United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Highways, 

Transit, and Pipelines, Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, House 

of Representatives

RAIL TRANSIT

Observations on FTA’s State 

Safety Oversight Program 

Statement of Katherine Siggerud, Director 

Physical Infrastructure 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, July 19, 2006

 

GAO-06-997T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

July 19, 2006

RAIL TRANSIT

Observations on FTA’s State Safety 

Highlights of GAO-06-997T, a report to Oversight Program 

Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and 

Pipelines, Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, House of 

Representatives 

The U.S. rail transit system is a

vital component of the nation’s 

transportation infrastructure,

carrying millions of people daily. 

Unlike most transportation modes,

safety and security oversight of rail 

transit is the responsibility of statedesignated oversight agencies

following Federal Transit

Administration (FTA)

requirements. In addition, in 2001, 

Congress passed the Aviation and

Transportation Security Act, giving

the Transportation Security

Administration (TSA) authority for 

security over all transportation 

modes, including rail transit. 

This testimony is based on ongoing 

work for this subcommittee’s 

committee—the House Committee 

on Transportation and

Infrastructure. I describe (1) how

the State Safety Oversight program 

is designed; (2) what is known 

about the impact of the program on

rail safety and security; and (3) 

challenges facing the program. I

also provide information about 

oversight of transit systems that 

cross state boundaries. To address

these issues, we reviewed program 

documents and interviewed

stakeholders including officials 

from FTA, TSA, the National 

Transportation Safety Board, and

the American Public

Transportation Association. We

also surveyed state oversight and 

transit agencies covered by FTA’s 

program, interviewing 24 of the 25 

oversight agencies and 37 of 42

transit agencies across the country.

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other 

federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the 

safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to designate 

an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies that 

receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible for overseeing 

transit agencies, including reviewing transit agencies’ safety and security

plans. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of 

their responsibilities, the TSA also has security oversight authority over 

transit agencies. 

Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit 

agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several 

transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as 

reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample 

anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not 

definitively shown the program’s benefits and has not developed

performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as 

required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program 

after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated 

3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack of 

information to track the program’s trends. FTA officials recognize it will be 

difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help determine the 

program’s impact, especially since fatalities and incidents involving rail 

transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor 

and has stated that the program’s new leadership will make auditing 

oversight agencies a top priority. 

FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. 

First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from 

16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough 

qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we 

spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address this 

variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about what 

role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has 

hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could 

result in duplication of effort. 

Examples of Rail Transit Systems Subject to FTA State Safety Oversight Program 

Source: Pennsylvania DOT; Seattle Center Monorail; San Francisco Municipal Railway; GAO.

Inclined plane Inclined plane

Heavy Rail Heavy Rail eavy Rail

Chicago Transit Authority “L”

Light Rail ht Rail ht Rail

Port Authority of Allegheny County “T”

Automated Guideway Automated Guideway utomated Guideway

Seattle Center Monorail

Trolley Trolley

Kenosha Transit Trolley

Cable Car Cable Car able Car

San Francisco Municipal Railway Cable Car

Inclined plane

Port Authority of Allegheny County Duquesne Incline

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-997T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Katherine 

Siggerud on (202) 512-2834 or 

siggerudk@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the mechanisms in 

place to oversee the safety and security of the nation’s rail transit system. 

This system moves more than 7 million daily passengers, and, according to

Federal Transit Administration (FTA) statistics, accounts for less than 6 

percent of all public transportation accidents while providing almost 32 

percent of all passenger trips, making it one of the safest forms of public 

transportation. However, safety and security are still concerns. Although 

safe, the number of fatalities and accidents has varied over the past few 

years. For example, between 1999 and 2005, fatalities have ranged from 26 

to 57 per year, with an approximate average of 40 per year. In addition, 

recent acts of terrorism on European and Indian transit systems illustrate

the need to maintain high levels of safety and security for transit. 

The focus of my testimony today is FTA’s State Safety Oversight program. 

In 1991, Congress required FTA to (1) issue regulations requiring states to 

designate an oversight agency to oversee the safety and security of rail 

transit agencies, and (2) withhold federal funds if a state did not comply 

with the regulations. Through the resulting State Safety Oversight 

program, FTA requires states to designate an oversight agency to 

implement FTA safety and security oversight over rail transit agencies. 

My testimony today (1) describes how the State Safety Oversight program 

is designed, (2) identifies what is known about the impact of the program 

on rail transit safety and security, and (3) identifies any challenges to the

State Safety Oversight program. It also provides information on how the 

State Safety Oversight program functions in areas where transit systems 

cross state lines (see app. I). My comments are based on our ongoing work 

for this subcommittee’s committee—the House Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure. We plan to release this work soon. To 

obtain information on how the program is designed and identify what is 

known about the impact of the program, we reviewed program guidance 

and interviewed a wide range of stakeholders including FTA, the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Transportation Security

Administration (TSA), and the American Public Transportation 

Association (APTA), an industry group. To identify challenges facing the 

program, we conducted interviews with 24 of the 25 state safety oversight 

agencies across the country and 37 of the 42 operating rail transit 

agencies.1

 We also visited 8 oversight agencies and 17 transit agencies—of 

 1

One oversight agency and five transit agencies declined to participate in our review. 

Page 1 GAO-06-997T 
these 17 transit agencies, 2 will soon begin operations and 3 cross state 

boundaries. We conducted our work from August 2005 through June 2006 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary: 

• FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, 

other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to 

ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states 

to designate a state safety oversight agency and develops and oversees the

implementation of rules and guidance on safety and security that the 

designated agencies are to use to oversee transit operations; however, it 

does not fund state agencies’ ongoing oversight. The designated state 

oversight agencies directly oversee transit agencies’ activities including 

their safety and security plans. Most commonly, these oversight agencies 

are state transportation departments, but public utility commissions and 

regional transportation authorities also serve in this role. Transit agencies

develop and implement safety and security plans, assess hazardous 

conditions, report certain incidents to the oversight agency, conduct self

audits, and keep the state oversight agency apprised of corrective actions. 

Finally, federal agencies including the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) also have a role in 

transit security. 

• Almost all oversight and transit agencies report that the State Safety 

Oversight program is worthwhile in terms of promoting and improving the 

safety and security of rail transit systems; however, there is limited 

information showing its impact on safety and security. For example, 

transit agency officials cite the importance of having state oversight 

agency staff help them identify larger, systemic issues. Although many 

officials support the program, FTA’s methods for obtaining information on 

transit safety and security (i.e., transit and oversight agency data and FTA

audits of the oversight agencies) do not include performance measures 

and related program goals. FTA issued annual reports from 1999 through 

2003 that track transit accident, crash, fatality, and other safety data, but

FTA officials have found it difficult to identify performance measures for 

the program and set performance goals, because of the relatively low 

number of fatalities and incidents and the varying design of rail transit 

systems. Furthermore, in the past 8 years, FTA has audited all oversight 

agencies in operation before 2004 at least once; however, FTA has not 

conducted audits as often as it envisioned when it started the program 

(i.e., once every 3 years). This reduced schedule limits FTA’s ability to 

conduct oversight, including collecting information on the safety oversight 

agencies and making informed and timely revisions to the program. 

Page 2 GAO-06-997T 
According to FTA officials, they did not keep to their stated audit schedule 

because they were reassessing the priorities for the program after the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. They also noted that they continued 

conducting “safety and security readiness reviews” to ensure that new 

transit systems would be able to safely and securely begin passenger 

operations. Recent changes in FTA’s program regulations and leadership 

provide an opportunity to address this lack of information, performance 

measures, and program goals, and to resume its stated audit schedule. 

