*The Honorable Robert H. Cleland, United States District Judge forthe Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0007P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0007p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________GARYWALSH,Plaintiff-Appellant,v.UNITEDPARCELSERVICE,Defendant-Appellee.;>1No. 98-6466Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.No. 96-00676—James D. Moyer, Magistrate Judge.Argued: November 2, 1999Decided and Filed: January 6, 2000Before: KENNEDY and RYAN, Circuit Judges;CLELAND, District Judge.*_________________COUNSELARGUED:David G. Torchia, TOBIAS, KRAUS &TORCHIA, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Tony C.2Walsh v. United Parcel ServiceNo. 98-6466Coleman, BROWN, TODD & HEYBURN, Louisville,Kentucky, for Appellee.ON BRIEF:David G. Torchia,TOBIAS, KRAUS & TORCHIA, Cincinnati, Ohio, forAppellant. Matthew R. Westfall, Jr., WESTFALL,TALBOTT & WOODS, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee._________________OPINION_________________KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Gary Walsh(plaintiff) worked as a management pilot for United ParcelService (defendant or UPS). In 1993 plaintiff went ondisability leave due to complications stemming from anearlier car accident. Approximately five months after his yearof paid medical leave ended, plaintiff was terminated.Defendant claims the termination was solely due to plaintiff’sfailure to provide information concerning his disability statusand ability to return to work. As a result of his termination,plaintiff brought this action against defendant, claimingviolations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 12101, et seq., Kentucky’s equivalent provision, Ky. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 344.040, and § 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPSon all claims brought by plaintiff and plaintiff appealed. Forthe reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’sdecision.I.FactsPlaintiff Gary Walsh worked for United Parcel Service asa management pilot. In November of 1991, plaintiff wasinvolved in an automobile accident in which his wrist wasbroken and his spine was fractured. He returned to work inJanuary of 1992 and continued to work until UPS removedhim from flight status in November of 1993. Plaintiffconcedes that at the time UPS made this decision, his memorywas poor, his hand eye coordination had declined and hecould not think as clearly as before the car accident. Plaintiffacknowledges that his ability to function as a commercialNo. 98-6466Walsh v. United Parcel Service3airline pilot was impaired and raises no argument againstdefendant’s conclusion that he should no longer be flying.On January 10, 1994, defendant received aneuropsychological evaluation from plaintiff’s doctor whichstated, “My recommendation would be for a two-or-threemonth medical leave of absence to address physical issues,obtain counseling support and become more physically andemotionally stable.” After defendant received this evaluationit had Aviation Medical Examiner Dr. Stephen Wrightexamine plaintiff as well. Dr. Wright agreed that a medicalleave of absence would be the best course of action. Based onthese diagnoses, defendant placed plaintiff on medical leavein February of 1994, continuing his salary through thecompany’s salary continuation plan. Plaintiff ultimatelyremained on paid leave until March 1, 1995, receiving a totalof $152,716.During plaintiff’s medical leave Dr. Christopher Lawrenceacted as plaintiff’s primary treating physician. DoctorLawrence initially believed that plaintiff’s major problem wasfatigue. As a result, he started plaintiff on Prozac andindicated that if things went well he hoped that plaintiff couldreturn to his job in approximately three months. On June 23,1994, Dr. Lawrence sent an update of plaintiff’s condition inwhich he indicated that plaintiff was improving bothphysically and mentally. Dr. Lawrence noted that he plannedto see plaintiff in four weeks to evaluate whether he was readyto work and stated, “[a]t this rate, I anticipate that he will beready for a restricted return to work on a limited hour basis.”On August 12, 1994, Paula Shearer (Shearer), UPS’smedical manager, sent plaintiff a letter informing him that hewas scheduled for a physical on August 16 with Dr. Wright.Dr. Wright performed a general company physical and sent aletter to Shearer indicating that plaintiff’s main complaint ofextreme fatigue continued. Dr. Wright also noted thatplaintiff declined his offer to perform an FAA physicalbecause plaintiff knew he would not pass while he continuedtaking Prozac. Dr. Wright stated that he advised plaintiff that4Walsh v. United Parcel ServiceNo. 