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DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 17, 2005

Serial No. 109–140

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois, Vice Chairman 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

BARBARA LEE, California 

MARK WALKER, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DAN S. GETZ, Professional Staff Member 

BRIAN WANKO, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Thomas A. Shannon, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western 

Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................. 18

Ms. Ana Julia Jatar, Executive Committee, Su ́mate ............................................ 43

Mr. Joseph McSpedon, Senior Program Manager, Freedom House .................... 47

Mr. John Walsh, Senior Associate, Washington Office on Latin America .......... 53

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 4

The Honorable Thomas A. Shannon: Prepared statement ................................... 24

Ms. Ana Julia Jatar: Prepared statement ............................................................. 45

Mr. Joseph McSpedon: Prepared statement .......................................................... 50

Mr. John Walsh: Prepared statement .................................................................... 54

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 67

(1)

DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:36 a.m. in room 

2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Dan 

Burton (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. BURTON. Good morning. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere will come to order. I ask 

unanimous consent that all Members and witnesses’ written and 

opening statements be included in the record and without objection, so ordered. 

I ask unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits and extraneous or tabular material referred to by Members or witnesses be 

included in the record and without objection, so ordered. 

I ask unanimous consent that any Member that may attend today’s hearing be considered a Member of the Subcommittee for the 

purposes of receiving testimony and questioning witnesses after 

Subcommittee Members have been given the opportunity to do so 

and without objection, so ordered. 

Today we are convening a hearing on Democracy in Venezuela to 

take stock of the state of political and economic freedoms in that 

country. 

Your testimony today, Mr. Secretary, will help the Subcommittee 

in making an assessment of political developments in that country 

so that we can make an objective or take an objective inventory of 

real and perceived threats to democratic institutions and freedoms 

and the implications for stability in the region. 

It will also help us achieve a better understanding of the opportunities to strengthen U.S. engagement in the region that is geared 

to promoting democratic and equitable growth and stability. 

I first want to welcome the Honorable Thomas A. Shannon, the 

newly sworn-in Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Western 

Hemisphere Affairs. I want to thank you for joining us today. We 

look forward to working with you, Tom and we share the confidence that Secretary Rice and President Bush has in you. 

You have got a tough job, but we want to be as much help to you 

as we possibly can and we look forward to hearing what you have 

to say. 

I am convinced by the growing body of evidence that the Government of Venezuela is dismantling the institutions of democracy. I 

also believe the greatest threat to democracy in Venezuela is 

2

authoritarianism. The greatest threat to democracy in Venezuela is 

not American hedge money or free markets. It is fragile or corrupted institutions and the lack of respect for constitutional mechanisms and the rule of law. 

In the 1970s, Venezuela enjoyed a tradition of civilian democratic 

rule and earned a reputation as one of the more stable democracies 

in Latin America, with a burgeoning middle class. 

The United States has traditionally had close relations with Venezuela, but there has been deepening friction in the relationship 

with President Chavez, accompanied by an erosion of democratic 

institutions. 

The Government of Venezuela is becoming more authoritarian, 

replacing the country’s multi-party democracy with a political system that revolves around the state with its President controlling all 

the levers of power. 

Some of this is called statification of Venezuelan society. Others 

point to the increasing influence of the armed forces and President 

Chavez’s open admiration of people like Che Guevara and cooperation with Fidel Castro in Cuba as a matter of deep concern. 

Given Mr. Castro’s record in Cuba and trying to start revolutions 

throughout Central and Latin America, I can certainly appreciate 

this concern. 

In President Chavez’s speech at the Summit of the Americas 

meeting this month and I watched all of it personally, I wanted to 

hear what he had to say, because I have had the opportunity to 

meet with President Chavez twice and he is a very engaging fellow. 

He has a Clintonesque, if you will, personality. He is very engaging. He is a very warm guy. He talks a good game. I did not mean 

that in a detrimental way, I am just using that as a comparison. 

I always thought of Mr. Clinton as one of the finest politicians, I 

did not agree with him on a lot of other things, one of the finest 

politicians we have ever had. 

But in any event, when I met with Mr. Chavez he was very engaging and he said he wanted to work with the United States and 

he wanted to have a rapport with us. 

When we talked about having his foreign minister meet with our 

State Department, he was open to that, even though he had not 

been engaging Mr. Brownfield, our Ambassador down there, in 

meetings and so we were hopeful. 

Then in New York, once again, we had some kind of positive 

statements from him. So I left with some encouraging feelings that 

maybe there were some things that we could work out with Mr. 

Chavez by having a dialogue with him. 

But when I heard that speech at the Summit of the Americas, 

I was extremely disappointed. Now I have heard that he wanted 

to give F–16 fighter planes to Fidel Castro in Cuba. I have heard 

of some of the other things that have been said and that kind of 

rhetoric bothered me, but I thought well you know he is a politician. Maybe he is talking to the people in his country and he is trying to whip up more support for himself. 

But when he finished his speech at the Summit of Americas to 

that mob down there, rent-a-mob or whatever you want to call it 

and he started saying that we need to continue to push for the 

3

goals of Che Guevara, I felt like everything that I had heard him 

say before was all a bunch of bologna. 

I am very sad to say that, because I think it is extremely important for a powerhouse in South America, like Venezuela, to start 

going down this path. They get $100 million a day in oil revenues, 

60 percent of it coming from us and so we would like to have a 

good working relationship with them. 

But there is a real concern among many of the Central and 

South American leaders with whom I have talked that the money 

that Mr. Chavez is getting is being used to undermine some of 

those other fledgling democracies and it is not just one or two or 

three or four, there is a whole bunch of them down there in Central 

and South America. 

I can tell you, although they may not be saying publicly the 

things that I am saying to you today, they are very, very concerned 

about this. 

I have been one who believed that the best way to work out our 

problems and I hope our State Department feels the same way, is 

to open up a dialogue with these leaders down there. 

We may have differences of opinion. We cannot make the world 

over in our image. That is not possible. But when we hear a leader 

who has the financial wherewithal to undermine fledgling democracies and export revolution, like Che Guevara and Fidel Castro 

wanted to do and now we have a guy who has the money to do it, 

openly extolling the virtues of Che Guevara, who was a cutthroat 

revolutionary who wanted to undermine all the governments of 

Latin America, it really concerns me. 

So this hearing today, I wanted to express very clearly my position and I will put the rest of my statement in the record, but it 

really concerns me that a man with whom I have talked and we 

have gone out of our way to meet with President Chavez, is now 

talking about the virtues of somebody like Che Guevara, who was 

a hardcore communist, bothers me a great, great deal. 

This could lead to a very difficult situation with the leader of 

Venezuela and we don’t want that to happen. So I would just like 

to say, if this is going to Venezuelan television and I hope it is 

today, I hope Mr. Chavez will take a hard look at what he said in 

the past. 

I hope he will listen to the rhetoric that is coming out of this 

hearing today and from somebody who has met with him and had 

a heart-to-heart talk with him on a couple of occasions along with 

Mr. Delahunt and Mr. Rangle and Mr. Meeks and others, that we 

still want to work with all of the leaders of Central and South 

America and that includes Mr. Chavez, but the kind of revolutionary rhetoric that we heard coming out of the Summit of Americas, when he met with that street mob, is not conducive to a situation where we can work together. 

I hope that message gets out there and I hope that things will 

change for the better, because if they do not, I have real concerns 

about what may happen in the future down there and we hate to 

see that happen. 

With that, I yield to my colleague, Mr. Menendez. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:] 

4

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Today we are convening a hearing on Democracy in Venezuela to 

take stock of the state of political and economic freedoms in that 

country. Your testimony today will help the Subcommittee in making an assessment of political developments in that country, so that 

we may take an objective inventory of real and perceived threats 

to democratic institutions and freedoms and the implications for 

stability in the region. It will also help us achieve a better understanding of the opportunities to strengthen U.S. engagement in the 

region that is geared to promoting democratic and equitable growth 

and stability. 

I first want to welcome the Honorable Thomas A. Shannon, the 

newly sworn-in Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Thank you for joining us this morning. We look forward to 

working with you Tom and we share Secretary Rice and President 

Bush’s confidence in your capacity to execute your duties. 

I am convinced by the growing body of evidence that the government of Venezuela is dismantling the institutions of democracy. I 

also believe the greatest threat to democracy in Venezuela is 

authoritarianism. The greatest threat to democracy in Venezuela is 

not American hegemony or free markets. It is fragile or corrupted 

institutions, the lack of respect for constitutional mechanisms and 

the rule of law. 

In the 1970s Venezuela enjoyed a tradition of civilian democratic 

rule and earned a reputation as one of the more stable democracies 

in Latin America with a burgeoning middle class. The United 

States has traditionally had close relations with Venezuela, but 

there has been deepening friction in the relationship with President Chavez accompanied by an erosion of democratic institutions. 

The government of Venezuela is becoming more authoritarian; replacing the country’s multiparty democracy with a political system 

that revolves around the state with its president controlling all the 

levers of power—some call this a STATIFICATION of Venezuelan 

society. Others point to the increasing influence of the armed forces 

and President Cha ́vez’s open admiration of Che Guevara and cooperation with Castro’s regime in Cuba as a matter of deep concern. Given Mr. Castro’s record in Cuba, I can certainly appreciate 

this concern. 

In President Chavez’s speech at the Summit of Americas meeting 

this month, he talked about the revolutionary goals of communist 

Che Guevara, and the need for Guevara’s revolution to continue 

throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. I want to tell President Chavez that my Colleagues and I do not support his idea of 

a communist revolution throughout Latin America, and simply 

abhor his vitriolic, leftist, revolutionary rhetoric. While we wish to 

work with President Chavez to create better U.S.—Venezuela relations, his continued use of dangerous, destabilizing, anti-U.S. rhetoric, is unacceptable and could easily lead to serious problems. All 

of the democratically-elected governments in the region are concerned about the activities of the Venezuelan president. If he continues to follow the path of his rhetoric, it is apparent that he 

5

poses a threat to freedom and democracy in Central and South 

America. 

His speech at the demonstration during the Summit of the Americas was un-statesmanlike and he lost an opportunity to engage his 

fellow leaders in discussing the pressing issues of our hemisphere 

in a constructive way. 

What can we and other democracies in our hemisphere do to prevent Mr. Chavez from undermining, if he is trying to undermine, 

these other fledgling democracies in Central and South America? 

Our government and like-minded societies that have embraced 

the promise of democracy are seeking to spread prosperity throughout the Western Hemisphere by means different than Mr. Chavez, 

namely through reforms, long-term economic and social development and political stability and where the rights and freedoms of 

individuals are respected. President Chavez has called this ‘‘NeoImperialism’’ and says it is something that we are trying to impose 

on the rest of the world. The facts are however, President Bush has 

laid out a roadmap for cooperation to consolidate democracy in the 

Western Hemisphere, and use trade as a catalyst for positive 

growth in the region to create conditions which will alleviate poverty and strengthen democratic institutions. Most of the governments in the region want to participate in these goals. Twenty-nine 

of the 34 Western Hemisphere nations that met down in Argentina 

earlier this month are in favor of moving forward on negotiations 

with the FTAA. 

A turn to authoritarianism poses a grave danger to the social 

fabric in Venezuela and the region and does not present a viable 

alternative that can otherwise lift the millions who now live in poverty out from their despair. 

While our policies may be condemned and while our leaders may 

be scorned, the fact remains that we are committed to working 

closely with the people of Venezuela to create new opportunities to 

rebuild a relationship that is in our mutual interests. 

I now recognize my good friend, the distinguished Ranking Member from New Jersey, Bob Menendez for any statement he may 

wish to make.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you 

for holding this important hearing today and for your commitment 

to the Subcommittee over the past year. I want to welcome the Assistant Secretary and wish him well in his new position. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your positive observations of President Clinton. I would be having a different introductory statement if President Chavez had done what President Clinton did, which was to balance the budget for the first time in a generation, create record surpluses, low unemployment, low interest 

rates and the greatest peacetime economy in over a generation and 

we——

Mr. BURTON. I wish I hadn’t made that comparison. 

Mr. MENENDEZ [continuing]. Were at peace in the world, Mr. 

Chairman. 

But let me get to the matter at hand. I want to provide a framework before I get to Venezuela specifically, because I think this 

hearing on Venezuela, to some extent, makes the case that I have 

been making for the past year. 

6

I think we can have no greater evidence of the President’s failed 

policy in Latin America, or more accurately a lack of a policy, than 

what we saw a few weeks ago at the Summit of the Americas. 

The images sent back to us here in the United States of massive 

anti-American and anti-Bush demonstrations, coupled with little 

support for the U.S. summit agenda paint a stark picture of a 

failed U.S. policy in our own hemisphere. 

Let me be clear. I certainly don’t agree with President Chavez 

and I disagree with many of the protestors on their methods and 

their agenda, but I will tell you that these protests come from valid 

frustrations. 

Frustrations with poverty, with massive inequality and with governments that fail to respond to the basic needs of their citizens. 

That is why we saw a massive protest at the summit, and street 

revolutions overturning democratically-elected governments in Bolivia and Ecuador. 

Meanwhile, the only response from the United States is free 

trade, free trade, free trade. Even Karen Hughes seemed to ignore 

the reality of these recent protests when she cited free trade and 

other governments’ support for free trade as the cornerstone for our 

plan for public diplomacy in the hemisphere. 

I believe that what we saw in Argentina is the result of a massive failure of leadership. As Ronald Reagan once said, ‘‘To grasp 

and hold a vision, that is the very essence of successful leadership.’’

So I would ask, what is our vision for the hemisphere and where 

is our leadership? 

If the United States and Latin American leaders don’t offer a vision, a comprehensive solution to the valid frustration from poverty, inequality and lack of effective governments, the people of 

Latin America will continue to buy the fool’s gold offered by Chavez 

and others. 

This fool’s gold glitters with the idea of eliminating poverty and 

hunger, but in reality it carries the heavy price of increased poverty, crushed democratic institutions and human rights violations. 

So, Mr. Secretary, we need a real plan. This is your first time 

before the Committee. You have just started in your position. You 

have an opportunity, I hope within the context of the Administration, to make a different case, even though I am sure you will defend the Administration in its present plan. But I hope that we can 

get to a real plan. 

Let us create a real plan together. I offered one with the Social 

Investment and Economic Development plan, which has bipartisan 

support, but it certainly doesn’t have to be my plan. But the plan 

must be comprehensive, innovative, effective and powerful. 

Let me remind you that if we don’t even participate in the process of responding to the real problems of Latin America, then we 

will continue to create fertile ground for people like Chavez, who 

will feed on the growing discontent. 

Now let us take a close look at what is going on in Venezuela. 

Frankly, I am deeply concerned that democracy in Venezuela is in 

danger. 

I am concerned when an elected leader is attempting to consolidate power within the presidency, purging critics and packing the 

7

courts, intimidating the media and harassing human rights workers and religious groups. 

I am concerned when initial Venezuelan statistics, confirmed by 

separate United Nations and World Bank statistics, point to a 10-

percent rise in poverty during Chavez’s first 5 years and a rise in 

extreme poverty to 25 percent during the same period. 

I am even more concerned when supposedly independent National Institute of Statistics suddenly revises its numbers and says 

that poverty actually fell 4.5 percent, after being scolded by President Chavez for reporting the truth. 

I am concerned that Chavez is using his oil largesse to buy power 

and influence inappropriately throughout the region. 

Through oil initiatives, such as PetroSun, Petrocaribe and Petro 

Andina, he is solidifying relationships with the poorer Caribbean 

countries, Central America and South America. 

He is also antagonizing other countries in the region, including 

Mexico and Colombia. If he was simply using the oil to help those 

poorer countries, that would be one thing. But he is promoting his 

idea of what government should be and I don’t believe, based upon 

his actions and the concerns that have been raised internationally 

by many others including those who don’t hold many of my views, 

but who have sent letters to President Chavez concerning what is 

happening inside of Venezuela that this is a real concern. 

I am concerned when foreign direct investment is one-third of 

what it was 5 years ago and the U.N. Development Program’s 2005 

Human Development Report dropped Venezuela from 68th place 

last year to 75th place this year, because per capita income has 

fallen. 

So let us be clear. Democracy is not just about elections or polls. 

No democracy can exist without strong democratic institutions. No 

democracy can exist without an independent judiciary. No democracy can exist without freedom of the press and respect for human 

rights. 

I challenge us here in the United States to make it clear that we 

expect real long-term and robust democracy for the Venezuelan 

people. 

Mr. Chavez likes to use a lot of strong words and he certainly 

has a lot of oil money to throw around, but as they say, all that 

glitters is not gold. 

Our best answer to President Chavez is a real plan to address 

the real problems in the hemisphere. In the absence of that, the 

vacuum that we have allowed to take place gets filled by the 

Chavezes of the hemisphere. It is time for the United States to 

show some real leadership and a new shared vision for the hemisphere. 

I look forward to the Secretary and the other witnesses in their 

testimonies. 

Mr. BURTON. We will try to confine the remarks of the Committee to 5 minutes if it is possible. With that, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Chairman Burton. I am 

gratified that your Subcommittee is holding this hearing on the 

status of democracy in Venezuela and I think Chairman Burton 

and Ranking Member Menendez for the opportunity to discuss this 

important topic. 

8

The focus regarding the situation in Venezuela is on the corrosive effect that Hugo Chavez has had on the process of democracy 

in the country, how he has undermined the consolidation and the 

strengthening of democratic institutions and how he has launched 

a full assault on Venezuelan independent civil society. 

The people of Venezuela and of the United States share a rich 

and fruitful relationship. Nonetheless, the tight grip of Venezuela’s 

oppressive government continues to plague the democratic institutions and its civil society. 

According to the State Department’s country reports on human 

rights practices, the abuse of political power is reported in connection with human rights violations by the Government of Venezuela. 

Women, children and the disabled and indigenous people often 

bear the brunt of human rights violations, being subjected to physical violence and discrimination. 

International human rights organizations have expressed concerns about the deterioration of democratic institutions and the 

threats to freedom of speech and press in Venezuela under the 

Chavez government. 

Other groups, such as the Committee For the Protection of Journalists and Reporters Without Borders have expressed concerns 

about Chavez’s attacks against journalists during street protests. 

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued a report last year expressing concerns about Chavez’s government’s 

tendency to militarize public administration. 

The Commission expressed extreme concern about reports of 

undo influence of the armed forces in the country’s political affairs 

and excessive involvement by the armed forces in political decisionmaking. 

When we look at the status of democracy in Venezuela, the facts 

speak for themselves. The Inter-American Commission on Human 

Rights and human rights organizations talked about extra judicial 

killings, serious delays in prosecution of human rights violations, 

death squads, torture and abuse of detainees, little or no tolerance 

for government protestors, severe corruption of civil judicial system 

and serious restrictions upon the freedoms of speech and press. 

The horrific alliance between Castro and Chavez illustrates the 

dangers of a regime that models its practices on the evil and terrorist dictatorship in Cuba. 

The Venezuelan leader claims that he is a small D democrat, 

whose social policies are meant to help those whom he describes as 

marginalized sectors of the population, while his international policies aim to improve Venezuela’s stature in the region. 

However, what possible advantage could Venezuela derive from 

Chavez’s association with the leaders of the world’s most repressive 

governments, while he distances himself from the most prosperous 

democracies in the region? 

Chavez recently reaffirmed his close friendship with Cuba’s brutal dictator, with Libya’s Qadafi and of course with Iran and this 

is indicative of the external component of the Chavez threat to democracy that is the Chavez threat is not limited to the domestic 

sphere in Venezuela, but also to the consolidation of democracy 

throughout our hemisphere. This in turn poses a serious threat to 

our United States national security. 

9

In late August of this year, on his way home from visits to Paraguay and Peru, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld honed in on the case 

of Bolivia, where social uprisings have pushed out two Presidents 

in less than 2 years. 

He told reporters that Cuba and Venezuela have been influencing the Andean nation in highly unhelpful ways. Not only is 

this Cuba/Venezuela axis of evil displaying itself overtly, it is also 

manifesting itself through Chavez’s broadcasts, Alo Presidente on 

Telesur, which are vehicles for anti-American propaganda and for 

fomenting instability and leftist revolutionary ideology in the region. 

I am therefore gratified with Congressional initiatives to counter 

telesur’s incitement by initiating radio and television broadcasts 

that will provide a consistently accurate, objective and comprehensive source of news to Venezuela. 

The U.S. must respond to the realignment that is taking place 

between Chavez and repressive dictatorships as well as between 

Chavez and Islamist extremist regimes by strengthening our own 

democratic alliances to counter emerging threats. 

I thank the Chairman for the hearing. I can see that my time 

is up. 

Mr. BURTON. Is Mr. Meeks next? 

Mr. MEEKS. If you say so. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Clearly I wish certain 

things hadn’t taken place. Clearly I wish the rhetoric between 

President Chavez and President Bush had not taken place. 

Clearly I wish that at the time of the attempted coup attempt in 

Venezuela that the United States would have taken a strong position, when we talk about democracy, since we had a person that 

was elected. The United States stepped in and said that we are not 

going to have a situation where we are going to allow democratically-elected people to be overturned. Clearly, I think that that 

would have had some or made some difference in the relationships 

that we currently have with Venezuela and President Chavez. 