• FTA faces challenges in managing and implementing the program. First, 

the level of state oversight-staff expertise and number of oversight staff 

(and thus their potential ability to oversee transit agencies), varies widely 

across the country. For example, one oversight agency requires its staff 

have at least 5 years of rail transit experience while another oversight 

agency assigned a state department of transportation planner to work on 

safety and security oversight as a collateral duty. Although no officials 

identified a safety or security problem resulting from lack of staff 

expertise, most transit and oversight agency officials with whom we spoke 

believe that federal funding for training and an FTA-developed 

curriculum—including training on how to oversee safety and security—

would improve the qualifications and effectiveness of state oversight 

agency personnel. Furthermore, FTA’s approach contrasts with the 

approach other Department of Transportation (DOT) agencies, such as 

FRA and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA) take, which is to provide free training or use agency funds to pay 

for state agency personnel’s attendance at training sessions, in some 

instances.2

 A second challenge to implementing the program, according to 

officials from 20 of 24 state oversight agencies and 14 of 37 transit 

agencies, is the uncertainty about the role of TSA in FTA’s program since 

Congress designated TSA the lead agency on security matters in 2001. 

Although TSA has regulatory authority over security activities in 

transportation, its rail program is still developing, and several oversight 

and transit agency officials with whom we spoke were concerned about 

the potential for duplication of effort given that state safety oversight 

agencies and TSA both review and comment on transit systems’ security 

plans. TSA and FTA recognize this concern and have begun discussions on 

how to coordinate their oversight efforts. 

 2

PHMSA requires new inspectors to complete applicable Transportation Safety Institute 

(TSI) training courses in a 3-year period. 

Page 3 GAO-06-997T 
In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation 

Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA),3

 which added Section 28 to the Federal 

Transit Act.4

 ISTEA required FTA to establish a state-managed safety and

security oversight program for rail transit agencies. As a result, on 

December 27, 1995,5

 FTA published a set of regulations, called Rail Fixed 

Guideway Systems; State Safety Oversight (subsequently referred to as 

FTA’s rule), to improve the safety and security of rail transit agencies. 

FTA’s rule required state oversight agencies to have approved transit 

agencies’ safety plans by January 1, 1997, and security plans by January 1,

1998. At the time of the FTA rule’s publication, 5 of 19 states affected by 

the FTA rule had oversight programs in place for rail transit safety and 

security, and no oversight agency met all the requirements in FTA’s rule. 

During the first few years of implementation, FTA worked with states to 

develop compliant programs that addressed FTA’s requirements. Ten 

years after FTA promulgated the initial rule, FTA published a revision to it

in the Federal Register on April 29, 2005, which required that oversight 

agencies had to comply with the revised FTA rule by May 1, 2006. 

FTA relies on staff in its Office of Safety and Security to lead the State 

Safety Oversight program—and hired the current Program Manager in

March 2006. This manager is also responsible for other safety duties in 

addition to the State Safety Oversight program. Additional FTA staff within 

the Office of Safety and Security assist with outreach to transit and 

oversight agencies and additional tasks. FTA regional personnel are not 

formally involved with the program’s day-to-day activities, though officials 

from FTA Regional Offices help address specific compliance issues that 

occasionally arise and help states with new transit agencies establish new 

oversight agencies. FTA also relies on contractors to do many of the dayto-day activities, ranging from developing and implementing FTA’s audit 

program of state oversight agencies to developing and providing training 

classes on system safety. 

The revised FTA rule applies to all states with rail fixed guideway systems 

operating in their jurisdictions. As specified in the FTA rule, a rail fixed 

guideway system is defined as: “any light, heavy, or rapid rail system; 

Background 

 3

P.L. 102-240. 

4

Codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 5330. 

5

Codified at 49 CFR Part 659. 

Page 4 GAO-06-997T 
monorail, inclined plane, funicular, trolley, or automated guideway that is 

not regulated by FRA and 

• is included in FTA’s calculation of fixed guideway route miles or receives

funding under FTA’s formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C. 

5336); or 

• has submitted documentation to FTA indicating its intent to be included in

FTA’s calculation of fixed guideway route miles to receive funding under 

FTA’s formula program for urbanized areas (49 U.S.C. 5336).” 

Figure 1 shows examples of the types of rail systems that are included in

the State Safety Oversight program. 

Page 5 GAO-06-997T 
Figure 1: Examples of Rail Systems Included in the State Safety Oversight Program 

Automated Guideway

Seattle Center Monorail 

Inclined plane

Port Authority of Allegheny County Duquesne Incline 

Heavy Rail

Chicago Transit Authority “L” 

Light Rail

Port Authority of Allegheny County “T” 

Cable Car 

San Francisco Municipal Railway Cable Car 

Trolley

Kenosha Transit Trolley 

Source: Pennsylvania DOT; Seattle Center Monorail; San Francisco Municipal Railway; GAO. 

FTA’s program generally differs from other agencies within DOT, such as 

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), FRA, and PHMSA. These 

agencies promulgate their own technical standards that govern how 

vehicles or facilities must be operated or constructed, while FTA does not 

prescribe technical standards, though the state oversight agencies can 

develop technical standards. 

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, 

other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to 

ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. Under the program, 

FTA is responsible for developing the regulations and guidance governing 

the program, auditing state safety oversight agencies to ensure the 

regulations are enforced, and providing technical assistance and other 

information; FTA provides funding to oversight agencies in only limited 

instances under the program. State oversight agencies directly oversee the 

safety and security of rail transit systems by reviewing safety and security

Many Agencies Are 

Involved in the State 

Safety Oversight 

Program 

Page 6 GAO-06-997T 
plans, performing audits, and investigating accidents. Rail transit agencies

are responsible for developing safety and security plans, reporting 

incidents to the oversight agencies, and following all other regulations 

state oversight agencies set for them. In addition to FTA, federal agencies 

such as FRA, DHS’s Office of Grants and Training, and TSA also have 

regulatory or funding roles related to rail transit safety and security. 

FTA Oversees and 

Administers the State 

Safety Oversight Program 

FTA officials stated that they used a multi-agency system-safety approach

in developing the State Safety Oversight program.6

 Federal and state 

agencies and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the rail transit 

system is operated safely and each of these agencies has some monitoring 

responsibility, either of themselves or another entity. FTA oversees and 

administers the program. As the program administrator, FTA is 

responsible for developing the rules and guidance that state oversight 

agencies are to use to perform their oversight of rail transit agencies. FTA 

also is responsible for informing oversight and transit agencies of new 

program developments, facilitating and informing the transit and oversight 

agencies of training available through FTA or other organizations, 

facilitating information sharing among program participants, and 

providing technical assistance. 

FTA officials stated they emphasize that components of a riskmanagement approach to safety and security, such as hazard analysis and

risk-mitigation procedures, are included in the program standard that each

state oversight agency issues to the transit agencies they oversee. This is 

consistent with our position that agencies make risk-based decisions on 

where their assets can best be used, both in transportation security and 

safety. However, FTA recognizes that some parts of the State Safety 

Oversight program are not risk-based, including requiring minimum 

standards for all transit agencies in the program, no matter their size or 

ridership.7

While FTA officials stated that FTA does not inspect transit agencies with

regard to safety, it is responsible for ensuring that, through reviews of 

 6

A system-safety approach involves the application of technical and managerial skills to 

identify, analyze, assess, and control hazards and risks.

7

FTA states that to ensure a minimum standard is met, a focus on universally applied rules 

is necessary. Therefore, FTA officials stated that they felt it was inappropriate to use a riskbased approach in this area of the program. 

Page 7 GAO-06-997T 
oversight agency reports and audits, state oversight agencies comply with 

the program requirements. For example, according to the FTA rule, when 

a state proposes to designate an oversight agency, FTA may review the 

proposal to ensure the designated agency has the authority to perform the 

required duties without any apparent conflicts. FTA has recommended in 

two instances that a state choose a different agency because the oversight

agency that the state proposed appeared to be too closely affiliated with 

the transit agency and did not appear to be independent. In addition, FTA 

is responsible for reviewing the annual reports oversight agencies submit. 

