a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

June 2006 ELECTIONS

The Nation’s Evolving 

Election System as 

Reflected in the 

November 2004 

General Election

GAO-06-450
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2006

ELECTIONS

The Nation’s Evolving Election System as 

Reflected in the November 2004 General 

Election 

Highlights of GAO-06-450, a report to 

congressional committees 

The 2004 general election was the

first presidential election that

tested substantial changes states

made to their election systems 

since the 2000 election, including

some changes required by the Help 

America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). 

HAVA required some major 

changes in the nation’s elections 

processes, not all of which had to 

be implemented by the November 

2004 election. HAVA addressed 

issues of people, processes, and 

technology, all of which must be

effectively integrated to ensure 

effective election operations. GAO 

initiated a review under the 

authority of the Comptroller 

General to examine an array of

election issues of broad interest to

Congress. For each major stage of 

the election process, this report 

discusses (1) changes to election

systems since the 2000 election, 

including steps taken to implement 

HAVA, and (2) challenges 

encountered in the 2004 election. 

For this report, GAO sent a survey

to the 50 states and the District of

Columbia (all responded) and 

mailed a questionnaire to a

nationwide sample of 788 local 

election jurisdictions about

election administration activities

(80 percent responded). To obtain 

more detailed information about 

experiences for the 2004 election, 

GAO also visited 28 local

jurisdictions in 14 states, chosen to 

represent a range of election

system characteristics. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any 

recommendations at this time. 

In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local

jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the election system, but it is 

too soon to determine the full effect of those changes. For example, 41 states 

obtained waivers permitted under HAVA until January 1, 2006, to implement 

a requirement for statewide voter registration lists. States also had discretion 

in how they implemented HAVA requirements, such as the identification 

requirements for first-time mail registrants. Some local election jurisdictions 

described different identification procedures for first-time mail registrants 

who registered through voter registration drives. Although states differed 

regarding where voters who cast provisional ballots for federal office must 

cast those ballots in order for their votes to be counted, provisional voting 

has helped to facilitate voter participation. HAVA also created the Election 

Assistance Commission, which has issued best practice guides and voluntary 

voting system standards and distributed federal funds to states for improving 

election administration, including purchasing new voting equipment. The 

results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that larger

jurisdictions may be replacing older equipment with technology-based voting 

methods to a greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use 

paper ballots extensively and are the majority of jurisdictions. As the 

elections technology environment evolves, voting system performance 

management, security, and testing will continue to be important to ensuring 

the integrity of the overall elections process.

GAO found that states made changes—either as a result of HAVA or on their 

own—to address some of the challenges identified in the November 2000

election. GAO also found that some challenges continued—such as problems 

receiving voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies, 

addressing voter error issues with absentee voting, recruiting and training a 

sufficient number of poll workers, and continuing to ensure accurate vote 

counting. At the same time, new challenges arose in the November 2004 

election, such as fraudulent, incomplete, or inaccurate applications received 

through voter registration drives; larger than expected early voter turnout, 

resulting in long lines; and counting large numbers of absentee ballots and 

determining the eligibility of provisional voters in time to meet final vote

certification deadlines. 

The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, Process, and Technology

Voter

registration

Conducting 

elections

Vote

counting 

and

certification

Absentee 

and 

early voting

Voting with 

provisional 

ballots

People

Process

Technology

Source: GAO.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-450.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-451SP.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-452SP. 

To view the full product or the related 

surveys, click on the links above. 

For more information, contact William O.

Jenkins, Jr., at (202) 512-8777 or

JenkinsWO@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-450 Elections

Contents

Transmittal Letter 1

Executive Summary 3

Purpose 3

Background 4

Results in Brief 5

Principal Findings 12

Concluding Observations 31

Chapter 1

Introduction

33

Election Authority 34

Election System Elements 40

Scope and Methodology 45

Chapter 2

Voter Registration

47

Overview 48

Changes Required by HAVA Subsequent to the 2000 General 

Election 50

Processing Registration Applications Received from MVAs and 

Other NVRA Entities Remained a Challenge 77

Jurisdictions Encountered New Challenges Processing the Large 

Volume of Voter Registration Applications for the November 

2004 General Election 81

Concluding Observations 96

Chapter 3

Absentee and Early 

Voting

99

Overview 100

Absentee Voting 102

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting 127

Early Voting 133

Concluding Observations 145

Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

148

Overview 148

HAVA Made Changes Intended to Improve Election 

Administration 149

Some States Reported Changing Identification Requirements for 

All Prospective Voters 166
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-450 Elections

Recruiting a Sufficient Number of Skilled, Reliable Poll 

Workers Continued to Be a Challenge for Large and Medium 

Jurisdictions 170

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported on 

Challenges Training Poll Workers 182

Poll Worker Performance Problems in Some Large and Medium 

Jurisdictions 186

Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Met Standards Continued 

to Be a Challenge for Some Jurisdictions 190

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported That 

Designing Clear Ballots Continued to Be a Challenge 199

Preparing Ballots or Voting Equipment Not a Problem Reported by 

Most Jurisdictions, but These Activities Can Be a Challenge for 

Some Jurisdictions 202

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported 

Experiencing Long Lines on Election Day, while Officials in 

Other Jurisdictions Did Not 206

Overloaded Phones on Election Day Posed Problems for Some 

Large and Medium Jurisdictions 207

Election Officials in Some Jurisdictions We Visited Reported 

That Third-Party Observers Were a Challenge on Election 

Day 2004 209

Concluding Observations 211

Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

213

Overview 214

Events in the November 2000 Election Preceded the HAVA 

Requirement for Provisional Ballots 215

State and Local Jurisdictions Varied in Their Implementation for 

Providing Provisional Ballots for the November 2004 Election 218

State and Local Jurisdictions Reported Variation in Several Areas 

Affecting whether Provisional Ballots Are Counted 234

A Number of Factors Contribute to Difficulties in Estimating and 

Comparing Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted 242

Concluding Observations 248

Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

249

Overview 249

In the 2004 General Election the Vote-Counting Process Remained 

Complex and Marked by Local Diversity 250
Contents

Page iii GAO-06-450 Elections

For the 2004 General Election, More States Had Requirements or 

Guidance for Determining Voter Intent 259

Recounts and Contested Elections Remained Uncommon for the 

November 2004 General Election 264

Several States Had Further Developed Their Specifications for an 

Election Recount since the 2000 General Election 267

Vote Count Audits Were Not Prevalent in the 2004 General Election, 

but Some States Reported Taking Action to Require Them 270

Local Jurisdictions Reported Some Mistakes and Technical 

Challenges in Counting Votes for the 2004 General Election 273

In the 2004 General Election, Some Election Jurisdictions 

Reported Difficulty Meeting Deadlines for Certifying the 

Final Vote Count 276

The Recount in Washington State Revealed the Intricacies of the 

Election Process, but Also Yielded Many State Reforms 277

Concluding Observations 283

Chapter 7

Voting Methods and 

Technologies

286

Overview 287

Voting Methods Vary among Jurisdictions and Are Being 

Influenced by States’ Choices and HAVA 291

Voting Equipment Performance Was Not Consistently Measured 

during the 2004 General Election, but Estimated Levels of 

Performance Satisfaction Were High 311

Attention to Voting System Security Management Continues 

to Vary amid Published Concerns and Federal Improvement 

Efforts 328

Certain Types of Tests and Evaluations Were Widely Performed on 

Voting Systems, while Others Were Less Common 350

Information on Jurisdictions’ Election Technology Integration Is 

Limited, but Current and Emerging Technologies Offer Greater 

Opportunities 363

Concluding Observations 375

Appendixes

Appendix I: Related GAO Products 378

Appendix II: 2005 Survey of State Election Officials 380

Appendix III: 2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions 420

Appendix IV: Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions GAO Visited 468
Contents

Page iv GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix V: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 485

Appendix VI: Voter Registration Deadlines for States and the District 

of Columbia 497

Appendix VII: Characteristics of Early Voting Jurisdictions Visited 499

Appendix VIII: Selected State Statutory Requirements for Absentee 

Voting 501

Appendix IX: State Provisions for Accessibility of Polling Places and 

Alternative Voting Methods 505

Appendix X: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements 

for Local Jurisdictions to Use Federal Standards for Voting 

Systems 508

Appendix XI: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments 510

Glossary 511

Tables Table 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions That Removed 

Names from Voter Registration List for 2004 General 

Election for Various Reasons 59

Table 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Engaged 

in Various Quality Assurance Activities when Entering 

Completed Voter-Registration Applications 88

Table 3: Options Allowed by States for Requesting and Returning 

Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General 

Election 106

Table 4: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Voter Error Problems 

in Processing Absentee Ballot Applications, November 

2004 General Election 120

Table 5: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods When 

Absentee Ballot Applications Could Not Be Processed, 

November 2004 General Election 121

Table 6: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Problems in 

Processing Submitted Absentee Ballots, November 2004 

General Election 122
Contents

Page v GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 7: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods when 

Absentee Ballots Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 

General Election 123

Table 8: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 

Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Voters Did Not Vote 

More than Once, November 2004 General Election 125

Table 9: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 

Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Absentee Ballots Were 

Actually Completed by the Person Requesting the Ballot, 

November 2004 General Election 126

Table 10: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions, by 

Jurisdiction Size, That Encountered Specific Voter Error 

Problems on Absentee Applications That Used the Federal 

Post Card Application, November 2004 General 

Election 128

Table 11: States Reporting Differing Mail-in Absentee Ballot 

Deadlines from Inside and Outside the United States, 

November 2004 General Election 129

Table 12: Early Voting Period in 24 Early Voting States and the 

District of Columbia, November 2004 General Election 137

Table 13: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 

Various Staff Mixes at Early Voting Locations, November 

2004 General Election 141

Table 14: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 

Various Methods to Train Early Voting Staff, November 

2004 General Election 142

Table 15: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size That Provided Alternative Voting 

Methods and Accommodations for the November 2004 

General Election 159

Table 16: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size That Took Steps to Provide Voter 

Education Prior to the November 2004 General 

Election 163

Table 17: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size That Used Sources to Recruit Poll 

Workers for the November 2004 General Election 174

Table 18: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Nationwide 

That Provided Provisional, Challenge, or Other Ballots for 

the November 2004 Election under Various Scenarios 228
Contents

Page vi GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 19: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using 

Various Methods to Inform Voters of the Outcome of Their 

Provisional Ballot, November 2004 240

Table 20: Reported Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted in Selected 

Jurisdictions 246

Table 21: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Having Written 

Ballot Security Policies and Procedures, November 2004 

General Election 252

Table 22: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using 

Particular Voting Methods by Ballot Type for the November 

2004 Election 254

Table 23: States Reported Changes to Recount Provisions since 2000 

for the 2004 General Election 268

Table 24: Voting System Security Tasks and Responsibilities for the 

2004 General Election Reported by Election Officials in 

Jurisdictions Visited by GAO 333

Table 25: Security Controls Reportedly Used in the 2004 General 

Election Reported by Election Officials in Jurisdictions 

Visited by GAO 337

Table 26: Voting System Security Topics Addressed in Security Plans 

Submitted by Jurisdictions Visited by GAO 343

Table 27: Types of Testing and Evaluation for Voting Systems, with 

Common Time Frames and Responsibilities 351

Table 28: Population in Each State Group 488

Table 29: Local Election Survey Sample Allocation 491

Table 30: Local Election Jurisdiction Survey Response Rates, 

Overall and by Sample Strata 493

Table 31: Local Election Jurisdictions Visited 496

Table 32: States Reporting on November 2004 General Election 

Registration Deadlines 497

Table 33: Selected Information on Jurisdictions We Visited That Had 

Early Voting 499

Table 34: Selected State Requirements for Domestic Absentee 

Voting, November 2000 and 2004 General Elections 501

Table 35: States’ Mail-in Absentee Ballot Application and Mail-in 

Absentee Ballot Deadlines for Inside the United States, 

November 2004 General Election 503

Table 36: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling 

Places 506

Table 37: State Provisions for Alternative Voting Methods and 

Accommodations 506
Contents

Page vii GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 38: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places 

and Accommodations for Individuals with Disabilities for 

the November 2004 General Election 507

Table 39: States and the District of Columbia Reported 

Requirements for Use of Voluntary Federal Standards for 

New Voting Systems for the November 2006 General 

Election 508

Figures Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems 

Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications 

Received for the 2004 General Election 14

Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That 

Encountered Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications 

and Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General 

Election 17

Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining 

a Sufficient Number of Poll Workers for the November 

2004 General Election 21

Figure 4: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had 

to Be Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 

2004 General Election 24

Figure 5: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit 

Requirements in Place for the 2004 General Election 26

Figure 6: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using a 

Predominant Voting Method in the 2000 and 2004 General 

Elections 29

Figure 7: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, 

Process, and Technology 40

Figure 8: Many States Report Challenges Matching Voter 

Registration Information with State Records 57

Figure 9: States Reporting That They Had or Would Have as of 

January 2006, Capability for Real-Time Access to Voter 

Registration List to Enter, Update, and Query 

Information 64

Figure 10: States’ Reported Capabilities to Electronically Match 

Voter Registration Information with State Death Records 

and Felony Conviction Records 65

Figure 11: Virginia Voter Registration Form Indicating whether the 

Voter Had Registered Elsewhere 70

Figure 12: Colorado Voter Registration Form with Instructions for 

First-Time Mail Registrants 75
Contents

Page viii GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 13: Example of the Voter Registration Application Process 78

Figure 14: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems 

Entering the Number of Voter Registration Applications 

Received for 2004 General Election 82

Figure 15: Total Weekly Voter Registration Applications 

Documented by a Large Jurisdiction in 2004 83

Figure 16: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions with 

Insufficient Election Workers to Process Voter 

Registration Applications 86

Figure 17: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Had 

Names on Voter Registration Applications Appearing to 

Be Fraudulent and Volume of Fraudulent Applications 

Identified for the 2004 General Election 91

Figure 18: Mail-in Absentee Voting Process 103

Figure 19: Example of a Standard Absentee Ballot Application Form 

for the November 2004 General Election 105

Figure 20: Two Examples of Absentee Ballot Envelopes with the 

Inclusion of Affidavit Information—One with 

Certification on Inner Envelope and One with 

Certification on Outer Envelope—for the November 2004 

General Election 108

Figure 21: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That 

Encountered Problems Processing Absentee 

Applications because the Applicant Did Not Meet the 

Excuse Required by State Law, November 2004 General 

Election 111

Figure 22: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That 

Encountered Lateness with Absentee Ballot Applications 

and Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General 

Election 115

Figure 23: Example of Envelope Illustrating Official Postal Marking 

for Absentee Ballot Materials, November 2004 General 

Election 118

Figure 24: The Federal Post Card Application Used before and after 

the November 2004 General Election 131

Figure 25: Twenty-four States and the District of Columbia Reported 

Providing Early Voting as an Option in the November 2004 

General Election 135

Figure 26: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Offered 

Early Voting for Various Time Periods, November 2004 

General Election 138
Contents

Page ix GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 27: King County, Washington, Poster Used to Inform 

Prospective Voters of New Identification 

Requirements 153

Figure 28: Examples of Voter Information Signs Posted at Polling 

Places for the November 2004 General Election 161

Figure 29: Efforts to Inform Voters Prior to the November 2004 

General Election 165

Figure 30: States’ Reported Identification Requirements for 

Prospective Voters for the November 2004 General 

Election 168

Figure 31: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining 

a Sufficient Number of Poll Workers for the November 

2004 General Election 172

Figure 32: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties 

Recruiting Enough Poll Workers with Specific 

Political Party Affiliation for the November 2004 

General Election 176

Figure 33: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties 

Recruiting Poll Workers with Information Technology 

Skills or Computer Literacy for the November 2004 

General Election 178

Figure 34: Materials Used to Recruit Poll Workers in Jurisdictions 

We Visited 180

Figure 35: Reported State Requirements for Poll Worker Training for 

the November 2004 General Election 183

Figure 36: Examples of Instructions and Checklists Provided to Poll 

Workers for the November 2004 General Election 189

Figure 37: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining 

a Sufficient Number of Polling Places for the November 

2004 General Election 191

Figure 38: Town Hall in Madbury, New Hampshire 192

Figure 39: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by 

Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining 

Enough Polling Places That Were Accessible to Voters 

with Disabilities for November 2004 General Election 194

Figure 40: El Paso County, Colorado, Optical Scan Ballot 200
Contents

Page x GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 41: DRE and Optical Scan Voting Equipment That Large 

Jurisdictions Had to Prepare and Deliver Prior to Election 

Day 205

Figure 42: Provisional Ballot Envelope 222

Figure 43: Middlesex County, New Jersey, Challenged Voter 

Affidavit 227

Figure 44: Affidavit Containing Provisional Ballot Instructions for 

Poll Workers in Champaign, Illinois 233

Figure 45: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had 

to Be Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 

2004 General Election 235

Figure 46: Examples of Written Information Provided to Voters to 

Inquire whether Their Provisional Vote Was Counted 241

Figure 47: Sealed Voting Equipment Bag 251

Figure 48: Punch Card Tabulator Connected to Computer 256

Figure 49: Punch Card Voting Booth 262

Figure 50: New Hampshire Guidance for Determining Voter Intent 

on Paper Ballots 263

Figure 51: Number of States Reporting Federal and Statewide 

Recounts for the 2004 Primary or General Elections 265

Figure 52: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit 

Requirements in Place for the 2004 General Election 271

Figure 53: Examples of Voting Equipment 287

Figure 54: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using 

Predominant Voting Methods in the 2000 and 2004 

General Elections 293

Figure 55: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using 

Predominant Voting Methods in 2004, by Jurisdiction 

Size 295

Figure 56: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions with Plans to 

Acquire Particular Voting Systems before the November 

2006 General Election 297

Figure 57: State-Reported Status of Lever and Punch Card Voting 

Equipment in 2000, 2004, and 2006 299

Figure 58: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used 

Single and Multiple Voting Methods in the November 2004 

General Election 302

Figure 59: Precinct Count Optical Scan Voting Equipment 303

Figure 60: State-Reported Involvement in the Use of Specific Voting 

Methods in the 2004 and 2006 General Elections 305
Contents

Page xi GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 61: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Identifying 

Factors That Influenced Buying or Leasing Voting 

Equipment since the 2000 General Election 307

Figure 62: Federal Payments to States in Fiscal Year 2003 under 

HAVA to Replace Lever and Punch Card Voting 

Equipment 308

Figure 63: Example of DRE Instructions and Equipment 310

Figure 64: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 

Voting System Performance Information for the 2000 and 

2004 General Elections 316

Figure 65: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 

Information on Voting Accuracy for the 2004 General 

Election, by Jurisdiction Size 318

Figure 66: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 

Information on Voting Equipment Reliability for the 2004 

General Election, by Jurisdiction Size 319

Figure 67: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 

Information on Voting Equipment Failures for the 2004 

General Election, by Predominant Voting Method 321

Figure 68: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected 

Information on Voting System Efficiency for the 2004 

General Election, by Jurisdiction Size 322

Figure 69: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Satisfied with 

Voting System Performance for the 2004 General 

Election, by Jurisdiction Size 325

Figure 70: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Identified 

Security Responsibilities for the 2004 General Election, 

by Jurisdiction Size 332

Figure 71: Estimated Percentages of Jursidictions That Used 

Security Controls in the 2004 General Election, by 

Jurisdiction Size 335

Figure 72: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That 

Documented Security Policies or Procedures for Their 

Voting Systems in the 2004 General Election, by 

Jurisdiction Size 339

Figure 73: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Established 

Policies or Procedures for Electronic Transmission of 

Voted Ballots in the 2004 General Election, by 

Predominant Voting Method 341

Figure 74: State-Reported Standards Required for Voting 

Systems 346
Contents

Page xii GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 75: State-Reported Voting System Certification Requirements 

for the 2004 General Election 356

Figure 76: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Conducting 

Postelection Voting System Audits for the 2004 General 

Election, by Predominant Voting Method 362

Figure 77: Examples of Portable Memory Cards and Cartridges Used 

with Voting Equipment 365

Figure 78: Examples of Ballot Tabulation Equipment and 

Environments 366

Figure 79: Example of an Assembly for Producing a Voter-Verifiable 

Paper Audit Trail for DRE Voting Equipment 368

Figure 80: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used 

Networking or Remote Access for Voting Equipment in 

the 2004 General Election 370

Figure 81: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Automated 

Election Support for the 2004 General Election, by 

Jurisdiction Size 372

Figure 82: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions with Plans 

to Acquire Voting Equipment 374
Contents

Page xiii GAO-06-450 Elections

Abbreviations:

ADA Americans with Disabilities Act

DRE direct recording electronic

EAC Election Assistance Commission

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEC Federal Election Commission

FPCA Federal Post Card Application

FVAP Federal Voting Assistance Program

HAVA Help America Vote Act

MCD minor civil division

MVA motor vehicle agency

NASED National Association of State Election Directors

NIST National Institute for Standards and Technology

NVRA National Voter Registration Act

PKI public key infrastructure

SSA Social Security Administration

UOCAVA Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act

VVPT voter-verifiable paper trail

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-06-450 Elections

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Comptroller General A of the United States

June 6, 2006 TransmtLaileter

Congressional Committees

The November 2004 presidential election was not as close as the 2000 presidential 

election, but it still raised concerns about our election processes. Following the 2004 

general election, a number of members of Congress asked GAO to review aspects of that 

election. In response to these requests, GAO initiated a review under the authority of the 

Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress. 

This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United States and the 

November 2004 general election. Specifically, for each major stage of the election 

process—voter registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and conducting 

elections, provisional voting, and counting the votes—plus voting methods, this report 

discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to 

implement the Help America Vote Act, and (2) challenges encountered by election officials 

in the November 2004 election. 

Copies of this report are being sent to the congressional leadership and the Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Science. Copies will also be sent to 

state election officials and the election official for the District of Columbia and local 

elections jurisdictions that participated in our research and will be made available to other 

interested parties upon request. As a courtesy, we are providing other members of 

Congress a copy of the report’s highlights page and executive summary.

If you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-5500; Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security 

and Justice, at (202) 512- 8777; or William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, at (202) 512-8757. They 

can also be reached by e-mail at rabkinn@gao.gov and jenkinswo@gao.gov, respectively. 

Contacts and key contributors are listed in appendix XI. 

David M. Walker

Comptroller General

of the United States
Page 2 GAO-06-450 Elections

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Trent Lott

Chairman 

The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Rules and Administration

United States Senate

The Honorable Vernon J. Ehlers, III

Chairman

The Honorable Juanita Millender-McDonald

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on House Administration

House of Representatives

The Honorable Arlen Specter

Chairman

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.

Chairman

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

Chairman

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Tom Davis

Chairman

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives
Page 3 GAO-06-450 Elections

Executive Summary Chapte1r

Purpose Faith in the fairness and accuracy of the U.S. election system is at the 

foundation of our democracy. All eligible persons, but only eligible persons, 

should be able to cast their votes and have their validly cast votes counted 

accurately. Reports of problems encountered in the close 2000 presidential 

election with respect to voter registration lists, absentee ballots, ballot 

counting, and antiquated voting systems raised concerns about the fairness 

and accuracy of certain aspects of the U.S. election system. Subsequently, 

the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted,1

 and major 

election reforms are now being implemented. The November 2004 general 

election highlighted some of the same challenges as in 2000 as well as some 

new challenges in areas such as electronic voting technology and 

implementation of some HAVA requirements. The issues that arose in both 

elections highlighted the importance of the interaction of people, 

processes, and technology in ensuring effective election operations and 

maintaining public confidence that our election system works. 

The November 2004 general election was the first federal election that 

tested changes states have made to their systems of election administration 

since the 2000 general election and the first presidential election since the 

enactment of HAVA. HAVA includes a number of provisions related to the 

administration of federal elections affecting voter registration, absentee 

voting, voting systems, and other election administration activities. 

The November 2004 general election was not as close or contentious as the 

2000 general election, but media reports, interest groups, and members of 

Congress raised concerns about various aspects of the elections process. 

Following the November 2004 election, a number of members of Congress 

asked us to review aspects of that election. In response to these requests, 

we initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to 

examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress using an 

approach similar to that we used to examine election issues following the 

November 2000 election. During the design of the review, GAO kept key 

committees of jurisdiction and interested parties informed of its work.

This report focuses on the changing election processes in the United States 

and the November 2004 election. It discusses (1) changes to election 

systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, 

and (2) challenges encountered by election officials in the November 2004 

1

Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).
Executive Summary

Page 4 GAO-06-450 Elections

election for each major stage of the election process—voter registration, 

absentee and early voting, Election Day preparation and activities, 

provisional voting, and vote counting—and for voting technology.

Background In the United States, election authority is shared by federal, state, and local 

entities. In addition to HAVA, federal laws have been enacted in several 

major areas of the voting process such as the National Voter Registration 

Act of 1993 (NVRA), which was designed to expand the opportunities for 

citizens to register to vote in federal elections by allowing registration by 

mail and at state motor vehicle agencies (MVA) and other public agencies, 

and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 

(UOCAVA), which facilitated absentee voting by these populations.

The U.S. election system is highly decentralized, with primary 

responsibility for managing, planning, and conducting elections residing at 

the local jurisdiction level—generally, the county level in most states, but 

some states have delegated election responsibility to subcounty 

governmental units. Subcounty election jurisdictions in 9 states account for 

about 75 percent of about 10,500 local election jurisdictions in the United 

States, but about 12 percent of the 2000 U.S. Census population. Local 

election jurisdictions vary widely in size and complexity, ranging from 

small New England townships to Los Angeles County, whose number of 

registered voters exceeds that of many states. Our election system is based 

upon a complex interaction of people (voters, election officials, and poll 

workers), processes (controls), and technology that must work effectively 

together to achieve a successful election. Every stage of the election 

process—registration, absentee and early voting, preparing for and 

conducting Election Day activities, provisional voting, and vote counting—

is affected by the interface of people, processes, and technology.

Following the November 2000 general election, GAO issued a series of 

reports addressing a range of issues that emerged during that election.2

These reports also identified challenges that election officials reported they 

faced in major stages of the election process. We have also issued reports 

since the November 2004 general election on voter registration issues and 

security and reliability of electronic voting. As appropriate, information 

from our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes 

2

See appendix I for a list of GAO reports on elections since 1983.
Executive Summary

Page 5 GAO-06-450 Elections

nationwide was used as a basis for determining changes since 2000.3 Our 

more recent reports were used to supplement this report on challenges 

election officials faced in the November 2004 election. Our methodology 

for this report included a Web-based survey of all 50 states and the District 

of Columbia (all 51 responded) and a mail questionnaire sent to a 

representative probability sample of 788 local election jurisdictions 

nationwide, stratified by population (632, or 80 percent, responded). We 

also conducted site visits to a nonprobability sample of 28 local election 

jurisdictions in 14 states, selected to reflect variation in such factors as 

geographic location, whether early voting was offered, whether recounts 

for federal or statewide offices occurred, and voting technology used.4

Some of the 28 jurisdictions visited were among those we had visited for 

our 2001 election report. In stratifying our nationwide mail survey of local 

election jurisdictions, we grouped election jurisdictions by their 2000 U.S. 

Census population—small (less than 10,000), medium (10,000 to 100,000), 

and large (more than 100,000). These categories are also used in this report 

to describe jurisdictions we visited. The results of our state and local 

surveys are presented in two supplemental products that can be found on 

our Web site at www.gao.gov.

5

Results in Brief The most prevalent changes to state and local elections systems since the 

2000 presidential election were changes required under HAVA, which, 

among other things, established the U.S. Election Assistance Commission 

(EAC) with wide-ranging duties that include providing information and 

assistance to states and local jurisdictions with regard to election 

administration. EAC is led by four Commissioners who are to be appointed 

by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioners who, 

under HAVA, were to be appointed by February 26, 2003, were appointed by 

the President in October 2003 and confirmed by the Senate in December 

2003. Since beginning operations in January 2004, EAC has achieved many 

of its objectives; however, EAC has reported that its delayed start-up 

affected its ability to conduct some HAVA-mandated activities within the 

3

GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3, 

(Washington, D.C.: October 2001).

4

Appendix V provides more detailed information about our scope and methodology.

5

GAO, Elections: 2005 Survey of State Election Officials, GAO-06-451SP (Washington, D.C.: 

June 6, 2006); and GAO, Elections: 2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions, 

GAO-06-452SP (Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2006).
Executive Summary

Page 6 GAO-06-450 Elections

time frames specified in the act. In turn, according to its fiscal year 2004 

annual report, the delayed EAC start-up affected states’ procurement of 

new voting systems and the ability of some states and local jurisdictions to 

meet related HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines. 

In addition, HAVA included specific changes to certain aspects of state 

administration of federal elections. Some key changes included 

requirements for states to implement statewide voter registration lists, a 

requirement that certain first-time mail registrants provide identification 

with their registration application or when they vote for the first time at the 

polls, and a requirement that most states permit, under certain 

circumstances, the casting of provisional ballots—those cast by voters at 

the polls whose eligibility to vote is unclear and to be determined later—in 

elections for federal office. HAVA also provided for funding to encourage 

states to replace their punch card and lever voting equipment, and set out 

voting system standards that state voting systems used in federal elections 

must meet. While HAVA defined some parameters for these requirements, 

the act leaves the states discretion in choosing the methods of 

implementing them. It is too early to determine the full effect that HAVA’s 

requirements may have on the elections process because those 

requirements are in different stages of implementation. States had to 

implement HAVA’s requirements for provisional voting and identification 

for first-time voters who register by mail prior to the November 2004 

election. However, 41 states obtained waivers, allowed under HAVA, to 

delay the implementation of their statewide voter registration systems from 

January 1, 2004, to January 1, 2006. Moreover, states are in different stages 

of replacing their older voting equipment, such as punch card and lever 

machines, with newer technology.

On the basis of our surveys of states and local jurisdictions and visits to 

selected jurisdictions, we found that states varied in their progress in 

implementing their statewide voter registration lists and how they have 

implemented their voting systems. Except for the 9 states that did not 

obtain a waiver from HAVA’s requirements for establishing a statewide 

voter registration lists, all other states subject to the statewide list 

requirement were not required to perform list maintenance activities as 

defined in HAVA until the extended waiver deadline of January 2006. By the 

November 2004 general election, states were in various stages of 

implementing provisions of HAVA related to their statewide voter 

registration lists and performing voter list verification and maintenance, 

and had different capabilities and procedures at the state and local level for 

performing required list maintenance functions. Thus, states are still 
Executive Summary

Page 7 GAO-06-450 Elections

working to fully implement HAVA’s voter registration requirements. As 

states gain more experience with their statewide voter registration and 

data-matching systems and processes, it is likely their systems and 

processes will evolve. Given the continuing challenge of maintaining 

accurate voter registration lists in a highly mobile society, this is to be 

expected. 

We also found that implementation of the identification provision for 

certain first-time mail registrants varied. One noteworthy variation is in the 

definition of mail registration: Some local jurisdictions we visited said that 

applications received through voter registration drives would be treated as 

mail registrations and thus would be subject to the HAVA identification 

requirements. Other local jurisdictions we visited said applications from 

registration drives were not to be treated as mail registrations and 

therefore were not subject to the HAVA identification requirements. As to 

the other two provisions, the results of GAO’s survey of state and local 

officials and jurisdictions we visited showed that states varied in their 

implementation of HAVA’s requirement for provisional voting. One variation 

of particular note during the November 2004 election was the difference in 

state requirements regarding the location where voters must cast their 

provisional ballots in order for them to be counted. For example, in some 

jurisdictions, once the voter’s eligibility to vote had been verified, the 

provisional ballot was counted if it was cast within the voter’s county of 

residence, while in other jurisdictions the ballot was counted only if the 

voter had cast it in the assigned precinct. Notwithstanding these variations 

for implementing provisional voting, it is clear that provisional voting has 

helped to facilitate voter participation of those encountering eligibilityrelated issues when attempting to vote.

Many states have taken advantage of federal funding to replace their punch 

card and lever voting equipment with other voting methods. The results of 

our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that large jurisdictions 

are replacing older voting equipment with more technology-based voting 

methods to a greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use 

paper ballots extensively and constitute the majority of jurisdictions across 

the United States. On the basis of states’ reported plans and local 

jurisdictions’ estimated plans for acquiring voting systems for future 

elections, the election technology environment can be characterized as 

varied and evolving. Accordingly, voting system performance management, 

security, and testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity 

of the overall election process. 
Executive Summary

Page 8 GAO-06-450 Elections

In addition to reporting the required HAVA changes, some states reported 

having taken other actions since the 2000 general election to reform 

election administration; for example, 6 states reported they had eliminated 

the need for an excuse to vote absentee, and 9 states reported establishing 

procedures to conduct an automatic recount (audit), in full or in part, of the 

vote tabulation to help ensure accuracy of the vote prior to certification.

Election officials identified challenges faced in the November 2004 general 

election. Some of these challenges were also identified as challenges in 

GAO’s October 2001 comprehensive report on the election processes, while 

others were raised with us for the first time.

Continuing Challenges in 

2004

• Voter registration. According to our nationwide survey of local 

election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local 

jurisdictions reported that they continued to encounter challenges with 

the voter registration lists that they had experienced in the 2000 general 

election, such as difficulties related to voter registration applications 

with inaccurate and incomplete voter registration information, multiple 

registrations by the same person, or ineligible voters appearing on the 

list. Election jurisdictions also continued to face challenges obtaining 

voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies and other 

NVRA entities.

• Absentee voting. The results of our nationwide survey indicate that 

election jurisdictions continued to experience absentee voting 

challenges that included receiving late absentee voter applications and 

ballots, managing large workloads with inadequate resources, 

addressing voter error issues such as unsigned or otherwise incomplete 

absentee applications, and preventing potential fraud. Although election 

officials in jurisdictions we visited provided examples of procedures 

used to help protect against fraud such as comparing signatures on 

absentee applications to signatures on registration applications, election 

officials still suspected instances of fraud. In 1 jurisdiction we visited, 

election officials reported they referred to the district attorney for 

investigation matters pertaining to 44 individuals who allegedly voted 

absentee ballots with invalid signatures.

• Election Day activities. According to our nationwide survey of local 

election jurisdictions and visits to selected jurisdictions, many local 

jurisdictions reported that they encountered many of the same 

challenges preparing for and conducting Election Day activities in the 
Executive Summary

Page 9 GAO-06-450 Elections

November 2004 general election as they did in November 2000, including 

recruiting and training an adequate supply of skilled poll workers, 

locating a sufficient number of polling places that met requirements, 

designing ballots that were clear to voters when there were many 

candidates or issues to include, having long lines at polling places, and 

handling the large volume of telephone calls received from voters and 

poll workers on Election Day. On the basis of our nationwide survey, we 

estimate that large jurisdictions and, to some extent, medium 

jurisdictions encountered these challenges more than small 

jurisdictions.

• Vote counting. On the basis of interviews with election officials, many 

of the problems in managing people, processes, and technology for vote 

counting that had confronted election officials across the country in the 

November 2000 general election continued to be a challenge for them in 

the 2004 general election. Voting equipment problems, poll worker 

errors, and voter errors were reported as making it difficult to tabulate 

the votes quickly and accurately. 

• Voting technology. According to our local jurisdiction survey and 

visits, voting system performance measures have not been 

systematically embraced, reliable performance data have not been 

collected, and security and testing activities have not been consistently 

required and performed for all voting systems. As a result, effective 

management of voting technology remains a challenge for many states 

and local jurisdictions because election officials may continue to use a 

patchwork of operational indicators and anecdotal experiences, rather 

than requirements-based information on voting system performance, to 

support decisions regarding voting system investments and operations. 

New Challenges in 2004 • Registrations from registration drives. Election officials in some 

local election jurisdictions we visited reported that efforts of various 

groups to “get out the vote” by registering new voters through voter 

registration drives created new challenges not identified to us in the 

2000 general election. Specifically, at some local jurisdictions we visited, 

election officials told us they faced a challenge processing large 

volumes of voter registration applications just prior to the deadlines for 

registration. The conditions that election officials reported experiencing 

in processing the volume of voter registration applications, such as long 

hours and lack of time to fully train temporary workers, can result in 

data entry errors that would have the impact of not properly registering 
Executive Summary

Page 10 GAO-06-450 Elections

eligible voters and not identifying ineligible voters. Moreover, while not 

reported as a prevalent problem, applications received from voter 

registration drives was a challenge reported by election officials, who 

said that some of these applications had incomplete or invalid 

addresses, fictitious names, or questionable signatures. On the basis of 

our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 

5 percent of local jurisdictions had voter registration applications that 

appeared to have fraudulent names.

• Early voting. Election officials reported encountering new challenges 

managing early voting. Some local jurisdictions we visited reported that 

they experienced long lines at early voting locations resulting from 

larger than expected early voter turnout. In some jurisdictions we 

visited, election officials said that factors such as inadequate planning 

on their part, limitations on types of facilities that could be used for 

early voting locations, and funding constraints on hiring more staff or 

acquiring more voting locations affected their management of large 

early voter turnout.

• New UOCAVA provision. A new challenge could develop for election 

officials as a result of a HAVA amendment to UOCAVA. In an effort to 

help make registration and voting easier for absent uniformed service 

voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United 

States, this 2002 amendment extended the period of time that can be 

covered by a single application from the year during which the 

application was received to a time period covering up to the next two 

subsequent general elections for federal office, or 4 years. However, 

election officials in 4 jurisdictions we visited told us that a possible 

unintended consequence of this amendment could be that when 

uniformed services personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, 

absentee ballots may not be sent to the correct address for subsequent 

general elections. Even with a 2005 revision to the Federal Post Card 

Application form where voters can indicate that they want ballots for 

one federal election only, election officials were concerned that many 

absentee ballots would be returned as undeliverable. 

• Third-party polling place activities. Election officials in some of the 

jurisdictions we visited in states where the presidential race was 

considered close (often referred to as battleground states) reported 

encountering challenges with disruptive third-party (e.g., poll watchers, 

observers, and electioneers) activities at polling places on Election Day. 

In some instances, these third parties simply increased the number of 
Executive Summary

Page 11 GAO-06-450 Elections

people that poll workers were to manage at a polling location; in others, 

election officials told us third-party observers’ behavior negatively 

affected poll workers and voters.

• Provisional voting. The implementation of provisional voting 

requirements as specified under HAVA highlighted another instance 

where states varied in their election systems, with somewhat distinct 

approaches for providing and counting provisional ballots. That is, 

states reported various differences in their counting processes such as 

the prescribed location (e.g., county or precinct) in which a voter must 

cast a provisional ballot in order for it to be counted. Another way states 

varied included circumstances, apart from those specified in HAVA, 

where a provisional ballot would be offered, such as when voters 

claimed they did not receive an absentee ballot. States also varied in the 

design of provisional ballots and how they tracked them.

• Vote counting deadlines. A new phenomenon emerged as a challenge 

to election officials with respect to counting the votes: Some 

jurisdictions reported difficulty completing the extra steps required to 

verify and count provisional votes within the time allowed for tallying 

the final vote count.

• Voting systems. States and local jurisdictions face a broad challenge in 

ensuring consistent accuracy, integrity, and security among their voting 

systems in light of their adoption of various versions of federal 

voluntary voting system standards containing somewhat different—and, 

in some cases, outdated—performance thresholds for voting equipment. 

Adoption of the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines by EAC on 

December 13, 2005, provided updated criteria that states and local 

jurisdictions can choose to apply when evaluating and certifying their 

voting equipment. Organizations involved with voting system 

certification—including federal, state, and local governments; testing 

authorities; and vendors—may need the capacity to assume the 

workloads associated with the adoption of current standards, including 

upgrading, testing, and certifying newly acquired voting systems to meet 

the standards, particularly if the standards are to be applied to the 2006 

general election. Furthermore, as states and jurisdictions move to a 

more integrated suite of election systems, proactive and systematic 

efforts in areas such as standards will be essential to addressing 

emerging technical, security, and reliability interactions among systems 

and managing risks in this dynamic election environment.
Executive Summary

Page 12 GAO-06-450 Elections

Principal Findings

Voter Registration In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter 

registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two goals—

minimizing the burden on eligible persons of registering to vote, and 

ensuring that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to those eligible to 

vote and that eligible registered voters are not inadvertently removed from 

the registration lists. During 2004 and 2005, many states were in the process 

of implementing their HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists and 

associated requirements for maintaining such a list. Thus, the potential 

benefits to be gained from HAVA’s requirement for a statewide voter 

registration list were not evident in many states at the time of the 

November 2004 general election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA 

intended to help states and local election jurisdictions have access to more 

accurate voter registration list information, such as identifying duplicate 

registrations and matching the voter information against other state agency 

databases or records, were not yet fully implemented by many states. Many 

local jurisdictions were not yet seeing the benefits of being able to verify 

voter registration application information with state motor vehicle agency 

databases to identify eligible voters, or to match voter registration lists 

with a state agency’s records to identify felons who may be ineligible to 

vote.

Local jurisdictions also encountered instances where voters claimed to be 

registered to vote and their names were not on the voter registration list. 

When this occurs, under HAVA’s provisional voting requirements, states 

must permit voters to cast provisional ballots if the voters assert that they 

are registered in the jurisdiction where they desire to vote and are eligible 

to vote in a federal election. The results of our nationwide survey of local 

election jurisdictions indicate that many local jurisdictions encountered 

problems determining whether a provisional ballot was eligible to be 

counted where voters claimed to have registered at a motor vehicle agency 

or at another NVRA entity but there was insufficient evidence that the voter 

had submitted a registration application at one of those offices.

While registering to vote appears to be a simple step in the election system 

generally, applying to register and being registered are not synonymous, 

and election officials face challenges in processing the voter registration 

applications they receive. Local election jurisdictions continued to 

encounter challenges with the voter registration lists for the November 
Executive Summary

Page 13 GAO-06-450 Elections

2004 election such as difficulties related to receiving inaccurate and 

incomplete voter registration information, multiple registrations, and 

ineligible voters appearing on the lists. The surge of last-minute 

registrations in many jurisdictions prior to the November 2004 election 

illustrated the challenge of balancing ease of registration with assurances 

that only eligible voters are on the registration rolls. In some cases, election 

officials reported that hundreds or thousands of applications were 

submitted just before the registration deadline and close to Election Day. 

According to our nationwide survey and visits to selected jurisdictions, 

entering voter registrations in a timely manner presented a challenge for 

some election officials in marshaling the needed resources, including in 

some cases hiring and training temporary employees, to review the 

applications, obtain missing or incomplete information from applicants, 

determine that the registrants were eligible to vote in the jurisdiction, and 

ensuring that the names of eligible voters were added to the voter 

registration rolls prior to Election Day. As shown in figure 1, we estimate 

that 19 percent of jurisdictions nationwide received applications just prior 

to the registration deadline that posed problems in entering them prior to 

Election Day, with large jurisdictions experiencing problems more than 

medium and small jurisdictions.6

6

Our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions was designed to have maximum 

sampling errors of +/- 5 percentage points for the complete sample.
Executive Summary

Page 14 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems Entering the 

Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for the 2004 General Election

Note: Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. 

During our site visits, 1 large jurisdiction we visited reported that on a daily 

basis it was 30,000 to 40,000 applications behind in data entry. As a result, 

election officials reported that they hired 80 full-time temporary workers 

who worked two full-time shifts to enter all eligible applications into the 

voter registration list used at the polls on Election Day. Election officials in 

another large jurisdiction told us that they unexpectedly received about 

10,000 last-minute registration applications. 

According to our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions and 

election officials in jurisdictions we visited, many local election 

jurisdictions had processes to help manage receipt of voter registration 

0

10

20

30

40

50

Experienced

problems

entering

applications

Percentage of jurisdictions

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

49

21

19

16
Executive Summary

Page 15 GAO-06-450 Elections

applications such as training for MVA and other NVRA entities’ staff and 

local election office’s staff for data entry and tracking of registration 

application forms. However, some local jurisdictions did not report having 

such management processes. We estimate that 76 percent of all 

jurisdictions provided training to data entry staff about the processing and 

inputting of registration applications, and we estimate that over half of all 

jurisdictions tracked incoming registration applications to ascertain the 

total number received, the number entered into registration lists, and the 

number not processed because of omission or application error, and to 

identify ineligible voters based on age or residence. In addition, some local 

jurisdictions we visited reported that they implemented processes such as 

tracking the number of applications distributed and the source from which 

applications are received, and providing receipts to voter registrants to 

help alleviate problems encountered with properly registering voters.

In addition to challenges encountered processing the large volume of 

registration applications received through voter registration drives, on the 

basis of our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate 

that 5 percent of local jurisdictions had voter registration applications that 

appeared to have fraudulent names. Election officials in some jurisdictions 

we visited reported receiving voter registration applications that had 

irregularities. For example, election officials in 1 jurisdiction reported 

receiving applications that were unreadable, had questionable signatures, 

were incomplete, or had invalid addresses. Election officials in another 

jurisdiction also reported receiving applications with fictitious names and 

fake signatures. Generally, election officials reported that the number of 

applications that were irregular were few in number, especially in relation 

to the total number of applications received. 

Absentee and Early Voting Some states have increased the opportunities for citizens to vote absentee 

or early. For the November 2004 general election, 3 additional states 

reported that they no longer required voters to provide excuses such as 

being ill, having a disability, or being away from the precinct on Election 

Day to vote absentee. Three states reported expanding their provisions for 

permanent absentee status (usually reserved for the elderly or individuals 

with disabilities), allowing voters to receive absentee ballots for a statespecified time period, such as 4 years. One state reported eliminating its 

requirement that mail-in absentee voters provide an affidavit from a notary 

or witness for their signature along with the completed absentee ballot. 

Furthermore, HAVA amended UOCAVA to, among other things, extend the 

period of time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application 
Executive Summary

Page 16 GAO-06-450 Elections

by absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters 

residing outside of the United States from the year during which the 

application was received to a time period covering up to the two next 

regularly scheduled general elections for federal office.

Absentee voting. Voting prior to Election Day can make voting easier for 

voters but can also create challenges for election officials. On the basis of 

our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, more than half of all 

jurisdictions encountered problems receiving absentee ballot applications 

and absentee ballots from voters too late to process—an estimated 

55 percent of jurisdictions received applications too late and an estimated 

77 percent received ballots too late, as shown in figure 2. 
Executive Summary

Page 17 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Lateness 

with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General 

Election

a

All size categories are statistically different from one another.

b

Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large jurisdictions.

Although the extent of the problem in terms of the number of applications 

and ballots that could not be processed is unknown, the estimated number 

of jurisdictions encountering the problem would seem to be of some 

concern to state and local election officials. Absentee application deadlines 

close to Election Day provide citizens increased time to apply to vote 

absentee. But such deadlines can create difficulties for election officials, 

providing a short period of time to ensure that eligible voters receive 

absentee ballots in time to vote, including having time to notify voters and 

have the voters correct errors on their ballot applications, such as failing to 

sign them. The impact of absentee ballot application deadlines on voters’ 

ability to complete and return the absentee application and ballot in time 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Ballots received

too lateb Applicationsreceived too latea

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Percentage of jurisdictions

92 92

55

71

46

75 77

97
Executive Summary

Page 18 GAO-06-450 Elections

for their votes to be counted is another example of the difficulties of 

balancing voter access and ease of voting with appropriate election 

administration processes and controls.

Election officials identified problems related to voter errors on absentee 

ballot applications and ballots. On the basis of our nationwide survey of 

election jurisdictions, we estimate that almost half of the jurisdictions 

encountered problems with missing or illegible signatures on absentee 

ballot applications, and our survey results also indicate that local 

jurisdictions encountered problems with, among other things, missing or 

inadequate voting residence addresses on absentee applications and 

missing or incomplete witness information for a voter’s signature or 

information. In jurisdictions that we visited, some election officials told us 

of steps they took, when time permitted, to address voter errors. States 

reported having information on their Web sites that included information 

on the basic requirements for requesting and casting an absentee ballot. In 

addition, some absentee voting applications and ballots provided to us by 

elections jurisdictions we visited included instructions for voting absentee.

Mail-in absentee ballots are considered by some to be particularly 

susceptible to fraud. Election fraud could include such activities as 

completion of a ballot by someone other than the registered voter or an 

attempt by a voter to cast more than one ballot in an election. On the basis 

of our nationwide survey, we estimated that a majority of jurisdictions used 

procedures in the November 2004 election designed to help ensure that 

absentee voters did not vote more than once and that absentee ballots were 

actually completed by the person requesting the ballot. However, some 

mail-in absentee voter fraud concerns remained. In particular, election 

officials expressed concern regarding absentee voters being unduly 

influenced or intimidated while voting by third parties who went to voters’ 

homes and offered to assist them in voting ballots. Election officials also 

expressed concerns about the influence of third parties on voters for early 

voting when voters waiting in line were approached by candidates and poll 

watchers.

Uniformed military and overseas absentee voters. Election officials in 

a few jurisdictions we visited told us of a possible unintended consequence 

that may create a challenge with respect to provisions in UOCAVA as 

amended by HAVA, whereby the Federal Post Card Application can 

possibly cover as many as two subsequent general elections for federal 

office. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited said that when 

uniformed service personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, ballots 
Executive Summary

Page 19 GAO-06-450 Elections

might not be sent to the correct address for subsequent general elections. 

Election officials in some of these jurisdictions said they were taking steps 

to help ensure that absentee ballots would be sent to the correct address 

for the 2006 general election, such as requesting e-mail addresses as a 

means to obtain information to update mailing addresses or conducting 

mass mailings to these voters to confirm mailing addresses. However, 

election officials were concerned that if these efforts are not successful, a 

number of the ballots mailed to addresses provided on the Federal Post 

Card Application for the November 2006 election would be returned as 

undeliverable. This was a concern for these election officials because the 

jurisdictions would have to absorb the expense of mailing ballots that 

would be undeliverable. Furthermore, a potential effect may be that some 

uniformed services voters, who applied to vote absentee using the Federal 

Post Card Application, may not receive their ballots for subsequent general 

elections. As noted in our April 2006 report on election assistance provided 

to uniformed service personnel, one of the top two reasons for 

disqualifying absentee ballots for these voters was that they were 

undeliverable.7

Early voting. With respect to early voting, election officials in some 

jurisdictions we visited identified obtaining adequate staffing for 

conducting early voting as a challenge, especially when given the 

unanticipated large early voter turnout. In 11 of the 14 early voting 

jurisdictions visited, election officials emphasized the importance of 

staffing early voting locations with experienced staff such as election office 

staff or experienced and seasoned poll workers. According to our 

nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 30 percent of 

jurisdictions used permanent staff to work early voting polling locations. 

Our nationwide survey also showed that jurisdictions used other types of 

staff and combinations of staff such as permanent and part-time staff. 

Depending on the number of early voting locations to be staffed, using 

experienced staff may not always be feasible, and using other staff may 

affect the speed with which voters can be processed and may contribute to 

long lines. As states fully implement their statewide voter registration lists, 

processing voters at early voting locations may become easier as the voter 

registration systems evolve and systems become user-friendly so that all 

types of staff can be more effective in processing voters.

7

GAO, Elections: Absentee Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens Increased 

for the 2004 General Election, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-521 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 

7, 2006).
Executive Summary

Page 20 GAO-06-450 Elections

Conducting Elections States and local jurisdictions have reported making changes since the 

November 2000 general election as a result of HAVA requirements and 

other state actions to improve the administration of elections in the United 

States. HAVA established requirements with respect to elections for federal 

office for, among other things, certain voters who register by mail to 

provide identification prior to voting; mandated that voting equipment 

accessible to individuals with disabilities be located at each polling place; 

and required that voter information be posted at polling places on Election 

Day. Since the November 2000 general election, some states have also 

reported making changes to their identification requirements for all voters.

Many of the challenges that election officials reported encountering in 

preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election were not 

new challenges. Recruiting and training an adequate supply of poll 

workers, finding accessible polling places, and managing communications 

on Election Day were challenges that we identified in our October 2001 

report on the November 2000 general election.8

 As shown in figure 3, on the 

basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that more large jurisdictions 

encountered difficulties than medium and small jurisdictions when it came 

to obtaining a sufficient number of poll workers.

8

GAO-02-3.
Executive Summary

Page 21 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size 

That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Poll Workers for the 

November 2004 General Election

a

All size categories are statistically different from one another.

b

The difference between small and medium jurisdictions is statistically significant.

c

The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

d

Jurisdictions could indicate not applicable for a variety of reasons, including that poll workers are not 

recruited, but elected or appointed; that elections are conducted by mail ballot, and as a result there is 

not a need for poll workers to staff polling places on Election Day; or that the election officials 

themselves serve as poll workers.

e

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/-8 percentage points.

Administering an election in any jurisdiction is a complicated endeavor that 

involves effectively coordinating the people, processes, and technologies 

associated with numerous activities. However, we found in our survey of 

local jurisdictions and site visits to 28 localities that more large and, to 

some extent, medium jurisdictions reported that they encountered 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Percentage of jurisdictions

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

47e

44

24

14

20

Difficult or very 

difficulta Neither difficult 

nor easyb Easy or very easyc Not applicabled

32

30

35

22

46

5 4

1 1 97

17

57
Executive Summary

Page 22 GAO-06-450 Elections

challenges in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general 

election than small jurisdictions did. This may be because the complexity 

of administering an election and the potential for challenges increase with 

the number of people and places involved and the scope of activities and 

processes that must be conducted, such as the need to provide ballots and 

voter assistance in languages other than English. The results of our local 

election jurisdiction survey indicate that more large and medium 

jurisdictions than small jurisdictions took steps—such as through voter 

education or providing instructions at polling places for poll workers—

designed to minimize potential problems. Many of the election officials in 

large jurisdictions we visited told us that being well prepared, having 

established policies and procedures in place, and having high-quality 

election staff were factors that contributed to a smooth Election Day. One 

problem that election officials in some jurisdictions reported encountering 

on Election Day was actions by poll watchers and other third parties that 

election officials considered disruptive. This presents another issue that 

election officials may need to include in their Election Day preparations 

and training.

Provisional Voting Concerns were raised with respect to the November 2000 election that 

some eligible voters were not allowed to vote because of questions 

regarding the voters’ eligibility. HAVA required that by January 1, 2004, 

states permit the casting of provisional ballots in elections for federal office 

by voters who assert that they are eligible to vote and registered in that 

jurisdiction, but are not found on the voter registration list.9

 Such states are 

also required under HAVA to provide provisional ballots in federal elections 

under other circumstances, such as for certain voters who registered by 

mail and do not have required identification. While HAVA requires that 

states permit an individual under certain circumstances to cast a 

provisional ballot in a federal election, the act left the specific choices on 

the methods of implementation to the discretion of the states. Under HAVA, 

election officials receiving provisional voter information are to determine 

whether such individuals are eligible to vote under state law. If an 

individual is determined to be eligible, HAVA specifies that such individual’s 

provisional ballot be counted as a vote in that election in accordance with 

state law.

9

Six states are exempt from this requirement, in general, either because they permit voter 

registration on Election Day (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) 

or because they do not require voter registration (North Dakota).
Executive Summary

Page 23 GAO-06-450 Elections

On the basis of our survey of state election officials, our nationwide survey 

of election jurisdictions, and our visits to jurisdictions, states and local 

jurisdictions varied in a number of ways in how they implemented HAVA’s 

provisional voting requirements in the November 2004 election. For 

example, in addition to those specified in HAVA, the circumstances 

reported by states and local jurisdictions when a provisional ballot would 

be offered varied, with some jurisdictions allowing voters claiming they did 

not receive an absentee ballot to vote provisionally. The results of our 

survey of state elections officials showed that states also varied as to the 

location where voters must cast their provisional ballots in order for such 

ballots to be eligible to be counted, as shown in figure 4. 
Executive Summary

Page 24 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 4: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 2004 

General Election

Note: Six states are not subject to HAVA’s provisional voting requirements, but 2 of these 6 (Wisconsin 

and Wyoming) authorize some measure of provisional voting. Both of these states are included with 

the 32 states that reported requiring that provisional voters must cast their votes in the specific 

precincts in which they are registered in order for their votes to be eligible to be counted.

Source: GAO survey of state election officials. 

VT

DC

OK

CA CO

AZ NM

NV

TX

NE

UT

KS

ND

ID

IA 

AK

HI

AR

MO

WV

TN

NC

GA

FL

LA

WI

WY

NH

MA

RI

CT

NJ

MD

DE

ME

NY

PA

WA

OR

MT

SD

MN

MI

AL

IL IN OH

KY 

VA

SC

MS

Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia required that the provisional voter had to be 

in the specific precinct.

Fourteen states required that the voter could have been anywhere within the county 

in which he or she resided.

Four states were exempt from provisional voting and did not provide it.
Executive Summary

Page 25 GAO-06-450 Elections

On the basis of our interviews with local election officials, local election 

procedures and unique circumstances add to the differences among 

jurisdictions. For example, in some jurisdictions we visited, election 

officials described various factors that affected the counting of provisional 

ballots, such as the time allowed for provisional voters to provide missing 

identification. Specifically, in 1 jurisdiction, voters had to provide the 

required identification before the polls closed for the ballot to be counted, 

while in other jurisdictions the ballot would be counted if the voter 

provided the required identification within a specified number of days after 

Election Day.

These variations in provisional voting implementation highlight how 

individual state rules, procedures, and practices may have affected the 

number of provisional ballots cast and counted in the November 2004 

election. These differences and limited data availability make it difficult to 

determine with certainty how many provisional ballots were cast and 

counted nationally in the November 2004 election. However, the data that 

are available indicate that the HAVA requirement for provisional voting has 

helped to better facilitate voter participation of those encountering 

eligibility-related issues when attempting to vote.

Counting the Votes Although the methods used to secure and count ballots vary across the 50 

states and the District of Columbia, the goal of vote counting is the same 

across the nation: to accurately process those ballots requiring verification 

and accurately count every valid ballot. As with the elections process 

overall, conducting an accurate vote count is not a simple process. It 

requires many steps, an unerring attention to detail, and the seamless 

integration of people, processes, and technology.

In 2004, vote counting remained an intricate multistep process 

characterized by a great variety of local procedures depending on a local 

jurisdiction’s technology, size, and preferences. The multistep process can 

involve such activities as the initial vote count, a vote count audit to verify 

the accuracy of the count, certification of the vote count, and recounts of 

the votes when an election is close.10 There were some notable 

developments related to conducting recounts that may be mandatory 

10As used in this report, a vote count audit is an automatic recount, in full or in part, of the 

vote tabulation, irrespective of the margin of victory, in order to ensure accuracy before 

certification.
Executive Summary

Page 26 GAO-06-450 Elections

(because of a close margin of victory) or requested. Some states reported 

that they added rules for mandatory recounts. Others reported that they 

changed their guidance for who may request a recount. Regarding vote 

count audits, while 29 states and the District of Columbia reported they did 

not require audits of vote counts, 21 states reported having provisions that 

required or allowed audits of vote counts, as shown in figure 5. 

Furthermore, 9 states reported having taken some legislative or executive 

steps toward doing so since November 2004.

Figure 5: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in Place for 

the 2004 General Election

a

Includes District of Columbia.

Providing eligible voters multiple means and times within a jurisdiction for 

casting their ballots—early, absentee, provisional, and Election Day 

voting—enhances eligible voters’ opportunity to vote. At the same time, 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Did not require

Allowed local jurisdictions

Required audits

for

Required audits

for

Number of states

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

Audits

 to conduct audits

some local jurisdictions

 all local jurisdictions

or allow auditsa

8

2

11

30
Executive Summary

Page 27 GAO-06-450 Elections

multiple voting methods and types of ballots can make the vote-counting 

process more complicated. In addition, short deadlines for certifying the 

final vote—as little as 2 days in 1 state—provide little time for election 

officials to review, verify, and count provisional and absentee ballots. 

Larger jurisdictions generally face more challenges than smaller 

jurisdictions because of the sheer volume of votes cast by all ballot types—

absentee, provisional, and regular ballots. Provisional ballots were new for 

many jurisdictions in November 2004 and created some challenges in 

tracking, verifying, and counting. On the basis of their experience in 

November 2004, some election officials in jurisdictions we visited said that 

they are implementing new procedures for provisional voting, such as 

printing provisional ballots in a color different from other types of ballots 

or using paper ballots rather than direct recording electronic (DRE) 

machines for provisional voters. These procedures are intended to help 

election officials track provisional ballots to ensure that they are all 

accounted for and included in the vote count.

Two jurisdictions we visited in Washington told us that they are moving to 

all-mail elections, which was authorized on a countywide basis by a new 

state law. Although replacing in-person voting with all-mail voting 

eliminates some challenges that can affect accurate vote counting—e.g., 

poll worker training on voting equipment operations and provisional voting 

or the chance of malfunctioning voting equipment at the polls—it magnifies 

the importance of other aspects of the process, such as accurately 

matching voter signatures and having clear guidance for determining voter 

intent from improperly or unclearly marked ballots.

The recount in the close gubernatorial election in Washington revealed the 

interdependence of every stage of the elections process in ensuring an 

accurate vote count. In the initial statewide count, a mere 261 votes 

separated the two top candidates, and an initial recount reduced that 

margin of victory to just 42 votes out of more than 2.7 million cast, and the 

final recount resulted in a 129-vote margin of victory for the candidate who 

came in second in the first two vote counts. The experiences of election 

jurisdictions that had to conduct the recounts illustrated how small errors 

in the election administration process can affect the vote count. For 

example, in at least 11 counties provisional ballots were found by a 

Washington state superior court to have been counted without verifying 

voter signatures or before verification of voter registration status had been 

completed. Furthermore, 573 absentee ballots were erroneously 

disqualified in one county, and 22 absentee and provisional ballots were 

discovered in the base units of optical scan machines in another county 
Executive Summary

Page 28 GAO-06-450 Elections

after the election had been certified. Were any state’s election processes 

subjected to the very close scrutiny that characterized the recount in 

Washington state, it is likely that imperfections would be revealed. Votes 

are cast and elections are conducted by people who are not and cannot be 

100 percent error free in all their tasks all the time. Thus, the consistently 

error-free vote count may be elusive, particularly in very large jurisdictions 

with hundreds of thousands of ballots cast in person, absentee, or 

provisionally. However, diligent efforts to achieve a consistently error-free 

count can help to ensure that any errors are reduced to the minimum 

humanly possible.

Voting Methods and 

Technologies

The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied 

and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local 

jurisdiction survey estimates. Figure 6 shows the estimated percentages of 

all jurisdictions’ use of a predominant voting method in the 2000 and 2004 

general elections. Two key patterns emerged in the use of voting methods 

between the 2000 and 2004 general elections. First, we estimate that the 

percentage of large jurisdictions using DREs doubled from 15 percent in 

the 2000 general election to 30 percent in 2004. The predominant voting 

method most often used for large jurisdictions changed from precinct 

count optical scan in 2000 to both DRE and precinct count optical scan in 

2004. In contrast, we estimate that the predominant voting methods most 

often used remained the same for small and medium jurisdictions (paper 

ballots and precinct count optical scan, respectively) from 2000 to 2004. 

Furthermore, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 

at least one-fifth of jurisdictions plan to acquire DRE or optical scan 

equipment before the 2006 general election. Second, in response to our 

state survey, 9 states reported that they eliminated the lever machine and 

punch card voting methods for the 2004 general election. In addition, 

18 other states plan to eliminate lever or punch card voting methods for the 

2006 general election. This greater state involvement in jurisdictions’ 

choice of voting methods, the availability of federal funding to replace lever 

and punch card voting equipment, and certain HAVA requirements—among 

other factors—are likely influences on the adoption of DRE and optical 

scan voting methods. 
Executive Summary

Page 29 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 6: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using a Predominant Voting 

Method in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections

HAVA recognized the importance of voting system performance by 

specifying requirements for error rates in voting systems and providing for 

updates to the federal voting system standards, including the performance 

components of those standards. According to our local jurisdiction survey, 

most local jurisdictions adopted performance standards for accuracy, 

reliability, or efficiency for the 2004 general election—usually standards 

selected by their respective states. It is important that system performance 

be measured during an election, when the system is being used and 

operated according to defined procedures by voters and election workers, 

to provide a basis for determining where performance needs, requirements, 

and expectations are not being met so that timely corrective action can be 

taken. As was the case for the 2000 general election, jurisdictions collected 

various types of voting system performance measures for the 2004 general 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Paper ballot

Precinct count

Lever machine

punch card

Central count

punch card

Precinct count

optical scan

Central count

optical scan

DRE

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Predominant voting method

2000

2004

5 5

7

21 21

26

30

2 22

8

7

31

30

Percentage of jurisdictions
Executive Summary

Page 30 GAO-06-450 Elections

election, although some types of measures were collected by fewer 

jurisdictions than others—in part because they were not well suited to 

particular voting methods. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate 

that the vast majority of all jurisdictions were very satisfied or satisfied 

with their systems’ performance during the 2004 general election, even 

though performance data may not have been collected to an extent that 

would provide firm support for these views. The moderate collection levels 

of data on operational voting systems’ performance may present a 

challenge to state and local election officials in their efforts to make 

informed decisions on both near-term and long-term voting system changes 

and investments.

Having secure voting systems is essential to maintaining public confidence 

in the election process, and according to our local jurisdiction survey 

estimated results, accomplishing this was a shared responsibility among 

states, local jurisdictions, vendors, law enforcement officials, and others 

for most jurisdictions. According to our state survey, estimates from our 

local jurisdiction survey, and visits to jurisdictions, there were differences 

across states and jurisdictions in areas such as the adoption of system 

security standards and reported implementation of system security 

controls, which was generally consistent with what we reported in our 

October 2001 report on election processes. In addition, 27 states reported 

in our state survey that they are requiring jurisdictions to apply voluntary 

federal standards to voting systems used for the first time in the November 

2006 general election that are outdated, unspecified, or entail multiple 

versions. In the area of testing, most states reported that they required 

national or state certification of their voting systems, but the systems 

covered by those requirements and the criteria used for certification also 

varied by state and by voting method. Readiness (logic and accuracy) 

testing continued to be commonly performed by an estimated 92 percent of 

local jurisdictions that used automated voting systems for the 2004 general 

election, but the local election officials we talked with described a variety 

of testing approaches.11 We estimate that two other forms of testing—

parallel testing and postelection auditing of voting equipment—were much 

less prevalent than readiness testing and were conducted by 2 percent and 

43 percent of jurisdictions that used automated voting, respectively.12

11For the questions in our local survey related to types of testing, jurisdictions that used only 

hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded.

12We estimate that 91 percent of jurisdictions considered parallel testing to be not 

applicable.
Executive Summary

Page 31 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appropriately defined and implemented standards for system functions 

and testing processes are essential to ensuring the accuracy, integrity, and 

reliability of voting systems across all phases of the elections process. 

States and local jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly updating and 

consistently applying appropriate standards and other directives for 

security management and testing to address vulnerabilities and risks in 

their specific election environments.

The number of jurisdictions that had integrated particular aspects of voting 

system components and technologies was limited for the 2004 general 

election according to estimates from our local jurisdiction survey and visits 

to local jurisdictions for the selected areas of integration we examined, 

such as electronic programming or setup and electronic management. 

Furthermore, relatively few local jurisdictions we visited reported having 

plans for integrating or further integrating their election-related systems 

and components for the 2006 general election, and in the instances where 

jurisdictions reported plans, the scope and nature of the plans varied. 

Nevertheless, there is real potential for greater integration among voting 

systems, election systems, and components as states and jurisdictions act 

on plans to acquire optical scan and DRE equipment that lends itself to 

integration. It is unclear if and when this migration to more technologybased voting methods will produce more integrated election system 

environments. However, suitable standards and guidance for these 

interconnected components and systems—some of which remain to be 

developed—could facilitate the development, testing, operational 

management, and maintenance of components and systems, thereby 

maximizing the benefits of current and emerging election technologies and 

achieving states’ and local jurisdictions’ goals for performance and 

security. The challenge inherent in such a dynamic environment is to 

update system standards so that emerging technical, security, and 

reliability interactions are systematically addressed.

Concluding 

Observations

The administration of election systems will never be error free or perfect. 

Each stage of the election process poses a major challenge for election 

officials. Effective management of the election system requires a variety of 

resources that must be prepared, mobilized, and deployed at regular 

intervals. These resources include the people who conduct the election and 

participate in it, the processes that govern what the people do and how the 

election is conducted, and the technology that facilitates the efforts of the 

people as they work through the election processes. Although 

responsibility for election administration falls largely on local 
Executive Summary

Page 32 GAO-06-450 Elections

governmental units, state and federal governments have a role to play in 

helping to minimize the types of errors that can occur. Thus, as technology 

evolves and circumstances warrant, state and federal governments might 

consider what, if any, actions on their part could help to improve election 

processes.

GAO found that states have made changes—either as a result of HAVA or 

on their own—that addressed some of the challenges identified in the 2000 

general election. GAO also found that some challenges continue and new 

challenges occurred in the 2004 general election. In passing HAVA, 

Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve 

upon several aspects of the voting administration system. It is too soon to 

determine the full effect of those changes, especially the requirement for 

statewide voter registration lists for federal elections and new voting 

systems, both of which are at different stages of implementation across the 

states.
Page 33 GAO-06-450 Elections

Chapter 1

Introduction Chapte2r

The basic goal of the elections system in the United States is 

straightforward: All eligible persons, but only eligible persons, should be 

able to cast their votes and, if such votes have been properly cast by the 

voters, have those votes counted accurately. Faith in the fairness and 

accuracy of the U.S. election system is at the foundation of our democracy. 

Reports of problems encountered in the close 2000 presidential election 

with respect to voter registration lists, absentee ballots, ballot counting, 

and antiquated voting equipment raised concerns about the fairness and 

accuracy of certain aspects of the U.S. election system. After the events 

surrounding the November 2000 general election, the Help America Vote 

Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted and major election reforms are now being 

implemented.1

 The November 2004 general election highlighted some of the 

same challenges as 2000 as well as some new challenges in areas such as 

electronic voting technology and implementation of some HAVA 

requirements. The issues that arose in both elections highlighted the 

importance of the effective interaction of people, processes, and 

technology in ensuring effective election operations and maintaining public 

confidence that our election system works. 

Since 2001, GAO has issued a series of reports covering aspects of the 

election process primarily with respect to federal elections.2

 This report 

focuses on the changing of such election processes in the United States and 

the November 2004 general election. Specifically, primarily with respect to 

federal elections, our objectives were to examine each major stage of the 

election process to (1) identify changes to election systems since the 2000 

election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) describe the 

issues and challenges encountered by election officials in the November 

2004 election.

1

Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).

2

See appendix I for a list of these reports. One of the most comprehensive is GAO, Elections: 

Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 15, 2001).
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 34 GAO-06-450 Elections

Election Authority Election authority is shared by federal, state, and local officials in the 

United States. Congressional authority to affect the administration of 

elections derives from various constitutional sources, depending upon the 

type of election.3

 Congress has passed legislation in several major areas of 

the voting process. For example, the National Voter Registration Act of 

1993 (NVRA),4

 expanded the opportunities for citizens to register to vote 

for federal elections by, among other things, requiring most states to accept 

registration applications for federal elections by mail and at state motor 

vehicle agencies (MVA) and at certain other state agencies. The act also 

requires that in the administration of elections for federal office, states are 

to take certain steps to accurately maintain voter registration lists, and it 

limits the circumstances for removing names from voter lists. The 

Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA) 

requires states to, among other things, permit uniformed services voters 

absent from the place of residence where they are otherwise qualified to 

vote, their dependents, and U.S. citizens residing outside the country to 

register and vote absentee in elections for federal office.5

The Help America Vote Act was enacted into law on October 29, 2002. As 

discussed below, the act includes a number of provisions related to voter 

registration, provisional voting, absentee voting, voting equipment, and 

other election administration provisions, and authorizes the appropriation 

of funds to be used toward implementing the law’s requirements. HAVA 

also provides that the choices on the methods of implementation of such 

requirements, for example, a computerized statewide voter registration list, 

provisional voting, voter information requirements at the polling place, 

identification requirements, and voting system standards (for ballot 

verification, manual audit capacity, accessibility, and error rates), are left to 

the discretion of the states. HAVA further specifies that such requirements 

are minimum requirements and should not be construed to prevent states 

from establishing election technology and administration requirements that 

are stricter than HAVA requirements as long as they are not inconsistent 

with certain other specified provisions.

3

GAO, Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election Administration, 

GAO-01-470 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2001).

4

42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10.

5

42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to 1973ff-6.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 35 GAO-06-450 Elections

HAVA, in general, applies to all 50 states and the District of Columbia. 

Areas covered by the law include

• Computerized statewide voter registration list: HAVA requires most 

states to implement a single, uniform, centralized, computerized 

statewide voter registration list to serve as the official voter 

registration list for the conduct of all elections for federal office in 

each such state.6

 Under HAVA, the computerized statewide voter 

registration list was to have been implemented by 2004. However, 

40 states and the District of Columbia received waivers to extend the 

deadline until January 1, 2006. States are required to perform regular 

maintenance of the voter list by comparing it to state records on 

felons and deaths, and to match voter registration applicant 

information on the voter list with information in the state motor 

vehicle agency’s records and Social Security Administration records, 

as appropriate. 

• Absentee ballots: HAVA contains various amendments to UOCAVA 

regarding absentee voting for absent uniformed service voters and 

certain other civilian voters residing outside of the United States. 

The amendments, among other things, (1) required that the 

secretaries of each military department, to the maximum extent 

practicable, provide notice to military personnel of absentee ballot 

deadlines, (2) extended the time that can be covered by a single 

absentee ballot application from UOCAVA voters, and (3) prohibited 

states from refusing to accept or process, with respect to federal 

elections, a voter registration application or an absentee ballot 

application by an absent uniformed services voter on the ground that 

the application was submitted before the first date that the state 

otherwise accepts or processes applications for that year from 

nonuniformed service absentee voters. 

6

Under HAVA, states with no voter registration requirements for voters with respect to 

federal elections on and after the date of HAVA’s enactment (e.g., North Dakota) are not 

subject to the act’s computerized statewide voter registration list requirement. 
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 36 GAO-06-450 Elections

• Provisional ballots: HAVA requires most states to implement 

provisional voting for elections for federal office.7

 Under HAVA, in an 

election for federal office, states are to provide a provisional ballot to 

an individual asserting (1) to be registered in the jurisdiction for 

which he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible to vote in a federal 

election but (3) whose name does not appear on the official list of 

eligible voters for the polling place. Provisional ballots are also to be 

provided in elections for federal office to individuals who an election 

official asserts to be ineligible to vote, and for court-ordered voting in 

a federal election after the polls have closed. These various types of 

individuals, under HAVA, are to be permitted to cast the provisional 

ballot upon the execution of written affirmation at the polling place 

that they are registered voters in the jurisdiction and that they are 

eligible to vote in that election. If election officials determine that the 

individual is eligible under state law to vote, the individual’s 

provisional ballot is to be counted as a vote in accordance with state 

law. HAVA also requires that a free access system be established to 

inform voters if their votes were counted, and if not, the reason why. 

• Polling places: HAVA provisions targeted, among other things, 

improving information at polling places and Election Day 

procedures. To improve the knowledge of voters regarding voting 

rights and procedures, HAVA requires election officials8

 to post 

voting information at each polling place on the days of elections for 

federal office, including, for example, a sample ballot, polling place 

hours, how to vote, instructions for first-time voters who registered 

by mail, and general information on federal and state voting rights 

laws and laws prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation. The act also 

authorized the appropriation of funds for payments to states for 

educating voters concerning voting procedures, voting rights, and 

voting technology. Under HAVA, voting systems used in elections for 

federal office are required to meet specified accessibility 

requirements for individuals with disabilities. With respect to 

7

Under HAVA, states that had either (1) no voter registration requirements for voters with 

respect to federal elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day 

with respect to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and 

Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject to HAVA’s provisional voting 

requirements.

8

Jurisdictions call their poll workers by different titles, including clerks, wardens, election 

judges, inspectors, captains, and precinct officers and often have a chief poll worker for 

each polling place.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 37 GAO-06-450 Elections

improving accessibility, HAVA also authorized the appropriation of 

funds for payments to states to be used for improved accessibility of 

polling places for, among others, individuals with disabilities and 

those with limited English proficiency. HAVA also requires that such 

voting systems provide individuals with disabilities with the same 

opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and 

independence) as for other voters. In connection with this 

requirement, HAVA provides for the use of at least one direct 

recording electronic (DRE) device or other voting system equipped 

for individuals with disabilities at each polling place.9

• Identification requirements: Under HAVA, states are to require that 

certain voters who register by mail to provide specified types of 

identification when voting at the polls or send a copy of the 

identification with their mailed applications.10 Acceptable 

identification includes a current and valid photo identification or 

current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or 

other government document that shows the name and address of the 

voter. Under HAVA, voters at the polls who have not met the 

identification requirement may cast a vote under HAVA’s provisional 

voting section. Similarly, mail-in ballots from persons who have not 

provided the required identification also are to be counted as HAVA 

provisional ballots.

• Election administration: HAVA also established an agency with 

wide-ranging duties to help improve state and local administration of 

federal elections. The Election Assistance Commission is to be 

involved with, among other things, providing voluntary guidance to 

states implementing certain HAVA provisions, serving as a national 

clearinghouse and resource for information with respect to the 

9

There are two types of DREs, push-button, and touch screen. For push-button machines, 

voters press a button next to the candidate’s name or ballot issue, which then lights up to 

indicate the selection. Similarly, voters using touch screen DREs make their selections by 

touching the screen next to the candidate or issue, which is then highlighted. When voters 

are finished on a push-button or touch screen DRE, they cast their votes by pressing a final 

“vote” button on the machine or screen.

10Voters subject to this provision are those who have registered to vote in a jurisdiction by 

mail and have not previously voted in an election for federal office in the state or those who 

have not previously voted in such an election in the jurisdiction and the jurisdiction is 

located in a state that does not have a statewide computerized voter registration list, as 

required by HAVA. 
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 38 GAO-06-450 Elections

administration of federal elections, conducting studies, administering 

programs that provide federal funds for states to make improvements 

to some aspects of election administration, and helping to develop 

testing for voting systems, and standards for election equipment. 

EAC is led by four Commissioners, who are to be appointed by the 

President and confirmed by the Senate. The Commissioners, who, 

under HAVA, were to be appointed by February 26, 2003, were 

appointed by the President in October 2003 and confirmed by the 

Senate in December 2003. Since beginning operations in January 

2004, EAC has achieved many of its objectives. Among other things, 

EAC has held hearings on the security of voting technologies and the 

national poll worker shortage; established a clearinghouse for 

information on election administration by issuing two best practices 

reports; distributed payments to states for election improvements, 

including payments for voter education and voting equipment 

replacement; drafted changes to existing federal voluntary standards 

for voting systems; and established a program to accredit the 

national independent certified laboratories that test electronic voting 

systems against the federal voluntary standards. However, EAC has 

reported that its delayed start-up affected its ability to conduct some 

HAVA-mandated activities within the time frames specified in the act. 

In turn, according to its fiscal year 2004 annual report, the delayed 

EAC start-up affected states’ procurement of new voting equipment 

and the ability of some states and local jurisdictions to meet related 

HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines. 

• Voting systems: One of the primary HAVA provisions relates to 

encouraging states to replace punch card voting systems and lever 

voting systems and authorizing appropriations for payments to 

support states in making federally mandated improvements to their 

voting systems. A voting system includes the people, processes, and 

technology associated with any voting method. It encompasses the 

hardware and software used to define the ballot, conduct the vote, 

and transmit and tally results, and system maintenance and testing 

functions. With respect to standards for voting systems used in 

elections for federal office, HAVA requirements for such systems 

include providing voters with the ability to verify their votes before 

casting their ballots, producing permanent paper records for manual 

auditing of voting systems, and compliance of voting system ballot 

counting error rates with those set out in specified federal voting 

system standards. HAVA also directs that updates to the federal 

voluntary voting system standards for these requirements be in place 
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 39 GAO-06-450 Elections

by January 1, 2004,11 and provides for additional updates to the 

voluntary standards as approved by the Election Assistance 

Commission. Mechanisms are also specified that can be used by 

states and localities in acquiring and operating voting systems, 

including accreditation of laboratories to independently test and 

evaluate voting systems and federal certification for voting systems 

that undergo independent testing. 

The time frames for implementing various HAVA requirements ranged from 

as early as 45 days after enactment (a deadline for establishing a grant 

program for payment to the states for improved election administration) to 

as late as January 1, 2006, for various voting system standards.12 Several 

key deadlines were set for January 1, 2004, including implementation of 

HAVA’s provisional voting requirements and the establishment of a 

statewide voter registration list (or to request a waiver from the deadline 

until January 1, 2006). States receiving funds to replace punch card voting 

systems or lever voting systems could also request a waiver until January 1, 

2006; otherwise such systems were to be replaced in time for the November 

2004 general elections. The deadline for states and jurisdictions to comply 

with specific requirements for voting systems, such as producing a paper 

record for audit purposes, was January 1, 2006. 

HAVA vests enforcement authority with the Attorney General to bring a 

civil action against any state or jurisdiction as may be necessary to carry 

out specified uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and 

administration requirements under HAVA. These requirements pertain to 

HAVA voting system standards, provisional voting and voting information 

requirements, the computerized statewide voter registration list 

requirements, and requirements for persons who register to vote by mail. 

The enforcement of federal statutes pertaining to elections and voting has, 

with certain exceptions, been delegated by the Attorney General to the 

Civil Rights Division.

11The Election Assistance Commission approved the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines in 

December, 2005.

12These HAVA voting system standards pertain to, among other things, voter ballot 

verification prior to casting a vote, permanent paper records with a manual audit capacity, 

federal standards for error rates, alternative language accessibility, and accessibility for 

individuals with disabilities. In addition, HAVA requires that voting systems purchased with 

specified HAVA funds on or after January 1, 2007, must meet HAVA voting system standards 

for disability access.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 40 GAO-06-450 Elections

Election System 

Elements

The U.S. election system is highly decentralized and based upon a complex 

interaction of people (election officials and voters), processes, and 

technology. Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia has its own 

election system with a somewhat distinct approach. Within each of these 

51 systems, the guidelines and procedures established for local election 

jurisdictions can be very general or specific. Each election system 

generally incorporates elements that are designed to allow eligible citizens 

to vote and ensures that votes are accurately counted. While election 

systems vary from one local jurisdiction to another, most election systems 

have the elements identified in figure 7. 

Figure 7: The Election Process Involves the Integration of People, Process, and Technology

Source: GAO.

People

Process

Technology

Voter

registration

Conducting 

elections

Vote counting 

and

certification

Absentee 

and 

early voting

Voting with 

provisional 

ballots
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 41 GAO-06-450 Elections

Delegation of Election 

Responsibility

Typically, states have decentralized elections so that the details of 

administering elections are determined at the local jurisdiction. States can 

be divided into two groups according to how they delegate election 

responsibilities to local jurisdictions. The first group include 41 states 

where election responsibilities are delegated to counties, with a few of 

these states delegating election responsibilities to some cities, and 1 state 

that delegates these responsibilities to election regions. We included the 

District of Columbia along with this group. The second group is composed 

of 9 states that delegate election responsibilities to subcounty 

governmental units, known by the U.S. Census Bureau as minor civil 

divisions (MCD). However, in 1 of these states, Minnesota, election 

functions are split between county-level governments and MCDs. For 

example, registration is handled exclusively by county officials, and 

functions, such as polling place matters, are handled by MCDs. Overall, 

about 10,500 local government jurisdictions are responsible for conducting 

elections nationwide, with the first group of states containing about onefourth of the local election jurisdictions and about three-fourths of the local 

election jurisdictions located in the states delegating responsibilities to 

MCDs. Although more election jurisdictions are in the 9 states, most of the 

population (88 percent of the U.S. population based on the Census of 2000) 

lives in the states delegating responsibilities primarily to counties. 

Voter Registration While voter registration is not a federal requirement, the District of 

Columbia and all states, except North Dakota, generally require citizens to 

register before voting.13 The deadline for registering, and what is required 

to register, varies; at a minimum, state eligibility provisions typically 

require a person to be a U.S. citizen, at least 18 years of age, and a resident 

of the state, with some states requiring a minimum residency period. 

Citizens apply to register to vote in various ways, such as at motor vehicle 

agencies, during voter registration drives, by mail, or at local voter registrar 

offices. Election officials process registration applications and compile and 

maintain the list of registered voters to be used throughout the 

administration of an election. Prior to HAVA, voter registration lists were 

not necessarily centralized at the state level, and separate lists were often 

13Historically, Wisconsin has not required voters in all jurisdictions to register to vote. Only 

municipalities with populations exceeding certain specified thresholds were required to 

register voters. Changes made in 2003 to Wisconsin’s election laws will require voter 

registration in every municipality regardless of population size. This registration 

requirement first applies to the 2006 spring primary election.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 42 GAO-06-450 Elections

managed by local election officials. HAVA requires voter registration 

information for federal elections to be maintained as a statewide 

computerized list and matched with certain state data, and that voter 

registration application information be matched with certain state data 

and, in some cases, with federal data, to help ensure that the voter list is 

accurate. 

Absentee and Early Voting All states and the District of Columbia have provisions allowing voters to 

cast their ballot before Election Day by voting absentee with variations on 

who may vote absentee, whether the voter needs an excuse, and the time 

frames for applying and submitting absentee ballots. In addition, some 

states also allow early voting, in which the voter goes to a specific location 

to vote in person prior to Election Day. As with absentee voting, the 

specific circumstances for early voting—such as the dates, times, and 

locations—are based on the state and local requirements. In general, early 

voting allows voters from any precinct in the jurisdiction to cast their vote 

before Election Day either at one specific location or at one of several 

locations. The early voting locations are staffed by poll workers who have a 

registration list for the jurisdiction and ballots specific to each precinct. 

The voter is provided with and casts a ballot for his or her assigned 

precinct.