That being said, I don’t like the rhetoric and the war of words 

that are going back and forth and I wish that that would not have 

taken place, but sometimes I think you know the impression one 

would get is that all was well in Venezuela pre-Chavez. 

Sometimes I question whether we know really what democracy 

is. Some people say that democracy in this country existed in 1776. 

If you ask my ancestors, democracy was not in this country in 1776 

or 1876. In fact, it just began in 1964, when we had the civil rights 

and the voting rights act. 

So the question of what a democracy is and who does what is 

really a big question that I have. Now, when you look at democracy 

and that is what this hearing is supposed to be about, democracy 

in Venezuela 40 years prior to the 1998 election of Hugo Chavez 

was weak and riddled with corruption and at best gave the perception of participatory. 

With the election of Hugo Chavez, it marked the first time that 

all citizens of Venezuela had the experience of participating in a 

real democracy, under which the people began to take control of 

their lives, their community and their country. 

10

I was there during the referendum election. I saw lines around 

the block where people who had not voted before and wanted to 

vote in the first election with Chavez, came out in strong numbers 

to make sure that their vote, they waited all day. 

I wish in my district I had the kind of voter participation that 

they had in Venezuela. I wish in my district I could see people 

waiting for hours upon hours to vote. 

I had not seen anything like that other than when Nelson 

Mandela was being elected President of South Africa. 

Let us look through the numbers and I have heard a lot of things 

really with the numbers. Under the neoliberal model and the IMF 

enforced policies, poverty rose in Venezuela from 28 percent in 

early 1980s to 85 percent in 1998, the year President Chavez took 

office. 

According to the Center for Economic and Policy Research, for 

the 28 years that preceded the current government, 1970 to 1998, 

Venezuela suffered one of the worst economic declines in Latin 

America and the world. This is a worst decline than even Sub-Saharan Africa. 

During the Presidency of Hugo Chavez, social expenditures equaled $5 billion per year, thus wiping out, to a large extent, illiteracy, providing 40 percent of the population with subsidized food 

and ensuring that 18 million people have free health care. 

Venezuelan economy is growing at the second fastest rate in the 

world actually and the non-oil sectors grew at a faster pace than 

their oil sectors. 

Venezuela and what is important here is when we talk about the 

5 years of when they went down, that is predominantly if you look 

at what happened with the strike, the oil strike and the attempted 

coup, which had devastating, a devastating affect on the economy 

of Venezuela during that period of time. 

Now we can go back and forth and I know that time is short, but 

it is important to recognize, I think and this is basically what I am 

saying, because I don’t want to make you think that I think that 

Hugo Chavez is 100 percent right and he is doing everything right, 

but I do subscribe to what I think my colleague Mr. Menendez did 

say and that is, let us look at our policies toward Latin America. 

If we think that Hugo Chavez is the cause of Latin America’s 

troubles, then I think we are badly mistaken and we will miss the 

boat. 

He is not the cause of it. He may be the symptoms of neglect of 

South America and Latin America and our policies and I agree. I 

am a guy who believes in free trade and pro trade, but that is not 

the only thing that is going to resolve the issues of the people and 

poor people in Latin America. 

That is part of the answer and we have got to do much, much 

more than that and I happen to think that when we look at democracy, when we look at the popularity of the people in Venezuela as 

they look at their President, his popularity and his ratings is much 

higher than the popularity of our President in this country and his 

policies. 

If you want to go by that, if you go and ask the people of Venezuela whether they think their democracy is working, they will 

tell you they believe in their democracy and if you go and ask the 

11

people in this country whether they think we are headed in the 

right direction with our President, they will tell us that we are 

headed in the wrong direction. 

I see my time is up and I know the Chair wants to shut me up, 

but so I yield. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meeks, you and I have traveled together. I 

would never ever attempt to shut you up. 

Mr. Weller. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Of course I want to 

thank you for this hearing. 

I want to thank Mr. Shannon and others for joining us. Welcome 

the new Assistant Secretary for the Western Hemisphere. It was 

a real privilege to join you at your swearing in 2 weeks ago. I congratulate you on your new role in the Administration. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your continuing series of 

hearings focused on important issues in our own hemisphere. 

Today’s hearing in Venezuela is timely, as relations between the 

United States and Venezuela, although historically very close, continue to be strained and are a source of concern not only for myself, 

but I know many others in this Committee, in this Congress. 

Unfortunately, many of the actions taken by the Government of 

Venezuela serve to further weaken our relationship, cause greater 

concern for democracy, as well as for the people of Venezuela. 

Notably Venezuela joined Burma this year as one of the only two 

countries who have failed to demonstrably adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements. 

This determination followed Venezuela’s ending of cooperation 

between the Drug Enforcement Administration and their Venezuela counterparts, after they were labeled spies by the Venezuelan Government. 

Regrettably, Venezuela’s democratic institutions have been weakened with the Supreme Court packing plan, broadcast media laws 

that restrict the ability to criticize the incumbent government and 

continuing pressure on independent civic groups, such as Su ́mate, 

for simply working to preserve democracy in Venezuela. 

Corruption continues to be a problem and one that becomes more 

difficult to control the more concentrated power becomes in the 

hands of a few, President Chavez’s cronies. 

Mr. Chairman, I am also concerned about Venezuela’s support 

for Iran and Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Only one nation voted 

against the International Atomic Energy Agency’s resolution calling on Iran to observe fully its commitments and to return to the 

negotiating process that has made good progress in the last 2 

years. Of course that country was Venezuela. 

President Chavez we know has met with Saddam Hussein at a 

time when no other world leader would and has met with the Iranian Mullahs to talk about mutual interests. 

Venezuela’s Ambassador to Iran has even said that the principles 

and ideals that inspire the Bolivarian revolution of Venezuela are 

inspired by values common to the Iranian Islamic revolution. 

This should be a concern for all peace loving people in the world. 

Many potential links between Venezuela and radical extremist Islamic elements must be carefully monitored and explored. 

12

As we saw at the Summit of the Americas, Mr. Chavez has attempted to portray the future of this hemisphere as a struggle 

against the United States, where there is an adversarial relationship between the United States and our neighbors to the south. 

We must reject this misguided and false vision for our hemisphere. The United States wants to be a partner with our friends 

and neighbors in the democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean. 

We must continue to engage with our hemispheric partners and 

work together, especially in the efforts to ensure the success and 

strengthening of democracy in all of Latin America. 

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this 

important hearing and welcoming Secretary Shannon as well as 

the other witnesses and I look forward to your testimony. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, I believe my good friend, the 

gentleman from Massachusetts, was here before me and I kind of 

want to defer that. 

Mr. BURTON. Sure. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I will have a statement. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Secretary, welcome. At your confirmation 

hearing, you described the poor relations between the United 

States and Venezuela as tragic and I concur. 

I also noted that there is nothing in your prepared remarks relative to an effort or desire for rapprochement with the Chavez government. I would infer that the current policy is either one of socalled containment or isolation. 

While we are here to discuss the bilateral relationship that we 

have with Venezuela, I agree with my Ranking Member that we 

should put it in the larger context of our relationship with Latin 

America, in American foreign policy challenges worldwide. 

The truth is that we have a serious problem in Latin America 

and throughout the world and that has nothing to do with Hugo 

Chavez, no matter how much some would wish the answer were 

that simple. 

Ironically, I hear much about democracy and democratic institutions, obviously with a specific focus on Venezuela and you reference a poll in your remarks that 60 percent of Venezuelans do 

not trust the electoral system. 

I don’t know where that poll came from, but I know you must 

be familiar with the poll done by the respected Chilean polling firm 

that was reported in the Economist, which had this to say and I 

hope my colleagues are listening carefully. 

According to that poll, the Venezuelans themselves, the people of 

Venezuela have the second highest satisfaction level in Latin 

America with the way their own democracy functions. 

I guess it is right after Uruguay and it should be noted for the 

record that there were 18 nations that were part of that survey. 

But again, back to America for a moment and democracy. A poll 

again you must be familiar with that was commissioned by the 

13

Miami Herald and the University of Miami School of Business that 

was taken in Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. 

That poll found that 81 percent of the respondents, 81 percent 

of the respondents gave President Bush a negative job approval 

rating. 

Now what I find particularly disturbing is that the sample comprised of the so-called elite, the opinion makers in Latin America. 

Certainly not adherents of Hugo Chavez. 

The pollster, who was Mr. Zogby, had this to say. This was his 

conclusion, not mine, not yours, but his and I am quoting: ‘‘Clearly, 

Bush’s Presidency has done damage to U.S. prestige in Latin 

America. Their apparent lack of confidence in him is no doubt behind opinion leaders in the region wanting to look elsewhere to 

form economic alliances.’’ It says nothing about Hugo Chavez. 

Of course we see similar results in polls from around the globe. 

You must be familiar with them. I am sure you are. 

By the way, I want to commend you for what you have done for 

this country through the years. I have great respect for you, Mr. 

Shannon. 

But as the GAO, our GAO recently reported, anti-Americanism 

is spreading and deepening everywhere, with profound consequences for our national interests. 

Do we have any responsibility for this decline in American prestige? What about our own policies and attitudes? Are we fueling 

this rampant anti-Americanism or is Hugo Chavez responsible for 

it, along with the 81 percent negative rating for President Bush? 

I would put forth that one factor in this disturbing trend appears 

to be the disparity between our rhetoric and our actions. 

I constantly have the word hypocritical thrown in my face when 

I travel and at meetings with officials and citizens of other governments. 

An example, as we lecture about democracy, we embrace dictators. I and Lloyd Doggett introduced a measure to end American 

support for the dictator of Uzbekistan that got 84 votes on the 

Floor of the House and many of those in this House who expressed 

concern about tyranny voted to keep providing military assistance 

to Islam Karimov, a thug. A thug. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Delahunt, could you sum up, sir? We are trying 

to stay as close as we can to the 5 minutes, but that is all right. 

We will give you a little more time. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Can I have a couple of more minutes? Maybe a 

minute and a half? 

Mr. BURTON. Okay. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Will the Chairman yield? 

Mr. BURTON. Yes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would be glad to yield 1 to 2 minutes of 

my time to——

Mr. BURTON. Then why don’t I do this? I will just recognize you 

and you can yield to Mr. Delahunt? If you will recognize Mr. 

Faleomavaega and start the clock. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would like to, at this time, yield 2 minutes 

of my time to Mr. Delahunt and then I will proceed then too. 

14

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank my friend. Mr. Karimov, who has got a 

great habit of boiling dissidents alive and he is invited to the White 

House for a meeting with President Bush. 

There is Jose Miguel Vivanco, who recently stated and again he 

is no fan of Hugo Chavez, ‘‘the trouble is that the Bush Administration has a serious credibility problem.’’

Well recent history between the United States and Venezuela 

certainly hasn’t helped our image as a defender of democracy either. Whether the Bush Administration likes them or not, he was 

democratically elected and in April 2002 there was an attempted 

coup against him, but even as the rest of the Latin America condemned what was happening, this Administration was quietly applauding. 

In fact, the Administration actually blamed Chavez for his own 

overthrow and our Ambassador, the then Ambassador at the OAS, 

sought to block the Inter-American Democratic Charter from being 

applied to Venezuela. 

Well, the perception is that our support for democracy depends 

on the circumstances. Those circumstances include democraticallyelected leader at odds with United States interests, such as Hugo 

Chavez, or an unelected leader, who sides with Washington, like 

Musharaff of Pakistan, Mubarack of Egypt, the Saudi oil family, 

Turkmenbashi of Turkministan, Islam Karimov of Ubezkistan. The 

list goes on, but you get the point. 

Let me conclude by saying this. I am convinced of one thing. 

Hugo Chavez is profoundly concerned by the poverty and inequality 

in Venezuela and I know that we share those concerns. 

The question is whether his efforts to address these fundamental 

issues do erode support for democracy to succeed or not. The Administration clearly has a different approach. 

You have spoken about engaging with him in a clash of ideas. 

I would rather that we seek to have a respectful exchange of ideas 

that could accomplish those mutual goals and I will do whatever 

I can, however negligible it may be, to help promote that dialogue, 

because both the American and Venezuelan people deserve it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank my good friend from Massachusetts. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the comments 

made earlier by our Ranking Member and the gentleman from New 

Jersey, Mr. Menendez and also the comments made by my good 

friend from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt. 

I think the response recently that happened in Argentina, in my 

humble opinion and I do welcome Mr. Secretary Shannon this 

morning, is not just on Hugo Chavez. 

I don’t think Hugo Chavez is on trial here. I think it is an overall 

reflection of passiveness, indifference, benign negligence if you will 

just about of the whole situation dealing with Latin America. 

In all the years that I have served as a Member of this Committee, not just by a Republican Administration, both Republican 

and Democratic Administrations, have been just all rhetoric and 

hardly any results or any real substantive, serious not only dialogue but consideration on how we deal with our neighbors 

throughout Latin America. 

15

Why is it if it is symptomatic of the frustrations that our Latin 

America friends have toward us, how isn’t it a nationally man of 

the cloth, a professed Christian preacher who is supposed to be promoting peacemaking being forgiven? 

All this relates to Christianity to international public radio, television, promoting the idea that the President, a President duly 

elected by the people of Venezuela, should be assassinated, if that 

doesn’t put a chill on your backs, my dear colleagues, I don’t know 

what will. 

I am not a defender of Mr. Chavez with all his failings and I am 

sure he is not a perfect man, no more perfect than our own President if you will. 

My understanding is President Chavez’s government is not the 

only government in Latin America that also recognizes Fidel Castro 

and his government in Cuba. I think we need to keep that in proper perspective and I am not a defender of Castro either. 

Now my understanding, no other Latin American leader has 

done more to help the most critical, the lowest cast of the cast and 

I am talking about indigenous Indians, Mr. Chairman, than this 

President right now of Venezuela. 

He has done more for indigenous Indians, the lowest in economics and opportunities ever throughout Latin American, than President Chavez. I think that is something that should be noted. 

It is——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am limited in my time, Madam Chairman. 

Is that all right with you? 

It is going to be my privilege to visit Venezuela in the near future and I sincerely hope that I will have an opportunity to express 

my concerns and the problems that we are having with Latin 

America and leaders such as Hugo Chavez. 

Mr. Chairman, whatever time I have I would be more than 

happy to yield to my good friend——

Mr. BURTON. I will let you yield for one question from Ms. RosLehtinen, but your time has expired. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Please. 

Mr. BURTON. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much for your generosity, Mr. 

Burton. Just a quick comment. Alluding to the statements that Mr. 

Delahunt made and I agree with him about Karimov being a bloody 

tyrant and as you know the Subcommittee the Middle East and 

Central Asia held a hearing where we talked about the violations 

in Ubezkistan, but then you allude to the elections of Hugo Chavez. 

I was wondering if my good friend, Mr. Delahunt, is aware that 

Mr. Karimov was technically also elected, just as many other socalled leaders were technically elected, but that the difference is 

not just an election, but whether you are ruling as a democratic 

leader? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I don’t think, if the gentlelady would yield to me? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I don’t think that any comparison made between 

the election of Islam Karimov and Hugo Chavez would pass the 

smell test. 

16

Mr. BURTON. Okay. I think this is a debate that goes beyond the 

scope of the hearing. We will pass on that right now and the gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Payne? 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me commend you for calling this important hearing and I would just commend you for your overall leadership of the Committee. 

Let me say that it is important that we examine democracy in 

the nation of Venezuela. Of course based on recent events in press 

reports, it is clear that this will be an issue that will require sustained attention by our Committee. 

Indeed, some of the news coming out of Venezuela should give 

us all cause for concern. We have heard from Human Rights Watch 

that their leaders have continued to take steps to undermine the 

independence of the country’s judiciary and to threaten freedom of 

the press and this is not going in the right direction and we deplore 

that. 

They also note problems with police abuse, unpunished 

extrajudicial killings, rampant violence in prisons and intimidation 

of government opponents, all of which are certainly going in the 

wrong direction. 

We must continue to monitor these developments to ensure the 

strengthening of democracy in Venezuela continues in the right direction. 

However, we must all recognize the reality of how President Chavez was elected in 1998 in the first place. He ran on a message of 

radical change to rid the country of corruption, the same way that 

we saw in Cuba back in the 1950s and 1960s, where corruption 

was rampant and people ran to change the corruption that was corrupting the country and that is what was happening in Venezuela 

and most importantly to aggressively deal with the high poverty 

rate. 

He spoke to millions of Venezuelans who were ready to take a 

new path in the country’s development and while many of his initiatives have been controversial, it is undeniable that President 

Chavez’s numerous social programs have made an enormous difference for the civilians of Venezuela. 

His government has embarked on an adult literacy campaign 

that has given over one million adults the skills needed to participate in the political and economic life of the country. 

Schools for children are being built at a fast rate. People that 

could not get access to doctors before are seeing community based 

health care programs and doctors in their neighborhoods for the 

first time in the history of their country. 

As a matter of fact, the adult literacy program, an 85-year-old 

man for the first time had an opportunity to put a pencil in his 

hand and he said that ‘‘this is freedom to me.’’

A major land reform campaign has been undertaken to redistribute this wealth and the land to those of the poor that can use 

it for agriculture. 

We can argue over his motives, but President Chavez has made 

an enormous effort to provide other countries, including the Caribbean region, with discounted access to his nation’s oil. 

17

Regarding elections, most would agree that President Chavez’s 

government has overseen a fair, free, peaceful and orderly process. 

He was elected in 1998, re-elected under the rules of the new constitution in 2000 and he won a re-election in August 2004. 

While there was a dispute over the results of the recall election, 

the Organization of American States validated the results and the 

Carter Center found that the process suffered from some irregularities, delays, politicizing and intimidation. 

Nevertheless, the Carter Center noted that it is important to distinguish between irregularities and fraudulent acts that could 

change the outcome of a process. It is the Carter Center’s finding 

that the official results reflect the will of the Venezuelan electorate. 

Perhaps if the United States is concerned with democracy in 

Venezuela, it should question its endorsement for the coup, when 

President Chavez in 2002, the United States supported on the 

morning of April 12, 2002, Assistant Secretary Otto Reich, told a 

gathering of Latin American and Caribbean Ambassadors that they 

had to support the new government in an article that was reported 

in the New York Times that day. 

This is absolutely unprecedented that the United States of America would recognize a country that is taken over by a coup, a military coup. 

Even in the organization the OAU, now the Africa Union, in 

Mauritania, a bad, bad dictator person who actually even practiced 

slavery in Africa, even to today, was overthrown about 4 or 5 

months ago and the Africa Union said that even though this was 

a despot, terrible person and should be out of office, that they could 

not recognize a new government that took over by a military coup 

d’etat. 

Here the United States recognized or moved to recognize the government. That is absolutely wrong, whether you applaud the government or not. 

So in conclusion, in a region with extremely high poverty rates 

that recently saw massive street, the whole region is having problems, we saw it at the Summit of the Americas, that there is a 

question about the so-called free trade, we must take a look at U.N. 

millennium development goals so we could talk about halving poverty. 

Let me also indicate that we have seen statistics that say that 

the poverty rate has increased in Venezuela. I believe if you would 

take into account, as you may recall, the long strikes of the oil producing area where months and months there was no income when 

the country is primarily dependent on oil, you will probably see in 

the out years, now that there is stability in the oil markets, that 

you will see that that was a blip in the accounting and you will 

see that poverty is going to actually increase. 

Finally, there was a question regarding NED in its funding of 

Su ́mate. NED has put in maybe $4 million in democracy building 

and that is good. 

However, there was a question of IRI and its funding of an organization to lead the recall drive, the Su ́mate, and it was a question 

whether that funding for a particular political purpose should have 

happened. 

18

I think that we like NED. We like what they do. However, they 

should not get involved in partisan politics, but in educating people 

about democracy and training people how to go about it. 

I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Payne. 

We, unfortunately, Mr. Secretary have three votes and I do not 

want to cut you off in the middle of your statement, because we 

want to hear what you have to say, plus we want to be able to ask 

you questions. 

Please bear with us. We apologize. We will probably be gone for 

about 20 minutes. 

I would like to just end, before we go, by saying that there has 

been a little bit of misinformation about the attitudes of other 

countries regarding the free trade agreement down there and 29 of 

the 34 Western Hemisphere nations that met in Argentina earlier 

this month are in favor of moving forward on negotiations. 

There is a lot of support for this and we will discuss that further 

when we come back. We will stand in recess until the call of the 

Chair, which will be in about 20 minutes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being so patient. We 

appreciate everybody’s patience while we were gone. 

Thomas A. Shannon is a Senior Foreign Service Officer and was 

sworn in as the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs last week and I am sorry I wasn’t there at your 

swearing in. It was quite an affair I understand. I apologize. 

He has twice served as Director on the National Security Council 

and he has served our country with distinction at our Embassies 

and Consulates in Venezuela, South Africa, Brazil and Guatemala. 

