THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Thirty Year 

Report

SEPTEMBER 2005

THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Thirty Year

Report

SEPTEMBER 2005
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Scott E. Thomas, Chairman (2005)

Michael E. Toner, Vice Chairman (2005)

David M. Mason, Commissioner

Danny L. McDonald, Commissioner

Ellen L. Weintraub, Commissioner

James A. Pehrkon, Staff Director

Lawrence H. Norton, General Counsel

Lynne A. McFarland, Inspector General

Prepared by:

Greg Scott, Assistant Staff Director, Information Division

Gary Mullen, Writer, Information Division
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CHARTS iv

INTRODUCTION	 1

CHAPTER	1

Historical Context 3

Early Reform 3

The 1971 Election Laws 4

1974 Amendments 5

Buckley v. Valeo 5

1976 Amendments 6

1979 Amendments 6

Other Amendments 6

Soft Money 7

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 7

McConnell v. FEC 7

CHAPTER	2

Administering, Interpreting, Enforcing 

and Defending the FECA 9

Outreach and Disclosure 9

Outreach 9

Interpreting the FECA 10

Disclosure 10

Compliance 12

Bipartisan Structure and Enforcement 15

Presidential Public Funding 16

Audits 16

Tax Checkoff 17

CHAPTER	3

Key Issues Before the Commission 19

Electioneering Communications 19

Political Committee Status 20

Personal Use of Campaign Funds 21

Coordination Issues 23

Regulation of the Internet 23

CHAPTER	4

Continuing Debate Over Reform 25

The Role of Political Parties 25

The Role of Independent Organizations 27

Presidential Public Funding 28

CONCLUSION	 31

APPENDIX	1

FEC Commissioners and Officers, 

1975-2005 33

Commissioners 33

Ex Officio Commissioners 34

Statutory Officers 34
TABLE OF CHARTS

Chart	2-1	 Number of Detailed Contribution and Expenditure Transactions Processed 11

Chart	2-2 Number of Reports Reviewed by the Reports Analysis Division 12

Chart	2-3(a) Conciliation Agreements and Civil Penalties by Calendar Year 13

Chart	2-3(b) Median Civil Penalty by Calendar Year 14

Chart	2-4 Administrative Fines Collected by Calendar Year 15

Chart	4-4 Total Presidential Matching Fund Payouts and Number of Candidates 

Participating in Matching Fund Program, 1976-2004 Elections 16

Chart	3-1 Largest Electioneering Communications Filers 20

Chart	4-1 Overall Financial Activity of National Party Committees (in Millions) 26

Chart	4-2(a) Total Fundraising by Democratic National Party Committees, 

2000-2004 Election Cycles 27

Chart	4-2(b) Total Fundraising by Republican National Party Committees, 

2000-2004 Election Cycles 27

Chart	4-3 Spending by Registered Political Committees and Other 527 Organizations 28

iv 


INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, Congress created the 

Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer 

and enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act 

(FECA)–the statute that governs the financing 

of federal elections. The regulation of federal 

campaigns emanated from a Congressional 

judgment that our representative form of 

government needed protection from the corrosive 

influence of unlimited and undisclosed political 

contributions. The laws were designed to ensure 

that candidates in federal elections were not–and 

did not appear to be–beholden to a narrow group 

of people. Taken together, it was hoped, the laws 

would sustain and promote citizen confidence and 

participation in the democratic process.

Guided by this desire to protect the 

fundamental tenets of democracy, Congress 

created an independent regulatory agency–the 

FEC–to disclose campaign finance information; 

to enforce the limits, prohibitions and other 

provisions of the election law; to interpret the 

FECA through the promulgation of regulations 

and the issuance of advisory opinions; and to 

administer the public funding of Presidential 

elections.

Fulfilling that mission places the agency at 

the center of constitutional, philosophical and 

political debate. On one hand, the Commission 

must administer, interpret and enforce the FECA, 

which the Supreme Court has said serves a 

legitimate governmental interest. On the other 

hand, the Commission must remain mindful 

of the constitutional freedoms of speech and 

association, and the practical implications of its 

actions. The Commission, of course, does not bear 

this responsibility alone. Congress and the courts 

must also balance these competing interests.

This tension between valid governmental 

interests and certain constitutional guarantees 

frames many of the issues discussed in this report. 

While the report commemorates the Commission’s 

30th anniversary, it does not chronicle the entire 

30-year period. Instead, it offers a current 

snapshot of the agency, focusing on significant 

Commission actions of recent years.

Chapter 1 provides an historical context for 

the report.

Chapter 2 looks at the Commission’s 

administration, enforcement, interpretation and 

defense of the FECA.

Chapter 3 examines some of the key issues 

the Commission is currently debating or has 

recently resolved.

Chapter 4 offers FEC statistics to 

supplement the continuing national debate on the 

structure and role of the Commission, the place 
of party committees in the electoral process and 

the influence of independent organizations on the 

electoral process.

What emerges from this discussion is a portrait 

of an agency that has accomplished much, 

even as it has grappled with difficult issues 

whose resolution has helped define the proper 

balance between governmental interests and 

constitutionally protected political activity. The 

Commission’s administration and enforcement 

of the FECA have also helped ensure the 

continued legitimacy of our representative form 

of government. 


CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The origins of campaign financing in the 

United States date back to 1791, when groups 

supporting and opposing Alexander Hamilton 

published competing newspapers designed to sway 

the electorate. These minimal expenditures set the 

tone for campaigns over the next several decades.

In the Presidential election of 1832, however, 

the financing of campaigns changed. The Bank 

of the United States, whose charter-renewal was 

threatened by President Andrew Jackson, spent 

heavily to elect Henry Clay, who supported renewal 

of the bank’s charter. The bank’s tactics backfired, 

however, when Jackson characterized it as a “money 

monster,” and won reelection.

During the 1840s and 50s, the size of the 

electorate grew and so did the amount of campaign 

spending. Still, during the pre-Civil War period, 

“costs were relatively moderate, corruption...was 

the exception rather than the rule, fundraising was 

conducted in an amateur fashion, and the alliance 

between economic interests and politicians, though 

growing, was loose and flexible.”1

 By contrast, the 

postwar years have been called the most corrupt 

in U.S. history. Historian Eugene H. Roseboom 

describes financier Marcus A. Hanna’s fundraising 

for President McKinley’s 1896 campaign as follows:

“For banks the [campaign finance] assessment 

was fixed at one quarter of one percent of their 

capital. Life insurance companies contributed 

liberally, as did nearly all the great corporations. 

The Standard Oil Company gave $250,000 to 

Hanna’s war chest. The audited accounts of 

the national committee revealed collections of 

about $3,500,000.”2

Early Reform 

The drive to institute comprehensive campaign 

finance reform began around the turn of the century, 

when the muckrakers revealed the financial misdeeds 

of the 1896 election.3

 Their stories of corporations 

financing candidates’ campaigns in hopes of 

influencing subsequent legislation prompted 

President Theodore Roosevelt to proclaim: “All 

contributions by corporations to any political 

committee or for any political purpose should be 

forbidden by law.” In 1907, Congress passed the 

Tillman Act, which prohibited corporations and 

national banks from contributing money to federal 

campaigns. Three years later, Congress passed 

the first federal campaign disclosure legislation. 

Originally, the law applied only to House elections, 

but Congress amended the law in 1911 to cover 

Senate elections as well, and to set spending limits 

for all Congressional candidates.

The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 

which applied to general election activity only, 

2 CQ, Dollar Politics, p.3

3 The first campaign finance law actually predates these practices. 

Congress passed legislation in 1867 that prohibited federal officers 

1 Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree, p.35 from soliciting Navy Yard workers for contributions.


strengthened disclosure requirements and increased 

expenditure limits. The Hatch Act of 1939 and its 

1940 amendments asserted the right of Congress 

to regulate primary elections and included 

provisions limiting contributions and expenditures 

in Congressional elections. The Taft-Hartley Act 

of 1947 barred both labor unions and corporations 

from making expenditures and contributions in 

federal elections.

These legislative initiatives, taken together, sought 

to:

• Limit contributions to ensure that wealthy 

individuals and special interest groups did not 

have a disproportionate influence on federal 

elections; 

• Prohibit certain sources of funds for federal 

campaign purposes; 

• Control campaign spending, which tends to 

fuel reliance on contributors and fundraisers; 

and 

• Require public disclosure of campaign 

finances to deter abuse and to educate the 

electorate. 

None of these laws, however, created an 

institutional framework to administer and enforce 

the campaign finance provisions effectively. As a 

result, those provisions were largely ignored. The 

laws had other flaws as well. For example, spending 

limits applied only to committees active in two 

or more states. Further, candidates could avoid 

the spending limit and disclosure requirements 

altogether because a candidate who claimed to have 

no knowledge of spending on his behalf was not 

liable under the 1925 Act.

When Congress passed the more stringent 

disclosure provisions of the 1971 Federal Election 

Campaign Act (FECA), the shortcomings of 

the earlier laws became apparent. In 1968, still 

under the old law, House and Senate candidates 

reported spending $8.5 million, while in 1972, after 

the passage of the FECA, spending reported by 

Congressional candidates jumped to $88.9 million.4

4 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, VOl. xxvii, No. 49, 

December 5, 1969, p. 2435; Clark of the House, “The Annual 

Statistical Report of Contributions and Expenditures Made During 

the 1972 Election Campaigns for the U.S. House of Representatives” 

(1974), p. 161; Secretary of the Senate, “The Annual Statistical Report 

of Receipts and Expenditures Made in Connection with Elections for 

the U.S. Senate in 1972” [undated], p. 33

The 1971 Election Laws

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 

(P.L. 92-225), together with the 1971 Revenue Act 

(P.L. 92-178), fundamentally changed the federal 

campaign finance laws. The FECA, effective April 7, 

1972, not only required full reporting of campaign 

contributions and expenditures, but also limited 

spending on media advertisements and limited 

spending from candidates’ personal funds.5

 (These 

limits were later repealed to conform with judicial 

decisions.)

