United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

International Relations, House of 

Representatives 

EXPORT CONTROLS

Improvements to 

Commerce’s Dual-Use 

System Needed to 

Ensure Protection of 

U.S. Interests in the 

Post-9/11 Environment

June 2006 

 

GAO-06-638 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2006

EXPORT CONTROLS

Improvements to Commerce's Dual-Use 

System Needed to Ensure Protection of 

U.S. Interests in the Post-9/11 

Environment 

Highlights of GAO-06-638, a report to the 

Chairman, Committee on International 

Relations, House of Representatives 

In regulating exports of dual-use

items, which have both commercial 

and military applications, the

Department of Commerce’s Bureau

of Industry and Security (BIS) 

seeks to allow U.S. companies to 

compete globally while minimizing

the risk of items falling into the 

wrong hands. In so doing, BIS faces 

the challenge of weighing U.S. 

national security and economic 

interests, which at times can be 

divergent or even competing.

In light of the September 2001 

terror attacks, GAO was asked to

examine BIS’s dual-use export

control system. In response, GAO 

is reporting on BIS’s

(1) evaluations of and changes to 

the system, (2) screening of export 

license applications against its 

watchlist, and (3) actions to correct

weaknesses previously identified

by GAO. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

Secretary of Commerce 

systematically evaluate the dualuse export control system; correct

omissions in BIS’s watchlist and

weaknesses in the screening 

process; and take action to address

GAO’s prior unimplemented 

recommendations. Commerce

disagreed with the report’s findings 

and characterizations of its system 

but did not address GAO’s 

recommendations. GAO maintains

that the report fairly represents 

BIS’s actions and the need for an

overall evaluation framework. 

Lack of systematic evaluations. Although BIS made some regulatory and 

operational changes to the dual-use export control system, it has not 

systematically evaluated the system to determine whether it is meeting its 

stated goal of protecting U.S. national security and economic interests. 

Specifically, BIS has not comprehensively analyzed available data to 

determine what dual-use items have actually been exported. Further, 

contrary to government management standards, BIS has not established 

performance measures that would provide an objective basis for assessing 

how well the system is protecting U.S. interests. Instead, BIS relies on 

limited measures of efficiency that focus only on narrow aspects of the 

license application review process to assess the system’s performance. BIS 

officials use intelligence reports and meetings with industry to gauge how 

the system is operating. Absent systematic evaluations, BIS conducted an ad

hoc review of the system to determine if changes were needed after the 

events of September 2001. BIS officials determined that no fundamental 

changes were needed but opted to make some adjustments primarily related 

to controls on chemical and biological agents. GAO was unable to assess the 

sufficiency of the review and resulting changes because BIS officials did not 

document their review. 

Omissions in BIS’s watchlist. GAO found omissions in the watchlist BIS 

uses to screen export license applications. This screening, which is part of 

the license application review process, is intended to identify ineligible

parties or parties warranting more scrutiny. The omissions undermine the 

list’s utility, which increases the risk of dual-use exports falling into the 

wrong hands. GAO identified 147 parties that had violated U.S. export 

control requirements, had been determined by BIS to be suspicious end 

users, or had been reported by the State Department as committing acts of 

terror, but these parties were not on the watchlist of approximately 

50,000 names. Reasons for the omissions include a lack of specific criteria as 

to who should be on the watchlist and BIS’s failure to regularly review the 

list. In addition, a technical limitation in BIS’s computerized screening 

system results in some parties on license applications not being 

automatically screened against the watchlist. 

Some prior GAO recommendations left unaddressed. BIS has 

implemented several but not all of GAO’s recommendations for ensuring that

export controls on sensitive items protect U.S. interests. Among weaknesses 

identified in prior GAO reports is the lack of clarity on whether certain items

are under BIS’s control, which increases the risk of defense-related items 

being improperly exported. BIS has yet to take corrective action on this 

matter. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-638.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Ann CalvaresiBarr at (202) 512-4841 or

calvaresibarra@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 4

BIS Has Not Systematically Evaluated the Dual-Use Export Control 

System to Ensure Its Effectiveness and Efficiency 8 

Omissions and Weaknesses Undermine BIS’s Screening of

Applications against the Watchlist 12 

BIS Has Not Corrected Some Weaknesses Identified In Prior GAO 

Reports 15

Conclusions 16

Recommendations for Executive Action 17 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18 

Scope and Methodology 20 

Appendix I Trends in Dual-Use Export Licensing 23 

Appendix II Prior GAO Reports on the Dual-Use Export 

Control System and the Status of Recommendations 

(Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 31 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Commerce 41 

GAO Comments 67 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 73 

Related GAO Products 74 

Tables 

Table 1: Changes in Top Five Countries of Destination for 

Approved and Rejected License Applications, Fiscal Years 

1998 and 2005 27 

Page i GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Figures 

Figure 1: Overview of BIS’s Export Licensing Process and Time 

Frames 6

Figure 2: Total Number of Dual-Use License Applications 

Processed, Fiscal Years 1998 to 2005 23 

Figure 3: Percent of Applications Referred to Other Agencies,

Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001 and 2002 to 2005 24 

Figure 4: Percent of Applications Approved, Returned without 

Action, and Rejected, Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001 and 2002 

to 2005 25 

Figure 5: Median Processing Times for License Applications, Fiscal 

Years 1998 to 2005 26 

Figure 6: Median Processing Times for Referred and Nonreferred 

License Applications, Fiscal Years 1998 to 2005 28 

Figure 7: Number of Commodity Classifications Processed by BIS, 

Fiscal Years 1998 to 2005 29 

Figure 8: Median Processing Times for Commodity Classifications, 

Fiscal Years 1998 to 2005 30 

Abbreviations 

BIS Bureau of Industry and Security 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

EAA Export Administration Act 

EAR Export Administration Regulations 

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PSV Postshipment Verification 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

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Page ii GAO-06-638 Export Controls
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

June 26, 2006

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde 

Chairman 

Committee on International Relations 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Each year companies in the United States export billions of dollars worth 

of dual-use items that have both commercial and military applications. For

example, dual-use materials can be incorporated into golf clubs but can 

also help missiles evade radar detection. The Department of Commerce’s 

Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is responsible for regulating the 

export of thousands of dual-use items. In so doing, BIS faces the challenge 

of weighing U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic interests, 

which at times are divergent or even competing, to achieve an appropriate

balance that allows U.S. companies to compete globally while minimizing 

the risk that exported items could be used against U.S. interests. This 

challenge has been heightened by shifts in the security and economic 

environment since the late 1970s, when the current statutory framework 

for dual-use export controls was put in place. Perhaps most notably, in the 

aftermath of the September 2001 terror attacks, the threats facing the 

United States have been redefined. Also, over the decades, trade in rapidly

advancing technologies has increased as the economy has become more 

globalized. 

BIS administers the dual-use export control system through the 

requirements contained in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).1

Under these regulations, exporters are to either obtain prior government 

authorization in the form of a license from BIS or determine that a license 

is not needed before exporting dual-use items.2

 Multiple factors govern 

whether an exporter needs a license, including the item to be exported and 

the country of ultimate destination. Within the dual-use export control 

system, BIS heads an interagency process for reviewing export license 

applications. The decision to approve an application is based, in part, on 

 1

15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774. 

2

BIS controls exports of dual-use commodities, software, and technology, which are

collectively referred to as “items” in this report. 

Page 1 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
how the exported item is to be used and who plans to use it. During the 

license application review process, BIS screens applications against its 

own watchlist of individuals and companies to identify applications 

involving parties that are either ineligible or warrant additional scrutiny to

minimize the risk of dual-use items being used against U.S. interests. 

In light of the September 2001 terror attacks, you requested that we 

examine BIS’s dual-use export control system and whether BIS has made 

changes to the system. In response, we (1) assessed whether BIS has 

evaluated the dual-use export control system and made changes to the 

system, (2) evaluated BIS’s screening of export license applications 

against its watchlist, and (3) determined the extent to which BIS has taken 

corrective actions in response to weaknesses previously identified by 

GAO. 

In assessing BIS’s evaluations of the system’s effectiveness and efficiency, 

we compared BIS’s annual reports, performance plans, and budget 

submissions with performance management and internal control 

standards.3

 Through discussions with BIS officials and reviews of 

regulatory notices, we identified evaluations conducted by BIS and 

resulting changes to the system after the events of September 2001. We 

also analyzed data on export license applications, which we determined to 

be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To evaluate BIS’s watchlist 

screening process, we compared BIS’s watchlist with government 

documents to assess the list’s completeness, reviewed BIS’s internal 

guidance for adding parties to the watchlist and screening applications, 

and discussed with BIS officials reasons parties were not included on the 

list and BIS’s screening process. To determine what actions BIS has taken 

during the last 5 years in response to previously identified weaknesses, we 

reviewed regulatory changes and information provided by BIS and other 

agency officials. We performed our review from July 2005 through May 

2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

 3

For additional information regarding GAO’s work on improving government performance, 

see GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and

Results Act ,GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.:, June 1996); GAO, Managing for Results: 

Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for Management Decision Making, 

GAO-05-927 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005); and GAO, Standards for Internal Control in

the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Page 2 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Results in Brief BIS has not systematically evaluated the dual-use export control system to 

determine whether it is achieving its goal of protecting U.S. national 

security and economic interests. In managing the dual-use export control 

system, BIS has not comprehensively analyzed available data to determine 

what dual-use items have actually been exported. Further, BIS has not 

established performance measures to assess how effectively the system is 

achieving its goal, as called for under government performance 

management standards. Instead it relies on limited measures of efficiency

to determine whether its goal is being achieved. Specifically, BIS measures 

the timeliness of the initial steps in the license application review process 

and has reported meeting its licensing time frames. However, BIS does not 

measure the efficiency of other aspects of the system, such as commodity 

classifications4

 that represent a significant part of its workload. Absent 

systematic evaluations, BIS relies on intelligence reports and anecdotal 

information to gauge how the system is operating. After the events of 

September 2001, senior BIS officials told us they conducted an ad hoc 

review of the system and determined that no fundamental changes were

needed. The officials, however, identified the review as the impetus for 

some regulatory adjustments, such as increased restrictions on exports 

related to chemical and biological agents. We were unable to assess the 

sufficiency of the review or resulting changes because BIS did not 

document how it conducted the review or reached its conclusions. 

The effectiveness of BIS’s watchlist screening process is questionable. BIS 

has not ensured that certain parties of concern appear on its list of 

approximately 50,000 names and that all parties on license applications are 

screened. We found that the BIS watchlist does not include 147 parties 

that have committed export control violations or are known terrorists, 

which are reasons cited by BIS for adding parties to its watchlist. Of these, 

five are barred by BIS from exporting dual-use items. These omissions in 

the watchlist are attributable to a lack of specific criteria as to who should 

be on the watchlist and BIS’s lack of regular reviews to determine whether 

parties are missing from the list. Further, a technical limitation in BIS’s 

computer system results in some parties on license applications not being 

screened against the watchlist. We identified at least 1,187 license 

 4

If an exporter has determined that the item it wishes to export is Commerce-controlled,

but is uncertain of export licensing requirements, the exporter can request a commodity 

classification determination from BIS. For additional information on the commodity 

classification process, see GAO, Export Controls: Processes for Determining Proper 

Control of Defense-Related Items Need Improvement, GAO-02-996 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 20, 2002). 