Conducting Elections Election officials perform a broad range of activities in preparation for and 

on Election Day itself. Prior to an election, officials recruit and train poll 

workers to have the skills needed to perform their Election Day duties, 

such as opening and closing the polls, operating polling place equipment, 

and explaining and implementing provisional voting procedures for certain 

voters such as those who are not on the registration list. Where needed and 

required, election officials must also recruit poll workers who speak 

languages other than English. Polling places have to be identified as 

meeting basic standards for accessibility and having an infrastructure to 

support voting machines as well as voter and poll worker needs. Ballots are 

designed and produced to meet state requirements, voter language needs, 

and identify all races, candidates, and issues on which voters in each 

precinct in their jurisdiction will vote. Election officials seek to educate 

voters on topics such as what the ballot looks like, how to use a voting 

machine, and where their particular polling place is located. Finally, 

election officials seek to ensure that voting equipment, ballots, and 

supplies are delivered to polling places.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 43 GAO-06-450 Elections

On Election Day, poll workers set up and open the polling places. This can 

include tasks such as setting up the voting machines or voting booths, 

readying supplies, testing equipment, posting required signs and voter 

education information, and completing paperwork such as confirming that 

the ballot is correct for the precinct. Before a voter receives a ballot or is 

directed to a voting machine, poll workers typically are to verify his or her 

eligibility. The assistance provided to voters who are in the wrong precinct 

depends on the practices for that particular location.

Provisional Voting One of the most significant post-2000 election reforms found in HAVA, 

according to the Election Assistance Commission, is that states are 

required to permit individuals, under certain circumstances, to cast a 

provisional ballot in federal elections.14 More specifically, states are to 

provide a provisional ballot to an individual asserting to be (1) registered in 

the jurisdiction for which he or she desires to vote and (2) eligible to vote 

in a federal election, but (3) whose name does not appear on the official list 

of eligible voters for the polling place. In addition, provisional ballots are to 

be provided in elections for federal office to individuals who an election 

official asserts to be ineligible to vote, and for court-ordered voting in a 

federal election after the polls have closed. Although many states had some 

form of provisional balloting prior to the passage of HAVA, 44 of the 

50 states and the District of Columbia were required to provide provisional 

ballots for the 2004 general election. Under HAVA, 6 states were exempt 

from HAVA’s provisional voting requirements because they either permitted 

voters to register on Election Day or did not require voter registration.15

If individuals are determined to be eligible voters, their provisional ballots 

are to be counted as votes in accordance with state law, along with other 

types of ballots, and included in the total election results. 

14The United States Election Assistance Commission, 2004 Election Day Survey; How We 

Voted: People, Ballots, and Polling Places. September 2005.

15Under HAVA, states that had either (1) no voter registration requirements for voters with 

respect to federal elections (e.g., North Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election 

Day with respect to federal elections (as in Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, 

and Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject to HAVA’s provisional 

voting requirements.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 44 GAO-06-450 Elections

Vote Counting and 

Recounting

Following the close of the polls, election officials and poll workers 

complete a number of basic steps to get the votes counted and determine 

the outcome of the election. Equipment and ballots are to be secured, and 

votes are to be tallied or transferred to a central location for counting. The 

processes used to count or to recount election votes vary with the type of 

voting equipment used in a jurisdiction, state statutes, and local jurisdiction 

policies. Votes from Election Day, absentee ballots, early votes (where 

applicable), and provisional ballots are to be counted and consolidated for 

each race to determine the outcome. While preliminary results are 

available usually by the evening of Election Day, the certified results are 

generally not available until days later. Some states establish a deadline for 

certification of results, while other states do not. 

Voting Methods and 

Technologies

Voting methods are tools for accommodating the millions of voters in our 

nation’s approximately 10,000 local election jurisdictions. Since the 1980s, 

ballots in the United States have been cast and counted using five methods: 

paper ballots, lever machines, punch cards, optical scan, and DREs. Four of 

the five methods by which votes are cast and counted involve technology; 

only the paper ballot system does not use technology. The three newer 

methods—punch card, optical scan, and DRE—depend on computers to 

tally votes. Punch card and optical scan methods rely on paper ballots that 

are marked by the voter, while many DREs use computers to present the 

ballot to the voter. Voting systems utilize technology in different ways to 

implement these basic voting methods. For instance, some punch card 

systems include the names of candidates and issues on the printed punch 

card, while others use a booklet of candidates and issues that must be 

physically aligned with the punch card. The way systems are designed, 

developed, tested, installed, and operated can lead to a variety of situations 

where misunderstanding, confusion, error, or deliberate actions by voters 

or election workers can, in turn, affect the equipment’s performance in 

terms of accuracy, ease of use, security, reliability, and efficiency. In fact, 

some recent election controversies have been specifically associated with 

particular voting methods and systems. Nevertheless, all voting methods 

and systems can benefit from established information technology 

management practices that effectively integrate the people, processes, 

technologies.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 45 GAO-06-450 Elections

Scope and 

Methodology

For this report, we conducted a Web-based survey of election officials in all 

50 states and the District of Columbia, surveyed by mail a nationally 

representative stratified random probability sample of 788 local election 

jurisdictions, and conducted on-site interviews with election officials in 

28 local jurisdictions in 14 states. Copies of the survey instruments are in 

appendixes II and III. In addition, the results of our state and local surveys 

are presented in two supplemental GAO products that can be found on our 

Web site at www.gao.gov.16 Appendix IV provides a summary of 

jurisdictions we visited. In reporting the state survey data, actual numbers 

of states are provided. When reporting local jurisdiction survey data, we 

provide estimates for jurisdictions nationwide. Unless otherwise noted, the 

maximum sampling error, with 95 percent confidence, for estimates of all 

jurisdictions from our local jurisdiction survey is plus or minus 

5 percentage points (rounded).17 We also provide some national estimates 

by jurisdiction population size, and the sampling errors for these estimates 

are slightly higher. For these estimates, large jurisdictions are defined as 

those with a population over 100,000, medium jurisdictions have a 

population of over 10,000 to 100,000, and small jurisdictions have a 

population of 10,000 or less. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates from our 

local jurisdiction survey are within our planned confidence intervals. 

Jurisdictions in which we conducted on-site interviews were chosen based 

on a wide variety of characteristics, including voting methods used, 

geographic characteristics, and aspects of election administration, such as 

whether early voting was offered. We did not select jurisdictions we visited 

on the basis of size, but as appropriate, we identify the size of a jurisdiction 

we visited using the same groupings we used for our nationwide mail 

survey. 

16GAO, Elections: 2005 Survey of State Election Officials, GAO-06-451SP (Washington, 

D.C.: June 6, 2006); and GAO, Elections: 2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions,

GAO-06-452SP (Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2006).

17Measures of sampling error are defined by two elements: the width of the confidence 

intervals around the estimate (sometimes called the precision of the estimate) and the 

confidence level at which the intervals are computed. Because we followed a probability 

procedure based on random selections, our sample is only one of a large number of samples 

that we might have drawn. As each sample could have provided different estimates, we 

express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample results as a 95-percent 

confidence interval (e.g., plus or minus 5 percentage points). This is the interval that would 

contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a 

result, we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence intervals based on the mail 

survey includes the true values in the sample population.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 46 GAO-06-450 Elections

We also reviewed extensive prior GAO work and other national studies and 

reports, and attended an annual election official conference. A 

comprehensive description of our methodology for this report is contained 

in appendix V. 

We conducted our work between March 2005 and February 2006 in 

Washington, D.C.; Dallas; Los Angeles; and 28 local election jurisdictions in 

14 states, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.
Page 47 GAO-06-450 Elections

Chapter 2

Voter Registration Chapte3r

In general, the goal of a voter registration system is to ensure that eligible 

citizens who complete all the steps required of them to register to vote in 

their jurisdictions are able to have their registrations processed accurately 

and in a timely fashion, so they may be included on the rolls in time for 

Election Day. The November 2000 general election resulted in widespread 

concerns about voter registration in the United States. Headlines and 

reports questioned the mechanics and effectiveness of voter registration by 

highlighting accounts of individuals who thought they were registered 

being turned away from polling places on Election Day, the fraudulent use 

of the names of dead people to cast additional votes, and jurisdictions 

incorrectly removing the names of eligible voters from voter registration 

lists. With the passage of HAVA,1

 with respect to federal elections, most 

states were required to establish statewide computerized voter registration 

lists and perform certain list maintenance activities as a means to improve 

upon the accuracy of voter registration lists.2

 List maintenance is 

performed by election officials and consists of updating registrants’ 

information and deleting duplicate registrations and the names of 

registrants who are no longer eligible to vote.

The voter registration process includes the integration of people, 

processes, and technology involved in registering eligible voters and in 

compiling and maintaining accurate and complete voter registration lists. 

In managing the voter registration process and maintaining voter 

registration lists, state and local election officials must balance two goals—

minimizing the burden on eligible persons registering to vote, and ensuring 

that voter lists are accurate, that is, limited to those eligible to vote and that 

eligible registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the voter 

registration lists. This has been a challenging task, and remains so, as we 

and others have noted. While registering to vote appears to be a simple step 

in the election system generally, applying to register and being registered 

are not synonymous, and election officials face challenges in processing 

the voter registration applications they receive. This chapter describes 

various HAVA and state changes related to the voter registration processes 

that have occurred since the 2000 general election. It also examines 

1

Pub. L. No. 107-252,116 Stat. 1666 (2002).

2

HAVA section 303(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15483(a)). North Dakota did not have voter 

registration requirements for persons with respect to federal elections as of the date of 

HAVA’s enactment and, under HAVA, is therefore not subject to the act’s requirement to 

create and maintain a computerized statewide voter registration list.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 48 GAO-06-450 Elections

continuing and new registration challenges encountered by local 

jurisdictions for the 2004 general election. 

Overview With respect to voter registration, a significant change since the 2000 

general election is the HAVA requirement for states to each establish a 

single, uniform, statewide, computerized voter registration list for 

conducting elections for federal office. The HAVA requirements for states 

to develop statewide lists and verify voter information against state and 

federal agency records presented a significant shift in voter list 

management in many states. While the initial deadline to implement HAVA’s 

statewide list requirement was January 1, 2004, more than 40 states took 

advantage of a waiver allowing an extra 2 years to complete the task, or 

until January 1, 2006. The statewide registration lists for federal elections 

are intended to implement a system capable of maintaining voter 

registration lists that are more accurate by requiring states to (1) match 

voter registration application information against other state and federal 

agency databases or records to help ensure that only eligible voters are 

added to such lists, (2) identify certain types of ineligible voters whose 

names should be removed from the lists, and (3) identify individual voter 

names that appear more than once on the list to be removed from the lists. 

While HAVA defined some parameters for the required statewide voter 

registration lists and required matching voter information with certain state 

and federal records, the act leaves the choices on the methods of 

implementing such statewide list requirement to the discretion of the 

states. On the basis of our survey of state election officials, states varied in 

the progress made in implementing their statewide voter registrations lists, 

how they have implemented these systems, and the capabilities of their 

systems to match information with other state and federal agency records 

as well as many other features of the state systems.

In addition to requiring states to develop statewide voter registration lists, 

HAVA provides that states must require that mail registrants who have not 

previously voted in a federal election in the state are to provide certain 

specified types of identification with their mail application, and if they do 

not provide such identification with their application, these first-time mail 

registrants are to provide the identification at the polls. Furthermore, if 

such a voter does not have the requisite identification at the polls, HAVA 

requires that the voter be provided a provisional ballot with the status of 

his or her ballot to be determined by the appropriate state or local official. 

As with the statewide voter registration list requirement, HAVA leaves the 

choices on the methods of implementing the provisional voting 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 49 GAO-06-450 Elections

requirement to the discretion of the states. On the basis of interviews of 

officials in 28 local election jurisdictions, implementation of the 

requirement for first-time voters who registered by mail varied. One 

noteworthy variation is in the definition of mail registration, where some 

local jurisdictions we visited told us that applications received through 

voter registration drives would be treated as mail registrations subject to 

HAVA identification requirements and other local jurisdictions we visited 

told us applications from registration drives were not treated as mail 

registrations and therefore were not treated as subject to HAVA 

identification requirements.

As noted above, during 2004 and 2005 many states were in the process of 

implementing their HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists and 

associated requirements for maintaining the lists. Thus, the potential 

benefits to be gained from HAVA’s requirement for the statewide voter 

registration lists were not evident in many states at the time of the 

November 2004 general election. Maintenance requirements in HAVA 

intended to help states and local election jurisdictions to have access to 

more accurate voter registration list information, such as identifying 

duplicate registrations and matching the voter information against other 

state agency databases or records, were not yet fully implemented by many 

states. Many local jurisdictions were not yet seeing the benefits of being 

able to verify voter registration application information with state motor 

vehicle agency databases to identify eligible voters, or to match voter 

registration lists with state vital statistics agency records to identify 

deceased persons, and to appropriate state agency’s records to identify 

felons who may be ineligible to vote. Thus, on the basis of our nationwide 

survey and local election jurisdictions we visited, many local jurisdictions 

continued to encounter challenges with the voter registration lists that they 

had experienced in the 2000 general election, such as difficulties related to 

receiving inaccurate and incomplete voter registration information, 

multiple registrations, or ineligible voters appearing on the list. In addition, 

election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us they continued to 

face challenges obtaining voter registration applications from motor 

vehicle agencies and other NVRA entities.3

3

In 1993, the National Voter Registration Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10), among other 

things, expanded the number of locations and opportunities of citizens to apply to register 

to vote in federal elections at MVAs and other public organizations, such as public 

assistance agencies and armed forces recruiting centers. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 50 GAO-06-450 Elections

In addition, for some local election jurisdictions we visited, election 

officials told us that efforts on the part of various groups to get out the vote 

by registering new voters through voter registration drives created new 

challenges not identified to us as a problem in the 2000 general election. 

Specifically, at some local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us 

they faced a challenge processing large volumes of voter registration 

applications just prior to the deadlines for registration, which included 

challenges in some large jurisdictions to resolve issues of incomplete or 

inaccurate (and potentially fraudulent) applications submitted by entities 

conducting voter registration drives. 

Changes Required by 

HAVA Subsequent to 

the 2000 General 

Election

HAVA requires states to, among other things, (a) implement a single, 

uniform, computerized statewide voter registration list for conducting 

elections for federal office;4

 (b) perform regular maintenance by comparing 

the voter list against state records on felons and deaths; (c) verify 

information on voter registration applications with information in state 

motor vehicle agency databases or with a Social Security Administration 

database, as appropriate. In addition, HAVA imposes new identification 

requirements for certain mail registrants—such as, individuals who register 

by mail and have not previously voted in a federal election within the state.5

4

This HAVA-required statewide voter registration list is, among other things, to be defined, 

maintained, and administered at the state level. In addition, this list is to serve as a secure, 

centralized, and interactive database that is coordinated with other state agency databases 

and grants state and local election official immediate electronic access to information 

contained in the list.

5

These HAVA identification requirements also apply to individuals who register to vote in a 

jurisdiction by mail or have not previously voted in a jurisdiction when the jurisdiction is 

located in a state that does not have a HAVA compliant statewide voter registration list. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 51 GAO-06-450 Elections

HAVA Requirements for 

Statewide Voter 

Registration List

Historically, to ensure that only qualified persons vote, states and local 

jurisdictions have used various means to establish and compile voter 

registration lists.6

 Prior to HAVA, we noted in our October 2001 

comprehensive report on election processes nationwide that in compiling 

these lists, election officials used different methods to verify the 

information on registration forms, check for duplicate registrations, and 

update registration records, and we noted that states’ capabilities for 

compiling these lists varied. At the time, some states had statewide voter 

lists, but others did not and were not required to do so. Moreover, most 

jurisdictions we visited at the time maintained their own local, 

computerized voter lists.7

 Under HAVA, this has changed. HAVA requires 

the chief election official in the state to implement a “single, uniform, 

official, centralized, interactive, computerized statewide voter registration 

list” that must contain the name and registration information of every 

legally registered voter in the state. Under HAVA, states were required to be 

in compliance with the statewide voter registration list requirement by 

January 2004 unless they obtained a waiver until January 2006. Forty-one 

states and the District of Columbia obtained a waiver and thus, for the 2004 

general election, were not required to have their statewide voter 

registration lists in place.8

With respect to the HAVA required statewide voter registration list, states 

are to, among other things:

• Make the information in such lists electronically accessible to any 

election officials in the state.

• Ensure that such voter lists contain registration information on every 

legally registered voter in the state, with a unique identifier assigned 

to each legally registered voter. 

6

Throughout this chapter, the use of the term “voter registration list” refers specifically to 

the names of registered voters compiled by state and local officials in accordance with 

HAVA provisions. The term “voter registration system” refers more broadly to computer 

systems (stand-alone or Internet- or network-based) where voter registration lists reside in 

accordance with appropriate security and privacy measures.

7

GAO-02-3.

8

Nine states (Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South 

Dakota, and West Virginia) did not seek a waiver.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 52 GAO-06-450 Elections

• Verify voter identity; most states are required to match voter 

information obtained on the voter registration application for the 

applicant’s drivers’ license number or the last four digits of the voter’s 

Social Security number, when available, to state MVAs or the Social 

Security Administration databases. In connection with this 

requirement to verify voter registration application information, 

states must require that individuals applying to register to vote 

provide a current and valid driver’s license number, or the last four 

digits of their Social Security number; if neither has been issued to 

the individual, then the state is to assign a unique identifier to the 

applicant. The state MVA must enter into an agreement with the 

Social Security Administration (SSA), as applicable, to verify the 

applicant information when the last four digits of the Social Security 

number are provided, rather than a driver’s license number or state 

ID number.9

• Perform list maintenance on the statewide voter registration lists by 

coordinating them on a regular basis with state records on felony 

status and deaths, in order to identify and remove names of ineligible 

voters.10 List maintenance is also to be conducted to eliminate 

duplicate names.

• Implement safeguards ensuring that eligible voters are not 

inadvertently removed from statewide lists. 

9

Seven states (Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, and 

Virginia) required, at the time of our review, full Social Security numbers on applications for 

voter registration. HAVA provides that for states using full Social Security numbers on 

applications in accordance with section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974, the HAVA voter 

registration verification requirements are optional. Georgia’s right to require full Social 

Security numbers under this Privacy Act provision, however, has been the subject of recent 

litigation. In January 2005 a federal district court found that Georgia did not qualify to use 

full Social Security numbers under this Privacy Act provision (Schwier v. Cox, Civil No. 

1:00-CV-2820, (N.D. Ga. January 31, 2005)). The district court determined, in part, that 

Georgia must correspondingly revise its voter registration forms and instructions and 

expressly inform applicants that they are not required to provide their Social Security 

numbers. On February 16, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 

the district court’s January 2005 ruling (Schwier v. Cox, 439 F. 3d 1285 (2006)).

10In 1993, the National Voter Registration Act, among other things, limited the circumstances 

under which states could remove the names of registrants from registration lists for federal 

elections and required states to take certain steps to accurately maintain such voter 

registration lists by removing the names of certain types of ineligible persons. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 53 GAO-06-450 Elections

• Include technological security measures as part of the statewide list 

to prevent unauthorized access to such lists. 

Except for the 9 states that did not obtain a waiver from HAVA’s 

requirements for establishing a statewide voter registration list, all other 

states subject to the statewide list requirement were not required to 

perform list maintenance activities as defined in HAVA until the extended 

waiver deadline of January 2006. By the November 2004 general election, 

states were in various stages of implementing provisions of HAVA related 

to their statewide voter registration lists and performing voter list 

verification and maintenance, and had different capabilities and 

procedures at the state and local levels for performing required list 

maintenance functions. Many states reported that their statewide voter 

registration systems implementing the statewide list requirement include 

or will include additional election management features not required under 

HAVA.

Progress Establishing 

Statewide Voter 

Registration Lists Varied

Voter registration system development was an ongoing process in 2004 and 

2005. For the November 2004 general election, the use of technology to 

compile voter registration information remained an issue. Developing and 

implementing statewide computerized voter lists has been an ongoing 

process for many states, and state and local election officials reported 

encountering difficulties along the way. Our state survey and site visits 

suggest that states and jurisdictions were still coming to terms, as of the 

last half of calendar year 2005, with how their systems should be updated 

and whether states or jurisdictions should control the flow of information 

into statewide registration systems. 

As mentioned in chapter 1, HAVA vests the Attorney General with the 

responsibility of enforcing certain HAVA requirements with respect to the 

states. In January 2006, the Justice Department asked all states, the District 

of Columbia, and other covered territories to provide a detailed statement 

of their compliance with voting systems standards and implementation of a 

single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide 

voter registration list. If the states, the District of Columbia, or covered 

territories were not implementing HAVA’s requirements for the 

computerized statewide voter registration lists as of January 2006, the 

Justice Department reported that it then asked them to identify steps they 

planned to take to achieve full implementation of the HAVA-compliant 

statewide voter registration list and the date on which each step would be 

accomplished. According to Justice Department officials, they are 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 54 GAO-06-450 Elections

reviewing the information provided by the states, the District of Columbia, 

and such territories to make determinations of what, if any, enforcement 

action might be needed. The Department of Justice reports that it entered 

into a memorandum of agreement with California in November 2005 after 

that state realized it would not be able to fully meet HAVA’s requirements by 

the January 1, 2006, deadline. On March 1, 2006, the Department of Justice 

also filed suit in a federal district court against the state of New York 

alleging the state not to be in compliance with, among other things, HAVA’s 

requirement for a computerized statewide voter registration list and 

seeking a judicial determination of noncompliance and a court order 

requiring the state to develop a plan for how it will come into compliance.11

During our site visits in 2005, we asked local election officials about the 

status of their statewide registration systems. Election officials in some 

local jurisdictions we visited cited difficulties related to implementing their 

statewide voter registration systems involving, among other things, internal 

politics and technology-related challenges. For example, election officials 

in a large jurisdiction reported that a disagreement between the State 

Board of Elections and local election officials over the type of system to 

implement delayed the project for a year. State election officials wanted a 

system requiring all voter registrations to be entered at the state level but 

maintained locally. The local election officials expressed the view that such 

a system would result in a lack of control over data entry at the local level 

at the front end, while imposing accountability on them on the back end 

(data maintenance). During our interview in August 2005, these election 

officials told us that a statewide registration system had not been 

implemented yet. In some jurisdictions, the difficulties cited by election 

officials may have reflected the fact that they were establishing statewide 

voter registration systems for the first time. For example, in 1 large 

jurisdiction that was establishing a HAVA voter registration list from 

scratch, local election officials noted that at the time of our interview in 

August, the system was behind schedule, lacked the ability to identify 

duplicates, had no quality control, and was not planned to function as a 

real-time system. 

11United States v. New York State Board of Elections, Civil No. 06-CV-0263 (N.D. NY, March 

1, 2006).
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 55 GAO-06-450 Elections

State Capabilities for Matching 

Voter Registration Lists with 

State and Federal Records, as 

Required by HAVA, Were Under 

Way or Not Yet Achieved 

In our survey of states and the District of Columbia, and our survey of local 

election jurisdictions nationwide, among other things, we inquired about 

the status of their capabilities for meeting HAVA provisions for (1) verifying 

voter registration application information against MVA and SSA databases 

and (2) maintaining the statewide voter lists by comparing information on 

the statewide voter registration list against state death records and felon 

information, and discussed the issues during our local site visits. Our work 

focused on how states had matched or planned to match voter registration 

lists against other state records, as required by HAVA. However, it is 

important to note that the success of such matching in ensuring accurate 

voter registration lists is dependent upon the accuracy and reliability of the 

data in the databases used for matching. If that state’s MVA databases, felon 

records, death records, or other records used for matching are inaccurate, 

they can result in voter registration list errors.

Matching to MVA Databases

When a driver’s license or driver’s license number is presented as 

identification when registering to vote in an election for federal office, 

HAVA requires that states match the voter registration application 

information presented with that in the MVA records.12 In our survey of state 

election officials, we asked states whether their voter registration systems 

would have the capability to perform electronic matching of such voter 

registration information with state motor vehicle agency records for the 

purposes of verifying the accuracy of information on the registration 

application. Twenty-seven states reported they will have or currently had 

the capability to match on a real-time basis, 15 states and the District of 

Columbia reported they will have or currently had capability to match in 

batches, and 4 states reported they would not have the capability to 

perform electronic matching. The remaining 4 states included 2 states that 

reported that they are not subject to HAVA’s registration information 

verification requirement because they collect the full Social Security 

numbers on voter registration applications;13 1 state, North Dakota, which 

12HAVA section 303(a)(5) (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15483(a)(5)).

13The authority of one of these states (Georgia) to require full Social Security numbers has 

been the subject of recent litigation. In February 2006 a federal appeals court affirmed a 

January 2005 federal district court ruling that Georgia did not have the authority, under the 

Privacy Act of 1974, to require voter applicants to disclose their Social Security numbers on 

voter registration forms. Schwier v. Cox, 439 F. 3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2006). 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 56 GAO-06-450 Elections

does not require voter registration, did not respond, and 1 state reported 

that it was uncertain of its capability to perform electronic matching.

Matching with SSA Records

With respect to matching voter information with SSA data when a Social 

Security number is presented instead of a driver’s license, in our state 

survey, 7 states had and 26 states and the District of Columbia reported that 

they would have the capability, by January 1, 2006, to electronically match 

voter registration information with SSA (through the MVA); 10 states 

reported they planned to have this capability in place but not by January 

2006; and 6 states had not yet determined whether they could do so. Many 

states reported concerns with whether SSA would be able to return 

responses to verify requests in a timely manner. Specifically, 30 states and 

the District of Columbia reported some level of concern about the issue. 

When asked whether they thought local jurisdictions would be able to 

resolve nonmatches resulting from SSA verification checks, opinions were 

divided, with a number of states (21) expressing some degree of concern 

about this, while a nearly equal number (22 states and the District of 

Columbia) did not. 

In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration lists, we 

found that in one state (Iowa) that had verified its voter registration list 

with SSA before the 2004 general election, there was no unique match for 

2,586 names, according to the SSA records.14 As we stated in our report, 

Iowa officials said that the biggest problem they faced was that SSA did not 

specify what specific voter information did not match (i.e., was the 

mismatch in name, date of birth, or final four-digit Social Security number). 

Without that information, they were not able to efficiently resolve the nonmatching problems. In that same report, we also noted that an SSA official 

said that the system established to perform the HAVA matching on the fourdigit Social Security number is not able to provide that detail. In addition, 

we found that use of SSA’s database to identify deceased registrants, which 

is linked with the system established to perform the HAVA verification of 

voter registration application information, had matching and timeliness 

issues. 

14GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials 

Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478 (Washington, D.C.: June 2005).
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 57 GAO-06-450 Elections

Overall Matching Challenges 

As shown in figure 8, many states reported that they faced significant 

challenges when trying to match voter registration information with state 

records. For example, in our survey, 29 states and the District of Columbia 

reported that records with incomplete data posed a challenge; 19 states and 

the District of Columbia reported that obtaining records not maintained 

electronically was a challenge; and 23 states reported that verifying 

information against incompatible electronic record systems was also a 

challenge. 

Figure 8: Many States Report Challenges Matching Voter Registration Information 

with State Records

a

Includes the District of Columbia.

During our site visits to local jurisdictions, we obtained additional views on 

how well, in general, states were believed to perform various data0

10

20

30

40

Number of states

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

 records with

Matching

 incomplete dataa

 maintained electronicallya Obtaining records not

 against incompatible

Verifying information

 electronic record systems

30

20

23
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 58 GAO-06-450 Elections

matching functions.15 We asked local election officials to describe their 

state system’s ability to match voter registration information with MVA and 

SSA records and the system’s ability to verify information on eligibility 

status for felons, noncitizens, and others with other state databases or 

records. One jurisdiction in Illinois reported it was not sure how or if its 

voter registration system would be able to match data with MVA and SSA 

databases or to verify eligibility status for felons and by age. An official in a 

jurisdiction in Florida said that Florida’s system could not verify 

information on the eligibility status of felons, noncitizens, the mentally 

incompetent, or the underaged—though plans were under way to obtain 

information from the Clerk of Courts Information System to perform some 

of these tasks. 

Removing Voters Names from 

the Registration List

HAVA’s list maintenance provisions require states to match the statewide 

voter registration list information against certain state records to identify 

ineligible voters and duplicate names.16 If a voter is ineligible under state 

requirements and is to be removed from the statewide voter registration 

list, states are generally required to remove such names in accordance with 

NVRA provisions relating to the removal of voter names from registration 

lists for federal elections. Under NVRA, in the administration of voter 

registration for federal elections, states may not remove the names of 

people who are registered to vote for nonvoting and names may be 

removed only for certain specified reasons: at the request of the registrant; 

by reason of criminal conviction, as provided by state law; by reason of 

mental incapacity, as provided by state law; or pursuant to a general 

program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible 

voters from the official lists by reason of the death of the voter or on the 

ground that the voter has changed address to a location outside the 

election jurisdiction on the basis of change of address information from the 

U.S. Postal Service (but only if either (1) the voter confirms in writing a 

change of address to a place outside the election jurisdiction or (2) the 

voter has failed to respond to a confirmation mailing and the voter has not 

voted or appeared to vote in any election between the time of such notice 

and the passage of two federal general elections).17

15HAVA’s list maintenance provisions require states to compare the statewide registration list 

with state records on felons and deaths to identify ineligible voters as well as to identify 

duplicate registrations. 

16HAVA section 303(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15483).

1742 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 59 GAO-06-450 Elections

Reasons Names Removed from Registration Lists

In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked about the 

reasons names were removed from voter registration lists. On the basis of 

our survey of local election jurisdictions, the following table shows various 

reasons that jurisdictions removed names from voter registration lists for 

the 2004 general election and our estimates of how frequently names were 

removed for that reason. For example, the most frequent reason was the 

death of the voter (76 percent). Names were removed with about equal 

frequency because the voter requested that his or her name be removed (54 

percent) or the registrant’s name appeared to be a duplicate (52 percent). 

The least frequent reason was for mental incompetency (10 percent). In 

many jurisdictions, names were not removed but rather placed on an 

inactive list for a period of time. In our survey of local jurisdictions, nearly 

half, or an estimated 46 percent, took this step. 

Table 1: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions That Removed Names from Voter 

Registration List for 2004 General Election for Various Reasons 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. 

Name removed because:

Percentage of all 

jurisdictions 

Information received from state/county vital statistics offices 

identified registrants as deceased

76

Registrants requested that their names be removed from the 

voter registration list (e.g., moved out of jurisdiction or other 

reason)

54

Registrant’s name appeared to be a duplicate 52

Change of address information received from U.S. Postal Service 

showed that the registrants had moved outside of the jurisdiction 

where registered

45

Registrant failed to respond to a notice from the registrar and had 

not voted or had not appeared to vote in the most recent two 

federal elections

38

Felony records received from federal/state/local governmental 

entities identified registrant as ineligible to vote or register to vote 

because of a felony conviction

38

Newspaper obituaries identified registrant as deceased 31

Names removed from the voter registration list for other reasons 11

Information received from federal/state/local courts indicating that 

registrant had been judged to be mentally incompetent

10
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 60 GAO-06-450 Elections

In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration lists,18

on the basis of interviews of election officials in 14 jurisdictions and 7 state 

election offices, we reported that in larger jurisdictions, the task of 

identifying and removing registrants who died can be substantial. For 

example, in the city of Los Angeles, in 1 week in 2005 alone, almost 300 

persons died. 

The issue of felons voting unlawfully—that is, voting when their felony 

status renders them ineligible to voter under state law—was a high-profile 

issue in some jurisdictions. According to an election official in a 

Washington jurisdiction we visited, this issue was identified during the 

November 2004 general election. This official also told us that the Secretary 

of State is working to establish a database that will indicate felony status 

and cancel the registration of felons. This election official noted that the 

jurisdiction rarely receives information from federal courts on felony 

convictions. Under federal law, U.S. Attorneys are to give written notice of 

felony convictions in federal district courts to the chief state election 

official of the offender’s state of residence.19 In our June 2005 report on 

maintaining accurate voter registration lists,we found that U.S. Attorneys 

had not consistently provided this information, and while the law did not 

establish a standardized time frame or format for forwarding the federal 

felony conviction information, election officials in 7 states we visited 

reported that the felony information received from U.S. Attorneys was not 

always timely and was sometimes difficult to interpret.20 We recommended 

that the U.S. Attorneys provide information in a more standardized manner.

Removing Duplicate Names

Under HAVA, duplicate names on the statewide voter registration list are 

also to be identified and removed. In our state survey, 49 states and the 

District of Columbia reported that their voter registration systems will 

include a function for checking duplicate voter registration records.21 On 

the basis of our nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 

18GAO-05-478.

1942 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(g). 

20GAO-05-478.

21One state responded that it did not know whether its system would include checking for 

duplicates.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 61 GAO-06-450 Elections

72 percent of local jurisdictions employed a system of edit checks 

(automated controls to identify registration problems) to identify 

duplicates. Our prior work has also found that states were, for the most 

part, able to handle duplicate registrations—though obtaining timely, 

accurate data to facilitate the identification of duplicate registrations has 

been viewed as a challenge among some state election officials. 

Specifically, in our February 2006 report on certain states’ (9 states that did 

not seek a waiver until January 1, 2006 and were to implement a 

computerized statewide voter registration list by January 1, 2004) 

experiences with implementing HAVA’s statewide voter registration lists, 

we found that 8 of the 9 states we reviewed screened voter applications to 

identify duplicate registrations, and most did so in real time.22 We also 

reported that 8 of these 9 states checked voter registration lists for 

duplicate registrations on an annual, monthly, or other periodic basis. And 

4 of the 9 states reported that implementing the HAVA requirements led to 

some or great improvement in the accuracy of their voter lists by reducing 

duplicate registrations or improving the quality of voter information before 

it was entered into the statewide voter list. 

Checking for duplicates remained a challenge for some in 2004 and 2005, 

however. In our June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter 

registration lists, we noted that officials in 7 of the 21 local election 

jurisdictions we spoke with during 2004 and 2005 had some concern about 

the accuracy and timeliness of data they received to identify duplicate 

registrants and verify that registrants resided within the jurisdiction.23

They noted that the matching and validation of names are complex and 

made more so when considering aliases and name changes, as are matches 

such as “Margie L. Smith” with “Margaret Smith.” Officials from several 

states who reported, at the time of our review, that their state had not 

implemented a statewide voter registration system noted that there was no 

way to identify duplicates outside their jurisdiction. 

22These are the 9 states that implemented the HAVA requirement to have statewide voter 

registration lists in place by the earlier deadline of January 1, 2004.

23GAO-05-478.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 62 GAO-06-450 Elections

Most States Reported Having 

Established Centralized Voter 

Registration Systems, and Half 

Reported They Can Enter Voter 

Information on a Real-Time Basis

While HAVA requires that both state and local election officials have 

immediate electronic access to information in the statewide voter 

registration list, HAVA grants states discretion as to the method used to 

ensure that this capability is established.24 According to EAC, state and 

local election officials may determine whether to establish (a) a top-down 

system, whereby the statewide voter registration list resides on a state 

database hosted on a single, central platform (e.g., a mainframe or client 

servers), which state and local election officials may query directly; 

(b) a bottom-up system, whereby the statewide voter list is stored on a 

state-level database that can be downloaded to jurisdictions and updated 

by the state only when the jurisdictions send new registration information 

back to the state;25 or (c) take another approach. According to the EAC 

voluntary guidance on HAVA’s statewide voter registration system, the 

top-down approach most closely matches HAVA requirements—but other 

configurations may be used as long as they meet the HAVA requirement 

for a single, uniform list that allows election officials to have 

immediate access. 

Our 2005 survey of state election officials sought information on how states 

were implementing statewide computerized voter registration systems. We 

asked, among other things, whether states were using a top-down or a 

bottom-up approach. In response, 40 states and the District of Columbia 

reported that they have a database maintained by the state, with 

information supplied by local jurisdictions (top-down system); 4 states 

reported that local jurisdictions retain their own lists and transmit 

information to a statewide list (a bottom-up system); and 5 states reported 

they use a hybrid of these two options. We also asked whether state 

election officials would have immediate, real-time access to their state lists 

for the purposes of entering new voter registration information, updating 

existing information, and querying voter registration records. About half 

the states and the District of Columbia reported they had or would have all 

these capabilities. Specifically, 24 states and the District of Columbia 

reported they had or would have as of January 2006, real-time access for 

entering new voter registration information, while 23 states reported they 

did not plan to do so and 2 states did not respond. In addition, 26 states and 

24HAVA section 305 (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15485).

25According to EAC, a bottom-up system remains static until the state electronically 

provides the next updated version; registration information held solely in a local database is 

not part of the official registration list until it is electronically transmitted to the state and 

added to the list. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 63 GAO-06-450 Elections

the District of Columbia reported that they had or would have as of January 

2006, real-time access for updating existing voter registration information, 

while 21 states reported they did not plan to do so and 2 states did not 

respond. And 47 states and the District of Columbia reported they had or 

would have as of January 2006 real-time access for querying all state voter 

registration records, while 1 state reported it would not do so and 1 state 

did not respond. For each of these questions, one state reported it too 

would have these capabilities, but not by the January 1, 2006, HAVA 

deadline. 

We also sought state election officials’ views on whether election officials 

in local jurisdictions would have immediate, real-time access to voter list 

information for the same three purposes stated above: entering new 

information, updating existing information, and querying records. In our 

state survey, most states and the District of Columbia reported that local 

jurisdictions had these capabilities. Specifically, 46 states and the District 

of Columbia reported that local jurisdictions had or would have as of 

January 2006, real-time access for entering new voter registration 

information, and 3 other states reported that they planned to do so as well, 

but not by January 1, 2006. Also, 46 states and the District of Columbia 

reported that local jurisdictions had or would have as of January 2006, 

real-time access for updating existing voter registration information, and 

3 other states planned to do so as well, but not by the deadline. Finally, 

47 states and the District of Columbia reported local jurisdictions had or 

would have as of January 2006 the capability to query records for their 

jurisdictions in real time, and 2 states planned to do so, but not by January 

2006. Figure 9 compares the capability of state and local jurisdiction 

election officials to access the voter registration lists to perform certain 

tasks. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 64 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 9: States Reporting That They Had or Would Have as of January 2006, 

Capability for Real-Time Access to Voter Registration List to Enter, Update, and 

Query Information

Most States Reported They Will 

Match Statewide Voter 

Registration List Information 

Electronically against State 

Databases 

While HAVA’s list maintenance provisions require states to coordinate 

statewide voter registration list information with certain other state 

records within their state in order to identify and remove ineligible names, 

the act does not specifically provide that such coordination must be done 

electronically. However, to determine whether state systems had or would 

have the capability to perform electronic data matching, our survey asked 

states about existing or planned electronic capability. As shown in figure 

10, more than half the states reported that they had, or planned to have, the 

ability to match voter registration information electronically with state 

records on felony convictions and deceased registrants. Specifically, 

25 states reported they had and 15 states reported that they would have the 

capability to electronically match against state death records as of January 

2006, and 6 states and the District of Columbia planned to have the 

capability, but not by January 2006. Three states reported that they did not 

0

10

20

30

40

50

Access for

querying

information

Access for

updating

information

Access for

entering

information

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

States and District of Columbia

Local jurisdictions

25

27

47 47 48 48

Number of states and District of Columbia
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 65 GAO-06-450 Elections

plan to have this capability. With respect to identifying ineligible felons, 

16 states reported they had, and 15 reported they would have the capability 

to electronically match against felony conviction records as of January 

2006, while 9 states planned to do so but would not have done so by 

January 2006. In addition, 7 states and the District of Columbia did not plan 

to have this capability, and 2 states had not determined whether to have the 

capability. 

Figure 10: States’ Reported Capabilities to Electronically Match Voter Registration 

Information with State Death Records and Felony Conviction Records

a

Includes District of Columbia.

On the topic of states’ efforts to meet HAVA’s data-matching requirements 

electronically—as opposed to transmitting paper records—EAC 

0

10

20

30

40

50

Don't know

No capabiltiya

Planned for capability

Had or would have

No capabiltiy

Planned for capability

Had or would have

Number of states

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

capability by Jan. 2006

 after Jan. 2006a

 capabiltiy by Jan. 2006

 after Jan. 2006

2

8 9

31

40

7

3

Matching state death records

Matching state felony conviction records
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 66 GAO-06-450 Elections

recommends that voter registration information be transmitted 

electronically, particularly between states and their MVAs. EAC further 

recommends that to the extent allowed by state law and available 

technologies, the electronic transfer between statewide voter registration 

lists and coordinating verification databases should be accomplished 

through direct, secure, interactive, and integrated connections. While EAC 

provided guidance to states for their statewide systems, under HAVA, the 

states are to define the parameters for implementing interactive and 

integrated systems. 

Security of Voter Information in 

the Statewide Voter Registration 

Lists 

HAVA requires election officials to provide adequate technological 

database security for statewide voter registration lists that is designed to 

prevent unauthorized access.26 EAC provided states with voluntary 

guidance, issued in July 2005, to help clarify HAVA’s provisions for 

computerized statewide voter registration lists. Among other things, the 

EAC guidance noted that such computer security must be designed to 

prevent unauthorized users from altering the list or accessing private or 

otherwise protected information contained on the list. Access may be 

controlled through a variety of tools, including network- or system-level 

utilities and database applications (such as passwords and “masked” data 

elements). Special care must be taken to ensure that voter registration 

databases are protected when linked to outside systems for the purposes of 

coordination. Any major compromise of the voter registration system could 

lead to considerable election fraud.27

We sought information on what documented standards or guidance for 

computer and procedural controls would be in place to prevent 

unauthorized access to the lists. In our state survey, 45 states and the 

District of Columbia reported having such standards or guidance, 3 plan to 

do so, and 1 reported that it did not know. We also asked states what 

actions they had taken or planned to take to deal with privacy and intrusion 

issues. We asked, for instance, what, if anything, had been done to install or 

activate mechanisms to detect or track unauthorized actions affecting the 

state’s computerized voter registration system. A majority of states 

26HAVA section 303(a)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15483(a)(3)).

27Election fraud includes conduct that corrupts the electoral process for (1) registering 

voters; (2) obtaining, marking, or tabulating ballots; or (3) canvassing and certifying election 

results. Types of fraudulent conduct may include, among other things, voting by ineligibles, 

voting more than once, voter impersonation, intentional disruption of polling places either 

physically or by corrupting tabulating software, or destroying ballots or voter registrations. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 67 GAO-06-450 Elections

reported actions had been taken or were to be taken at some point. 

Specifically, 26 states reported taking action as of August 1, 2005, while 

12 states and the District of Columbia reported they would do so by 

January 1, 2006. An additional 4 states reported that actions were planned, 

but at no particular point in time. In a related question, we asked what 

actions had been taken or were planned to install or activate mechanisms 

to protect voter privacy. Again, a majority of states reported actions had 

been taken or were to be taken at some point. Specifically, 32 states 

reported taking action as of August 1, 2005, while 13 states and the District 

of Columbia reported they would do so by January 1, 2006. Two other 

states reported actions would be taken at a later point in time. 

During our site visits, we asked local election officials what standards or 

procedures were used for the November 2004 general election to help 

ensure that the registration list was secure and that the privacy of 

individuals was protected. Election officials in most jurisdictions reported 

that voter information (such as name and address) is public information if 

it is to be used for political purposes—though some do not release Social 

Security numbers, and others limit access to this information by requiring a 

fee. Some local election officials noted that security standards for this 

information were not set by the state but rather at the county or local level, 

though many look to the state for future guidance on standards. The type of 

security in place to restrict access to voter registration records varied by 

jurisdiction; among the procedures commonly used were password 

protection (so that only certain election officials could log onto the voter 

registration system to access the information); storage of voter registration 

records in locked facilities; use of “best practice” protocols such as system 

firewalls; and in some cases, registration information is maintained on a 

computer system that is separate from the jurisdiction’s central system. 

Along these lines, 1 jurisdiction noted that it planned to implement a public 

key infrastructure (PKI). A PKI is a system of computers, software, 

policies, and people that can be used to facilitate the protection of sensitive 

information and communications. The official noted it is a felony in that 

jurisdiction to use a PKI authorization without authorization from the State 

Board of Elections. Election officials in another jurisdiction we visited told 

us that all voter registration system users must log on using unique user IDs 

and passwords, which are maintained by the county registrar. The system 

tracks all data entries and changes, which user made them, and when they 

were made. In a few jurisdictions, election officials said they grant 

additional privacy to the records of voters involved in domestic disputes or 

other law enforcement matters. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 68 GAO-06-450 Elections

When asked whether they had any plan to develop or change existing 

security standards or procedures, local election officials in 16 of the 

28 jurisdictions we visited told us there were no plans to alter current 

practices, though some noted they were not sure. Among those indicating 

that security procedures were being enhanced, election officials in 1 large 

jurisdiction said they planned to enclose their computer systems server in a 

secure case with restricted access. Another official in a large jurisdiction in 

another state said that because of a change in state law in 2004, a hard copy 

of voter records was no longer available for public inspection. 

Sharing Registration and 

Eligibility Information among 

States Is Limited

As mentioned earlier, the HAVA computerized statewide voter registration 

list provisions require states to perform list maintenance to identify 

duplicate registrations, deceased registrants, and registrants who may be 

ineligible to vote under state law based upon a felony conviction. However, 

we note that requirements for matching voter registration lists with certain 

state records leaves some potential gaps for incomplete and inaccurate 

voter registration lists because election officials may not have information 

regarding registered voters who die out of state or who are in prison in 

another state and ineligible because of a criminal conviction. To determine 

whether states went beyond HAVA requirements to share voter registration 

data with other states to identify registrants who died in another state, 

were incarcerated in another state, or registered in another state, we asked 

on our survey of state election officials whether they had taken action to 

electronically exchange voter registration information with at least 1 other 

state and whether they were sharing registration information routinely with 

other states. In our state survey, 31 states and the District of Columbia 

reported that they did not plan to electronically exchange voter registration 

information with another state. However, 35 states and the District of 

Columbia reported they share information with states when a new 

registrant indicates he or she previously resided in another state. Other 

types of information sharing across state lines were less common. For 

instance, 6 states reported sharing voter registration information with 

neighboring states, and 1 state reported that it shared information with 

states where an individual is known to reside part of the year. In our state 

survey, 14 states reported they do not currently share voter registration 

information with other states. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 69 GAO-06-450 Elections

We analyzed state and federal voter registration applications to determine 

whether these applications provided space for applicants to indicate they 

were registered in other states or in other jurisdictions within the same 

state to identify duplicate registrations.28 We obtained state application 

forms during site visits with local election jurisdictions, from state Web 

sites or, if not available from there, we obtained the application from the 

state. Registration forms were those on the Web site or obtained from the 

states as of January 2006. Applications for the 46 states and the District of 

Columbia and both federal applications had a place on their registration 

application where registration applicants could indicate prior registration 

in another state on their forms. Three states (Kentucky, Texas, and 

Wyoming) did not include a place on their registration forms to identify 

prior registration information in another state.29 Forty-five states and the 

District of Columbia included a space for registration applicants to indicate 

prior registration in another jurisdiction within their state on their forms, 

or in the case of the District of Columbia applicants were to indicate the 

address of their last registration. Four states (Alaska, Hawaii, Kentucky, 

and Wyoming) did not provide space to indicate prior registration within 

their state. Figure 11 is an example of a state registration form that 

provided a space for the voter registration applicant to indicate that he or 

she had registered in another state. 

28The National Voter Registration Act required the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to 

develop a mail voter registration application form for elections for federal office. NVRA also 

requires states to accept and use this federal mail voter registration application form for the 

registration of voters in elections for federal office. Pursuant to HAVA, various FEC 

functions, including those relating to the federal mail voter registration form application 

were transferred to the Election Assistance Commission.

29The total number of states does not add to 50 because North Dakota does not require 

voters to register to vote and therefore does not have voter registration forms.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 70 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 11: Virginia Voter Registration Form Indicating whether the Voter Had Registered Elsewhere

On the basis of our survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimated that 

12 percent of local jurisdictions administered their own registration 

application form in addition to the state registration application. Of the 

12 percent who had their own form, we estimate that 70 percent had space 

on their voter registration applications so that an applicant can indicate

Source: State Board of Elections Web site for Virginia.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 71 GAO-06-450 Elections

whether he or she was previously registered in another state.30 However, 

we estimate that about a third did not capture this information on their 

forms. 

Many States Have or Plan to 

Have Additional Election 

Management Features in Voter 

Registration Systems

Although HAVA’s voter registration-related provisions focus primarily on 

state election management activities for developing, verifying, and 

maintaining voter lists, we sought information on what other types of 

registration system upgrades, if any, states planned, and we asked at the 

sites we visited what additional system capabilities, if any, had been 

implemented or planned. In our state survey, 15 states reported taking 

action to upgrade the processing speed or records capacity of their systems 

as of August 2005; 6 states reported that such actions would be taken by 

January 2006; and 12 states and the District of Columbia reported they 

would take such action at a later time. 

In other recent work, we have also looked at selected states’ efforts to 

enhance their statewide voter list systems. In our February 2006 report on 

certain states’ experiences with implementing HAVA’s statewide voter 

registration lists, we found that 7 of 9 states that reported implementing 

HAVA provisions for a computerized, statewide voter registration system 

by January 1, 2004, also reported that they have upgraded or enhanced their 

systems, or planned to so do, to include additional election management 

capabilities.31 For example, Arizona reported plans to upgrade its current 

system to reflect reciprocity agreements with other states, so that election 

officials can be alerted when a voter moves from state to state, and will 

allow election officials to retrieve data on such issues as voter petitions, 

provisional ballots, poll worker training, and polling locations. Other states 

reported adding or planning similar enhancements. Kentucky reported 

another type of enhancement: It has used its statewide computerized voter 

registration system to establish voter information centers on the state’s 

Web site, to assist applicants and staff in the voter registration process. 

During our site visits, we asked local election officials to comment on the 

election management functions their voter registration systems might 

perform. While some local election officials noted they were not certain 

30The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +11 or -13 percentage points.

31GAO, Election Reform: Nine States’ Experiences Implementing Federal Requirements to 

Establish Computerized Voter Registration Lists, GAO-06-247 (Washington, D.C.: February 

2006).
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 72 GAO-06-450 Elections

whether their new statewide voter registration systems would include the 

same array of features as the local county versions, other local election 

officials in some jurisdictions responded that they expect their statewide 

systems to be able to perform some or all of the following functions: 

• maintain records confirming mailings to new registrants,

• generate letters informing rejected applicants of reasons for 

rejection,

• generate forms or mailing labels,

• note status or date of absentee applications and ballots sent and 

received,

• identify polling places for use on Election Day, and

• identify poll workers. 

In some jurisdictions, other capabilities were mentioned; 2 large 

jurisdictions noted, for instance, that bar coding would be used to identify 

registrants, and 2 other large jurisdictions indicated that their systems 

would track and maintain candidate petition information. 

Not all jurisdictions expressed equal confidence in the extra (non-HAVArelated) capabilities of their systems. Election officials in a couple of large 

jurisdictions, for instance, told us they were not certain their statewide 

voter system would have features comparable to those already in place, 

and that their vendor or state was taking a one-size-fits-all approach for all 

jurisdictions regardless of size, rather than taking specific local needs into 

account. In some jurisdictions, election officials stated that their statewide 

systems were still too new to know whether these additional functions 

would be operational, and some said they were not yet familiar with all the 

system’s capabilities. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 73 GAO-06-450 Elections

Implementation of 

Identification Requirements 

for First-Time Mail 

Registrants Varied

HAVA imposed new identification requirements for certain mail 

registrants—such as, individuals who register by mail and have not 

previously voted in a federal election within the state.32 These individuals 

(first-time mail registrants) must provide certain specified types of 

identification either by submitting copies of such identification during the 

mail registration process or by presenting such identification when voting 

in person for the first time following their mail registration.33 Moreover, 

first-time mail registrants are to be informed on the application that 

appropriate identifying information must be submitted with the mailed 

form in order to avoid additional identification requirements upon voting 

for the first time. An individual who asserts that he or she has registered by 

mail and desires to vote in person but who does not meet the identification 

requirements may cast a provisional ballot under HAVA’s provisional 

language. However, according to election officials in some jurisdictions we 

visited, casting a provisional ballot requires that these voters are to provide 

identification to election officials by a specified time (e.g., by close of polls 

on Election Day or within a certain number of days following Election Day) 

to have their ballot count. On the basis of our local survey, we estimate that 

32 percent of local jurisdictions encountered a problem in counting 

provisional ballots because voters did not provide identification as 

specified by HAVA for mail-in registrants and were voting for the first time 

in the precinct or jurisdiction.34 Our discussion of provisional voting 

processes appears in chapter 5. 

32HAVA section 303(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15483(b)).

33Acceptable forms of identification to meet this HAVA requirement include, for example, a 

current and valid photo identification, a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, 

government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and 

address of the voter. 

34The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 6 percentage points.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 74 GAO-06-450 Elections

HAVA, in general, provides states with discretion as to the methods of 

implementing HAVA’s identification requirements for first-time mail 

registrants, such as ensuring that voters comply with the requirements and, 

subject to certain limitations, allows states to establish requirements that 

are stricter than those required under HAVA.35 According to our state 

survey, 7 states reported that such HAVA requirements were already 

covered by existing state legislation or some type of state executive action 

(such as orders, directives, regulations, or policies); 44 states and the 

District of Columbia reported that they enacted new legislation or took 

some type of state executive action (such as orders, directives, regulations, 

or polices) to address the identification requirements in HAVA for first-time 

mail registrants.36

We analyzed state and federal (NVRA) voter registration application forms 

to determine whether the applications provided instructions on 

identification requirements for individuals registering in a jurisdiction for 

the first time. We obtained some state application forms during site visits 

with local election jurisdictions, and others from state Web sites or, if not 

available from there, we obtained the application from the state. 

Registration forms were those on the Web site or obtained from the states 

as of January 2006. Our analysis showed that 39 states and the District of 

Columbia had information on their application forms and 10 states did not 

provide this information on their forms.37 The NVRA voter registration form 

included this information. Figure 12 is an example of a voter registration 

form that included instructions for first-time mail registrants. 

35HAVA sections 304 and 305 (codified at 42 U.S.C.§§ 15484, and 15485, respectively). For 

example, Arizona submitted an inquiry to Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division 

asking whether it was permissible under HAVA for a state to mandate that a potential voter 

show identification at the polls prior to receiving a provisional ballot. The Civil Rights 

Division responded, in part, in September 2005, that while HAVA requires states to allow 

voters who meet certain specified conditions the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot, 

states are free to prescribe their own rules for deciding whether to count those ballots. 

(September 1, 2005, letter to the State of Arizona from the Civil Rights Division).

36Three states (California, Texas, and Washington) reporting that existing legislation or 

executive action addressed HAVA first-time voter identification requirements also reported 

enacting additional legislation or taking executive action to address such HAVA 

requirements.

37The 10 states are Alabama, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South 

Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Three of these states, Hawaii, Kentucky, and 

Tennessee, require full Social Security numbers on applications for voter registration.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 75 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 12: Colorado Voter Registration Form with Instructions for First-Time Mail Registrants

Source: Secretary of State Web site for Colorado.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 76 GAO-06-450 Elections

During our site visits, we asked local election officials whether they 

considered registering by mail to only include when someone mails in a 

single application or to also include mailed-in applications from voter 

registration drives. Five local jurisdictions told us that applications 

received by mail as a result of voter registration drives are not treated as 

mail-in applications and therefore are not treated as subject to mail 

registration identification requirements under HAVA; 3 jurisdictions told us 

that applications submitted by voter registration drives were treated as 

mail-in applications subject to HAVA’s mail registration identification 

requirements. Election officials in 1 of these jurisdictions told us that under 

their state law (Pennsylvania) all voters who are voting for the first time in 

a district must show a valid form of identification, regardless of how they 

registered to vote. 

Also, during our site visits we asked local election officials how they 

processed voter registration applications from first-time mail registrants 

for the 2004 general election. Election officials reported taking different 

approaches, many involving mailed communications from election officials 

sent back to the applicant, particularly if required information was missing. 

For example, at least 2 large jurisdictions reported that first-time voters 

who did not mail in identification with their applications were sent letters 

instructing them to do so. Similarly, officials in 2 jurisdictions in another 

state said letters were sent to applicants whose applications were 

incomplete, advising them of the need to provide photo ID—and informed 

applicants that if they failed to do so, they may have to use a provisional 

ballot on Election Day, which would be subject to the voter subsequently 

providing identification. In other jurisdictions, though local election 

officials reported taking steps to process incomplete applications from 

first-time voters, they did not necessarily give the applicant a chance to 

correct the application prior to Election Day. For example, in a medium 

jurisdiction we visited, first-time voter applicants who did not submit 

proper identification were to have been given provisional ballots. However, 

the election official told us her office did not inform them about this in 

advance for the 2004 general election. 

In addition to contacting applicants to inform them of the need to provide 

identification discussed above, 1 jurisdiction we visited told us that it 

periodically provided a list of applicants who provided driver’s license 

numbers but did not provide identification at the time of registration to the 

state MVA as another means to verify the registrant’s identity. In this case, 

the MVA compared the county clerk office’s registration list against its list 

of licensed drivers to see if the name, date of birth, and driver’s license 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 77 GAO-06-450 Elections

number matched, and returned the results to election officials. If all these 

data elements matched, the election official certified the records and these 

prospective voters were not required to show identification at the polling 

place. 

If a registrant did not provide identification prior to Election Day, local 

election officials at all 28 sites we visited reported having a system for 

recording first-time voters who failed to provide identification and 

transferring that information to a polling site by annotating the poll book. 

One large jurisdiction, for example shaded the voter line in the poll book, 

while another printed the words “ID required” next to the voter’s name. 

With respect to voters who presented themselves at a polling place and did 

not have identification, election officials at some local jurisdictions we 

visited described different ways that the voter’s provisional ballot could 

become verified. For example, a jurisdiction in Georgia said that if a voter 

did not provide identification at the polls, it allowed the voter to vote a 

provisional ballot and the voter had until 2 days after the election to 

provide identification. Another jurisdiction in Kansas told us that the voter 

had until the day that votes were canvassed to provide identification. Other 

jurisdictions told us that voters would have until the close of the polls on 

Election Day to provide identification to election officials. A local 

jurisdiction in Washington told us that if the voter did not have 

identification on Election Day, the voter would vote a provisional ballot 

and election officials would subsequently have the voter’s signature 

matched against the registration application to verify the voters identity. 

Processing 

Registration 

Applications Received 

from MVAs and Other 

NVRA Entities 

Remained a Challenge 

Citizens generally have numerous opportunities to apply to register to vote. 

Figure 13 shows several of these opportunities—such as applying at a local 

election office, at a motor vehicle agency, or through a voter registration 

drive—and the processes used to submit an application.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 78 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 13: Example of the Voter Registration Application Process

Problems with applications submitted to MVAs have been identified as a 

challenge since 1999. Our October 2001 report on election processes found 

that 46 percent of local jurisdictions nationwide had problems processing 

applications submitted at MVAs and other public registration sites

Source: GAO.

Voters

Voter completes an application 

at a voter registration drive

Voter goes to local MVA office 

and completes an application

E-mail

Internet

Mail

Hand delivery

Mail

Hand delivery

Mail

Hand delivery

Mail

Hand delivery

Mail

Hand delivery

State election office

Local election office

Voter obtains and completes an 

application from a public entity, 

such as a library, or community 

center or via the internet

Voter goes to local election 

office and completes an 

application

Voter goes to an 

NVRA-designated agency 

and fills out an application

- Receives applications

- Obtains additional information to 

 complete application

- Verifies application information

- Confirms with newly registered voter 

 by mailing confirmation card

- Updates statewide voter registration list 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 79 GAO-06-450 Elections

designated pursuant to NVRA requirements.38 In its reports to Congress on 

the impact of NVRA on federal elections in 1999 through 2002, the Federal 

Election Commission (FEC) found that several states reported problems 

with election officials receiving applications from MVA offices in a timely 

manner, resulting in, the FEC stated, “the effective disenfranchisement” of 

citizens who had applied to vote but were not processed by Election Day.39

FEC recommended in both reports that states develop ongoing training 

programs for personnel in NVRA agencies, such as MVAs. 

HAVA includes requirements providing that voters who contend that they 

registered (at MVAs or through other means) in the jurisdiction in which 

they desire to vote, but whose names are not on the voter registration list 

for that polling place, be allowed to cast a provisional ballot.40 HAVA also 

requires that voters who an election official asserts is not eligible to vote 

also be permitted to cast a provisional ballot. Election officials would 

determine the voter’s eligibility under state law and whether the vote 

should count as part of the vote counting process. From our local 

jurisdiction survey, we estimate that for the 2004 general election, 

61 percent of local jurisdictions had a problem in counting provisional 

ballots because of insufficient evidence that individuals had submitted 

voter registration applications at MVAs.41 In addition, we estimate that 

29 percent of local jurisdictions had a problem in counting provisional 

ballots because of insufficient evidence that individuals had submitted 

voter registration applications at NVRA agencies other than MVAs.42 Also, 

our September 2005 report on managing voter registration reported that 

4 of 12 jurisdictions we surveyed reported that election office staff 

experienced challenges,43 either to a great extent or some extent, receiving 

38GAO-02-3.

39Federal Election Commission, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act on 

Federal Elections 1999-2000 and 2001-2002. These reports surveyed 44 states, and the 

District of Columbia, that were subject to NVRA provisions for the administration of 

elections for federal office. 

40HAVA section 302 (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 15482).

41The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 7 percentage points.

42The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 6 percentage points.

43GAO, Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter 

Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote, GAO-05-997 (Washington, D.C.: 

September 2005).
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 80 GAO-06-450 Elections

voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies.44 They 

reported taking steps to address the problem by hiring additional staff to 

handle the volume of applications received and by contacting applicants to 

obtain correct information. 

There is evidence that, at least in 1 jurisdiction, election officials took steps 

since the 2000 general election to address the MVA voter registration issue, 

though problems persisted for the November 2004 general election. When 

we revisited the same small jurisdiction in 2005 that we had visited in 2001, 

election officials reported they were still experiencing problems receiving 

registration forms from the MVA, for all those who registered to vote 

there—but noted that the process had improved. For example, they said 

elections staff now have access to the MVA database directly, so they can 

verify whether someone who claimed to have registered at the MVA 

actually did so. 

In our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate that few jurisdictions 

provided training to MVA or other NVRA agencies. Specifically, for the 2004 

general election, we estimate that 12 percent of local jurisdictions provided 

training or guidance to MVA offices and an estimated 3 percent provided 

training to other NVRA entities regarding procedures for distributing and 

collecting voter registration applications. Large jurisdictions are 

statistically different from small or medium jurisdictions, and medium 

jurisdictions are statistically different from small jurisdictions. Specifically, 

we estimate that 34 percent of large jurisdictions provided training to MVA 

offices, an estimated 18 percent of medium jurisdictions did so, and an 

estimated 9 percent of small jurisdictions did this. In addition, large 

jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small 

jurisdictions in providing training to other NVRA entities.

In our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes 

nationwide, we identified measures such as improving the training of MVA 

staff as a means of addressing challenges related to applications received 

from MVAs.45 After the November 2004 general election, the National Task 

Force on Election Reform—composed almost exclusively of officials who

44We surveyed 14 jurisdictions altogether, but Wisconsin, represented by 2 jurisdictions on 

this question, was not, at the time of our survey, subject to NVRA, and therefore the MVA 

question did not apply. 

45GAO-02-3.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 81 GAO-06-450 Elections

served in voter registration and administration of elections capacities46—

reported that while the NVRA expanded the number of locations and 

opportunities where citizens can apply to register to vote, supporting the 

voter registration application process is a secondary duty for entities that 

do so under this law. The task force report noted that it is a challenge for 

these entities to provide this service in a consistent manner and to transfer 

the registrations collected accurately and efficiently to voter registration 

offices. 

Jurisdictions 

Encountered New 

Challenges Processing 

the Large Volume of 

Voter Registration 

Applications for the 

November 2004 

General Election

In our October 2001 report on election processes, some election officials 

noted that while extending voter registration deadlines gave voters 

additional chances to register, it shortened the time for processing 

applications.47 And a few election officials raised concerns about short time 

frames for processing applications in relation to the possibility of voter 

fraud if there was insufficient time to verify an applicant’s eligibility. For 

the 2004 general election, the time frame for processing applications had 

the potential to pose an even greater challenge given the increase in the 

number of voter registration applications that elections officials reported 

receiving for the November 2004 general election. The conditions that 

election officials experienced in processing the volume of voter 

registration applications, such as long hours and lack of time to fully train 

temporary workers, could have resulted in data entry errors that would 

have had the impact of not properly registering eligible voters and not 

identifying ineligible voters.

During our site visits to local jurisdictions, election officials told us that for 

the 2004 general election, entering applications in a timely manner was 

possible—but challenges did arise, and election officials described actions 

taken to help ensure that voters were properly registered. Furthermore, on 

the basis of our survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimate that 81 

percent of local jurisdictions were able to process applications received 

just prior to the registration deadline—though we estimate 19 percent of 

the jurisdictions received applications just prior to the registration deadline 

46The task force, composed of local election officials, was convened by the nonprofit 

Election Center, also known as the National Association of Election Officials, following the 

2000 federal election to study and address questions about the election. The task force was 

reconvened in 2005 to examine the 2004 election. 

47GAO-02-3.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 82 GAO-06-450 Elections

that posed problems in entering them prior to Election Day. As shown in 

figure 14, we estimate that large jurisdictions experienced problems in 

entering the number of voter registration applications more than small and 

medium jurisdictions. Large jurisdictions are statistically different from 

both medium and small jurisdictions. This may be attributable to larger 

jurisdictions having larger populations with more registration activity, 

among other things. 

Figure 14: Estimated Percentage of Jurisdictions Having Problems Entering the 

Number of Voter Registration Applications Received for 2004 General Election

Note: Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. 

All jurisdictions we visited reported that they were able to enter all eligible 

applications into the voter registration lists. Nevertheless, most reported it 

was a challenge to process the large volume of applications received. For 

0

10

20

30

40

50

Experienced

problems

entering

applications

Percentage of jurisdictions

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

49

21

19

16
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 83 GAO-06-450 Elections

example, 1 large jurisdiction we visited reported that on a daily basis it was 

30,000 to 40,000 applications behind in data entry. As a result, election 

officials reported that they hired 80 full-time temporary workers who 

worked two full-time shifts to enter all eligible applications into the voter 

registration list used at the polls on Election Day. Election officials in 

another large jurisdiction told us that they unexpectedly received about 

10,000 last-minute registrants. Another large jurisdiction reported it was 

“swamped” with registration applications right before the registration 

deadline and was not prepared for the volume of applications submitted. 

Several jurisdictions required permanent employees to work extended 

hours or on weekends. To manage registration workloads, other 

jurisdictions reported hiring temporary workers and recruiting county 

employees to handle processing workloads. Figure 15 shows the reported 

spike in voter registration applications received prior to Election Day in 

1 large jurisdiction. Some applications were received after the final week 

allowed for voter registration and could not be registered for the 2004 

general election but were registered for future elections. 

Figure 15: Total Weekly Voter Registration Applications Documented by a Large 

Jurisdiction in 2004

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 52

Number of applications (in thousands)

Source: GAO (analysis), Clark County, Nevada (data).

2004 (by week)

Registaion deadline 

week 40

Election day 

week 44
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 84 GAO-06-450 Elections

In our state survey, a few states reported that since the 2000 general 

election they increased the time that voters in their states have to register. 

Although setting registration deadlines close to Election Day itself provides 

citizens increased time to apply to register, reducing the number of days 

from the registration deadline to Election Day can make it difficult for 

election officials to ensure that all eligible voters are included on the voter 

registration list. Specifically, in our state survey, 3 states (Maryland, 

Nevada, and Vermont) reported changing their registration deadlines for 

the November 2004 general election. For the 2000 general election, 

Maryland’s registration deadline had been 25 days before the election, but 

for the 2004 general election, the deadline for registration was 21 days 

before the election, extending the time that voters could register by 4 days. 

Nevada’s 2000 registration deadline (9 p.m. on the fifth Saturday preceding 

any primary or general election) remained the same for mail-in 

registrations. However, for the 2004 general election, the state extended inperson registration by 10 days. Vermont’s voter registration deadline 

changed from the second Saturday before the election to the second 

Monday before the election, allowing voters 2 more days to register. 

Appendix VI provides information on state laws pertaining to registration 

deadlines. 

On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, entering all voter registration 

applications for the time between the registration deadline and the 

November 2004 general election posed problems for large jurisdictions 

more than it did for small and medium jurisdictions. Specifically, we 

estimate that 41 percent of large jurisdictions experienced problems, 

18 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 13 percent of small jurisdictions. 

Large jurisdictions are significantly different from both medium and small 

jurisdictions. Inasmuch as large jurisdictions have more potential 

registrants, it is reasonable to expect that they would experience more 

difficulty entering all voter registration applications by Election Day than 

smaller ones would.

For the 2004 general election, while many states reported having 

registration deadlines that were 20 to 30 days prior to Election Day, a few 

states reported having registration deadlines that were 10 days or less prior 

to Election Day, and some states reported having same-day registration. 

Four states (Alabama, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont) reported 

having registration deadlines that were 10 days or less prior to Election 

Day. Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming 

reported having Election Day registration at the polling place. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 85 GAO-06-450 Elections

According to Our 

Nationwide Survey and 

Jurisdictions Visited, Some 

Jurisdictions Lacked 

Sufficient Staff to Process 

Applications

Having sufficient staff to process the increased number of voter 

registration applications was an issue for large local election jurisdictions. 

On the basis of our nationwide survey, most local jurisdictions (an 

estimated 89 percent) had a sufficient number of election workers 

(whether full-time, part-time, or temporary) who were able to enter 

registration applications in a timely manner. However, we estimate that 

11 percent had an insufficient workforce for this task. Large jurisdictions 

experienced problems with insufficient election workers to enter voter 

registrations applications more than small and medium jurisdictions did, as 

shown in figure 16. The difference between large jurisdictions and both 

medium and small jurisdictions is statistically significant. This difference 

could be attributable to larger jurisdictions having a greater need for 

additional staff. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 86 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 16: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions with Insufficient Election 

Workers to Process Voter Registration Applications

Note: The difference between large jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions is statistically 

significant.

Several jurisdictions we visited reported that there was a price to pay for 

the large volume of registration applications received, such as the need to 

hire temporary workers or extend the hours of permanent employees in 

order to process voter registration applications for the November 2004 

general election. Election officials in several jurisdictions we visited 

commented on the financial impact of the temporary workers hired, 

overtime hours, and the purchase of needed equipment, such as computers. 

In our September 2005 report on managing voter registration, we noted that 

all but 1 of the 14 jurisdictions we surveyed faced challenges receiving and 

processing voter registration applications during the 2004 general election 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Experienced

Insufficient

workers to

process

applications

Percentage of jurisdictions

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

25

16

11

8
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 87 GAO-06-450 Elections

and took various steps to address them.48 For example, election officials in 

7 of the 14 jurisdictions reported challenges checking voter registration 

applications for completeness, or for accuracy, or for duplicates. At that 

time, as in our more recent site visits, jurisdictions reported hiring extra 

staff, among other things, to address these challenges. 

Larger Jurisdictions More 

Likely than Small or 

Medium Ones to Provide 

Training to Staff and Track 

Receipt of Voter 

Applications 

Providing training to data entry staff and tracking applications provide 

ways for election officials to manage the flow of applications for 

processing that can help ensure that voter registration applications are 

appropriately entered into the voter registration list. As part of our inquiry 

into the methods jurisdictions used to enter completed registration 

application data into voter lists, our questionnaire to local election 

jurisdictions asked how they went about accomplishing this task. On the 

basis of our survey, we estimate that 76 percent of all local jurisdictions 

provided training to data entry staff about the processing and inputting of 

registration applications. Seventy-five percent of small jurisdictions 

provided this training, 73 percent of medium jurisdictions did so, and 

94 percent of larger jurisdictions did so, too. Large jurisdictions are 

statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions. Another 

activity that election officials undertook when entering completed 

registration applications included tracking incoming registrations. The 

results of our survey show that over half of local jurisdictions tracked 

incoming registration applications to ascertain the total number received, 

the number entered into registration lists, and the number not processed 

because of omission or application error, and to identify ineligible voters 

based on age or residence. Again, large jurisdictions are statistically 

different from both medium and small jurisdictions. Table 2 provides 

information on the different activities that local election jurisdictions 

undertake when entering completed registration applications into the 

official voter registration list.

48GAO-05-997.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 88 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 2: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Engaged in Various Quality Assurance Activities when Entering 

Completed Voter-Registration Applications 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a Large jurisdictions are statistically different from both medium and small jurisdictions.

b All size categories are statistically different from one another. 

c Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small jurisdictions.

Processing Applications 

Obtained through Voter 

Registration Drives Posed 

Additional Challenges for 

Some Jurisdictions 

Nongovernmental organizations in many states sponsored voter 

registration drives for the November 2004 general election in an effort to 

increase the number of citizens eligible to vote. Voter registration drives 

pose a dilemma for some election officials. On one hand, voter registration 

drives provide another means by which persons can apply to register to 

vote. On the other hand, they pose challenges in assessing the validity of 

submitted registrations and in processing large numbers of registrations 

submitted close to the registration deadline. For the November 2004 

general election, election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us 

they encountered challenges validating and processing the large number of 

voter registration applications obtained through voter registration drives 

Jurisdictions engaged in the 

following activities when entering 

completed registration applications

Percentage of all 

jurisdictions 

Percentage of small 

jurisdictions 

(<10,000)

Percentage of 

medium jurisdictions 

(10,000–100,000) 

Percentage of large 

jurisdictions 

(>100,000) 

Provided training to data entry staff 

about the processing and inputting of 

registration applicationsa

76 75 73 94

Employed a system of edit checks in 

the voter registration database to 

identify duplicatesb

72 66 82 95

Employed a system of edit checks in 

the voter registration database to 

identify ineligibles based on agea

67 62 74 89

Employed a system of edit checks in 

the voter registration database to 

identify ineligibles based on 

residencea

64 61 68 84

Verified input of data by the same or a 

different individual to confirm initial 

input accuracyc

60 57 64 77

Tracked incoming registration 

applications for total number received, 

number entered into registration list, 

and number not processed because 

of an omission or error on applicationc

59 55 64 74 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 89 GAO-06-450 Elections

that employed either paid staff (where workers are paid for each voter 

registration application completed and submitted to election authorities 

prior to Election Day)49 or used volunteers. For example, Wisconsin’s state 

legislative audit bureau conducted an evaluation of the 2004 general 

election in its state.50 It found, among other things, that many registration 

deputies appointed for the November 2004 general election worked for 

special interest groups or political parties interested in increasing voter 

turnout.51 The evaluation states that investigators found that registration 

deputies had submitted 65 falsified names for the 2004 general elections 

and that district attorneys in two counties charged four individuals with 

submitting fraudulent registration forms. According to the evaluation 

report, these registration deputies were reportedly paid by their employer 

on a per registrant basis, which may have encouraged them to submit 

fraudulent registration forms to increase their compensation. 

Such questions about the integrity of the voter registration process were of 

particular concern in battleground states such as Florida, Ohio, and 

Pennsylvania, where margins of victory were slim and accurate tallies of 

eligible votes were therefore of consequence.52 In our state survey several 

states reported that their state election provisions do not address the issue 

of voter registration drives that involve payment per application, while 

relatively fewer states reported prohibiting them outright. Specifically, 

19 states and the District of Columbia reported that state laws or executive 

actions are silent about these drives (that is, it is left up to each local 

jurisdiction to decide). However, 1 of these 19 states further reported that 

while its state law does not address voter registration drives that involve 

49With respect to federal voter registration forms, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 

provides that the chief election official of a state shall make such forms available through 

governmental and private entities, with particular emphasis on making them available for 

organized voter registration programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-4(b). 

50Legislative Audit Bureau, State of Wisconsin. An Evaluation: Voter Registration, Report 

05-12 (Madison, Wisconsin: September 2005).

51In some states, election officials appoint registration deputies who assist with voter 

registration. Some registration deputies are municipal officials and are permitted to work 

for interest groups or political parties. 

52EAC, using various news media sources, identified 17 states deemed to be most 

competitive in the 2004 presidential contest. These “battleground or highly contested” states 

included Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 

Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, West 

Virginia, and Wisconsin. We visited 8 of these 17 states during our site visits; alternatively, 

16 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited were located in these battleground states.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 90 GAO-06-450 Elections

payment per application, the conduct of such drives is not left up to each 

local jurisdiction—the local jurisdictions have no authority in regulating 

such matters. Sixteen states reported that voter registration drives are 

allowed either by state law or by executive action, 13 states reported that 

they are prohibited by state law, and 2 states did not respond. 

In addition, our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions inquired 

about their awareness and handling of registration drives, and any actions 

taken to deter fraudulent applications from being submitted by persons or 

groups participating in paid registration drives, and we discussed this 

matter during our site visits to selected jurisdictions as well. In our 

nationwide survey, we estimate that 91 percent of all local jurisdictions 

were not aware of such drives, while 9 percent were aware. About a third 

(an estimated 32 percent) of the large jurisdictions—those with 

populations greater than 100,000—were aware of such drives. We also 

queried local election jurisdictions whether any names on voter 

registration applications appeared to be fraudulent. On the basis of our 

local survey, nearly all jurisdictions—an estimated 95 percent—did not 

have any names that appeared to be fraudulent. Although only 5 percent of 

local election jurisdictions had voter registration applications that 

appeared to have fraudulent names, an estimated 70 percent identified 

receiving 10 fraudulent applications or fewer, an estimated 14 percent 

identified receiving 10 or more fraudulent applications, and an estimated 

16 percent did not know the volume of fraudulent applications received. 

The distribution of the volume of fraudulent applications received is of a 

smaller subset of our total sample and therefore has larger confidence 

intervals than other estimates. Figure 17 shows the extent to which local 

jurisdictions identified experiencing fraudulent voter registration 

applications. 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 91 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 17: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Had Names on Voter Registration Applications Appearing to Be 

Fraudulent and Volume of Fraudulent Applications Identified for the 2004 General Election

Note: The distribution of the volume of fraudulent applications received is of a smaller subset of our 

total sample and therefore has larger confidence intervals than other estimates. For the category of 

10 or fewer fraudulent applications the confidence interval is +/- 17 percent, for the category of 10 or 

more the confidence level is +/- 16 percent, and for the category of don’t know the confidence level is 

+/- 12 percent. Furthermore, not all respondents who had names on voter registration applications that 

appeared to be fraudulent answered our question about the volume of these applications. Therefore, 

our estimate of the subset for the volume of applications that were received is based on 4 percent of 

jurisdictions that answered that question.

In addition, our prior work raised concerns about the quality of voter 

registration applications obtained through voter registration drives. In our 

September 2005 report on managing voter registration, we reported that 

Did not have applications with names that appeared fraudulent

Had applications with names that appeared fraudulent

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

16%

70%

Don't know volume of 

fraudulent applications 95%

5%

Received 10 fraudulent 

applications or fewer

Received 10 or more 

fraudulent applications

14%
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 92 GAO-06-450 Elections

among 12 of 14 local jurisdictions we surveyed, processing applications 

received from voter registration drives sponsored by nongovernmental 

organizations posed a challenge to election officials because applications 

were incomplete or inaccurate.53

Election Officials’ Views on 

Irregular Voter Registration 

Applications from Registration 

Drives

During our site visits, we sought local officials’ views on a host of issues 

related to the integrity of the voter registration process, including how or 

whether voter registration drive applications were tracked, how many 

registration applications were submitted by volunteer or paid registration 

drives in calendar year 2004 leading up to the November election, and how 

their jurisdictions dealt with irregular applications. (We defined irregular 

applications as those using fictitious names, unusual dates of birth, 

nonexistent addresses, or fake signatures or party affiliations.) We also 

asked election officials whether they had the ability to determine if 

individuals were using false or fictitious names. Many local jurisdictions 

that we visited told us that they did not have specific procedures to ensure 

that voter applications obtained through voter registration drives were 

collected or tracked. This was because, in some cases, the application 

forms could simply be downloaded from the Internet. One large 

jurisdiction that did not track applications coming from various sources 

told us it planned to begin doing so, using a drop-down menu in its 

statewide voter registration system that will allow staff to record the 

information. 

Overall, at local jurisdictions that we visited where applications from voter 

registration drives were tracked or at least estimated, the number and 

proportion of applications submitted through voter registration drives 

relative to total registrations—and the number and proportion considered 

irregular—varied widely. For example, in 1 large jurisdiction, election 

officials reported that approximately 30,000 registrations received in 

2004—about 90 percent—were submitted by registration drives. Of these, 

the election officials estimated that only about 50 applications were 

irregular—that is, they were unreadable, had questionable signatures, were 

incomplete, or had invalid addresses. The election official from this 

jurisdiction noted that it appeared some of the applications had been filled 

out by individuals who took addresses from the phone book and changed 

them slightly. In another large jurisdiction in a battleground state, local 

election officials estimated that 70,000 registration applications were 

submitted by volunteer or paid registration drives, and here too 

53GAO-05-997.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 93 GAO-06-450 Elections

irregularities were noted—such as fictitious names and fake signatures—

but election officials stated that these irregular applications represented a 

“low” percentage of the total. In other large jurisdictions, fewer voter 

registration applications were received; 1 jurisdiction, for example, in 

another battleground state, reported receiving 2,500 such applications and 

estimated that about 20 percent of them were irregular. Two medium 

jurisdictions we visited reported receiving a few hundred voter registration 

applications or fewer, and both reported that there were no irregularities. 

One small jurisdiction did not report any voter registration drives taking 

place. 

When we asked local election officials during our site visits whether they 

had the ability to determine whether a person actually tried to vote using a 

false or fictitious name, responses were mixed: Election officials in 3 large 

jurisdictions we visited told us they did not have the ability to make this 

determination. An election official in another large jurisdiction stated that 

“there is no way to know if someone falsely registered has voted.” Others, 

however, reported that they were able to determine whether false identities 

had been used. For example, in 1 large jurisdiction, election judges check 

voter IDs and signatures at the polls to prevent the use of fictitious 

identities. One large jurisdiction verifies voter registration information 

against Social Security and driver’s license information and checked voter 

history internally; election officials in this jurisdiction reported that they 

believe anyone who attempted to use a false or fictitious name in the 

November 2004 general election would have been caught. And in another 

jurisdiction, election officials told us that if an individual attempted to vote 

using a fictitious name that was not in the poll book, that individual would 

be issued a provisional ballot—which would not be verified if it was 

determined that the name was indeed fictitious. Election officials in some 

jurisdictions we visited said there was no way to know whether the poll 

book already contained fictitious names. 

When asked what steps, if any, local jurisdictions we visited took to notify 

law enforcement or other legal authorities on irregular registration 

applications received, most reported taking some actions. For example, 

1 large jurisdiction we visited reported providing irregular registration 

applications to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the district 

attorney’s office and to the Secretary of State’s office for investigation. 

Both the FBI and the district attorney declined to pursue the matter on the 

ground that they were understaffed, the jurisdiction reported. The 

Secretary of State’s office concluded that while the registration 

applications were fraudulent or fictitious, a purposeful fraud was not 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 94 GAO-06-450 Elections

committed and that the people completing the fake applications were not 

trying to alter an election, but to obtain money by working for the 

registration drives. Four other jurisdictions that we visited said they 

contacted appropriate state or federal authorities, such as state law 

enforcement, a State’s Attorney, a state election enforcement agency, or the 

FBI, but election officials did not know whether any action had been taken. 

In addition, in our June 2005 report on maintaining voter registration lists, 

we reported that election officials in seven locations we visited referred 

reported instances of voter registration fraud allegations to appropriate 

agencies, such as the district attorney and the U.S. Attorney for 

investigation.54 Also, EAC issued voluntary guidance in July 2005 to help 

states implement HAVA. EAC’s guidance suggested that when the voter 

registration verification process indicates the possible commission of an 

election crime, such as the submission of false registration information, 

such matters should be forwarded to local, state, and federal law 

enforcement authorities for investigation. 

Some Jurisdictions Have 

Controls to Manage Registration 

Drives

When we asked local jurisdictions that we visited whether they had 

procedures in place for registration groups to follow when submitting 

applications, election officials in most jurisdictions reported that some 

type of system was in place to control registration drives. For example, 

1 large jurisdiction reported that it had a program to train volunteer field 

registrars to register citizens on behalf of the county registrar; these field 

registrars were to comply with all registration rules and laws and must 

themselves be registered voters, and noncandidates, have proof of identify, 

complete a 2-hour training course, and pass a brief examination before 

taking an oath. In addition, this same jurisdiction required that any group 

requesting more than 50 voter registration forms was required to provide a 

plan to the state elections department for when, where, and how it would 

distribute the forms—all of which were numbered so that election offices 

could track them. Some jurisdictions reported, however, that no 

procedures were in place that registration groups had to follow. One large 

jurisdiction, for instance, reported that anyone can run a voter registration 

drive simply by downloading the voter registration form from the election 

office Web site. 

