Filed 3/25/24 Urrutia v. Wallens CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

IDOYA URRUTIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ASHLEY JORDAN WALLENS,

Defendant and Appellant.

B319415

(Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BD604471)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Mark A. Juhas, Judge. Affirmed.

Ashley Jordan Wallens, in pro. per., for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Pamela Rae Tripp for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________________
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INTRODUCTION

Appellant Ashley Jordan Wallens appeals from a domestic 

violence restraining order issued against him under the Domestic 

Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code,1 § 6200 et seq.) to 

protect his former wife, respondent Idoya Urrutia, their minor 

son, and Urrutia’s current husband. Among other arguments,

Wallens asserts the order must be reversed because the trial 

court denied his right to competent counsel and a fair trial, made 

erroneous evidentiary rulings, and punitively included his minor 

son as a protected person. Urrutia argues Wallens’s appeal is 

moot, and even if not moot, his claims lack merit. We conclude

the appeal is not moot; however, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in granting the restraining order, and Wallens has not 

demonstrated any reversible error. We accordingly affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. The parties

Wallens and Urrutia were married and have one child 

together, X.W. The parties separated in 2014, and divorced in

2015. Wallens later married Devrie DeMarco, and Urrutia 

married Philip Pearson.

In 2021, Wallens and DeMarco divorced following a series 

of domestic violence incidents between them. They obtained 

domestic violence restraining orders against one another in July 

2021, and X.W. was included as a protected person in the order 

issued against DeMarco. 

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references 

are to the Family Code.
3

II. The events leading to Urrutia’s request for a 

domestic violence restraining order

As of November 2021, Wallens and Urrutia shared joint 

custody of X.W., who was then 12 years old. Wallens had custody 

from Thursday afternoons through Sunday afternoons, and 

Urrutia had custody the rest of the week plus one weekend per 

month. Wallens also had a scheduled Zoom call with X.W. on 

Wednesday afternoons to assist the child with his schoolwork.

On November 10, 2021, X.W. missed his Zoom call with 

Wallens. At that time, X.W.’s stepfather, Pearson, who is a 

physician, needed to use the study where the computer was 

located for a telehealth appointment with a patient. When X.W. 

failed to attend the call, Wallens sent the child a series of e-mails, 

which culminated in Wallens cancelling any future study sessions 

with X.W. The e-mails caused X.W. to cry and to express to 

Urrutia that he felt afraid of his father. That same day, Wallens 

also sent a series of text messages to both Urrutia and Pearson in 

which he called them vulgar and derogatory names, and made 

comments about contacting the hospital where Pearson worked. 

Urrutia responded to Wallens in a message through the Our 

Family Wizard (OFW) platform, which stated, “Your harassing 

texts and messages need to stop now.” 

The following day, after consulting with X.W.’s therapist, 

Urrutia advised Wallens in another OFW message that X.W. was 

scared and wanted a break from seeing him that weekend.

In response, Wallens sent Urrutia a series of text messages in 

which he accused her of kidnapping X.W. and threatened to call 

the police. Wallens also made reference to contacting the 

employers of both Urrutia and Pearson. After receiving the texts, 

Urrutia decided to stay overnight at a hotel with Pearson and 
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X.W. X.W. contacted Wallens by phone later that night, and after 

the call, Urrutia observed that X.W. was distraught and appeared 

to be scared. A week later, on November 17, 2021, Wallens again 

sent Urrutia a number of texts that she perceived as threatening

in nature. 

On November 22, 2021, Urrutia filed a request for a 

domestic violence restraining order against Wallens. On that 

date, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) 

against Wallens that named Urrutia, Pearson, and X.W. as the 

protected persons. After Wallens was served with the TRO, he 

did not have contact with Urrutia or Pearson. Wallens did, 

however, leave a voicemail message for Urrutia’s parents in 

which he stated that he could not talk to Urrutia and Pearson 

directly, but that he intended to call the police if they did not 

return X.W. to him. Wallens also sent text messages to Urrutia’s 

brother in which he warned that law enforcement and the 

employers of Urrutia and Pearson would be contacted about the

kidnapping of X.W.

III. The trial court’s ruling on the request for a domestic 

violence restraining order

In January 2022, the trial court held a three-day hearing 

on Urrutia’s request for a domestic violence restraining order. 

Both Urrutia and Wallens attended the hearing and were 

represented by counsel. At the start of the third day, however, 

Wallens decided to relieve his counsel and represent himself. 

