Census costs and has 

taken some actions, including early planning, to contain those costs. In 

fact, one of the Bureau’s stated goals for the 2010 Census is to contain 

costs. However, according to the Bureau’s estimate, the 2010 Census will 

be the most expensive census in our nation’s history, even after adjusting 

for inflation, totaling over $11.3 billion. Based on our issued work, my 

testimony today specifically addresses the extent to which the Bureau has 

(1) made progress redesigning its approach, including actions related to 

nonresponse follow-up, a key cost driver; and (2) developed a 

comprehensive, integrated project plan for the 2010 Census, as well as 

timely, detailed cost data for effective oversight and cost control. My main 

point today is that while the Bureau has planned early and reengineered 

the decennial census to contain costs, the Bureau has not developed and 

provided a comprehensive, integrated project plan to help monitor costs; 

and the Bureau’s September 2005 life-cycle cost estimate for the 2010 

Census does not reflect current information from testing and evaluation, 

lacks detailed information, and does not make clear the relationship 

between various cost drivers and the ultimate estimate. As a result, the 

impact of proposed reductions to the Bureau’s fiscal year 2007 budget

request can not be determined. 

Today’s hearing is particularly crucial as many decennial activities will be 

finalized in fiscal year 2007, while others will just be getting started. The 

Bureau is completing the last of its field tests—the 2006 Census Test, 

being held in the central portion of Travis County, Texas, and at the 

Cheyenne River American Indian Reservation and Tribal Trust Lands in 

South Dakota, where the Bureau is evaluating key operations and the type

of equipment that it plans to employ for the full enumeration in 2010. The

evaluations from 2006 testing, the content for the 2010 census

questionnaire, and the baselining of all 2010 program requirements are 

also being finalized in 2007. We agree with Bureau officials who stated 

 1

Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2007, H.R. 

5672, 109th Cong. tit. II (2006). 

Page 1 GAO-06-1009T 
that, as 2010 approaches it becomes increasingly more difficult to make 

significant changes to the decennial’s design without affecting the overall 

success of the census. A major milestone getting underway in 2007 will be 

the preparatory activities for a “Dress Rehearsal” scheduled for 2008 in

San Joaquin County, California, and nine counties in Eastern North 

Carolina, including the city of Fayetteville. While “Census Day” for the 

Dress Rehearsal is April 1, 2008, preparations—such as opening the local 

census offices, recruiting and hiring, and updating and verifying the 

address file—will take place during fiscal year 2007. Finally, with three 

major contracts already in place, in 2007, the Bureau plans to award three 

of four remaining major 2010 decennial contracts.

The decennial census is a crucial, constitutionally mandated activity 

undertaken by the Bureau. The stakes for a successful census are very 

high. The data that the census produces are used to reapportion the seats 

of the U.S. House of Representatives; realign the boundaries of the 

legislative districts of each state; allocate about $200 billion dollars each 

year in federal financial assistance; and provide a social, demographic, and

economic profile of the nation’s people to guide policy decisions at each

level of government. Further, businesses use census data to target new 

services and products and to tailor existing ones to demographic changes.

Over the decades, the decennial census has grown in cost and complexity, 

and we have been reviewing the national enumeration on behalf of 

Congress. Over the years, through scores of reports and testimonies, we 

have acquired broad institutional knowledge that gives us a historical view

of the key ingredients of a successful census. One such ingredient is strong 

and continued congressional involvement in the decisions that influence 

the direction of the census. As you are keenly aware, Mr. Chairman, 

congressional support and funding of the reengineered census are 

essential to the ultimate success of the decennial. 

As a backdrop for this testimony, I want to highlight several broad themes 

that have emerged from our work over the years—lenses really—through 

which to view the Bureau’s business environment. They are important 

because they ultimately affect the Bureau’s readiness to conduct the 

census and the quality of the results. 

First, completing the decennial census is a monumental undertaking, and 

the Bureau recognizes that streamlined and efficient operations are critical 

for the census’ cost-effectiveness. The Census’ sheer size and complexity 

make it a risky and fragile enterprise. The 2000 Census, for example, 

involved the hiring of more than 500,000 enumerators on a temporary 

Page 2 GAO-06-1009T 
basis, opening 511 local census offices and 24,000 questionnaire assistance 

centers nationwide, processing 1.5 billion sheets of paper, and in 10 weeks 

following up with 42 million nonrespondent households. The size of the 

census means that small problems can magnify quickly, and big problems 

could be overwhelming. For example, 60 seconds might seem like an 

inconsequential amount of time, but in 2000, if enumerators had spent just 

1 minute more at each household during nonresponse follow-up, almost 

$10 million would have been added to the cost of the census, assuming a 

pay rate of around $13 per hour, with wages ranging from $8.25 to $18.50 

per hour for enumerators in 2000, depending on the location.

