IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 19, 2020

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RANDALL KENNETH REED

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County

No. 281407 Thomas C. Greenholtz, Judge

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No. E2019-00771-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

This appeal arises from the second jury trial of the Defendant-Appellant, Randall 

Kenneth Reed, for which he was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first 

degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and theft of property, and received an 

effective sentence of life imprisonment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), (a)(2), 

39-13-402, 39-14-103. In this appeal, Reed argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying 

his right to self-representation; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, 

which it construed as a motion for reconsideration; (3) the evidence is insufficient to 

establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses; (4) the guilty pleas he made in 

front of the jury should have been assessed and a new jury empaneled to ensure that he 

had a fair and unbiased trial; and (5) the trial court erred in admitting life and death 

photographs of the victim at trial. After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable 

law, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1 and 2 as 

specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are 

affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3, Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

and Remanded for Entry of Corrected Judgments

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES 

CURWOOD WITT, JR., and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Robert DeBusk, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the Defendant-Appellant, Randall Kenneth 

Reed. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D. Ward, Assistant 

Attorney General; Neal Pinkston, District Attorney General; and Andrew Coyle and 

Jason Demastus, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the Appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

09/18/2020
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OPINION

The offenses in this case occurred on June 15, 2011. In September 2011, a 

Hamilton County grand jury indicted Reed for one count of first degree premeditated 

murder, one count of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated 

robbery, and one count of theft of property.

At his first trial, Reed was convicted as charged. Reed appealed, and this court 

reversed his convictions and remanded the case for a new trial based on the admission of 

evidence at trial regarding Reed’s refusal to take a polygraph examination and potential 

suspect Milo Geiger’s request to take a polygraph examination. See State v. Randall 

Kenneth Reed, E2015-01638-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1959497, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

May 11, 2017). 

The proof at trial established that on June 15, 2011, Jane Stokes, the seventy-oneyear-old victim, failed to come to work. James Hutcherson, the victim’s employer, 

believed the victim’s absence was unusual because she always informed him if she was 

going to miss work. Chris Davis, another of Hutcherson’s employees, called the victim’s 

neighbor, Cynthia Price, to ask her to check on the victim. Price, who was already at 

work, asked her daughter, Patricia Steinway, to go to the victim’s house. When Steinway 

informed Price that the victim’s vehicle was parked in the driveway, Price asked 

Steinway to get her copy of the victim’s house key so Steinway could enter the home to 

check on the victim.

Steinway first attempted to enter the victim’s home through the side door, but the 

storm door on the outside was locked, and the key did not fit that lock. She next tried to 

enter through the back door but was unable to gain entry. Finally, Steinway went to the 

front door of the victim’s home, which was not generally used. She discovered that the 

front door was unlocked, which was unusual. Steinway entered the home and finally

found the victim, who was unresponsive and lying on the floor of her bedroom with her 

face “wrapped in plastic[.]” Steinway immediately called 9-1-1.

Detective Julius Johnson of the East Ridge Police Department testified that he and 

two other detectives responded to the crime scene just after 11:00 a.m. on June 15, 2011. 

Detective Johnson said that the deceased victim was lying on her back on the floor of her 

bedroom with a roll of cellophane plastic wrapped around her face and with her wrists 

bound behind her back with zip ties. He noted that the victim’s purse and wallet were on 

her bed, along with several cards that had been removed from her wallet. Detective 

Johnson found a zip tie on the top of the victim’s dresser, which was consistent in type 

and color with the zip ties used to bind the victim’s wrists. He also observed a roll of 
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cellophane in the bedroom that was the same type as the cellophane that was wrapped 

around the victim’s face. 

When Detective Johnson went to the victim’s kitchen, he noticed that the 

cupboards had been opened. In the pantry, someone had emptied a box of Glad Pressand-Seal cellophane wrap and had removed the internal roll. Detective Johnson also 

observed a handprint in a reddish substance on the living room door inside the home. 

Although officers tried to lift fingerprints from the handprint, they were unable to do so. 

Gwen Cribbs, a detective with the East Ridge Police Department, stated that the 

handprint appeared to be paint, rather than blood, because the substance would not lift 

when the officers tried to collect prints from it. 

 

Sandy Kelley, a fraud investigator with First Bank, explained that the victim had a 

checking account with First Bank. After the victim’s death, Kelley noticed some 

suspicious transactions, specifically some automated teller machines (ATM) withdrawals 

and attempts to withdraw money from the victim’s checking account. Kelley said that on 

June 15, 2011, the day of the victim’s death, there was a $303 withdrawal from a First 

Tennessee Bank in Chattanooga, a $202.95 withdrawal from a SunTrust Bank in 

Chattanooga, and a $102 withdrawal from a Bank of America in Rossville. Kelley also 

noticed some unsuccessful withdrawal attempts with the victim’s debit card on the same 

date.

Several bank security employees also testified about withdrawals or attempted 

withdrawals that were made with the victim’s debit card. Mitchell Webber, the vice 

president and security manager for SunTrust Bank in Chattanooga, testified that there 

was one successful withdrawal with the victim’s debit card at a SunTrust branch for 

$202.95 on June 15, 2011, at 6:51 a.m., and an unsuccessful attempt to use the victim’s 

debit card at a second SunTrust branch on June 16, 2011, at 7:14 a.m. Webber said he 

provided photographs of these transactions to law enforcement. Timothy Ramsey, a 

corporate security investigator for First Tennessee Bank, testified that there was a

transaction using the victim’s debit card at a First Tennessee Bank branch on June 15, 

2011. He stated that he provided still photographs, receipts, and a transaction history for 

the victim’s debit card to law enforcement. Amos Frazier, a fraud investigator for 

Regions Corporate Security, testified that he provided photographs of a transaction with 

the victim’s debit card at a Regions branch at 2:24 p.m. on June 15, 2011. 

Chris Moffett, the owner of a construction company, testified that Reed was one of 

his employees and that Reed had done some repair work for the victim in April or May 

2011 while working for him. Moffett said that shortly after the victim’s death, the 

newspaper ran an article that included a bank surveillance photograph of someone using 

the victim’s debit card, and Moffett immediately recognized that the person in the 
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photograph was Reed, and he contacted the police. Moffett said that Reed was wearing a 

white shirt and a ball cap in this surveillance photograph. He also noted that Reed drove 

“a little white midsize . . . sedan type car” and identified Reed’s car in some of the ATM 

surveillance photographs that had already been admitted into evidence. Moffett said he

called Reed on June 16, 2011, and tried to convince Reed to meet him so the police could 

arrest him. He said that the day after this phone call, Reed turned himself into the police.

Daniel Stephenson, an officer in the criminal investigation division of the East 

Ridge Police Department, testified that he collected evidence at the crime scene. He also 

went to the home of Reed’s parents because Reed was thought to live there. Prior to

arriving at this home, Officer Stephenson spoke with Reed’s mother, who gave her 

consent for the officers to search her home. Reed’s parents told him that Reed often used 

the garage and a downstairs bedroom in the house, so he focused his search on these 

areas. Officer Stephenson noted that the garage contained items that were used by both

Reed’s parents and Reed. In the garage, he found several zip ties, both black and clear in 

color. Specifically, he found a 100-count bag of black 8-inch zip ties with 22 zip ties 

missing. He also found some zip ties in the garage that had been interconnected to create 

something resembling handcuffs, which was significant because he knew the victim had 

been bound with zip ties in a “handcuff like fashion.” He also found two gardening type 

gloves on the floor of Reed’s bedroom and some additional zip ties inside this bedroom. 

Officer Stephenson said he attended the victim’s autopsy, where zip ties from the 

victim’s wrists, a blood swatch from the victim, and the cellophane that was wrapped 

around the victim’s head were collected. He noted that the zip ties removed from the 

victim’s wrists were the same color and type and had the same letter and number 

markings as the zip ties inside the 100-count bag that he collected from the Reed’s 

parent’s garage. 

 

On June 17, 2011, officers executed the search warrant of Reed’s car and his motel 

room at the Travel Lodge in Chattanooga. Upon searching the motel room, they 

encountered Reed’s ex-wife, Angelia Westerfield. The officers collected a white shirt 

from a laundry basket in the motel room after Westerfield told them that it was the same 

white shirt Reed had been wearing in the ATM surveillance photograph that was on the 

news. When officers searched Reed’s car, they found two zip ties on the rear floorboard,

a roll of duct tape, and a “quarter wrapper.”

Miranda Gaddes, a special agent forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of 

Investigation (TBI) and an expert in forensic analysis, microanalysis, and physical 

comparison, testified that her microanalysis of the zip ties recovered from the garage, the 

zip ties from the bedroom used by Reed, the zip ties found in Reed’s car, the zip tie on 

the victim’s dresser, and the zip ties used to bind the victim’s wrists revealed that “all the 

physical characteristics, including the color” and “all of the manufacturing 
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characteristics, including the logo, the manufacturing mold numbers, and letter[s] that are 

placed on those, as well as measurements taken of each zip tie were consistent between 

all of [these zip ties].” 

During the investigation into the victim’s death, officers obtained a 

deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample from Reed. Mark Dunlap, a special agent forensic 

scientist with the TBI and an expert in serology and DNA, later compared Reed’s DNA

to the DNA collected from different pieces of evidence. Reed could not be excluded as 

the minor contributor of the partial DNA profile obtained from a wadded piece of Pressand-Seal cellophane wrap found at the crime scene. Agent Dunlap explained that the 

probability of an unrelated individual having the same DNA mixture profile was 1 in 3 

for the African American population, 1 in 3 for the Caucasian population, 1 in 3 for the 

southeastern Hispanic population, and 1 in 4 for the southwestern Hispanic population. 

He said there were no DNA markers found on the piece of Press-and-Seal cellophane that 

were not found in the victim’s DNA or Reed’s DNA, which meant that there was no 

evidence of DNA from a third party on this piece of evidence. 

Agent Dunlap said the victim’s DNA profile was also compared to the DNA 

collected from the white shirt taken from Reed’s motel room, and the major contributor 

of the DNA on that shirt was consistent with the victim’s DNA profile. He said the 

probability of an unrelated individual having the same DNA profile was 1 in 98,810 for 

the African American population, 1 in 27,400 in the Caucasian population, 1 in 52,160

for the southwestern Hispanic population. 

Finally, Agent Dunlap said Reed’s DNA could not be excluded from being a 

minor contributor to the DNA collected from the zip ties used to bind the victim’s wrists. 

He said the probability of an unrelated individual having the same DNA profile was 1 in 

30 from the African American population, 1 in 13 from the Caucasian population, 1 in 15 

from the southeastern Hispanic population, and 1 in 22 from the southwestern Hispanic 

population. He also stated that there were no DNA markers on the zip ties used to bind 

the victim’s wrists that were not found in the victim’s DNA or Reed’s DNA. Agent 

Dunlap acknowledged that touch DNA can be transferred, meaning that it can be 

transferred to one person, and that person can transfer the DNA to another person. 

During Agent Dunlap’s cross-examination, the trial court allowed the defense to conduct 

a demonstration as to DNA transfer, and Agent Dunlap stated that it was “reasonably 

likely that some of [the prosecutor’s] DNA was transferred to the shirt” during this 

demonstration.” 

