This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2020 UT 32

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

JEREMY WILLIAMS BRIDGEWATERS,

Appellant.

No. 20180190

Heard September 18, 2019

Filed May 28, 2020

On Certification from the Court of Appeals

Third District, West Jordan

The Honorable William K. Kendall

Nos. 171402352 and 171403026

Attorneys:

Sim Gill, Samuel P. Sutton, Salt Lake City, for appellee

Samantha R. Dugan, Salt Lake City, for appellant

JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, 

JUSTICE HIMONAS, and JUSTICE PEARCE joined.

JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Jeremy Bridgewaters was charged with two separate 

instances of violating a protective order. After a preliminary 

hearing, the district court, acting as a magistrate, bound him over 

to stand trial. Bridgewaters moved to quash the bindover. He 

argued that he had not been properly served with the protective 

order he was accused of violating, and that a previously issued ex 

parte order had expired. The district court denied his motion. 
STATE v. BRIDGEWATERS

Opinion of the Court

2

Bridgewaters filed an interlocutory appeal, which the court of 

appeals certified to us.

¶2 The statute that criminalizes violation of a protective 

order (Violation Statute) requires the prosecution to prove that the 

defendant was “properly served” with the order at issue. UTAH 

CODE § 76-5-108(1) (2017).1 While the Violation Statute does not 

define proper service, the Utah Cohabitant Abuse Act (Act or 

Cohabitant Abuse Act), id. §§ 78B-7-101 to -116 (2017),2 under 

which the orders in this case were issued, contains certain specific 

procedural requirements that inform our analysis. We conclude 

that the Act requires a protective order to be served in accordance 

with rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even though a

protective order does not initiate a civil protective order 

proceeding in the same way that a summons and complaint 

commence other civil actions. Because the protective order here 

was served pursuant to rule 5, it was not properly served.

¶3 However, as the district court correctly determined, the 

ex parte order was still in effect at the time of the events in 

question. Under the Act, once a court holds a hearing on a petition 

for a protective order and issues such an order, a previously 

issued ex parte order “remains in effect until service of process of 

the protective order is completed.” Id. § 78B-7-107(1)(d) (2017).

¶4 Bridgewaters argues that even under such circumstances, 

Utah Code § 78B-7-107(1)(c) (2017) does not permit an ex parte 

order to remain in effect longer than 180 days. We disagree with

his reading of the Act. Because the district court issued a 

protective order after a hearing, the “ex parte protective order 

remain[ed] in effect” until the protective order was served in 

accordance with the Act. See id. § 78B-7-107(1)(d) (2017).

__________________________________________________________

1 This statute was amended during the 2018 general session of 

the Utah Legislature. See 2018 Utah Laws 1564. We refer to the 

version of the statute in effect at the time of the alleged violations.

2 As with the Violation Statute, portions of the Cohabitant 

Abuse Act have been amended. So we refer to the version of the 

statute in effect at the time of the alleged violations.
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Opinion of the Court

3

¶5 Accordingly, the magistrate properly bound over 

Bridgewaters to face both counts to the extent they are based on 

the ex parte order. We affirm.

BACKGROUND3

¶6 On February 5, 2016, Bridgewaters’ former girlfriend

(T.T.) petitioned for a temporary protective order against him. The 

district court issued an ex parte protective order (ex parte order) 

that same day. The ex parte order prohibited Bridgewaters from 

communicating with T.T. other than during court mediation 

sessions, and from going to T.T.’s residence and workplace, 

among other things. Bridgewaters was personally served with a 

copy of the ex parte order the day it was issued. The order

indicated that there would be a hearing on February 23, 2016, and 

it instructed Bridgewaters to “[g]o to the court hearing on the date 

listed [on the order].”

¶7 The district court held a hearing on the scheduled date.

But Bridgewaters did not attend. Upon conclusion of the hearing, 

the court entered a protective order, dated February 23, 2016. Like 

the ex parte order, the protective order prohibited Bridgewaters

from communicating in any way with T.T. other than during 

court mediation sessions and from going to T.T.’s residence and 

workplace.