Second, sound risk management is important to a successful census 

because many risks are interrelated, and a shortcoming in one operation

could cause other operations to spiral downward. For example, a low mail

response rate would drive up the follow-up workload, which in turn would 

increase staffing needs and costs (of course, the reverse is also true, where 

a success in one operation could have a number of positive downstream 

impacts). Rigorous up-front planning and testing, as well as risk mitigation 

plans, are the best ways to stave off these problems. In the 2000 Census, 

the Bureau successfully planned and mitigated risk in recruiting and hiring

workers by using management information systems capable of tracking 

key operations with real-time measures. To recruit the vast army of people 

needed to fill the ranks of its workforce for the 2000 Census, the Bureau 

set a recruitment goal of 2.4 million qualified applicants. Because the 

Bureau tracked the progress local census offices were making in meeting

their individual goals, it was able to mitigate risk by quickly raising pay

rates and taking other actions at those offices where recruitment was 

lagging. In the end, the Bureau exceeded its recruitment goal by 100,000 

applicants. 

Third, the census is conducted against a backdrop of immutable deadlines; 

the census’ elaborate chain of interrelated pre- and post-Census Day 

activities is predicated upon those dates. The Secretary of Commerce is 

legally required to (1) conduct the census on April 1 of the decennial year,

(2) report the state population counts to the President for purposes of 

congressional apportionment by December 31 of the decennial year, and 

(3) send population tabulations to the states for purposes of redistricting 

no later than 1 year after the April 1 census date. To meet these legally

mandated reporting requirements, census activities need to take place at 

specific times and in the proper sequence. We agree with Bureau officials 

who recently stated that the design and plans being implemented are too 

far down the road and time is too short to allow for significant 

adjustments to be effectively implemented. In fact, as Census Day 

Page 3 GAO-06-1009T 
approaches, the tolerance for any operational changes becomes 

increasingly small. Indeed, considerable risk and cost increases could 

accompany design changes that occur late in the decade. 

My remarks today are based on GAO-issued work on the planning and 

development of the 2010 Census. These reports are listed in attachment I.

We analyzed Bureau cost and planning documents and data and 

interviewed key Bureau officials regarding the 2004 and 2006 Census 

Tests, contract monitoring, and the life-cycle cost estimate. In conducting

our work, we visited the Texas and South Dakota test sites; Queens, New 

York; and several counties in rural south-central Georgia, where an earlier 

field test was held in 2004. During these visits we observed the addresscanvassing operation, where workers go door to door verifying addresses 

and updating maps as part of the Bureau’s effort to build a complete and 

accurate address list, and we observed the nonresponse follow-up 

operation, in which enumerators collect information from those 

households that do not return their initial questionnaire. We conducted 

our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

The Bureau has made significant progress redesigning its approach for 

conducting the 2010 Census, including early planning, a greater reliance on

contractors, and actions related to nonresponse follow-up, a key cost 

driver. Specifically, the Bureau’s preparations for the 2010 Census appear 

to be further along than at a similar point during the planning cycle for the 

2000 Census. The Bureau also plans to make the most extensive use of 

contractors in its history, turning to the private sector to supply a number 

of different mission-critical functions, including data collection, data 

processing, and address and map updates. In addition, the Bureau has 

developed new initiatives to reduce the cost of nonresponse follow-up that 

include using a short-form-only census questionnaire and automating field 

operations. 

The Bureau Has Made 

Significant Progress 

Preparing for the 2010 

Census

The Design of the 2010 

Census Shows Promise 

For the 2010 decennial, the Bureau developed a design for the census early

in the decade, and Congress has been supportive of the Bureau’s 

approach. However, the situation 10 years ago for the 2000 decennial was 

somewhat different. In testimony before Congress in late 1995, we 

expressed concern that Congress and the Bureau had not agreed on the 

fundamental design and budget of the census, and that the longer this 

situation continued, the greater the risk that the census would not be 

planned well and that hundreds of millions of dollars would be spent 

Page 4 GAO-06-1009T 
inefficiently.2

 Indeed, the final life-cycle cost for the 2000 Census exceeded

the original estimates by about $1.5 billion, or about 30 percent. 