Dr. James Metcalfe, the chief medical examiner for Hamilton County and an 

expert in the field of forensic pathology, testified that his office performed the victim’s 

autopsy. After reviewing the documents in his office’s file, the written autopsy report, 
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and the accompanying diagrams, Dr. Metcalfe concluded that the victim’s cause of death 

was “suffocation due to plastic wrap around head.” He stated that the Press-and-Seal

plastic wrap had been wrapped so tightly around the victim’s head that it flattened the 

victim’s nose. He also noted that the victim had blood coming out of her nose as a result 

of her suffocation. Dr. Metcalfe also asserted that the victim had bruises on her arms and 

had grooves and scrapes on her wrists, which were caused by her trying to move against 

the zip ties in an attempt to free herself, and Dr. Metcalfe opined that the victim’s death 

would have been frightening and extremely uncomfortable. 

In regard to the defense proof, Linda Reed, the defendant’s mother, testified that 

her son lived with her and her husband at their home on East Stump Street. Mrs. Reed1

asserted that she and her husband had purchased different types of zip ties for the purpose 

of securing electrical wiring in the garage and for hanging Christmas decorations. She 

noted that the prior owner of the East Stump Street house was an electrician, who had left 

screws, bolts, and zip ties in the garage after he moved out. She explained that there were 

several different types of zip ties in a white bucket in their garage and that there were five 

inch zip ties inside drawers mounted to the garage wall. 

Mrs. Reed said that on June 15, 2011, she met her son at 6:30 a.m. at Walgreens to 

collect money for his car payment before she went to work. She knew that her son had 

spent the previous night at a motel in East Ridge with his ex-wife. Mrs. Reed asserted 

that in the late afternoon of June 16, 2011, her son called her, “hysterically crying,” and 

informed her that his picture was on the news and that he was a suspect in a homicide. 

Ms. Reed said her son asked her to pick him up so he could turn himself into the police

for questioning, which she did. 

The Defendant-Appellant, Randall Kenneth Reed, testified in his own defense. He

said that he first became addicted to crack cocaine when he was eighteen or nineteen 

years old and that his addiction issues resulted in him “stealing things,” “burglariz[ing] a 

business,” and committing “various little crimes.” Reed said that in 2011, he obtained

crack cocaine by calling Milo, his drug dealer. 

Reed acknowledged that he had done repair work on the victim’s home in May 

2011. However, he claimed that he only saw the victim for approximately two minutes 

while he was at her home and that he did not know her name. Reed said that while he 

was working at the victim’s home, Milo, his drug dealer, brought him crack cocaine, and 

he smoked it while still on the victim’s property. 

 

1 We have referred to this witness as Mrs. Reed to distinguish her from her son, Randall Kenneth 

Reed, the Defendant-Appellant. Although we have referred to other witnesses by their last name for the 

sake of efficiency, we intend no disrespect to these witnesses. 
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Reed said that on the night of June 14, 2011, he stayed at a motel, rather than at 

his parents’ home, so he could smoke crack cocaine without his parents’ knowledge. 

Reed said he purchased the crack cocaine from Milo, who came by his motel room later 

that night. Reed said that his ex-wife joined him at the motel that night around midnight. 

On June 15, 2011, Reed said he awoke early and put gas in his wife’s car before 

she left for work around 5:30 or 5:45 a.m. When he returned to the motel room, he 

received a phone call on the motel phone from Milo. Milo said he had gotten a debit card

and told Reed he would give him crack cocaine if he used this debit card to withdraw

money from some ATM machines for him. Reed said he was not concerned about the 

criminal implications of using this debit card because this was generally a misdemeanor 

crime that resulted in probation. 

Before he left to meet Milo, Reed called his mother because he had money for his 

car payment. He met her at the Walgreens around 6:20 or 6:30 a.m. on June 15, 2011. 

After meeting his mother, Reed met Milo at a SunTrust Bank. He got into Milo’s 

vehicle, and Milo gave him the victim’s debit card with a sticker that had the PIN number 

written on it. Reed said that Milo bumped into him when he reached over to open the 

passenger door with pliers so Reed could get out. Reed then exited Milo’s car, 

successfully withdrew approximately $200 from the SunTrust ATM, and gave Milo the 

cash, the debit card, and the receipt. Reed said he did not pay attention to the name on 

the debit card while he was using it to withdraw money. At that point, Reed said Milo 

informed him that he did not have the crack cocaine on him and asked him to call him 

later in the day. Reed said he repeatedly called Milo, who finally told him to meet him at 

a First Tennessee Bank branch. Once Reed got there, Milo asked him to do another ATM 

withdrawal, and after Reed withdrew the cash and gave Milo the money, the card, and the 

receipt, Milo gave Reed some crack cocaine, and they left the bank separately. Reed 

identified both his own car and Milo’s sport utility vehicle in one of the bank surveillance 

photographs that had been admitted.

Reed said that night, Milo called him again, and Reed met him at a Bank of 

America, where Milo had him withdraw cash from that ATM. Reed acknowledged that

during the June 15, 2011 transactions, he was wearing a white shirt, ball cap, and shorts. 

Later that day, Reed rented a room at a different motel, and Milo visited him there and 

gave him some more crack cocaine. Still later, Reed met Milo at a Regions Bank, and 

after Reed’s first transaction was unsuccessful, he was able to withdraw money in a 

second transaction. After that, Reed returned to the motel room to meet his ex-wife. 

Reed denied ever going to the victim’s home on June 15, 2011. 
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Reed asserted that on the morning of June 16, 2011, after his ex-wife went to 

work, Milo came to his motel room and drove him to more banks. Reed said that on that 

day he wore a striped brown shirt and jeans and that he and Milo went to a different 

SunTrust Bank on Lee Highway. Although Reed attempted to withdraw additional cash

at this bank, the debit card did not work, and he returned the card to Milo. Reed left and 

called his mother for money, which she gave to him. Later, Reed met Milo again so he 

could get some more crack cocaine and then went back to his motel room, where he

smoked crack cocaine and watched television. As he was watching the news, he saw a 

photograph of him using the victim’s debit card in a news story about the victim’s death. 

Reed said that when he heard that someone had died, he “was horrified” and “couldn’t 

believe that something like that . . . happened.” He immediately called his mother, crying 

hysterically, and told her he “didn’t understand what was going on[.]” Reed asked his 

mother to meet him so he could go to the police station for questioning.

 

Reed said that when Detective Gwen Cribbs later accused him of killing the 

victim, he replied that he did not know who that was. Reed said he told Detective Cribbs 

that he got the victim’s debit card from a guy named Milo and then provided a physical 

description of Milo, Milo’s cell phone number and address, Milo’s grandmother’s 

address, a description of Milo’s sport utility vehicle, and a list of places that Milo 

frequented. Reed said he offered to wear a wire and approach Milo, but Detective Cribbs 

told him they could not do that and continued to insist that Reed had killed the victim. 

When Detective Cribbs offered to help him get a reduced sentence, Reed said he told her, 

“I’m not going to confess to something I did not do.” Reed denied ever harming or 

killing the victim and denied ever being inside the victim’s home on June 15, 2011. 

Reed acknowledged he was wearing the white shirt that the police had collected 

from the laundry basket in his motel room and that was in the photograph that was shown 

on the news. He said he never told Detective Cribbs that Milo brought him crack cocaine 

at the victim’s house; however, he claimed that Detective Cribbs never asked him that 

question. Reed admitted telling Detective Cribbs that Milo had broken into houses in the 

past and that he had given Milo information about which houses to target. He also 

acknowledged that when Detective Cribbs asked him how Milo got access to the victim’s 

house, he replied, “I told him once that . . . [the victim] lived there . . . and that she pretty 

much stayed by herself . . . [and] I didn’t know if anyone else lived there . . . [Milo] was 

supposed to have just broken in. I didn’t know anybody was there or anything.” 

Reed claimed that the victim’s DNA could have gotten on his shirt when Milo 

reached across him to open his car door with pliers at SunTrust Bank on June 15, 2011, 

or when Milo bumped into him at the motel. He admitted that he had provided more 

details about how the victim’s DNA had gotten on his shirt at trial than he had at a 
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previous hearing, when he testified that Milo had bumped into him a few times at the 

motel. 

Reed acknowledged that although he had previously testified on direct

examination to only having a theft conviction and burglary conviction and other “little”

convictions, he also had a prior convictions for arson, two convictions for felony theft of 

property in 2001, and convictions for forgery in 2001, bank fraud in 2008, and forgery in 

1996. 

After Reed’s testimony, the defense recalled Detective Cribbs. Detective Cribbs 

acknowledged that although Reed told her he did not know Milo’s last name, he did give 

her Milo’s phone number. She said that after Reed gave her Milo’s first name and a 

physical description, she used a police database program consisting of information from 

traffic stops, police reports, and field interviews to determine that the description Reed 

had given for Milo matched a person named Milo Geiger, who was a drug dealer. 

Despite this database match, Detective Cribbs said that it took her almost two years to 

obtain an interview with Milo Geiger. She also admitted that although Milo Geiger’s 

DNA was already on file, she did not test Geiger’s DNA against the DNA obtained from 

evidence collected in this case. Ultimately, Detective Cribbs said she cleared Milo 

Geiger as a suspect; she explained that although Reed claimed Milo called him to 

withdraw money from the bank ATM machines, the phone records she subpoenaed for 

Reed and Milo Geiger showed that Reed actually called Geiger multiple times and that 

Geiger never called Reed. Detective Cribbs said that in light of the lie Reed had told 

regarding Milo Geiger calling him to set up the ATM withdrawals, she did not feel it 

necessary to test Geiger’s DNA. 

Detective Cribbs admitted that when she had asked Reed to set up a drug deal with 

Milo, Reed agreed to do this while wearing a wire. She recalled talking to her supervisor 

about this potential drug deal but could not remember whether she had “planned to follow 

through or not originally.” Detective Cribbs acknowledged that Reed initially told her he 

was not the victim’s killer. Although defense counsel suggested during crossexamination that Milo Geiger was a different individual than the Milo identified by Reed, 

Detective Cribbs insisted that Milo Geiger was the same Milo with whom Reed had 

offered to do a drug deal in light of Reed’s description of Milo, the fact that Milo Geiger 

was a known drug dealer in Chattanooga, and the proof regarding Reed’s numerous 

phone calls to Milo Geiger at the time of the first ATM withdrawal. 

 

After hearing the proof presented at trial, the jury convicted Reed of first degree 

premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and theft of 

property. The trial court merged the first degree felony murder conviction with the first 

degree premeditated murder conviction and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. 
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Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a twenty-year sentence for the 

aggravated robbery conviction and an eleven-month-and-twenty-nine-day sentence for 

the theft of property conviction, which were to be served concurrently to one another and 

concurrently to Reed’s sentence of life imprisonment. The trial court entered the

judgments for the first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder 

convictions on July 20, 2018, and entered the judgments for the aggravated robbery and 

theft convictions on October 8, 2018. 

Reed filed a timely motion for new trial2as well as an amended motion for new 

trial. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for new 

trial on April 5, 2019. On May 3, 2019, Reed filed a timely notice of appeal. 