A total of four witnesses—Wallens, Urrutia, Pearson, and 

the process server for the TRO—testified at the hearing. The 

trial court took judicial notice of the domestic violence restraining 

orders and related pleadings that were filed in the proceeding 

between Wallens and his second wife, DeMarco. The court also 
5

admitted into evidence Wallens’s various written communications 

with Urrutia, Pearson, and X.W. in November 2021 following the 

missed Zoom call. However, none of the exhibits admitted into 

evidence at the hearing are included in the record on appeal.

In his testimony, Wallens acknowledged that he and 

DeMarco had a history of domestic violence that resulted in the 

issuance of mutual restraining orders in July 2021, but he denied 

that he was ever the aggressor or that X.W. witnessed any of the

abuse. Wallens also admitted that he sent a number of angry

messages to Urrutia and Pearson in November 2021 after X.W. 

missed their Zoom call, and that he tried to contact Urrutia’s 

family after being served with the TRO. He maintained, 

however, that none of these communications were intended to be

threats. Wallens testified, “I felt bad for my words. I’m not 

proud of them. I’m not going to lie. I genuinely believed that 

I did not threaten anyone, and I did not repeat or escalate 

anything.”

At the hearing, both Urrutia and Pearson testified that 

they felt threatened by Wallens’s communications. According to 

Pearson, after receiving the November 10, 2021 text messages, he 

feared for his safety. He also was concerned Wallens would 

follow through on his threat to contact Pearson’s employer in an 

effort to defame him. Urrutia likewise testified that Wallens’s 

various text messages to her in November 2021 caused her to feel

afraid for herself and her family. Based on the erratic nature of 

the messages, Urrutia believed Wallens was “out of control” and 

was “coming after [her] family.” She also feared Wallens would 

contact her employer because she was aware that he engaged in 

similar conduct with DeMarco. Urrutia further testified that 

X.W. expressed that he felt scared of Wallens after receiving his
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e-mail messages and speaking to him on the phone. According to 

Urrutia, immediately following the November 11, 2021 telephone 

conversation with Wallens, X.W. “crumpled in [her] arms” and 

was “emotionally distraught and just so scared.” In addition, 

Urrutia testified that, during the last year of the marriage, there 

were times when she feared for her safety because Wallens was a 

heavy drinker, had anger issues, and tended to act erratically. 

The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence 

that Wallens was a perpetrator of domestic violence. The court 

noted that it had “significant concerns about Mr. Wallens’s 

credibility,” that there was an existing restraining order against 

Wallens based on domestic violence with DeMarco, and that 

Wallens had shown himself to be “entirely unpredictable,” both in 

how he handled the missed call with X.W. and comported himself

in the courtroom. The court issued a five-year domestic violence 

restraining order against Wallens with Urrutia, Pearson, and 

X.W. as the protected persons. The order prohibited Wallens 

from having any contact with Urrutia and Pearson except for the 

purpose of communicating about court-ordered visitation for X.W. 

and exchanging the child for the visits. The order restricted

Wallens’s contact with X.W. to supervised visits on two 

Saturdays per month from 4:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. 

As the court was announcing the terms of the restraining 

order, Wallens attempted to ask a question. The court instructed 

Wallens to hold any questions until it finished setting forth its 

ruling. However, Wallens became increasingly disruptive during 

the hearing and was ordered by the bailiff to quiet down. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the court stated that, although it had 

promised to answer his questions, Wallens “makes it impossible 
7

for me to do that because I continuously get interrupted.” 

The court then adjourned the proceedings. 

Wallens timely appealed. While the appeal was pending, 

Urrutia filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot.

DISCUSSION

I. Urrutia’s motion to dismiss the appeal 

We first address Urrutia’s motion to dismiss the appeal. 

Urrutia argues the appeal has been rendered moot by subsequent 

orders that restrict Wallens from having any contact with X.W. or 

Urrutia. Those subsequent orders consist of (1) a July 26, 2022 

order terminating visitation between Wallens and X.W.; and 

(2) a July 28, 2022 criminal protective order prohibiting Wallens 

from contacting Urrutia for a three-year period. Because Wallens 

did not file an appeal from those orders, Urrutia asserts this

court cannot provide him with any effective relief from the 

domestic violence restraining order even if we were to find

reversible error. 

“A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible 

for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to 

grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 

266, 276.) In this case, the January 13, 2022 domestic violence 

restraining order at issue on appeal includes Urrutia, Pearson, 

and X.W. as protected persons, and is in effect for a five-year

period until January 13, 2027. In contrast, the July 26, 2022 

family law order only applies to visitation with X.W., and the 

July 28, 2022 criminal protective order only applies to contact 

with Urrutia for a period of three years. Because the domestic 

violence restraining order is broader in scope and/or longer in 

duration than the subsequent orders, a decision in favor of 

Wallens could provide him with some effective relief. Under 
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these circumstances, Wallens’s appeal is not moot, and we 

therefore deny Urrutia’s motion to dismiss the appeal. 

II. Wallens’s challenge to the domestic violence 

restraining order 

Wallens raises several claims regarding the domestic 

violence restraining order. He contends the order must be 

reversed because the trial court (1) denied his right to competent 

counsel after his attorney resigned; (2) denied his right to a fair 

trial by refusing to answer any questions at the conclusion of the 

hearing; (3) denied his right to cross-examine his second wife, 

DeMarco; (4) improperly allowed evidence of his alleged conduct 

during his marriage to Urrutia; (5) improperly credited Urrutia’s 

testimony even though new evidence shows she lied about a 

certain telephone call; and (6) effectively ended his relationship 

with X.W. by including the child as a protected person in the 

restraining order. We conclude Wallens’s claims lack merit.

A. Governing law on the DVPA

The DVPA authorizes the court to issue a protective order 

“ ‘ “to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a 

recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of 

separation of the persons involved,” upon “reasonable proof of a 

past act or acts of abuse.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M.

(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 115.) The DVPA defines “domestic 

violence” as “abuse perpetrated against,” among others, a spouse 

or former spouse. (§ 6211, subd. (a).) “Abuse is not limited to the 

actual infliction of physical injury or assault” (§ 6203, subd. (b)), 

but also extends to “behavior that has been or could be enjoined 

pursuant to Section 6320” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4)). Section 6320, in 

turn, includes within conduct that may be enjoined, “threatening, 

. . . harassing, . . . contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail 
9

or otherwise, . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party, and 

. . . other named family or household members.” (Id., subd. (a).) 

Under the DVPA, “ ‘[a]nnoying and harassing an individual is 

protected in the same way as physical abuse.’ ” (In re Marriage of 

Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 536.) 

We review the grant or denial of a domestic violence

restraining order for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of D.S. 

& A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 933; Herriott v. Herriott (2019) 

33 Cal.App.5th 212, 223.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of 

discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of 

reason.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S., at p. 933.) “ ‘ “So long 

as the court exercised its discretion along legal lines, its decision 

will not be reversed on appeal if there is substantial evidence to 

support it.” ’ [Citation.] We resolve all conflicts in the evidence 

in favor of . . . the prevailing party, and indulge all legitimate and 

reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s 

findings.” (Herriott v. Herriott, at p. 223.)

B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

issuing the domestic violence restraining order

It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that an 

appealed order is presumed to be correct. (Denham v. Superior 

Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) To overcome this presumption, 

the appellant must provide an adequate record demonstrating

error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140–1141.) 

“ ‘ “[A] record is inadequate . . . if the appellant predicates error 

only on the part of the record he [or she] provides the trial court, 

but ignores or does not present to the appellate court portions of 

the proceedings below which may provide grounds upon which 

the decision of the trial court could be affirmed.” ’ ” (Jade 

Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries, Inc. (2014) 
10

229 Cal.App.4th 635, 644.) “Where the appellant fails to provide 

an adequate record of the challenged proceedings, we must 

presume that the appealed . . . order is correct, and on that basis, 

affirm.” (Ibid.) Additionally, “ ‘ “the party asserting trial court 

error may not . . . rest on the bare assertion of error but must 

present argument and legal authority on each point raised. 

[Citation.]” [Citations.] When an appellant raises an issue “but 

fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to 

authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ” (Hernandez v. First 

Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.)

Here, Wallens claims the trial court committed errors in 

granting a domestic violence restraining order. Wallens does not, 

however, support his claims of error with any citations to legal 

authority or to the record on appeal. Moreover, Wallens has 

failed to provide an adequate record to show there was reversible

error. The record does not include Urrutia’s application for a 

restraining order or any supporting documentation, or any of the 

exhibits admitted into evidence at the hearing before the trial 

court. Most notably, the record fails to include any of the text, email, or other written communications that Wallens had with 

Urrutia, Pearson, and X.W. in November 2021, which gave rise to

Urrutia’s request for a restraining order against Wallens. 