It is good to have you with us. Since you are now an official in 

this area, why don’t you stand up so we can swear you in and we 

will take your testimony? 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Secretary, we will hear your comments. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS A. SHANNON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and thank 

you to the distinguished Members of the Committee. I especially 

appreciate those Members who have spent time and effort in Venezuela and engaging both the Government of Venezuela and the 

people of Venezuela. 

I thank you for this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today to address an important topic, the state of democracy in Venezuela. 

I realize that in the statements made previously there were additional comments about the state of our larger relationship with 

Latin America and I would be happy to address those either today 

or in a separate fora. 

I am going to restrict my opening comments to democracy and 

then take questions as you see fit, sir. 

19

It is not news to Members of this Committee that over the past 

year the assault from within on Venezuela’s democratic institutions 

has continued. 

Indeed, there is a growing hemispheric and international consensus that democracy in Venezuela is in peril, as documented by 

international human rights groups, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference and 

independent Venezuelan NGO’s, among others. 

As the Secretary of State has noted, our interest in the fate and 

well-being of Venezuela’s democracy is part of a larger hemispheric 

commitment to democracy, made by leaders of the hemisphere at 

the 2001 Quebec City Summit of the Americas and expressed most 

eloquently in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 

Our goal in the Americas is to promote democratically-elected 

governments that govern democratically and responsibly, expand 

economic opportunity for their people and work cooperatively with 

their neighbors. 

Our concern is that the Venezuelan Government is backsliding 

on all these fronts, undermining democratic institutions, restricting 

fundamental freedoms, slowly hollowing out economic freedoms and 

turning away from the hemispheric commitment to free markets 

and economic integration. 

But let me take a moment to put our concern in perspective. 

Venezuela is in the midst of a long-term and slow-motion political 

transition. 

The Venezuelan people, through their civic traditions, democratic 

institutions and constitutional processes, are searching for a path 

that will allow them to modernize their state, address the social 

and economic needs of the country and create the conditions for 

Venezuela to be an integral part of the Americas and a larger 

world. 

The election of President Hugo Chavez in 1998 was a clear vote 

of no confidence by the Venezuelan people for old line political parties and a clear expression of the Venezuelan electorate’s desire to 

create new political space where modern, accountable and democratic political leadership could emerge. 

At that moment, Venezuela and Hugo Chavez had an opportunity to bind up the wounds of Venezuelan society, build bridges 

across Venezuela’s social divide and create a new national consensus around the development and modernization of Venezuela. 

Venezuela had an opportunity to show the world that dramatic 

social transformation could take place within a democratic and constitutional context. 

Regrettably, the government of Hugo Chavez chose otherwise. Instead of attempting to overcome Venezuela’s social divisions, it 

mined them, using confrontation and conflict to drive a political 

agenda that President Chavez has slowly revealed to be the socialism of the 21st century. 

The results of this decision we all know, profound polarization, 

political upheaval and serious damage to Venezuela’s economic infrastructure. 

Venezuela was saved from devastating internal conflict only 

through the intervention of the Organization of American States 

and the international community. 

20

What the international community was able to preserve, however, was a tattered democracy with weakened institutions and a 

sullen hostile standoff between the Chavez government and its opposition. 

Again, instead of reaching across a political divide to build a 

basis for democratic governability, the Chavez government accelerated its efforts to consolidate control over political institutions, 

marginalize any who opposed it, suffocate democratic debate within 

Venezuela and resist any external effort to support broader democratic political activity within Venezuela. 

So where are we now? Speaking at a human rights conference 

held in Caracas in September, Human Rights Watch Americas Director, Jose Miguel Vivanco, characterized the state of the rule of 

the law, the backbone of liberal democracy, in Venezuela as ‘‘extraordinarily grave’’ and necessitating urgent action by the InterAmerican system. 

Indeed, we are witnessing an increasing and unchecked concentration of power in the executive, the politicization of the judiciary, the electoral authorities and the legal system. 

In other words, the separation of powers and the independence 

of the branches of government, always a fragile thing in Venezuela, 

have been seriously undermined. 

Also, we are witnessing political persecution of civil society and 

the democratic opposition, arbitrary restrictions on and intimidation of the press and threats to free association. 

In its 2005 World Report, Human Rights Watch noted that the 

Venezuelan Government continued to take steps to undermine the 

independence of the country’s judiciary and to threaten freedom of 

the press. 

In the statement issued in December 2004, following the politically motivated expansion of the Supreme Court, Human Rights 

Watch condemned the government for packing the court with 12 

new loyalist judges as ‘‘a severe blow to judicial independence,’’ 

adding that the move would ‘‘degrade’’ and ‘‘betray’’ Venezuelan democracy. 

Similar concerns have been echoed by Amnesty International and 

the Andean Commission of Jurists. 

The politicization of the judiciary also extends to the lower 

courts. According to the Venezuelan judicial watchdog, NGO Fora 

Penal, over 200 judges have been removed or retired for political 

reasons. 

During the 123rd session of the Inter-American Commission on 

Human Rights in October, several respected Venezuelan human 

rights NGO’s, such as PROVEA, COFAVIC and the Center for 

Human Rights at the Andres Bello Catholic University, identified 

the deterioration of the justice system as the root cause of the rising climate of impunity and increased criminality and violence in 

the country. 

These NGO’s themselves face increased harassment by the government and impediments in carrying out their work. 

While Venezuela continues to enjoy an independent media, in the 

past year the government has taken a number of steps to erode 

freedom of expression. 

21

Last year’s enactment of the punitive media law, which places restrictions on broadcast content, has resulted in self-censorship by 

major media outlets and the termination of certain radio and TV 

programs. 

This and other laws serve as pretexts to stifle press freedom and 

intimidate government critics. In September, for example, the National Telecommunications Council, or the FCC equivalent, opened 

administrative proceedings into seven TV stations for alleged failure to make proper use of assigned frequencies. 

Twenty-two radio stations are under investigation for other alleged improprieties. Stations found in violation could lose their 

broadcast licenses. 

Alleged tax violations have also been used to harass media outlets critical of the government. The October 24 closure of a regional 

paper, El Impulso, for alleged tax infractions is but the latest example. 

This alarming trend has not gone unnoticed. The Inter-American 

Press Association, Reporters Without Borders, Human Rights 

Watch and the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression for 

the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have all voiced 

concern about increased threats to freedom of expression in Venezuela. 

In March of this year, the Special Rapporteur specifically criticized the passage of certain amendments to the Criminal Code that 

expand the reach and increase criminal penalties for ‘‘desacato’’ or 

‘‘contempt’’ of public officials. 

At a time when many of the hemispheres democracies are repealing such anachronistic laws, Venezuela is giving them added teeth. 

Citing the Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression 

approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 

October 2000, the Special Rapporteur noted that ‘‘Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public officials . . . restrict 

freedom of expression and the right to information.’’

Most disturbing of all is the attempt to use the criminal justice 

system to stifle media criticism. On November 4, the Attorney General announced a detention order for a well-known journalist and 

vocal government critic, Patricia Poleo, for her alleged participation 

in the plot to assassinate prosecutor Danilo Anderson, who was 

killed in November 2004. 

The Inter-American Press Association immediately condemned 

this charge as an attempt to silence the media through intimidation. 

In July, the Office of the Attorney General said it was opening 

a criminal investigation against the leading daily El Universal for 

publishing an editorial criticizing the politicization of the judicial 

system. 

This action too was denounced by the Inter-American Press Association and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur for Press Freedom. 

The Venezuelan Catholic Bishop’s Conference has stated it most 

succinctly: ‘‘All persons and institutions have the right to express 

their opinion in accordance with their convictions, a right that 

must be respected and guaranteed in any democratic society.’’

22

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I know some of 

you have had the opportunity to meet with the leaders of the electoral watchdog NGO Su ́mate, Maria Corina Machado and 

Alejandro Plaz. 

Theirs is perhaps the best and most well-known example of the 

government’s harassment and persecution of those who disagree 

with it. 

Machado, Plaz, and two of their colleagues, have been indicted 

for conspiracy to overthrow the republican form of government, for 

receiving a $31,000 grant from the National Endowment for Democracy for voter education activities. We understand that oral arguments in their case are scheduled to begin in early December. 

Perhaps less visible, but equally disturbing, is the continued persecution of political appointments and discrimination against those 

who signed the recall referendum petition. 

These citizens have been denied basic government services, including passports and national identity cards, forced from their 

jobs and excluded from government contracts as punishment for exercising their constitutional right to petition the government. 

In January, the respected Venezuelan human rights organization, PROVEA, reported a 13 percent increase in politically motivated detentions from the previous year. 

Between October 2003 and September 2004, according to the 

NGO, 54 such cases were reported. A comparison with the number 

of reported detentions in 1999 underline the point even more dramatically. That year PROVEA only noted one case. 

These latest moves against the freedom of the press and freedom 

of association come just weeks before the December 4 National Assembly elections. 

These elections will be a test of the transparency and fairness of 

the electoral authorities and the electoral system, which are increasingly in doubt. 

Observers from the European Commission and the OAS will be 

in Venezuela in advance of the elections to monitor preparations 

and push for greater transparency. 

Opposition political parties are participating in the elections, but 

they, along with Su ́mate and other NGO’s, have denounced obstructionism by electoral officials. 

Voter turnout and confidence in the electoral system appears to 

be at an all time low. Abstention levels in the August parish and 

municipal elections were over 70 percent. Recent polls indicate that 

over 60 percent of Venezuelans do not trust the electoral system. 

Independent pollsters are predicting close to 80 percent abstention rates in the upcoming legislative elections. We will see whether or not these pollsters are correct. 

These deepening suspicions are fueled by the political makeup of 

the CNE and its reluctance to implement the recommendations 

made by the OAS and the Carter Center after the August 2004 

Presidential recall referendum. 

Speaking directly to the issue of public confidence in elections, 

among its recommendations, the Carter Center noted the need for 

the CNE to ‘‘communicate and consult much more regularly with 

the political parties and put in play much greater mechanisms of 

transparency to restore confidence in the electoral process.’’

23

Indeed, the Carter Center report underscored that the referendum’s ‘‘numerous irregularities’’ mostly centered ‘‘around the lack 

of transparency of the CNE in its decision-making process and its 

ad hoc implementation of the recall referendum process.’’

In its own separate report, the OAS observer mission recommended a third party audit of the electoral registry, whose results would be made public. 

The CNE has contracted the Costa Rica-based Center For Electoral Assistance and Promotion, CAPEL, which is the electoral arm 

of the Inter-American Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, 

to conduct such an audit. 

This decision was made unilaterally by the CNE, without consulting other groups and some NGO’s, such as Su ́mate, have questioned the independence and ability of CAPEL to conduct a thorough audit. 

We have no position on this, but I would like to underscore that 

the differences and concerns about the transparency of the electoral 

registry continues to be an important problem. 

CAPEL has said that it expects to issue a final report before the 

end of November. Still, with less than a month before the legislative elections, it is all but impossible to implement significant 

changes by then, even if the audit result were presented and disseminated on schedule. Any real changes will take time and more 

importantly political will. 

The Administration is working multilaterally, engaging the OAS, 

and the European Union, the Council of Europe, among others to 

support Venezuelan civil society, speak out against abuses of democracy and hold the Venezuelan Government accountable to its 

commitments under the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 

We are likewise reaching out at a bilateral level to our partners 

in the hemisphere and in Europe to do the same. 

Within Venezuela we are working to help preserve political and 

civic space for increasingly at-risk groups. The Venezuelan business community, organized labor, the independent media, NGO’s 

and religious institutions, in particular the Catholic church, have 

a critical role to play in providing the checks and balances that 

government institutions are no longer able to provide. 

Establishing linkages between these groups and institutions and 

their U.S. and international counterparts will fortify their ability to 

perform their essential role. 

The work of the National Endowment for Democracy is especially 

important in helping foster these kinds of linkages. 

The Administration is reaching out to international human 

rights and other NGO’s to help create an international network to 

support and defend Venezuelan civil society. 

Our USAID program in Caracas supports local human rights 

NGO’s, judicial and penal watchdog groups, press freedom activities and provides small high impact grants for programs that serve 

poor communities. 

Our Embassy’s public diplomacy outreach is also a key part of 

our effort to highlight American values, our ties and affection for 

the Venezuelan people and to communicate the Administration’s 

positive hemispheric agenda. 

24

President Bush, during his recent stop in Brazil following the 

Summit of the Americas, said it best when he noted that ‘‘ensuring 

social justice for the Americas requires choosing between two competing visions: One offers a vision of hope. It is found that on representative government, integration into the world community, and 

faith in the transformative power of freedom. The other seeks to 

role back the democratic progress of the past two decades by playing to fear, pitting neighbor against neighbor, and blaming others 

for their own failures to provide for their people.’’

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. Once again, 

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

and I would be pleased to respond to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shannon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS A. SHANNON, ASSISTANT SEC- RETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee 

today to address an important topic—the state of democracy in Venezuela. 

It is not news to the members of this Committee that, over the past year, the assault from within on Venezuela’s democratic institutions has continued. Indeed, 

there is a growing hemispheric and international consensus that democracy in Venezuela is in grave peril, as documented by international human rights groups, the 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference, and independent Venezuelan NGOs, among others. 

As the Secretary has noted, the United States does not seek to have poor relations 

with Venezuela. What we want, our Hemispheric and international partners want, 

and we believe the Venezuelan people want and deserve, is the very goal we are 

striving for in the rest of the Hemisphere—democratically-elected governments that 

govern democratically and responsibly, expand economic opportunity for their people, and work cooperatively with their neighbors. Regrettably, the democraticallyelected Venezuelan government is backsliding on all these fronts, subverting democratic institutions by using them to restrict the rights of those who disagree with 

it, slowly undermining economic freedoms, and rejecting the opportunities of 

globalization. 

Speaking at a human rights defenders conference held in Caracas in September, 

Human Rights Watch Americas Director Jose ́ Miguel Vivanco characterized the 

state of the rule of law, the backbone of liberal democracy, in Venezuela as ‘‘extraordinarily grave’’ and necessitating urgent action by the Inter-American system. Indeed, we are witnessing an increasing and unchecked concentration of power in the 

executive; the politicization of the judiciary, the electoral authorities and the legal 

system; political persecution of civil society and the democratic opposition; arbitrary 

restrictions on, and intimidation of, the press; and threats to free association. 

President Cha ́vez controls the five branches of government set out in Venezuela’s 

constitution—executive, legislative, judicial, electoral and the so-called ‘‘citizens’ 

power’’ (which includes the Attorney General and the Accounting Office). Most notably he has centralized his control over the Supreme Court, which last year he expanded and packed with loyalists, and lower courts; the National Electoral Council 

(CNE) (four of whose five members are government supporters); the National Assembly, where all polls indicate he will secure a two-thirds majority in the December 4 legislative elections and achieve absolute control; and the office of the Attorney General. This is also true of the military and previously independent entities 

such as the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, and the Central Bank. The impact 

on the civic, political and economic life of the country is evident in increased selfcensorship by the media, lack of public confidence in the electoral system, reluctance 

to express disagreement with government policies for fear of government retribution, capital flight, decreased oil production by the now politicized state company 

and decreased foreign investment in any sector outside of oil, which is now to be 

subject to increased state control. 

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

In its 2005 World Report, Human Rights Watch noted that the Venezuelan government continued ‘‘to take steps to undermine the independence of the country’s 

judiciary and to threaten freedom of the press.’’ In a statement issued in December 

2004, following the politically motivated expansion of the Supreme Court, Human 

25

Rights Watch condemned the government for packing the Court with 12 new loyalist 

justices as ‘‘a severe blow to judicial independence,’’ adding that the move would 

‘‘degrade’’ and ‘‘betray’’ Venezuelan democracy. Similar concerns have been echoed 

by Amnesty International and the Andean Commission of Jurists. 

The politicization of the judiciary also extends to the lower courts. According to 

the Venezuelan judicial watch-dog NGO Foro Penal, over 200 judges have been removed or retired for political reasons. During the 123rd session of the IACHR in 

October, several respected Venezuelan human rights NGOs—PROVEA, COFAVIC, 

and the Center for Human Rights at the Andre ́s Bello Catholic University—identified the deterioration of the justice system as the root cause of a rising climate of 

impunity, and increased criminality and violence in the country. These NGOs themselves face increased harassment by the government and impediments in carrying 

out their work. 

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

While Venezuela continues to enjoy an independent media, in the past year, the 

government has taken a number of steps to erode freedom of expression. Last year’s 

enactment of a punitive media law, which places arbitrary restrictions on broadcast 

content, has resulted in self-censorship by major media outlets and the termination 

of certain radio and TV programs. This and other laws serve as pretexts to stifle 

press freedom and intimidate government critics. In September, for example, the 

National Telecommunications Council (CONATEL), or FCC equivalent, opened administrative proceedings into seven TV stations for alleged failure to make proper 

use of assigned frequencies. Twenty-two radio stations are under investigation for 

other alleged improprieties. Stations found in violation could lose their broadcast licenses. Alleged tax violations have also been used to harass media outlets critical 

of the government. The October 24-closure of a regional paper (El Impulso) for alleged tax infractions is but the latest example. 

This alarming trend has not gone unnoticed. The Inter-American Press Association, Reporters Without Borders, Human Rights Watch and the Special Rapporteur 

for Freedom of Expression for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Association have all voiced concern about increased threats to freedom of expression 

in Venezuela. In March of this year, the Special Rapporteur specifically criticized 

the passage of certain amendments to the Criminal Code that expand the reach and 

increase criminal penalties for ‘‘desacato’’ or ‘‘contempt’’ of public officials. At a time 

when many of the Hemisphere’s democracies are repealing such anachronistic laws, 

Venezuela is giving them added teeth. Citing the Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression approved by the IACHR in October 2000, the Special Rapporteur 

noted that ‘‘Laws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public officials . . . 

restrict freedom of expression and the right to information.’’

Most disturbing of all is the attempt to use the criminal justice system to stifle 

media criticism. On November 4, the Attorney General announced a detention order 

for a well-known journalist and vocal government critic, Patricia Poleo, for her alleged participation in the plot to assassinate prosecutor Danilo Anderson, who was 

killed in November 2004. The Inter-American Press Association immediately condemned this charge as an attempt to silence the media through intimidation. In 

July, the Office of the Attorney General said it was opening a criminal investigation 

against the leading daily El Universal for publishing an editorial criticizing the 

politicization of the judicial system. This action too was denounced by the InterAmerican Press Association and the IACHR Special Rapporteur for Press Freedom. 

The Venezuelan Catholic Bishops Conference has stated it most succinctly: ‘‘All 

persons and institutions have the right to express their opinions in accordance with 

their convictions, a right that must be respected and guaranteed in any democratic 

society.’’

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I know some of you have had the opportunity to meet with the leaders of the electoral watch-dog NGO Su ́mate, Maria 

Corina Machado and Alejandro Plaz. Theirs is perhaps the most well-known example of the government’s harassment and persecution of those who disagree with it. 

Machado, Plaz, and two of their colleagues, have been indicted for ‘‘conspiracy to 

overthrow the republican form of government’’ for receiving a $31,000 grant from 

the National Endowment for Democracy for voter education activities. We understand that oral arguments in their case are scheduled to begin in early December. 

Perhaps less visible but equally disturbing is the continued persecution of political 

opponents and discrimination against those who signed the recall referendum petition. These citizens have been denied basic government services, including passports 

26

and national identity cards, forced from their jobs, and excluded from government 

contracts as punishment for exercising their constitutional right to petition the government. In January, the respected Venezuelan human rights organization 

PROVEA reported a 13% increase in politically motivated detentions from the previous year. Between October 2003 and September 2004, according to the NGO, 54 

such cases were reported. A comparison with the number of reported detentions in 

1999 underlines the point even more dramatically. That year, PROVEA only noted 

one case. 

ELECTORAL RIGHTS

These latest moves against freedom of the press and freedom of association come 

just weeks before the December 4 National Assembly elections. The elections will 

be a test of the transparency and fairness of the electoral authorities and the electoral system, which are increasingly in doubt. Observers from the European Commission and the OAS will be in Venezuela in advance of the elections to monitor 

preparations and push for greater transparency. Opposition political parties are participating in the elections, but they, along with Su ́mate and other NGOs, have denounced obstructionism by electoral officials. 

Voter turn-out and confidence in the electoral system is at an all-time low. Abstention levels in the August parish and municipal elections were over 70 percent. 

Recent polls show that over 60 percent of Venezuelans do not trust the electoral system. Independent pollsters are predicting close to 80 percent abstention rates in the 

upcoming legislative elections. These deepening suspicions are fueled by the political 

make-up of the CNE (only one of whose five members is not a government loyalist) 

and its reluctance to implement the recommendations made by the OAS and Carter 

Center after the August 2004 presidential recall referendum. Speaking directly to 

the issue of public confidence in elections, among its recommendations, the Carter 

Center noted the need for the CNE to ‘‘communicate and consult much more regularly with the political parties, and put in place much greater mechanisms of transparency to restore confidence in the electoral process.’’ Indeed, the Carter Center report underscored that the referendum’s ‘‘numerous irregularities’’ mostly centered 

‘‘around the lack of transparency of the CNE in its decision-making process and its 

ad hoc implementation of the recall referendum process.’’

