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27–227PDF 2006

UNITED NATIONS REFORM: IMPROVING INTERNAL

OVERSIGHT WITHIN THE UN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 27, 2006

Serial No. 109–170

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

BARTON FORSYTH, Counsel 

JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office .............................................................. 7

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable David M. Walker: Prepared statement ........................................ 11

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 45

Responses from Comptroller General David M. Walker to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable J. Gresham Barrett, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of South Carolina ................................................... 46

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UNITED NATIONS REFORM: IMPROVING 

INTERNAL OVERSIGHT WITHIN THE UN 

THURSDAY, APRIL 27, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:18 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee will come to order. 

Today the Committee convenes to discuss the need for reform at 

the United Nations, particularly in light of the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) most recent reports on UN procurement 

and oversight. 

This hearing continues our ongoing oversight of the UN. A month 

ago, Mr. Lantos and I led a delegation to the UN to meet with the 

Secretary-General, permanent representatives of the Security 

Council and representatives of the G–77. 

While our meetings were productive, I remain convinced that 

Congress must press forward with legislation that links U.S. contributions to the UN to essential UN reform. Furthermore, I believe that reform efforts at the UN are best advanced by a unified 

American position. Therefore, I am now working with Mr. Lantos 

on legislation that gives the Administration flexibility to withhold 

dues to enforce UN reforms. My hope is that cooperatively we can 

catalyze the vital reforms that we were unable to achieve individually. 

The need for legislative action has never been more pressing. As 

the most recent GAO reports document, the UN’s Oil-for-Food scandal was not an isolated abuse, but a symptom of a larger contagion 

that infects both procurement and oversight within the UN. Most 

recently, a scandal surfaced within the UN Post Office where officials sold millions of dollars in UN stamps and original artwork 

without authorization and without observing proper bidding procedures. It remains unclear whether the proceeds from the sales were 

properly accounted for. The potential loss to the UN could be as 

high as $344 million. These endless abuses are financed in large 

part by American taxpayers. 

The GAO reports and numerous previous reports from other institutions trace the origin of these scandals to weak oversight and 

procurement controls. GAO highlighted a lack of coordination 

among oversight bodies, a lack of budgetary independence within 

the UN Office of Internal Oversight (OIOS), and a lack of budgetary flexibility that prevents OIOS from auditing high-risk proVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:40 Jul 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042706\27227.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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grams as problems arise. The result, the GAO concludes, is that, 

and I quote:

‘‘UN funds are unnecessarily vulnerable to waste, fraud, and 

abuse because the UN lacks an effective organizational structure for managing procurement, has not demonstrated a commitment to a professional procurement workforce, and has 

failed to adopt specific ethics guarantees for procurement officials.’’

The UN’s own attempts at reform have been inadequate. The 

most glaring example is the newly created human rights commission. Despite all the pontifications calling for a reformed human 

rights body, and despite many admirable efforts, the resolution to 

create the new body fell far short of expectations. As a result, the 

new commission is proceeding without U.S. participation. If the 

human rights resolution, one of the most important of the reform 

process, is indicative of the course the General Assembly will follow 

on future reform measures, I fear for the entire reform process. 

Turning to management reforms, Secretary-General Kofi Annan 

recently released a report recommending numerous changes within 

the Secretariat, including vesting new authorities in the Deputy 

Secretary-General, revamping the budgeting process, recruiting 

and staffing initiatives, and outsourcing certain administrative 

services. The G–77 recently moved to block these vital reforms, 

leaving their future uncertain. 

Furthermore, it has been suggested that these reforms will come 

with a price tag of over $500 million. With the current UN biennium budget topping $3.8 billion, these reforms must be financed 

from existing resources and through corresponding offsets. 

Meanwhile, brazen corruption in UN procurement shocks the 

conscience of everyone paying attention. The January release of an 

OIOS peacekeeping procurement report illustrates that corruption 

has risen to crisis levels. Crimes exposed by the investigations into 

the Oil-for-Food Program have been compounded by a procurement 

department adrift in fraud, waste, negligence, and abuse of authority. 

According to the UN’s own internal investigation, it is estimated 

that nearly $300 million have been lost. The UN report concludes 

that the likelihood of recurrence of fraud and mismanagement is 

almost certain under present conditions. 

The new GAO report confirms and expounds upon these conclusions. But will the UN act in light of these findings? In the words 

of the OIOS, ‘‘Despite numerous recommendations by OIOS in past 

audit reports, management has failed to establish accountability 

where irregularities occurred.’’

This has led to a culture of impunity. A disturbing portrait has 

been exposed, revealing corruption on a larger scale than first 

thought. Accordingly, we have many issues to cover today. I look 

forward to hearing from our distinguished witness, United States 

Comptroller General David Walker. 

And I now turn to my good friend, Mr. Faleomavaega, for such 

remarks as he may wish to offer before we get to General Walker. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

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Mr. Lantos, our Senior Ranking Member on this side of the aisle, 

expresses his deep regrets for not being here because of a conflict 

in schedule. So he has asked me to represent our side of the aisle 

in this important hearing that you have called. 

Thank you also, Mr. Chairman, for the recent trip that we had 

taken to the United Nations and meeting with Ambassador Bolton 

and members of the United States Mission of the United Nations, 

as well as the opportunity of also having to meet with our Secretary-General Kofi Annan and members of his staff regarding 

questions of accountability. 

Mr. Chairman, I also want to welcome the Comptroller General 

of the United States, Mr. David Walker. We are always pleased to 

have you, and I hope this meeting is the first of many when we 

can hear from you on important oversight issues. 