Despite the significance of those writings to the trial court

proceedings, the only evidence in the appellate record regarding 

their content is the witnesses’ testimony confirming certain 

excerpts and describing their effect on the recipients. 

Nevertheless, based on the limited record that Wallens has 

provided, we conclude the trial court acted within its broad 

discretion in issuing the restraining order.
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The testimony at the hearing supported a finding that, 

when X.W. missed a single Zoom call, Wallens responded by 

sending a number of threatening and harassing communications

to Urrutia and her family. In his text messages to Urrutia and 

Pearson, Wallens called them offensive names, accused them of 

kidnapping X.W., and threatened to report them to the police and 

their places of employment. Both Urrutia and Pearson testified 

that Wallens’s texts caused them to feel threatened and afraid for 

their safety. Urrutia also testified that, after receiving Wallens’s 

e-mail messages and speaking to him on the telephone, X.W. was 

emotionally distraught and expressed that he feared his father. 

Although Wallens stopped communicating with Urrutia and 

Pearson after being served with the TRO, he left messages for

Urrutia’s parents and sibling in which he again claimed that 

Urrutia and Pearson kidnapped X.W. and threatened to call their 

employers. In addition, at the time of the hearing, there were 

mutual domestic violence restraining orders in place to protect 

Wallens and his second wife, DeMarco, from one another. 

In his testimony, Wallens denied that he intended for any 

of his communications to be perceived as threats. He also denied 

that he engaged in domestic violence against DeMarco or anyone 

else, and testified that X.W. was never exposed to any domestic 

violence in his home. In granting the request for a restraining 

order, however, the trial court expressed that it had “significant 

concerns about . . . Wallens’s credibility” based on his testimony.

As this court has explained, “[i]t was for the trial court to weigh 

the evidence and consider the demeanor and credibility of the 

witness[es].” (Herriott v. Herriott, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 223.) On this record, the testimony elicited at the hearing 

supported the trial court’s ruling. 
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While Wallens asserts several claims of error on appeal, 

none have merit. With respect to his claim that he was denied 

his right to competent counsel, “the general rule is that there is 

no due process right to counsel in civil cases.” (Walker v. State

Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1107, 1116.) The record further shows that, 

on the third and final day of the hearing, Wallens chose to relieve 

his counsel and represent himself. With respect to his claim that 

he was denied the right to a fair trial because the trial court 

refused to answer his questions, the record reflects that, by the 

conclusion of the hearing, the court determined it was no longer 

feasible to try to respond to Wallens’s questions given his 

increasingly disruptive behavior. 

With respect to his claims of evidentiary error, Wallens 

contends the trial court precluded him from cross-examining 

DeMarco. However, neither party called DeMarco to testify at 

the hearing. Wallens also argues the trial court erred in allowing 

Urrutia to testify about his alleged abusive conduct during their 

marriage, which ended in 2014. This argument fails because the 

testimony in question was limited in scope and was relevant to 

explaining why Urrutia felt threatened by Wallens’s similarly 

erratic conduct in 2021. Wallens further asserts the trial court 

improperly credited Urrutia’s testimony about a November 11, 

2021 telephone call between X.W. and Wallens, even though new 

evidence in the form of cell phone records shows that such call 

never took place. As Wallens acknowledges, this evidence was 

not presented to the trial court during the January 2022 hearing. 

Thus, it is not relevant to the current appeal.

Finally, Wallens claims the trial court acted in a punitive 

manner by naming X.W. as a protected person in the restraining 

order. Wallens contends this ruling had the effect of ending his 
13

parental relationship with X.W. We disagree. In ruling on a 

request for a domestic violence restraining order, the court also

has broad discretion to “make an order for the custody of a child

. . . that seems necessary or proper.” (§ 3022; see Celia S. v. Hugo 

H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 655, 661.) “The guiding principle for the 

court in making any custody or visitation order is that the order 

must be in the child’s best interest.” (Celia S. v. Hugo H., at 

p. 661.) Here, the record reflects that, in granting the restraining

order against Wallens, the trial court limited Wallens’s contact 

with X.W. to supervised visits twice per month for three hours 

per visit. Given Urrutia’s testimony about Wallens’s erratic and 

harassing behavior and the severe emotional impact it had on 

X.W., the trial court reasonably could conclude that an order for 

supervised visitation was in the child’s best interest. On this 

record, the trial court’s issuance of the domestic violence 

restraining order was not an abuse of discretion. 

DISPOSITION

The domestic violence restraining order issued against 

Wallens is affirmed. Urrutia shall recover her costs on appeal.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

GRIMES, J.