Page 3 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
applications with parties that would not have been automatically screened 

against the watchlist over the last 8 years. Though aware of the screening 

limitation, BIS officials have not conducted their own analyses to 

determine the extent of the problem. 

While BIS has implemented several GAO recommendations made over the 

last 5 years, it has not implemented others. BIS has not addressed 

recommendations related to ensuring that export controls on sensitive 

items protect U.S. interests and are consistent with U.S. law. For example, 

BIS has not taken recommended steps to ensure that items are properly 

classified to guard against the improper export of defense-related items. 

We are making four recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to 

use available data and develop performance measures in consultation with 

other agencies to systematically evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency 

of the dual-use export control system in achieving the goal of protecting 

U.S. interests. We are making three additional recommendations to the 

Secretary of Commerce to correct omissions in the watchlist and 

weaknesses in the screening process. We are also recommending that the

Secretary of Commerce take action to address our prior unimplemented 

recommendations. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Commerce 

Department did not address our recommendations and disagreed with the 

report’s findings and characterizations of the dual-use export control 

system. The Departments of Defense, Energy, and State had no comments 

on the draft report. After considering the Commerce Department’s 

comments, we stand by our findings and recommendations. 

In regulating dual-use exports, the Commerce Department’s BIS faces the 

challenge of weighing various U.S. interests, which can be divergent or 

even competing, so U.S. companies can compete globally while minimizing 

the risk of controlled dual-use items falling into the wrong hands. Under 

the authority granted in the Export Administration Act (EAA),5

 BIS 

administers the EAR that require exporters to either obtain a license from 

BIS or determine government authorization is not needed before exporting

controlled items. Even when a license is not required, exporters are 

Background 

 5

50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420. The EAA is not permanent legislation. Authority granted 

under the act lapsed in August 2001. However, Executive Order 13222, Continuation of

Export Control Regulations, which was issued in August 2001 under the authority provided

by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1702), continues the

controls established under the act and the implementing EAR. 

Page 4 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
required to adhere to the provisions of the EAR when exporting controlled 

dual-use items. Whether an export license is required depends on multiple 

factors including the 

• item being exported, 

• country of ultimate destination, 

• individual parties involved in the export, 

• parties’ involvement in proliferation activities, and 

• planned end use of the item. 

Dual-use items specified in the EAR’s Commerce Control List are 

controlled for a variety of reasons, including restricting exports that could 

significantly enhance a country’s military potential, preventing exports to 

countries that sponsor terrorism, and limiting the proliferation of 

chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The 

U.S. government controls many of these items under its commitments to 

multilateral export control regimes, which are voluntary agreements 

among supplier countries that seek to restrict trade in sensitive 

technologies to peaceful purposes.6

For those exports requiring a license, Executive Order 129817

 governs the 

dual-use license application review process and establishes time frames 

for each step in the review process (see fig. 1). 

 6

The four principal export control regimes are the Australia Group, which focuses on trade

in chemical and biological items; the Missile Technology Control Regime; the Nuclear 

Suppliers Group; and the Wassenaar Arrangement, which focuses on trade in conventional

weapons and related dual-use items. The United States is a member of all four regimes. For 

additional information on the multilateral regimes, see GAO, Nonproliferation: Strategy

Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes, GAO-03-43 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 25, 2002). 

7

Exec. Order No. 12,981, 15 C.F.R. § 750.4. 

Page 5 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Figure 1: Overview of BIS’s Export Licensing Process and Time Frames 

Final interagency

decision to:

 grant license

 deny license

 return without action

If BIS and other agencies

agree, they make final

interagency decision to: 

 grant license

 deny license

 return without action

BIS enters application

into database

BIS screens application

against watchlist and

determines if application

involves an individual or 

company of concern

Other agencies review

application and provide

BIS with their recommendations on the application

If there is disagreement

among the agencies,

application goes through

interagency escalation

process

Interagency escalation

process completed

BIS reviews application;

if referral is needed, BIS

makes a recommendation to ...

 grant license

 deny license

 return without action 

 because license is not 

 required or BIS needs

 

 more information

... and sends application

to other agencies to

review





Day 1 By day 9 By day 39 By day 90









BIS reviews application;

if no referral is needed,

BIS makes final decision to ...

 grant license

 deny license

 return without action













Source: Exec. Order 12,981, 15 C.F.R. § 750.4 (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Note: Under the executive order, the entire license application review process—including 

escalation—is to be completed within 90 days, unless an agency appeals the decision to the 

President who is not given a time limit. However, few applications are escalated through the 

interagency dispute resolution process. For example, in fiscal year 2005, of the almost 

17,000 applications processed by BIS, only 143 were escalated and none reached the President for 

final resolution.

One of the first steps in the license application review process is the 

screening of parties on the application, such as the planned exporter or 

end user, against BIS’s internal watchlist to identify ineligible parties or 

parties that warrant closer scrutiny. Neither the EAA nor the EAR provide 

specific criteria as to which parties are to be included on the watchlist. 

However, under the EAR, BIS may deny export privileges to persons 

convicted of export violations, and the watchlist serves as a mechanism 

for identifying parties that have been denied exporting privileges. This 

screening process can also serve as a tool for identifying proposed end 

users sanctioned for terrorist activities and, therefore, ineligible to receive 

certain dual-use items. BIS has the discretion to add other parties to the 

watchlist. A match between the watchlist and a party on an application 

does not necessarily mean that the application will be denied, but it can 

Page 6 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
trigger additional scrutiny by BIS officials, including BIS enforcement 

officials, during the license application review process. 

While BIS is responsible for administering the dual-use export control 

system and licensing dual-use exports, other federal agencies play active 

roles. As provided for under Executive Order 12981, the Departments of 

Defense, Energy, and State have the authority to review any export license 

applications submitted to BIS.8

 These departments specify through 

delegations of authority to BIS the categories of applications that they

want to review based, for example, on the item to be exported. License 

applications can also be referred to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

for review. After reviewing an application, the agencies are to provide the 

BIS licensing officer with a recommendation to approve or deny the 

application.

9

 In addition to reviewing license applications, the Defense, 

Energy, and State Departments are also involved in the regulatory process. 

Before changes are made to the EAR and the Commerce Control List, such 

as the addition of an item to the list, proposals are reviewed through an 

interagency review process. BIS is responsible for issuing the regulatory 

changes related to dual-use exports. 

For fiscal year 2005, BIS had a budget of $67.5 million, of which 

$33.9 million was for the administration of the export control system.10 Of 

the 414 positions at BIS in fiscal year 2005, 48 were licensing officers. 

These officers are responsible for developing the Commerce Department 

position as to whether an application should be approved and responding 

to exporter requests for commodity classifications as well as performing 

other duties related to administering the dual-use export control system. 

 8

Executive Order 12981 also provides that BIS may refer applications to other departments

or agencies as appropriate. For example, license applications involving encryption

technology are referred to the Department of Justice. 

9

If agencies do not provide their recommendations within 30 days after the application is 

referred by BIS to them, it is deemed that they concur with BIS’s recommendation. While 

the CIA reviews applications, it does not provide recommendations on whether they should

be approved or denied. 

10In addition to administering the dual-use export control system, BIS is responsible for

enforcing dual-use export control regulations and law, along with the Departments of 

Homeland Security and Justice. BIS is also responsible for monitoring the viability of the

defense industrial base, ensuring industry compliance with arms control treaties, enforcing 

antiboycott laws, and assisting other countries in developing effective export control 

systems. 

Page 7 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
BIS Has Not 

Systematically 

Evaluated the DualUse Export Control 

System to Ensure Its 

Effectiveness and 

Efficiency 

BIS has not systematically evaluated the overall effectiveness and 

efficiency of the system to determine whether its stated goal of protecting 

U.S. national security and economic interests is being achieved. 

Specifically, it has not comprehensively analyzed key data on actual dualuse exports, including unlicensed exports that represent the majority of 

exports subject to its controls. Further, contrary to what is called for 

under government management standards, BIS has not established 

performance measures to assess how effectively the system is protecting 

U.S. interests in the existing security and economic environment. While 

BIS has established some measures related to the system’s efficiency, 

those measures focus on narrow aspects of the licensing process. BIS 

officials also rely on intelligence reports and meetings with industry 

officials to provide insight into how the system is operating. After the 

events of September 2001, BIS conducted an ad hoc review of the system 

to determine if changes were needed. According to BIS officials, no 

fundamental changes to the system were needed, but they cited the review 

as the basis for some adjustments—primarily related to controls on 

chemical and biological agents. However, because BIS did not document 

its review, we could not assess the sufficiency of the review and the 

resulting changes. 

BIS’s Assessment of the 

Dual-Use Export Control 

System Has Been Limited 

In managing the dual-use export control system, BIS has not conducted 

comprehensive analyses of available data on items under its control that 

have been exported. 11 According to BIS officials, they recently began 

conducting limited analyses of export data to evaluate the potential effects 

of proposed regulatory changes on U.S. industry. While BIS is cognizant of

dual-use exports authorized through the license application review 

process, it has not analyzed export data to determine the extent to which

approved licenses resulted in actual exports. BIS also does not routinely 

analyze data on the items and destinations for unlicensed exports, which 

represent the majority of exports subject to BIS’s controls. 

BIS has not established measures to assess whether it is effectively

achieving its goal of protecting national security and economic interests. 

Under the performance management framework established by the 

 11Data on actual licensed and unlicensed dual-use exports are maintained by the Commerce 

Department’s Bureau of the Census. The Census Bureau collects data on U.S. foreign trade

under the authority provided in 13 U.S.C. §§ 301-307. 

Page 8 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,

12 federal agencies are to 

develop objective performance measures for assessing how well they are 

achieving their goals over time. These measures should focus on an 

agency’s outcomes as opposed to its processes. BIS’s lack of effectiveness 

measures was noted in a 2005 review by the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB). In response to OMB’s review, BIS indicated plans for 

developing measures to assess the system’s effects on national security 

and economic interests in consultation with the other agencies involved in

the export control system. BIS officials informed us that their attempt to 

devise effectiveness measures did not succeed due to a lack of

cooperation and that they opted not to independently pursue the 

development of effectiveness measures. 

Without measures of effectiveness to assess it performance, BIS relies on 

measures related to the efficiency of the dual-use export control system. 

These efficiency-related measures generally focus on the first steps in the 

license application review process—how long it takes to review a license 

application internally and refer an application to another agency.13 Over 

the last 3 fiscal years, BIS has reported meeting its licensing-related time 

frames. However, BIS does not have efficiency-related measures for other 

steps in the license application review process, such as how quickly a 

license should be issued or denied once other agencies provide their input, 

or for the review process as a whole. BIS also does not evaluate the 

efficiency of other aspects of the system. Most notably, it does not 

measure whether it is meeting the regulatory time frame for the processing 

of commodity classification requests, of which there were 5,370 in fiscal

year 2005 or about 24 percent of licensing officers’ workload (see app. I 

for additional information on BIS’s processing times).14

BIS officials acknowledged that they have not systematically evaluated the 

dual-use export control system. Instead, BIS officials informed us that they

regularly review intelligence reports and meet with industry officials to 

gauge how well the system is working. A senior BIS official stated there 

 12The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285, 

was enacted to help resolve long-standing management problems that undermine the

government’s effectiveness and efficiency and provide greater accountability for results. 

13BIS’s other measure of efficiency addresses the amount of time BIS takes to issue draft

regulations. 

14Per 15 C.F.R. § 750.2, BIS is to complete commodity classifications within 14 calendar 

days. 