While this time the Bureau has planned earlier than in the past, it needs to

do more. The Bureau has a significant responsibility to provide Congress 

with detailed documentation and analyses that provide support and 

justification for its 2007 budget and 2010 life-cycle cost estimate, 

especially during a time when the nation is facing serious fiscal challenges. 

In our view, the Bureau needs to inform Congress in a timely manner on

the cost and progress being made toward a successful 2010 Census. 

In planning early for the 2010 Census, the Bureau established four goals 

aimed at addressing shortcomings with the 2000 enumeration: (1) increase 

the relevance and timeliness of data, (2) reduce operational risk, (3) 

increase coverage and accuracy, and (4) contain costs. To achieve these 

goals, three components—all new operations—are key to the Bureau’s 

plans for 2010: 

• enhancing procedures for building its address list, known as the Master 

Address File (MAF), and its associated geographic information system, 

called the Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and 

Referencing (TIGER®) database;3

 

• replacing the census long-form questionnaire with the American 

Community Survey (ACS)4

; and 

• conducting a short-form-only decennial census supported by early 

research and testing. 

Steps that the Bureau has taken to correct problems it encountered when 

planning past censuses are another sign of the thoroughness of the 

Bureau’s planning process. For example, early in the decade, senior 

 2

 GAO, Decennial Census: Fundamental Design Decisions Merit Congressional Attention, 

GAO/T-GGD-96-37 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 1995). 

3

 The TIGER database is a mapping system that identifies all visible geographic features, 

such as type and location of streets, housing units, rivers, and railroads. To link TIGER to 

the master address file, the Bureau assigns every housing unit in the master address file to 

a specific location in the TIGER, a process called “geocoding.” TIGER is a registered 

trademark of the U.S. Census Bureau. 

4

 ACS is intended to be a monthly survey of 250,000 households that, under the Bureau’s

plans, will replace the long-form census questionnaire. 

Page 5 GAO-06-1009T 
Bureau staff considered various goals for the 2010 Census and articulated

a design to achieve those goals. Moreover, staff with operational 

experience in the census participated in the 2010 design process. 

According to Bureau officials, this was a departure from the 2000 planning

effort, in which Bureau staff with little operational experience played key 

roles in the design process, resulting in impractical reform ideas that could 

not be implemented. 

Bureau Will Make 

Extensive Use of 

Contractors for 2010 

Census 

For the 2010 Census the Bureau plans to make the most extensive use of 

contractors in its history, turning to the private sector to supply a number 

of different mission-critical functions, including nationwide data collection 

and processing activities, and improvements to the address file and maps. 

The Bureau estimates that of the $11.3 billion total cost of the census, 

around $1.9 billion (or 17 percent) will be spent for its seven largest 

contracts. To date, the Bureau has awarded three of its seven major 

contracts that account for approximately $1.3 billion. Those contracts 

support (1) MAF/TIGER modernization; (2) the development and 

operation of the Decennial Response and Integration System (DRIS)—a 

system planned to integrate decennial responses; and (3) the Field Data 

Collection Automation (FDCA) program—a system designed to provide 

field staff with the equipment and infrastructure needed to collect census 

data. As detailed below, it will be important for the Bureau to monitor the 

contracts to avoid late design changes and hastily designed, untested 

systems that could result in additional costs. 

In fiscal year 2007, the Bureau will also award three of four remaining 

major decennial contracts as follows: 

• in February 2007, the Bureau plans to award the contract for Data 

Access and Dissemination System II, which will replace the Bureau’s 

current data tabulation and dissemination system; 

• in March or April 2007, the 2010 Census printing contract will be 

awarded; and, 

• in April 2007, the Bureau will begin to lease office space for the 2010 

Census. 

The exact date for the 2010 communications contract—which is set to be

awarded sometime in fiscal year 2008—is not yet firmly established. 