On the topic of what actions, if any, local jurisdictions had taken to deter 

paid registration drives from submitting fraudulent registration 

54GAO-05-478.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 95 GAO-06-450 Elections

applications, from our nationwide survey, we estimate that roughly half of 

the estimated 9 percent of local jurisdictions that were aware that paid 

registration drives were occurring provided training or guidance on how to 

accurately complete an application, and an estimated 41 percent of these 

jurisdictions notified the persons or groups engaged in paid registration 

drives that they had submitted incomplete, inaccurate, or fraudulent 

applications.55 In addition, on the basis of our survey, 41 percent of local 

jurisdictions that were aware of the drives helped prevent submission of 

incomplete, inaccurate, or fraudulent applications by working with persons 

and groups engaged in paid registration drives.56

Actions Taken to Help Prevent 

Fraudulent Registrations and 

Ensure Submission of 

Registrations to Election Offices

In a couple of jurisdictions, election officials told us they took other steps, 

such as meeting with registration drive organizers and contacting the 

registrant identified on the application, to help prevent fraudulent 

registrations. A jurisdiction in Colorado reported that numerous 

complaints had been received from voters who claimed to have completed 

registrations through a drive but for whom the county had no record of 

application. The jurisdiction reported that Colorado’s legislature passed a 

bill pertaining to voter registration drives. Subsequently, Colorado enacted 

legislation effective in June 2005 that, among other things, requires voter 

registration organizers to file a statement of intent with the Secretary of 

State, fulfill training requirements pursuant to rules promulgated by the 

Secretary of State, and, in general, submit or mail registration applications 

within 5 business days. In addition, the 2005 state legislation provides that 

voter registration organizers may not compensate persons circulating voter 

registration application forms based on the number of applications 

distributed or collected. The Secretary of State issued rules in November 

2005 implementing such requirements, including rules that require 

registration drive organizers to file a statement of intent with the Secretary 

of State and require persons circulating such application forms to ensure 

that the tear-off receipt on the application is completed and given to the 

applicant. Election officials in 17 jurisdictions we visited told us that they 

had procedures in place for managing voter registration drives to some 

extent. For example, in 1 medium jurisdiction, election officials stated that 

groups or persons seeking to run registration drives must be trained and 

deputized by the registrar’s office. 

55The 95 percent confidence interval is +/- 13 percentage points.

56The 95 percent confidence interval is +/- 14 percentage points.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 96 GAO-06-450 Elections

Concluding 

Observations 

In 43 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, successfully registering 

to vote prior to Election Day is a prerequisite for casting a ballot and having 

that ballot counted. States are still working to fully implement HAVA’s voter 

registration requirements. As states gain more experience with their 

statewide voter registration and data matching systems and processes, it is 

likely their systems and processes will evolve. Given the continuing 

challenge of maintaining accurate voter registration lists in a highly mobile 

society, this is to be expected. 

For election officials, the voter registration process presents a continuing 

challenge in balancing ease of registration for eligible voters with sufficient 

internal controls to help ensure that only eligible voters are added to and 

remain on the voter registration rolls. To maintain accurate voter 

registration lists, election officials must use and rely upon data from a 

number of sources, such as state death and criminal records and 

applications from MVAs. 

HAVA’s requirements for creating and maintaining statewide voter 

registration lists and its identification requirements for first-time voters 

who register by mail were designed to help improve the accuracy of voter 

registration lists and reduce the potential for voter fraud. Specifically, 

HAVA’s requirements for creating and maintaining a statewide voter 

registration list was designed to improve voter registration list accuracy by 

identifying duplicate registrations within the state and identifying those 

ineligible to vote because of death, criminal status, or other reasons. HAVA 

requires states to match the names and other identifying information on 

their statewide voter registration lists against death and felony records in 

the state. States may voluntarily match their voter registration lists with the 

voter registration lists, death, felony, or other records in other states. In the 

absence of voluntary cross-state matching, it is possible to fully implement 

HAVA’s statewide voter registration provisions and still have ineligible 

persons on the state’s voter registration rolls on Election Day, such as those 

who died out of state or were convicted in federal courts or other states.57

Nor would implementing HAVA’s statewide matching requirements identify 

persons who are registered to vote in more than one state. Although some 

states report sharing registration and eligibility information among states, 

the practice was generally limited to neighboring states or dependent upon 

a registrant indicating that he or she previously resided in another state.

57GAO-05-478.
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 97 GAO-06-450 Elections

HAVA includes a provision that requires certain first-time voters who 

register by mail to provide identification as proof of their identity and 

eligibility to vote in the jurisdiction. Which voters must present 

identification either with their mail application or when they vote for the 

first time depends upon how states and local jurisdictions define “mail 

registrations” subject to HAVA’s identification requirement. In our site 

visits, we found that some local jurisdictions considered registration 

applications submitted by registration drives to be mail registrations 

subject to HAVA’s identification requirement for first-time voters, while 

other jurisdictions did not consider such registrations to be mail 

registrations subject to the identification requirement. This distinction has 

importance on Election Day for first-time voters who registered through 

registration drives. In those jurisdictions that considered mail registrations 

to include registration drive applications, first-time voters who registered 

through registration drives would be required to show an acceptable form 

of identification at the polls on election day. If they did not do so, they are 

to be permitted to cast a provisional ballot, but the ballot would only be 

counted upon a state determination that the voter is eligible to vote under 

state law. In contrast, in those jurisdictions that did not consider mail 

applications to include those submitted through registration drives, firsttime voters would not be treated as subject to the HAVA identification 

requirement and could generally cast a regular ballot that would be 

counted with all other regular ballots.

Election jurisdictions continue to face challenges in obtaining voter 

registration applications from NVRA entities, including MVAs. Some local 

jurisdictions have established processes to manage receipt of voter 

registration applications from these entities, such as training for staffs of 

these agencies. To the extent that NVRA entities do not track and forward 

to the appropriate election jurisdiction the voter applications that they 

have received, voters may be required to cast provisional ballots instead of 

regular ones because their names do not appear on the voter registration 

lists. In addition, the provisional ballot will not be counted if the voter’s 

valid registration cannot be verified. Our survey of local election 

jurisdictions found that many local jurisdictions encountered problems 

counting provisional ballots in cases where voters claimed to have 

registered at an MVA or some other NVRA entity but there was insufficient 

evidence that the voter had submitted a registration application at the MVA 

or NVRA entity.

A surge of last-minute registrations in many jurisdictions prior to the 

November 2004 election illustrated the challenge of balancing ease of 
Chapter 2

Voter Registration

Page 98 GAO-06-450 Elections

registration with assurance that only eligible voters are on the registration 

rolls. Some election jurisdictions reported registration drive groups 

submitted hundreds or thousands of applications just before the 

registration deadline. When the registration deadline is close to Election 

Day, processing these applications presents a tremendous challenge in 

checking applications for completeness, having time to contact applicants 

to obtain missing information, verifying applicants’ eligibility to vote, and 

adding the name of eligible voters to the registration list. Some 

jurisdictions reported hiring and training temporary employees to process 

the applications. The enormous workload and time constraints associated 

with processing large numbers of last-minute applications can increase the 

chances that errors will be made in determining voter eligibility, and the 

names of some eligible voters may not be added to the list in time for 

Election Day.
Page 99 GAO-06-450 Elections

Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting Chapte4r

A growing number of citizens seem to be casting their ballots before 

Election Day using absentee and early voting options that are offered by 

states and local jurisdictions. 

However, circumstances under which these voters vote and the manner in 

which they cast their ballots before Election Day differ because there are 

51 unique election codes.1

 Because of the wide diversity in absentee and 

early voting requirements, administration, and procedures, citizens face 

different opportunities for obtaining and successfully casting ballots before 

Election Day.

To collect information about absentee and early voting options, in our state 

and local surveys we asked questions about each of these voting options 

separately. We defined absentee voting as casting a ballot, generally by 

mail, in advance of Election Day (although ballots could be returned 

through Election Day and dropped off in person). We defined early voting 

as generally in-person voting in advance of Election Day at specific polling 

locations, separate from absentee voting. However, there is some measure 

of overlap between absentee voting and early voting reported by the states, 

especially where states have reported in-person absentee voting to be, in 

effect, early voting. This may be due, in part, to the fact that the relational 

statutory framework for early voting and absentee voting varies among the 

states—with some states, for example, providing early voting within the 

context of the state’s absentee voting provisions, while others, for example, 

provide for absentee voting within the context of the state’s early voting 

provisions. Similarly, local jurisdictions that completed our survey may 

also have had some measure of overlap in relation to their practices for 

absentee and early voting. During our interviews with local election 

officials in jurisdictions that offered early voting, we were able to obtain 

more detailed information about absentee and early voting procedures and 

practices for those jurisdictions. 

On the basis of our site visits to jurisdictions that had early voting, absentee 

and early voting were similar in some ways and distinct in others. Election 

officials described to us that when voters cast absentee ballots, they 

typically followed a specific process including applying for and receiving 

the ballot and returning their marked ballots before Election Day or, in 

some cases, returning the ballot up until the close of polls on Election Day.2

According to the description that election officials gave us, early voting 

1

This total includes the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 100 GAO-06-450 Elections

was distinct from in-person absentee voting in that in-person absentee 

voters usually applied for and received a ballot, and cast it at the registrar’s 

office, while early voters reported to a voting location where early voting 

staff verified their eligibility to vote, usually by accessing the jurisdiction’s 

voter registration list. Also, early voting usually did not require citizens to 

provide an excuse, as some states required for absentee voting, and it was 

usually allowed for a shorter period of time than absentee voting. For 

example, in the 14 jurisdictions we visited in 7 states that reported having 

early voting, the time frame allowed for absentee voting was almost always 

at least twice as long as that for early voting (e.g., Colorado allowed 30 days 

for absentee voting and 15 days for early voting). Early voting was similar 

to Election Day voting in that the voting methods were usually the same. 

However, according to election officials in jurisdictions we visited that had 

early voting, voters were not limited to voting in their precinct because all 

early voting locations had access to a complete list of registered voters for 

the jurisdiction (not just precinct specific) and had appropriate ballots that 

included federal, state, and precinct-specific races. Appendix VII provides a 

description of selected characteristics of the early voting jurisdictions we 

visited.

In this chapter, we will discuss changes since 2000 and challenges related 

to (1) absentee voting in general, (2) overseas military and civilian absentee 

voting, and (3) early voting.

Overview Some states have increased the opportunities for citizens to vote absentee 

or early. For the November 2004 general election, 21 states reported that 

they no longer required voters to provide excuses such as being ill, having a 

disability, or being away from the precinct on Election Day to vote 

absentee—an increase of 3 states from the November 2000 general 

election. Three states reported expanding their provision for permanent 

absentee status (usually reserved for the elderly or those with disabilities), 

allowing voters to receive absentee ballots for a state-specified time period, 

such as 4 years. One state reported eliminating its requirement that mail-in 

absentee voters provide an attestation from a notary or witness for their 

signature along with the completed absentee ballot. Eliminating the need 

for a notary or witness removes a potential barrier to an absentee ballot 

being counted. According to election officials in 2 jurisdictions in 1 state 

2

Some states require voters to provide an excuse to cast an absentee ballot. This subject is 

discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 101 GAO-06-450 Elections

we visited that required a notary or witness signature, an absentee ballot 

may not be counted if voters neglect to have their ballots witnessed or 

notarized. Furthermore, HAVA amended the Uniformed and Overseas 

Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) to, among other things, extend the 

period of time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application 

by absent uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters 

residing outside of the United States from the year during which the 

application was received to a time period covering up to the two next 

regularly scheduled general elections for federal office. 

Election officials reported facing some of the same challenges in the 

November 2004 general election that they had identified to us for the 

November 2000 general election, and they also reported some new 

challenges. Continuing absentee voting challenges included (1) receiving 

late absentee voter applications and ballots; (2) managing general 

workload, resources, and other administrative constraints; (3) addressing 

voter error issues such as unsigned or otherwise incomplete absentee 

applications and ballot materials; and (4) preventing potential fraud. 

Election officials also told us that they encountered new challenges in the 

November 2004 general election. Some election officials said that the 

increased early voter turnout during this election resulted in long lines. In 

some local jurisdictions we visited, election officials said that factors such 

as inadequate planning on their part, limitations on types of facilities that 

could be used for early voting locations, and funding constraints on hiring 

more staff or acquiring more voting locations affected their management of 

large early voter turnout. In addition, some election officials reported that 

they encountered a challenge handling disruptive third parties as they 

attempted to approach early voters who were in line to vote. Another 

challenge could develop as a result of a 2002 HAVA amendment to 

UOCAVA. In an effort to help make registration and voting easier for absent 

uniformed service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside 

of the United States, this 2002 amendment, as noted above, extended the 

period of time that can be covered by a single application from the year 

during which the application was received to a time period covering up to 

the next two subsequent general elections for federal office. Election 

officials in 4 jurisdictions we visited told us that a possible unintended 

consequence of this amendment could be that when uniformed services 

personnel are reassigned to other duty posts, absentee ballots may not be 

sent to the correct address for subsequent general elections. Even with a 

2005 revision to the ballot request form whereby voters can indicate that 

they want ballots for one federal election only, election officials in 3 of 
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 102 GAO-06-450 Elections

these jurisdictions were concerned many absentee ballots would be 

returned as undeliverable.

Absentee Voting Absentee voting allows citizens the opportunity to vote when they are 

unable to vote at their precinct on Election Day. Although availability, 

eligibility requirements, administration, and procedures vary across the 

50 states and the District of Columbia, absentee voting generally follows a 

basic process. As figure 18 shows, this process included four basic steps for 

the November 2004 general election.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 103 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 18: Mail-in Absentee Voting Process 

Source: GAO (analysis); GAO and Art Explosion (clip art).

Step 1:

Registered voter applies

for a mail-in absentee ballot.

Step 3:

Citizen votes and returns completed 

ballot, providing a signature or other 

required information on the affidavit 

envelope.

Step 4:

Local election official reviews

affidavit envelope and qualifies

ballot to be counted.

NOV

TUESDAY

S Applicationtep 2:

Local election official reviews

application and determines if it 

meets established requirements, 

or if not, requests further information 

from voter.

After the application is approved, 

local election official mails

absentee ballot to voter.

Absentee

ballot

Affidavit envelope
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 104 GAO-06-450 Elections

a

In general, for a mail-in absentee ballot application to be approved, it must meet certain state or local 

requirements. For example, in some states, the voter must be registered, and in some jurisdictions, the 

signature on the absentee application must match the one on the voter registration application, among 

other things.

Jurisdictions we visited typically provided absentee ballot applications that 

registered voters used to request absentee ballots in a standard state or 

jurisdiction form, as shown in figure 19.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 105 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 19: Example of a Standard Absentee Ballot Application Form for the 

November 2004 General Election

Source: El Paso County, Colorado.

SOS Approved 9.28.05

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

STATE OF COLORADO

ABSENTEE BALLOT APPLICATION Under Colorado law, your absentee ballot application must contain your printed name, signature, residence address,

mailing address if you wish to receive the ballot by mail, and your date of birth. If you do not provide all of this

information, you may not receive an absentee ballot according to the rules established by the Colorado Secretary of

State. (C.R.S. 1-8-104)

Please Print

Please do not write outside the box

Date / /

 MM DD YYYY 

 SIGNATURE or

 Mark (Required)

* Witness Signature

* The application for an absentee ballot shall be personally signed by the applicant; or, in case of the applicant's inability to sign, the elector's mark shall be 

witnessed by another person.

*

Voter Information: Required fields must be completed. 

Last Name (Required) First Name (Required) Middle Initial Previous Name of Applicant – If Applicable

Residential Street Address (Required) Apt. No. City/Town (Required) State Zip (Required)

Mailing Address or P.O. Box - Required if different from residential address City/Town State Zip

Date of Birth (Required) Social Security Number – At Least the Last 4 digits Colorado Driver’s License Number OR State Issued ID Number

Change of Residence: Has your residential address changed? YES NO If NO, skip this Change of Residence section of the form. 

If your change of residence was from one county to another county, you must register to vote in your new county prior to using this Absentee Ballot Application.

OLD Residential Street Address City/Town State Zip

Will you have resided at your new address at least 30 days prior to the Election? 

YES NO 

On what date did you, or will you, begin living at your new address?

 _____/_____/___________

mm dd yyyy

Party Affiliation: If you are currently Unaffiliated and wish to vote in a Primary Election, you must declare an affiliation with a political party. Unaffiliated 

voters may affiliate with a political party up to and including Primary Election Day. If you are currently affiliated with a political party and wish to change your

affiliation, you must submit this change request at least 29 days prior to Election Day.

I am Unaffiliated and wish to affiliate with the following political party ______________________________________

I wish to change my affiliation to the following political party _____________________________________________

(Change request must be submitted at least 29 days prior to Election Day)

I wish to remain Unaffiliated (Not eligible to vote in a Primary Election) 

Election Selection: Indicate the election(s) for which you wish to receive an Absentee Ballot by placing a “check” in the appropriate box below. Absentee

Ballot applications must be re-submitted after January 1 of each election year.

Check all 

that apply Election Type 

Exception Mailing 

Instructions

If you wish to have your Absentee Ballot mailed to a temporary address that differs 

from the residential/mailing address shown above, please indicate below. 

 Primary Election 

(August – even years)

Mail my Primary

Election Absentee 

Ballot to 

________________________________________________________________

Street Address Apt. No.

________________________________________________________________

City/Town State Zip Code

 November Election

 (General – even years

 Coordinated – odd years)

Mail my November

Election Absentee

Ballot to

________________________________________________________________

Street Address Apt. No.

________________________________________________________________

City/Town State Zip Code

 Other Election Mail my ____________

Election Absentee 

Ballot to

________________________________________________________________

Street Address Apt. No.

________________________________________________________________

City/Town State Zip Code
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 106 GAO-06-450 Elections

According to our state survey, state election officials reported that 

registered voters could visit or write their local election office, or in some 

cases visit a state or local election Web site, to obtain an application or 

learn what information was required to request an absentee ballot. State 

election officials reported registered voters could return a completed 

absentee ballot application via the U.S. mail or in many other different 

ways as allowed by state absentee ballot provisions. Also, some election 

officials in jurisdictions we visited told us that voters could complete any 

part of the absentee voting process in person at their local elections office. 

Table 3 shows the various options allowed by states for requesting and 

returning absentee ballot applications. However, it is important to note that 

particular local jurisdictions might not have offered all of the options 

described below. 

Table 3: Options Allowed by States for Requesting and Returning Absentee Ballot 

Applications, November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

a

States include the 50 states and the District of Columbia.

According to our state survey results, states reported that applicants could 

find out the status of their absentee ballot application after it was 

submitted and offered at least one of several ways, including telephoning a 

state or local jurisdiction office, telephoning a hotline or toll-free number, 

Options Number of statesa

Allowed for requesting absentee ballot applications

In person 51

U.S. mail 51

Telephone 41

E-mail 42

Via facsimile 48

Via state Web site 30

Download from Web site 41

Allowed for returning absentee ballot applications

In person 51

U.S. mail 51

E-mail 11

Via facsimile 34

Via state Web site 4
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 107 GAO-06-450 Elections

or e-mailing a state or local jurisdiction office. For example, in 49 states 

and in the District of Columbia, applicants could telephone a state or local 

jurisdiction office, and in 47 states and in the District of Columbia, 

applicants could e-mail a state or local jurisdiction office to find out their 

absentee ballot applications’ status. Thirty-nine states and the District of 

Columbia notified the applicant if the application was rejected. 

While absentee ballots are generally provided to the voter through the mail, 

unless voting in person, on the basis of our survey of a representative 

sample of local jurisdictions nationwide, some jurisdictions provided 

absentee ballots using fax and e-mail. Specifically, for the November 2004 

general election, we estimate that 17 percent of local jurisdictions provided 

absentee ballots by fax, and 4 percent of local jurisdictions provided 

absentee ballots by e-mail. On the basis of our discussions with election 

officials in jurisdictions we visited, absentee ballots are generally returned 

through the mail. 

Election officials in most jurisdictions we visited said that voters used a 

combination of envelopes for returning completed absentee ballots so that 

voters’ indentities would be distinct from the ballots they were casting. For 

example, a voter would place the completed ballot in a secrecy (inner) 

envelope, which would then be placed in an outer envelope. The secrecy 

envelope would be to ensure that the voted ballot was not linked to the 

voter, while the voter’s affidavit information, such as a name, address, and 

signature, needed to certify that the voter was eligible to vote, would be 

marked on the outer envelope. Election officials in some jurisdictions 

provided examples of the envelopes used to return absentee ballots. One of 

these examples had a separate affidavit envelope, which was to be placed 

in a pre-addressed return envelope and mailed to the local elections 

jurisdiction. Other examples allowed the voter to include the affidavit 

information on the back of the pre-addressed return envelope. Once the 

local elections jurisdiction certified that the absentee ballots could be 

counted using the affidavit information, election officials in jurisdictions 

we visited told us that they removed the secrecy envelope (with the voted 

ballot sealed inside) and set it aside for counting. Figure 20 shows 

examples of absentee ballot return envelopes and the inclusion of affidavit 

information. 
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 108 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 20: Two Examples of Absentee Ballot Envelopes with the Inclusion of Affidavit Information—One with Certification on 

Inner Envelope and One with Certification on Outer Envelope—for the November 2004 General Election

Sources: Champaign County, Illinois; Clark County, Washington.

Inner envelope with certification statement

Reverse of outer envelope with certification statement

Outer envelope
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 109 GAO-06-450 Elections

In our survey of state election officials, we asked whether absentee voters 

were able to find out the status of their submitted absentee ballots in 

various ways. According to our state survey, 44 states and the District of 

Columbia reported that absentee voters were able to telephone a state or 

local jurisdiction office, 32 states and the District of Columbia reported 

that absentee voters were able to e-mail a state or local jurisdiction office, 

16 states reported that absentee voters could telephone a hotline or tollfree number, and 5 states reported that absentee voters’ ballot status was 

available via a Web site. Furthermore, 16 states reported that either state or 

local jurisdictions would notify the voter if the absentee ballot was not 

counted. However, 6 states reported that they do not allow voters to check 

the status of their absentee ballots at all. For example, Vermont reported 

that state law does not allow voters to find out whether or not the absentee 

ballot was counted. Kentucky reported that it does not track whether or 

not an individual voter’s ballot was counted because linking a voted ballot 

back to a specific voter violates that voter’s right to a secret ballot. 

A Few States Reported 

Changes to Absentee Voting 

Requirements since 2000

A few states reported changes to their requirements with respect to 

absentee voting by (1) no longer requiring a reason or excuse for voting 

absentee; (2) eliminating the need for a mail-in absentee voter to have a 

notary or witness for the voter’s signature to accompany the ballot; and 

(3) not limiting permanent absentee voting status to individuals with 

disabilities or the elderly. 

Excuse Requirement According to our state survey regarding the November 2004 general 

election, all 50 states and the District of Columbia had some provisions 

allowing registered voters to vote before Election Day, but not every 

registered voter was eligible to do so. Twenty-one states reported allowing 

voters to vote absentee for the November 2004 general election without 

first having to provide a reason or excuse. The other 29 states and the 

District of Columbia reported requiring voters to meet one of several 

criteria, or “excuses,” to be eligible to vote before Election Day, such as 

having a disability, being elderly, or being absent from the jurisdiction on 

Election Day. The following are examples of excuses that some states 

required:

• absent from the state or county on Election Day;

• a member of the uniformed services or a dependent;

• a permanent or total disability;
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 110 GAO-06-450 Elections

• ill or having a temporary disability;

• over a certain age, such as 65;

• at a school, college, or university;

• employed on Election Day in a job for which the nature or hours 

prevent the individual from voting at his or her precinct, such as an 

election worker; and

• involved in emergency circumstances, such as the death of a family 

member. 

In our survey of local jurisdictions, we asked about problems encountered 

when processing absentee ballot applications. As shown in figure 21, we 

estimate that 9 percent of local jurisdictions received absentee applications 

that did not meet the excuse required by law, in states where excuses were 

required. The issue of applicants not meeting the required excuse is more 

of a problem for large jurisdictions than small or medium jurisdictions. 
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 111 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 21: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Problems 

Processing Absentee Applications because the Applicant Did Not Meet the Excuse 

Required by State Law, November 2004 General Election

Note: The difference between large jurisdictions and small and medium jurisdictions is statistically 

significant.

According to our state survey, the number of states that allowed absentee 

voting without an excuse increased from 18 in 2000 to 21 in 2004. Since 

November 2004, 2 more states reported that they have eliminated their 

excuse requirement. Specifically, during visits to local jurisdictions in New 

Jersey, election officials told us that state law had changed since the 

November 2004 general election. According to these officials, no-excuse 

absentee voting was adopted by the New Jersey legislature and became 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Percentage of jurisdictions

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

33

13

6

Problems

processing

absentee 

applications

when excuse was

required

9
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 112 GAO-06-450 Elections

effective in July 2005. Ohio also amended its absentee voter provisions, 

effective January 2006, to provide for no-excuse absentee voting.

Notary or Witness Signature 

Requirement 

Election officials in 2 jurisdictions in 1 state we visited told us that if voters 

returned a completed (voted) ballot without having the signature notarized 

or affirmed by a witness, the vote would be disqualified and not counted. 

For the November 2004 general election, according to our state survey, 

12 states reported requiring that mail-in absentee ballots contain 

attestation by a notary or witness for a voter’s signature to accompany the 

absentee ballot. From the November 2000 election to the November 2004 

election, Florida was the only state that reported in our state survey that it 

had dropped the requirement that mail-in absentee ballots contain 

attestation by a notary or witness for a voter’s signature. 

Permanent Absentee Voting Permanent absentee voting, which typically was available to individuals 

with disabilities or the elderly, was another way some states sought to help 

enfranchise certain categories of voters. Permanent absentee status, where 

offered, generally allowed the voter to apply for mail-in absentee ballots 

once (rather than for each separate election) over a specified time period. 

State requirements dictated when and how often a voter must apply for 

permanent absentee status. For example, for the November 2004 general 

election, in a New Jersey jurisdiction that we visited, election officials told 

us that state law required those eligible for permanent absentee status to 

apply at the beginning of the calendar year to receive absentee ballots for 

that year. According to the absentee ballot application provided by this 

jurisdiction, a voter’s permanent absentee status remains in effect 

throughout that year unless the voter notifies the election office otherwise. 

An election official in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited said that his 

state allowed permanent absentee voters to apply once every 4 years. In 

this state, permanent absentee voters were to receive absentee ballots for 

all elections during the 4-year period, according to the election official. In 

2 Washington jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that any 

voter could qualify for permanent absentee status for all future elections 

(e.g., no time period specified). In one of these Washington jurisdictions, 

election officials provided a copy of the permanent absentee application 

instructing voters that their permanent absentee status would be 

terminated upon the (1) voter’s written request, (2) cancelation of the 

voter’s registration record, (3) death or disqualification, or (4) return of an 

ongoing absentee ballot as undeliverable. 

Our state survey results showed that since the November 2000 general 

election, 3 states (California, Rhode Island, and Utah) reported state 
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 113 GAO-06-450 Elections

changes that expanded, in some manner, the use of permanent absentee 

voting. For example, California, reported changes for the November 2004 

election that allowed any voter to apply for and receive permanent 

absentee status. For the November 2000 general election, California 

previously reported that only certain categories of voters with disabilities 

(e.g., blind voters) were eligible for permanent absentee status. Overall, the 

results of our state survey showed that at the time of the November 2004 

general election, 17 states reported having some provision for permanent 

absentee status, 32 states and the District of Columbia reported that they 

did not provide for permanent absentee status, and Oregon reported 

conducting its election entirely by mail—making permanent absentee 

status unnecessary in this state. 

Appendix VIII provides information on states’ requirements for no-excuse 

absentee voting and witness or notary signature provisions for the 

November 2000 and 2004 general elections and shows where changes 

occurred. States did not report any changes to their permanent absentee 

requirements since the November 2000 general election.

Receiving Late Absentee 

Ballot Applications and 

Ballots for the November 

2004 General Election 

Continued to Be a Challenge 

The results from our state survey show that deadlines for voters to both 

apply for absentee ballots and return them to local jurisdictions to be 

counted differed among states. According to our state survey for the 

November 2004 general election, 47 states and the District of Columbia 

reported that they had absentee ballot application deadlines that ranged 

from Election Day (5 states: Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, Ohio, and 

South Dakota) to 21 days before Election Day (Rhode Island). Three states 

(Florida, New Hampshire, and Oregon) reported having no absentee ballot 

application deadline, although ballots in these states had to be returned by 

the close of polls on Election Day.3

With respect to state deadlines for returning absentee ballots, many states 

reported having more than one deadline to correspond with differing 

methods of returning such ballots to election officials. In our state survey, 

44 states reported having provisions requiring that absentee ballots be 

returned by or on Election Day; 7 states reported having provisions 

requiring that absentee ballots be returned a certain number of days before 

Election Day; and 8 states and the District of Columbia reported having 

3

Oregon conducts its entire election by mail.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 114 GAO-06-450 Elections

provisions allowing mailed absentee ballots to be returned a certain 

number of days after Election Day, if such ballots were postmarked by a 

specified date. For example, for the 2004 November general election, 

Alaska reported two deadlines: (1) mail-in absentee ballots were to be 

received by close of business on the 10th day after the election when 

postmarked on or before Election Day, and (2) in-person absentee ballots 

were to be delivered by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day.

Also, according to our state survey, Nebraska reported that for absentee 

ballots returned by mail, the deadline changed from no later than 2 days 

after Election Day for the November 2000 general election to the close of 

polls on Election Day for the November 2004 general election. According to 

our state survey, these deadlines may be different for absent uniformed 

service voters and certain other civilian voters residing outside the United 

States, a subject that will be discussed later in this chapter. 

In our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes, we 

reported that election officials for the 2000 general election identified 

receiving applications and ballots after state statutory deadlines as a 

challenge.4

 According to our nationwide survey, local jurisdictions 

encountered similar problems with processing absentee ballot applications 

and absentee ballots for the November 2004 general election. More 

specifically, on the basis of our survey, we estimate that 55 percent of local 

jurisdictions received absentee ballot applications too late to process. We 

also estimate 77 percent of local jurisdictions encountered problems in 

processing absentee ballots because ballots were received too late. 

Furthermore, we asked jurisdictions about which problems were 

encountered most frequently. An estimated 25 percent of local jurisdictions 

encountered the ballot lateness problem most frequently. Figure 22 shows 

that medium and large jurisdictions encountered lateness with absentee 

ballots more than small jurisdictions did. 

4

GAO-02-3.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 115 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 22: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Encountered Lateness 

with Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General 

Election

a

All size categories are statistically different from one another.

b

Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large jurisdictions.

Appendix VIII summarizes states’ deadlines for receiving domestic mail-in 

absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots. 

Election officials in the local jurisdictions we visited told us that they tried 

to approve applications and mail absentee ballots to voters as quickly as 

possible, assuming that the ballots had been finalized and printed. In 

8 jurisdictions we visited in 5 states (Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, 

Pennsylvania, and Washington), election officials said that their states 

mandated that local election jurisdictions process absentee ballot 

applications within a specified time period, such as within 24, 48, or 

72 hours of receipt of the application. In 2 Pennsylvania jurisdictions we 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Ballots received

too lateb Applicationsreceived too latea

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Percentage of jurisdictions

92 92

55

71

46

75 77

97
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 116 GAO-06-450 Elections

visited, election officials stated that they established a local policy 

encouraging election staff to process absentee ballot applications faster 

(such as on the day of receipt) than the time period specified in state law 

(which was 48 hours). In 1 Illinois and 1 Nevada jurisdiction we visited, 

election officials said that while a 24- or 48-hour turnaround time for 

absentee ballot applications was not mandated in state law, local office 

policy was to process them as quickly as possible—such as within 24 hours 

of receipt of the application. 

During our site visits, election officials in 9 jurisdictions stated that they 

received large numbers of mail-in absentee ballot applications just prior to 

the deadlines prescribed by state law. Most of these election officials said 

they were able to meet their state-mandated or office policy applicationprocessing time, although they had to work long hours and hire additional 

staff to process the absentee ballot applications by the deadline. In 

1 Florida jurisdiction we visited, local election officials said that even 

though they had no absentee ballot application deadline, they processed 

applications using “long hours and extra people” and tried to send out 

absentee ballots within 24 hours of receiving a complete application.

In jurisdictions we visited in Pennsylvania and Colorado, election officials 

said that sometimes the 24- or 48-hour turnaround was impossible to meet 

because the state did not finalize the ballots for printing until the days 

immediately preceding Election Day for the November 2004 election. For 

example, an election official in the Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited told 

us that determining whether or not an independent presidential candidate’s 

name was to be included on the November 2004 general election ballot 

proved to be a challenge. In this jurisdiction, the validity of petition 

signatures supporting the independent candidate’s request to be included 

on the ballot was challenged in state court about 10 weeks before the 

election. As a result, according to the election official, election officials 

were required to participate in a court-mandated process of verifying the 

signatures. According to the election official, it took about 10 days in court 

to resolve the situation, which delayed the printing of the ballots. 

In 6 jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that slowness in the 

delivery of the mail added to the processing time crunch during the week 

before Election Day—a problem that is out of election officials’ control and 

may contribute to the local election officials’ receipt of absentee voting 

materials after state-mandated deadlines. Although envelopes can use an 

“official election mail” designation, election officials in these 6 jurisdictions 

we visited said that the U.S. Postal Service did not always process absentee 
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 117 GAO-06-450 Elections

voting materials in a timely manner. For example, in one New Mexico 

jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that they experienced 

serious problems with the U.S. Postal Service delivering absentee ballot 

applications. These officials felt that the post office ignored the envelopes’ 

official election mail designation and did not process and deliver them 

quickly. Election officials in this jurisdiction said that their telephone 

system crashed numerous times leading up to Election Day in November 

2004, given the heavy volume of incoming calls from voters checking on the 

status of their absentee ballot applications. In one Pennsylvania 

jurisdiction that we visited, election officials said that postal concerns were 

raised when some college students’ absentee ballot applications were 

received after Election Day. These officials could not definitely say at what 

point these applications might have been delayed and explained that the 

mail delivery delay could have been attributable to either the U.S. Postal 

Service or the university’s mailing center. Figure 23 illustrates the use of 

special postal markings for absentee ballot materials.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 118 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 23: Example of Envelope Illustrating Official Postal Marking for Absentee Ballot Materials, November 2004 General 

Election

While election officials in 6 jurisdictions we visited told us about challenges 

with mail delivery, election officials in 7 jurisdictions we visited told us that 

they did not have problems with mail delivery or coordinating with the U.S. 

Source: Muscogee County, Georgia.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 119 GAO-06-450 Elections

Postal Service. In an Illinois jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us 

that prior to the election, staff from his office met with the postmaster to 

establish a good working relationship. Election officials in a New 

Hampshire and Ohio jurisdiction we visited stated that the post office was 

very helpful. In a Nevada jurisdiction we visited election officials said that 

they received excellent service from the postal service.

When an absentee application was received after the state-mandated 

deadline, election officials in 13 jurisdictions we visited told us that they 

often sent these applicants a letter explaining that their application was 

received too late. In 5 of these same jurisdictions, election officials said 

they also provided an alternative to absentee voting such as early voting, 

voting on Election Day, or in-person absentee voting, where the voter could 

visit the election office and complete the absentee voting process in 

person.

Voter Errors in the 

November 2004 Election 

Continued to Be a Challenge 

with Processing Absentee 

Ballot Applications and 

Ballots

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that election 

officials for the 2000 general election identified voters’ failure to provide 

critical information, with respect to signatures and addresses, as 

challenges to successfully processing mail-in absentee applications and 

verifying ballots for counting.5

 According to our nationwide survey for the 

November 2004 election, local jurisdictions encountered similar voter 

errors that could affect the jurisdictions’ ability to establish voter eligibility 

or approve the ballot for counting when processing absentee ballot 

applications and absentee ballots. 

Absentee Ballot Applications In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions what problems they 

encountered in processing absentee ballot applications. We estimate that 

48 percent of them identified problems receiving absentee ballot 

applications that contained a missing or illegible voter signature. 

Furthermore, we asked about which problems were encountered most 

frequently. An estimated 20 percent of local jurisdictions encountered the 

problem of receiving absentee ballot applications that contained a missing 

or illegible voter signature most frequently. Table 4 shows our estimates of 

the types of voter errors local jurisdictions encountered with absentee 

ballot applications submitted for the November 2004 general election. 

5

GAO-02-3.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 120 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 4: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Voter Error Problems in 

Processing Absentee Ballot Applications, November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a

Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and medium jurisdictions.

b

All size jurisdictions are statistically different from one another.

 cThe 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 6 percentage points.

 dThe 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 8 percentage points.

On the basis of our nationwide survey, large jurisdictions had more of a 

problem than small or medium jurisdictions concerning missing or illegible 

signatures. Specifically, we estimate that 73 percent of large jurisdictions 

encountered this problem, while we estimate 44 percent and 55 percent of 

small and medium jurisdictions respectively encountered it. Large 

jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and small jurisdictions.

When elections officials were unable to process absentee ballot 

applications, our nationwide survey showed that some local jurisdictions 

contacted applicants to inform them of the status of their application using 

the methods listed in table 5. Specifically, on the basis of our survey of local 

jurisdictions, we estimate that 72 percent of all jurisdictions telephoned 

applicants when their absentee applications could not be processed. We 

found no significant difference based on the size of the jurisdiction with 

regard to this contact method. However, we estimate that 84 percent of 

medium jurisdictions and 90 percent of large jurisdictions contacted 

absentee applicants by U.S. mail. In contrast, 63 percent of small 

jurisdictions contacted absentee applicants with problem applications via 

U.S. mail. Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and 

large jurisdictions. We also estimate that 10 percent of local jurisdictions 

did not inform any applicants about the status of their application.

Problem All jurisdictions 

Small

(< 10,000)

Medium

(10,000 to 100,000)

Large

(>100,000)

Missing or illegible signaturea 48 44c 55 73d

Missing or inadequate voting residence addressa 35 30c 42 70d

Applied to wrong jurisdictiona 33 32c 32 58d

Missing or inadequate voting mailing addressb 32 25c 43 74d
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 121 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 5: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods When 

Absentee Ballot Applications Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a

Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large jurisdictions.

b

Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and medium jurisdictions.

c

“Other” included contact by facsimile or contacting voters’ relatives, among other things.

d

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 6 percentage points.

In an Illinois jurisdiction that we visited, elections officials told us that they 

would do everything possible in an attempt to obtain complete absentee 

applications from voters. If the absentee ballot application was incomplete, 

election office staff said they contacted the voter and attempted to resolve 

the problem in the best way practical, according to the election officials. 

For example, if the application was missing the voter’s signature and there 

was enough time, the staff mailed the application back to the voter for 

signature. If time was limited, the staff called the voter and asked him or 

her to visit the election office to sign the application. An election official in 

a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited told us that if applicants forgot to 

include one part of an address, such as a ZIP code, but election staff could 

match the rest of the address and voters’ identifying information with their 

registration information, the application was approved. Election officials in 

another Pennsylvania jurisdiction and a Nevada jurisdiction told us that the 

voter registration system automatically generated letters to voters when 

the application could not be processed for any reason. 

Absentee Ballots In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions what problems they 

encountered in processing submitted absentee ballots. We estimate that 

61 percent of all jurisdictions reported that absentee ballots were received 

without the voter’s signature on the envelope. We estimate 54 percent of 

small jurisdictions, 76 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 90 percent of 

large jurisdictions encountered this problem. Jurisdictions of all sizes are 

statistically different from one another. Table 6 shows our estimates of the 

types of problems election officials encountered on absentee ballots. We 

Methods used to inform applicants of application 

status All jurisdictions

Small

(< 10,000)

Medium

(10,000 to 100,000)

Large

(>100,000)

Telephoned the applicant 72 72d 73 77

Contact by maila 69 63d 84 90

Contact by e-mailb 20 18d 21 46

Otherc 15 18d 9 11
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 122 GAO-06-450 Elections

estimate that 81 percent of local jurisdictions encountered at least one of 

the problems listed. 

Table 6: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Encountered Problems in Processing 

Submitted Absentee Ballots, November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a Jurisdictions of all sizes are statistically different from one another. 

b

Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and medium jurisdictions.

c

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 8 percentage points.

If the ballot was not able to be verified, election officials in some 

jurisdictions we visited told us that they attempted to contact the voter, 

time permitting, so that the affidavit envelope could be corrected and 

approved for counting. In 10 jurisdictions we visited, election officials said 

that they reviewed the affidavit envelope information to approve the ballots 

as they received them rather than waiting until Election Day. On the basis 

of our nationwide survey, we estimate that 40 percent of local jurisdictions 

contacted the voter by mail in an attempt to address a problem with the 

affidavit envelope, and 39 percent contacted the voter via telephone. Table 

7 shows our estimates of the contact methods used by local jurisdictions 

when absentee ballots had problems that could prevent them from being 

approved for counting if not corrected. 

Problems encountered

All 

jurisdictions

Small

(< 10,000)

Medium

(10,000 to 100,000)

Large

(>100,000)

Envelope not signeda 61 54 76 90c

Missing or incomplete witness signature or 

information 

36 38 33 36c

Improper or missing notary signature 18 19 16 12c

Signature on the envelope did not match the 

application or digitized signature on fileb

13 9 18 48c

Voter identification marks on envelope or ballotb 9 9 7 23c

Voter identification number not included 3 2 5 7c
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 123 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 7: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size Using Various Contact Methods when 

Absentee Ballots Could Not Be Processed, November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a

Small jurisdictions are statistically different than medium and large jurisdictions.

b

“Other” included contacting the voter by facsimile, contacting a family member of the voter, or 

providing a hotline number for voters to check their ballot status, among other things.

c

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 6 percentage points.

Differences in whether voters were contacted by mail when there were 

problems with their absentee ballots were based on the size of the local 

elections jurisdiction. Specifically, we estimate that 31 percent of small, 

61 percent of medium, and 66 percent of large jurisdictions contacted 

voters by mail. Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium 

and large jurisdictions.

While election officials in 10 jurisdictions we visited told us that they 

qualified absentee ballots prior to Election Day—allowing them time to 

follow up with voters, in 6 local jurisdictions we visited, election officials 

told us that they qualified or approved absentee ballots for counting on 

Election Day. According to election officials in these jurisdictions, 

contacting the voter for corrected or complete ballot information was not a 

viable option because there was not enough time. These election officials 

stated that absentee ballots with incomplete or inaccurate information on 

the affidavit envelope would not be qualified or counted. 

Some election officials in jurisdictions we visited told us that voters can 

visit local election offices and complete all or part of the absentee process 

in person. Some election officials told us that when voters vote in-person 

absentee, officials are well situated to help ensure that the application and 

ballot are complete and accurate before accepting them. For example, in 

one Connecticut jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that they 

Methods used to inform voters of ballot 

status All jurisdictions

Small

(< 10,000)

Medium

(10,000 to 100,000)

Large

(>100,000)

Contacted the voter by maila 40 31c 61 66

Telephoned the voter 39 38c 42 41

Did not inform voters 27 29c 24 25

Did not receive any ballots that could not be 

processed

21 25c 12 3

Contacted the voter by e-mail 8 8c 7 15

Otherb 11 11c 7 16
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 124 GAO-06-450 Elections

did not have incomplete absentee ballot applications from voters who 

visited the office in person because they reviewed the application and 

required the person to correct any errors before leaving. 

Some Election Jurisdictions 

Continued to Have 

Concerns about Fraud and 

Had Procedures to Address 

the Potential for Fraud 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that election 

officials for the 2000 general election had concerns with mail-in absentee 

voting fraud, particularly regarding absentee voters being unduly 

influenced or intimidated while voting.6

 However, we also reported that 

election officials identified that they had established procedures to address 

certain potential for fraud, such as someone other than the registered voter 

completing the ballot or voters casting more than one ballot in the same 

election. 

Once the voters received and voted absentee ballots in accordance with 

any state or local requirements (such as providing a signature or other 

information on the affidavit envelope), such ballots were to be returned to 

specified election officials. In general, local election officials or poll 

workers were to review the information on the affidavit envelope and 

subsequently verified or disqualified the ballot for counting based on 

compliance with these administrative requirements, according to election 

officials in some local jurisdictions we visited. 

In our state survey, we asked states whether they specified how local 

jurisdictions were to determine eligibility of absentee ballots. According to 

our survey, 44 states and the District of Columbia reported that at the time 

of our survey, they specified how to determine absentee ballot eligibility, 

while 6 states reported that they did not. Colorado, for example, specified 

that the poll worker is to compare the signature of the voter on a selfaffirmation envelope with a signature on file with the county clerk and 

recorder. Wisconsin specified, among other things, that inspectors 

ascertain whether a certification has been properly executed, if the 

applicant is a qualified elector of the ward or election district, and that the 

voter has not already voted in the election. 

Our survey of local elections jurisdictions asked election officials if they 

used any of the procedures described in table 8 to ensure that the absentee 

voter did not vote more than once for the November 2004 general election. 

6

GAO-02-3.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 125 GAO-06-450 Elections

These procedures could have been conducted either manually by elections 

officials or through system edit checks. On the basis of our survey of local 

jurisdictions, we estimate that 69 percent of jurisdictions checked the 

Election Day poll book to determine whether the voter had been sent an 

absentee ballot, and 68 percent of jurisdictions checked the Election Day 

poll book to determine whether the voter had completed an absentee 

ballot. 

Table 8: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Voters Did Not Vote More 

than Once, November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a

Small jurisdictions are significantly different from medium and large jurisdictions.

b

All size categories are statistically different from one another.

c

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 6 percentage points.

On our survey of local jurisdictions, we also asked if any of the procedures 

listed in table 9 were in place to ensure that the absentee ballots were 

actually completed by the person requesting the ballot. On the basis of our 

survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 70 percent of jurisdictions 

compared the absentee ballot signature with the absentee application 

signature. 

Procedure

All 

jurisdictions

Small

(< 10,000)

Medium

(10,000 to 100,000)

Large

(>100,000)

Election Day poll book checked to determine whether the 

voter had been sent an absentee ballot

69 65c 77 82

Election Day poll book checked to determine whether the 

voter had completed an absentee ballot

68 66c 74 56

Election Day poll book checked against the absentee 

ballots prior to counting thema

64 68c 54 48

Applications or voter registration system checked to 

determine whether the voter had already applied for an 

absentee ballotb

58 52c 70 85
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 126 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 9: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Specific Procedures to Help Ensure Absentee Ballots Were 

Actually Completed by the Person Requesting the Ballot, November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and medium jurisdictions.

b Small jurisdictions are statistically different from medium and large jurisdictions.

c

The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/- 8 percentage points.

With respect to comparing the absentee ballot application signature with 

the absentee ballot signature, there were differences based on the size of 

the jurisdiction. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we 

estimate that 72 percent of small, 69 percent of medium, and 40 percent of 

large jurisdictions compared these signatures. Large jurisdictions are 

significantly different from small and medium jurisdictions. One reason 

that large jurisdictions may differ is that they have a large volume of 

absentee ballots to process and it may be too resource intensive to 

compare signatures, among other things. 

During our site visits, elections officials provided examples of the 

procedures they used to ensure against fraud. For example in 20 local 

jurisdictions that we visited, election officials said that when the ballot 

signature was compared with the absentee application signature, voter 

registration signature, or some other signature on file, the signatures had to 

match for the ballot to be approved and counted. In addition to matching 

signatures, election officials in 2 Illinois jurisdictions and 1 New Jersey 

jurisdiction we visited told us that during the Election Day absentee ballot 

qualification process, poll workers were instructed to check the poll book 

to determine if the voter had cast an Election Day ballot. In 1 of these 

Illinois jurisdictions, if poll workers found both an Election Day and 

absentee ballot were cast, they were instructed to void the absentee ballot 

so that it would not be counted. In addition to matching signatures, election 

officials in a Nevada jurisdiction we visited said that they used an 

Procedure All jurisdictions

Small

(< 10,000)

Medium

(10,000 to 100,000)

Large

(>100,000)

Absentee ballot signature was compared with the absentee 

application signaturea

70 72 69 40c

Absentee ballot signature had to be witnessed (in only those 

states that required it)b

54 64 28 25c

Absentee ballot signature was compared with the voter 

registration signature

39 36 47 62c

Absentee ballot signature had to be notarized (in only those 

states that required it)

8 7 14 6c
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 127 GAO-06-450 Elections

electronic poll book to manage absentee, early, and Election Day voting to 

ensure that voters cast only one ballot. Once a ballot was cast in this 

jurisdiction, the electronic poll book was annotated and the voter was not 

allowed to cast another ballot. 

Although election officials in the 20 jurisdictions mentioned above told us 

that they had procedures in place designed to help prevent fraud during the 

absentee voting process, election officials told us that they still suspected 

instances of fraud. For example, in a Colorado jurisdiction we visited, 

election officials told us that they referred 44 individuals who allegedly 

voted absentee ballots with invalid signatures to the district attorney for 

investigation. In a New Mexico jurisdiction that we visited, election 

officials told us that organized third parties went door to door and 

encouraged voters to apply for absentee ballots. Once these voters 

received their ballots, according to election officials, the third parties 

obtained the voters’ names (in New Mexico this is public information, 

according to such officials), and went to the voters’ homes and offered to 

assist them in voting the ballots. These election officials said that they were 

concerned that the latter part of this activity might be intimidating to voters 

and could result in voter fraud. 

Uniformed and 

Overseas Citizens 

Absentee Voting

In general, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 

requires, among other things, that states permit absent uniformed services 

members and U.S. citizen voters residing outside the country to register 

and vote absentee in elections for federal office.7

 In addition, states also 

generally offer some measure of absentee voting for registered voters in 

their states not covered under UOCAVA. The basic process for absentee 

voting under UOCAVA is generally similar to that described in figure 18 for 

absentee voters not covered under UOCAVA in that UOCAVA voters also 

must establish their eligibility to vote on their absentee ballot application, 

and the ballot must be received by the voter’s local jurisdiction to verify it 

for counting. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that 

they allow UOCAVA voters to submit a voted ballot via facsimile—a 

method that might not be allowed for absentee voters not covered under 

UOCAVA because of concerns about maintaining ballot secrecy. In 

6 jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that they require voters 

7

42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to 1973ff-6.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 128 GAO-06-450 Elections

under UOCAVA to submit a form acknowledging that ballot secrecy could 

be compromised when ballots are faxed.

One mechanism used to simplify the process for persons covered by 

UOCAVA to apply for an absentee ballot is the Federal Post Card 

Application (FPCA), which states are to use to allow such absentee voters 

to simultaneously register to vote and request an absentee ballot. On our 

survey of local jurisdictions, we asked if any problems were encountered in 

processing absentee applications when the applicant used the FPCA. We 

estimate that 39 percent of local jurisdictions received the FPCA too late to 

process—a problem also encountered with other state-provided absentee 

ballot applications. Table 10 shows our estimates of problems local 

jurisdictions encountered when processing Federal Post Card 

Applications. In addition, we asked about which problems were 

encountered most frequently when the FPCA was used, and an estimated 

19 percent of local jurisdictions encountered the problem of receiving the 

FPCA too late to process more frequently than other problems.

Table 10: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions, by Jurisdiction Size, That Encountered Specific Voter Error Problems 

on Absentee Applications That Used the Federal Post Card Application, November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO analysis of local election jurisdiction survey data.

a

All size categories are statistically different from one another.

b

Large jurisdictions are statistically different from small and medium jurisdictions.

Also, uniformed services voters and U.S. citizen voters residing outside of 

the country are allowed to use the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot to vote 

for federal offices in general elections. This ballot may be used when such 

voters submit a timely application for an absentee ballot (i.e., the 

application must have been received by the state before the state deadline 

or at least 30 days prior to the general election, whichever is later) but do 

Problems

All 

jurisdictions

Small

(< 10,000)

Medium

(10,000 to 100,000)

Large

(>100,000)

Application received too latea 39 32 53 70

Missing or inadequate voting residence addressa 31 24 41 75

Applied to wrong jurisdictionb 29 25 36 60

Missing or inadequate voting mailing addressa 24 17 36 67

Missing or illegible signatureb 21 16 27 57

Application not witnessed, attested, or notarized 13 13 13 14

Did not meet excuse required by state law 3 2 4 13
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 129 GAO-06-450 Elections

not receive a state absentee ballot. Some states’ absentee ballot application 

forms included serving in a uniformed service or residing outside the 

country as excuses for voting absentee. According to our state survey, 

4 states (Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island) reported that 

they require attestation by a notary or witness for a voter’s signature on 

voted mail-in absentee ballots but do not require uniformed service voters 

and U.S. citizen voters outside the country to provide this on their voted 

ballots. 

For the 2004 November general election, according to our state survey, 

9 states reported having absentee ballot deadlines for voters outside the 

United States that were more lenient than the ballot deadlines for voters 

inside the United States. Table 11 lists these 9 states and the difference 

between the mail-in ballot deadline from inside the United States and the 

mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States. 

Table 11: States Reporting Differing Mail-in Absentee Ballot Deadlines from Inside and Outside the United States, November 

2004 General Election 

Source: GAO 2005 survey state election officials. 

HAVA amended the UOCAVA to, among other things, extend the period of 

time that can be covered by a single absentee ballot application—the 

Federal Post Card Application—by absent uniformed service voters and 

State

Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from 

inside the United States Mail-in absentee ballot deadline from outside the United States

Alaska 10 days after Election Day and postmarked 

by Election Day

15 days after Election Day and postmarked by Election Day

Arkansas Election Day 10 days after Election Day

Florida Election Day No later than 10 days after Election Day if postmarked or signed and 

dated by Election Day (federal races only)

Louisiana 1 day before Election Day Election Day

Maryland 1 day after Election Day if postmarked 

before Election Day

10 days after Election Day and postmarked before Election Day

Massachusetts Election Day 10 days after Election Day and postmarked by Election Day

Ohio Election Day 10 days after Election Day

Pennsylvania 4 days before Election Day Deadline extended per court order for November 2004 general 

election for not only absentee ballots from outside the United States 

but also for those voters covered by UOCAVA, including domestic 

uniformed service members, who are nonetheless absent from the 

place of residence where they are otherwise qualified to vote

Texas Election Day 5 days after Election Day
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 130 GAO-06-450 Elections

citizen voters residing outside the United States from the year during which 

the application was received to a time period covering up to the two next 

regularly scheduled general elections for federal office. To illustrate, if 

uniformed service voters or civilian voters residing outside the United 

States submitted a completed FPCA in July 2004, they would have been 

allowed to automatically receive ballots for the next two federal general 

elections, including those held in 2004 and 2006. (See fig. 24 for an example 

of the FPCA used in 2004.)

In 4 local jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that the 

amendment described above may present a challenge for successfully 

delivering absentee ballots to the uniformed services members because 

they tend to move frequently. For example, in a North Carolina jurisdiction 

that we visited, election officials stated that addresses on file for such 

voters at the time of the November 2004 general election may be no longer 

correct and that mail sent to these voters could be returned as 

undeliverable. Also, in 1 jurisdiction in Georgia that we visited, election 

officials told us that they were concerned that many of the absentee ballots 

sent in subsequent general elections would be returned as undeliverable. In 

an Illinois jurisdiction we visited, elections officials expressed concerns 

about paying the postage for mail that may be undeliverable will be a 

challenge in future years. Also, we noted in our March 2006 report on 

election assistance provided to uniformed service personnel, that one of 

the top two reasons for disqualifying absentee ballots for UOCAVA voters 

was that the ballots were undeliverable.8

The Federal Post Card Application was revised in October 2005, after the 

November 2004 general election, and now allows overseas military and 

civilians to designate the time period for which they want to receive 

absentee ballots. (See figure 24 for the revised FPCA.) Those who do not 

wish to receive ballots for two regularly scheduled general elections can 

designate that they want an absentee ballot for the next federal election 

only and then complete the form and request a ballot for each subsequent 

federal election separately. The FPCA used at the time of the November 

2004 election did not allow overseas military and civilian voters to make 

this designation. 

8

See GAO, Elections: Absentee Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens 

Increased for the 2004 General Election, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-521 (Washington, 

D.C.: April 7, 2006), for more information.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 131 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 24: The Federal Post Card Application Used before and after the November 2004 General Election

Source: U.S. Department of Defense Federal Voting Assistance Program Web site.

Block 6 - Additional Information: 

(3) Submission of this form serves as a request to receive ballots for all 

Federal elections held through the next two regularly scheduled general 

elections. If you do not wish to receive ballots for that length of time, you 

may request a ballot for each election for Federal office held in the next 

election year OR a ballot for only the next scheduled election for Federal 

office by noting your choice in Block 6. (Depending on your state of 

residence, you may also receive ballots for State and local offices during 

the selected period as well.)

2000 form

2005 form
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 132 GAO-06-450 Elections

Even with the revised FPCA, some applications might not have this box 

checked, and jurisdictions could continue to have absentee ballots 

returned as undeliverable. In an attempt to mitigate these problems, 

election officials in 3 local jurisdictions we visited told us that they planned 

several activities in an attempt to maintain and update the addresses of 

uniformed services voters and civilian voters residing outside the country. 

In a Washington jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that they 

began requesting e-mail addresses from such voters so that any problems 

with these applications or ballots could be corrected more efficiently. In 

previous elections, when e-mail addresses were not available, elections 

officials in this jurisdiction told us that many absentee applications and 

ballots sent to uniformed services members and civilian voters residing 

outside the United States were often returned as undeliverable. In a 

Georgia jurisdiction that we visited, election officials said that they planned 

to create a subsystem within their voter registration system. This 

subsystem will, according to the election officials, allow staff in the 

election office to produce a form letter for each uniformed services voter 

that will verify the voter’s current address. The election officials also told 

us letters will be mailed in January asking the voter to contact the 

jurisdiction to confirm that he or she continues to reside at the address on 

the letter. If the jurisdiction does not receive confirmation from the 

uniformed services voter, the election officials told us that they will contact 

the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) for assistance in locating 

the voter.9

 In an Illinois jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that 

they plan to canvass all uniformed services members and civilians residing 

outside the United States who are registered in the state in 2006. Election 

officials in this jurisdiction told us that they had approximately 7,400 such 

registered voters who completed the FPCA and that the jurisdiction 

planned to canvass these voters to confirm that they continued to reside at 

the address on the FPCA. This jurisdiction expects that as many as half of 

these canvass cards will be returned as undeliverable. Once the cards are 

returned, state law allows those voters whose canvass cards are returned 

to be deleted from the voter registration list, according to the election 

officials. 

9

FVAP provides overseas miliary and civilian voters a broad range of nonpartisan 

information and assistance to facilitate their participation in the electoral process. 
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 133 GAO-06-450 Elections

Early Voting Early voting is another way to provide registered voters with the 

opportunity to cast ballots prior to Election Day. However, conducting 

early voting is generally more complicated for election officials than 

conducting Election Day voting. In the jurisdictions we visited in 7 states 

with early voting, election officials described early voting as generally inperson voting at one or more designated polling locations usually different 

from polling locations used at the precinct level on Election Day. The 

voting may or may not be at the election registrar’s office. Early voting is 

distinct from in-person absentee voting in that in-person absentee voters 

usually apply for an absentee ballot at the registrar’s office and vote at the 

registrar’s office at that time. Also, early voting usually does not require an 

excuse to vote, which some states require for absentee voting, and in the 

jurisdictions we visited in 7 states with early voting, it was usually offered 

for a shorter period of time than absentee voting.10 The time frame allowed 

for absentee voting was almost always at least twice as long as for early 

voting. For example, election officials in the Colorado jurisdictions we 

visited said that they allow 30 days for absentee voting and 15 days for early 

voting. In the jurisdictions we visited in 7 states with early voting, election 

officials said early voting is similar to Election Day voting in that the voter 

generally votes using the same voting method as on Election Day. However 

they added that it differs from Election Day voting in that voters can vote at 

any early voting polling location because all early voting locations have 

access to a list of all registered voters for the jurisdiction (not just precinct 

specific) and can provide voters with appropriate ballots that include 

federal, state, and precinct-specific races.

10The seven states are Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, and North 

Carolina.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 134 GAO-06-450 Elections

Proponents argue that early voting is convenient for voters and saves 

jurisdictions money by reducing the number of polling places and poll 

workers needed on Election Day, and also provides the voter with more 

opportunity to vote. Opponents counter that those who vote early do so 

with less information than Election Day voters, and there is no proof that 

early voting increases voter turnout. Statistics on voter turnout for early 

voting can be difficult to come by, partly because some states and localities 

combine early and absentee voting numbers.11 Nevertheless, early voting in 

certain jurisdictions appears to be popular with voters and on the rise. In a 

New Mexico jurisdiction, election officials told us that early voting 

accounted for about 34 percent of the ballots cast in that jurisdiction. In 

North Carolina and Colorado elections jurisdictions we visited, election 

officials said that early voters cast about 35 and 38 percent of the 

jurisdictions’ total votes in the November 2004 election, respectively. In a 

Nevada jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us that the percentage 

of voters who voted early steadily increased over time. The officials said 

that in 1996, about 17 percent of voters voted early; in 2000, 43 percent 

voted early; and in the November 2004 general election, about 50 percent 

(271,500) of their voters voted early.

Our prior work on the 2000 general election did not identify states that 

offered early voting as we have defined it. Rather, we reported on absentee 

and early voting together. Thus, we are unable to identify the change in the 

number of states that offered early voting for the November 2000 general 

election and the November 2004 general election. We describe the 

availability of early voting throughout the nation and the challenges and 

issues that election officials encountered in the November 2004 general 

election as they conducted early voting in selected jurisdictions. Many 

early polling locations in Florida and elsewhere received media publicity 

about voters standing in long lines and waiting for long periods of time to 

vote early. In half of the local election jurisdictions we visited, election 

officials described encountering challenges that included long lines, and 

some identified challenges dealing with disruptive third-party activities at 

the polls.

11The statutory framework for early voting and absentee voting varies among the states—

with some states, for example, providing early voting within the context of the state’s 

absentee voting provisions, while others provide for absentee voting in the context of the 

state’s early voting provisions.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 135 GAO-06-450 Elections

Early Voting Appears to Be 

Gaining in Popularity 

For the November 2004 general election, in our state survey, 24 states and 

the District of Columbia reported offering early voting. In addition, 

2 states—Illinois and Maine—reported, in our state survey, that they had 

enacted legislation or taken executive action since November 2004 to 

provide for early voting in their states. Another 7 states reported that with 

respect to early voting, they (1) had legislation pending, (2) considered 

legislation in legislative session that was not enacted, or (3) had an 

executive action that was pending or was considered. Figure 25 shows 

where early voting was provided for the November 2004 general election.

Figure 25: Twenty-four States and the District of Columbia Reported Providing Early 

Voting as an Option in the November 2004 General Election

Allowed early voting in 2004 general election

Sources: GAO survey of state election officials, MapArt (map).

Washington, DC

NV

ID

MT

UT

AZ NM

ND

NE

TX

KS

OK

IA

AR

LA

TN

FL

GA

NC

CA

VT

WV

HI

AK

CO
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 136 GAO-06-450 Elections

On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate 23 percent of 

jurisdictions were in states that offered early voting. Furthermore, we 

estimate that 16 percent of small jurisdictions, 40 percent of medium 

jurisdictions, and 52 percent of large jurisdictions were in states that 

offered early voting. Small jurisdictions are statistically different from both 

medium and large jurisdictions. 

The Number of Days and 

Hours to Conduct Early 

Voting 

The number of days that early voting was available in these 24 states and 

the District of Columbia varied. In some cases, early voting was allowed no 

sooner than a day or a few days prior to Election Day, while in other cases 

voters had nearly a month or longer to cast an early ballot. Table 12 shows 

the range of days for early voting among the states and the District of 

Columbia that reported providing early voting for the November 2004 

election.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 137 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 12: Early Voting Period in 24 Early Voting States and the District of Columbia, 

November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO analysis. 

a

For the purposes of this table, the phrase “early voting period” refers to the period of time during which 

in-person early ballots may be cast in elections for federal office. Different time periods may be 

applicable under state laws with respect to early ballot applications and nonfederal elections. 

States that reported providing 

early voting Statutory early voting perioda

Alaska 16 days

Arizona At least 30 days

Arkansas 15 days

California 30 days

Colorado 15 days

Florida 15 days

Georgia 5 days

Hawaii 10 days

Idaho Beginning of early voting period is unspecified–

early voting period ends on the day before the 

election

Iowa Up to 40 days

Kansas Up to 20 days

Louisiana 12 to 6 days

Montana 45 days

Nebraska Beginning of early voting period is unspecified–

early voting period ends by close of polls on 

Election Day

Nevada 14 days

New Mexico 17 days

North Carolina Up to 19 days

North Dakota 15 days

Oklahoma 3 days

Tennessee Up to 20 days

Texas 14 days

Utah Beginning of early voting period is unspecified–

early voting period ends on the day before the 

election

Vermont Unspecified

West Virginia 18 days

District of Columbia 15 days
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 138 GAO-06-450 Elections

On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 

75 percent of the jurisdictions that offered early voting offered it for 2 or 

more weeks prior to Election Day. Figure 26 shows the estimated 

percentage of local jurisdictions that offered early voting for various time 

periods. 

Figure 26: Estimated Percentage of Local Jurisdictions That Offered Early Voting for 

Various Time Periods, November 2004 General Election

Note: The 95 percent interval for these percentages is +/- 10 percentage points or less. Figures do not 

total 100 because of rounding.

Among the local jurisdictions that we visited in the 7 states that provided 

early voting, we found that the shortest time frame allowed for early voting 

was in Georgia, which had 5 days, and the longest time frame allowed for 

early voting was in New Mexico, with 28 days. Furthermore, in the local 

jurisdictions we visited in the 7 states that provided early voting, election 

officials supplied information on early voting hours that ranged from 

weekday business hours to those that included weekends and evenings. 

For more details on the characteristics of early voting sites we visited, see 

appendix VII.

During the course of our work, a limited review of state statutes showed, 

for example, that Nevada statute requires early voting polling places be 

26%

27%

48%

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Offered early voting 28 days

prior to election days

Offered early voting 14–27 days

prior to election day

Offered early voting 1–13 days

prior to election day
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 139 GAO-06-450 Elections

open Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., during the first week of early 

voting and possibly to 8 p.m. during the second week, dependent upon the 

county clerk’s discretion. In addition, under the Nevada provision, polling 

places must be open on any Saturdays within the early voting period from 

10 a.m. to 6 p.m., and may be open on Sundays within the early voting 

period dependent upon the county clerk’s discretion. Under these 

provisions, the early voting period is to begin the third Saturday prior to an 

election and end the Friday before Election Day. Similarly, Oklahoma 

statute provides that voters be able to cast early ballots from 8 a.m. to 

6 p.m. on the Friday and Monday immediately before Election Day, and 

from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. on the Saturday immediately before Election Day. 

Some states’ statutes are less prescriptive, such as those of Florida, where 

the statute specifies that early voting should be provided for at least 

8 hours per weekday during the early voting period, and at least 8 hours in 

the aggregate for each weekend during the early voting period, without 

specifying the specific hours such voting is to be offered. Other states, such 

as Kansas, however, do not specify in statute the hours for voting early.12

Kansas statute, in general, leaves it to county election officials to establish 

the times for voting early. Officials at some local jurisdictions we visited 

said that their hours of operations were set based on the hours of the 

election office or by the hours of the facility that was hosting early voting 

such as a shopping mall or a library.

According to our survey of local jurisdictions, an estimated 34 percent13 of 

local jurisdictions that provided early voting for the November 2004 general 

election offered early voting during regular business hours (e.g., from 

8 a.m. until 4 p.m.) on weekdays, and 16 percent14 offered early voting 

during regular business hours on weekdays and during other hours. Other 

hours included weekday evenings (after 4 p.m. or 5 p.m. until 7 p.m. or 

9 p.m.) and Saturdays (all day) and Sundays (any hours) for about 2 percent 

of the jurisdictions, respectively.

12Kansas election officials reported that early voting in Kansas is called advance voting. Any 

registered voter may choose to vote an advance ballot by mail or in person with in-person 

voting in the county election office up to 20 days before any election, according to the 

election officials.

13The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 9 percentage points.

14The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +7 or -5 percentage points.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 140 GAO-06-450 Elections

Determining Number and 

Types of Early Voting 

Locations

As with early voting time frames, some states reported having requirements 

for local election jurisdictions regarding the number of early voting 

locations. In our state survey, 17 of the 25 entities (including 24 states and 

the District of Columbia) that reported offering early voting for the 

November 2004 general election also reported having requirements for 

local jurisdictions regarding the number or distribution of early voting 

locations. Kansas election standards, for example, provide for one such 

voting location per county unless a county’s population exceeds 250,000, in 

which case the election officer may designate additional sites as needed to 

accommodate voters. 

Election officials in 1 jurisdiction we visited said that state statute 

determined the number of locations, while election officials in 13 other 

jurisdictions told us they decided the number of locations. For example, 

New Mexico’s early voting statutory provisions specifically require that 

certain counties with more than 200,000 registered voters establish not 

fewer than 12 voting locations each. During our site visits, we asked 

jurisdictions how they determined the number of early voting locations. In 

a Nevada jurisdiction that we visited, election officials said that the number 

of locations was determined by the availability of resources such as fiscal 

and manpower needs. In a Colorado jurisdiction we visited, an election 

official said he would like to have had more early voting locations but could 

not because the jurisdiction did not have the funds to pay for additional 

costs associated with additional sites, such as the cost for computer 

connections needed for electronic voter registration list capability. In a 

North Carolina jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that they had 

only one early voting location because they did not have election staff that 

would be needed to manage another site. 

Conducting Early Voting In many ways, early voting is conducted in a manner substantially similar 

to Election Day voting in that polling locations are obtained, workers are 

recruited to staff the sites for each day polling locations are to be open, and 

voting machines and supplies are delivered to the polling locations. 

However, as described by election officials in jurisdictions we visited that 

had early voting, early voting differs from Election Day voting in that staff 

are generally required to perform their voting day-related duties for more 

than 1 day, and staff generally do not use poll books to identify eligible 

voters and check them in. Instead, as described by some of these 

jurisdictions, early voting staff usually access the jurisdiction’s voter 

registration list to identify eligible voters and to indicate the voter voted 
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 141 GAO-06-450 Elections

early to preclude voting on Election Day or by absentee ballot. Also, 

election officials told us that, generally, staff must possess some computer 

skills and need to be trained in using the jurisdiction’s voter registration 

system. Furthermore, staff must be aware that ballots are specific to the 

voter’s precinct.

In our nationwide survey of local election jurisdictions, we asked about the 

type of staff who worked at early voting polling places. According to our 

survey for the November 2004 general election, local election jurisdictions 

relied on permanent election jurisdiction staff most often to work at early 

voting polling locations. As table 13 shows, we estimate 30 percent of local 

jurisdictions offered early voting using only permanent election jurisdiction 

staff to work at the early voting polling places; we estimate that 14 percent 

of local jurisdictions used poll workers exclusively; and we estimate 

14 percent used other staff (e.g., county or city employees).

Table 13: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Various Staff 

Mixes at Early Voting Locations, November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 9 percentage points.

b

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +7 or -6 percentage points.

c

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +8 or -6 percentage points.

d

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +6 or -4 percentage points.

Staff Percent

Permanent staff 30a

Poll workers 14 b

Other (respondents wrote in other categories) 14c

Permanent and temporary part-time staff 7d

Permanent staff and poll workers 4d

Permanent, temporary full-time, and temporary part-time staff and poll workers 4d

Permanent and temporary full-time staff 4d

Permanent and temporary part-time staff and poll workers 4d

Temporary part-time staff and poll workers 3d

Temporary full-time staff and poll workers 2d

Permanent, temporary full-time, and temporary part-time staff 2d

Temporary full-time and temporary part-time staff and poll workers 1d
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 142 GAO-06-450 Elections

Election officials at 11 jurisdictions we visited emphasized the importance 

of staffing early voting locations with experienced staff such as election 

office staff or experienced and seasoned poll workers. Even with 

experienced staff working early voting locations, election officials at local 

jurisdictions we visited mentioned that staff were required to take training 

and were provided tools to help them perform their duties. 

In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions that provided early 

voting about the ways that staff were trained for early voting. As shown in 

table 14, the majority of jurisdictions used methods, such as providing a 

checklist of procedures, written guidance for self-study or reference, and 

quick reference materials for troubleshooting, to train early voting staff. 

Table 14: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Various Methods 

to Train Early Voting Staff, November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a

The 95 percent confidence interval for all percentages is +/- 11 percentage points or less.

Local jurisdictions could do more than one of the above ways to train early 

voting staff. On the basis of our local survey, we estimate that 14 percent of 

local jurisdictions used classroom training, written guidance for self-study 

or reference, a checklist of procedures, and quick reference materials for 

troubleshooting to train early voting staff.15

When asked about what worked particularly well during early voting, 

election officials in 1 jurisdiction we visited in Colorado said that that they 

provided 8 hours of training and had on-site supervision that they thought 

contributed to a successful early voting experience. The election officials 

also said they used a feature in their electronic poll book system to track 

Ways that early voting staff were trained

Percentage of local 

jurisdictionsa

Provided a checklist of procedures 80

Provided written guidance for self-study or reference 78

Provided quick reference materials for troubleshooting 74

Provided classroom training 56

Viewed training video 31

15 The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +8 or -6 percentage points.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 143 GAO-06-450 Elections

the number of ballots used at each site to determine whether sites had 

adequate inventories of ballots. The program for the poll book system had 

an alarm that went off if any site was running low on ballots, according to 

these election officials. Two other jurisdictions we visited in Kansas and 

Florida noted the importance of having experienced staff for early voting, 

with the election officials in 1 Kansas jurisdiction saying that designating a 

group of workers to work on early voting helped the process run effectively 

and the election officials in 1 Florida jurisdiction saying that having the 

supervisor of elections office staff on site to support early voting helped 

make the process work well. 

Some Local Jurisdictions We 

Visited Encountered Long lines 

Resulting from Larger than 

Expected Early Voter Turnout

When asked about challenges with early voting faced during the November 

2004 general election, in half of the local jurisdictions we visited that 

offered early voting election officials identified long lines as a major 

challenge. Election officials at 5 local jurisdictions we visited said that they 

had not anticipated the large number of voters who had turned out to vote 

early. Officials attributed challenges handling the large number of voters 

and resulting long lines to problems with technology, people, and 

processes. Election officials at local jurisdictions we visited made the 

following comments: 

• Election officials in one Florida jurisdiction we visited said that their 

jurisdiction faced more early voters than anticipated and this fact, 

coupled with slowness in determining voter eligibility, resulted in 

long lines. They said that on the first day of early voting, staff was 

unable to access the voter registration list because laptops were not 

functioning properly. To address the problem, a worker at the early 

voting location paired with another worker, who called the 

supervisor of elections office to obtain voter registration information 

and provide information on the voter seeking to vote early. 

• An election official in another Florida jurisdiction said that while 

state law provides for early voting in the main office of the supervisor 

of elections, other locations may be used only under certain 

conditions. For example, in order for a branch office to be used, it 

must be a full-service facility of the supervisor and must have been 

designated as such at least 1 year prior to the election. In addition, a 

city hall or public library may be designated as an additional early 

voting location, but only if the sites are located so as to provide all 

voters in the county an equal opportunity to cast a ballot, insofar as is 

practicable. The official thought more flexibility was needed to allow 

him to either have more early voting locations or use other types of 
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 144 GAO-06-450 Elections

facilities, such as a local community center, that could accommodate 

more voters. 

• An election official in a Nevada jurisdiction we visited said that the 

jurisdiction’s process flow was inadequate to handle the large turnout 

for early voting. The election official said that the jurisdiction had not 

planned sufficiently to manage the large turnout for early voting and 

did not have enough staff to process voters. The election official said 

that in the future, he will hire temporary workers and will assign one 

person to be in charge of each process (e.g., checking in voters, 

activating the DRE machine, etc.) In addition, the election official 

said that, in hindsight, he made a questionable decision to close all 

but two early voting locations for the last day of early voting. The 

closing of all but two locations on the last day of early voting 

coincided with a state holiday so children were out of school. The 

decision to close all but two locations caused 3 to 31⁄2 hours of wait 

time, with parents waiting in line with children. The election official 

said he has set a goal for the future that no wait time should be longer 

than half an hour.16

To address challenges related to heavy early voter turnout, election 

officials in 1 Nevada jurisdiction said they have gradually added new early 

voting locations each year to keep up with the increasing number of people 

who vote early. In a New Mexico jurisdiction we visited, election officials 

said that they used a smaller ratio of voters to machines than required by 

state statute. According to these election officials, the state required at 

least one machine for every 600 voters, and during early voting, the election 

officials said they used one machine for every 400 voters registered in the 

jurisdiction. 

In 1 Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that they 

addressed the challenge of long lines by having greeters inform voters 

about the line and make sure the voters had required identification with 

them. They said they provided equipment demonstrations and passed out 

sample ballots so people in line could consider their choices, if they had 

16The election official said that he closed all but two locations because he wanted to have 

enough time before Election Day to make sure that he got all of the data off the DRE 

machines (which were new) and have them ready to be transported to Election Day polling 

places. 
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 145 GAO-06-450 Elections

not already done so. They also said they offered people in line the option of 

absentee ballot applications. 

Some Jurisdictions We Visited 

Encountered Challenges Dealing 

with Disruptive Third-Party 

Activities 

In 3 jurisdictions we visited, election officials stated that they encountered 

challenges dealing with disruptive third-party activities at early voting sites. 

In particular, concerns were raised about various groups attempting to 

campaign or influence voters while the early voters waited in line. State 

restrictions on various activities in or around polling places on Election 

Day include prohibitions relating to, for example, the circulation of 

petitions within a certain distance of a polling place, the distribution of 

campaign literature within a certain distance of the polls, the conduction of 

an exit or public opinion poll within a certain distance of the polls, and 

disorderly conduct or violence or threats of violence that impede or 

interfere with an election. Election officials in 1 jurisdiction we visited 

stated that campaign activities too close to people waiting in line were a 

concern to the extent that police were called in to monitor the situation at 

one early voting location. Election officials in a Florida jurisdiction we 

visited said that they were concerned about solicitors, both candidates and 

poll watchers, approaching people waiting in line to vote early and offering 

them water or assistance in voting.17 While Florida’s statutory provisions in 

place for the November 2004 general election contained restrictions of 

various activities in or around polling places on Election Day, such 

provisions did not explicitly address early voting sites. Amendments to 

these provisions, effective January 2006, among other things, explicitly 

applied certain restrictions of activities in or around polling places to early 

voting areas. With respect to poll watchers, these amendments also 

prohibit their interaction with voters to go along with the pre-existing 

prohibition on obstructing the orderly conduct of any election by poll 

watchers.

Concluding 

Observations

Making voting easier prior to Election Day has advantages for voters and 

election officials, but also presents challenges for elections officials. Many 

17Florida statutory provisions in place for the November 2004 general election provided, in 

part, that each political party and each candidate may have one watcher in each polling 

room at any one time during an election. Such statutory provisions further provided, among 

other things, that no watcher shall be permitted to come closer to the official’s table or the 

voting booths than is reasonably necessary to properly perform his or her functions, but 

each shall be allowed within the polling room to watch and observe the conduct of electors 

and officials.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 146 GAO-06-450 Elections

states and local jurisdictions appear to be moving in the direction of 

enabling voters to vote before Election Day by eliminating restrictions on 

who can vote absentee and providing for early voting. Many states allowed 

voters to use e-mail and facsimiles to request an absentee ballot application 

and, in some cases, to return applications. To the extent that large numbers 

of voters do vote absentee or early, it can reduce lines at the polling place 

on Election Day and, where permitted by state law, ease the time pressures 

of vote counting by allowing election officials to count absentee and early 

votes prior to Election Day.

However, there are also challenges for election officials. An estimated 

55 percent of jurisdictions received absentee ballot applications too late to 

process, and an estimated 77 percent received ballots too late. Although we 

do not know the extent of these problems in terms of the number of 

applications and ballots that could not be processed, the estimated number 

of jurisdictions encountering these problems may be of some concern to 

state and local election officials. Absentee application deadlines close to 

Election Day provide citizens increased time to apply to vote absentee. 

However, the short time period between when applications are received 

and Election Day may make it difficult for election officials to ensure that 

eligible voters receive absentee ballots in time to vote and return them 

before the deadline for receipt at election offices. 

Voter errors on their absentee applications and ballots also create 

processing problems for election officials. These include missing or 

illegible signatures, missing or inadequate voting residence addresses, and 

missing or incomplete witness information for a voter’s signature or other 

information. In addition, mail-in absentee ballots are considered by some to 

be particularly susceptible to fraud. This could include such activities as 

casting more than one ballot in the same election or someone other than 

the registered voter completing the ballot. Despite efforts to guard against 

such activities, election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited 

expressed some concerns, particularly regarding absentee voters being 

unduly influenced or intimated by third parties who went to voters’ homes 

and offered to assist them in voting their ballots. Some election officials 

expressed similar concerns about the influence of third parties on early 

voters waiting in line who were approached by candidates and poll 

watchers. After this happened in Florida in November 2004, the state 

amended its election provisions to prohibit such activity with respect to 

early voters.
Chapter 3

Absentee and Early Voting

Page 147 GAO-06-450 Elections

Getting absentee ballots to uniformed service personnel and overseas 

citizens is a continuing challenge. UOCAVA permitted such voters to 

request an absentee ballot for the upcoming election, and HAVA extended 

the covered period to include up to two subsequent general elections for 

federal office. Because the duty station of uniformed service personnel 

may change during the period covered by the absentee ballot requests, 

election officials in jurisdictions we visited were concerned that they have 

some means of knowing the current mailing address. Some jurisdictions 

are taking action to ensure that they have the correct address for sending 

absentee ballots for the November 2006 election, such as requesting e-mail 

addresses that can be used to obtain the most current address information 

prior to mailing the absentee ballot. To the extent there are problems 

identifying the correct address, uniformed service personnel and overseas 

civilians may either not receive an absentee ballot or receive it too late to 

return it by the deadline required for it to be counted.
Page 148 GAO-06-450 Elections

Chapter 4

Conducting Elections Chapte5r

Whether voters are able to successfully vote on Election Day depends a 

great deal on the planning and preparation that occur prior to the election. 

Election officials carry out numerous activities—including recruiting and 

training poll workers; selecting and setting up polling places; designing and 

producing ballots; educating voters; and allocating voting equipment, 

ballots, and other supplies to polling places—to help ensure that all eligible 

voters are able to cast a ballot on Election Day with minimal problems.1

 In 

our October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide 

we described these activities as well as problems encountered in 

administering the November 2000 general election.2

 Since then, federal and 

state actions have been taken to help address many of the challenges 

encountered in conducting the November 2000 general election. However, 

reports after the November 2004 general election highlighted instances of 

unprepared poll workers, confusion about identification requirements, long 

lines at the polls, and shortages of voting equipment and ballots that voters 

reportedly encountered on Election Day. This chapter describes changes 

and challenges—both continuing and new—that election officials 

encountered in preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general 

election.

Overview States and local jurisdictions have reported making changes since the 

November 2000 general election as a result of HAVA provisions and other 

state actions to improve the administration of elections in the United 

States. In addition to establishing a commission—the U.S. Election 

Assistance Commission—with wide-ranging duties that include providing 

information and assistance to states and local jurisdictions—HAVA also 

established requirements with respect to elections for federal office for, 

among other things, certain voters who register by mail to provide 

identification prior to voting; mandated that voting systems accessible to 

individuals with disabilities be located at each polling place; and required 

voter information to be posted at polling places on Election Day. HAVA also 

authorized the appropriation of federal funds for payments to states to 

implement these provisions and make other improvements to election 

administration. Since the November 2000 general election, some states 

1

Jurisdictions call their poll workers by different titles, including clerks, wardens, election 

judges, inspectors, captains, and precinct officers and often have a chief poll worker for 

each polling place. 

2

See GAO-02-3.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 149 GAO-06-450 Elections

have also reported making changes to their identification requirements for 

all voters.

Election officials reported encountering many of the same challenges 

preparing for and conducting the November 2004 general election as they 

did in 2000, including recruiting and training an adequate supply of skilled 

poll workers, locating a sufficient number of polling places that met 

requirements, designing ballots that were clear to voters when there were 

many candidates or issues (e.g., propositions, questions, or referenda), 

having long lines at polling places, and handling the large volume of 

telephone calls received from voters and poll workers on Election Day. 

Election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited also reported 

encountering new challenges not identified to us in the 2000 general 

election with third-party (e.g., poll watchers, observers, or electioneers) 

activities at polling places on Election Day. On the basis of our survey of a 

representative sample of local election jurisdictions nationwide and our 

visits to 28 local jurisdictions, the extent to which jurisdictions 

encountered many of these continuing challenges varied by the size of 

election jurisdiction. Large and medium jurisdictions—those jurisdictions 

with over 10,000 people—generally encountered more challenges than 

small jurisdictions. In most results from our nationwide survey where there 

are statistical differences between the size categories of jurisdictions, large 

jurisdictions are statistically different from small jurisdictions.

HAVA Made Changes 

Intended to Improve 

Election 

Administration

HAVA established EAC to provide voluntary guidance and assistance with 

election administration, for example, by providing information on election 

practices to states and local jurisdictions and administering programs that 

provide federal funds for states to make improvements to some aspects of 

election administration.3

 HAVA also added a new requirement for states to 

in turn require certain first-time voters who register by mail who have not 

previously voted in a federal election in the state to provide identification 

prior to voting,4

 and jurisdictions reported taking steps to implement this 

requirement and inform voters about it. In addition, HAVA includes 

provisions to facilitate voting for individuals with disabilities, such as 

requirements for accessible voting systems in elections for federal

3

HAVA section 201 et seq. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15321 et seq.).

4

HAVA section 303(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)).
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 150 GAO-06-450 Elections

office.5 HAVA established voter information requirements at polling places 

on the day of election for federal office6 and authorized the appropriation 

of funding for payments to states to expand voter education efforts.

HAVA Established EAC to 

Provide Guidance and 

Assistance with Election 

Administration

HAVA established EAC, in part, to assist in the administration of federal 

elections by serving as a national clearinghouse for information and 

providing guidance and outreach to states and local officials.7

 In our 

October 2001 report on election processes, we estimated that on the basis 

of our survey of local election jurisdictions in 2001, 40 percent of local 

election jurisdictions nationwide were supportive of federal development 

of voluntary or mandatory standards for election administration similar to 

the voluntary standards available for election equipment. We also reported 

in 2001 that some election officials believed that greater sharing of 

information on best practices and systematic collection of information 

could help improve election administration across and within states.8

 To 

assist election officials, since its establishment, EAC has produced two 

clearinghouse reports, one of which covers election administration.9

 EAC 

released a Best Practices Toolkit on Election Administration on August 9, 

2004, to offer guidance to election officials before the November 2004 

general election. The document is a compilation of practices used by 

election officials that covers topics such as voter outreach, poll workers, 

polling places, and election operations. Of note, this compilation provided 

election officials with a checklist for HAVA implementation that covers 

identification for new voters, provisional voting, complaint procedures, 

and access for individuals with disabilities. EAC has made this guidance 

available to states and local jurisdictions via its Web site and engaged in 

5

HAVA section 301(a)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(3)).