In its own separate report, the OAS observer mission recommended a third-party 

audit of the electoral registry, whose results would be made public. The CNE has 

contracted the Costa Rica-based Center for Electoral Assistance and Promotion 

(CAPEL), which is the electoral arm of the Inter-American Institute for Democracy 

and Human Rights, to conduct such an audit. Su ́mate and many in the opposition 

have questioned CAPEL’s independence and ability to conduct a thorough audit. 

CAPEL has said it expects to issue a final report before the end of November. Still, 

with less than a month before the legislative elections, it is all but technically impossible to implement significant changes by then—even if the audit results are presented and disseminated on schedule. Any real changes will take time, and, more 

importantly, political will. 

WHAT WE ARE DOING

The Administration is working multi-laterally, engaging the OAS, the EU, and 

the Council of Europe, among others, to support Venezuelan civil society, speak out 

against abuses of democracy, and hold the Venezuelan government accountable to 

its commitments under the Inter-American Democratic Charter. We are likewise 

reaching out, at a bilateral level, to our partners in the Hemisphere and in Europe 

to do the same, and sensitizing them to the threat to regional stability posed by the 

Venezuelan government’s arms shopping spree and its support for radical political 

movements. 

Within Venezuela, we are working to preserve political and civic space for increasingly at-risk groups. The Venezuelan business community, organized labor, the independent media, NGOs, and religious institutions, in particular, the Catholic Church, 

have a critical role to play in providing the checks and balances that government 

institutions are no longer able to provide. Establishing linkages between these 

groups and institutions and their U.S. and international counterparts will fortify 

their ability to perform their essential role. The work of the National Endowment 

for Democracy (NED) is especially important in helping foster these kinds of linkages. 

The Administration is reaching out to international human rights and other 

NGOs to help create an international network to support and defend Venezuelan 

civil society. Our USAID program in Caracas supports local human rights NGOs, 

27

judicial and penal watch-dog groups, press freedom activities and provides small, 

high-impact grants for programs that serve poor communities. 

Our Embassy’s public diplomacy outreach is a key part of our effort to highlight 

American values, our ties and affection for the Venezuelan people, and to communicate the Administration’s positive hemispheric agenda. President Bush said it best 

during his stop in Brazil following the Summit of the Americas earlier this month. 

He said:

‘‘Ensuring social justice for the Americas requires choosing between two competing visions: One offers a vision of hope. It is founded on representative government, integration into the world community, and faith in the transformative 

power of freedom; the other seeks to roll-back the democratic progress of the 

past two decades by playing to fear, pitting neighbor against neighbor, and 

blaming others for their own failures to provide for their people.’’

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. Once again, I would like to 

thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today and I would be pleased to 

respond to your questions.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. We appreciate that comprehensive statement. I made a lot of notes here, if I can read them 

and I would like to run through some of these questions that came 

up during your statement. 

First of all, I would like to ask you a question that goes beyond 

the borders of Venezuela. Obviously this is a hearing about the 

problems within the confines of Venezuela, but I have been to a 

number of countries in Central and South America and talked to 

leaders down there about the problems and their concerns that emanate from Venezuela. 

Have you had an opportunity, in your role as Assistant Secretary 

for Western Hemisphere, to talk to any of those leaders about their 

concerns about the possibility that support for Venezuela is trying 

to undermine their democracies? 

Mr. SHANNON. We have had an opportunity in our regular consultations, in Central America and in the Caribbean and the Andes 

and elsewhere, to discuss the broad range of challenges that these 

countries face. 

I would make a couple of points in response to your question. 

First, there is concern expressed at a variety of levels that on occasion, Venezuela will fish in troubled waters. 

Several Members of the Committee have noted that Hugo Chavez 

is not the cause of Latin America’s problems and they are correct 

and this is recognized within the region. 

The different challenges that countries in the hemisphere face 

have a variety of causes. One of the causes actually has to do with 

the expectations that have been generated through the success of 

democracy in the region and the belief that democracy needs to deliver the benefits, needs to provide the goods to the people and the 

problem of institutional capacity in some of these countries. 

In effect, because of the success we have had in promoting a 

democratic agenda, so many of the conflicts, whether they be social 

conflicts, economic or political conflicts, are now being channeled 

through democratic institutions and this was not true in the past. 

In those countries that have weak institutions, weak political 

party structures and nascent civil societies, this has been a big 

challenge and in that environment the ability of a small amount 

of money linked to an organizational skill can have an impact and 

it is something that is worrisome to some countries. 

28

But ultimately, as many people on this Committee have noted, 

the response to this really has to come in two forms. One of course 

is to resist interventionism in any shape, but the ultimate solution 

comes from the development of a positive agenda in response to 

that kind of interventionism. 

I believe that the countries facing this challenge understand 

that. We understand it and that really is a central point of the 

President’s policy in the region. 

Mr. BURTON. I guess I can deduct from your statement, which 

was very eloquent, that yes there is concern. 

Mr. SHANNON. There is concern. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. At the Summit of the Americas and let 

me just ask one more question real quick, I talked to Condoleeza 

Rice and Ambassador Zoellick about having some dialogue with 

leaders of the Chavez government, because I always think that dialogue is good, especially when there is a strong disagreement and 

the kind of rhetoric gets a little bit out of control as I alluded to 

about some of the comments that Chavez made down there at the 

Summit of the Americas. 

Has anybody had a chance to talk? I know Ambassador 

Brownfield down there has tried to talk with him on a number of 

occasion, our Ambassador, but has anybody like Secretary Zoellick 

or anybody had a chance to talk to the Foreign Minister of Venezuela to discuss some of the issues that we have been concerned 

about? 

Mr. SHANNON. Not at this moment, sir. We, at the Department, 

of course are open to talking with other countries. That is our job. 

We are diplomats and we do believe that talking with other countries does indeed provide us an opportunity to deepen our understanding. 

One of the problems that we face, however, in our effort to have 

a constructive outreach to Venezuela is indeed the very public comments of President Chavez attacking the United States and attacking the President. 

What that effectively does is freeze Venezuela’s diplomatic community and it freezes many of their ministers and puts them in a 

position in which they have to be very, very careful about being 

open to us in any way, largely because of the very vitriolic and personal attacks on the President and the Secretary of State. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just say that you heard my opening statement. I don’t like what Chavez has said. When he starts talking 

about Che Guevara and furthering the goals of Che, I mean the 

hair on the back of my neck starts to stand up, because what he 

is talking about is a communist revolution that Castro was pushing 

for all of Latin America. 

That just is the kind of rhetoric that is intolerable and some of 

the comments he has made about our Secretary of State and our 

President I think are just horrible. 

But, I would just like to ask that the United States be viewed 

as reaching out as much as possible so that we can have a dialogue, if possible, with his government. That way if everything goes 

to hell nobody can say that we didn’t do our best to find solutions 

to the problems. 

29

I am not sure it is going to benefit anything. I am not sure it 

is going to work, but I think that one of the things and it is a tough 

thing for you because you are stepping into a very difficult situation, not only in Venezuela but in a lot of the areas down there, 

but I would urge that there be an attempt on our part to have a 

dialogue with them and if it doesn’t work and if we continue to 

have the kind of rhetoric that comes out of Mr. Chavez’s mouth, 

then of course the world will see that the United States went that 

extra step and then whatever has to be done has to be done. 

But I want us to be the good guys and let his vitriolic rhetoric 

speak for itself. So I wish you would carry that message back. 

Mr. SHANNON. I would be happy to do so, sir. 

Mr. BURTON. I think it is important for our foreign policy that 

the world says, hey yes, the United States has done everything 

they can and this guy just doesn’t get it. Okay? 

At the Summit of the Americas, Venezuela and I am going to 

sum up here pretty quick because I know I have probably gone beyond my 5 minutes, but that is the Chairman’s prerogative, but I 

will get through here in a quick second, at the Summit of the 

Americas, Venezuela indicated reservations about the Inter-American Democratic Charter principles. 

Is Venezuela committed to the OAS charter and its full and effective implementation? What is Venezuela’s stated alternative to representative democracy recognized in the Inter-American Democratic Charter? 

In a trip Chavez made to Cuba he referred to the Cuban system 

as a revolutionary democracy, which is really a joke. But in any 

event, if you could just give us your view on whether or not they 

are committed to the OAS charter and working within that framework. 

Mr. SHANNON. They are a signatory to the charter, so we assume 

they are committed to it and we believe that they need to be held 

to that charter. 

When the charter was negotiated, of course, the major point of 

divide between Venezuela and the other countries around the negotiating table was how you describe democracy. 

Thirty-three countries around the table wanted to describe democracy as representative and by representative they meant elected officials acting on behalf of constituents within a governmental 

context, defined by separation of powers and independent branches 

of government, with all of the freedoms that apply to a representative democracy. 

The Venezuelans wanted to present a vision of participatory democracy, which they distinguish from representative democracy by 

indicating that effectively the people need to be consulted on a regular basis through referenda in order to legitimize the direction of 

government and address long-term problems of corruption. 

There was openness around the negotiating table to the idea of 

participatory democracy in the sense that many countries in the region, ours included, at the state level have referenda, but the larger concern was that looking behind the idea of participatory democracy was an effort to effectively lay the groundwork for the beginning of an attack on some of the fundamental freedoms that we 

consider to be a vital part of representative democracy. 

30

One of the points of my testimony today has been to underscore 

what we consider to be a degradation or a decline in important aspects of that fundamental freedom and also the hollowing out of institutions that are going to be vital to the long-term democratic 

governability of Venezuela. 

Mr. BURTON. Do you intend to request a democracy review or formal report on Venezuela from the OAS? 

Mr. SHANNON. That is a very good question and at this point, we 

do not have that intention, but it is certainly something that we 

would consider, especially as we move forward in determining——

Mr. BURTON. Might I suggest that that might give credence to 

some of the issues that we are raising about him is if the OAS 

would review their democratic institutions there and give a report 

to not only the United States, but to all the members of the OAS 

about what the heck is going on down there. 

That might put some light on the whole issue and Mr. Chavez 

then you know would have to explain why those things are happening. 

One more question and then I will yield to my colleague. For 

what overarching purposes or purpose is Chavez antagonizing the 

U.S. and our allies in the region? I just would like to have your 

opinion on that. Why do you think he is raising all that cain? 

Mr. SHANNON. I believe there are several reasons for it. One, 

President Chavez has a different vision for the Americas than we 

do and a different vision than that expressed through the summit 

process. 

He does not see the ultimate goal of hemispheric policy to be a 

united Americas. He sees South America and North America as 

distinct, politically, culturally and socially. He views the United 

States as a hedgomonic power, which needs to be contained. He believes that by highlighting these differences with the United 

States, by highlighting his differences over key policy initiatives, 

not just with the United States but more largely within the summit 

process, the Free Trade Area of the Americas being one of them, 

he will have an opportunity to more sharply make an argument 

that South American integration is an important means to protect 

South America from North America and that that integration need 

not be economic, but should be social and political and cultural. 

That is one reason. 

A second reason, sir, I believe is that the kind of political dynamic created in Venezuela is a profoundly negative dynamic. It is 

a dynamic based on confrontation and conflict and in order to sustain it over time, it requires an ever increasing search for enemies. 

I believe that the anti-American rhetoric of the President is part 

of a larger effort to keep a constituency mobilized. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Menendez. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Before I get to questions, I just do want to make a comment. 

In some of the opening statements I heard, I heard the reference 

to the corruption in Cuba that created the rise of a revolution and 

that is true. It also created a rise of a dictatorship, a dictatorship 

that has existed for 46 years of unelected, one-man rule. 

31

It is also a dictatorship that has the greatest corruption that we 

know in the Caribbean right now, that prostitutes its women and 

then ultimately denigrates the fundamental rights that we as 

Americans enjoy, to its people. 

I hope that is not the course that the Venezuelans are on, because while there is certainly corruption in Venezuela, I hope that 

the course of events doesn’t lead us to the same type of situation. 

Dictatorships, whether they are from the left or the right, in my 

view are anti-democratic and go against the very grain of what we 

want to see. 

That is why I want to pick up where the Chairman left off with 

you, Mr. Secretary and I do want to talk about broader U.S. policy, 

but I won’t do it today and I will look forward to the opportunity 

to meeting with you. 

You were talking about division of representative democracy 

versus participatory democracy. You could have a referendum that 

basically says the people support criminalization of speaking out 

against the present administration. Would that not be true? 

Mr. SHANNON. Of course, yes. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. You could have a referendum that says that the 

press can be limited in its scope in terms of the criticisms that it 

can raise against any incumbent administration. Would that not be 

true? 

Mr. SHANNON. It would be. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. You could actually in essence, through a referendum, if you got that referendum passed, could in essence undermine the very essence of what we would generally consider, not 

only in the United States but in most of the free world, as the fundamental underpinnings of democracy. Would that not be true? 

Mr. SHANNON. Correct. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Therefore, the referendum process, while under 

the guise of participatory democracy, has a great opportunity to undermine what all of us, regardless of where we live in this world, 

would want to have as fundamental basic human rights and that 

is a real concern, as is the fact that it seems to me that President 

Chavez has been pursuing stronger relationships with several 

countries that run against our own interests as a country. 

That is often not unusual, but it is the nature of the relationships that is concerning such as Chavez’s close relationship with 

Castro, he giving thousands of barrels of oil a day to Cuba. 

He has increased arms sales with Russia, attempted to work 

with Iran for nuclear technology, has been pursuing increasingly 

close relationships with China, including joint ventures to share 

technology and launch satellites. He has said that he is going to 

give our United States-made aircraft, F–16’s, to Cuba and to 

China, which would be in violation of the agreements under which 

they were given and a risk, potentially, to the national security of 

the United States. And there have been also reports that Chavez 

has been attempting to influence elections in both Nicaragua and 

Bolivia and assisting Marxist guerrillas in Colombia. 

That is a lot that is not just simply about vitriolic statements, 

but go to the very grain of undermining democracy in various parts 

of the hemisphere. 

Can you respond to some of those allegations? 

32

Mr. SHANNON. It is quite a list, sir and it is a disturbing list. I 

think everything you said is a statement of fact. 

As you note, it is reflective of what is happening inside of Venezuela. In other words, as confrontation and conflict become the 

mode of political discourse inside of Venezuela, confrontation and 

conflict become the means by which Venezuela engages with the 

world. 

It is one of the reasons why Venezuela is attracted to countries 

like Iran, to Iraq and to Saddam Hussein, to Fidel Castro and it 

is one of the reasons why they prefer provocative statements in 

their effort to describe their relationship with the United States. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. On October 3, Venezuela announced that it was 

starting research into ‘‘peaceful uses of nuclear energy’’ and indicated it was interested in working with Iran to achieve those goals. 

A week later the Venezuelan Minister of Energy denied that 

Venezuela was developing a nuclear reactor, but admitted that it 

was working with both Argentina and Brazil to develop scientific 

and technological knowledge of nuclear material. 

The Argentine newspaper, Clarin, reported that PDSVA, the 

Venezuelan state run oil company, had asked the Argentine technology network, RTA, to develop a medium-sized nuclear reactor to 

help process fuel on the Orinoco tar belt. 

Venezuela is the fourth major supplier of oil to the United 

States. It has huge reserves. What does it need nuclear technology 

for? 

Mr. SHANNON. I am no expert on nuclear technology, sir, or on 

the petroleum industry, but it is my understanding that the effort 

to extract petroleum, especially from the heavy tar that Venezuela 

has in some areas, requires an enormous amount of energy. Oftentimes natural gas is used for that. 

One could imagine a nuclear power plant providing that kind of 

energy, but from our point of view, Venezuela has plenty of natural 

gas to manage that process and more importantly, the relationship 

that Venezuela has with countries like Iran would make this kind 

of arrangement worrisome. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. You know I am concerned, especially when we 

deal with Iran, who the world has real concerns about in terms of 

nuclear technology. 

When President Chavez recently called the United States—not 

President Bush but the United States—‘‘the greatest threat to life 

on earth.’’ The greatest threat to life on earth. 

That is the type of statement that goes beyond his views of the 

President of the United States. It goes to a country as a people. 

I am concerned why we would even consider seeking nuclear 

technology in a country that has, like Iran, such huge oil reserves. 

Finally, what about the issues of transferring United States technology to Cuba and China? 

Mr. SHANNON. I know the Chinese have made clear that they are 

not interested in our F–16’s. Obviously this would violate the terms 

of the agreement by which the F–16’s were transferred to Venezuela and we would act very vigorously to prevent that kind of 

transfer. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.. 

33

Mr. Weller? 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Shannon, welcome. Good to have you here. 

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you. 

Mr. WELLER. First official appearance as Assistant Secretary and 

we hope to see you many, many times and we look forward to 

working with you. 

Clearly the greatest threat to democracy in hemisphere is 

narcotrafficking and the terrorism that it sponsors. Many of us are 

concerned when it is discovered that the foreign minister of the 

FARC, one of the leading narcotrafficking terrorist groups in the 

world, is residing in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, with Venezuelan Government issued official identification documents. 

Many of us are concerned when the Venezuelan Government 

steps away from previous agreements regarding narcotrafficking 

stops cooperating with the Drug Enforcement Administration, dismisses the head of the counter narcotics agency because of perceived cooperation with the United States in joint counter narcotics 

efforts. 

Also you know we have concerns regarding President Chavez’s 

relationship with the leadership in Iran. Iran has been identified 

around the world as a state sponsor of terrorism. President Chavez 

has made repeated visits to Iran. 

Hezbollah, an Iranian sponsored terrorist group, has been suggested to have activities on Margarita Island as a fundraising base 

through contraband and intellectual piracy as a fundraising source. 

President Chavez has made statements in support of the Iranian 

nuclear program and again the Venezuelan Ambassador to Iran 

stated that the principles of the Iranian Islamic revolution were basically the principles of the Bolivarian revolution. 

So clearly there are signals coming out of Venezuela that caused 

a lot of us concern for the future of democracy, but also we question 

why the Venezuelan Government would seek such supportive ties 

to Iran. 

Recently the President of Iran made a statement calling for the 

elimination of Israel and while governments around the world expressed outraged and condemnation, there was silence in Venezuela and from its President regarding elimination of a democratic 

nation of good standing in the Mid East. 

I was wondering, Mr. Secretary, what your thoughts are about 

the ties between the government of Hugo Chavez and Iran and 

should we have concern? 

Mr. SHANNON. From my point of view, the relationship is a worrisome one, because obviously it goes beyond just a state-to-state 

relationship. 

It is reflective of an affinity I believe that the President has for 

Iran, because he perceives it as a fellow revolutionary in a larger 

world effort, sees it as a country which has stood fast against the 

United States and against the rest of the world, not only in terms 

of nuclear issues but also in terms of human rights issues and that 

there is a degree of solidarity there that goes beyond normal stateto-state relationships. 

34

Mr. WELLER. President Chavez has welcomed a large number of 

Cuban security and intelligence personnel into his country. Have 

we seen any Iranian security or intelligence presence in Venezuela? 

Mr. SHANNON. That is a very good question. There is an Iranian 

Embassy in Caracas, but I am afraid in this venue I cannot go into 

greater detail in terms of what intelligence presence there might 

be. 

Mr. WELLER. President Chavez has moved forward and established a one and a half million person military reserve under his 

personal command and the Inter-American Commission on Human 

Rights has expressed concern regarding President Chavez’s policies 

of militarizing many public institutions in Venezuela. 

We have seen an increasing number of current and former military personnel placed in decisionmaking positions, in various institutions in Venezuela. 

What have you seen, as a result of this, regarding the day-to-day 

activities of the Venezuelan Government as well as the impact on 

the day-to-day activities of Venezuelan citizens with the increased 

militarization of the Venezuelan Government? 

Mr. SHANNON. I would say, sir, that the increased militarization 

is actually indicative of a larger problem that President Chavez 

faces, which is one of governability. 

It is very hard to govern a modern state from a consolidated center. What I mean by that effectively is that modern states require 

power to be devolved or decentralized and trying to run a modern 

state from a single power point requires organizational structures 

and loyalties that typically don’t exist within democratic systems. 

For that reason, he has found over time a need to rely either on 

Cuban intelligence or social service personnel and military personnel to manage aspects of his bureaucracy that typically would 

fall to civil authorities and I think this is a larger problem that 

Venezuela is going to have to deal with over time, which is as 

President Chavez consolidates power, his ability to govern actually 

lessens over time. 

Mr. WELLER. With this one and a half million essentially personnel militia for President Chavez, is that a potential tool for suppression and intimidation of the people of Venezuela on a neighborhood and barrio basis? 

Mr. SHANNON. It could be. This militia has several purposes. 

Number one, to act as a popular counterweight to the military and 

a check on the military. 

Secondly, it is part of a larger effort by President Chavez to finally grind away and break down an historic relationship between 

the U.S. Armed Forces and Venezuelan Armed Forces and to create 

a militia that is capable of responding to any type event inside of 

Venezuela, including the growing apocalyptic and dark visions that 

President Chavez sometimes expresses about invasion. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Weller. 

I would just like to ask if we could get, at some point, an intelligence briefing. The question that Congressman Weller just asked, 

Vice Chairman Weller asked about other potential military personnel, besides the Cubans there, we would like to talk to you 

about and not just Iranians. 