ANALYSIS

I. Right to Self-Representation. Reed contends that the trial court erred in

denying his request to represent himself. He claims he “made a clear and unequivocal 

oral motion for self-representation and later sought self-representation through a valid 

Motion to Dismiss Attorney, asking for advisory counsel in the alternative of being 

granted new counsel.” Reed, while declaring that “legal knowledge is not a prerequisite 

to self-representation,” nevertheless asserts that he was capable of representing himself 

because he knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, even a mid-trial plea, 

because he understood the factual basis required for guilty pleas, and because he 

demonstrated his ability to identify and raise certain issues with the court by filing several 

pro se motions. Reed insists that because the trial court’s denial of his right to selfrepresentation was a structural constitutional error not amenable to harmless error review, 

he is entitled to an automatic reversal of his convictions. See State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 

1, 30 (Tenn. 2010). 

In response, the State contends that while Reed made two requests to dismiss his 

attorney, the record shows that neither of these requests amounted to a clear and 

unequivocal written request to represent himself at trial. Contra State v. Michael A.

 

2

“[W]here there is a single trial for felony murder and the underlying felony, and where the 

sentences are entered on different days, we interpret Rule 33(b) as to require a motion for new trial to be 

filed within thirty days of the day the last sentence is entered.’” State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 801 

(Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Bough, 152 S.W.3d 453, 460-61 (Tenn. 2004)). Because Reed’s motion 

for new trial was filed within thirty days of entry of the aggravated robbery and theft convictions, which 

were the last sentences entered, we conclude that his motion for new trial was timely as to both the 

murder convictions and the aggravated robbery and theft convictions. Accordingly, we will consider 

Reed’s issues on the merits.
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Alderson, No. M2015-01395-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 5543266, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

Sept. 29, 2016) (noting “that the written waiver is required only in the event that the 

defendant is permitted to proceed pro se” and that “[t]here is no requirement that the 

request for permission to waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se be in writing”). 

We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Reed’s requests to represent 

himself. 

Initially, we recognize that a criminal defendant has the right to be represented by 

counsel or the right to represent himself and proceed pro se without the assistance of 

counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9; see Hester, 324 S.W.3d at 30; 

State v. Holmes, 302 S.W.3d 831, 838 (Tenn. 2010); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 44(a) (“Every 

indigent defendant is entitled to have assigned counsel in all matters necessary to the 

defense and at every stage of the proceedings, unless the defendant waives counsel.”). 

The right of self-representation exists “‘despite the fact that its exercise will almost surely 

result in detriment to both the defendant and the administration of justice.’” State v.

Antonio McMiller, No. E2015-01597-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 3947878, at *3 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. July 18, 2016) (quoting State v. Fritz, 585 P.2d 173 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)). 

The issue of whether a defendant has exercised his right of self-representation and has 

simultaneously waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that this 

court reviews de novo, accompanied by a presumption that the trial court’s factual 

findings are correct. Hester, 324 S.W.3d at 29-30. “An error in denying the exercise of 

the right to self-representation is a structural constitutional error not amenable to 

harmless error review and requires automatic reversal when it occurs.” Id. at 30 (citing 

State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008)). 

In order to exercise the right of self-representation, a defendant must waive his 

right to counsel, and this waiver may occur at any stage of the proceedings. Id.

However, “[c]ourts should indulge every presumption against waiver of the right to 

counsel.” Lovin v. State, 286 S.W.3d 275, 287 n.15 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Brewer v.

Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); State v. Worrell, 660 S.E.2d 183, 185 (N.C. Ct. 

App. 2008); Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); State v.

Vermillion, 51 P.3d 188, 192-93 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)). Courts have typically

“assigned a constitutional primacy to the right to counsel over the right of selfrepresentation.” Hester, 324 S.W.3d at 30.

In order to exercise the right of self-representation, “(1) a defendant must make the 

request in a timely manner; (2) the assertion of the right of self-representation must be 

clear and unequivocal; and (3) the assertion of the right of self-representation must reflect 

a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at 30-31 (citing State v.

McCary, 119 S.W.3d 226, 256 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003); State v. Herrod, 754 S.W.2d 

627, 629-30 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 
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2005); United States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000)). Before 

accepting a waiver of the right to counsel, the trial court must advise the accused in open 

court of the right to assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceedings and must 

“determine whether there has been a competent and intelligent waiver of such right by 

inquiring into the background, experience, and conduct of the accused, and other 

appropriate matters.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 44(b)(1). The defendant’s waiver of the right to 

counsel must be in writing and must be included in the record. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 

44(b)(2), (b)(3). “[T]he competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his 

right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent 

himself.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993) (footnote omitted). “[A] criminal 

defendant’s ability to represent himself [or herself] has no bearing upon his [or her]

competence to choose self-representation” Id. at 400 (footnote omitted). 

However, “[t]he right of self-representation is not absolute.” Hester, 324 S.W.3d 

at 31. Even if a defendant’s invocation of the right of self-representation meets the 

aforementioned requirements, “the effectiveness of the defendant’s invocation and waiver 

is not a foregone conclusion.” Id. Notably, there is no right of self-representation when a

defendant “seeks to abuse the dignity of the courtroom or to engage in serious 

obstructionist misconduct.” Id. (citing Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008)). 

Moreover, defendants are not allowed to use the right of self-representation “‘as a tactic 

for delay, for disruption, for distortion of the system, or for manipulation of the trial 

process.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Mosley, 607 F.3d 555, 558 (8th Cir. 2010)). 

In State v. Hester, the trial court declined to allow the defendant to represent 

himself. Id. at 28-29. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that while the trial 

court’s concerns about the defendant’s lack of knowledge of the law and lack of 

competence as a communicator and advocate did not support the denial of the

defendant’s request to represent himself, the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s 

attempting to manipulate the judicial system did provide adequate support for the trial 

court’s denial of the request for self-representation. Id. at 33. After detailing the trial 

court’s ruling concerning this denial, the Hester court stated, “We understand the trial 

court’s ruling as reflecting its conclusions that Mr. Hester was trying to manipulate the 

process to obtain a new lawyer or to have [his former lead attorney] reappointed as lead 

counsel and that Mr. Hester did not have a genuine desire or intent to represent himself at 

trial.” Id. 
- 13 -

In this case, Reed made two attempts to dismiss his trial attorney. Reed’s first pro 

se motion3 was entitled “Motion to Appoint New Counsel. At the March 23, 2018 

hearing on this motion, Reed asked the trial court to dismiss one of his defense attorneys

because he claimed she had failed to meet with him and had discussed his case with other 

inmates. Reed’s defense attorney assured the trial court that she had not talked to 

anyone, other than Reed, about Reed’s case. She also asserted that she had tried to visit 

Reed the prior week, but Reed had refused to talk to her. Reed eventually admitted that 

he had, in fact, refused to speak to defense counsel; however, he claimed that he had to 

write the Board of Professional Responsibility in order to get her to visit him. Defense

counsel then declared that Reed would not talk to her about the investigation she had 

done in his case or about the motions she had filed. She asserted that she had 

“scrutinized the trial transcript [from Reed’s first trial] many, many times” and that she 

was very familiar with the case because she had successfully obtained a reversal of 

Reed’s murder conviction from his first trial. The trial court acknowledged the difficulty 

in having a murder conviction reversed on appeal and then stated, “I don’t see right now, 

Mr. Reed, a basis to grant your motion. If you’re not cooperating with counsel, that’s not 

counsel not doing her job.” When Reed claimed that defense counsel was not

cooperating with him either, the following exchange occurred:

Defense counsel: Judge, I was not even aware there was an issue at all 

until . . . I went to see [Reed] last week and he 

wouldn’t speak to me. But he indicated to me, I told 

him that the Court was probably—based on how the 

Court generally operates, would probably be 

disinclined to appoint new counsel. And he said that 

he would represent himself, and he was not going to 

allow me to do it. So I’ll do whatever the Court wants 

me to do. Of course, despite the Board complaint, I 

don’t have any animosity toward Mr. Reed. I’ll do 

whatever the Court thinks is best.

Trial court: Okay. Well, what I want to do, I haven’t heard 

anything today that would require appointment of new 

counsel on the case. It may be that if there’s a further 

need for communication on the case or an update from

Mr. Reed, I’m certain that can happen going forward 

on it.

 

3 Although this motion is not included in the technical record, a minute entry filed on March 23, 

2018, states that the trial court denied Reed’s pro se Motion to Appoint New Counsel. In addition, the 

transcript of this motion hearing is included in the appellate record.
- 14 -

All right, Mr. Reed, anything else?

Reed: Yes, sir. If you’re not going to remove her from the 

case, I’ll just defend myself. If you’re not going to 

appoint me new counsel. 

Trial court: Your trial date is going to stay where it’s set. So this 

Court does not play games with appointment of 

counsel. We’re on, you know, a couple of months 

before the trial goes [and] then all of a sudden we have 

[a request for] new counsel.

You have given me no basis at all to relieve counsel on 

your case.

Reed: Oh, so, it’s fine for . . . counsel to talk to other inmates 

about my case.

Trial court: I don’t believe that happened. Honestly, I just don’t. 

I know [defense counsel]. [Defense counsel] is bound 

by ethical responsibilities. I just don’t believe that 

[your attorney] is out there talking about [your] case. 

Now, if you want to have people brought in and put 

evidence on, I’m happy to do that.

Reed: Yeah, I can have signed affidavits from them if you 

need that.

Trial court: I think I do. Because I am not going to presume that 

[defense counsel] is out there talking about your case. 

She has ethical duties not to do so. And if she has 

violated her ethical duties in that regard it’d be the first 

I’ve heard of it. 

Reed: That’s why I filed with the Board of Professional 

Responsibility about it.
- 15 -

Defense counsel: They just turn it into a consumer assistance complaint 

and just . . . 

Trial court: Yes, okay. 

Mr. Reed, I don’t have any other motions before me

today so I’m not going to relieve [defense counsel] on

the case, and I’m going to keep the case set for trial. If 

there are other issues we need to take up, you all let me 

know.

After the parties talked about whether defense counsel would file a motion for bond, 

defense counsel, the trial court, and Reed had the following discussion:

Defense counsel: Just two more quick matters. One is just for 

clarification. Mr. Reed has not indicated to me

anything other than the fact that he is maintaining his 

innocence and wants a trial. So there’s not anything 

for me to even discuss with anyone else other than, I 

mean, obviously this case is public record.

Trial court: [Defense counsel], in the absence of any other 

evidence, I would not presume that you’re talking with 

others about the case. I would not even presume that. 

I mean, I know that you have ethical duties that would 

prevent you from doing that. I know that you are an 

ethical lawyer and follow those duties. Absent any 

other proof, no, I don’t credit that. 

Defense counsel: Okay. Thank you. 

And secondly, so for now I am on the case whether—I 

mean, even though . . . he’s insisting he represent[] 

himself . . . I am still on the case; correct?

Trial court: You are representing Mr. Reed on the matter. The 

case is set for trial. There are no other motions before 

the Court presently.
- 16 -

Defense counsel: Yes, sir.

Trial court: Okay. 

All right, Mr. Reed, thank you very much. Motion 

denied. Passed to pretrial conference.

