Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

J. Clayton Miller

Jordan Law, LLC

Richmond, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of H.R., Minor 

Child Alleged to be a Child in 

Need of Services;

C.R. (Father), 

Appellant-Respondent, 

v. 

Indiana Department of Child 

Services, 

Appellee-Petitioner.

July 22, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JC-144 

Appeal from the Henry Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Bob A. Witham, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

33C01-1807-JC-90 

Najam, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 2 of 14

Statement of the Case

[1] C.R. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s adjudication of his minor child, H.R. 

(“Child”), as a child in need of services (“CHINS”) and the trial court’s 

termination of his visitation with Child.

1

 Father raises two issues for our 

review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial 

court’s adjudication of Child as a CHINS. 

2. Whether the trial court denied Father his right to due 

process when it terminated his visitation with Child. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Father and H.G. (“Mother”) have one child together, Child, who was born on 

September 8, 2014. Beginning in January 2018, Father had sole custody of 

Child. On July 22, Child’s adult half-sister, F.R. (“Sister”), picked Child up 

from Father. Father told Sister that Child “may have a yeast infection and that 

[Sister] need[s] to go get some medication for it.” Tr. Vol. III at 92. The next 

day, Sister called Child’s pediatrician, who called in a prescription for Child. 

Sister picked up the medication the following day, July 24. 

[4] Sister’s wife, S.R., attempted to put the medication on Child. When Child saw

that S.R. was about to put the medication on her, she “jumped backwards” and 

 

1

 Child’s mother does not participate in this appeal. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 3 of 14

said, “no, no, no don’t hurt me. I don’t want it to go in my coochie like it does 

at daddy’s house.”2

 Id. Sister then asked Child what she meant, and Child 

said, “the white thing with the knot on the end, it goes in my coochie and it 

hurts me.” Id. at 97. 

[5] Sister then contacted Carrie Matthews, a family case manager (“FCM”) with 

the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Sister told FCM Matthews 

that Child “had told her that her dad had touched her in her vagina area[.]” Tr. 

Vol. II at 171. FCM Matthews recommended that Sister take Child to the 

pediatrician’s office. 

[6] Sister made an appointment for Child to see the doctor. Sister did not provide 

any information to the doctor’s office about Child’s allegations but, rather, 

made the appointment “for a checkup of the yeast infection.” Tr. Vol. III at 

122. On July 25, Sister took Child to the pediatrician’s office, and FCM 

Matthews met them there. Once Sister and Child arrived, Amanda Witham, a 

medical assistant, conducted a clinical workup of Child. Child told Witham 

that she “was having burning,” and she pointed “down to her vaginal area and 

toward her bottom or rectum.” Tr. Vol. II at 79. Witham then talked to Child 

while they waited for the nurse practitioner to examine Child. Child told 

Witham that she “didn’t want her daddy to put anything down there anymore 

and again pointed to her vaginal and anal area.” Id. 

 

2

 Child used the word “coochie” to refer to her “vaginal area.” Tr. Vol. II at 196
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 4 of 14

[7] Based on Child’s statements during the exam, FCM Matthews set up an 

appointment for Child to undergo a forensic interview. During the interview, 

the interviewer asked Child if anyone has ever touched her. Child told the 

interviewer that, sometimes before she goes to bed, “daddy puts a white ball 

thing in my coochie.” Ex. 15. The interviewer then asked Child if the white 

thing did anything, and Child stated that it “was bobbing in [her] butt.” Id. 

Child also stated that it “was beeping off and on.” Id. Child further told the 

interviewer that, when Father “pressed a button,” the white thing “went 

mmm.” Id. Child then said that it “felt like brushing my teeth.” Id. The 

interviewer then asked Child if she has an electric toothbrush, and Child stated 

that she does. 

[8] Following Child’s forensic interview, FCM Matthews scheduled an 

appointment for Holly Renz, a sexual assault nurse examiner, to examine Child

the next day. Meanwhile, FCM Matthews contacted the Henry County 

Sheriff’s Department and informed them of Child’s allegations against Father. 

FCM Matthews then contacted Father and asked Father to go to the Sheriff’s 

Department. Father complied, and officers interviewed him. Based on the 

interview and the information that the officers had received from DCS, 

Detective David Pierce obtained a warrant to search Father’s house for “all 

vibrators, massagers, sex toys, [and] sexual devices, including a white in color 

vibrator or massager.” Ex. at 14. Detective Pierce did not find any sex toys, 

but he found 196 grams of marijuana in jars that were in unlocked cabinets in 

various rooms of the house. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 5 of 14

[9] On July 26, Renz examined Child. During the exam, Renz asked Child “if 

anyone had ever touched her coochie for no good reason.” Tr. Vol. II at 197. 