¶8 The Cohabitant Abuse Act requires that “[f]ollowing the 

protective order hearing, the court shall . . . as soon as possible, 

deliver the order to the county sheriff for service of process.”

UTAH CODE § 78B-7-106(4)(a) (2017). But for reasons that do not 

appear in the record, the sheriff did not serve the protective order 

on Bridgewaters.

¶9 Eventually, on May 3, 2016, counsel for T.T. stepped in 

and filed a certificate of service, informing the court that counsel

__________________________________________________________

3 When reviewing a bindover determination, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and

resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution. See State v. 

Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 24, 137 P.3d 787; State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 

¶ 19, 20 P.3d 300 (“Viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, the facts presented at the preliminary hearing were 

sufficient to meet the reasonable belief standard.”).
STATE v. BRIDGEWATERS

Opinion of the Court

4

had mailed a true and correct copy of the protective order to 

Bridgewaters at his last known address. Notably, Bridgewaters’ 

last known address was T.T.’s residence at the time she filed the

protective order petition, and the ex parte order and protective 

order both prohibited him from being there.

¶10 On June 27, 2017, T.T. spotted Bridgewaters at her 

apartment complex. She and her adult daughter were returning 

home late that night when they saw Bridgewaters exiting the 

complex. Bridgewaters rolled down his car window and said that 

he “was driving through.”4

¶11 The next day, Bridgewaters texted T.T. Although the text 

messages were from various unknown numbers, T.T. knew the 

text messages were from Bridgewaters because of “the way he 

addressed [her] . . . in them.”

¶12 The State charged Bridgewaters with violating the ex 

parte order and the protective order in two separate criminal 

cases: one related to Bridgewaters’ physical presence at T.T.’s 

apartment complex, and the other related to the text messages he 

had sent her the following day. After a preliminary hearing in 

which both cases were heard together, the magistrate bound

Bridgewaters over to stand trial on both counts.

¶13 Bridgewaters moved to quash the bindover, arguing that 

the State had not presented evidence that he had been properly 

served with the protective order, and that the ex parte order had 

expired at the time of the alleged offenses because the Cohabitant

Abuse Act prohibits an ex parte order from being extended 

beyond 180 days. The district court denied the motion. It looked 

to the language of the Act, which states that “[i]f at that hearing 

[on the ex parte order] the court issues a protective order, the ex 

parte protective order remains in effect until service of process of 

the protective order is completed.” Id. § 78B-7-107(1)(d) (2017). 

The court rejected Bridgewaters’ statutory interpretation and 

concluded that the ex parte order remained in effect.

__________________________________________________________

4 At a different point in the preliminary hearing, Bridgewaters’ 

attorney asked T.T. if Bridgewaters had “told [her] he was just 

turning around,” to which she responded, “Yeah.” While this 

does not bear on the outcome, we include this information for the 

sake of accuracy and completeness.
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Opinion of the Court

5

¶14 Bridgewaters petitioned for permission to appeal from an 

interlocutory order, which the court of appeals granted. The court 

of appeals then consolidated the two cases for a single 

determination and certified the case to us to decide (1) “whether, 

pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-7-107, a properly served exparte protective order may extend beyond 180 days if a 

permanent protective order is subsequently issued but not 

properly served upon a respondent” and (2) “whether rule 4 of 

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs proper service of 

protective orders, as provided in Utah Code section 76-5-108, or 

whether rule 5 governs.”

¶15 We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-

102(3)(b).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶16 The two questions before us are whether the protective 

order was properly served as required by the Violation Statute,

UTAH CODE § 76-5-108 (2017), and whether the ex parte order 

remained in effect under the Cohabitant Abuse Act, id. §§ 78B-7-

101 to -116 (2017), on the dates of the alleged offenses. These are 

legal questions, which we review for correctness. See Keystone Ins. 

Agency, LLC v. Inside Ins., LLC, 2019 UT 20, ¶ 12, 445 P.3d 434 

(reviewing interpretation of rules of civil procedure for 

correctness); Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, 

¶ 12, 267 P.3d 863 (reviewing questions of statutory interpretation 

for correctness).