As we noted in our May 2006 report, the Bureau has a tight schedule for 

systems development and testing; therefore, it will be important for the 

Bureau to keep the award of decennial contracts on schedule. To stay on 

Page 6 GAO-06-1009T 
schedule, we recommended that the Bureau ensure that key systems 

provided by contractors are fully functional and ready to be assessed as 

part of the 2008 Dress Rehearsal.5

 While the Bureau neither agreed nor 

disagreed with this recommendation, the Bureau did state that it would be 

providing the results from the 2006 Census Test to the FDCA contractor. 

Staying on track is important because we previously reported that during 

the 1998 Dress Rehearsal for the 2000 Census a number of new features 

were not test-ready; as a result, the Bureau said it could not fully evaluate 

them with any degree of assurance as to how they would affect the 

census.6

 These late design changes and hastily developed, untested 

systems resulted in additional costs to the census. 

We recognize that contractors can help the Bureau address the challenges

it faces as it plans for and implements the 2010 Census, especially as it 

becomes increasingly difficult to count the nation’s population with the 

Bureau’s in-house staff and capabilities. For example, the contractors that 

the Bureau relied on to perform some of its major decennial activities 

during Census 2000 generally performed well.7

 However, increased 

reliance on contractors entails certain management challenges, including

overseeing them to ensure that they meet the Bureau’s needs in an 

effective, economical, and timely manner. For example, according to the 

Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, the Bureau did not 

have sufficient program management staff to efficiently acquire systems 

and manage complex, high-dollar contracts during Census 2000.8

 As a 

result, the cost of the Bureau’s data capture system increased from $49 

million to $238 million by the end of that decennial. 

Closely monitoring these major contracts will be important. In March 2006,

we testified that while project offices responsible for the DRIS and FDCA 

 5

 GAO, 2010 Census: Census Bureau Generally Follows Selected Leading Acquisition 

Practices, but Continued Management Attention Is Needed to Help Ensure Success,

GAO-06-277 (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2008). 

6

 GAO, 2010 Census: Basic Design Has Potential, but Remaining Challenges Need

Prompt Resolution, GAO-05-9 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2005). 

7

 For example, the data capture system exceeded its performance goals for accuracy, and 

the advertising campaign blanketed the country with more than 250 advertisements in 17 

languages, which helped boost the response rate higher than the Bureau had expected. 

8

 Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, Improving Our Measure of

America: What Census 2000 Can Teach Us in Planning for 2010, OIG-14431 

(Washington, D.C.: Spring 2002). 

Page 7 GAO-06-1009T 
contracts had carried out initial acquisition management activities, neither

office had the full set of capabilities needed to effectively manage the 

acquisitions.9

 For DRIS, the Bureau’s project office had established 

baseline requirements, but the Bureau had not validated the requirements 

and had not implemented a process for managing the requirements. Also, 

the project office had identified the project’s risks but had not developed 

written mitigation plans or established milestones for completing key risk 

mitigation activities. As for FDCA, the Bureau again had specified baseline 

requirements but had not validated them. While the project office had 

begun activities to oversee the contractor’s performance, it had not 

determined which performance measures it would use, and the office had 

not implemented a risk management process. Until these basic 

management activities are implemented, both systems could face 

increased risks of cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance 

shortfalls. The Bureau has agreed to take steps to mitigate some of these 

challenges, such as enhancing the ability of key contract project offices to

better manage contracts through such actions as developing action plans 

with milestones for key activities and regularly briefing senior managers. 

Bureau Has Taken Steps to 

Reduce Nonresponse 

Follow-up Costs, but 

Challenges with 

Technology Remain 

Since 2000, the Bureau has reengineered the decennial census and has 

begun to implement new initiatives to reduce the cost of nonresponse 

follow-up, including a short-form-only census and automation, the key 

feature of which is the use of hand-held mobile computing devices (MCD). 

First, the Bureau plans to contain the cost of nonresponse follow-up by 

increasing mail response through a short-form-only census. The overall 

mail response rate has been declining steadily since 1970. In the 1980 

Census, the mail response rate was 75 percent, 3 percentage points lower 

than it was in the 1970 Census. In the 1990 census, the mail response rate 

dropped to 65 percent and, in 2000, appeared to be leveling off at about 64 

percent. Contributing to this decline was the unwillingness of some of the 

public to complete the long form. Specifically, the response rates during 

the 1990 and 2000 censuses to the short form were higher than the 

response rate to the long form. Bureau data suggest a 1 percent increase in

the mail response rate would result from conducting a short-form-only 

census. 