98-6466he would need statements from all of plaintiff’s treatingphysicians acknowledging that plaintiff was able to return towork before he could clear him to do so.On December 7, 1994, Shearer sent a letter to both plaintiffand Dr. Lawrence requesting information on plaintiff’s workrestrictions, projected return to work date, and treatmentplans. The letter also indicated that work that didn’t requirean active FAA medical certificate was available in theLouisville office and asked that the requested information beprovided as soon as possible. UPS needed newdocumentation from plaintiff, as corporate policy onlyallowed salary continuation for a period of twelve monthswithout new documentation. As a result, Shearer madeadditional requests on December 22, 1994 and January 5,1995 for plaintiff to fill out and return the disability formmentioned in her December 7th letter.Plaintiff did eventually give Dr. Lawrence a disability formto fill out and send in to UPS, but could not recall how orwhen it was sent. Dr. Lawrence mailed the form sometime inJanuary, but failed to provide a return to work date and onlycertified that plaintiff was disabled “from February 1, 1994through present.” Dr. Lawrence signed the form and dated itJanuary 5, 1995. When Shearer called Dr. Lawrence onFebruary 6, 1995, regarding plaintiff’s disability, Dr.Lawrence apparently indicated that he could not provide anyfurther information as he had not seen plaintiff sinceDecember 9, 1994. Shearer also called plaintiff on February6 to notify him that the form was incomplete.On February 13, 1995, Shearer sent plaintiff another blankdisability form and advised him that it needed to becompleted in order for him to continue his leave. On March15, 1995, UPS Human Resource Manager Jan Toronzo(Toronzo) wrote plaintiff, pointing out that he had declined totake an FAA first class medical exam, which she stated “wasscheduled to determine your ability to perform the functionsof your current position as management captain or your abilityto return to work in a non-flight position.” Toronzo furtherNo. 98-6466Walsh v. United Parcel Service21concerning plaintiff’s disability status and accommodationsrequired, and plaintiff never provided this information.The only other evidence that plaintiff relies on are factsadvanced in his attempt to state a prima facie case againstdefendant under ERISA § 510. Accordingly, plaintiff has notshown evidence of pretext that would permit a reasonablejuror to conclude it overwhelms the nondiscriminatoryreasons UPS advanced for firing him.SeeManzer, 29 F.3d at1084.Having failed to produce evidence from which a reasonablejury could conclude that UPS’s legitimate non-discriminatoryreason for terminating him was pretextual, plaintiff’s ERISA§ 510 claim was properly disposed of by the district court onsummary judgment.III. ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’sgrant of summary judgment to defendant regarding all claimsbrought by plaintiff.20Walsh v. United Parcel ServiceNo. 98-64666Although he does not state so, plaintiff is apparently arguing in thealternative. When a plaintiff claims that the reasons the employeradvanced for firing him or her did not actually motivate the termination,“the plaintiff admits that the factual basis underlying the employer’sproffered explanation and further admits that such conduct could motivatethe dismissal.”See Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084. This is necessarily sobecause the employee is arguing that the legitimate reasons the defendantadvanced for the termination weren’t the actual motivating reasons.requested. Plaintiff’s argument appears to largely be thatunder the circumstances it was unfair for defendant toterminate him. However, the question is not whether it wasfair for defendant to terminate him, or whether defendantcould have considered less drastic alternatives. Rather, theonly question is whether plaintiff’s conduct gave defendant asufficient non-discriminatory reason to fire him.Consequently, plaintiff has not shown that a reasonable jurycould conclude that defendant advanced an insufficient basisfor terminating him.Finally, plaintiff states that the case is ultimately aboutdefendant’s motive. In discussing motive, plaintiff is tryingto indirectly attack the credibility of defendant’s profferedexplanation for terminating him.6However, to successfullyshow that a termination was motivated by impermissibleconsiderations, rather than the non-discriminatory reasonsadvanced by the employer, an employee must come forwardwith evidence other than that used to established his or herprima facie case.See Manzer, 29 F.3dat 1084-85. In thisregard, plaintiff alleges that defendant previously claimed thatit needed additional information about plaintiff’s condition,but now claims that it only needed to know whether or not hewas disabled and what jobs, if any, he would be able toperform. Assuming this to be true, this is not the type ofconflict in testimony that would preclude summary judgment.Cf. Tinker v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 127 F.3d 519, 523 (6thCir. 1997) (finding that the completely inconsistent reasonsadvanced by several individuals to explain plaintiff’s firingindicated the presence of an issue of material fact). It isundisputed that UPS consistently requested informationNo. 