35

Mr. SHANNON. Sure. 

Mr. BURTON. So if we could talk to you about a closed briefing 

on that we would appreciate it. 

Mr. SHANNON. Happily. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meeks? 

Mr. MEEKS. Speaking of intelligence, is there any weapons of 

mass destruction there? 

Mr. SHANNON. In Venezuela? 

Mr. MEEKS. Yes. 

Mr. SHANNON. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. MEEKS. Intelligence. Speaking of intelligence, before we go 

there, let me just ask you, because it is your first time before the 

Committee and I don’t know whether or not you have any position, 

but clearly I think you would agree that the relationship between 

the United States and Venezuela is not good. 

What, if anything, do you think that you will be proposing to the 

Administration to change what our policies are in Venezuela or 

other parts of Latin America for that matter? 

What would you suggest to be different? As indicated by every 

poll, most people in Latin America all of them have a bad opinion 

of the United States of America and President Bush in particular. 

So I hope that if you are going to be of any service to President 

Bush that you are going to have to do something to change his 

image, not only in Venezuela, but all of Latin America. Do you 

have any ideas on that? 

Mr. SHANNON. Yes. Thank you very much. Sir, as I began my testimony, you were not here, but I did single out those Members of 

the Subcommittee and I meant yourself, sir and also Mr. Delahunt, 

who have spent time in Venezuela and made a special effort to engage with the Venezuelan Government and especially the Venezuelan Congress. 

I had the pleasure of working with Mr. Delahunt and former 

Representative Cass Ballenger to help bring to birth the Boston 

Group and you know we very much value that level of engagement 

and we have always valued the activities that you have undertaken 

in Venezuela. 

In regard to how we could begin to improve the relationship with 

Venezuela, I would identify three areas where we could work more 

closely, if the Venezuelans wanted to work with us. 

The first is counter narcotics cooperation. As you are aware, Venezuela was decertified recently because of actions that it has taken, 

which we believed compromised its ability to cooperate with us in 

a meaningful way on counter narcotics operations. We are currently in discussions with the Venezuelan Government trying to determine how we can get that relationship back on track. It is an 

important relationship for us, because we have found as the Colombian Air Bridge Denial program is successful and as the Brazil Air 

Bridge Denial program is successful, more and more cocaine trafficked out of Colombia or through the northern part of Brazil actually flies into Venezuela and then is shipped out of Venezuela or 

flowing out of Venezuela and the air tracks that we get from JATF 

East and from U.S. Southern Command are stark in how they describe the flow of illegal narcotics out of the Andes through Venezuela. 

36

So from our point of view, having a productive counter drug relationship with Venezuela is vital. So we are quite open to finding 

ways to restore that relationship. 

Mr. MEEKS. But is that going to change the opinion of the Venezuelan people and many Latin Americans as reference to their impressions as to George Bush and this Administration? Is that kind 

of an agreement going to make a difference to them as far as improving that kind of relationship? 

Mr. SHANNON. I had understood your question in two parts, the 

first being how we could improve our relationship with Venezuela 

and the second being how we could improve a larger popular understanding of President Bush and the United States. 

Just very quickly, I also believe that on the counterterrorism 

front and on the energy front there are historic relationships that 

could be revived and could serve as a basis for increased dialogue 

with Venezuela. 

In terms of the image of the United States, I believe in Venezuela. I know many Venezuelans. I would argue that the image 

in Venezuela of the United States is relatively strong. 

Where it has run into problems is in what I noted earlier about 

the level of political polarization. That polarization is so intense 

that it is like a political black hole that sucks everything into it 

and how Venezuelans perceive their relationship with the United 

States is affected by that and that kind of brings——

Mr. MEEKS. But Mr. Secretary, let me just say this. Could it not 

be a problem with this Administration, when in fact you had a 

democratically-elected government and there was a coup attempt? 

Talk about silence? We were silent. 

Could it not be you know when we talk rhetoric also, I mean 

someone has made the question of the statement that he was, he 

being President Chavez, was with the Saddam Hussein and Iraqi 

Government, when in fact if I recall correctly at the time when 

most of the atrocities were taking place, we were with the Iraqi 

Government and Saddam Hussein and we don’t talk about that? 

Could it be that at the time when we are talking about packing 

courts in Venezuela we have a President here who is trying to pack 

courts in the United States? 

Could it be the fact that when you talk about elections, you could 

go back to 2000 when every vote was not counted and you talk 

about elections in Venezuela? 

Could it be that maybe sometimes we talk and we are hypocritical and we say, do as we say, but don’t do as we do? Could that 

be causing a problem with the people in Latin America that they 

are not watching what we are saying? They are watching what we 

are doing and if we do things differently, that that would change 

the relationship with the people of Latin America? 

Or could it be that we don’t care the fact that there is poverty, 

people are hungry, there is lack of education, there is lack of health 

care, we don’t care? We don’t talk about that. 

That has been going on for awhile, but anytime that something 

is happening where people begin to have better health care, become 

more literate, become more respectful of themselves, then we have 

a problem with that? 

37

If in fact we made a difference in those kinds of policies, showing 

that we truly care for the people of Latin America, of Venezuela, 

that then maybe the image of the United States and this Administration would be a little bit different. 

Could it be that if we are not hypocritical, could it be if we were 

just a little truthful that that could make a tremendous difference 

in our relationships in Latin America and in particular in Venezuela? 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. Your time has expired. 

You can respond if you would like. 

Mr. SHANNON. I would just say, sir, that sincerity is always important in relationships between peoples. I obviously would disagree with some of the comparisons you drew between Venezuela 

and the United States. 

However, I would say in the larger policy in the region you know 

our commitment, which is a commitment that was shaped at the 

Quebec City Summit, to democracy and economic development and 

with economic development being driven through free markets and 

economic integration. Part of the larger vision of development in 

the region that the President has expressed are exactly the things 

you talk about. 

It is education. It is health care and it is providing people the 

means and the resources they need to take control of their destinies and to be a meaningful participants in an economy. 

In that regard, our focus in the region has been about that and 

in fact, if you look at how we have used our official development 

assistance in the region, if you look at the additional funds that 

have been brought to bear under the emergency plan for AIDS and 

the efforts to attack malaria, it is significant and it is considerable. 

Again, if you look at polling data in the region, especially that 

coming out of Latinobarometro, what you see is that the more engaged the United States is in a country, the more favorable the 

opinion is of the United States and the less engaged the United 

States is, the less favorable. I think what that underscores is that 

in our diplomacy and in our development programs we need to be 

more engaged. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think that Mr. Payne is before me. 

Mr. BURTON. Okay. Mr. Payne. I would try to do it in order of 

liable, but Mr. Payne, go ahead. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. 

There was a comment made by the Chairman in his statement 

that 29 countries in Latin America were in support of moving forward on negotiations of the free trade, areas of the American FTAA 

and it was not necessarily saying that they endorsed it. It was just 

that they wanted to continue to move forward, however noted that 

only five countries opposed moving forward. 

I just might draw to the attention of the Chairman that the only 

five countries happen to be Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay 

and Uruguay and if you take a look at those countries who opposed 

it, you will find that probably 80 percent of the population, the vast 

majority of the land mass in South America happens to be encompassed in those five countries. 

38

So even though 29 countries said let us go to the next step, I 

think that it is very clear that an overwhelming majority of the 

countries where the population resides happens to be opposed to it. 

The world is moving into world organizations and so forth. However, the smaller countries wonder how are they going to make it 

in these organizations. 

You take Dominica. Dominica had a Lomay treaties with the 

British Government. Lomay was Lomay II and done in Africa 

where the former British colony said that we will give preferences 

to our former colonies. We will try to help them out. We will give 

them a hand up. 

So Dominica, which is very dependent on bananas, their bananas 

are smaller, their bananas were not as pretty as Chiquita banana, 

it could not really compete because of the small farmers in Dominica, but that was the largest income producer in the country. 

WTO, United States, you know Mr. Kamptor went and put a 

challenge into poor Dominica saying that we don’t grow bananas in 

the United States, but Chiquita banana being a big U.S. firm said 

that Chiquita banana should. 

That poor Dominica and some of the other countries should not 

have any more. The British said, we don’t mind paying a couple of 

dollars more, you know a few cents more per banana so that we 

can keep this one commodity country alive, but we went in and 

now Dominica will have to lose the banana trade. 

Now the big trade is drugs that are moving in, because there is 

virtually nothing else to do. So we are weakening our war on 

drugs, our third border initiative that we started, saying that the 

Caribbean countries are our third border. They are the countries 

who support the United States the most. They are English speaking countries. 

There are countries, Jamaica and Trinidad and others that supply us with our nurses and many of our intellectuals that come to 

the United States, but our policies have hurt those poor fragile 

Caribbean states. 

It is not surprising that in Latin America there is a question 

about how do we benefit? How do we, the small countries and the 

countries of Latin America benefit? I think we have to do a better 

job with this whole world trade and free trade. 

I have opposed all of them. I have opposed NAFTA. I opposed 

CAFTA. I opposed this FTAA, because until we stop foreign subsidies, where there is over $300 billion subsidized between the EU 

and the U.S. and the G–8, where countries, rural communities in 

Africa where 80 percent of the people live in rural communities 

cannot compete for agriculture, cotton or you name it and so these 

world organizations are absolutely devastating the ability of these 

poor, fragile countries to exist. 

I think there has to be a better way. I am happy that the United 

States is strong in some areas. However, there has got to be some 

way that there is a fair kind of a playing field and I know you are 

just new in this area and you can see that there is definitely a 

strong difference of opinion on our Committee. 

We all want to see the United States prosper and move forward. 

We all want to see a better policy of the United States and Latin 

America, because we believe there has been no policy at all. 

39

Other than Plan Colombia, there has been virtually no financial 

assistance and with Article 98, the way that we are treating our 

countries, our friends, Jamaica and countries that will not sign Article 98 that we say you have got to sign Article 98 or we are going 

to cut off aid. 

My question quickly is: Do you think that NED needs to review 

its funding policies that IRI did? Much of the funding was not necessarily full NED and protection of NED, but it was done by the 

USAID. 

Have you looked at that and to see whether there could be a way 

to make sure that the government and I am for democracy, I am 

a big NED fan, but to see if they can keep it from looking like it 

is a U.S. opposition party to the government? 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Payne’s time has expired. You may respond, 

sir. 

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you very much. I can’t speak for NED or 

IRI, since they are independent organizations. However, it is my 

understanding that they regularly review their funding practices to 

be certain that they do fund organizations that are promoting democracy as opposed to participating in directly partisan politics. 

My own belief, sir, in tracking the role that NED and both IRI 

and NDI have played in Venezuela is it has been a very positive 

role. 

The Venezuelans need this kind of engagement. They need it not 

only from NED as an institution, but also in a bipartisan way from 

IRI and NDI. 

I actually would be in favor of increased NED engagement and 

increased IRI and increased NDI engagement in Venezuela and 

elsewhere in the hemisphere. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know I undoubtedly believe, and I read your 

statement quite carefully this morning, single party dominance in 

any government tends to eliminate checks and balances that are 

really necessary. Some of us on this side of the aisle understand 

that quite well and we have made that point again and again and 

again. 

Let me say this. I think that Hugo Chavez needs an opposition. 

I believe and I know that he understands that concept, but it has 

to be an opposition that is not discredited, is not tainted by the 

past, so to speak. 

I respect that, but to move on to other observations that you 

made, I think you are right that small, not small but not as a consequence such as working together in terms of drug interdiction 

and those issues is important. 

I understand that there has been some progress made, is that 

correct? 

Mr. SHANNON. Slowly, sir, but there is still a ways to go. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Then let us continue that. You spoke earlier 

about Iran and it is true that we all share concerns about the design of Iran. I think we have to understand that Venezuela is part 

of OPEC, but as you heard me in my opening statement, this inconsistency that sometimes rears its very ugly head. 

40

This past week we had Ahmed Chalabi visiting with the Vice 

President and yet reports in our own media indicate that Mr. 

Chalibe was disseminating intelligence that put military personnel, 

American military personnel at risk in Iraq. 

He has been identified as close to the Iranian leadership and yet 

for some reason he has access to the Vice President. I understand 

he is the Deputy Prime Minister. 

In your statement you indicated that the Venezuelan Government is backpedaling on expanding economic opportunity for their 

people and yet that same poll we both alluded to indicates that in 

Venezuela the Venezuelans tend to be far more optimistic about 

the direction that their country is heading in, in economic terms, 

with the single exception of two. 

You talk about rejecting the opportunities of globalization. I don’t 

want to reject the opportunities of globalization, but I do want to 

discuss and debate the consequences of globalization. 

So that these are legitimate concerns that are shared by elected 

Members of Congress of the United States, not just Hugo Chavez. 

You know we had a vote on CAFTA here. Do you know what the 

results were, Mr. Shannon? 

Mr. SHANNON. I watched it, sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. What was the final margin of victory? 

Mr. SHANNON. It depends on how you are counting. It is either 

one or two. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. So these are good, healthy debates. Debates that we should be having with Hugo Chavez and others. This 

engagement, I call it an engagement of ideas, I think that is really 

important and I would encourage that. 

I pick up on what the Chairman said about utilizing the OAS to 

grade democracy in Venezuela, but I would expand that. I would 

like the OAS, I think it would energize that particular multilateral 

institution, to grade every democracy in the hemisphere. 

That could be a very interesting experience for all of us, because 

some of us have concerns and I know they are shared by Members 

on this side, including my dear friend and Ranking Member about 

democracy in this institution. We have got to be careful about this. 

In any event, do I have a question for you? No, I don’t other than 

simply this. I would respectfully request that we reenergize the 

parliamentary, the Congress-to-Congress relationship. 

To take the group of all of us, I know I should be speaking for 

Mr. Meeks, deal with our counterparts in Venezuela and attempt 

to use that as a mechanism for dialogue and understanding. 

I think it is very, very useful and I will encourage my good friend 

from Indiana and the Chairman of the Subcommittee to fully participate that. We can go down to Venezuela. It is time they hosted 

it and you know have the kind of dialogue that I know that he 

wants and I think is in the best interest of all of us. 

One other final comment. Maybe it is time that, whether it is 

President Bush, Hugo Chavez and everyone in the Administration 

declare a moratorium, moratorium on rhetoric. I think that could 

benefit our respective peoples. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. I hope that Mr. Chavez, 

if he is watching, will get that last part as well. 

Ms. Lee. 

41

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you. 

Ms. LEE. There are of course spoken and unspoken rumors that 

the United States has been pressuring allies to ostracize Venezuela 

through a variety of mechanisms. 

I am trying to really, quite frankly, understand our policy toward 

Venezuela. It appears that central to the United States’ foreign policy, especially in the Western Hemisphere, is a country’s ties with 

Cuba. 

With all due respect to my colleague from New Jersey, Mr. 

Menendez, that is the basis of our foreign policy, yet and maybe 

this may be naive on my part, but I always thought that sovereign 

nations had a right to self-determination and also had a right to 

determine their own foreign policy. 

Many of us don’t agree with many of China’s human rights policies and the lack of democracy in China, yet the United States has 

preferred trade relations with China and I don’t see us going 

around bluffing and blackmailing other countries as the basis for 

the hostility or our hostility to another country, based on China 

policy. 

We all know that President Chavez his support comes from 

marginalized, poor communities, minority communities, really 

quite frankly people who look like me. That is where his support 

comes. 

It was reported that 71 percent of eligible voters, Venezuelans 

came to the polls. Of course in our election in 2004 I guess it was 

54 percent. 

Also they used electronic voting machines with a paper trail, 

which many of us think we need to have here. They use that for 

accuracy and the Carter Center has and others have certified the 

election results. 

History has demonstrated time and time again that the United 

States engages in covert actions to set up conditions for regime 

changes, assassinations and invasions. That is a documented historical fact. 

You probably disagree, but look at what really happened in Grenada and you look at what most recently has happened in Haiti. 

So my question to you is: Mr. Secretary, in your position as a diplomat as Assistant Secretary, will you emphasize diplomacy? 

Will you defend the democratic process, regardless of the outcome, whether or not the Bush Administration likes it or not? Will 

you oppose any efforts at covert actions and assassinations and an 

invasion, if in fact that is being discussed and we do not know if 

it is or not? 

But I think as a diplomat you know your obligations and your 

duties internally I hope would be to aggressively defend diplomacy 

and I would like to know if that is exactly what you intend to do 

in your new job. 

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you very much. I can answer affirmatively. 

I am a diplomat and the diplomatic action of the United States is 

an important and powerful arm of our engagement with the world 

and especially our engagement in the Western Hemisphere. Working with our partners in the region, what we have been able to acVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:27 Jul 14, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\111705\24600.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
42

complish through the summit process is a common agenda, an ambitious agenda for the hemisphere and an agenda that is only going 

to be successful if we are able to cooperate and collaborate in pursuit of that agenda. 

As I have noted, that agenda is all about democracy and it is all 

about development. We are prepared to engage, at all levels, to promote that. That is the reason the President went to Mar del Plata 

and it is the reason why we continue our outreach throughout the 

hemisphere. 

You can be sure, ma’am, that within this hemisphere we are 

committed to democracy. We are not committed to picking winners. 

We are committed to respecting the popular will of peoples as expressed through elections and through their democratic institutions 

and constitutional processes, because we believe at the end of the 

day that what is going to define the Americas is not whether it is 

leftist or rightist or centrist, but whether it is democratic and 

whether it is committed to the kind of development that this region 

needs to provide the people of the region the resources and the benefits to take control of their own destinies and live a life of human 

dignity. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, because I think it is important for the Venezuelan Government, the Venezuelans, for Americans to hear you say that, because quite frankly we do hear assassination threats and we do hear of covert activities being planned. 

We do not know if they are true or not, but I think it is very important to know that our top diplomat will be definitely opposed to 

such actions, because again I still am not clear on what our policy 

is toward Venezuela, but I am sure that there are those in the CIA 

and in the military who are trying to fight for just the opposite of 

what you just said. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. BURTON. Gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Mr. Secretary, you have had your test under fire the first time 

before our Committee and I hope you have found it, if not easy 

work, at least entertaining. 

Mr. SHANNON. Sir, it will help keep me young. 

Mr. BURTON. It will help keep you young. I look forward to having a close working relationship with you and I hope that you will 

take to heart some of the suggestions that we have made. You are 

excused. Thank you very much. Your testimony was very good. 

Mr. SHANNON. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. BURTON. On our next panel is Dr. Ana Julia Jatar. She is 

a member of the Executive Committee and Director of the Political 

Discrimination Project at Su ́mate. 

She was a visiting scholar at the David Rockefeller Center for 

Latin American studies at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow 

at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, D.C. 

Ms. Jatar has researched and written extensively on economic 

and social affairs in Venezuela and Cuba and we appreciate you 

being here very much. Thank you. 

Joseph McSpedon is a Senior Program Manager at Freedom 

House, with a responsibility for the Mexico, Venezuela community 

of democracies and exchange programs. 

Prior to working at Freedom House, Mr. McSpedon managed academic exchange programs for the state University of New York and 

43

Santiago, Chile. Mr. McSpedon has traveled extensively in Latin 

America. 

John Walsh is a Senior Associate at the Washington Office on 

Latin America, also known as WOLA. WOLA’s key concerns in the 

Andes relate to strengthening the rule of law, promoting respect for 

human rights and bolstering democratic institution. 

Mr. Walsh holds a master’s degree in public policy from the 

Johns Hopkins University and we appreciate you being so patient 

while we had all this questioning and dialogue. Would you please 

rise so I can swear you in? 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. BURTON. We will start with you, Ms. Jatar and if we could 

try to hold your comments to 5 minutes so we could get the questions we would really appreciate it. 

TESTIMONY OF MS. ANA JULIA JATAR, EXECUTIVE 

COMMITTEE, SU ́ MATE 

Ms. JATAR. Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like 

to start by saying that I am very glad to be here, but I would be 

happier if my colleagues from Su ́mate were here with me, but as 

it has been said, they are facing charges for conspiracy to destroy 

the Venezuelan republican system. 

Some of them had prohibition to leave the country. I understand 

that some of them also got that prohibition lifted yesterday, but 

they will have a trial December 6. 

My colleagues are just another example of the political persecution suffered by hundreds of Venezuelans. There are more than 200 

political prisoners in Venezuela today, but many more are affected 

by rampant political discrimination. 

Political discrimination on the internet, political discrimination 

of the 21st century. More than 3.4 million citizens are politically 

segregated today for having signed a petition for a Presidential recall referendum in 2003. We at Su ́mate are writing a book on this 

issue. 

Why are they being discriminated? Because the identity of those 

who signed was delivered by the CME, the electoral council, to a 

member of the National Assembly. Congressman Tascon, from 

President’s political party and then Tascon proceeded to out it in 

an easy to search database and post it on his Web site. 

This list is today used by government officials to fire public sector workers, deny employment and contracts and withhold public 

services. 

On April this year, President Chavez was forced to acknowledge 

the existence and the ill use of this list and he declare on TV that 

it should be buried, but the Tascon list unfortunately, and the intent to intimidate has not been buried at all. 