Mr. Chairman, we all agree that the United Nations must be the 

most accountable organization possible. Not only does the U.S. taxpayer demand it, but every citizen of the world requires it. Whether you are a vulnerable child on the streets of Monrovia or a wellheeled international businessman, we all deserve a United Nations 

that is more effective, more transparent, and more accountable 

than it has been in the past. 

Unfortunately, the millions in United Nations funds that were 

apparently stolen by Mr. Yakovlev, an employee of the United Nations procurement office, and his cronies in the service of the most 

base form of personal greed, have unfairly cast a black cloud over 

thousands of hard-working United Nations employees. Many of 

these international civil servants selflessly sacrifice comfort and 

safety to advance humanitarian interests and security in all of the 

world’s hot spots. It is absolutely critical to the United States and 

global interests that critical controls be established so that the 

black cloud that is hanging over the UN can be lifted and confidence in the UN and its thousands of hard-working officers can 

be restored. 

Indeed, if the United Nations is to help make progress in stopping the genocide in Darfur or restraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions, 

it will need all the credibility it can possibly muster. That is why 

I am pleased that the United Nation’s Secretary-General Kofi 

Annan and the Under Secretary-General Chris Burnham have 

demonstrated that they will not accept the development of a culture of corruption. Together, they have taken far reaching steps to 

strengthen accountability at the United Nations. 

At the Secretary-General’s recommendation, the UN has endorsed a new independent audit advisory committee as recommended by this Committee, has increased resources for the existing audit office, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, or 

OIOS, and has engaged with Pricewaterhouse to carry out a complete review of that office with the view of making recommendations to strengthen that office. 

We are also looking forward to Pricewaterhouse’s conclusions and 

the recommendations of the eminent Steering Committee to which 

Pricewaterhouse reports, and I urge that we send these reports to 

Pricewaterhouse immediately so that they may consider these recommendations without delay. 

4

And after reading OIOS’s conclusions that there was substantial 

evidence of abuse, Under Secretary Chris Burnham has launched 

an unprecedented review of UN peacekeeping procurement including a forensic audit and an examination of internal controls by 

Deloitte & Touche. An independent investigation is now underway 

by the EU’s top fraud investigator, who is compiling information on 

possible wrongdoers including eight members of the UN staff who 

have been placed on leave. The UN is cooperating with state and 

federal investigators as well as investigators in the U.K., who are 

trying to determine whether there was criminal wrongdoing. 

All this makes clear that the Secretary-General needs additional 

authority to deal with rogue employees who are so difficult to fire 

under the current system. I strongly hope that the UN’s internal 

justice redesigned panel looks at all the issues on the table including those outlined in the GAO’s reports. 

Mr. Chairman, I understand that the UN Audit Office fully 

agrees with the conclusions of this GAO report on obstacles to its 

performance, and I congratulate the GAO on the contributions it is 

making to the UN reform process. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, this is the Secretary-General’s final term. 

We are now beginning to discuss in earnest who the next Secretary-General may be. The reports published today make it quite 

clear that the next Secretary-General must have significant experience and interest in management and reform issues, or all the 

work that Kofi Annan and his team have accomplished will be lost. 

I strongly urge the Administration to consider this as they engage 

in this conversation with our friends and allies. 

I note with interest also, Mr. Chairman, the GAO report is a key 

criticism of the Administration for failing to fill for 13 months now 

the post of Ambassador for Administration and Management in 

New York, concluding that this lapse resulted in a missed opportunity for the United States in the formation of the UN Management Reform Agenda agreed upon at the World Summit in 2005. 

I would hope and I am sure that Mr. Walker would expand on this 

as part of the report that was submitted by the GAO. 

I also have an article here that was just recently released by the 

Associated Press, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the 

record. It is entitled, ‘‘U.S. Commitment to UN Reform Questioned.’’

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our Comptroller General, Mr. Walker, and 

again thank him for his presence and his outstanding services to 

our country in holding this very responsible position, and the tremendous work that he and the members of his staff have done for 

our country and especially for the Office of the Comptroller General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. The Chair will entertain opening statements, if there are any, from the Members 

and in the order in which they appeared for the hearing. 

Mr. Leach. 

Mr. LEACH. No opening statement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I will just revise and extend my remarks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. 

Well, I welcome our witness, the Comptroller General, to the 

Committee this afternoon. 

David Walker became the seventh Comptroller General of the 

United States on November 9, 1998. As Comptroller General, Mr. 

Walker is the Nation’s Chief Accountability Officer and head of the 

United States Government Accountability Office. Before his appointment as Comptroller General, Mr. Walker had extensive executive-level experience in both government and private industry. 

He currently serves as Chair of the United States Intergovernmental Audit Forum at the Center for Continuous Auditing, and as 

a principal of the United States Joint Financial Management Improvement Program. He is on the board of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions and various other educational and non-profit entities. 

Mr. Walker, please proceed. 

THE HONORABLE DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. WALKER. Chairman Hyde, Ranking Member Faleomavaega, 

other Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to be before you 

today to be able to discuss United Nations reforms in the context 


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of improving UN internal oversight and strengthening internal controls and processes over its procurement system. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, if my entire statement 

could be included in the record, I will summarize the highlights. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you. 

I would like to thank this Committee for your continued interest 

in our work on the United Nations. As you know, because the UN 

is a multilateral institution, GAO’s oversight authority does not extend directly to the UN, but instead does so through the U.S. membership in the organization. Thus, we only do UN-related work at 

the specific request of Committees with jurisdiction over UN matters, including this Committee. 