 9

 GAO, Census Bureau: Important Activities for Improving Management of Key 2010 

Decennial Acquisitions Remain to be Done, GAO-06-444T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1,

2006). 

Page 8 GAO-06-1009T 
Secondly, by using the MCD, the Bureau plans to automate field data 

collection to contain the cost of nonresponse follow-up. If successfully 

used, the MCD would allow the Bureau to automate operations and 

eliminate the need to print millions of paper questionnaires and maps used 

by census workers to conduct address canvassing and nonresponse 

follow-up, as well as managing field staff’s payroll. The benefits of using 

the MCD have been tested in the 2004 and 2006 tests. For example, during 

the 2004 Census Test, the MCD allowed the Bureau to successfully remove 

over 7,000 late mail returns from enumerators’ assignments, reducing the 

total nonresponse follow-up workload by nearly 6 percent. The ability to 

remove late mail returns from the Bureau’s nonresponse follow-up 

workload reduces costs, because census workers no longer need to make 

expensive follow-up visits to households that return their questionnaire 

after the mail-back deadline. 

However, the MCDs experienced significant reliability problems during the 

2004 and 2006 census tests. At this point, the uncertainty surrounding the 

MCD’s reliability constitutes a risk to the cost-effective implementation of 

the 2010 Census. Specifically, during the 2004 Census Test, the MCDs 

experienced transmission problems, memory overloads, and difficulties 

with a mapping feature—all of which added inefficiencies to the test’s 

nonresponse follow-up operation.10 During the 2006 Census Test’s address 

canvassing operation, the device was slow to pull up address data and 

accept the data entered by census workers. Further, the MCD’s global 

positioning system (GPS) receiver—a satellite-based navigational system 

to help workers locate street addresses and collect coordinates for each 

structure in their assignment area—was also unreliable. According to 

Bureau officials, some workers had trouble receiving signals; but even 

when a signal was available, the receiver was slow to find assignment 

areas and correct map locations. The Bureau extended the operation 10

days and still was unable to complete the job, leaving census blocks in 

Austin, Texas and on the Cheyenne River Reservation, South Dakota 

unverified. 

While acknowledging that the MCD’s performance is an issue, the Bureau

believes the problem will be addressed through a contract that was 

awarded on March 30, 2006, to develop a new MCD, among other things. 

However, the new MCD will not be operationally tested until the 2008 

Dress Rehearsal, and if problems do emerge, little time will be left to 

 10 GAO-05-9. 

Page 9 GAO-06-1009T 
develop, test, and incorporate refinements. In our May 2006 report, we 

highlighted the tight time frames to develop the MCD and recommended 

that systems being developed or provided by contractors for the 2010 

Census—including the MCD—be fully functional and ready to be assessed 

as part of the 2008 Dress Rehearsal.11 The Department of Commerce noted 

in its comments on our draft report that the Bureau provided competitors 

for the contract with information about the design, requirements, and 

specification for the 2006 test in the request for proposals. Commerce also 

noted that the Bureau would share preliminary results from the 2006 test 

with the firm that was awarded the contract, upon the availability of those 

results. The Bureau, however, did not specify when preliminary results 

would be available. If after the 2008 Dress Rehearsal the MCD is found not 

to be reliable, the Bureau could be faced with a remote but daunting 

possibility of having to revert to the costly, paper-based census used in 

2000. The Bureau in its 2005 life-cycle cost estimate did indicate that if it

were to conduct a paper-based census in 2010 using the same methods as 

2000, the life-cycle cost would increase by $1.3 billion dollars. However, as 

discussed in more detail later in this testimony, we are unable to 

determine the validity of the Bureau’s cost estimates, paper-based or not, 

because those estimates are not supported by timely and detailed data. 

Nevertheless, we support the Bureau’s efforts to contain cost and look 

forward to seeing the MCD that is currently being designed under the 

FDCA contract as well as more details concerning the Bureau’s cost 

estimates. 