The FECA also provided the basic legislative 

framework for corporations and labor unions to 

establish separate segregated funds,6

 popularly 

referred to as PACs (political action committees). 

Although the Tillman Act and the Taft-Hartley Act 

of 1947 banned direct contributions by corporations 

and labor unions to influence federal elections, the 

FECA provided an exception whereby corporations 

and unions could use treasury funds to establish, 

operate and solicit voluntary contributions for the 

organization’s PAC. These voluntary donations 

from individuals could then be used to contribute to 

federal campaigns.

Under the Revenue Act–the first of a series 

of laws designed to implement federal financing of 

Presidential elections­­–citizens could check a box 

their tax forms authorizing the federal government 

to use one of their tax dollars to finance Presidential 

campaigns in the general election.7

 Congress 

implemented the program in 1973 and, by 1976, 

enough tax money had accumulated to fund the 

1976 Presidential election–the first publicly funded 

federal election in U.S. history.

Like its predecessors, the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971 did not provide for a single, 

independent body to monitor and enforce the law. 

Instead, the Clerk of the House, the Secretary of the 

5 “Contribution” is defined in 2 U.S.C. 431(8) and 11 CFR 100.51 

to 100.57. “Expenditure” is defined in 2 U.S.C. 431(9) and 11 CFR 

100.110 to 100.114.

6 “Separate segregated fund” is described at 2 U.S.C. 441b(b) and 11 

CFR 114.5.

7 In 1966, Congress encated a law to provide for public funding of 

Presidential elections, but suspended the law a year later. It would have 

included a taxpayers’ checkoff provision similar to that later embodied 

in the 1971 law.
Senate and the Comptroller General of the United 

States, head of the General Accounting Office 

(GAO), monitored compliance with the FECA. The 

Justice Department was responsible for prosecuting 

violations of the law referred by the three 

supervisory officials. Following the 1972 elections, 

however, the Justice Department prosecuted few of 

the 7,100 cases referred to it.8

1974 Amendments

In 1974, following the documentation of 

campaign abuses in the 1972 Presidential elections, a 

consensus emerged to create an independent body to 

ensure compliance with the campaign finance laws. 

Comprehensive amendments to the FECA (P.L. 93-

443) established the Federal Election Commission, 

an independent agency to assume the administrative 

functions previously divided between Congressional 

officers and GAO. The Commission was given 

jurisdiction in civil enforcement matters, authority to 

write regulations and responsibility for monitoring 

compliance with the FECA.

Additionally, the amendments transferred from 

GAO to the Commission the function of serving 

as a national clearinghouse for information on the 

administration of elections.

Under the 1974 amendments, the President, 

the Speaker of the House and the President pro 

tempore of the Senate each appointed two of the six 

voting members of the newly created Commission. 

The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the 

House were designated as nonvoting, ex officio 

Commissioners. The first Commissioners were sworn 

in on April 14, 1975.

The 1974 amendments also expanded the 

public funding system for Presidential elections. The 

amendments provided for partial federal funding, in 

the form of matching funds, for Presidential primary 

candidates and also extended public funding 

to political parties to finance their Presidential 

nominating conventions.

Complementing these provisions, Congress 

also enacted strict limits on both contributions 

to and expenditures by candidates for federal 

office.9

 Expenditures by other persons relative to a 

candidate were also limited. Another amendment 

relaxed the prohibition on contributions from 

federal government contractors. The FECA, as 

amended, permitted corporations and unions with 

federal contracts to establish and operate PACs.

Buckley v. Valeo

The constitutionality of key provisions of 

the 1974 amendments was immediately challenged 

in a lawsuit filed by Senator James L. Buckley 

(Conservative Party, New York) and Eugene 

McCarthy (former Democratic Senator from 

Minnesota) against the Secretary of the Senate, 

Francis R. Valeo. The Supreme Court handed down 

its ruling on January 30, 1976. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 

U.S. 1 (1976).

In its decision, the Court upheld contribution 

limits because they served the government’s interest 

in safeguarding the integrity of elections by 

preventing even the appearance of corruption of 

public officials. However, the Court overturned the 

expenditure limits, stating: “It is clear that a primary 

effect of these expenditure limitations is to restrict 

the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, 

groups and candidates. The restrictions...limit 

political expression at the core of our electoral 

process and of First Amendment freedoms.” 

Acknowledging that both contribution and spending 

limits had First Amendment implications, the Court 

stated that the new law’s “expenditure ceilings 

impose significantly more severe restrictions on 

protected freedoms of political expression and 

association than do its limitations on financial 

contributions.” The Court implied, however, that 

the expenditure limits placed on publicly funded 

candidates were constitutional because Presidential 

candidates were free to disregard the limits if 

they chose to reject public financing; later, the 

Court affirmed this ruling in Republican National 

Committee v. FEC, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).

9 “Political committee” is defined in 2 U.S.C. 431(4) and 11 CFR 

100.5.

8 Comptroller General of the United States, “Report of the Office of 

Federal Elections of the General Accounting Office in Administering 

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971” (February 1975). pp. 23 

and 24.
 

The Court also sustained other public funding 

provisions and upheld disclosure and recordkeeping 

requirements. However, the Court found that the 

method of appointing FEC Commissioners violated 

the constitutional principle of separation of powers, 

since Congress, not the President, appointed four 

of the Commissioners, who exercised executive 

powers.10As a result, beginning on March 22, 1976, 

the Commission could no longer exercise its executive 

powers.11 The agency resumed full activity in May, 

when, under the 1976 amendments to the FECA, 

the Commission was reconstituted and the President 

appointed six Commission members, who were 

confirmed by the Senate.

1976 Amendments

In response to the Supreme Court’s decision, 

Congress again revised the campaign finance 

legislation. The new amendments, enacted on May 

11, 1976, repealed the expenditure limits (except 

for candidates who accepted public funding) and 

revised the provision governing the appointment of 

Commissioners. The 1976 amendments also added 

specific contribution limits on giving to national 

party committees and to any other federal political 

committee.

Among the 1976 amendments were 

provisions to limit the scope of PAC fundraising 

by corporations and labor organizations. Preceding 

this curtailment of PAC solicitations, the FEC 

had issued an advisory opinion, AO 1975-23 (the 

SunPAC opinion), confirming that the 1971 law 

10 Similarly, in its 1993 decision in NRA Political Victory Fund v. FEC, 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that 

the presence of two Congressionallyappointed ex officio members on 

the Commission “violate[d] the Constitution’s separation of powers.” 

6 F.3d 821, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In compliance with the court’s 

decision, the Commission reconstituted itself as a six-member body, 

comprising only the Presidentially appointed Commissioners. As a 

precaution, the reconstituted Commission ratified all of its previous 

decisions to ensure uninterrupted enforcement of the FECA. The 

Commission petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in 

the case, but in December 1994, the Court dismissed the Commission’s 

petition, concluding that the agency lacked statutory authority to seek 

Supreme Court review on its own in cases arising under the FECA. 

The Court’s decision left standing the appeals court ruling. (FEC v. 

NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994)). 

11 The Supreme Court stayed its judgment concerning Commission 

powers for 30 days; the stay was extended once.

permitted a corporation to use treasury money to 

establish, operate and solicit contributions to a 

PAC. The opinion also permitted corporations and 

their PACs to solicit the corporation’s employees 

as well as its stockholders. The 1976 amendments, 

however, put significant restrictions on PAC 

solicitations, specifying who could be solicited and 

how solicitations would be conducted. In addition, 

a single contribution limit was adopted for all PACs 

established by the same union or corporation.

1979 Amendments

Building upon the experience of the 1976 and 

1978 elections, Congress made further changes in 

the law. The 1979 amendments to the FECA (P.L. 

96-187), enacted on January 8, 1980, included 

provisions that simplified reporting requirements, 

encouraged party activity at state and local levels 

and increased the public funding grants for 

Presidential nominating conventions.

Other Amendments

Throughout the 1980s and 90s and continuing 

to 2001, Congress adopted several amendments of 

limited scope, including provisions to:

• Ban honoraria for federal officeholders; 

• Repeal the “grandfather clause” that had 

permitted some Members of Congress to 

convert excess campaign funds to personal 

use; and 

• Increase funding for national nominating 

conventions. 

In addition, Congress enacted legislation that:

• Instituted a program for electronic filing of 

campaign finance reports; 

• Created a program for administrative fines 

dealing with reporting violations;

• Permitted candidates to access credit from 

their brokerage accounts or similar lines of 

credit;


• Assigned significant new administrative 

duties to the Commission under the National 

Voter Registration Act;12 and 

• Increased the tax checkoff for the 

Presidential Election Campaign Fund from $1 

to $3. 

Soft Money

In the 1996 election cycle, the major national 

party committees experienced significant increases 

in financial activity, a large portion of which was 

due to the dramatic increase in funds raised outside 

the limits and prohibitions of federal law, otherwise 

known as nonfederal or “soft” money. Compared to 

the 1992 Presidential cycle, the Republican national 

committees’ soft money receipts more than doubled 

and the Democratic national committees’ soft 

money receipts tripled, exceeding their total federal 

receipts for the cycle. 