As the largest financial contributor to the United Nations, which 

has a total budget of about $1.6 billion in 2006, obviously the 

United States has a strong interest in UN management reforms in 

order to combat corruption, improve economy efficiency and effectiveness. For more than a decade, experts have called on the UN 

to correct serious deficiencies in its procurement process. However, 

recent audits and investigations have uncovered evidence of corruption and mismanagement in the UN’s procurement activities. 

In 2005, UN member states approved an agenda to reform many 

of the UN’s management practices, including strengthening internal oversight and accountability and improving procurement practices. 

Even though UN member states support management reforms, 

there has been considerable disagreement within the General Assembly over the process and the implementation of the reforms 

which thus far has been slow and uneven. And it is my understanding that, as I speak this morning, the fifth committee is meeting at the UN to discuss these reforms. 

The UN is vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement due to a range of weaknesses in existing management and 

oversight practices. In particular, current funding arrangements 

adversely affect OIOS’s budgetary independence and serve to compromise its ability to investigate high-risk areas. In addition, weaknesses in the control environment and UN procurement processes 

leave UN funds vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Specifically, the General Assembly mandate creating the OIOS 

calls for it to be operationally independent. In addition, international auditing standards that have been adopted by the OIOS 

call for a certain degree of independence. However, OIOS’s independence is impaired for two primary reasons. First, while OIOS 

is funded by the UN’s regular budget and 12 other extrabudgetary 

revenue streams, UN financial regulations and rules severely limit 

OIOS’s ability to respond to changing circumstances and to reallocate resources among revenue streams, locations, and operating divisions. As a result, OIOS cannot always deploy the resources necessary to address current and emerging high-risk areas that may 

emerge after its budget is approved. 

Secondly, OIOS is dependent upon UN funds and programs for 

resources for the services that it provides. OIOS must obtain permission to perform audits or investigations from the managers of 

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funds and programs, and they must negotiate the terms of work 

and payment for those services that are provided. 

Moreover, these entities have the right to deny funding for the 

work that OIOS proposes. By denying OIOS funding, UN entities 

can avoid any oversight by OIOS and high-risk areas can be excluded from timely examination. Candidly, the Oil-for-Food situation is a prima facie example of some of the ‘‘what can happen’’ due 

to the current weaknesses that exist. 

Although OIOS has begun to implement key components of effective oversight, some of their audit practices fall short of meeting 

international auditing standards, specifically, that while they develop an annual work plan, it has not been fully implemented in 

the context of a risk management framework. There is a need to 

periodically assess risk and to allocate resources appropriately. 

OIOS annual reports do not provide an overall assessment of risk 

exposures and control issues facing the UN organization as a 

whole. On resource management, OIOS officials report that the office does not have adequate resources. However, they do not have 

a mechanism in place to determine appropriate staffing levels and 

to help justify budgetary requests. And, finally, OIOS has no mandatory training curriculum for staff to develop and maintain their 

expertise. 

The control environment over the UN’s procurement activities is 

also weak. Specifically, the UN has not established a single organizational entity or mechanism capable of effectively and comprehensively managing its procurement practices. The UN has not demonstrated a commitment to improving the professionalism of its 

procurement staff in the form of training, a career development 

path, or other key human capital practices critical to attracting, developing, retaining, and motivating a top-flight professional workforce. 

The UN has not adopted a full range of new ethics guidance for 

procurement officials despite directives from the General Assembly 

in 1998 and 2005. We found that although UN procurement has increased sharply in recent years, the size of the UN’s principal contract review committee and its support staff remain relatively stable. Committee Members stated that they do not have the resources necessary to keep pace with the expanding workload. 

The UN has not established an independent process to consider 

vendor protest despite a 1994 recommendation by a high-level 

panel of international procurement experts to do so as prudently 

possible. The UN has not updated its procurement manual since 

2004 to reflect current UN procurement policy. 

Further, the UN does not consistently implement its processes 

for helping to ensure that it is conducting business solely with 

qualified vendors. 

In summary, our two reports that were issued today—as you 

know, Mr. Chairman, I have copies here and the Members have 

been provided copies. In those two reports we recommended that 

the United States Secretary of State and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN work with member states to, 

first, support budgetary independence for OIOS and OIOS’s efforts 

to more closely adhere to international auditing standards; and, 

second, to encourage the UN to establish clear lines of authority, 

10

enhance training, adopt ethics guidance, address problems facing 

its principal contracts review committee, establish an independent 

bids protest mechanism, and implement certain other steps to improve UN procurement practices. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, let me 

note that I personally know Director Inga-Britt Ahlenius, our 

Under Secretary, who was head of OIOS. She was formerly Chair 

of the Supreme Audit Institution of Sweden. And in addition to 

being on the board for International Auditor Generals, I am also 

head of strategic planning. So I have had the opportunity to work 

with Inga-Britt Ahlenius for a number of years. She is a capable 

and tough professional, and I know that she is dedicated to doing 

her part. However, these issues need to be addressed in order for 

anybody to be successful and effective in that important role and 

function. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer your 

questions and those of the Committee Members. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. I usually save my questions 

for the end, but your provocative remarks—and I mean that in the 

best sense—require me to ask you a pretty fundamental question. 

I maintain, there will be no reform at the UN of the slightest 

kind even if it involves accounting for paper clips until funding is 

withheld from the UN as a penalty for failing to adopt reform, 

these reforms. But waiting for the UN to reform itself without any 

penalty if they fail to do so is a fool’s errand. 