Page 9 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
are no anecdotal indications that the system is not effective. The official

added that “it stands to reason” that BIS’s controls have limited various 

parties’ access to U.S. dual-use technologies but that it is difficult to 

determine how controls are affecting U.S. industry. Also, as evidence of 

how the system is operating, BIS officials referred us to BIS’s annual 

report on its foreign policy-based controls.15 This report summarizes 

various regulatory changes from the previous year and what the newly 

imposed controls were intended to achieve. However, this report does not 

contain an assessment of the impact these controls have had on U.S. 

interests. To address its lack of evaluations, BIS officials informed us that 

they are in the process of establishing an Office of Technology Evaluation. 

BIS is hiring analysts to evaluate topics including how dual-use items 

should be controlled and how export controls have affected industry. 

Absent systematic evaluations, BIS conducted an ad hoc review after the 

September 2001 attacks to determine what changes, if any, needed to be 

made to the system in light of the new security environment. However, 

according to BIS officials, they did not produce a report or other 

documentation regarding their review. Therefore, we could not assess the 

validity or sufficiency of BIS’s review and the resulting changes. BIS 

officials told us they determined that, other than some adjustments to its 

controls, no fundamental changes to the system were needed because they 

already had controls and procedures in place to deny terrorists access to 

dual-use technologies. Of the hundreds of regulatory changes made since 

September 2001, BIS officials identified the following specific changes as

stemming from their ad hoc review 

• establishing a worldwide licensing requirement for exports of 

biological agents; 

• changing the licensing requirement for biological agent fermenters 

from fermenters larger than 100 liters to those larger than 20 liters; 

• controlling components that can be used in the manufacture of 

chemical agents; 

 15BIS controls some dual-use items to further U.S. foreign policy or fulfill its international 

obligations. Items controlled for foreign policy reasons include crime control and detection 

equipment, missile technology, and chemical and biological agents and related equipment.

Exports to designated terrorist states and embargoed countries are also controlled for 

foreign policy reasons. Pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 

(50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706), the President has authorized the system of controls established 

under the EAA, including export controls maintained for foreign policy purposes that 

require annual extensions made through reports to Congress. 

Page 10 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
• including additional precursors for the development of chemical 

agents on the Commerce Control List; 

• revising licensing requirements to further restrict U.S. persons from 

designing, developing, producing, stockpiling, or using chemical or 

biological weapons; 

• requiring licenses for exports of equipment related to the 

production of chemical or biological agents to countries that are not 

members of the Australia Group;16

• imposing controls on exports of unmanned aerial vehicles capable 

of dispersing more than 20 liters of chemical or biological agents; 

and 

• adding amorphous silicon plane arrays, which can be used in night 

vision or thermal imaging equipment, to the Commerce Control List. 

According to BIS officials, their review did not result in changes to the 

license application review process after the events of September 2001. 

However, decisions by other agencies—namely the Energy Department 

and the CIA—have resulted in BIS referring more license applications to 

them. Specifically, in response to Energy’s request, BIS began referring 

applications related to missile technologies and chemical or biological 

agents, in addition to the nuclear-related applications Energy was already 

reviewing. Similarly, based on discussions between BIS and the CIA, the 

decision was made to refer more applications to the CIA for review to 

determine whether foreign parties of concern may be involved in the 

proposed export (see app. I for information on BIS referral rates). 

Additionally, in response to the changing security environment after 

September 2001, BIS reprioritized its enforcement activities.17 Specifically, 

BIS enforcement officials are to give highest priority to dual-use export 

control violations involving the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, terrorist organizations, and exports for unauthorized military 

or government uses. Further, senior BIS officials noted that they have 

made regulatory changes to reflect the dynamic geopolitical environment, 

such as changing licensing requirements for exports to India, Iraq, Libya,

and Syria. 

 16There are currently 40 members of the Australia Group.

17GAO is currently conducting a separate review of export control enforcement efforts.

Page 11 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
BIS’s watchlist is intended to facilitate the identification of license 

applications involving individuals and companies representing an export 

control concern. However, BIS’s watchlist is incomplete, as numerous 

export control violators and terrorists are not included on the list. Further, 

BIS’s process for screening applications does not ensure that all parties on

all applications are screened against the watchlist. As a result, the 

watchlist’s utility in the license application review process is undermined, 

which increases the risk of dual-use items falling into the wrong hands. 

BIS’s watchlist does not include certain companies, organizations, and 

individuals that are known entities of export control concern and, 

therefore, warrant inclusion on the watchlist. Based on our comparison of 

the watchlist to publicly available U.S. government documents, including 

ones available through BIS’s Web site, we identified 147 parties that had 

either violated U.S. export control requirements, been determined to be 

suspicious end users, or committed acts of terror but were not on BIS’s 

watchlist. BIS officials confirmed that, at the time of our review, the 

parties we identified were not on BIS’s watchlist. Specifically, we 

identified 

Omissions and 

Weaknesses 

Undermine BIS’s 

Screening of 

Applications against 

the Watchlist 

BIS’s Watchlist Is 

Incomplete 

• 5 export control violators that have been denied dual-use export 

privileges by BIS; 

• 60 companies and individuals that had committed export control 

violations and were, therefore, barred by the State Department from 

being involved in the export of defense items; 

• 52 additional companies and individuals that have been 

investigated, charged, and, in most cases, convicted of export

control violations; 

• 2 overseas companies whose legitimacy as end users could not be 

established by BIS; and 

• 28 organizations identified by the State Department as committing 

acts of terror. 

The above individuals and companies we identified as not being on the BIS 

watchlist include those that have exported or attempted to export 

weapons to terrorist organizations, night vision technologies to embargoed 

countries, and materials that can be used in biological and missile 

programs. The terrorist organizations include one that has staged attacks

against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and another that has 

attacked and abducted large numbers of civilians, including children. 

Page 12 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
BIS’s standard for including a party on its watchlist is that the party 

represents an export control concern. BIS does not have an official 

definition or explanation as to what constitutes an export control concern.

As a result, the decision as to whether a party should be added to the 

watchlist is left to the judgment of the BIS personnel responsible for 

maintaining the watchlist. The only specific guidance BIS provides is that

parties under investigation by BIS enforcement officials must be added to

the watchlist. BIS officials told us that the reasons a company, 

organization, or individual should be added to the watchlist include 

previous violations of U.S. export control regulations, inability to 

determine a party’s legitimacy, possible support of international terrorism, 

and possible involvement with missile programs of concern. The 

147 parties we identified fall within these categories. In addition, BIS 

officials do not regularly review the watchlist to ensure its completeness. 

BIS officials said they do not conduct periodic checks as to whether 

particular parties have been added to the list. They also do not compare 

the BIS watchlist to other federal agencies’ lists or databases used for 

similar purposes to determine whether the BIS watchlist is missing 

pertinent parties. 

BIS officials offered several explanations for why the 147 parties were not 

on the watchlist. First, they acknowledged it was an oversight on their part 

not to include several of the parties on the watchlist. For example, at least 

two parties were not added to the watchlist because the BIS personnel 

involved thought they had been added by someone else. Second, for some 

of the parties, BIS did not receive information from another agency about 

export control-related investigations. However, these parties could have 

been identified through publicly available reports. Third, BIS relies on 

limited sources to identify parties involved in terrorist activities. The 

officials explained that their primary source for identifying terrorist 

organizations is the Treasury Department’s public listing of designated 

terrorists.18 While Treasury maintains a list of terrorists, its list is not 

exhaustive and therefore, does not include all known terrorist 

organizations. Finally, BIS officials noted that many of the parties we 

identified were individuals and that they do not typically add individuals to

 18The Treasury Department maintains a list of individuals and companies owned or

controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries, such as Cuba and North

Korea. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics

traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such 

individuals and companies are called “Specially Designated Nationals,” whose assets are 

blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.

Page 13 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
the watchlist because applications generally contain names of companies. 

However, we found numerous individuals included on the watchlist and 

individuals can and do appear on license applications. 

BIS’s Process Does Not 

Ensure That All Parties 

Are Screened against the 

Watchlist 

BIS’s process for screening applications does not ensure that all parties 

are screened against the watchlist. To screen parties on applications 

against the watchlist, BIS relies on a computerized process. The computer 

system recognizes parties that are identified in one of five specified fields

and automatically screens the parties identified in those fields against the 

watchlist. If there are multiple parties, BIS’s regulations direct the 

applicant to list the additional parties in the “Additional Information” field. 

However, the computer system does not recognize the parties listed in that 

field, which means the parties are not automatically screened against the 

watchlist. While BIS officials told us that they may identify applications 

involving multiple parties and manually screen them against the watchlist, 

they do not have a systematic means of identifying applications involving 

parties listed in the “Additional Information” field. As a result, BIS cannot 

ensure that all parties on all applications have been screened. Based on 

our review of licensing data for the past 8 years, we identified at least 

1,187 applications involving multiple parties that would not have been 

automatically screened. BIS officials informed us that they are aware of 

this limitation, but have not conducted reviews to determine the number 

of applications affected.

According to BIS officials, since most applications are reviewed by other 

agencies, the risk of not screening all parties is lessened. However, a

senior BIS official acknowledged that by not screening all applications 

against the BIS watchlist, applications involving parties that are the 

subject of BIS enforcement investigations would not be identified as that 

information only resides on the BIS watchlist. Defense and State officials, 

to whom most license applications are referred, stated that they do not 

maintain watchlists for the screening of dual-use export license 

applications and expect BIS to have already screened all parties before 

referring applications to them. BIS officials informed us of their plans to 

develop a new computerized screening system to ensure that all parties on

applications are screened against the watchlist. However, the new system 

will not be operational for several years. 

Page 14 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
BIS Has Not 

Corrected Some 

Weaknesses Identified 

In Prior GAO Reports 

In the years since the September 2001 terror attacks, GAO has issued a 

number of reports identifying weaknesses in the dual-use export control 

system. The weaknesses identified in many of the prior reports relate to 

ensuring that export controls on sensitive items protect U.S. interests and 

are consistent with U.S. law. Some of our recommendations to correct 

those weaknesses remain unimplemented (see app. II for more detailed 

information on these reports and the status of recommendations). 

Among the weaknesses identified in prior GAO reports is the lack of 

clarity as to which items are controlled and whether they are controlled by

the Commerce Department or the State Department. A lack of clarity as to 

whether an item is Commerce-controlled or State-controlled19 increases 

the risk that defense-related items will be improperly exported and U.S. 

interests will be harmed as a result. In most cases, State’s controls over 

arms exports are more restrictive than Commerce’s controls over dual-use 

items. 20 For example, a State-issued license is generally required for arms 

exports, whereas many dual-use items do not require licenses for export to 

most destinations. Further, most arms exports to China are prohibited, 

while dual-use items may be exported to China. 

In 2002, we reported that BIS had improperly informed exporters through 

the commodity classification process that their items were subject to 

Commerce’s export control requirements, when in fact the items were 

subject to State’s requirements.21 BIS made improper determinations 

because it rarely obtained input from the Departments of State or Defense 

during the commodity classification process on which department had 

jurisdiction over the items in question. We recommended that the 

Commerce Department, together with the Departments of State and 

Defense, develop agreed-upon criteria for determining which classification 

requests should be referred to the other departments, which would 

minimize the risk of improper determinations. However, BIS has not 

implemented our recommendation and continues to refer only a few 

 19The State Department regulates arms exports under the authority of the Arms Export 

Control Act (22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799aa-2). 