6

HAVA section 302(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15482(b)).

7

Prior to the establishment of EAC, the Federal Election Commission’s Office of Election 

Administration served as a national clearinghouse for information regarding the 

administration of federal elections.

8

See GAO-02-3.

9

The second report covers voting by absent uniformed service voters and citizens residing 

outside of the United States. On September 21, 2004, EAC released Best Practices for 

Facilitating Voting by U.S. Citizens Covered by UOCAVA, which was compiled in 

consultation with the U.S. Department of Defense Federal Voting Assistance Program. This 

report describes methods to enhance absentee voter registration by UOCAVA voters and 

ensure the timely receipt of their ballots.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 151 GAO-06-450 Elections

public hearings and outreach efforts to inform the election community 

about the resource tool.

EAC also administers programs that provide federal funds for states under 

HAVA to make improvements to aspects of election administration, such as 

implementing certain programs to encourage youth to become involved in 

elections; training election officials and poll workers; and establishing tollfree telephone hotlines that voters may use to, among other things, obtain 

general election information. The results of our state survey of election 

officials show that as of August 1, 2005, most states reported spending or 

obligating HAVA funding for a variety of activities related to improving 

election administration. For example, 45 states and the District of 

Columbia reported spending or obligating HAVA funding for training 

election officials, and 32 states and the District of Columbia reported 

spending or obligating funding to establish toll-free telephone hotlines.

HAVA Added a New 

Requirement for Certain 

Voters, and Jurisdictions 

Reported Taking Steps to 

Inform Voters

As discussed in chapter 2, under HAVA, states are to require certain firsttime voters who registered to vote by mail to provide identification prior to 

voting.10 Voters who are subject to this provision are those individuals who 

registered to vote in a jurisdiction by mail and have not previously voted in 

a federal election in the state, or those who have not voted in a federal 

election in a jurisdiction which is located in a state that has not yet 

established a computerized voter registration list, as required by HAVA. 

When voting in person, these individuals must (if not already provided with 

their mailed application) present a current and valid photo identification, 

or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, 

paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and 

address of the voter. Under HAVA, voters at the polls who have not met this 

identification requirement may cast a vote under HAVA’s provisional voting 

provisions. Additional information on provisional voting processes and 

challenges is presented in chapter 5.

Election officials in 21 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported 

encountering no problems implementing the HAVA first-time voter ID 

requirement, and officials in some of these jurisdictions provided reasons 

10HAVA requirements to present ID at the time of voting for mail registrants are, in general, 

not applicable to certain types of voters such as, for example, persons who have previously 

submitted required ID with their mail registration, and those entitled to vote by absentee 

ballot under UOCAVA.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 152 GAO-06-450 Elections

why there were no problems.11 For example, election officials in 

2 jurisdictions in Colorado told us that they did not encounter 

implementation problems because all voters, under state requirements, 

were required to show identification. Election officials in some other 

jurisdictions we visited reported that they took steps to inform voters of 

the new HAVA ID requirement for such voters registering by mail. For 

example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Ohio reported that they 

contacted about 300 prospective voters twice, either by phone or by letter, 

prior to the election to inform them that that they needed to show 

identification. Figure 27 illustrates a poster used in a jurisdiction we visited 

to inform prospective voters about the new identification requirements.

11Election officials in 6 other jurisdictions we visited reported encountering some problems, 

such as poll worker confusion or administrative burdens associated with mailing postcards 

to all voters who needed to show identification at polling places. Election officials in 

1 jurisdiction we visited told us that this HAVA requirement was not implemented until 2005.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 153 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 27: King County, Washington, Poster Used to Inform Prospective Voters of 

New Identification Requirements

Source: GAO (photo).
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 154 GAO-06-450 Elections

HAVA Includes Provisions 

to Facilitate Voting for 

Individuals with Disabilities

HAVA contains provisions to help facilitate voting for individuals with 

disabilities,12 including requirements for the accessibility of voting systems 

used in elections for federal office, effective January 1, 2006. HAVA also 

authorized the appropriation of funding for payments to states to improve 

the accessibility of polling places. In October 2001, we issued a report that 

examined state and local provisions and practices for voting accessibility, 

both at polling places and with respect to alternative voting methods and 

accommodations.13 We reported in 2001 that all states and the District of 

Columbia had laws or other provisions concerning voting access for 

individuals with disabilities, but the extent and manner in which these 

provisions addressed accessibility varied from state to state. In addition, in 

our 2001 report we noted that various features of the polling places we 

visited had the potential to prove challenging for voters with certain types 

of disabilities. On the basis of our observations on Election Day 2000, we 

also estimated that most polling places in the contiguous United States had 

one or more physical features, such as a lack of accessible parking or 

barriers en route to the voting room, that had the potential to pose 

challenges for voters with disabilities.14 Results from our 2005 surveys 

show that at the time of the November 2004 general election, many states 

and local jurisdictions had taken steps to meet HAVA’s requirement for 

accessible voting systems, as well as making other changes to help improve 

the accessibility of voting for individuals with disabilities.

HAVA Requirements for 

Accessible Voting Systems

HAVA requires that, effective January 1, 2006, each voting system used in a 

federal election must meet certain accessibility requirements. These voting 

systems are required to provide individuals with disabilities with the same 

opportunity for access and participation (including independence and 

12Other federal laws affecting voting for individuals with disabilities include the Americans 

with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)), which, in general, 

provides civil rights protection to individuals with disabilities similar to those provided to 

individuals on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, age, and religion, and the Voting 

Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98 Stat. 1678 (1984)), 

which, in general, requires registration facilities and polling places for federal elections to 

be physically accessible to the elderly and those with disabilities.

13For more information, see GAO, Voters with Disabilities: Access to Polling Places and 

Alternative Voting Methods, GAO-02-107 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).

14In our October 2001 report we reported that these potential impediments would primarily 

affect individuals with mobility impairments. We also reported that polling places generally 

provide accommodations, such as curbside voting, voting stations designed for people with 

disabilities, and voter assistance inside the voting room.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 155 GAO-06-450 Elections

privacy) as for other voters. These HAVA requirements specify that such 

accessibility include nonvisual accessibility for voters who are blind or 

visually impaired. HAVA provides for the use of at least one DRE or other 

voting system equipped for voters with disabilities at each polling place. 

The results of our state survey show that as of August 1, 2005, 41 states and 

the District of Columbia reported having laws (or executive action) in place 

to provide each polling location with at least one DRE voting system or 

other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities by January 1, 

2006. Of the remaining 9 states, 5 reported having plans to promulgate laws 

or executive action to provide each polling location with at least one DRE 

voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with 

disabilities, and 4 reported that they did not plan to provide such 

equipment or were uncertain about their plans.15

Some local election jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines at 

polling places for the November 2004 general election. On the basis of our 

survey of a representative sample of local election jurisdictions 

nationwide, we estimate that 29 percent of all jurisdictions provided 

accessible voting machines at each polling place in the November 2004 

general election.16 Further, more large and medium jurisdictions provided 

accessible voting machines than small jurisdictions. We estimate that 

39 percent of large jurisdictions, 38 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 

25 percent of small jurisdictions provided accessible voting machines at 

each polling place. The differences between both large and medium 

jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically significant. Election 

officials from some small jurisdictions who provided written comments on 

our survey questionnaire expressed concerns about how this requirement 

would be implemented in their jurisdictions and whether electronic voting 

machines were the best alternative. For example, one respondent wrote: 

“We [live] in a small town ... and use paper ballots and that has worked 

very well in the past and I believe will work very well in the future. Voting 

machines should be decided on for much larger areas with a lot more than 

our 367 population with 150 voters.” Another wrote: “We are a small rural 

15The 5 states that reported having plans were Kansas, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, and 

Wyoming. The 4 states that reported having no plans or were uncertain about their plans 

were Delaware, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Tennessee.

16Unless otherwise noted, the maximum sampling error for estimates of all jurisdictions is 

plus or minus 5 percentage points (rounded); +/- 7 percentage points (rounded) for large 

population size jurisdictions; +/- 7 percentage points (rounded) for medium population size 

jurisdictions; and +/- 5 percentage points (rounded) for small population size jurisdictions.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 156 GAO-06-450 Elections

township with about 160 voters. Our 2004 election went well; as usual, we 

had no problems. We use paper ballots. We have some concerns with the 

implementation of HAVA. We are being forced to use expensive voting 

machines that will require expensive programming for every election. We 

are concerned about these costs.... If our limited budget can’t afford those 

expensive machines and programming, we may need to combine our 

township polling place with another township—maybe several townships. 

The additional driving to a different polling place miles away will 

discourage voters from voting—particularly our elderly residents. So these 

efforts (HAVA) to help voters will actually hinder voters.”

In an effort to address these issues, Vermont, which has about 250 small 

and medium election jurisdictions that use paper and optical scan ballots, 

took an alternative approach to meeting the HAVA requirement, according 

to an election official. Instead of providing one DRE machine for each of its 

280 polling places, Vermont plans to implement a secure vote-by-phone 

system that allows voters to mark a paper ballot, in private, using a regular 

telephone at the polling place. According to the Vermont’s Secretary of 

State’s Office, a poll worker uses a designated phone at the polling place to 

call a computer system located at a secure location and access the 

appropriate ballot for the voter. The computer will only permit access to 

the system from phone numbers that have been entered into the system 

prior to the election, and only after the proper poll worker and ballot 

access numbers have been entered. The phone system reads the ballot to 

the voter, and after the voter makes selections using the telephone key pad, 

the system prints out a paper ballot that is automatically scanned by the 

system and played back to the voter for verification. The voter may then 

decide to cast the ballot or discard it and revote. The system does not use 

the Internet or other data network, and it produces a voter-verified paper 

ballot for every vote cast. In addition, according to an election official, 

voters are able to dial into a toll-free telephone number for at least 15 days 

prior to an election to listen to, preview, and practice with the actual ballot 

they will vote on Election Day. This is a way of providing a sample ballot to 

voters, as well as providing an opportunity for voters to become familiar 

with using the telephone system.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 157 GAO-06-450 Elections

Provisions for Polling Place 

Accessibility and Other 

Accommodations

For our October 2001 report on voters with disabilities, our analysis 

included a review of state statutes, regulations, and written policies 

pertaining to voting accessibility for all 50 states and the District of 

Columbia, as well as policies and guidelines for a statistical sample of 

100 counties.17 As part of our 2005 surveys, we asked states to report on 

provisions concerning accessibility and local jurisdictions whether they 

provided accommodations or alternative voting methods for individuals 

with disabilities in the November 2004 general election. While the 

methodologies in the 2001 report and this report differ, results of our 

2005 surveys show that states and local jurisdictions have taken actions to 

help improve voting for individuals with disabilities by, for example, using 

HAVA funds, taking steps to help ensure accessibility of polling places, and 

providing alternative voting methods or accommodations.

Most states reported that they had spent or obligated HAVA funding to 

improve the accessibility of polling places, including providing physical or 

nonvisual access. The results of our state survey of election officials show 

that as of August 1, 2005, 46 states and the District of Columbia reported 

spending or obligating HAVA funding for this purpose. For instance, 

election officials in a local jurisdiction we visited in Colorado told us they 

had used HAVA funds to improve the accessibility of polling places by 

obtaining input from the disability community, surveying the accessibility 

of their polling places, and reviewing the DRE audio ballot with 

representatives of the blind community.

States and local jurisdictions reported taking a variety of actions designed 

to help ensure that polling places are accessible for voters with disabilities, 

including specifying guidelines or requirements, inspecting polling places 

to assess accessibility, and reporting by local jurisdictions on polling place 

accessibility to the state. In our October 2001 report on voters with 

disabilities, we noted that state involvement in ensuring polling places are 

accessible and the amount of assistance provided to local jurisdictions 

could vary widely. For example, in 2001 we reported that 29 states had 

provisions requiring inspections of polling places, and 20 states had 

provisions requiring reporting by local jurisdictions.18 According to our 

2005 state survey, 43 states and the District of Columbia reported requiring 

or allowing inspections of polling places, and 39 states and the District of 

17See GAO-02-107.

18See GAO-02-107.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 158 GAO-06-450 Elections

Columbia reported that they required or allowed reporting by local 

jurisdictions. From our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 

83 percent of jurisdictions nationwide used state provisions to determine 

the accessibility requirements for polling places. During our site visits to 

local jurisdictions, we asked election officials to describe the steps they 

took to ensure that polling places were accessible. Election officials in 

many of the jurisdictions we visited told us that either local or state 

officials inspected each polling location in their jurisdiction using a 

checklist based on state or federal guidelines. For example, election 

officials in the 4 jurisdictions we visited in Georgia and New Hampshire 

told us that state inspectors conducted a survey of all polling locations. 

Election officials in the 2 jurisdictions we visited in Florida told us that they 

inspected all polling places using a survey developed by the state. 

Appendix IX presents additional information about state provisions for 

alternative voting methods and accommodations for the November 2000 

and 2004 general elections.

In addition to making efforts to ensure that polling places are accessible, 

some local jurisdictions provided alternative voting methods pursuant to 

state provisions (such as absentee voting) or accommodations at polling 

places (such as audio or visual aids) that could facilitate voting for 

individuals with disabilities. Table 15 presents results from our survey of 

local election jurisdictions about the estimated percentages of jurisdictions 

that provided alternative voting methods or accommodations to voters for 

the November 2004 general election.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 159 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 15: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Provided Alternative Voting Methods 

and Accommodations for the November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a

Some provisions, such as early voting, might not be provided by some jurisdictions because state 

provisions do not authorize them. Some provisions may not be applicable for the type of voting system 

a jurisdiction uses.

b

The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

c

The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/- 8 percentage points.

d

The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/- 6 percentage points.

e

The difference between large and small jurisdictions is statistically significant.

HAVA Helped to Expand 

State and Local 

Jurisdictions’ Voter 

Education Efforts

Election officials’ efforts to educate citizens can help minimize problems 

that could affect citizens’ ability to successfully vote on Election Day. 

Informing the public about key aspects of elections includes 

communicating how to register, what opportunities exist to vote prior to 

Election Day, where to vote on Election Day, and how to cast a ballot. This 

information can be distributed through a number of different media, 

including signs or posters, television, radio, publications, in-person 

demonstrations, and the Internet. In our October 2001 report on election 

processes, we stated that lack of funds was the primary challenge cited by 

election officials in expanding voter education efforts. From our 2001 

survey of local election jurisdictions, we estimated that over a third of 

jurisdictions nationwide believed that the federal government should

Provisiona

Percentage of all 

jurisdictions

Percentage of 

small jurisdictions 

(<10,000)

Percentage 

of medium 

jurisdictions 

(10,000 to 100,000)

Percentage of large 

jurisdictions 

(>100,000)

Early voting b 27 20 41 49c

Absentee voting (no excuse or an allowable 

excuse) 86 84 91 89

Permanent absentee voting (for instance, 

absentee voting status for a time period or 

number of elections)b 58 52d 74 68

Curbside voting 55 55d 54 60

Audio or visual aids to assist voters with 

disabilities (magnifying lens)e 42 38d 50 57c

Braille ballots or voting methods 15 15 16 10

Large-font ballots or instructions 13 11 19 21
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 160 GAO-06-450 Elections

provide monetary assistance for voter education programs.19 Since the 

November 2000 election, changes in voter education efforts include HAVA 

requiring certain information to be posted at polling places and authorizing 

the payment of federal funds to states to use for educating voters, and 

states and local jurisdictions reported expansion of voter education efforts.

HAVA Required Voter 

Information at Polling Places and 

Provided for Funding to States

To help improve voters’ knowledge about voting rights and procedures, 

HAVA required election officials to post voting information at each polling 

place on the day of each election for federal office and authorized the 

payment of funding to states for such purposes. This required voting 

information includes a sample ballot, polling place hours, instructions on 

how to vote, first-time mail-in instructions, and general information on 

federal and state voting rights laws and laws prohibiting fraud and 

misrepresentation. Results of our state survey of election officials show 

that as of August 1, 2005, 40 states and the District of Columbia reported 

spending or obligating HAVA funding for voting information, such as 

sample ballots and voter instructions, to be posted at polling places. 

Election officials in all 28 jurisdictions we visited told us they posted a 

variety of voter information signs at polling places on Election Day 2004. 

Figure 28 illustrates examples of some of these signs.

19See GAO-02-3.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 161 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 28: Examples of Voter Information Signs Posted at Polling Places for the November 2004 General Election

HAVA also authorized the payment of funding for voter education programs 

in general, and according to our state survey, as of August 1, 2005, 44 states 

and the District of Columbia reported spending or obligating HAVA funding 

for these programs. For example, according to its HAVA plan, Florida 

required local election officials to provide descriptions of proposed voter 

education efforts, such as using print, radio, or television to advertise to 

voters, in order to receive state HAVA funds in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. 

Election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited in Florida provided us 

information about voter education campaigns that they implemented. 

Election officials in 1 of these jurisdictions reported designing election 

Source: Clark County, Nevada, and Chicago, Illinois, posters (GAO photos).
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 162 GAO-06-450 Elections

advertisements to be shown on movie theater screens in the beginning of 

the summer season; election officials in the other jurisdiction told us they 

implemented a “Get Out the Vote” television advertising campaign with a 

cable company intended to reach hundreds of thousands of households 

during the weeks prior to the November 2004 general election.

Variety of Local Election 

Jurisdictions’ Actions to Educate 

Prospective Voters

More local election jurisdictions appear to have taken steps to educate 

prospective voters prior to Election Day in 2004 than in 2000, and on the 

basis of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, more large and medium 

jurisdictions took these steps than small jurisdictions. In our October 2001 

report on election processes, we noted that local election jurisdictions 

provided a range of information to prospective voters through multiple 

media. For example, on the basis of our 2001 survey of local jurisdictions, 

we reported that between 18 and 20 percent of local jurisdictions 

nationwide indicated they placed public service ads on local media, 

performed community outreach programs, or put some voter information 

on the Internet. On the basis of our 2005 survey, we estimate that more 

jurisdictions provided these measures. For instance, we estimate that 

49 percent of all jurisdictions placed public service ads on local media, and 

43 percent of all jurisdictions listed polling places on the Internet. However, 

increases in the overall estimates from the 2001 and 2005 surveys are, in 

part, likely due to differences in the sample designs of the two surveys and 

how local election jurisdictions that were minor civil divisions (i.e., 

subcounty units of government) were selected. Because of these sample 

design differences, comparing only election jurisdictions that are counties 

provides a stronger basis for making direct comparisons between the two 

surveys’ results.20 These county comparisons show increases as well. For 

instance, for the November 2000 election, we estimate that 21 percent of 

county election jurisdictions placed public service ads on local media, 

while for the November 2004 election, we estimate that 61 percent of 

county election jurisdictions placed such ads.21

20For this reason, some estimates from the 2001 survey are slightly different than the overall 

sample estimates provided in our prior report. For these comparisons, the 95 percent 

confidence interval is +/- 5 percent or less for the 2001 survey estimates and +/- 8 percent or 

less for the 2005 survey estimates. See appendix V for further details about the sampling 

differences between the 2001 and 2005 local election jurisdiction surveys. 

21In addition, some of the increase may be because of changes in how the question was 

worded. However, as noted above, HAVA authorized the payment of funding to states for 

voter education programs, and according to our survey of state election officials, most 

states reported obligating or spending HAVA funds for voter education.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 163 GAO-06-450 Elections

In our 2005 survey, we also looked at whether there were differences 

between the size categories of jurisdictions, and generally, more large 

jurisdictions provided voter education prior to Election Day than medium 

and small jurisdictions. For instance, we estimate that 88 percent of large 

jurisdictions, 46 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 38 percent of small 

jurisdictions listed polling place locations on Internet Web sites. Table

16 presents estimated percentages of jurisdictions that provided various 

voter education steps prior to the November 2004 general election.

Table 16: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Took Steps to Provide Voter Education 

Prior to the November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a

The differences between large jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant 

b

The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/- 6 percentage points.

c

The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

d

All size categories are statistically different from one another.

e

The difference between large and small jurisdictions is statistically significant.

Step

Percentage of all 

jurisdictions

Percentage of 

small 

jurisdictions 

(<10,000)

Percentage 

of medium 

jurisdictions 

(10,000 to 

100,000)

Percentage of large 

jurisdictions 

(>100,000)

Provided sample ballots, either by mail or by 

printing in newspaper 87 86 91 86

Placed polling place locations on Internet 

Web sitea 43 38b 46 88

Placed public service ads on local media, 

such as TV, radio, or newspapersc 49 43b 62 63

Conducted outreach with local organizations, 

such as political parties or charitable or 

social groupsd 26 16 43 76

Mailed vote-casting instructions on using the 

jurisdiction’s voting system to registered 

votersa 12 11 9 28

Demonstrations of voting equipment (at 

county fairs, registrar’s office, public events)d 28 21 41 61

Provided information to voters about their 

specific polling place locatione 83 82 83 92
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 164 GAO-06-450 Elections

Large jurisdictions may have provided voter education through multiple 

media in order to reach a broader audience of prospective voters. For 

instance, Web sites were used to provide information to voters by nearly all 

large jurisdictions. On the basis of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, we 

estimate that 93 percent of large jurisdictions, 60 percent of medium 

jurisdictions, and 39 percent of small jurisdictions had a Web site. The 

differences between all size categories are statistically significant. During 

our site visits, election officials in large jurisdictions described a variety of 

voter education mechanisms used to reach a number of prospective voters. 

For example, election officials in a large Nevada jurisdiction we visited told 

us that their office partnered with power, water, and cable companies to 

provide voter registration information in subscribers’ billing statements. 

Election officials in other jurisdictions we visited reported using a variety 

of other media to encourage participation or provide information to a 

broad audience of prospective voters. For example, figure 29 illustrates a 

billboard, cab-top sign, and milk carton used in local jurisdictions we 

visited.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 165 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 29: Efforts to Inform Voters Prior to the November 2004 General Election 

Source (top): Broward County, Florida, (bottom left to right): Leon County, Florida; Clark County, Nevada, milk carton (GAO photo).
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 166 GAO-06-450 Elections

Some States Reported 

Changing Identification 

Requirements for All 

Prospective Voters

Whether or not all voters should be required to show identification prior to 

voting is an issue that has received attention in the media and reports since 

the November 2000 general election. Recent state initiatives, such as those 

in Georgia, that in general require voters to provide photo identification, 

exemplify the challenge that exists throughout the election process in 

maintaining balance between ensuring access to all prospective voters and 

ensuring that only eligible citizens are permitted to cast a ballot on Election 

Day. Results of our state and local jurisdiction surveys show that while 

providing identification could be one of several methods used to verify 

identity, it was not required by the majority of states, nor was it the only 

way used to verify voters’ identities in the majority of local jurisdictions for 

the November 2004 election. Voter identification requirements vary in 

flexibility, in the number and type of acceptable identification allowed, and 

in the alternatives available for verifying identity if a voter does not have an 

acceptable form of identification.

Results of our state survey of election officials show that for the November 

2004 general election 28 states reported that they did not require all 

prospective voters to provide identification prior to voting in person.22

Twenty-one states reported that they required all voters to provide 

identification prior to voting on Election Day 2004. However, 14 of these 

states reported allowing prospective voters without the required 

identification an alternative. In 9 of these 14 states the alternative involved 

voting a regular ballot in conjunction with, for example, the voter providing 

some type of affirmation as to his or her identity. For example, 

Connecticut, in general, allowed voters who were unable to provide 

required identification to swear on a form provided by the Secretary of 

State’s Office that they are the elector whose name appears on the official 

registration list. Kentucky allowed an election officer to confirm the 

identity of a prospective voter by personal acquaintance or by certain types 

of documents if the prospective voter did not have the required 

identification. The other 5 states reporting that they offered an alternative 

did so through the use of a provisional ballot if a prospective voter did not 

have the required identification. For the November 2004 election, 5 of the 

21 states that reported having identification requirements also had 

statutory provisions requiring, in general, that such identification include a 

22Oregon conducts all-mail voting on Election Day; identification requirements for in-person 

voting are not applicable. The District of Columbia also reported on our survey that this 

requirement was not applicable.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 167 GAO-06-450 Elections

photograph of the prospective voter.23 For the other 16 states that reported 

requiring identification, there was a range of acceptable forms of 

identification, including photo identification, such as a driver’s license, and 

other documentation, such as a copy of a government check or current 

utility bill with a voter’s name and address. Figure 30 presents information 

on the identification requirements for prospective voters for the November 

2004 general election for all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

23These states were Florida, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and South Dakota.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 168 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 30: States’ Reported Identification Requirements for Prospective Voters for the November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO survey of state election officials. 

Had requirement

Had requirement, allowed alternative to vote regular ballot

VT

OK

CA CO

AZ NM

NV

TX

NE

UT

KS

ND

ID

IA 

AK

HI

AR

MO

WV

TN

NC

GA

FL

LA

WI

WY

NH

MA

RI

CT

NJ

MD

DE

ME

NY

PA

WA

OR

MT

SD

MN

MI

AL

IL IN OH

KY 

VA

SC

MS

Had requirement, allowed alternative to vote provisional ballot

Did not have requirement

Not applicable

Washington, DC
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 169 GAO-06-450 Elections

In our nationwide survey, we asked local jurisdictions about how they 

checked voters’ identities, such as by asking voters to state their name and 

address, verifying voters’ signatures, or asking voters to provide a form of 

identification or documentation. On the basis of this survey, we estimate 

that 65 percent of all local jurisdictions checked voters’ identification as 

one way to verify their identities on Election Day. However, in an estimated 

9 percent of all jurisdictions, providing identification was the only way 

voters could verify their identities.

Since the November 2004 general election, several states have reported 

that they have considered establishing identification requirements for all 

prospective voters, and some reported that they have implemented 

requirements. Results of our state survey show that at the time of our 

survey, 9 states reported having either considered legislation (or executive 

action) or legislation (or executive action) was pending to require voters to 

show identification prior to voting on Election Day. 24 Four states, at the 

time of our survey, reported having taken action since November 2004 to 

require that voters show identification for in-person Election Day voting. 

For example, changes in Arizona law and procedure emanating from a 

November 2004 ballot initiative were finalized in 2005 after receiving 

approval from the Department of Justice. These Arizona changes require 

voters to present, prior to voting, one form of identification with the voter’s 

name, address, and photo, or two different forms of identification that have 

the name and address of the voter. Indiana enacted legislation in 2005 

requiring, in general, that voters provide a federal- or state-of-Indianaissued identification document with the voter’s name and photo prior to 

voting, whereas 2005 legislation in New Mexico and Washington imposed 

identification requirements but allowed prospective voters to provide one 

of several forms of photo or nonphoto forms of identification. In all four 

states, if voters are not able to provide a required form of identification, 

they are allowed to cast a provisional, rather than a regular, ballot. Finally, 

a state that had identification requirements in place for the November 2004 

general election may have taken additional actions to amend such 

requirements. Georgia, for instance, required voters in the November 2004 

general election to provide 1 of 17 types of photo or nonphoto 

identification. In 2005 Georgia enacted legislation that, in general, amended 

24These 9 states are Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, 

Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Since our survey, more recent actions by states 

include, for example, Ohio’s enactment of legislation, effective in May 2006, requiring voters 

to provide identification prior to voting.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 170 GAO-06-450 Elections

and reduced the various forms of acceptable identification and made the 

presentation of a form of photo identification, such as a driver’s license, a 

requirement to vote.25

Recruiting a Sufficient 

Number of Skilled, 

Reliable Poll Workers 

Continued to Be a 

Challenge for Large 

and Medium 

Jurisdictions

Having enough qualified poll workers to set up, open, and work at the polls 

on Election Day is a crucial step in ensuring that voters are able to 

successfully vote on Election Day. The number of poll workers needed 

varies across jurisdictions, and election officials recruit poll workers in a 

variety of ways using different sources and strategies. Some poll workers 

are elected, some are appointed by political parties, and some are 

volunteers. Election officials in jurisdictions we visited reported 

considering several different factors—such as state requirements, 

registered voters per precinct, historical turnout, or poll worker functions 

at polling places—to determine the total number of poll workers needed. 

On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that recruiting 

enough poll workers for the November 2004 general election was not 

difficult for the majority of jurisdictions. However, large and medium 

jurisdictions encountered difficulties to a greater extent than small 

jurisdictions. To meet their need, election officials recruited poll workers 

from numerous sources, including in some cases, high schools and local 

government agencies, to help ensure that they were able to obtain enough 

poll workers for Election Day. Poll workers with specialized characteristics 

or skills were also difficult for some large and medium jurisdictions to find. 

Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited reported that finding 

qualified poll workers could be complicated by having a limited pool of 

volunteers willing to work long hours for low pay. Poll worker reliability 

continued to be a challenge for some jurisdictions—especially large 

jurisdictions—that depend on poll workers to arrive at polling places on 

time on Election Day.

25In October 2005 a federal district court order (Common Cause/GA v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 

2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005)) granted a preliminary injunction enjoining and restricting the state 

from enforcing or applying certain provisions of the 2005 Georgia amendments. Plaintiffs in 

the case allege, in general, that such amendments unduly burden the right to vote. On 

appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district 

court on February 10, 2006, for further proceeding in light of subsequent Georgia 

amendments to its voter identification laws enacted in January 2006.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 171 GAO-06-450 Elections

Recruiting Enough Poll 

Workers Was Not Difficult 

for the Majority of 

Jurisdictions, but Many 

Large and Medium 

Jurisdictions Encountered 

Difficulties

We estimate that recruiting enough poll workers for the November 2004 

general election was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions, and may 

have been less of a challenge for the November 2004 election than it was 

for the November 2000 election. For example, on the basis of our 2001 

survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate 51 percent of county election 

jurisdictions found it somewhat or very difficult to find a sufficient number 

of poll workers for the November 2000 election.26 In contrast, from our 

2005 survey, we estimate that 36 percent of county election jurisdictions 

had difficulties obtaining enough poll workers for the November 2004 

election. In our 2005 survey, there are differences between size categories 

of election jurisdictions in the difficulties encountered obtaining a 

sufficient number of poll workers, with more large and medium 

jurisdictions encountering difficulties than small jurisdictions. As shown in 

figure 31, we estimate that 47 percent of large jurisdictions, 32 percent of 

medium jurisdictions, and 14 percent of small jurisdictions found it difficult 

or very difficult to obtain a sufficient number of poll workers.

26These estimates include only county election jurisdiction subgroup comparisons between 

the 2001 and 2005 surveys. See appendix V for further details about the sampling differences 

between these surveys.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 172 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 31: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size 

That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Poll Workers for the 

November 2004 General Election

a

All size categories are statistically different from one another.

b

The difference between small and medium jurisdictions is statistically significant.

c

The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

d

Jurisdictions could indicate not applicable for a variety of reasons, including that poll workers are not 

recruited, but elected or appointed; that elections are conducted by mail ballot, and as a result there is 

not a need for poll workers to staff polling places on Election Day; or that the election officials 

themselves serve as poll workers.

e

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 8 percentage points.

Election officials in large and medium jurisdictions, with typically more 

polling places to staff, are generally responsible for obtaining more poll 

workers than officials in small jurisdictions. For example, election officials 

in a large jurisdiction we visited in Illinois told us that recruiting enough 

poll workers for Election Day was always a challenge and November 2004 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Percentage of jurisdictions

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

47e

44

24

14

20

Difficult or very 

difficulta Neither difficult 

nor easyb Easy or very easyc Not applicabled

32

30

35

22

46

5 4

1 1 97

17

57
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 173 GAO-06-450 Elections

was no different. They said that state law specifies a minimum of 5 poll 

workers per precinct, and there were 2,709 precincts in their jurisdiction 

for the November 2004 general election, requiring at least 13,545 poll 

workers. In contrast, election officials in a small jurisdiction we visited in 

New Hampshire told us that they never had difficulties finding poll workers 

because they were able to use a pool of volunteers to staff the 9 poll worker 

positions at their one polling place.

While election officials in 10 of the 27 large and medium jurisdictions we 

visited told us they had difficulties recruiting the needed number of poll 

workers, election officials in the other 17 jurisdictions did not report 

difficulties. These officials provided a variety of reasons why they did not 

encounter difficulties, including having a set number of appointed or 

elected poll workers for each precinct, having a general public interest in 

being involved in a presidential election, and using a variety of strategies 

and sources to recruit poll workers. For example, election officials in a 

large jurisdiction in New Mexico told us that their lack of problems with 

recruitment was due to the fact that they had a full-time poll worker 

coordinator who began the search for poll workers very early and, as a 

result, was able to fill all of the positions needed (about 2,400) for the 

November 2004 election. Election officials in other large jurisdictions 

reported that they were able to obtain enough poll workers by relying on 

multiple sources. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in 

Kansas told us that they made an exhaustive effort to recruit about 

1,800 poll workers for the November 2004 general election that included 

soliciting from an existing list of poll workers, working with organizations, 

using a high school student program to obtain about 300 student poll 

workers, recruiting from a community college, using county employees, 

and coordinating with the political parties. On our nationwide survey we 

asked local jurisdictions about the sources they used to recruit poll 

workers for the November 2004 general election, and table 17 presents 

estimates from this survey on a variety of sources that jurisdictions used.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 174 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 17: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size That Used Sources to Recruit Poll Workers 

for the November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a

The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

b

The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/- 6 percentage points.

c

All size categories are statistically different from one another.

d

The 95 percent confidence interval for these percentages is +/- 8 percentage points.

e

The differences between large jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

f

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +8 and -7 percentage points.

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we identified several 

recruiting strategies that election officials reported helped in their efforts 

to obtain enough poll workers.27 On the basis of our local jurisdictions 

survey, student poll workers and county or city employees were used as 

sources for poll workers by many medium and large jurisdictions in the 

November 2004 general election, as shown in table 17. These two sources 

were also cited as having worked well by election officials in several of the 

jurisdictions we visited. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in 

Source

Percentage of all 

jurisdictions

Percentage of small 

jurisdictions 

(<10,000)

Percentage of 

medium jurisdictions 

(10,000 to 100,000)

Percentage of large 

jurisdictions 

(>100,000)

Lists or rosters of poll workers from 

past electionsa 89 86 96 98

Referrals from poll workersa 62 48b 92 97

Political partiesa 48 36b 72 82

High schoolsc 21 13 36 59d

Collegesc 11 4 18 64d

Public announcements or 

information posted on jurisdiction’s 

Web sitec

18

9 31 77

City/county government officesc 18 12 25 65d

Local school districtsc 10 5 17 43d

Civic, cultural, or religious 

organizationsc 10 3 21 63d

Private firmse 2 0 2 24f

27See GAO-02-3.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 175 GAO-06-450 Elections

Colorado told us that their high school student poll worker programs 

helped them to obtain a sufficient number of skilled poll workers and 

reported that 200 of their about 600 poll workers were high school 

students. Election officials in other jurisdictions we visited reported that 

high school students often helped them in obtaining enough poll workers 

with specialized skills or characteristics, such as needed language skills. 

According to our state survey, 38 states and the District of Columbia 

reported allowing poll workers to be under the age of 18.

Local government offices were another source of poll workers for the 

November 2004 general election. As shown in table 17, we estimate that 

65 percent of large jurisdictions, 25 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 

12 percent of small jurisdictions recruited poll workers from city or county 

government offices. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in 

Nevada told us that the chief poll worker at most of the jurisdiction’s 

329 polling places is a county employee, and described benefits of 

recruiting local government employees as poll workers, including their 

experience in dealing with the public.

According to Our 

Nationwide Survey, Poll 

Workers with Specialized 

Skills Were Difficult to Find 

for Some Jurisdictions

The specific skills and requirements needed for poll workers varies by 

jurisdiction, and in some cases by precinct, but can include political party 

affiliation, specific technical or computer skills, or proficiency in languages 

other than English. On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we 

estimate that most jurisdictions nationwide did not encounter difficulties 

recruiting poll workers with these specific skills and requirements. 

However, the results show that the ease of obtaining poll workers with 

these skills varied by the size of the election jurisdiction, with large and 

medium jurisdictions generally experiencing more difficulties than small 

jurisdictions.

Some states require political balance between poll workers at polling 

places. For example, New York election law, which requires that each 

election district must be staffed with four election inspectors (i.e., chief 

poll workers) and a variable number of poll workers (depending upon 

specified conditions), requires that appointments to such positions for 

each election district be equally divided between the major political 

parties. Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that even 

though not required, they tried to maintain a balance in poll workers’ 

political party affiliation. Recruiting enough poll workers with specific 

political party affiliations continued to be a challenge for some, in 

particular large and medium jurisdictions. From our local jurisdiction 
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 176 GAO-06-450 Elections

survey, we estimate that 49 percent of large jurisdictions, 41 percent of 

medium jurisdictions, and 22 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties 

recruiting enough Democratic or Republican poll workers, as shown in 

figure 32.

Figure 32: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size 

That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Enough Poll Workers with Specific Political 

Party Affiliation for the November 2004 General Election 

a

The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

b

The difference between small jurisdictions and medium jurisdictions is statistically significant.

c

Not all local jurisdictions are required to obtain poll workers with specific party affiliations.

d

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 8 percentage points.

Election officials in 11 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported 

experiencing some difficulties finding enough poll workers with needed 

party affiliations. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Percentage of jurisdictions

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

49d

28

35

23 22

20

Difficult or very 

difficulta Neither difficult 

nor easyb Easy or very easya Not applicablea,c

41

26

30

16

35

29

21

8

10

17

12
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 177 GAO-06-450 Elections

Connecticut told us that because their jurisdiction was predominantly one 

political party it was difficult to find minority party poll workers. Election 

officials in these 11 jurisdictions told us that they recruited independents, 

unaffiliated persons, or student poll workers to fill minority party poll 

worker positions.

Recruiting poll workers with necessary information technology skills or 

computer literacy was also a challenge for some large and medium 

jurisdictions, according to our survey of local jurisdictions. We estimate 

that 34 percent of large jurisdictions and 28 percent of medium 

jurisdictions found it difficult or very difficult to obtain poll workers with 

these skills, whereas, we estimate that 5 percent of small jurisdictions had 

difficulties, as shown in figure 33.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 178 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 33: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size 

That Encountered Difficulties Recruiting Poll Workers with Information Technology 

Skills or Computer Literacy for the November 2004 General Election 

a

The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

b

The difference between small and large jurisdictions is statistically significant.

c

Jurisidictions may not need to recruit poll workers with technical or computer skills because they, 

among other reasons, use paper or mechanical voting systems, use paper poll books, or specifically 

train poll workers for any skills needed in these areas.

d

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 6 percentage points.

Election officials in 23 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that 

computer or technically skilled poll workers were not needed in their 

jurisdictions for the November 2004 general election. However, election 

officials in some of these jurisdictions reported that they foresaw a need 

for poll workers with these skills with the implementation of electronic poll 

books or new voting technology. Among the reasons cited for not needing 

technically skilled poll workers were the use of paper ballots or lever 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Not applicableb,c Easy or very

easya Neither difficultnor easy

Difficult or very

difficulta

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Percentage of jurisdictions

34

12

29

23

5

28

25 25

12

30

24

42d

31

29

39

12
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 179 GAO-06-450 Elections

machines, the ease of use of DRE voting equipment, and that any needed 

skills were taught. In addition, election officials in many jurisdictions we 

visited told us that they recruited and trained technicians or 

troubleshooters to maintain, repair, and in some cases set up voting 

equipment prior to Election Day.

Some jurisdictions may be required under the language minority provisions 

of the Voting Rights Act to, in general, provide voting assistance and 

materials in specified minority languages in addition to English. We asked 

on our survey of local jurisdictions whether jurisdictions encountered 

difficulties recruiting poll workers who were fluent in the languages 

covered under the Voting Rights Act for their jurisdiction and estimate that 

for the majority (61 percent) of all jurisdictions, this requirement was not 

applicable. We estimate that 15 percent of all jurisdictions indicated that 

recruiting poll workers fluent in languages other than English was difficult 

or very difficult.28 Jurisdictions of all size categories may encounter 

difficulties recruiting poll workers with needed language skills for different 

reasons. For instance, small jurisdictions may find it difficult to recruit 

enough poll workers fluent in other languages because of a limited pool of 

potential recruits, whereas large jurisdictions may be required to provide 

voters with assistance in multiple languages other than English. Los 

Angeles County, for example, was required to provide voters assistance in 

six languages other than English for the November 2004 election. Election 

officials in some of the large jurisdictions we visited reported encountering 

difficulties obtaining poll workers with needed language skills, but these 

officials also told us about their efforts to recruit poll workers with 

language skills. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in 

Illinois reported that they recently established an outreach department to 

assist in the recruitment of poll workers with specialized language skills. 

The jurisdiction has hired outreach coordinators for the Hispanic, Polish, 

and Chinese communities to assist with recruiting. Figure 34 illustrates 

materials used by election officials in some jurisdictions we visited to 

recruit poll workers with a variety of skills for the November 2004 general 

election.

28The differences between size categories were not statistically significant. We estimate that 

23 percent of large jurisdictions, 20 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 13 percent of small 

jurisdictions had difficulties recruiting poll workers with needed language skills.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 180 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 34: Materials Used to Recruit Poll Workers in Jurisdictions We Visited

Election Officials in Some 

Jurisdictions We Visited 

Described Factors That 

Affected Recruiting Poll 

Workers

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we identified long hours, 

low pay, and an aging volunteer workforce as factors that complicated 

election officials’ efforts to recruit enough poll workers.29 Election officials 

in some, but not all, of the jurisdictions we visited in 2005 told us that one 

or more of these factors complicated their efforts to find enough quality 

poll workers for the November 2004 general election. For example, election 

officials in a large jurisdiction in Nevada told us that it was difficult to find 

people who wanted to work, considering that most families are two-income 

Source (left to right): Cuyahoga County, Ohio; King County, Washington (GAO photo); Guilford County, North Carolina. 

29See GAO-02-3.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 181 GAO-06-450 Elections

households and Election Day is a long—14 hours—grueling day. Election 

officials in a large jurisdiction in Washington told us that they never have 

enough poll workers, noting that the pay is minimal, the hours are long, and 

the majority of the poll worker population is elderly. Election officials in 

several of these jurisdictions we visited reported concerns about finding 

poll workers in light of a limited pool of volunteers. For example, election 

officials in a large jurisdiction in Colorado told us the average age of poll 

workers was over 70 years old and expressed concerns about obtaining 

poll workers who could physically work a 12-hour day. Alternatively, 

election officials in a large jurisdiction in Florida told us that the younger 

generation does not have the same commitment to civic duty that the older 

poll worker generation had and recruiting enough qualified poll workers 

may be a challenge in the future. These officials noted that about threequarters of their poll workers are return participants. An election official in 

a large jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, where the median age of poll workers 

is about 75 years old, suggested that serving as a poll worker should be 

treated similarly as serving on jury duty—it should be everyone’s civic duty 

to serve as a poll worker.

Poll Worker Reliability 

Continued to Be a 

Challenge, Especially in 

Large Jurisdictions

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we noted that poll 

worker reliability was a challenge for election officials, who depended on 

poll workers to arrive on time, open, and set up polling places.30 Poll 

worker absenteeism was a challenge for large and, to some extent, medium 

jurisdictions in the November 2004 general election. On the basis of our 

nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 61 percent of 

large jurisdictions, 20 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 2 percent of 

small jurisdictions encountered problems with poll workers failing to show 

up on Election Day. The differences between all size categories are 

statistically significant. One way that election officials in several large 

jurisdictions we visited minimized the impact of poll worker absenteeism 

was to recruit backup poll workers to ensure that polling places were set 

up and adequately staffed, even if some poll workers failed to show up. For 

example, election officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in Illinois 

reported that approximately 1 to 2 percent of about 13,000 poll workers did 

not show up on Election Day. However, these officials reported that they 

had recruited stand-by judges who were to report to the elections office on 

Election Day in case an already scheduled judge did not show up. Election 

30See GAO-02-3.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 182 GAO-06-450 Elections

officials in a few other jurisdictions we visited told us that they called poll 

workers before Election Day to help ensure they showed up. For instance, 

election officials in a large jurisdiction in Pennsylvania told us that they 

called all of the chief poll workers—about 1,300 people—during the week 

prior to the election. Election officials in a large jurisdiction we visited in 

Connecticut went a step further, reporting that in addition to placing wakeup calls to all of the chief poll workers, they offered rides to poll workers to 

help ensure they showed up on time.

Election Officials in 

Some Jurisdictions We 

Visited Reported on 

Challenges Training 

Poll Workers

Voters’ experiences on Election Day are largely informed by their 

interactions with poll workers, who are responsible for conducting many 

Election Day activities, such as setting up polling places, checking in voters 

and verifying their eligibility to vote, providing assistance to voters, and 

closing the polling places. Although these workers are usually employed 

only for 1 day, the success of election administration partly depends on 

their ability to perform their jobs well. Depending on the applicable state 

requirements and the size of the jurisdiction, the steps that election 

officials take to adequately prepare all of their poll workers can vary, but 

may include training, testing, or certification. Ensuring that poll workers 

were adequately trained for Election Day was a challenge reported by some 

election officials in large and medium jurisdictions we visited, but these 

officials also reported a variety of steps they took to help prepare poll 

workers for Election Day.

State Requirements for 

Training Poll Workers 

Varied

Most states and the District of Columbia reported having training 

requirements for poll workers for the November 2004 general election, but 

the frequency and content of training varied. Some states also reported 

providing guidance related to the training of poll workers. According to our 

state survey, for the November 2004 general election, 18 states reported 

having had poll worker training requirements and providing guidance; 

20 states and the District of Columbia reported having had training 

requirements; 9 states reported providing guidance; 1 state reported that it 

did not require training nor provide guidance; and Oregon, which 

conducted all-mail voting on Election Day 2004, indicated this requirement 

was not applicable.31 Figure 35 shows reported state requirements for 

31The total does not add to 50 because 1 state did not respond to this question on our survey.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 183 GAO-06-450 Elections

training for the chief poll worker at a precinct or polling place and for poll 

workers.

Figure 35: Reported State Requirements for Poll Worker Training for the November 

2004 General Election 

a

Includes the District of Columbia.

b

The total does not add to 50 because 2 states indicated that this requirement was not applicable—

1 of which was Oregon, which conducted all-mail voting on Election Day 2004. 

c

The total does not add to 50 because 1 state did not respond to this question on our survey and 

Oregon indicated this requirement was not applicable.

About half of the states with training requirements reported requiring that 

poll workers be trained prior to every election or every general election. 

According to our survey, of the 38 states and the District of Columbia that 

reported having training requirements for poll workers, 22 states and the 

0

5

10

15

20

25

No requirements

Provided guidance only

Had requirements onlya

Had both requirements

No requirements

Provided guidance only

Had requirements onlya

Had both requirements

Number of states

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

 and guidance

 and guidance

1

9

21

18

20

21

7

Chief poll worker at a precinct or polling placeb

Poll workersc

1

 or guidance

 or guidance
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 184 GAO-06-450 Elections

District of Columbia reported requiring poll workers to be trained prior to 

every election or every general election. For example, Florida provisions in 

place for the November 2004 general election required that poll workers 

have a minimum of 3 hours of training prior to each election and 

demonstrate a working knowledge of the laws and procedures relating to 

voter registration, voting system operation, balloting, and polling place 

procedures, and problem-solving and conflict resolution skills. These 

Florida provisions also require, among other things, that local election 

officials are to contract with a “recognized disability-related organization” 

to develop and assist with training for disability sensitivity programs, 

which must include actual demonstrations of obstacles confronted by 

persons with disabilities during the voting process, including obtaining 

access to the polling place and using the voting system. Ten states reported 

requiring that poll workers be trained on a scheduled basis (e.g., yearly or 

every 2 years). For example, under provisions in place for the November 

2004 general election, New Jersey required that all district board members 

attend training sessions for each election at least once every 2 years. The 

other 6 states reported that training was required at least once, but not 

prior to every general election; that the frequency of training was not 

specified; or that they did not know. 

For the November 2004 general election, fewer states reported requiring 

testing or certification than training for poll workers. According to our 

state survey, 12 states reported having requirements for testing or 

certification for poll workers, and 16 states reported having these 

requirements for the chief poll worker at a precinct or polling place. 

Election officials in 6 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported that poll 

workers were certified or tested after training. Election officials in 6 other 

jurisdictions told us that they used informal tests or quizzes or informally 

monitored poll workers performance in training. For instance, election 

officials in a jurisdiction in Kansas told us that they gave poll workers a 

nongraded quiz at the end of training. In Nevada, where state election 

officials indicated in our state survey that there are no requirements for 

poll worker training or testing, election officials in the 2 jurisdictions we 

visited told us that they required poll workers to attend training. Election 

officials in 1 of these jurisdictions required all poll workers to attend a 

training class each year and to pass a hands-on performance test in which 

they demonstrate their ability to perform their assigned function, such as 

checking in voters or programming the DRE voting equipment.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 185 GAO-06-450 Elections

Election Officials Reported 

on Training Conducted and 

Challenges Encountered

Training provided to poll workers varies greatly among local election 

jurisdictions. Therefore, we asked questions about training challenges as 

part of our site visits only where we were able to gain an understanding of 

the types of training and specific conditions faced by local jurisdictions. 

Election officials in a small jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire 

reported that they did not conduct training for the November 2004 general 

election because poll workers only receive training if they have not 

previously worked in the polling place, and all nine poll workers had 

worked in the polling place before. Election officials in the 27 other 

jurisdictions we visited described the training that they provided poll 

workers for the November 2004 general election. According to these 

officials, poll worker training generally occurred in the weeks or month 

before the election and ranged from 1 hour to 2 days, depending on the type 

of poll worker being trained. Election officials in most of these 

jurisdictions reported that training was mandatory. However, the frequency 

varied, with election officials in the majority of jurisdictions reporting that 

they required training prior to every election. Election officials in a few 

jurisdictions reported that poll workers received training at least once or 

on a scheduled basis, such as once every 2 years. Election officials in many 

jurisdictions told us that poll workers were paid to attend training, and 

payments could range from $5 to $50.

While election officials in nearly all of these jurisdictions reported that 

training was conducted by these officials and their staffs, the manner in 

which the training was conducted varied. For example, election officials in 

a large jurisdiction in Nevada told us that poll workers were trained in a 

workshop fashion in which 15 to 20 poll workers were provided hands-on 

training for their specific function, such as operating voting machines or 

processing voters. In a large jurisdiction in Kansas, election officials told us 

that they conduct the training for between 70 and 100 poll workers using a 

formal presentation as well as the documents poll workers use on Election 

Day and the voting equipment. Election officials in a large jurisdiction in 

Washington told us that poll worker training consisted of a PowerPoint 

presentation conducted in a train-the-trainer style where election officials 

trained the chief poll workers, who then trained the poll workers.

Election officials in 9 of the 27 large and medium jurisdictions we visited 

reported encountering some challenges with training poll workers, but 

generally reported that they overcame them. Some of the challenges 

reported by these officials included keeping poll workers informed about 

new or changing requirements, conveying a vast amount of information 

about election processes to a large number of people in a limited time, and 
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 186 GAO-06-450 Elections

ensuring that poll workers understand their tasks and responsibilities. For 

instance, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Ohio told us that it was 

challenging keeping up with state changes and incorporating such changes 

into poll worker training. Election officials in a large jurisdiction in 

Connecticut told us that effectively training poll workers on a variety of 

new changes (such as those required by HAVA) could be challenging 

because the procedures can be difficult to understand, especially for 

tenured poll workers who have been working at the polls for many years. 

Election officials in a large jurisdiction in Kansas noted that addressing the 

need to have a systematic way to evaluate poll worker performance at 

polling places was a challenge. These officials said that they currently rely 

on the fact that the poll worker showed up, general observations of the poll 

workers’ performance, and feedback cards completed by voters exiting the 

polls. Election officials in the jurisdictions we visited reported taking steps 

to address these challenges, such as providing poll workers training 

manuals or booklets for reference on Election Day, training poll workers to 

perform one function, and conducting training in a workshop fashion with 

smaller class sizes.

Poll Worker 

Performance Problems 

in Some Large and 

Medium Jurisdictions

Election officials and poll workers perform many tasks throughout the day 

to ensure that elections run smoothly and that voters move efficiently 

through the polling place. These activities can include checking in voters, 

providing instructions for voting machine operation, or assisting voters at 

the polls. We asked on our survey of local jurisdictions whether for the 

November 2004 general election jurisdictions encountered poll workers 

failing to follow procedures for a variety of activities, including, among 

others, procedures for voter identification requirements, providing correct 

instructions to voters, and voting machine operation. Overall, according to 

this survey, most local election jurisdictions nationwide did not encounter 

problems with poll worker performance. For example, we estimate that

• 90 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers failing to 

follow procedures related to voter identification requirements,

• 92 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers failing to 

provide correct instructions to voters, and

• 94 percent of all jurisdictions did not encounter poll workers failing to 

follow procedures for voting machine operation.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 187 GAO-06-450 Elections

However, we estimate that poll worker performance problems encountered 

varied by size category of jurisdiction, with more large jurisdictions 

encountering problems than medium and small jurisdictions. For example, 

we estimate that 37 percent of large jurisdictions, 19 percent of medium 

jurisdictions, and 3 percent of small jurisdictions encountered problems 

with poll workers failing to follow procedures related to voter 

identification requirements. In terms of providing correct instructions to 

voters, we estimate that 31 percent of large jurisdictions, 12 percent of 

medium jurisdictions, and 1 percent of small jurisdictions encountered 

problems with poll worker performance in this area. For both results, the 

differences between all size categories are statistically significant.

Large jurisdictions could have encountered problems for a variety of 

reasons, including having more poll workers to train and oversee or having 

fewer options for recruiting skilled poll workers. While jurisdictions may 

have reported on our survey that they encountered problems with a 

particular aspect of poll workers’ performance, written comments 

provided on the questionnaire indicated that these problems may not have 

been widespread or may have been easily remedied after they occurred. 

For example, one survey respondent wrote: “Errors were few and far 

between, but with 4,500 poll workers, it is very difficult to answer that [our 

jurisdiction did not encounter any problems with poll workers’ 

performance.]” Election officials in 12 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited 

reported that they encountered some problems with poll workers’ 

performance, but that generally the majority of poll workers performed 

well. For example, an election official in a large jurisdiction in 

Pennsylvania we visited told us that while the jurisdiction did not 

encounter serious problems with performance, in the official’s opinion, it 

would be disingenuous to report that there were no problems with the 

6,500 poll workers working the polls on Election Day.

Most Jurisdictions Provided 

Guidance at Polling Places 

to Help Poll Workers

In an effort to minimize poll worker confusion or performance problems, 

many jurisdictions provided written guidelines or instructions for poll 

workers to use at the polling place. On our nationwide survey we asked 

local jurisdictions whether or not for the November 2004 general election 

they had written guidelines or instructions at the polling place for poll 

workers covering a variety of topics, such as voting equipment operation; 

procedures related to verifying voters’ eligibility to vote; and assisting 

voters with special needs, such as voters with disabilities or who spoke a 

language other than English. We estimate that 94 percent of all jurisdictions 

had at least one set of written guidelines at polling places for poll workers. 
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 188 GAO-06-450 Elections

Further, more large and medium jurisdictions provided instructions to poll 

workers than small jurisdictions. For example, we estimate that 99 percent 

of large jurisdictions, 96 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 80 percent of 

small jurisdictions provided written instructions for poll workers to use at 

polling places if a voter’s name was not on the poll list. In addition, we 

estimate that 96 percent of large jurisdictions, 92 percent of medium 

jurisdictions, and 71 percent of small jurisdictions provided written 

guidelines to use at the polls for identification requirements for first-time 

voters who registered by mail and did not provide identification with their 

registration. For both of these results, small jurisdictions are statistically 

different from both medium and large jurisdictions.

During our site visits, election officials in 26 of the 28 jurisdictions we 

visited reported that they provided written instructions or checklists for 

poll workers to have at polling places. Election officials in the 2 smallest 

population size jurisdictions we visited reported that they did not provide 

written instructions for poll workers. As the officials in a small jurisdiction 

in New Hampshire said, they are at the polling place to resolve issues 

personally as they arise. Figure 36 illustrates examples of some checklists 

that election officials in jurisdictions we visited provided to us.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 189 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 36: Examples of Instructions and Checklists Provided to Poll Workers for the November 2004 General Election

Written instructions and checklists may help poll workers, but problems on 

Election Day can still be encountered with some issues, in particular issues 

related to voter registration. We asked on our survey of local jurisdictions 

whether for the November 2004 general election jurisdictions maintained a 

written record to keep track of issues or problems that occurred on 

Election Day. We estimate that 55 percent of all jurisdictions nationwide 

maintained a written record to keep track of issues. Of those that did 

Source (left to right): Clark County, Washington; Leon County, Florida.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 190 GAO-06-450 Elections

maintain a record and provided written comments on our survey, the issues 

most frequently cited by election officials were problems with voter 

registration (e.g., not being registered, being registered at another polling 

location, or being in the wrong polling location).

Obtaining Enough 

Polling Places That Met 

Standards Continued 

to Be a Challenge for 

Some Jurisdictions

Election officials are responsible for selecting and securing a sufficient 

number of polling places that meet basic requirements and standards. 

Polling place locations vary across jurisdictions but can include public and 

private facilities, such as schools, government buildings, fire departments, 

community centers, libraries, churches, and residential facilities. To meet 

the needs of the voting population, polling places should be easily 

accessible to all voters, including voters with disabilities. Polling places 

also need to have a basic infrastructure, including electricity, heating and 

cooling units, and communication lines, to support some voting machines 

and be comfortable for voters and poll workers. In our October 2001 report 

on election processes, we stated that obtaining polling places for the 

November 2000 election was not a major challenge for most jurisdictions.32

On the basis of our 2005 survey of local jurisdictions, obtaining a sufficient 

number of polling places was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions. 

However, finding polling places that met these standards was generally 

more difficult for large and medium jurisdictions than for small 

jurisdictions. Election officials in many jurisdictions reported combining 

precincts in one polling place, with minimal challenges, for the November 

2004 general election.

Finding a Sufficient Number 

of Polling Places Was 

Difficult for Some, but Not 

Most, Jurisdictions

For the November 2004 election, obtaining a sufficient number of polling 

places was not difficult for the majority of jurisdictions. On the basis of our 

survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 3 percent of all jurisdictions 

found it difficult or very difficult to obtain a sufficient number of polling 

places for the November 2004 general election. However, the difficulty 

encountered in finding enough polling places varied by the size category of 

jurisdiction. We estimate that 14 percent of large jurisdictions, 8 percent of 

medium jurisdictions, and 1 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties 

obtaining enough polling places, as presented in figure 37.

32See GAO-02-3.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 191 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 37: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size 

That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining a Sufficient Number of Polling Places for the 

November 2004 General Election

a

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 8 percentage points.

b

The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

c

All size categories are statistically different from each other.

d

Jurisdictions may indicate not applicable if they do not use polling places on Election Day because of 

all mail balloting, or because only one polling location is used on Election Day.

Small jurisdictions may not experience difficulties obtaining polling places 

for a variety of reasons, among them because they do not have to find as 

many locations to support an election as large jurisdictions do. For 

example, election officials in a small jurisdiction we visited in New 

Hampshire told us that because of the small voting population (about 

1,200), they only needed to use one polling place—the town hall—for the 

November 2004 general election, as shown in figure 38.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Percentage of jurisdictions

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

14

3

33

13

1

Difficult or very 

difficultb Neither difficult 

nor easyb Easy or very easyc Not applicableb,d

8

20

45a

56

75

68

11

3 2

9

38
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 192 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 38: Town Hall in Madbury, New Hampshire 

In contrast, large jurisdictions could be responsible for selecting hundreds 

of polling places for Election Day. Election officials from a large 

jurisdiction we visited in Illinois reported that they used over 1,800 polling 

places for the November 2004 election and hired staff to find polling places 

that met standards for their jurisdiction. Although election officials in some 

large and medium jurisdictions told us that they needed to find numerous 

polling places, officials in only 1 large jurisdiction we visited in Kansas told 

us that they encountered difficulties finding suitable polling places, in part 

because of low payments provided to use polling place facilities. Election 

officials in this jurisdiction reported that in 2003 they implemented a 

campaign to “recruit” polling places and sent letters to schools and other 

possible locations in addition to conducting site visits and inspections. 

These election officials reported that after their efforts, they added about 

70 polling places for use on Election Day 2004.

Source: GAO.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 193 GAO-06-450 Elections

Finding Accessible Polling 

Places and Polling Places 

with Parking and Phone 

Lines Was Difficult for Some 

Jurisdictions

Selecting accessible polling places includes assessing parking areas, routes 

of travel, exterior walkways, and entrances, as well as interior voting areas. 

In our October 2001 report on voters with disabilities, we identified a 

variety of challenges faced by election officials in improving the 

accessibility of voting—including the limited availability of accessible 

buildings and the lack of authority to modify buildings to make them more 

accessible.33 Finding accessible polling places continued to be a challenge 

for some jurisdictions for the November 2004 general election. On the basis 

of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 36 percent of large 

jurisdictions, 25 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 5 percent of small 

jurisdictions found it difficult or very difficult to find enough accessible 

polling places, as shown in figure 39.

33See GAO-02-107.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 194 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 39: Estimated Percentages of All Local Jurisdictions and by Jurisdiction Size 

That Encountered Difficulties Obtaining Enough Polling Places That Were 

Accessible to Voters with Disabilities for November 2004 General Election

a

The differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

b

All size categories are statistically different from one another.

c

Jurisdictions may indicate not applicable if they do not use polling places on Election Day because of 

all mail balloting, or because only one polling location is used on Election Day.

Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited told us that they 

encountered challenges finding accessible polling places. For example, 

election officials in 2 large jurisdictions we visited reported that it was 

challenging to find polling places that were accessible because many of the 

public buildings in their jurisdiction were older facilities and were not 

compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). However, 

election officials reported taking steps to help ensure that polling places 

were accessible. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in 

Georgia reported that they hired a private company to conduct surveys of 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Percentage of jurisdictions

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

Overall

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

36

12

32

15

5

Difficult or very 

difficulta Neither difficult 

nor easya Easy or very easyb Not applicablea,c

25

20

37

40

69

60

11

3 2

8

25
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 195 GAO-06-450 Elections

the polling locations and determine whether they were accessible and 

what, if any, changes needed to be made to make the facilities compliant. 

Some election officials described making minor or temporary 

modifications to polling places to ensure that they were accessible, for 

example, by adding ramps, using doorstops for heavier doors, or clearly 

identifying accessible entrances.

In addition to being accessible for all voters, polling places should have 

sufficient parking for voters and phone lines to provide for communication 

on Election Day. From our local jurisdiction survey, more large and 

medium jurisdictions encountered difficulties in finding polling places with 

these characteristics than small jurisdictions. On the basis of this survey, 

we estimate that 38 percent of large jurisdictions, 18 percent of medium 

jurisdictions, and 4 percent of small jurisdictions had difficulties obtaining 

polling places with adequate parking. The differences between all size 

categories are statistically significant. In terms of finding polling places 

with adequate phone lines, we estimate that 35 percent of large 

jurisdictions, 33 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 9 percent of small 

jurisdictions had difficulties obtaining polling places with adequate phone 

lines. Providing cell phones to poll workers was one way for some 

jurisdictions to help ensure communication between polling places and the 

election office on Election Day. Also on the basis of our survey, we estimate 

that cell phones provided by the jurisdiction were the primary means of 

communication for 29 percent (plus or minus 9 percent) of large 

jurisdictions, 15 percent (+9 percent, -6 percent) of medium jurisdictions, 

and 3 percent of small jurisdictions.34 For both of these results, the 

differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small 

jurisdictions are statistically significant. Election officials in some large 

jurisdictions we visited included cell phones as part of the supplies 

provided to each polling place. For example, officials in a large jurisdiction 

we visited in Nevada told us they paid poll workers $5 to use their own cell 

phones.

34The 95 percent confidence interval for both the large and medium percentages is greater 

than the +/-7 percent sampling error for their respective samples. 
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 196 GAO-06-450 Elections

Combining Precincts at a 

Polling Location Continues 

to Be a Strategy to Address 

Challenges with Obtaining 

Polling Places

We identified several strategies in our October 2001 report on election 

processes that election officials said helped in their efforts to obtain 

enough polling places, including locating more than one precinct at a single 

polling place.35 Results of our 2005 state and local surveys and site visits 

show that combining precincts at a polling location continued to be a 

strategy used by local jurisdictions, predominantly large and medium 

jurisdictions, to find adequate polling locations for voters in all precincts. 

According to our state survey, nearly all states (47) reported that they 

allowed precincts to be colocated in a polling place for the November 2004 

general election.Ten states reported allowing colocation only under 

specified conditions, for instance, if no suitable polling place existed for a 

precinct, and 37 states reported allowing colocation but did not specify 

conditions. 36 On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate 

33 percent of all jurisdictions had multiple precincts located in the same 

polling place. However, more large and medium jurisdictions combined 

precincts than small jurisdictions. We estimate that 78 percent of large 

jurisdictions, 63 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 19 percent of small 

jurisdictions had multiple precincts located in the same polling location. 

The differences between all size categories are statistically significant. 

During our site visits, election officials in 22 of the 28 jurisdictions we 

visited told us that they combined precincts in the same polling location for 

the November 2004 general election. Included in the 6 jurisdictions that did 

not report combining precincts in a single polling place were the 1 small 

and 2 medium jurisdictions we visited. Further, in many of the large 

jurisdictions we visited, election officials told us that most of their polling 

places had more than one precinct. For example, election officials in a 

large jurisdiction in Ohio told us that there was an average of three 

precincts per polling location, but that there could be up to nine precincts 

in one polling place.

Although combining precincts may help solve the issue of obtaining a 

sufficient number of voting places that meet requirements, other 

challenges may surface, including voter confusion in not finding the correct 

precinct at a location, poll worker confusion about eligibility if a voter is 

not in the correct precinct poll book at a polling place, and the possibility 

35See GAO-02-3.

36North Carolina and the District of Columbia reported that they did not allow precincts to 

be colocated in a polling place. Oregon, which uses all-mail voting on Election Day, and 

Kentucky reported on our survey that this was not applicable.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 197 GAO-06-450 Elections

of voters voting on the wrong voting machine for their precinct. However, 

on the basis of our local survey, few challenges were encountered in polling 

places where precincts were combined for the November 2004 general 

election. We estimate that of the 33 percent of jurisdictions with multiple 

precincts at a polling location, 85 percent (+6 percent, -5 percent) did not 

experience challenges in terms of voters locating their correct precinct.37

Election officials in jurisdictions we visited described steps they took to 

help ensure that voters were able to easily find their correct precinct, 

including posting signage to direct voters to the correct precinct, using 

specially designated poll workers as greeters to direct voters as they 

entered the polling location, setting up separate tables or voting areas for 

each precinct, and locating the precincts in distinct areas of the building, 

for example, in the gym and cafeteria of a school building.

Election officials in a few jurisdictions we visited told us that they 

consolidated functions, such as the check-in table or voting equipment, for 

precincts located in the same polling location in order to avoid voter 

confusion or problems with voting. For example, election officials in a 

jurisdiction in Kansas reported that they used one registration table with a 

consolidated poll book for all precincts at a polling location. As a result, 

voters only needed to locate one table. Election officials in a jurisdiction in 

Nevada reported that once voters checked in, they were able to vote on any 

voting machine in the polling location because the machines were 

programmed with ballots from each of the precincts located at the polling 

place, and poll workers activated the particular ballot style for a particular 

voter.

Beyond consolidating some functions at a polling place, in 2004 Colorado 

authorized the use of “vote centers,” which are polling places at which any 

registered voter in the local election jurisdiction may vote, regardless of the 

precinct in which the voter resides. Each vote center is to use a secure 

electronic connection to a computerized registration list maintained by the 

local election office to allow all voting information processed at any vote 

center to be immediately accessible to computers at all other vote centers 

in the jurisdiction. Larimer County, with 143 precincts and about 

200,000 registered voters, reported using 31 vote centers for the November 

2004 general election. Election officials in Larimer County described 

several benefits of vote centers, including voter convenience; cost37The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is greater that the +/-5 percent 

sampling error for the complete sample.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 198 GAO-06-450 Elections

effectiveness; minimal voter wait time on Election Day; and overall easier 

management, including requiring fewer poll workers. Election officials told 

us that voters liked the convenience of being able to vote anywhere in the 

jurisdiction, regardless of the precinct they live in. Vote centers can also be 

cost-effective, according to election officials, for jurisdictions faced with 

replacing voting equipment to comply with HAVA accessibility 

requirements for voting systems used in federal elections. Using vote 

centers also reduces the number of polling places a jurisdiction needs, 

which can be cost-effective with respect to finding enough accessible 

polling places. Election officials also told us that on Election Day they were 

able to avoid having long lines at most vote centers by issuing media 

announcements to voters throughout the day specifying which vote centers 

were busy and which were not, and by using their electronic poll book 

technology to process voters quickly and to monitor ballots and supplies. 

Officials told us that on average there was a 15-minute wait time for voters. 

Finally, officials told us that from the perspective of election officials, vote 

centers facilitated aspects of election administration because there were 

fewer locations (about 30 instead of about 140) and fewer poll workers 

overall to recruit and train.

While other jurisdictions in Colorado have used vote centers since the 

November 2004 election or are planning to pilot vote centers in elections in 

2006, election officials in a second jurisdiction we visited in Colorado 

explained why their jurisdiction opted to not use vote centers.38 Officials 

told us that their jurisdiction assessed the feasibility of implementing vote 

centers and concluded that despite several advantages offered by vote 

centers, the cost of implementation was prohibitive. For example, election 

officials identified costs including the connectivity for the electronic poll 

books, so that voters can be credited with voting in real time; potential 

rental costs for facilities, such as hotels, to house vote centers; and the 

expense of purchasing additional voting equipment. Because a voter in a 

jurisdiction using vote centers can vote at any vote center, each vote center 

needs to be stocked with all applicable ballot styles for an election or have 

DRE voting machines capable of being programmed with all applicable 

ballot styles, according to election officials. For the November 2004 general 

election, these officials told us that they used optical scan for absentee and 

Election Day voting and DREs for early voting. To avoid the cost and 

38Other jurisdictions outside of Colorado are considering vote centers. For example, the 

Indiana Secretary of State formed a bipartisan delegation of legislators and local election 

officials to conduct a study of vote centers and their applicability to Indiana.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 199 GAO-06-450 Elections

confusion of having to print and keep track of ballot styles for their 

378 precincts—compared to Larimer County’s 143 precincts—election 

officials said that they would need to purchase additional DRE voting 

machines if they were to implement vote centers.

Election Officials in 

Some Jurisdictions We 

Visited Reported That 

Designing Clear Ballots 

Continued to Be a 

Challenge

Election officials are responsible for designing ballots that meet various 

state requirements, possibly federal requirements under the minority 

language provisions of the Voting Rights Act relating to offering voting 

materials in specified minority languages in addition to English, and the 

requirements of the particular voting equipment, and these ballots must be 

easy for voters to understand. Ballot design generally involves both state 

and local participation. Most states (46 states and the District of Columbia) 

were involved in ballot design for the November 2004 general election. For 

instance, according to our state survey, 17 states and the District of 

Columbia reported designing ballots for local jurisdictions, 3 states 

reported requiring approval of the ballot design, and 26 states reported 

having requirements for local jurisdictions regarding ballot design 

(e.g., layout, candidate order, or paper stock).39 Specifically, election 

officials must determine all races, candidates, and issues that voters in 

each precinct in a jurisdiction will vote on and construct layouts for these 

races and issues for the particular types of ballots used with their election 

equipment. Figure 40 illustrates an optical scan ballot used in El Paso 

County, Colorado, for the November 2004 general election.

39Three states (Kentucky, Nevada, and Washington) reported that they were not involved in 

ballot design; local jurisdictions designed ballots. One state did not respond to this question 

on our survey.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 200 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 40: El Paso County, Colorado, Optical Scan Ballot

Source: El Paso County, Colorado.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 201 GAO-06-450 Elections

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we noted that despite the 

controversy over the “butterfly ballot” and other ballot problems in the 

aftermath of Florida’s 2000 general election, very few jurisdictions 

nationwide thought that confusing ballot design was a major problem.40

Ballot design problems were not highlighted by voters as a problem in the 

November 2004 election; therefore, we did not inquire about the extent of 

ballot design problems in our local survey of jurisdictions. However, we 

asked about ballot design processes and problems during our visits to local 

election jurisdictions. Election officials in all of the jurisdictions we visited 

reported that they did not encounter voter problems with confusing ballot 

designs for the November 2004 general election. However, election officials 

in 7 jurisdictions we visited told us that designing easily understood ballots 

that meet the particular constraints of the voting equipment can be 

challenging when there are a large number of races or issues to include on 

the ballot. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction we visited in 

Colorado that used optical scan ballots told us that fitting all of the races 

and questions on the ballot is always challenging, but they managed to do 

so by limiting the number of words on ballot questions and using small 

fonts. These officials noted that they provided magnifying glasses at polling 

places to assist voters. Election officials in a jurisdiction we visited in 

Florida reported that they had to use oversized optical scan ballots to 

accommodate the number of constitutional amendments that had to be 

included on the ballot.

Some ballot design options taken to help ensure clarity for voters could 

lead to problems later. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in 

Kansas reported that they used a two-sided ballot design requiring that the 

optical scan counting equipment read the ballot front and back, which 

presented a problem. Chapter 6 discusses challenges with counting ballots. 

The requirements of the voting equipment may also limit options election 

officials can take related to ballot design. For example, election officials in 

a jurisdiction in Illinois that used punch cards reported that lengthy ballots 

could have been a problem in the November 2004 election, but they 

decided to change the type of punch card ballot used. These officials told 

us that increasing the number of punch positions allowed for more space 

on the ballot and prevented challenges related to length of ballot. However, 

with punch card ballots, the greater the number of choices on a punch card, 

the greater the potential for voter error in punching the preferred choice, as 

voters must align the ballot carefully.

40See GAO-02-3.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 202 GAO-06-450 Elections

Election officials in jurisdictions we visited that designed their ballots 

described steps they took to ensure that ballots were clear to voters, 

including using templates from the state or election management systems, 

proofreading both before and after printing, and public viewing or testing 

of ballots. For example, election officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado told 

us that prior to printing they send proofs of the ballot designs to candidates 

for their review. After printing, election officials said that staff members 

and representatives of the political parties test the ballot designs to ensure 

that there are no problems with how the ballots are processed through the 

counting equipment. Election officials in another jurisdiction in Colorado 

reported conducting a mock election with county employees to review the 

ballot and test a ballot from each package of printed ballots. Election 

officials in a jurisdiction in Ohio told us that they displayed the ballots for 

the general public to view and test.

Preparing Ballots or 

Voting Equipment Not 

a Problem Reported by 

Most Jurisdictions, but 

These Activities Can 

Be a Challenge for 

Some Jurisdictions

The activities and plans that election officials undertake related to 

preparing ballots or voting equipment can have a direct impact on a voter’s 

Election Day experience. For example, reports about the November 2004 

election highlighted shortages of ballots and voting machines at some 

polling places. While election officials may not be able to prepare for every 

contingency that could affect a voter’s wait time or experience at the polls, 

ensuring that there is a sufficient number of ballots or voting machines can 

minimize potential problems. On the basis of our survey of local 

jurisdictions, we estimate that few jurisdictions had problems with ballot 

or voting equipment shortages for the November 2004 general election. We 

estimate that 4 percent of all jurisdictions experienced problems with 

Election Day ballot shortages, and an estimated 4 percent of all 

jurisdictions did not have enough voting equipment on Election Day. 

However, there were statistical differences between large and small 

jurisdictions in having enough voting equipment. We estimate that 

12 percent of large jurisdictions, 4 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 

3 percent of small jurisdictions did not have enough voting equipment. 

Election officials in 23 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported that they 

encountered no challenges with preparing and delivering ballots, voting 

equipment, and supplies for the November 2004 general election. However, 

these activities could present logistical challenges for jurisdictions if there 

are unexpected delays, or for jurisdictions that are required to prepare 

ballots in multiple languages or prepare and deliver numerous voting 

machines to a large number of polling places.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 203 GAO-06-450 Elections

To ensure that there is an adequate supply of machine-readable paper 

ballots on Election Day, election officials may conduct numerous activities, 

such as designing, reviewing, proofreading, printing, and testing ballots. 

Uncertainties about ballot content, such as whether or not certain 

candidates or issues will be included on the ballot, could affect these 

activities by delaying printing or leading to a last-minute rush to ensure that 

ballots are printed in time for the election. While election officials in most 

of the jurisdictions we visited did not report encountering these 

uncertainties, election officials did in 4 jurisdictions. For example, election 

officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado reported that ballot printing was 

delayed by three statewide lawsuits regarding the content of the ballot. 

These officials reported that they prepared two ballot designs—one with a 

particular candidate’s name and one without—so that they would be 

prepared to send the ballots to an external printer regardless of the 

lawsuits’ outcome.

Some jurisdictions are required to provide ballots in languages other than 

English. Producing ballots in multiple languages can add to the complexity 

of preparing ballots because election officials must take steps to ensure 

proper translation and printing for each required language. On the basis of 

our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate that 6 percent of jurisdictions 

nationwide provided ballots in other languages. We estimate that 

significantly more large jurisdictions provided ballots in languages other 

than English than medium and small jurisdictions. We estimate that 

26 percent of large jurisdictions (compared to 10 percent of medium 

jurisdictions and 3 percent of small jurisdictions) provided ballots in 

languages other than English.41

Once voting equipment, ballots, and supplies have been prepared, ensuring 

that they are transported to polling places can be a logistical challenge for 

jurisdictions with thousands of voting machines and hundreds of polling 

places. Election officials in 18 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that 

they contracted with moving companies to deliver voting equipment to 

polling places prior to Election Day. For example, election officials in a 

jurisdiction in Pennsylvania told us that they contract with a moving 

company that transports about 1,000 DREs to about 400 polling places in 

41On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that all of the jurisdictions that 

provided ballots in a language other than English provided ballots in Spanish. Our survey 

results also showed that some large jurisdictions provided ballots in other languages, such 

as Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, and Tagalog, for the November 2004 general election.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 204 GAO-06-450 Elections

the week prior to Election Day. Election officials in a jurisdiction in Nevada 

told us that to ensure that voting machines were delivered to the correct 

polling places, they bar-coded each DRE and also assigned a bar code to 

each polling place. Upon delivery, contract movers used scanners to read 

the bar codes on each DRE and the bar code for the specific polling place. 

Prior to Election Day, these officials said that teams of election staff 

technicians then went to each polling place to set up the DREs and verify 

the scanned bar codes. After setting up the DREs, the rooms in which they 

were located were secured until Election Day. In contrast, in a jurisdiction 

we visited in New Hampshire, two election workers delivered 12 optical 

scan counters to the 12 polling places at 4:00 a.m. on Election Day. Figure 

41 shows stored voting equipment—with accompanying delivery 

instructions for each DRE for 1 location—in 3 large jurisdictions we visited 

that needed to be prepared and delivered to polling places prior to 

Election Day.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 205 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 41: DRE and Optical Scan Voting Equipment That Large Jurisdictions Had to Prepare and Deliver Prior to Election Day

Source: GAO.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 206 GAO-06-450 Elections

Election Officials in 

Some Jurisdictions We 

Visited Reported 

Experiencing Long 

Lines on Election Day, 

while Officials in Other 

Jurisdictions Did Not

Long voter wait times are a problem that election officials try to avoid. 

However, voters waiting in line at the polls was an issue identified in 

reports reviewing the November 2004 general election. These reports 

identified a variety of factors, including confusion about a voter’s 

registration status, ballot or voting equipment shortages, or malfunctioning 

voting equipment that led to long voter wait times. We asked election 

officials during our site visits whether or not any polling places in their 

jurisdictions had long lines during the November 2004 general election and 

to describe factors they thought contributed to or helped to reduce long 

lines.

Election officials in 17 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited reported having 

long lines at one or more polling places in their jurisdiction at some point 

on Election Day. However, there was variation in the reported voter wait 

times, times of day, and numbers of polling places with lines. For instance, 

election officials described voter wait times that ranged from 15 minutes to 

1 1⁄2 hours. Some election officials reported that the longer lines occurred in 

the morning; others told us that they kept polling places open past the 

official closing time to accommodate voters who were in line when the 

polls closed. Election officials in over half these 17 jurisdictions attributed 

long lines to higher than expected voter turnout, both in general and at 

peak voting times. Some of these jurisdictions were located in states where 

the presidential race was considered close (often referred to as 

“battleground states”).42 For example, the election official in a jurisdiction 

in Nevada attributed long lines to using a new voting system in addition to 

being a battleground state and encountering high voter turnout. This 

official estimated that there were between 30,000 and 35,000 more voters 

for the November 2004 general election than in previous elections. Election 

officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited in Ohio told us that higher than 

expected voter turnout in some precincts led to long lines. For example, 

election officials in 1 of these jurisdictions reported that at a polling place 

where two precincts were located there was higher than expected turnout 

because of a school board race. According to these officials, at this polling 

place there was a single line for voters from both precincts to check in at 

42EAC, using various news media sources, identified 17 states deemed to be most 

competitive in the 2004 presidential contest. These “battleground or highly contested” states 

included Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 

Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, West 

Virginia, and Wisconsin. We visited 8 of these 17 states during our site visits; alternatively, 

16 of the 28 jurisdictions we visited were located in these battleground states.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 207 GAO-06-450 Elections

the registration table, and this line backed up. Election officials in another 

jurisdiction in Ohio told us that some precincts had long lines, and one 

precinct in particular had a waiting time of up to 1 hour. These officials said 

that one precinct closed 30 to 45 minutes after closing time for the voters 

that were in line at 7:30 p.m.

Election officials in 11 of 28 jurisdictions we visited told us that none of the 

polling places in their jurisdictions had long lines, and some described 

factors that helped to reduce or prevent lines. High voter turnout prior to 

Election Day—either during early voting or through absentee voting—was 

one factor they identified. For example, election officials in 2 jurisdictions 

we visited—a second jurisdiction in Nevada and 1 in New Mexico—told us 

that about 60 percent of those who cast ballots voted early or absentee. 

Election officials in a jurisdiction we visited in Washington (which reported 

that it did not require or allow early voting) told us that they attributed their 

lack of long lines on Election Day to the fact that two-thirds of voters in 

their jurisdiction vote by absentee ballot. Election officials in a jurisdiction 

in Florida reported that in planning for the November 2004 general 

election, they decided to encourage early and absentee voting as 

alternatives to Election Day voting in anticipation that there would be 

heavy turnout for the general election. Their voter education campaign, 

which included buying airtime on radios and in movie theaters, stressed 

early voting options. In the end, about 40 percent of voters cast early 

ballots, which, according to election officials, made crowds easier to 

manage on Election Day.

Overloaded Phones on 

Election Day Posed 

Problems for Some 

Large and Medium 

Jurisdictions

On Election Day, poll workers may need to communicate with election 

officials at the central office for a variety of reasons—to inquire about a 

person’s eligibility to vote if his or her name does not appear in the poll 

book, to report voting equipment problems, or to report other issues that 

could occur at a polling place on Election Day. On the basis of our 

nationwide survey of local jurisdictions, for the November 2004 general 

election, we estimate that for 48 percent of all jurisdictions, the primary 

means of communication between polling places and the central office was 

telephones installed at polling places. Cell phones were also used as a 

primary means of communication in some jurisdictions. For example, on 

the basis of our local survey results, we estimate that for 25 percent of all 

jurisdictions, personal cell phones were the primary means of 

communication.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 208 GAO-06-450 Elections

Having inadequate communication lines on Election Day was a problem for 

election officials in the November 2000 election, as we noted in our 

October 2001 report on election processes.43 On the basis of our 2005 

survey of local jurisdictions, communication problems between polling 

places and the election office on Election Day were a challenge for some 

jurisdictions in the November 2004 election, and these problems varied by 

the size category of jurisdiction, with more large jurisdictions encountering 

major problems than medium and small jurisdictions. We estimate that 

36 percent of large jurisdictions, 63 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 

89 percent of small jurisdictions encountered no major problems with the 

communication system used at polling places. Small jurisdictions may not 

have experienced communication problems on Election Day for a variety 

of reasons, among them because a single polling place is located in the 

same building as the central election office, allowing the election officials 

to be physically present to resolve any questions or issues. Election 

officials in small jurisdictions provided comments on our nationwide 

survey of local jurisdictions about the primary communication system used 

in their jurisdictions on Election Day, including “personal contact—the 

clerk’s office is across the hall from the polling place,” “[we] yelled across 

the room,” or “we are the central office and the polling place.” In addition, 

the election official in the small jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire 

told us that the town clerk was on site at the one polling place.

Election Day communication problems encountered by some large and 

medium jurisdictions included overloaded phones because of the volume 

of calls. On the basis of our local jurisdictions survey, we estimate that 

49 percent (plus or minus 8 percent) of large jurisdictions, 14 percent of 

medium jurisdictions, and 1 percent of small jurisdictions experienced 

overloaded phone systems.44 The differences between all size categories 

are statistically significant. Election officials in many large jurisdictions we 

visited reported receiving numerous phone calls on Election Day, both 

from polling places and from the public. In addition to poll workers calling 

from polling places, election officials at the central office may receive 

phone calls from citizens asking about the location of their polling place or 

whether or not they are registered to vote. For example, a large jurisdiction 

we visited in Nevada reported receiving over 35,000 calls on Election Day 

43See GAO-02-3.

44The 95 percent confidence interval for the large percentage is greater than the +/- 7 percent 

sampling error for the sample. 
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 209 GAO-06-450 Elections

2004, about three times the number reportedly received in 2000. Election 

officials reported that most calls received were from people wanting to 

know whether or not they were registered or where their polling place was, 

despite providing polling place locations on their Web site, printing the 

locations in the newspaper, and mailing a sample ballot listing polling place 

locations to every registered voter in the jurisdiction. Election officials in 

2 other large jurisdictions in Florida and Kansas reported that the volume 

of calls received was extremely high and that most inquiries concerned 

voter eligibility. In 1 of these 2 jurisdictions, election officials told us that 

many poll workers could not get through to the elections office to verify 

voter registration information, which may have increased the number of 

provisional ballots issued during the election.