FTA officials ensure they include all the required information—such as 

descriptions of program resources, and causes of accidents and collisions; 

they then compile this information for a program annual report, and look 

for industry-wide safety and security trends or problems. Furthermore, 

FTA is responsible for performing audits of oversight agencies to ensure 

they are complying with program requirements and guidance. FTA audits

evaluate how well an oversight agency is meeting the requirements of the 

FTA rule, including whether or not the oversight agency is investigating

accidents properly, if it is conducting its safety and security reviews 

properly, and if it is reporting to FTA all the information that is required. 

Finally, FTA does not provide funding to states for the operation of their 

oversight programs. However, states may use FTA Section 5309 (New 

Starts program) funds—normally used to pay for transit-related capital 

expenses—to defray the cost of setting up their oversight agency before a

transit agency begins operations. Also, FTA officials stated this year that 

FTA used a portion of the funding originally designated for FTA audits to 

pay for one person from each oversight agency to attend training on the

revisions to FTA’s rule, which oversight agencies had to comply with by 

May 1, 2006.

State Oversight Agencies 

Conduct Direct Oversight 

of Rail Transit Agencies 

In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are 

responsible for directly overseeing rail transit agencies. According to the 

FTA rule, states must designate an agency to perform this oversight 

function at the time FTA enters into a grant agreement for any “New 

Starts” project involving a new rail transit system, or before the transit 

agency applies for FTA formula funding. States have designated several 

different types of agencies to serve as oversight agencies. Most 

frequently—in 17 cases—states have designated their departments of 

transportation to serve in this role. In three instances—California, 

Colorado, and Massachusetts—states have designated utilities 

commissions or regulators to oversee rail transit safety and security. 

According to state officials, since these bodies already had regulatory and 

Page 8 GAO-06-997T 
oversight authority, it was a natural extension of their powers to add rail 

transit oversight to their responsibilities. Two states have designated 

emergency management or public safety departments to oversee their rail 

transit agencies. Officials in one state, Illinois, have designated two 

separate oversight agencies, both local transportation funding authorities,

to oversee the two rail transit agencies operating in the state. In the 

Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia), region, the rail transit system 

runs between two states and the District of Columbia. These states and the 

District of Columbia established the Tri-State Oversight Committee as the 

designated oversight agency.8

 Finally, one state, New York, has given its 

oversight authority to its Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB). 

PTSB officials said they have authority similar to the public utilities 

commissions discussed above, but have no other mission than ensuring 

and overseeing transit safety in New York. See appendix II for a table

showing each oversight agency and the rail transit agencies they oversee. 

The individual authority each state oversight agency has over transit 

agencies varies widely. While FTA’s rule gives state oversight agencies 

authority to mandate certain rail safety and security practices as the 

oversight agencies see fit, it does not give the oversight agencies authority

to take enforcement actions, such as fining rail transit agencies or shutting 

down their operations. However, we found five states where the states 

granted their oversight agencies some punitive authority over the rail 

transit agencies they oversee. Officials from oversight agencies that have

the authority to fine or otherwise punish rail transit agencies all stated that 

they rarely, if ever, use that authority, but each stated that they believed it

gives their actions extra weight and forced transit agencies to acquiesce to

the oversight agency more readily than they otherwise might. The majority 

of oversight agencies, 19 of the 24 with which we spoke, have no such 

punitive authority, though officials from some oversight agencies stated 

they may be able to withhold grants their oversight agencies provide to the 

transit agencies they oversee.9

 Although officials from several of these 

agencies stated that they believe they would be more effective if they did

 8

The Tri-State Oversight Committee has six representatives—two each from Maryland, 

Virginia, and the District of Columbia. 

9

Officials from 16 oversight agencies stated that they provide some form of grant funding to

transit agencies they oversee and that they could, potentially, withhold those grants to 

force a transit agency to take a particular safety action. However, no oversight agency 

officials stated that they had taken this step. 

Page 9 GAO-06-997T 
have enforcement authority, under the current program this authority 

would be granted by individual states. 

While the states have designated a number of different types of agencies 

with varying authority to oversee transit agencies, FTA has a basic set of 

rules it requires each oversight agency to follow. In the program, oversight 

agencies are responsible for the following: 

• Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail transit 

agency responsibilities, providing “guidance to the regulated rail transit 

properties concerning processes and procedures they must have in place 

to be in compliance with the State Safety Oversight program.” 

• Reviewing transit agencies’ safety and security plans and annual reports. 

• Conducting safety and security audits of rail transit agencies on at least a 

triennial basis. 

• Tracking findings from these audits to ensure they are addressed, and 

tracking and eliminating hazardous conditions that the transit agency 

reports to the oversight agency outside the audit process. 

• Investigating accidents that meet a certain damage or severity threshold 

and developing a corrective action plan for the causes leading to the 

accident. 

• Submitting an annual report to FTA detailing their oversight activities, 

including results of accident investigations and the status of ongoing 

corrective actions. 

FTA’s rule also lays out several specific requirements that oversight 

agencies must require transit agencies to follow, such as developing 

separate system safety and security plans, performing internal safety and

security audits over a 3-year cycle, developing a hazard management 

process, and reporting certain accidents to oversight agencies within 2 

hours. The locations and types of transit agencies participating in the 

program are shown in figure 2. 

Page 10 GAO-06-997T 
Figure 2: Locations and Types of Rail Transit Agencies Participating in State Safety Oversight Program 

Heavy Rail 

Light Rail 

Automated Guideway 

Trolley 

Cable Car 

Inclined Plane 

Source: FTA’s National Transit Database. 

San Diego, CA Little Rock, AR 

Miami, FL 

San Jose, CA Denver, CO 

Sacramento, CA 

H 

Chicago, IL 

Atlanta, GA 

San Juan, Puerto Rico 

Memphis, TN Chattanooga, TN 

Kenosha, WI 

Tampa, FL 

A 

Seattle, WA 

Jacksonville, FL 

C 

L 

Houston, TX 

Baltimore, MD 

Galveston, TX 

St. Louis, MO 

Tacoma, WA 

Salt Lake City, UT 

Dallas, TX 

T 

New Orleans, LA 

Los Angeles, CA 

San Francisco, CA 

Washington, DC 

Cleveland, OH 

Portland, OR 

Philadelphia, PA 

Pittsburgh, PA 

Johnstown, PA 

Boston, MA 

Detroit, MI 

Trenton, NJ 

Jersey City, NJ 

Newark, NJ 

Minneapolis, MN 

Buffalo, NY 

New York City, NY 

Page 11 GAO-06-997T 
In addition to FTA, the state oversight agencies, and the rail transit 

agencies, two entities within DHS are involved in transit safety security. 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),10 passed by 

Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, gave 

TSA authority for security over all transportation modes, including 

authority to issue security regulations.11 While TSA’s most public 

transportation security duties are its airport screening activities, TSA has 

taken steps to enhance all rail security, including rail transit. For example, 

in May 2004, TSA issued security directives to rail transit agencies to 

ensure all agencies were implementing a consistent baseline of security. 

Also, TSA has hired 100 rail security inspectors, as authorized by 

Congress.12 While the exact responsibilities of the inspectors are still being 

determined, a TSA official stated that they will monitor and enforce 

compliance with the security directives by passenger rail agencies, as well

as increase security awareness among rail transit agencies, riders, and 

others. 