20For additional information on the arms export control system, including processing times

for arms export license applications, see GAO, Defense Trade: Arms Export Control 

Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the Post-9/11 Security Environment, GAO-05-468R 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2005) and GAO, Defense Trade: Arms Export Control System in

the Post-9/11 Environment, GAO-05-234 (Washington, D.C., Feb. 16, 2005).

21GAO, Export Controls: Processes for Determining Proper Control of Defense-Related

Items Need Improvement, GAO-02-996 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2002) 

Page 15 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
commodity classifications to the Departments of State and Defense. In 

fiscal year 2005, BIS processed 5,370 commodity classification requests 

and referred only 10 to State and Defense. Additionally, in 2001, we 

reported that export control jurisdiction between the Departments of State 

and Commerce had not been clearly established for almost 25 percent of 

the items the U.S. government has agreed to control as part of its 

commitments to the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime.22 The 

two departments have yet to take action to clarify which department has 

jurisdiction over these sensitive missile technology items. As a result, the 

U.S. government has left the determination of jurisdiction to the exporter,

who by default can then determine which national policy interests are to 

be considered and acted upon when defense-related items are exported. 

BIS has taken actions to address other weaknesses identified in GAO 

reports. For example, in response to a 2004 GAO report, BIS expanded its 

licensing requirements for the export of missile technology items to 

address missile proliferation by nonstate actors.23 Similarly, BIS 

implemented GAO’s recommendation to require exporters to inform end 

users in writing of any conditions placed on licenses to help ensure that 

the end users abide by those restrictions.24

Exports of dual-use items are important to a strong U.S. economy, but in 

the wrong hands, they could pose a threat to U.S. security and foreign 

policy interests. However, BIS has not demonstrated whether the dual-use 

export control system is achieving its goal of protecting national security 

and economic interests in the post-September 2001 environment. Without

systematic evaluations, BIS cannot readily identify weaknesses in the 

system and implement corrective measures that allow U.S. companies to 

compete in the global marketplace while minimizing the risk to other U.S. 

interests. Further, the absence of known parties of concern on the BIS 

watchlist and limitations in the screening process create vulnerabilities 

and are illustrative of what can happen when there is not an emphasis on 

Conclusions 

 22GAO, Export Controls: Clarification of Jurisdiction for Missile Technology Items 

Needed, GAO-02-120 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 9, 2001). 

23GAO, Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology Exports for 

Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, GAO-04-175 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 23, 

2004). 

24GAO, Export Controls: Post-Shipment Verification Provides Limited Assurance That 

Dual-Use Items Are Being Properly Used, GAO-04-357 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2004). 

Page 16 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
evaluating how well a system is operating and taking corrective action to

address known deficiencies. Also, the weaknesses and associated risks 

identified in prior GAO reports will persist until the remaining 

recommendations are implemented. Until corrective actions are taken, the 

United States will continue to rely on BIS’s management of the dual-use 

export control system with known vulnerabilities and little assurance that 

U.S. interests are being protected. 

To ensure that the dual-use export control system is effective as well as 

efficient in protecting U.S. interests, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Commerce direct the Under Secretary for Industry and Security to take the 

following four actions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• identify and obtain data needed to evaluate the system; 

• review existing measures of efficiency to determine their 

appropriateness and develop measures that address commodity 

classifications; 

• develop, in consultation with other agencies that participate in the 

system, measures of effectiveness that provide an objective basis 

for assessing whether progress is being made in achieving the goal 

of protecting U.S. interests; and 

• implement a plan for conducting regular assessments of the dualuse export control system to identify weaknesses in the system and 

corrective actions. 

To ensure that BIS has a process that effectively identifies parties of 

concern during the export license application review process, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Under Secretary 

for Industry and Security to take the following three actions 

• develop criteria for determining which parties should be on the 

watchlist; 

• implement regular reviews of the watchlist to help ensure its 

completeness; and 

• establish interim measures for screening all parties until the 

planned upgrade of the computerized screening system eliminates 

current technical limitations. 

To mitigate the risks identified in prior GAO reports related to the dual-use 

export control system, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce 

direct the Under Secretary for Industry and Security to report to Congress 

on the status of GAO recommendations, the reasons why 

Page 17 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
recommendations have not been implemented, and what other actions, if 

any, are being taken to address the identified weaknesses. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Commerce, 

Defense, and State. In its comments on the draft, the Commerce 

Department did not respond to any of our recommendations and disagreed 

with our findings and characterizations of the U.S. dual-use export control 

system following the September 2001 terror attacks. The Departments of 

Defense and State had no comments on the draft report. The Energy 

Department declined the opportunity to review and comment on the draft

report. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

In introducing its overall comments, the Commerce Department raises 

concerns regarding the report’s scope. Commerce states that we expanded 

the initial scope of our audit from narrowly looking at BIS’s response to 

the September 2001 terror attacks to the three issues we address in our 

report. In fact, the scope of our audit has remained the same. To examine 

BIS’s dual-use export control system and whether changes to the system 

were made, we focused on three specific issues related to how well the 

system is operating in the post-September 2001 environment. Based on our 

examination of these issues, we concluded that there are vulnerabilities in

the dual-use export control system and that BIS can provide few 

assurances that the system is protecting U.S. interests in the current 

environment. After considering the Commerce Department’s extensive 

comments, our report’s findings, conclusions, and resulting 

recommendations remain unchanged. 

In commenting on our findings, the Commerce Department states that our 

report presumes BIS must develop a national security strategy to 

administer the dual-use export control system. Our report does not 

presume this as our recommendations address the need for BIS to develop 

performance measures and conduct systematic evaluations for 

determining the extent to which the system is meeting its stated goal of 

protecting both national security and economic interests. The Commerce 

Department further states that BIS represents the “gold standard” for its 

rigorous process of defining priorities, implementing plans, and measuring 

success. To support this statement, Commerce lists several actions that 

BIS has taken since September 2001 and cites BIS’s “Game Plan” as 

identifying BIS’s priorities and providing a basis for measuring BIS’s 

performance. However, BIS has not evaluated what effects these actions

have had on U.S. interests. Also, the “Game Plan” provided to us at the end 

of our review did not contain performance measures for assessing how 

Page 18 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
dual-use export controls affect national security or economic interests. 

Further, OMB determined in its 2005 Program Assessment Rating Tool that

BIS lacked measures related to its fundamental purpose. Absent 

performance measures and systematic evaluations, it is unclear what the

basis was for the various actions taken by BIS, what the impact of these 

actions has been on national security and economic interests, whether 

these actions are sufficient to protect U.S. interests in the current 

environment, or how BIS represents the gold standard. 

The Commerce Department also comments that our report is misleading 

and does not provide sufficient context for our findings related to BIS’s 

watchlist. According to Commerce, the 147 parties we identified as not 

being on the list should be placed in the context of the approximately 

50,000 names that are on BIS’s watchlist, and no licenses were issued to 

the 147 parties. Commerce’s comment does not address our basic point. It 

was not our intent to identify every party that should be on BIS’s watchlist. 

Nor did we seek to determine whether licenses were issued to parties not 

on the watchlist, in part, because BIS’s regulations permit the approval of

license applications involving parties on the watchlist. Instead, the point of 

our finding and our related recommendations is that BIS does not have 

mechanisms for ensuring a robust watchlist and screening process. To 

provide additional context, we adjusted the text to reflect the number of 

names on the watchlist. The Commerce Department also notes that the 

watchlist is only one check during the license application review process 

and that there are multiple layers and agencies involved—a fact we 

address in our report. According to Commerce, the built-in redundancies 

in the review process minimize the possibility of a party slipping through 

the cracks. We agree that having multiple layers of review can create an

effective system of checks and balances, but only if each agency is 

fulfilling its responsibilities at each stage in the review. The other agencies 

involved in the process clearly expect BIS to have a robust watchlist 

screening process. BIS’s stated reliance on others to compensate for 

weaknesses in its watchlist creates gaps in the review process and, 

therefore, undermines the ability of the system to effectively protect U.S. 

interests. While the Commerce Department cites some measures BIS has 

taken recently to refine the watchlist, these measures do not address the 

weaknesses created by the lack of criteria and reviews of who should be 

on the watchlist or the technical limitations that result in some parties not 

being screened against the watchlist. 

Regarding its implementation of GAO’s prior recommendations, the 

Commerce Department states that BIS has met most of the 

recommendations and maintains that none of the outstanding

Page 19 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
recommendations puts BIS’s mission at risk. We disagree since BIS has not 

implemented recommendations that address the most basic aspects of the

export control system. Specifically, BIS’s failure to implement 

recommendations that would provide for clear, transparent decisions 

about export control jurisdiction increases the risk that sensitive defenserelated items will be improperly exported and that some exporters will be

placed at a competitive disadvantage—undermining BIS’s goal of 

protecting national security and economic interests. 

The Commerce Department also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated into our report as appropriate. Commerce’s comments are 

reprinted in appendix III, along with our supplemental responses. 

To assess BIS’s evaluations of the dual-use export control system’s 

efficiency and effectiveness after the events of September 2001, we 

compared BIS’s annual reports, performance plans, and budget 

submissions with performance management and internal control 

standards. These standards call for federal agencies to develop resultsoriented goals, measure progress toward achieving those goals, and have

procedures that provide reasonable assurances about the agency’s 

effectiveness and efficiency. We also spoke with senior BIS officials to 

identify evaluations they conducted of the system, particularly those 

conducted after the 2001 terror attacks, and discussed how those 

evaluations were conducted. To identify changes made to the system, we 

interviewed BIS officials and reviewed BIS regulatory notices issued since 

September 2001. Additionally, we interviewed officials from the CIA and 

the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State to determine changes to 

the system based on their participation in the dual-use licensing and 

regulatory processes. We also examined existing data on the system. 

Specifically, we analyzed data from BIS’s Export Control Automated 

Support System on applications and commodity classification requests 

closed between fiscal years 1998 and 2005. To assess data reliability, we 

performed electronic testing of relevant data elements, interviewed 

knowledgeable agency officials, and reviewed system documentation. We 

determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our 

review. 

Scope and 

Methodology 

In examining the BIS watchlist, we reviewed BIS’s internal guidance for 

adding parties to the watchlist and discussed with BIS officials the various

sources and reasons they use to add parties to the watchlist. Using the 

reasons they identified, we compared BIS’s watchlist, dated January 2006,

to documents publicly available through U.S. government Web sites to 

assess the list’s completeness. These documents included BIS’s Denied 

Page 20 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Persons List, Unverified List, and Major Cases List;25 the State

Department’s Debarred Parties List and Patterns of Global Terrorism 

report;26 and the Homeland Security Department’s fact sheet on arms and 

strategic technologies investigations.27 We confirmed with BIS officials 

that the parties we identified were not on the watchlist and discussed 

reasons they were excluded. We also discussed BIS’s process for 

screening applications with BIS officials and reviewed BIS’s internal 

guidance. 

To determine the status of GAO’s prior recommendations to correct 

weaknesses in the system, we identified reports issued between fiscal 

years 2001 and 2005 regarding the dual-use export control system and their 

recommendations. We reviewed BIS’s regulatory notices to determine 

whether BIS made regulatory changes in response to GAO’s 

recommendations. We also followed up on the status of recommendations 

through interviews with Commerce, Defense, and State officials and 

reviews of supporting documentation they provided. 