Election officials in many of the large jurisdictions we visited reported 

taking steps to manage, or even reduce, the volume of calls from both 

polling places and the public. These actions included setting up call centers 

or phone banks, installing additional phone lines in their offices, or hiring 

temporary workers. For example, election officials in a large jurisdiction in 

Pennsylvania reported that after experiencing problems being able to 

handle the volume of calls on Election Day 2000, they implemented a call 

center at their office with 30 phone lines for the November 2004 election. 

While these election officials reported receiving “a lot” of calls for the 2004 

general election, they said they were able to successfully handle the 

volume because of the new phone lines. Election officials in a large 

jurisdiction in Illinois reported that a feature, new for the November 2004 

election, on the jurisdiction’s Web site that allowed voters to determine 

their polling place online helped to reduce the number of phone calls 

received from people asking about polling location.

Election Officials in 

Some Jurisdictions We 

Visited Reported That 

Third-Party Observers 

Were a Challenge on 

Election Day 2004

After the November 2004 general election, some reports highlighted 

allegations of voter intimidation by third parties (e.g., poll watchers, 

observers, or electioneers) at polling places. To gain a better understanding 

of the extent to which this alleged behavior occurred and because the 

range of behaviors and circumstances in which they could have occurred 

was difficult to capture on a structured survey, we asked election officials 

during our site visits about challenges they faced conducting voting on 

Election Day—specifically, we asked them about any problems they 

encountered with voter intimidation. Election officials in 19 of the 

28 jurisdictions we visited did not report experiencing problems with third 

parties on Election Day. However, election officials in 9 jurisdictions we 

visited in battleground states reported challenges with disruptive third-
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 210 GAO-06-450 Elections

party activities.45 In some instances these third parties simply increased the 

number of people that poll workers were to manage at a polling location; in 

others, election officials told us third-party observers provided 

misinformation to voters or even used intimidation tactics.

Election officials in a jurisdiction in Nevada told us that poll watchers were 

the biggest challenge on Election Day. Poll watchers, according to election 

officials, had been bused in from another state to observe the election 

because Nevada was a battleground state, which led to having 14 poll 

watchers at some locations. These officials noted that while most poll 

watchers simply observed, the poll watchers did increase the number of 

people at polling places, creating more for poll workers to manage. 

Election officials in other jurisdictions reported that third-party behavior 

negatively affected poll workers and voters. For example, election officials 

in a jurisdiction in Pennsylvania reported that one of the biggest challenges 

on Election Day was managing poll workers’ stress levels in an especially 

contentious election where poll watchers and observers yelled at them 

throughout the day. Election officials in another jurisdiction in Nevada told 

us that outside observers’ behavior was disruptive and noted that the 

observers were contentious, violated electioneering limits at the polling 

place, and questioned every action that poll workers made. Election 

officials in a jurisdiction in Colorado reported that at one polling location 

on a college campus, poll watchers and representatives of a national 

organization were encouraging students to go to the polling place at one 

time to create a disruption. Students were also being encouraged to get 

back in line after they had voted, which caused long lines for other voters. 

Election officials said that they ended up calling security officers to help 

manage the situation.

In other instances, election officials reported that observers provided 

misinformation to voters or even used intimidation tactics. Election 

officials in a jurisdiction in Florida reported that third-party organizations 

caused confusion at polling places by misinforming voters and staging 

demonstrations. In a jurisdiction we visited in Colorado, election officials 

told us that poll watchers caused problems at some polling places by 

providing misinformation to voters, such as informing them that their 

provisional ballots would not be counted. In a jurisdiction in New Mexico, 

election officials said that one polling place had to remain open until 

45As previously noted, during our site visits we visited 8 of the 17 states defined by EAC as 

battleground states.
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 211 GAO-06-450 Elections

10:30 p.m. because voters were encouraged by local political advocates to 

go to that polling place to vote even though the polling location for their 

precinct had been changed. As a result, according to these officials, 

hundreds of provisional ballots were cast at the polling place, which made 

for long waiting times. Election officials in another jurisdiction in New 

Mexico reported that outside candidate advocates and observers from 

political parties tried intimidation tactics and treated people at the polls 

“terribly.” For example, these election officials told us that some advocates 

were observed taking photographs of the license plates of Hispanic voters 

as they arrived at polling places.

We did not ask a specific question about third-party activities at polling 

places on our survey of local jurisdictions because of the complexities in 

capturing the range of alleged behaviors on a structured survey. However, 

we asked whether local election jurisdictions maintained a written record 

of issues that occurred on Election Day and, if so, what issue or problem 

occurred most frequently on Election Day. Several election officials from 

jurisdictions in battleground states that provided comments on our 

nationwide survey wrote that electioneering or poll watchers did. For 

example, election officials from Florida, Colorado, and Iowa wrote “voters 

complained about being harassed by demonstrators while waiting in line to 

vote,” “poll watchers acting aggressively,” and “poll watchers (who were 

attorneys, mostly) were interfering with the process, intimidating precinct 

officials, and giving erroneous advice to voters who showed up at the 

wrong polling place.”

Concluding 

Observations

Administering an election in any jurisdiction is a complicated endeavor that 

involves effectively coordinating the people, processes, and technologies 

associated with numerous activities. Many of the challenges that election 

officials reported encountering in preparing for and conducting the 

November 2004 election were not new. Recruiting and training an adequate 

supply of poll workers, finding accessible polling places, and managing 

communications on Election Day were challenges we identified in our 

October 2001 report on the November 2000 election. 

Data from our local elections jurisdiction survey and site visits to 

28 locations, indicate that more large, and to some extent medium, 

jurisdictions encountered challenges in preparing for and conducting the 

November 2004 general election than did small jurisdictions. This is not 

surprising. Larger, diverse jurisdictions may face challenges smaller 

jurisdictions do not, such as recruiting poll workers with non-English 
Chapter 4

Conducting Elections

Page 212 GAO-06-450 Elections

language skills. Larger jurisdictions are also likely to need to rely to a 

greater degree on technology to manage their elections administration 

process, and this brings its own set of challenges. The complexity of 

administering an election and the potential for challenges increase with the 

number of people and places involved, the ethnic diversity and language 

skills of the voting population, and the scope of activities and processes 

that must be conducted. Many of the election officials in large jurisdictions 

we visited told us that being well prepared, having established policies and 

procedures in place, and having qualified election staff were factors that 

contributed to a smooth Election Day. One problem that occurred on 

Election Day in some jurisdictions that election officials reported 

encountering was the actions of poll watchers and other third parties that 

election officials considered disruptive. This presents another issue that 

election officials may need to include in their Election Day preparations 

and training.
Page 213 GAO-06-450 Elections

Chapter 5

Provisional Voting Chapte6r

A goal of the election process is to ensure that every eligible voter is able to 

cast a vote and have that vote counted. In the November 2000 general 

election, reports of some voters showing up at the polls and not being able 

to vote raised concerns about eligible voters’ names not appearing on the 

voter registration list at the polling place or poll workers not otherwise 

being able to determine voters’ eligibility. While many jurisdictions 

reported in 2001 having at least one procedure in place to help resolve 

eligibility questions for voters whose names did not appear on a polling 

place registration list, only 20 states plus the District of Columbia reported 

using some form of provisional ballot for the 2000 general election.1

One of the major changes since the 2000 general election has been the 

implementation of a HAVA provision requiring, in general, that states 

permit individuals, under certain circumstances, to cast provisional ballots 

in elections for federal office. In general, under HAVA, voters who claim to 

be eligible to vote and registered in the jurisdiction they desire to vote in 

but whose names do not appear on the polling place registration list are to 

be allowed to cast provisional ballots in a federal election. These ballots 

are called provisional because they are counted only if an election official 

determines that the voter is eligible under state law to vote. In terms of 

ballot access, provisional ballots benefit voters by allowing an individual to 

cast a vote, in general, when there is some question as to the individual’s 

eligibility such as when the individual’s name is not on the registration list 

or the individual’s eligibility has been questioned by an election official. In 

terms of ballot integrity, provisional ballots benefit election officials by 

allowing them to determine voter eligibility prior to counting such ballots 

(i.e., verifying provisional ballots). 

In this chapter, we describe (1) events that preceded HAVA’s provisional 

voting requirements, (2) how states and local jurisdictions implemented 

the requirement to provide provisional ballots, (3) how states and local 

election jurisdictions qualified provisional ballots for counting, and (4) the 

difficulties of estimating and comparing the number of provisional ballots 

that were cast and counted.

1

GAO-02-3.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 214 GAO-06-450 Elections

Overview Concerns were raised with respect to the November 2000 election that 

some eligible voters were not allowed to vote because of questions 

regarding the voters’ eligibility. HAVA required that by January 1, 2004, 

most states permit the casting of provisional ballots in elections for federal 

office by voters who affirm in writing that they believe they are eligible to 

vote and registered in that jurisdiction, but are not found on the voter 

registration list.2

 Such states are also required under HAVA to provide 

provisional ballots in federal elections under other circumstances such as 

for certain voters who registered by mail and do not have required 

identification, and where an election official asserts that an individual is 

ineligible to vote. Provisional votes cast under HAVA’s provisional voting 

requirements are to be counted in accordance with state law if election 

officials determine that the voter is eligible to vote under state law. Under 

HAVA, 6 states are exempt from the act’s provisional voting requirements 

because they either permitted the voter to register on Election Day or did 

not require voter registration.3

On the basis of reports from state election officials and in local election 

jurisdictions we surveyed and visited, states and local jurisdictions varied 

in a number of ways regarding how they implemented HAVA’s provisional 

voting requirements in the November 2004 election. Among other things, 

we found variation in the

• additional circumstances, apart from those circumstances specified 

in HAVA, where a provisional ballot would be offered, such as when 

voters claimed they did not receive an absentee ballot;

• design of ballots themselves and how they were tracked; and 

• voting method used for casting provisional ballots, such as optical 

scan ballots or DRE.

2

HAVA section 302 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15482).

3

Under HAVA, states that had either (1) no voter registration requirements for voters with 

respect to federal elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day 

with respect to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and 

Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject to HAVA’s provisional voting 

requirements.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 215 GAO-06-450 Elections

With respect to the counting of provisional votes, states reported various 

differences in their counting processes such as the prescribed location 

from which a voter must cast a provisional ballot in order for it to be 

counted. Also, with respect to the counting of provisional ballots, 

according to our estimates from our survey of local election jurisdictions 

nationwide, a voter not meeting residency requirements was the most 

frequently cited problem, followed by insufficient evidence that the voter 

was registered. In jurisdictions we visited, election officials also varied in 

how they handled a lack of information from the voter that was needed to 

verify a provisional ballot. 

National figures on provisional ballots for the November 2004 election are 

difficult to estimate because of a lack of data on provisional ballots cast 

and counted, and variation in how states implemented provisional voting. 

Nevertheless, we estimate that between 1.1 million and 1.7 million 

provisional ballots were cast in the November 2004 election. The variation 

in how provisional voting was implemented makes it difficult to compare 

the use and counting of provisional ballots among jurisdictions. A number 

of factors can affect the number of provisional ballots cast and counted. 

For example, one such factor could be an instance in which the polling 

location hours were extended and votes cast during the extended hours 

were cast provisionally. 

Events in the 

November 2000 

Election Preceded the 

HAVA Requirement for 

Provisional Ballots 

Following the November 2000 election, in our October 2001 comprehensive 

report on election processes nationwide, we noted that the biggest 

problems on Election Day involved resolving questions about voter 

eligibility.4

 Typically, a voter’s eligibility is established before a voter 

receives a ballot, most often by a poll worker examining a poll book or 

registration list for the person’s name. If the name appears on the list and 

other identification requirements are met, the voter is given a regular ballot 

and is allowed to vote. We also noted in our report that in the November 

2000 election, a large number of voters with eligibility issues created 

frustration for voters, long lines, and problems communicating between the 

polls and election headquarters as workers tried to resolve eligibility 

issues.

4

GAO-02-3.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 216 GAO-06-450 Elections

For the 2000 general election, when the voter’s name did not appear on the 

registration list, we reported in October 2001 that jurisdictions had 

different procedures for dealing with the question of the voter’s eligibility. 

More specifically, we reported that 20 states plus the District of Columbia 

used some form of provisional ballot when a voter’s name was not on the 

voter list, with verification of registration conducted after the election.5

 As 

we reported, provisional balloting measures went by different names 

among the states, including provisional ballot, challenged ballot, special 

ballot, emergency paper ballot, and escrow ballot. Further, in 5 states in the 

2000 general election, we reported that voters could complete an affidavit 

when voting with no further verification of their registration information 

being required by state law prior to the ballot being counted. 

The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that of the 19 million registered voters 

who did not vote in 2000, 6.9 percent did not vote because of uncertainty 

regarding their registration.6

 In our October 2001 report, we noted that 

headlines and reports questioned the effectiveness of voter registration by 

highlighting accounts of individuals who thought they were registered 

being turned away from polling places on Election Day and jurisdictions 

incorrectly removing the names of eligible voters from voter registration 

lists. Our report also found that almost half of the jurisdictions nationwide 

in 2000 reported having problems with registration applications submitted 

at motor vehicle agency offices that election officials believed could result 

in individuals showing up at the polls to vote and discovering that they 

were not registered. 

Numerous recommendations were made for federal regulations to require 

that all states provide provisional voting. For example, the Federal Election 

Commission in June 2001 recommended that all states devise procedures 

for voters to cast provisional ballots at the polls under certain conditions, 

as did the National Commission of Federal Election Reform in August 2001 

and the National Task Force on Election Reform in July 2001, among 

others.

5

See GAO-02-3, table 22, for a list and description of measures, including provisional voting 

requirements, in the 50 states and the District of Columbia to address instances of voter 

names not appearing on registration lists for the 2000 general election.

6

U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2000, U.S. 

Department of Commerce, February 2002.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 217 GAO-06-450 Elections

Under HAVA, in an election for federal office, most states are to permit 

individuals to cast a provisional ballot under certain circumstances.7

 The 

statutory deadline for implementing HAVA’s provisional voting requirement 

was January 1, 2004. For federal elections, states are, in general, required to 

allow the casting of a provisional ballot by an individual 

• asserting to be registered in the jurisdiction in which the individual 

desires to vote and eligible to vote but whose name does not appear 

on the official list of eligible voters for the polling place, or

• whom an election official asserts to be ineligible to vote, or

• who registered to vote by mail but does not have (and has not 

previously provided) the required registration identification when 

trying to vote in person or by mail, or 

• casting a vote pursuant to a court order or other type of order 

extending poll closing times. 

HAVA requires that an individual be permitted to cast a provisional ballot 

upon the execution of a written affirmation before an election official at the 

polling place. The written affirmation must state that the individual is 

registered to vote in that jurisdiction and eligible to vote in that election. 

HAVA specifies that either the provisional ballot or the written affirmation 

information be transmitted to an appropriate election official for a 

determination as to whether the individual is eligible to vote under state 

law. Under HAVA, if an individual is determined to be eligible, the 

provisional ballot is to be counted as a vote in accordance with state law. 

Election officials, under HAVA, are to give the individual written 

information on how to ascertain whether the vote was counted and, if the 

vote was not counted, the reason the vote was not counted. HAVA directs 

that state or local election officials establish a free access system, such as a 

toll-free number, for provisional voters to ascertain such information.

7

Although many states had some form of provisional balloting prior to the passage of HAVA, 

44 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia were required to permit certain individuals 

to cast provisional ballots for the 2004 general election. Under HAVA, 6 states were exempt 

from HAVA’s provisional voting requirements. States that had either no voter registration 

requirements for voters with respect to federal elections (North Dakota) or polling place 

registration on Election Day with respect to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New 

Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) in effect on and after August 1, 1994, are not subject 

to HAVA’s provisional voting requirements. 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 218 GAO-06-450 Elections

While HAVA established conditions under which an individual must be 

allowed to cast a provisional ballot, states are not prohibited from offering 

provisional ballots for other reasons, or from using ballots with other 

names (e.g., a challenged ballot) to serve provisional vote purposes. HAVA 

explicitly provides that the specific choices on the methods of complying 

with certain act requirements, including the provisional voting 

requirements, are left to the discretion of the state.8

 In addition, HAVA 

provides that a state may establish election technology and administration 

requirements that are stricter than HAVA requirements, so long as they are 

not inconsistent with other specified federal requirements.9

State and Local 

Jurisdictions Varied in 

Their Implementation 

for Providing 

Provisional Ballots for 

the November 2004 

Election

On the basis of reports from state election officials and in local election 

jurisdictions we surveyed and visited, states and local jurisdictions 

provided for provisional voting in a variety of ways for the November 2004 

election. These differences contributed to the variation in the number of 

provisional votes cast among jurisdictions. 

The results of our state survey of election officials show that states 

reported using new or existing legislative or executive actions (which 

included executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies) to 

implement HAVA’s provisional voting requirements. Specifically, our state 

survey showed 

• 27 states reported enacting new legislation or taking executive action to 

meet HAVA’s provisional voting requirements;

8

HAVA section 305 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15485).

9

HAVA section 304 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15484). For example, Arizona submitted an 

inquiry to Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division asking whether it was permissible 

under HAVA for a state to mandate that a potential voter show identification at the polls 

prior to receiving a provisional ballot. The Civil Rights Division responded, in part, on 

September 1, 2005, that while HAVA requires states to allow voters who meet certain 

specified conditions the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot, states are free to prescribe 

their own rules for deciding whether to count those ballots. (September 1, 2005, letter to the 

state of Arizona from the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division).
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 219 GAO-06-450 Elections

• 11 states and the District of Columbia reported using the state’s existing 

legislative or executive action to meet the requirements;10

• 7 states said HAVA provisional requirements were met by a combination 

of new legislation or executive action and existing actions;11

• 5 states (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and 

Wisconsin), in response to the question of how their state established 

the provisional voting requirements set forth in HAVA, answered that 

they were exempt from such requirements; these 5 states are exempt 

from HAVA provisional requirements, in general, because they have 

same-day voter registration or no voter registration.12

Connecticut officials responded, for example, that the state enacted 

legislation after HAVA to establish HAVA provisional voting requirements. 

Connecticut state laws were enacted in June 2003 related to the application 

for a provisional ballot, casting of the ballot, and determination of eligibility 

for counting of provisional ballots, among other things. In contrast, Alaska 

election officials reported that existing legislation met HAVA’s provisional 

voting requirements. According to Alaska’s 2005 updated HAVA plan, the 

state had an existing provisional voting process known as Questioned 

Voting. This process, established in the early 1980s, required only minimal 

changes to meet HAVA provisional voting requirements. Alaska requires 

use of a questioned ballot for any voter who votes at a polling location 

where his or her name does not appear on the precinct register, or if the 

voter does not have identification and is not personally known by the 

election official. In our state survey, New Jersey reported meeting HAVA 

provisional voting requirements with a combination of existing and new 

legislation. In one New Jersey jurisdiction we visited, election officials 

stated that state provisional voting procedures were first established in 

10Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, 

South Carolina, and West Virginia reported using existing legislative or executive action to 

meet HAVA requirements.

11Arizona, California, Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Washington reported meeting 

HAVA requirements with a combination of new and existing state actions.

12Wyoming is also exempt from HAVA’s provisional voting requirements. States are exempt 

because they had either (1) no voter registration requirements for voters with respect to 

federal elections (North Dakota) or (2) polling place registration on Election Day with 

respect to federal elections (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), 

in effect on and after August 1, 1994. Despite the exemption, Wyoming reported enacting 

legislation to authorize some measure of provisional voting to be consistent with HAVA.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 220 GAO-06-450 Elections

1999. According to these officials, the state amended its provisional ballot 

election law after HAVA to allow use for voting by court (or other) order 

after the polls have closed, and by first-time mail registrants who do not 

provide identification.

Paper Ballots and DRE Were 

Voting Methods Used to 

Cast Provisional Ballots

Election officials in 25 of the 26 jurisdictions we visited that provide for 

provisional voting told us that they used some form of paper ballot for 

Election Day provisional voting for the November 2004 election.13 For 

example, election officials in the Illinois jurisdictions we visited said that 

the regular punch card ballot was used by provisional voters, and then 

placed in provisional ballot envelopes. In the New Jersey jurisdictions we 

visited officials said that provisional votes were cast on paper ballots that 

could be counted with optical scan machines (if voters were determined to 

be eligible). Election officials in Connecticut jurisdictions said that they 

used hand-counted paper ballots for provisional voters.

According to election officials in 1 Ohio jurisdiction and 1 Nevada 

jurisdiction, DRE was used for Election Day provisional voters.14 According 

to election officials or documents they provided in the 2 jurisdictions we 

visited that used DRE for provisional voting on Election Day, the processes 

used for casting provisional votes were as follows: 

• In the Ohio jurisdiction, election officials said voters first completed an 

affidavit statement with a preprinted code number, and signed a special 

section of the poll book. The poll worker then inserted a unit into the 

DRE that contained the ballot for the precinct. The poll worker then 

pressed the provisional ballot selection on the DRE and entered the 

code number for the individual voter associated with the voter’s 

affidavit statement. The individual then voted. 

13Two additional jurisdictions we visited were in New Hampshire, which is not subject to 

HAVA provisional voting requirements.

14In each of these jurisdictions paper ballots were used for some provisional voting—for 

those casting a provisional vote Election Day in the election office in Ohio and those casting 

a provisional ballot during early voting in the Nevada jurisdiction. Voters in Nevada, 

including early voters, who were first-time voters who registered by mail and did not 

provide identification when they registered and could not provide required identification 

when at the polls, were allowed to cast a provisional ballot. Election officials in the other 

Nevada jurisdiction also told us they used DRE for provisional voting but not on Election 

Day. This jurisdiction used DREs for provisional early voting and optical scan paper ballots 

on Election Day. 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 221 GAO-06-450 Elections

• In one Nevada jurisdiction, DREs were used for Election Day 

provisional voting, but optical scan ballots were used for provisional 

voters participating in early voting. According to the poll worker’s 

manual provided by election officials, Election Day provisional voters 

completed an affirmation with identifying information and the reason 

they were casting a provisional ballot. As described to us by election 

officials at this jurisdiction, the poll worker then added precinct 

information, and both signed the affirmation. The poll worker then 

activated the DRE with a card. To indicate that the ballot was 

provisional, the poll worker pressed “0” and the machine provided a 

provisional voter identification number that the poll worker copied onto 

the voter affirmation and provisional voter receipt. The voter then 

voted. 

The Provisional Ballot 

Design and Tracking 

Procedures Varied among 

States 

According to election officials in the jurisdictions we visited, the design of 

provisional ballots varied for the November 2004 election. The provisional 

ballot differences included variation in terms of the races included, ballot 

and envelope color, the envelopes they were placed in, and the information 

included on the provisional ballot envelopes. For example, in the Nevada 

jurisdictions, the provisional ballot only included races for federal offices, 

while in the Kansas jurisdictions, officials said that the provisional ballot 

was the same as a regular ballot. In 1 Georgia jurisdiction, election officials 

stated that they were using an absentee ballot for provisional voters but 

were inserting it into a salmon-colored envelope, whereas in an Illinois 

jurisdiction we visited, “Provisional” was printed in pink letters across the 

punch card ballot used in that jurisdiction so that these ballots were 

distinguishable from other ballots. 

The provisional ballot envelopes also varied in terms of what information 

was provided in the jurisdictions we visited, according to example 

envelopes provided to us (or described) by election officials. The outside of 

the provisional ballot envelopes in most of the jurisdictions we visited 

served as the voter’s written affirmation that is required by HAVA. For 

example, in a jurisdiction in Illinois, the ballot envelope included 

instruction to voters on how to cast a provisional ballot; in a Florida 

jurisdiction (as well as in Illinois) the provisional envelope includes 

information on the reason why the provisional ballot was cast. In New 

Mexico and Colorado jurisdictions we visited, the envelope included a tearoff tab with information on how voters could find out whether their vote 

counted, and if not, why it was not counted. In addition, election officials in 

some jurisdictions we visited described provisional ballots being placed in 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 222 GAO-06-450 Elections

envelopes, sometimes with a second security envelope covering the ballot 

inside. Figure 42 shows an example of a provisional ballot envelope. 

Figure 42: Provisional Ballot Envelope 

Officials in jurisdictions we visited described a variety of methods used for 

tracking provisional ballots in the November 2004 election. Methods 

included having individual ballots numbered, maintaining an inventory or 

log, accounting for provisional ballots at the beginning and end of Election 

Source: Broward County, Florida.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 223 GAO-06-450 Elections

Day, and using specially colored ballots or envelopes for holding 

provisional ballots. The following are examples of how election officials in 

four jurisdictions we visited said they tracked provisional ballots for the 

November 2004 election: 

• In a Pennsylvania jurisdiction, election officials tracked provisional 

ballots cast at the polling place on a form provided by the election 

officials. Provisional ballots were marked with a sticker indicating 

that they were provisional. The sticker also had an identification 

number for tracking the ballot, and the voter was provided a receipt 

with the identification number to use when calling for information on 

the status of their ballot. All provisional ballots were placed inside of 

green envelopes.

• In a New Mexico jurisdiction, an election official said that ballots 

were numbered sequentially, so that the poll workers could track the 

numbers. The precinct judges certified the numbers of the ballots 

they received, used, delivered, and destroyed.

• In a New Jersey jurisdiction, the municipal clerk issued a specific 

number of provisional ballots (25) to each precinct, with a “Custody 

Receipt” form that identified who was in possession of the orange 

bag with the provisional ballots and an accounting of all ballots 

originally issued. A ballot that had been voted was enclosed in a gray 

envelope and then put back in the orange bag.

• In a Kansas jurisdiction, separate poll books, separate envelopes for 

provisional ballots, and separate pouches for envelopes containing 

provisional ballots (all blue in color) facilitated tracking the ballots 

as separate items from regular Election Day ballots. No tracking of 

the actual ballot occurred (before it was voted) because the same 

optical scan paper ballot was used for regular Election Day voters.

Additional Circumstances 

for Using Provisional 

Ballots Varied for the 

November 2004 Election

Apart from permitting voters to cast provisional ballots under the 

circumstances specified in HAVA, some jurisdictions we surveyed or spoke 

with had additional reasons for providing provisional ballots to voters in 

the November 2004 election and other types of ballots that could be used 

for different circumstances. In addition, election officials in jurisdictions 

we visited told us about different approaches for offering provisional 

ballots. 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 224 GAO-06-450 Elections

Provisional Ballots Were 

Provided for a Variety of Reasons 

in Jurisdictions We Visited

In the local election jurisdictions we visited, election officials described 

various circumstances, in addition to those required by HAVA, in which a 

provisional ballot was provided to a prospective voter in the November 

2004 election. The additional circumstances under which provisional 

ballots were provided are established by state officials. For example,

• In one Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election officials stated that 

provisional ballots were available to voters who did not have the 

identification required of all voters in the state and also available if a 

person was listed as a felon in the poll book. Further, election 

officials told us that the Colorado Secretary of State issued guidance 

just prior to the 2004 general election that allowed individuals—

claiming to have registered at a voter registration drive but for whom 

the jurisdiction had no record—to vote provisionally. 

• Election officials in jurisdictions we visited in Colorado, Florida, 

Kansas, Ohio, and Washington said that voters claiming they had not 

received their absentee ballots were provided with provisional 

ballots. In other jurisdictions, such as the 2 we visited in Connecticut, 

voters were allowed to vote regularly if their absentee ballot did not 

arrive. 

• Kansas election officials reported that they allowed voters to cast 

provisional ballots if the voter did not trust the voting machines and 

wanted a paper ballot, or if the voter had a different last name than 

the listed one because of marriage or divorce. 

The extent to which voters are provided with provisional ballots varied 

depending on whether states required identification of all voters or only 

certain voters, according to our state survey. Some states reported that 

they require all voters to provide identification; some reported that they 

require only provisional voters to produce identification, while others 

reported that they do not require identification from voters other than firsttime voters who registered by mail, as required by HAVA.15 Chapter 4 on 

conducting elections discusses state requirements for voter identification 

for all voters. According to our state survey, 6 states—Arizona, 

Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Utah, and Wisconsin—reported 

15HAVA mandates all states to require identification from first-time voters who registered by 

mail unless a copy of the identification is included with their mail-in voter registration 

application.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 225 GAO-06-450 Elections

requiring identification from only provisional voters in the November 2004 

election, but Michigan and Utah reported allowing an alternative to 

identification for provisional voters who did not have required 

identification. In Michigan, for example, a voter receiving a provisional 

ballot who was unable to meet the identification requirement was 

permitted, according to election officials responding to our state survey, to 

fax, mail, or hand-deliver an acceptable form of photo identification to the 

clerk anytime during the 6 days following the election.

Alternatives to Provisional 

Voting Available in Some 

Jurisdictions We Visited

Some jurisdictions we visited reported that Election Day voting options 

other than provisional ballots were available. For example, election 

officials in jurisdictions we visited in Ohio said that provisional ballots 

were the only special ballots available for that election. In contrast, in a 

New Mexico jurisdiction we visited, election officials said the state offered 

an in-lieu-of ballot for voters who requested an absentee ballot, and 

claimed it did not arrive. These election officials said the in-lieu-of ballot 

was the same as a provisional ballot, but it was placed in a different sleeve 

for later determination of whether an absentee ballot had been cast or not. 

At a Connecticut jurisdiction we visited, election officials described the 

state’s presidential ballot, available at the clerk’s office on Election Day for 

the November 2004 election. A presidential ballot, according to election 

officials and documents they provided, allowed voting for president and 

vice-president by former Connecticut residents who had moved to another 

state within 30 days of the election and for that reason could not vote in 

their new state of residence.16

Election officials in some jurisdictions we visited, such as 1 jurisdiction in 

Florida and 2 jurisdictions in New Jersey, said their procedures allowed 

challenged voters to sign a statement, such as an affidavit declaring their 

eligibility, and to vote on a regular ballot that would be counted with other 

ballots on Election Day. According to poll worker guidance provided by 

election officials in the Florida jurisdiction, a written challenge must be 

submitted under oath and given to the voter; then the voter has the right to 

submit an oath affirming his or her eligibility. The polling place clerk and 

inspectors must resolve the challenge by majority vote, providing a regular 

ballot if the decision is in the prospective voter’s favor. The guidance states 

that a challenged voter who refuses to sign the oath must be offered a 

provisional ballot. In both jurisdictions we visited in New Jersey, voters 

16To be eligible for a presidential ballot, a person must be a citizen at least 18 years old and 

have not forfeited electoral privileges because of a disfranchising crime. 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 226 GAO-06-450 Elections

who were challenged were not issued a provisional ballot, according to 

documents provided by election officials. As stated in the poll worker 

manual for one of the jurisdictions for the 2004 general election, a voter 

who was challenged completed a challenged voter affidavit, as shown in 

figure 43. The manual stated that the location’s four poll workers take a 

vote to decide whether the voter would be allowed to vote. On the basis of 

the decision, the challenged voter cast a regular ballot or was not allowed 

to vote, according to the manual (in case of a tie, the voter was allowed to 

vote). 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 227 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 43: Middlesex County, New Jersey, Challenged Voter Affidavit

Source: Middlesex County, New Jersey.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 228 GAO-06-450 Elections

In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked for 

information on the use of provisional ballots, challenged ballots, or other 

types of ballots under various scenarios for the November 2004 election.17

Table 18 shows the extent to which we estimate that local jurisdictions 

provided provisional ballots as compared to providing other types of 

ballots. 

Table 18: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Nationwide That Provided Provisional, Challenge, or Other Ballots for 

the November 2004 Election under Various Scenarios

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Note: Jurisdictions could indicate using more than one type of ballot for a particular scenario; therefore, 

the row of percentages may not add to 100 percent. 

Jurisdictions Varied in Their 

Approach to Providing 

Provisional Ballots

Apart from permitting voters to cast provisional ballots under the 

circumstances specified in HAVA, election officials in jurisdictions we 

visited described differing approaches under which provisional ballots 

were utilized for the November 2004 election. 

Election officials in most of the 28 jurisdictions we visited said that in the 

November 2004 election they would not refuse an individual a provisional 

17Jurisdictions in Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and North Dakota were not asked 

questions about provisional voting because they are not subject to HAVA’s provisional voting 

requirements and do not provide for provisional voting. Maine was inadvertently not asked 

to answer these questions.

Scenario

Percentage of jurisdictions providing

Not applicable

Provisional 

ballots

Challenge 

ballots

Other 

ballots

Individuals who registered by mail (without providing 

identification),voted for the first time, and did not bring proper 

identification with them to the polling place

49 6 7 39

Individuals who claimed they were at the correct polling place but 

were not on the voter registration list at the polling place

48 7 13 33

Individuals who were challenged by an election official as 

ineligible to vote

23 23 3 49 

Individuals who voted after the polling place closing times when 

the polling place was kept open late because of a federal court, 

state court, or other order extending the polling place hours

6 1 2 91

Individuals who said they had requested an absentee ballot but 

that the ballot never arrived

18 1 19 60
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 229 GAO-06-450 Elections

ballot. In a Colorado jurisdiction, election officials said that election judges 

were instructed to direct all voters meeting the criteria for voting 

provisionally (e.g., claiming to be registered and eligible, but with some 

eligibility question) to the provisional voting table. In 1 Nevada jurisdiction, 

the election official said that anyone could receive a provisional ballot. He 

said that they had Las Vegas tourists who wanted to vote a provisional 

ballot, even though they were informed that it would not be counted. 

Election officials in 1 Washington jurisdiction said voters knew that they 

could cast a ballot regardless of circumstances, and election officials in the 

other Washington jurisdiction said that provisional ballots served as a 

conflict avoidance tool at the polls. Election officials in both New Mexico 

jurisdictions said that if a voter was not on the registration list, he or she 

was immediately given a provisional ballot. According to the New Mexico 

election officials, precinct officials were not to direct a voter to the correct 

precinct; instead, under the provisional voting rule, they were to offer a 

provisional ballot to the voter.

Election officials in some other jurisdictions we visited told us that poll 

workers may have taken certain steps before providing a voter with a 

provisional ballot. In 1 Illinois jurisdiction, an election official said that if a 

potential voter was not listed, the poll workers first tried to determine if the 

voter was registered in another jurisdiction. If that was the case, the poll 

workers then directed the voter to that jurisdiction, but they did not refuse 

to provide a provisional ballot if a voter requested one. In 1 Ohio 

jurisdiction, election officials told us that if a voter was registered in Ohio, 

everything was done to get the voter to the correct precinct. In a New 

Jersey jurisdiction we visited, election officials explained that poll workers 

take several steps when the voter’s name was not listed in the poll book. 

Poll workers were instructed, according to the poll worker’s manual, to 

check the poll book for misspellings or for the name being out of 

alphabetical sequence, and to check the county street guide to see if the 

voter was in the wrong location. Election officials in this jurisdiction also 

told us that voters who were in the wrong location were directed to the 

correct location. They added that voters who did not wish to vote 

provisionally were told to go before a superior court judge to plead their 

cases.

In 5 jurisdictions we visited, election officials said there were instances 

where election officials would refuse to provide a provisional ballot on 

Election Day. In 1 Ohio jurisdiction, election officials said that a provisional 

ballot was provided if the potential voter appeared at the polling place. 

However, if the person came to the election office on Election Day and no 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 230 GAO-06-450 Elections

record of voter registration was found by the Registrar, then the voter was 

not allowed to vote provisionally. A potential voter stating that he or she 

was not registered or not a resident was a reason not to offer the individual 

a provisional ballot, according to election officials in 1 jurisdiction in 

Nevada, and 1 in New Jersey, and both jurisdictions in North Carolina. 

Officials in 1 Georgia jurisdiction we visited said that an individual might 

not be offered a provisional ballot if he or she was on the voter registration 

list and therefore eligible to vote a regular ballot.

Whether a provisional ballot was provided or not might have been based, in 

part, on the size of the jurisdiction and the familiarity of the poll workers 

with the voters. Several election officials in small local jurisdictions 

included in our nationwide survey made this point in written comments. 

For example, comments included the following:

• “This is a small township. We don’t have the problems big cities have. 

People know who lives in the township. They know their neighbors.” 

• “Most voters are personally known, including their addresses.” 

• “We were told that the state voter list was the bible for the day. But we 

had one lady who should have been provisional but we all knew where 

she lived so we let her vote. It was the choir lady’s niece. Her signature 

was on file.” 

In larger jurisdictions, poll workers might be less likely to know the voters 

in the precinct and may have made greater use of provisional ballots than in 

smaller jurisdictions. 

Newness of Providing 

Provisional Ballots 

Presented Some Challenges 

in November 2004

Some jurisdictions we visited reported that knowing how many provisional 

ballots to have available for the November 2004 election was a challenge. 

However, on the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 

for the November 2004 election, only 1 percent of jurisdictions had a 

shortage of provisional ballots. The difficulty with anticipating the need for 

provisional ballots, according to an Illinois jurisdiction election official, 

was that officials had no historical experience to rely upon in deciding how 

many to make available at each site. In this jurisdiction, provisional ballots 

were used for the first time in the November 2004 election, according to the 

election official. Similarly, in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited, 

election officials stated that they had no basis to plan for the number 

needed, and that they had to rush to produce (e.g., placing a provisional 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 231 GAO-06-450 Elections

ballot sticker over an absentee ballot) additional provisional ballots at the 

last minute because some precincts needed more than were initially 

allocated. Election officials in one Nevada jurisdiction we visited said some 

polling places were overstocked while others were understocked, requiring 

them to shuttle the ballots between polling places. In a Colorado 

jurisdiction we visited, election officials said that last-minute changes by 

state officials created a need for more provisional ballots because this 

change allowed individuals who registered during a voter registration drive 

but who were not on the voter list to vote provisionally. 

On the basis of our local survey, poll workers failing to follow procedures 

for conducting provisional voting surfaced as an issue in some jurisdictions 

in the November 2004 election. We estimate that 12 percent of jurisdictions 

nationwide encountered poll worker performance problems related to their 

failure to follow procedures with provisional voting. The newness of the 

provisional procedures or last-minute changes in the guidance were 

challenges that confused poll workers, according to election officials in 

jurisdictions we visited. Specifically,

• In a Georgia jurisdiction, election officials told us there was a question 

regarding whether several college students were eligible to vote 

provisionally, and state election officials were called for clarification 

(the students were allowed to vote provisionally). 

• In a Connecticut jurisdiction, election officials said poll workers were 

confused about the process, issuing provisional ballots in some cases 

before checking with the Registrar to try to locate the prospective 

voters in the statewide database.

• In both Nevada jurisdictions, election officials we visited identified poll 

worker training needs; for example, in 1 of the Nevada jurisdictions 

election officials said provisional ballot materials were not adequately 

tracked and returned. 

• In an Ohio jurisdiction, election officials identified poll worker handling 

of provisional ballots as an area for improvement based on finding valid 

provisional ballots returned in envelopes for soiled and defaced ballots. 

In addition, they said about half of the provisional voters did not sign the 

poll book, as they were supposed to have done under this jurisdiction’s 

requirements. Furthermore, voters were to place their provisional 

ballots in a colored provisional sleeve for determination of eligibility 

before the vote was submitted, but the election official estimated that 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 232 GAO-06-450 Elections

about 10 percent of the provisional ballots were placed directly in the 

ballot box instead.

Some election officials in jurisdictions we visited described actions they 

took to implement provisional voting that worked well for the November 

2004 election. Several identified training given to poll workers that 

prepared them for provisional voting, or had staff dedicated to handling 

provisional votes, or poll workers with prior provisional voting experience. 

For example, election officials in 1 Colorado jurisdiction said that they had 

election judges whose sole responsibility was conducting provisional 

voting. According to these election officials, the election judges (i.e., poll 

workers) were well trained and sat at a separate table to handle provisional 

voting. One jurisdiction we visited in Illinois had specific instructions on 

the voter affidavit for election workers to follow. Figure 44 provides an 

example of the affidavit.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 233 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 44: Affidavit Containing Provisional Ballot Instructions for Poll Workers in 

Champaign, Illinois

Source: Champaign County, Illinois.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 234 GAO-06-450 Elections

State and Local 

Jurisdictions Reported 

Variation in Several 

Areas Affecting 

whether Provisional 

Ballots Are Counted

HAVA specifies that voters casting ballots under HAVA’s provisional 

balloting requirements must, in general, execute a written affirmation 

stating that they are registered in the jurisdiction in which they desire to 

vote and that they are eligible to vote in that election. Polling place 

officials, under HAVA, are to transmit either the ballot or the written 

affirmation information to an appropriate election official for verification 

to ascertain if the individual is eligible to vote under state law. In the 

November 2004 election, state requirements regarding the location from 

which voters had to cast their provisional ballot in order for it to be 

counted (e.g., in the specific precinct in which the voter is registered or 

anywhere within the county—city, parish, township—in which the voter 

was registered) was one key difference among states. States also varied in 

how missing voter information was handled and how voters were informed 

whether their vote was counted or not. On the basis of our national survey 

of local jurisdictions, the most frequent problem encountered by local 

jurisdictions in counting provisional ballots was that voters did not meet 

residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or jurisdiction. 

Location Where Voters Must 

Cast Their Ballots in Order 

to Be Counted Varied among 

States

HAVA requires states to provide provisional balloting where, among other 

things, individuals assert that they are registered in the jurisdiction in 

which they desire to vote. The term “jurisdiction” in HAVA’s provisional 

voting requirements is not specifically defined. As a result, states establish, 

under their own election codes, the applicable jurisdiction where voters 

must cast their provisional ballot from in order for such ballot to be eligible 

to be counted. For example, in some states this location is the specific 

precinct in which the voter is registered, and in other states, the voter may 

be anywhere within the county (city, parish, township) in which the voter 

resides and is registered. Our survey of state election officials asked where 

a provisional voter needed to cast a vote in order for it to be counted for 

the November 2004 election. Figure 45 shows where states reported that 

provisional voters needed to cast their votes in order for such votes to be 

eligible to be counted. 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 235 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 45: State-Reported Locations Where a Provisional Vote Had to Be Cast in Order for It to Be Counted for the November 

2004 General Election

Note: Six states are not subject to HAVA’s provisional voting requirements, but 2 of these 6 (Wisconsin 

and Wyoming) authorize some measure of provisional voting. Both of these states are included with 

the 32 states that reported requiring that provisional voters must cast their votes in the specific 

precincts in which they are registered in order for their votes to be eligible to be counted.

Source: GAO survey of state election officials. 

Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia required that the provisional voter had to be 

in the specific precinct.

Fourteen states required that the voter could have been anywhere within the county 

in which he or she resided.

Four states were exempt from provisional voting and did not provide it.

VT

DC

OK

CA CO

AZ NM

NV

TX

NE

UT

KS

ND

ID

IA 

AK

HI

AR

MO

WV

TN

NC

GA

FL

LA

WI

WY

NH

MA

RI

CT

NJ

MD

DE

ME

NY

PA

WA

OR

MT

SD

MN

MI

AL

IL IN OH

KY 

VA

SC

MS
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 236 GAO-06-450 Elections

Variation in state requirements as to the location where a provisional ballot 

must have been cast in order to be counted was also evident in the 

jurisdictions we visited. For example, voters in Kansas could, according to 

election officials, vote provisionally in precincts other than where they 

were registered (but within the same county) and if otherwise eligible to 

vote have their vote partially counted (e.g., for county, state, or federal 

offices or issues). Nevada election officials said they count provisional 

votes cast anywhere in the county where the voter was registered and 

otherwise eligible, but all provisional ballots only included federal races. 

Election officials in both Washington jurisdictions we visited reported that 

a voter in the November 2004 election was allowed to cast a provisional 

ballot anywhere in the state of Washington, and the ballot would be 

forwarded to the correct county (if the ballot was cast in a county other 

than the one in which the voter was registered) and counted if the voter 

was eligible. Election officials in 1 Washington jurisdiction we visited said 

that county election workers mailed the provisional ballots for nonWashington residents to the Secretary of State of the state where the voter 

claimed to be registered, but these officials were not knowledgeable of 

what became of the ballots. 

Election officials in several states have faced court challenges to their state 

requirements regarding the location where a provisional ballot must have 

been cast in order to be counted. The litigation has primarily arisen in 

states requiring that a provisional voter had to cast a vote in the specific 

precinct in which he or she was registered, in order for that vote to be 

counted. In this context, the courts have generally held that HAVA does not 

require a state to count provisional votes cast in the wrong precinct as legal 

votes when they would otherwise be considered invalid under state law.18

In our state survey, we also asked state election officials if they anticipated 

that their state would change, by November 2006, where a provisional voter 

must cast a vote for it to be counted. Forty states reported that they did not 

anticipate such rules would change. Election officials in 4 states reported 

they anticipated a change by November 2006. Three out of the 4 states 

(Arkansas, Nevada, and New Jersey) reporting that they anticipated a 

change for 2006 had reported for the November 2004 general election that a 

18For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in ruling on the 

counting of provisional votes under Ohio law, held that ballots cast in a precinct where the 

voter does not reside and which would be invalid under state law for that reason are not 

required by HAVA to be counted as valid votes. Sandusky County Democratic Party v. 

Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 2004).
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 237 GAO-06-450 Elections

provisional voter could have cast a vote anywhere within the county (city, 

parish, township) in which the voter resides and have such vote counted. 

The fourth state, Colorado, had reported for the November 2004 general 

election that provisional voters had to cast their votes in the specific 

precincts in which they were registered in order for their votes to be 

counted. Georgia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia said they did not 

know whether rules specifying where a provisional voter must cast a ballot 

in order to be counted could be anticipated to change, and the remaining 

4 states responded that they will not have provisional voting. These 4 states 

are not subject to provisional voting requirements. 

Residency Requirements 

and Evidence of 

Registration Were the Most 

Frequent Problems 

Nationwide Affecting 

whether Provisional Ballots 

Were Counted 

In our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, we asked about 

problems that local jurisdictions encountered during the November 2004 

election in counting provisional ballots. On the basis of our survey, in 

jurisdictions where provisional ballots were cast we estimate that the most 

frequent problems concerned voters not meeting residency requirements 

or lacking evidence that the voter was registered. Specifically, we estimate 

• 66 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) of jurisdictions had a problem with 

voters not meeting residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or 

jurisdiction,19

• 61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) received insufficient evidence that 

individuals had submitted voter registration applications at motor 

vehicle agency offices,

• 61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had instances of insufficient 

evidence that individuals had registered or tried to register directly with 

the election office, 

• 34 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had registration applications 

received by the registrar very close to or after the registration deadline,

• 32 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had voters not providing 

identification as specified by HAVA for registrants who registered by 

mail and were voting for the first time in the precinct or jurisdiction,

19The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is greater than the +/- 5 percent 

sampling error for the complete sample.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 238 GAO-06-450 Elections

• 29 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) received insufficient evidence that 

individuals had submitted voter registration applications at National 

Voter Registration Act agencies other than motor vehicle agency offices,

• 28 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) had provisional ballot envelopes or 

ballots that were incomplete or illegible, and

• 20 percent of jurisdictions had problems with voters who did not sign a 

sworn statement that they met the qualifications to be eligible to vote in 

the precinct or jurisdiction.

Written comments made by local election officials in our nationwide survey 

identified some additional problems encountered with counting provisional 

ballots. Examples included uncertainty whether a convicted felon’s voting 

rights, lost as a result of such conviction, had been restored; a voter’s 

registration records that had been sealed by a court; and the state changing 

the rules several times right up to Election Day, creating confusion, 

according to election officials.

Jurisdictions Visited 

Identified Variations in How 

Missing Information Was 

Handled when Provisional 

Ballots Were Counted 

In addition to variation in where states required provisional ballots to be 

cast in order to be counted for the November 2004 election, local 

jurisdictions we visited reported a variation in how to handle a lack of 

identification or a missing signature. For example, election officials in one 

New Mexico jurisdiction we visited said that first-time voters that did not 

provide the required identification had until the close of the polls on 

Election Day to bring their identification to the county clerk’s office. In 

contrast, according to election officials in a New Jersey and a Georgia 

jurisdiction, provisional voters were allowed up to 2 days to produce 

identification for their vote to be counted, and in a Nevada jurisdiction, 

voters had until 5:00 p.m. the Friday after the election. 

With respect to mail registrants who were permitted to cast provisional 

ballots because they did not provide required identification when voting for 

the first time, election officials in 1 Illinois jurisdiction we visited reported 

a lack of clarity as to what subsequent identification-related verification 

was needed prior to counting provisional ballots. According to the Illinois 

election officials, the state’s guidance resulted in a situation where one 

Illinois jurisdiction required the voter to provide to the county clerk’s office 

identification with an address that matched the address in the voter 

registration list within 48 hours after the election in order to be counted, 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 239 GAO-06-450 Elections

while another jurisdiction did not require the two such addresses match. 

The Illinois officials stated that this issue has been clarified. 

Jurisdictions we visited also varied in how they handled a missing voter 

signature. For example, in 1 Colorado jurisdiction, election officials said 

that they mailed letters to voters who failed to sign their provisional ballot 

envelopes and allowed the voters up to 10 days after the election to come in 

and sign so that their votes would be counted. This was not a procedure 

described in all jurisdictions we visited. In 1 jurisdiction in New Mexico, 

ballots would not be counted for voters who did not sign the provisional 

ballot affidavit or roster. In 1 Georgia jurisdiction we visited, voters had to 

complete a new voter registration form or their provisional ballots were not 

counted. 

Telephone Was Used Most 

Often to Provide Voters with 

the Outcome of Their 

Provisional Vote

HAVA requires that provisional voters be provided with written information 

about how to find out whether their vote was counted (and if not, why) 

using a free access system established by state or local election officials. 

On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the majority 

of local jurisdictions that had provisional ballots cast used the telephone 

(often toll-free) as the free access system for voters in the November 2004 

election to obtain information on whether their provisional ballot was 

counted, and if not counted, why not. Table 19 shows the estimated 

percentage of jurisdictions that used various methods. Some jurisdictions 

used more than one method. 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 240 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 19: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Various Methods to 

Inform Voters of the Outcome of Their Provisional Ballot, November 2004 

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. The estimates are based on a subgroup of jurisdictions where provisional ballots 

were cast.

a

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 6 percentage points.

b

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +/- 8 percentage points.

c

The 95 percent confidence interval for this percentage is +6,-3 percentage points.

Note: Jurisdictions could indicate using more than one method, therefore the percentages add to more 

than 100 percent.

Election officials from jurisdictions we visited described a number of ways 

that provisional voters were provided information about how to learn the 

outcome of their votes for the November 2004 election, such as ballot 

receipts, a copy of the voter’s affidavit, a form letter, or a tear-off portion of 

the provisional ballot envelope. In a New Jersey jurisdiction we visited, 

provisional voters were given a toll-free number at which to leave their 

name and address, and then the results were mailed to them, according to 

election officials. The jurisdiction election officials noted that this process 

worked well. Figure 46 provides examples of the information voters were 

provided to inquire whether their vote was counted. 

Method used

Percentage of 

jurisdictions using 

method

Local election office telephone number 84a 

State election office telephone number 50b 

Letter informing voters of the outcome of their provisional ballot 51b 

Internet Web site address 35b

E-mail informing voters of the outcome of their provisional ballot 3c 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 241 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 46: Examples of Written Information Provided to Voters to Inquire whether Their Provisional Vote Was Counted

Source (top to bottom): Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; Santa Fe County, New Mexico; El Paso County, Colorado. 

Serial number a voter uses

when calling on the status of 

the provisional ballot. 

The state provided voters 

with the option of checking

the status of their provisional 

vote on the Internet

The voter was provided with 

information listing a phone 

number to call to determine if 

the provisional vote was counted

Tear-off stub to be retained

by the voter (with information

about how to determine 

whether the provisional ballot

was counted)
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 242 GAO-06-450 Elections

In our local jurisdiction survey, we asked how soon after Election Day 

information on the outcome of a provisional ballot was made available to 

voters. According to written comments, feedback was reported by some 

election officials to be available to voters after the November 2004 election 

as early as the next day, or within 7 days after the election, although some 

allowed 1 month, or until the election was certified. 

Election officials in some of the jurisdictions we visited reported that few 

voters called to find out if their provisional votes were counted. For 

example, in a Colorado jurisdiction, officials reported approximately 

100 calls out of over 6,100 ballots cast; a Kansas jurisdiction election 

official estimated receiving calls from 6 provisional voters out of over 

3,600 that voted; a New Jersey jurisdiction reported receiving 69 inquiries 

from voters out of over 6,300 cast; and in 3 other jurisdictions we visited, 

election officials reported no one called to find out if his or her vote was 

counted. 

A Number of Factors 

Contribute to 

Difficulties in 

Estimating and 

Comparing Provisional 

Ballots Cast and 

Counted 

Estimating the number of provisional ballots initially cast and those that 

were counted in the November 2004 election is difficult because complete 

information is not available, and because of differences in how state and 

local jurisdictions have implemented HAVA provisional voting 

requirements affecting how and whether such ballots are provided and 

counted. Those same factors limit the value of comparing provisional 

ballots cast and counted among jurisdictions. Although estimation is 

difficult, our survey allowed us to estimate provisional ballots cast, but 

with strong caveats. 

While HAVA required that most states permit individuals to cast provisional 

ballots under certain circumstances, not all jurisdictions reported having 

provisional ballots cast in their jurisdiction in the November 2004 election. 

On the basis of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 

provisional votes were cast in 33 percent of jurisdictions and none were 

cast in 67 percent of jurisdictions.20 Our estimates varied by size of 

jurisdiction regarding whether provisional votes were cast or not. We 

estimate that in 99 percent of large jurisdictions, 84 percent of medium 

jurisdictions, and 12 percent of small jurisdictions provisional votes were 

20Jurisdictions in Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and North Dakota were not 

included in this estimate. 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 243 GAO-06-450 Elections

cast in the November 2004 election. The differences between all sizes of 

jurisdictions were statistically significant. 

The difference between different sizes of jurisdictions’ use of provisional 

ballots may be explained in part by comments from election officials in 

local jurisdictions surveyed and from officials in jurisdictions we visited. 

For example, officials in several smaller jurisdictions included in our 

nationwide survey who reported that provisional ballots were not cast in 

their jurisdiction had indicated in written comments that election workers 

are likely to have personal knowledge of a voter’s eligibility. As one election 

official from a Wisconsin jurisdiction wrote, provisional ballots were 

available, but use of the ballots was not necessary. Similarly, in a small 

jurisdiction we visited in New Hampshire, election officials told us that 

given the town’s small population of roughly 1,600 residents, 99 percent of 

the time someone in the room knew the individual and could vouch for his 

or her identity. In this circumstance, according to election officials, no 

verification was necessary at the poll to ensure the voter's identification. 

Data Were Lacking for 

National Estimate of 

Provisional Votes Cast and 

Counted 

The number of provisional ballots cast and counted nationally is difficult to 

estimate with precision because of the limited data available and data 

quality concerns. Estimates that are available, however, do serve as an 

indication that the HAVA provisional voting requirements have allowed 

potentially eligible voters who otherwise might have been turned away to 

participate. We requested November 2004 data on provisional ballots cast 

and counted in our survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide, but 

because of missing information and other methodological concerns, our 

estimate is provided only with strong caveats. We estimate that a total of 

between 1.1 million and 1.7 million provisional ballots were cast. Our range 

reflects the fact that an estimated 20 percent of the jurisdictions in our 

survey did not provide data on how many provisional ballots were cast. We 

could not estimate the number of provisional ballots that were counted 

with any level of certainty, because of a very high level of missing data—an 

estimated 40 percent of the jurisdictions did not provide data on the 

number of provisional ballots counted.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 244 GAO-06-450 Elections

In addition, some jurisdictions in our survey providing the number of 

provisional ballots cast may have actually provided the number of 

provisional votes counted. It is possible this may have occurred because 

jurisdictions would more likely have a record of the number of provisional 

votes determined to be qualified and counted than they would have the 

number of provisional votes originally submitted at polling places (cast).21

For example, in 1 jurisdiction we visited, provisional ballot numbers were 

provided only on the number of provisional votes that were counted. If 

some responses to our survey of local jurisdictions actually provided the 

number of votes counted rather than the number of votes cast, then our 

estimate of provisional votes cast may be an underestimate. 

HAVA specifies that information be made available to individuals through a 

free access system (such as a toll-free telephone number or an Internet 

Web site) regarding whether their provisional votes were counted and, if a 

vote was not counted, the reason it was not counted.22 The specifics of 

implementing such a system, such as the methods by which such 

information is to be identified, collected, and maintained, however, under 

HAVA, are left to the discretion of state and local election officials. The 

National Task Force on Election Reform recommended that states develop 

a uniform method for reporting provisional ballots at the state and national 

levels, and also that states collect data on the number of provisional ballots 

cast on Election Day.23 Some states might require the information on ballots 

cast and counted be sent for statewide figures. Election officials in a 

Connecticut jurisdiction we visited, for example, said that the Registrar 

completed a provisional ballot report for the Secretary of State in 

accordance with state guidance. 

21Lack of agreement for terms was a data quality issue pointed out by the Election 

Assistance Commission for the commission’s Election Day survey, with some responses 

providing the same number for Election Day ballots cast and ballots counted. The U.S. 

Election Assistance Commission. 2004 Election Day Survey: How We Voted: People, Ballots 

and Polling Places. September 2005.

22HAVA section 302(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a)).

23National Task Force on Election Reform, Election 2004, Review and Recommendations 

by the Nation’s Elections Administrators. May 2005.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 245 GAO-06-450 Elections

Other national estimates of the number of provisional votes cast and 

counted in the November 2004 election have been affected by data quality 

issues. The Election Assistance Commission, using data from its survey of 

election administrators,24 estimated that 1.9 million voters cast provisional 

ballots at the polls in November 2004, and that 1.2 million of those votes 

cast were counted.25 As with our estimates, EAC cautioned that the 

coverage, or response rate, for its estimates was limited. The response rate 

for provisional ballots cast and counted was 46 percent and 38 percent, 

respectively. The report authors stated that data quality issues, such as 

missing data or data error entries (such as in 15 jurisdictions in the EAC 

report where the number of provisional ballots counted was greater than 

the jurisdiction reported as cast) were identified and corrected where 

possible. 

On the basis of data collected at different times from different sources in 

different states, electionline.org estimated that over 1.6 million provisional 

ballots were cast, and nearly 1.1 million of them were counted. However, 

readers are cautioned here as well about the limitations of the available 

data. For example, figures are not definitive because of the variation in 

requirements and procedures among (or even within) states, and estimates 

are based on incomplete information.26 The authors stated that they 

provided provisional voting estimates with the intent of moving the 

discussion of provisional voting forward. 

Number of November 2004 

Provisional Votes Cast and 

Counted in Local 

Jurisdictions We Visited 

Information provided by some of the jurisdictions we visited illustrates the 

variation in the reported number of provisional ballots cast and counted 

during the November 2004 election, as shown in table 20. 

24EAC surveyed all 50 states (which, in turn, worked with local election officials), the 

District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, in 

the fall of 2004 and with follow-up requests in 2005. 

25U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2004 Election Day Survey. September 2005.

26Electionline.org, Briefing: Solution or Problem? Provisional Ballots in 2004. March 2005. 

Electionline.org is produced by the Election Reform Information Project.
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 246 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 20: Reported Provisional Ballots Cast and Counted in Selected Jurisdictions

Source: GAO summary of information provided by jurisdictions we visited.

When looking at provisional ballots cast and counted for a particular 

jurisdiction, the variability in the implementation of provisional voting by 

states and jurisdictions makes interpretation and comparison among 

jurisdictions difficult. As mentioned earlier, the number of provisional 

votes cast and counted may vary based on a number of factors. In general, 

states and jurisdictions vary in why and how provisional ballots are 

provided to potential voters, as well as the state and local procedures for 

how provisional ballots are counted. A partial list of these factors includes 

the following:

Jurisdiction

Provisional

ballots cast

Total 

provisional 

ballots 

counted of 

those cast

Percentage 

of 

provisional 

ballots cast 

that were 

counted

Total 

ballots 

counted in 

jurisdiction

El Paso, CO 6,158 4,779 78 242,888

Larimer, CO 2,636 1,798 68 147,112

New Haven, CT 75 67 89 Not available

Dougherty, GA 130 12 9 33,809

Muscogee, GA 210 107 51 64,336

Champaign, IL 292 64 22 84,153

Chicago, IL 22,611 13,838 61 1,063,860

Johnson, KS 10,942 7,375 67 259,599

Wyandotte, KS 3,664 2,780 76 53,630

Clark, NV 4,352 1,543 35 546,858

Washoe, NV 1,465 880 60 159,511

Bernalillo, NM 12,367 6,233 50 263,054

Santa Fe, NM 580 230 40 67,782

Carteret, NC 1,099 888 81 31,770

Guilford, NC 2,260 1,291 57 201,854

Cuyahoga, OH 25,309 16,750 66 687,255

Mahoning, OH 2,786 2,350 84 134,290

Clark, WA 5,214 4,215 81 172,277

King, WA 31,712 28,010 88 898,238
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 247 GAO-06-450 Elections

• State provisions varied regarding the additional circumstances (apart 

from the minimum requirements specified in HAVA) under which a 

provisional ballot may be offered.

• Some states offered other voting options in addition to provisional 

ballots to voters with eligibility issues (such as signing an affidavit, 

then voting normally or casting a challenged ballot).

• The manner and extent to which the provisional ballot options 

available to voters are actually utilized varied in connection with the 

size and approach of the jurisdictions. For example, smaller 

jurisdictions were, according to election officials, less likely to use 

the provisional ballot option than larger jurisdictions because they 

were more knowledgeable of voters in their jurisdictions and 

therefore better positioned to address eligibility issues than larger 

jurisdictions, and some jurisdictions reported taking additional steps 

to send the voter to the correct precinct before offering a provisional 

ballot, whereas other jurisdictions might not do so.

• States established the location where voters must cast their 

provisional ballots from in order for such ballots to be eligible to be 

counted. For example, in some states this location is the specific 

precinct in which the voter is registered, and in other states, the voter 

may be anywhere within the county (city, parish, township) in which 

the voter resides and is registered. 

• States or local jurisdictions established other conditions (e.g., the 

time limit for providing required identification) that varied in 

determining whether a provisional vote was to be counted.

• There were other factors, such as instances in which the polling 

location was kept open late because of a federal court, state court, or 

other order extending the polling hours.

Notwithstanding the variations we have identified in provisional voting 

processes and challenges identified by some election officials in 

jurisdictions we visited, several election officials reported that they 

thought the provisional voting process worked well for the November 2004 

election, in that people who would normally not have been able to cast a 

ballot were allowed to do so, and some of those ballots were counted. 
Chapter 5

Provisional Voting

Page 248 GAO-06-450 Elections

Concluding 

Observations

While many jurisdictions reported that for the November 2000 election 

having at least one procedure in place to help resolve eligibility questions 

for voters whose name did not appear on a polling place registration list, 

only 20 states plus the District of Columbia reported using some form of 

provisional voting in the November 2000 election. In those states in which 

it was not available, voters whose names did not appear on polling place 

registration lists, but stated they had properly registered to vote, were often 

not permitted to cast a regular ballot. Provisional voting is an important 

means of enhancing voter access to the polls.

HAVA required all states that required registration prior to Election Day to 

provide for provisional balloting by the November 2004 election, but left to 

states the specific choices on how they would implement that requirement. 

In exercising this discretion, states have created varied provisional voting 

rules and practices. Under HAVA, provisional ballots are to be counted as a 

vote under state law if the person casting the ballot is determined to be 

eligible to vote under state law. These statutory provisions and 

determinations of eligibility and what constitutes a properly voted ballot 

vary by state and thus affect the state rules and procedures used to 

determine whether provisional ballots are counted. At least 1 state, for 

example, allows voters to cast a provisional ballot for statewide offices 

anywhere in the state, with the ballot returned for eligibility verification 

and counting to the jurisdiction in which the voter said he or she was 

registered. Other states required that voters cast provisional ballots in their 

assigned precinct for the ballots to be counted. The actual impact of these 

varying practices on provisional balloting and vote counting is unknown. 

Comparable data across states are not available to determine whether or 

how these variations affect the number of voters who are permitted to cast 

provisional ballots or the percentage of provisional ballots that are actually 

counted. Thus, it is difficult to assess the potential impact of a state 

changing its existing rules and practices. However, based on the data that 

are available, it is clear that provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter 

participation of those encountering eligibility-related issues when 

attempting to vote.
Page 249 GAO-06-450 Elections

Chapter 6

Counting the Votes Chapte7r

Once the polls close on Election Day, the process of determining and 

certifying the final results begins. Vote counting is a complex, multistep 

process with many variations across the nation. The exact process depends 

upon a number of variables. Among them are state requirements that define 

standards for determining voter intent for ballots that are not clearly 

marked, deadlines for certifying the final count, and specifications for 

conducting recounts when required. The types of ballots to be counted 

affect vote tabulations because absentee and provisional ballots typically 

undergo some type of verification before counting, while early and regular 

Election Day ballots typically do not require this processing. The types of 

technology used for vote casting and counting—hand-counted paper 

ballots and machine-counted ballots (punch card, optical scan, and those 

cast electronically)—also add variance to how votes are handled. The 

counting process requires attention to detail, and problems in any one 

election stage can affect the final vote count. Moreover, its orchestration 

requires the effective interaction of people, processes, and technology. This 

chapter discusses the continuity and key changes since the 2000 general 

election and challenges—new and ongoing—encountered by election 

officials in the 2004 general election with respect to counting votes. 

Overview In the 2004 general election, vote counting remained an intricate, multistep 

process characterized by a great variety of local procedures depending on a 

local jurisdiction’s technology, size, and preferences. As with the 2000 

general election, the proportion of jurisdictions nationwide reporting 

recounts or contested elections remained small in the 2004 general 

election. There were some notable developments related to vote counting. 

A significant change was the fact that by the 2004 general election more 

states had developed guidance for determining voter intent on unclear 

ballots. Eighteen states that reported not having guidance in the 2000 

general election reported in our survey they had such guidance in place for 

the 2004 general election. In addition, 9 states reported changes relating to 

the process of conducting recounts. Some added requirements for 

mandatory recounts. Others changed their conditions and guidance for 

conducting recounts. The results of our state survey showed that while 29 

states and the District of Columbia did not require audits of vote counts, 9 

states reported having taken some legislative or executive steps toward 

doing so. 

Many of the problems in managing people, processes, and technology that 

had confronted election officials across the country in the November 2000 

general election continued to challenge them in the 2004 general election. 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 250 GAO-06-450 Elections

Equipment problems, poll worker errors, and voter errors made it difficult 

to tabulate the votes quickly and accurately, according to some election 

officials. A new phenomenon emerged as a challenge to election officials, 

as well: Some jurisdictions reported difficulty completing the extra steps 

required to verify and count provisional votes within the time allowed for 

tallying the final vote count. Finally, while recounts and contested elections 

remained rare in the 2004 general election, those that did occur, 

particularly in Washington state, revealed the intricacies and vulnerabilities 

of the election process. 

In the 2004 General 

Election the VoteCounting Process 

Remained Complex 

and Marked by Local 

Diversity

The basic elements of the vote-counting process we described in our 

October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide 

remained in practice for the general election of 2004.1

 Of necessity, it was a 

complex, multistep process, with many variations, depending on a 

jurisdiction’s technology, size, and preferences. As with other elections, 

vote counting in the 2004 general election involved certain common steps: 

closing and securing the polls and voting equipment; securing the ballots; 

reconciling the number of ballots at the polls (e.g., the number available at 

the polls compared to the number cast, spoiled, and remaining); 

transporting ballots and equipment from the polling places to a central 

location where they were secured; in some cases electronically 

transmitting results from polling place voting equipment to a central tally 

location; verifying provisional and absentee ballots for counting; 

determining whether and how to count ballots that may be improperly or 

unclearly marked; conducting any necessary recounts; and certifying the 

final count.

Local Jurisdictions We 

Surveyed and Visited 

Secured Machines and 

Ballots in a Variety of Ways 

Preliminary to counting, a key step was to secure the voting machines and 

ballots so that no additional votes could be cast. Procedures for securing 

equipment varied with the equipment that was in use. However, on the 

basis of our survey of a representative sample of local election jurisdictions 

nationwide, we estimate that 91 percent of all jurisdictions used hardware 

locks and seals as one of their predominant security measures. In our site 

visits, local election officials also described securing DRE tapes and 

cartridges under lock and key before and after they were delivered to 

boards of elections or other authorities. For example, election officials 

1

GAO-02-3.
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 251 GAO-06-450 Elections

from 1 jurisdiction we visited described securing memory cards in optical 

scan counting machines by attaching a plastic band with a serial number. 

The band would have to be severed in order for the memory card to be 

removed, according to election officials. One such band is shown in Figure 

47 securing a voting equipment bag. 

Figure 47: Sealed Voting Equipment Bag 

Election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited also described a variety of 

measures they took to ensure that ballots were not lost or miscounted. In 

1 Washington jurisdiction, officials said they secured punch card ballots at 

polling places for counting elsewhere by transporting ballots twice: once 

earlier on Election Day and the other time after the polls had closed. These 

officials also said that ballots were bundled into groups of 50, separated by 

type (Election Day, provisional, and absentee ballots), and put into 

transport carrier safe boxes. Two poll workers, one from each political 

party, accompanied the ballots when they were transported to the elections 

office for counting. Similarly, in a Colorado jurisdiction we visited, election 

officials said that at the close of Election Day they sealed optical scan 

ballots from the polling place and the optical scan counter to prevent 

Source: GAO.
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 252 GAO-06-450 Elections

tampering. Then, two election judges transferred the ballots and optical 

scan counter to the counting center.

While ballot-securing methods varied, the results of our local jurisdiction 

survey showed that most jurisdictions had written policies and procedures 

in place in the November 2004 general election to secure ballots (including 

paper and electronically stored ballots). As shown in table 21, on the basis 

of our survey we estimate that two-thirds of local jurisdictions had written 

procedures for transporting ballots, and about three-quarters had written 

procedures in place for secure ballot storage rooms. 

Table 21: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Having Written Ballot Security 

Policies and Procedures, November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a

Transporting ballots or e-memory to locations was not applicable for an estimated 20 percent of 

jurisdictions. 

b

Securing electronic transmissions was not applicable for an estimated 57 percent of jurisdictions.

In addition, reconciling ballots with the number of voters was a common 

step in securing ballots before they were counted. According to our state 

survey, 47 states and the District of Columbia reported that they required 

jurisdictions to count or keep track of ballots that were unused, spoiled, 

rejected, or issued but not returned. Two states, Montana and Maine, 

reported not requiring jurisdictions to count or keep track of such ballots. 

New York reported in our survey that because it does not have paper 

ballots, such tracking was not necessary. New York reported that it did not 

use paper, optical scan, or punch card ballots. During our visits to election 

jurisdictions, we asked officials how they reconcile ballot and voter 

numbers. The election officials reported conducting cross-checks in a 

Policies and procedures 

Percentage of 

jurisdictions that 

had written 

policies and 

procedures

Transporting unvoted ballots to polling places 66 

Transporting voted ballots or e-memory to locations for countinga 66 

Providing secure rooms or building where unvoted ballots are stored 71

Providing security for rooms or building where voted ballots are 

stored

76 

Securing the electronic transmission of voted ballots for countingb 18 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 253 GAO-06-450 Elections

number of ways, but generally followed a process of reconciling any 

discrepancies between the total numbers of ballots on hand at the 

beginning of the day, the number of voters who signed in at the polling 

place, and the number of ballots cast. 

Counting, Canvassing, and 

Certifying the Vote Was an 

Intricate and Varied 

Operation

Once the ballots were reconciled in the November 2004 election, local 

jurisdictions tabulated and canvassed (or reviewed) the vote. Both 

counting and canvassing the count were an ongoing process in the effort to 

ensure an accurate tally. After initial tabulations of votes on election night, 

which were typically released to the public, canvassing was typically the 

process of reviewing all votes by precinct, resolving problem votes, and 

counting all types of votes (including absentee and provisional votes) for 

each candidate and issue on the ballot and producing an official total for 

each. The official total was usually certified by an election official. This 

process varied among jurisdictions in terms of how and where it was done 

and who was responsible. 

The counting process involved several different types of ballots, cast under 

different circumstances: 

• General election votes are cast at polling places on Election Day by 

voters who appeared in the registration lists for that precinct and voted 

a regular ballot.

• Provisional votes are cast by those, for example, whose registration 

(and qualification to vote) could not be established at the time of voting 

at the polls on Election Day. 

• Absentee votes are generally votes received and cast by mail before 

Election Day.

• Early votes are generally cast in person before Election Day.

According to our local survey, for the November 2004 general election, 

local jurisdictions nationwide used different voting methods for different 

ballot types. As shown in table 22, we estimate the largest percentages of 

jurisdictions used optical scan and paper hand-counted ballots for Election 

Day. Also, optical scan and punch card vote-counting methods were used at 

precincts or at central locations. Jurisdictions could check more than one 

voting method.
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 254 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 22: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Using Particular Voting Methods by Ballot Type for the November 2004 

Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

a

A small number of jurisdictions indicated on our questionnaire that they use precinct count equipment 

for provisional ballots. This could be true when a jurisdiction does not physically count provisional 

ballots at a precinct, but when officials programmed optical scan or punch card tabulating machines to 

accept provisional ballots only from specified precincts. 

In our local jurisdiction survey, we also asked what predominant voting 

method was used to process the largest number of ballots in the 2004 

general election. We estimate that hand-counted paper ballots were the 

predominant tabulation method for 30 percent of all jurisdictions, although 

these were almost all small jurisdictions. Specifically, we estimate that 

41 percent of small jurisdictions, 3 percent of medium jurisdictions, and no 

large jurisdictions hand-counted paper ballots.2

 Small jurisdictions were 

statistically different from large jurisdictions. 

As in the November 2000 general election, the counting process for the 

November 2004 election took place at precincts or at centralized locations, 

such as election headquarters at town halls and even warehouses. In 

jurisdictions we visited, we learned about some of the substantial 

variations in the sequence, procedures, and precautions taken to conduct 

the count. We found in our site visits that vote counting ranged from a very 

simple process in a small jurisdiction to more complex processes in larger 

jurisdictions. For example, a small New Hampshire jurisdiction, with just 

Voting method

Percentage of 

jurisdictions using 

method for general 

Election Day voting

Percentage of 

jurisdictions using 

method for absentee 

voting

Percentage of 

jurisdictions using 

method for 

provisional voting

Percentage of 

jurisdictions using 

method for 

early voting

DRE 7 4 1 4

Central count optical scan 24 20 9 5

Precinct count optical scan 32 24 10a 5

Lever machine 7 1 1 1

Central count punch card 

ballot

3 3 2 1

Precinct count punch card 

ballot

2 1 2a 1

Paper (hand-counted) ballot 35 36 18 8

2

The estimate for large jurisdictions has a 95 percent confidence interval of 0 to 

+2 percentage points.
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 255 GAO-06-450 Elections

over 1,000 registered voters, had one polling place and one precinct open 

on Election Day, according to election officials. They told us the paper 

ballots were not transferred to any location for counting and were handcounted by 25 election workers. These officials also said that five teams of 

five individuals each reviewed votes cast on each paper ballot and used 

paper and pencil to record and tally vote totals. The final election outcomes 

were written on a standard form and submitted to the New Hampshire 

Secretary of State’s office, according to election officials. 

In contrast, election officials in a large Washington jurisdiction described a 

more complex process for their centralized vote count of punch card 

ballots. As described by these officials, their process enabled them to begin 

reporting results on Election Day evening by precinct and to provide 

updates of the count every 30 minutes. Once Election Day ballots were 

transferred to the election office by poll workers, the ballots were counted 

to determine total numbers, according to election officials. They also told 

us that after the ballots were separated by precinct, up to 20 inspection 

boards, composed of two Republicans and two Democrats each, inspected 

the ballots one precinct at a time. In the inspection process, the officials 

said that the ballots were further separated into categories—those that 

were machine-readable and those that required further examination, such 

as ballots with write-in candidates or with a chad hanging by two or more 

corners. Once all questions were resolved (including any that would 

require review by a canvassing board), they told us ballots in batches of 

500 each were placed in trays by precinct and brought to the ballot 

tabulation area. According to these officials, the jurisdiction used a punch 

card tabulator, which was connected to a computer and had a processing 

speed of 600 ballots per minute (see fig. 48). Once all ballots were counted, 

jurisdiction election officials told us they generated an unofficial report 

with results for all races and voting propositions. This initial tally was 

posted on the county Web site and released to the press, candidates, and 

public, according to election officials. 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 256 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 48: Punch Card Tabulator Connected to Computer

Six of the jurisdictions we visited told us that they counted Election Day 

votes at the local precinct, where poll workers would tabulate results and 

resolve any ballot issues that could be handled locally. For example, in a 

large Kansas jurisdiction, election officials said that voters were able to 

place their ballots in an optical scanner at the polling place that read the 

ballot and rejected it if there were any problems. According to officials 

there, the machines could return to the voter any ballot that, for example, 

had too few or too many votes for a specific office and provide a screen 

message for what to correct before resubmitting the ballot. After the polls 

closed, the optical scan machines with their memory cards—which had 

been programmed for the specific precinct—were transferred to election 

headquarters, according to election officials. The officials also said the 

optical scan machines were linked electronically to one computer and data 

from the memory cards were uploaded so that votes from all precincts 

could be tallied.

Source: GAO.
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 257 GAO-06-450 Elections

Additional Steps Were 

Required to Manage 

Absentee, Provisional, and 

Early Votes

Absentee, provisional, and early votes each required some additional steps 

to manage in order to include them in the vote count. 

Absentee votes: According to our state survey, all states reported having 

some provision for absentee voting in the 2004 general election. As we 

discussed in chapter 3, on absentee voting, absentee ballots must typically 

undergo some type of verification prior to counting. At 1 Colorado 

jurisdiction we visited, officials said that they began verifying and counting 

absentee ballots 10 days before Election Day. At 1 jurisdiction in 

Washington election officials said that they qualified the absentee ballots as 

they were received at the election office, but did not count the votes until 

3:00 p.m. on Election Day. Additionally, at a jurisdiction in Illinois, election 

officials said that they distributed most absentee ballots to their respective 

precincts to be counted along with the Election Day ballots. In each of 

these jurisdictions, however, according to election officials, the absentee 

ballot results were not released until after the Election Day polls were 

closed. Also, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 

99 percent of election jurisdictions included the counts of qualified 

absentee ballots in the final certified count, regardless of their effect on the 

outcome.

Provisional votes: Provisional voting, which was required by HAVA in all 

but 6 states during the 2004 general election, generally required several 

steps. At all of the local jurisdictions we visited that used provisional 

ballots, election officials said that the ballots were transferred to an 

election office or central count location, where the eligibility of the voter 

was verified before they were counted. We estimate, on the basis of our 

local jurisdiction survey, that 83 percent of jurisdictions that provided 

provisional ballots during the 2004 general election transferred the 

provisional ballots to a central location for counting. Those jurisdictions 

that did not engage in transfers may have been jurisdictions with only one 

precinct, in which case, the votes were tallied on-site. At all of the 

jurisdictions we visited that used provisional ballots election officials said 

they included provisional ballots determined to be verified in certified vote 

counts regardless of their effect on the outcome of the election. 

Early votes: According to our state survey, for the November 2004 election, 

24 states and the District of Columbia reported they allowed early voting, 

and from our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that about 23 percent of 

local jurisdictions allowed early voting in the election. In early voting 

jurisdictions we visited, a variety of reconciliation and counting processes 

were used, according to election officials. At one jurisdiction we visited, 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 258 GAO-06-450 Elections

election officials told us that early voting DRE votes were reconciled daily. 

According to these officials, at the end of the early voting period, election 

department staff shut down the DRE machines and removed the memory 

cards (which stored cast votes). The officials said that the memory cards 

were sealed and returned to the election department office for counting, in 

a manner similar to Election Day DRE votes. In another jurisdiction we 

visited that used optical scan machines for early voting, officials told us 

that ballots were inserted by voters into the machines at the polls—the 

same procedure used on Election Day. At the end of each early voting day, 

according to the officials, the ballots from that day were physically 

transferred to the clerk’s office and the optical scan results were submitted 

by modem to the jurisdiction’s headquarters. 

Election Certification 

Periods Varied by State

Election returns posted on election night are unofficial and are not 

considered final until canvassing—the process described earlier of 

reviewing all votes by precinct, resolving problem votes, and counting all 

types of votes—is complete and the count is certified. Certification is when 

the vote count is finalized, generally by state and local officials. Our state 

survey showed that for the 2004 general election, states reported varied 

practices for when counts were certified and by whom, similar to the 

general election of 2000. 

Our state survey showed that most states reported setting certification 

deadlines, but the certification periods varied from state to state. Four 

states (Alaska, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island) and the 

District of Columbia reported not specifying a deadline following Election 

Day for certification of election results, while all other states reported 

specifying such a deadline. For example, certification on the second day 

after Election Day was reported by Delaware, while not later than 40 days 

was reported by Michigan. Some states reported caveats and varying levels 

of specificity in the certification deadlines. Maine reported allowing 3 days 

for local election official certification and 20 days for state-level 

certification. Missouri’s reported deadline was by the fourth Tuesday 

following the election. North Dakota reported a deadline of not less than 

3 days, but not more than 6. Similarly, the requirement reported for Texas 

was 15 to 30 days after the election. 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 259 GAO-06-450 Elections

For the 2004 General 

Election, More States 

Had Requirements or 

Guidance for 

Determining Voter 

Intent

An important facet of the canvassing process is the consideration that may 

or may not be given to ballots that have not been marked properly. An 

improper mark, for example, could be a circle around a candidate’s name 

instead of a checked box on a ballot that is to be scanned optically. For 

those states providing for the determination of voter intent, the importance 

of having explicit and consistent criteria for treating unclear ballots 

became evident in the 2000 general election when different interpretations 

for punch card ballots in Florida made the close presidential race 

extremely contentious. While subsequent federal reforms have not 

specified standards for treating unclear ballots, HAVA requires that each 

state adopt uniform standards, by January 2006, that define what 

constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote for each category of 

voting system used in the state.3

In our state survey, 39 states and the District of Columbia reported that for 

the November 2004 general election they had requirements or guidance for 

determining voter intent that focused primarily on improper ballot marks. 

Forty-five states and the District of Columbia reported they had 

requirements or guidance for determining how or whether to count a 

machine-unreadable ballot—one that cannot be processed by machine 

because it is damaged. 

Eighteen states that had reported not having provisions in place for the 

2000 general election reported to us in our 2005 state survey that they had 

voter intent guidance for the November 2004 general election. Georgia, for 

example, had developed requirements for four methods: DRE machines, 

lever-type machines, optical scan, and hand-counted paper ballots. Some of 

Georgia’s requirements were for certain ballots rejected by optical scan 

machines. These requirements provide for some measure of subjective 

determination of a voter’s intent by election officials in certain specified 

instances. In such an instance, a vote shall be counted, under these Georgia 

provisions, if in the opinion of the vote review panel, the voter has clearly 

and without question indicated a choice for which the voter desired to vote. 

In addition, under specified circumstances, these Georgia provisions also 

provide for a similar type of voter intent determination with respect to 

hand-counted paper ballots. 

3

HAVA section 301(a)(6) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(6)).
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 260 GAO-06-450 Elections

As described below, we found in our site visits that under state or local 

guidance, local jurisdictions we visited had gone to varied lengths in the 

2004 general election to salvage ballots that were improperly marked or 

that were machine unreadable. These efforts varied by the type of voting 

equipment used in the jurisdiction. 

Optical scan ballots: In some jurisdictions, election officials told us that 

optical scan machines located at polling places could notify the voter of an 

unreadable or incorrectly marked ballot at the moment it was submitted. 

However, where the ballots were transferred to a central location for 

counting this would not be the case. In one jurisdiction in Colorado where 

optical scanning was done centrally for absentee ballots, election officials 

told us they were required to interpret voter intent or replace an 

unreadable ballot. According to election officials, the jurisdiction had 

instructions, which they stated were based on state statutes, specifying that 

bipartisan election judges would be the responsible parties for determining 

voter intent. Their deliberations, however, would be observed by others, 

according to the instructions. If a decision was reached on voter intent, a 

replacement ballot could be created and run through the optical scanner, 

according to the officials. 

Officials in a Kansas jurisdiction we visited said that state election 

standards were very specific for interpreting an incorrectly marked optical 

scan ballot. They would count a vote if an oval shape is marked, near but 

not inside the oval, and not closer to another candidate’s name. A 

completed oval would also be counted if another oval for the same race 

was scribbled or crossed out. If the ballot could be interpreted locally, 

officials said election workers duplicated the vote on a new ballot for the 

optical scanner to read. According to election officials, if the intent was not 

clear, the ballot would be sent to the Board of Canvassers for further 

examination. State guidance also included standards for hand-counted 

paper ballots.

In Florida, guidance in place for the November 2004 general election was 

even more specific than that provided in Colorado or Kansas. The guidance 

specified, for example, that, with respect to manual recounts, a vote may be 

counted if “there is an ‘X’, a check mark, a plus sign, an asterisk or a star, 

any portion of which is contained in a single oval or within the blank space 

between the head and tail of a single arrow and which does not enter into 

another oval or the space between the head and tail of another arrow.” It 

also allowed for a vote to be counted under additional specified 

circumstances including if “there is a diagonal, horizontal, or vertical line, 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 261 GAO-06-450 Elections

any portion of which intersects two points on the oval and which does not 

intersect another oval at any two points,” provided that the horizontal line 

does not strike through the name of the candidate.