While these funds could not legally be spent 

to support or oppose federal candidates, the parties 

nonetheless used soft money to fund “issue ads” 

that portrayed their candidates more favorably than 

their opponents. Often, corporations and unions 

would themselves finance “issue ads” ostensibly to 

influence legislation, but with a fairly clear electioninfluencing slant.

The way soft money was raised caused at 

least as much concern among reformers as the way 

it was spent. The parties frequently asked federal 

candidates and officeholders to help raise large soft 

money donations, offering donors access to current 

about potential corruption or the appearance of 

corruption.

The Bipartisan Campaign 

Reform Act

In an effort to address concerns about the 

effects of soft money and issue ads on the federal 

election process, Congress passed a comprehensive 

and future federal legislators and raising concerns 

reform bill called the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 

Act of 2002 (BCRA). President George W. Bush 

signed the BCRA into law on March 23, 2002. 

Among other things, the new law prohibits national 

party committees from raising or spending soft 

money. It also places certain limitations on the 

ability of federal candidates and officeholders to 

raise or spend soft money.

 In addition to banning soft money 

fundraising by and for national parties, the BCRA 

also restricts state and local party committees’ use of 

nonfederal funds to pay for certain federal election 

activities, such as voter registration and get-out-thevote efforts in connection with a federal election.

 With respect to issue advertising, the BCRA 

prohibits corporations and unions from funding 

broadcast ads that refer to a federal candidate 

in close proximity to that candidate’s election 

(i.e., within 30 days prior to the primary and 60 

days prior to the general). The law requires other 

groups not registered with the FEC to disclose 

their payments for these types of ads (referred to 

as electioneering communications), and the source 

of the funds used. The ads must also include a 

disclaimer identifying the sponsor. 

The BCRA’s comprehensive reach extended 

to numerous aspects of the FECA in areas such 

as contribution limitations, party committee 

activity, independent spending, compliance 

matters, permissible use of campaign funds and 

contributions by minors and foreign nationals. 

McConnell v. FEC

The BCRA was challenged in court within 

days of its passage into law. On March 27, 2002, 

Senator Mitch McConnell and the National 

Rifle Association each filed a complaint with the 

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 

challenging the constitutionality of several 

provisions of the BCRA. The Commission, 

through the Litigation Division of the Office of 

General Counsel, and the Office of the Solicitor 

General of the Department of Justice, defended 

12 These responsibilities were transferred to the newly created Election BCRA. The Supreme Court handed down its ruling 

Assistance Commission under the Help America Vote Act of 2002.
 

on December 10, 2003, upholding most of the 

challenged provisions of the BCRA, including its 

two principal features: the control of soft money and 

the regulation of electioneering communications. 

The Court found unconstitutional other BCRA 

provisions banning contributions from minors and 

requiring party committees to choose whether to 

make coordinated or independent expenditures on 

behalf of their nominees.13

Soft Money Ban 

In upholding the soft money ban, the Court 

noted that the “record is replete with examples of 

national party committees’ peddling access to federal 

candidates and officeholders in exchange for large 

soft-money donations.”14

The Court also upheld the BCRA’s limits on 

state and local party committees’ use of soft money 

for activities affecting federal elections, finding 

that this provision was closely drawn to match the 

governmental interest of preventing corruption and 

the appearance of corruption.

Electioneering Communications and 

Express Advocacy 

The electioneering communications 

provisions were also upheld by the Court. The 

plaintiffs had claimed that Buckley v. Valeo drew 

a constitutionally mandated line between express 

advocacy, which contains “magic words” such 

as “vote for” or “vote against,” and the more 

ambiguous language of issue advocacy. The Court 

disagreed, finding that the express advocacy 

restriction was not a constitutional command: 

“both the concept of express advocacy and the class 

of magic words were born of an effort to avoid 

constitutional problems of vagueness and overbreadth in the statute before the Buckley Court.” 

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claims that 

arguments in support of the longstanding ban on 

express advocacy communications financed by 

corporations and unions cannot be applied to the 

larger quantity of speech captured in the definition 

13 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. at 93.

14 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. at 95–96

of electioneering communication. The Court went 

on to say that “issue ads broadcast during the 30- 

and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and 

general elections are the functional equivalent of 

express advocacy,” adding that the “justifications for 

regulating express advocacy apply equally to those 

ads if they have an electioneering purpose, which the 

vast majority do.”


Chapter 2

Administering, Interpreting, Enforcing 

and Defending the FECA

The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) 

governs the financing of elections for federal office. 

It limits the sources and amounts of funds used 

to support candidates for federal office, requires 

disclosure of campaign finance information and– in 

tandem with the Primary Matching Payment Act 

and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund 

Act– provides for the public funding of Presidential 

elections. 

As the agency charged with administering 

and enforcing the FECA, the Federal Election 

Commission has four major responsibilities:

Providing disclosure of campaign finance 

information; 

Ensuring that candidates, committees 

and others comply with the limitations, 

prohibitions and disclosure requirements of 

the FECA; 

Administering the public funding of 

Presidential elections; and

Interpreting and defending the FECA. 

This chapter highlights the Commission’s 

stewardship of the FECA, focusing on recent 

improvements the agency has made in carrying out 

its responsibilities.

•

•

•

•

Outreach and Disclosure

Since its beginning, 30 years ago, the FEC 

has prided itself in providing outstanding service to 

the public, the press and the regulated community. 

Transcending the Commission’s prescribed duties, 

the commitment to serving the public is most evident 

in the Commission’s efforts to encourage voluntary 

compliance with the FECA and to facilitate public 

access to campaign finance data. This section 

demonstrates how the agency’s outreach and 

disclosure programs serve the public.

Outreach

For political committees, outreach begins 

early. A committee’s first contact with the FEC 

usually takes place through two different channels: 

the agency’s web site and its toll-free information 

hotline. When committees contact the Information 

Division through the hotline, they receive guidance 

on how to comply with the law and regulations. 

Information Division staff explain the requirements 

of the FECA and send the committee a registration 

packet that contains forms and publications geared 

toward its needs. Staff may also direct callers to 

the FEC web site which contains an extensive 

store of information on the law, regulations, filing 

requirements and compliance, as well as campaign 

finance information filed by political committees.
10

When a committee submits its registration 

documents, the Commission’s Information 

Technology (IT) staff assigns it an identification 

number and enters the registration information 

into the FEC database. Microfilm, electronic and 

paper copies of the registration are made available 

in the Commission’s Public Records Office and on 

the Commission’s web site. The committee is also 

automatically added to the mailing list for all official 

notices and correspondence from the Commission, 

including the agency’s award-winning monthly 

newsletter, the Record.

As questions about the FECA arise, committee 

staff can choose from a variety of FEC services 

designed to help them understand the law and 

voluntarily comply with its provisions. (These 

services are available to anyone interested in learning 

about the law.) Public affairs specialists answer 

their questions about the law, and campaign finance 

analysts, who review the actual reports filed by 

committees, respond to reporting questions and 

offer guidance on the law. The analysts also offer 

guidance on how to file electronically using the 

“FECfile” software, which is made available to 

committees at no charge. Every committee that files 

with the FEC has its own campaign finance analyst 

in the agency’s Reports Analysis Division. (Staff in 

the Commission’s Audit Division and the Office of 

General Counsel’s General Law and Advice Division 

help Presidential committees comply with the special 

rules that govern publicly funded campaigns.) 

Committee staff can also attend instructional 

workshops and conferences and/or request free FEC 

publications that explain particular aspects of the 

law. Should committee staff need a publication or 

other document quickly, they can access it on the 

web site or call the agency’s automated “faxline” 

system and receive the document immediately by 

fax, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 

To further assist committees, the Commission 

sends reminder notices along with the necessary 

reporting forms shortly before reports are due. 

Committees also receive notice when they have failed 

to file.

Interpreting the FECA

Rulemaking

The Commission implements the various 

provisions of the FECA and its amendments 

through its rulemaking procedures. As part of these 

procedures, the Commission, with the assistance 

of the Office of General Counsel’s Policy Division, 

issues notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRMs), 

collects, reviews and analyzes comments on the 

NPRMs, conducts hearings and promulgates final 

rules with explanations and justifications.

In recent years, the Commission has 

undertaken several notable rulemakings, including 

the proceedings implementing the Bipartisan 

Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). The Commission 

completed the rulemaking on the soft money ban 

in the BCRA in 90 days and the rulemakings on 

the other provisions of the BCRA in 270 days. The 

Commission also received over 150,000 comments 

in connection with its political committee status 

rulemaking, which the Office of General Counsel 

reviewed and processed.

Advisory Opinions

If an individual, political committee or other 

entity wants official, legally binding guidance from 

the Commission, it may request an advisory opinion 

(AO). The Commission responds to these requests 

within 60 days, or within 20 days if a candidate’s 

committee submits the request just before an 

election. An AO answers the requesting committee’s 

question and also serves as a precedent for other 

committees in the same situation. The Commission 

has issued more than 1,200 AOs since 1975.

Disclosure

Disclosing the sources and amounts of funds 

used to finance federal elections is perhaps the 

most important of the FEC’s duties. In fact, it 

would be virtually impossible for the Commission 

to effectively fulfill any of its other responsibilities 

without disclosure. Public disclosure of a 

committee’s receipts and disbursements provides 

essential aid to the Commission’s efforts to ensure 
that committees are complying with the FECA’s 

contribution prohibitions and limitations. Disclosure 

also helps the public evaluate political committees 

and the candidates running for federal office and 

it enables them, along with the agency, to monitor 

committee compliance with the election laws. Given 

these facts, the Commission has devoted substantial 

resources to providing effective access to campaign 

finance data.