On April 11, 2018, Reed filed a second pro se motion, entitled “Motion to Dismiss 

Attorney,” wherein he complained that defense counsel did not come to see him enough, 

that she stayed only ten to fifteen minutes when she did meet with him, that she did not 

provide any information on his case, and that she had not filed motions she promised to 

file in his case. In this second motion, Reed asked the trial court “to dismiss [defense

counsel] from [his] case and ap[p]oint a new attorney or let [him] defend [him]self with 

[the] help of anothe[r] attorney.” 

At the April 20, 2018 hearing on this second motion, Reed claimed that defense

counsel had not filed the bond motion she promised to file at the March 23, 2018 hearing

and that defense counsel had not visited him since that hearing. Defense counsel replied

that she had filed the bond motion and had gone to see Reed twice since the last hearing

but had been unable to gain access to the jail because it was understaffed. She also said

that she had been interviewing witnesses for Reed’s trial. At that point, the following 

conversation occurred:

Trial court: . . . Mr. Reed, it sounds like work is being done on 

your case. If [defense counsel] were to come out to 

visit you a little more often do you think that would 

. . . solve the issue?

Reed: Yeah, because I mean—yeah, I have a lot of things I 

need to go over with her, but I don’t ever—I can’t 

ever, you know, meet with her or anything.

Trial court: Right. Okay. All right.

Reed: And, I mean, she said she filed [the] bond motion. I

mean, I just filed this [motion] April 11th and we’re 

already hearing my motion.
- 17 -

Trial court: Well, that’s because I put you up specifically. 

Typically when motions are filed in my court, I put 

them off to a conference. I don’t bring them up 

typically. This is a very special case because your trial 

is coming ready on July 17th so that’s why I fasttracked this one. Typically we have a built-in schedule 

so the motions that are filed are put off unless there’s 

an earlier request to set it, . . . so that’s what happened 

here. There’s no magic that you filed motions and 

they’re on the docket and she files motions and they’re 

not. It’s just because I put you on the docket 

specifically to have the discussion.

So, [defense counsel], I know that you are making 

efforts to go see Mr. Reed.

Defense counsel: Yes, sir.

Trial court: Could you continue to make those efforts so that any 

concerns or input that he has can be assuaged?

Defense counsel: I certainly will, Judge.

After discussing a hearing date for the bond motion, the trial court stated, “So, Mr. Reed, 

very respectfully I’m going to deny your motion to relieve counsel and to appoint new 

counsel, but I think we’re all on the same page here.”

 

At the motion for new trial hearing following Reed’s second trial, Reed testified 

that when his first pro se motion was heard, he asked to represent himself, but the trial 

court left defense counsel on the case and “denied his right” to defend himself. Reed

admitted that at the hearing on his second pro se motion, he agreed to keep defense 

counsel as long as she did the things he asked; however, he claimed that he “didn’t have a 

choice” because the trial court was “not going to dismiss her.” Appellate counsel argued 

that Reed was capable of representing himself because he had filed over five pro se 

motions in this case, which prompted the trial court to make the following ruling:

The filing of pro se motions is something that the Court encounters 

regularly. That, in and of itself, is not a clear and unequivocal assertion of 

the right to represent himself. The Court does not recall the circumstances 
- 18 -

that Mr. Reed testifies to today. Very candidly, the record will speak for 

itself in that regard. 

But, in any event, even if an . . . unequivocal waiver of the right to 

counsel and assertion of the right of self[-]representation occurred earlier in 

the case, when the Court held a hearing on the motion itself, on the motion 

that was styled as an alternative request, Mr. Reed did no[t] assert his right 

to self-representation at all. And, in fact, the Court made specific inquiry to 

Mr. Reed whether the measures that the Court had taken to ensure his 

representation by counsel were sufficient to solve his issue, he confirmed in 

open court that it was.

The Court does not credit, to the extent that it matters, his now selfserving statement that he thought it was futile [to assert his right of selfrepresentation on the second motion, which] was in response to a leading 

question. 

We note that at the March 23, 2018 hearing on Reed’s first pro se “Motion to 

Appoint New Counsel, Reed initially complained that defense counsel would not meet 

with him but later admitted that he refused to talk to defense counsel when she tried to

meet with him. Reed also acknowledged that he filed a complaint with the Board of 

Professional Responsibility against defense counsel. When the trial court recognized that 

defense counsel had accomplished a difficult feat in getting Reed’s convictions reversed 

and indicated that it would not grant the motion for new counsel, Reed suddenly declared, 

“If you’re not going to remove [defense counsel] from the case, I’ll just defend myself. If 

you’re not going to appoint me new counsel.” Upon hearing this, the trial court quickly

informed Reed that it “d[id] not play games with appointment of counsel” and that 

“[w]e’re . . . a couple of months4 before the trial goes [and] then all of a sudden we have 

[your request for] new counsel.” The court also made a specific finding that Reed’s

claim that defense counsel had talked to other inmates about his case was not credible.

We acknowledge that defendants “are free to seek to invoke a right of selfrepresentation as an alternative should their request for the appointment of a different 

attorney be denied.” Id. at 33. Nevertheless, we understand the trial court’s statements at 

the March 23, 2018 hearing to be a finding that Reed did not genuinely want to represent 

himself and was simply manipulating the judicial process in order to have a new attorney 

 

4 The record shows that at the time the trial court made this statement, Reed’s trial was set for 

July 17, 2018.
- 19 -

appointed to his case or to delay his trial. Cf. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 546 

(Tenn. 2000) (noting that the right to counsel “does not include the right to appointment 

of counsel of choice, or to special rapport, confidence, or even a meaningful relationship 

with appointed counsel”). “Disingenuous invocations of the right of self-representation 

that are designed to manipulate the judicial process constitute an improper tactic by a 

defendant and are not entitled to succeed.” Hester, 324 S.W.3d at 33 (citing United 

States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1982)). We also recognize that “[a] court 

may deny a manipulative request for self-representation, distinguishing between a 

genuine desire to invoke a right of self-representation and a manipulative effort to 

frustrate the judicial process. Id. (citing United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 271 (4th 

Cir. 2005); United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2000); Edwards v.

Commonwealth, 644 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2007); People v. Marshall, 931 P.2d 262, 272 

(1997)). In analyzing this issue, we conclude that the evidence in the record does not 

preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Reed did not have a genuine desire to 

represent himself and was only making this request to manipulate the judicial process. 

See id. at 34. We, like the Hester court, “are wary of creating incentives for defendants 

to use a request for self-representation as a subterfuge when they lack a genuine desire or 

intent to represent themselves.” Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not 

err in denying Reed’s March 23, 2018 request to represent himself. 

We note that at the April 20, 2018 hearing on Reed’s second pro se motion, which 

was entitled “Motion to Dismiss Attorney,” Reed initially asked the trial court to dismiss 

defense counsel and appoint a new attorney or let him defend himself with the help of 

another attorney. However, upon questioning by the trial court, Reed immediately

acknowledged that his issues with defense counsel would be resolved if she agreed to 

meet with him more often. Consequently, we can easily conclude that Reed’s request for

self-representation at the April 20, 2018 hearing was not clear and unequivocal, as is 

required. For all these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying 

Reed’s requests to represent himself. 

II. Denial of Motion to Suppress. Reed also argues that the trial court erred in

refusing to reconsider his motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of the 

“garage apartment” at his parent’s home. He asserts that his mother had no authority to 

consent to the search of this garage apartment. Relying on proof he presented at the 

motion for new trial hearing following his second trial, Reed argues he had a possessory 

interest in and the right to exclude his parents and others from the “garage apartment”

where zip ties and “non-illegal items” were recovered because he had a lock on the door 

and paid rent for this space. Reed also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to 

reconsider his motion to suppress because his attorney in his first appeal never raised the 
- 20 -

issue that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his “apartment” pursuant to the 

factors in State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 731 (Tenn. 2010).5 

The State counters that because the motion to suppress in this record is the same as 

the suppression motion that was denied prior to Reed’s first trial, the trial court properly 

considered the motion as a motion to reconsider, and Reed has failed to show how the 

trial court erred in refusing to reconsider its previous ruling. The State further asserts that 

even if Reed has shown that the trial court erred in failing to reconsider the motion, the

appellate record does not show that the trial court’s refusal to reconsider the motion to 

suppress was harmful. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to reconsider Reed’s motion to suppress. 

On December 4, 2017, following the remand of this case but prior to his second 

trial, Reed filed a “Motion to Suppress,” seeking to suppress “any and all evidence 

obtained by police during and after the unconstitutional search of [his] garage apartment 

at . . . E. Stump St., East Ridge, Tennessee on June 17, 2011[,] in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 7 of the Tennessee 

Constitution.” In this motion, Reed asserted that he had “rented this garage apartment 

from his parents, paid monthly rent, and maintained a separate lock on same” and that 

“his mother had no authority to consent to police search of same.” Reed also contended 

that the “consent to search signed by his mother authorized the seizure only of ‘stolen or 

contraband items’” and that because he was already in custody, “no exception existed 

relating to his probationary status.” 

At the June 22, 2018 pre-trial hearing on this motion, the trial court said that it had

done “significant research” on whether it had the discretion to reconsider the suppression 

ruling made by a different judge prior to Reed’s first trial and, if so, whether it should 

exercise such discretion. The court noted that “the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not 

recognize motions to reconsider.” Nevertheless, the trial court asserted that State v.

Ryan, 756 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988), recognized a trial court’s inherit 

power to reconsider its own prior decisions. 

 

5

In determining whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in this context, this court 

applies a totality of the circumstances test and the following seven factors: (1) [whether the defendant 

owns the property seized]; (2) whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the thing seized; (3) 

whether the defendant has a possessory interest in the place searched; (4) whether he has a right to 

exclude others from that place; (5) whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that the place would

remain free from governmental invasion; (6) whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy; 

and (7) whether he was legitimately on the premises. Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 731 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 
- 21 -

The trial court also considered the federal authority on this issue. Citing the 

Christianson case, the court recognized that “[a] court has the power to revisit prior 

decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule 

courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as 

where the initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’” 

Christianson v. Colt Inus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (quoting Arizona v. 

California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 (1983)). The trial court also referenced the Gillig case, 

which recognized that 

“[i]t would be utterly destructive . . . if each successive decision resulted in 

the reconsideration of every previous one, and a sequence of decisions in 

the same case based on different views of overlapping issues of law would 

likely result in an internally inconsistent judgment. To avoid the horns of 

this dilemma, it is the practice to treat each successive decision as 

establishing the law of the case and depart from it only for convincing 

reasons.” 

Gillig v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 67 F.3d 586, 589-90 (6th Cir. 1995) 

(quoting James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[4.-1]). In addition, the 

trial court found persuasive the holding in Gillig: “[W]hen a case is transferred from one 

judge to another, it is important that the transferee judge does not hastily disturb the 

rulings of the transferor judge, inasmuch as the utility of such a transfer would be 

seriously compromised if the fact of transfer were to be treated as an invitation to seek a

second opinion on every pre-transfer ruling . . . .” Id. at 590 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). The trial court noted that while Reed’s case had not been 

transferred from another division of criminal court, the situation in this case was 

“analogous” because the trial court, as successor judge, had to decide whether to 

reconsider a decision made by the prior judge who presided over Reed’s first trial. 