Punch cards: While federal election reforms included provisions 

promoting replacement of punch card ballots, on the basis of our local 

jurisdiction survey, some jurisdictions continued to use them in the 2004 

election. As was the case for other types of ballots, levels of guidance for 

interpreting voter intent varied by state. Illinois reported that it had no 

requirements or guidance for determining voter intent, according to our 

state survey. Election officials in 2 Illinois jurisdictions using punch card 

ballots told us in our site visit that election workers did not attempt to 

ascertain the intent of voters on punch card ballots that were improperly 

punched. If the ballot could not be counted by a punch card-counting 

machine because of an improper punch or mark, the votes were not to be 

counted. 

In contrast to Illinois, Washington reported that it had guidelines or 

requirements regarding voter intent and allowed for remaking an 

unreadable or damaged punch card. In a Washington jurisdiction we visited 

that used punch card ballots in the 2004 general election, election officials 

said that state law guided their jurisdiction’s written instructions for 

determining voter intent. Election officials said voters were given very 

specific instructions for how to change their vote before casting their vote, 

if necessary, on a punch card ballot while at the polls. These officials also 

said ballots could be either enhanced or duplicated if it was clear that a 

voter had followed these instructions. Also, according to the officials, a 

problem ballot could be enhanced or duplicated by officials if voter intent 

could easily be determined. If voter intent was at all unclear, the ballot was 

to be sent to the canvassing board for review. According to officials, 

canvassing board meetings were open to the public and state guidelines 

were to be used to interpret voter intent. Figure 49 shows a punch card 

voting booth.
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 262 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 49: Punch Card Voting Booth 

Hand-counted paper ballots: While we estimate, on the basis of our local 

jurisdiction survey, that no large jurisdictions and only 3 percent of 

medium jurisdictions used paper ballots in the November 2004 general 

election for their predominant voting method, 41 percent of small 

jurisdictions did. This voting method presented yet another variation in the 

process of determining voter intent. For example, in one small jurisdiction 

we visited in New Hampshire, election officials we spoke with said a senior 

election official was on hand during ballot counting. They said if a ballot 

was unclear, the senior official would be involved to discuss it. If it was still 

unresolved, state guidance called for an unclear ballot to “be counted in 

accordance with a majority vote of the election officials present.” The 

guidance, which we examined, also provided examples of what marks on a 

paper ballot to accept, as shown in figure 50. 

Source: GAO.
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 263 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 50: New Hampshire Guidance for Determining Voter Intent on Paper Ballots

Source: New Hampshire Election Procedure Manual: 2004-2005; provided by election officials in Madbury, New Hampshire.
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 264 GAO-06-450 Elections

Recounts and 

Contested Elections 

Remained Uncommon 

for the November 2004 

General Election

As with the 2000 general election, recounts and contested elections were 

an uncommon event in the 2004 general election. On the basis of our local 

survey, we estimate that 92 percent of election jurisdictions nationwide did 

not conduct a recount for federal or statewide office. Also on the basis of 

our survey, recounts were more prevalent in large than in small election 

jurisdictions. Specifically, we estimate that 4 percent of small jurisdictions, 

16 percent of medium, and 24 percent of large jurisdictions conducted 

recounts for federal or statewide offices. Both large and medium 

jurisdictions were statistically different from small jurisdictions. Similarly, 

in our state survey, 37 states and the District of Columbia reported they had 

no recounts for federal or statewide offices during the primary or general 

elections of 2004, as shown in figure 51. 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 265 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 51: Number of States Reporting Federal and Statewide Recounts for the 2004 

Primary or General Elections

a

Includes District of Columbia.

Recounts are, in general, conducted because a candidate, voter, or group of 

voters has requested it or because the margin of victory was within a 

certain specified margin such that state provisions required or allowed for 

a recount. Election officials in local jurisdictions we visited in several 

states where recounts were conducted described to us the procedures they 

used for their 2004 general election recounts. In a New Hampshire 

jurisdiction, where a recount was conducted of the presidential race of 

2004, officials said the recount was requested by a presidential candidate to 

test the accuracy of the optical scan vote-counting equipment. The officials 

provided the following description of the recount: Five wards in the 

jurisdiction had been selected for a sample recount. It was conducted by 

the New Hampshire Secretary of State’s office, not by the local election 

jurisdiction. The jurisdiction’s only role in the recount was to provide the 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Don’t know

No recounts for federal

Only for

Only for

Both federal and

Number of states

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

Recounts

statewide offices

federal offices

statewide offices

or statewide officesa

6

2

4

38

1
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 266 GAO-06-450 Elections

Secretary of State with the optical scan ballots from the applicable wards. 

After the Secretary of State recounted a portion of the optical scan ballots 

and found no significant discrepancies between the initial vote tally and the 

partial recount, a full recount was not conducted statewide, according to 

these officials. 

In North Carolina, races for two statewide offices (the Agricultural 

Commissioner and the Superintendent of Public Instruction) were subject 

to recounts because, under state law, the close margin of victory allowed 

the losing candidates to request a recount, according to election officials. 

In 1 North Carolina jurisdiction we visited, which used DRE machines, 

local election officials described the recount process as follows: The 

recount was conducted in a different manner from the initial count. For the 

initial count, votes were electronically transferred from each DRE machine 

to vote storage devices at the polls that stored the vote totals by precinct. 

The precinct totals were then downloaded from the vote storage devices 

onto a computer located at the jurisdiction’s election headquarters, and 

vote tabulation software summed vote totals from each precinct for each 

election contest in the jurisdiction. During the recount, rather than relying 

on aggregated votes totaled by precinct for a vote count, officials tabulated 

individual DRE ballots. To complete this process, the jurisdiction’s 

tabulation software recognized individual ballot images from the DRE 

machines rather than aggregated votes per precinct. The individual ballot 

images were downloaded onto the computer in election headquarters, and 

votes for the races in question were retabulated (by voter, rather than by 

precinct as in the initial count). The outcomes of both the Agricultural 

Commissioner and the Superintendent of Public Instruction races were 

unaffected by the recount results. 

Generally, contested elections are court actions initiated by a candidate or 

voter alleging, for example, that some type of misconduct or fraud on the 

part of another candidate, election officials, or voters, occurred in a 

particular election. The results of our local survey indicate that contested 

elections were rare during the period from 2001 to the 2004 general 

election. In our local survey, we asked local jurisdictions whether they held 

any primary or general elections for federal or statewide offices during this 

period that were contested, and if so, whether the outcomes for these 

elections changed. On the basis of our nationwide survey, we estimate that 

5 percent of local election jurisdictions held a federal or statewide election 

that was contested during this period. The contested elections in which the 

winner did change involved races for offices such as state judge or 

governor, or for the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 267 GAO-06-450 Elections

Perhaps the most heavily contested election in November 2004, which 

received a great deal of press coverage, was the Washington state 

governor’s race. A close margin of victory and a candidate request 

prompted two recounts, and after the state certification of a winner in the 

election, the second place candidate’s campaign and seven voters filed a 

petition in a state Superior Court contesting such certification, alleging that 

errors, omissions, mistakes, neglect, and other wrongful acts had occurred 

in conducting the election. The Chelan County Superior Court dismissed 

the election contest petition, finding that the petitioners failed to prove that 

grounds for nullification of the election existed.4

 The Superior Court held, 

in general, that while there was some evidence of irregularities, the 

petitioners failed to adequately prove that the outcome of the election was 

changed as a result. The recount itself, however, revealed the substantial 

complexities involved in accomplishing an error-free count. We discuss this 

case more closely later in this chapter. 

Several States Had 

Further Developed 

Their Specifications for 

an Election Recount 

since the 2000 General 

Election

State provisions for recount processes vary, and not all states have 

provided for or required them in the past. For the November 2004 general 

election, however, several states reported that they had introduced or 

further developed their specifications for election recounts since the 2000 

general election. 

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that 

47 states and the District of Columbia had provisions for recounts, though 

most did not have mandatory recount provisions.5

 To better understand 

recount reform efforts to help ensure vote count accuracy since the 

2000 election, we asked states in our 2005 survey about changes to their 

mandatory recount provisions in place for the November 2004 general 

election. Nineteen states reported requiring a mandatory recount 

predominantly in cases of a tie or close margin of victory, whereas in 2001, 

17 states indicated they required mandatory recounts. Thus, 2 more states 

reported requiring mandatory recounts for the 2004 general election than 

for the 2000 general election. In addition, 3 other states reported amending 

their existing provisions for mandatory recounts, while 3 said they had 

changed their requirements or guidance for who may request a recount as 

4

Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Chelan County Super. Ct., June 6, 2005) 

(transcript of oral decision).

5

GAO-02-3.
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 268 GAO-06-450 Elections

shown in table 23. Three states—Hawaii, Mississippi, and Tennessee—

reported not having any formal provision for conducting recounts—both 

for the 2000 or 2004 general elections. 

Table 23: States Reported Changes to Recount Provisions since 2000 for the 2004 

General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials

Alabama, Pennsylvania, and Texas were the states that reported adding 

mandatory recount provisions for the 2004 election. Alabama law, in place 

for the 2004 general election, requires a recount when the election returns 

for any public office indicate that a candidate or ballot measure is defeated 

by not more than one-half of 1 percent of the votes cast for the office or the 

ballot measure—unless the defeated candidate submits a written waiver. In 

Pennsylvania, a recount is mandatory if an election is decided by one-half 

of 1 percent or less—unless the defeated candidate requests in writing that 

a recount and recanvass not be made. Texas reported that a recount was 

required only if two or more candidates tie in an election. 

For the 2004 general election, Arizona, Minnesota, and Washington 

reported adding more specifications to the vote margins that trigger 

recounts in their states than were in effect during the 2000 general election. 

Arizona added triggers for different types of races. For the 2000 general 

election, Arizona reported requiring a mandatory recount when the margin 

of votes between the two candidates receiving the most votes was not more 

than 0.1 percent of votes cast for both candidates, or 200 votes for 

statewide offices and 50 votes for the state legislature. For the 2004 general 

election, Arizona reported in our state survey that it had amended its 

mandatory recount requirements so that the thresholds triggered by the 

number of votes only applied when the total number of votes cast was 

25,000 or fewer. 

Washington’s mandatory recount provisions in place for the November 

2004 general election had changed since the November 2000 general 

election. The requirement in 2000 for a mandatory recount by machine was 

States reporting changes Type of change since 2000

Alabama, Pennsylvania, Texas Mandatory recount requirement added

Arizona, Minnesota, Washington Mandatory recount requirements amended 

Florida, Maine, Rhode Island Requirement or guidance for who may 

request a recount changed 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 269 GAO-06-450 Elections

a margin of 0.5 percent or less of total votes cast for the top two candidates. 

If the margin was less than 150 votes and less than 0.25 percent of total 

votes cast for the top two candidates, a manual recount was required. The 

amended requirement, in place for the November 2004 general election, 

specified that a recount by machine was required when the margin is both 

fewer than 2,000 votes and less than 0.5 percent of total votes cast for the 

top two candidates. If the margin was fewer than 150 votes and less than 

0.25 percent of total votes cast for the top two candidates, there was to be a 

manual recount. 

Since the November 2000 election, Minnesota amended its mandatory 

recount triggers to include a specific percentage margin of victory in 

certain circumstances, rather than only a specified difference in the 

absolute number of votes between the top two candidates. While a margin 

of 100 votes or fewer in an election had previously triggered a recount for 

the 2000 general election, Minnesota election officials reported in our state 

survey that for the 2004 general election their state required a recount if the 

margin was determined to be either less than one-half of 1 percent of the 

total number of votes counted or, was 10 votes or less when no more than 

400 votes are cast. 

According to our state survey, state requirements or guidance for who may 

request a recount, in place for the November 2004 general election, 

changed in Florida, Maine, and Rhode Island since 2000. While any Florida 

candidate or candidate’s political party in 2000 could request a recount, this 

was no longer true for the November 2004 general election. For the 2004 

general election, Florida election officials reported that no candidate or 

political party could request a recount, and that the only authorized 

recounts were mandatory recounts to be conducted when the margin of 

victory was 0.5 percent or less of the total votes cast. Rhode Island, which 

reported that for the November 2000 general election it had allowed 

recount requests by any candidate who trailed the winning candidate by 

less than 5 percent, reported that for the November 2004 general election, it 

required a smaller margin before a losing candidate could request a 

recount. For example, for races with between 20,001 and 100,000 votes, 

Rhode Island reported that it required a margin of 1 percent or less (or 

500 votes) before a trailing candidate could request a recount, and for races 

with more than 100,000 votes the required margin was one-half of 1 percent 

(or 1,500 votes) before a trailing candidate could request a recount. Maine, 

on the other hand, reported that its recount provisions in place for the 

November 2004 general election were clarified to provide that an apparent 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 270 GAO-06-450 Elections

losing candidate, rather than only the second-place candidate, could 

request a recount. 

Vote Count Audits 

Were Not Prevalent in 

the 2004 General 

Election, but Some 

States Reported Taking 

Action to Require 

Them 

Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia reported that for the 2004 

general election, they did not have provisions requiring or allowing local 

jurisdictions to conduct a vote count audit of election results. However, in 

our state survey, 9 states reported taking action since November 2004 

(e.g., enacted legislation or took executive action) to require audits of vote 

counts. As used in this report, a vote count audit is an automatic recount, in 

full or in part, of the vote tabulation, irrespective of the margin of victory, in 

order to ensure accuracy before certification. 

On the basis of our state survey, as shown in figure 52, 8 states reported 

that for the 2004 general election they had a vote count audit requirement 

for all local jurisdictions, and 2 states reported requiring vote count audits 

for some local jurisdictions. Election officials from 29 states and the 

District of Columbia reported that for the 2004 general election they did not 

require or allow local jurisdictions to conduct vote count audits. Eleven 

states reported that they allowed them. We estimate, on the basis of our 

local survey, that 15 percent of all local jurisdictions were required by their 

states to conduct such audits as part of the certification process for the 

2004 general election. Larger and medium jurisdictions were more likely to 

have been required to do so than smaller jurisdictions. Nine percent of 

small jurisdictions, 27 percent of medium, and 38 percent of large 

jurisdictions conducted a required vote count audit of the 2004 general 

election. Both large and medium jurisdictions were statistically different 

from small jurisdictions. 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 271 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 52: Number of States Reporting Vote Count Audit Requirements in Place for 

the 2004 General Election 

a

Includes District of Columbia.

Nine states reported in our state survey that they had enacted legislation or 

taken some executive action to require audits since November 2004.6

 For 

example, in Washington, beginning January 1, 2006, prior to election 

certifications, county officials must audit the results of votes cast on DRE 

machines. The audit must be conducted by randomly selecting up to 

4 percent of the DRE voting machines or one machine, whichever is 

6

These 9 states were Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, New Mexico, 

North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Did not require

Allowed local jurisdictions

Required audits for

Required audits for

Number of states

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

Audits

 to conduct audits

some local jurisdictions

 all local jurisdictions

or allow auditsa

8

2

11

30
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 272 GAO-06-450 Elections

greater, and for each device, comparing the results recorded electronically 

with the results recorded on paper. 

During our visits to local election jurisdictions, election officials in 5 

jurisdictions described conducting vote count audits as a part of the 

election certification process for the November 2004 general election. For 

instance, 2 large jurisdictions in Nevada reported that the state requires 

each jurisdiction to randomly audit election results when DRE machines 

were used. According to officials in 1 of these Nevada jurisdictions, they 

were required to select 1 percent of DRE machines, or 20 machines, 

whichever amount is greater, and to perform a manual audit of the 

machine-tabulated vote totals. The officials said that they used a computer 

program to randomly select which of the jurisdiction’s 740 DRE machines 

to audit. To conduct a paper-based audit, they told us that for each 

randomly selected machine, election workers printed the DRE result tapes 

from the voter-verified paper trail printer, manually counted the vote data 

on the tapes, and compared the manual count results to the original 

electronic results. 

In one large Illinois jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us they 

were required by the state to automatically audit (by retabulating votes) 

results of punch card ballots in 5 percent of their precincts, which were 

randomly selected. According to the officials, the State Board of Elections 

sent the jurisdiction officials a letter specifying which randomly selected 

precincts had to retabulate their votes. 

Election officials in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction we visited said that state 

law required random audits when electronic voting machines were used. 

According to these officials, they were required to audit 2 percent of DRE 

vote totals following an election. They told us, however, that in practice 

they actually audit all DRE machine vote totals to ensure an accurate vote 

count. They stated that vote data stored on DRE backup memory cards is 

printed and compared to vote data stored on DRE cartridges used in 

original vote counts. They said they operated on the assumption that 

because the internal memory cards serve as a backup system, there should 

be no difference in the totals. 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 273 GAO-06-450 Elections

Local Jurisdictions 

Reported Some 

Mistakes and Technical 

Challenges in Counting 

Votes for the 2004 

General Election 

As in the general election of 2000, the 2004 general election saw failures to 

properly employ voting equipment. At several of the jurisdictions we 

visited, officials recounted mistakes in using the DRE systems, for 

example, that echoed other recent findings (in our September 2005 report 

on the security and reliability of electronic voting), noting inadequate 

understanding of the equipment on the part of those using it.7

In our September 2005 report on electronic voting, we noted that instances 

of fewer votes counted than cast in one Pennsylvania county in the 2004 

general election had resulted from incorrectly programmed DRE machines. 

Similarly, in our 2005 site visits to election jurisdictions for this report, 

officials with whom we spoke recounted difficulties that had resulted from 

mistakes in programming the electronic equipment. In 1 Florida 

jurisdiction, for example, officials reported that the storage capacity of an 

optical scan accumulator (used to combine vote data from DREs and 

optical scanners) had been inadequately programmed to capture all of the 

votes cast. Officials there were able to discover and rectify the problem so 

that all votes were counted. In a Nevada jurisdiction, officials said that on 

Election Day, there were 198 provisional ballots (out of 4,532 cast) that 

were incorrectly programmed on the DRE machines at several polling 

locations, resulting in the provisional votes being counted without the 

voter first being qualified. According to these officials, poll workers forgot 

to add the “0” to the beginning of the precinct number. The officials noted 

that 2004 was the first time that the jurisdiction had used provisional voting 

and that in the future they planned to use paper provisional ballots to avoid 

any confusion. 

In a North Carolina jurisdiction we visited, election officials told us about 

how a misunderstanding of the voting equipment resulted in the loss of 

votes. Specifically, election officials were unclear about the vote storage 

capacity of a DRE machine used in early voting and failed to notice the 

machine’s warning that its file was full. The software installed on this 

machine was an older version of the program and only recognized up to 

3,500 votes, according to election officials. Election administrators 

believed that it could recognize up to 10,500 votes. They discovered the 

error at the close of Election Day when reconciling the number of votes 

7

GAO, Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting 

Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed, GAO-05-956

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2005).
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 274 GAO-06-450 Elections

cast on the DRE machine used in early voting with the number of voters 

credited with early voting at the polls. Furthermore they said it was not 

until they subsequently conducted a simulation of votes cast that they 

discovered the cause of the problem. They also discovered that while the 

machine’s software flashed warnings on its screen when the voter file 

became full, election workers had not seen it because of the screen’s 

positioning. Also, according to the officials, they had been operating under 

the assumption that the machine would have automatically stopped 

accepting votes once the limit had been reached. Instead, the machine had 

continued to accept votes cast, overwriting earlier votes in order to 

accommodate the new ones. The officials said they determined that 

4,235 votes were lost. 

Not all equipment failures resulted in lost votes, but some did create 

technical challenges. Officials in a Colorado jurisdiction stated that 

memory cards for optical scan machines at early voting sites sometimes 

failed, which meant that all affected optical scan ballots were rescanned 

using a new card once poll workers realized that the original card was 

malfunctioning. Also, in our September 2005 report on the security and 

reliability of electronic voting mentioned earlier, we noted that a Florida 

county experienced several problems with its DRE system, including 

instances where each touch screen took up to 1 hour to activate and had to 

be activated separately and sequentially, causing delays at the polling place. 

In addition, we reported that election monitors discovered that the system 

contained a flaw that allowed one DRE machine’s ballots to be added to the 

canvass totals multiple times without being detected. In another instance, 

our report notes that a malfunction in a DRE system in Ohio caused the 

system to record approximately 3,900 votes too many for one presidential 

candidate in the 2004 general election. We also reported that a statedesignated voting system examiner in a Pennsylvania jurisdiction noted 

that the county DRE system had technical problems, such as failure to 

accurately capture write-in votes, frozen computer screens, and difficulties 

sensing voters’ touches. 

During our 2005 site visits, officials from 3 jurisdictions also described 

several cases of jamming problems with optical scan and punch card ballot 

tabulators. For example, election officials in a Kansas jurisdiction we 

visited told us that an extensive two-sided optical scan ballot frequently 

jammed voting machines because of its length. These officials told us that 

they used a two-sided ballot design which required that the optical scan 

counting equipment read the ballot front and back, which presented a 

problem. According to the officials, the ballot was not scored properly to 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 275 GAO-06-450 Elections

feed easily through the equipment and paper jams occurred frequently. 

Election officials said the ballots had to be hand-sorted into 13 groups 

before scanning, which took time. Similarly, officials in a New Jersey 

jurisdiction told us that their optical scan machines had frequently jammed 

when reading provisional and absentee ballots. According to the officials, 

the ballots had two or three folds, which in combination with the high 

volume of ballots being read, jammed the machine regularly. To repair the 

jams, officials told us they would straighten ballots and run them through 

again, or, if needed, would remake the ballot. Also, officials in an Illinois 

jurisdiction we visited said punch cards had also jammed in their tabulator. 

Officials there said that this had been likely due to the punch cards swelling 

in humid weather, and this problem had caused the scanner to misread 

ballots on several occasions. In all of these instances, the problems were 

corrected.

While we heard in our site visits about some human error at the polls, in 

our survey of local jurisdictions we found that human error was a problem 

for a small portion of election jurisdictions in terms of at least one key 

function. Specifically, we estimate that 6 percent of local jurisdictions 

nationwide experienced poll worker errors in tracking and accounting for 

ballots. To the extent that these errors occurred, they were more common 

in large jurisdictions. We estimate 1 percent of small jurisdictions, 

14 percent of medium jurisdictions, and 34 percent of large jurisdictions 

had these errors. The differences between all size categories are 

statistically significant. In 10 of the jurisdictions we visited, election 

officials cited poll worker or voter errors as the cause of discrepancies in 

the number of ballots and voters. In 1 Ohio jurisdiction, for example, 

election officials said the discrepancy in the number of ballots and votes 

was caused by the fact that poll workers did not track some voters who left 

the polling place without voting. In a Florida jurisdiction, according to 

election officials, some voters left the polling place without signing a poll 

book (which was used to reconcile voter numbers). Another cause for 

discrepancies in the number of ballots and voters cited by election officials 

in a Washington jurisdiction was that poll workers erroneously counted 

some provisional ballots as regular Election Day ballots, which led to the 

appearance of more regular Election Day ballots cast than voters credited 

with voting in that manner. 

Finally, from election officials in 2 jurisdictions we visited, we learned of 

voter errors in using voting technology. In one Kansas jurisdiction, officials 

reported that some voters did not know how to scroll down the electronic 

screen to see all of the information. Also, we were told by election officials 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 276 GAO-06-450 Elections

in a New Jersey jurisdiction that poll workers had noticed that some voters 

had failed to press a button to finalize their votes. According to these 

officials, the poll workers watched for such a mistake, and in at least one 

instance, reached under the curtain to register a vote while both a 

Democrat and a Republican poll worker observed the maneuver. 

In the 2004 General 

Election, Some 

Election Jurisdictions 

Reported Difficulty 

Meeting Deadlines for 

Certifying the Final 

Vote Count

According to state survey responses, 7 states (Arkansas, California, 

Georgia, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia) 

encountered a challenge during the 2004 general election related to timely 

completion of the certification process. For example, Georgia election 

officials reported difficulty in certifying election results in a timely manner 

that would allow a runoff election to commence within 3 weeks of Election 

Day. California officials responded that achieving an appropriate balance 

between vote count accuracy and the speed of vote tabulation was a 

challenge statewide. Arkansas officials said that the Secretary of State’s 

office had to contact local election jurisdictions numerous times to receive 

certified election results in a timely manner. 

In some local jurisdictions we visited, we also heard about difficulty 

meeting certification deadlines, particularly with regard to provisional 

ballots. In 7 local election jurisdictions we visited, election officials cited 

concerns with the timing requirements of election certifications. 

Specifically, the task of verifying voter information with respect to 

provisional ballots and counting provisional ballots made achieving 

certification deadlines difficult. For example, officials in 1 Colorado 

jurisdiction said that verifying and counting provisional ballots within the 

state-mandated 12-day period required that the county hire additional 

workers. A Florida jurisdiction reported a similar challenge, but in this 

instance, these officials stated that the county canvassing board was 

required to consider each provisional ballot individually, which added to 

the challenge to meet the short state certification deadline. One large 

jurisdiction in Illinois also reported that its 14-day certification deadline 

was difficult to achieve because of the large number of provisional ballots 

that had to be verified and counted. In a Washington jurisdiction, officials 

stated that verifying and counting all ballots (including provisional ballots) 

within state-mandated periods had been a challenge in 2004. In 2005, the 

Washington state legislature extended the mandated certification deadline 

from 15 to 21 days following any general election. 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 277 GAO-06-450 Elections

The Recount in 

Washington State 

Revealed the 

Intricacies of the 

Election Process, but 

Also Yielded Many 

State Reforms 

While the 2004 recount in Washington was one of few statewide recounts 

conducted across the country, the types of issues that surfaced during the 

recount about Washington’s election system identified problems in all three 

key elements of elections—people, process, and technology. The close 

gubernatorial race and the recount subjected these elements to close 

scrutiny, revealing the vulnerability and interdependence of the various 

stages of the elections process and the unerring attention to detail that is 

required to run an error-free election. It was, in fact, the closest 

gubernatorial race in United States history. In the initial statewide count, a 

mere 261 votes separated the top two candidates—about 0.001 percent of 

the total votes cast. An initial recount reduced that margin of victory to just 

42 votes out of more than 2.7 million cast, and the final recount resulted in 

a 129-vote margin of victory for the candidate who came in second in the 

first two vote counts. 

In part because it is the largest election jurisdiction (in number of voters) in 

Washington state, King County was the subject of some of the greatest 

scrutiny. However, problems were identified by courts in other 

jurisdictions in the state as well. As a result of this scrutiny, as discussed 

below, Washington state, and King County itself, has subsequently 

instituted many reforms.

Breakdowns in Interaction 

of People, Process, and 

Technology Can Impair the 

Vote Count

We reviewed a variety of reports and studies on this extraordinary election, 

including state task force studies, an internal county review, a management 

audit sponsored by the Election Center,8

 and the findings of a state 

Superior Court that resulted from a lawsuit challenging the results of the 

final recount. The principal problems we identified in these materials 

ranged from poll worker errors to challenges in using equipment. 

Described here, they illustrate how breakdowns in the interface of people, 

process, and technology may, at any stage of an election, impair an 

accurate vote count. 

8

The Election Center is a nonprofit organization composed of government employees whose 

profession it is to serve in voter registration and elections administration (e.g., voter 

registrars, elections supervisors, elections directors). The Election Center in October 2005 

completed an audit of King County’s elections operations following the November 2004 

general election. The audit was initiated in response to a mandate from King County’s 

governing council requesting that such an audit be completed.
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 278 GAO-06-450 Elections

Provisional Ballots Counted 

before Being Validated

In at least 11 counties provisional ballots were found by a Washington state 

Superior Court to have been counted without verifying voter signatures or 

before verification of voter registration status was completed.9

 For 

example, in Pierce County, Washington, 77 provisional ballots were found 

by the Superior Court to have been improperly cast. Provisional ballots 

were to have included on the ballot envelope the voter’s name and 

residence. Because the provisional voter’s identity or residence was not 

marked on the provisional ballot envelope for these 77 ballots, voter 

registration status could not be verified. In King County, the court found 

that 348 provisional ballots were improperly cast without verifying voter 

eligibility. The Election Center management audit found this had occurred 

because the provisional voters had been allowed to put their ballots, which 

had not been verified, directly into the optical scan machines at the voting 

precincts. The Superior Court found that of these 348 provisional ballots, 

252 were ultimately determined to have been cast by registered voters. 

According to the audit, this error resulted from poll worker confusion 

about who was accountable for the provisional voting process at the polls. 

No one poll worker was assigned responsibility for tracking provisional 

ballots. 

Illegal Votes Cast by Felons The Superior Court also found that more than 1,400 votes had been cast 

illegally by felons during the November 2004 general election in counties 

across Washington. Under Washington state law, in general, persons 

convicted of a federal or state felony are not eligible to vote unless their 

right to vote has been restored. According to the King County audit, some 

felons were registered to vote in King County. The audit stated that election 

registration officials had very limited information available to them 

regarding such felons that would have allowed them to periodically purge 

the rolls. Moreover, according to the audit report, when a former felon who 

wished to register signed an affidavit to attest to the fact that his or her 

voting rights had been restored, election officials had no expedient way to 

verify the claim, particularly for former felons convicted in a different 

county. In addition, the audit report noted that election officials did not 

necessarily have the authority to refuse to accept a registration form. In our 

June 2005 report on maintaining accurate voter registration lists, we found 

9

Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Chelan County Super. Ct., June 6, 2005) 

(transcript of oral decision).
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 279 GAO-06-450 Elections

that similar challenges in identifying and removing felons from voter rolls 

were reported in other states as well.10

More Votes Counted than Cast The Superior Court found that more votes were counted than the number 

of voters credited with voting. Specifically, a judge cited evidence of 

190 excess votes counted in Clark County, 77 excess votes counted in 

Spokane County, 20 excess votes counted in Island County, and 14 excess 

votes counted in Kittitas County. In a King County internal report, election 

officials reported that the discrepancy between voters credited with voting 

and ballots cast was about 0.2 percent, or over 1,000 votes. The Election 

Center management audit concluded that the discrepancy may have been 

due, in part, to the use of an electronic wand held by temporary employees 

to scan the entry codes in the poll book when registrants came to vote. The 

audit noted space limitations and difficulty hearing the wand’s beep when it 

processed a bar code may have prevented an accurate count of voters. 

During our site visit with King County officials, they told us that separate 

from the wanding issue, poll worker training deficiencies may have 

contributed to discrepancies in the number of votes credited and cast when 

voter information was not entered properly into poll books.

Uncounted Ballots Discovered 

after Results Had Been Certified

According to the Superior Court’s findings, in several counties uncounted 

ballots were discovered after the certification of the initial election results. 

The Superior Court found that there were 64 uncounted absentee ballots 

found in Pierce County and 8 in Spokane County. According to the Election 

Center audit, in King County, the uncounted ballots were both absentee and 

provisional ballots, and 22 absentee and provisional ballots were 

discovered in the base units of optical scan machines after the election was 

certified. The audit concluded that poll workers had failed to adhere to 

their procedures for checking these units when reconciling ballots after the 

polls closed, and recommended strengthening both procedures and 

training. 

Absentee Ballots Erroneously 

Disqualified

In King County, during the second recount, the King County Canvassing 

Board discovered that election workers had disqualified 573 absentee 

ballots during initial canvassing when they could not find the voters’ 

signatures in the county’s new computerized voter registration list for 

verification. In addition, the election workers had not checked elsewhere 

for these signatures, such as on the voters’ paper registration forms. In the 

10GAO-05-478.
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 280 GAO-06-450 Elections

recount, the King County Canvassing Board decided to recanvass these 

ballots to determine whether their disqualification had been appropriate or 

whether these ballots should have been counted.11 According to the King 

County audit, the voter registration list had been very recently updated, and 

for this reason, not all voter signatures had been scanned and electronically 

stored in time for the general election so that election workers would have 

been able to find them. 

Verifying absentee ballots was another issue highlighted during the 

recount. According to press accounts, differences existed in how local 

jurisdictions in the state verified the signatures of absentee and provisional 

voters. The Seattle Times reported conducting a survey in which it found 

that signatures went through as many as four levels of review in one county 

and only one level in another. Also, the newspaper reported that some 

counties would look for as many as six different identifying traits of a 

signature, while others “eyeballed the handwriting.” Recommendations by 

the Governor’s Election Reform Task Force identified the verification of 

voter signatures as one of several areas needing more procedural 

consistency among the counties. 

The Washington Recount 

Fueled Several Reforms at 

the State and Local Levels

Washington enacted into law a series of election reform measures in 2005 

designed to clarify, standardize, and strengthen election requirements and 

procedures. Several of the statewide reforms specifically address problems 

described above, but others are broader measures designed to improve 

election administration. Examples of these measures are listed below. 

• Unique provisional and absentee ballots: All provisional and absentee 

ballots are required to be visually distinguishable from one another and 

must be either printed on colored paper or imprinted with a bar code for 

the purpose of identifying the ballot as a provisional or absentee ballot. 

The bar code must not identify the voter. Provisional and absentee 

ballots must be incapable of being tabulated by polling place counting 

devices. 

11The King County Canvassing Board’s authority to recanvass these ballots was litigated in 

late 2004. The Washington State Supreme Court eventually ruled that the county canvassing 

board could, in its discretion, recanvass the 573 uncounted ballots (eventually totaling 735 

after another 162 ballots were discovered) in certain circumstances, thereby allowing the 

recanvassing of the ballots and inclusion in the total tally of votes. Wash. State Republican 

Party v. King County, 103 P.3d 725 (2004); See also In Re Election Contest filed by Coday, 

2006 Wash. LEXIS 185 (Wash. Mar. 9, 2006.).
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 281 GAO-06-450 Elections

• Standardized guidelines for signature verification processes: The 

Secretary of State is to establish guidelines for signature verification 

relating to, for example, signatures on absentee and provisional ballot 

envelopes. All election personnel assigned to verify signatures are 

required to receive training on the established guidelines. State law also 

provides that while signatures on certain mail-in ballot envelopes (such 

as absentee ballots) must be compared with the voter’s signature in the 

county registration files, variation between the signature on a return 

envelope and the signature of that voter in the registration files due to 

the substitution of initials or the use of common nicknames (e.g., Joseph 

Smith versus Joe Smith) is permitted so long as the surname and 

handwriting are clearly the same. 

• Triennial review of county election processes and reports listing 

corrective actions: Instead of being performed periodically, 

state-conducted reviews of county election-related policies, procedures, 

and practices are to be performed at least once every 3 years. If staffing 

or budget levels do not permit a 3-year review cycle, such reviews must 

be done as often as possible. The county auditor or the county 

canvassing board must respond to the review report in writing, listing 

steps to be taken to correct any problems. Before the next primary or 

general election, the Secretary of State’s office must visit the county and 

verify that the corrective action has been taken.

• Election law manuals for use in all vote-counting centers: The Secretary 

of State must prepare a manual explaining all election laws and rules in 

easy-to-understand, plain language for use during the vote counting, 

canvassing, and recounting process. The manuals must be available for 

use in all vote-counting centers throughout the state. 

• Option to conduct voting entirely by mail: Another change introduced by 

the state, which may avoid errors at the polls, has been to give county 

officials the option to conduct elections entirely by mail. The new 

measure authorizes the use of all-mail voting in counties upon the 

express approval by a county’s legislative authority and provides that 

such approval must apply to all primary, special, and general elections 

conducted by the county. For example, King County has announced 

plans to conduct elections entirely by mail in 2007. The King County 

Independent Task Force on Elections found in 2005 that the King 

County election process basically involved simultaneously conducting 

two dissimilar elections. The task force stated that increasingly, a 

majority of King County voters (565,011, or slightly more than 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 282 GAO-06-450 Elections

62 percent in 2004) used the permanent absentee or vote-by-mail 

process. Despite this fact, the task force reported that the county also 

conducted a traditional election involving about 330,000 voters assigned 

to over 2,500 precincts and 540 individual polling places, and the use of 

hundreds of temporary election workers who must be trained and who 

work at the polling places for more than 13 hours on election days. 

Furthermore, the task force stated that both election processes contain 

independent, complex, and often conflicting requirements that have 

clearly caused significant problems for King County election officials. 

Having one means of voting for all citizens is perceived to be both more 

efficient and cost-effective than the previous process, according to the 

task force.

• Paper records for electronic voting devices and precertification audits 

of electronic voting results: All electronic voting devices must, 

beginning January 1, 2006, produce an individual paper record of each 

vote, at the time of voting, that may be accepted or rejected by the voter 

before finalizing his or her vote. This audit is to be conducted by 

randomly selecting a specified percentage of electronic voting devices 

and, for each device, comparing the results recorded electronically with 

the paper records. The audit process must be open to observation by 

political party representatives if such representatives have been 

appointed and are present at the time of the audit. 

Separate from changes made at the Washington state level, King County, as 

reported in the Election Center audit, also implemented or was in the 

process of implementing changes to improve election administration that 

specifically address issues that arose during the 2004 general election.12

Examples of such reported changes are below: 

• Controls to manage provisional ballots: Provisional ballots will be colorcoded for easy recognition and will have timing marks that prevent the 

counter at the polling place from accepting them. Therefore, the voter 

has no option but to return his or her provisional ballot to a poll worker, 

who will place it in a provisional envelope. One additional poll worker is 

to be assigned to each polling place to exclusively manage provisional 

ballots for all voters at that polling place. 

12Election Center, King County Elections Operations (Houston, Texas, 2005).
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 283 GAO-06-450 Elections

• Controls to prevent misplaced ballots: Poll workers are required to 

record the serial number located at the bottom of the optical scan bins 

on the ballot reconciliation transmittal form. The serial number is not 

visible if any ballots remain in the bin. Increased poll worker training, 

attaching a flashlight to the inside of each bin, and continued adherence 

to existing procedures for troubleshooters to examine each bin before 

certification are also intended to help ensure that all ballots are properly 

handled and counted in future elections. 

• Additional procedures for tracking absentee ballots and registration 

signatures: King County performed a database search of the entire voter 

file prior to the fall 2005 elections, in order to identify missing or 

unreadable signatures. On the basis of the search results, elections 

personnel contacted voters and made significant progress in updating 

the files. In addition, procedures at the absentee ballot operation center 

have been enhanced. New logs were created for tracking absentee 

ballots that required additional research because they were not easily 

verified. Also, in any instance where a voter registration signature is not 

on file, or is illegible, a search for the original record, as well as a call 

and a letter to the voter, is required. 

• Improvements to procedures for reconciling ballots and voters: For the 

2005 primary and general elections, the use of electronic hand wands to 

scan poll books, when reconciling ballot and voter numbers, was to be 

done at a county center where more space would be available. New 

checklists were developed that required staff to balance the number of 

signatures recorded with the wand against the number of ballots 

counted by the computer. Also, the hand-wand process was to occur at 

the beginning rather than at the end of the canvass to allow more time 

for any necessary research into potential discrepancies. 

Concluding 

Observations

Although the methods used to secure and count ballots vary across the 

50 states and the District of Columbia, the goal of vote counting is the same 

across the nation: to accurately count all ballots cast by eligible voters. As 

with the elections process overall, conducting an accurate vote count is not 

a simple process. It requires many steps, an unerring attention to detail, 

and the seamless integration of people, processes, and technology. 

Providing eligible voters multiple means and times within a jurisdiction for 

casting their ballots—early, absentee, provisional, and Election Day 

voting—enhances eligible voters’ opportunity to vote. At the same time, 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 284 GAO-06-450 Elections

multiple voting methods and types of ballots can make the vote-counting 

process more complicated. In addition, short deadlines for certifying the 

final vote—as little as 2 days in 1 state—provide little time for election 

officials to review, verify, and count provisional and absentee ballots. 

Larger jurisdictions generally face more challenges than smaller 

jurisdictions because of the sheer volume of votes cast by all ballot types—

absentee, provisional, and regular ballots. Provisional ballots were new for 

many jurisdictions in November 2004 and created some challenges in 

tracking, verifying, and counting. On the basis of their experience in 

November 2004, some jurisdictions are implementing new procedures for 

provisional voting, such as printing provisional ballots in a color different 

from other types of ballots or using paper ballots rather than DRE 

machines for provisional voters.

Two jurisdictions we visited in Washington have announced plans to move 

to all-mail elections, which was authorized on a county-wide basis by 

recent state law. Although replacing in-person voting with all-mail voting 

eliminates some challenges—e.g., poll worker training on voting equipment 

operations and provisional voting or the chance of malfunctioning voting 

equipment at the polls—in some circumstances it could magnify the 

importance of other aspects of state election processes, such as verifying 

votes, accurately matching voter signatures and having guidance for 

determining voter intent from improperly or unclearly marked ballots. For 

those jurisdictions allowing or requiring the determination of a voter’s 

intent from an improperly or unclearly marked ballot, the importance of 

having explicit and consistent criteria for treating such ballots became 

evident in the 2000 general election when different interpretations for such 

ballots in Florida made the close presidential race extremely contentious. 

Eighteen states that reported they did not have voter intent guidance in 

place for the November 2000 general election reported to us in our state 

survey that they did have voter intent requirements or guidance in place for 

the November 2004 general election. While federal election provisions do 

not address the state counting issue of ascertaining voter intent, HAVA did 

require states to adopt, by January 2006, uniform and nondiscriminatory 

standards defining what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a 

vote for each type of voting system used by the state. 

The recount in the close gubernatorial election in Washington revealed the 

interdependence of every stage of the elections process in ensuring an 

accurate vote count. That experience also illustrated how small errors in 

election operations can affect the vote counting process. Were any state’s 

election processes subjected to the very close scrutiny that characterized 
Chapter 6

Counting the Votes 

Page 285 GAO-06-450 Elections

the recount in Washington state, it is likely that imperfections would be 

revealed. Votes are cast and elections are conducted by people who are not 

and cannot be 100 percent error free in all their tasks all the time. Thus, the 

consistently error-free vote count may be elusive, particularly in very large 

jurisdictions with hundreds of thousands of ballots cast in person, 

absentee, or provisionally. However, diligent efforts to achieve consistent 

error-free vote counts can help to ensure that any errors are reduced to the 

minimum humanly possible.
Page 286 GAO-06-450 Elections

Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies Chapte8r

Voting methods can be thought of as tools for accommodating the millions 

of voters in our nation’s more than 10,000 local elections jurisdictions. 

These tools are as simple as a pencil, paper, and a box, or as sophisticated 

as programmable computer-based touch screens.1

 Regardless of method, 

however, the proper operation and functioning of each depends on its 

effective interplay with the people who participate in elections (both voters 

and election workers) and the processes (governed by policies, 

procedures, and so forth) that govern the interaction of people with one 

another and with the voting method. 

This chapter focuses on voting methods—the technology variable in the 

people, process, and technology election equation. It describes the use of 

voting methods in the 2004 general election, compares this technology 

environment with that of the 2000 general election, and examines plans for 

voting technologies in the 2006 election, particularly in light of the roles 

being played by states and HAVA. It also examines efforts to measure and 

understand how well voting equipment performed in the 2004 election 

(see fig. 53 for equipment examples), including the state of performance 

standards and local jurisdictions’ overall satisfaction with their respective 

voting methods. Additionally, this chapter discusses the state of practice 

relative to voting system security, testing, and integration, and presents key 

challenges facing all levels of governments as voting systems, related 

election systems, and supporting technologies continue to evolve.

1

As described in the glossary of this report, the five types of voting methods are paper ballot, 

lever machine, punch card, optical scan, and direct recording electronic (DRE). All except 

paper ballot are considered automated methods. The punch card, optical scan, and DRE 

methods utilize computers to automate voting or tabulation. Of these three, punch card and 

optical scan equipment typically automate vote counting, while DREs automate both vote 

casting and counting. Optical scan and DRE are considered the more technology-based 

voting methods.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 287 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 53: Examples of Voting Equipment

Overview The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied 

and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local 

jurisdiction survey estimates. We estimate on the basis of our local 

jurisdiction survey that the predominant voting methods most often used 

for the 2004 general election by large jurisdictions were DRE and precinct 

count optical scan, while medium jurisdictions most often used precinct 

count optical scan and small jurisdictions most often used paper ballot. In 

addition, the predominant voting method most often used for large 

jurisdictions changed from precinct count optical scan in 2000 to both DRE 

and precinct count optical scan in 2004, while the predominant voting 

Source: GAO.

DRE (top left), precinct count optical scan (top center), central count optical scan (top right), 

lever machine (bottom left), precinct count punch card (bottom center), 

and central count punch card (bottom right).
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 288 GAO-06-450 Elections

methods remained the same for the other jurisdiction sizes. Also in the 

2004 general election, an estimated one-fifth of jurisdictions used multiple 

voting methods to support voting activities. Most states generally exercised 

influence over the voting methods used by their respective elections 

jurisdictions through a range of approaches such as requiring the use of 

one specific voting method, helping with local acquisition efforts, or 

eliminating voting methods, according to our 2005 state survey. Ten states 

and the District of Columbia reported that they required the use of one 

specific method for the 2004 general election, and 4 additional states 

planned to require a specific method for the 2006 general election. Sixteen 

states and the District of Columbia reported that they were involved to 

some extent in local jurisdiction efforts to acquire voting systems, 

components, and services. States also reported that they were eliminating 

lever and punch card equipment between the 2000 and 2006 general 

elections. Specifically, for the November 2000 general election, 37 states 

reported that they used lever or punch card voting equipment; by the 

November 2006 general election, only 4 states had plans to use lever and 

punch card equipment. HAVA has influenced state and local decisions 

regarding particular voting methods by providing funds to states to replace 

punch card and lever voting equipment with other voting methods. This 

greater state involvement in jurisdictions’ choice of voting methods, 

combined with federal funding to replace lever and punch card voting 

equipment and certain HAVA requirements—among other factors—is likely 

to influence the adoption of DRE and optical scan voting methods.

Federal and state standards provide an important baseline for the 

performance of voting systems and were widely adopted for the 2004 

general election. However, according to our local jurisdiction survey, voting 

equipment performance was not consistently measured during the 2004 

general election and varied by jurisdiction size and voting method, in part 

because some types of measures were not well suited to particular voting 

methods. For example, small jurisdictions were generally less likely to 

collect accuracy measures such as accuracy of voting equipment 

(estimated at 31 percent for small jurisdictions) than large and medium 

jurisdictions (66 percent and 54 percent, respectively), and this may be 

because the predominant voting method most used by small jurisdictions 

was paper ballot. On the other hand, on the basis of our local jurisdiction 

survey, we estimate that the vast majority of all jurisdictions were very 

satisfied or satisfied with their systems’ performance during the 2004 

general election. For instance, we estimate that 78 percent of jurisdictions 

were very satisfied or satisfied with the accuracy of their voting system 

performance. The estimated high satisfaction levels demonstrated across 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 289 GAO-06-450 Elections

different voting system performance areas and jurisdiction sizes contrast 

with our lower estimates of the performance measures that were collected 

for the 2004 general election. Although the reasons for moderate collection 

levels for performance measures are unclear, jurisdictions that may not 

have collected performance data or may have considered such information 

not applicable to their situation may lack sufficient insight into their system 

operations to adequately support their satisfaction in the variety of 

performance areas we surveyed. The moderate collection levels of data on 

operational voting system performance may present a challenge to state 

and local election officials in their efforts to make informed decisions on 

both near-term and long-term voting system changes and investments.

A wide range of recently published concerns for the security of voting 

systems and the development of nationwide mechanisms under HAVA to 

improve security standards and processes have not yet produced a 

consistent approach across all jurisdictions for managing the security of 

voting systems. Our 2005 local jurisdiction survey and our visits to local 

jurisdictions found that voting system security has been primarily 

shouldered by local jurisdictions. However, states, vendors, law 

enforcement officials, and others shared in these efforts to varying degrees 

for the 2004 general election. Our state survey for the 2004 general election 

and visits to local jurisdictions indicated that security mechanisms 

employed by some states—but not others—included promulgation of 

policies and guidance, compliance of voting equipment with security 

standards, and monitoring and evaluation of implemented security 

controls. According to our local jurisdiction survey estimates and visits to 

local jurisdictions, jurisdictions and their support organizations were 

largely responsible for implementation of security controls, such as access 

restrictions to voting equipment, system backup capabilities, and securityrelated testing. Estimates from our local jurisdiction survey also showed, 

however, that many jurisdictions nationwide had not documented their 

security measures, and we found that several of the jurisdictions we visited 

reported that they had not implemented recommended measures, such as 

security plans, training, and documentation of policies and procedures. 

Furthermore, decisions by states to continue using outdated voting system 

standards may allow the vulnerabilities of newer technologies to go 

unevaluated and impair effective management of the corresponding 

security risks. States and local jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly 

updating and consistently applying appropriate standards and other 

directives to meet the vulnerabilities and risks of their specific election 

environments.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 290 GAO-06-450 Elections

Testing and evaluation of voting systems also varied across states and 

jurisdictions for the 2004 general election. Our state survey found that most 

states required certification testing of their voting systems using a range of 

criteria. However, responsibility for purchasing a certified system typically 

rested with local jurisdictions. Other results from our 2005 state survey and 

responses from jurisdictions we visited indicated that acceptance testing 

continued to be commonly performed, but there was wide variation in the 

responsibilities and practices for this type of testing, including whether 

such testing was applied to new systems or upgrades, the extent of vendor 

participation, and the coverage of hardware and software functions. Also 

on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that most 

jurisdictions conducted readiness (logic and accuracy) testing for the 2004 

general election as they did for the 2000 election, but in some jurisdictions 

we visited, we found they used different procedures that may have 

included one or more processes such as diagnostic tests, mock elections, 

or suites of test votes. In contrast, our local survey estimates indicate that 

parallel testing was employed by fewer than an estimated 2 percent of 

jurisdictions. This may be due to, in part, the lack of directives for 

conducting such tests.2

 Finally, postelection voting system audit tests were 

conducted by fewer than half of jurisdictions for the 2004 general election, 

according to our local survey estimates, although many more large and 

medium jurisdictions performed these tests than small jurisdictions. As 

with other types of testing, the requirements and practices for audit tests 

were diverse. Factors associated with the testing of voting systems may 

further challenge states and local jurisdictions as they adapt to changes in 

voting system capabilities, standards, and national certification for the 2006 

general election. Those factors are likely to include increased certification 

testing workloads to recertify systems with new capabilities, ongoing limits 

to the number of available testing laboratories until a new laboratory 

accreditation process becomes fully operational, and more complex testing 

because a new version of the federal voluntary voting system guidelines 

has been added in 2005 to older federal standards from 1990 and 2002 that 

states are already using.

The number of jurisdictions that had integrated particular aspects of voting 

system components and technologies was limited for the 2004 general 

election, according to estimates from our local jurisdiction survey and 

visits to local jurisdictions for the selected areas of integration we 

examined, such as electronic programming or setup and electronic 

2

We estimate that 91 percent of jurisdictions considered parallel testing to be not applicable.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 291 GAO-06-450 Elections

management. Two-thirds of the jurisdictions we visited told us that they 

used electronic programming or setup of voting equipment, and an 

estimated 7 percent of jurisdictions that used voting methods other than 

paper ballots, according to our local survey, connected their voting 

equipment via a local network at polling locations. Relatively few local 

jurisdictions we visited also reported having plans for integrating or further 

integrating their election-related systems and components for the 2006 

general election, and in the instances where jurisdictions reported plans, 

the scope and nature of the plans varied. For instance, officials at 5 

jurisdictions we visited reported plans to introduce a voter-verifiable paper 

trail (VVPT) capability for future elections, and officials from 1 jurisdiction 

reported plans to purchase an optical scanner with the ability to tabulate 

both DRE and optical scan election results. Nevertheless, the potential for 

greater integration in the future does exist as states and jurisdictions act on 

plans to acquire the kind of voting equipment (e.g., optical scan and DRE 

products) that lends itself to integration. For example, on the basis of our 

local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that at least one-fifth of jurisdictions 

plan to acquire DRE or optical scan equipment before the 2006 general 

election, and officials from 2 jurisdictions we visited who used DRE 

equipment told us that their state planned to purchase electronic poll 

books for its precincts to use during the 2006 elections to electronically 

link its voter registration system with its voting systems. It is unclear if and 

when this migration to more technology-based voting methods will 

produce more integrated election system environments. However, suitable 

standards and guidance for these interconnected components and 

systems—some of which remain to be developed—could facilitate the 

development, testing, operational management, and maintenance of 

components and systems, thereby maximizing the benefits of current and 

emerging election technologies and achieving states’ and local 

jurisdictions’ goals for performance and security. The challenge inherent in 

such a dynamic environment is to update system standards so that 

emerging technical, security, and reliability interactions are systematically 

addressed.

Voting Methods Vary 

among Jurisdictions 

and Are Being 

Influenced by States’ 

Choices and HAVA

The technology of the voting environment can be characterized as varied 

and evolving, according to our 2005 state survey results and local 

jurisdiction survey estimates. We estimate on the basis of our local 

jurisdiction survey that the predominant voting methods most often used 

for the 2004 general election by large jurisdictions were DRE and precinct 

count optical scan, while medium jurisdictions most often used precinct 

count optical scan and small jurisdictions most often used paper ballot. 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 292 GAO-06-450 Elections

Two key patterns emerged in the use of voting methods between the 2000 

and 2004 general elections. First, we estimate that the percentage of large 

jurisdictions using DREs doubled from 15 percent in the 2000 general 

election to 30 percent in 2004. The predominant voting method for large 

jurisdictions changed from precinct count optical scan in 2000 to both DRE 

and precinct count optical scan in 2004. In contrast, we estimate that the 

predominant voting methods remained the same for small and medium 

jurisdictions (paper ballots and precinct count optical scan, respectively) 

from 2000 to 2004. Furthermore, on the basis of our local jurisdiction 

survey, we estimate that at least one-fifth of jurisdictions plan to acquire 

DRE or optical scan equipment before the 2006 general election. Second, in 

response to our state survey, 9 states reported that they eliminated the 

lever machine and punch card voting methods for the 2004 general 

election. In addition, 18 other states plan to eliminate lever or punch card 

voting methods for the 2006 general election. This greater state 

involvement in jurisdictions’ choice of voting methods, the availablilty of 

federal funding to replace lever and punch card voting equipment, and 

certain HAVA requirements—among other factors—are likely influences on 

the adoption of DRE and optical scan voting methods. 

Voting Methods Differ by 

the Size of Local 

Jurisdictions and States’ 

Choices

Since the November 2000 general election, the DRE voting method has 

become more widely used in large jurisdictions, according to our local 

jurisdiction 2005 survey. During the same period, states’ reported use of 

lever machine and punch card voting methods has decreased, according 

to responses to our 2005 state survey. Our state and local jurisdiction 

surveys also indicate plans for changes to voting technologies for the 2006 

general election. 

Overall, the estimated percentages of predominant voting methods used by 

local jurisdictions in the 2000 and 2004 general elections did not change 

appreciably. In particular, from our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate 

that the mix of predominant voting methods used in the November 2000 

general election was 5 percent DRE, 21 percent central count optical scan, 

26 percent precinct count optical scan, 5 percent central count punch card, 

2 percent precinct count punch card, 8 percent lever, and 31 percent paper.3

In comparison, we estimate that the mix for the November 2004 general 

3

We defined the predominant voting method as one that processed the largest number of 

ballots regardless of when the vote was cast: on general Election Day, as a provisional vote, 

during absentee voting, or during early voting. 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 293 GAO-06-450 Elections

election (in the same order) was 7 percent DRE, 21 percent central count 

optical scan, 30 percent precinct count optical scan, 2 percent central 

count punch card, 2 percent precinct count punch card, 7 percent lever, 

and 30 percent paper. Figure 54 compares these percentage changes.

Figure 54: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant Voting 

Methods in the 2000 and 2004 General Elections

According to our local jurisdiction survey, there may have been a small 

shift away from punch card and lever machine voting methods (estimated 

at 3 percent or 1 percent loss of jurisdictions, respectively) and may have 

been an increase in optical scan and DRE voting equipment (estimated at 

5 percent and 2 percent gain of jurisdictions, respectively) for the 2004 

general election. However, these differences are not statistically 

significant. During the same time frame, we estimate that 16 percent of 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Paper ballot

Precinct count

Lever machine

punch card

Central count

punch card

Precinct count

optical scan

Central count

optical scan

DRE

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Predominant voting method

2000

2004

5 5

7

21 21

26

30

2 22

8

7

31

30

Percentage of jurisdictions
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 294 GAO-06-450 Elections

jurisdictions acquired new voting equipment through their own purchases 

or leases and 15 percent of jurisdictions through purchases or leases by 

their state. Thus, the new voting equipment acquired by many jurisdictions 

since 2000 did not substantively affect the predominant voting methods 

that were already in use. 

One notable change did occur, however, in the use of predominant voting 

methods in the 2000 and 2004 general elections. The percentage of large 

jurisdictions using DREs doubled (estimated at 15 percent in 2000 and 

30 percent in 2004, respectively)—an increase that is statistically 

significant. This increase in the use of DREs changed the predominant 

voting method most often used for large jurisdictions, which was precinct 

count optical scan in 2000, to both DRE and precinct count optical scan in 

2004. A smaller increase in the use of DREs among medium jurisdictions 

(from an estimated 13 percent in 2000 to 20 percent in 2004) is not 

statistically significant, and there was virtually no change in DRE use 

among small jurisdictions (an estimated 1 percent for both elections). In 

contrast, the use of paper ballots as a predominant voting method did not 

appreciably change between the 2000 and 2004 general elections (with 

overall use at 30 percent in 2000 and 31 percent in 2004, respectively). 

Small jurisdictions were the major contributors to this steady use of paper 

ballots (estimated at 43 percent in 2000 and 41 percent in 2004, 

respectively); medium jurisdictions were minor contributors (3 percent for 

each election). (No large jurisdictions used paper ballots as their 

predominant voting method for either of these elections.) We also estimate 

that use of precinct count optical scan as the predominant voting method 

for medium jurisdictions did not change appreciably between the 2000 and 

2004 elections (estimated at 35 percent in 2000 and 39 percent in 2004, 

respectively). Figure 55 shows the estimated use of predominant voting 

methods for small, medium, and large jurisdictions in the 2004 general 

election.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 295 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 55: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Predominant Voting Methods in 2004, by Jurisdiction Size

Note: Percentages for predominant voting methods within each jurisdiction size may not add to 100 

because of rounding.

a

The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and large jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

b

The differences between both small and medium jurisdictions and large jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

c

The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions is statistically significant.

The more widespread adoption of DREs by large jurisdictions was 

consistent with their greater proportion among jurisdictions that acquired 

voting equipment since 2000. According to our local jurisdiction survey, we 

estimate that 37 percent of large jurisdictions bought or leased new voting 

equipment since 2000, compared with 21 percent of medium jurisdictions 

and 12 percent of small jurisdictions, where the differences between large 

jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant. 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Paper ballota Lever

machinec Precinct countpunch card

Central count

punch cardb

Precinct count

optical scan

Central count

optical scanb

DREa

Percentage of jurisdictions

Predominant voting method

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

1

20

30

21

24

8

27

39

28

6

9

14

1

3

15

2 2

6

41

3

0
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 296 GAO-06-450 Elections

Furthermore, on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 

at least one-fifth of jurisdictions plan to acquire DRE or optical scan 

equipment before the 2006 general election.4

 Both large and medium 

jurisdictions are more likely to have plans to acquire DREs before the 

November 2006 general election (estimated at 34 percent each) than small 

jurisdictions (estimated at 13 percent), while small jurisdictions are more 

likely to have plans to acquire precinct count optical scan voting equipment 

(estimated at 28 percent) than medium or large jurisdictions (estimated at 

17 percent and 15 percent, respectively). In general, fewer jurisdictions 

expected to acquire central count optical scan voting equipment than the 

other two voting methods, although the differences were not statistically 

significant. The percentages of jurisdictions planning to acquire the newer 

voting systems before the next general election are shown in figure 56 by 

the size of jurisdiction.

4

Jurisdictions could identify more than one voting method to be acquired. 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 297 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 56: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions with Plans to Acquire Particular 

Voting Systems before the November 2006 General Election

a

The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and large jurisdictions are statistically 

significant. The 95 percent confidence interval for large jurisdictions planning to acquire DREs is +/- 8 

percentage points.

b

The difference between small jurisdictions and medium jurisdictions is statistically significant.

c

The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions is statistically significant.

Another interesting pattern emerged in voting methods between November 

2000 and November 2004 at the statewide level. Thirty-seven states 

reported that at least 1 jurisdiction used lever machine or punch card 

voting equipment for the November 2000 general election. By the time of 

the November 2004 general election, the number of states that continued to 

employ these voting methods decreased to 28. Specifically, our state survey 

results show that 9 states reported that they completed replacement of all 

their punch card or lever voting equipment before the November 2004 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Precinct count

optical scanc Central countoptical scanb

DREa

Percentage of jurisdictions

Voting method to be acquired

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

13

34 34

11

15

4

28

17

15
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 298 GAO-06-450 Elections

general election, and 4 other states reported that they completed their 

replacements since the 2004 election. Of the remaining 24 states that 

reported using the punch card and lever methods in 2000 but had not yet 

replaced them at the time of our survey, 18 reported that they planned to 

replace all punch card and lever voting equipment by the November 2006 

general election, while 3 planned to replace a portion of their equipment by 

then. One state reported no replacement plans prior to the November 2006 

general election. Figure 57 summarizes the states’ progress and plans for 

replacing punch card and lever voting equipment. 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 299 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 57: State-Reported Status of Lever and Punch Card Voting Equipment in 

2000, 2004, and 2006

Used for November 2000 general election

Did not use for November 2000 general election

Plans to use for November 2006 general election

Plans not to use for November 2006 general election

Don’t know

Used for November 2004 general election

Did not use for November 2004 general election 

Sources: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials and follow-up with 2 states for clarification of responses (analysis), 

MapArt (map).

2004

Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C.

2000

2006
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 300 GAO-06-450 Elections

Our local jurisdiction survey provided insight into jurisdictions’ plans for 

acquiring technology-based voting methods and the time frames for 

executing these plans, which may increase the predominance of these 

methods in future elections. Specifically, we estimate that 25 percent of 

local jurisdictions are planning to acquire precinct count optical scan 

machines by the November 2006 general election, 19 percent expect to 

acquire DREs by then, and about 7 percent plan to acquire central count 

optical scan equipment before that election.5

 In addition, we estimate that 

between 4 and 10 percent of local jurisdictions had plans to acquire 

additional equipment in each of these voting methods but had not set a 

target date for doing so at the time of our survey.6

During visits to election jurisdictions across the country, local election 

officials explained some of their motivations behind plans to acquire DRE 

or optical scan voting equipment. For example, election officials in 

6 jurisdictions cited HAVA as the reason for purchasing new DRE 

equipment, particularly HAVA’s requirement that each voting place have at 

least one voting method that is accessible to persons with disabilities, as 

we discussed earlier in chapter 4.7

 More specifically, officials in 1 large 

jurisdiction in Connecticut said that they would evaluate the use of DREs 

to meet HAVA accessibility requirements before deciding whether to 

purchase more DREs in time for the November 2006 general election. 

Election officials from 5 other jurisdictions stated that they planned to 

purchase new voting equipment to provide a VVPT, a requirement levied by 

3 of the 14 states we visited (Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico). Officials 

from 5 other jurisdictions said that they expected to acquire new voting 

equipment but did not give a reason and, in some cases, did not yet know 

what type of equipment they would obtain. Officials in jurisdictions that did 

not plan to purchase new voting equipment told us that their existing 

equipment was sufficient or that budget constraints prevented the 

acquisition of new equipment, among other reasons.

5

Some jurisdictions may be planning to acquire equipment for more than one voting method.

6

We also estimate that about one-fourth of jurisdictions did not know whether they planned 

to acquire DRE or optical scan voting equipment in time for the 2006 general election.

7

HAVA § 301(a)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(3)).
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 301 GAO-06-450 Elections

More Jurisdictions Used 

Several Voting Methods

As for the 2000 general election, some jurisdictions used multiple voting 

methods to support the 2004 general election, and some of these methods 

were more widely used than others for particular types of voting. In our 

October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide, we 

reported that 5 percent of jurisdictions used more than one voting method.8

On the basis of our 2005 local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 

21 percent of jurisdictions used more than one voting method in the 

November 2004 general election, with the most common combination of 

methods being central count optical scan with paper ballot (estimated to be 

5 percent of jurisdictions).9

 Other common combinations in 2004 were 

lever machine with paper ballot (4 percent) and DRE with paper ballot 

(3 percent). DRE with central count optical scan was one of numerous 

other combinations used by 2 percent or less of local jurisdictions. Figure 

58 shows the estimated proportion of jurisdictions with the most prevalent 

single and combination voting methods.

8

GAO-02-3.

9

The percentage of jurisdictions reported for the November 2000 general election was based 

on GAO analysis of data from Election Data Services and states; the current estimate of 

jurisdictions is based on our 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions. Some of the 

differences may be due to differences in these methods.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 302 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 58: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Used Single and 

Multiple Voting Methods in the November 2004 General Election

Note: Percentages for single and multiple voting methods do not add to 100 because of rounding.

The specific mix of voting methods used can also be viewed with respect to 

particular types of voting (e.g., absentee, early, provisional) that were 

supported in the 2004 election. In this regard, some voting methods were 

applied to a particular type of voting more frequently than others. We 

estimate that paper ballot was the most widely used voting method for 

9%

All other combinations

1%

DRE

3%

DRE and paper

Optical scan

Central count optical scan and paper

Lever and paper

Paper ballot

3%

Punch card

2%

Lever

5%

29%

Source: GAO analysis of GAO’s 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

45%

4%

Single voting method

Multiple voting methods
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 303 GAO-06-450 Elections

absentee voting (36 percent of jurisdictions), provisional voting 

(18 percent), and early voting (8 percent). Precinct count optical scan 

(shown in fig. 59) was generally the second most widely used voting 

method for these types of voting (24 percent of jurisdictions for absentee, 

10 percent for provisional, and 5 percent for early voting, respectively), 

while central count optical scan was the third most widely used method 

(20 percent of jurisdictions for absentee, 9 percent for provisional, and 

5 percent for early voting, respectively). 

Figure 59: Precinct Count Optical Scan Voting Equipment

Jurisdictions’ Voting 

Methods Were Influenced by 

the States and HAVA

Most states have generally exercised influence over the voting methods 

used by their respective elections jurisdictions through a range of 

approaches. In particular, for our state survey, a majority of states (32) and 

the District of Columbia said that they restricted the voting methods 

employed by local jurisdictions in the 2004 election either by requiring the 

use of one specific method (10 states and the District of Columbia) or 

providing a list of approved voting methods for the jurisdiction to select 

from (22 states). An alternate approach reported by 10 states was to require 

local jurisdictions to obtain state approval when selecting a voting method. 

The remaining 8 states said that local jurisdictions chose the voting method 

they used without any state involvement.

Source: GAO.

Precinct count optical scan voting equipment at the warehouse (left), polling location (center), 

and tabulation facility (right). 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 304 GAO-06-450 Elections

In addition to affecting the choice of voting methods, 16 states and the 

District of Columbia reported that they were involved to some extent in 

local jurisdiction efforts to acquire voting systems, components, and 

services. For example, 1 state reported that it evaluated voting equipment 

options and vendors, and then contracted with a single vendor to supply 

voting equipment for all jurisdictions in the state. Jurisdictions within this 

state then had the option of purchasing additional voting equipment from 

this vendor, as needed. The top map of figure 60 shows the role of each 

state in the selection of specific voting methods for jurisdictions in the 2004 

general election.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 305 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 60: State-Reported Involvement in the Use of Specific Voting Methods in the 

2004 and 2006 General Elections

State will not be involved in method selection

State will require method chosen by local jurisdictions to be approved by the state

State will provide list of voting methods from which local jurisdictions will be required to choose

State will require local jurisdictions to use one specific voting method

State was not involved in method selection

State required method chosen by local jurisdictions to be approved by the state

State provided list of voting methods from which local jurisdictions were required to choose

State required local jurisdictions to use one specific voting method

Sources: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials (analysis), MapArt (map).

2004

2006

Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 306 GAO-06-450 Elections

Responses to our state survey indicate that state influence over the voting 

methods to be used in the November 2006 general election will continue to 

increase. Four additional states planned to require the use of a single voting 

method statewide, which will bring the total number of states doing so to 

14, and the District of Columbia will do so as well. Also, 5 additional states 

reported that they will require local jurisdictions to select a voting method 

or methods from a state-approved list, bringing this total to 27; 8 states 

intended to continue to allow local jurisdictions to select their voting 

methods with state approval. Only 1 state was not expecting to be involved 

in decisions on voting methods for its jurisdictions for 2006. The bottom 

map of figure 60 shows the role of each state in the selection of specific 

voting methods for jurisdictions in the 2006 general election.

Consistent with state survey responses indicating their contributions to 

local jurisdictions’ selection of voting methods and on the basis of our local 

jurisdiction survey, one of the most frequent factors that influenced the 

16 percent of local jurisdictions that bought or leased new voting 

equipment since the November 2000 general election was state 

requirements or certification of the equipment (an estimated 83 percent of 

the 16 percent of jurisdictions that bought or leased the new voting 

equipment). Other widely influential factors included ease of equipment 

use (91 percent), vendor demonstrations (72 percent), and affordability 

(68 percent). In contrast, local requirements and HAVA funding were less 

influential factors for local jurisdictions’ acquisition of voting equipment 

(44 percent and 45 percent of jurisdictions, respectively). (See fig. 61.)
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 307 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 61: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions Identifying Factors That Influenced Buying or Leasing Voting 

Equipment since the 2000 General Election

Note: These percentages represent responses from the estimated 16 percent of our sample of local 

jurisdictions that responded to our local jurisdiction survey that they bought or leased new voting 

equipment for the 2004 general election or later. The 95 percent confidence interval for values in all 

categories is +/- 13 percentage points or less.

HAVA has also influenced state and local decisions regarding particular 

voting methods through mechanisms to encourage the adoption of 

technology. Among other things, HAVA provided funds to states to replace 

punch card and lever voting equipment with other voting methods (Section 

102 funds).10 During fiscal year 2003, the General Services Administration 

Percentage of jurisdictions

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Local requirements

HAVA funding

Perception of success

State funding

Cost effectiveness or

HAVA requirements

System or vendor

Affordability

Vendor demonstrations

State requirements

Voter ease of use

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Factors in buying or leasing voting systems

 or certification

 performance elsewhere

performance of prior system

 or failure elsewhere

91

83

72

68

63

59 59

51 48

45 44

10HAVA § 102 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15302). HAVA § 101(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 

15301(b)) and HAVA § 102(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15302(a)(2)) govern the use of HAVA 

Title I funds. 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 308 GAO-06-450 Elections

(GSA) reported distributing about $300 million to 30 states that applied for 

these funds. Figure 62 depicts an overview of the funds distributed to states 

specifically to replace lever machines and punch card voting equipment.

(Fig. 57 presented an overview of states’ progress in replacing lever and 

punch card voting equipment.) In responding to our state survey, 24 of the 

30 states reported that they had invested at least a portion of these funds to 

replace lever or punch card voting equipment as of August 1, 2005. 

Figure 62: Federal Payments to States in Fiscal Year 2003 under HAVA to Replace 

Lever and Punch Card Voting Equipment

Note: These figures represent lower limits on payments for replacement of lever and punch card voting 

equipment as made under HAVA Section 102. States may use additional HAVA funding obtained under 

HAVA Section 101 for voting equipment replacement or upgrade. However, these uses have not been 

separately tracked or reported by EAC or GSA to date.

In addition to the funding that HAVA earmarked for voting equipment 

replacement, states could also apply for other HAVA funds that could be 

No payment

Up to $10 million

$10 million or more

Sources: GAO analysis of EAC data (analysis), MapArt (map).

Washington, D.C.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 309 GAO-06-450 Elections

used for multiple purposes, including replacement or upgrade of voting 

systems (Section 101 funds).11 In its 2004 annual report, EAC reported that 

almost $344 million had been distributed to each of the 50 states and the 

District of Columbia under this multiple purpose funding category. In all, 

44 states and the District of Columbia reported in our state survey that they 

had spent or obligated funds from one or both of these HAVA funding 

sources in order to improve, acquire, lease, modify, or replace voting 

systems and related technology. EAC requires states to submit detailed 

annual reports on the use of those funds but has not yet compiled data from 

the state reports about spending for voting equipment covered in HAVA 

Section 101. 

Besides authorizing funding for changes to voting methods, HAVA also has 

the potential to influence voting methods through new requirements for the 

usability and accountability of voting systems. Among other things, HAVA 

requires that voting systems used in federal elections provide voters with 

ballot verification and correction capabilities by January 1, 2006, including

• the opportunity to verify their ballots in a private and independent 

manner before they are cast; 

• the ability to change their ballots or correct any error in a private and 

independent manner before the ballots are cast and counted; and

• the capability to both notify the voter whenever more than one 

candidate has been selected for a single office and correct the 

ballots.12

HAVA also requires voting equipment to generate a permanent paper record 

with manual audit capacity as an official record of the election.13

Our October 2001 report on election processes described how voting 

methods varied in their ability to support features such as error

11HAVA § 101(b)(1)(F) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15301).

12HAVA § 301(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(1)).

13HAVA § 301(a)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(2)). HAVA requirements for maximum 

error rates in counting ballots are discussed in the section on voting system performance, 

which follows.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 310 GAO-06-450 Elections

identification and correction for voters.14 With regard to minimizing voter 

error at the polls, our local jurisdiction survey for the 2004 general election 

found that, for instance, voters were provided the opportunity to correct a 

ballot or exchange a spoiled ballot for a new one in most jurisdictions, and 

such capabilities were largely available for all voting methods. Our 

estimates of the availability of ballot correction capabilities range from 

100 percent15 (for jurisdictions whose predominant voting method was 

central count punch cards) to 70 percent (for jurisdictions predominantly 

using DREs).16 However, the differences among these voting methods were 

not statistically significant. Figure 63 shows one approach that allows 

voters to verify and correct their ballots using a particular voting method 

(DRE).

Figure 63: Example of DRE Instructions and Equipment

14GAO-02-3.

15The 95 percent confidence interval for this value is between 100 percent and 89 percent.

16The 95 percent confidence interval for DREs is +13 or -15 percentage points. 

Source: GAO.

DRE voting instructions (left), DRE voting unit (right). 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 311 GAO-06-450 Elections

With regard to voting equipment that generated a permanent paper record 

with a manual audit capability for election audits in the 2004 general 

election (including solutions such as VVPT), we estimate that few 

jurisdictions that used DREs had this capability.17 Specifically, from our 

local jurisdiction survey, a small proportion of jurisdictions that used DREs 

for the 2004 election had manual audit capabilities such as VVPT 

(estimated at 8 percent of DRE jurisdictions)18 or printing of ballot images 

(11 percent of DRE jurisdictions).19 An estimated 52 percent of 

jurisdictions using DREs had equipment that produced an internal paper 

record that was not voter-verifiable.20 With this limited implementation of 

HAVA-related capabilities in the 2004 general election, it appears that most 

of the voting system and election process changes to comply with these 

specific HAVA usability and accountability requirements will need to be 

satisfied by jurisdictions for the 2006 general election.

Voting Equipment 

Performance Was Not 

Consistently Measured 

during the 2004 

General Election, but 

Estimated Levels of 

Performance 

Satisfaction Were High

Voting system performance can be viewed in terms of accuracy, reliability, 

and efficiency. Accuracy refers to how frequently the equipment 

completely and correctly records and counts votes; reliability refers to a 

system’s ability to perform as intended, regardless of circumstances; and 

efficiency refers to how quickly a given vote can be cast and counted. 

Performance in each of these areas depends not only on how well a given 

voting system was designed and developed, but also on the procedures 

governing its operation and maintenance and the people who use and 

operate it. Thus, it is important that system performance be measured 

during an election when the system is being used and operated according 

to defined procedures by voters and election workers. As we have 

previously reported in our October 2001 report on election processes, 

17Jurisdictions that used optical scan, punch card, and paper ballot voting methods were not 

included in our survey responses on manual audit capabilities because they already provide 

a key component for manual audits—a paper record created by the voter. Jurisdictions that 

used lever machines were not included in survey responses because the machines are no 

longer manufactured.

18The 95 percent confidence interval for VVPT in DRE jurisdictions is +9 or -6 percentage 

points.

19The 95 percent confidence interval for printing of ballot images in DRE jurisdictions is +6 

or -5 percentage points.

20The 95 percent confidence interval for internal paper records that were not voter-verifiable 

in DRE jurisdictions is +/- 13 percentage points.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 312 GAO-06-450 Elections

measuring how well voting systems perform during a given election allows 

local election officials to better position themselves for ensuring that 

elections are conducted effectively and efficiently.21 Such measurement 

also provides the basis for knowing where performance needs, 

requirements, and expectations are not being met so that timely corrective 

action can be taken.

HAVA recognized the importance of voting system performance by 

specifying requirements for error rates in voting systems and providing for 

updates to the federal voting system standards, including the performance 

components of those standards. Moreover, according to our local 

jurisdiction survey, most local jurisdictions adopted performance 

standards for the 2004 general election—usually standards selected by 

their respective states.22 As was the case for the 2000 general election, 

jurisdictions collected various types of voting system performance 

measures for the 2004 general election, although some types of measures 

were collected by fewer jurisdictions than others—in part because they 

were not well suited to particular voting methods. Furthermore, from our 

local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the vast majority of all 

jurisdictions were very satisfied or satisfied with their systems’ 

performance during the 2004 general election, even though performance 

data may not have been collected to an extent that would provide firm 

support for these views.

HAVA Has Increased the 

Focus on Voting System 

Performance

In our October 2001 report on voting equipment standards, we reported 

that the national voluntary voting system standards being used by some 

states and local jurisdictions at that time were originally approved in 199023

and were thus out of date.24 Among other things, these standards identified 

minimum functional and performance thresholds for voting systems in 

terms of accuracy, reliability, and efficiency. In 2002, the Federal Election 

Commission updated these standards and, in doing so, provided new or 

21GAO-02-3.

22Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded 

from this survey question.

23Federal Election Commission, Performance and Test Standards for Punchcard, 

Marksense, and Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems, Jan. 1990.

24GAO, Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards, GAO-02-52

(Washington, D.C.: Oct.15, 2001).
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 313 GAO-06-450 Elections

enhanced coverage of certain performance requirements for, among other 

things,25

• voting system components that define, develop, and maintain 

election databases; perform election definition and setup functions; 

format ballots; count votes; consolidate and report results; and 

maintain records to support vote recounts;

• direct feedback to the voter that indicates when an undervote or 

overvote is detected in DRE and paper-based voting systems that 

encompass punch cards and optical scan;

• system standards to meet the needs of voters with disabilities, 

including specific standards for DREs; and

• strengthened election record requirements to address a range of 

election management functions, including such functions such as 

ballot definition and election programming.

HAVA further focused attention on voting system performance by 

establishing a performance requirement for systems used in elections for 

federal offices and by providing for updates to federal voting system 

standards. Specifically, HAVA required that voting systems used in federal 

elections comply with error rate standards specified in the 2002 federal 

voting system standards.26 Under these standards, the maximum 

acceptable error rate during testing is 1 in 500,000 ballot positions.27 In 

addition, HAVA directed EAC to revise the voluntary national voting system 

standards, and to test, certify, decertify, and recertify voting system 

hardware and software with respect to national voting system standards 

using accredited testing laboratories. 

25Federal Election Commission, Voting System Performance and Test Standards, 2002.

26HAVA § 301(a)(5) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(5)). 

27The law did not specify whether the accuracy standards are to be measured in a test 

environment or an operational environment. However, the standard itself specifies a test 

environment.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 314 GAO-06-450 Elections

Most Jurisdictions Adopted 

Voting System Performance 

Standards, but Collection of 

Performance Measures 

Varied by Jurisdiction Size 

and Voting Method 

On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that the vast 

majority of jurisdictions that used some type of automated voting 

equipment on Election Day generally established written standards for the 

performance of their voting equipment for the November 2004 general 

election.28 Of these, most jurisdictions (an estimated 77 percent) had 

adopted their state’s standards or requirements pertaining to voting system 

performance, although a few had adopted performance standards from a 

source other than their state (10 percent) or developed their own 

(8 percent).29 The apparently high adoption rate for standards among states 

and local jurisdictions is important because it indicates broad acceptance 

of a basic management tool needed for systematic performance 

measurement and evaluation.

Consistent with our results on voting system performance measurement 

from our October 2001 report on election processes,30 estimates from our 

local jurisdiction survey indicated that jurisdictions used several specific 

measures that could be generally grouped into the areas of accuracy, 

reliability, and efficiency to assess the performance of their voting systems 

for the 2004 general election. However, jurisdictions measured how well 

their systems actually performed in the 2004 election to varying degrees. In 

the discussion below, we compare jurisdictions’ collection of selected 

information on voting system performance for the 2000 and 2004 general 

elections, and then examine jurisdictions’ performance monitoring in each 

of the three performance areas.

On the basis of on our local jurisdiction surveys for the 2000 and 2004 

elections, we estimate that about 50 percent of jurisdictions collected 

performance information in both elections using three measures—

accuracy, undervotes, and overvotes. The percentage of jurisdictions that 

collected information on a fourth performance measure—average time to 

vote—was much smaller (estimated at 10 percent or less). The differences 

28Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded 

from this survey question.

29Fourteen percent of the jurisdictions that adopted standards for the 2004 election did not 

know the source of the performance standards that they had adopted. Responses for these 

categories do not add to 100 percent because respondents were allowed to select multiple 

items for this question.

30GAO-02-3.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 315 GAO-06-450 Elections

between estimates for the two elections are not statistically significant.31

Figure 64 shows the percentages of jurisdictions that collected these 

performance measures for the 2000 and 2004 general elections.

31Differences in overall estimates from the 2001 and 2005 GAO surveys of local election 

jurisdictions are, in part, likely due to differences in the sample designs of the two surveys 

and how local election jurisdictions that were minor civil divisions were selected. Because 

of these sample design differences, comparing only election jurisdictions that are counties 

provides a stronger basis for making direct comparisons between the two surveys' results. 

The estimates compared in this report are of the county local election jurisdictions only; for 

this reason, some estimates from the 2001 survey are slightly different than the overall 

sample estimates provided in our prior report (GAO-02-3). For these comparisons, the 95 

percent confidence interval is +/- 5 percentage points or less for the 2001 survey estimates 

and +/- 8 percentage points or less for the 2005 survey estimates.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 316 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 64: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Voting System 

Performance Information for the 2000 and 2004 General Elections

Note: These estimates include only county election jurisdiction subgroup comparisons between the 

2001 and 2005 surveys. See appendix V for further details about sampling differences between the 

surveys.

Accuracy In the area of accuracy, we estimate that 42 percent of jurisdictions overall 

monitored the accuracy of voting equipment in the 2004 general election.32

Other widely used measures of accuracy in the 2004 general election were 

spoiled ballots (estimated at 50 percent of jurisdictions),33 undervotes 

(50 percent of jurisdictions), and overvotes (49 percent of jurisdictions). 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Average time

to vote

Accuracy Undervotes Overvotes

Percentage of jurisdictions

Sources: 2000 data: GAO 2001 survey of local election jurisdictions; 2004 data: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Performance measure

2000

2004

50

55

52

57

46

54

10

5

32An estimated 38 percent of respondents selected “not applicable” to the question on 

accuracy of voting equipment in their survey response.

33An estimated 25 percent of respondents selected “not applicable” to the question on 

spoiled/ruined ballots in their survey response.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 317 GAO-06-450 Elections

During our visits to local jurisdictions, election officials in several 

jurisdictions told us that measuring overvotes was not a relevant 

performance indicator for jurisdictions using lever machines and DREs 

because neither permits overvoting. Election officials in several local 

jurisdictions we visited also told us that undervotes were not a meaningful 

metric because most voters focused on a limited range of issues or 

candidates and thus frequently chose not to vote on all contests. 

Jurisdictions’ collection of the accuracy measures we studied for the 2004 

general election varied according to jurisdiction size, with small 

jurisdictions generally less likely to collect these measures than other 

jurisdiction sizes. Both large jurisdictions (an estimated 66 percent) and 

medium jurisdictions (54 percent) were significantly more likely than small 

jurisdictions (31 percent) to collect data on vote count accuracy. In 

addition, large jurisdictions (65 percent) were significantly more likely than 

small jurisdictions (47 percent) to collect data on undervotes.(See fig. 65.) 

This disparity may be due to the proportion of smaller jurisdictions that use 

paper ballots and for whom collection of these data would be a manual, 

time-consuming process.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 318 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 65: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on 

Voting Accuracy for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size

a

The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and large jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

b

The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions in these categories is +/- 6 percentage 

points.

c

The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions is statistically significant. The 95 

percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/- 6 percentage points.

Reliability In the area of reliability, we estimate that 15 percent of jurisdictions 

measured the reliability of their voting equipment in terms of pieces of 

equipment that failed, and 11 percent measured equipment downtime.34

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Undervotesc Overvotes Spoiled ballot b s Accuracya b

Percentage of jurisdictions

Accuracy measures collected

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

31

54

66

49

53

56

46

56

58

47

55

65

34An estimated 66 percent of respondents selected the response “not applicable” for the 

survey questions on measurement of pieces of equipment that failed and equipment 

downtime.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 319 GAO-06-450 Elections

As with accuracy, a higher percentage of large and medium jurisdictions 

collected such reliability data than small jurisdictions, and in the case of 

equipment failures, there were statistically significant differences in the 

collection of this information among different sizes of jurisdictions. 

(See fig. 66.) Importantly, an estimated 55 percent of all jurisdictions kept a 

written record of issues and problems that occurred on Election Day, 

which could be a potential source of reliability data. 

Figure 66: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on 

Voting Equipment Reliability for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size

a

The differences between all categories of jurisdiction size are statistically significant.