Other Federal Agencies 

Play a Role in Ensuring 

Rail Transit Safety and 

Security, but Often Their 

Roles Are Outside the 

State Safety Oversight 

Program 

In contrast to the enforcement role of TSA, another DHS agency, the

Office of Grants and Training plays a role in ensuring rail transit security 

through supporting security initiatives. The Office of Grants and Training 

(formerly known as the Office of Domestic Preparedness) is the primary 

federal source of security funding for rail transit systems, as well as for 

state and local jurisdictions; this security funding goes toward the 

purchase of equipment, support planning and the execution of exercises, 

and the provision of technical assistance to prevent, prepare for, and 

respond to acts of terrorism. The Office of Grants and Training has 

provided over $320 million to rail transit providers through the Urban Area 

Security Initiative and Transit Security Grant Program. 

FRA, within DOT, also plays a role in ensuring transit agencies operate 

safely. In general, FRA exercises its jurisdiction over parts of a rail transit 

system that share track with the general railroad system, or places where a 

rail transit system and the general railroad system share a connection (e.g., 

 10Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

11ATSA initially created TSA within DOT. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.

107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), transferred TSA to DHS. 

12These positions were funded through the DHS Appropriations Act of 2005 and its

accompanying conference report, which provided TSA with $12 million in funding for rail 

security activities. 

Page 12 GAO-06-997T 
a grade crossing).13 According to FRA, if a rail transit vehicle were to 

operate on the same tracks and at the same time as general railroads, this 

would make the rail transit agency operating the vehicle use much sturdier 

(and more expensive) vehicles. Therefore, 11 rail transit agencies have

requested waivers from FRA and, according to an FRA official, as of June

2006, FRA granted waivers to 10 of the 11 rail transit agencies that applied 

for them.14

Finally, NTSB also plays a role in enhancing and ensuring rail transit 

safety, though it has no formal role in FTA’s oversight program. NTSB has 

authority to investigate accidents involving passenger railroads, including

rail transit agencies. NTSB officials stated they generally will investigate 

only the more serious accidents, such as those involving fatalities or 

injuries, or those involving recurring safety issues. Often, NTSB accident

investigations of rail transit accidents will result in recommendations to 

federal agencies or rail transit agencies to eliminate the condition that led

to the accident. 

The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom 

we spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety 

and security in their organizations. These officials provided illustrations 

about how the program enhanced safety or security; however, they have 

limited statistical evidence that the oversight program improved safety or

security. FTA has obtained a variety of information on the program from 

sources such as national transit data, annual reports from oversight 

agencies, and its own audits of the oversight agencies. However, these 

data are not linked to any program goals or performance measures. FTA 

officials recognize the need for performance measures for its safety and 

security programs and are taking steps in 2006 to begin to address this 

need. Finally, although FTA expected to audit the oversight agencies every 

3 years, it has not conducted these audits as frequently as it had planned

(it has conducted eight audits since September 2001). However, program 

officials stated they are committed to getting “back on track” to meet the 

planned schedule. 

Transit and Oversight 

Agencies Perceive the 

Program as 

Worthwhile; However,

FTA Does Not Have 

Goals or Performance 

Measures to 

Document the Impact 

of the State Safety 

Oversight Program on 

Safety and Security 

 13FRA clarified its position on safety jurisdiction over shared-track situations. See 65 Fed. 

Reg. 42529 (Jul. 10, 2000). 

14FTA provided documentation showing that FRA told the one rail transit agency that did

not receive its waiver that its application was unnecessary—what the agency proposed was 

already allowed under FRA regulations. 

Page 13 GAO-06-997T 
Both transit agency and oversight agency officials state that FTA’s State 

Safety Oversight program is worthwhile and valuable because it helps 

them maintain and improve safety and security. Of the 37 transit officials 

with whom we spoke, 35 believe the program that oversees their safety 

and security is worthwhile. One transit agency official explained that the

oversight agency helps them identify larger, systemic issues. In addition, 

the program provides support to exert extra influence on a transit agency’s 

board of directors or senior management to get safety or security 

improvements implemented faster and improve the safety and security of 

their equipment. For example, one oversight agency helped its transit 

agency’s safety department address problems with train operators running 

red light signals by helping convincing the transit agency’s senior 

management to replace all signals with light-emitting diode (LED) signals 

that were brighter and more visible. Finally, transit agency officials believe

that FTA’s program is an effective method for overseeing safety and 

security. Several officials said that they felt having a state or local (rather 

than national) oversight agency facilitated ongoing safety and security 

improvements and consistent working relationships with the oversight 

staff. 

Transit and Oversight 

Agencies Describe the 

Oversight Program as 

Worthwhile and Valuable 

In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 state 

safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the State 

Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for improving transit 

systems’ safety and security. Several officials commented that the program 

provides an incentive to examine safety and security issues and avoid 

complacency. Furthermore, several officials commented that they believed 

the current system worked well and that the program provides 

consistency, endowing the state safety oversight agencies with enough 

authority to accomplish their tasks. Also, officials said that having the 

states carry out the program provides on-going oversight in addition to 

formal audits, which helps maintain a constant oversight of safety and 

security issues. 

Finally, several transit and oversight agency officials stated that, because 

they were subject to oversight, they believed they saw improved safety in

their rail system, but it was difficult to show statistics proving this. For 

example, the California oversight agency found an 87 percent drop in rail

transit collisions at the San Francisco transit agency (MUNI) from 1997, 

Page 14 GAO-06-997T 
when the oversight agency began oversight, to 2005.15 Although FTA 

changed its definition of a reportable accident during this time period—

making it impossible to determine exactly what impact external oversight 

had on MUNI safety—both MUNI and the oversight agency staff stated 

they were confident the oversight efforts had been a major factor in 

reducing accidents. 

APTA officials with whom we spoke were concerned that, although the 

State Safety Oversight program contains minimum requirements for safety 

and security, the previous industry-regulated approach encouraged 

industry officials to surpass minimum standards and continue striving for 

improved safety and security.16 However, transit officials with whom we 

spoke often discussed the benefits of a federal program. In addition, 

officials from 17 transit agencies reported that their respective state safety

oversight agencies imposed requirements above those required in FTA’s 

requirement. 

FTA Gathers Various Types 

of Safety Information, but 

Does Not Have the Data to 

Document the Impact of 

the Oversight Program on 

Safety and Security 

One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight 

program’s impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects through 

the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to submit. The 

reports include information on many different issues including program 

resources, accidents, fatalities, injuries, hazardous conditions, and any 

corrective actions taken resulting from audits or accident investigations. 

FTA officials stated they have used the oversight agencies’ reports to 

publish their own annual reports on transit safety; however, the 

information was not tied to any program goals or performance measures. 

In addition, the 2003 report is the most recent one FTA has issued. 

 15Prior to the existence of the FTA State Safety Oversight program, California law dictated 

that the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) had oversight authority over rail 

transit agencies, but exempted municipally operated systems. Since the City of San 

Francisco operates MUNI, it was not subject to CPUC oversight. However, since 49 CFR 

Part 659 required that California designate an agency to oversee all rail transit systems 

receiving federal funds, the governor of California designated CPUC to oversee MUNI in

1997. 

16Prior the implementation of the State Safety Oversight program, according to APTA, most 

transit agencies were self-regulated and submitted to occasional APTA-sponsored safety 

audits as a way of obtaining outside feedback about their safety practices and areas for 

potential improvement. APTA charged transit agencies for their participation in these 

audits. 

Page 15 GAO-06-997T 
According to program officials, FTA has recognized the need for better 

information and performance measures for its safety and security 

programs and has not published a report since the 2003 report because it

has been looking into improving the type of safety and security data it can 

collect, and how it can use the information to track program performance 

and progress toward yet to be defined goals. FTA’s 2006 business plan for 

its Safety and Security Division includes a goal to continue developing and 

implementing a data-driven performance analysis and tracking system to 

help ensure management decisions are informed by data and focus on 

performance and accountability. As part of these efforts, FTA officials 

explained they are working with a contractor who is working with 

oversight and transit agencies to identify measures that they can use to 

develop performance measures for the State Safety Oversight program. 