Taking into account the aforementioned law, the trial court asserted that it believed the 

proper standard was “whether reconsideration would be in the interest of justice.” 

However, the trial court also recognized that “there may be even perhaps a duty to 

reconsider a suppression issue.” The court specifically referenced Rouse v. United 

States, 359 F.2d 1014, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir. 1966), which held that if “[n]ew facts, new 

light on the credibility of government witnesses, or other matters appearing at trial . . . 

cast reasonable doubt on the pretrial [suppression] ruling,” then it “becomes the duty of 

the trial judge to consider de novo the issue of suppression and, if necessary, hold a 

hearing out of the presence of the jury.” In addition, the trial court acknowledged that 
- 22 -

“reconsideration [of a suppression ruling] may be necessary when the law is changed or 

[when a] previous [decision] is clearly erroneous or [not in the interest] of justice.” 

The trial court, after reviewing the aforementioned the law, then made the 

following findings:

In this case as the Court looked back through the motions that were 

previously filed as well as the new arguments that have been raised, the 

Court does not find the presence of extraordinary circumstances that would 

cause this Court to reconsider the previous rulings. Based upon the factors 

that the Court has identified earlier, the Court doesn’t believe that there 

would be a duty to reconsider. The Court is particularly persuaded in 

what’s mentioned in [Waste Management of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 

169 Fed. Appx. 976, 987 (6th Cir. 2006),] that to allow reconsideration 

without extraordinary circumstances following the first appeal of the case

[yields inconsistent] results. The Court very much agrees with the 6th 

Circuit[’s conclusion in Waste Management of Ohio] that it would be 

[absurd] that a party who has chosen not to argue [a point] on first appeal 

should stand better [as] regards the law [of the] case [than one who had 

argued and lost]. Although our appellate courts may take a different view, 

under the circumstances of this case[,] perhaps the Court finds the [Waste 

Management of] Ohio case particularly persuasive. 

So the Court would deny reconsideration of the other motions. 

At the motion for new trial hearing following Reed’s second trial, appellate 

counsel presented proof from Reed, who testified that he paid $350 a month in rent to his 

parents and that he kept a separate lock on his room, to which his parents did not have 

access. After hearing this proof, the trial court noted that the defense had the

“opportunity . . . to have offered that evidence” when the suppression motion was 

originally litigated prior to Reed’s first trial. It also noted that Reed, in his appeal 

following his first trial, never raised a Fourth Amendment issue regarding the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress. When appellate counsel asserted that a failure to raise 

this issue on appeal would not bar Reed from raising it at this time, the trial court stated, 

“The real issue is whether this Court now has acted outside of its discretion in refusing to 

reconsider a motion. Not whether the Fourth Amendment issue on its substance is 

there[.]” The trial court reiterated much of the case law on which it relied at the June 22, 

2018 hearing, and then the following discussion transpired:
- 23 -

Trial Court: So is . . . the issue here really a 4

th Amendment issue, 

or is [it] whether the Court acted outside of its 

discretion in failing to reconsider the previous issue 

after it was not challenged on appeal?

Defense Counsel: I do believe that it goes to the heart of the 4

th

Amendment violation, Your Honor. If that is the state 

of the law that because it was not raised on first 

appeal, that it is now I guess [in a] sense, waived, 

and/or [defense counsel] may have also waived 

argument as to extraordinary circumstances[,] despite 

the likelihood of new evidence which may have 

changed this Court’s opinion. It is beginning to sound 

to me like that is more of a [post-conviction] issue[,]

which may be raised at a later date[,] than it is [a]

motion for new trial [issue], Your Honor.

Trial Court: I’m not certain the Court’s holding [is] that it’s 

waived. But I think the Court’s holding previously 

was that there were not extraordinary circumstances 

such as the one the Court identified earlier that would 

have required reconsideration on the first issue.

At the conclusion of this discussion, the trial court denied relief on this ground.

We recognize that “[a] motion to reconsider or to reopen the proof taken at a 

suppression hearing is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this 

Court will not interfere with that discretion absent a showing that an injustice occurred as 

a result of the denial of the motion.” State v. McClure, 74 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 2001) (citing State v. Moore, 775 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989); State 

v. Bell, 690 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985)). Before an “injustice” can be 

said to have transpired due to the denial of such a motion, “it must be established by the 

party aggrieved that the evidence sought to be introduced would establish that a different 

result would probably be reached by the trial judge in the resolution of the motion to 

suppress.” Moore, 775 S.W.2d at 375 (citing Bell, 690 S.W.2d at 882).

Here, Reed maintains that if the trial court had agreed to reconsider his motion to 

suppress, then it would have reached a different result regarding the suppression motion. 

The record shows that at the motion for new trial hearing following Reed’s second trial, 
- 24 -

the trial court allowed Reed to present proof about his claimed privacy interest in the 

room at his parent’s home and the right to exclude his parents and others from this room. 

However, the trial court ultimately held that no extraordinary circumstances existed that 

would cause it to reconsider the suppression ruling made by the prior judge assigned to 

Reed’s first trial. 

The appellate record from Reed’s first appeal shows that the parties had a “pretrial 

suppression hearing” concerning Reed’s claim that he “paid rent and therefore his mother 

could not voluntarily consent” to a search of his room. Accordingly, this record clearly 

establishes that Reed raised these same suppression issues prior to his first trial but failed 

to include them in his first appeal. See Rouse v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 300 F.3d 711, 

715 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the law of the case doctrine, which generally prevents 

reconsideration of claims that have been decided at a previous stage in the same 

litigation, “also bars challenges to a decision made at a previous stage of the litigation 

which could have been challenged in a prior appeal, but were not”). Although Reed was 

hopeful that the successor judge assigned to his second trial would be more inclined to 

suppress this evidence than the prior judge had been, the successor judge had no 

obligation to do so. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817 (“A court has the power to revisit 

prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule 

courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as 

where the initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. Petroleum 

Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tenn. 1998) (recognizing that the 

law of the case doctrine “is not a constitutional mandate nor a limitation on the power of 

a court” but “is a longstanding discretionary rule of judicial practice which is based on 

the common sense recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of 

competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be revisited”).

After considering the proof presented in conjunction with the Talley factors, we 

conclude that Reed has failed to establish that this proof would have caused the successor 

judge to reach a different result as to his suppression motion. The record indicates that 

Reed’s mother, who lived with her husband at the home on East Stump Street, had 

common authority over the premises and had the authority to consent to the search of 

Reed’s bedroom. “Common authority is defined as the ‘mutual use of the property by 

persons generally having joint access or control . . . so that it is reasonable to recognize 

that any of the co-habitants has the right to permit [an] inspection . . . and that the others 

have assumed the risk . . . .” Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 734 (quoting United States v.

Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)); see State v. Ellis, 89 S.W.3d 584, 593 (Tenn. 

2000) (“The State may satisfy its burden of proof in this regard either by demonstrating 

that the third party in fact possessed common authority as defined above or, alternatively, 

by demonstrating that the facts available to the searching police officers would have 
- 25 -

warranted a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had 

authority over the premises.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). After 

considering this case law, it is evident that no injustice occurred in this case. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 

reconsider Reed’s suppression motion. 

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Next, Reed argues that the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain his convictions. Although he does not challenge the evidence 

supporting the elements of each of the conviction offenses, he does contend that the State 

failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of these offenses beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The State counters that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Reed was the 

perpetrator in the victim’s murder and robbery in light of the DNA, surveillance, and 

microanalytical proof that was presented at trial. We agree with the State that the 

evidence is sufficient to sustain all of Reed’s convictions. 

At the motion for new trial hearing following Reed’s second trial, appellate 

counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Reed’s identity as the 

perpetrator in this case. Specifically, he claimed the evidence was insufficient “based on 

the trial testimony, based on the incomplete investigation by the [Chattanooga Police 

Department] into other potential culprits, based on the fact that these zip ties are 

ridiculously common, . . . based on the fact that it is being more and more acknowledged 

by the bar and by scientists every day . . . that secondary and tertiary DNA transfers are 

becoming more and more of a problem.” In considering this ground, the trial court noted 

that it allowed “a demonstration [to the jury of DNA transfer] over the vigorous objection 

of the State[,]” and that the jury “rejected the [defense] theory” and “rejected [Reed’s] 

credibility.” The trial court, recognizing that legal sufficiency is “a deferential standard 

after the verdict,” ruled that “the proof is legally sufficient to support [Reed’s] 

conviction[s].” 

“Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and raises a 

presumption of guilt, the criminal defendant bears the burden on appeal of showing that 

the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.” State v. Hanson, 279 

S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)). 

“Appellate courts evaluating the sufficiency of the convicting evidence must determine 

‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tenn. 2012) 

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). 

When this court evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the State is entitled 

to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be 

drawn from that evidence. State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State 
- 26 -

v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn. 2010)).

“[T]he perpetrator’s identity is an essential element of every criminal offense.” 

State v. Bell, 512 S.W.3d 167, 198 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 662). The 

State has the burden of proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator beyond a 

reasonable doubt. State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 779 (Tenn. 1998). The identity of the 

defendant as the perpetrator may be established by direct evidence, circumstantial 

evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tenn. 

1975). The identification of the defendant as the perpetrator is a question of fact for the 

jury after considering all the relevant proof. Bell, 512 S.W.3d at 198 (citing State v.

Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 388 (Tenn. 2005)). In resolving questions of fact, including 

determining the identity of a perpetrator, “‘the jury bears the responsibility of evaluating 

the conflicting evidence and accrediting the testimony of the most plausible witnesses.’” 

State v. Pope, 427 S.W.3d 363, 369 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting State v. Hornsby, 858 S.W.2d 

892, 897 (Tenn. 1993)). 

Here, Reed challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his 

identity as a perpetrator in this case; therefore, we will not detail the elements of each of 

the conviction offenses. Reed maintains that he was not at the victim’s home at the time 

she was murdered and that the DNA evidence admitted at trial never linked him to the 

crimes. Specifically, he claims there was no proof linking him to the cellophane wrapped 

around the victim’s head and “[a]t best, the State could only demonstrate that [he] ‘could 

not be excluded’” from the DNA profile found on the zip-tie on the victim’s wrists, 

which he claims represented a “7.7% chance6 of misidentification.” He also asserts that 

the lead detective failed to test the “on-file DNA of a second suspect,” presumably Milo 

Geiger, and that the police failed to gather other potential DNA samples from the scene 

and failed to properly follow up on “a second, known potential suspect,” also presumably 

Geiger, whom Reed claims possessed the victim’s debit card before giving it to him.

Reed insists that he presented proof at trial regarding the possibility of tertiary DNA 

transfer among the victim, this other suspect, and him. Reed also claims that the presence 

of zip ties in his car can be explained by the fact that he worked in construction and that 

the zip ties were used for electrical purposes around his parents’ home and garage. In 

addition, he claims that the similarities between the zip ties from his car and the ones on 

the victim’s wrists show “at best that the zip ties, which are common use to individuals 

even outside of electrical or construction jobs, have consistencies due to factory 

manufacturing.” Reed argues that “[w]ithout further proof that [he] was tied to anything 

 

6 Agent Dunlap actually testified that the probability of an unrelated person having the same 

DNA profile as the DNA found on the zip-ties used to bind the victim’s wrists was 1 in 13 from the 

Caucasian population, which represents a 7.14% chance that Reed did not deposit the DNA found on this 

piece of evidence. 
- 27 -

beyond having a smudge of . . . the victim’s makeup on his shirt and possession and use 

of [the victim’s] stolen [debit] card as pled to by [him],” this court should reverse his 

convictions. 