Collection of reliability data for automated voting equipment was also 

related to the predominant voting method used by a jurisdiction, with 

jurisdictions that predominantly used DREs more likely to collect 

reliability data than those that used optical scan voting methods. 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Equipment

downtime

Equipment

failuresa

Percentage of jurisdictions

Reliability measures collected

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

8

28

59

5

23

30
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 320 GAO-06-450 Elections

An estimated 45 percent of jurisdictions whose predominant method was 

DREs collected information on the number of pieces of voting equipment 

that failed. The next most frequently collected information on machine 

failures was for precinct count optical scan systems (an estimated 

23 percent of jurisdictions) and central count optical scan systems 

(an estimated 10 percent). The differences in data collection on equipment 

failures among jurisdictions that predominantly used DREs and those that 

used precinct count optical scan or central count optical scan voting 

methods are statistically significant. (See fig. 67.)
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 321 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 67: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on 

Voting Equipment Failures for the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting 

Method

Note: The differences between DRE and both central count and precinct count optical scan voting 

methods are statistically significant.

a

The 95 percent confidence interval for DRE is +/- 13 percentage points.

b

The 95 percent confidence interval for central count optical scan percentages is +7 or -5 percentage 

points. 

c

The 95 percent confidence interval for precinct count optical scan percentages is +8 or -7 percentage 

points. 

Efficiency In the area of efficiency, we estimate that 13 percent of jurisdictions 

measured their voting system’s speed of counting votes, 17 percent 

measured the time it took for election workers to set up equipment, and 

4 percent measured the average length of time it took for voters to cast 

ballots on Election Day. Large jurisdictions (34 percent) were significantly 

more likely than were both medium jurisdictions (19 percent) and small 

jurisdictions (9 percent) to collect information on counting speed. There 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Precinct count

optical scanc

Central count

optical scanb

DREa

Percentage of jurisdictions

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Predominant voting methods

45

23

10
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 322 GAO-06-450 Elections

were no significant differences for other efficiency measures by 

jurisdiction size. (See fig. 68.) 

Figure 68: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Collected Information on 

Voting System Efficiency for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size

a

The differences between all categories of jurisdiction size are statistically significant.

It is worth noting that for several types of performance measures in our 

local jurisdiction survey, jurisdiction size was a factor in whether system 

performance information was collected. Generally, large jurisdictions were 

most likely to record voting system performance and small jurisdictions 

were least likely, with medium jurisdictions in between. Moreover, large 

jurisdictions were more likely to keep a written record of issues or 

problems that occurred on Election Day. Specifically, on the basis of our 

local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 79 percent of large jurisdictions 

kept such records, compared with 59 percent of medium jurisdictions and 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Counting

speeda Election Dayvote time

Equipment

setup time

Percentage of jurisdictions

Efficiency measures collected

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

9

19

34

14

23 24

2

8 7
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 323 GAO-06-450 Elections

52 percent of small jurisdictions.35 The differences between large 

jurisdictions and both medium and small jurisdictions are statistically 

significant. The responsibilities for monitoring or reporting voting system 

performance most often rested with local jurisdictions. On the basis of our 

local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 83 percent of local jurisdictions 

had local officials responsible for performance monitoring or reporting, 

while states or other organizations (such as independent consultants or 

vendors) held such responsibilities in 11 percent and 13 percent of 

jurisdictions, respectively. 

Information obtained during our visits to local election jurisdictions was 

generally consistent with the above estimates from our local jurisdiction 

survey. For example, election officials in the 28 jurisdictions we visited 

most frequently cited number of undervotes (14 jurisdictions), overvotes 

(10 jurisdictions), and equipment failures (10 jurisdictions) as types of 

performance metrics collected. Another collected metric (cited by election 

officials in 6 jurisdictions we visited) was equipment speed, measured in 

terms of how fast the voting equipment downloaded vote totals or 

transmitted totals to its central count location, and the time required to 

cast a vote (reported by election officials in 4 jurisdictions, although 

officials in 2 of these 4 jurisdictions limited their measurements to early 

voting). Another measurement that election officials in some jurisdictions 

told us they collected was comments from poll workers and voters on the 

efficiency of the equipment. For instance, an election official in a large 

jurisdiction in Georgia told us that poll workers commented that it took 

20 minutes to vote using the voting equipment’s audio feature. In addition, 

election officials in several jurisdictions that we visited told us that they 

had established performance management programs for their voting 

systems. For example, election officials in 1 jurisdiction reported that they 

collected data on the time it took to vote to better allocate its voting 

equipment to various locations. Officials in a large jurisdiction in Kansas 

said they had conducted a survey of voters concerning their satisfaction 

with the ease of use of voting equipment during the 2004 general election 

and determined that they were very satisfied. 

35The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/- 6 percentage points.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 324 GAO-06-450 Elections

Local Jurisdictions Were 

Generally Satisfied with 

Their Voting Systems in 

2004, although Some 

Problems Were Reported

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that 

96 percent of local jurisdictions nationwide were satisfied with the 

performance of the voting equipment during the November 2000 general 

election. On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey for the 2004 general 

election, we estimate that election officials were generally satisfied with 

their voting system performance. Estimated satisfaction varied for specific 

areas of voting system performance, ranging from relatively high levels for 

accuracy (78 percent), speed of vote counting (73 percent), time to set up 

equipment (63 percent), and number of spoiled or ruined ballots 

(61 percent), to relatively low levels for equipment failures (37 percent), 

and downtime (36 percent).36 Some of these measures may not be 

applicable to all jurisdictions, such as those using only hand-counted paper 

ballots. When jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots were 

excluded from our results, satisfaction levels were higher in all 

performance areas—accuracy (86 percent), speed of vote counting 

(83 percent), time to set up equipment (76 percent), number of spoiled 

ballots (68 percent), equipment failures (54 percent), and downtime 

(52 percent). However, even with the exclusion of paper ballot 

jurisdictions, “not applicable” responses were often selected by 

jurisdictions in the areas of equipment failures (41 percent not applicable) 

and downtime (43 percent not applicable). 

Also on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, for five of six satisfaction 

measures, we estimate that medium and large jurisdictions were satisfied 

or very satisfied with their voting systems more frequently than small 

jurisdictions and that most of these differences are statistically significant. 

These ratings may be related to the widespread use of paper ballots by 

small jurisdictions, where this voting method was predominant in an 

estimated 41 percent of jurisdictions. Figure 69 shows the frequency of 

satisfaction in each of six performance areas for large, medium, and small 

jurisdictions.

36Percentages represent the combination of “satisfied” or “very satisfied” responses for each 

survey question item.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 325 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 69: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Satisfied with Voting System Performance for the 2004 General Election, by 

Jurisdiction Size

Note: Satisfaction combines percentages with responses for “satisfied” or “very satisfied.” Jurisdictions 

that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded from this figure.

a

The differences between both small and medium jurisdictions and large jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

b

The differences between all categories of jurisdiction size are statistically significant.

c

The difference between small jurisdictions and medium jurisdictions is statistically significant.

d

The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and large jurisdictions are statistically 

significant.

e

The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and large jurisdictions are statistically 

significant. The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/- 7 percentage points.

f

The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/- 7 percentage points.

The estimated high satisfaction levels demonstrated across different voting 

system performance areas and jurisdiction sizes contrast with our lower 

estimates of the performance measures that were collected for the 2004 

general election. Although the reasons for moderate collection levels for 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Spoiled or

ruined ballotsf

Equipment

setup timee Accuracy ofcounting votesd

Speed of

counting votesc Equipmentdowntimeb

Equipment

failuresa

Percentage of jurisdictions

Performance area

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

47

60

81

42

62

79 78

91

87

79

96 95

70

86

67

86

70

64
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 326 GAO-06-450 Elections

performance measures are unclear, jurisdictions that may not have 

collected performance data or may have considered such information not 

applicable to their situation may lack sufficient insight into their system 

operations to adequately support their satisfaction in the variety of 

performance areas we surveyed. 

Local election officials at most of the 28 jurisdictions we visited also 

expressed satisfaction with the performance of their voting systems or 

method. For example,

• Election officials in several jurisdictions using optical scan systems 

stated that they were pleased with their equipment because it 

produced a paper trail and permitted fast processing. Officials in 

1 large jurisdiction in Florida added that their use of the same 

equipment over several elections made it easy for voters to use the 

equipment in both 2000 and 2004. 

• Election officials in several other jurisdictions using DREs told us 

that their equipment was easy to use and provided results that were 

accurate and timely. Officials in 1 large jurisdiction in New Jersey 

reported that, in contrast to paper ballots, DREs do not require poll 

workers to interpret a voter’s ballot. 

• Election officials in a large Connecticut jurisdiction using lever 

machines said that voters were happy with the equipment and that it 

had worked well for over 60 years. They emphasized that the 

simplicity and transparency of the equipment’s counting mechanisms 

gave voters confidence that their votes would be counted correctly.

• Election officials in a small New Hampshire jurisdiction using paper 

ballots reported that they had used the same hand-counted paper 

ballot system for decades and it has been very cost-effective for the 

small population of voters in the jurisdiction.

Overall, election officials in few of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited 

reported substantive performance issues, such as overvoting, undervoting, 

or equipment failure.

Although the estimated level of satisfaction with voting equipment 

performance in the 2004 general election was high overall, some 

dissatisfaction existed. On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we 

estimate that between 1 and 4 percent of jurisdictions were dissatisfied or 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 327 GAO-06-450 Elections

very dissatisfied with their voting systems in the 2004 general election for 

the six performance areas of our survey.

Our local jurisdiction survey provided additional insight into the role of 

voting equipment in jurisdictions’ dissatisfaction ratings. Of almost 

300 responses to our open-ended question about the issue or problem that 

occurred most frequently on Election Day, November 2004, fewer than 

20 responses were specifically related to voting equipment. The most 

frequent reason for voting system dissatisfaction was voting equipment 

malfunction. Ballot errors related to voting equipment were much less 

frequently mentioned.

Although such problems were rarely mentioned by election officials during 

our visits to local jurisdictions, some did describe a few reasons for 

dissatisfaction with voting equipment, including 

• the additional time required to count ballots using DREs versus the 

optical scan equipment previously used, 

• the perceived lower reliability and greater failure rates of DREs over 

the voting equipment used in the past,

• accuracy problems with DRE computer programs, and 

• difficulty in first-time poll worker operation and voter use of DREs. 

Election officials in a few jurisdictions we visited noted situations that 

required considerable effort to resolve. For example, as mentioned in our 

discussion of vote counting in chapter 6, election officials in a North 

Carolina jurisdiction told us that 4,235 ballots were lost by one of the DREs 

used for early voting because the software manufacturer had not installed 

an upgrade that would have allowed the machine to record up to 10,000 

ballots rather than its original limit of 3,500 ballots. The machine continued 

to show the number of people who voted on the machine after 3,500 ballots 

had been cast, but did not store the results of their ballots. As a result, the 

jurisdiction switched to hand-counted paper ballots for elections after the 

2004 general election until its state can approve a new automated system 

for use. Given the real and potential impacts of situations where 

dissatisfaction was reported, systematic collection and analysis of 

performance information may help provide election officials with objective 

support for decisions to improve the operation and upgrade of these 

systems.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 328 GAO-06-450 Elections

Attention to Voting 

System Security 

Management 

Continues to Vary amid 

Published Concerns 

and Federal 

Improvement Efforts

Having secure voting systems is essential to maintaining public confidence 

in the election process, and accomplishing this is a shared responsibility 

among federal, state, and local jurisdiction authorities. Among other things, 

voting system security involves ensuring that technical security controls 

embedded in voting equipment operate as intended, as well as ensuring 

that security policies and procedures governing the testing, operation, and 

use of the systems are properly defined and implemented by state and local 

election officials. 

Our October 2001 report on election processes identified voting system 

security challenges facing local jurisdictions, such as consistent 

application of controls and adequacy of resources.37 HAVA recognized 

some of these challenges by requiring specific system security controls and 

providing improved security management guidance. Nevertheless, while 

we estimate from our local survey that most jurisdictions have assigned 

responsibility for voting system security to individuals and implemented 

certain security controls, the nature and extent of their respective security 

efforts and activities varied widely. In particular, according to our state 

survey, estimates from our local jurisdiction survey, and visits to 

jurisdictions, there are differences across jurisdictions in the (1) adoption 

of system security standards, with some states requiring jurisdictions to 

use outdated standards for voting systems; (2) reported implementation of 

system security controls; and (3) testing performed to ensure that security 

controls are functioning properly. For instance, we estimate on the basis of 

our local jurisdiction survey that at least 19 percent of local jurisdictions 

nationwide (excluding jurisdictions that reported using paper ballots) did 

not conduct security testing for the systems they used in the November 

2004 general election. In addition, 27 states reported in our state survey 

that they are requiring jurisdictions to apply federal standards to voting 

systems used for the first time in the November 2006 general election that 

are outdated, unspecified, or entail multiple versions. This variability in 

implementation and testing of controls is generally consistent with what 

we reported for the 2000 general election. Moreover, our September 2005 

report on the security and reliability of electronic voting highlighted 

substantial security issues and concerns for more modern electronic voting 

systems and reinforced the importance of effective security management.38

37GAO-02-3.

38GAO-05-956.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 329 GAO-06-450 Elections

HAVA Has Increased Focus 

on Voting System Security

HAVA recognized the importance of effective voting system security 

through two primary mechanisms. First, it required voting systems to 

produce a permanent paper record that provides a manual review 

capability and constitutes the official record for recounts by January 1, 

2006.39 The paper record can be compared with polling place records and 

voting system documentation to ensure that authorized ballots have been 

completely and accurately counted. Second, HAVA provided various means 

to assist states and localities in acquiring and operating secure voting 

systems. These include provisions for EAC to (1) update voting system 

standards for voting systems, including standards for security;40

(2) establish processes for accrediting voting system testing laboratories 

and conducting tests of voting systems against the standards;41 and 

(3) create a process for federal certification of voting systems that undergo 

the testing process.42 In doing so, HAVA created tools and resources that 

states and local jurisdictions can leverage when, for example, acquiring 

systems from vendors, conducting system testing, and operating and 

auditing voting systems. 

However, delays in establishing EAC and commission funding challenges 

resulted in the first update to the 2002 voluntary voting system standards, 

and its provisions for system security, not being approved until 

December 2005.43 Further, commission efforts to establish processes for 

accrediting testing laboratories, conducting testing, and certifying systems 

are still under way.

39HAVA § 301(a)(2)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(2)(B)).

40HAVA § 221 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15361).

41HAVA § 231 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15371).

42HAVA § 231 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15371).

43EAC was to be appointed by March 2003, but the appointment of EAC commissioners did 

not occur until December 13, 2003. The $1.2 million in funding received for fiscal year 2004 

supported limited activities. Significant startup funding was not received until fiscal year 

2005, when its budget was increased to $13.8 million. The largest portion of EAC’s 2005 

budget (31 percent) was allocated to improving voting technology, including $2.8 million for 

National Institute of Standards and Technology support to develop the Voluntary Voting 

System Guidelines.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 330 GAO-06-450 Elections

Efforts to Address System 

Security Continued to Vary 

Widely, and Jurisdictions 

Were Inconsistent in 

Following Common 

Security Practices 

As was the case for the November 2000 general election, the nature and 

extent of voting system security efforts and activities during the 2004 

election varied among jurisdictions. Moreover, these efforts and activities 

do not in all cases reflect the use of recommended system security 

management practices and current voting system security standards.

In our October 2001 report on election processes, we reported that 

jurisdictions had taken a number of steps to manage the security of their 

respective voting systems for the 2000 general election.44 In particular, we 

estimated that 89 percent of the local jurisdictions assigned responsibility 

for performing security-related functions to one or more individuals, and 

implemented some type of controls to protect their equipment during the 

election. Examples of implemented security controls included such 

physical controls as locks and surveillance, and such embedded controls as 

access restrictions and firewalls. However, we also reported in 2001 that an 

estimated 40 percent of the jurisdictions had not assessed the security 

threats and risks on which their controls were based,45 and 19 percent had 

not reviewed the sufficiency of their security controls. Moreover, the 

nature of established controls varied by type of system, and these controls 

were not uniformly followed across jurisdictions.46

For the November 2004 general election, jurisdictions addressed system 

security to varying degrees and through various means. At the foundation 

of these approaches, responsibilities for voting system and network 

security were distributed among local officials, the state, and third parties 

(e.g., independent consultants and vendors) in varying proportions. On the 

basis of our 2005 local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 90 percent of all 

jurisdictions (excluding those that used only hand-counted paper ballots on 

Election Day) specifically assigned responsibility for voting system

44GAO-02-3.

45Threats and risks to voting systems include loss of electronic voting data, loss or theft of 

ballots, and unauthorized access to software.

46Common security controls included (1) identification names and passwords to control 

access to voting equipment and software, (2) redundant storage media for recovery in the 

event of power or equipment failure, (3) encryption to ensure privacy of votes and 

confidentiality of election results, (4) audit trails to document the integrity of the voting 

process, and (5) hardware locks and seals to prevent unauthorized access to voting 

equipment components. 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 331 GAO-06-450 Elections

security in the 2004 general election.47 We estimate that 67 percent of these 

local jurisdictions assigned responsibilities for voting system and network 

security to local election officials, 14 percent relied on state officials to 

perform these responsibilities, and 24 percent assigned them to third 

parties.48 Moreover, this distribution varied somewhat according to 

jurisdiction size, with large jurisdictions depending on local officials the 

most and medium jurisdictions depending on local officials the least. 

Figure 70 shows how voting system and network security responsibilities 

were distributed among various parties for each size of jurisdiction. 

47Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded 

from this survey question.

48Jurisdictions may have identified more than one group with assigned security 

responsibilities.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 332 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 70: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Identified Security 

Responsibilities for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size

Note: Jurisdictions may have identified more than one group with assigned security responsibilities. 

Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded from this 

survey question.

a

The difference between medium jurisdictions and large jurisdictions is statistically significant. The 

95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/- 7 percentage points.

b

Others include third parties, such as independent consultants and vendors.

On the basis of our visits to local jurisdictions, the types of system security 

responsibilities and the groups that performed them further demonstrate 

the variation among security approaches and controls applied to voting 

systems. Specifically, election officials in these jurisdictions were typically 

responsible for implementing security controls, state officials were usually 

involved with developing security policy and guidance and monitoring local 

jurisdictions’ implementation of security, and third parties performed tasks 

such as ensuring adequate security of voting equipment during transport or 

storage. Table 24 shows examples of security tasks and the parties that 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Others S b Local election tate

officialsa

Percentage of jurisdictions

Responsibility for voting system security

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

57

70

14

80

15

12

23

27

19
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 333 GAO-06-450 Elections

performed them as reported to us by election officials in the jurisdictions 

that we visited.

Table 24: Voting System Security Tasks and Responsibilities for the 2004 General Election Reported by Election Officials in 

Jurisdictions Visited by GAO

Source: GAO analysis of documents provided by local jurisdictions we visited.

Responses to our state survey showed that both states and third parties 

participated in security responsibilities related to monitoring and 

evaluating security and privacy controls. Although the most frequently 

cited party responsible for this area was local officials (identified by 38 

states), just less than one-half of the states (22 states and the District of 

Columbia) reported that they had some level of responsibility for security 

monitoring and evaluation as well. In addition, 22 states responded that 

third parties (e.g., independent consultants or vendors) were involved in 

monitoring and evaluating controls. Overall, security monitoring and 

evaluation was performed by two or more entities in 26 of the states. 

Examples of voting system security tasks 

identified by local officials

Performing entity

Local officials State Third parties

Secure ballot programming X

Sealing of voted ballots X

Secure storage of voting equipment X X

(e.g., schools)

Video surveillance of stored equipment or ballots X

Access control to stored election materials X

Protection of voting equipment and materials during 

transport

X X

(e.g., law

enforcement officials)

Inventory management of voting equipment and 

ballots

X

Monitoring vote tallying systems for unauthorized 

connections

X

Impoundment of election materials after elections X

Monitoring or testing of equipment accuracy before, 

during, or after elections

X X X

Security awareness training for election personnel X X X

Certification of voting equipment X X

Development of security policies and guidance for 

local jurisdiction use

X X

Monitoring implementation of security policies X X
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 334 GAO-06-450 Elections

The use of certain security controls was similarly varied. On the basis of 

our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 59 percent of jurisdictions 

used power or battery backup, 67 percent used system access controls, 

91 percent used hardware locks and seals, and 52 percent used backup 

electronic storage for votes.49 We further estimate that 95 percent of 

jurisdictions used at least one of these controls, with hardware locks and 

seals being most consistently used across the automated voting methods 

associated with this survey question.50 Furthermore, we estimate that a 

lower percentage of small jurisdictions used power or battery backup and 

electronic backup storage of votes for their voting equipment than large or 

medium jurisdictions, and these differences are statistically significant in 

most cases. Figure 71 presents the use of various security controls by 

jurisdiction size. 

49Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded 

from this survey question.

50We were unable to reliably estimate percentages for jurisdictions whose predominant 

voting methods were central count punch card or precinct count punch card voting methods 

for all but one of these security controls. We estimate that 95 percent of jurisdictions whose 

predominant voting method was central count punch card used hardware locks and seals.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 335 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 71: Estimated Percentages of Jursidictions That Used Security Controls in 

the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size

Note: More than one type of security control may have been identified.

a

The difference between small jurisdictions and medium jurisdictions is statistically significant. The 95 

percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/- 8 percentage points.

b

The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/- 8 percentage points.

c

The differences between small jurisdictions and both medium and large jurisdictions are statistically 

significant. The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/- 8 percentage points.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Electronic

backup storagec Hardware

locks and seals

Access control Power or b

battery backupa

Percentage of jurisdictions

Voting system security controls

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

53

68 67

75

66 66

91 90

95

43

63

72
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 336 GAO-06-450 Elections

We estimate that a small percentage of local jurisdictions (10 percent) 

provided remote access to their voting systems for one or more categories 

of personnel—local election officials, state election officials, vendors, or 

other parties.51 Small jurisdictions, in particular, were less likely to provide 

remote access to their voting systems (estimated at 7 percent) than either 

medium jurisdictions (13 percent) or large jurisdictions (19 percent). The 

difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions is statistically 

significant. For each category of personnel—local officials, state election 

officials, vendors, or other parties—7 to 8 percent of jurisdictions did not 

know if remote access was available to their systems, a situation that could 

increase the risk of unauthorized access to these systems. Some of the 

jurisdictions responding to this survey question described a variety of 

protections to mitigate the risk of unauthorized remote access, including 

locally controlled passwords, passwords that change for each access, and 

local control of communications connections. 

Among the jurisdictions that we visited, election officials reported that 

various security measures were in use during the 2004 general election to 

safeguard voting equipment, ballots, and votes before, during, and after the 

election. However, the measures were not uniformly reported by officials in 

these jurisdictions, and officials in most jurisdictions reported that they did 

not have a security plan to document these measures or other aspects of 

their security program. The security controls most frequently cited by 

officials for the jurisdictions that we visited were locked storage of voting 

equipment and ballots, and monitoring of voting equipment. Other security 

measures mentioned during our visits included testing voting equipment 

before, during, or after the election to ensure that the equipment was 

accurately tallying votes; planning and conducting training on security 

issues and procedures for elections personnel; and video surveillance of 

stored ballots and voting equipment. Table 25 summarizes the types and 

frequency of security measures reported by election officials in the 

jurisdictions we visited.

51Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded 

from this survey question.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 337 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 25: Security Controls Reportedly Used in the 2004 General Election Reported 

by Election Officials in Jurisdictions Visited by GAO 

Source: GAO analysis of interviews from local jurisdictions we visited.

a

One or more jurisdictions we visited indicated this security control was not applicable because of the 

voting method used.

Notwithstanding this range of reported security controls that were used in 

the 2004 general election by jurisdictions we visited, jurisdictions’ activities 

and efforts for managing voting system security were not always in line 

with recommended system security practices. Our research of 

recommended practices shows that effective system security management 

involves having, among other things, (1) defined policies governing such 

system controls as authorized functions and access, and documented 

procedures for secure normal operations and incident management; 

(2) documented plans for implementing policies and procedures; 

(3) verified implementation of technical and procedural controls designed 

to reduce the risk of disruption, destruction, or unauthorized modification 

of systems and their information; and (4) clearly assigned roles and 

responsibilities for system security. 

Reported security control Number of jurisdictions

Locked/sealed storage of voting equipment and ballotsa 25

Monitoring of voting equipment a 14

Encrypted ballots or election results a 10

Security plansa 8

Testing of voting equipment a 7

Control of voting machine memory cards by precinct 

personnel during elections a

6

Video surveillance for voting equipment or ballots 5

Security training 4
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 338 GAO-06-450 Elections

On the basis of our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 46 percent of 

election jurisdictions nationwide that used some type of automated voting 

method had written policies for voting system security and access in place 

for the November 2004 general election, while 45 percent had formal 

security procedures.52 Written security policies were more prevalent among 

large jurisdictions, an estimated 65 percent, compared to an estimated 

52 percent of medium jurisdictions and an estimated 41 percent of small 

jurisdictions. The difference between large and small jurisdictions is 

statistically significant. More large and small jurisdictions had formal 

security procedures (an estimated 51 percent and 47 percent, respectively) 

than medium jurisdictions (an estimated 39 percent), although these 

differences are not statistically significant. Figure 72 shows the estimated 

percentages of jurisdictions with written security policies and procedures 

by jurisdiction size. 

52Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded 

from this survey question.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 339 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 72: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions That Documented Security 

Policies or Procedures for Their Voting Systems in the 2004 General Election, by 

Jurisdiction Size

Note: Percentages in each category of jurisdiction size may not add to 100 because of rounding. 

Jurisdictions that used only hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day were excluded from this 

survey question.

a

The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions is statistically significant. The 95 

percent confidence interval for small and medium jurisdictions is +/- 8 percentage points.

b

The 95 percent confidence interval for small and large jurisdictions is +/- 8 percentage points.

In our earlier discussion of local survey responses related to counting votes 

in chapter 6, we estimated that many jurisdictions had written policies and 

procedures for ballot security in the 2004 general election. However, we 

estimate that up to one-fifth of jurisdictions did not have written policies 

and procedures uniformly in place, including policies and procedures for 

transporting unvoted and voted ballots or electronic memory, storing 

unvoted and voted ballots, and electronic transmission of voted ballots. 

The disparity in written policies and procedures was observed for 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Formal

proceduresb

Written policiesa

Percentage of jurisdictions

Voting system security and access measures

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000)

Medium (10,000–100,000)

Large (>100,000)

41

52

65

47

39

51
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 340 GAO-06-450 Elections

electronic transmission of voted ballots for counting, where an estimated 

18 percent of jurisdictions had such security management tools,53

compared with between 66 and 76 percent of jurisdictions for each of the 

other four types of ballot controls—a difference that is statistically 

significant but which may be linked to the percentage of jurisdictions that 

used paper ballot and older technologies in the 2004 general election. Yet 

we also found that an estimated 17 percent of jurisdictions whose 

predominant method was DRE had no policies or procedures for electronic 

transmission of voted ballots for counting.54 In addition, the differences in 

estimates of policies and procedures for electronic ballot transmission 

among jurisdictions whose predominant voting method was punch cards 

and those whose methods were DRE or optical scan are statistically 

significant. Figure 73 shows the variation in estimates of documented 

policies and procedures for electronically transmitting ballots among 

jurisdictions that used specific voting methods.

53 An estimated 57 percent of respondents selected “not applicable” for written policies and 

procedures for electronic transmission of voted ballots for counting in their survey 

response.

54The 95 percent confidence interval for jurisdictions using DREs was +13 or -9 percentage 

points. An estimated 38 percent of respondents from jurisdictions whose predominant 

method was DRE selected “not applicable” in their survey response to written policies and 

procedures for electronic transmission of voted ballots for counting.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 341 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 73: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Established Policies or 

Procedures for Electronic Transmission of Voted Ballots in the 2004 General 

Election, by Predominant Voting Method

Note: Estimates of respondents who selected “not applicable” for this survey question ranged between 

38 and 75 percent.

a

The 95 percent confidence interval for DRE is +/- 14 percentage points.

b

The 95 percent confidence interval for central count optical scan is +9 or -8 percentage points.

c

The 95 percent confidence interval for precinct count optical scan is +/- 8 percentage points.

d

The 95 percent confidence interval for lever machine is +11 or -6 percentage points.

e

The 95 percent confidence interval for paper ballot is +6 or -4 percentage points.

Moreover, our visits to local jurisdictions found diverse approaches to 

documenting security policies and procedures. Election officials in 8 of the 

jurisdictions that we visited told us that they had written instructions for 

managing security aspects of their voting equipment and processes. 

However, some guidance we reviewed did not cover these topics. Election 

officials in some jurisdictions stated that their security measures were 

contained in the voting process documentation for the voting system or 

were covered in election worker training. For example, the hardware guide 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Paper ballote

Lever machined

Precinct count

punch card

Central count

punch card

Precinct count

optical scanc

Central count

optical scanb

DREa

Percentage of jurisdictions

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Predominant voting methods

39

30

19

1 2

8

5
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 342 GAO-06-450 Elections

for the voting system used by some jurisdictions described the verification 

and authentication functions that were built into the system to secure vote 

counts during transmission of the precinct results to the jurisdiction, 

including processes for ballot creation and vote tabulation that also 

included security procedures. In contrast, several other jurisdictions that 

we visited had published detailed security policies and procedures for their 

voting systems that included, for example, network security policies for 

election tabulation, procedures for securing and protecting election 

equipment and software, testing voting equipment to ensure accurate 

recording of votes, and disaster recovery plans, and they provided them to 

GAO. Officials in several jurisdictions also described their steps to ensure 

that election workers had access to, and were trained in, the contents of 

the policies and procedures for securing ballots and voting equipment. 

Information system security plans typically identify the responsibilities, 

management approach, and key controls to be implemented for an 

information system, based on an assessment of identified risks to the 

information. Election officials in a few of the jurisdictions that we visited 

told us that they had security plans in place for the November 2004 general 

election (8 of 28). Officials at 4 of the jurisdictions that we visited stated 

that they had security plans or plan components that were approved at the 

state level, and officials in 1 large jurisdiction in Nevada reported having a 

state statutory requirement for a voting system security plan. However, 

jurisdictions that employed advanced security technologies, such as 

encryption, in their systems did not always have a plan that would 

document how the elections people, process, and technologies would work 

together to provide comprehensive protections. Moreover, the contents of 

plans we obtained from our visits to local jurisdictions varied widely. One 

of the jurisdiction security plans we examined covered most aspects of the 

voting process, from ballot preparation through recount, while another 

plan focused on the security of its vote-tallying system in a stand-alone 

environment. Two security plans covered several security topics including 

risk assessment, physical and personnel controls, and incident response. 

Table 26 shows the variation in topics covered in the security plans we 

reviewed.55

55Election officials in three of the jurisdictions that we visited reported having security plans 

but did not provide them for this study.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 343 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 26: Voting System Security Topics Addressed in Security Plans Submitted by 

Jurisdictions Visited by GAO

Source: GAO analysis of documents provided by local jurisdictions we visited.

Security testing is an important way to verify that system security controls 

have been implemented and are functioning properly. From our survey of 

state election officials, 17 states and the District of Columbia reported that 

they had conducted security testing of the voting systems used in the 2004 

general election, and 7 other states reported that they required local 

jurisdictions to conduct such testing. The remaining 22 states said that they 

did not conduct or require system security testing. (Three states reported 

that security testing was not applicable for their voting systems.) Moreover, 

from our local jurisdiction survey, we estimate that at least 19 percent of 

local jurisdictions nationwide (excluding jurisdictions that reported that 

they used paper ballots) did not conduct security testing for the systems 

they used in the November 2004 general election. Although jurisdiction size 

was not a factor in whether security testing was performed, the percentage 

of jurisdictions performing security testing was notably higher when the 

predominant voting method was DRE (63 percent)56 and lower for 

jurisdictions where the predominant method was central count optical 

scan (38 percent)57 or precinct count optical scan (45 percent).58 However, 

Jurisdiction coverage of topic in security plans

Security topic 1 2 3 4 5

Risk assessment X X X

Awareness training X X

Physical controls X X X

Personnel controls X

Access controls X X X X

Security testing or audit

Backup and recovery X X X

Incident response X X

56The 95 percent confidence interval for DRE is +14 or -15 percentage points.

57The 95 percent confidence interval for central count optical scan is +/- 10 percentage 

points.

58The 95 percent confidence interval for precinct count optical scan is +/- 9 percentage 

points.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 344 GAO-06-450 Elections

the difference in the percentages of jurisdictions performing security 

testing on DRE or central count optical scan is not statistically significant. 

Beyond jurisdictions’ efforts to verify implementation of voting system 

security controls, some states required that their voting systems be 

nationally qualified against the federal voluntary voting system standards, 

which include a security component. In particular, from our state survey, 

most states that used a new voting system for the first time in the 

November 2004 general election said that they required the system to go 

through qualification testing. For example, all 26 states that used DREs for 

the first time in the 2004 general election, as well as the District of 

Columbia, required qualification testing and approval by the National 

Association of State Election Directors (NASED).59 Similarly, of the 

35 states and the District of Columbia that used optical scan systems for 

the first time in the 2004 general election, 31 reported that they required 

voting systems to be qualified. Nine of the 10 states that used new punch 

card systems for the first time in the 2004 general election also reported 

that they required voting systems to be qualified. 

Security Standards Being 

Used Vary by State and 

Jurisdiction

States and jurisdictions are applying a variety of security standards to their 

voting systems, some of which are no longer current. Specifically, 44 states 

and the District of Columbia reported on our state survey that they were 

requiring local jurisdictions’ voting systems being used for the first time in 

the November 2006 general election to comply with voluntary federal 

voting system standards, which include security standards. However, they 

are not all using the same version of the voluntary standards. This is 

troublesome because the 2002 standards are more stringent than the 1990 

standards in various areas, including security. For instance, the 2002 

standards establish security requirements and acceptable levels of 

performance for the telecommunications components of voting systems, 

while the 1990 standards do not include detailed requirements for this 

control measure.

According to our analysis of responses states reported in our state survey, 

17 of the 44 states and the District of Columbia reported that their voting 

systems must comply solely with the 2002 standards that were developed 

59Prior to the November 2004 general election, NASED conducted the qualification program 

to test voting systems against the federal voluntary voting system standards. In 2005, EAC 

assumed this responsibility.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 345 GAO-06-450 Elections

and approved by the Federal Election Commission and later adopted by 

EAC. However, 27 other states are requiring their jurisdictions to apply 

federal standards to their new voting systems that are outdated, 

unspecified, or entail multiple versions. In the case of 5 of these 27 states 

where multiple versions of voluntary federal standards will be applied, one 

of the versions is the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, which was 

approved by the EAC in December 2005.60 These guidelines promote 

security measures that address gaps in prior standards and are applicable 

to more modern technologies, such as controls for distributing software 

and wireless operations. Nevertheless, these same 5 states reported that 

they will also apply older federal standards to systems that are new to the 

2006 election. Furthermore, 2 other states responded that they do not plan 

to require their voting systems to comply with any version of the voluntary 

federal standards, while 3 additional states reported that they had not yet 

made a decision on compliance with voluntary federal standards for 2006. 

(One state did not respond.) Figure 74 depicts the number of states that 

reported applying voluntary federal voting system standards to their new 

voting systems. Appendix X summarizes responses for all states and the 

District of Columbia regarding reported requirements for local 

jurisdictions’ use of federal standards for their voting systems.

60 After the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines become effective in December 2007, voting 

systems will no longer be tested by federally accredited laboratories to prior versions of the 

federal standards.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 346 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 74: State-Reported Standards Required for Voting Systems

Note: State respondents were allowed to select multiple items for this survey question.

Simultaneous use of multiple versions of voting system standards is not 

new for the 2006 election. Not all NASED-qualified voting systems that may 

have operated during the 2004 election were tested against a single version 

of security standards. For example, many systems that were qualified 

before the 2004 general election had been tested against the 1990 Federal 

Election Commission standards, rather than the more stringent 2002 

standards. 

The use of outdated system security standards increases the risk of system 

integrity, availability, and confidentiality problems for all voting methods, 

but it is of special concern for jurisdictions that use their systems in a 

networked environment or transmit election data using 

telecommunications capabilities. This is because the use of such 

connectivity introduces vulnerabilities and risks that the older versions of 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

No response

Not yet

determined

No federal compliance

requirement

Any federal standards

or guidelines

Hybrid of federal

standards

Draft EAC voting

system guidelines

2002 FEC

standards

1990 FEC

standards

Number of states

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

Applicable standards

11

29

5 5

10

6

3

1
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 347 GAO-06-450 Elections

the standards do not adequately address, as we have previously described 

in our September 2005 report on the security and reliability of electronic 

voting.61

Recent Studies and 

Analyses Have Raised 

Concerns about the Security 

Vulnerabilities and 

Weaknesses of Modern 

Voting Systems 

After the 2000 general election, Congress, the media, and others cited 

numerous instances of problems with the election process. As the use of 

electronic voting systems expanded and the 2004 general election 

approached, the media and others continued to report problems with these 

systems that caused some to question whether they were secure and 

reliable. To clarify the wide range of concerns and issues raised and 

identify recommended practices for addressing them, our September 2005 

report on the security and reliability of electronic voting analyzed over 

80 recent and relevant studies related to the security and reliability of 

electronic voting systems.62 We focused on systems and components 

associated with vote casting and counting, including those that define 

electronic ballots, transmit voting results among election locations, and 

manage groups of voting machines. 

In summary, our September 2005 report stated that while electronic voting 

systems hold promise for a more accurate and efficient election process, 

numerous organizations and individuals have raised concerns about their 

security, citing instances of weak security controls, system design flaws, 

inadequate system version control, inadequate security testing, incorrect 

system configuration, poor security management, and vague or incomplete 

voting system standards, among other issues. For example, we reported 

that studies found (1) some electronic voting systems did not encrypt cast 

ballots or system records of ballots, and it was possible to alter both 

without being detected; (2) it was possible to alter the files that define how 

a ballot looks and works so that the votes for one candidate could be 

recorded for a different candidate; and (3) vendors installed uncertified 

versions of voting system software at the local level. We also reported that 

some of these concerns were said to have caused local problems during 

national elections—resulting in the loss or miscount of votes.63 We added, 

however, that many of the reported concerns were drawn from specific 

61GAO-05-956.

62GAO-05-956.

63Several of the problems included in our 2005 report on voting system security and 

reliability have been discussed in this report.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 348 GAO-06-450 Elections

system makes and models or from a specific jurisdiction’s election, and 

that there has been a lack of consensus among election officials and other 

experts on the pervasiveness of the concerns.

We also reported in September 2005 that federal organizations and 

nongovernmental groups have issued recommended practices and 

guidance for improving the election process, including electronic voting 

systems, as well as general practices for the security of information 

systems. For example, in mid-2004, EAC issued a collection of practices 

recommended by election experts, including state and local election 

officials.64 This guidance includes approaches for making voting processes 

more secure and reliable through, for example, risk analysis of the voting 

process, poll worker security training, and chain of custody controls for 

Election Day operations, along with practices that are specific to ensuring 

the security and reliability of different types of electronic voting systems. 

As another example, in July 2004, the California Institute of Technology and 

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology issued a report containing 

recommendations pertaining to testing equipment, retaining records of 

ballots, and physically securing voting systems.65 In addition to such 

election-specific practices, numerous recommended practices are available 

that are relevant to any information system. For instance, we, the National 

Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), and others have issued 

guidance that emphasizes the importance of incorporating security and 

reliability into the life cycle of information systems through practices 

related to security planning and management, risk management, and 

procurement.66 We noted that the recommended practices in these electionspecific and information technology-focused documents provide valuable 

guidance that, if implemented effectively, should help improve the security 

of voting systems.

64EAC, Best Practices Tool Kit (July 2004), 

http://www.eac.gov/bp/docs/BestPracticesToolKit.doc.

65California Institute of Technology/Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Immediate Steps 

to Avoid Lost Votes in the 2004 Presidential Elections: Recommendations for the Election 

Assistance Commission (July 2004).

66For example, GAO, Federal Information Systems Controls Audit Manual,

GAO/AIMD-12.19.6 (Washington, D.C.: January 1999); NIST, Generally Accepted Principles 

and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems, SP 800-14 (September 1996) 

and Security Considerations in the Information System Development Life Cycle,

SP 800-64, Revision 1 (June 2004); and International Systems Security Engineering 

Association, Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model, ISO/IEC 21827, 

version 3.0 (June 2003).
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 349 GAO-06-450 Elections

Further, our September 2005 report stated that since the passage of HAVA, 

the federal government has begun a range of actions that are expected to 

improve the security and reliability of electronic voting systems. 

Specifically, after beginning operations in January 2004, EAC was leading 

efforts to (1) draft changes to the existing federal voluntary standards for 

voting systems, including provisions related to security;67 (2) develop a 

process for certifying, decertifying, and recertifying voting systems; 

(3) establish a program to accredit the national independent testing 

laboratories that test electronic voting systems against the federal 

standards; and (4) develop a software library and clearinghouse for 

information on state and local elections and systems. However, we 

observed that these actions were unlikely to have a major effect in the 2006 

federal election cycle because at the time of our report publication the 

changes to the standards had not yet been completed, the system 

certification and laboratory accreditation programs were still in 

development, and the software library had not been updated or improved 

since the 2004 elections. Further, we stated that EAC had not defined tasks, 

processes, and time frames for completing these activities, and we 

recognized that other organizations had actions under way that were 

intended to improve the security of electronic voting systems. These 

actions include developing and obtaining international acceptance for 

voting system standards, developing voting system software in an open 

source environment (i.e., not proprietary to any particular company), and 

cataloging and analyzing reported problems with electronic voting systems.

To improve the security and reliability of electronic voting systems, we 

made recommendations to EAC for establishing tasks, processes, and time 

frames for improving the federal voluntary voting system guidelines, 

testing capabilities, and management support available to state and local 

election officials. The EAC commissioners agreed with our 

recommendations and stated that actions to address each were either 

under way or intended, and the NIST director agreed with our conclusions. 

67The Federal Election Commission used the general term “voting system standards” for its 

2002 publication Voting Systems Performance and Test Standards. Consistent with HAVA 

terminology, EAC refers to its revision of these standards as Voluntary Voting System 

Guidelines. For this report, we refer to the contents of both of these documents as 

standards.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 350 GAO-06-450 Elections

Certain Types of Tests 

and Evaluations Were 

Widely Performed on 

Voting Systems, while 

Others Were Less 

Common

To ensure that voting systems perform as intended during use, the systems 

must be effectively tested, both before they are accepted from the 

manufacturer and before each occasion that they are used. Further 

confidence in election results can be gained by conducting Election Day 

and postelection audits of voting systems. For the November 2004 general 

election, voting system testing was conducted for almost all voting 

systems, but the types and content of the testing performed varied 

considerably. Most states and local jurisdictions employed national and 

state certification testing and readiness testing to some extent, but the 

criteria used in this testing were highly dependent on the state or 

jurisdiction. Also, many, but not all, states and jurisdictions conducted 

acceptance testing of both newly acquired systems and those undergoing 

changes or upgrades. In contrast, relatively few states and jurisdictions 

conducted parallel testing during elections or audits of voting systems 

following elections. 

To assist election officials in testing voting systems for the 2004 general 

election, most local jurisdictions documented policies and procedures 

related to some types of testing, according to estimates based on our 

survey of local jurisdictions. However, the testing approaches embodied in 

policies and procedures that the local jurisdictions we visited shared with 

us varied considerably. Furthermore, in jurisdictions we visited, few voting 

system problems were reported as a result of local testing, and 

correspondingly few changes were made to the systems or election 

processes. The variability in testing approaches among states and 

jurisdictions underscores our previously reported concerns from our 

September 2005 report about whether actual testing of voting systems is 

sufficient to ensure satisfaction of system requirements, including those 

associated with accuracy, reliability, and security.68

Voting system test and evaluation can be grouped into various types or 

stages: certification testing (national level), certification testing (state 

level), acceptance testing, readiness testing, parallel testing, and 

postelection voting system audits. Each of these tests has a specific 

purpose, and is conducted at the national, state, or local level at a 

particular time in the election cycle. Table 27 summarizes these types of 

tests. 

68GAO-05-956.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 351 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 27: Types of Testing and Evaluation for Voting Systems, with Common Time Frames and Responsibilities

Source: GAO analysis based on GAO-02-3 and GAO-05-956.

a

With the enactment of HAVA in 2002, responsibility for overseeing national testing of voting systems 

and certifying those that met federal standards was assigned to EAC in HAVA § 231(a)(1) (codified at 

42 U.S.C. § 15371(a)(1)). EAC assumed this responsibility in August 2005, when it was transferred 

from NASED. Under NASED, national testing against federal standards was called qualification testing.

b

Refers to EAC and testing laboratories accredited by them as provided for in HAVA § 231 (codified at 

42 U.S.C. § 15371).

c

Readiness testing that is conducted to confirm the proper functioning of election equipment on 

Election Day just before the polls open is sometimes called verification testing.

Many states have laws or regulations that mandate specific types of testing 

for voting equipment and time frames for conducting those tests. 

Documented policies and procedures for testing and evaluation provide an 

important means for ensuring that testing is effectively planned and 

executed. Effective test and evaluation can greatly reduce the chances of 

unexpected or unknown equipment problems and errors. From our local 

jurisdiction survey for the 2004 election, we estimate that 85 percent of 

local jurisdictions had documented policies and procedures for some type 

of voting system testing, 6 percent of jurisdictions did not have policies and 

procedures for testing, and 9 percent did not know whether their 

Test type Purpose When conducted Responsibility

Certification (national)a To verify compliance of voting 

equipment with federal standards

Prior to (or as a condition of) 

system acceptance

Federal authorities and 

independent laboratoriesb

Certification (state) To validate compliance of voting 

equipment with state-specific 

requirements

Before election State election authorities

Acceptance To verify that voting equipment 

delivered by a vendor meets state 

or local requirements

Before election State or local election authorities

Readiness (logic and 

accuracy)

To verify that voting equipment is 

functioning properly, usually by 

confirming that predictable outputs 

are produced from predefined 

inputsc

Before election Local election authorities

Parallel To verify accurate performance of 

voting equipment through random 

selection and systematic 

evaluation of operational 

equipment

During election State or local election authorities

Audit To review and reconcile election 

records to confirm correct conduct 

of an election or uncover evidence 

of problems with voting equipment 

or election processes

After election State or local election authorities
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 352 GAO-06-450 Elections

jurisdictions had them. Larger jurisdictions were more likely to have these 

management tools than smaller ones. An estimated 96 percent of large 

jurisdictions had documented testing policies and procedures, compared 

with 89 percent of medium and 82 percent of small jurisdictions.69 The 

difference between large and small jurisdictions is statistically significant. 

The testing policies and procedures of the local jurisdictions we visited 

presented a wide variety of approaches and details for the 2004 general 

election. For instance, election officials in 1 large jurisdiction in 

Connecticut told us that they did not conduct acceptance testing on their 

lever equipment, which had been in use for many years, and did not 

conduct either parallel testing or audit testing, stating that these tests were 

not applicable to its systems for 2004. However, officials said they did 

conduct readiness testing at the polling place prior to the election. Election 

officials in a large Ohio jurisdiction that used punch card voting equipment 

told us that readiness testing had been conducted by local officials. 

However, election officials stated that certification and acceptance testing 

were not performed for 2004 because this system had been used in prior 

elections. They also said that neither parallel testing nor audit testing of 

voting systems was performed. Officials in a large Colorado jurisdiction we 

visited that used central count optical scan equipment told us that they 

obtained state certification of the newly purchased equipment, conducted 

acceptance and readiness testing prior to the election, and executed 

another readiness test following the election. Election officials in a large 

Georgia jurisdiction that used DRE voting equipment reported that the 

state performed both certification and acceptance testing when the 

equipment was purchased and conducted a parallel test of the tabulation 

system during the election. Further, local officials reported that they 

conducted readiness testing prior to the election, but did not perform 

postelection audit testing. For the 5 local jurisdictions that provided us 

with copies of procedures for readiness testing, three sets of procedures 

were developed by the jurisdictions themselves and two sets were 

developed by the voting equipment vendors.

69The 95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +6 or -7 percentage points. 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 353 GAO-06-450 Elections

National Certification 

Testing Was Widely 

Performed, but Its 

Standards and Usage Varied

The enactment of HAVA in 2002 established federal responsibilities for the 

certification of voting systems to meet federal standards and provided the 

framework for a national testing program. The act charged EAC, supported 

by NIST, with instituting a federal program for the development and 

adoption of voluntary voting system guidelines against which voting 

systems can be evaluated, establishing processes and responsibilities for 

accrediting laboratories to test systems, and using the results of testing by 

the accredited labs to certify the voting systems. In 2005, EAC developed 

guidelines for the certification process and defined the steps needed for the 

process to transition from NASED to EAC. States and local jurisdictions 

are to decide whether and how to use the testing and certification results 

from the federal program in their elections processes.

Most states continued to require that voting systems be nationally tested 

and certified. In our October 2001 report on election processes, we 

reported that 38 states required that their voting systems meet federal 

standards for the November 2000 general election, which meant that the 

systems were tested by NASED. For voting systems being used for the first 

time in the 2004 general election, national certification testing was almost 

uniformly required. From our prior discussion of state survey responses in 

the context of voting system security, 26 of 27 states using DRE for the first 

time in this election, as well as the District of Columbia, required them to 

be nationally certified, while 9 of the 10 states using punch card equipment 

for the first time, and 30 of 35 states and the District of Columbia using 

optical scan equipment for the first time, said they had such requirements.

It is unclear whether the proportion of nationally certified systems changed 

between the 2000 and 2004 general elections. In our October 2001 report on 

election processes nationwide, we reported that an estimated 39 percent of 

jurisdictions used NASED-qualified voting equipment for the 2000 general 

election.70 However, for the 2004 general election, we estimate that 

68 percent of jurisdictions did not know whether the respective systems 

that they used were NASED-qualified. This uncertainty surrounding the 

national qualification status of a specific version of voting system at the 

local level underscores a concern we recently reported with respect to 

electronic voting security and reliability in our September 2005 report on 

this topic—that is, even though voting system software may have been 

70GAO-02-3.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 354 GAO-06-450 Elections

qualified and certified at the national or state levels, software changes and 

upgrades performed at the local level may not be qualified and certified.71

The upcoming 2006 general election can be viewed as a challenging 

transition period in the voting system capabilities, standards, and national 

certification, with several testing-related factors potentially increasing the 

difficulty of this transition. First, HAVA’s requirements for voting system 

capabilities, such as voter error correction and manual audit, along with 

the attendant new guidelines, are likely to require additional testing at the 

national level to recertify previously fielded and certified systems that have 

been upgraded. Second, this increased workload is not likely to be met with 

added national testing capacity, since the process for accrediting new 

voting system testing laboratories is not expected to produce newly 

accredited labs in time for the 2006 election. Third, the complexity of the 

testing being performed is likely to increase because states report that they 

will collectively apply the full range of available standards—1990, 2002, and 

2005 standards, as well as various combinations of these—to voting 

systems first used for the November 2006 election. As a result, a range of 

test protocols must be developed or maintained, and a variety of 

corresponding tests must be planned, executed, and analyzed to meet the 

variety of standards. 

States Generally Required 

Certification of Voting 

Systems Using a Range of 

Criteria

Most states continue to certify voting systems to ensure that they meet 

minimum state election requirements. In our October 2001 report on 

election processes, we reported that 45 states and the District of Columbia 

had certification programs for their voting systems, 38 of which required 

that the systems be tested before they were certified for the 2000 general 

election.72 In addition, we reported that an estimated 90 percent of local 

jurisdictions used state-certified voting equipment for the November 2000 

general election. However, we also reported that state officials had 

expressed concerns with voting system changes that did not undergo 

recertification. Since then, we have reported that security experts and 

election officials have expressed similar concerns.73

71GAO-05-956.

72GAO-02-3.

73GAO-05-956.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 355 GAO-06-450 Elections

For the November 2004 general election, 42 states and the District of 

Columbia reported on our state survey that they required state certification 

of voting systems.74 (See fig. 75.) Seven states required certification of the 

voting equipment purchased at the state level for local jurisdictions in the 

2004 election. However, in 35 states and the District of Columbia, officials 

reported that responsibility for purchasing a state-certified system rested 

with the local jurisdiction. While state certification requirements often 

included NASED testing, as well as approval or confirmation of 

functionality for particular ballot conditions, some states also included 

additional requirements for features such as quality of construction, 

transportation safety, and documentation. Although the remaining 8 states 

did not require state certification, the officials we contacted described 

other mechanisms to address the compliance of voting equipment with 

state-specific requirements, such as a state approval process or acceptance 

of voting equipment based on federal certification. Figure 75 shows states’ 

reported certification requirements for voting systems used in the 2004 

general election.

74Initial state responses were obtained from our 2005 state survey; we later obtained 

clarifications by phone or electronic mail from 19 states.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 356 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 75: State-Reported Voting System Certification Requirements for the 2004 

General Election

For the 2006 general election, 44 states reported that they will have 

requirements for certification of voting systems, 2 more states than for the 

2004 general election. The District of Columbia reported that it will not 

require voting system certification for the 2006 general election. Of the 

44, all but 1 expected to conduct the certification themselves; the 1 state 

reported that it would rely solely on a national independent testing 

authority to make its certification decision. Furthermore, of the 43 other 

states conducting certification themselves, 41 reported that they would 

include testing of system functions to obtain certification. In addition, 

18 of the 43 states planned to involve a national testing laboratory in their 

certification process. 

State certification was not required

State certification was required

Sources: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials and follow-up with selected states for clarification of responses

(analysis), MapArt (map).

Washington, D.C.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 357 GAO-06-450 Elections

Acceptance Testing 

Continued to Be Commonly 

Performed, but 

Implemented Practices 

Varied Widely

As we reported previously in our October 2001 report on election 

processes, either states or local jurisdictions conducted acceptance tests 

prior to the 2000 general election.75 However, the testing processes, test 

steps, and involvement of vendors in the testing performed varied by 

jurisdiction and by type of equipment. Also, we reported in our 2001 report 

that states and local jurisdictions sometimes relied heavily on vendors to 

design and conduct acceptance tests. With respect to vendor involvement 

in particular, we reported that vendors were sometimes heavily relied upon 

to design and conduct acceptance tests.

For the 2004 election, the extent and variety of acceptance testing was 

similar to those for the 2000 election. With regard to state roles and 

involvement in acceptance testing of new voting systems, 26 states and the 

District of Columbia reported responsibilities at some level of government. 

Specifically, 8 states and the District of Columbia reported on our survey 

that they had responsibility for performing acceptance testing, 15 states 

required local jurisdictions to perform such testing, and 3 states reported 

that requirements for acceptance testing existed at both the state and local 

levels. Twenty-two states either did not require such testing or did not 

believe that such testing was applicable to them. (Two states did not know 

their acceptance testing requirements for the 2004 election.) More states 

required that acceptance testing be performed for changes and upgrades to 

existing systems than they did for new systems—30 states in all and the 

District of Columbia. Specifically, 15 states and the District of Columbia 

were responsible for performing acceptance tests for changes and 

upgrades, 10 states required local jurisdictions to perform these tests, and 

5 states required acceptance testing at both the state and local levels.

Election officials at a majority of the local jurisdictions that we visited told 

us that they conducted some type of acceptance testing for newly acquired 

voting equipment. As with the 2000 general election, these officials 

described a variety of approaches to acceptance testing for the 2004 

general election. For example, the data used for testing could be vendorsupplied, developed by election officials, or both, and could include system 

initialization, logic and accuracy, and tamper resistance. Other steps, such 

as diagnostic tests, physical inspection of hardware, and software 

configuration checks, were also mentioned as testing activities by local 

election officials. Further, election officials from 3 jurisdictions that we 

75GAO-02-3.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 358 GAO-06-450 Elections

visited said that vendors were heavily involved in designing and executing 

the acceptance tests, while officials from another jurisdiction that we 

visited said that vendors contributed to a portion of their testing. In 

2 jurisdictions in Georgia, officials said that acceptance tests were 

conducted at a university center for elections systems.

Readiness Testing 

Continued to Be Widely 

Performed Using Various 

Approaches 

Most jurisdictions conducted readiness testing, also known as logic and 

accuracy testing, for both the 2000 and 2004 general elections. In addition, 

some states reported that they conducted readiness testing for the 2004 

general election. The content and nature of these tests varied among 

jurisdictions. 

According to our state survey, 49 states and the District of Columbia 

reported that they performed readiness testing of voting systems at the 

state level, the local level, or both (1 state did not require readiness 

testing). Most states required local jurisdictions to perform readiness 

testing (37 states in all). However, 7 states reported that they performed 

their own readiness testing of voting equipment for the 2004 general 

election in addition to local testing. Five states and the District of Columbia 

reported that they had no requirements for local jurisdictions to perform 

readiness testing but conducted this testing themselves. State laws or 

regulations in effect for the 2004 election typically had specific 

requirements for when readiness testing should be conducted and who was 

responsible for testing, sometimes including public demonstrations of 

voting system operations. For example, one state mandated that local 

jurisdictions conduct three readiness tests using all types of election 

ballots including audio ballots. One test took place before Election Day and 

two occurred on Election Day—before the official counting of ballots 

began and after the official counting had been completed. Another state 

required the Secretary of State to conduct testing using pre-audited ballots 

before Election Day, as well as on Election Day before ballots were 

counted.

On the basis of a subgroup of local election jurisdictions from our 2000 

election survey, we estimate that 96 percent of jurisdictions nationwide 

conducted readiness testing before the 2000 general election.76 For a 

76These estimates include only county election jurisdiction subgroup comparisons between 

2001 and 2005 surveys. See the scope and methodology in appendix V for further details 

about sampling differences.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 359 GAO-06-450 Elections

comparable subgroup of jurisdictions in the 2004 general election, we 

estimate that 95 percent of local jurisdictions conducted readiness testing. 

The frequency with which readiness testing was conducted in 2004 was 

largely stable across all jurisdictions of various sizes that did not solely use 

hand-counted paper ballots, ranging between an estimated 90 percent (for 

small jurisdictions) to an estimated 96 percent (for large jurisdictions). 

Whenever the sample of jurisdictions permitted statistical comparison, 

there were also no significant differences between the percentages of 

jurisdictions that said they conducted readiness testing for various 

predominant voting methods.

The variety of readiness testing activities performed by jurisdictions for the 

2000 general election was also evident for the 2004 general election. 

Election officials in all of the local jurisdictions we visited following the 

2004 election reported that they conducted readiness testing on their voting 

equipment using one or more of the approaches we identified for the 2000 

election, such as diagnostic tests, integration tests, mock elections, and 

sets of test votes. Election officials in many of these jurisdictions told us 

that they combined test approaches. For example, officials in 1 large 

jurisdiction in Florida told us that they conducted pre-election testing using 

complete ballots (not test decks) to determine the accuracy of the marks 

and to see if there were any errors in voting machine programming. They 

told us that logic and accuracy testing was performed for each machine 

using undervoted ballots and overvoted ballots, and that zero tapes were 

run for each voting machine before the election.77 In addition, a diagnostic 

test was run before the election on each voting machine. According to the 

local officials, this was the test approach described in the manufacturer’s 

preparation checklist. Election officials in another Florida jurisdiction 

stated that readiness testing included integration testing to demonstrate 

that the voting system is properly programmed; the election is correctly 

defined on the system; and all system inputs, outputs, and communication 

devices are in working order. In the case of these jurisdictions, the state 

requires logic and accuracy testing and submission of the test parameters 

to the state.

77Zero tapes record the vote counts stored in a piece of voting equipment for each of the 

contests prior to voter inputs, when all counts should be zero.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 360 GAO-06-450 Elections

Parallel Testing Was Not 

Frequently Performed

Parallel testing was not widely performed by local jurisdictions in the 2004 

general election, although 7 states reported on our state survey that they 

performed parallel testing of voting systems on Election Day, and another 

6 states reported that this testing was required by local jurisdictions.78

From our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 2 percent of 

jurisdictions that did not solely use hand-counted paper ballots conducted 

parallel testing for the 2004 general election.79 Large and medium 

jurisdictions primarily performed this type of testing (7 percent and 

4 percent of jurisdictions, respectively). The percentage of small 

jurisdictions performing this type of testing was negligible (0 percent). The 

differences between both large and medium jurisdictions and small 

jurisdictions are statistically significant.

Our visits to local jurisdictions affirmed the limited use of parallel testing. 

Specifically, election officials in 2 of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited told 

us that they performed parallel testing. Officials in 1 large jurisdiction in 

Georgia told us that parallel testing was conducted by the state in 

conjunction with a university center for voting systems. In another case, 

officials in a large jurisdiction in Kansas told us that parallel testing was 

required by the local jurisdiction and was publicly conducted. In both 

cases, the tests were conducted on voting equipment for which security 

concerns had been raised in a voting equipment test report issued by the 

state of Maryland prior to the 2004 general election. Local officials who told 

us that parallel testing was not performed on their voting systems 

attributed this to the absence of parallel testing requirements, a lack of 

sufficient voting equipment to perform these tests, or the unnecessary 

nature of parallel testing because of the stand-alone operation of their 

systems. 

Postelection Voting System 

Audit Requirements and 

Practices Were Diverse 

According to our state survey, 22 states and the District of Columbia 

reported that they performed postelection voting system audits for the 2004 

general election. Specifically, 4 states and the District of Columbia reported 

that they conducted postelection audits of voting systems themselves, 

78Both EAC’s Best Practices Tool Kit and the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

recommend development of parallel testing procedures for all types of automated voting 

equipment.

79We estimate that 91 percent of jurisdictions considered parallel testing to be not 

applicable.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 361 GAO-06-450 Elections

16 states required that audits of voting systems be conducted by local 

jurisdictions, and 2 states reported that audits of voting systems were 

performed at both the state and local levels. State laws or regulations in 

effect for the 2004 general election varied in when and how these audits 

were to be conducted. In addition, a variety of statutes cited by states for 

testing requirements did not mention postelection voting system audits, 

and the one that did lacked details on the scope or components of such 

audits.

According to our local jurisdiction survey, postelection voting system 

audits were conducted by an estimated 43 percent of local jurisdictions 

that did not solely use hand-counted paper ballots on Election Day. This 

practice was much more prevalent at large and medium jurisdictions 

(62 percent and 55 percent, respectively) than small jurisdictions 

(34 percent).80 The differences between small jurisdictions and both 

medium and large jurisdictions are statistically significant. We further 

estimate that these voting system audits were conducted more frequently 

in jurisdictions with central count optical scan voting methods (54 percent) 

than they were in jurisdictions with precinct count optical scan voting 

methods (35 percent).81 Figure 76 shows the estimated use of postelection 

audits for jurisdictions with different voting methods in the 2004 general 

election.

80The 95 percent confidence interval for large jurisdictions is +/- 8 percentage points. The 

95 percent confidence interval for small jurisdictions is +/- 7 percentage points.

81Percentages for the other voting methods had confidence intervals greater than 

+/- 10 percent or were unreliable.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 362 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 76: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Conducting Postelection Voting 

System Audits for the 2004 General Election, by Predominant Voting Method

a

The 95 percent confidence interval for DRE is +/- 14 percentage points.

b

The 95 percent confidence interval for central count optical scan is +/- 10 percentage points. 

c

The 95 percent confidence interval for precinct count optical scan is +/- 8 percentage points.

Election officials in 14 of 28 local jurisdictions that we visited told us that 

they conducted postelection voting system audits. However, the conditions 

and scope of voting system audits varied. Some were routine, while others 

were conducted only in the event of close races or challenges to results. 

Among the 14 jurisdictions, most of the officials we spoke with said that 

they focused on reconciling voting machine counts with known votes, and 

officials in 2 of these jurisdictions characterized the voting system audits 

largely as voting system logic and accuracy tests. However, officials with a 

few jurisdictions told us that they also reviewed voting machine logs, 

sampled results from random precincts, or employed independent auditors 

to repeat and verify vote counting. In 1 large jurisdiction in Nevada, an 

election official told us that paper results were compared to the tabulated 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Precinct count

optical scanc

Central count

optical scanb

DREa

Predominant voting method

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Percentage of jurisdictions

53 54

35
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 363 GAO-06-450 Elections

results of votes counted on 24 machines. In addition, every voting machine 

was activated and the same scripts used for pre-election testing were rerun 

through the machines. According to the election official, this level of 

testing was required by law.

Information on 

Jurisdictions’ Election 

Technology Integration 

Is Limited, but Current 

and Emerging 

Technologies Offer 

Greater Opportunities

The number of jurisdictions that have integrated particular aspects of 

voting system components and technologies was limited for the 2004 

general election for the areas of integration we examined, based on 

estimates from our local jurisdiction survey and visits to local jurisdictions. 

For the areas of integration we did examine, the scope and nature of this 

integration was diverse and included remote programming of electronic 

ballots, statewide tabulation of voting results, and end-to-end management 

of the election process. Nevertheless, the potential for greater integration 

in the future does exist as states and jurisdictions act on their earlier 

discussed plans to acquire the kind of voting equipment (e.g., optical scan 

and DRE products) that lends itself to integration. It is unclear if and when 

this migration to more technology-based voting methods will produce more 

integrated election system environments. However, suitable standards and 

guidance for these interconnected components and systems—some of 

which remain to be developed—could facilitate the development, testing, 

operational management, and maintenance of components and systems, 

thereby maximizing the benefits of current and emerging election 

technologies and achieving states’ and local jurisdictions’ goals for 

performance and security.

Reported Instances of 

Certain Election Systems 

Integration Approaches 

Have Been Inconsistent

Various voting systems, components, and technologies—some of which 

have been available since the 2000 general election—encompass a wide 

range of functional capabilities and system interactions. According to our 

local jurisdiction survey estimates and visits to election jurisdictions for 

the 2004 general election, officials reported various types of integration, 

but there were few instances. The areas in which integration was reported 

can be grouped into four categories: (1) electronic programming or setup 

of voting equipment from a centralized facility, (2) electronic aggregation 

and tabulation of voting results from multiple voting systems or locations, 

(3) add-on voting features and technologies, and (4) electronic 

management of voting equipment and operations.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 364 GAO-06-450 Elections

Electronic Programming or 

Setup

Electronic programming or setup of voting equipment involves integration 

between an administrative system and voting equipment to initialize vote 

count totals, load ballot definitions, and authorize voter access. As we 

previously reported in our September 2005 report on the security and 

reliability of electronic voting, this type of integration has raised security 

concerns.82 Election officials in 19 of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited 

used portable memory cartridges or cards for electronic programming or 

setup of their voting equipment. To accomplish programming or setup, 

officials at some of the local jurisdictions that we visited said that they used 

a computer to preload voting equipment with ballots or tabulation logic 

prior to transporting the equipment to polling locations. At 1 large New 

Jersey jurisdiction, officials stated that the administrative computer used a 

dedicated connection to the election server to electronically transmit the 

data and logic necessary to program and enable the units for the election. 

Election officials in some jurisdictions told us that an administrative 

system loaded ballot definitions onto portable electronic devices, such as 

memory cartridges or smart cards, which were then physically transported 

to the locations where the voting equipment was being prepared for the 

election—either at a storage facility or polling location (see fig. 77). The 

cartridges or cards were then inserted into individual voting units to 

prepare or activate them for the election. Some electronic ballot cards 

were provided directly to the voter to activate the voting equipment, then 

returned to election workers when the ballot has been cast.

82GAO-05-956.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 365 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 77: Examples of Portable Memory Cards and Cartridges Used with Voting 

Equipment

Electronic Aggregation or 

Tabulation

Electronic aggregation or tabulation of cast ballots also requires 

integration between voting equipment and another computer system that is 

responsible for collecting and aggregating the votes. Figure 78 shows 

examples of computer systems used for vote tabulation. 

Source: GAO.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 366 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 78: Examples of Ballot Tabulation Equipment and Environments

Transfer of votes or election results between the voting equipment and the 

central tabulator may employ portable electronic media or 

telecommunication lines. Portable electronic media were the means that 

officials at 7 of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited said they used to 

electronically aggregate election results from multiple voting locations. For 

DRE equipment, memory cartridges that stored cast ballots from individual 

voting units were transferred to the election office, and the data they 

contained were uploaded and tallied by an electronic tabulation system. 

Source: GAO.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 367 GAO-06-450 Elections

Some jurisdictions also used telecommunications services to transfer 

election data from polling locations or election coordination centers to 

tabulation facilities, although how these services were used varied. 

Officials at 4 jurisdictions that we visited told us that they employed dial-up 

connections to transmit local vote tallies for further tabulation. For 

instance, election officials in a large jurisdiction in Washington told us that 

after the polls were closed and all ballots were scanned and recorded by 

the optical scan machines at each polling place, the machines were taken 

to storage areas, where the results were transmitted to the central 

computer for tabulation using the jurisdiction’s phone line. Officials at a 

large jurisdiction that we visited in Ohio said that they had election judges 

take voting machine memory cartridges from their polling locations to 

facilities where laptop computers would read the cartridges and transmit 

vote tallies over phone lines to a remote access server at the elections 

office. In a large jurisdiction that we visited in Illinois, election officials told 

us that they took their portable precinct ballot counters to 1 of 10 stations 

throughout the city, where vote totals from the counters were encrypted 

and transmitted to a remote access server via a cellular network. 

Add-on Features and 

Technologies

Add-on features and technologies to ensure the accuracy of votes, provide 

easier access to persons with disabilities or special needs, and enhance 

security or privacy were also integrated into voting systems by a few states 

and jurisdictions for the 2004 general election. Officials at both large 

jurisdictions in Nevada that we visited told us that they had integrated a 

VVPT capability into their DREs to meet a state requirement for VVPT. 

Figure 79 shows one example of a VVPT voting system component. Overall, 

we estimate that about 8 percent of jurisdictions operating DRE voting 

equipment in the November 2004 general election produced VVPT.83

83The 95 percent confidence interval for this item is +9 or -6 percentage points.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 368 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 79: Example of an Assembly for Producing a Voter-Verifiable Paper Audit Trail 

for DRE Voting Equipment

Audio features were also added to voting systems for the 2004 election. 

Officials at 6 of the jurisdictions that we visited reported that they had 

incorporated an audio ballot component into their DRE machines for 

voters with sight impairments. Election officials in 3 jurisdictions reported 

that they offered audio ballots in languages other than English. 

Security and privacy capabilities, such as data encryption and virtual 

private networks, were also reportedly integrated into several jurisdictions’ 

voting system environments for the 2004 general election to protect 

electronically transferred election data or to secure remote system access. 

Election officials at 6 of the 28 jurisdictions that we visited said they used 

encryption to protect ballots during electronic storage. Officials at both 

jurisdictions in Georgia explained that their state-selected DRE equipment 

used individual access cards for each voter, uniquely encrypted data on the 

card (including the voter’s cast ballot) for each polling location, and a 

separately encrypted electronic key needed to access the voter’s ballot. 

Officials at 7 jurisdictions said they applied encryption to the transmission 

of election results during the 2004 general election. Election officials in 

1 large Colorado jurisdiction stated that they used a virtual private network 

to ensure the secrecy of data and authenticity of parties when transmitting 

election results from jurisdictions to the state. 

Source: GAO.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 369 GAO-06-450 Elections

Electronic Management Electronic management of voting equipment and operations was another 

form of integration employed for the 2004 general election. Electronic 

management covers such functions as equipment testing, initializing, 

operational monitoring, diagnosis, troubleshooting, shutdown, and 

auditing. It also includes election operations that affect voting equipment, 

such as voter processing at the polling place and handling of absentee 

ballots. We previously reported that some of these capabilities were 

available during the 2000 general election in our October 2001 report on 

election processes.84 For the 2004 general election, on the basis of our local 

jurisdiction survey, we estimate that 7 percent of jurisdictions that used 

voting methods other than paper ballots connected their voting equipment 

via a local network at their polling locations. The frequency with which 

remote access to voting systems was provided for the 2004 general election 

was similarly low (estimated at 10 percent of jurisdictions that used voting 

methods other than paper ballots) but was again affected by the size of 

jurisdictions. We estimate that a higher percentage of large jurisdictions 

used remote access to voting equipment (estimated at 19 percent) than 

medium jurisdictions (13 percent) or small jurisdictions (7 percent). The 

difference between large and small jurisdictions is statistically significant.85

Furthermore, we estimate that remote access was primarily provided to 

local election officials (in 6 percent of jurisdictions) and to a lesser extent, 

state election officials, voting equipment vendors, and third parties. Figure 

80 shows the estimated percentages of jurisdictions of various sizes that 

used networking or various types of remote access. These capabilities pose 

voting system security and reliability concerns as reported in our 

September 2005 report on the security and reliability of electronic voting.86

From approximately 20 open-ended text responses to our survey of local 

jurisdictions that described steps taken to prevent unauthorized remote 

access to voting systems, four safeguards were identified: employing 

passwords for remote users, limiting operations to specific election 

activities, use of virtual private networks, and system monitoring. 

84GAO-02-3.

85Percentages represent the aggregation of responses for all sources of remote access. 

Percentages exclude jurisdictions that use only hand-counted paper ballots.

86GAO-05-956.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 370 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 80: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions That Used Networking or Remote 

Access for Voting Equipment in the 2004 General Election

a

Jurisdictions may have selected one or more types of remote access.

As we previously reported in our September 2001 report on voting 

assistance to military and overseas citizens, state and local election 

officials used technologies like electronic mail and faxing to better 

integrate activities during the 2000 general election and to improve 

communications with absentee voters.87 According to our estimates from 

the local jurisdiction survey for the 2004 election, jurisdictions continued 

to use electronic mail to interact with voters and also relied on Web sites 

for a variety of election needs including voter registration status, the 

application and processing of absentee ballots, and the status of 

provisional ballots. For seven items in our survey where we asked about 

87 GAO-01-1026.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Remote access by

 third party for supporta

Remote access

by vendorsa

Remote access by

state election officialsa

Remote access by

 local election officialsa

Networked at

polling places

Percentage of jurisdictions

Types of connections to voting systems

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

7

6

3

4

0
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 371 GAO-06-450 Elections

jurisdictions’ use of e-mail and Web sites for voter services, we estimate 

that large jurisdictions generally used these technologies more frequently 

than both medium and small jurisdictions, and that differences in six of 

these items were statistically significant. Figure 81 shows the extent to 

which jurisdictions of different sizes employed e-mail and Web sites for 

selected voter services. In addition to using technology to support 

individual voters, election officials in 1 large jurisdiction we visited in New 

Mexico described their use of telecommunications technology to support 

early voting at multiple locations. This jurisdiction connected its 

registration database to its early voting locations with dedicated phone 

lines, thus making voter registration information electronically available at 

each location.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 372 GAO-06-450 Elections

Figure 81: Estimated Percentages of Jurisdictions Using Automated Election 

Support for the 2004 General Election, by Jurisdiction Size

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Notification of

absentee

application

problems

by e-mail

Status of

absentee

application

by e-maila

Status of voter

registration

on Web sitea

Percentage of jurisdictions

Voter notification support

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

Small (<10,000) Medium (10,000–100,000) Large (>100,000)

10

6

25

18

46

21

8 7

15

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Ballot provided

by e-mailb

Application

submitted

by e-mailc

Application

requested

by e-maila

Application

downloaded

from Web siteb

Percentage of jurisdictions

Absentee ballot support

41

59

83

47

78

58

16

19

31

2

7

20
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 373 GAO-06-450 Elections

Note: The 95 percent confidence interval for all jurisdiction sizes is +/- 8 percentage points or less.

a

The differences between both small and medium jurisdictions and large jurisdictions are statistically 

significant. 

b

The differences between all categories of jurisdiction size are statistically significant. 

c

The difference between small jurisdictions and large jurisdictions is statistically significant. 

Prospects for Expanded Use 

of Integrated Election 

Systems Are Unclear

Relatively few local jurisdictions we visited reported having plans for 

integrating or further integrating their election-related systems and 

components for the 2006 general election, and in cases where they had 

plans, the scope and nature of the plans varied. At the same time, we 

estimate on the basis of our local jurisdiction survey that a relatively large 

proportion of jurisdictions expect to acquire DREs and optical scan 

systems, which will introduce greater integration opportunities. However, 

given the uncertainty surrounding the specific types of systems and 

features to be acquired, the extent and timing of greater integration of 

voting systems and components, as well as election-related systems, 

remains to be seen. 

More specifically, officials in several jurisdictions that we visited told us 

about plans to integrate relatively modular add-on components to their 

systems, while officials with several other jurisdictions described plans for 

more complex end-to-end interactions among election systems and 

technologies. For example, officials at 5 jurisdictions that we visited 

reported plans to introduce a VVPT capability for future elections, and 

officials at 2 jurisdictions reported plans to integrate an audio component 

to comply with HAVA requirements. In another case, officials in 

2 jurisdictions told us that their state is planning to purchase electronic poll 

books for its precincts to use during the 2006 elections to electronically 

link its voter registration system with its voting systems. Officials at 

another jurisdiction told us that they plan to obtain a new optical scanner 

that will be used to tabulate both DRE and optical scan election results. 

The scope and magnitude of election system integration may be influenced, 

in part, by the jurisdictions’ adoption of the optical scan and DRE voting 

methods and the corresponding products that support add-on automated 

features, such as languages and accessibility tools, and interactions among 

automated components of the election process, such as ballot generation 

and tabulation. As we discussed earlier in this chapter, one-fifth of local 

jurisdictions are planning to acquire new optical scan and DRE voting 

equipment in time for the 2006 general election. For instance, on the basis 

of our survey of local jurisdictions, we estimate that 25 percent of 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 374 GAO-06-450 Elections

jurisdictions plan to acquire precinct count optical scan voting equipment 

by the November 2006 general election. However, some jurisdictions had 

not yet finalized their time frame for acquiring voting equipment at the time 

of our survey. In addition, their acquisition plans also include technologies 

for their election Web sites. Figure 82 estimates the percentages of 

jurisdictions with acquisition plans for various technologies and their 

implementation time frames. While the advent of more technology-based 

voting methods provides greater opportunities for integration, the 

uncertainty around the timing and nature of their introduction makes the 

future extent of this integration unclear at this point. 

Figure 82: Estimated Percentages of Local Jurisdictions with Plans to Acquire 

Voting Equipment

It is important for voting system standards developers to recognize the 

opportunity and potential for greater integration of election systems. EAC 

recently adopted a new version of the voluntary voting system guidelines in 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Technology

for election

Web site

Precinct count

optical scan

Central count

optical scan

DRE

Percentage of jurisdictions

Information technology to be acquired

Source: GAO 2005 survey of local election jurisdictions.

By November 2006

Date uncertain

19

8

7

4 4

3

25

10
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 375 GAO-06-450 Elections

December 2005 that will become effective in December 2007. However, this 

version does not address some of the capabilities discussed above. For 

instance, the guidelines do not address the integration of registration 

systems with voting systems. Neither do they address commercial-off-theshelf devices (such as card readers, printers, or personal computers) or 

software products (such as operating systems or database management 

systems) that are used in voting systems without modification. EAC has 

acknowledged that more work is needed to further develop the technical 

guidelines in areas such as voting accessibility, usability, and security 

features. Such efforts have the potential to assist states and local 

jurisdictions in maximizing the benefits of emerging election technologies.

Concluding 

Observations

The challenges confronting local jurisdictions in acquiring and operating 

voting technologies are not unlike those faced by any technology user—

adoption and consistent application of standards for system capabilities 

and performance, reliable measures and objective data to determine 

whether the systems are performing as intended, rigorous and disciplined 

performance of security and testing activities, and successful management 

and integration of the people, process, and technology components of 

elections during system acquisition and operation. These challenges are 

heightened by other conditions common to both the national elections 

community and other information technology environments: the 

distribution of responsibilities among various organizations, technology 

changes, funding opportunities and constraints, emerging requirements 

and guidance, and public attention.

The extent to which states and local jurisdictions adopt and consistently 

apply up-to-date voting systems standards will directly affect the security 

and performance of voting systems. A substantial proportion of 

jurisdictions have yet to adopt the most current federal voting system 

standards or related performance measures. Even if this happens, however, 

other challenges loom because systems will need to be tested and 

recertified by many states (and by federal processes whenever states have 

adopted national standards) to meet any newly adopted voting standards 

and HAVA requirements for accuracy. Organizations involved with 

recertification—including federal, state, and local governments; testing 

authorities; and vendors—may need the capacity to assume the workloads 

associated with expected increases in the adoption of current standards 

and the use of new voting systems so that potential risks to near-term 

election processes are minimized. 
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 376 GAO-06-450 Elections

Reliable measures and objective data are also considered essential 

management practices for determining whether the technology being used 

is meeting the needs of the jurisdiction’s user communities (both the voters 

and the officials who administer the elections). Looking back to the 

November 2000 and 2004 general elections, we estimate that the vast 

majority of jurisdictions were satisfied with the performance of their 

respective technologies. However, considering that our local jurisdiction 

surveys for the 2000 and 2004 elections indicated limited collection of 

voting system performance data, we conclude that estimated levels of 

satisfaction with voting equipment found in our local surveys have been 

mostly based on a patchwork of operational indicators and, based on site 

visits to local jurisdictions, have involved anecdotal experiences of election 

officials. Although these impressions should not be discounted, informed 

decision making on voting system changes and investment would benefit 

from more objective data about how well existing equipment is meeting 

specific requirements, such as those governing system accuracy, reliability, 

efficiency, and security. No one voting method, or particular voting system 

make and model, will meet the needs of every jurisdiction. The challenge is 

thus to ensure that decisions about staying with an existing voting method 

or investing in new or upgraded voting equipment are made on the basis of 

reliable and relevant data about the operational performance of the 

existing method against requirements and standards, as well as the benefits 

to be derived versus the costs to be incurred with each choice.

Effective execution of well-planned security and testing activities provides 

opportunities to anticipate and address potential problems before they 

affect election results. This is important because even a few instances of 

election errors or disruptions can have a sizable impact if election results 

are close. We estimate that the vast majority of jurisdictions performed 

security and testing activities in one form or another for the 2004 general 

election. However, the nature and extent of these activities varied among 

jurisdictions—to some degree by jurisdiction size, voting method, or 

perceived applicability of the activities. These activities were also largely 

responsive to—and limited by—formal state and local directives. When 

appropriately defined and implemented, such directives can promote the 

effective execution of security and testing practices across all phases of the 

elections process. As voting technologies and requirements evolve, states 

and local jurisdictions face the challenge of regularly updating and 

consistently implementing the directives to meet the needs of their specific 

election environments.
Chapter 7

Voting Methods and Technologies

Page 377 GAO-06-450 Elections

As we noted for the 2000 general election, managing the three election 

components of people, process, and technology as interrelated and 

interdependent variables presents an important challenge in the acquisition 

or operation of a given voting method. Whether a state or jurisdiction is 

acquiring, testing, operating, or maintaining a new voting system or an 

existing one, how successfully the system actually performs throughout the 

election cycle will depend not only on how well the technology itself has 

been designed, but also on how well the people and processes associated 

with the system fulfill their roles for each stage. The technical potential of 

more extensive integration of voting equipment, components, and election 

systems also holds the prospect for even more interrelationships and 

interdependencies among the people, processes, and technologies, with all 

their attendant risks. In addition to establishing minimum functional and 

performance requirements and processes for voting system aspects of the 

election process, system standards can also be used to govern the 

integration of election systems; address the accuracy, reliability, privacy, 

and security of components and interfaces; and deliver needed support for 

the people and processes that will use the integrated election systems. 

Timely development of integration standards presents a challenge to the 

election community to keep pace with the advancement of election 

systems and technology. 
Page 378 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix I

Related GAO Products ApendxiI

Elections: Absentee Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens 

Increased for 2004 General Election, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-521. 

Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2006. 

Election Reform: Nine States’ Experiences Implementing Federal 

Requirements for Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists. GAO06-247. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2006.

Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter 

Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote. GAO-05-997. 

Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2005.

Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of 

Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be 

Completed. GAO-05-956. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2005. 

Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials 

Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists. GAO-05-478. Washington, 

D.C.: June 10, 2005. 

Department of Justice's Activities to Address Past Election-Related 

Voting Irregularities. GAO-04-1041R. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 

2004.

Elections: Electronic Voting Offers Opportunities and Presents 

Challenges. GAO-04-975T. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004.

Elections: A Framework for Evaluating Reform Proposals. GAO-02-90. 

Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.

Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the Nation. 

GAO-02-3. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.

Elections: Statistical Analysis of Factors That Affected Uncounted Votes 

in the 2000 Presidential Election. GAO-02-122. Washington, D.C.: October 

15, 2001.

Elections: Status and Use of Federal Voting Equipment Standards. GAO02-52. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001. 

Voters with Disabilities: Access to Polling Places and Alternative Voting 

Methods. GAO-02-107. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.
Appendix I

Related GAO Products

Page 379 GAO-06-450 Elections

Elections: Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens Should Be 

Improved. GAO-01-1026. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.

Comparison of Voting Age Population to Registered Voters in the 40 

Largest U.S. Counties. GAO-01-560R. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2001. 

Elections: The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election 

Administration. GAO-01-470. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2001.

Bilingual Voting Assistance: Assistance Provided and Costs. GAO/GGD97-81. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 1997.

Puerto Rico: Confusion over Applicability of the Electoral Law to 

Referendum Process. HRD-93-84. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 1993.

Voting: Some Procedural Changes and Informational Activities Could 

Increase Turnout. PEMD-91-1. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 1990.

Bilingual Voting Assistance: Costs of and Use during the November 1984 

General Election. GGD-86-134BR. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 1986. 