Would you comment on that statement? 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I think there are pros and cons with 

regard to whether or not you ought to link UN contributions to reforms. 

Let me just say this. For any fundamental transformation effort 

to work, you need to have three elements in addition to a plan. You 

need to have incentives for people to make the necessary reforms. 

You need to have adequate transparency mechanisms to provide 

reasonable assurance they will do what they say they are going to 

do, because somebody is looking. And, thirdly, you need to have accountability mechanisms if people do not do what they say they are 

going to do. 

The question is, what are the appropriate accountability mechanisms? Obviously, one might be financial in nature, but I have not 

really fully studied that issue. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is a shame. 

Mr. WALKER. I will be happy to give it some further reflection if 

you would so desire, Mr. Chairman, and talk to you about it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have a burning desire. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, I will try to do my best to quench that within 

a reasonable period of time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Walker, thank you for your testimony and for the report you have provided. Let me just ask you a couple of questions. 

How adequate is oversight of the UN’s various specialized agencies? I know I have asked for answers on a number of things as 

Chairman of the Global Human Rights and International Relations 

Subcommittee for 6 years, and now I have that Subcommittee 

again with the important addition of Africa as a regional part, a 

super-Subcommittee that was created by Chairman Hyde. But 

when we ask questions, we get very, very poor answers. We don’t 

have access. 

How is the money spent? By whom? Under what circumstances? 

We get these very unresponsive fact sheets back that don’t really 

tell us much as to what is happening on the ground. And I am 

wondering what your feelings about this practice are, particularly 

with regard to the specialized agencies. And did your report include 

the Global Fund at all? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, first, my understanding is that our review did 

not deal with the specialized agencies such as the World Health 

Organization. 

I think the biggest problem with regard to the funds that are 

within the control and the duties and responsibilities of the SecVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:40 Jul 13, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042706\27227.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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retary-General, which is what we are dealing with—and as you 

know, the specialized industries do not come under the direct control of the Secretary-General—is that there are certain special 

funds and programs, such as the Oil-for-Food Program as an example, that present a particular problem. And that is where there is 

clearly inadequate oversight and where the need for more certainty 

as to resources, more adequacy as to resources, more flexibility as 

to allocating one’s resources for OIOS, and not having to basically 

have the person that you want to audit approve the audit and be 

in a position to effectively say ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ as to whether or not 

you are going to do the work and what work you are going to do. 

Let me also note that, frankly, there clearly need to be some fundamental reforms with regard to the UN, as well as a transformation of how it does business, which involves certain fundamental cultural changes and challenges. It is particularly difficult 

in a multilateral organization, and I would also note that we have 

some of our own challenges within the United States Government 

with regard to this issue, too. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Let me ask you, if I could, on the 

OIOS with regards to peacekeeping, we held two hearings on the 

horrific problem of UN peacekeepers raping and sexually abusing 

young children in the Congo. There was an investigation, and I 

think there are many within the UN system that desperately want 

real reform. Jane Holl Lute, for example, and others are trying 

their best; but the culture tries to mitigate everything they attempt 

to do. Did you find any of that in your investigations relative to 

peacekeeping? 

And on procurement, we all know that human rights specs get 

the bid, and sometimes sweetheart deals can be there—lowest bidder and best qualified may not be the ones getting the bid. 

What did you find in terms of that whole issue? 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Smith, the two reports we issued today are focused on internal oversight vis-a-vis the OIOS and also internal 

procurement policies and practices. As you properly point out, the 

OIOS recently completed some audit work itself with regard to procurement practices relating to peacekeeping operations and found 

a number of serious problems there which exposed the UN to potential fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

In addition, as you also know, there has been a significant increase in the amount of money being allocated to peacekeeping activities in recent years, and therefore, that increases the sense of 

urgency to get on with these types of reforms. 

As far as the issue of human rights abuses, my understanding 

is, that is beyond the scope of what we got involved with. But with 

your permission, Mr. Chairman, I have Tom Melito with me who 

is a director in our GAO, and he might be able to provide some 

more specifics there. 

Mr. MELITO. Thank you. 

Yes, the Comptroller General is correct, we didn’t actually look 

at human rights abuses, but in the course of our work we did find 

that OIOS’s budget problems restricted their ability to look at the 

sexual exploitation allegations in peacekeeping operations. They 

identify that as one of the areas they wish to explore, but they 

were hindered because of budgetary issues. 

35

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Okay. 

Mr. WALKER. And clearly those types of activities could be within 

and should be within the scope of OIOS. As you know, the GAO 

does work with regard to financial matters, but we do work with 

regard to a broad range of other activities that are non-financial in 

nature on behalf of the Congress and the country. 

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. You do make the point that it has 

not adopted specific ethics guidance. Also, Transparency International is very good at listing countries that are transparent when 

it comes to how they handle finances at a government level. Could 

you speak about how would you rate the UN, having done a study 

in terms of its transparency? 

Mr. WALKER. Its transparency is inadequate. I go back to what 

I said before. In any system, whether it is a government system, 

a procurement system, a health care system, whatever, you have 

got to have three things, you know: Incentives for people to do the 

right thing, transparency to provide reasonable assurance they will 

because somebody is looking, and accountability if they do the 

wrong thing. 