Another source of information is the audits of the oversight agencies that 

FTA had planned to conduct every 3 years. However, the agency has not 

met this schedule. Although the audits provide detailed information on 

specific oversight agencies, FTA has not brought together information 

from these audits to provide information on the safety and security of 

transit systems across the country. FTA tracks the deficiencies and areas 

of concern and follows up with oversight agency staff to assure that each 

state safety oversight agency resolves the suggested corrective actions. 

Given this lack of consistent audits, we are unsure if FTA has obtained 

enough information to provide a current picture of transit system safety 

and security, or a framework to identify potential challenges that oversight 

and transit agency officials may face in implementing the program. FTA 

has audited each state oversight agency that existed prior to 2004 at least 

one time since the program began; two agencies were audited twice. 

However, FTA largely discontinued the audit program after the September 

11, 2001, terrorist attacks and acknowledged that the agency’s priorities 

shifted in the wake of the terrorist attacks. However, officials indicated

they continued to evaluate the readiness of rail transit projects to safely 

and securely enter operations. In addition, according to FTA officials, FTA 

is not conducting audits in fiscal year 2006 so it can use the money and

time to help states comply with the revised FTA rule, and has planned a 

detailed outreach effort—including a workshop for oversight agency 

officials—to help ensure compliance. FTA plans to return to its triennial 

audit schedule in fiscal year 2007, with 10 audits scheduled for the first 

year to get back on the triennial schedule. 

Page 16 GAO-06-997T 
Despite the program’s popularity with participants, FTA faces challenges 

in implementing the program’s revised rule and continuing to manage the 

program. First, several oversight agency officials stated they are not 

confident they have adequate numbers of staff to effectively oversee rail

transit system safety and security, and they are unsure the current training 

available to them is sufficient. Also, we found the level of staffing and 

expertise of oversight agency staff varies widely across the country. A 

second challenge FTA faces in implementing the program is that many 

transit and oversight agency personnel are confused about how security 

issues in the program will be handled, and what agencies will be 

responsible for what actions, as TSA takes on a greater role in rail transit 

security. 

FTA Faces Challenges 

in Managing and 

Implementing the 

State Safety Oversight 

Program 

Many Oversight Agency 

Officials Are Unsure That 

Their Staff Are Adequately 

Trained and That They 

Have Adequate Numbers 

of Staff 

While a majority of both oversight and transit agency officials with whom 

we spoke endorsed the usefulness of the State Safety Oversight program, 

many of these same officials stated that they were unsure that they were 

adequately trained for their duties. Specifically, officials from 18 of 24

oversight agencies with which we spoke stated they believed additional 

training would help them provide more efficient and effective safety and 

security oversight. We found that the level of expertise of oversight agency 

staff varied widely across the country. For example, 11 of the 24 oversight 

agencies with which we spoke had oversight staff that had no career or 

educational background in transit safety or security. Conversely, another 

11 oversight agencies required their staff to have certain levels of 

experience or education. For example, New York’s Public Transportation 

Safety Board requires its staff to have 5 years of experience in transit 

safety. According to some oversight agency officials who had no previous 

transit safety or security background, they had to rely on the transit 

agency staff they were overseeing to teach them about transit operations,

safety, and security. These officials stated that if they left their positions, 

any new staff taking over for them would face a similar challenge. 

Therefore, several oversight agency staff cite the lack of a training 

curriculum for oversight staff as a challenge to their effectiveness. For 

example, officials from eight oversight agencies stated that the training 

they had received in transit operations, accident investigations, and other 

areas was beneficial, but they had not received any training on how to 

perform oversight functions. Although many oversight agency officials 

acknowledged that they felt the training that had been made available to 

Page 17 GAO-06-997T 
them either by FTA, the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI), or the 

National Transit Institute (NTI) had been adequate,17 officials from 17 of 24 

oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that they were somewhat 

unsure of which courses they should take to be effective in their oversight

role. 

Furthermore, although FTA provides training to state oversight agency 

staff (either on their own or through TSI), and encourages state oversight 

agencies to seek training opportunities, FTA does not pay staff to travel to

these courses. Also, oversight agencies must pay their own tuition and 

travel expenses for courses not provided by FTA or TSI.18 Officials from 10 

of the 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds as 

one reason why they could not attend training they had hoped to attend. 

Also, officials from all 24 oversight agencies stated that, if FTA provided 

some funding for them to travel to training or paid tuition for training they 

wanted to attend, it would allow the oversight agencies to spend their 

limited resources on direct oversight activities, such as staff overtime, 

travel expenses to visit transit agencies, or hiring contractors. Several 

oversight agency officials also cited the example of other DOT agencies 

that provide free training or pay for state staff to travel to attend training. 

For example, 30 states participate in FRA’s State Rail Safety Participation 

Program. These states have inspectors who FRA has certified to enforce 

FRA safety regulations. FRA pays for their initial and ongoing classroom 

training and state staff’s travel to this training. In addition, the federal 

agency regulating pipelines, PHMSA, authorizes state-employed inspectors 

to inspect pipelines in many states. PHMSA also recently paid for two 

inspectors from each state to attend training when it instituted a new 

inspection approach. Officials from both FRA and PHMSA stated that 

providing funding to states to train their employees helps the federal 

agencies more effectively carry out their enforcement activities, easing the 

states’ burden of paying to enforce federal regulations. For the first time, 

FTA paid for oversight agencies’ personnel to travel to attend a special 

meeting in June 2006 in St. Louis, where FTA provided technical 

assistance and shared best practices in meeting the requirements of the 

 17TSI is a part of DOT’s Research and Innovative Technology Administration. NTI, which

FTA funds, is affiliated with Rutgers University and dedicated to training employees of the 

public transportation industry. 

18FTA and TSI provide their courses free of charge to transit and oversight agencies but do 

charge a nominal fee for course books and materials. FTA and TSI also respond to requests 

to teach courses in field locations, potentially reducing travel costs for participants. 

Page 18 GAO-06-997T 
revised FTA rule. FTA officials agree that they have not provided training 

specifically pertaining to oversight activities or provided a recommended 

training curriculum to oversight agencies, but stated that it would not be 

difficult to take these steps. 

FTA officials told us that they considered addressing the lack of 

consistency in oversight agency staff qualifications when they were 

revising FTA’s rule in 2005; however, they stated they did not have the 

legal authority to direct states to require certain education, experience, or 

certifications for oversight agency staff. Furthermore, these officials noted 

that, despite the lack of formal requirements, FTA checks to ensure 

oversight agency personnel are adequately trained during its audits, and 

have recommended in five instances that oversight agency staff take 

additional training. They also stated that FTA could issue guidance or 

recommendations to oversight agencies about the level of training their 

oversight staff should have. 

In addition to concerns about training, oversight agencies were unsure 

they had sufficient numbers of staff to adequately oversee a transit 

agency’s operations. Officials at 14 of 24 oversight agencies with whom we 

spoke stated that more staff would help them do their job more effectively.

Officials from 11 oversight agencies told us they devoted the equivalent of

less than one person working half-time on oversight, and, in some cases, 

described oversight as a “collateral duty.” See table 1 for the amount of 

personnel oversight agency representatives estimated their agencies 

dedicate to oversight responsibilities. While in some of these instances, the 

transit agencies overseen are small, some of the transit agencies with the 

highest ridership levels have similar levels of oversight. For example, one 

state that estimated it devotes 0.1 full-time equivalent (FTE) to oversight 

program functions is responsible for overseeing a major transit agency 

that averages nearly 200,000 daily passenger trips. This state supplements 

its staff time with the services of a contractor, mainly to perform the 

triennial audits of the transit agency. Also, one state that estimated 

devoting 0.5 FTE to oversight functions is responsible for overseeing five 

transit agencies (including two systems not yet in operation) in different 

cities, making it difficult to maintain active oversight when their 

responsibilities are so spread out. As FTA resumes its audit schedule, it 

would be practical for FTA to focus on this issue. (See app. II for 

information on estimated FTE and transit system information for each 

state safety oversight agency and related transit agency). 