Despite its emphasis on cost containment, the Bureau does not have a 

comprehensive, integrated project plan that details milestones and 

itemized costs for completing key activities for the 2010 Census, and its 

$11.3 billion life-cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census lacks timely and 

complete supporting data. The supporting data of the estimate are not 

timely because they do not include the most current information from 

testing and evaluation, and the estimate is not complete because it does 

not provide sufficient information on how changing assumptions could 

affect cost. Absent this information, we are unable to determine the affect

proposed budget reductions will have in 2007, as well as the impact of 

Bureau Does Not 

Have Sufficient 

Planning and Cost 

Documentation for 

the 2010 Census 

 11 GAO, 2010 Census: Census Bureau Generally Follows Selected Leading Acquisition 

Planning Practices, but Continued Management Attention Is Needed to Help Ensure

Success, GAO-06-277 (Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2006). 

Page 10 GAO-06-1009T 
those reductions on the overall design and the Bureau’s 2010 life-cycle 

cost estimate. 

In our January 2004 report, we reported that the Bureau’s cost projections 

for the 2010 decennial census continue an escalating trend.12 As previously 

noted, the Bureau now estimates the 2010 Census will cost over $11.3 

billion, making it the most expensive in history, even after adjusting for 

inflation. Although some cost growth can be expected, in part because the 

number of housing units—and hence the Bureau’s workload—has become 

larger, the cost growth has far exceeded the increase in the number of 

housing units. For example, the Bureau estimates that the number of 

housing units for the 2010 Census will increase by 10 percent over 2000 

Census levels, while the average cost per housing unit for 2010 is expected 

to increase by approximately 29 percent from 2000 levels. 

Moreover, the risk exists that the actual, final cost of the census could be

considerably higher. Indeed, the Bureau’s initial cost projections for 

previous censuses proved to be too low because of such factors as 

unforeseen operational problems or changes to the fundamental design. 

For example, during the 2000 Census, the Bureau was unable to finalize its 

fundamental design until late in the decade because of lack of agreement 

between the administration and Congress over the design. This required 

the Bureau to proceed down a dual track. The Bureau estimated that the

2000 Census would cost around $4 billion if sampling was used, as 

opposed to $5 billion for a traditional census without sampling. In the end, 

the price tag for the 2000 Census (without sampling) was over $6.5 billion, 

a 30 percent increase in cost. 

Cost for Each Decennial 

Census Continues to 

Significantly Increase 

Bureau Has Not Provided a 

2010 Comprehensive 

Project Plan 

Our January 2004 report contained a recommendation for improving the 

transparency, comprehensiveness, and timeliness of the 2010 Census’ lifecycle costs. We specifically recommended that the Bureau develop a

comprehensive, integrated project plan for the 2010 Census, and we also 

emphasized the importance of providing information on the 

interrelationships and dependencies among project milestones. Such a 

project plan would be updated as needed and would include: (1) detailed 

milestones that identify all significant interrelationships; (2) itemized 

 12 GAO, 2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be Addressed Soon, GAO-04-37

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 15, 2004). 

Page 11 GAO-06-1009T 
estimated costs of each component, including a sensitivity analysis, and an 

explanation of significant changes in the assumptions on which these 

costs are based; (3) key goals translated into measurable, operational 

terms to provide meaningful guidance for planning and measuring 

progress, and (4) risk and mitigation plans that fully address all significant

potential risks. We noted then that, although some of this information is 

available piecemeal, to facilitate a thorough, independent review of the 

Bureau’s plans and hold the agency accountable for results, having a 

single, comprehensive document would be important. Although the 

Bureau disagreed with the recommendation, it stated it would develop and 

provide such a document to Congress and GAO. More than 2 years passed 

and the Bureau did not provide this plan. The Bureau has stated that it 

agrees with the Office of Management and Budget that the annual budget 

submission process is the appropriate vehicle for providing 

comprehensive and detailed cost information on 2010 Census planning. 

However, in our view, having a single comprehensive project plan that is 

updated annually, as we recommended in 2004, would have provided the 

Bureau with additional support for its fiscal year 2007 budget request. 

Further, GAO reemphasized the need for such a plan in testimonies during 

March and June 2006. 