Clearly there is a need for progress in each of those dimensions 

with regard to the UN, and the complexity of achieving that is even 

greater than it is in our own government because you are dealing 

with a supernational multilateral institution that adds a whole 

new degree of complexity where each member has one vote. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Walker, could you amplify a little bit on the 

views that you expressed in your report given the imperative of 

shifting responsibility away from the General Assembly? And I 

don’t know if this is beyond your purview, but share your thoughts 

on how we can more effectively move that agenda at the UN. 

Mr. WALKER. I think that we are helped in moving the agenda 

now that the critical position that was mentioned before by the 

Ranking Member has been filled. It has been filled as of March 

2006. So that means that the person who is responsible to focus 

primarily on these types of issues with the Fifth Committee. My 

understanding, our new Ambassador, whose name is Mark Wallace, is now on the job and focused on these issues. 

I think that it is important for not just the Congress to be interested in this issue; I think it is also important for other types of 

professional organizations and other countries to be interested in 

this issue. 

For example, on the issue of organizational independence of 

OIOS and their authorities, the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, which I serve on the board and am head 

of strategic planning, that is an organization where it and its members can, and should I believe, serve to reinforce the importance of 

these types of reforms with their respective governments in order 

to try to achieve the necessary improvements that can provide for 

more effective oversight and help to combat corruption and to enhance efforts to improve economy efficiency and effectiveness. 

Those would be a couple examples I would give off the top of my 

head. 

Mr. SCHIFF. At present, though, has this generated into a fight 

between the rich and the poor nations at the UN, with more of the 

36

donor nations urging this centralization of authority, poor nations 

resisting it; and the United States, because of an absence of a point 

person or because we have largely criticized from outside rather 

than aggressively promoting and working within—I mean, is that 

sort of where we are right now? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, as you know, Mr. Schiff, without being on the 

front line and without being part of the UN organization, I can 

only give you my perspective from the experience that I have had. 

There is a longstanding history within the UN of there being 

some differences between the developed world and the developing 

world. As you might imagine, the donor countries, the primary 

donor countries, because everybody donates—that is important, but 

obviously the donations are determined by a complex formula 

which, among other things, includes GDP. Those who contribute 

more money have more of an incentive to make sure that corruption is minimized and that you maximize economy and efficiency 

and effectiveness because we have the greatest stake. We are the 

ones making the reforms. 

Mr. SCHIFF. We do and we don’t. We have the greatest stake as 

a donor, but we have a smaller stake in that we are not a recipient. 

The recipients arguably should have the greater stake because they 

are the countries in need that would lose from funds that are siphoned off for unimportant or corrupt abuses. 

Mr. WALKER. I think you make an excellent point. And I think 

one of the things that the developing world needs to recognize and 

that all member-nations need to recognize is that there are finite 

resources, and every dollar that is lost through corruption and 

every dollar that is wasted is a dollar that is not available to do 

good and to further the agenda of the UN. 

And this is going to be particularly important because the industrialized nations, including the United States, face serious budgetary constraints that we are going to have to come to grips with. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Real quickly in my last seconds, if you can only accomplish one thing at the UN—reform, single most important thing 

that the United States should prioritize getting done—what would 

it be? 

Mr. WALKER. I would have to think about that, and I will be 

happy to provide it for the record if I am going to get it down to 

one. Thank you. 

[Note: The information referred had not been submitted by Mr. 

Walker at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Walker, you indicated earlier that the total UN budget now 

is about $1.6 billion. About what percentage of that comes from the 

United States funding? 

Mr. WALKER. The U.S. contribution, I apologize, is $1.6 billion. 

And we contribute, what, 22 to 25 percent of the total budget. And 

I am sorry, your question was? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Did you say that the total budget of the United Nations is $1.6 billion? 

Mr. WALKER. I don’t think that is right. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What is the total UN budget? 

37

Mr. WALKER. My capable staff informs me that the total is about $3.8 billion, and that the United States contributes about $1.6 billion. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That is almost one-third. 

Mr. WALKER. By the time you consider specialized operations and 

other types of activities, where it is not the normal formula allocation and where there are special arrangements made for different 

burden sharing——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Have you had a chance to review the allocation formula that you said is very complex? Does it seem fair, based 

on GDP or whatever it is that goes on in terms of the contributions? I mean, who are the other major contributors, the top three 

or four major contributors to this $3.8 billion budget total, besides 

the United States at $1.6 billion? 

Mr. WALKER. Obviously, Japan and the EU nations would be the 

larger contributors. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And Japan is not a Permanent Member of 

the Security Council, right? 

Mr. WALKER. That is correct. That was determined in the aftermath of World War II. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I understand. 

What is the current procedure for prosecuting someone that violates or simply steals from the United Nations, as we are now encountering, in terms of people who—just simply for embezzlement, 

somebody steals from the kitty? How do we go about prosecuting 

that person, whether the person comes from other countries or 

even from our own country? 

Mr. WALKER. If there are allegations of fraud or other types of 

criminal activity, it would be investigated by OIOS, assuming they 

have adequate resources and assuming that their authorities were 

adequate. 

As far as the prosecution, Tom, could you help with regard to the 

prosecution? 

Mr. MELITO. If it is a criminal matter, such as in the case of 

Yakovlev, it would get referred to the United States Attorneys Office, if in the United States, or something equivalent in a different 

country. If it is more of an initiative matter, then there are forums 

within the UN to take care of that. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. So that foreign national can be prosecuted 

in our courts, in our country if that person is prosecuted for criminal——

Mr. MELITO. Individuals have diplomatic immunity. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That was what I was going to get in my 

next question. 