As a matter of fact, the list has been enriched with additional 

data on electoral behavior, on participation in government sponsored programs. Now the regime has the new and improved 

Maisanta list and with it, in a big brother fashion, is perpetrating 

an environment of fear and intimidation that is undermining independent political expression. 

44

In Venezuela today, political discrimination is a state policy. The 

powers and the powers of the General Public Prosecutor have been 

used to enforce this policy. 

Since his appointment on December 2000, General Public Prosecutor, formerly appointed by President Chavez as Vice President 

for Venezuela, the Prosecutor has initiated more than 400 legal 

proceedings against opposition leaders, where none has been initiated by him against any senior member of the government. 

Instead his office has shielded the administration from multiple 

well-documented accusations of human rights violations, abuse of 

power and corruption. 

The General Public Prosecutor has been very busy building arbitrary cases against perceived political threats. Among others, he 

has charged Carlos Ayala-Corao, former President of the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission, for conspiracy. 

Yes, my country has become a place with less freedom and also 

fewer check and balances. The National Assembly has made it a 

habit to change through simple majority rules that according to the 

constitution require two-third majority and for example in this 

fashion has reformed the Supreme Court rule, increasing the number of justices and appointing them, thus packing the court unconstitutionally with government supporters. 

This Supreme Court and I want to make a note of this, has ignored human rights decisions taken by supranational authorities 

and in our opinion, this is preparing the ground for non-recognition 

of decisions by international tribunals or organizations. 

The combination of changes to the legal expression of opinion 

were those made to the penal code have been severely criticized by 

organizations such as Inter-American Commission of Human 

Rights, who has expressed its concern, plus granting many journalists precautionary protection measures, which I have to say most 

of them have been ignored by the government. 

In Venezuela today, the voice of political dissent has few possibilities to express itself, while the President has been overflowing 

airwaves with his message. 

During the January–October period, the President was able to 

transmit 20,944,000 minutes, while the democratic minorities 

transmitted only 825, a ratio of 25,000 to 1. 

In Venezuela, private phone conversations between citizens or 

even private conversations between residents of other countries can 

be aired on state owned TV stations. 

Venezuela has used its immense oil windfall to put in place the 

most sophisticated electronic voting and identification system in 

the world, but I can state categorically that this has not translated 

into greater transparency nor efficiency or increased trust. 

As a matter of fact, recent polls from SECA say that 69 percent 

of Venezuelans do not trust the CNE. A Felix Senas poll says that 

61 percent doesn’t trust the CNE and InterLassus, a last leader, 

is 59 percent. 

Mr. BURTON. Ms. Jatar, can you sum up, please? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes, I am. I am finishing. 

Mr. BURTON. Okay. 

Ms. JATAR. Recent polls indicate that the right to vote secretly 

can no longer be guaranteed. The combination of electronic voting 

45

machines with an electronic fingerprinting system, which identifies 

the voter, in situ right before voting opens up the possibility of 

identifying a person’s votes and Su ́mate is fighting over the issue 

that paper trails should be used and not the way it is used now, 

that less than 1 percent of the boxes are being opened. 

I could go on for hours, but my time has run out. I did not come 

to this prestigious audience to ask for help, nor did I come to persuade the U.S. Congress of the need to interfere in our destiny, but 

I do come today to make you reflect about our current challenges 

and opportunities. 

Fish don’t know they are in water. They take water for granted. 

Venezuelans used to take freedom for granted. Today those institutional foundations have been taken away. History is full of lessons 

of what happens to countries where governments are not constrained by laws. 

Venezuela is becoming one more exhibit in that gruesome also. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jatar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. ANA JULIA JATAR, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, SU ́ MATE

I would like to start by saying that I should not be here. Alejandro Plaz and 

Maria Corina Machado, the president and the vice-president of SUMATE should be 

addressing this prestigious audience instead of me. But unfortunately for SUMATE 

and shamefully for Venezuela, both of them have been accused of ‘‘conspiracy to destroy the Venezuelan Republican system’’. Their trial is set to start on December 

6th, 2005 and last week, when they were preparing their trip to attend your invitation, the judge in charge of the case, violating once more the principles of due process, issued them a prohibition to leave the country. The proof held by the prosecutors to initiate this political trial against my colleagues is the $31,400 donation from 

the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to SUMATE to develop and teach 

courses on democratic principles and citizen rights. Alejandro and Maria Corina are 

just another example of the political persecution suffered by hundreds of Venezuelans. Today there are more than 200 political prisoners in my country while a 

much larger number is being accused with the sole purpose of preventing them from 

dedicating their full attention to their political rights. Leaders such as recently 

elected mayors, former governors, former Supreme Court justices, journalists, military officers, trade union leaders and members of NGOs defending democratic principles and human rights have to divide their time and energies between what they 

want to do to improve their country and what they need to do to stay out of arbitrary imprisonment. 

In Venezuela there is not only persecution but also political discrimination. Today 

more than 3,450,000 citizens are politically segregated for having signed a petition 

for a Presidential Recall Referendum in 2003. The list of those who signed was put 

into an easily searchable dataset and published by a member of the government 

party, congressman Tasco ́n on his website. Those who are on that list have become 

second class citizens, many loosing their public-sector jobs or restricted from benefiting from public services. Over a year after the list was published, President Chavez was forced to respond to public opinion pressures against this form of discrimination and in April 2005 he acknowledged the problem and stated on national TV: 

‘‘Lets bury the Tasco ́n List! . . . The famous list perhaps had a significant role at 

a specific moment, but that is over’’. But the infamous Tasco ́n list has not been buried. Instead, it has been enriched with additional data on electoral behavior and 

participation in government-sponsored programs and has become the Maisanta list. 

With it, Big Brother is creating an environment of fear and intimidation against 

independent political expression. 

In fact, in Venezuela today, political discrimination is the policy of the State. 

President Chavez said a year ago in November 2004 in Fuerte Tiuna the Caracas 

military garrison: ‘‘In this new phase, he who is with me, is with me; and he who 

is not with me, is against me . . . Today I announce the offensive to impede that 

[the opposition] reorganize. Speaking in military terms, if they try to reorganize we 

shall attack and harass them without rest.’’ Yes, Venezuelans are afraid of the presidential wrath. 

46

Also, the powers of the General Public Prosecutor have been used as a weapon 

against the political opposition and as a shield against corruption. Since his appointment on December 2000 Isaı ́as Rodriguez, former Vice President of Venezuela appointed by President Chavez, more than 400 legal proceedings have been initiated 

against political opposition leaders. Nevertheless, very few have been initiated by 

the General Public Prosecutor against any supporter or member of the government, 

in spite of massive evidence of corruption and illegal handling of public money. 

Among many others, the case of the missing 4 billion dollars of the Oil Stabilization 

Fund in 2002; or the missing 3.5 billion dollars of oil revenues that last year never 

made it into the country, thus violating the Central Bank law which specifically required that all dollar-income coming from the oil company, PDVSA, be sold to the 

Venezuelan Central Bank. Instead, the General Public Prosecutor has been busy 

building arbitrary cases against perceived political threats. Among others, his office 

opened, on April 7, 2005, a criminal prosecution—for ‘‘conspiracy’’ on the bases of 

hearsay and press articles—against Carlos Ayala-Corao, former president of the 

Inter-American Human Rights Commission. Also, it has recently pressed charges 

against a major opposition journalist—Ibe ́yise Pacheco—who is standing as a candidate for the National Assembly, for ‘‘false testimony against the Public Prosecutor’’. 

Yes, Venezuela has become a country with less freedom, fewer checks and balances and less democracy. The National Assembly has made it a habit to change 

by simple majority rules that according to the Constitution require a 2/3 majority. 

In order to do so, the Assembly changed in 7 occasions—also by simple majority—

its rules for internal debate. It has thus reformed the Supreme Court Law, increasing the number of justices and unconstitutionally packing it with its own supporters. It has changed the Penal Code, making it a crime to criticize the President 

and other public officials even in private. It has changed the Law that regulates the 

use of the airwaves, limiting freedom of expression. It has ignored Human Rights 

decisions taken by supranational authorities, thus preparing the ground for non-recognition of decisions by international tribunals or organizations. Just a few days ago 

the Supreme Court authorized an electoral rule that would undo the constitutional 

mandated system of proportional representation with a system that would give the 

Government an unwarranted advantage in the way votes are transformed into 

seats. 

In Venezuela today freedom of expression has been terribly suppressed by new 

legislation which was approved by a simple majority vote. The Law of Social Responsibility of the Radio and Television introduced rules internationally known as 

‘‘contempt laws’’. General Uson, President Chavez’s own Finance Minister, was accused of contempt of the Armed Forces and sentenced to a 6-year prison term for 

condemning on TV the use of a flamethrower in an incident in which a number of 

soldiers lost their lives in a military prison. The combination of changes to the legal 

expression of opinion with those made to the Penal Code have been severely criticized by organizations such as the Inter American Commission of Human Rights, 

Reporters without Frontiers, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Inter American Press 

Society (SIP) and the International Association of Broadcasting Radio (AIR). These 

organizations share the view that the new laws create an unbearable ‘‘strait jacket’’ 

on Freedom of Speech and the Press, criminalizing political dissent and using the 

criminal law as an intimidating and threatening weapon against political minorities. 

As a result, in Venezuela today there are numerous journalist prosecuted, persecuted and harassed by the Public Prosecutor and the Courts. The Inter-American 

Human Rights Commission has expressed its concern and many journalists have 

been granted precautionary protection measures. 

In Venezuela today the voice of political dissent has few possibilities to express 

itself while the President has been overflowing airwaves with his message. The government regularly requires radio and TV stations to transmit live propaganda and 

sections of the 5-hours-long TV program Alo ́ Presidente, starring Mr. Chavez. During the January-October period the President was able to transmit 20.944.000 minutes while the democratic minorities transmitted only 825 minutes: a ratio of about 

25.000 to 1. In Venezuela today your telephone conversations can be taped and aired 

in the state-owned TV stations. Last year one of my emails was read by MVR congressman William Lara in the government owned channel 8 as a ‘‘proof’’ that the 

OAS electoral mission was biased in favor of the opposition. 

In Venezuela the institution of the vote is in jeopardy while the National Electoral 

Council (CNE) violates the Constitution and the electoral laws. In my country, the 

secrecy of the vote cannot be guaranteed because of the use of a system which combines electronic voting machines with an electronic fingerprinting system which 

identifies the voter in situ right before voting. The system was not design to prevent 

FARC guerillas from voting in the Recall Referendum but it does allow the GovernVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:27 Jul 14, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\111705\24600.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
47

ment to check in real time who has not yet voted on an election-day so as to pressure them to do so, as happened in the last municipal elections held on August 7, 

2005. According to SUMATE, during that election, the Electoral Council violated 

electoral laws more than 20 times. (State of Democracy in Venezuela: only the facts

at www.SUMATE.org) 

In Venezuela today there is no difference between the budget of the government 

and the pocket of the government party. The government thrives in the ambiguity 

of whether social programs are for citizens or just for militants. Program participants are required to wear t-shirts with the colors and slogans of the government 

party. These programs are not financed through the national budget but instead 

through obscure and un-transparent transfers from the National Oil Company 

PDVSA. The oil company spent over 2 years without auditing its books, making it 

impossible for citizens to monitor the use of their resources. 

I could go on for hours but my time has run out. I did not come to speak to this 

prestigious audience to ask for help, nor did I come to persuade the US Congress 

of the need to interfere in our destiny. Venezuela has a long history of self determination and we will continue to stand for it. But I did come today to make you 

reflect about our current challenges and opportunities. Fish don’t know they are in 

water. They take water for granted. Venezuelans used to take freedom for granted, 

not knowing what the institutional underpinnings of their freedom were. Today 

those institutional foundations have been taken away. History is full of lessons 

about countries where governments are not constrained by laws. Venezuela is becoming one more exhibit in that gruesome old lesson.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Ms. Jatar. I apologize. 

Mr. McSpedon. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. JOSEPH McSPEDON, SENIOR PROGRAM 

MANAGER, FREEDOM HOUSE 

Mr. MCSPEDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you for the 

opportunity to testify today on the critical and timely issue of 

democratic institutions and human rights in Venezuela. 

I would like to focus my remarks today on our analysis of democratic governance in Venezuela, paying special respect to the questions of rule of law and human rights. 

I will also draw on our experience working in the region with the 

number of human rights defenders as well as share with you some 

of our recommendations for increased U.S. focus. 

Through our annual report, Freedom in the World, Freedom 

House has analyzed the state of political and civil liberties in Venezuela for the past 30 years. In addition, a newer publication, 

Countries At A Crossroad, which focused specifically on democratic 

governance, included Venezuela in its first publication in 2004. 

Freedom House gives each country a designation of one of the following: Free, signifying respect of democratic norms and an adherence to international human rights standards; partly free, signifying the adherence to some democratic standards and not free, signifying the systematic suppression of democratic institutions and 

massive violations of human rights. 

In the 1970s, Venezuela was consistently given a rating of free 

and was regarded by Freedom House as one of the region’s most 

stable democracies. 

During the last 1980s and throughout the 1990s, our analysts 

began identifying gaps in the country’s democratic performance, a 

trend that accelerated under the rule of President Chavez. 

Venezuela is currently ranked as a partly free country and has 

been for the entire period that President Chavez has been in 

power. 

48

Venezuela has generally held free and fair elections, although obviously there was and is controversy surrounding the recall referendum. It is unclear what role, if any, fraud played and how 

great its impact was and without further proof, there will be no definitive answer. 

That being said, there is more to democratic governance than 

just elections and the rankings for Venezuela have gone down in 

a few of the areas critical to this, specifically talking about the rule 

of law and the functioning of government sections of our reports. 

Highly politicized climate in Venezuela, the rule of law score has 

consistently gone down. The Chavez government has made one of 

its central focuses the control of the judiciary and they have accomplished this through a variety of means. 

The high percentage of judges are provisional, which has a serious detrimental impact on citizens’ right to proper justice. There 

have been a number of instances where the provisional status has 

led to judges being removed from office for making decisions with 

which the Executive Branch didn’t agree. 

In addition, there have been recent cases where judges have been 

named by the government who do not have the required by law 

academic credentials to serve in the positions and whose sole qualifications are the connections to the ruling party. 

In terms of rule of law and prevailing in criminal and civil matters, this is also an area where there are deficiencies. Extrajudicial 

killings, while not on the level of some other countries in the region, continue to be a problem. 

In the most recent annual report of the human rights group 

PROVEA, the number of deaths that came at the hands of state security groups, which are reported officially as occurring while suspects are resisting arrest, has increased 300 percent over the past 

10 years. 

When combined with the ineffectiveness of the judiciary, it is not 

surprising that recent information shows that 90 percent of all investigations into human rights violations do not make it past the 

preliminary stages. 

In one state, Anzoategui, alone there have been human rights 

groups have documented over 500 cases of extrajudicial killings 

over the past 4 years and have encountered countless obstacles in 

bringing the perpetrators to justice. 

Torture is also on the rise. Recent studies by PROVEA show that 

the number of cases have increased by 90 percent in the past 5 

years. 

Under the functioning of government category, we looked at the 

pervasiveness of official corruption, government openness and 

transparency and the degree to which government policies are determined by freely elected officials. 

Corruption and its corrosive effect on democratic governance has 

continued to be an issue in Venezuela under the Chavez regime. 

The executive controls the citizen power of rights of government 

created to fight corruption in 1999. This branch is made up of the 

officers of the ombudsman, the comptroller general and the public 

prosecutor. 

In 2003, law against corruption was put into effect, which establishes citizens’ right to know and set out the state’s obligations to 

49

provide a thrice yearly rendition of public goods and expenses, except for those in the security national defense. 

The effectiveness of this law is highly suspect, considering that 

Venezuela’s ranking by Transparency International’s 2005 corruption perceptions index was 130 out of 158 of the countries surveyed, down from 114 I think out of 146 from the year before. 

Consistent threats and a climate of intimidation characterizes 

government’s interaction with civil society groups. The Chavez government has also made an effort to undermine the legitimacy of 

reputable human rights and other civil society organizations by 

questioning their ties to international organizations and foreign 

governments. 

This has resulted in personal attacks against leading human 

rights defenders, including a series of recent statements by high 

level officials with both veiled and open threats against Venezuelan 

groups that participated in the most recent session of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. 

These attacks are designed to cow Venezuela human rights defenders and prevent them from carrying out their work and also to 

create a climate where supporters of the government and the society at large rejects these groups, which increased their vulnerability. 

Restrictions on international funding are a means for limiting 

the effectiveness of Venezuelan civil society and lead to both greater impunity and greater reliance on state organs. 

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me, Mr. McSpedon. We have two votes coming up here pretty quick. If you could sum up, I would like to get 

to Mr. Walsh before we do that. 

Mr. MCSPEDON. Sure. Certainly. I will just close with a couple 

of recommendations that we think future United States focus in 

Venezuela. 

Number one, the U.S. should remain focused on human rights, 

especially as the rising crime rates are creating pressures within 

the region that bypass basic human rights procedures. 

The U.S. should increase support for human rights defenders 

that monitor and report on abuses, as well as the functioning of the 

justice system and that can provide legal advice and services to 

citizens who are accessing justice. 

Two, the United States should continue to advocate for effective 

ways to utilize the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the 

steps that it spells out in the event of the steady erosion of democratic institutions, not just in Venezuela, but throughout the region. 

The United States finally should look to broaden the support 

among other countries in the region by deepening their engagement in the promotion of democracy. Venezuela has taken an international approach to its perceived conflict with the United States, 

enlisting the support of many other Latin American countries. 

The U.S. needs to effectively engage these countries, not solely 

on issues of trade and security, but also on the fundamental support necessary to maintaining democratic rule in the region. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McSpedon follows:]

50

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH MCSPEDON, SENIOR PROGRAM MANAGER, FREEDOM HOUSE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the critical and 

timely issue of democratic institutions and human rights in Venezuela. 

I would like to focus my remarks today on our analysis of democratic governance 

in Venezuela, paying special respect to questions of rule of law and human rights. 

I will also draw on our experience working in the region with a number of human 

rights defenders as well share with you some of our recommendations for increased 

U.S. focus. As you are aware, a core part of Freedom House’s mission is to monitor 

and analyze information about the state of freedom around the world. To this end, 

we publish on a regular basis a series of reports and surveys on global freedom, including reports that focus on specific aspects of democracy including press freedom, 

as well as on democratic governance, rule of law and corruption. 

Through our annual report, Freedom in the World, Freedom House has analyzed 

the state of political and civil liberties in Venezuela for the past thirty years. In addition, a newer publication, Countries at a Crossroads, which focuses more specifically on democratic governance, included Venezuela in its first publication in 2004. 

Freedom House gives each country a designation of one of the following: Free, signifying a respect for democratic norms and an adherence to international human 

rights standards; Partly Free, signifying an adherence to some democratic standards; and Not Free, signifying the systematic suppression of democratic institutions 

and a massive violation of human rights. 

During the 1970s Venezuela was consistently given a rating of Free, and was regarded by Freedom House as one of the region’s most stable democracies. During 

the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, our analysts began to identify gaps in the 

country’s democratic performance, a trend that accelerated after the election of 

President Hugo Chavez. 

Venezuela is currently ranked as a Partly Free country, and has been for the entire period that President Chavez has been in power. Venezuela has generally held 

free and fair elections, although obviously there was controversy surrounding the recall referendum. It is unclear what role fraud played and how great its impact was, 

and without further proof there will be no definitive answer. That being said, there 

is much more to democratic governance than just elections, and the rankings for 

Venezuela have gone down in a few of the areas critical for this, including in the 

rule of law and functioning of government sections. 

Under the category of rule of law, our analysts specifically look at the degree of 

judicial independence, the predominance of the rule of law in criminal and civil matters, civilian control of the police and security forces, protection from torture and 

unjust imprisonment, and equal treatment of all people under the law. 

In the current highly politicized climate in Venezuela, the rule of law score has 

consistently gone down. The Chavez government has made one of its central focus 

points the control of the judiciary, and they has accomplished it through a variety 

of means. A high percentage of judges are provisional, which has a serious detrimental impact on citizens’ right to proper justice and on the judges’ right to stability 

in their positions as a guarantee of judicial independence and autonomy. There have 

been a number of instances where this provisional status has led to judges being 

removed from office for making decisions with which the executive branch did not 

agree. In addition, there have been a number of recent cases where judges have 

been named by the government who do not have the required (by law) academic credentials to serve in those positions, and whose sole qualifications are their connections to members of the ruling party. 

The Organic Law of the Supreme Court allowed Justices to be added and removed 

through a simple majority vote in the Congress. In addition, the recent reforms have 

increased the number of Supreme Court Justices and made it easier for the Chavez 

government to pack the court with supporters. These overall weaknesses in the judicial sector have contributed to increased impunity within the country. 