98-6466Walsh v. United Parcel Service5stated in her letter that salary continuation could not beapproved due to plaintiff’s failure to provide appropriatemedical documentation. As a result, she advised plaintiff thathis salary continuation was being discontinued effectiveMarch 1, 1995.On March 23, 1995, Toronzo met with plaintiff to discussmedical documentation, any limitations on his ability to work,and the possibility of a new job assignment. Both plaintiffand UPS were represented by counsel at this meeting. At themeeting plaintiff provided a disability form signed by a Dr.Vengrow. Dr. Vengrow listed plaintiff’s disability dates andreturn to work date as “unknown.” Toronzo told plaintiff thatthe form was unacceptable, and they apparently agreed thatadditional time would be allowed for Dr. Lawrence to furnishthe necessary information. The deadline agreed upon appearsto have been May 8, 1995. Although UPS compiled a list ofavailable non-flying jobs prior to its meeting with plaintiff,UPS never reviewed the list with him, apparently because heattended the meeting without the return to work release thatthe company had anticipated.Following the meeting, Shearer sent a letter to Dr.Lawrence on March 27, 1995, requesting informationregarding plaintiff’s condition, ability to return to work, andmedical treatment. Dr. Lawrence responded on March 29,1995, indicating that he felt plaintiff was stable objectively,but that subjectively plaintiff felt that he couldn’t go back tohis old job as a pilot. Dr. Lawrence noted that plaintiffcomplained of persistent fatigue and chronic pain and wasineligible to return to work as a pilot, but he stated that he wasoffering no active treatment and expected no significantchange in his condition over the next twelve to eighteenmonths. As the district court observed, “[the] letter did notoffer a diagnosis, did not release plaintiff to return to work,did not identify a disability, and did not point out anypotential accommodations which would allow plaintiff tofunction either as a pilot or in any other UPS position.”6Walsh v. United Parcel ServiceNo. 98-6466On April 11, 1995, Shearer sent Dr. Lawrence anotherletter, requesting a summary of treatment, ability to return towork, tentative return date, limitations and restrictionsrequired, and recommendations for future medical evaluation.Plaintiff received a copy of this letter as well. Apparently inresponse, a letter from Dr. Vengrow was sent to UPS on April28, 1995. In his sixty word letter Dr. Vengrow indicated thathe could not diagnose a neurologic problem and concludedthat it was beyond the realm of his expertise to suggest thatplaintiff should not be currently working. Dr. Vengrow statedthat the appropriate specialty should be consulted and notedthat he had referred plaintiff to the Mayo Clinic.Plaintiff never visited the Mayo Clinic as the insurancecarrier refused to authorize the expense. UPS scheduledplaintiff for an independent medical evaluation with anorthopedic surgeon on May 16, 1995, to determine what workplaintiff could perform and what medical restrictions wouldbe required. Plaintiff canceled, however, stating that he hadjury duty. Toronzo then sent plaintiff a final letter on May 26,1995, detailing the requests for information that UPS hadmade over the last six months and concluding, “I will allowyou another week to provide this information, but you mustknow if I have not received appropriate documents by June 5,1995, your continued employment with United Parcel Servicewill cease on that date.” Plaintiff called on or around June 5to tell Toronzo that he was currently undergoing evaluationand could not supply the information in time.On June 6, 1995, defendant sent plaintiff a letter stating thathis employment was terminated for failure to provideappropriate medical documentation. Sometime afterreceiving this letter, plaintiff apparently spoke with JamesDarwin, an assistant of Toronzo’s, about the possibility ofgoing on long term disability. Plaintiff claims he was toldthat he was no longer eligible because his employment withUPS had terminated. On August 31, 1995, plaintiff sent aletter to Toronzo requesting reinstatement and long termdisability benefits. Plaintiff also attached a letter from Dr.Stoff, a homeopathic physician. In the letter Dr. StoffNo. 98-6466Walsh v. United Parcel Service19discriminatory reason for its actions. The burden then shiftsto plaintiff to show either: “(1) that the proffered reasons hadno basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actuallymotivate the discharge, or (3) that they were insufficient tomotivate discharge.”Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock, 29 F.3d1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1995).Plaintiff argues defendant’s reason for discharging him waspretextual because it had no basis in fact. However, plaintiffhas come forward with no evidence showing that the basiswhich defendant advanced for plaintiff’s discharge wasfactually false.See Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13F.3d 1120, 1124 (6th Cir. 1994) (providing that plaintiff mustproduce evidence from which a rational fact finder could inferthat the company lied to have a submissible issue of pretextfor the jury). Over a more than six month period, whichincluded multiple phone calls, letters, and a meeting wherethe parties where represented by counsel, defendant continuedto request information relating to plaintiffs disability.Nonetheless, plaintiff failed to supply the requestedinformation. In response plaintiff attempts to argue that hesubstantially complied, however at no point did he respond todefendant’s questions by indicating his disability status orwhat accommodations he might require. Consequently,plaintiff has not come forth with evidence from which areasonable jury could find that defendant’s reason forterminating plaintiff had no basis in fact.Plaintiff’s claim that his conduct was insufficient tomotivate defendant to discharge him is also unsupported bythe evidence. To support such a claim, an employee mustnormally show that other employees who engaged insubstantially identical conduct were not discharged by theemployer.See Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1083. Plaintiff did notproduce evidence that defendant refrained from terminatingother employees in similar circumstances. Plaintiff insteadargues that because he did not wilfully fail to provide theinformation requested, his conduct was insufficient to warrantdismissal. As support, plaintiff points to the fact thatdefendant did not have an urgent need for the information it18Walsh v. United Parcel ServiceNo. 