Mr. MELITO. But in the case of Mr. Yakovlev, there was a request to have that waived, and it was waived in that case. So there 

is always a possibility. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I know that there is a sense of the perception, at least in my sensing in meeting with some of the people at 

the United Nations, that—and, of course, I don’t know whether 

they resent it, but it is a reality that sometimes we kind of bear 

ourselves and say it is either our way or the highway. And, of 

course, what we are concerned about here is the American taxpayer’s money and whether or not we are properly accounted for. 

38

My question is, we are having a problem in our own country. 

How do we go about saying what accounting system is the best procedure to follow? I know there is a standard accounting—I am not 

an accountant, but there is a guideline standard to say, this is 

what accountants should go by. 

You know, we are getting into the Enrons and all the situations. 

You can cook the books and pretty much still justify as an accountant and say, it is okay. And I just was curious, do we apply United 

States accounting standards on how they keep the books of the 

United Nations, or are there some other procedures that they have 

been following prior to this concern that we have now expressed 

about accountability? 

Mr. WALKER. It is my understanding they follow international accounting and reporting standards. There are international standards for both accounting and reporting. There are international 

standards for auditing and other types of assurance services. 

But as you know, there is a difference between external reporting 

and internal auditing and related accounting and reporting activity, such things as cost accounting, which may or may not be reported externally, but are necessary in order to be able to make 

timely, informed management decisions. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Would you say that the international standards are pretty much up to par with what——

Mr. WALKER. Well, I think they are complying with international 

standards for external reporting. What their real problem is is to 

be able to deal with the internal accounting and controls, internal 

controls and oversight mechanisms. 

You know, candidly, we have many of the same challenges, but 

not necessarily to the same degree, in our own Defense Department. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. One more question, Mr. Chairman. What 

would be your best judgment in terms of the amount of loss on account of fraud, waste, funding that just could not be accounted for? 

Is there any sense of estimate that can become——

Mr. WALKER. Not that would meet GAO’s professional standards. 

I can tell you that it is much higher than what we see here in the 

United States; not as high as we see in Third World countries, but 

OIOS has been quoted as saying that they think it could be in the 

hundreds of millions of dollars. And that is obviously a big number 

when you consider that the total amount of money that they received last year was $3.8 billion. 

And the only thing I would want to provide for the record is, was 

that OIOS estimate of hundreds of millions for 1 year or over a period of time, because obviously that would make a significant difference with regard to the percentage. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Walker, for your service. With the Oil-forFood Program, what level of study have you done of that? And 

what are the key lessons learned from it? What are the implications for future sanctions? 

Mr. WALKER. We have done work in regard to the Oil-for-Food 

Program in the past; we have issued reports on it. I would be 

39

happy for my staff to provide you with a copy. But our work among 

other things identified that there was clearly fraud identified with 

that program. 

In addition to that, our work was one of the primary factors that 

we believe led to the appointment of Paul Volcker and the only 

independent investigation that was conducted by Paul Volcker on 

behalf of the UN. 

Furthermore, some of the issues that we are raising in our reports that were issued today were such that they allowed that type 

of situation to potentially occur: That the OIOS did not have adequate resources, did not have adequate authorities to be able to 

audit areas that they felt were high risk. And that is why we think 

it is important that we address the systemic problems and that, 

hopefully, our recommendations will be acted upon in a timely 

manner. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate the questions of Mr. Faleomavaega 

in regard to prosecution for obvious criminal conduct. 

And then you have diplomatic immunity, and how do you balance 

this; and where people, as you identified, may have committed open 

and blatant fraud, who and where? 

And you had mentioned the U.S. Attorneys Office. Where could 

this be pursued? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, my understanding, the way that it works 

right now is, depending upon where the violation occurs, then it is 

subject to prosecution under the courts of where the violation occurs. 

However, presumably if one is eligible for diplomatic immunity 

here, if the violation occurred here, the same would occur elsewhere. And, therefore, from a practical standpoint, given the nature and extent of the abuse, I would imagine that the degree of 

international pressure and the degree of press attention that would 

be brought to bear would be, practically, the primary factor that 

would determine whether or not the country would be willing to 

waive diplomatic immunity or force that individual to do that. 

Mr. WILSON. And who is it that provides the waiver? Is it the 

country of the person’s citizenship, or who waives this? 

Mr. WALKER. My understanding, it is the Secretary-General in 

consultation, not solely. I am sure he consults with others, including the country involved, because after all, it is a collegial body. 

But it is my understanding the Secretary-General has the authority to waive diplomatic immunity. 

Mr. WILSON. And in the most recent, say, Volcker investigations, 

how many waivers have occurred? You identified, I believe, one; 

were there any others? 

Mr. WALKER. That is the only one that we are aware of, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. That is just amazing. That is sad. 

Mr. WALKER. It is not over yet, though, hopefully. 

Mr. WILSON. I mean, just from what I have seen, just in terms 

of the vouchers being provided, the obvious securing of support by 

a totalitarian regime, and then the spending procedures that they 

had, which were overpriced. And that is just a shame. 

With the United Nations is a new ethics office, I understand. Is 

it operational? Has the office been set up? Is it probably——

40

Mr. WALKER. Well, first, they haven’t adopted clear ethics standards yet. 

But with regard to the office, Tom, could you give us the status 

on that? 

Mr. MELITO. Yes. The office was established in January. To my 

understanding, they are up to four staff members, but they are trying to get up to 16 staff members. It is a very enormous task because there are 29,000 employees in the UN system, so it is going 

to be something that is going to take a while for them to fully staff. 