We requested data for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 on actual exports of dualuse items from the Bureau of the Census. As discussed with your staff, we 

requested the data in October 2005 and did not receive the data in time for 

inclusion in this report after multiple attempts to obtain the data. The 

delays from Census prevented us from reporting on actual dual-use 

exports as planned. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from 

 25The Denied Persons List identifies parties that have been denied exporting privileges by 

BIS. The Unverified List identifies parties in foreign countries that were parties in past

transactions for which a prelicense check or a postshipment verification could not be 

conducted for reasons outside the control of the U.S. government. The Major Cases List 

highlights BIS enforcement activities. 

26The Debarred List identifies parties that have been convicted of violating or conspiracy to

violate the Arms Export Control Act and, therefore, denied exporting privileges by the

State Department. The Patterns on Global Terrorism report, which was last issued in 2003, 

identifies terrorist organizations and groups that have committed acts of terrorism in the 

United States and other countries. 

27The Homeland Security Department, which enforces both arms and dual-use export 

control laws, maintains a listing of its major export control investigations. 

Page 21 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees as well as the Secretaries of Commerce, 

Defense, Energy, and State; the Director, Central Intelligence Agency; the

Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs. In addition, this report will be 

made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or calvaresibarra@gao.gov if you or 

your staff have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours, 

Ann Calvaresi-Barr 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 22 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix I: Tre

Lic

nds in Dual-Use Export 

ensing 

Page 23 GAO-06-638

Appendix I: Trends in Dual-Use Export 

Licensing 

The number of dual-use export license applications processed by the 

Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has 

increased over the last several years. These applications were generally for 

the export of items in the following categories: materials, chemicals, 

microorganisms, and toxins; nuclear materials, facilities and equipment 

and miscellaneous items; telecommunications and information security; 

and other items subject to BIS’s controls but not specified on the 

Commerce Control List.28 As shown in figure 2, from fiscal years 1998 

through 2005, the number of applications processed increased by over 

50 percent. 

Figure 2: Total Number of Dual-Use License Applications Processed, Fiscal Years 

1998 to 2005 

Source: BIS (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

1998

Fiscal years

Number of applications processed

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

 28The Commerce Control List is divided into 10 categories. In addition, items subject to 

BIS’s controls but not specified on the control list are designated “EAR99.” 

Export Controls
Appendix I: Trends in Dual-Use Export 

Licensing 

Additionally, BIS has been referring a larger percentage of applications to

other agencies for their review. From fiscal year 1998 to 2005, the total 

percentage of applications referred to other agencies increased from about 

85 percent to about 92 percent. As shown in figure 3, the greatest increases 

were in the percent of applications referred to the Department of Energy 

and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 

Figure 3: Percent of Applications Referred to Other Agencies, Fiscal Years 1998 to

2001 and 2002 to 2005 

74%

85%

Source: BIS (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Energy CIA Defense State

Other agencies that reviewed applications

Fiscal years 2002-05

In percent

100

80

60

40

20

0

Applications referred by BIS to other agencies

16%

30%

39%

Fiscal years 1998-2001

79%

62%

83%

Note: An application can be referred to more than one agency. 

Page 24 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix I: Trends in Dual-Use Export 

Licensing 

After the license application review process is completed, BIS can approve 

an application, return it without action, or reject it. The majority of 

applications processed since fiscal year 1998 have been approved, as 

shown in figure 4. 

Figure 4: Percent of Applications Approved, Returned without Action, and Rejected, 

Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001 and 2002 to 2005 

Source: BIS (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Approved

BIS’s actions

Fiscal years 2002-05

In percent

100

80

60

40

20

0

Three types of resulting actions for processed applications

78%

Fiscal years 1998-2001

Rejected Returned

without action

83%

5%

17%

2%

15%

Page 25 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix I: Trends in Dual-Use Export 

Licensing 

Although the number of applications processed by BIS increased over the 

last several years, the overall median processing times have remained 

relatively stable and consistent with time frames established by executive 

order,29 as shown in figure 5. 

Figure 5: Median Processing Times for License Applications, Fiscal Years 1998 to

2005 

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Source: BIS (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Fiscal years

In days

50

40

30

20

10

0

Median processing times

 29Exec. Order No. 12,981, 15 C.F.R. § 750.4.

Page 26 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix I: Trends in Dual-Use Export 

Licensing 

As shown in table 1, there have been changes over the years in the top 

countries of destination for approved and rejected license applications. 

However, applications for dual-use exports to China have consistently 

represented a significant portion of BIS’s licensing workload. 

Table 1: Changes in Top Five Countries of Destination for Approved and Rejected License Applications, Fiscal Years 1998 

and 2005 

Approved license applications Rejected license applications 

Fiscal year 1998 Fiscal year 2005 Fiscal year 1998 Fiscal year 2005 

Country

Number of 

applications

approved Country

Number of 

applications

approved Country

Number of 

applications

rejected Country

Number of 

applications

rejected

China 638 China 1,303 India 213 India 69

India 476 Japan 1,187 China 37 China 44

Russia 426 Canada 938 Israel 9 Cuba 36

Mexico 418 Taiwan 725 Pakistan 8 Syria 32

Taiwan 398 India 694 Russia 6 Pakistan 18

Source: BIS (data); GAO (analysis). 

Page 27 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix I: Trends in Dual-Use Export 

Licensing 

As shown in figure 6, referring applications to other agencies increases the

time it takes to process license applications. Between fiscal years 1998 and 

2005, referred license applications took about 24 more days to process 

than those applications that were processed solely by BIS. 

Figure 6: Median Processing Times for Referred and Nonreferred License 

Applications, Fiscal Years 1998 to 2005 

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Fiscal years

In days

50

40

30

20

10

0

Median processing times

Source: BIS (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Nonreferred applications

Referred applications

Page 28 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix I: Trends in Dual-Use Export 

Licensing 

BIS’s workload related to commodity classifications has also increased in

recent years. As shown in figure 7, the number of commodity 

classifications almost doubled from fiscal year 1998 to 2005. 

Figure 7: Number of Commodity Classifications Processed by BIS, Fiscal Years 

1998 to 2005 

1998

Fiscal years

Number of commodity classifications

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

1,000

2,000

0

Source: BIS (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Page 29 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix I: Trends in Dual-Use Export 

Licensing 

BIS continues to exceed the 14-day time frame established in the Export 

Administration Regulations30 for processing commodity classifications, as 

shown in figure 8. 

Figure 8: Median Processing Times for Commodity Classifications, Fiscal Years 

1998 to 2005 

Source: BIS (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

1998

Fiscal years

In days

50

40

30

20

10

0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Median processing times

 3015 C.F.R. § 750.2 

Page 30 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports on the DualUse Export Control System and the Status of 

Recommendations (Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 

Export Controls: System for Controlling Exports of High Performance Computing Is Ineffective 

(Dec. 18, 2000, GAO-01-10) 

Background: Exports of high performance computers 

exceeding a defined performance threshold require an 

export license from the Commerce Department. As 

technological advances in high performance computing 

occur, it may become necessary to explore other options to 

maintain the U.S. lead in defense-related technology. As a 

step in this direction, the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 1998a

 required the Secretary of Defense 

to assess the cumulative effect of U.S.-granted licenses for 

exports of computing technologies to countries and entities 

of concern. It also required information on measures that 

may be necessary to counter the use of such technologies 

by entities of concern. 

Main issues: The current system for controlling exports of 

high performance computers is ineffective because it 

focuses on the performance level of individual computers 

and does not address the linking or “clustering” of many 

lower performance computers that can collectively perform 

at higher levels than current export controls allow. 

However, the act does not require an assessment of the 

cumulative effect of exports of unlicensed computers, such 

as those that can be clustered. 

The current control system is also ineffective because it 

uses millions of theoretical operations per second as the 

measure to classify and control high performance 

computers meant for export. This measure is not a valid 

means for controlling computing capabilities. 

GAO recommendations

Commerce Department 

• in consultation with other 

relevant agencies, convene a 

panel of experts to 

comprehensively assess and 

report to Congress on ways of

addressing the shortcomings of 

computer export controls. 

Defense Department 

• determine what

countermeasures are 

necessary, if any, to respond to 

enhancements of the military or 

proliferation capabilities of 

countries of concern derived 

from both licensed and 

unlicensed high performance 

computing. 

Action taken

The Commerce Department 

has implemented our 

recommendation. 

The Defense Department has 

not implemented our 

recommendation. 

Export Controls: State and Commerce Department License Review Times Are Similar 

(June 1, 2001, GAO-01-528) 

Background: The U.S. defense industry and some U.S. 

and allied government officials have expressed concerns 

about the amount of time required to process export 

license applications. 

Main issues: In fiscal year 2000, State’s average review 

time for license applications was 46 days while 

Commerce’s average was 50 days. Variables identified as 

affecting application processing times include the 

commodity to be exported and the extent of interagency 

coordination. Both departments approved more than 80 

percent of license applications during fiscal year 2000. 

GAO recommendations

No recommendations. 

Action taken

Not applicable.

Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports on the DualUse Export Control System and the Status of 

Recommendations (Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 

Page 31 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports on the DualUse Export Control System and the Status of 

Recommendations (Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 

Export Controls: Regulatory Change Needed to Comply with Missile Technology Licensing Requirements 

(May 31, 2001, GAO-01-530) 

Background: Concerned about missile proliferation, the 

United States and several major trading partners in 1987 

created an international voluntary agreement, the Missile 

Technology Control Regime (MTCR), to control the spread 

of missiles and their related technologies. Congress 

passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1991 to fulfill the U.S. government’s MTCR 

commitments. This act amended the Export Administration 

Act of 1979, which regulates the export of dual-use items, 

by requiring a license for all exports of controlled dual-use 

missile technologies to all countries. The National Defense 

Authorization Act also amended the Arms Export Control 

Act, which regulates the export of military items, by 

providing the State Department the discretion to require 

licenses or provide licensing exemptions for missile 

technology exports. 

Main issues: The State Department’s regulations require 

licenses for the exports of missile technology items to all 

countries—including Canada, which is consistent with the 

National Defense Authorization Act. However, the 

Commerce Department’s export regulations are not 

consistent with the act as they do not require licenses for 

the export of controlled missile equipment and technology 

to Canada. 

 GAO recommendations

Commerce Department 

• revise the Export Administration 

Regulations to comply with the 

MTCR export licensing 

requirements contained in the

National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 1991, or 

• seek a statutory change from 

Congress to specifically permit 

MTCR items to be exempted

from licensing requirements. 

• if Commerce seeks a statutory 

change, revise the Export 

Administration Regulations to 

comply with the current statute 

until such time as a statutory 

change occurs.

Action taken

Our recommendations have not 

been implemented. However,

the Commerce Department has 

a regulatory change pending 

that, once implemented, will 

require licenses for the export 

of dual-use missile technologies 

to Canada. 

Page 32 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports on the DualUse Export Control System and the Status of 

Recommendations (Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 

Export Controls: Clarification of Jurisdiction for Missile Technology Items Needed 

(Oct. 9, 2001, GAO-02-120) 

Background: The United States has committed to work 

with other countries through the MTCR to control the 

export of missile-related items. The regime is a voluntary 

agreement among member countries to limit missile 

proliferation and consists of common export policy 

guidelines and a list of items to be controlled. In 1990, 

Congress amended existing export control statutes to 

strengthen missile-related export controls consistent with 

U.S. commitments to the regime. Under the amended 

statutes, the Commerce Department is required to place 

regime items that are dual-use on its list of controlled 

items. All other regime items are to appear on the State 

Department’s list of controlled items. 