98-6466wouldn’t be interested because he would have to terminate hisemployment. When combined with the timing of his firing,i.e., while he was still under medical evaluation to determinethe extent of his disability, plaintiff contends an inference ofdiscriminatory motive is raised.Plaintiff’s evidence of a causal connection between hisfiring by defendant and a desire on the part of defendant toavoid paying LTD benefits is weak at best. For the purposeof argument, however, we will assume that a prima facieshowing has been made, as it is clear that plaintiff has failedto show that defendant’s alleged non-discriminatory reasonwas pretextual. TheSmith v. AmeritechCourt addressed theissue of pretext and how the explanations employers advancefor their actions fit within ERISA § 510 analysis, providing:If the plaintiff states a prima facie case under § 510,the employer can rebut the presumption of impermissibleaction raised by the prima facie case by introducingevidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for itschallenged action. This shifts the burden back to theplaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered reasonwas mere pretext. Although the plaintiff need not showthat the employer’s sole purpose was to interfere with theplaintiff’s entitlement to benefits, he must either provethat the interference was a motivating factor in theemployer’s actions, or prove that the employer’sproffered reason is unworthy of credence. Summaryjudgment is appropriate if plaintiff fails to establish aprima facie case or fails to rebut the employer’s profferof a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.Id.at 865.As detailed above, defendant made repeated requests overa six month period for the medical information necessary tokeep the plaintiff on medical leave. Defendant also met withplaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel to discuss the informationneeded. Defendant has stated that its sole reason for firingplaintiff was that he failed to produce the requestedinformation. In so stating, defendant has advanced a nonNo. 98-6466Walsh v. United Parcel Service7concluded that plaintiff was disabled from his profession andpredicted that it would be one to three years before he couldreturn to working as a commercial pilot. The letter did notrelease plaintiff for work or suggest what jobs he might beable to perform or what accommodations might be required.On September 11, 1995, Toronzo responded to plaintiff’sletter, stating that UPS could not consider any informationprovided because he was no longer an employee.Plaintiff filed this action against UPS, claiming violationsof the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.§ 12101, et seq., Kentucky’s equivalent provision, Ky. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 344.040, and § 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140.Prior to trial UPS moved for summary judgment. The districtcourt granted defendant’s motion with regard to the ADAclaims and the corresponding claims brought under Ky. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 344.040. The court found summary judgmentwas proper for three reasons. First, the court stated thatplaintiff had not shown that he was a qualified individual witha disability, having never supplied any informationconcerning what accommodations he would require, whatjobs he could perform, or even that he was released to returnto work. Second, the court observed that an employer has aright to request reasonable medical information from anindividual who claims a disability. The court noted thatplaintiff failed to meet these requests over a period in excessof six months, not coming up with documentation for hisdisability until nearly three months after the deadline. Third,the court found that plaintiff made no showing of a causalconnection between his disability and his delay in furnishingthe requested information. Given plaintiff’s repeated andlong term consultation with medical professionals and the factthat he was represented by counsel, the court could not find acausal connection between plaintiff’s disability and his failureto produce the requested medical information.As to the plaintiff’s ERISA § 510 claim, the court founddefendant’s initial argument, that plaintiff’s claim should bedismissed on summary judgment for failure to exhaustadministrative remedies, unavailing. Defendant then entered8Walsh v. United Parcel ServiceNo. 