Mr. WILSON. And you identified that the standards of ethics still 

need to be identified. Is progress being made? 

Mr. MELITO. They are establishing—I mean, this is something 

they are creating from scratch, so—but they have established a financial disclosure procedure, and they are trying to implement 

other aspects. 

Mr. WALKER. For the procurement area, for example, they need 

to do more in particular. 

Mr. WILSON. And do they have currently a financial disclosure 

filing? 

Mr. MELITO. As of this year——

Mr. WILSON. Staff. 

Mr. MELITO. They are now requiring financial disclosures for 

many more staff than in the past. I think it is most of their executive-level staff as well as those people in procurement. 

Mr. WILSON. And would the ethics office be similar to, say, an 

inspector general’s office? 

Mr. MELITO. The office will work with the OIOS to do investigations; and I think that relationship has yet to be negotiated and 

established. 

Mr. WALKER. As you know, we have an Office of Government 

Ethics and we have an inspectors general. And so while there is 

correlation in some activities, they are really separate and distinct 

functions. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you very much for holding this hearing, Mr. 

Chairman. 

And thank you very much for coming and describing the processes of your investigation. And your report repeatedly states that 

the UN peacekeeping staff noted that they are often procuring 

goods and services in extremely difficult post-conflict environments, 

making implications of the best practices and challenges. And I 

note that while you did a number of surveys and questionnaires, 

the staff did not go out to the field to actually evaluate the conditions under which the procurement took place. 

Is that so? 

Mr. MELITO. We created a structured interview and we interviewed every single program manager in all of the peacekeeping 

missions. So we had telephone conversations of between 3 and 4 

hours with each of the program managers, and we did some followup as well. This was a much more comprehensive view of field procurement than we would have gotten if we had only visited a couple of peacekeeping missions. 

41

Ms. WATSON. I know how difficult it is when you go to the various countries, the various hot spots, because people do things differently than we do them here. And I think that is probably something that you find as a stumbling block. 

Plus, you need people to be able to go out there. That requires 

a budget and so on. Because things are just done differently and 

accounting is different—trust me, I know this—the outcomes are 

always questionable because of the different interpretation. 

Would you agree that many of the problems you identified in 

your procurement report are due to a failure by the UN Department of Management and Procurement Services in the New York 

area not providing sufficient support to the UN Department of 

Peacemaking during this period of significant growth in the temple 

of the UN peacemaking operations? 

Mr. WALKER. That has been one of the problems. 

But let me also reinforce, we are not assuming that United 

States standards and policies are appropriate. There are generally 

accepted international standards. Nonetheless, you are correct in 

noting that there is a wide difference between whether or not people adopt them and their ability to do so in a timely manner. 

Ms. WATSON. And it takes bringing them up to that level, that 

international standard level, because you will find different countries lagging behind or keeping up with the pace. 

So I understand the problems, and I would hope that we would 

continue to look at those problems and come back with recommendations. 

I would hope that we would never decrease the funding, because 

if we are going to require them to reach that international standing, that means that we are going to have to have people who can 

go out to the site and see how things are being done there. 

Mr. WALKER. It should, however, be easier for the UN to accomplish this than individual countries. 

Ms. WATSON. Exactly. 

Mr. WALKER. As you know, Ms. Watson, the World Bank, for example, has set as one of its highest priorities—or the highest priority is to combat corruption and to promote professional standards, the adoption of professional standards and enhance capacity 

building in the developing world. 

It is a lot more complicated when you are talking about dealing 

with 180-plus countries than it is dealing with a single supernational institution of top-quality professionals. And so they should 

be able to do a lot better. 

Ms. WATSON. I understand completely what you are saying. And 

it is going to take a while for those individual countries to come 

up to speed, because they think of these things differently. And 

what we would call waste, fraud, and abuse, it would require—it 

is a cultural necessity in some places. And you have got to change 

their thinking, you have to change the way they operate. 

So I commend you for the start you are making and your recommendations. And we like the transparency; we like you coming 

back and reporting to us your successes in areas that you think 

need improvement. I am behind you 100 percent. Thank you very 

much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

42

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McCotter. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding the hearing. 

Help me understand a couple of things. Sorry I didn’t hear opening statements. 

The distinction I think has to be made, and you can tell me if 

it has been or not, and if there are adequate safeguards in both 

realms between misfeasance and malfeasance. Misfeasance of control over other individuals’ funds to me would be an indifference or 

an incompetence in the expenditure to other people of those funds, 

whereas malfeasance would be a willful, deliberate attempt to gain 

personally from the expenditures of those funds. I would differentiate in the waste, fraud and abuse. I would go to the differentiation between misfeasance and malfeasance. 

My second question would be is it not safe to assume that if individuals encounter difficult circumstances in the expenditure of 

funds, that they should be well prepared and well advised to prepare ethical standards for when they encounter such difficult circumstances. To me, it would make perfect sense to say to yourself 

if I continue to find myself in the situation where it is difficult to 

gain an accounting or to provide ethical guidance to individuals 

under my charge, that I should then internally adopt and promulgate standards and procedures which will then make it easier for 

them to perform their duties. 

Finally, is there any discussion about whether the reduction of 

funds is a necessary imperative for reform within the UN? We will 

hear from some quarters that we should not reduce funding because it will impair the cause of reform. It would seem to me by 

that logic that if one withholds—one refuses to withhold funds and 

one funds the UN at the levels they seek, that that would be detrimental to pursuing reform, because reform would then lead to a 

measurement that would be used to potentially terminate United 

States assistance should misfeasance or malfeasance be found. 