ANALYSIS

¶17 The State charged Bridgewaters with two counts of 

violating “a protective order or ex parte protective order issued to 

[him] under Utah Code 78B-7-1, [the] Cohabitant Abuse Act.” 

(Emphasis added.) The Cohabitant Abuse Act defines an “ex parte 

protective order” as “an order issued without notice to the 

defendant in accordance with this chapter.” UTAH CODE § 78B-7-

102(6) (2017). It defines a “protective order” as “an order issued 

pursuant to this chapter subsequent to a hearing on the petition, 

of which the petitioner and respondent have been given notice in 

accordance with this chapter.” Id. § 78B-7-102(10)(a) (2017).

¶18 The parties do not dispute that the Violation Statute 

requires the State to prove Bridgewaters was “properly served” 

with the orders he is alleged to have violated. See id. § 76-5-108(1)

(2017). Bridgewaters contends that proper service means service 
STATE v. BRIDGEWATERS

Opinion of the Court

6

of process under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 

which was not done here. And while he does not dispute that the 

ex parte order was properly served on him, he argues that it had 

expired by the time of the alleged offenses. He contends that the 

Cohabitant Abuse Act does not permit an ex parte order to remain 

in effect longer than 180 days from its issuance, regardless of the 

circumstances. See id. § 78B-7-107(1)(c) (2017).

¶19 We first analyze whether the protective order was 

properly served. Because we conclude it was not, we then 

determine whether the ex parte order remained in effect at the 

time of the alleged offense.

I. SERVICE OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER

¶20 Bridgewaters argues that the district court should have 

granted his motion to quash the bindover because the State did 

not produce evidence that he was properly served with the 

protective order he is charged with violating. We agree that the 

State was required to produce evidence of proper service, and that 

proper service in this context mandates service under rule 4. 

However, because this argument applies only to the protective 

order, not the ex parte order, our agreement with Bridgewaters 

here does not lead to a reversal of the magistrate’s decision on the 

motion to quash.5

¶21 As a threshold matter, proper service is an element of the 

charged offense, and therefore the State was required to produce 

evidence that Bridgewaters was properly served. At a preliminary 

hearing, the State must “establish probable cause” by 

“produc[ing] evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief 

that the defendant committed the charged crime.” State v. Virgin, 

2006 UT 29, ¶ 17, 137 P.3d 787. And proper service is an element 

of the crime charged here. The Violation Statute states that “[a]ny

person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective 

order” or “ex parte protective order . . . who intentionally or 

knowingly violates that order after having been properly served, is 

guilty of a class A misdemeanor.” UTAH CODE § 76-5-108(1) (2017)

(emphasis added).

__________________________________________________________

5 Bridgewaters does not dispute that he was properly served 

with the ex parte order. So this section deals only with service of 

the protective order.
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Opinion of the Court

7

¶22 Bridgewaters argues that proper service in this context 

means service under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Although this is a criminal case, which is generally governed by 

the procedural rules established in the Utah Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, the protective order Bridgewaters is charged with 

violating was issued in a civil proceeding under the Cohabitant 

Abuse Act. See UTAH CODE §§ 78B-7-101 to -116 (2017). When a 

plaintiff or petitioner commences a civil action, rule 4 generally 

governs how the plaintiff must serve the summons and complaint

on the defendant. Rule 4 requires service upon the defendant 

personally; leaving the documents at the defendant’s “dwelling 

house or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and 

discretion who resides there”; delivery of the documents to an 

authorized agent; or sending the documents by mail or 

commercial courier service, “provided the defendant signs a 

document indicating receipt.”6 UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(A), (2)(A). 

If the plaintiff cannot locate the person to be served, or if the 

person is avoiding service, rule 4 allows the plaintiff to move to 

serve the defendant by some other means.7 Id. 4(d)(5)(A).

¶23 The State counters that the Cohabitant Abuse Act does 

not require the protective order to be served in accordance with 

rule 4. It argues that the protective order was properly served 

when T.T.’s counsel mailed it to Bridgwaters’ last known address

in accordance with rule 5(b)(3)(C). Rule 5 governs the service of 

pleadings and papers after a civil action has been initiated.8 The 

__________________________________________________________

6 These methods of service apply unless the defendant is a 

“minor under 14 years old”; has been “judicially declared to be 

incapacitated, of unsound mind, or incapable of conducting the 

individual’s own affairs”; or is “incarcerated or committed at a 

facility operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions.” 

UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(B), (C), (D).

7 Specifically, alternative methods of service may be available 

“[i]f the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are 

unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, 

if service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under 

the circumstances, or if there is good cause to believe that the 

person to be served is avoiding service.” Id. 4(d)(5)(A).

8 Rule 5 permits service of a paper upon a party’s lawyer, or 

upon a party if he or she is unrepresented, through the following 

(Continued . . .)
STATE v. BRIDGEWATERS

Opinion of the Court

8

State reasons that rule 5 should have governed service of the 

protective order because the action had already commenced with 

the ex parte order, which had been personally served on 

Bridgewaters.

¶24 While the Violation Statute establishes that proper service 

is an element of the offense, the statute does not contain further 

guidance regarding what is meant by that phrase. So we turn to 

the civil Cohabitant Abuse Act, under which the underlying 

protective order was issued. Although the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure govern service of process, pleadings, and papers in 

civil cases, the Cohabitant Abuse Act sets forth some unique 

procedures that are specific to protective order proceedings, as 

described below. In light of this, the Act states, “Insofar as the 

provisions of this chapter are more specific than the Utah Rules of 

Civil Procedure, regarding protective orders, the provisions of 

this chapter govern.”9 UTAH CODE § 78B-7-106(12) (2017).

 

methods: emailing the paper to the email address provided by the 

person; mailing it to the person’s last known address; handing it 

to the person; leaving it at the person’s office with a person in 

charge, in a receptacle for deliveries, or in a conspicuous place; 

leaving it at the “person’s dwelling house or usual place of abode 

with a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there;” or 

any other method agreed to by the parties. Id. 5(b)(3)(B)–(G).

9 Article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution requires this 

court to “adopt rules of procedure . . . to be used in the courts of 

the state.” The legislature may amend those rules “upon a vote of 

two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature.” See 

also Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶ 17, 387 P.3d 1040. When the 

legislature enacts procedure, this provision contemplates that it 

must do so by amending our rules. Such an amendment “would 

need to contain a reference to the rule to be amended and a clear 

expression of the Legislature’s intent to modify our rules.” Id.

¶ 20.

While the Cohabitant Abuse Act contains unique procedural 

rules that purport to supersede the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 

where applicable, see UTAH CODE § 78B-7-106(12) (2017), the 

legislature did not enact those procedural provisions in a joint 

resolution that amended the corresponding rule of civil 

procedure. The State has not challenged the constitutionality of 

(Continued . . .)
Cite as: 2020 UT 32

Opinion of the Court

9

¶25 Protective order petitions do not commence with a 

summons and complaint. Compare id. § 78B-7-105 (2017)

(discussing forms for petitions and protective orders), with UTAH 

R. CIV. P. 3(a) (discussing commencement of a civil action by filing 

a complaint and serving a summons with a copy of the 

complaint). Rather, if a person files a petition for an order of 

protection, a court may immediately issue an ex parte protective 

order, without notice to the respondent or a hearing, “[i]f it 

appears from [the] petition . . . that domestic violence or abuse has 

occurred.” UTAH CODE § 78B-7-106(1) (2017).

¶26 If the court issues an ex parte protective order, it must 

schedule a hearing on the petition within twenty days of the 

issuance of the ex parte order.10 Id. § 78B-7-107(1)(a) (2017). If at 

the hearing the court does not issue a protective order, the ex 

parte order expires. Id. § 78B-7-107(1)(b) (2017). But if the court 

does issue a protective order and the respondent is not present at 

the hearing, “the ex parte protective order remains in effect until 

service of process of the protective order is completed.” Id. § 78B7-107(1)(d) (2017).

¶27 Relevant here, the Cohabitant Abuse Act specifies how a 

protective order issued after a hearing must be served. It states 

that “[f]ollowing the protective order hearing, the court shall . . . 