Page 19 GAO-06-997T 
Table 1: Estimated FTEs Used by Oversight Agencies to Oversee Transit Agency 

Safety and Security 

Estimated FTEs 0.5 or less 0.6–1 1.1–3 3.1–5 Over 5 Total

Number of oversight 

agencies 11 5 6 1 1 24

Source: GAO analysis of oversight agency interview responses. 

Transit and Oversight 

Agency Staff Are Uncertain 

How TSA’s Emerging Role 

in Transit Security Will 

Affect the Program 

Another challenge facing the program is how TSA and its rail inspectors 

might affect oversight of transit security. As I mentioned earlier, TSA has 

regulatory authority over transportation security, and, according to TSA 

officials, has hired 100 rail inspectors, who are to monitor and enforce 

compliance with rail security directives TSA issued in May 2004. However, 

of the officials at 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke, officials at 

20 agencies stated they did not have a clear picture of who was 

responsible for overseeing transit security issues. Similarly, officials at 14 

of 37 transit agencies were also unsure of lines of responsibility regarding 

transit security oversight. Several state oversight agencies were

particularly concerned that TSA’s rail inspectors would be duplicating 

their role in overseeing transit security. One oversight agency official 

stated it would be more efficient if TSA and oversight agency staff audited 

transit agencies’ security practices at the same time. 

TSA staff reported hearing similar comments from oversight agencies; FTA 

program staff and TSA rail inspector staff both indicate that they are 

committed to avoiding duplication in the program and communicating 

their respective roles to transit and oversight agency officials as soon as 

possible. However, as TSA is still developing its program, currently there is

no formally defined role for TSA in the State Safety Oversight program, 

and TSA has not determined the roles and responsibilities for its rail 

inspectors. While FTA’s rule discusses requirements for a transit agency’s

security plan, it does not discuss TSA’s specific role in the program, and 

both TSA and FTA officials state that exactly how TSA would participate 

in the program was still to be determined. However, the officials added 

that they are working together to ensure inspection activities are 

coordinated, thereby fostering consistency and minimizing disruption to 

rail transit agency operations. For example, in May 2006, TSA’s director of 

the rail inspector program reported that it had designated 26 rail 

inspectors as liaisons to state oversight agencies. Also, these TSA rail 

inspectors attended a training session where FTA presented information 

on the State Safety Oversight program, and they have contacted 13 

oversight agencies to begin discussions on how they can coordinate 

activities. 

Page 20 GAO-06-997T 
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I plan to include

recommendations to address these challenges in the report we plan to 

issue next week. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or 

other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Katherine 

Siggerud at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Individuals making key 

contributions to this testimony include Ashley Alley, Catherine Colwell, 

Colin Fallon, Michele Fejfar, Joah Iannotta, Stuart Kaufman, Joshua 

Ormond, Tina Paek, Stephanie Purcell, and Raymond Sendejas. 

Contact Information 

Page 21 GAO-06-997T 
Page 22 GAO-06-997T 

Appendix I: Case Studies of Multi-State 

Transit Systems 

Three rail fixed guideway transit systems in the United States—the Port 

Authority Transit Corporation (PATCO) in Philadelphia, MetroLink in St. 

Louis, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) 

in Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia)—cross state lines and require 

the collaboration of multiple oversight agencies to run the State Safety

Oversight program; alternatively, states can agree that one state will be 

responsible for oversight of the transit system. Each of these multi-state 

transit systems has a different structure to handle oversight 

responsibilities. The oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have 

both developed strategies to centralize decision making, streamline 

collaboration, and respond promptly to safety and security audit findings. 

In contrast, the Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC), which serves as the 

oversight agency in the District of Columbia area, requires majority 

decision making by the six committee members of the agency, including at 

least one member from each jurisdiction. However, WMATA has 

experienced difficulty obtaining funding, responding to FTA information 

requests, and ensuring audit findings are addressed. 

Multi-State State Safety 

Oversight Agencies Have 

Varied Structures and 

Handle Oversight 

Responsibilities Differently

Each multi-state oversight program varies in structure and each performs 

oversight responsibilities differently. In Philadelphia, authority to serve as 

the oversight agency was delegated to one of the two state agencies—

namely, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) 

agreed to allow the New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) to

serve as the sole oversight agency for the PATCO heavy rail transit line. 

MetroLink in St. Louis is subject to oversight from both Illinois (through 

the St. Clair County Transit District) and Missouri (through the Missouri 

Department of Transportation); the two organizations share oversight 

duties. Finally, TOC, which is composed of multiple representatives from 

each jurisdiction (including Virginia, Maryland, and the District of 

Columbia), provides oversight for WMATA. 

The PATCO Speedline is a heavy rail line serving about 38,000 riders daily 

and links Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey. Most of PATCO’s track 

is in New Jersey, and 9 of the 13 stations are in New Jersey. Until early 

2001, safety and security oversight functions were shared by Pennsylvania

and New Jersey through the Delaware River Port Authority (DRPA), a 

regional transportation and economic development agency serving both 

Southeastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. When DRPA 

implemented organizational and functional changes, DRPA leadership no

longer believed that DRPA could perform its role as the designated 

oversight agency without facing conflicting interests. As a result, 

Pennsylvania and New Jersey agreed to have NJDOT replace DRPA as the 
oversight agency. This arrangement allows the oversight agency to take

corrective action without seeking additional levels of approval from 

Pennsylvania, although the oversight agency does keep Pennsylvania 

informed of its activities. Also, Pennsylvania provides some support to 

NJDOT by having PennDOT perform oversight functions for the stations, 

passageways, and concourses located in Pennsylvania. PennDOT reports 

any deficiencies or hazardous conditions that may be noted during the 

performance of oversight directly to New Jersey. Through meetings or 

other means of communication, the follow-up actions may be performed 

by the Pennsylvania oversight agency in a supporting role or directly by 

New Jersey. New Jersey currently devotes two full-time staff members and 

one part-time staff member to its oversight program, and while these staff 

members must oversee several transit systems, including PATCO, their 

sole responsibilities are for safety and oversight functions. 

The St. Louis MetroLink is a light rail line between Lambert–St. Louis 

International Airport in St. Louis and Scott Air Force Base outside Shiloh, 

Illinois. Service was initiated in 1993, at which time the system included 

about 16 miles of track in Missouri and about 1.5 miles of track in Illinois.

Because so little track was in Illinois, Illinois officials agreed to allow the 

Missouri Department of Transportation to provide safety and security 

oversight for the entire system. However, in 2001, MetroLink opened a

17.4-mile extension in Illinois, which roughly equalized the amount of 

track in both states. Because of this, the states agreed that it was 

appropriate for Illinois to play a greater role in safety and security 

oversight, and Illinois designated the St. Clair County Transit District as its 

oversight agency. St. Clair is one of the few non-state-level agencies to be 

an oversight agency. The involvement of two separate oversight agencies

could create challenges to effective implementation, but the agencies have

taken steps to ensure close coordination. First, the Illinois and Missouri 

oversight agencies have agreed to use only one uniform safety and security 

standard across the entire MetroLink system.1

 According to area officials, 

this arrangement creates consistency throughout the system and allows 

both agencies to perform their oversight functions in a consistent manner. 