When a committee files its FEC report on 

paper, the Commission’s Public Records Office 

ensures that a copy is available for public inspection 

within 48 hours. Simultaneously, the agency’s IT 

staff begins to enter the information disclosed in the 

report into the FEC computer database. Reports 

filed electronically1

 are made available to the public 

almost immediately. The amount of information 

disclosed has grown dramatically over the years. 

By December 2004, more than 28 million pages of 

information dating back to 1972 were available for 

public review.

1 Under the Commission’s mandatory electronic filing program, 

almost all committees with more than $50,000 in either contributions 

or expenditures must file reports electronically.

On the FEC web site, the public can access all 

reports filed with the agency regardless of whether 

they were filed electronically or on paper. Scanned 

copies of paper reports can be searched and viewed 

through the FECs digital imaging system online. The imaging system permits a user to view a 

committee’s report on a high resolution computer 

screen (or a paper copy), just as the document 

appeared in its original form. Campaign finance data 

can also be searched in a host of different ways: one 

can search the database by individual contributor, 

committee, candidate, occupation, date, dollar 

amount or other search criteria. 

In the Public Records Office, visitors can 

inspect microfilm and paper copies of committee 

reports, as well as the FEC’s computer database and 

more than 25 different computer indexes that make 

the data more accessible. (The G Index, for example, 

lists individuals who have given more than $200 to 

a committee during an election cycle. The K and 

L Indexes offer broader “bank statement” views 

of receipts and disbursements for PACs, parties 

and candidates.) The Public Records staff assist 

thousands of callers and visitors every year. 

CHART 2-1

Number of Detailed Contribution and Expenditure Transactions Processed*

0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2,000,000

2,500,000

Number of Transactions Processed

040302010099989796959493929190898887868584838281807978

* The Commission lowered its data entry threshold from $500 to $200 in 1989 and began entering soft money 

transactions in 1991.
12

Members of the news media may review 

committee reports using any of the methods 

described above and may receive assistance 

from the Commission’s Press Office. The staff 

answer reporters’ questions, issue press releases 

summarizing campaign finance data and significant 

FEC actions and respond to requests under the 

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The press 

office logs thousands of calls each year.

The Commission also makes available, both in 

its Public Records Office and on the web, a variety 

of agency documents, including advisory opinions 

and closed enforcement and audit reports, as well 

as litigation documents. In December of 2003, 

the Commission introduced a searchable database 

of enforcement matters, the Enforcement Query 

System (EQS). EQS is a web-based search tool that 

allows users to find and examine public documents 

regarding closed Commission enforcement matters. 

Previously, this information was available only at the 

Commission’s offices in Washington, and only on 

paper or microfilm.

Compliance

As effective as the Commission’s efforts to 

encourage voluntary compliance with the FECA 

have been, none would have succeeded without the 

deterrent provided by the agency’s enforcement 

program. As noted in Chapter 1, earlier campaign 

finance laws were largely ineffectual because no 

single, independent agency handled enforcement. By 

contrast, under the current law, the Commission has 

exclusive jurisdiction over civil enforcement.

Enforcement cases are generated through 

complaints filed by the public, referrals from 

other federal and state agencies and the FEC’s 

own monitoring procedures. The Commission’s 

Reports Analysis Division reviews each report a 

committee files in order to ensure the accuracy of 

the information on the public record and to monitor 

the committee’s compliance with the law. If the 

information disclosed in a report appears to be 

incomplete or inaccurate, the reviewing analyst sends 

the committee a request for additional information 

(RFAI). The committee may avoid a potential 

enforcement action and/or audit by responding 

promptly to such a request. (Most responses take 

the form of an amended report.) Although the 

Commission does not have authority to conduct 

random audits of committees, it can audit a 

committee “for cause” when the committee’s reports 

indicate violations of the law. ( Chart 2-2 tracks 

report review activity.)

CHART 2-2

Number of Reports Reviewed by the Reports Analysis Division

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

Number of Reports

0403020100999897969594939291908988878685848382818079
Whether initiated by outside complaint 

or internal referral, the most complex and legally 

significant enforcement matters are handled by 

the Enforcement Division of the Office of General 

Counsel (OGC). The Enforcement Division: 

Recommends to the Commission whether to 

find “reason to believe” the FECA has been 

violated, a finding that formally initiates an 

investigation; 

Investigates potential violations of the 

FECA by requesting, subpoenaing, and 

reviewing documents and interviewing and 

deposing witnesses; and

Conducts settlement negotiations on 

behalf of the Commission, culminating in 

“conciliation agreements” with respondents.

Based on the results of its investigations, 

the Office of General Counsel recommends to the 

Commission whether to find “probable cause to 

believe” the FECA has been violated.

The agency must attempt to resolve 

enforcement matters through conciliation. If 

conciliation fails, however, the Commission may 

sue a respondent in federal district court . Likewise, 

•

•

•

when Commission actions are challenged in 

court, the Commission conducts its own defensive 

litigation.2

 The Commission has been involved 

in more than 530 court cases since 1980, and the 

Commission prevailed in 90 percent of those cases 

(excluding cases that were dismissed). 

Enforcement Initiatives

Prior to 1993, the Commission handled every 

enforcement matter, regardless of its significance. 

As the number and complexity of cases increased, a 

backlog developed, jeopardizing the Commission’s 

ability to enforce the law effectively. In order to 

deal with the increasing caseload, the Commission 

developed the Enforcement Priority System 

(EPS). Under this system, the Commission ranks 

enforcement cases based on specific criteria, and 

immediately assigns the significant cases to staff.

2 With regard to cases that are appealed to the Supreme Court, 

however, the high Court ruled, in December 1994, that the 

FEC could not unilaterally bring cases before it, except those 

involving the Presidential public funding program. Instead, 

the Commission must ask the Justice Department either to 

represent the agency or to grant approval for the Commission 

to represent itself before the Court. (FEC v. NRA Political 

Victory Fund, supra.)

0403020100999897969594939291908988878685

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Number of Conciliation Agreements

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

Total Civil Penalty Amount

Number Thousands of Dollars

CHART 2-3(a)

Conciliation Agreements and Civil Penalties by Calendar Year
14

 Implementation of the EPS was a major 

accomplishment, which continues to yield benefits 

today. But it also reflected that the Commission’s 

enforcement program had neither the resources nor 

the systems in place to handle every case. Between 

fiscal year 1995 and fiscal year 2000, 54 percent 

of enforcement matters were summarily dismissed 

under the EPS as either low rated – meaning the 

matter was of a lesser priority compared to other 

matters before the Commission – or as “stale,” 

meaning the matter rated as being a higher priority, 

but staff resources did not become available to work 

the case within 12 to 18 months following intake. 

In recent years, the number of cases summarily 

dismissed has dramatically decreased. And, in fiscal 

year 2004, for the first time since implementation of 

the EPS more than a decade before, the Commission 

did not dismiss a single case as “stale.” 

The recent history of the Commission’s 

enforcement program reflects efforts to become 

more effective and efficient, to do far more with few 

additional resources. These efforts have included 

a number of management initiatives implemented 

within OGC, including:

Emphasizing that the investigative process 

conducted within OGC is not an adversarial 

•

proceeding, and that the General Counsel’s 

recommendations to the Commission in 

enforcement matters are objective and based 

on a fair reading of the record and careful, 

thorough consideration of the issues; 

• Bringing all enforcement matters under the 

Enforcement Division, and creating two new 

enforcement teams. (Immediately prior to 

this most recent reorganization, enforcement 

matters were handled by two different 

divisions of OGC, depending on certain 

characteristics of the particular matter.); 

• Initiating numerous staff training programs;

• Renewing the emphasis on timeliness of case 

processing;

• Balancing resources to account for the 

seriousness, magnitude and complexity of 

cases;

• Increasing efficiency through centralized and 

strategic case assignments; 

• Implementing a computerized Case 

Management System to track and store 

data related to cases and respondents in a 

searchable database; and

• Requiring respondents to cease and 

CHART 2-3(b)

Median Civil Penalty by Calendar Year

0403020100999897969594939291908988878685

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

Penalty Amount Dollars
desist from violating the same provision or 

provisions of the law in the future.

The Commission has also introduced 

new programs to expedite resolution of less 

serious violations of the law. In July 2000, the 

Commission was authorized by Congress to create 

an Administrative Fine Program to process cases 

involving late or non-filed reports. This program 

promotes timely filing by assessing civil money 

penalties for committees that file reports and 

notices late or fail to report at all. The program 

has significantly increased the timeliness of 

committee filings and has succeeded in allowing the 

Commission to use its enforcement resources more 

efficiently (See chart). Since the Administrative Fine 

Program’s establishment, the program has processed 

over 1,000 cases and assessed $1,370,827 in fines.

Another program that has helped to reduce 

the burden on the traditional enforcement process 

is the FEC’s Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

Program. The ADR Program is designed to resolve 

cases without using the more formal enforcement 

process. The program allows appropriate cases to 

be dealt with through negotiation and mediation 

between the FEC and the respondent. The program 

has proved successful in expediting the resolution of 

numerous complaints filed with the Commission as 

well as internal referrals from the Audit and Reports 

Analysis divisions. Begun in 2000 as a pilot program 

and then made permanent in 2002, the ADR 

program has reached more than 150 negotiated 

settlements.