 

the Act’s procedural provisions, so we will not opine on that 

question. We note, however, the practical concern with the way in 

which section 78B-7-106(12) (2017) purports to take precedence 

over less specific rules. In protective order proceedings, litigants 

and courts are faced with two sets of procedural rules running on 

parallel tracks and are required to make judgment calls about 

which rule should apply in a given circumstance. Aside from any 

constitutional concerns, the legislature could increase clarity for 

the bar and the bench if it were to enact rule changes through joint 

resolutions that specifically amend the relevant rule of procedure.

10 The court may extend the ex parte order beyond twenty 

days only if the petitioner is unable to attend the hearing, the 

respondent has not been served, the respondent has had the 

opportunity to present a defense at the hearing, the respondent 

requests that the ex parte order be extended, or exigent 

circumstances exist. Id. § 78B7-107(1)(b) (2017).
STATE v. BRIDGEWATERS

Opinion of the Court

10

as soon as possible, deliver the order to the county sheriff for 

service of process.” Id. § 78B-7-106(4)(a) (2017) (emphasis added).

¶28 The Act’s use of the phrase “service of process” indicates

that the protective order must be served in accordance with rule 4. 

Most importantly, rule 4 explicitly governs service of process. See

UTAH R. CIV. P. 4 (titled “Process”). We have explained that 

“[s]ervice of process implements the procedural due process 

requirement that a defendant be informed of pending legal action 

and be provided with an opportunity to defend against the 

action.” Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Utah 1987). In this 

context, “process” means a “summons or writ, esp[ecially] to 

appear or respond in court.” Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(11th ed. 2019). And the phrase “service of process” is generally 

understood as service on a defendant of the documents that 

commence an action, pursuant to rule 4. See Weber County v. Ogden 

Trece, 2013 UT 62, ¶¶ 28, 45, 48, 64, 321 P.3d 1067.

¶29 In using the phrase “service of process,” the legislature 

referenced the procedure codified in rule 4. Accordingly, we 

conclude that even though the protective order does not initiate a 

protective order proceeding in the same way a summons and 

complaint commence other civil actions, the legislature intended a 

protective order to be served as if it were “process.” This 

implicates rule 4, not rule 5.11

__________________________________________________________

11 The State argues that it would be duplicative and 

unnecessary to require rule 4 service of the protective order where 

the ex parte order has already been personally served, as is the 

case here. But the language of the Act does not support that 

argument. It clearly states that a protective order issued after a 

hearing shall be delivered “to the county sheriff for service of 

process.” Id. § 78B-7-106(4)(a) (2017). The State does not identify 

statutory language modifying this requirement where the 

defendant was personally served with a previous ex parte order. 

Further, such dual service would not necessarily be duplicative 

and unnecessary, because both the ex parte order and the 

protective order can give rise to criminal and civil liability in the 

event of a violation. See id. § 78B-7-106(5)(a) (2017). And a 

protective order can include certain additional restrictions not 

present in the ex parte order. See id. § 78B-7-106(2)–(3) (2017). In 

this way, a protective order is substantively different than other 

(Continued . . .)
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Opinion of the Court

11

¶30 But unlike rule 4, which puts the onus of service on the 

plaintiff, the Cohabitant Abuse Act provides for rule 4 service by 

the sheriff. See UTAH CODE § 78B-7-106(4)(a) (2017). The Act 

directs the court to transmit the order to the sheriff “as soon as 

possible.” Id. It then specifies that the sheriff must provide 

“expedited service” for orders for protection, and that once the 

order has been served, the sheriff must transmit verification of 

service of process to the statewide domestic violence network. Id.

§ 78B-7-106(8)(a) (2017).

¶31 Here, for reasons that do not appear in the record, these 

procedures were not completed. The sheriff did not serve 

Bridgewaters with the protective order. Instead, T.T.’s counsel

mailed the protective order to Bridgewaters’ last known address.