At trial, the State presented strong proof of Reed’s identity as the perpetrator. The 

white shirt the police recovered from the motel room in which Reed stayed the night of 

June 15, 2011, contained DNA that was consistent with the victim’s DNA profile. 

Although Reed argued at trial that the victim’s DNA on his shirt could be explained by 

“tertiary DNA transfer,” the State is entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be 

drawn from this evidence, including the inference that Reed got the victim’s DNA on his 

shirt when he perpetrated the crimes against the victim. See Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729.

The evidence also showed that Reed could not be excluded as a minor contributor of the 

DNA samples collected from the wadded piece of cellophane and the zip ties used to bind 

the victim’s wrists, and there was no DNA on these items that belonged to anyone other 

than Reed and the victim. Moreover, several surveillance photographs admitted at trial

showed that Reed, who was wearing the same white shirt collected by the police, used the 

victim’s debit card on the day of the victim’s murder to withdraw money from several 

ATM machines. Although Reed claimed that Milo, his drug dealer, gave him the victim’s 

debit card and that Reed used this card in exchange for crack cocaine, the jury clearly 

rejected this defense theory with its verdicts. Finally, the State presented proof that the 

zip ties used to bind the victim’s hands were a microanalytical match to the zip ties

collected from Reed’s car as well as the bedroom and the garage used by Reed. In total,

the evidence at trial showed that a DNA profile consistent with the victim’s DNA was 

found on Reed’s shirt, that Reed could not be excluded as a minor contributor of the 

DNA on the cellophane or zip-ties at the crime scene, that Reed possessed and used the 

victim’s debit card the day she was murdered, and that Reed had numerous zip ties that 

were a microanalytical match for the ones used to bind the victim’s wrists. Given this 

proof, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Reed was the 

perpetrator of the offenses in this case. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is

more than sufficient to sustain Reed’s convictions. 

IV. New Jury Empaneled. Reed also argues that his guilty pleas should have 

been immediately assessed and a new jury empaneled, upon acceptance or rejection of 

the pleas, in order to ensure that he had a fair and unbiased trial. See Jones v. State, 403 

S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tenn. 1966). He asserts that although he attempted to plead “guilty to 

theft of property on the basis of receiving the property and withdrawing the amounts from 

the [debit] card,” the State stopped his plea to this count and called into question the 

factual basis of the plea, which caused the trial court to reject his guilty plea two days 

after it was made in front of the jury. Reed claims that the State then proceeded at trial on 

a different theory for the theft charge than the one announced during the guilty plea

colloquy and later “used” his guilty plea to this charge during its rebuttal closing
- 28 -

argument, which resulted in the jury’s convicting him of first degree premeditated 

murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery. Reed insists that because 

“no amount of limiting instructions would have ‘put the genie back in the bottle[,]’ . . . a 

repaneling [sic] of the jury was necessary to a fair and unbiased trial thereafter.” The 

State responds that because Reed never requested a mistrial after the trial court rejected 

his guilty plea to theft of property, this issue is waived, and that waiver notwithstanding, 

Reed has not shown the trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial under these 

circumstances was plain error. We conclude that Reed has waived this issue and is not 

entitled to plain error relief. 

The record reflects that Reed raised this issue for the first time in his motion for 

new trial. Accordingly, we agree with the State and conclude that Reed has waived

plenary review of this issue by failing to “take whatever action was reasonably available 

to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). Significantly, 

when the trial court rejected his guilty plea to the theft of property charge, Reed never 

contemporaneously objected and never requested a mistrial. See State v. Robinson, 971 

S.W.2d 30, 42-43 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (“[F]ailure to make a contemporaneous 

objection or motion for mistrial constitutes a waiver of the issue absent the existence of 

plain error.”). Accordingly, Reed has waived plenary review of this claim, and we may 

only review this issue for plain error. However, Reed has failed to request plain error 

relief as to this issue and, consequently, has failed to provide any analysis of the five 

factors required for plain error review. 

In order for this court to find plain error,

“(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a

clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a 

substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the 

accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of 

the error is ‘necessary to do substantial justice.’”

State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282 (2000) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 

641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). “[P]lain error must be of such a great magnitude that it 

probably changed the outcome of the trial.” Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 642 (citations and 

internal quotations marks omitted). It is the defendant’s burden to persuade an appellate 

court that the trial court committed plain error. State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 808 

(Tenn. 2010). “[T]he presence of all five factors must be established by the record before 

this Court will recognize the existence of plain error, and complete consideration of all 

the factors is not necessary when it is clear from the record that at least one of the factors 
- 29 -

cannot be established.” Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 283. A recognition of plain error “should be 

limited to errors that had an unfair prejudicial impact which undermined the fundamental 

fairness of the trial.” Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 642.

Given the particular circumstances in this case, Reed has failed to establish that a 

clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached or that a substantial right of the defendant 

was adversely affected. The record shows that Reed failed to notify the trial court or the 

State of his intent to enter guilty pleas in front of the jury to the four charges for 

fraudulent use of a debit card and one charge for theft of property. See Tenn. R. Crim. P.

11(c)(2)(B) (stating that “[e]xcept for good cause shown, the parties shall notify the court 

of a plea agreement at the arraignment or at such other time before trial as the court 

orders”) (emphases added); State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1, 40 (Tenn. 2017) (concluding 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept the defendant’s guilty

pleas when the defendant admitted guilt to the relevant offenses three years prior and 

waited until after a jury was sworn, jeopardy had attached, witnesses were summoned, 

and the trial was underway before asking the trial court to accept his guilty pleas); State 

v. Todd, 654 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tenn. 1983) (“The trial judge may accept or reject the plea 

agreement in the exercise of his discretion.”). Once the trial court realized that Reed was 

pleading guilty to these offenses in the presence of the jury, it immediately announced 

that it would not accept the guilty pleas. A short time later, the trial court provided a 

curative instruction to the jury, stating that while it had accepted Reed’s pleas of not 

guilty in case number 281407, it had not accepted Reed’s “pleas with respect to the 

remaining count[s] in both indictments.” The court then instructed the jury that “[Reed] 

starts this trial with a clean slate, with no evidence at all against him, and the law 

presumes that he is innocent.” The court added that “[t]he presumption of innocence 

stays with [Reed] throughout the trial[,] and it is not overcome unless and until the State 

presents evidence here in court that overcomes that presumption and convinces you 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.” The trial court, upon being surprised with 

Reed’s guilty pleas, provided a detailed curative instruction to the jury about Reed’s 

presumption of innocence and the fact that the prosecution had the burden of proving 

guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and we must presume that the jury followed this 

instruction. See State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 323 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Shaw, 37 

S.W.3d 900, 904 (Tenn. 2001).

It is also clear that Reed waived this issue for tactical reasons. Based on the 

defense’s opening and closing statements, as well as its proof, the defense theory at trial 

was that while Reed was guilty of fraudulent use of a debit card and theft of property, he 

was not guilty of murdering or robbing the victim. Therefore, Reed’s attempt to plead 

guilty to these offenses in front of the jury at the beginning of his trial was made for the

tactical purpose of cementing this defense theory in the minds of the jurors. 
- 30 -

Finally, Reed has failed to establish that consideration of the error is “necessary to 

do substantial justice.” Reed failed to notify the trial court or the State of his intent to 

enter a guilty plea in front of the jury to the four charges for fraudulent use of a debit card 

and one charge for theft of property, a decision of which defense counsel were well 

aware. Because Reed created the issue of which he now complains, this circumstance 

heavily weighs against a finding that consideration of the error is “necessary to do 

substantial justice.” Moreover, we recognize that there was overwhelming evidence of 

Reed’s guilt presented at trial. The proof showed that a DNA profile consistent with the 

victim’s DNA was found on Reed’s shirt, that Reed could not be excluded as a 

contributor of the DNA on the cellophane or zip ties found at the crime scene, that Reed 

possessed and used the victim’s debit card the day she was murdered, and that Reed had 

numerous zip ties that were a microanalytical match for the ones used to bind the victim’s 

wrists. Because Reed has failed to establish that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 

breached, that a substantial right of the defendant was adversely affected, that he did not 

waive the issue for tactical reasons, or that consideration of the error is “necessary to do 

substantial justice,” we conclude that he is not entitled to plain error relief on this claim. 

V. Admission of Photographs of the Victim. Lastly, Reed argues that the trial 

court erred in admitting, over his objection, life and death photographs of the victim at 

trial. The State responds that the life and death photographs were properly admitted. We

agree with the State. 

At the June 22, 2018 hearing, the State notified the trial court that it intended to 

introduce a life photograph of the victim pursuant to Code section 40-38-103(c) to show 

the victim’s general appearance and condition while alive pursuant to the statute. When 

the trial court questioned how the victim’s appearance would be relevant to the issues at 

trial, the State replied, “I want [the life photograph] in because I want the jury to see the 

victim. I’ll just be blatant with the Court. I think that there could be some arguments.” 

The trial court then stated:

The reason the issue is concerning a little bit [is] because I have 

what appears to be from [State v.] Adams[, 405 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2013),]

clear [Tennessee] Supreme Court authority saying trial courts really need to 

watch this. And if the real reason [the State is offering the life photograph] 

is to show how the victim looked, despite what I would believe to the 

contrary, it’s not relevant. And then I have the General Assembly saying it 

absolutely is relevant. And so I’ve got a conflict between the two branches 

of government about what this court [should do].
- 31 -

After engaging in a discussion regarding how State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473

(Tenn. 2001), would apply to this issue, the trial court told the State, “If you would like to 

take this issue back up on the morning of trial and submit to the Court the State’s reason 

and response on how the statute would not violate the separation of powers, I would love

to consider it.” The State explained that its intent in addressing the life photograph at that 

point was to disclose it pursuant to discovery, and the trial court said, “Let’s hold that 

issue [regarding the potential separation of powers problem] in abeyance. . . . There may 

not even be an objection to it on the basis of relevance. If not, then we don’t reach the 

constitutional issues.” 

On July 17, 2018, at a jury-out hearing immediately prior to the start of trial, the 

State asserted that it would not be proceeding under the Code section 40-38-103(c) but 

did want to admit the life photograph of the victim to prove that this was “an intentional 

killing” and that Reed acted with “premeditation. The State said its theory was that “the 

deadly weapon used in this case was the cellophane that was wrapped around [the 

victim’s] face causing her suffocation.” It asserted that “the tightness of that [cellophane] 

wrap and the impact that it had on her nose, her inability to breathe, is absolutely up for 

dispute in this case[.]” 

The State also asserted that it was seeking to admit two photographs of the victim 

taken at the medical examiner’s office to show the marks on the victim that were caused 

“during the course of her death,” either “[d]uring her struggle to survive or during the

struggle that ensued when she was being . . . murdered.” The State said that although it 

knew that the court had to look very closely at autopsy photographs to ensure that they 

did not prejudice the jury, it had “been very judicious in choosing those [two] 

photographs.” 