Child told Renz that “her daddy had touched her coochie” with “the white 

thing.” Id. Renz then asked Child if anyone had ever touched her butt for no 

good reason, and Child responded: “my daddy puts his finger in my butt.” Id. 

[10] That same day, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child is a CHINS. 

Specifically, DCS alleged that Father had “committed acts on [Child] that 

appear to be sexual acts involving a sexual aid” and that officers had located a 

large amount of marijuana in Father’s house. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 17. 

DCS removed Child from Father and placed her with Sister. Thereafter, on 

August 1, the forensic interviewer conducted a second interview of Child. 

During that interview, Child told the interviewer that she had asked Father to 

throw the white thing away because “it hurts people.” Ex. 15. 

[11] On August 8, Father filed a request for parenting time, which the court denied. 

However, the court found that the issue “may be revisited following [C]hild’s 

beginning of therapy and therapist’s recommendation for visitation with 

[F]ather to commence.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 25. Father later requested 

that he be allowed to participate in visitation with Child. On September 12, the 

court approved Father’s request for therapeutic visitation. But the court 

authorized the therapist “to terminate the visitation immediately” if “the 

visitation is deemed to be harmful to the [C]hild.” Id. at 29. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 6 of 14

[12] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition on October 3, 

October 29, and November 5. During the hearing, the State presented as 

evidence the testimony of Doctor Jason Cook, a clinical psychologist who had 

conducted an evaluation of Child to determine if Child would be emotionally or 

mentally harmed by testifying in court. Dr. Cook testified that, when he 

mentioned Father to Child, Child “had emotional reactions like arms flinging” 

and she became “agitated.” Tr. Vol. II at 104. Dr. Cook specifically testified 

that Child would use her arms “as a weapon.” Id. at 108. The State also 

presented as evidence the video recordings of Child’s two forensic interviews. 

Father stipulated to the admission of the first interview, and the court admitted 

the video recording of the second interview without objection from Father. 

[13] On October 19, Kaylee Durnell, Child’s home-based therapist, wrote a letter in 

which she detailed her observations of Child. Specifically, Durnell observed 

that, during play therapy, Child engaged in “rigid play therapy” with themes 

that “allude to high anxiety and inability to manage anxious behaviors.” 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 33. Durnell further observed that the “introduction 

of a ‘father role’ during play stimulated anxious behavior” and that Child “will 

deflect, redirect, and flee when [Durnell] explores her relationships with her 

father.” Id. Durnell stated that she is “extremely concerned” that Father had 

visitation with Child, and she asked the court to suspend visitation due to the 

“long lasting, traumatic impact face to face visitation” would cause Child. Id. 

at 34. Based on that letter, the State filed a motion to cease visitation between 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 7 of 14

Father and Child on October 31, after the second day of the fact-finding hearing 

but prior to the third day. 

[14] At the start of the third and final day of the fact-finding hearing on November 5, 

the court asked counsel for the parties if they had any preliminary matters to 

discuss. DCS stated that it “ha[s] a motion with regard to visitation for later.” 

Tr. Vol. III at 80. The court acknowledged DCS’s motion and confirmed that it 

would discuss the motion, and Father did not raise any issues he had with 

DCS’s motion at that time. The court then proceeded with the fact-finding 

hearing on the CHINS petition. Toward the end of the hearing, the State 

attempted to call Durnell as a rebuttal witness, but Father objected. Due to 

Father’s objection, the court did not allow Durnell to testify “with respect to the 

Fact[-]Finding” hearing, but the court stated that it “will consider the report 

that she has filed on the Motion to Cease Visitation[.]” Id. at 144. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the State’s petition alleging Child 

to be a CHINS under advisement, but the court granted the State’s motion to 

cease visitation from the bench over Father’s objection. 

[15] Thereafter, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in 

which it adjudicated Child to be a CHINS. Specifically, the court found as 

follows:

1. [Child] made numerous statements to several persons 

regarding her father, [Father], touching her in an 

inappropriate manner on parts of her body, including her 

vagina and anus. Those statements were made to, or in the 

presence of, [Sister], [S.R.], Amanda Witham[,] and in two 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 8 of 14

(2) forensic interviews. . . . [Father] was the parent who had 

sole custody of [Child] prior to [Child] being removed from 

his custody on July 25, 2018.