2010 Cost Estimate Lacks 

Timely and Complete 

Information 

The Bureau’s most recent cost estimate is not based on timely and 

complete information. As stated in our January 2004 report, the Bureau 

derived its 2010 cost estimate, in June 2001, by using the actual cost of the 

2000 Census combined with assumptions about such cost drivers as (1) 

staffing needs, (2) enumerator productivity, (3) pay rates for census 

workers, (4) the nonresponse rate for mailing back the questionnaires,13

and (5) inflation.14 However, the most recent life-cycle cost estimate15 does 

not incorporate current information about assumptions made in 2001, 

leaving us unable to link information on assumptions among the cost 

estimates released in 2001, 2003, and 2005. For example, one key 

assumption that has not been updated pertains to the use of a new 

technology—new hand-held, GPS-enabled MCDs. These devices are 

important to the success of the 2010 census because they are expected to

 13 Lower mail-back response rates increase costs by necessitating costly follow-up visits by 

enumerators to nonresponding households and/or the mailing of a follow-up questionnaire.

14 GAO-04-37. 

15 U.S. Census Bureau: Census Bureau Estimated Life Cycle Costs for Reengineering the 

2010 Decennial Census Program (Washington, D.C.: September 2005). 

Page 12 GAO-06-1009T 
make possible automated and streamlined address canvassing, 

nonresponse follow-up, coverage measurement, and payroll operations. 

The Bureau anticipated that the use of MCDs would facilitate reductions in

administrative and support costs in the Bureau’s field offices, including a 

50 percent reduction in clerical and administrative local census office staff 

costs and a 50 percent reduction in space at each local census office. 

However, the Bureau’s existing assumptions about the use and reliability 

of the MCD were not updated to reflect information from the 2004 Census 

Test, which revealed that assumptions about staffing and space associated 

with the new technology had changed since the June 2001 life-cycle 

estimate. Specifically, Bureau evaluations of the 2004 test show that more 

help desk staff at the local census office were needed to support the use of

the MCD, and additional storage space was needed for the devices. 

However, the Bureau did not use this information when revising its cost 

estimate in 2005 because, according to Bureau officials, they conduct field 

tests for operational purposes only—not to inform the cost estimates. In 

our view, revising cost estimates on the most recent information—

including test results that are pertinent to cost assumptions—can assist 

the Bureau and external decision makers to oversee costs and make 

necessary resource allocations to help ensure a successful, cost-effective

census. 

The Bureau’s cost estimate also lacks complete information, such as 

sensitivity analysis regarding assumptions that could affect cost drivers. 

OMB Circular A-94 provides guidelines for cost-benefit analysis of federal 

programs and recommends that agencies develop a sensitivity analysis for 

major projects with significant uncertainty, like the decennial census. The

circular provides a method for determining how sensitive outcomes relate 

to changes in assumptions. In January 2004, we reported that the Bureau 

could provide more robust information on the likelihood that the values 

the Bureau assigned to key cost drivers could differ from those initially

assumed. We also stated that updates of the life-cycle cost could be 

timelier—previously the life-cycle cost estimate had been provided at 2-

year intervals.16 While the Bureau agreed to provide updates of the lifecycle cost annually, the Bureau’s latest life-cycle cost document does not

contain a sensitivity analysis on assumptions that impact cost.

Having transparent information about cost estimates is especially 

important, because decennial costs are sensitive to many key assumptions. 

 16 GAO-04-37. 

Page 13 GAO-06-1009T 
In fact, for the 2000 Census, the Bureau’s supplemental funding request for 

$1.7 billion in fiscal year 2000 primarily involved changes in assumptions 

related to increased workload, reduced employee productivity, and 

increased advertising. Given the cost of the census in an era of serious 

national fiscal challenges, it would be beneficial for the Bureau and 

Congress to have sensitivity information about the likelihood—high, 

medium, or low—that certain assumptions would drive costs. By providing 

this information, the Bureau would better enable Congress to consider 

funding levels in this uncertain environment. 

Questions have been raised about the impact of proposed reductions in 

the Bureau’s fiscal year 2007 overall budget request. Would such a 

budgetary change cause the dramatic changes in the decennial’s overall 

design and life-cycle cost that the Bureau predicts? The answer is that 

given the lack of consolidated, timely, and detailed plans and cost 

estimates, we simply cannot tell. Importantly, this testimony notes that the 

preparatory steps for the 2010 Census have almost reached a point where 

the Bureau will no longer be able to effectively undertake design changes 

and other significant corrective actions if such are needed—for example, 

in response to unanticipated failures of the MCD. To help policymakers 

make informed decisions, including funding decisions, the Bureau needs 

to provide policymakers with comprehensive, timely, and updated 

information. 