In addition, the agencies use a single contractor who is responsible for the 

triennial audit. All other work is performed by the Illinois and Missouri 

 1

In the most recent revision to 49 CFR Part 659, the Rail Fixed Guideway Systems; State 

Safety Oversight rule, governing the State Safety Oversight program, FTA mandated that in 

areas where transit agencies ran through multiple states, the states coordinate to ensure

they use the same program standard for the transit agency to meet. This way one transit 

agency does not have to meet two separate standards in different parts of their system. 

Page 23 GAO-06-997T 
oversight agencies. Finally, staff from the two oversight agencies 

coordinate very closely and each have centralized leadership. Specifically, 

there is one full-time employee in Missouri who devotes 90 percent of his

time to safety and security oversight activities. Illinois has several 

employees who devote smaller percentages of their individual time to the 

program, but the Managing Director is primarily responsible for 

coordinating with Missouri. MetroLink, in turn, indicated that responding 

to state safety oversight directives is a priority, and the agency works 

quickly to implement changes. 

WMATA operates a heavy rail system within the District of Columbia, 

Maryland, and Virginia. The states and the District of Columbia decided to 

carry out their oversight responsibilities through a collaborative 

organization managed by TOC. TOC is composed of six representatives—

two each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. All of the 

representatives have other primary duties, and their activities on TOC are 

collateral to these other daily duties, as is the case with staff at several 

other oversight agencies. TOC does not have any dedicated staff, and TOC

members have limited rail operational experience. To gain access to 

additional experience and expertise in rail oversight, TOC contracts with a 

consultant to provide technical knowledge, perform required audits of 

WMATA, and ensure that audit recommendations are completed. In 

addition, TOC funding comes from, and must be approved by, each of the 

jurisdictions every year. The Washington Council of Governments 

processes TOC funds and handles their contracting procedures. These 

issues result in a lengthy process for TOC to receive its yearly funding and 

process its expenses. 

Multi-State Oversight 

Programs Have Addressed 

Their Administrative 

Challenges in Different 

Ways 

The State Safety Oversight programs in Philadelphia and St. Louis have 

attempted to streamline their decision making, while TOC has a more 

collaborative process. Philadelphia and St. Louis have both developed 

strategies to centralize decision making and streamline collaboration, 

albeit through different structures. Because Pennsylvania granted New 

Jersey the authority to act as the oversight agency for all of PATCO’s 

territory, PATCO only has to interact with one oversight agency’s staff. 

New Jersey also has in-house staff dedicated to the State Safety Oversight 

program, which helps to ensure continuity, facilitates communication, and 

provides PATCO with one set of contacts to work with on the 

implementation of any new safety or security processes. Although St. 

Louis has two agencies providing safety oversight, both oversight agencies 

have made it a priority to ensure that they are providing consistent 

information to the transit agency, and they are coordinating their activities 

Page 24 GAO-06-997T 
so MetroLink is not burdened by multiple contacts about the same issue. 

To do this, the Missouri and Illinois representatives stay in close contact 

with each other. Both oversight agencies stated they have in-house staff 

dedicated to safety and security oversight, and the agencies have very 

good working relationships. Oversight agency staff admitted that St. Louis

could face challenges in the future if staff turned over in either agency and

new employees did not establish a similar working relationship. In 

addition, officials indicated that, if oversight agency staff had 

disagreements over safety or security standards, or how to enforce the 

existing standards, it would be highly problematic. However, officials in 

the Illinois and Missouri oversight agencies, as well as at MetroLink, 

thought that the current arrangements have produced one set of 

standards, good communication, and effective coordination. Both 

MetroLink and oversight agency staff in St. Louis credited each other with 

creating an environment where this system of having multiple oversight 

agencies could work well. 

In contrast, TOC has implemented a less streamlined process for making 

decisions, which, according to FTA and TOC officials, may have 

contributed to the difficulties it has had in responding to FTA information 

requests. On June 15, 2005, FTA notified TOC that it would perform TOC’s 

audit in late July 2005. FTA requested information prior to the audit to 

facilitate the time it spent on-site. TOC did not submit the requested State 

Safety Oversight program materials despite several FTA requests and an 

extension by FTA to move the audit to a later date. At the end of August, 

FTA initiated its audit even though it had not received requested 

information, but was not able to complete the audit until the end of 

September, when it received all requested materials. FTA’s Final Audit 

Report to TOC cited 10 areas for improvement and provided TOC 60 days

to resolve these issues. According to FTA, TOC resolved one issue within 

the time period. FTA held a follow-up review with TOC in mid-March to 

check on the status of the remaining areas for improvement. As of June 

2006, FTA was evaluating how many of the remaining audit findings 

remained open, although FTA stated that TOC had created a detailed set of 

internal operating procedures to address many of FTA’s findings and 

concerns. In addition, TOC representatives stated that some of the areas 

for improvement FTA found were complicated issues, such as reviewing 

WMATA’s accident investigation procedures and approving modifications,

and could not be addressed within the 60 days FTA initially allowed. TOC 

staff emphasized that, although WMATA was sometimes slow to respond 

to TOC audit recommendations or information requests, they were pleased

with their relationship with WMATA and that WMATA was responsive to 

Page 25 GAO-06-997T 
TOC. Similarly, FTA officials stressed that they recognized and 

appreciated the effort TOC had undertaken in addressing FTA’s findings. 

TOC staff credited WMATA with helping TOC develop a matrix to track 

outstanding recommendations and agreeing to meet via conference call on

at least a bi-weekly basis to ensure the issues are addressed. Also, TOC 

members stated that part of the reason they were slow to respond to FTA’s

initial requests was that TOC had spent all its allocated funds for the year 

and, consequently, they had to temporarily stop working with the 

consultant who had conducted its audits of WMATA and maintained their 

files. According to TOC officials, since the process for acquiring additional

funding would require approval from all three jurisdictions represented on

TOC, it was not feasible to obtain additional funding quickly. In addition, 

TOC cannot take any action without a majority of its members, and at least

one member from each jurisdiction, approving the action. Reaching such

majority agreements can be time consuming since all members of TOC 

have other primary responsibilities. This is especially a concern when 

quick decisions are necessary, such as responding to FTA’s audit 

recommendations. 

TOC officials cited several challenges in accomplishing their mission, 

including lack of a dedicated and permanent funding source, the lengthy 

process required to obtain approval on planning and implementation of 

corrective actions, and limited staff time. They also stated that they 

believed TOC and WMATA receive more scrutiny than other transit and 

oversight agencies, due to their location in the District of Columbia, and 

their proximity to FTA’s headquarters staff. To address these challenges, 

the chair of TOC stated that she planned to spend additional time 

overseeing WMATA and was hoping to work to find ways to streamline the 

administrative and funding processes that TOC must navigate. Hiring a 

full-time administrator, or designating a TOC member to serve in a fulltime capacity, could help solve some of these issues. However, funding 

this position could be a challenge, and the administrator would need to 

have decision-making authority to be effective and act quickly.