Main issues: The Departments of Commerce and State 

have not clearly determined which department has 

jurisdiction over almost 25 percent of the items that the 

U.S. government agreed to control as part of its regime 

commitments. The lack of clarity as to which department 

has jurisdiction over some regime items may lead an 

exporter to seek a Commerce license for a militarily 

sensitive item controlled by the State. Conversely, an 

exporter could seek a State license for a Commercecontrolled item. Either way, exporters are left to decide 

which department should review their exports of missile 

items and, by default, which policy interests are to be 

considered in the license review process. 

GAO recommendations

Commerce and State Departments 

• jointly review the listing of items 

included on the MTCR list, 

determine the appropriate 

jurisdiction for those items, and 

revise their respective export 

control lists to ensure that 

proposed exports of regime 

items are subject to the 

appropriate review process. 

Action taken

The Departments of Commerce 

and State have not 

implemented our 

recommendations despite 

initially agreeing to do so. 

Export Controls: Issues to Consider in Authorizing a New Export Administration Act 

(Feb. 28, 2002, GAO-02-468T) 

Background: The U.S. government’s policy regarding

exports of sensitive dual-use technologies seeks to balance 

economic, national security, and foreign policy interests. 

The Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, as amended, 

has been extended through executive orders and law. 

Under the act, the President has the authority to control 

and require licenses for the export of dual-use items, such 

as nuclear, chemical, biological, missile, or other 

technologies that may pose a national security or foreign 

policy concern. In 2002, there were two different bills 

before the 107th Congress—H.R. 2581 and S. 149—that 

would enact a new EAA.b 

Main issues: A new EAA should take into consideration 

the increased globalization of markets and an increasing 

number of foreign competitors, rapid advances in 

technologies and products, a growing dependence by the 

U.S. military on commercially available dual-use items, and 

heightened threats from terrorism and the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction.

GAO recommendations

No recommendations. 

Action taken

Not applicable.

Page 33 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports on the DualUse Export Control System and the Status of 

Recommendations (Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 

Export Controls: Rapid Advances in China’s Semiconductor Industry Underscore Need for Fundamental U.S. Policy Review

(April 19, 2002, GAO-02-620) 

Background: Semiconductor equipment and materials are

critical components in everything from automobiles to 

weapons systems. The U.S. government controls the 

export of these dual-use items to sensitive destinations, 

such as China. Exports of semiconductor equipment and 

materials require a license from Commerce Department. 

Other departments, such as Defense and State, assist 

Commerce in reviewing license applications. The United

States is a member of the multilateral Wassenaar 

Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms 

and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. 

Main issues: Since 1986, China has narrowed the gap 

between the U.S. and Chinese semiconductor 

manufacturing technology from approximately 7 years to 

2 years or less. China’s success in acquiring manufacturing 

technology from abroad has improved its semiconductor 

manufacturing facilities for more capable weapons systems 

and advanced consumer electronics. The multilateral

Wassenaar Arrangement has not affected China’s ability to 

obtain semiconductor manufacturing equipment because 

the United States is the only member of this voluntary 

arrangement that considers China’s acquisition of 

semiconductor manufacturing equipment a cause for 

concern. Additionally, U.S. government policies and 

practices to control the export of semiconductor technology 

to China are unclear and inconsistent, leading to 

uncertainty among U.S. industry officials about the 

rationale for some licensing decisions. Furthermore, U.S. 

agencies have not done the analyses, such as assessing 

foreign availability of this technology or the cumulative 

effects of such exports on U.S. national security interests, 

necessary to justify U.S. policies and practices. 

GAO recommendations

Commerce Department 

• in consultation with the Defense 

and State Departments, 

reassess and document U.S. 

export policy on semiconductor 

manufacturing equipment and

materials to China: 

• complete the analyses 

needed to serve as a sound 

basis for an updated policy; 

• develop new export controls, if

appropriate, or alternative 

means for protecting U.S. 

security interests; and 

• communicate the results of 

these efforts to Congress and 

U.S. industry. 

Action taken

After initially disagreeing with 

our recommendations, the 

Commerce Department has 

cited our recommendations as 

the basis for increased

resources so it can conduct 

the recommended analyses. 

Page 34 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports on the DualUse Export Control System and the Status of 

Recommendations (Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 

Export Controls: More Thorough Analysis Needed to Justify Changes in High Performance Computer Controls 

(Aug. 2, 2002, GAO-02-892) 

Background: High performance computers that operate at

or above a defined performance threshold, measured in 

millions of theoretical operations per second, require a 

Commerce license for export to particular destinations. The 

President has periodically changed, on the basis of 

technological advances, the threshold above which 

licenses are required. The National Defense Authorization 

Act of 1998 requires that the President report to Congress 

the justification for changing the control threshold. The 

report must, at a minimum, (1) address the extent to which 

high performance computers with capabilities between the 

established level and the newly proposed level of 

performance are available from foreign countries, 

(2) address all potential uses of military significance to 

which high performance computers between the 

established level and the newly proposed level could be 

applied, and (3) assess the impact of such uses on U.S. 

national security interests. 

Main issues: In January 2002, the President announced

that the control threshold—above which computers 

exported to such countries as China, India, and Russia—

would increase from 85,000 to 190,000 millions of 

theoretical operations per second. The report to Congress 

justifying the changes in control thresholds for high 

performance computers was issued in December 2001 and

focused on the availability of such computers. However, the 

justification did not fully address the requirements of the 

National Defense Authorization Act of 1998. The December

2001 report did not address several key issues related to 

the decision to raise the threshold: (1) the unrestricted 

export of computers with performance capabilities between

the old and new thresholds will allow countries of concern 

to obtain computers they have had difficulty constructing on

their own, (2) the U.S. government is unable to monitor the 

end uses of many of the computers it exports, and (3) the 

multilateral process used to make earlier changes in high 

performance computer thresholds. 

GAO recommendations

No recommendations. 

Action taken

Not applicable.

Page 35 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports on the DualUse Export Control System and the Status of 

Recommendations (Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 

Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls over Transfers of Technology to Foreign Nationals Need Improvement

(Sept. 6, 2002, GAO-02-972) 

Background: To work with controlled dual-use technologies 

in the United States, foreign nationals and the firms that 

employ them must comply with U.S. export control and visa

regulations. U.S. firms may be required to obtain what is 

known as a deemed export license from the Commerce 

Department before transferring controlled technologies to 

foreign nationals in the United States. Commerce issues 

deemed export licenses after consulting with the Defense, 

Energy, and State Departments. In addition, foreign 

nationals who are employed by U.S. firms should have an 

appropriate visa classification, such as an H-1B specialized 

employment classification. H-1B visas to foreign nationals 

residing outside of the United States are issued by the State

Department, while the Immigration and Naturalization 

Servicec

 approves requests from foreign nationals in the 

United States to change their immigration status to H-1B. 

Main Issues: In fiscal year 2001, Commerce approved 

822 deemed export license applications and rejected 3. 

Most of the approved deemed export licenses allowed 

foreign nationals from countries of concern to work with 

advanced computer, electronic, or telecommunication and 

information security technologies in the United States. To

better direct its efforts to detect possible unlicensed deemed

exports, in fiscal year 2001 Commerce screened thousands 

of applications for H-1B and other types of visas submitted 

by foreign nationals overseas. From these applications, it 

developed 160 potential cases for follow-up by enforcement

staff in the field. However, Commerce did not screen 

thousands of H-1B change-of-status applications submitted 

domestically to the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

for foreign nationals already in the United States. In addition, 

Commerce could not readily track the disposition of the 

160 cases referred to field offices for follow-up because it 

lacks a system for doing so. 

Commerce attaches security conditions to almost all 

licenses to mitigate the risk of providing foreign nationals 

with controlled dual-use technologies. However, according 

to senior Commerce officials, their staff do not regularly visit 

firms to determine whether these conditions are being 

implemented because of competing priorities, resource 

constraints, and inherent difficulties in enforcing several 

conditions. 

GAO recommendation

Commerce Department 

• use available Immigration and 

Naturalization Service data to 

identify foreign nationals 

potentially subject to deemed 

export licensing requirements. 

• establish, with the Defense, 

Energy, and State Departments, 

a risk-based program to monitor 

compliance with deemed export 

license conditions. If the 

departments conclude that 

certain security conditions are 

impractical to enforce, they 

should jointly develop conditions 

or alternatives to ensure that 

deemed exports do not place 

U.S. national security interests at 

risk. 

Action taken

Our recommendations have 

been implemented. 

Page 36 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports on the DualUse Export Control System and the Status of 

Recommendations (Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 

Export Controls: Processes for Determining Proper Control of Defense-Related Items Need Improvement 

(Sept. 20, 2002, GAO-02-996) 

Background: Companies seeking to export defense-related

items are responsible for determining whether those items 

are regulated by the Commerce Department or the State 

Department and what the applicable export requirements 

are. If in doubt about whether an item is Commerce or Statecontrolled or when requesting a change in jurisdiction, an 

exporter may request a commodity jurisdiction determination 

from State. State, which consults with Commerce and 

Defense, is the only department authorized to change export 

control jurisdiction. If an exporter knows an item is 

Commerce-controlled but is uncertain of the export 

requirements, the exporter can request a commodity 

classification from Commerce. Commerce may refer 

classification requests to State and Defense to confirm that 

an item is Commerce-controlled. 

Main issues: The Commerce Department has improperly

classified some State-controlled items as Commercecontrolled because it rarely obtains input from Defense and

State before making commodity classification

determinations. As a result, the U.S. government faces an 

increased risk that defense items will be exported without 

the proper level of government review and control to protect 

national interests. Also, Commerce has not adhered to 

regulatory time frames for processing classification requests.

In its implementation of the commodity jurisdiction process, 

the State Department has not adhered to established time 

frames, which may discourage companies from requesting 

jurisdiction determinations. State has also been unable to 

issue determinations for some items because of interagency 

disputes occurring outside the process. 

GAO recommendations

Commerce Department 

• promptly review existing 

guidance and develop criteria

with concurrence from the State 

and Defense Departments for 

referring commodity classification 

requests to those departments. 

• work with State to develop 

procedures for referring requests 

that are returned to companies 

because the items are controlled 

by State or because they require

a commodity jurisdiction review. 

Commerce, Defense and 

State Departments 

• revise interagency guidance to 

incorporate any changes to the 

referral process and time frames 

for making decisions. 

• assess the resources needed to 

make jurisdiction 

recommendations and 

determinations within established 

time frames and reallocate them 

as appropriate. 

Action taken

With a limited exception, our 

recommendations have not 

been implemented. In 

responding to our report, the 

State Department indicated it 

partially agreed with our 

recommendations, while the 

Departments of Commerce 

and Defense agreed to 

implement our 

recommendations. 

• Commerce and Defense 

have added staff to assist 

with their respective 

processes. 