As a result of these initiatives, civil penalties 

collected by the Commission have increased, 

especially since 2003. In calendar year 1995, the 

Commission collected $1,339,000 in civil penalties, 

and the median civil penalty was at an all-time high 

of $7,500. (The median civil penalty did not exceed 

$1,000 until 1993.) As recently as 2001, civil penalty 

collections for the year were less than a million 

dollars. In 2003, the standard enforcement process 

alone collected a record $2,184,375, counting all 

penalties collected in that year. In 2004, that record 

was surpassed, with total penalties negotiated in 

the traditional enforcement process amounting to 

$2,370,395, with a median penalty of $21,000. 

In addition, the initiatives of recent years 

have speeded case processing times. In just one 

year, from Fiscal Year 2003 to Fiscal Year 2004, 

the Office of General Counsel reduced by 25% the 

median number of days from the date a complaint 

was received to the date a substantive analysis was 

completed and further action taken, if appropriate, 

to resolve the matter; the average time for processing 

such matters was reduced 16% over the same time 

period. 

In short, the FEC has been able to close 

significant numbers of routine reporting violations 

and address other straightforward violations more 

expeditiously. At the same time, OGC has focused 

resources on more significant cases, resolving them 

more quickly with substantially higher civil penalties 

and all but eliminating the number of matters 

summarily dismissed due to lack of resources.

Bipartisan Structure and 

Enforcement

By law, no more than three Commissioners 

may be from the same political party. Historically, 

this has left the Commission composed of three 

CHART 2-

Administrative Fines Collected by Calendar Year

0

100

200

300

400

500

Civil Money Penalties

2001 2002 2003 2004

Thousands of Dollars
1

Democratic and three Republican Commissioners. 

The structure of the Commission leaves open the 

possibility of a tied vote on enforcement matters. 

Because enforcement matters can only proceed with 

a majority vote, effective enforcement is in part 

dependent upon the Commission’s ability to reach a 

consensus. In the five-year period from 1999-2003, 

the Commission voted 5,602 times and reached a 

tie vote on enforcement matters 60 times (or just 

less than 1.1% of overall votes for that period). The 

vast majority of tie votes do not result in the closure 

of the enforcement matter; instead, the matter is 

usually continued with the terms of the case revised 

and with a consensus achieved. 

Presidential Public Funding

Every presidential election since 1976 has 

been financed with public funds. While the concept 

of public funding dates back to the turn of the 

century, a statutory public funding program was not 

implemented until the early 1970s.

Congress designed the program to correct 

the problems perceived in the presidential electoral 

process. Those problems were believed to include:

The disproportionate influence (or the 

appearance of influence) of the wealthiest 

contributors; 

The demands of fundraising that prevented 

some candidates from adequately presenting 

their views to the public; and 

The increasing cost of presidential 

campaigns, which effectively disqualified 

candidates who did not have access to large 

sums of money.3

To address these problems, Congress devised 

a program that combines public funding with 

limitations on contributions and expenditures. The 

program has three parts:

Matching funds for primary candidates; 

Grants to sponsor political parties’ 

Presidential nominating conventions; and 

Grants for the general election campaigns of 

3 See S. Rep. No. 93-689, pp. 1–10 (1974)

•

•

•

•

•

•

major party nominees and partial funding for 

qualified minor and new party candidates. 

Based on statutory criteria, the Commission 

determines which candidates and committees are 

eligible for public funds, and in what amounts. The 

U.S. Treasury then makes the necessary payments. 

Later, the Commission audits all of the committees 

that received public funds to ensure that they used 

the funds properly. Based on the Commission’s 

findings, committees may have to make repayments 

to the U.S. Treasury.

Audits

Ensuring the proper use of public funds 

requires Commission auditors to review thousands 

of transactions involving millions of dollars for 

each Presidential candidate who receives public 

funds. In the past, the time required for these audits, 

and the campaigns’ response to the Commission’s 

conclusions, often extended several years after the 

election. 

CHART 4-4

Total Presidential Matching Fund Payouts and 

Number of Candidates Participating in Matching 

Fund Program, 1976-2004 Elections

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

0400969288848076

0

5

10

15

20

Matching Funds

Number of Candidates 

Millions of Dollars Candidates
During the 1990s, the agency revised its 

regulations, amended its audit procedures, expanded 

its use of technology and increased staffing to 

hasten the completion and disclosure of Presidential 

audits. One significant change allows Audit staff 

to issue the preliminary results of audits that do 

not raise significant legal questions or issues to the 

Commission without formal review by the Office 

of General Counsel. This change eliminated one 

complete level of processing while preserving the 

opportunities for campaigns to answer and comment 

on the conclusions reached in the audit reports. 

The Office of General Counsel’s General Law and 

Advice Division continues to assist on audits that 

raise significant or complex legal issues, and to 

facilitate the audit process by advising the auditors 

on a wide range of legal and audit protocol issues. 

As a result of these changes, the vast majority of the 

audits for the 2000 election were completed in 2002, 

marking a significant improvement over previous 

Presidential cycles. 

Tax Checkoff

The public funding program is exclusively 

funded by the dollars that taxpayers designate for 

the Presidential Election Campaign Fund on their 

1040 tax forms. Beginning in 1980, fewer and fewer 

taxpayers designated a dollar to the Presidential 

Fund, even as Fund payments to candidates 

increased with inflation. 

After being warned by the Commission that 

the program faced an impeding shortfall, Congress 

acted to preserve the fund in the short run by raising 

the checkoff amount from $1 to $3 in 1993. But 

Congress did not index the checkoff amount for 

inflation, so the long-term problem of shortfall 

remains. The Commission has suggested a number 

of legislative changes to remedy this problem, 

including indexing the checkoff amount for inflation 

and allowing the Treasury to rely on “expected 

proceeds” from the checkoff instead of the actual 

balance as of the dates of the matching fund 

payments. The checkoff is discussed in further detail 

in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3

Key Issues Before the Commission

Since its inception, the FEC has negotiated 

the tension between the rights of citizens to enter 

into public political debate and discussion and the 

need to simultaneously safeguard the integrity of 

the electoral process. Throughout its 30 years as an 

agency, the Commission has dealt with a myriad 

of issues that have required it to balance a keen 

sensitivity for the First Amendment right to free 

speech with the need to safeguard the process central 

to our representative form of government.

This chapter examines the Commission’s 

balancing act, focusing particularly on a few of the 

difficult issues that the agency is currently addressing 

or has recently resolved.

Electioneering Communications

The extent to which the FECA may limit 

election-related communications by corporations 

and unions has long been a contentious and 

constitutionally significant issue debated both in 

the courts and at the Federal Election Commission. 

While the history of this issue has its provenance 

as far back as the 1907 Tillman Act, the constantly 

shifting terrain of campaign finance activity and 

subsequent regulation have culminated in what is 

arguably among the most significant regulatory 

measures to date: the electioneering communications 

provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. 

These provisions not only expand application of 

the long-standing corporate/labor prohibition but 

also provide greater disclosure of election-related 

communications.

For some, the express advocacy standard 

established by the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Buckley v. Valeo marked the boundary delineating 

how far the FEC could regulate election-related 

speech. Applying that standard, any communication 

that expressly advocated a vote for or against a 

federal candidate could be paid for only with funds 

subject to the limits and prohibitions of federal 

law (also called “hard money”). Over the years, 

an increasing number of corporations, unions, 

political parties and independent groups produced 

communications contoured specifically to avoid 

express advocacy language, thereby avoiding 

regulation. Reformers cited these communications 

as evidence that express advocacy was an insufficient 

standard for distinguishing between electioninfluencing ads and those that genuinely addressed 

other issues. In a study cited by Congressional 

proponents of the electioneering communications 

provisions, only 10% of election ads in the 2000 

election used express advocacy language.1

 Spending 

on “issue” ads increased almost sevenfold from $30 

million in 1998 to over $200 million in the 2000 

election.2

 In light of these developments, reformers 

argued that the express advocacy standard was an 

1 Craig B. Holman and Luke P. McLoughlin, Buying Time 2000. 

Brennan Center For Justice. www.brennancenter.org.

2 Ibid. p. 15.
20 

easily circumvented and ineffective standard for 

preventing prohibited sources of funds from being 

used to affect federal elections.

The electioneering communications 

provisions introduce a new standard for determining 

whether or not an ad is campaign related. Since 

most ads are indirect in their appeal and rarely state 

a direct call to action, such as “vote for” or “vote 

against,” Congressional sponsors of the provisions 

sought to craft legislation that focused on when, 

how and to whom a communication is made. 

Accordingly, the electioneering communications 

provisions require that any broadcast, cable or 

satellite ad that satisfies the following criteria must 

be disclosed and paid for with funds permissible 

under federal law:

The ad mentions a clearly identified federal 

candidate; 

The ad is run within 30 days of a primary or 

60 days of a general election; and 

The ad is targeted to the relevant electorate.

Some have referred to the 30- and 60-day 

pre-election windows as “blackout periods,” 

suggesting that ads cannot be run during those 

periods. Actually, electioneering communications 

are permitted during those periods, but they 

must be paid for with donations from individuals 

and not from any prohibited sources, such as 

corporations, unions and foreign nationals. In the 

2004 election cycle, individuals and groups disclosed 

to the FEC over $97 million in electioneering 

•

•

•

communications. As Chart 3-1 shows, a handful 

of groups were responsible for the vast majority of 

spending on electioneering communications. The 

sources and amounts of these communications 

would likely have gone undisclosed prior to the 

electioneering communications provisions.