98-6466a new motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffhad failed to state a prima facie case. The district courtagreed, finding that plaintiff had produced no evidenceshowing it was defendant’s specific intent to fire plaintiff toprevent him from receiving long term disability benefits dueto him under ERISA. Further, the court found that even if theplaintiff did present a prima facie case, UPS had articulateda reasonable non-discriminatory grounds for terminatingplaintiff—his failure to provide medical informationconcerning his eligibility for continued leave.II. DiscussionA. Standard of ReviewThis court reviews a district court’s grant of summaryjudgment de novo.Monette v. Electronic Data SystemsCorp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1176 (6th Cir.1996). Summaryjudgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as toany material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgmentas a matter of law.SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is materialif its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit.SeeAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct.2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If, “the moving party hascarried its burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions,answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in therecord, construed favorably to the nonmoving party, do notraise a genuine issue of material fact for trial,” summaryjudgment should be granted.Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d1534, 1536 (6th Cir.1987).B. Plaintiff’s ADA ClaimThe Americans with Disabilities Act provides that:No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualifiedindividual with a disability because of the disability ofsuch individual in regard to job application procedures,the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,employee compensation, job training, and other terms,conditions, and privileges of employment.No. 98-6466Walsh v. United Parcel Service17To state a claim under § 510, the plaintiff must showthat an employer had a specific intent to violate ERISA.In the absence of direct evidence of such discriminatoryintent, the plaintiff can state a prima facie case byshowing the existence of (1) prohibited employerconduct (2) taken for the purpose of interfering (3) withthe attainment of any right to which the employee maybecome entitled.Id.at 865 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Further,theSmith v. AmeritechCourt found that in making its primafacie case, a plaintiff must show a causal link betweenpension benefits and the adverse employment decision.Id.This means that for plaintiff’s case, “to survive a defendant’smotion for summary judgment, plaintiff must come forwardwith evidence from which a reasonable jury could find thatthe defendant’s desire to avoid pension liability was adetermining factor in plaintiff’s discharge.”Id.In the case at bar, the district court held that plaintiff failedto establish a prima facie case. In arriving at this conclusion,the district court emphasized the fact that, regardless of whatUPS officials may have thought, termination was not a bar tothe plaintiff applying for and receiving LTD benefits.Further, the court observed that there was no evidence thatplaintiff had ever applied for LTD benefits, but had heapplied, it would have been difficult to see how he wouldhave qualified, given that he had represented himself as ready,willing, and able to work in his application for WashingtonState unemployment benefits.Plaintiff disputes the district court’s conclusion, stating thatsufficient evidence existed in the record to create an issue ofmaterial fact as to whether defendant fired plaintiff out of adesire to avoid paying long term disability benefits. Insupport, plaintiff points to the fact that defendant knew thatLTD was a possibility and had even estimated the cost to thecompany. Further, plaintiff claims that he asked for LTDforms in December of 1994 and asked Toronzo about thepossibility of LTD in March of 1995, but was told he16Walsh v. United Parcel ServiceNo. 98-6466employer incurs additional administrative costs and more importantly isforced to shoulder long-term uncertainty regarding the composition of itswork force. Further, during the extended leave, the employee losesvaluable work skills, and if the employee ever returns, he or she will likelyrequire significant retraining. When this is balanced against the potentialbenefit derived from the employee returning to work, which must besignificantly discounted by the obvious indeterminacy involved, the costexceeds the likely benefit.Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that whereplaintiff has failed to present any evidence of the expectedduration of her impairment as of the date of her termination,a request for medical leave was unreasonable).Because continued leave was an unreasonableaccommodation, we find that the plaintiff’s ADA claim andhis claim under Kentucky’s equivalent provision, Ky. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 344.040, were properly dismissed by the districtcourt on defendant’s motion for summary judgment.C. Plaintiff’s ERISA ClaimPlaintiff also challenges the district court’s grant ofsummary judgment regarding his claim that UPS violatedERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, by allegedly terminating himto avoid paying long term disability (LTD) benefits. ERISA§ 510 makes it unlawful for an employer to:discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, ordiscriminate against a participant or beneficiary forexercising any right to which he is entitled under theprovisions of an employee benefit plan . . . or for thepurpose of interfering with the attainment of any right towhich such participant may become entitled under theplan . . . .29 U.S.C. § 1140. InSmith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857 (6thCir. 