Page 26 GAO-06-997T 
Page 27 GAO-06-997T 

State 

State safety oversight

agency (estimated FTE) 

Rail transit agency 

(estimated FTE) 

City center 

served

Type of 

system 

Annual ridership 

and directional 

route miles 

Single state systems

Arkansas Arkansas State Highway 

and Transportation 

Department (0.5) 

Central Arkansas

Transit Authority 

(0.08) 

Little Rock, AR Trolley 159,458 

2.8 

California California Public Utilities

Commission (9.6) 

Bay Area Rapid 

Transit (7) 

San Francisco, CA Heavy rail 99,296,028 

209 

Los Angeles County 

Metropolitan 

Transportation 

Authority (1.5)

Los Angeles, CA Heavy rail and

light rail

74,242,912 

141.6 

San Francisco

Municipal Railway (7)

San Francisco, CA Light rail, 

trolley, and

cable car 

53,768,895 

81.7 

San Diego Trolley, 

Inc. (0.9) 

San Diego, CA Light rail 29,334,362 

96.6 

Sacramento 

Regional Transit 

District (N/A) 

Sacramento, CA Light rail 12,008,620 

58.4 

Santa Clara Valley 

Transit Authority 

(N/A) 

San Jose, CA Light rail 6,780,431 

58.4 

Colorado Colorado Public Utilities

Commission (1.2) 

Denver Regional 

Transit District (1.25) 

Denver, CO Light rail 11,142,220 

31.6 

Florida Florida Department of 

Transportation (1) 

Metro-Dade Transit 

Authority (N/A) 

Miami, FL Heavy rail and

automated 

guideway 

26,479,423 

53.5 

Jacksonville 

Transportation 

Authority (N/A) 

Jacksonville, FL Automated 

guideway 

736,510 

5.4 

Hillsborough Area

Regional Transit 

(0.85) 

Tampa, FL Trolley 565,002 

4.8 

Georgia Georgia Department of 

Transportation (0.1) 

Metropolitan Atlanta

Rapid Transit 

Authority (6) 

Atlanta, GA Heavy rail 70,984,053 

96.1 

Illinois Regional Transportation 

Authority (1) 

Chicago Transit 

Authority (11) 

Chicago, IL Heavy rail 186,759,524 

206.3 

Louisiana Louisiana Department of 

Transportation (0.1) a

New Orleans

Regional Transit 

Authority (N/A) 

New Orleans, LA Trolley 5,667,952 

25.3 

Appendix II: List of State Oversight Agencies 

and Transit Agencies They Oversee 
State 

State safety oversight

agency (estimated FTE) 

Rail transit agency 

(estimated FTE) 

City center 

served

Type of 

system 

Annual ridership 

and directional 

route miles 

Maryland Maryland Department of 

Transportation (1.3) 

Maryland Transit 

Administration 

(5) 

Baltimore, MD Heavy rail and

light rail

18,059,117 

87 

Massachusetts Massachusetts

Department of 

Telecommunication and 

Energy (2.67) 

Massachusetts Bay 

Transportation 

Authority (5.1)

Boston, MA Heavy rail, light 

rail, and trolley

215,787,440 

127.3 

Michigan Michigan Department of 

Transportation (0.5)

Detroit Transit 

Corporation (1.1) 

Detroit, MI Automated 

guideway 

1,340,646 

2.9 

Minnesota Minnesota Department of 

Public Safety (0.1) 

Hiawatha Metro 

Transit (1-1.5)

Minneapolis, MN Light rail 7,901,668 

24.4 

New Jersey NJDOT (2-3) New Jersey Transit 

Newark City Subway 

(0.5) 

Newark, NJ Light rail 14,312,676 

99.9b

New Jersey Transit 

Hudson-Bergen Light 

Rail (N/A) 

Jersey City, NJ Light rail 

New Jersey Transit 

River Line (2) 

Trenton, NJ Light rail 

New York New York Public 

Transportation Safety 

Board (3.5) 

New York City 

Transit (15) 

New York City, NY Heavy rail 1,803,536,486

493.8 

Niagara Frontier 

Transit Authority 

(0.5) 

Buffalo, NY Light rail 5,373,321 

12.4 

Ohio Ohio Department of 

Transportation (1) 

Greater Cleveland 

Regional Transit 

Authority (1.2)

Cleveland, OH Heavy rail and

light rail

8,236,840 

68.5 

Oregon Oregon Department of 

Transportation (1.2) 

Portland Tri-Met (10) Portland, OR Light rail 34,755,147 

92.9b

Portland Streetcar 

(0.5) 

Portland, OR Light rail 

Pennsylvania PennDOT (0.5) Southeastern 

Pennsylvania Transit 

Authority (2) 

Philadelphia, PA Heavy rail, light 

rail, and trolley

113,252,100 

141.1 

Port Authority of 

Allegheny County 

(0.3) 

Pittsburgh, PA Light rail and

inclined plane 

8,072,099 

45.8 

Cambria County 

Transit Authority (1) 

Johnstown, PA Inclined plane 86,031 

0.3 

Page 28 GAO-06-997T 
State 

State safety oversight

agency (estimated FTE) 

Rail transit agency 

(estimated FTE) 

City center 

served

Type of 

system 

Annual ridership 

and directional 

route miles 

Puerto Rico Puerto Rico State 

Emergency and Disaster 

Management Agency (3) 

Puerto Rico

Highway and 

Transportation 

Authority Tren 

Urbano (1.6) 

San Juan, Puerto

Rico 

Heavy rail 2,182,668 

(N/A) 

Tennessee Tennessee Department 

of Transportation (0.25) 

Chattanooga Area

Rapid Transit 

Authority (N/A) 

Chattanooga, TN Inclined plane 435,780 

2 

Memphis Area

Transit Authority 

(0.3) 

Memphis, TN Trolley 1,015,448 

10 

Texas Texas Department of 

Transportation (0.4) 

Galveston Island 

Transit (0.25) 

Galveston, TX Light rail 47,706 

4 

Dallas Area Rapid 

Transit (0.75) 

Dallas, TX Light rail and

trolley 

17,487,057 

87.7 

Metropolitan Transit 

Authority of Harris

County (2) 

Houston, TX Light rail 10,233,638 

14.8 

Utah Utah Department of 

Transportation (0.8) 

Utah Transit 

Authority (1.5)

Salt Lake City, UT Light rail 13,101,791 

37.3 

Washington Washington State 

Department of 

Transportation (0.35) 

Sound Transit 

Tacoma Link (N/A) 

Tacoma, WA Light rail 884,895 

3.6 

Seattle Center 

Monorail (0.02)

Seattle, WA Automated 

guideway 

1,506,240c

1.8 

Wisconsin Wisconsin Department of 

Transportation (0.3) 

Kenosha Transit 

(0.85) 

Kenosha, WI Trolley 68,209 

1.9 

Multi-state systems

Illinois and Missouri St. Clair County Transit 

District (0.25-0.5) and 

Missouri Department of 

Transportation (0.9) 

Bi-State 

Development Agency 

- St. Louis Metro (2) 

St. Louis, MO Light rail 15,648,233 

75.8 

New Jersey and

Pennsylvania

NJDOT (2-3) Port Authority 

Transit Corporation 

(1) 

Philadelphia, PA Heavy rail 9,362,839 

31.5 

Maryland, Virginia, 

and Washington, DC 

PennDOT (0.2) Washington 

Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority (1) 

Washington, DC Heavy rail 259,430,055 

206.6 

Sources: GAO interviews and National Transit Database.

Page 29 GAO-06-997T 
Notes: Full-time equivalent (FTE) data comes from our interviews with oversight agencies and transit 

agencies. The data do not include contractor staff that assist transit or oversight agencies, though 

several agencies reported using contractors. Data on ridership is current as of 2005, and includes the 

total number of passengers boarding the rail system annually (also known as “unlinked passenger 

trips”) as provided by FTA. Directional route miles—the miles of track in each direction over which

transportation vehicles travel while carrying passengers—are current as of 2004, and were obtained 

from data published by FTA in the National Transit Database. The data in this table are presented for 

background purposes and were not verified. FTA defines trolley operations as “light rail” for statistical 

purposes. However, to differentiate between vintage trolley operations and modern light rail 

operations, we have created separate categories for them in this chart. 

N/A = Not available 

a

Because we were not able to speak with the oversight agency, FTE data was provided by FTA. 

b

Annual unlinked passenger trips and directional route miles represent the total for all systems within 

a transit agency.

c

According to agency officials, the ridership data presented in this table represents a year when the 

monorail was out of service for an extended period and does not reflect the normal use of the system. 

In prior years the number of annual unlinked passenger trips exceeded about 2 million. 

Page 30 GAO-06-997T (542097) 
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