Justice Can Further Improve Its Monitoring of Changes in State/Local 

Voting Laws. GGD-84-9. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 1983. 
Page 380 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials ApendxiI
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 381 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 382 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 383 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 384 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 385 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 386 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 387 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 388 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 389 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 390 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 391 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 392 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 393 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 394 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 395 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 396 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 397 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 398 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 399 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 400 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 401 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 402 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 403 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 404 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 405 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 406 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 407 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 408 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 409 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 410 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 411 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 412 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 413 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 414 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 415 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 416 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 417 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 418 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix II

2005 Survey of State Election Officials

Page 419 GAO-06-450 Elections
Page 420 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions ApendxiI
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 421 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 422 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 423 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 424 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 425 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 426 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 427 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 428 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 429 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 430 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 431 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 432 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 433 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 434 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 435 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 436 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 437 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 438 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 439 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 440 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 441 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 442 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 443 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 444 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 445 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 446 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 447 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 448 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 449 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 450 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 451 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 452 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 453 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 454 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 455 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 456 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 457 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 458 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 459 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 460 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 461 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 462 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 463 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 464 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 465 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 466 GAO-06-450 Elections
Appendix III

2005 Survey of Local Election Jurisdictions

Page 467 GAO-06-450 Elections
Page 468 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions GAO 

Visited ApendxiIV

Local election jurisdictions, such as counties, cities, townships, and 

villages, conduct elections—including federal and state contests. We 

visited 28 local election jurisdictions to collect information about the 

election administration process and their experiences during the 

November 2004 general election. In addition to information such as 

population size, number of precincts, and type of voting system used in the 

November 2004 general election,1

 we include information about whether 

these jurisdictions provided bilingual voting materials. Under section 203 

of the Voting Rights Act,2

 the Census Bureau Director is to make 

determinations3 based upon the most recent Census data as to which 

jurisdictions must provide voting materials4 in specified minority languages 

as well as in the English language. In our summaries we identify, pursuant 

to the Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights 

Act, whether or not each of the 28 jurisdictions we visited is currently (e.g., 

for purposes of this appendix, as of the November 2004 election) required 

to provide bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language 

minority voters.

Following is a brief summary of these 28 local jurisdictions, as reported to 

us by election officials we met with. The summaries, except where another 

source is specifically identified, are based upon information provided to us 

by local election officials and provide a general description of the 

environment in which the local election jurisdictions operate. The 

statements in this appendix that are based upon information from local 

election officials were not independently verified by us.

1

We asked election officials about the number of precincts in their jurisdiction for the 

November 2004 general election. Some officials indicated whether the total number 

included absentee ballot precincts, while others did not. In most jurisdictions we visited, 

the number of precincts was not the same as the number of polling places operating on 

Election Day.

2

42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a.

3

Determinations made by the Census Bureau Director are to be based upon a prescribed 

statutory formula. The most recent determinations made as to which jurisdictions are to be 

covered were published on July 26, 2002, at 67 Fed. Reg. 48,871 (2002).

4

In this context, the term “voting materials” means registration or voting notices, forms, 

instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the electoral process, 

including ballots.
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 469 GAO-06-450 Elections

Larimer County, 

Colorado

The County Clerk and Recorder is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Larimer County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, Larimer County had 10 full-time employees and 1 parttime employee working on election administration activities. The 2000 

Census showed that Larimer County had a population of about 251,000. 

During our site visit, Larimer County election officials told us that for the 

2004 election, the county had about 200,000 registered voters. Pursuant to 

the Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, 

Larimer County is not currently required to provide bilingual voting 

materials to any particular group of language minority voters. As a result, 

the county provides voting materials in English only. For the November 

2004 election, the county had 144 precincts. However, Larimer County used 

31 “vote centers” as polling places. On Election Day, any registered voter 

could go to any of the 31 vote centers to cast a ballot. The county also 

offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote early at designated 

early voting locations prior to Election Day. For the November 2004 general 

election, the county used optical scan ballots for early, absentee, 

provisional, and Election Day voting. For early and Election Day voting, the 

ballots were counted at the early voting sites and vote centers. Absentee 

and provisional ballots were counted centrally using optical scan counters. 

This county was included in our site visits to local jurisdictions for our 

October 2001 comprehensive report on election processes nationwide.5

El Paso County, 

Colorado 

The County Clerk and Recorder is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in El Paso County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, El Paso County had nine full-time staff working on 

election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that El Paso 

County had a population of about 517,000. During our site visit, El Paso 

County election officials told us that for the 2004 election, the county had 

about 354,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director’s 

determinations under the Voting Rights Act, El Paso County is not currently 

required to provide bilingual voting materials to any particular group of 

language minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting materials 

in English only. For the November 2004 general election, the county had 

378 precincts. The county also offered its registered voters the opportunity 

to vote early at designated locations prior to Election Day. For the 

5

For more information, see GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges 

across the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 470 GAO-06-450 Elections

November 2004 general election, the county used direct recording 

electronic (DRE) voting systems for early voting. Optical scan ballots were 

used to record absentee, provisional, and Election Day votes. Ballots cast 

on Election Day were counted using optical scan counters located in 

precincts. Absentee and provisional ballots were counted centrally.

City of New Haven, 

Connecticut

Responsibility for election administration for the City of New Haven is 

divided between two entities—the Registrars of Voters and the City Clerk’s 

Office. The Registrars of Voters have responsibility for voter registration, 

Election Day activities, provisional voting, vote counting and recounts, 

voting equipment, and voter education. The City Clerk is responsible for 

designing and disseminating absentee ballots, printing paper ballot strips 

for the lever machines, and providing sample ballots to polling places. At 

the time of our visit, there were six full-time staff in the Registrars of Voters 

Office and three full-time staff in the City Clerk’s Office working on election 

administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that the City of New 

Haven had a population of about 124,000. During our site visit, New Haven 

election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the city had 

about 58,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director’s 

determinations under the Voting Rights Act, the City of New Haven is 

currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to a particular 

group of language minority voters. As a result, the city provides voting 

materials in English and Spanish. For the November 2004 general election, 

the city had 42 precincts operating on Election Day and used lever 

machines for Election Day voting. Paper ballots were used to record 

absentee and provisional votes and were hand-counted in a central 

location. In addition, the city provided presidential ballots to Connecticut 

residents that were not registered to vote, and former Connecticut 

residents who had moved to another state within 30 days of the election. 

These ballots could be used only to vote for presidential and vice 

presidential candidates. 

City of Hartford, 

Connecticut 

Responsibility for election administration for the City of Hartford is divided 

between two entities—the Registrars of Voters and the City Clerk’s Office. 

The Registrars of Voters have the responsibility for voter registration, 

Election Day activities, provisional voting, vote counting and recounts, 

voting equipment, and voter education. The City Clerk is responsible for 

designing and disseminating absentee ballots, printing paper ballot strips 

for the lever machines, and providing sample ballots to polling places. At 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 471 GAO-06-450 Elections

the time of our visit, there were nine full-time staff in the Registrars of 

Voters and three full-time staff in the City Clerk’s Office working on 

election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that the City of 

Hartford had a population of about 122,000. According to the Secretary of 

State’s Web site, at the time of the 2004 general election, the city had about 

58,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director’s 

determinations under the Voting Rights Act, the city of Hartford is currently 

required to provide bilingual voting materials to a particular group of 

language minority voters. As a result, the city provides voting materials in 

English and Spanish. For the November 2004 general election, the city had 

23 precincts operating on Election Day and used lever machines for 

Election Day voting. Paper ballots were used to record absentee and 

provisional votes and were hand-counted in a central location. In addition, 

the city provided presidential ballots to Connecticut residents who were 

not registered to vote, and former Connecticut residents who had moved to 

another state within 30 days of the election. These ballots could be used 

only to vote for presidential and vice presidential candidates. 

Broward County, 

Florida 

The County Supervisor of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Broward County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, Broward County had 72 full-time staff working on 

election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Broward 

County had a population of about 1.6 million. During our site visit, Broward 

County election officials told us that for the November 2004 general 

election, the county had about 1 million registered voters. Pursuant to the 

Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, 

Broward County is currently required to provide bilingual voting materials 

to a particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the county 

provides voting materials in English and Spanish. County officials told us 

that they were unable to provide voting materials in Seminole, a Native 

American language, because the language is phonetic and cannot be 

written. In addition, county officials told us that they provided some voter 

education materials in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and Creole. For the 

November 2004 general election, the county had 793 precincts operating on 

Election Day. The county also offered its registered voters the opportunity 

to vote early at designated locations prior to Election Day. For the 

November 2004 general election, the county used DRE voting systems on 

Election Day and for early voting. Paper ballots were used to record 

absentee and provisional votes and were counted centrally using optical 

scan counters.
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 472 GAO-06-450 Elections

Leon County, Florida The County Supervisor of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Leon County, from registration through recounts. At the 

time of our visit, Leon County had 16 full-time staff working on election 

administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Leon County had a 

population of about 239,000. During our site visit, Leon County election 

officials told us that for the November 2004 general election, the county 

had about 171,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 

Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Leon County is not 

currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to any particular 

group of language minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting 

materials in English only. Additionally, for the November 2004 general 

election, the county provided ballots in Braille for the blind. The county 

had 179 precincts operating on Election Day for the November 2004 general 

election. The county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to 

vote early at the Supervisor of Elections’ office building prior to Election 

Day. For the November 2004 general election, the county used paper ballots 

to record absentee, early, provisional, and Election Day votes. Election Day 

and early voting ballots were counted using precinct optical scan counters, 

and absentee and provisional ballots were counted centrally using optical 

scan counters.

Dougherty County, 

Georgia 

The Supervisor of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Dougherty County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, Dougherty County had three full-time staff working on 

election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Dougherty 

County had a population of about 96,000. During our site visit, Dougherty 

County election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the 

county had about 46,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 

Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Dougherty County is 

not currently required to provide bilingual voting materials and assistance 

to any particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the county 

provides voting materials in English only. For the November 2004 general 

election, the county had 31 precincts operating on Election Day. The 

county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote early in the 

election office prior to Election Day. For the November 2004 general 

election, the county used DRE voting systems for Election Day, early, and 

in-person absentee voting. Paper ballots were used to record provisional 

and mail-in absentee votes and were counted centrally using optical scan
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 473 GAO-06-450 Elections

counters. This county was included in our site visits to local jurisdictions 

for our October 2001 report on election processes.6

Muscogee County, 

Georgia

The Director of Elections, appointed by the City Council, is responsible for 

overseeing election administration in Muscogee County, from registration 

through recounts. At the time of our visit, Muscogee County had five fulltime staff working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census 

showed that Muscogee County had a population of about 186,000. During 

our site visit, Muscogee County election officials told us that for the 2004 

general election, the county had about 106,000 registered voters. Pursuant 

to the Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights 

Act, Muscogee County is not currently required to provide bilingual voting 

materials to any particular group of language minority voters. As a result, 

the county provides voting materials in English only. For the November 

2004 general election, the county had 49 precincts, with 1 absentee voting 

precinct for purposes of counting ballots, operating on Election Day. The 

county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote early at the 

election office prior to Election Day. For the November 2004 general 

election, the county used DRE voting systems for Election Day and early 

voting. Paper ballots were used to record absentee and provisional ballots 

and were counted centrally using optical scan counters. 

Champaign County, 

Illinois 

The County Clerk is responsible for overseeing election administration in 

Champaign County, from registration through recounts. At the time of our 

visit, Champaign County had 16 full-time staff working on election 

administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Champaign County 

had a population of about 180,000. During our site visit, Champaign County 

election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the county had 

about 123,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director’s 

determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Champaign County is not 

currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to any particular 

group of language minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting 

materials in English only. For the November 2004 general election, the 

county had 117 precincts operating on Election Day. The county used 

punch card ballots to record Election Day, absentee, and provisional votes. 

These ballots were counted centrally using punch card counter machines. 

6

See GAO-02-3. 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 474 GAO-06-450 Elections

This county was included in our site visits to local jurisdictions for our 

October 2001 report on election processes.7

City of Chicago, Illinois The Executive Director of the Board of Elections is responsible for 

overseeing election administration in the City of Chicago, from registration 

through recounts. At the time of our visit, the City of Chicago had 300 fulltime staff on the Board of Elections working on election administration 

activities. The 2000 Census showed that the City of Chicago had a 

population of about 2.9 million. During our site visit, Chicago election 

officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the city had about 

1.4 million registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director’s 

determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Cook County, in which the City 

of Chicago is located, is currently required to provide bilingual voting 

materials to particular groups of language minority voters. As a result, the 

city provides voting materials in English, Spanish, and Chinese (including 

Mandarin and Cantonese). In addition, election officials told us that they 

provide voter registration information and other materials in 15 languages, 

including Croatian, Korean, Russian, and Tagalog. For the November 2004 

general election, the city had 2,709 precincts operating on Election Day. 

The city used punch card ballots to record Election Day, absentee, and 

provisional votes. Election Day and absentee ballots were counted in each 

precinct using punch card counters. Provisional ballots were counted 

centrally using punch card counters. 

Wyandotte County, 

Kansas 

The County Election Commissioner is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Wyandotte County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, Wyandotte County had six full-time staff working on 

election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Wyandotte 

County had a population of about 158,000. During our site visit, Wyandotte 

County election officials told us that for the November 2004 general 

election, the county had about 89,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the 

Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, 

Wyandotte County is not currently required to provide bilingual voting 

materials to any particular group of language minority voters. As a result, 

the county provides voting materials in English only. For the November 

2004 general election, the county had 159 precincts operating on Election 

7

See GAO-02-3. 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 475 GAO-06-450 Elections

Day. The county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote 

early at the headquarters office prior to Election Day. For the November 

2004 general election, the county used paper optical scan ballots to record 

Election Day, absentee, early, and provisional votes. Election Day ballots 

were counted at the precincts using optical scan counters, and early ballots 

were counted at the early voting location using optical scan counters. 

Absentee and provisional ballots were counted using optical scan counters 

in a central location.

Johnson County, 

Kansas 

The County Election Commissioner is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Johnson County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, Johnson County’s Election Office had 16 full-time staff 

working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 

that Johnson County had a population of about 451,000. During our site 

visit, Johnson County election officials told us that for the November 2004 

general election, the county had about 349,000 registered voters. Pursuant 

to the Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights 

Act, Johnson County is not currently required to provide bilingual voting 

materials to any particular group of language minority voters. As a result, 

the county provides voting materials in English only. For the November 

2004 general election, the county had 415 precincts operating on Election 

Day. The county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote 

early at designated early voting locations prior to Election Day. For the 

November 2004 general election, the county used DRE voting systems for 

Election Day voting. Paper optical scan ballots were used to record early, 

absentee, and provisional votes and were counted in a central location 

using optical scan counters. 

City of Manchester, 

New Hampshire 

The City Clerk is responsible for overseeing election administration for the 

City of Manchester, from registration through recounts. At the time of our 

visit, the City Clerk’s Office had 14 full-time staff working on election 

administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that the City of 

Manchester had a population of about 107,000. During our site visit, 

Manchester’s City Clerk told us that for the November 2004 general 

election, the city had about 57,000 registered voters. In terms of population, 

the City of Manchester is the largest city in New Hampshire and is located 

in the largest county. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director’s 

determinations under the Voting Rights Act, the City of Manchester is not 

currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to any particular 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 476 GAO-06-450 Elections

group of language minority voters. As a result, the city provides voting 

materials in English only. For the November 2004 general election, the 

county had 12 precincts operating on Election Day. The city used paper 

optical scan ballots to record Election Day and absentee votes, which were 

counted in each precinct using optical scan counters. 

Town of Madbury, New 

Hampshire

The Town Clerk is responsible for overseeing election administration for 

the Town of Madbury, from registration through recounts. At the time of 

our visit, the town had no full-time staff working on election administration 

activities, but had nine part-time workers, including the Town Clerk, 

assigned to administer elections. The 2000 Census showed that the Town of 

Madbury had a population of about 1,500. During our site visit, Madbury 

election officials told us that for the November 2004 general election, the 

town had about 1,200 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 

Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, the Town of 

Madbury is not currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to 

any particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the town 

provides voting materials in English only. For the November 2004 general 

election, the town had one precinct operating on Election Day. The town 

used hand-counted paper ballots to record Election Day and absentee 

votes. 

Middlesex County, 

New Jersey 

Responsibility for election administration for the County of Middlesex is 

divided between two entities—the County Clerk’s Office and the Board of 

Elections. The County Clerk’s Office is responsible for sending out 

absentee ballots, designing ballots, and certifying elections to the state. The 

Board of Elections has responsibility for voter registration, poll workers, 

polling places, vote counting and recounting, and voting equipment. At the 

time of our visit, the Board of Elections had 21 full-time staff and 4 parttime commissioners working on election administration activities. The 

2000 Census showed that Middlesex County had a population of about 

750,000. During our site visit, election officials told us that about 

427,000 residents of the county are registered voters. Pursuant to the 

Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, 

Middlesex County is currently required to provide bilingual voting 

materials to a particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the 

county provides voting materials in English and Spanish. For the November 

2004 general election, the county had 597 precincts operating on Election 

Day. The county used DRE voting systems on Election Day. Paper ballots 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 477 GAO-06-450 Elections

were used to record absentee and provisional votes, and were counted 

centrally using optical scan counters. In addition, paper ballots were used 

to record emergency votes, and were hand counted in a central location. 

This county was included in our site visits to local jurisdictions for our 

October 2001 report on election processes.8

Passaic County, New 

Jersey

Responsibility for election administration for Passaic County is divided 

among three entities—the Board of Elections, the County Clerk’s Office, 

and the Superintendent of Elections Office. The Board of Elections has 

responsibility for poll workers, polling places, vote counting, and recounts. 

The County Clerk’s Office has responsibility for ballot design, accepting 

absentee ballot applications and sending out ballots, and certifying the 

election to the state. The Superintendent of Elections has responsibility for 

voter registration and voting equipment. At the time of our visit, there were 

5 full-time staff in the Board of Elections Office, 3 full-time staff in the 

County Clerk’s Office, and 25 full-time staff in the Superintendent of 

Elections Office working on election administration activities. The 2000 

Census showed that Passaic County had a population of about 490,000. 

During our site visit, Passaic County election officials told us that for the 

2004 general election, the county had about 255,000 registered voters. 

Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting 

Rights Act, Passaic County is currently required to provide bilingual voting 

materials to a particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the 

county provides voting materials in English and Spanish. For the November 

2004 general election, the county had 288 precincts operating on Election 

Day. The county used DRE voting systems on Election Day. Paper ballots 

were used to record absentee and provisional votes, and were counted 

centrally using optical scan machines. In addition, emergency ballots were 

available for “emergency” situations, such as DRE malfunction or power 

loss, and were hand-counted in the precinct. 

8

See GAO-02-03. 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 478 GAO-06-450 Elections

Clark County, Nevada The Registrar of Voters, appointed by the County Manager, is responsible 

for overseeing election administration in Clark County, from registration 

through recounts. At the time of our visit, Clark County had 38 full-time 

staff working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census 

showed that Clark County had a population of about 1.4 million. During our 

site visit, Clark County election officials told us that for the 2004 general 

election, the county had about 684,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the 

Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, 

Clark County is currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to a 

particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the county 

provides voting materials in English and Spanish. For the November 2004 

election, the county had 1,042 precincts operating on Election Day. The 

county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote early at 

designated early voting locations prior to Election Day. For the November 

2004 general election, the county used DRE voting systems for Election 

Day, early voting, and provisional voting. Absentee and provisional votes, 

other than those cast on Election Day, were recorded on paper ballots and 

counted centrally using optical scan counters.

Washoe County, 

Nevada

The Registrar of Voters, appointed by the County Manager, is responsible 

for overseeing election administration in Washoe County, from registration 

through recounts. At the time of our visit, Washoe County had eight fulltime staff working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census 

showed that Washoe County had a population of about 339,000. During our 

site visit, Washoe County election officials told us that for the 2004 general 

election, the county had about 234,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the 

Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, 

Washoe County is not currently required under the Voting Rights Act to 

provide bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language 

minority voters. Nonetheless, the county provided voting materials in 

English and Spanish. For the November 2004 general election, the county 

had 236 out of 489 precincts operating on Election Day. The county also 

offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote early at designated 

early voting locations prior to Election Day. For the November 2004 general 

election, the county used DRE voting systems for Election Day and early 

voting. Paper ballots were used to record absentee and provisional votes, 

and were counted centrally using optical scan machines.
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 479 GAO-06-450 Elections

Bernalillo County, New 

Mexico

The Elections Administrator is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Bernalillo County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, Bernalillo County had 29 full-time staff working on 

election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Bernalillo 

County had a population of about 557,000. During our site visit, Bernalillo 

County election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the 

county had about 357,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 

Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Bernalillo County is 

currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to particular groups 

of language minority voters. As a result, the county provides voting 

materials in English and Spanish, and provides interpreters in three Native 

American languages, Navajo, Tiwa, and Keres, which have no written form. 

In addition, the county has a Native American coordinator who works with 

the various pueblos to discuss specific issues. For the November 2004 

general election, the county had 413 precincts operating on Election Day. 

The county also offered its registered voters the opportunity to vote early 

at designated early voting locations prior to Election Day. For the 

November 2004 general election, the county used DRE voting systems for 

Election Day and early voting. Absentee ballots were counted centrally 

using optical scan machines. Provisional votes were recorded on paper 

ballots and hand-counted centrally. This county was included in our site 

visits to local jurisdictions for our October 2001 report on election 

processes.9

Santa Fe County, New 

Mexico

The Bureau of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Santa Fe County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, Santa Fe County had eight full-time staff working on 

election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Santa Fe 

County had a population of about 129,000. During our site visit, Santa Fe 

County election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the 

county had about 95,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 

Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Santa Fe County is 

currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to particular groups 

of language minority voters. As a result, voting materials were provided in 

English and Spanish. The county also provides oral translation and 

audiotapes in Native American languages, some of which have no written 

form. For the November 2004 general election, the county had 87 precincts, 

9

See GAO-02-3. 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 480 GAO-06-450 Elections

including one absentee voting precinct for purposes of counting absentee 

ballots, operating on Election Day. The county also offered its registered 

voters the opportunity to vote early at designated early voting locations 

prior to Election Day. For the November 2004 general election, the county 

used DRE voting systems for Election Day. In addition, absentee ballots 

were counted centrally using optical scan machines. Provisional votes 

were recorded on paper ballots and centrally hand-counted. This county 

was included in our site visits to local jurisdictions for our October 2001 

report on election processes.10

Carteret County, North 

Carolina 

The Board of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Carteret County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, Carteret County had two full-time staff working on 

election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Carteret 

County had a population of about 59,000. During our site visit, Carteret 

County election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the 

county had about 42,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 

Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Carteret County is 

not currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to any 

particular group of language minority voters. Nonetheless, the county 

provided some voting materials, such as polling place posters, in English 

and Spanish. Election ballots and other materials were provided in English 

only. For the November 2004 general election, the county had 34 precincts 

operating on Election Day. The county also offered its registered voters the 

opportunity to vote early at the Board of Elections’ office prior to Election 

Day. For the November 2004 general election, the county used DRE voting 

systems for Election Day and early voting. Optical scan ballots were used 

to record absentee and provisional votes, and were centrally counted using 

optical scan machines. 

10See GAO-02-3. 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 481 GAO-06-450 Elections

Guilford County, North 

Carolina 

The Board of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Guilford County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, Guilford County had 14 full-time staff working on 

election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Guilford 

County had a population of about 421,000. During our site visit, Guilford 

County election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the 

county had about 275,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 

Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Guilford County is 

not currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to any 

particular group of language minority voters. Nonetheless, the county 

provided ballots in English and voting instructions in English and Spanish. 

For the November 2004 general election, the county had 159 precincts 

operating on Election Day. The county also offered its registered voters the 

opportunity to vote early at designated early voting locations prior to 

Election Day. For the November 2004 general election, the county used 

DRE voting systems for most Election Day and early voting ballots. Optical 

scan ballots were used to record absentee and provisional votes, and were 

centrally counted using optical scan machines.

Cuyahoga County, 

Ohio

The Board of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Cuyahoga County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, Cuyahoga County had about 86 full-time staff working 

on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that 

Cuyahoga County had a population of about 1.4 million. During our site 

visit, Cuyahoga County election officials told us that for the 2004 general 

election, the county had about 1 million registered voters. Pursuant to the 

Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, 

Cuyahoga County is not currently required to provide bilingual voting 

materials to any particular group of language minority voters. As a result, 

the county provides voting materials in English only. For the November 

2004 general election, the county had 1,436 precincts operating on Election 

Day. The county used punch card ballots for Election Day, absentee, and 

provisional voting that were counted in a central location. This county was 

included in our site visits to local jurisdictions for our October 2001 report 

on election processes.11

11See GAO-02-3. 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 482 GAO-06-450 Elections

Mahoning County, 

Ohio

The Board of Elections is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Mahoning County, from registration through recounts. At 

the time of our visit, Mahoning County had 12 full-time staff working on 

election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that Mahoning 

County had a population of about 258,000. During our site visit, Mahoning 

County election officials told us that for the 2004 general election, the 

county had about 195,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau 

Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, Mahoning County is 

not currently required to provide bilingual voting materials to any 

particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the county 

provides voting materials in English only. For the November 2004 general 

election, the county had 312 precincts operating on Election Day. The 

county used DRE voting systems for Election Day and Election Day 

provisional voting. Optical scan ballots were used to record absentee votes 

and were centrally counted using optical scan machines.

Allegheny County, 

Pennsylvania

The Allegheny County Elections Division is responsible for the day-to-day 

activities of and overseeing election administration, from registration 

through recounts. At the time of our visit, the county Elections Division had 

45 full-time staff working on election administration activities. The 2000 

Census showed that Allegheny County had a population of about 

1.3 million. According to Pennsylvania’s Department of State’s Web site, 

Allegheny County had about 919,000 registered voters for the 2004 general 

election. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director’s determinations under 

the Voting Rights Act, Allegheny County is not currently required to provide 

bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language minority 

voters. As a result, the county provides voting materials in English only. For 

the November 2004 general election, the county had 1,317 precincts 

operating on Election Day. For the November 2004 general election, the 

county used lever machines for Election Day voting. Paper ballots were 

used to record absentee and provisional votes. Absentee ballots were handcounted at the precincts, and provisional ballots were hand-counted in a 

central location. 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 483 GAO-06-450 Elections

Montgomery County, 

Pennsylvania

The Voter Services Office is responsible for overseeing election 

administration in Montgomery County, from registration through recounts. 

At the time of our visit, Montgomery County had 18 full-time staff working 

on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed that 

Montgomery County had a population of about 750,000. During our site 

visit, Montgomery County election officials told us that for the 2004 general 

election, the county had about 565,000 registered voters. Pursuant to the 

Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights Act, 

Montgomery County is not currently required to provide bilingual voting 

materials to any particular group of language minority voters. As a result, 

the county provides voting materials in English only. For the November 

2004 general election, the county had 407 precincts operating on Election 

Day. The county used DRE voting systems for Election Day. Paper ballots 

were used to record absentee and provisional votes. Absentee ballots were 

hand-counted in each precinct and recounted by county staff to obtain the 

official count. Provisional ballots were hand-counted in a central location. 

This county was included in our site visits to local jurisdictions for our 

October 2001 report on election processes.12

Clark County, 

Washington 

The County Auditor is responsible for overseeing election administration in 

Clark County, from registration through recounts. At the time of our visit, 

Clark County had eight full-time staff working on election administration 

activities. The 2000 Census showed that Clark County had a population of 

about 345,000. During our site visit, Clark County election officials told us 

that for the 2004 general election, the county had about 208,000 registered 

voters. Pursuant to the Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the 

Voting Rights Act, Clark County is not currently required to provide 

bilingual voting materials to any particular group of language minority 

voters. As a result, the county provides voting materials in English only. 

For the November 2004 general election, the county had 180 precincts 

operating on Election Day. The county used punch card ballots to record 

Election Day, absentee, and provisional votes. These votes were counted in 

a central location. This county was included in our site visits to local 

jurisdictions for our October 2001 report on election processes.13

12See GAO-02-3. 

13See GAO-02-3. 
Appendix IV

Summary of Local Election Jurisdictions 

GAO Visited

Page 484 GAO-06-450 Elections

King County, 

Washington

The Director of Records, Elections and Licensing Services is responsible 

for overseeing election administration in King County, from registration 

through recounts. At the time of our visit, King County had 38 full-time staff 

working on election administration activities. The 2000 Census showed 

that King County had a population of about 1.7 million. In terms of 

population, it has the largest population in Washington state. During our 

site visit, King County election officials told us that for the 2004 general 

election, the county had about 1 million active registered voters. Pursuant 

to the Census Bureau Director’s determinations under the Voting Rights 

Act, King County is currently required to provide bilingual voting to a 

particular group of language minority voters. As a result, the county 

provides voting materials in English and Chinese. For the November 2004 

general election, the county had 2,616 precincts operating on Election Day. 

The county used paper ballots on Election Day and for absentee and 

provisional votes. Election Day ballots were counted at the precincts using 

optical scan machines. Absentee and provisional ballots were counted 

centrally using optical scan machines. 
Page 485 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApendxiV

Our objectives were to

• identify changes to election systems since the November 2000 

general election, including steps taken to implement provisions of 

the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) and

• describe the issues and challenges encountered by election officials 

in the 2004 general election.

For both objectives, we (1) conducted a Web-based survey of the 50 states 

and the District of Columbia on state laws and other actions taken at the 

state level related to major stages of election administration—voter 

registration, absentee and early voting, conducting elections, and vote 

counting; (2) sent a mail questionnaire to election officials in a 

representative sample of local election jurisdictions nationwide; and 

(3) visited 28 local election jurisdictions in 14 states to obtain information 

about their experiences during the November 2004 general election. To 

obtain additional information about local election jurisdiction experiences, 

we attended the Election Center’s 21st Annual National Conference in 

August 2005. The Election Center is a national association of state and local 

election officials.

To identify questions to ask in our surveys and during our site visits to local 

jurisdictions about changes and issues and challenges, we reviewed prior 

GAO reports and relevant studies. The studies included those done by 

national or state organizations and state or local governments to assess the 

November 2004 general election. We also attended several hearings held by 

the Election Assistance Commission regarding election administration 

issues and attended the winter 2005 joint meeting of the National 

Association of Secretaries of State and National Association of State 

Election Directors. Overall, we did our work between March 2005 and 

February 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.

State Survey Our state survey sought to update information on selected state statutory 

requirements included in our 2001 elections report and inquired about 

other changes that included actions taken to implement HAVA. To develop 

our survey of state election officials, we reviewed existing studies about 

the election process, including previous and ongoing GAO work. Social 

science survey specialists designed a draft questionnaire in close 

collaboration with GAO subject matter experts, and we conducted pretests 
Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 486 GAO-06-450 Elections

with representatives of 5 states to help further refine our questions, 

develop new questions, clarify any ambiguous portions of the survey, and 

identify any potentially biased questions. These pretests were conducted in 

person and by telephone with election officials from states with varying 

election system characteristics. 

Prior to fielding our state survey, we contacted the Secretaries of State, 

Chairs of Election Boards, or other responsible state-level officials to 

confirm the contact information for the director of elections for each state. 

We launched our Web-based survey on August 15, 2005, and received all 

responses by November 7, 2005. Log-in information for the Web-based 

survey was e-mailed to directors of elections. We sent one follow-up e-mail 

message to all nonrespondents after the questionnaire had been online for 

2 weeks. After another 4 weeks, we contacted by telephone or e-mail all 

those who had not completed the questionnaire. A representative of the 

Council of State Governments also coordinated with us to encourage a 

select number of nonresponding states to complete the survey. We obtained 

responses from all 50 states and the District of Columbia for a 100 percent 

response rate. Even so, the number of responses to individual questions 

may be fewer than 51, depending upon how many states were eligible to or 

chose to respond to a particular question.

Because our state survey was not a sample survey, but rather a census of all 

states, including the District of Columbia, there are no sampling errors. 

However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce 

nonsampling errors. For example, differences in how a particular question 

is interpreted or the sources of information available to respondents can 

introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We included steps in 

both the data collection and data analysis stages for the purpose of 

minimizing such nonsampling errors. As indicated above, social science 

survey specialists designed a draft questionnaire, and versions of the 

questionnaire were pretested with 5 members of the population. We 

examined the survey results and performed computer analyses to identify 

inconsistencies and other indications of error. A second, independent 

analyst checked the accuracy of all computer analyses.

Mail Survey of Local 

Jurisdictions 

To obtain national information from local election officials on changes to 

election systems since 2000 and election administration, we conducted a 

mail survey of local election jurisdictions nationwide. Overall, there are 

about 10,500 local government jurisdictions responsible for conducting 

elections nationwide. States can be divided into two groups according to 
Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 487 GAO-06-450 Elections

how they delegate election responsibilities to local jurisdictions. The first 

group is composed of 41 states that delegate election responsibilities 

primarily to counties, with a few of these states delegating election 

responsibilities to some cities, and 1 state that delegates these 

responsibilities to election regions. We included the District of Columbia in 

this group of states. The first group contains about one-fourth of the local 

election jurisdictions nationwide. The second group is composed of 

9 states that delegate election responsibilities to subcounty governmental 

units, known by the U.S. Census Bureau as minor civil divisions (MCD). 

This group of states contains about three-fourths of the local election 

jurisdictions nationwide. The division of the 50 states and the District of 

Columbia by how election responsibilities are organized is as follows 

(states in bold delegate election responsibilities to some cities 

independently from counties). 

• County-level states: Alaska (four election regions), Alabama, Arizona, 

Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, 

Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 

Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 

Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 

Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South 

Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, 

West Virginia, and Wyoming

• Minor civil division-level states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 

Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 

Wisconsin

While only about one-fourth of election jurisdictions nationwide are in 

states that delegate election responsibilities primarily to counties, 

according to Census 2000, 88 percent of the U.S. population lived in these 

states. The U.S. population distribution between the two state groups is 

shown in table 28.
Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 488 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 28: Population in Each State Group

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.

2001 Local Election 

Jurisdiction Mail Survey

After the 2000 general election, GAO also conducted a mail survey of local 

election jurisdictions nationwide. The sample frame for GAO’s 2001 survey 

consisted of (1) all county election jurisdictions, or their equivalents, in 

39 states that delegate election responsibilities primarily to counties;1

(2) the largest MCD in each county (based on 1999 Census population 

estimates) in the 9 states that delegate election responsibilities to MCDs; 

(3) the District of Columbia; and (4) Alaska. Survey results were 

generalized to this sample frame, which covered 90 percent of the U.S. 

population.

The sample frame for the 2001 survey was stratified into three groups—

jurisdictions that used electronic voting machines; those that used optical 

scan; and those that used any other method, including punch cards, lever 

machines, and hand-counted paper ballots. To determine the population of 

jurisdictions that used each type of voting method, we used two databases 

from Election Data Services2

—one for counties nationwide and one for 

New England MCDs---supplemented by data we obtained from other 

sources. We created separate strata for DRE and optical scan because 

these were the two types of methods usually considered at the time as 

options by jurisdictions purchasing new voting equipment.

Where possible, the results of some questions in the 2001 survey were 

compared with results in the 2005 local election jurisdiction survey. 

Differences in overall estimates from the 2001 and 2005 surveys of local 

State group Population in 2000 Percentage

County-level states 247,277,791 88

Minor civil division-level states 34,143,449 12

Total 281,421,240 100

1

We did not include any election jurisdictions in Oregon because statewide voting in Oregon 

for the November 2000 election was conducted entirely by mail and absentee balloting.

2

Election Data Services is a private company that collects election-related data from state 

and local jurisdictions, such as the number of registered voters and voting methods used in 

local election jurisdictions. We used several methods to check the reliability of data in these 

databases and found the databases to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes in this survey.
Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 489 GAO-06-450 Elections

election jurisdictions are, in part, likely due to differences in the sample 

designs of the two surveys and how MCDs were selected. Because of these 

sample design differences, comparing only election jurisdictions that are 

counties provides a stronger basis for making direct comparisons between 

the two surveys' results. The estimates compared in this report are of the 

county local election jurisdictions only; for this reason, some estimates 

from the 2001 survey are slightly different than the overall sample 

estimates provided in our prior report. For these comparisons, the 95 

percent confidence interval is plus or minus 5 percentage points or less for 

the 2001 survey estimates and plus or minus 8 percentage points or less for 

the 2005 survey estimates.

2005 Local Election 

Jurisdiction Mail Survey

Unlike for the 2001 GAO election survey, for the 2005 survey GAO 

constructed its own sample frame. The initial list for each state group was 

constructed from the 2000 decennial census data. Census population data 

were available for all counties and county equivalents (cities that are 

independent from counties and boroughs, municipalities, and other census 

areas in Alaska); the county equivalents for Alaska were assigned to their 

respective election regions. Census population data were also available for 

all MCDs. We used jurisdiction population size to define sample strata 

because these census data were readily available for all counties and MCDs 

nationwide. Ideally, it would have been useful to define the sample using 

national data on all registered voters or all eligible voters. However, we did 

not use numbers of registered voters to define the strata because census 

data on registered voters were not available at the county and MCD level 

nationwide. And we did not use numbers of eligible voters (individuals 

18 years and over) to define the strata because census data allowing us to 

exclude noncitizens and felons, groups that are not eligible to vote, from 

the 18 years and over population, were also not available at the county and 

MCD levels nationwide.

The large imbalance between the distribution of population and election 

jurisdictions between the two groups of states created unique challenges in 

designing a survey sample that, at the same time, is representative of all 

election jurisdictions nationwide and covers the entire U.S. population. 

Because about three-fourths of all election jurisdictions are in the MCD 

states, in large part, a survey of a representative sample of jurisdictions 

nationwide is a survey of the MCD jurisdictions and the election processes, 

procedures, and practices that result from the laws of the 9 states in which 

they are located. And, because of the large number of MCD jurisdictions in 

Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin, these 3 states play a big role in the 
Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 490 GAO-06-450 Elections

sample.3 Contrariwise, a survey that is representative of the U.S. population 

nationwide, and not of local election jurisdictions nationwide, similar to 

GAO’s 2001 election survey, would place heavy emphasis on the 41 countylevel states in which 88 percent of the U.S. population lives. In a sample like 

this, about 88 percent of the sampled jurisdictions would come from the 

county-level states, and about 12 percent would come from the MCD states. 

So neither the MCD jurisdictions nor their states would receive as much 

emphasis in the sample. Therefore, we designed a survey sample that 

would allow us to provide survey results that can be generalized to all local 

election jurisdictions nationwide, as well as for local election jurisdictions 

by population size.

We surveyed a stratified random probability sample of 788 local election 

jurisdictions nationwide. The sampling unit was the geographically distinct 

local election jurisdiction at the county, city, or MCD level of local 

government (or, in Alaska, the election region). The population of election 

jurisdictions was divided into the two state groups—county-level states 

and MCD-level states, and each state group was then divided into strata 

according to jurisdiction population size using Census 2000 data. Countylevel states were divided into 4 strata, and MCD-level states were divided 

into 6 strata. The allocation of units, or jurisdictions, to strata was done in 

two stages (see table 29). In the first stage, 533 units were allocated across 

the 9 strata in proportion to the number of jurisdictions in the population in 

each stratum. We used only 9 strata because 1 stratum (stratum 5) did not 

have any jurisdictions. Sample allocation at this stage allowed us to have a 

random sample of all local election jurisdictions nationwide. In the second 

stage, we allocated an additional 255 sample units to the 5 strata having the 

largest population, with all jurisdictions in county-level states having a 

population greater than 1 million being selected. Sample allocation at this 

stage allowed us also to have a random sample of local jurisdictions 

nationwide according to population size—large, medium, and small. To 

group jurisdictions by population size, we combined jurisdictions in likesized population strata in county-level and MCD-level states. We defined 

large jurisdictions as those with a population greater than 100,000 (strata 

1, 2, and 6), medium jurisdictions as those with a population of more than 

10,000 to 100,000 (strata 3 and 7), and small jurisdictions as those with a 

population of 10,000 or less (strata 4, 8, 9, and 10). Thus, our survey results 

3

There are more than 6,100 MCD jurisdictions in these 3 states combined.
Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 491 GAO-06-450 Elections

can be generalized to all local election jurisdictions nationwide, as well as 

to jurisdictions by population size category.

Table 29: Local Election Survey Sample Allocation

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data for the population counts and GAO for sample allocations.

As indicated above, GAO constructed an initial sample frame for each state 

group using 2000 decennial census data. To check the comprehensiveness 

and correctness of this list, information about election jurisdictions was 

obtained from state election Web sites in nearly all states. In making these 

checks, we determined that the census data did not coincide with all local 

election jurisdictions in 7 states—Hawaii, Virginia, Maine, New Hampshire, 

Vermont, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. All of these states, except Wisconsin, 

had counties or MCDs that were not identified as election jurisdictions, and 

Maine and Wisconsin had election jurisdictions that were not census 

MCDs. Therefore, we adjusted the original sample frame to reflect the 

election jurisdictions in these 7 states as best we could determine. 

Additionally, during the course of fielding this survey, we learned that the 

5 counties, or boroughs, that constitute New York City are not separate 

election jurisdictions, but are a single election jurisdiction governed by the 

New York City Board of Elections. We adjusted our sample frame based on 

census data again to reflect this circumstance. Two states, Minnesota and 

Michigan, did not provide comprehensive listings of election jurisdictions 

on their state election Web sites. However, from the Minnesota Municipal 

Stratum

Total number of 

jurisdictions in 

population

Number in

stage 1 

allocation

Number in

stage 2 

allocation

Total number of 

jurisdictions 

sampled

1 County/city—greater than 1 million population 28 1 27 28

2 County/city—100,001 to 1 million population 422 21 136 157

3 County/city—10,001 to 100,000 population 1,716 87 65 152

4 County/city—1 to 10,000 population 648 33 0 33

5 MCD—greater than 1 million population 0 0 0 0

6 MCD—100,001 to 1 million population 25 1 7 8

7 MCD—10,001 to 100,000 population 673 33 20 53

8 MCD—1,001 to 10,000 population 3,053 155 0 155

9 MCD—301 to 1,000 population 2,341 119 0 119

10 MCD—0 to 300 population 1,585 83 0 83

Total 10,491 533 255 788
Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 492 GAO-06-450 Elections

Clerks and Finance Officers’ Association and the Minnesota Association of 

Townships, we obtained lists of Minnesota MCD election officials; and from 

the Michigan Townships Association Web site, the Michigan Association of 

Municipal Clerks, and a listing of Michigan local government Web sites 

contained in an online document from the University of Michigan, we 

obtained Internet links to Michigan MCDs that enabled us to identify local 

election officials in this state. From all of these data sources, GAO 

constructed a complete list of local election jurisdictions in the United 

States. The information from state election Web sites and other sources 

was used also to obtain contact information for the head official in local 

election jurisdictions selected to be in our survey sample. For some local 

election jurisdictions officials whose contact information was not readily 

available, we called or e-mailed state election officials, county or city hall 

administration offices, or jurisdiction membership organizations in order 

to learn appropriate names and addresses. A contractor was used to call all 

jurisdictions in the sample to confirm or correct, as necessary, this contact 

information.

We had to make adjustments in how we surveyed the election jurisdictions 

in two states—Minnesota and Texas. During questionnaire development, 

we learned that election functions in Minnesota are split between countylevel government and MCDs. For example, registration is handled 

exclusively by county officials, and county auditors may delegate other 

functions, such as absentee voting, to MCDs. There are some functions that 

MCDs are responsible for handling, such as polling place matters. 

Therefore, we also surveyed election officials in the 67 Minnesota counties 

that had MCDs selected to be in our sample—our sample included no 

MCDs from the remaining Minnesota counties. We created separate 

versions of our questionnaire for Minnesota county and MCD election 

officials. GAO staff reviewed and combined the responses from counties 

with the responses from their included MCDs to create a single completed 

questionnaire per Minnesota MCD in our sample. Also, during the course of 

fielding this survey, we learned that some Texas counties split election 

responsibilities between the county clerk and the tax assessor-collector. In 

the few Texas counties in our sample with these split responsibilities, we 

sent a copy of the main questionnaire to each official, and again used only a 

single completed questionnaire for the county.

Our survey period was from mid-August until mid-December 2005. A 

contractor was used to make up to two follow-up telephone calls to all 

nonrespondents to encourage them to return a completed questionnaire. In 

all, we received 632 usable questionnaires for an overall response rate of 
Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 493 GAO-06-450 Elections

80 percent. The response rates by strata are presented in table 30. As can be 

seen, the response rates were high in all strata, with the lowest response 

rate being 69 percent in stratum 2. And according to our groupings of 

jurisdictions by population size, the response rates for large jurisdictions 

was 72 percent, for medium jurisdictions it was 82 percent, and for small 

jurisdictions it was 83 percent. We believe that these response rates 

combined with relatively small sampling errors, presented below, allow us 

to describe the issues and challenges encountered by local election 

jurisdictions, both in total and by population size categories, in the 2004 

general election with an acceptable level of precision.

Table 30: Local Election Jurisdiction Survey Response Rates, Overall and by Sample Strata

Source: GAO

All sample surveys are subject to sampling error—that is, the extent to 

which the survey results differ from what would have been obtained if the 

whole population had been observed. Measures of sampling error are 

defined by two elements, the width of the confidence intervals around the 

estimate (sometimes called the precision of the estimate) and the 

confidence level at which the intervals are computed. Because we followed 

a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample is only 

one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. As each 

sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence 

in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95 percent 

confidence interval (e.g., plus or minus 5 percentage points). This is the 

Stratum

Number of 

jurisdictions 

sampled

Number of jurisdictions 

returning usable 

questionnaires Response rate

1 County/city—greater than 1 million population 28 24 86%

2 County/city—100,001 to 1 million population 157 108 69%

3 County/city—10,001 to 100,000 population 152 121 80%

4 County/city—1 to 10,000 population 33 26 79%

5 MCD—greater than 1 million population 0 0 0

6 MCD—100,001 to 1 million population 8 7 88%

7 MCD—10,001 to 100,000 population 53 48 91%

8 MCD—1,001 to 10,000 population 155 126 81%

9 MCD—301 to 1,000 population 119 96 81%

10 MCD—0 to 300 population 83 76 92%

Total 788 632 80%
Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 494 GAO-06-450 Elections

interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the 

samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that 

each of the confidence intervals based on the mail survey includes the true 

values in the sample population. Unless otherwise noted, the maximum 

sampling error for estimates of all jurisdictions is plus or minus 

5 percentage points, plus or minus 7 percentage points for large 

jurisdictions, plus or minus 7 percentage points for medium population size 

jurisdictions; and plus or minus 5 percentage points for small population 

size jurisdictions.

In addition to the reported sampling errors, as indicated earlier, the 

practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, 

commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, differences in 

how a particular question is interpreted, the information sources available 

to respondents, or the types of sample members who do not respond can 

introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took extensive 

steps in questionnaire development, data collection, and the editing and 

analysis of the survey data to minimize nonsampling errors. As with the 

questionnaire for our state survey, social science survey specialists 

designed the draft questionnaire for local jurisdictions in close 

collaboration with GAO subject matter experts. An early draft was 

reviewed by an expert in the election field who is also a long-time local 

election administrator. We pretested the questionnaire in person and by 

telephone with officials in election jurisdictions in 7 states. From this 

review and these pretests, we made revisions, as necessary. We also 

consulted with election officials in several counties in Minnesota when 

developing separate questionnaire versions for Minnesota counties and 

MCDs. Our questionnaire was sent to all jurisdictions in booklet form. A 

copy of the main mail questionnaire is included in appendix III. All returned 

questionnaires were reviewed and edited, and we called respondents to 

obtain information for blank responses or where clarification was needed. 

For example, many jurisdictions returned a questionnaire that had two or 

more adjacent pages left blank. We called these jurisdictions to determine 

whether the questions on these pages had not been answered accidentally 

or intentionally. We then obtained answers to these questions from those 

respondents willing to provide answers. Also, when necessary, we called 

Minnesota election officials to resolve conflicts that occurred when we 

were combining questionnaire data from Minnesota MCDs and associated 

counties into a single completed questionnaire per MCD. All questionnaire 

data were double key-entered into an electronic file in batches (that is, the 

entries were 100 percent verified), and a random sample of each batch was 

selected for further verification for completeness and accuracy. Computer 
Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 495 GAO-06-450 Elections

analyses were also performed to identify any inconsistencies in response 

patterns or other indications of errors. All computer syntax was peerreviewed and verified by separate programmers to ensure that the syntax 

had been written and executed correctly.

Visits to Selected Local 

Election Jurisdictions

To obtain a more detailed understanding of the stages of the election 

process, challenges associated with it in local jurisdictions, and how local 

election officials address those challenges, we visited and interviewed 

officials in a nonprobability sample of 28 local election jurisdictions in 

14 states nationwide. We obtained and reviewed available documentation 

on the requirements, people, processes, and technology of election 

administration within each jurisdiction. Although the information obtained 

from the visits to these 28 jurisdictions cannot be generalized to other local 

election jurisdictions, these jurisdictions were chosen based on a wide 

variety of characteristics, including voting methods used, geographic 

characteristics, and aspects of election administration. Regarding election 

administration, we sought to have a mix of jurisdictions where the 

following varied: registration time frames, absentee voting requirements 

(i.e., excuse versus no excuse), whether early voting was offered, whether 

voters were required to provide identification to vote, and whether 

recounts for federal or state offices occurred. We did not select 

jurisdictions we visited on the basis of size, but as appropriate, we identify 

the size of a jurisdiction we visited using the same groupings we used for 

our nationwide mail survey. The jurisdictions we visited are shown in 

table 31.
Appendix V

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 496 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 31: Local Election Jurisdictions Visited

Source: GAO

We visited these 28 local election jurisdictions between July and October 

2005. 

State Jurisdiction visited

Colorado El Paso County

Larimer County

Connecticut City of Hartford

City of New Haven

Florida Broward County

Leon County

Georgia Dougherty County

Muscogee County

Illinois Champaign County

City of Chicago

Kansas Johnson County

Wyandotte County

New Hampshire Town of Madbury

City of Manchester

New Jersey Middlesex County

Passaic County

Nevada Clark County

Washoe County

New Mexico Bernalillo County

Santa Fe County

North Carolina Carteret County

Guilford County

Ohio Cuyahoga County

Mahoning County

Pennsylvania Allegheny County

Montgomery County

Washington Clark County

King County
Page 497 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix VI

Voter Registration Deadlines for States and 

the District of Columbia ApendxiVI

 The following table presents information on voter registration deadlines in 

the 50 states and the District of Columbia as reported by state election 

officials in our state survey. In our state survey, we provided states the 

deadline they had reported to us for submitting a registration application 

for the November 2000 general election and asked if the deadline for 

submitting a registration application remained the same or had changed for 

the November 2004 general election. As shown in bold text, three states 

(Maryland, Nevada, and Vermont) reported that their states had changed 

their registration deadlines for the November 2004 general election. 

Table 32: States Reporting on November 2004 General Election Registration Deadlines

State 2004 general election registration deadline (days before election)

Alabama 10 days before election

Alaska 30

Arizona 29

Arkansas 30

California 15

Colorado 29

Connecticut 14

Delaware 20 days prior to a general election and 21 days prior to a primary election

District of Columbia 30

Florida 29

Georgia The fifth Monday before a general primary, general election, presidential preference primary, or special election 

unless special election or special primary is held on date other than uniform election date, in this case deadline 

would be fifth day after the date of the call for the special primary or election

Hawaii 30–9 October, 1 month prior to election

Idaho 25 days before an election if mailed, 24 days for in-person Election Day registration at polling precincts

Illinois 28 days before a general and primary election

Indiana 29

Iowa Must be delivered by 5 p.m., 10 days before a state primary or general election, 11 days before all others, or 

postmarked 15 or more days before an election

Kansas 15 days prior to any election

Kentucky No state response to this question

Louisiana 30

Maine Registration by mail or delivered by a person other than the voter had to be received by the registrar of voters by 

the 10th business day before the election. Registration permitted in person up to and on Election Day

Maryland 21 days before the election (the deadline was reduced from 25 days before the election)

Massachusetts 20
Appendix VI

Voter Registration Deadlines for States and 

the District of Columbia

Page 498 GAO-06-450 Elections

Source: GAO 2005 state survey.

Michigan 30

Minnesota Delivered by 5 p.m. 21 days before an election. Election Day registration at polling precincts

Mississippi 30

Missouri 28–always fourth Wednesday prior to an election. In some years this is 28 days, in some years it may be more than 

28 days

Montana 30

Nebraska For applicants submitted other than in person (mail, MVA, public assistance agency, etc.) the deadline is the third 

Friday prior to election. For in-person registrations at the local election official’s office, the deadline is 6 p.m. the 

second Friday before election

Nevada Deadline for registration by mail (9 p.m. on the fifth Saturday preceding any primary or general election) 

stayed the same. For registration in person the deadline was lengthened 10 days (9 p.m. on the third 

Tuesday preceding any primary or general election).

New Hampshire Must be received 10 days before an election. Election Day registration at polling precincts

New Jersey 29

New Mexico 28

New York 25

North Carolina Postmarked 25 days before an election or received 25 days before an election in the elections office or designated 

voter registration agency by 5 p.m.

North Dakota No voter registration

Ohio No state response to this question

Oklahoma 24

Oregon Postmarked or received 21 days before an election

Pennsylvania 30

Rhode Island 30

South Carolina 30

South Dakota Postmarked 30 days before an election or delivered 15 days before an election

Tennessee Postmarked or received 30 days before an election

Texas 30

Utah Postmarked 20 days before an election; in person at a county clerk’s office or at a county clerk designated 

“satellite” registration location 8 days before an election 

Vermont Noon on the second Monday before the election (changed from the second Saturday before the election)

Virginia 28 days prior to the general or primary election

Washington 30 days before an election or delivered in person up to 15 days before an election at a location designated by the 

county elections officer

West Virginia 21 days before the election

Wisconsin Postmarked or accepted by second Wednesday preceding election, or completed in the local voter registration 

office 1 day before the election. Election Day registration at polling precincts

Wyoming 30–Election Day registration at polling precincts

(Continued From Previous Page)

State 2004 general election registration deadline (days before election)
Page 499 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix VII

Characteristics of Early Voting Jurisdictions 

Visited ApendxiVI

GAO’s review of the November 2004 general election included visits to 

14 early voting election jurisdictions in 7 states, selected as part of a 

nonprobability sample of local election jurisdictions.1

 The election 

jurisdictions varied widely in their provisions of early voting locations, 

equipment, workers, and calendar days and hours. As shown in the table 

below, for example, election jurisdictions in Florida, Georgia, Kansas, and 

North Carolina had one early voting location, while others had multiple 

sites such as 3 in Johnson County, Kansas; 5 in Larimer County, Colorado; 

14 in Broward County, Florida; and 63 in Clark County, Nevada. The broad 

range of early voting locations involved the use of as few as one voting 

machine in Georgia and North Carolina counties we visited to several 

hundred voting machines used in counties visited in New Mexico and 

Nevada. The cadre of poll workers staffing early voting sites included as 

few as eight or nine workers in Georgia, Kansas, and North Carolina 

counties; dozens in jurisdictions such as Larimer County, Colorado; 

Bernalillo County, New Mexico; and hundreds in Broward County, Florida; 

Clark County, Nevada; and Guilford County, North Carolina. The period for 

early voting ranged from 5 days in Georgia to 28 days in New Mexico. Early 

voting hours varied extensively, but early voting was generally available 

during weekday business hours and sometimes on Saturday and Sunday.

Table 33: Selected Information on Jurisdictions We Visited That Had Early Voting

1

Election responsibility for these jurisdictions resided at the county level.

State County

Total 

number 

of 

locations

Locations 

accessible 

to voters 

with 

disabilities

Locations 

with 

voting 

machines 

accessible 

to voters 

with 

disabilities

Voting 

machines

Poll 

workers

Early 

voting 

calendar 

days

Early voting hours

Election/main 

office Other locations

Colorado El Paso 3 3 3 69 14 15 8 a.m.–5 p.m. 8 a.m.–4:30 p.m.

Colorado Larimer 5 5 0a 5 92 15 8 a.m.–5 p.m. 8 a.m.–5 p.m.

Florida Broward 14 14 14 183 220 15 8:30 a.m.–

6 p.m. M-F; 

10 a.m.–

3 p.m. Sat.; 

1 p.m.–

4 p.m. Sun.

8:30 a.m.–

6 p.m. M-F; 

10 a.m.–

3 p.m. Sat.; 

1 p.m.–

4 p.m. Sun.
Appendix VII

Characteristics of Early Voting Jurisdictions 

Visited

Page 500 GAO-06-450 Elections

Source: GAO interviews of local election jurisdiction officials.

a

To vote early, voters with disabilities completed a paper ballot which an election worker fed into a 

precinct count optical scan machine.

b

N/A–not applicable because jurisdiction had only 1 location for early voting.

c

New Mexico statute provides that a voter may vote early up to 28 days prior to an election at the office 

of the county clerk or at an alternate location.

Florida Leon 1 1 0a 1 15 15 8:30 a.m.–

5:30 p.m. M-F; 

9 a.m.–

5 p.m. Sat.; 

9 a.m.–

5 p.m. Sun.

N/Ab

Georgia Dougherty 1 1 1 7 8 5 8:30 a.m.–5 p.m. N/Ab

Georgia Muscogee 1 1 1 9 20 5 8 a.m.–5 p.m. N/Ab

Kansas Johnson 3 3 3 6 24 20 8 a.m.–

7 p.m. M-F; 

8 a.m.–

5 p.m. Sat. 

(generally)

11 a.m.–

7 p.m. M-F; 

9 a.m.–

5 p.m. Sat. 

(generally)

Kansas Wyandotte 1 1 0a 4 8 20 8 a.m.–5 p.m. N/Ab

Nevada Clark 63 63 63 390 347 17 Various Various

Nevada Washoe 11 11 11 85 29 17 8 a.m.–6 p.m. 

(generally)

8 a.m.–6 p.m. 

(generally)

New 

Mexico

Bernalillo 13 13 13 283 55 28c 8 a.m.–5 p.m. M-F

(generally)

12 p.m.–

8 p.m. T–F; 

10 a.m.–

5p.m. Sat. 

(generally)

New 

Mexico

Santa Fe

5 5 0a 5 20 17c

12 p.m.–

8 p.m. T – F; 

10 a.m.–

6 p.m. Sat.

12 p.m. –

8 p.m. T–F; 

10 a.m. – 

6 p.m. Sat.

North 

Carolina

Carteret 1 1 1 13 9 19 8 a.m.–

5 p.m. M-F; 

8 a.m.–1 p.m. Sat. 

N/Ab

North 

Carolina

Guilford 13 13 13 114 116 19 8 a.m.–5 p.m. M-F 

(generally)

10 a.m.–

6:30 p.m. M-F; 

10 a.m.–

1, 3, or 4 p.m. 

Sat. (generally)

(Continued From Previous Page)

State County

Total 

number 

of 

locations

Locations 

accessible 

to voters 

with 

disabilities

Locations 

with 

voting 

machines 

accessible 

to voters 

with 

disabilities

Voting 

machines

Poll 

workers

Early 

voting 

calendar 

days

Early voting hours

Election/main 

office Other locations
Page 501 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix VIII

Selected State Statutory Requirements for 

Absentee Voting ApendxiVI

This appendix presents selected state statutory requirements for absentee 

voting. Table 34 summarizes certain mail-in absentee voting requirements 

in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The statutory changes are in 

bold to highlight differences between requirements in the November 2000 

and 2004 general elections, including excuse requirements and notary or 

witness requirements. Table 35 summarizes the deadlines for returning 

mail-in absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots in the 50 states 

and the District of Columbia. Some of the states reporting that an excuse 

was required to vote absentee also reported providing voters with other 

means to vote prior to Election Day without requiring an excuse. According 

to our state survey, of the 30 states that reported requiring an excuse to 

vote absentee, 8 states reported that they offered voters the option of early 

voting without requiring an excuse. Oregon reported, on our state survey, 

that it offered all-mail voting.

Table 34: Selected State Requirements for Domestic Absentee Voting, November 2000 and 2004 General Elections

State

Excuse required Witness or notary required

2000 2004 2000 2004

Alabama Yes Yes Yes Yes

Alaska No Yes Yes Yes

Arizona No Yes No No

Arkansas Yes Yes No No

California No No No No

Colorado No No No No

Connecticut Yes Yes No No

Delaware Yes Yes No No

Florida Yes No Yes No

Georgia Yes Yes No No

Hawaii No No No No

Idaho No No No No

Illinois Yes Yes No No

Indiana Yes Yes No No

Iowa Yes No No No

Kansas No No No No

Kentucky Yes Yes No No

Louisiana Yes Yes Yes Yes

Maine No No No No
Appendix VIII

Selected State Statutory Requirements for 

Absentee Voting

Page 502 GAO-06-450 Elections

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials and GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges Across the Nation, 

GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: October 2001). 

Information in bold shows states with changes in excuse or witness or notary requirement.

Maryland Yes Yes No No

Massachusetts Yes Yes No No

Michigan Yes Yes No No

Minnesota Yes Yes Yes Yes

Mississippi Yes Yes Yes Yes

Missouri Yes Yes Yes Yes

Montana No No No No

Nebraska No No No No

Nevada No No No No

New Hampshire Yes Yes No No

New Jersey Yes Yes No No

New Mexico No No No No

New York Yes Yes No No

North Carolina Yes No Yes Yes

North Dakota No No No No

Ohio Yes Yes No No

Oklahoma No No Yes Yes

Oregon No Yes No No

Pennsylvania Yes Yes No No

Rhode Island Yes Yes Yes Yes

South Carolina Yes Yes Yes Yes

South Dakota Yes No No No

Tennessee Yes Yes No No

Texas Yes Yes No No

Utah Yes No No No

Vermont Yes No No No

Virginia Yes Yes Yes Yes

Washington No No No No

West Virginia Yes Yes No No

Wisconsin No No Yes Yes

Wyoming No No No No

District of Columbia Yes Yes No No

Total 33 18 30 21 13 38 12 39

(Continued From Previous Page)

State

Excuse required Witness or notary required

2000 2004 2000 2004
Appendix VIII

Selected State Statutory Requirements for 

Absentee Voting

Page 503 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 35: States’ Mail-in Absentee Ballot Application and Mail-in Absentee Ballot Deadlines for Inside the United States, 

November 2004 General Election

State Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline Mail-in absentee ballot deadline

Alabama 5 days before Election Day Election Day and postmarked by day prior to Election 

Day 

Alaska 7 days before Election Day 10 days after Election Day and postmarked by 

Election Day 

Arizona 11 days before Election Day Election Day by 7 p.m. 

Arkansas 7 days before Election Day Election Day no later than 7:30 p.m. 

California 7 days before Election Day Election Day by close of polls

Colorado 11 days before Election Day Election Day by 7 p.m.

Connecticut Election Day Election Day by close of polls

Delaware 1 day before Election Day 1 day before Election Day by noon

Florida No deadline Election Day by 7 p.m. 

Georgia 4 days before Election Day Election Day by 7 p.m. 

Hawaii 7 days Election Day by close of polls 

Idaho 6 days before Election Day Election Day by 8 p.m.

Illinois 5 days before Election Day Election Day by close of polls.

Indiana Varies by county, type of voter, and delivery method, but 

earliest deadline is 8 days before Election Day

In time for the board to deliver the ballot to the 

precinct on Election Day

Iowa 4 days before Election Day Either (1) Election Day, received by close of polls, or 

(2) postmarked no later than the day before close of 

polls and received not later than 12 p.m. on the 

Monday following the election

Kansas 4 days before Election Day Election Day by close of polls

Kentucky 7 days before Election Day Election Day by close of polls

Louisiana 4 days before Election Day 1 day before Election Day

Maine Election Day Election Day by close of polls

Maryland 7 days before Election Day 1 day after Election Day by 4 p.m. if postmarked 

before Election Day 

Massachusetts 1 day before Election Day Election Day by the close of polls

Michigan 3 days before Election Day Election Day by close of polls 

Minnesota 1 day before Election Day Election Day 

Mississippi 1 day before Election Day 1 day before Election Day by 5 p.m.

Missouri 6 days before Election Day Election Day by close of polls

Montana 1 day before Election Day Election Day by close of polls

Nebraska 6 days before Election Day Election Day by close of polls

Nevada 7 days before Election Day Election Day by close of polls 

New Hampshire No deadline Election Day by 5 p.m. 
Appendix VIII

Selected State Statutory Requirements for 

Absentee Voting

Page 504 GAO-06-450 Elections

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

Note: All of the reported state mail-in ballot deadlines remained the same for the November 2000 and 

2004 general elections except for Nebraska. Nebraska reported that the mail-in absentee ballot 

deadline for the November 2000 general election was no later than 2 days after Election Day.

New Jersey Election Day Election Day by the closing of the polls

New Mexico 7 days before Election Day Election Day by 7 p.m. 

New York 7 days before Election Day 7 days after Election Day and postmarked before 

Election Day

North Carolina 7 days before Election Day 1 day before Election Day by 5 p.m.

North Dakota 1 day before Election Day Postmarked by midnight of the day before Election 

Day (if no postmark legible, must be received within 2 

days after Election Day) 

Ohio Election Day Election Day by close of the polls 

Oklahoma 6 days before Election Day Election Day no later than 7 p.m. 

Oregon No deadline Election Day not later than 8 p.m. 

Pennsylvania 7 days before Election Day 4 days before Election Day by 5 p.m.

Rhode Island 21 days before Election Day Election Day not later than 9 p.m. 

South Carolina 4 days before Election Day Election Day by closing of the polls

South Dakota Election Day Election Day

Tennessee 5 days before Election Day Election Day by close of polls

Texas 7 days before Election Day Election Day by close of polls 

Utah 20 days before Election Day 6 days after Election Day and postmarked before 

Election Day 

Vermont 1 day before Election Day Election Day 

Virginia 5 days before Election Day Election Day 

Washington 1 day before Election Day Postmarked no later than Election Day

West Virginia 6 days before Election Day Either (1) received Election Day by close of polls or 

(2) postmarked no later than Election Day and 

received before canvassing begins (generally the 

fifth day after a general election)

Wisconsin 4 days before Election Day Election Day 

Wyoming 1 day before Election Day Election Day by 7:00 p.m. 

District of Columbia 7 days before Election Day 10 days after Election Day and postmarked not later 

than Election Day 

(Continued From Previous Page)

State Mail-in absentee ballot application deadline Mail-in absentee ballot deadline
Page 505 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix IX

State Provisions for Accessibility of Polling 

Places and Alternative Voting Methods ApendxiIX

This appendix presents additional information on the accessibility of 

polling places and alternative voting methods.

State Provisions 

Concerning 

Accessibility for the 

2000 General Election

In October 2001, we issued a report that examined state and local 

provisions and practices for voting accessibility, both at polling places and 

with respect to alternative voting methods and accommodations. For that 

report, our analysis included a review of state statutes, regulations, and 

written policies pertaining to voting accessibility for all 50 states and the 

District of Columbia. We noted that all states and the District of Columbia 

had laws or other provisions concerning voting access for individuals with 

disabilities, but the extent and manner in which these provisions addressed 

accessibility varied from state to state.1

 Table 36 presents state provisions 

concerning the accessibility of polling places, and table 37 presents 

provisions related to alternative voting methods, as reported in our 

October 2001 report.

1

For more information, see GAO, Voters with Disabilities: Access to Polling Places and 

Alternative Voting Methods, GAO-02-107 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).
Appendix IX

State Provisions for Accessibility of Polling 

Places and Alternative Voting Methods

Page 506 GAO-06-450 Elections

Table 36: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places 

Source: GAO-02-107, p. 17; GAO analysis of statutes, regulations, and other written provisions in 50 states and the District of Columbia. 

Provision categories were identified based on our review of these legal and policy documents. 

a

Policies for a particular provision were identified only if a state did not have either a statute or a 

regulation for that provision.

Table 37: State Provisions for Alternative Voting Methods and Accommodations 

Source: GAO-02-107, p. 21; GAO analysis of statutes, regulations, and other written provisions provided by election officials in 50 states 

and the District of Columbia. 

Number of states with provisions

State provisions

Statute or 

regulation Policy onlya

Number of states 

with no provision

Polling place accessibility 

All polling places must/should be accessible 36 7 8

State provisions contain one or more polling place accessibility 

standards

23 19 9

Inspection of polling places to assess accessibility is required 15 14 22

Reporting by counties to state on polling place accessibility is required 10 10 31

Voting booth areas and equipment

Voting booth areas must/should accommodate wheelchairs 17 16 18

Voting systems must/should accommodate individuals with disabilities 13 11 27

Aids for visually impaired voters

Braille ballot or methods of voting must/should be provided 3 3 45

Ballots with large type must/may be provided 2 2 47

Magnifying instruments must/may be provided 7 15 29

Number of states

Methods and accommodations Permitting No provision Prohibited

Absentee voting by mail 51 0 0

Permanent absentee voting 17 34 0

Curbside voting on Election Day 28 19 4

Ballot can be taken to voter’s residence on or before Election Day 21 25 5

Early voting 39 12 0
Appendix IX

State Provisions for Accessibility of Polling 

Places and Alternative Voting Methods

Page 507 GAO-06-450 Elections

State Provisions For 

the November 2004 

General Election

Table 38 presents information from our 2005 survey of state election 

officials about provisions concerning accessibility and accommodations 

for individuals with disabilities for the November 2004 general election.

Table 38: State Provisions Concerning Accessibility of Polling Places and Accommodations for Individuals with Disabilities for 

the November 2004 General Election

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

a

Election officials in one state responded that they did not know.

b

Oregon conducts Election Day voting by mail; thus, provisions for polling place accessibility are not 

applicable.

c

Election officials in one state did not respond to this question.

d

Election officials in one state did not respond to this question.

Provision Required Allowed

Not

allowed

Not

addressed

Not 

applicable

Required or 

allowed

Polling place accessibility standardsa 41 6 0 2 1b 47

Inspections of polling place accessibility 28 16 0 6 1b 44

Reporting by local jurisdictions to the state 

on polling place accessibility 

32 8 0 9 2 b 40

Accommodation of wheelchairs in voting 

areas 

39 4 0 7 1b 43

Curbside voting available on Election Day 17 13 18 2 1b 30

Ballot can be taken to voter’s residence on 

or before Election Day

5 20 18 8 0 25

Notification of voters of any inaccessible 

polling placesc

16 11 1 16 6 b 27

Provision of ballot or methods of voting in 

Brailled

1 13 2 33 1 14

Provision of ballots with large type 5 17 3 26 0 22

Provision of magnifying instrumentsd 8 34 0 7 1b 42
Page 508 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix X

States and the District of Columbia Reported 

Requirements for Local Jurisdictions to Use 

Federal Standards for Voting Systems ApendxiX

The following table summarizes reported state requirements for 

compliance with voluntary federal standards for voting equipment that will 

be used for the first time in the 2006 general election in the 50 states and 

the District of Columbia. In our survey of state election officials, we asked 

states to identify from a list of federal standards or guidelines any or all that 

they would require local jurisdictions to comply with for new voting 

equipment for the November 2006 general election. According to our state 

survey, states are requiring local jurisdictions to apply a variety of federal 

standards to their voting systems.

Table 39: States and the District of Columbia Reported Requirements for Use of Voluntary Federal Standards for New Voting 

Systems for the November 2006 General Election

State

1990 FEC

standards

2002 FEC 

standards

Draft EAC

guidancea

Hybrid of one or

more of 1990 and

2002 FEC standards

and EAC guidance

Will use federal

standards/guidelines

but version was not

specified

Not yet

determined

Alabama x

Alaska x

Arizona x x x

Arkansas x

California x x x

Colorado x

Connecticut x x

Delawareb x x

Florida x

Georgia x

Hawaii x

Idaho x

Illinois x x

Indiana x

Iowa x

Kansas x x x

Kentucky x x

Louisiana x

Maine x

Maryland x

Massachusetts x x x

Michigan x

Minnesota x x
Appendix X

States and the District of Columbia Reported 

Requirements for Local Jurisdictions to Use 

Federal Standards for Voting Systems

Page 509 GAO-06-450 Elections

Source: GAO 2005 survey of state election officials.

a

At the time of our 2005 state survey, the proposed EAC guidelines were open to public comment for a 

period of 90 days. On December 13, 2005, EAC adopted the 2005 Voluntary Voting System 

Guidelines, which will take effect in December 2007.

b

Three states (Delaware, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma) indicated in their response that they do not 

require that local jurisdictions comply with federal standards or guidance.

c

South Carolina did not respond to any of the response categories.

Mississippi x

Missouri x

Montana x

Nebraska x

Nevada x

New Hampshireb

New Jersey x x

New Mexico x

New York x

North Carolina x

North Dakota x

Ohio x

Oklahomab

Oregon x x

Pennsylvania x

Rhode Island x

South Carolinac

South Dakota x

Tennessee x

Texas x x

Utah x

Vermont x

Virginia x x

Washington x x

West Virginia x

Wisconsin x

Wyoming x

District of Columbia x

Totals 11 29 5 10 6 5

(Continued From Previous Page)

State

1990 FEC

standards 

2002 FEC 

standards 

Draft EAC 

guidancea

Hybrid of one or

more of 1990 and

2002 FEC standards 

and EAC guidance

Will use federal

standards/guidelines 

but version was not

specified

Not yet

determined 
Page 510 GAO-06-450 Elections

Appendix XI

GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments ApendxiXI

Contacts For questions regarding this report, please contact Norman Rabkin at 

(202) 512-8777 (rabkinn@gao.gov), Bill Jenkins at (202) 512-8757 

(jenkinswo@gao.gov), or Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512-3870 

(hiter@gao.gov).

Acknowledgments Additional staff making major contributions to this report were 

Linda Watson, Project Manager and Assistant Director; David Alexander; 

Pille Anvelt; Orin B. Atwater; Carl Barden; Amy Bernstein; Susan Bernstein; 

Fred Berry; Stefanie Bzdusek; Grace Coleman; Willie Commons; John Dale; 

Lester Diamond; Neil Doherty; Michele Fejfar; Alice Feldesman; 

Joanne Fiorino; Dan Garcia; Dan Gordon; Rich Griswold; Brandon Haller; 

Geoffrey Hamilton; Mike Holland; Valerie Hopkins; Ashfaq Huda; 

Mary Catherine Hult; Cathy Hurley; Sairah Ijaz; Monica Kelly; 

Mohammad Khan; George Kovachick; Ron La Due Lake; Frank Maguire; 

Matthew R. Michaels; Jan Montgomery; Paula Moore; Jean Orland; 

Brandon S. Pettis; Tomas Ramirez; Emmy Rhine; Amy Sheller; Jay Spaan; 

Derek Updegraff; Ashanta Williams; and Ellen Wolfe.

We gratefully acknowledge the substantial time and cooperation of the 

election officials whom we visited in the following locations: Allegheny 

County, Pennsylvania; Bernalillo County, New Mexico; Broward County, 

Florida; Carteret County, North Carolina; Champaign County, Illinois; 

Chicago, Illinois; Clark County, Nevada; Clark County, Washington; 

Cuyahoga County, Ohio; Dougherty County, Georgia; El Paso County, 

Colorado; Guilford County, North Carolina; Hartford, Connecticut; 

New Haven, Connecticut; Johnson County, Kansas; King County, 

Washington; Larimer County, Colorado; Leon County, Florida; Madbury, 

New Hampshire; Mahoning County, Ohio; Manchester, New Hampshire; 

Middlesex County, New Jersey; Montgomery County, Pennsylvania; 

Muscogee County, Georgia; Passaic County, New Jersey; Santa Fe County, 

New Mexico; Washoe County, Nevada; and Wyandotte County, Kansas. 
Page 511 GAO-06-450 Elections

Glossary

This glossary is provided for reader convenience. It is not intended as a 

definitive, comprehensive glossary of election-related terms.

Absentee and Early Voting These are programs that, in general, permit eligible persons to vote prior to 

Election Day. Absentee voting is generally conducted by mail in advance of 

Election Day and early voting is generally in-person voting in advance of 

Election Day at specific polling locations. 

Acceptance Testing Acceptance testing is the examination of voting systems and their 

components by the purchasing election authority in a simulated-use 

environment to validate performance of delivered units in accordance with 

procurement activities. 

Audit Testing Audit testing reviews and reconciles election records to confirm correct 

conduct of an election or uncover evidence of problems with voting 

equipment or election processes. 

Ballot This is the official presentation of all of the contests to be decided in a 

particular election.

Canvassing This is the process of reviewing votes by precinct, resolving problem votes, 

and counting all types of votes (including absentee and provisional votes) 

for each candidate and issue on the ballot and producing an official total 

for each. 

Central Count Tabulation Ballots are counted at a central location.

Certification Certification is the point in the election process at which the vote count is 

finalized and made official. There are generally two stages of the 

certification process for statewide elections: First, the local election 

jurisdiction certifies the vote count to the state, and second, the state 

certifies the final vote count. 
Glossary

Page 512 GAO-06-450 Elections

Certification Testing Certification testing validates the compliance of the voting equipment with 

federal standards or state-specific requirements prior to (or as a condition 

of) system acceptance. Under NASED, national testing was called 

qualification testing.

Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration List

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 requires most states to implement a 

single, uniform, centralized, and interactive computerized statewide voter 

registration list to serve as the official voter registration list for the conduct 

of all elections for federal office in each such state. 

Contested Elections These generally involve either an administrative or a judicial process 

specified under state provisions whereby certain individuals (e.g., a voter, a 

group of voters, or candidates) initiate an action challenging an election on 

the basis of certain state-specified reasons that may include, for example, 

ineligibility of the person elected, illegal votes, fraud, or errors by election 

officials.

Direct Recording Electronic 

(DRE)

There are two types of DREs, push-button and touch screen. For pushbutton machines, voters press a button next to the candidate’s name or 

ballot issue, which then lights up to indicate the selection. Similarly, voters 

using touch screen DREs make their selections by touching the screen next 

to the candidate or issue, which is then highlighted. When voters are 

finished on a push-button or a touch screen DRE, they cast their votes by 

pressing a final “vote” button on the machine or screen. 

Election Administration This is the people, processes, and tasks associated with registering voters 

and preparing for and conducting elections.

Election Assistance 

Commission (EAC)

HAVA established this commission with wide-ranging duties to help 

improve the administration of federal elections. The commission is to be 

involved with, among other things, providing voluntary guidance to states 

on implementing certain HAVA provisions, serving as a national 

clearinghouse of state experiences implementing such guidelines and in the 

operation of voting systems in general, conducting studies, and helping to 

develop optional testing and standards for election equipment.
Glossary

Page 513 GAO-06-450 Elections

Election Day Activities Activities carried out on Election Day include opening and closing polling 

places, verifying voter qualifications, assisting voters in casting their 

ballots, resolving problems that may arise during the day, and safeguarding 

the ballots.

Election Day Preparation Tasks carried out in preparation for Election Day include recruiting and 

training poll workers, arranging for polling places, educating voters, 

designing ballots, and preparing voting equipment for use in casting and 

tabulating votes.

Election Fraud Election fraud includes conduct that corrupts the electoral process for 

(1) registering voters; (2) obtaining, marking, or tabulating ballots; or 

(3) canvassing and certifying election results. Types of fraudulent conduct 

may include, among other things, voting by ineligibles, voting more than 

once, voter impersonation, intentional disruption of polling places either 

physically or by corrupting tabulating software, or destroying ballots or 

voter registrations.

Election Jurisdictions These are counties, cities, townships, and villages that have responsibility 

for election administration. 

Election Management 

System

This is a system that integrates the functions associated with readying votecasting and -tallying equipment for a given election with other election 

management functions. 

Federal Election 

Commission (FEC)

In 1975, Congress established FEC to administer and enforce the Federal 

Election Campaign Act—the statute that governs the financing of federal 

elections. To carry out this role, FEC discloses campaign finance 

information; enforces provisions of the law, such as limits and prohibitions 

on contributions; and oversees the public funding of presidential elections.
Glossary

Page 514 GAO-06-450 Elections

Federal Voting Equipment 

Standards

In 1990, FEC issued voluntary federal voting equipment standards that 

identified minimum functional and performance requirements for 

electronic voting systems and specified test procedures to be used to 

ensure that voting equipment met these requirements. FEC later revised 

the standards in 2002 to address new or additional functional and technical 

voting system capabilities. With the passage of HAVA in 2002, the 

responsibility for issuing standards passed to EAC. In December 2005, EAC 

issued the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, which include additions 

and revisions for system functional requirements, performance 

characteristics, documentation requirements, and test evaluation criteria 

for the national certification of voting systems.

Integration Testing Integration testing determines whether vote-casting, tallying, and election 

management systems function together for the election. Integration testing 

is conducted before the election.

Lever Machines Lever machines are mechanical; the ballot is composed of a rectangular 

array of levers, which can be physically arranged either horizontally or 

vertically. Voters cast their votes by pulling down those levers next to the 

candidates’ names or ballot issues of their choice. After voting, the voter 

moves a handle that simultaneously opens the privacy curtain, records the 

vote, and resets the levers. 

Minor Civil Divisions (MCD) These are subcounty governmental units, as designated by the U.S. Census 

Bureau.

Optical Scan An optical scan voting system is composed of computer-readable ballots, 

appropriate marking devices, privacy booths, and a computerized 

tabulation machine. The ballots can vary in size and list the names of the 

candidates and the issues. Voters record their choices using an appropriate 

writing instrument to fill in boxes or ovals or to complete an arrow next to 

the candidate’s name or the issue. Optical scan ballots are counted by being 

run through a computerized tabulation machine.

Overvotes These are votes for more choices than are permitted for the contest. 
Glossary

Page 515 GAO-06-450 Elections

Paper Ballots Voters generally complete their paper ballots in the privacy of a voting 

booth and record their choices by placing marks in boxes corresponding to 

the candidates’ names and the ballot issues. After making their choices, 

voters drop the ballots into sealed ballot boxes. Paper ballots are manually 

counted and tabulated.

Parallel Testing Parallel testing verifies the accurate performance of voting equipment 

through random selection and systematic evaluation of operational 

equipment. Parallel testing is conducted during the election.

Precinct Count Tabulation Votes are cast and counted at the precinct.

Provisional Voting Provisional voting is generally used by states to address certain voter 

eligibility issues encountered at the polling place on Election Day. A 

provisional ballot cast by an individual with an eligibility issue would 

typically not be counted until the individual’s eligibility to vote under state 

law has been verified. HAVA specifies that states permit individuals to cast 

provisional ballots under certain circumstances. These circumstances 

include instances when voters assert they are registered in the jurisdiction 

in which they desire to vote and that they are eligible to vote in an election 

for federal office but their names do not appear on the polling place 

registration list. 

Punch Card Punch card voting equipment generally consists of a ballot, a voterecording device that keeps the ballot in place and allows the voter to 

punch holes in it, a privacy booth, and a computerized tabulation device.

The voter inserts a machine-readable card with prescored numbered boxes 

representing ballot choices into the vote-recording device and uses a stylus 

to punch out the appropriate prescored boxes. The ballot must be properly 

aligned in the vote-recording device for the holes in the ballot card to be 

punched all the way through. Punch card ballots are counted by being run 

through a computerized tabulation machine. 
Glossary

Page 516 GAO-06-450 Elections

Readiness Testing Also referred to as logic and accuracy testing, readiness testing checks that 

the voting equipment is functioning properly, usually by confirming that 

predictable outputs are produced from predefined inputs. Readiness 

testing is typically conducted in the weeks leading up to Election Day. 

Recount Some states authorize certain persons (e.g., defeated candidates and 

voters) to request an election recount under specified circumstances. 

These circumstances can include, for example, when there is a tie vote, 

when the margin of victory is within a specified percentage or number of 

votes, or when inaccuracies in the vote count are alleged. The scope and 

method of such recounts can vary to include, for example, partial recounts 

of certain precincts, complete recounts of all ballots, machine recounts, 

and hand recounts for the office or issue in question. Some states provide 

for mandatory (or automatic) recounts that are, for example, mandated in a 

specified percentage or number of precincts irrespective of victory 

margins, or triggered by a tie vote, or a margin of victory within a specified 

percentage or number of votes.

Registration For the 2004 election, most states and the District of Columbia required 

individuals to apply to register prior to Election Day and be registered with 

the appropriate local election officials before such individuals could vote. 

Some states had same-day registration and allowed individuals to register 

to vote at the polls on Election Day. One state, North Dakota, did not have a 

voter registration requirement. Voter registration includes the processes, 

people, and technology involved in registering eligible new voters and in 

compiling and maintaining voter registration lists. 

Spoiled Ballot This is a ballot that has been voted but will not be cast.

System Verification Testing System verification testing is testing before the election to verify that the 

voting equipment is operating properly on Election Day.
Glossary

Page 517 GAO-06-450 Elections

Undervotes Undervotes are votes for fewer choices than permitted, such as not voting 

for President. An undervote may or may not be an error. A voter might have 

tried to vote for a candidate but failed to mark the ballot unambiguously or 

might have chosen not to vote for any candidate for a particular office.

U.S. Election Systems Those federal and state constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, 

people, processes, and technology associated with the framework of, 

preparation for, and conduct of elections.

Vote Tabulation Vote tabulation is the counting of the ballots cast at the polling places on 

Election Day and those cast in person or by mail prior to Election Day; 

determining whether and how to count ballots that cannot be read by the 

vote-counting equipment; certifying the final vote counts; and performing 

recounts, if required.

Voter Education Voter education is essentially education about elections, and the primary 

target is the voter. It includes information about how to register, vote 

absentee or early, and use the voting method employed in the state or 

jurisdiction, as well as information needed to vote on Election Day. Voter 

education is usually identified as a function of the election authority. It may 

also be fostered by public interest organizations. Political parties may 

provide information about candidates, but this type of information is not 

included under our definition of voter education.

Voter Intent The determination of voter intent can be an issue under certain 

circumstances, such as when a voter has improperly or unclearly marked 

his ballot (for example, with a punch card ballot, not making a clean 

punch) and the state provides for resolving the situation by determining the 

“intent of the voter.” State direction to election officials in making such a 

determination can be set out as a general or a specific standard by which 

the election official should judge such a ballot.

Voter-Verifiable Paper Trail 

(VVPT)

This is a human-readable printed record of all of a voter’s selections, 

presented to the voter to view and check for accuracy.
Glossary

Page 518 GAO-06-450 Elections

Voting Equipment All devices used to display the ballot, accept voter selections, record voter 

selections, and tabluate the votes.

Voting Method The classes or types of machines used in a voting system. There are five 

types of voting methods used in U.S. elections: paper ballot, lever machine, 

punch card, optical scan, and DRE.

Voting System A voting system is the people, processes, and technology associated with 

any specific method of casting and counting votes, such as optical scan. 

Technology includes the mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic 

equipment, software, firmware, and documentation required to program, 

control, and support voting equipment.

440384
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to 

www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.”

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional 

Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548