In terms of the rule of law prevailing in criminal and civil matters, this is also 

an area where there are deficiencies. Extrajudicial killings, while not on the level 

of some of the other countries in the region, continue to be a problem. In the most 

recent annual report of the human rights group Provea, the number of deaths that 

came at the hands of state security groups, which are reported officially as occurring 

while suspects were ‘‘resisting arrest’’, has increased by 300% over the past ten 

years. When combined with the ineffectiveness of the judiciary, it is not surprising 

that recent information shows that 90% of all investigations into human rights violations did not make it past the preliminary stages of the process. 

Widespread arbitrary detention and torture of suspects, as well as extrajudicial 

killings by the often-corrupt military security forces and the police, have increased 

51

as crime continues to soar. Since the 1992 coup attempts, weakened civilian governments have had less authority over the military and the police, and overall rights 

abuses are committed with impunity. In the state of Anzoategui, human rights 

groups have documented over 500 cases of extrajudicial killings over the past four 

years, and have encountered countless obstacles in bringing the perpetrators to justice. 

Torture also increasingly is a problem in Venezuela. Recent studies by Provea 

state that the number of cases has risen by over 90% in the past five years. 

Venezuela has scored consistently low in the area pertaining to the equal treatment under law for all segments of the population. This has certainly been the case 

for Venezuelans who signed in favor of the recall referendum, and all information 

regarding these signatures has been made public. Many of the signatories have 

faced increased discrimination, including being fired from government positions, excluded from government sponsored social programs, and prevented from receiving 

passports. In addition, the indigenous population, although a small portion of the 

total population remains for all intents and purposes excluded from most of the benefits of representative democracy. 

Under the functioning of government category, we look at the pervasiveness of official corruption, governmental openness and transparency, and the degree to which 

government policies are determined by freely elected officials. 

Corruption, and its corrosive effect on democratic governance, has continued to be 

an issue in Venezuela under the Chavez Regime. The Executive controls the Citizen 

Power branch of government created to fight corruption by the 1999 constitution. 

This branch is made up of the offices of the ombudsman (responsible for compelling 

the government to adhere to the constitution and laws), the comptroller-general 

(who controls the revenues and expenses incurred by the government), and the public prosecutor (who provides opinions to the courts on the prosecution of criminal 

cases and brings to the attention of the proper authorities cases of public employee 

misconduct and violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners or accused persons). 

On April 7, 2003, the Law against Corruption was put into effect. It established 

a citizen’s right to know, and set out the state’s obligations to provide, a thrice-yearly rendition of public goods and expenses, except those security and national defense 

expenditures as exempted by law. The effectiveness of this law is highly suspect 

considering that Venezuela’s ranking by the Transparency International’s 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index, was 130 out of 158 countries surveyed, down from 114 

the year before. 

The Chavez government has done little to free the country from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements, and other forms of control that increase opportunities for corruption. It has relied instead on attacking persons and 

social sectors it considers to be corrupt and selectively enforcing good-government 

laws and regulations against its opponents. At the same time, Chavez replaced the 

old meritocracy at the state oil company, PDVSA, with his own directorate. New 

regulations and controls over the economy have ensured that public officials have 

retained ample opportunities for personal enrichment enjoyed under previous governments. 

Consistent threats and a climate of intimidation characterize the government’s 

interaction with civil society groups. The Chavez government has also made an effort to undermine the legitimacy of reputable human rights and other civil society 

organizations by questioning their ties to international organizations and foreign 

governments. This has resulted in particularly personal attacks against leading 

human rights defenders, including a series of statements by high level officials with 

both veiled and not so veiled threats against the Venezuelan groups that participated in the most recent session of the Inter American Human Rights Commission. 

These statements are designed to cow Venezuelan human rights defenders and prevent them from fulfilling their work, and also to create a climate where supporters 

of the government and the society at large rejects these groups, which increases 

their vulnerability. Restrictions on international funding are a means for limiting 

effectiveness of Venezuelan civil society, leading to both greater impunity and reliance on state organs. 

It is important to note, that in terms of the Inter American system, Venezuela 

places obstacles before all the ‘‘provisional and precautionary measures’’ handed 

down in favor of human rights defenders, journalists and NGOs, by the Inter American Court and Inter American Commission on Human Rights (OAS). This increases 

the danger faced by human rights defenders when carrying out their work, and 

demonstrates a complete lack of will in fulfilling its international obligations on the 

part of the Venezuelan Government. 

52

Freedom of peaceful assembly and association are guaranteed in the constitution, 

and the government generally respected these rights in practice. Public meetings 

and marches, the latter of which require government permits, are generally permitted without impediment, although government supporters often sought to disrupt these, frequently using violence. 

It is important to also note the increasing presence of the military in all aspects 

of Venezuelan life. Since Chavez’s election, Venezuela’s military, which is largely 

unaccountable to civilian rule, has become an active participant in the country’s social development and delivery of public services. The 1999 constitution assigns the 

armed forces a significant role in the state but does not provide for civilian control 

over the military’s budget or procurement practices, or for related institutional 

checks. A separate system of armed forces courts retains jurisdiction over members 

of the military accused of rights violations and common criminal crimes, and decisions cannot be appealed in civilian court. The military’s massive participation in 

non-traditional public administration missions has helped to reduce official accountability for acts of corruption. 

To this situation has been added the recent development of the creation of private 

militias, responsible only to the president of the republic. These militias are made 

up of ordinary citizens, ostensibly to protect the country in the case of invasion, but 

are more likely a danger to be used against fellow Venezuelans in the current politicized environment. In the statewide elections held last year, candidates from 

Chavez’s party took twenty of the twenty-two gubernatorial slots in the country. Ten 

of these governors are former military colleagues of President Chavez. The military 

is also used to run many of the countries prisons, in violation of the Venezuelan 

Constitution. 

Finally, freedom of the press is one of the most important freedoms in a functioning democracy. In the most recent version of Freedom House’s Freedom Of the 

Press annual survey, Venezuela was ranked not free, for the consistent efforts of the 

Chavez government to control the mostly opposition owned media. Although the constitution provides for freedom of the press, the exercise of that right is difficult in 

practice. A climate of intimidation and hostility, including physical attacks, exists 

with a strong anti-media rhetoric by the government and a significant anti-Chavez 

slant on the part of media owners. In July 2004, a new law was ratified that regulates the work of journalists, provides for compulsory registration with the national 

journalism association, and punishes reporters’ ‘‘illegal’’ conduct with prison sentences of three to six months. A Supreme Court ruling upheld censorship laws that 

effectively declared that laws protecting public authorities and institutions from insulting criticism were constitutional. The Law on the Social Responsibility of Radio 

and TV, giving the government control over the content of radio and television programs, went into effect in December. According to the Inter-American Press Association, the government ‘‘uses official advertising as an instrument of coercion and has 

become the country’s ‘main communicator.’ ’’ The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 

Expression of the Inter American Commission has also condemned this law and the 

restrictions it places on freedom of the press. All of this has resulted in self censorship. Recent reports on all of the major stations show that they are extremely careful about airing anything that could be considered illegal under the new laws. 

In closing, I would like to include some suggestions for future U.S. focus in Venezuela.

(1) The U.S. should remain focused on human rights—especially as rising crime 

rates are creating pressures within the region to bypass basic human rights 

procedures. The U.S. should increase support for the work of human rights 

defenders that monitor and report on abuses, as well as the functioning of 

the justice system, and can provide legal advice and services for citizens in 

accessing justice and raise public awareness of their rights. Human rights 

defenders must be able to continue to do their job professionally and 

credibly, which is the only way they can face the public attacks on their reputation.

(2) The U.S. should continue to advocate for effective ways to utilize the Inter 

American Democratic Charter and the steps that it spells out in the event 

of the steady erosion of democratic institutions, working with other concerned nations specifically on the case of Venezuela.

(3) The U.S. should look to broaden the support among other countries in the 

region by deepening their engagement in the promotion of democracy. Venezuela has taken an international approach to its perceived conflict with the 

U.S., enlisting the support of many other Latin American countries. The 

U.S. needs to effectively engage these countries, not solely on issues of trade 

and security, but also on the fundamental support necessary to maintaining 

53

democratic rule in the region. The U.S. should take advantage of the existing mechanisms of the Community of Democracies, of which many of Latin 

American countries are members, to build support for increased pressure on 

Venezuela to maintain its fragile democracy.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. McSpedon. 

Mr. Walsh. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. JOHN WALSH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA 

Mr. WALSH. Thank you, Chairman Burton, other Members of the 

Subcommittee. I know you are pressed and I will be brief. 

WOLA has supported United States policies promoting human 

rights and democracy in Latin America for 30 years. We are very 

pleased to be here today, and trust that what we have to say here 

today will not preclude further such invitations. 

Obviously today’s remarks make it evident how polarized and difficult the issue of democracy in Venezuela is. We think that given 

such polarization, discussions like this need to be as open as possible, again underscoring our appreciation for being invited today. 

It is also clear how discussion about Venezuela links to so many 

other issues in the hemisphere. WOLA for one supported Representative Menendez’s Social Investment Fund. Whether it is his 

plan or someone else’s, we think these broader policy perspectives 

are very much in order in the discussion. 

Very briefly, five main points to boil down my testimony. One, 

WOLA shares the very serious concerns raised about the state of 

democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela today. 

Most especially concerns over the concentration of power, the 

weakness of the judiciary, its vulnerability to political pressures 

from the executive and the legislative branches. 

Two, the context in which the further discussion of democracy in 

Venezuela needs to take place must include, in our view, the views 

of majority of Venezuelans on the functioning of their own democratic institutions. 

Three, a note on Chavez’s own legitimacy as an elected leader. 

Four, a complete understanding, full understanding of democracy 

in Venezuela needs to take into account the government’s social 

programs and their popularity. And finally if we are to consider 

United States relations with Venezuela and what the United States 

might intend to do with respect to democracy in Venezuela, we 

need to do so understanding the state of Venezuelan/United States 

relationships and views of the United States within Venezuela. 

So very briefly on those five points, the genuine concerns especially the concentration of power. Whole volumes have been written 

about them. We can discuss them at length and they need to be 

taken seriously. But they shouldn’t be exaggerated and that discussion should take place in the overall context. 

Representative Delahunt mentioned the Latinobarometro poll 

earlier. Its findings were striking, particularly to observers in 

Washington who may be surprised to hear that Venezuelans indeed, according to this poll and compared to most of their regional 

brethren are very happy with the functioning of their democracy 

today. 

54

Indeed, on a scale of one to ten, with ten being totally democratic, Venezuelans judged their country at a 7.6, the highest in the 

region. 

Also, 56 percent expressed satisfaction or great satisfaction with 

the functioning of their democracy. The Latin American average 

was 31 percent. So the context requires taking that into account. 

Obviously democracy consists of elections, but is more than elections. And even in the case of elections, the truest test of commitment to democracy is not when you win, but when you lose. 

For its part, sectors of the opposition in Venezuela showed a profound contempt for democracy in launching an April 2002 coup attempt against Chavez. For his part, while not yet tested by defeat 

at the polls, Chavez’s own leadership of a coup attempt in 1992 

leaves room for doubt about his democratic commitment. 

Unfortunately, the opposition has not been able to move forward 

to devise a positive agenda for Venezuela that would give them the 

viable opposition that Chavez needs and Venezuelans need. 

Also disappointingly, Chavez has not taken the opportunity to be 

magnanimous in victory, but has pursued a campaign to intimidate 

and harass political opponents. 

That said, it has to be clear to everyone here that Chavez has 

been the legitimately elected President of Venezuela. He has won 

in numerous elections and survived a recall referendum, with more 

or less identical vote results and nearly 60 percent of the vote. 

When we discussed the legitimacy of Chavez and his popularity, 

that needs to be kept in mind as well as the reasons for it and that 

goes to the question of the ‘‘missions’’ in massive spending on social 

programs that have won over and have harnessed enormous goodwill on the part of the Venezuelan people to participate in communities in programs such as this. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN WALSH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, WASHINGTON

OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA

On behalf of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), I thank you for 

inviting me to testify today. I am honored to be here and I look forward to a constructive exchange of views on this important issue. I am the Senior Associate for 

the Andes at WOLA, and I have been following the situation in Venezuela closely 

in recent years. 

The state of Venezuelan democracy is an important topic, the consideration of 

which is dramatically affected by Venezuela’s fiercely polarized social and political 

climate. In such a context, it is easy to fall into simplistic, black and white views, 

and all the more important to seek a more nuanced appreciation of the complex 

issues at play. In no small measure, gaining such an appreciation involves understanding how Venezuelans themselves view the state of their democracy. Assessments of the functioning of democracy in Venezuela should also take into account 

historical and regional contexts. 

With this in mind, I will touch very briefly, even cursorily, on a number of aspects 

of the broad topic of Venezuelan democracy. Free and fair elections are of course 

key to democracy, but other important elements to consider include the separation 

of powers; the rule of law and human rights; and the role of civil society. In addition, consideration of U.S. policies with respect to democracy in Venezuela requires 

an appreciation of the state of U.S.-Venezuelan relations. 

Before proceeding further, I would like underscore the importance of taking into 

account Venezuelans’ own views about democracy in general, and their appraisals 

of the functioning of their own government institutions in particular. A recent survey of public opinion in 18 Latin American countries, undertaken in August and 

September 2005 and coordinated by the well-respected Chilean non-profit 

Latinobaro ́metro, sheds some light on these questions. Among the survey’s most noVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:27 Jul 14, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\111705\24600.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
55

table results is the obvious preference of Venezuelans for democratic governance, 

and—in what may come as a surprise to observers in the United States—the relatively high levels of satisfaction that Venezuelans express with the functioning of 

their own democracy. 

Specifically, 76 percent of Venezuelan adults consider democracy to be preferable 

to any other form of government (confidence interval of plus or minus 3 percent). 

The 18-country average was only 53 percent, and Uruguay (77 percent) was the only 

country that recorded a higher preference for democracy than Venezuela. Indeed, 

since 1996, the preference for democracy as measured by the Latinobaro ́metro survey has eroded in 13 of the 18 countries, while the largest increase in preference 

for democracy was recorded in Venezuela (up from 62 percent in 1996). 

Even more notably, the survey indicates that Venezuelans regard their country 

as being in fact quite democratic. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 signifies ‘‘not democratic’’ and 10 signifies ‘‘totally democratic,’’ Venezuelans scored their country at 7.6, 

the highest of any of the 18 countries. Uruguay was the only other country with 

a score of more than 7, and the 18-country average was 5.5. Moreover, the survey 

found 56 percent of Venezuelans to be very satisfied or satisfied with the functioning of democracy in their country, well above the 18-country average of 31 percent, and again trailing only Uruguay (63 percent). 

Of course, these survey results do not exhaust the topic of the status of democracy 

in Venezuela. But it is surely important to keep these findings in mind, and to appreciate their significance in light of each state’s fundamental right to self-determination, explicitly enshrined in the Charter of the Organization of American States 

(OAS): ‘‘Every State has the right to choose, without external interference, its political, economic, and social system and to organize itself in the way best suited to it, 

and has the duty to abstain from intervening in the affairs of another State. Subject 

to the foregoing, the American States shall cooperate fully among themselves, independently of the nature of their political, economic, and social systems’’ (article 3e). 

ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

Venezuelans have gone to the polls frequently in recent years. The intense polarization and zero-sum character of the political conflict in Venezuela have led to significant international attention and monitoring of these elections. On balance, the 

elections have been deemed free and fair enough to faithfully express the preferences of the majority of voters in Venezuela. By no means have the elections been 

flawless, and international and Venezuelan monitor groups continue to cast doubt 

on the impartiality of Venezuela’s electoral institutions. On the other hand, the elections have not been stolen. While there should be little doubt that irregularities 

have occurred, the consensus among international observers has been that such 

irregularities have not been on the scale to affect outcomes. Indeed, the Carter Center and the OAS both deemed valid the results of the hotly contested August 2004 

recall referendum, won by President Hugo Cha ́vez with 59 percent of the vote. 

To be sure, democracy consists of more than elections, and the truest test of a 

leader’s commitment to electoral democracy comes with the reaction to defeat, not 

victory. In that regard, those sectors of the Venezuelan opposition responsible for 

the April 2002 coup attempt against President Cha ́vez demonstrated a profound 

contempt for democracy. The strength of Cha ́vez’s own commitment to democracy 

has not been tested by defeat, though his own leadership of a failed coup attempt 

in 1992 against an elected government leaves room for doubt. 

At the same time, it is beyond any doubt that Cha ́vez is the legitimate elected 

leader of Venezuela, and that he continues to enjoy strong popular support. The 

Latinobaro ́metro survey found that 65 percent of Venezuelans approve of the way 

in which Cha ́vez is leading the country, an approval rating significantly higher than 

the 18-country average of 49 percent. For the record, Cha ́vez initially won election 

to the presidency in December 1998, with 58 percent of the vote. His allies won 62 

percent of the vote (and 93 percent of the seats) in July 1999 elections for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. In December 1999, the new constitution was approved by 72 percent of the voters. Cha ́vez then won new elections in 

July 2000 with 59 percent of the vote, and, as noted above, prevailed in the August 

2004 recall referendum, again with 59 percent of the vote. His allies are poised to 

win convincingly in next month’s National Assembly elections, and no candidate has 

yet emerged as a viable challenger to Cha ́vez for the December 2006 presidential 

elections. 

Democracy entails not only that the majority should rule, but that the minority’s 

rights should be protected. While Cha ́vez’s margins of electoral victory have been 

consistently large, the size of the minority of Venezuelans voting against Cha ́vez is 

far from insignificant, and it is crucial to the health of Venezuelan democracy that 

56

their views find adequate expression through peaceful, democratic political processes. This requires both that President Cha ́vez and his government recognize the 

legitimate place of the political opposition, and that the opposition participate in the 

political process. 

Disappointingly, President Cha ́vez has not consistently signaled his tolerance of 

political disagreement. At the same time, unfortunately, many in the opposition 

have found it difficult to accept their electoral defeats, and have been slow to develop a positive political agenda with the potential to appeal broadly to Venezuelans. The opposition has been burdened by the blatantly anti-democratic actions 

of some Cha ́vez opponents, immensely complicating their task of trying to appeal 

to the country’s pro-Cha ́vez majority. Both sides should be encouraged to take more 

constructive positions. 

While international monitors have endorsed the results of Venezuela’s recent elections, they have also raised serious concerns over the lack of transparency within 

the country’s electoral institutions, specifically the National Electoral Council 

(CNE). In the events surrounding the controversial August 2004 recall referendum, 

the CNE came to conduct business along party lines, with pro-Cha ́vez members consistently outvoting opposition-aligned members by three to two. Since then, the composition of the CNE has become even more pro-government, with Cha ́vez supporters 

holding four of the five seats. This clear domination of a key electoral institution 

increases the chances that election rules will be made and interpreted in ways that 

favor Cha ́vez and his allies at the expense of the opposition. 

Boosting confidence in the basic fairness of electoral institutions is crucial, lest 

perceptions of unfairness prompt those opposed to the Cha ́vez government to conclude that the electoral avenue to political power is no longer open. Fortunately, the 

question is one of degrees, and many of those who are opposed to Cha ́vez and have 

little confidence in the impartiality of the CNE see little alternative but to participate in electoral politics, along the way negotiating the best set of rules they can. 

Arguably, the Cha ́vez government, whose rightful claim to legitimacy stems from its 

electoral performance, has much to lose if the credibility of the electoral system falls 

further into doubt. The government therefore would appear to have important incentives at least to ease some of the opposition’s concerns over lack of transparency, 

and some observers suggest that this appears to be occurring in the negotiation 

around provisions for the December National Assembly elections. 

The international community should continue to monitor electoral processes in 

Venezuela, to encourage both President Cha ́vez and his opponents to abide by 

agreed-upon rules of the game. 

RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

In Latin America generally, inefficient, corrupt and politicized justice systems 

have been significant obstacles to the consolidation of democracy, and have facilitated the impunity that perpetuates crime and undermines public trust in government. Historically, there has been little confidence that all will be treated equally 

before the law, and Venezuela has been no exception. Nevertheless, 

Latinobaro ́metro found relatively strong support in Venezuela (60 percent) for the 

proposition that justice arrives slowly, but arrive it does. By comparison, the 18-

country average was only 48 percent. 

Still, Venezuelan and international human rights monitors have pointed to serious concerns regarding the rule of law in Venezuela, including but not limited to 

concerns about the independence of the judiciary from the other branches of government; the impact of new media and penal laws on freedom of expression; impunity 

for para-police groups responsible for extrajudicial executions; and the use of the 

justice system to harass political opponents, most notably in the case of Su ́mate. 

Though these issues will only be mentioned briefly here, each has occasioned volumes of commentary (for example, the annual report of PROVEA, a prominent Venezuelan human rights NGO, runs to more than 600 pages). 

Some observers have expressed concerns that new laws governing the media, combined with a revised penal code, are resulting in self-censorship of political views 

that might be seen as running afoul of the law or risking reprisals. It is important 

to evaluate these new laws and their likely impact on freedom of expression in light 

of the behavior of the Venezuelan private media. Most of the major media operated 

in a highly partisan fashion, supporting efforts to dislodge Cha ́vez, especially during 

the April 2002 coup attempt and the subsequent oil strike. At a time when viable 

opposition political parties did not exist, the private media took on an overtly partisan political role. This role was sharply at odds with its responsibilities to provide 

a balanced view of events. 