Page 37 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports on the DualUse Export Control System and the Status of 

Recommendations (Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 

Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes 

(Oct. 25, 2002, GAO-03-43) 

Background: Multilateral export control regimes are a key 

policy instrument in the overall U.S. strategy to combat the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They are 

consensus-based, voluntary arrangements of supplier 

countries that produce technologies useful in developing 

weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. The

regimes aim to restrict trade in these technologies to prevent 

proliferation. The four principal regimes are the Australia 

Group, which controls chemical and biological weapons 

proliferation; the MTCR; the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and 

the Wassenaar Arrangement, which controls conventional 

weapons and dual-use items and technologies. All four 

regimes expect members to report denials of export licenses

for controlled dual-use items, which provides members with 

more complete information for reviewing questionable export 

license applications. The United States is a member of all 

four regimes. 

Main issues: Weaknesses impede the ability of the 

multilateral export control regimes to achieve their 

nonproliferation goals. Regimes often lack even basic 

information that would allow them to assess whether their 

actions are having their intended results. The regimes 

cannot effectively limit or monitor efforts by countries of 

concern to acquire sensitive technology without more 

complete and timely reporting of licensing information and 

without information on when and how members adopt and 

implement agreed-upon export controls. For example, GAO

confirmed that the U.S. government had not reported its 

denial of 27 export licenses between 1996 and 2002 for 

items controlled by the Australia Group. Several obstacles 

limit the options available to the U.S. government in 

strengthening the effectiveness of multilateral export control 

regimes. The requirement to achieve consensus in each 

regime allows even one member to block action in adopting 

needed reforms. Because the regimes are voluntary in 

nature, they cannot enforce members’ compliance with

regime commitments. For example, Russia exported nuclear

fuel to India in a clear violation of its commitments under the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group, threatening the viability of this 

regime. The regimes have adapted to changing threats in 

the past. Their continued ability to do so will determine

whether they remain viable in curbing proliferation in the 

future. 

GAO recommendations

State Department 

• as the U.S. government’s 

representative to the multilateral 

regimes, establish a strategy to 

strengthen these regimes. This 

strategy should include ways for 

regime members to 

• improve information-sharing, 

• implement regime changes to

their export controls more 

consistently, and 

• identify organizational 

changes that could help 

reform regime activities. 

• ensure that the United States 

reports all license application 

denials to regimes. 

• establish criteria to assess the

effectiveness of the regimes. 

Action taken

The State Department has not 

implemented our 

recommendations. 

Page 38 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports on the DualUse Export Control System and the Status of 

Recommendations (Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 

Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicles 

(Jan. 23, 2004, GAO-04-175) 

Background: Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAV) pose a growing threat to U.S. national security 

interests as accurate, inexpensive delivery systems for 

conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. Exports of 

cruise missiles and military UAVs by U.S. companies are 

licensed by the State Department while government-togovernment sales are administered by the Defense 

Department. Exports of dual-use technologies related to 

cruise missiles and UAVs are licensed by the Commerce 

Department. 

Main issues: U.S. export control officials find it increasingly 

difficult to limit or track dual-use items with cruise missile or

UAV-related capabilities that can be exported without a 

license. A gap in dual-use export control authority enables 

U.S. companies to export certain dual-use items to 

recipients that are not associated with missile projects or 

countries listed in the regulations, even if the exporter knows 

the items might be used to develop cruise missiles or UAVs.

The gap results from current “catch-all” regulations that 

restrict the sale of unlisted dual-use items to certain national 

missile proliferation projects or countries of concern, but not

to nonstate actors such as certain terrorist organizations or 

individuals. Catch-all controls authorize the government to 

require an export license for items that are not on control 

lists but are known or suspected of being intended for use in

a missile or weapons of mass destruction program. 

The Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State have 

seldom used their end use monitoring programs to verify 

compliance with conditions placed on the use of cruise 

missile, UAV, or related technology exports. For example, 

Commerce conducted visits to assess the end use of items 

for about 1 percent of the 2,490 missile-related licenses 

issued between fiscal years 1998 and 2002. Thus, the U.S. 

government cannot be confident that recipients are 

effectively safeguarding equipment in ways that protect U.S. 

national security and nonproliferation interests. 

GAO recommendations

Commerce Department 

• assess and report to the 

Committee on Government 

Reform on the adequacy of the 

Export Administration 

Regulations’ catch-all provision 

to address missile proliferation

by nonstate actors. This 

assessment should indicate 

ways the provision should be 

modified. 

Commerce, Defense and 

State Departments 

• as a first step, each department 

complete a comprehensive 

assessment of cruise missile, 

UAV, and related dual-use 

technology transfers to 

determine whether U.S. 

exporters and foreign end users 

are complying with the 

conditions on the transfers. 

• as part of the assessment, each 

department conduct additional 

postshipment verification visits

on a sample of cruise missile 

and UAV licenses. 

Action taken

The Commerce Department 

has addressed our 

recommendation by revising its 

licensing requirement for 

missile technology exports. 

While the Commerce 

Department has taken some 

actions to address our 

recommendations, the others

departments have not done so.

Page 39 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix II: Prior GAO Reports on the DualUse Export Control System and the Status of 

Recommendations (Fiscal Years 2001-2004) 

Export Controls: Post-Shipment Verification Provides Limited Assurance that Dual-Use Items Are Being Properly Used 

(Jan. 12, 2004, GAO-04-357) 

Background: The Commerce Department conducts postshipment verification (PSV) checks to ensure that dual-use

items arrive at their intended destination and are used for 

the purposes stated in the export license. To conduct PSV 

checks, Commerce personnel visit foreign companies to 

verify the use and location of exported items. PSVs serve as

one of the primary means of checking whether end users 

are complying with conditions imposed by the license. 

Commerce placed conditions on nearly all approved

licenses for exports to countries of concern for fiscal years 

2000 to 2002. 

Main issues: In fiscal years 2000 to 2002, the Commerce 

Department approved 7,680 licenses for dual-use exports to 

countries of concern, such as China, India, and Russia. 

However, we found that during this time Commerce 

completed PSV checks on only 428 of the dual-use licenses 

it approved for countries of concern. 

We identified three key weaknesses in the PSV process that 

reduce its effectiveness. First, PSVs do not confirm 

compliance with license conditions because U.S. officials 

often lack the technical training needed to assess 

compliance and end users may not be aware of the license

conditions by which they are to abide. Second, some 

countries of concern, most notably China, limit the U.S. 

government’s access to facilities where dual-use items are 

shipped, making it difficult to conduct a PSV. Third, PSV 

results have only a limited impact on future licensing 

decisions. Companies receiving an unfavorable PSV may 

receive greater scrutiny in future license applications, but 

licenses for dual-use exports to these companies can still be 

approved. In addition, according to Commerce officials, past 

PSV results play only a minor role in future enforcement 

actions. 

GAO recommendations

Commerce Department 

• improve technical training for 

personnel conducting PSV 

checks to ensure they are able

to verify compliance with license 

conditions. 

• ensure that personnel 

conducting PSV checks assess 

compliance with license 

conditions. 

• require that the exporter inform 

the end user in writing of the 

license conditions. 

Action taken

Our recommendations have 

been implemented. 

Source: GAO analysis of prior work. 

a

Pub. L. No. 105-85, §1211, 111 Stat. 1932-34 (1997). 

b Neither H.R. 2581 nor S. 149 was enacted. 

c

Functions performed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service are now divided between U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, both of which 

are within the Department of Homeland Security. 

Page 40 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Commerce 

Department of Commerce 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Page 41 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

Page 42 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

Page 43 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 5. 

See comment 6. 

Page 44 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 45 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 7. 

See comment 8. 

Page 46 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 9. 

See comment 10. 

See comment 11. 

Page 47 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 12. 

See comment 13. 

Page 48 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 14. 

See comment 15. 

Page 49 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 16. 

See comment 17. 

See comment 18. 

Page 50 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 19. 

See comment 20. 

See comment 21. 

See comment 22. 

Page 51 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 23. 

See comment 24. 

See comment 25. 

See comment 26. 

See comment 27. 

See comment 28. 

Page 52 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 29. 

Page 53 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 54 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 55 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 56 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 57 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 58 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 59 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 30. 

See comment 31. 

Page 60 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 32. 

Page 61 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 62 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

See comment 33. 

See comment 34. 

Page 63 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 64 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 65 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 66 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

1. The scope of our review has remained unchanged. We examined BIS’s 

dual-use export control system and whether changes were made to the 

system by focusing on three specific issues related to how well the 

system is operating in the post-September 2001 environment. 

GAO Comments 

2. Our report is not premised on a need for BIS to develop a national 

security strategy, which is outside of BIS’s mission. BIS’s stated goal is 

the protection of national security and economic interests. In its 

comments, BIS appears to define “national security interests” in terms 

of the administration’s National Security Strategy, but BIS has not 

developed performance measures to evaluate or determine whether the 

dual-use export control system is supporting and furthering that 

strategy. Commerce’s comments also do not address what effects the 

dual-use export control system has had on U.S. economic interests. 

3. The eight specific measures cited in our report are not “samples” of 

steps taken by BIS. Rather, they represent all of the changes identified 

by BIS officials as a result of their ad hoc review to determine what 

changes, if any, should be made to the system after the September 2001 

terror attacks. 

4. Our report accurately depicts what BIS officials told us regarding the ad 

hoc review they conducted in the aftermath of the 2001 terror attacks. 

Given that BIS officials did not document their review, we can neither 

confirm what the review consisted of nor determine the sufficiency of 

this review and the resulting changes. 

5. Our report acknowledges that BIS made adjustments to its enforcement 

efforts in response to the changing security environment. Also, GAO is 

currently conducting a separate review of export control enforcement 

efforts. 

6. Our report identifies the specific changes BIS officials stated were the 

result of their post-September 2001 ad hoc review and acknowledges 

that BIS has reprioritized its enforcement efforts and taken other 

actions as a result of various geopolitical changes. However, without 

performance measures and systematic evaluations, BIS is not in a 

position to readily identify weaknesses in the dual-use export control 

system, implement corrective measures, and determine whether those 

measures are having the intended effects of protecting U.S. national 

security and economic interests. 

7. Commerce’s characterization of BIS’s annual foreign policy report is 

misleading. BIS’s annual report summarizes export control changes and

describes what those changes were intended to achieve. BIS’s report 

Page 67 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

does not contain an assessment of the actual impact foreign policybased controls have had on U.S. interests. 

8. Our report acknowledges that there have been over 100 amendments to 

the EAR since September 2001. However, based on our review of those 

amendments, the specific basis for many of these revisions is not clear 

and given BIS’s lack of evaluations, the impact of these revisions is 

unknown. Also, it should be noted that many of the regulatory 

amendments made since September 2001 consisted of administrative 

changes and technical corrections as opposed to revisions of export 

requirements for dual-use items. 

9. The quotes from senior BIS officials’ speeches do not address whether 

the dual-use export control system is protecting U.S. interests nor do 

they provide other evidence that BIS has developed performance 

measures or conducted systematic evaluations. While these speeches 

outline BIS’s mission and the role of export controls, the lack of

performance measures and systematic evaluations precludes a 

determination as to whether that mission and role are being 

successfully fulfilled. It is also unclear how changing the bureau’s name 

is an example of a successful adaptation to the current environment. 

Further, the increased scrutiny of license applications was not the 

result of BIS’s actions as one of the quotes implies. As discussed in our 

report, increases in the referral of license applications resulted from 

decisions by other agencies involved in the application review process. 

10. Absent any documentation to the contrary, particularly when BIS 

officials repeatedly acknowledged that BIS had not undertaken 

systematic evaluations, we stand by our finding that BIS has not 

systematically evaluated the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the

dual-use export control system. Regarding BIS’s ad hoc post-September 

2001 review, we could not assess the validity and sufficiency of the 

review and resulting changes due to the lack of documentation. 