1997), this Circuit laid out the framework under which anERISA § 510 claim should be analyzed, providing:No. 98-6466Walsh v. United Parcel Service942 U.S.C. § 12112. Under the act, a qualified individual witha disability means, “an individual with a disability who, withor without reasonable accommodation, can perform theessential functions of the employment position that suchindividual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111. The Actmakes it clear that failure to accommodate an individual’sdisability may qualify as discrimination, defining the term“discriminate” to include:not making reasonable accommodations to the knownphysical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualifiedindividual with a disability who is an applicant oremployee, unless such covered entity can demonstratethat the accommodation would impose an undue hardshipon the operation of the business of such covered entity. . . .42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(A).As an aid to determining whether a plaintiff has made therequired showing of discrimination under § 12112, thisCircuit has stated the required analysis in the form of amultifactor test. To recover for discrimination under the Act,the plaintiff must show he or she: (1) is an individual with adisability; (2) is otherwise qualified to perform the jobrequirements, with or without reasonable accommodation;and (3) was discharged solely on account of the disability.See Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173,1177 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Maddox v. University ofTennessee, 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995), for itsconclusion that the analysis of claims brought under the ADAroughly parallels that of claims brought under theRehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1995)).Monettefurther clarified the burdens placed on each party by thisanalysis, stating that if the plaintiff has direct evidence thatthe employer relied on his or her disability in making anadverse employment decision:(1) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing thathe or she is disabled. (2) The plaintiff bears the burdenof establishing that he or she is “otherwise qualified” for10Walsh v. United Parcel ServiceNo. 98-64661McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct.1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).the position despite his or her disability: (a) withoutaccommodation from the employer; (b) with an alleged“essential” job requirement eliminated; or (c) with aproposed reasonable accommodation. (3) The employerwill bear the burden of proving that a challenged jobcriterion is essential, and therefore a business necessity,or that a proposed accommodation will impose an unduehardship upon the employer.Monette, 90 F.3d at 1186. When a plaintiff seeks to establishhis or her case indirectly, however, theMonettecourtrecognized that the traditionalMcDonnell Douglas1burdenshifting approach continues to apply, stating:[P]laintiff may establish a prima facie case ofdiscrimination by showing that: (1) he or she is disabled;(2) otherwise qualified for the position, with or withoutreasonable accommodation; (3) suffered an adverseemployment decision; (4) the employer knew or hadreason to know of the plaintiff’s disability; and (5) theposition remained open while the employer sought otherapplicants or the disabled individual was replaced. Thedefendant must then offer a legitimate explanation for itsaction. If the defendant satisfies this burden ofproduction, the plaintiff must introduce evidenceshowing that the proffered explanation is pretextual.Under this scheme, the plaintiff retains the ultimateburden of persuasion at all times.Id.at 1186-87.As an initial matter, it is not entirely clear whetherplaintiff’s ADA claim is based on direct or indirect evidence.Defendant claims to have fired plaintiff not because he wasdisabled, but rather because he failed to produce the medicaldocumentation which UPS required for additional leave. Insupport, defendant points to the fact that it was prepared toNo. 98-6466Walsh v. United Parcel Service155Some Courts have explained the inquiry into the reasonableness ofan accommodation as involving a benefit burden type analysis.SeeCehrs,155 F.3d at 781 (stating that plaintiff must show that the existenceof a plausible accommodation which costs less than the benefits thatwould be received);Monette, 90 F.3d at 1184 (suggesting a cost-benefitanalysis to determine whether a proposed accommodation is reasonable);Borkowski v. Valley Cent. School Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995)(observing “it is enough for the plaintiff to suggest the existence of aplausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearlyexceed its benefits.”). Such an analysis could be employed here. Whenboth the time and likelihood of return to work cannot be roughlyquantified after a significant period of leave has already been granted, thecosts of the requested additional leave outweigh the benefits. Theand a half in length to be reasonable. However, we must stilladdress the particular accommodation that plaintiff requested.See Cehrs, 155 F.3d at 782 (noting that the Supreme Courthas made clear that individualized attention is essential indisability cases).Plaintiff argues that while he was not specific in hisrequest, he only needed ninety days for additional evaluation.However, plaintiff has made no credible showing why thenearly year and a half leave defendant