The defense immediately objected to the life photograph of the victim on the 

grounds that the photograph was irrelevant and “highly prejudicial.” When the trial court 

asked defense counsel how the life photograph was prejudicial, the following discussion 

occurred: 

Defense Counsel: [T]he idea that the only way we’re going to be able to 

prove premeditation is to show how [the victim’s] nose 

is oddly shaped after having her head wrapped in 

cellophane is a stretch, to say the least, Judge. I mean 

anyone who looks at a person with cellophane 

wrapped around their head knows that they died of 

asphyxiation. There is simply no reason to show a 

photograph that is purely about being held up at 

closing arguments saying this sweet [victim], or 
- 32 -

whatever it is, Judge. You see? So my argument is 

it’s, you know, way prejudicial.

Trial Court: Okay.

The State: Judge, the State’s theory is not that she died of 

asphyxiation. I think if that’s all that the State had to 

prove, this trial would be very different. The State has 

to prove intent and premeditation, so it’s much more 

than just how this victim died. 

Trial Court: Okay. I think as an objection under 401 and 403 as 

offered by the State, the Mallard issues that concerned 

the Court previously no longer exist, and so the Court 

now is looking to what the probative value of the life 

photograph would be and then balance that with the 

corresponding dangers of, as articulated here, unfair 

prejudice. 

In this case, the life photograph[], the Court finds, [is]

probative insofar as premeditation is an issue. For 

example, there’s no strict standard that governs what 

constitutes proof of premeditation, though the 

circumstances in the case could allow a jury to infer 

premeditation from a variety of factors.

One that the court of criminal appeals has recognized 

is the particular cruelty of the killing. . . .The tightness 

with which the cellophane had been wrapped around 

the face could support a finding of premeditation, the 

nature of the killing also . . . . So the Court finds there 

is probative value and relevance to the photograph. 

With respect to . . . whether the life photograph itself is

prejudicial, the Court doesn’t see anything about the 

life photograph[] [itself] that would be inherently 

prejudicial . . . , at least under those theories, and so 

the Court would admit the life photograph[] under the 

balancing test in 403. 
- 33 -

With respect to the autopsy photos, [defense counsel], 

. . . to address your objection specifically with respect 

to the [autopsy] photograph that I’m holding here with 

[the victim] with the cellophane, your arguments are 

well taken. The Court believes that those arguments 

go to the weight of the evidence, maybe not 

necessarily to the admissibility of the evidence, and 

certainly the Court would expect you to make those 

arguments to the jury. 

[Defense counsel], do you have any further objections 

to the autopsy photos?

Defense Counsel: No, Your Honor. That’s what [we] discussed.

Trial Court: Okay. With respect to the autopsy photos themselves, 

the Court also finds that those photographs have 

probative value. Insofar as premeditation is 

concerned, the [probative] value of the photographs as 

evidence is important in terms of their clarity, in terms 

of perhaps of their accuracy.

There may be—as the testimony develops with the 

medical examiner, there may be other issues the Court 

could take up later, but at least as of right now the 

Court does not believe that the two [autopsy] 

photographs are so graphic or gruesome such that the 

danger of unfair prejudice here would outweigh the 

probative value. The Court does not find that the 

primary purpose of the photographs, at least now 

before the evidence is taken, would be designed to 

elicit emotions of bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, 

retribution or horror.

So I think right now, General, with respect to these 

photographs, . . . the Court does not make a finding 

that . . . the nature of the photographs themselves are 

so gruesome that it would prohibit their introduction. 
- 34 -

At trial, the State admitted the life photograph of the victim during Cynthia Price’s 

testimony. The State asked Price if the photograph accurately reflected the victim’s 

physical appearance prior to her murder, and Price responded affirmatively. Before this

photograph was admitted, the defense asserted that it had no objections to this photograph 

other than the objections on which the trial court had already ruled. 

The State admitted one death photograph of the victim during Patricia Steinway’s

testimony. This photograph depicted the victim on the floor of her bedroom with 

cellophane wrapped around her head and with her hands bound behind her back. 

Steinway acknowledged that this photograph of the victim fairly and accurately depicted 

what she saw when she found the deceased victim on June 15, 2011. She stated that she 

was unable to see the victim’s face because it was “wrapped in plastic[,]” and the victim 

“wasn’t moving.” 

During Officer Johnson’s testimony, the State admitted several photographs of the 

crime scene, including seven photographs that depicted the deceased victim. The 

defense, out of the hearing of the jury, objected that the number of photographs was 

“prejudicial.” The trial court, overruling the defense’s objection, noted that the 

photographs “portrayed different perspectives of the victim” and that “none of the 

photographs [were] duplicative in their nature.” The trial court also held that “outside of 

the nature of the act itself[,]” the photographs were “not particularly gruesome.” At that 

point, the defense asserted that “if there is no reason to have different perspectives, . . . 

then it’s just duplicative and [the photographs are being presented] for the [purpose] of 

prejudicing the jury.” The trial court stated that “the different perspectives [were]

necessary for the jury to have a sense of the surroundings,” which made the photographs 

“probative.” The court also held that because it did not “think the danger of unfair

prejudice would outweigh [the photographs probative value],” the photographs were 

admissible. 

During Dr. Metcalf’s testimony, the State admitted two photographs, Exhibits 105 

and 106, that were taken at the time of the victim’s autopsy. Exhibit 105 showed bruising 

on the victim’s right arm, and Exhibit 106 showed how the victim’s nose had been 

flattened from the cellophane that had been so tightly wrapped around her face. 

At the motion for new trial hearing, appellate counsel argued that “it [wa]s clear 

from the autopsy report alone that there had been premeditation” and “[t]he fact there 

there were [life and death photographs of the victim] that were admitted despite the 

existence of this autopsy report and other pieces of evidence which could have been used 

to prove [premeditation], severely lowers the probative value of the photographs 

[admitted].” The trial court responded that although it believed initially that the State 

was offering the life photograph of the victim to show a life in being, implicating 
- 35 -

Mallard, by the first day of trial it became clear that the State was actually offering the 

life photograph “by way of comparison to the autopsy photographs [to show] how tightly 

the cellophane was wrapped.” The court added that “the cellophane had been wrapped so 

tightly around [the victim’s] head that her nose was flattened essentially, [which] was 

probative of premeditation.” Appellate counsel insisted that the autopsy report 

“diminished the probative value of the photographs” and then asserted that the death 

photographs were “gruesome.” Citing State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 199-201

(Tenn. 2016), the trial court countered that “if the photograph is gruesome . . . only 

because the nature of [the] killing itself is gruesome[,] then prejudice is less likely to exist 

there because the State has the right to prove the nature of the crime.” Appellate counsel 

replied that he believed “the jury did not have to see these photographs in order for the 

State to possibly prove its case” and argued that these photographs admitted for “purely . 

. . or almost purely, emotional rhetoric as opposed to any kind of substantive value[.]” 

At that point, the trial court stated:

All right, the Court will very respectfully deny the motion for new trial on 

this ground for the reasons stated at trial. But the Court would reiterate, 

even under the State [v.] Banks[, 564 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tenn. 1978),] test 

. . . the Court believed then, as it does now, that [the] autopsy photographs 

. . . had probative value in the case.

The photographs, particularly in comparison with the life 

photograph, were clearly relevant and had significant probative value to 

show the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries, and w[ere] probative 

particularly to premeditation.

The Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that . . . autopsy 

photographs [that are] probative of premeditation may be admitted. That’s 

State [v. David G.] Jenkins[, No. M2016-00270-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL

1425610 (Tenn. Crim. App.] April 21, 2017[)]. As well as [Edgar Ray] 

Bettis [v.] State, [No. M2017-01845-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 3342830

(Tenn. Crim. App.] July 9, 2018[)]. I think Bettis may have also quoted 

Davidson . . . , noting that post-mortem pictures can also be relevant to the 

issue of deliberation or premeditation.

. . . [H]ere, the probative value must be substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice. And as our courts have noted, State [v.]

James[, 81 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn.] 2002[)], . . . Rule 403 is a rule of 

admissibility and it places a heavy burden on the parties seeking to exclude 

the evidence.
- 36 -

. . . [I]n State [v.] Zeigler, [No. M2017-01091-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 

WL 484647 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 7, 2019), the Court of Criminal 

Appeals] went further to note that excluding relevant evidence under Rule 

403 is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. And persons 

seeking to exclude otherwise admissible and relevant evidence have a 

significant burden of persuasion.

And in this case, the Court does not believe that the prejudice, if 

there is any, outweighs the probative value of the photographs. Once again, 

to the extent that the autopsy photographs [c]ould be fairly characterized as 

gruesome, and the Court doesn’t believe that they were, but to the extent 

that they were, it’s by virtue of the nature of the crime itself. State [v.] 

Davidson recognized that principle as well as State [v. Lesergio Duran] 

Wilson[, No. M2017-01950-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 246249 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. Jan. 17, 2019)]. 

And to the extent that the evidence was cumulative, the Court 

doesn’t believe that it was. But to the extent that it was cumulative, 

relevant photographs are not rendered inadmissible merely because they are 

cumulative. State [v.] Willis, [496 S.W.3d 653 (Tenn. 2016)], among other 

authorities for that proposition. 

 

A. Constitutionality of Code Section 40-38-103(c). Reed contends that the 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-103(c), which states that appropriate life 

photographs of homicide victims are admissible evidence, violates the separation of 

powers clause by taking all discretion regarding the admissibility of such photographs

away from the trial courts. The State responds that because Reed failed to challenge the 

admission of the life photograph on constitutional grounds at trial, he has waived this 

issue and is limited to plain error relief. Waiver notwithstanding, the State also asserts 

that Code section 40-38-103(c) is constitutional because it preserves the trial court’s 

discretion regarding the admissibility of such photographs. We agree with the State that 

Reed has waived this issue and is not entitled to plain error relief. 

In Adams, 405 S.W.3d at 657, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that it had

“consistently cautioned the State against the introduction of such [portrait-style] 

photographs as evidence because they typically lack relevance to the issues on trial and 

because of their potential to unnecessarily arouse the sympathy of the jury.” 

Nevertheless, the court recognized that “[g]enerally, photographs taken during the life of 
- 37 -

a victim are not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.” Id. at 658. In 2015, the 

legislature amended Code section 40-38-103(c) to state, “In a prosecution for any

criminal homicide, an appropriate photograph of the victim while alive shall be 

admissible evidence when offered by the district attorney general to show the general 

appearance and condition of the victim while alive.” 

After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Reed never argued Code 

section 40-38-103(c) violated the separation of powers clause prior to this appeal. 

Accordingly, we agree with the State that Reed has waived plenary review of this issue

and is limited to plain error review. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). We note that Reed has

again failed to provide any analysis of the five factors required for plain error review. 

A review of Code section 40-38-103(c) requires both constitutional and statutory 

interpretation, which are reviewed de novo, affording no presumption of correctness to 

the trial court’s conclusions. State v. Burgins, 464 S.W.3d 298, 305 (Tenn. 2015). When 

interpreting statutes, this court must begin with the presumption that legislative acts are 

constitutional. Id. (citing Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Tenn. 1997)). “‘[W]e 

must indulge every presumption and resolve every doubt in favor of constitutionality.’”

Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting Vogel v. Wells Fargo 

Guard Servs., 937 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tenn. 1996)). Accordingly, this court must “adopt a 

construction which will sustain a statute and avoid constitutional conflict if any 

reasonable construction exists that satisfies the requirements of the Constitution.” DavisKidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 529 (Tenn. 1993). 

The Tennessee Constitution provides, “No person or persons belonging to one of 

[the three distinct departments of government] shall exercise any of the powers properly

belonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein directed or permitted.” Tenn. 

Const. art. II, § 2. We recognize that “[o]nly the Supreme Court has the inherent power 

to promulgate rules governing the practice and procedure of the courts of this state, and 

this inherent power ‘exists by virtue of the [Constitution’s] establishment of a Court and 

not by largess of the legislature.’” State v. McCoy, 459 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2014) 

(quoting Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 480-81 (alterations in original)). “A legislative enactment 

which does not frustrate or interfere with the adjudicative function of the courts does not 

constitute an impermissible encroachment upon the judicial branch of government.” 

Underwood v. State, 529 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. 1975). “[T]his Court will consent to rules 

of procedure or evidence that are promulgated by the legislature so long as they ‘(1) are 

reasonable and workable within the framework already adopted by the judiciary, and (2) 

work to supplement the rules already promulgated by the Supreme Court.’” McCoy, 459 

S.W.3d at 9 (quoting Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 481). 
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While Code section 40-38-103(c) requires admission of “an appropriate 

photograph of the victim while alive,” the admission of such photograph will only occur 

in certain cases. State v. Glen Allen Donaldson, No. E2019-00543-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 

WL 2494478, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2020) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-

103(c)), perm. app. filed (July 9, 2020). The plain language of this statute clearly states 

that the trial court still has the discretion to decide whether a life photograph of a 

homicide victim is appropriate for admission. See id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-

103(c)). Pursuant to Code section 40-38-103(c), a trial court may exclude such a 

photograph, even if relevant to show the “general appearance and condition of the victim 

while alive,” see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-103(c), if the court determines that the 

photograph’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice” under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. Glen Allen Donaldson, 2020 WL

2494478, at *10. In such a scenario, the photograph would be inappropriate and, 

therefore, excludable under Code section 40-38-103(c). Id.

Here, the life photograph depicts the victim seated at a table and smiling, with her 

profile in sharp relief. As the trial court recognized, this life photograph showed the 

appearance of the victim’s nose prior to her death, and when compared to the death 

photographs, helped the State establish that the cellophane had been wrapped so tightly 

around the victim’s head that it flattened her nose. As we will explain below, this 

photograph was probative of intent and premeditation and did not cause unfair prejudice 

to Reed requiring its exclusion. Because Reed has failed to establish that a clear and 

unequivocal rule of law was breached, that a substantial right of the defendant was 

adversely affected, or that consideration of the error is “necessary to do substantial 

justice,” we conclude that he is not entitled to plain error relief on his claim that Code 

section 40-38-103(c) is unconstitutional. 

B. Admissibility of Life and Death Photographs. Alternatively, Reed argues 

that admission of the life photograph violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 401 because it

was irrelevant and violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 because it was admitted 

solely for the purpose of prejudicing the jury against him. He claims that there were no 

issues regarding the victim’s identity at trial and the life photograph had no probative

value outside of showing the jury “what the victim looked like beforehand.” 

In addition, Reed argues that the death photographs of the victim violated Rule 

403. He asserts that because the autopsy report and the manner of death left no question

about the victim’s identity or about the fact that the victim’s death was a premeditated 

and intentional killing, the admission of the death photographs served to prejudice the 

jury. Reed asserts that the trial court should never have admitted the approximately 

sixteen death photographs of the victim, which he claims were “far more than were ever 
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needed to prove premeditation or intent,” when these issues could have been proven 

through the autopsy report alone. 

The State responds that the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in 

admitting the life photograph. It also asserts the trial court properly admitted the death 

photographs of the victim because they were probative of intent and premeditation and 

were not particularly gruesome in nature. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in admitting the life and death photographs of the victim.

“Generally, the admissibility of evidence rests within the trial court’s sound 

discretion, and the appellate court does not interfere with the exercise of that discretion 

unless a clear abuse appears on the face of the record.” State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 

799, 809 (Tenn. 2010) (citing State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tenn. 2007)). A trial 

court is found to have abused its discretion when it applies “an incorrect legal standard or 

reaches a conclusion that is ‘illogical or unreasonable and causes an injustice to the party 

complaining.’” Lewis, 235 S.W.3d at 141 (quoting State v. Ruiz, 204 S.W.3d 772, 778 

(Tenn. 2006)). “[T]he modern trend is to vest more discretion in the trial judge’s rulings 

on admissibility.” State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 577 (Tenn. 2000). 

To be admissible, all evidence, including photographs, must be relevant to an issue 

the jury must decide. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d at 394. Relevant evidence is “evidence 

having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 

evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. However, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion

of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 

or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Unfair prejudice

has been defined as “‘[a]n undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 

commonly, though not necessarily an emotional one.’” State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951 

(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403, Advisory Comm. Notes). 

When determining the admissibility of relevant photographic evidence, the trial 

court should consider the following factors: 

[the photographs’] accuracy and clarity, and whether they were taken before 

the corpse was moved, if the position and location of the body when found 

is material; the inadequacy of testimonial evidence in relating the facts to 

the jury; and the need for the evidence to establish a prima facie case of 

guilt or to rebut the defendant’s contentions.
- 40 -

Id.

“[P]hotographs of [a victim’s body] are admissible in murder prosecutions if they 

are relevant to the issues on trial, notwithstanding their gruesome and horrifying 

character.” Id. at 950-51. However, if the photographs “are not relevant to prove some 

part of the prosecution’s case, they may not be admitted solely to inflame the jury and 

prejudice them against the defendant.” Id. at 951. In addition, if photographs do not add 

anything to the testimonial descriptions, they may be excluded. Id. Moreover, if the 

defense offers to stipulate to the facts shown in a photograph or never disputes the 

testimony that the photograph illustrates, then admission of the photograph itself may not 

be justified. Id. However, “‘photographs are not necessarily rendered inadmissible 

because they are cumulative of other evidence or because descriptive words could be 

used.’” Willis, 496 S.W.3d at 728 (quoting State v. Derek Williamson, No. M2010-

01067-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3557827, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2011)); see

State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 477 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that despite the admission 

of a color videotape showing the victim’s bodies, the color photographs of the deceased 

victims were not “unnecessarily cumulative”); State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 551 

(Tenn. 1992) (holding that the nine photographs of the victim’s body were admissible, 

despite testimony graphically describing the victim’s injuries, because the photographs 

established “the brutality of the attack and the extent of the force used against the 

victim”). If the State is required to establish the degree of a homicide, it may properly 

introduce photographs and other evidence bearing on that issue. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 

952; State v. McAfee, 784 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). 

After examining the life photograph of the victim, we conclude that it is relevant, 

probative, and not unfairly prejudicial. Because the life photograph depicts the 

appearance of the victim’s nose prior to her death, when it is compared to the death 

photographs of the victim depicting her flattened nose from the force with which the 

cellophane was wrapped, it supports the State’s argument that the killing was done with 

intent and premeditation. The life photograph shows the victim sitting at a table smiling, 

and we agree with the State that this photograph does not cause unfair prejudice requiring 

its exclusion under Rule 403. There is no indication that the “primary purpose” of the life 

photograph was “to elicit emotions of ‘bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or

horror.’” See State v. Collins, 986 S.W.2d 13, 20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting M. 

Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 182-83 (2d ed. 1986)). Because the probative 

value of the life photograph was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.

We likewise conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the two autopsy 

photographs of the victim because they were relevant, probative of intent and 
- 41 -

premeditation, and not unfairly prejudicial. Although Reed argues that there were sixteen 

“death pictures” introduced at the same time as the autopsy report, only Exhibit 105 and 

106 were actually admitted with the autopsy report. Exhibit 105 depicts a bruise on the 

back of the victim’s left arm, and Exhibit 106 shows the disfigurement of the victim’s 

nose after the cellophane wrap was removed. Because Reed was charged with first 

degree premeditated murder, the State was required to prove that he intentionally killed

the victim and that he acted with premeditation, and the challenged photographs, which 

depict the manner in which the killing was carried out and the extent of the victim’s 

injuries, were particularly probative of these issues. Moreover, these photographs are not 

particularly gruesome and are limited to the specific injuries suffered by the victim, 

which reduces the risk of undue prejudice. Accordingly, because the probative value of 

these photographs is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. 

While there were eight other photographs of the deceased victim that were 

admitted at trial, these photographs were taken at the crime scene. Exhibit 10 depicted 

what Patricia Steinway saw when she first found the deceased victim on June 15, 2011. 

Exhibits 12 and 13 show different perspectives of the victim’s bedroom, the contents of 

her purse scattered on the bed, and only a very small part of the victim’s body. Exhibit 

14 depicts the victim’s clothed body with cellophane wrapped around her head and her 

arms behind her, Exhibit 15 depicts a close-up of the victim from her waist to her head, 

Exhibit 16 shows a close-up of the front of the victim’s head with cellophane wrapped 

around it, Exhibit 17 depicts a close-up of the back of the victim’s head with cellophane 

wrapped around it, and Exhibit 18 shows a close-up of the victim’s hands bound behind 

her back. There is nothing unnecessarily gruesome about these photographs given the 

facts of this case. To the extent that Reed is challenging the admission of these 

photographs, we conclude that they, too, are relevant and are probative of intent and 

premeditation because they show the victim’s hands bound behind her back and her head 

wrapped in Press-and-Seal cellophane, which caused her death. We also conclude that

these crime scene photographs were not cumulative to each other or to the other evidence 

presented at trial, including the autopsy report, because they depicted the deceased victim 

from different perspectives, which assisted the jury in fully understanding the nature of 

the offenses and the manner in which the victim died. Because the probative nature of 

these crime scene photographs is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, we also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 

them. 

 As a final note, we detect some clerical errors in the judgment forms that require 

correction. Here, the trial court merged Count 2 with Count 1. A complete judgment 

form for each count of the indictment is required by law. See State v. Berry, 503 S.W.3d 

360, 364 (Tenn. 2015) (order for publication summarily granting the application of the 
- 42 -

defendant under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and reversing a 

portion of the judgment of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals) (“[W]hen two jury 

verdicts are merged into a single conviction, the trial court should complete a uniform 

judgment document for each count.”). This rule ensures that there is a complete record of 

each conviction and sentence in the event that one of the convictions is later reversed. 

Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms for 

Count 1 and Count 2. On remand, the trial court should impose separate sentences for 

Count 1 and Count 2 and should place these sentences on each judgment form. Id. Next, 

the trial court should note in the “Special Conditions” box on Count 1, which is the 

greater or surviving conviction, that the conviction in Count 2 merges with the conviction 

in Count 1. This merger should also be noted in the “Special Conditions” box for Count 

2. Id.

CONCLUSION

We remand Reed’s case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1 and 2 

as specified in this opinion, but in all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are 

affirmed. 

____________________________________

 CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE