Case 1:22-cv-01422-CJN Document 42 Filed 01/25/23 Page 1 of 15 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

) 

HERITAGE ACTION FOR AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) Civ. No. 22-1422 (CJN) 

) 

v. ) 

) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., ) SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS 

) 

Defendants. ) 

) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S REPLY 

IN SUPPORT OF ITS SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Acting General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley 

Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

Harry J. Summers 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

Greg J. Mueller (D.C. Bar No. 462840) 

Christopher H. Bell (D.C. Bar No. 1643526) 

Attorneys 

gmueller@fec.gov 

chbell@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

1050 First Street NE 

Washington, DC 20463 

January 25, 2023 (202) 694-1650 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1:22-cv-01422-CJN Document 42 Filed 01/25/23 Page 2 of 15 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1 

II. THE COMMISSION HAS ESTABLISHED THAT 

THIS MATTER IS MOOT............................................................................................2 

A. The Commission’s Mootness Challenge Is Well 

Supported by Apposite Case Law......................................................................2 

B. A Challenge to Agency Policy, Even If Plaintiff Had Made One, 

Would Not Be Exempt from the Requirements of Article III 

Standing, and Plaintiff Has Failed to Show That Its Rights 

Are at Stake Now...............................................................................................4 

C. The Voluntary Cessation Exception to Mootness Does Not 

Apply, and This Case Would Be Moot Even If the 

Exception Did Apply .........................................................................................7 

D. The “Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review” Exception to 

Mootness Does Not Apply.................................................................................9 

III. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................10 

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Case 1:22-cv-01422-CJN Document 42 Filed 01/25/23 Page 3 of 15 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

PAGE(S) 

CASES 

Campaign Legal Center v. Heritage Action, Civ. No. 22-1248 (D.D.C. 2022) ............................. 6 

Clark v. United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990)............................................................... 2, 5 

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) ..................................................... 7 

Entergy Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 391 F.3d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2004)...................................................5-6 

Garcia v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 

168 F. Supp. 3d 50 (D.D.C. 2016)............................................................................................... 3 

Herron for Congress v. FEC, 903 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2012)...............................................9-10 

La Botz v. FEC, 61 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D.D.C. 2014) ......................................................................... 3 

Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) ............................................................................................ 9 

Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Civ. No. 15-2023, 

2016 WL 10957246 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2016) ................................................................................ 4 

Reid v. Hurwitz, 920 F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2019)............................................................................. 5 

S. Co. Servs., Inc. v. FERC, Civ. No. 03-1106, 2003 WL 22669559 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 7, 2003)..... 6 

Sibley v. Alexander, 916 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2013)............................................................9-10 

Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) .......................................................................................... 10 

Worth v. Jackson, 451 F.3d 854 (D.C. Cir. 2006) .......................................................................... 3 

Statutes 

52 U.S.C. § 30106(c) .................................................................................................................. 5, 9 

52 U.S.C. § 30106(f)(1) .................................................................................................................. 9 

52 U.S.C. § 30106(f)(4) ...............................................................................................................8-9 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8).................................................................................................................. 3 

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Case 1:22-cv-01422-CJN Document 42 Filed 01/25/23 Page 4 of 15 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Heritage Action for America (“Heritage Action”) has failed to fully address, 

much less refute, the Federal Election Commission’s (“Commission” or “FEC”) showing that 

this matter is moot. (See FEC’s Second Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 39) (“Motion” or “Mot.”).) 

In its attempt to show that there is a live “case or controversy” sufficient to vest this Court with 

jurisdiction, plaintiff makes broad claims about a need to investigate alleged agency misconduct. 

But it still points to only eight FEC administrative enforcement proceedings, out of hundreds 

closed during the relevant time period, in an effort to establish that there was a Commission 

“policy” to conceal records. These matters themselves provide no evidence of an agency policy. 

Yet even if they could demonstrate that such a policy once existed, this case is moot because all 

of the matters have been closed since mid-2022 (the only one of the eight matters involving 

plaintiff had already closed), and the allegedly “concealed” records have long been available to 

the public and to this Court. Plaintiff speculates that what happened with those matters could 

theoretically happen in the future, citing exceptions to the mootness doctrine, but it offers no 

evidence to suggest that any future respondent, let alone plaintiff itself, will actually be subjected 

to the unlawful concealment it alleges. Plaintiff faults the Commission even for making this 

motion, claiming it is a waste of resources, but the agency has a duty to explain when, as here, a 

court has come to lack jurisdiction to proceed with a case for a significant additional reason. 

In any event, as the Commission has shown, the intervening closures of the small number 

of files that were ever at issue means that a decision of this Court will now have no effect on 

plaintiff’s rights. This Court should correspondingly reject its call for what amounts to an 

advisory opinion, and for an intrusive, open-ended fishing expedition into agency operations, 

which would be likely to waste considerable resources of the parties and the Court. This case 

should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1:22-cv-01422-CJN Document 42 Filed 01/25/23 Page 5 of 15 

II. THE COMMISSION HAS ESTABLISHED THAT THIS MATTER IS MOOT 

“Even where litigation poses a live controversy when filed, the [mootness] doctrine 

requires a federal court to refrain from deciding it if events have so transpired that the decision 

will neither presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of 

affecting them in the future.” Clark v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). In its Motion the Commission comprehensively 

explained why the plaintiff has received all of the relief it sought in this matter, and thus there is 

no basis for further litigation over the Commission’s alleged failure to disclose records, nor 

would declaratory judgment have any impact on plaintiff’s alleged rights. (Mot. at 20-27.) The 

Commission further detailed why plaintiff’s attempt to demonstrate the possibility of future harm 

relies on pure speculation, and there is no sufficient reason to believe that the alleged wrongs of 

which plaintiff complains will be repeated. (Mot. at 28-35.) 

Plaintiff’s brief rebuttal largely fails to respond to that showing, and instead it primarily 

reiterates arguments the Commission has already refuted, while attempting to distinguish a small 

number of the cases cited in the Commission’s Motion. Yet no matter how broad and sweeping 

the relief plaintiff says it wants or needs, such claims do not obviate the requirement that it show 

that a ruling would affect its rights for this Court to have jurisdiction to hear its claims. Here, 

plaintiff has failed to establish that the voluntary cessation exception to mootness saves it claims. 

Nor can plaintiff’s belated attempt to fit within the exception for claims “capable of repetition 

yet evading review” revive its moot claims in this case. 

A. The Commission’s Mootness Challenge Is Well Supported by Apposite Case Law 

Plaintiff begins its rebuttal by declaring that “the Commission was wrong to conflate 

mootness with standing” and that “the Commission misleadingly invokes cases that exclusively 

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Case 1:22-cv-01422-CJN Document 42 Filed 01/25/23 Page 6 of 15 

address standing when purporting to describe the standard for mootness[.]” (Pl’s Opp. to FEC’s 

Sec. Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 41) (“Response” or “Resp.”) at 2.) 

On the contrary, the Commission has made a clear mootness challenge principally relying 

on mootness case law, and plaintiff does not show otherwise. (See Mot. at 19-34 (citing 18 cases 

discussing mootness).) Moreover, the cases cited in the Commission’s Motion that do address 

Article III standing are highly relevant to the issues before this Court. The concepts of standing 

and mootness are “inter-related judicial doctrines” that “ensure that federal courts assert 

jurisdiction only over ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Garcia v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 

Servs., 168 F. Supp. 3d 50, 64 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Worth v. Jackson, 451 F.3d 854, 855 

(D.C. Cir. 2006)). Indeed, “both doctrines implicate the need for a plaintiff to demonstrate he 

has standing[.]” Id. Yet while “a standing inquiry is concerned with the presence of injury, 

causation, and redressability at the time a complaint is filed, a mootness inquiry scrutinizes the 

presence of these elements after filing — i.e., at the time of a court’s decision.” Id. at 65 (citing 

La Botz v. FEC, 61 F. Supp. 3d 21, 28 (D.D.C. 2014)). “[T]he mootness doctrine is a logical 

corollary to the case-or-controversy requirement: if subsequent events have made it impossible 

for the court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party, any opinion as to the legality of 

the challenged action would be advisory.” La Botz, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 30 (internal quotations 

omitted). Thus, caselaw addressing injury, causation, and redressability at all stages of litigation, 

in contexts comparable to the circumstances here, illuminates the mootness question of whether a 

decision could affect a party’s rights.

1 

The Commission’s challenge at the outset of this litigation to plaintiff’s standing to seek 

relief as to third-party administrative proceedings where it is not a respondent also remains 

pending. (See FEC’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Its Mot. to Dismiss (“First MTD”) at 18-19 

(Docket No. 17).) This is one among several independent grounds sufficient to dismiss 

plaintiff’s complaint, apart from mootness, which have been fully briefed to this Court. As the 

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In any event, plaintiff does not even explain why distinctions between doctrine in the 

cases the Commission cited mean that its claims should fare any better under a standing analysis, 

and these abstract assertions appear to be diversions from the main issue. Cf. Pub. Emps. for 

Env’t Resp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Civ. No. 15-2023, 2016 WL 10957246, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 

2016) (rejecting motion for reconsideration “[b]ecause an analysis based on mootness and not 

standing cannot compel a change in the Court’s decision to grant [defendant’s] Motion to 

Dismiss”). 

B. A Challenge to Agency Policy, Even If Plaintiff Had Made One, Would Not Be 

Exempt from the Requirements of Article III Standing, and Plaintiff Has Failed to 

Show That Its Rights Are at Stake Now 

Plaintiff’s attempt to establish an ongoing live claim or controversy relies entirely on its 

erroneous contention that it has challenged a Commission “policy,” and that only the agency’s 

disavowal of that supposed policy, or a Court order setting it aside, constitute adequate relief. 

(See Resp. at 3 (in addition to the release of records “Heritage Action has also sought both: (1) a 

declaratory judgment that Defendants acted unlawfully by concealing its terminating action; and 

(2) an order setting aside the concealment policy.”).) 

First, despite frequent references to a “concealment policy” that seem to suggest the 

matter is undisputed, plaintiff has offered no probative evidence that such a policy has ever 

existed at the Commission. As the FEC has explained, plaintiff’s evidence of such a policy is 

based almost entirely on eight enforcement matters in which certain Commissioners exercised 

their lawful discretion in a manner with which plaintiff disagrees. (See First MTD at 23-25.) In 

Commission has explained, the judicial review provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 

52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8), is the exclusive means of challenging the FEC’s handling of 

administrative enforcement matters, and plaintiff fails even to state a claim under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), because the actions it challenges are committed to the 

FEC’s discretion by law and there is no reviewable “final agency action.” (First MTD at 19-31.) 

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the roughly four years since the administrative complaint was filed in Matter Under Review 

(“MUR”) 7516 — the only FEC matter at issue in which plaintiff itself was actually involved — 

the agency has closed at least 692 MURs.

2 Even if plaintiff was correct that the matters it 

identified had been wrongly held open, eight isolated matters out of 692 is far short of the 

threshold necessary to establish that the Commission ever adopted a “policy.” (See First MTD at 

20-26; FEC’s Reply in Supp. of Its Mot. to Dismiss at 17-20 (Docket No. 23); FEC’s Opp’n to 

Pl’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Opp. to MSJ”) at 34-37.) Indeed, plaintiff has not even alleged that a 

majority of FEC Commissioners ever favored the course of action about which it complains, and 

three Commissioners cannot establish any policy on behalf of the agency. See 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30106(c).3 And even assuming a policy once existed for the handling of a tiny fraction of the 

agency’s docket, there is no reason to suspect plaintiff would be subject to it in the future. 

Second, even assuming (despite all evidence) that the Commission had such a policy, this 

does not override the requirement that a decision of this Court must presently affect Heritage 

Action’s rights. Clark, 915 F.2d at 701. In Entergy Services, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, this Circuit rejected a highly similar effort by plaintiffs to preserve their moot 

individual claims by asserting standing to challenge a broader ongoing agency policy. Entergy 

2 FEC, Enforcement Statistics for Fiscal Years 1977-2023 (including data through 

December 31, 2022), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cmscontent/documents/enforcementstats1977to2023.pdf (sum of Total Matter Under Review (MUR) 

Cases Closed for Fiscal Years 2019-23). 

3 The fact that the FEC never had the policy of which plaintiff complains is sufficient to 

distinguish the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Reid v. Hurwitz, 920 F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2019). (See 

Resp. at 2.) There, the government repeatedly invoked a nationwide prison policy as the basis 

for its actions against the defendant, an inmate. Id. at 831. In addition, plaintiff in that matter 

remained in custody, making it likely that he would be subjected to the policy again. Id. Here, 

there is no evidence of an agency policy, rather than a handful of enforcement proceedings in 

which plaintiff has criticized discretionary Commissioner votes. 

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Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 391 F.3d 1240, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In rejecting the attempt, the court 

noted that the rule plaintiffs challenged 

does not affect [plaintiffs] until they are confronted with it in a matter before the 

Commission regarding a “live” interconnection agreement. Until then, they are in 

a position identical to that of any other utility company whose hypothetical future 

interconnection agreements may be evaluated according to the rule. To open the 

courthouse doors to [plaintiffs] for the purposes of their policy challenge 

disembodied from the original Commission orders would open the door to every 

other utility company’s challenges to Commission policies. Federal courts do not 

have the jurisdiction to render advisory opinions on such matters, with respect to 

FERC or any other administrative agency. 

Id.; see also S. Co. Servs., Inc. v. FERC, No. 03-1106, 2003 WL 22669559, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 

7, 2003) (per curiam) (plaintiff’s challenge to ongoing agency requirements was moot because 

plaintiff’s agreement had expired, and plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ongoing 

requirement itself because it had “not shown that it faces the kind of actual or imminent injury 

required for Article III standing to pursue such a challenge”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

There as here, plaintiffs could not sustain a broad challenge to agency policy “disembodied from 

the original Commission orders” that might have arguably impacted plaintiffs’ rights. Entergy 

Servs., 391 F.3d at 1246. 

Plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment is likewise moot, both because it is subject 

to the same principles of mootness that govern all claims, and because plaintiff has not shown 

that a declaratory judgment in this proceeding would have any effect on the proceedings in 

Campaign Legal Center v. Heritage Action, Civ. No. 22-1248 (D.D.C.), as the FEC has 

explained. (See Mot. at 24-27.) In response, plaintiff merely reiterates its unsupported 

contentions that “the prospect that a declaratory judgment in [plaintiff’s] favor will affect future 

litigation typically defeats mootness[,]” and that here, “if this Court confirms that the FEC 

unlawfully concealed action on CLC’s administrative complaint, then Heritage Action can more 

effectively demonstrate the reasons it could not have intervened sooner and therefore why its 

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intervention motion was in fact timely.” (Resp. at 5.) The Commission has already explained 

why plaintiff’s assertion misstates the law of mootness, and that in any case a declaration that the 

Commission acted unlawfully in failing to release MUR information would have no bearing on 

the modes of analysis courts employ in reviewing whether the agency has unduly delayed in the 

MUR itself. (See Mot. at 24-27.) These arguments remain unrebutted. 

C. The Voluntary Cessation Exception to Mootness Does Not Apply, and This Case 

Would Be Moot Even If the Exception Did Apply 

Plaintiff fails to show that any exception to the mootness doctrine overcomes the 

Commission’s showing that this case is now moot. In its Response, plaintiff at times distorts the 

standards for evaluating mootness. It cites cases that apply the heightened standard applicable 

only when a defendant’s voluntary conduct in response to a lawsuit moots the case, without 

making clear when this standard applies. (See, e.g., Resp. at 1, 2 (describing the “heavy burden” 

of the party arguing mootness without reference to the voluntary cessation exception).) Plaintiff 

at times also seems to suggest that the Commission must prove that the challenged conduct will 

not recur, when the proper standard in reviewing a voluntary cessation of conduct, as plaintiff 

concedes, is whether it “could not reasonably be expected to recur.” (Resp. at 6 (citing Earth, 

Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)).) Such suggestions are particularly 

inappropriate here because this exception does not in fact apply. That is so because the 

Commission never adhered to any “policy” such as plaintiff alleges, and the Commission cannot 

voluntarily terminate a policy that was never in place. (See Mot. at 31.) Furthermore, even 

assuming arguendo that plaintiff had identified a “practice” or “policy” by the FEC, it was not 

ended in response to this lawsuit or any other. (See id. at 31-34.) 

Plaintiff does not meaningfully engage with the Commission’s arguments in this respect. 

Instead, plaintiff seems to offer the FEC’s consistent position that the “policy” plaintiff alleges 

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Case 1:22-cv-01422-CJN Document 42 Filed 01/25/23 Page 11 of 15 

did not exist as evidence that the “policy” will recur. (Resp. at 7 (“Even now, the Commission 

refuses to admit the concealment policy ever existed, and its silence on whether the concealment 

policy could be applied again in the future is deafening.”).) Plaintiff offers no support for the 

remarkable contention that the Commission’s denial of its claims is evidence of their validity. 

Plaintiff also asserts repeatedly that the Commission’s longstanding practice regarding 

MUR closure hangs by a thread, with the alleged “concealment policy” ready to spring back into 

operation at any time. (Resp. at 7 (“the Commission’s voluntary-cessation argument hangs on 

the ‘commit[ment]’ of just one of six Commissioners ‘to advocat[e]’ for ‘clos[ing] files’”) 

(alterations in original); id. (“the loss of a single other Commissioner opposing the concealment 

policy would rejuvenate [the policy] immediately”).) But actual policymaking, of course, does 

not work this way. The Commission has previously explained that only the affirmative votes of 

four Commissioners can make agency policy, and in any case the Commissioners cannot create a 

policy in the context of an individual enforcement proceeding. See First MTD at 23-24; see also 

52 U.S.C. § 30106(c). By arguing that a switch in votes in some undefined number of 

enforcement matters could reinstate a “concealment policy,” plaintiff makes clear that what it 

challenges is not a “policy” at all, but rather the votes in a small number of enforcement 

proceedings in which Commissioners have exercised their discretion on when to close 

enforcement files. 

Finally, plaintiff’s narrow focus on the public statements of FEC Commissioner 

Weintraub is similarly misplaced.4 As the Commission has noted, Commissioner Weintraub is 

Plaintiff claims that, because the decision to defend the FEC against this lawsuit 

brought pursuant to statutes other than the Federal Election Campaign Act is not subject to a 

Commission vote, “the arguments made by the FEC in this case do not represent the views of 

any... Commissioners.” (Resp. at 9 n.7) However, the General Counsel acts on behalf of the 

Commissioners whenever “the Commission . . . “appear[s] in and defend[s] against any action” 

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Case 1:22-cv-01422-CJN Document 42 Filed 01/25/23 Page 12 of 15 

entitled to exercise her discretion in individual enforcement proceedings, as are all 

Commissioners. (See, e.g., Opp. to MSJ at 31-34.) Moreover, even assuming arguendo that 

public statements by groups of three or fewer Commissioners could be taken as evidence of 

agency policy, Commissioner Weintraub’s position must be weighed against the public 

statements of three sitting Commissioners (Vice Chairman Cooksey and Commissioners Trainor 

and Dickerson) who have expressed opposing views, and a fourth (Chair Lindenbaum) who 

committed to the course of action plaintiff favors during her confirmation hearing before the 

United States Senate and indeed has acted in a manner consistent with that commitment. (Mot. 

at 10-11, n.11.) Plaintiff’s apparent view that all sitting Commissioners must publicly commit to 

exercising their discretion in a certain way in all future enforcement proceedings is wholly 

unsupported. 