¶32 Bridgewaters argues that this does not constitute proper 

service under the Violation Statute because it does not satisfy the 

requirements of rule 4. We agree. Because the Cohabitant Abuse 

Act requires service of process pursuant to rule 4, mailing the 

protective order to Bridgewaters’ last known address pursuant to 

rule 5 does not suffice.12 Accordingly, the protective order was not 

 

papers and pleadings that are typically served under rule 5. The 

State also raises a policy concern that a dual-service requirement 

could allow a defendant to avoid service of the protective order 

after being alerted to the proceeding by the ex parte order. We 

note that our reading of section 78B-7-107(1)(d) (2017), infra

¶¶ 33–40, alleviates this concern by holding that the ex parte 

order remains in effect until service of the protective order.

12 In his briefing, Bridgewaters occasionally appears to equate 

rule 4 service of process with personal service. But as 

Bridgewaters acknowledges, rule 4 includes service short of 

personal service, such as service by certified mail, or by 

alternative means in certain circumstances. UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2), 

(d)(5). We are not presented here with the question of whether a 

particular method of service under rule 4 meets constitutional 

procedural due process requirements in this context. We hold 

only that the Act requires service of the protective order under 

rule 4.
STATE v. BRIDGEWATERS

Opinion of the Court

12

properly served upon Bridgewaters as required by the Violation 

Statute.13

II. TIMEFRAME OF THE EX PARTE ORDER

¶33 Because we have determined that the protective order 

was not served in accordance with the Act, subsection 107(1)(d) 

applies. It states that “[i]f at [the] hearing the court issues a 

protective order, the ex parte protective order remains in effect 

until service of process of the protective order is completed.” UTAH 

CODE § 78B-7-107(1)(d) (2017) (emphasis added). Based on this 

provision, the magistrate concluded that the ex parte order was 

still in effect. This was correct.14

¶34 Bridgewaters does not dispute that the ex parte order 

was properly served on him. However, he argues that another 

__________________________________________________________

13 We flag another issue highlighted by these circumstances. 

The Act specifies that a protective order is to be served by the 

sheriff (or another law enforcement agency if it has contact with 

the respondent and the agency determines it is in the best 

interests of the petitioner to do so). See UTAH CODE § 78B-7-106(8)

(2017). Bridgewaters has not argued that the service here was 

improper because it was completed by counsel rather than the 

sheriff. However, it is arguable that the Cohabitant Abuse Act

requires not only rule 4 service, but rule 4 service by the entities it 

specifies—the sheriff or another law enforcement agency. See id.

§ 78B-7-106(12) (2017) (“Insofar as the provisions of this chapter 

are more specific than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 

regarding protective orders, the provisions of this chapter 

govern.”). As Bridgewaters has not made this argument, we do 

not resolve it. However, we note the issue in the event that the 

legislature wishes to provide clarification.

14 The State argues that because the magistrate based its 

bindover decision on subsection 107(1)(d), we should not reach 

the issue of whether the protective order was properly served, as 

we have done. See supra ¶¶ 20–32. But under the Cohabitant 

Abuse Act, the ex parte order remains in effect only if “service of 

process of the protective order” has not been “completed.” So it is 

necessary to first determine whether the protective order has been 

served in a particular case to ascertain whether subsection 

107(1)(d) is applicable.
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Opinion of the Court

13

provision of the Act limits the life of an ex parte order to 180 days, 

so it had expired by the time of the alleged violations. See id.

§ 78B-7-107(1)(c) (2017).

¶35 If a court issues an ex parte protective order, the Act 

requires the court to hold a hearing on the petition within twenty 

days. Id. § 78B-7-107(1)(a) (2017). “If at that hearing the court does 

not issue a protective order, the ex parte protective order shall 

expire, unless it is otherwise extended by the court.” Id. § 78B-7-

107(1)(b) (2017) (emphasis added). The Act then specifies that a

court may not extend an ex parte order beyond the twenty-day 

period unless:

(i) the petitioner is unable to be present at the 

hearing;

(ii) the respondent has not been served;

(iii) the respondent has had the opportunity to 

present a defense at the hearing;

(iv) the respondent requests that the ex parte order be 

extended; or

(v) exigent circumstances exist.

Id. The next subsection states, “Under no circumstances may an 

ex parte order be extended beyond 180 days from the date of 

initial issuance.” Id. § 78B-7-107(1)(c) (2017).