gave him was somehowan inadequate period for him to obtain an evaluation. Further,the evaluation that plaintiff received from his homeopathicphysician, months after his termination, still did not indicatea time frame or circumstances under which plaintiff couldreturn to work. The ADA was designed to eliminatediscrimination against individuals with disabilities so thatthey could become productive members of the workforce.See42 U.S.C. § 12101; 29 C.F.R. pt.1630 (1996). However,when the requested accommodation has no reasonableprospect of allowing the individual to work in the identifiablefuture, it is objectively not an accommodation that theemployer should be required to provide.Seecases cited insupranote 4. We therefore hold that when, as here, anemployer has already provided a substantial leave, anadditional leave period of a significant duration, with no clearprospects for recovery, is an objectively unreasonableaccommodation.5Cf. Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications14Walsh v. United Parcel ServiceNo. 98-64664See, e.g., Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 142 F.3d 999, 1004 (7thCir. 1998) (finding that, “[t]he ADA does not require an employer toaccommodate an employee who suffers from a prolongedillness byallowing him an indefinite leave of absence.”);Ralph v. Lucent Techs.,135 F.3d166, 172 (1st Cir.1998) (reviewing a preliminary injunctiongranted by the district court and agreeing with the court’s decision that avery limited four weeks leave time might be required as a reasonableaccommodation, even after plaintiff had been given 52 weeks of leavewith pay);Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1225-26 (11thCir. 1997) (stating that where plaintiff had been on salary continuation for10 months already, defendant had no obligation to maintain this benefitfor the remaining two months the company allowed when the defendantcould not show that he would likely be able to return to work at the endof this period);Monette, 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (holding that it is not areasonable accommodation to require employers to keep employees onmedical leave indefinitely in the hope that a position that they can performwill come available);Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 87 F.3d1167 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that while a reasonable allowance of timefor medical care may constitute a reasonable accommodation, defendantwas not required to wait indefinitely for plaintiff, who had failed topresent any evidence of expected return date at time of termination, torecover);see also Micari v. Trans World Airlines, 43 F. Supp.2d 275,281-82 (E.D. NY. 1999) (observing that where medical leaves havestretched beyond one year, courts have found that an employee cannotperform the essential functions of his or her job as a matter of law);Powers v. Polygram Holding, 40 F. Supp.2d 195, 200 (S.D. NY. 1999)(noting that cases in which courts have concluded that the length ofrequested medical leave is an unreasonable accommodation as a matter oflaw usually involved requests for close to a year or more).last medical evaluation which defendant received from ahomeopathic physician, months after the deadline set bydefendant, only contained a vague estimate of the date thatplaintiff could return to his job as a pilot, placing it at one tothree years in the future. Further, the letter did not releasedefendant for work or suggest what other jobs he might beable to perform or what accommodations might be required.Our review of case law in this and other circuits disclosedno cases where an employer was required to allow anemployee to take a leave of absence for well in excess of ayear—let alone indefinitely—as a reasonable accommodationto the employee’s disability.4This suggests that it would bevery unlikely for a request for medical leave exceeding a yearNo. 98-6466Walsh v. United Parcel Service112See Monette, 90 F.3d at 1187 (finding in a failure to accommodatecase that the defendant’s explanation for the replacingplaintiff—that hewas on medical leave, unable to perform his job, and was the onlycustomer service representative in the building—was direct evidence thatdefendant relied on plaintiff’s disabled status in replacing him);but seeCehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Center, 155 F.3d 775, 781(6th Cir. 1998)(applying theMonettecourt’s indirect evidence test in acase involving the termination of an employee for failure to properly fillout required company paperwork for an extended leave of absence).give plaintiff an alternate job as soon as it could determinewhat plaintiff’s disability was. Plaintiff, on the other hand,claims that the reasonable accommodation which hisdisability required was additional time for evaluation andtreatment, the very thing defendant was unwilling to give.2However, regardless of whether the direct or indirectevidence test is used, plaintiff’s claim must fail. As theMonetteCourt stated, the plaintiff bears the initial burden ofestablishing that the accommodation he or she seeks isreasonable.Id.at 1187;c.f.Gaines v. Runyon, 107 F.3d 1171,1175–76 (6th Cir. 1997) (observing that in order for a plaintiffto establish a prima facie handicap discrimination case basedon a failure to accommodate, plaintiff must show that he is aqualified individual with a handicap, i.e., “[one] who, with orwithoutreasonableaccommodation, can perform the essentialfunctions of the position in question without endangering thehealth and safety of the individual or others . . . .”). InMonette, the plaintiff proposed that as a possibleaccommodation he be kept on indefinite medical leave untilanother position opened up. The court concluded:[E]mployers simply are not required to keep an employeeon staff indefinitely in the hope that some position maybecome available some time in the future. Moreover,employers are not required to create new positions fordisabled employees in order to reasonably accommodatethe disabled individual. Accordingly, Monette has failedto establish that his proposed accommodation is a“reasonable” one under the statute.12Walsh v. United Parcel ServiceNo. 