D. The “Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review” Exception to Mootness Does Not 

Apply 

Finally, plaintiff’s brief attempt to fit its claims within the “capable of repetition, yet 

evading review” exception to mootness fails. First, plaintiff cannot invoke the “capable of 

repetition, yet evading review” exception because it must make “the requisite showing of ‘a 

reasonable expectation’ or a ‘demonstrated probability’ that ‘the same controversy will recur 

involving the same complaining party.’” Sibley v. Alexander, 916 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62–63 (D.D.C. 

2013) (quoting Herron for Congress v. FEC, 903 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2012) and noting 

that it in turn cites and quotes Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam)). 

However, as articulated previously, plaintiff cannot show that the alleged “policy” it challenges 

through “attorneys employed in its office,” 52 U.S.C. § 30106(f)(4), namely the “general 

counsel” and “additional personnel” working for her, 52 U.S.C. § 30106(f)(1). This is true no 

matter whether the defense is an enumerated one requiring four votes under 52 U.S.C. § 

30106(c). 

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will be repeated at all, let alone with respect to plaintiff itself. (Mot. at 28-35.) “When a claim 

rests entirely on an unlikely chain of hypothetical occurrences, the court must conclude that the 

controversy is not likely to reappear.” Sibley, 916 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63 (quoting Herron, 903 F. 

Supp. 2d at 15). 

In addition, plaintiff has not shown that the harm alleged here would evade review. 

Assuming arguendo that plaintiff is in fact harmed by the Commission’s alleged concealment of 

records, there is simply no natural time limit upon this conduct, and thus no reason for this Court 

to presume it will evade review, as would be the case with clearly time-limited events like those 

tied to an election cycle or a pregnancy. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974) 

(doctrine is appropriately applied where the state statute or policy in question will be applied in 

future elections and thus cause a comparable limited-time harm to candidates in the future). 

Here, several of the MURs subject to plaintiff’s challenge were pending for years before file 

closure, and they were not ended through any regular operation of the calendar or other 

inevitable events, but by the discretionary decisions of Commissioners. (See Mot. at 10-14 

(summarizing file closures for matters that had been open as long as ten years).) Plaintiff cannot 

show, as it must, that a challenge to the FEC’s handling of such matters like the one it has made 

here would be subject to a fixed time period that would typically be too short for judicial review. 

See Storer, 415 U.S. at 737 n.8. Thus, although plaintiff’s claims here have now become moot, it 

cannot show that any similar claims in the future would necessarily evade review, and it cannot 

demonstrate that the “capable of repetition” exception to mootness applies. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission’s second motion to dismiss should be 

granted, and plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed. 

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Case 1:22-cv-01422-CJN Document 42 Filed 01/25/23 Page 14 of 15 

Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Acting General Counsel 

lstevenson@fec.gov 

Kevin Deeley 

Associate General Counsel 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

Harry J. Summers 

Assistant General Counsel 

hsummers@fec.gov 

Greg J. Mueller (D.C. Bar No. 462840) 

Attorney 

gmueller@fec.gov 

/s/ Christopher H. Bell 

Christopher H. Bell (D.C. Bar No. 1643526) 

Attorney 

chbell@fec.gov 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

1050 First Street NE 

Washington, DC 20463 

January 25, 2023 (202) 694-1650 

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Case 1:22-cv-01422-CJN Document 42 Filed 01/25/23 Page 15 of 15 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on January 25, 2023, I served the foregoing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 5(b)(2)(E) on counsel of record, as a registered ECF user, through the Court’s ECF system. 

/s/ Christopher H. Bell 

Christopher H. Bell (D.C. Bar No. 1643526) 

Attorney 

chbell@fec.gov 

12