The constitutionality of the electioneering 

communications provisions was challenged in 

McConnell v. FEC. The plaintiffs argued that 

the electioneering communications provisions 

overstepped the constitutionally-mandated line 

between election advocacy and issue advocacy 

drawn by the Court in Buckley. The Court, however, 

found that the components of the definition of 

an electioneering communication are sufficiently 

tailored to distinguish election-related ads from 

those that are not.

Several issues remain outstanding following 

the district and appeals court decisions in 

Shays and Meehan v. FEC. The decisions 

rejected several aspects of the Commission’s 

regulations on electioneering communications. 

As a result, the Commission has embarked on 

a rulemaking re-examining the regulation that 

exempts communications that are conducted 

by public charities (entities that are organized 

under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 

Code). The Commission is also revisiting whether 

communications that broadcasters air for free should 

be covered by the electioneering communication 

rules. 

Political Committee Status

Determining which groups should be required 

to disclose their activity to the FEC as political 

committees has proven to be a challenge for 

Congress, the courts and the Commission. A vast 

number of organizations engage in some sort of 

political activity, ranging from education to lobbying 

to direct electoral activity. Many organizations 

never engage in the sort of election-influencing 

activity that the FEC regulates. According to the 

interpretation of the FECA in the Buckley v. Valeo

decision (see Chapter 1), a group or organization 

that is under the control of a candidate or has as 

CHART 3-1

Largest Electioneering Communications Filers

Filers Total 

Media Fund $26,869,676

Progress for American Voters Fund $26,472,972

Swift Boat Veterans for Truth $13,568,351

Moveon.org Voter Fund $5,717,031

Citizens for a Strong Senate $4,580,471

League of Conservation Voters $3,711,570

Club for Growth.net $3,633,577
2

its major purpose influencing the nomination or 

election of a candidate must register with the FEC 

as a political committee and regularly disclose all of 

its receipts and disbursements once it has made or 

received contributions or expenditures aggregating 

in excess of $1,000 in a calendar year. 

“527” Organizations

All political committees registered with the 

FEC are classified as political organizations under 

section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, but not all 

527 organizations are required to register or report 

with the Commission. Those that are not required to 

register or report to the FEC are also not bound by 

many of the limits and prohibitions of the FECA. 

During the 2004 elections, campaign spending by 

527 organizations not registered with the FEC 

became an issue of concern among campaign 

finance reformers (See Chart 4-3 in Chapter 4). Key 

sponsors of the BCRA encouraged the Commission 

to bring these groups within the agency’s control and 

the Commission has stated that it will address those 

concerns on a case-by-case basis.

New Rules Affecting Political Committees

In an effort to address some of these concerns, 

the Commission promulgated new regulations in 

November 2004 to clarify when funds received are 

considered contributions and could thus trigger 

political committee status. The new rules included in 

the definition of “contribution” any funds received 

in response to a solicitation that indicates that some 

portion of the funds will be used to support or 

oppose the election of a clearly identified federal 

candidate. Hence, 527 organizations that raise such 

funds may be required to register and report to 

the FEC as political committees. On September 

14, 2004, before the Commission promulgated 

the new rules on political committee status, U.S. 

Representatives Christopher Shays and Martin 

Meehan filed a complaint in the U.S. District 

Court for the District of Columbia challenging 

the Commission’s alleged “failure... to promulgate 

legally sufficient regulations to define the term 

‘political committee,” particularly as that term is 

applied to 527 organizations.3

 In January, 2005, 

EMILY’s List filed suit against the Commission in 

the same court alleging that the new rules violated 

the Administrative Procedure Act and the First 

Amendment. They argued that the FEC overstepped 

its authority by restricting activities that are not for 

the purpose of influencing a federal election. Their 

request for a preliminary injunction in this case was 

denied on February 25, 2005. 

Both the Shays-Meehan and EMILY’s List 

cases were pending at the date of this publication.

Personal Use of 

Campaign Funds

Congress banned personal use of excess 

campaign funds as part of the 1979 amendments 

to the FECA. That ban, however, did not apply 

to candidates who were Members of Congress on 

January 8, 1980 (due to the so-called “grandfather 

clause”), nor did it define the parameters of 

“personal use.”

Since most of the candidates initially seeking 

guidance under this section were incumbents, who 

were exempt under the “grandfather clause,” the 

Commission was rarely called upon to address the 

personal use issue. When questions did arise, the 

Commission tried to find answers that took into 

account both Congress’s desire to prohibit the 

undefined “personal use” of campaign contributions 

and the need to give candidates and campaigns 

the discretion to conduct their campaigns as they 

saw fit. Once again, the Commission was called 

upon to find a balance between legislative interests 

and constitutional freedoms, mindful of practical 

considerations.

As years passed, public interest groups and 

the press began to focus public attention on the way 

certain Members of Congress and other candidates 

spent their campaign funds. Common Cause, for 

example, alleged that “Members are using campaign 

funds to buy cars, to pay for clothes and meals, to 

pay for pleasure and vacation trips, to pay for club 

dues and tickets to theater and sporting events... 

3 337 F.Supp. 2d 28, (D.D.C., 2004).
22 

claiming these activities are related to campaign 

or official duties.” Others complained that “some 

campaign coffers are regarded as slush funds to be 

used by incumbents for whatever purposes meet 

their fancy.”4

In response to the criticism, Congress 

repealed the “grandfather clause” by passing the 

Ethics Reform Act of 1989. That statute extended 

the personal use ban to all candidates, including 

Members of the House and Senate who served in the 

103rd Congress or a subsequent Congress, but it did 

not define “personal use.”

Personal Use Regulations (1995)

With the repeal of the “grandfather clause,” the 

Commission expected additional questions regarding 

the scope of the personal use ban. As a result, the 

Commission initiated a rulemaking to define the 

term. Conflicting comments and testimony at public 

hearings demonstrated the controversial nature of 

the issue: One person’s “personal use” is another’s 

legitimate campaign expenditure.

After carefully considering the issues, the 

Commission adopted detailed regulations that 

defined personal use, and offered specific examples of 

expenses that the Commission considered personal. 

Generally, expenses that would exist regardless of an 

individual’s campaign for federal office or duties as a 

federal officeholder were deemed personal. Examples 

include:

Household expenses; 

Funeral expenses; 

Tuition payments; 

Entertainment expenses; and 

Membership dues at clubs.

Statutory Developments

When Congress enacted the BCRA, it amended 

the statutory basis for the personal use regulations. 

With some slight differences, these changes served 

4 Sara Fritz and Dwight Morris, Handbook of Campaign Spending: 

Money in the 1990 Congressional Races. Congressional Quarterly, 

Washington D.C. 1992; p. 9.

•

•

•

•

•

to codify the existing FEC regulations relating 

to personal use of campaign funds. The concept 

that personal use covers expenses that would exist 

irrespective of the candidate’s candidacy or federal 

office holding duties was placed into the statute. 

The BCRA also included a non-exhaustive list of 

prohibited personal uses of campaign funds which 

largely corresponded to the list contained in the 

1995 regulations. One exception was the treatment 

of funeral expenses which was removed from the list 

of prohibited personal uses. The new personal use 

regulations now permit campaign funds to be used 

for the funeral expenses of a candidate or campaign 

volunteer who dies in the course of campaign activity.

The BCRA also removed from the list of 

permissible purposes for the use of campaign funds 

“ any other lawful purpose.” In its 2004 legislative 

recommendations to Congress, the Commission 

suggested restoring this language. In December 2004 

Congress reinserted this language into the statute.

Candidate Salary

After the FECA was enacted, the Commission 

was unable to resolve the question of whether 

campaigns may pay a salary to a candidate during 

the campaign. Some Commissioners maintained that 

salary payments represented an illegal conversion of 

campaign funds to personal use. Others argued that 

banning campaign salaries unfairly disadvantaged 

challengers. In its 1995 rulemaking, the Commission 

considered two proposals to address the salary 

question: one would have banned candidate 

salaries; the other would have allowed candidates 

to receive a salary equal to the one they were forced 

to give up in order to campaign. Neither proposal, 

however, garnered support from a majority of the 

Commissioners.

In 2002, the Commission again considered the 

salary question, and issued new regulations that allow 

campaigns to pay a salary to the candidate, so long 

as that salary is not greater than the salary for the 

federal office sought or in excess of the candidate’s 

income for the previous year. The Commission noted 

that the earlier prohibition on candidate salaries 

unfairly hindered challengers and candidates who 

lacked the personal means to forego employment for 

the length of their campaigns. 
2

Coordination Issues

Under the FECA, expenditures that are 

coordinated with a candidate or campaign are 

considered in-kind contributions. The Commission, 

courts and the regulated community have long 

debated what standard should be used to determine 

what expenditures are coordinated and what 

expenditures are independent.

Following a lower court ruling that narrowed 

the activities that could result in coordination, and 

the Commission’s promulgation of coordination 

rules based on that ruling, Congress in the BCRA 

changed the statutory definitions of “independent 

expenditure” and “coordination.” Under the BCRA, 

an expenditure “made by any person in cooperation, 

consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or 

suggestion of” a candidate, party or any agent of a 

candidate or party is considered “coordinated” and 

is thus subject to the limitations, prohibitions and 

reporting requirements of the Act. Congress also 

directed the Commission to revise its regulations. 

