Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1608-CR-1866 | June 1, 2017 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Chanse T. Starr

Bunker Hill, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Chanse T. Starr,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent

June 1, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A03-1608-CR-1866

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Frances C. Gull, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

02D06-1111-FC-361

02D06-1111-FC-358

02D06-1106-FD-844

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1608-CR-1866 | June 1, 2017 Page 2 of 4

[1] Chanse Starr appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for jail time credit 

and petition to dismiss probation. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[2] In 2012, Starr entered into a plea agreement resolving three causes. Under the 

agreement, as later modified, Starr pleaded guilty to Class C felony corrupt 

business influence under cause FC-358, Class C felony corrupt business 

influence under cause FC-361, and admitted to being an habitual offender 

under cause FC-361.1 Pursuant to the plea agreement, Starr was sentenced to 

concurrent four-year terms for the two Class C felony convictions, with an 

eight-year habitual offender enhancement. The plea agreement also required 

the trial court to suspend six years of that sentence.

[3] At the March 14, 2012, sentencing hearing, Starr’s attorney informed the trial 

court that Starr had been continuously incarcerated since November 10, 2011, 

and agreed that part of his credit time was to be applied to an unrelated 

misdemeanor cause. Counsel calculated that Starr was entitled to 117 days of 

jail credit toward the offenses to which he was pleading guilty. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II p. 8-9, 10. Starr agreed that 117 days of jail time credit should 

apply to these offenses, with the balance being applied to a misdemeanor cause. 

 

1 The charges under cause FD-844 were dismissed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1608-CR-1866 | June 1, 2017 Page 3 of 4

The trial court awarded Starr 117 days of jail time credit in causes FC-358 and 

FC-361.

[4] On July 20, 2016, Starr filed a motion for jail time credit and a petition to 

dismiss probation. The trial court denied both motions on July 22, 2016, and 

Starr now appeals.2

Discussion and Decision

I. Jail Time Credit

[5] Presentence jail time credit is a matter of statutory right rather than a matter of 

judicial discretion. Weaver v. State, 725 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 

A motion for jail time credit must “identif[y] a sufficient factual basis for [the 

inmate’s] eligibility.” Id.

[6] Here, both Starr and his attorney represented to the trial court that part of his 

accumulated jail time credit had been applied to an unrelated misdemeanor 

cause and that the balance to be applied to these causes totaled 117 days. 

Nothing in the record or Starr’s argument leads us to question this calculation. 

Furthermore, the dates he suggests should be used to calculate his jail time 

credit are not supported by the chronological case summaries of these causes. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 44, 56. Moreover, while Starr argues that he was 

entitled to good time credit, nothing in the record indicates that he was denied 

 

2

Starr filed a timely notice of appeal on August 10, 2016. This Court accepted a belated filing of his brief on 

March 24, 2017.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1608-CR-1866 | June 1, 2017 Page 4 of 4

such credit. Under these circumstances, Starr has failed to identify a sufficient 

factual basis for his eligibility for additional jail time credit, and the trial court 

did not err by denying the motion.

II. Petition to Dismiss Probation

[7] Starr voluntarily entered into a plea agreement, which provided that six years of 

his agreed-upon sentence would be suspended to probation. He now seeks to 

dismiss that probation. But he may not collaterally attack a sentence provided 

for in a plea agreement: “it is a long-standing principle that the validity of a 

guilty plea can only be challenged by way of a petition for post-conviction 

relief, not by direct appeal or motion to correct error.” Allen v. State, 865

N.E.2d 686, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Furthermore, he fails to provide a 

cogent argument in support of his theory that he cannot be required to serve an 

executed sentence in a different cause with a sentence ordered to be served 

consecutively to the present sentence before beginning his present probation. 

We find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of Starr’s petition to dismiss 

probation.

[8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.