Conclusions 

As we have previously reported, the Bureau has planned earlier than in the 

past and that its plans and efforts to reengineer the census have potential

to contain costs. However, we believe the Bureau needs to do more. In this 

testimony, as well as in our previous reports and testimonies, we have 

discussed the Bureau’s ongoing emphasis on reengineering the census to

contain costs. We have noted that while the $11.3 billion estimate makes 

the 2010 Census the most expensive in history, new cost drivers have 

emerged. As we previously recommended, a periodically updated 

comprehensive project plan and cost estimate that is supported by 

transparent, detailed, and comprehensive analyses and documentation 

would enable analysts, policymakers, and others to ascertain whether 

significant risks exist that could cause costs to increase. We believe that in

this era of serious national budget challenges, it is important for the 

Bureau to implement our 2004 recommendation not only for this fiscal 

year but every fiscal year of the 2010 decennial life-cycle. To conduct its 

oversight and budgetary functions, Congress needs the Bureau to provide 

it with an annually updated comprehensive, integrated project plan which

Page 14 GAO-06-1009T 
includes milestones, itemized costs, measurable goals, and risk mitigation 

plans. 

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to 

respond to any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee may 

have. 

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Brenda S. Farrell, 

on (202) 512-6806, or by email at farrellb@gao.gov. Individuals making 

contributions to this testimony include Carlos Hazera, Assistant Director; 

Mike Carley, Betty Clark, Robert Goldenkoff, , Shirley Hwang, Wright 

Lewis, Krista Loose, Lisa Pearson, Scott Purdy, Mark Ryan, Shannon 

VanCleave, and Timothy Wexler. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

Page 15 GAO-06-1009T 
Page 16 GAO-06-1009T 

Attachment I: Related Products by GAO 

GAO Products 2010 Census: Census Bureau Needs to Take Prompt Actions to Resolve 

Long-standing and Emerging Address and Mapping Challenges. GAO06-272. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.

2010 Census: Costs and Risks Must be Closely Monitored and Evaluated 

with Mitigation Plans in Place. GAO-06-822T. Washington, D.C.: June 6, 

2006. 

2010 Census: Census Bureau Generally Follows Selected Leading 

Acquisition Planning Practices, but Continued Management Attentions 

Is Needed to Help Ensure Success. GAO-06-277. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 

2006. 

Census Bureau: Important Activities for Improving Management of Key 

2010 Decennial Acquisitions Remain to be Done. GAO-06-444T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2006. 

2010 Census: Planning and Testing Activities Are Making Progress. 

GAO-06-465T. Washington D.C.: March 1, 2006. 

Information Technology Management: Census Bureau Has Implemented

Many Key Practices, but Additional Actions Are Needed. GAO-05-661. 

Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2005. 

2010 Census: Basic Design Has Potential, but Remaining Challenges 

Need Prompt Resolution. GAO-05-09. Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2005. 

Data Quality: Census Bureau Needs to Accelerate Efforts to Develop and 

Implement Data Quality Review Standards. GAO-05-86. Washington, 

D.C.: November 17, 2004. 

Census 2000: Design Choices Contributed to Inaccuracies in Coverage 

Evaluation Estimates. GAO-05-71. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 2004. 

American Community Survey: Key Unresolved Issues. GAO-05-82. 

Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2004. 

2010 Census: Counting Americans Overseas as Part of the Decennial 

Census Would Not Be Cost-Effective. GAO-04-898. Washington, D.C.: 

August 19, 2004. 

2010 Census: Overseas Enumeration Test Raises Need for Clear Policy 

Direction. GAO-04-470. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004. 
2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be Addressed Soon. GAO04-37. Washington, D.C.: January 15, 2004. 

Decennial Census: Lessons Learned for Locating and Counting Migrant 

and Seasonal Farm Workers. GAO-03-605. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2003. 

Decennial Census: Methods for Collecting and Reporting Hispanic 

Subgroup Data Need Refinement. GAO-03-228. Washington, D.C.: January 

17, 2003. 

Decennial Census: Methods for Collecting and Reporting Data on the 

Homeless and Others Without Conventional Housing Need Refinement.

GAO-03-227. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2003. 

2000 Census: Lessons Learned for Planning a More Cost-Effective 2010 

Census. GAO-03-40. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002. 

The American Community Survey: Accuracy and Timeliness Issues.

GAO-02-956R. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2002. 

Page 17 GAO-06-1009T (450516) 
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