98-6466Id.at 1187. The burden of establishing that the proposedaccommodation is reasonable remains with the plaintiff,regardless of whether plaintiff has direct or indirect evidencein support of his or her ADA claim.See Id.at 1883,1186-87.This logically flows from the fact that the plaintiff is alwaysrequired to show that he or she is qualified for the position,with or without reasonable accommodation.See42 U.S.C.§ 12112(b)(5)(A).Because it is clear that in this case, plaintiff’s request foradditional leave was not a reasonable accommodation, wemust affirm the district court. Plaintiff was given a year ofpaid disability leave by UPS. Following that leave, plaintiffwas given more than six additional months of unpaid leave toprovide UPS with information concerning his allegeddisability. As the district court observed, no information wasforthcoming, and plaintiff, who saw multiple doctors and wasrepresented by counsel, made no showing that the delay wasattributable to his disability.Plaintiff claims that the accommodation he was asking forwas more time for diagnosis and treatment by his doctors. Itis possible that his June 5, 1995 phone call to Toronzo,requesting additional time for diagnosis would qualify as arequest for accommodation. Plaintiff is also correct that thisCircuit has recognized that a medical leave of absence canconstitute a reasonable accommodation under appropriatecircumstances.See, e.g., Cehrs v. Northeast OhioAlzheimer’s Research Institute, 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998),(finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether aneight-week leave of absence followed by a request for anadditional one-month leave was a reasonable accommodationunder the ADA). However, plaintiff’s request, to the extentit was made, was unreasonable.Plaintiff attempts to rely onCehrsfor the proposition thatan indefinite leave of absence, no matter how potentiallylengthy, can never be found to be objectively unreasonable.We disagree with plaintiff’s reading ofCehrs. InCehrs, theplaintiff had just taken a roughly eight week leave of absenceNo. 98-6466Walsh v. United Parcel Service133Significantly, the Court’s statements indicate that it believed that insome instances the employer would have the burden of showing that theemployee’s proposed accommodation was unreasonable.SeeCehrs, 155F.3d at 782-783 (discussing inquiry into the reasonableness of anaccommodation in the same manner as the question of whether theproposed accommodation unduly burdens an employer). To the extentthat theCehrsCourt suggested the employer must show that theaccommodation proposed by the employee is unreasonable, it misreadMonette. Monettemakes it plain that whether a requested accommodationis reasonable and whether it unduly burdens the employer are separateinquiries.See Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183, 1184 n.10 and 1187. (stating thelanguage of § 12112 makes it clear that while the employer has the burdenof persuasion on whether an accommodation would impose an unduehardship, the disabled individual has the initial and separate burden ofshowing a proposed accommodation is objectively reasonable). TheMonetteCourt did acknowledge that the inquiry into undue burden andreasonableness are similar. The Court distinguished them on the groundsthat the inquiry into reasonableness requires, “a factual determinationuntethered to the defendant employer’s particularized situation,” whereasthe question of whether a reasonable accommodation imposes an undueburden is evaluated with regard to “the employer’s specific situation.”Id.at 1184 n.10.for treatment of her Psoriasis. At the end of this period,plaintiff’s physician determined that another monthstreatment was needed, and estimated that plaintiff couldreturn to work on a part time basis by March 1, 1994.Id.at778. The defendant ostensibly denied the request because theplaintiff had not properly filled out the required paperwork.Observing that the defendant had allowed other employees totake medical leave under similar circumstances, the courtfound that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether thegranting of further medical leave would unduly burden thedefendant, or would have constituted a reasonableaccommodation to the plaintiff.3Id.at 783.Thus, theCehrsCourt was confronted with a situationwhere a request for a definite and relatively short leave wasmade, accompanied by a reasonable prospect of recovery.Clearly, the case at bar presents a much different scenario. Inthis case, plaintiff knew of his injury for years, was on salarycontinuation for a year, and unpaid medical leave for fivemonths before being terminated. As noted above, even the