11. Commerce’s description of BIS’s Game Plan is misleading and 

inaccurate. First, BIS’s mission and priorities as summarized in the 

Game Plan are not consistent with the mission and goals stated in 

Commerce’s official performance management documents, such as the 

annual performance plan. The Game Plan may represent BIS’s thoughts 

for how to align activities and priorities in the future, but it does not 

depict what has been in place since the September 2001 terror attacks. 

Second, the Game Plan does not contain measures of effectiveness. 

When we discussed the Game Plan with BIS officials, they

acknowledged that they had not developed measures for evaluating 

Page 68 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

how well the dual-use export control system is protecting national 

security and economic interests. 

12. We agree that the development of measures for determining the 

effectiveness of the dual-use export system would be difficult. 

However, BIS’s existing performance measures, which focus on 

processing times, fall far short of government management standards 

since they do not provide a basis for determining whether the system is 

protecting U.S. interests. 

13. Our report presents BIS’s position that it was unable to obtain

assistance from other agencies to develop performance measures for 

assessing the dual-use export control system’s effects on national 

security and economic interests. The two examples of performance 

measures provided in Commerce’s comments do not relate to BIS’s 

administration of the export controls system, which was the focus of 

our review, but rather to BIS’s export enforcement efforts and 

assistance to other countries. Also, it is not clear how these two 

measures would provide BIS with a basis for determining the security 

and economic impact of its controls on dual-use exports. Additionally, 

Commerce’s statement that BIS is assigning staff to develop a

methodology for evaluating the system’s effectiveness indicates that 

BIS does not yet have a systematic evaluation process in place. 

14. Our report discusses that, in the absence of systematic evaluations, BIS 

officials obtain information from industry to gauge how the dual-use 

export control system is operating. However, the collection of data 

from industry does not constitute a measure or evaluation of how the 

dual-use export control system is affecting U.S. economic interests. 

Also, BIS officials repeatedly informed us that they do not have

measures for determining the impact of dual-use export controls on 

economic interests. 

15. The Office of Management and Budget determined in its 2005 review 

that BIS lacked measures related to the fundamental purpose of the 

dual-use export controls system. Given this and our evaluation as well 

as BIS’s limited measures of efficiency and lack of comprehensive 

analyses as to which items under its control have actually been 

exported, BIS is not meeting government performance management 

standards and, therefore, does not represent the gold standard. 

16. We examined the completeness of the watchlist and the thoroughness 

of BIS’s watchlist screening process and found omissions in the list and 

weaknesses in the process. Our intent was not to determine whether 

licenses were approved for parties not on the watchlist. As our report 

Page 69 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

explains, a match between an application and the watchlist does not 

necessarily mean that the application will be denied but that the 

application will be more closely scrutinized during the license 

application review process. 

17. Our report places BIS’s watchlist in the context of the larger license 

application review process. A process built on multiple layers and 

multiple agencies is only as strong as its weakest link. Other agencies 

that participate in the license application review process expect BIS to 

thoroughly screen all parties on all applications against the watchlist 

before referring applications to them. Given the omissions we identified 

in the watchlist and the weakness in the screening process, BIS’s 

watchlist is not serving its intended purpose of helping identify those 

license applications that warrant additional scrutiny. 

We identified many of the 147 parties not on the watchlist by using the 

lists cited in Commerce’s comments. While BIS expects exporters to 

check these publicly available lists, we found that BIS failed to include 

all of the publicly-listed parties on its watchlist. It is reasonable that BIS 

would focus its licensing and enforcement efforts on the “truly bad 

actors.” However, given that the watchlist is supposed to help BIS 

identify parties of export control concern, BIS’s ability to focus on “bad 

actors” is undermined by the omissions we identified in the watchlist. 

18. The 147 parties we identified should not be regarded as an exhaustive 

list of every party of export control concern that should be on BIS’s 

watchlist. Our intent was not to identify all parties but rather to 

evaluate the process that BIS uses to determine which parties should be 

on the list. Therefore, the 147 parties represent examples that illustrate 

weaknesses in BIS’s management of the watchlist. However, to provide 

additional context, we revised the text to include the number of names 

on the BIS watchlist. 

19. The measures listed in Commerce’s comments do not address the 

underlying weaknesses we identified or our corrective 

recommendations. 

20. Our report accurately reflects that several, but not all, of GAO’s prior 

recommendations regarding the dual-use export control system have 

been implemented. BIS’s disagreement with the conclusions of GAO’s 

report on China’s semiconductor industry does not change the fact that 

BIS continues to cite that report and its recommendations as 

justification for requested increases in resources. However, BIS has not 

implemented the report’s recommendations. 

Page 70 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

The continued failure to address GAO’s recommendations regarding the 

commodity classification process and export control jurisdiction places 

BIS’s mission of protecting national security and economic interests at 

risk. Improper decisions regarding jurisdiction and the lack of clear 

jurisdiction create the risk that defense-related items will be exported 

without the proper level of government review and control to protect 

national interests. These weaknesses can also result in companies 

seeking to export similar items under the different controls of the 

Departments of State and Commerce, which places some companies at 

a competitive disadvantage. 

21. As discussed in our report’s scope and methodology, we reviewed BIS’s 

documents, such as its performance plans, that contain BIS’s official 

performance measures. None of these documents contains 

performance measures related to the processing of commodity 

classifications. During meetings with BIS officials, they did not identify 

additional measures for evaluating the system’s effectiveness. Also, 

Commerce’s comment is misleading, as our report does not cite BIS 

statistics on commodity classifications. Our report contains GAO’s 

analyses of BIS’s data on commodity classification processing times 

and shows that BIS has exceeded regulatory processing time frames. 

22. We are not revising the graphic because it depicts what can occur in the 

license application review process under different circumstances. 

23. Text revised to further clarify the CIA’s role in the license application 

review process. 

24. The examples provided by Commerce are limited to BIS’s analyses of 

licensing data. However, BIS has not comprehensively analyzed data on 

actual exports, particularly on unlicensed exports that represent the 

majority of exports subject to BIS’s control. 

25. Our report states that Executive Order 12981 provides time frames for 

the entire license application review process. However, none of BIS’s 

performance measures addresses the timeliness of the entire process. 

Also, BIS has not reported overall timeframes consistently in its annual 

reports. 

26. Our draft report cited changes in BIS’s licensing policy for dual-use 

exports to Iraq as an illustrative example; however, we have revised our 

report to include the other countries listed in Commerce’s comments. 

27. Despite Commerce’s comment regarding its sources, some of the 147 

parties we identified as not being on the watchlist appear on publicly 

Page 71 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

available documents from the State Department’s Directorate of 

Defense Trade Controls and the Homeland Security Department’s 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

28. We are not revising the text based on Commerce’s comment because 

our report accurately reflects how the Treasury Department 

characterizes the list it maintains on individuals and companies. 

29. Despite Commerce’s comment that it adds individuals to its watchlist, 

we identified many individuals who were not on the list but should have 

been. 

30. Our report explains that BIS has a regulatory change pending that once 

implemented will address this recommendation from 2001. 

31. Commerce’s actions regarding production equipment for missile 

technology items do not resolve the lack of clear jurisdiction between 

State and Commerce as to which department controls the export of 

almost 25 percent of the missile technology items the U.S. government 

agreed to control as part of its commitments to the Missile Technology 

Control Regime. As a result, GAO’s recommendations regarding this 

matter remain unimplemented. 

32. See comment 20. 

33. The memorandum contained in Commerce’s comments does not 

address GAO’s recommendations that BIS develop criteria, with the 

concurrence of the State and Defense Departments, for the referral of 

commodity classification requests and develop procedures for referring 

other commodity classification requests to the State Department. As a 

result, GAO’s recommendations regarding this matter remain 

unimplemented. 

34. We revised the report text to more clearly reflect BIS’s actions. 

Page 72 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 73 GAO-06-638

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Ann Calvaresi-Barr (202) 512-4841 or calvaresibarra@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Anne-Marie Lasowski, Assistant 

Director; Johana R. Ayers; Lily Chin; Arthur James, Jr.; Megan Masengale;

Margaret B. McDavid; Bradley Terry; Karen Thornton; and Joseph Zamoyta 

made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contacts 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Export Controls
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Defense Trade: Arms Export Control Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies 

in the Post-9/11 Security Environment. GAO-05-468R. Washington, D.C.: 

April 7, 2005. 

Defense Trade: Arms Export Control System in the Post9/11Environment. GAO-05-234. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2005. 

Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology 

Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175. 

Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2004. 

Export Controls: Post-Shipment Verification Provides Limited 

Assurance That Dual-Use Items Are Being Properly Used. GAO-04-357. 

Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2004. 

Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export 

Control Regimes. GAO-03-43. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2002. 

Export Controls: Processes for Determining Proper Control of DefenseRelated Items Need Improvement. GAO-02-996. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2002. 

Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls over Transfers of

Technology to Foreign Nationals Need Improvement. GAO-02-972. 

Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002. 

Export Controls: More Thorough Analysis Needed to Justify Changes in 

High Performance Computer Controls. GAO-02-892. Washington, D.C.: 

August 2, 2002. 

Export Controls: Rapid Advances in China’s Semiconductor Industry 

Underscore Need for Fundamental U.S. Policy Review. GAO-02-620. 

Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2002. 

Export Controls: Issues to Consider in Authorizing a New Export 

Administration Act. GAO-02-468T. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2002.

Export Controls: Clarification of Jurisdiction for Missile Technology 

Items Needed. GAO-02-120. Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2001.

Export Controls: State and Commerce Department License Review 

Times Are Similar. GAO-01-528. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2001. 

Page 74 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
Related GAO Products 

Export Controls: Regulatory Change Needed to Comply with Missile 

Technology Licensing Requirements. GAO-01-530. Washington, D.C.: 

May 31, 2001. 

Export Controls: Inadequate Justification for Relaxation of Computer 

Controls Demonstrates Need for Comprehensive Study. GAO-01-534T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2001. 

Export Controls: System for Controlling Exports of High Performance 

Computing Is Ineffective. GAO-01-10. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 

2000. 

Export Controls: Statutory Reporting Requirements for Computers Not

Fully Addressed. NSIAD-00-45. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 1999. 

Export Controls: Better Interagency Coordination Needed on Satellite 

Exports. NSIAD-99-182. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 1999. 

Export Controls: Change in Licensing Jurisdiction for Commercial 

Communications Satellites. T-NSIAD-98-222. Washington, D.C.: 

September 17, 1998 

Export Controls: National Security Issues and Foreign Availability for 

High Performance Computer Exports. NSIAD-98-200. Washington, D.C.: 

September 16, 1998. 

Export Controls: Issues Related to Commercial Communications 

Satellites. T-NSIAD-98-208. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 1998. 

China: Military Imports From the United States and the European 

Union Since the 1989 Embargoes. NSIAD-98-176. Washington, D.C.: 

June 16, 1998. 

Export Controls: Change in Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two 

Sensitive Dual-Use Items. NSIAD-97-24. Washington, D.C.: January 14,

1997. 

Export Controls: Sensitive Machine Tool Exports to China. NSIAD-97-4. 

Washington, D.C.: November 19, 1996. 

Export Controls: Sale of Telecommunications Equipment to China.

NSIAD-97-5. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1996. 

(120475) 

Page 75 GAO-06-638 Export Controls
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