Mr. WALKER. That is a multifaceted series of questions. Let me 

make a good faith step. First, what we are seeing is that in the 

procurement area, in particular the UN, does not have adequate 

systems and controls in order to prevent misfeasance, and by not 

having those adequate systems and controls, it also can facilitate 

malfeasance. 

Furthermore, we are saying that the OIOS, which is the primary 

internal oversight mechanism, does not have adequate independence, does not have adequate flexibility, and does not have adequate authorities in order to provide an effective check and balance, even if you had the proper types of systems and controls in 

place. 

Thirdly, there is a need, and obviously is appropriate, to provide 

additional guidance in order to help people do their job well and 

also to provide a basis from which OIOS can do its work to try to 

help facilitate things are going as they should be. 

With regard to whether or not to withhold funding, that was the 

first question the Chairman asked me, which I told him that there 

were pros and cons to that and that I would reflect on it further. 

I think what you have to do is this, this is a very complex situation 

43

which is not merely a business issue, there are political issues involved here, and there is a long history. It is difficult to isolate just 

the management reform issue. You and I might say from a professional standpoint we ought to be able to do that. I agree it is in 

everybody’s interest to make these management reforms happen, 

the developed world and the developing world, for the reasons we 

talked about, but practically, you are dealing with a very political 

organization that a lot of issues affect whether or not people are 

willing to move forward and how quickly. 

But I will get back to you, Mr. Chairman, as I promised. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. If I can just follow up with that 

because—and Representative Watson makes a very good point, is 

that one of the concerns may be that if you adopt routine procedures and routine ethical standards within the UN for their dayto-day operations, say, in New York or elsewhere, it might be advisable to also issue separate procedural and ethical safeguards for 

the difficult circumstances they require that may not lead or may 

not be as readily complied with under the circumstances that they 

face in one of those regions. There may be a two-track system. 

Mr. WALKER. My view is I think we should always keep in mind 

that things like the law and professional standards represent the 

floor of acceptable behavior. At a minimum, you want people to 

comply with that. But ultimately, you want to have a culture and 

an environment and adequate incentive, transparency and accountability mechanisms that don’t just make sure people comply with 

the law and the minimum standards, but they do the right thing 

that achieves positive outcomes from the standpoint of results, 

economy, efficiency and effectiveness. And that is a higher standard. And that is a cultural change which is going to take years, but 

needs to happen. I might add we have some of the same challenges. 

Do you want to come back on that? 

Mr. MCCOTTER. With the Chairman’s indulgence. 

If you find yourself as a UN employee in a circumstance where 

you are in a country in difficult circumstances, is that a lot of the 

circumstances that Representative Watson was talking about are 

not dictated by the UN employee, and they will then have to try 

to make the best of fulfilling their mission within the cultural circumstances they find themselves, which would be radically different than individuals within the UN, whether it be a culture of 

corruption or a culture of innocence, and that the day-to-day operations within a bureaucratic entity housed in New York would be 

vastly different than the UN employee would find on the ground 

in a cultural circumstance where they are trying to accomplish a 

mission but within the paradigm they find themselves. 

Mr. WALKER. I understand what you are saying but this is a very 

slippery slope. This Congress passed something called a Foreign 

Corrupt Practices Act, which basically says that you are not supposed to, among other things, U.S. corporations are not supposed 

to, among other things, provide bribes to foreign officials for certain 

types of activities. 

I think one of the things the UN has to debate is, is it going to 

do what it has to do or is it going to do the right thing. Is it going 

to try to raise everybody up or is it going to go along with whatever 

the standards are elsewhere, which may actually impede people 

44

coming to a higher standard, which is ultimately where you want 

them to be. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Gallegly. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Chairman, forgive my tardiness, but I will 

waive any comments at this point. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Well, gentlemen and General Walker, thank you for a most instructive testimony. I hope you won’t conclude there is a lack of interest on our side by this sparse showing, but today was an unusual day and I hope you understand that. But we are very interested in the subject, we are very interested in what you do, and we 

are very admiring of what you do. You have always done a wonderful job and I hope you continue to do it, and I know you do. We 

thank you and we will get back to you with written questions. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my pleasure. I 

have a great team of professionals that work at GAO and we look 

forward to continuing to work with you. 

Chairman HYDE. You especially have someone named Tom who 

is pretty good. 

Mr. WALKER. I concur, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:22 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(45)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RUSS CARNAHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Chairman Hyde and Ranking Member Lantos, thank you for holding this hearing 

regarding internal oversight at the United Nations. The GAO studies that were released this morning, highlight the extensive problems at the United Nations and the 

need for reform. 

I commend the extensive progress made concerning oversight, ethics, and procurement reforms. In order to fully engage the international community, we need the 

United Nations to be free of fraud and abuse. To accomplish this end, we must ensure that the appropriate internal oversight processes are in place, and are operating effectively. 

While improvement has been made at the UN, it does not appear that the peacekeeping procurement fraud has been alleviated, which is partly due to the fact that 

the extent of the problem is still not known. Since peacekeeping is a central function 

of the United Nations, we need to ensure that the procurement process is not corrupt and that it is receiving the necessary oversight. 

Mr. Walker, thank you for being here today. I will be especially interested to hear 

your thoughts on the progress made regarding the peacekeeping procurement problem, as well as what your findings show still needs to be done. 

46

RESPONSES FROM COMPTROLLER GENERAL DAVID M. WALKER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE J. GRESHAM BARRETT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA


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