As part of its BCRA rulemaking in 2002, 

the Commission developed regulations that 

adopted a three-prong test for determining when a 

communication is coordinated. This test considers the 

identity of the person paying for the communication, 

the content of the communication and the conduct 

of the parties producing the communication. This 

test was challenged in Shays and Meehan v. FEC. 

The district court decision in Shays, issued in 2004, 

held that by taking into account the content of 

communications, the Commission’s coordinated 

communication test undermined the BCRA’s 

statutory purposes of regulating campaign finance 

and preventing circumvention of the FECA’s 

contribution limits. The court stated that where 

the parties have coordinated the production of a 

communication that constitutes an “expenditure,” the 

communication should be considered a contribution 

regardless of its content. In July 2005, the U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the 

district court’s conclusion on narrower grounds. The 

Commission is currently engaged in a new rulemaking 

revisiting its coordination regulations.

Regulation of the Internet 

The development of the Internet has had 

important implications for the development of 

federal election laws. As the Commission has noted, 

the Internet “allows almost limitless, inexpensive 

communications across the broadest possible 

cross-section of the American population.” The 

Commission has examined a number of Internetrelated issues through advisory opinions which 

considered the impact of the Internet on various areas 

of campaign finance law, such as: 

Fundraising by candidates and political 

committees through web sites;5

The use of the Internet in volunteer 

activities;6

The services provided by vendors for 

fundraising;7

Non partisan get-out-the-vote activities;8

 and 

News media activity.9

As part of its rulemaking implementing the 

BCRA, the Commission concluded that Congress 

did not intend Internet communications to be 

treated as “public communications” and accordingly 

excluded Internet activity from Commission rules on 

soft money and coordinated communications. The 

district court’s decision in Shays and Meehan v. FEC

rejected the wholesale exclusion of the Internet from 

Commission regulations and charged the Commission 

with determining which forms of “general public 

political advertising on the Internet should be subject 

to some regulation.” As a result, the Commission is 

in the process of developing new regulations which 

will deal with concerns expressed by the Shays court 

while continuing to respect the use of the Internet 

by individuals as a means of political expression and 

information gathering.

5 Advisory Opinion 1995-09 (NewtWatch PAC) and 1999-09 (Bradley 

for President).

6 Advisory Opinion 1999-17 (Bush for President).

7 Advisory Opinions 1999-22 (Aristotle Publishing Company), 

2002-07 (Careau) and 2004-19 (Dollar Vote.org). 

8 Advisory Opinion 1999-25 (Democracy Network).

9 Advisory Opinions 2000-13 (iNEXTV) and 2004-07 (MTV). 

•

•

•

•

•

25

Chapter 4

Continuing Debate Over Reform

Since the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 

was signed into law in March 2002, the terrain of 

campaign finance law has shifted significantly and 

again placed the FEC at the center of public debate 

over the direction of campaign finance reform. This 

chapter examines some of the fundamental issues at 

the top of the reform agenda, supplemented by FEC 

statistical data.

The Role of Political Parties

Background

For many years conventional wisdom has 

held that political parties are gradually becoming 

less relevant in the American political arena. Up 

until the 1950s and ‘60s, the parties dominated 

the electoral process.1

 Then, a number of factors 

– including social, political, technological and 

governmental changes – coalesced to reduce party 

influence:

Direct primaries limited the role parties 

played in selecting nominees. 

Changes in civil service laws limited 

patronage, which parties had used to reward 

loyalists. 

Higher education levels spawned issueoriented campaigns, where voters and 

candidates were less reliant on party guidance. 

1 Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance, p. 3.

•

•

•

Television replaced the party as the primary 

link between candidates and voters.2

There were features of the FECA that also 

seemed to lessen the influence of the parties. It 

was argued, for example, that the Presidential 

public funding program, which provides public 

money directly to qualified candidates, reduced the 

parties’ role in selecting Presidential nominees by 

encouraging the trend toward candidate-centered 

politics.3

Many, however, found the critics’ evidence of 

party decline inconclusive. They noted the amounts 

raised and spent by parties generally indicated 

growth, rather than decline. Further, it was argued, 

the true importance of parties cannot be measured 

by contributions and expenditures alone. Parties 

produce generic materials and engage in other 

activities that also benefit federal candidates. For 

example, as a result of the 1979 amendments to 

the FECA, state and local party committees may 

produce and distribute slate cards and sample 

ballots, as well as yard signs, bumper stickers and 

other campaign materials that aid federal candidates, 

but these items are not considered contributions or 

coordinated party expenditures. As another example, 

parties may engage in generic voter identification 

and get-out-the-vote drives which have a significant 

2 Sabato, Paying for Elections: The Campaign Finance Thicket, p. 47 

and Crotty, American Parties in Decline, p. 75.

3 Price, Bringing Back the Parties, p. 243.

•
26 

impact on elections. Yet these activities are not 

considered contributions or expenditures on behalf 

of particular candidates. 

Parties After the BCRA

As noted in Chapters One and Three, the 

BCRA bans national party committees from raising 

or spending soft money. Directly following the 

passage of the BCRA, it was widely believed that 

this ban would drastically diminish the role of the 

national parties as soft money would move from 

the national parties into the hands of independent 

organizations and PACs. The BCRA ban on soft 

money effectively eliminated a source of funding that 

amounted to approximately $500,000,000 in 2001-

2002 for the six major national party committees 

(i.e., the Democratic National Committee (DNC), 

the Republican National Committee (RNC), the 

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee 

(DSCC), the National Republican Senatorial 

Committee (NRSC), the Democratic Congressional 

Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the National 

Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), 

accounting for more than 40% of the total receipts 

for national party committees.4

 Many were skeptical 

that the parties would ever be able to make up 

for the loss of soft money with an increase in 

hard money contributions. Yet, in the 2003-2004 

election cycle, the national parties managed to do 

just that. The DNC, DSCC, DCCC and state and 

local Democratic party committees raised over 

$683,600,000 in hard money. Also, the RNC, NRSC, 

NRCC and state and local Republican committees 

raised $755,300,000 in hard money. These 

fundraising figures represent an increase of 150% 

for Democratic committees and 69% for Republican 

committees. The national party committees managed 

to raise more in hard money than the combined hard 

and soft money totals of any previous year. 

In addition to the fundraising success of 

the national parties under the BCRA soft-money 

prohibition, the parties have also dramatically 

increased their independent activity. In 2004, 

Democratic party committees reported a total 

of $175,900,000 in independent expenditures – 

communications that expressly advocate the election 

or defeat of a candidate but are not coordinated 

with the candidate. The Republican party 

committees reported $88,000,000 in independent 

expenditures. Furthermore, over 71% of independent 

expenditures made in support of Presidential 

candidates were made by party committees.

The parties’ success in hard money 

fundraising still leaves open the question of what 

has happened to the soft money that they used to 

raise. Some have raised concerns that the soft money 

prohibited to national party committees has been 

CHART 4-1

Overall Financial Activity of National Party Committees (in Millions)

1999–2000	 2001–2002	 2003–2004

Federal	 Nonfederal	 Total	 Federal	 Nonfederal	 Total	 Federal	Only

DNC $124.00 $136.56 $260.56 $67.50 $94.56 $162.06 $394.41

DSCC $40.49 $63.72 $104.21 $48.39 $95.05 $143.44 $88.66

DCCC $48.39 $56.70 $105.09 $46.44 $56.45 $102.89 $93.17

RNC $212.80 $166.21 $379.01 $170.10 $113.93 $284.03 $392.41

NRSC $51.47 $44.65 $96.12 $59.16 $66.43 $125.59 $78.98

NRCC $97.31 $47.3 $144.61 $123.62 $69.68 $193.3 $185.72 

4 Malbin, Michael. “Political Parties Under the Post-McConnell

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,” Election Law Journal, vol. 3, no. 2, 

2004: p. 177.
redirected to independent “527” organizations. 

This subject is addressed below in “The Role of 

Independent Committees.”

The Role of 

Independent 

Organizations

During the debate surrounding the passage 

of the BCRA, some of the critics of the new 

legislation claimed that the ban on national party 

committees raising soft money would shift the flow 

of political money and influence away from the 

parties and into independent organizations. Since 

only some independent organizations fall under the 

sway of FEC disclosure regulations, it was argued, 

the BCRA would drive campaign finance activity 

further underground.

This debate continues, and will, until there are 

more election cycles under the BCRA to provide 

harder evidence. One possible indicator of the 

increased flow of political money into independent 

organizations is the volume of electioneering 

communications reported to the Commission. In 

the 2004 election cycle, $97,000,000 in electioneering 

communications were reported to the FEC. It is 

important to note that this activity went undisclosed 

prior to the BCRA, so it is difficult to determine 

how much electioneering communication activity 

shifted from national party committees to other 

political organizations.

Another possible indicator that political 

money may have shifted away from the parties is 

the increase in independent expenditures, a figure 

which reached $192,000,000 in the 2004 election for 

Presidential candidates alone. While this represents 

a substantial increase, the national party committees 

themselves were responsible for $138,000,000 

in independent expenditures (for Presidential 

candidates) in 2004. Since the preponderance of 

independent expenditures were made by the national 

party committees, this increase hardly amounts to 

an indication that political money has moved away 

from the party committees.