¶36 This is followed by subsection 107(1)(d), which states, “If 

at that hearing the court issues a protective order, the ex parte 

protective order remains in effect until service of process of the 

protective order is completed.”

¶37 Bridgewaters argues that the language in subsection 

107(1)(c) limits subsection 107(1)(d) and “shows a legislative 

intent for all ex parte protective orders issued pursuant to the Act 

to have a maximum effective life of 180 days.” Because the alleged 

violations occurred more than 180 days after the ex parte order 

was issued, Bridgewaters contends the ex parte order cannot form 

the basis of the criminal charge against him. But this 

interpretation of the statute is incorrect.

¶38 We agree with the district court that the 180-day limit on 

extensions of an ex parte order in subsection 107(1)(c) modifies the 

circumstances listed in subsection 107(1)(b) under which a court 

may extend the ex parte order beyond twenty days. Both 

subsections 107(1)(b) and 107(1)(c) use iterations of the word 

“extend” (i.e., “extended” and “[e]xtensions”). Id. § 78B-7-
STATE v. BRIDGEWATERS

Opinion of the Court

14

107(1)(b)–(c) (2017). This suggests that the two subsections should 

be read in conjunction with one another. Further, each of these 

subsections uses language suggestive of court action (i.e.,

“extended by the court” and “be extended”), id., but subsection 

107(1)(d) uses the more passive language of “remains in effect,” id.

§ 78B-7-107(1)(d) (2017). Based on the language of these 

subsections, it is apparent that subsection 107(1)(c) works with 

subsection 107(1)(b) to prohibit a court from extending an ex parte 

order beyond 180 days.

¶39 But while the 180-day limit applies to a court’s decision 

to extend an ex parte order before the court has held a hearing or 

before the court has issued a protective order, subsection 107(1)(d)

applies when a court has held a hearing and has decided to issue a 

protective order. See id. (“If at that hearing the court issues a 

protective order . . . .”). In this circumstance, the Act permits the 

ex parte order to remain in effect until “service of process of the 

protective order is completed.” Id. The 180-day time limit no 

longer applies.

¶40 Here, in the underlying civil protective order 

proceeding, the court issued an immediate ex parte order. 

Bridgewaters was personally served with the ex parte order, 

which notified him of the date of the hearing on the petition.15 The 

court held the hearing and determined that a protective order was 

warranted. However, the protective order issued by the court was 

not served in accordance with the Act. Under these circumstances, 

the magistrate correctly concluded that the ex parte order 

__________________________________________________________

15 We note that the ex parte order form contains potentially 

confusing language. It states, “This order lasts until the above 

hearing date; or later, if the court extends time for service.” 

Although we flag this language to acknowledge its potential for 

confusion, we also note the immediately preceding sentences: “Go 

to the court hearing on the date listed below. If you do not go to 

the hearing, the judge can make orders without hearing your 

side.” The order lists a hearing date and time, along with the 

commissioner’s name and the address and specific location of the 

hearing. While these sentences alleviate potential confusion, we 

flag this language for possible refinement in light of this opinion. 

We also note that Bridgewaters has not raised any legal challenge

in relation to this language.
Cite as: 2020 UT 32

Opinion of the Court

15

remained in effect at the time of the alleged violations. However, 

we clarify that the charges against Bridgewaters may be based 

only on a violation of the ex parte order, not the protective 

order.16

CONCLUSION

¶41 We conclude that the ex parte order remained in effect at 

the time of the alleged violations. Accordingly, to the extent that 

the charges against Bridgewaters are based on alleged violations 

of the ex parte order, we affirm.

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16 After the ex parte order had been personally served on 

Bridgewaters, notifying him of its terms and a scheduled hearing 

on the underlying petition at which he could be heard, the ex 

parte order was technically not ex parte any longer. See UTAH 

CODE § 78B-7-102(6) (2017) (defining “ex parte protective order” 

as “an order issued without notice to the defendant” (emphasis 

added)). However, we refer to it as the “ex parte order” 

throughout this opinion to distinguish it from the protective order

and to remain consistent with the terms used in the statute.