2. From the evidence presented, the Court is convinced that 

something happened to [Child] and [Child] was subjected to 

inappropriate touching and [Father] was the person who was 

legally responsible for [Child]. Additionally, the Court notes 

that containers of marijuana were found in [Father’s] home at 

around the time [Child] was removed from the home.

* * *

4. Pursuant to Indiana Code [Section] 31-34-1-1, the evidence 

presented shows that [Child’s] physical or mental health was 

seriously endangered by being inappropriately touched while 

in her father’s custody and [F]ather has been unable, has 

refused[,] or has neglected to supply [Child] with necessary 

supervision. The Court believes that [Child] is in need of 

care, treatment, or rehabilitation that [Child] is not receiving 

and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the

coercive intervention of the Court. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 36-37. On November 16, Father filed a motion to 

correct error. Father asserted that the trial court had violated his due process 

rights when it ceased his visitation with Child because the court granted the 

State’s motion “without a contested hearing” and without Father “having an 

opportunity to cross-examine” Durnell. Id. at 40. 

[16] On December 6, the court held a dispositional hearing and a hearing on 

Father’s motion to correct error. During the hearing, Father stated that he 

“should be afforded the opportunity to at least cross-examine [Durnell] about 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 9 of 14

her findings[.]” Tr. Vol. III at 156. The court responded and stated that it “did 

not rely upon any of that information” when it granted DCS’s motion to 

terminate Father’s visitation. Id. at 156-57. Rather, the court stated that it had 

granted DCS’s motion to cease visitation “based upon what the Court found in 

the Fact[-]Finding” hearing. Id. at 157. The court then denied Father’s motion 

to correct error and issued its dispositional order in which it ordered Father to 

participate in services. This appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[17] Father first contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the trial 

court’s determination that Child is a CHINS. Our Supreme Court recently 

reiterated our standard of review:

When reviewing a trial court’s CHINS determination, we do not 

reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. In re S.D., 2 

N.E.3d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2014). “Instead, we consider only the 

evidence that supports the trial court’s decision and [the] 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. at 1287 (citation, 

brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). When a trial 

court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. 

We consider, first, “whether the evidence supports the findings” 

and, second, “whether the findings support the judgment.” Id.

(citation omitted). We will reverse a CHINS determination only 

if it was clearly erroneous. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 

(Ind. 2012). A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do 

not support the findings or “if it applies the wrong legal standard 

to properly found facts.” Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 

(Ind. 1997) (citation omitted).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 10 of 14

Gr. J. v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs. (In re D.J.), 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017) 

(alterations in original). 

[18] DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-

1-1 (2018), which provides that a child is a child in need of services if, before the 

child becomes eighteen years of age: (1) the child’s physical or mental 

condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the 

inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to 

supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, 

or supervision; and (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that: 

(A) the child is not receiving; and (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted 

without the coercive intervention of the court. Our Supreme Court has 

interpreted this provision to require “three basic elements: that the parent’s 

actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child’s needs 

are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met 

without State coercion.” J.B. v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child. Serv. (In re S.D.), 2 N.E.3d 

1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014).

[19] On appeal, Father asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial 

court’s findings. Specifically, Father asserts that the evidence does not support 

the findings because Child’s statements were unreliable and, “[g]iven the 

unreliability of three-year-old [Child’s] alleged disclosures (which are the only 

evidence whatsoever of alleged sexual abuse),” the evidence “does not 

reasonably lead to the conclusion [Child] was the subject of any sexual abuse.” 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 11 of 14

Appellant’s Br. at 18, 19. However, we agree with DCS that there is sufficient

evidence to support the trial court’s findings. 

[20] It is well-established that the testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to 

support a CHINS allegation. See Rose v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1055, 1061 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015) (stating that “a conviction for child molesting may rest solely on the 

uncorroborated testimony of the victim.”). Here, the evidence demonstrates 

that, when S.R. attempted to apply medication to Child, Child “jumped 

backwards” and said, “don’t hurt me. I don’t want it to go in my coochie like it 

does at daddy’s house.” Tr. Vol. III at 92. Additionally, while at the 

pediatrician’s office, Child told Witham that she “didn’t want her daddy to put 

anything down there anymore” while pointing to her vaginal and anal area. Id. 