In the 2004 election cycle, “527” 

organizations spent over half a billion dollars, 

raising $434 million in calendar year 2004 alone, 

according to a report by the Center for Public 

Integrity. (See also Chart 4-3).5

The increase in non-party financial activity, 

while significant, has occurred alongside a dramatic 

5 Center for Public Integrity, “527s in 2004 Shatter Previous Records 

for Political Fundraising” 

(www.publicintegrity.org/527/report.aspx?aid=435)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400 2004

2002

2000

DNC DSCC DCCC

Millions of Dollars

CHART 4-2(a)

Total Fundraising by Democratic National Party 

Committees, 2000-2004 Election Cycles

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

2004

2002

2000

RNC NRSC NRCC

Millions of Dollars

CHART 4-2(b

Total Fundraising by Republican National Party 

Committees, 2000-2004 Election Cycles
28 

increase in fundraising by the national party 

committees. Receipts for national party committees 

increased by 150% for Democratic committees and 

69% for Republican committees. (See the section 

above on “The Role of Political Parties.”)

While there has been a surge in activity 

from independent organizations, this growth 

seems to parallel dramatic growth in party activity. 

Furthermore, with the FEC’s new regulations on 

solicitations, mentioned earlier, more independent 

organizations may be required to file with the 

FEC as “political committees” and disclose their 

activity to the public. As political committees, such 

organizations would no longer be able to avail 

themselves of sources of funds prohibited under 

federal law (such as corporations and unions), and 

they would not be able to serve as repositories for 

soft money.

Presidential Public Funding

In the 2000 primary election, George W. Bush 

opted out of the federal matching funds program 

and, upon his later election to office, became the first 

President elected without matching funds since the 

creation of the program. In the 2004 Presidential 

primary, three major party candidates, George W. 

Bush, Howard Dean and John Kerry, opted out of 

the matching funds program. 

In our discussion of Presidential Public 

Funding, in Chapter Two, we noted that candidates 

who accept matching funds must also accept limits 

on their expenditures, not only overall, but also for 

each state’s primary. The overall spending limit for 

a candidate in the 2004 primaries was about $45 

million. (This fell well below the amounts actually 

raised and spent by the primary campaigns of 

George W. Bush and John Kerry.) The expenditure 

limit for each state is determined by the votingage population of the state in question. Because 

there is a relatively small voting-age population 

in states holding early primaries (i.e., Iowa and 

New Hampshire), the expenditure limits for these 

states are relatively low. The low expenditure limits, 

together with increased contribution limits, the rising 

cost of campaigning and the increased efficiency of 

fundraising, led some candidates to forego matching 

funds. The number of candidates opting out of the 

matching funds program worries its supporters, since 

the primary purpose of the program was to diminish 

reliance on those who can raise large batches of 

contributions. 

In past Presidential election cycles, the 

Presidential Election Campaign Fund (the Fund) 

experienced temporary shortfalls in matching 

funds, requiring pro-rata payments to candidates 

until sufficient deposits were received. For several 

years, the Commission has urged Congress to help 

alleviate the shortfall problem. Possible solutions 

have included increasing the checkoff amount 

and revising the “set aside” provision under which 

funds must be earmarked for general election and 

convention financing before any monies can be used 

for primary matching payments. 

CHART 4-3

Spending by Registered Political Committees and Other 

527 Organizations

Registered Political Committees

Unregistered 527s Filing 

Electioneering Communication Reports

Other Spending by

Unregistered 527 Organizations

2004

10%

2%

88%

$4.45 billion in total spending
Early projections by the Commission indicated 

that January 2004 payments to eligible candidates 

in the 2004 primaries could be less than 20% of the 

amount certified, even if one major party candidate 

did not take federal matching funds. However, as 

noted above, three major party candidates– Howard 

Dean, John Kerry and President Bush–chose not 

to participate in the matching payment program. 

As a result, the U.S. Treasury successfully made the 

January payments of $15,417,353.84 to six eligible 

Presidential candidates. The only shortfall during the 

2004 cycle took place in February, when candidates 

received approximately 46 cents per dollar certified. 

This shortfall was remedied by the time the March/

April payments were made.

 A total of eight candidates were certified for 

primary matching funds during the 2004 primaries: 

Wesley K. Clark, John R. Edwards, Richard 

A. Gephardt, Dennis J. Kucinich, Lyndon H. 

LaRouche, Jr., Joseph Lieberman, Ralph Nader and 

Alfred C. Sharpton. 

The three major party candidates’ decision not 

to participate in the program lessened the shortfall 

somewhat for 2004, but the shortfall problem 

remains. To remedy this problem, the Commission 

has recommended several specific legislative 

changes. In 2005, the Commission repeated its 

recommendation that the law be revised to allow 

the Treasury to rely on expected proceeds from the 

checkoff, rather than relying solely on the actual 

fund balance as of the dates of the matching fund 

payments. Including estimated proceeds in the figure 

for matching fund payouts would virtually eliminate 

the shortfall in the near future. 

In order to further the long-term stability 

of the program, the Commission proposed that 

the voluntary tax checkoff amount be adjusted for 

inflation. While the checkoff amount was raised 

from $1 to $3 in 1993, no indexing was built in 

at that time to account for further inflation. This 

measure would be crucial to replenishing the funds 

in the program.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Election Commission has 

administered and enforced the Federal Election 

Campaign Act for three decades. In carrying 

out its duties, the Commission has negotiated 

the tension between the governmental interest in 

ensuring the integrity of our electoral process and 

the protection of the constitutional right to free 

speech and association.

The endeavor to balance these two values 

that lie at the very foundations of our democracy 

has led the Commission to address some of the 

most complex and controversial legal issues 

of the past several decades. Its position as the 

central regulatory agency in the middle of this 

controversy tends to evoke more criticism than 

praise from groups on either side of the public 

debate, in which one rarely finds focus on the long 

record of FEC accomplishments.

As this report has related, in the last few 

years alone the Commission has succeeded in the 

challenging task of promulgating regulations and 

procedures pursuant to the Bipartisan Campaign 

Reform Act (BCRA), the most significant and 

sweeping campaign finance legislation since 

the 1976 amendments to the FECA. The FEC 

also played a key role in defending the BCRA 

in the courts and continues to face many other 

legal, regulatory and administrative challenges 

associated with the new law. 

Even as it worked to implement the new 

law, the Commission continued to improve its 

operations. The agency enhanced its outreach and 

disclosure programs, expedited the processing 

and review of campaign finance transactions 

and improved compliance through numerous 

enforcement initiatives, including the creation of 

the Administrative Fines and Alternative Dispute 

Resolution programs. 

Though admittedly limited in scope, this 

report offers at least a glimpse of some of the 

FEC’s challenges and accomplishments over the last 

30 years and offers a clear vision of the agency’s 

place within the broad history of preserving the 

integrity of federal elections and of sustaining 

public trust in the electoral process.

Appendix 1

FEC Commissioners and Officers 1975-20051

Commissioners

Joan D. Aikens	 April 1975 – September 1998 (reappointed May 1976, December 1981, 

August 1983 and October 1989).

Thomas B. Curtis	 April 1975 – May 1976.

Thomas E. Harris	 April 1975 – October 1986 (reappointed May 1976 and June 1979).

Neil O. Staebler	 April 1975 – October 1978 (reappointed May 1976).

Vernon W. Thomson	 April 1975 – June 1979; January 1981 – December 1981 

(reappointed May 1976).

Robert O. Tiernan	 April 1975 – December 1981 (reappointed May 1976).

William L. Springer	 May 1976 – February 1979.

John Warren McGarry	 October 1978 – August 1998 (reappointed July 1983 and 

October 1989).

Max L. Friedersdorf	 March 1979 – December 1980.

Frank P. Reiche	 July 1979 – August 1985.

Lee Ann Elliott	 December 1981 – June 2000 (reappointed July 1987 and July 1994).

Danny L. McDonald	 December 1981 – Present (reappointed in July 1987, July 1994 and July 2000).

Thomas J. Josefiak	 August 1985 – December 1991.

Scott E. Thomas	 October 1986 – Present (reappointed in November 1991 and July 1998).

Trevor Potter	 November 1991 – October 1995.

Darryl R. Wold	 July 1998 – April 2002.

Karl J. Sandstrom	 July 1998 – December 2003.

David M. Mason	 July 1998 – Present.

Bradley A. Smith	 May 2000 – Present.

Michael E. Toner	 March 2002 – Present.

Ellen L. Weintraub	 December 2002 – Present.

1 Beginning and reappointment dates listed here do not necessarily reflect when Commissioners took the oath of office. Overlapping terms in 

office reflect delays between Senate confirmation and arrival at the Commission. 
Ex Officio Commissioners

Clerk of the House

W. Pat Jennings	 April 1975 – November 1975.

Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr.	 December 1975 – January 1983.

Benjamin U. Guthrie	 January 1983 – January 1987.

Donnald K. Anderson	 January 1987 – October 1993.

Secretary of the Senate

Francis R. Valeo	 April 1975 – March 1977.

Joseph Stanley Kimmitt	 April 1977 – January 1981.

William F. Hildenbrand	 January 1981 – January 1985.

Jo-Anne L. Coe	 January 1985 – January 1987.

Walter J. Stewart	 January 1987 – October 1993.

Statutory Officers

Staff Director

Orlando B. Potter	 May 1975 – July 1980.

B. Allen Clutter, III	 September 1980 – May 1983.

John C. Surina	 July 1983 – July 1998.

James A. Pehrkon	 April 1999 – Present.

General Counsel

John	G.	Murphy,	Jr.	 May 1975 – December 1976.

William	C.	Oldaker	 February 1977 – October 1979.

Charles	N.	Steele	 December 1979 – March 1987.

Lawrence	M.	Noble	 October 1987 – January 2001.

Lawrence	H.	Norton	 September 2001 – Present.

Inspector General

Lynne	A.	McFarland	 1990 – Present.

FE6AN012