57

To date at least, it is also clear that, notwithstanding the new laws, freedom of 

expression remains alive and well in Venezuela. But if the restrictiveness of the new 

laws should not be exaggerated, neither should the potential for self-censorship be 

discounted. Given the value of freedom of expression, in and of itself, as well as its 

importance in guaranteeing other political liberties, the debate over the role of the 

media and how it ought to be regulated by the state can be expected to continue 

apace in Venezuela. 

Venezuelan human rights monitors and the Inter-American Commission on 

Human Rights (IACHR) have drawn particular attention to the lack of independence 

and impartiality of the judiciary. As noted above, a weak judiciary is nothing new 

in the region or in Venezuela. Even so, the very high proportion (more than 80 percent) of Venezuelan judges with only temporary or provisional appointments, vulnerable to rapid dismissal, gives rise to the concern that the judiciary is subservient 

to the will of the legislative and executive branches. The Cha ́vez government has 

acknowledged that such a high proportion of provisional judges poses one of the 

most serious problems facing the judiciary, but provisional appointments continue. 

Human rights monitors have also raised concerns over a 2004 law empowering the 

National Assembly, by simple majority vote, to alter the number of judges in the 

different chambers of the Supreme Court and revoke the appointments of individual 

justices. As President Cha ́vez looks set to build on his advantage in the National 

Assembly, the 2004 law, combined with the already tenuous job security of judges 

throughout the Venezuelan judiciary, makes it increasingly easy for the executive 

and legislative branches to exercise political control over the judiciary. 

RESPECT FOR SEPARATION OF POWERS, LIMITS ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER

Well-established international norms do not exist with respect to separation of 

powers, which can very widely from country to country. The executive’s power visa`-vis the legislature varies, and how presidents wield their power when they have 

strong legislative majorities also varies from country to country and from president 

to president. 

That said, there is a long tradition of strong, often autocratic presidents in Latin 

America, a tradition that should make the international community sensitive to 

issues about the limits of presidential power in Latin America. There is reason for 

concern, therefore, about how far President Cha ́vez may seek to go in concentrating 

power, especially if, as expected, he wins a strong majority in the upcoming National Assembly elections. The international community should urge President 

Cha ́vez not to seek to concentrate power unduly. All parties should keep in mind 

the low tolerance of Venezuelans for authoritarian government: Latinobaro ́metro 

found only 11 percent support in Venezuela for the proposition that, in certain circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. 

CIVIL SOCIETY

Venezuelan civil society has been deeply polarized, with some organizations 

strongly in favor of President Cha ́vez, and some strongly opposed. The polarization 

has made it difficult to seek a middle ground position, critical of both sides, without 

being labeled an extremist by one camp or the other. In this difficult environment, 

funding provided to some Venezuelan civil society groups by U.S. government agencies such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has proven extremely 

controversial within Venezuela. 

On the one hand, Venezuelan civil society groups should be free to seek and receive international support, assuming that they are engaged in what are otherwise 

legal, peaceful and democratic activities. If so, their work should be judged on its 

merits. At the same time, however, given the obvious role of the U.S. government 

in Venezuela’s political conflict, and the well-founded skepticism about Bush administration intentions with respect to Cha ́vez, it is difficult to see how U.S. funding 

in support of democracy can be productive at this juncture. It seems more likely to 

be counterproductive, increasing the polarization rather than easing it. 

SOCIAL PROGRAMS

President Cha ́vez has used Venezuela’s surging oil wealth to implement a number 

of domestic programs, including the highly popular food, health and literacy programs, known as the ‘‘missions.’’ These programs contributed to Cha ́vez’s victory in 

the 2004 recall referendum and continue to pay political dividends, as is clear in 

Cha ́vez’s high approval ratings. 

Abroad, we often focus on Cha ́vez’s provocative rhetoric and anti-U.S. statements. 

But Venezuelans are responding to these social programs, and, at a deeper level, 

poor Venezuelans are responding to a leader who they regard as the first to take 

58

them and their priorities seriously. As a result, Cha ́vez has tapped into an enormous reservoir of good will among poor Venezuelans, many of whom feel energized 

to take part in and promote the ‘‘missions’’ in their communities. Whether Cha ́vez can institutionalize these programs in a way that sustains their on-the-ground benefits and their political payoffs remains to be seen. But as Venezuelans evaluate the 

state of their own democracy and evaluate the performance of the Cha ́vez government, it is obvious that the missions are crucial. Rather than seek to discredit such 

programs, the Venezuelan opposition will have to convince their fellow citizens that 

they will confront the issues of poverty, unemployment, crime and other social problems better than Cha ́vez. 

U.S.-VENEZUELA RELATIONS

Obviously, relations between the Cha ́vez and Bush governments are troubled. 

Cha ́vez’s provocative rhetoric, his opposition to U.S. initiatives—especially the Free 

Trade Area of the Americas—and his close friendship with Fidel Castro are especially grating to the Bush administration. At the same time, we should be aware 

that the U.S. government—the Bush administration in particular—is not viewed favorably by most Venezuelans. Latinobaro ́metro found that only 41 percent of Venezuelans have a good opinion of the United States, compared to an 18-country average of 61 percent. The Bush administration’s doctrine of pre-emptive military action, 

the U.S.-led war in Iraq, and revelations of detainee abuse have undoubtedly tarnished the image of the U.S. government in Latin America. In Venezuela, skepticism about U.S. support for democracy and human rights is all the more acute 

given the apparent U.S. support for the failed coup against Cha ́vez in April 2002. 

Despite the distrust on both sides and the escalating rhetoric, U.S.-Venezuelan 

commercial relations, particularly with respect to oil, remain stable. The Bush administration, for its part, can ill-afford disruptions in the flow of oil from Venezuela, 

especially given the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East. By the same token, the 

Cha ́vez government relies heavily on the U.S. market for Venezuela’s oil, the proceeds of which are funding the social programs that have boosted Cha ́vez’s domestic 

popularity. In the longer run, as both governments seek to reduce their dependence 

on one another, the oil-based relationship as it has existed may be altered. But for 

now, this mutual dependence on the continued flow of oil lends some stability to the 

relationship. 

As the U.S. government and the American people look at Hugo Cha ́vez, we should 

recognize that he is a legitimately elected president with strong support in Venezuela. He is pursuing foreign policy goals sometimes sharply at odds with the desires of the Bush administration; while some may not like this, we should recognize 

that he has a right to do so. U.S. policy toward Cha ́vez ought not be directed at 

confrontation. We should not refrain from expressing genuine concerns about democracy, human rights and rule of law issues in Venezuela, but neither should we exaggerate them. And we should seek dialogue with Cha ́vez and with the hemisphere 

as a whole about our foreign policy differences.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Walsh, excuse me just for a second. We have 

less than 5 minutes to get to the Floor for two votes. We will be 

coming back for questions for those of you who do have questions 

and it will be hopefully a relatively short session, but we will be 

back in about 20 minutes. 

Mr. WALSH. Good. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. We stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. WELLER [presiding]. Good afternoon. The Chair would like to 

reconvene the meeting. Good afternoon. We just had a vote on the 

Floor and Chairman Burton and other Members of the Committee 

will be arriving shortly. 

In respect for our witnesses, it would be good to reconvene the 

hearing and get things under way. I would like to begin my questioning with Ms. Ana Julia Jatar. 

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has expressed 

concerns about acts of violence of persecution against human rights 

activists. In fact, in recent testimony before the Commission members of several Venezuelan human rights organizations asserted 

59

the government of Hugo Chavez has labeled members of the 

human rights groups as traitors and coup plotters. 

One example is Carlos Ayala, a former President of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, who has been charged 

with supporting the April 2002 coup against Hugo Chavez, even 

though he was on public record of opposing the coup attempt. 

Charges were filed after Ayala initiated human rights cases 

against the government. 

Human rights groups have also criticized Venezuela’s charges 

against four leaders of your organization for accepting United 

States foreign assistance in a program to encourage citizen participation in elections. 

The four, which include Maria Corina Machado, who met with 

President Bush in May 2005, are charged with conspiring against 

the government and could face up to 16 years in prison. 

Let me ask this. Do those who disagree with Hugo Chavez, those 

who would be defined as being in the opposition, do you fear for 

your safety? Do you fear for the safety of your children? Your family? Your jobs? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes, absolutely. I think that today the combination 

of the new penal code and the new laws that in one way or another 

restrict the airwaves, what is said on TV, what is said on the radio 

is a very dangerous combination for the freedom of expression and 

for the safety of those who are opposing the government of President Chavez. 

As a matter of fact, in my own case I had to give up a job I had 

last year, because it was openly said by members of the administration that while I stayed in that company, the different permissions and the different documentation for the company to maintain 

its activities will not be granted. So I had to resign. 

Fear, I guess that you don’t realize how many liberties have been 

constrained until you start thinking about your children and I 

think that what has happened to some of the leaders of the opposition is that they try to have their children abroad and if they want 

to give a fight, they stay in Venezuela, while the children are 

abroad. 

Mr. WELLER. There is a recent news clipping that I saw where 

armed members of the Venezuelan military were sent into a Jewish 

grade school while the children were present. Is that a frequent occurrence? 

Ms. JATAR. No. That was actually last year and it was a terrible 

mistake by the government. It was very early on Monday morning 

and in fact, they were actually looking for some kind of proof relating a case of prosecutor Danilo Anderson, who was murdered over 

a year ago and his case has not been resolved. 

So under the investigation of this case, they went into the Jewish 

school and that brought back a lot of very terrible memories to 

many of the parents and I have to say that the Jewish community 

has been reducing the number of members in Venezuela. Some of 

them have been fleeing the country. 

Mr. WELLER. It certainly is——

Ms. JATAR. Not because of being persecuted, but they feel in danger. 

60

Mr. WELLER. That is a pretty chilling message to send the military into a grade school, regardless if it is a Catholic, Jewish or 

public grade school. 

Hugo Chavez is in the process of setting up a one and a half million person, both men and women, militia in addition to its traditional standing military of Venezuela. What is the view of the average citizen, particularly those who may disagree with Hugo Chavez 

on President Chavez’s purpose of this one and a half million 

manned citizen militia? 

Ms. JATAR. I have to be very honest here. I am telling the truth, 

but also I want to bring my own personal feelings here. 

The day that President Chavez sworn in that militia, it was a 

very sad day, but it was again in all TV stations and you could see 

this, I don’t know if there were 5,000 or I don’t know how many 

was like the first bunch of militia that was being sworn in by the 

President and you saw the soldiers applauding the President. 

You saw the President speaking to the militia under his command and you saw the lines of all these soldiers in the backyard 

of the military school and you know we were wondering if those militias were to defend us or to attack us. 

Mr. WELLER. The militia, are they present on the street? Do you 

see these individuals walking the streets? 

Ms. JATAR. No. I have to say no. We do know, because we have 

met some of them, that they do have training and that they are 

being paid. We don’t know how many there are anymore, but we 

don’t see them. No. 

Mr. WELLER. Are Cuban security or intelligence personnel involved in the training of this citizen militia? 

Ms. JATAR. There are rumors about that, but I couldn’t say. 

Mr. WELLER. Do you, as an average citizen, do you see Cuban security or intelligence personnel openly walking around the community? Openly participating? 

Ms. JATAR. I see a lot of Cubans in Venezuela now. I had a conversation with a member of the Cuban Embassy a month ago and 

he told me that there were over 25,000 Cubans in Venezuela. So 

it is a very——

Mr. WELLER. How do they——

Ms. JATAR [continuing]. Usual now. You go to beaches and——

Mr. WELLER. How do they keep track of them all if they have got 

25,000 of them running around the country? 

Ms. JATAR. Many of them are medical doctors. I have actually 

interviewed a few of them. Nice people I have to say. 

I have not met, at least I don’t know if I have met, any Cuban 

that is part of the G–2 or member of the security. Obviously, they 

are not going to say who they are, but I have seen and met and 

spoken with many Cubans. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you. I realize I have gone beyond my 5 minutes, but thank you for your participation. 

Ms. JATAR. You are welcome. 

Mr. WELLER. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. Chairman. Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON [presiding]. Mr. Delahunt is fine with me. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Those Cuban doctors, 

were they well received in Venezuela? 

61

Ms. JATAR. The Cuban doctors? Yes. I don’t think that they have 

anything against Cuban doctors. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Are they doing a good job, from what you can 

tell? 

Ms. JATAR. There have been complaints that some of them are 

not doctors and as a matter of fact, as I said, I know a few of them. 

I have to say that I was born in Cuba and I wrote a book on Cuba 

and I remember you, Congressman Delahunt, from other years that 

we were also in this Congress trying to lift the United States embargo. 

So I do have relationship with many Cubans and——

Mr. DELAHUNT. By the way, do you support lifting the travel 

there? 

Ms. JATAR. The Cuban people and the Venezuelan people are 

very similar. Now there is a sense in Venezuela that Cubans are 

welcome. The medical doctors are welcome, but not those who work 

for security. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. There has been a lot of talk about it was selfcensorship being embraced, if you will, by the national media. I 

have to be very candid. When I go to Venezuela, I see article after 

article after article castigating, the President, castigating the Chavez administration. 

I mean if any one of us on this dais were receiving the constant 

criticism and I applaud that by the way, I want to be very clear 

that the media does in terms of the government and the government officials, I cannot accept that self-censorship is being practiced by the Venezuelan media and that is fine. 

But when I hear about the erosion of press freedoms, I am sure 

that from President Bush on down none of us would want to experience the withering criticism that Hugo Chavez receives on a constant almost daily basis from Venezuelan media. 

To me it is one of the most vigorous, healthy presses that I have 

observed. My point is, if it is self-censorship, they are doing an 

awful lousy job of it, because they are out there. They are vigorous. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to select a random week of articles 

that appear in the Venezuelan press and submit them as evidence 

of that statement. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Delahunt, we will be glad to do it. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just say that our hearing was supposed to 

be able to be wrapped up at 1:30 and Mr. Smith, the Chairman of 

the Subcommittee that is coming in next——

Mr. DELAHUNT. So you want me to wrap up? 

Mr. BURTON. If you could and——

Mr. DELAHUNT. I will 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Menendez has a couple of questions and I don’t 

want to keep all these people waiting for the next hearing. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Sure. 

Mr. BURTON. I really apologize for cutting you short. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I appreciate that. I just wanted to bring up the 

issue of Su ́mate. I think that you know that I have made efforts, 

personal efforts to attempt to intervene in that particular issue. 

62

I think at the same time you mentioned Senora Corina Machado. 

It is true that she was at Miraflores in support of Pedro Carmona. 

Is that a fair statement? 

Ms. JATAR. No. She was not in Miraflores in support of Pedro 

Carmona. No. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. She told me she was there. 

Ms. JATAR. She went there with her mother to visit the wife of 

Pedro Carmona, but she was not there supporting Pedro Carmona. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But she was there——

Ms. JATAR. She was there for friend——

Mr. DELAHUNT. She was there as a friend? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. She was there when Mr. Carmona swore himself 

in as President provisional, if you will, of Venezuela. Is that a fair 

statement? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. It was Mr. Carmona who issued certain decrees 

eliminating the National Assembly, abolishing the National Assembly, is that correct? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And abolishing the judicial system, the judiciary? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And null and voided the constitution? Abrogated 

the existing constitution in Venezuela at that time? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. Payne, I——

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman, because of the next hearing coming 

up, I will yield and will not ask any questions. Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Menendez? Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I regret that votes, 

actually, have made this hearing late. 

Mr. BURTON. It was a problem, yes. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. We have witnesses that have traveled a great 

distance, though. I will try to be brief. 

Mr. McSpedon, let me ask you this. You referenced in your testimony that in March of this year amendments to Venezuela’s Criminal Code entered into law. 

According to Human Rights Watch, these amendments extend 

laws that make it a criminal offense to insult or show disrespect 

for the President and other governmental authorities and flout 

international principles that protect free speech. 

In addition to the laws that already protect the President, the 

Vice President, government ministers, state governors and members of the Supreme Court from disrespect, whatever that exactly 

means, the new amendments also cover legislators of the National 

Assembly, members of the National Electoral Council, the Attorney 

General, the Public Prosecutor, the Human Rights Ombudsman, 

the Treasury Inspector and members of the high military command. 

The penalties for breaking this law are also astounding, up to 40 

months in prison for disrespecting the President and up to 20 

months for disrespecting anyone else. 

63

Do we know whether anyone has been convicted yet under any 

of these new amendments? 

Mr. MCSPEDON. I don’t have any information on whether or not 

anyone has been convicted. I do know that the——

Mr. MENENDEZ. Or charged? 

Mr. MCSPEDON. I don’t know of anyone who has been charged. 

Ms. JATAR. General Muson has been charged and he is in prison 

6 years for exactly, because I want to be precise, for condemning 

on TV the use of a flamethrower in an incident in which a number 

of soldiers lost their lives in a military prison. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. He criticized that? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. He was charged under this statute? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. He was found guilty? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes and now he is in prison and was sentenced for 

5 years. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. For 5 years? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. In prison? 

Ms. JATAR. In prison. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. To those who believe that Mr. Chavez is making 

some social progress in his country, this is the essence, the essence 

of the concerns. Imagine, if we could not say something about 

President Bush, how many of my colleagues would be upset. And 

then if they would go to jail as a result of it, for 5 years. 

Let me ask one other question. I note by the way that this is not 

a view of just some of us. Former Czech President Vaclar Havel, 

former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and United 

States Senator John McCain of Arizona are members of an international coalition of more than 70 democrats, small ‘‘d,’’ who sent 

a letter last year to President Chavez expressing concern over the 

prosecution of civic activists in that country, calling it a grave 

threat to democracy. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that letter included for the 

record. 

Mr. BURTON. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. When you look at the lists, you will see that 

there is a very wide expanse of people from the left to the right 

on this list and many who I don’t agree with on other policy issues, 

but nonetheless who felt compelled to make this statement. It is a 

real concern. 

Lastly, Ms. Jatar, in your written testimony you talk about the 

legal problems facing the President and Vice President of Su ́mate, 

Alejandro Paz and Maria Corina Machado. 

You also mentioned that there are 200 political prisoners and 

that many more are facing accusations, persecution and harassment. 

Have you personally been harassed and if so——

Ms. JATAR. Yes. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. If so, how? 

Ms. JATAR. Well, I mentioned earlier that I had to resign to a job 

I had, because there was pressure from the government that I had 

to leave and secondly, also I have had to change my telephone 

64

number three times, because I get death threats during the night 

that have made my children very fearful. 

One of my e-mails was read by one of the members of the governed party as a proof that I was corroborating with the OAS and 

biasing OAS criteria and opinion on the recent elections. 

So yes, you feel that and when you see that everybody around 

you is getting some kind of harassment or some kind of persecution, you realize that you can be next anytime. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Finally, the lists that were put out of those who 

signed the petition that Su ́mate had for the referendum, are those 

still being used? 

Ms. JATAR. Yes. They are still being used and it is being enriched 

with new data. You could download it from the internet. I can look 

up my name and it is there where I live, if I voted or didn’t vote 

in the last election, if I participated or not in so-and-so social government problem. You do feel that big brother is watching you. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just thank you very much. I see Mr. Meeks 

came back, but Mr. Meeks unfortunately there is another hearing 

coming up immediately and we——

Ms. JATAR. Could I leave just something for the record? 

Mr. MEEKS. I just wanted to say because I think I wanted to 

make sure that one thing for the record is clear because Ms. Jatar 

I wanted you to know that from what I heard with you that we 

probably have more in common than that. You are in the minority. 

We are in the minority in Congress. 

I think that clearly I think Mr. Delahunt was right. I think clearly there needs to be opposition to, that is what helps make democracies thrive. 

I would just hope that you know you do it in the way that you 

should do it. Organizing people politically to motivate them to come 

out to vote and things of that nature. 

I don’t have any opposition. I just want to make sure the record 

is clear on that. I do believe that we should do it as a political 

party or in that aspect as opposed to anything else. 

The only thing that I would like to indicate is that, because I am 

a member of the NED board and so I just thought that it was important for me and how I voted on it that I thought that it was 

important that if in fact you are going in as a nonpartisan organization that is one thing, but if you go in as a partisanship, which 

I believe has to happen, I think that there is not an organized opposition in Venezuela and there should be and Su ́mate may be the 

group that needs to get out there to be that organizing element, 

but be that. 

Be the opposition party. Don’t go under the guise of well we don’t 

care which side wins. That is all I said, because I think that here 

we are going to organize and we are going to try to make sure that 

we become the majority party in 2006. We are going to do that. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. God forbid that last comment. We want to thank you very much. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, God has nothing to do with that. 

Mr. BURTON. There are a couple of other documents we want to 

submit for the record and without objection, so ordered. 

65

Thank you very much. I would like to talk to you after we leave 

the meeting, if you might, in the hall. 

Ms. JATAR. Sure. 

Mr. BURTON. Once again, to the Chairman of the Subcommittee, 

Mr. Smith, thank you very much for being so patient. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(67)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

68

LETTER FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE ROBERT MENENDEZ, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY


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