Further, during Child’s first forensic interview, Child told the interviewer that 

“daddy puts a white ball thing in my coochie.” Ex. 15. Child also told the 

interviewer that Father would “press[] a button” and it “went mmm” like her 

electric toothbrush. Id. And, during Renz’s examination of her, Child told 

Renz that “her daddy had touched her coochie with a white thing” and that her 

“daddy puts his finger in [her] butt.” Tr. Vol. II at 197. Father’s contention on 

appeal, that Child’s statements were unreliable, is merely a request for this 

Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to reweigh the evidence, 

which we cannot do. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.2d at 577-78. 

[21] The evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Father’s actions or 

inactions have seriously endangered Child, that Child’s needs are unmet, and 

that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion. See In re S.D., 2 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 12 of 14

N.E.3d at 1287. We therefore hold that sufficient evidence supports the trial 

court’s findings, and its findings support its conclusions with respect to Indiana 

Code Section 31-34-1-1. We affirm the trial court’s adjudication of Child as a 

CHINS.3

Issue Two: Due Process

[22] Father next contends that the trial court violated his due process rights when it 

terminated his visitation with Child. It is well settled that “[d]ue process 

requires ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 

manner.’” S.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re K.D.), 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 

(Ind. 2012) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). “Due 

process protections at all stages of CHINS proceedings are vital because every 

CHINS proceeding has the potential to interfere with the rights of parents in the 

upbringing of their children.” S.C. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re L.C.), 23 

N.E.3d 37, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). 

[23] Father contends that he was denied his due process rights when the trial court 

“summarily granted” DCS’s motion to cease visitation because the trial court 

“gave [Father] no opportunity to be heard” and because the trial court “did not 

give [Father] advanced notice of the basis [for] granting the motion[.]” 

 

3

 In its findings of fact, the trial court also “note[d] that containers of marijuana were found in [Father’s] 

home at around the time [Child] was removed from the home.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 37. However, 

the trial court only concluded that Child’s physical or mental health was seriously endangered “by being 

inappropriately touched while in her father’s custody.” Id. Accordingly, while the trial court acknowledged 

that officers had found marijuana in Father’s home, the trial court did not base its conclusion that Child is a 

CHINS on that finding of fact. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 13 of 14

Appellant’s Br. at 23. In essence, Father contends that the court violated his 

due process rights when it did not hold a separate hearing on the State’s motion 

to cease visitation because he was not on notice that his visitation would be an 

issue during the CHINS fact-finding hearing. We cannot agree. 

[24] DCS filed its petition alleging Child was a CHINS on July 26, 2018. In that 

petition, DCS alleged that Father had “committed acts on [Child] that appear 

to be sexual acts involving a sexual aid[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 17. 

Given the specific allegations in that petition, Father was on notice that his 

visitation with Child would be at issue when the merits of that petition came 

before the court. That is to say, any reasonable parent who has been accused of 

sexual misconduct with his child would be aware of the fact that visitation with 

his child would be at issue during the CHINS proceedings. 

[25] Further, prior to the fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition, Father filed a 

request for visitation, which request the trial court granted. However, in its 

order granting Father’s request, the court specifically authorized the therapist to 

terminate visitation immediately should the therapist deem visitation to be 

harmful to Child. Accordingly, in addition to being on notice that his visitation 

would be at issue based on the allegations in the CHINS petition, Father was 

additionally on notice from the date he received the court’s order granting 

visitation that visitation could be terminated at any time. 

[26] By the time the trial court held a three-day fact-finding hearing beginning on 

October 3, during which Father was represented by counsel, Father had clear
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JC-144 | July 22, 2019 Page 14 of 14

notice that his visitation with Child was at issue. And Father had ample 

opportunity to prepare for and present evidence at that hearing in support of his 

position that visitation should continue. Indeed, Father presented evidence 

during the fact-finding hearing to dispute DCS’s allegations. Further, the trial 

court made its decision to terminate Father’s visitation based only “upon what 

the Court found in the Fact[-]Finding” hearing. Tr. Vol. III at 197. 

Accordingly, even though the trial court did not hold a separate hearing to 

specifically address DCS’s motion to cease visitation, Father “had the 

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” on 

the issue of his visitation with Child. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1257. Because 

Father had the opportunity to be heard, the trial court did not violate Father’s 

due process rights, and we affirm the court’s order ceasing visitation. 

Conclusion

[27] In sum, DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 

adjudication of Child as a CHINS. And the trial court did not violate Father’s 

due process rights when it terminated Father’s visitation with Child. We affirm 

the trial court. 

[28] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Robb, J., concur.