NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DANIEL D. MOLDOVAN, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

JO ANN LONG, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0470

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2022-001806

The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Ivan & Associates, P.C., Glendale

By Florin V. Ivan

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Roberts & Carver, PLLC, Prescott

By Paul L. Roberts, Jerry Carver

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Pioneer Title Agency, Inc.

FILED 05-30-2024
MOLDOVAN, et al. v. LONG, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Anni Hill Foster and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Elite Holdings, LLC (“Elite”) and its manager, Daniel D. 

Moldovan, appeal from the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of Pioneer Title Agency, Inc.’s (“Pioneer”). For the following reasons, 

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This litigation arose from Elite’s 2020 sale of a Paradise Valley 

property (“Property”) and centers on Pioneer’s role as escrow agent in that 

transaction, particularly as concerns its disclosure of a November 2007

deed. That deed (“Turquoise Deed”) reads, in relevant part: 

For the consideration of Ten Dollars, and other valuable 

considerations, I or we, JO ANN LONG, an unmarried 

woman, do/does hereby convey to JO ANN LONG, an 

unmarried woman as to and [sic] undivided 50% interest and 

TURQUOISE 5, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company as 

to an undivided 50% interest JO ANN LONG, an unmarried 

woman as Grantor, and ,[sic] the following real property 

situated in Maricopa, [sic] County, Arizona . . . . 

(Emphasis added.)

¶3 In late December 2007, other recorded warranty deeds show 

the Property transferred from Long to Moldovan and then from Moldovan 

to Elite. Capital Title Agency, Inc. (“Capital”), the escrow agent for the 2007 

conveyance to Moldovan, did not disclose the Turquoise Deed. Between 

2008 and 2010, several deeds were recorded conveying the property 

between Elite, Moldovan, Moldovan’s wife, and Long, ending with a 

conveyance to Elite in 2010. 

¶4 In 2020, Elite listed the Property for sale, received an offer, 

and executed a purchase contract and escrow agreement with the buyer.

The purchase contract named Pioneer as the escrow company for the 
MOLDOVAN, et al. v. LONG, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

transaction; stated the contract “shall be used as escrow instructions”; and 

directed Pioneer to “obtain and deliver . . . a Commitment for Title 

Insurance together with [ ] documents that will remain as exceptions to 

Buyer’s policy of Title Insurance . . . including but not limited to . . . deed 

restrictions.” The escrow agreement cross-referenced the purchase contract 

and instructed Pioneer to “close this transaction upon fulfillment of any 

additional escrow/title requirements.” Elite and the buyer set the close of 

escrow for August 17. 

¶5 On July 30, Pioneer obtained a commitment for title insurance

which required recording a deed from Turquoise 5, LLC (“Turquoise”) to 

Elite “to eliminate interest created in [the Turquoise Deed].” On August 3, 

Pioneer emailed Moldovan, attached the title report, and wrote, “[l]ooks 

like the property is also owned by Turquoise 5, LLC. We’ll need to have 

them sign a deed coming off title....(we’ll need proof of the authorized 

signer as well for Turquoise 5) and then have you both sign a deed to the 

buyer.” (Ellipses in original.) Elite asserts this date was the first time it 

learned of the Turquoise Deed. Four days later, Elite and the buyer agreed 

to set the closing date for August 7.

¶6 Shortly after, Elite agreed to pay Turquoise $39,953 in return 

for Turquoise recording a deed releasing its 50% interest in the property. 

Elite, however, indicated it was paying under protest and intended to 

litigate. 

¶7 In February 2022, Elite and Moldovan filed a complaint 

against Pioneer, Long, Turquoise, Capital, and several others. As to Pioneer, 

the complaint alleged “[a] very short time prior to closing . . . Pioneer 

suddenly refused to close escrow unless Turquoise executed an instrument 

conveying title in favor of [Elite]” and “Pioneer’s failure to proceed shortly 

prior to closing without consent of Turquoise despite the deficiencies in [the 

Turquoise Deed] was negligent or a breach of fiduciary duty.” The 

complaint made no other claims against Pioneer.

¶8 Pioneer answered, moved for summary judgment, and 

requested attorneys’ fees under the indemnification clause of the escrow 

agreement and Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) § 12-341.01. After 

considering Elite’s and Moldovan’s joint response, Pioneer’s reply, and oral 

argument, the court granted Pioneer’s motion for summary judgment and

awarded Pioneer attorneys’ fees and costs. The court found the complaint

did not allege Pioneer had breached any term of the purchase contract or 

escrow agreement, but instead argued, without legal support, “that 

Pioneer, as escrow agent, should have investigated the circumstances of the 
MOLDOVAN, et al. v. LONG, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

Turquoise deed, talked to Long and Capital Title, and evaluated 

Moldovan’s claim of adverse possession, or requested the buyer [to] close 

escrow despite the Turquoise deed.” 

¶9 We have jurisdiction over Elite’s and Moldovan’s timely 

appeal under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 

12-2101(A)(1), -2101(A).

DISCUSSION

I. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Granting Summary Judgment 

in Favor of Pioneer.

¶10 We review the superior court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. ADP, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 254 Ariz. 417, 421 ¶ 5 (App. 2023).

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the moving party shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Once the 

moving party satisfies its initial burden to show no genuine issue of 

material fact exists, the nonmoving party bears the burden to present 

evidence establishing disputed material facts. Jones v. Respect the Will of the 

People, 254 Ariz. 73, 82–83 ¶ 37 (App. 2022).

¶11 Negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims require 

plaintiffs to first prove the defendant owed a duty to conform to a certain 

standard of care. See BNCCORP, Inc. v. HUB Int’l Ltd., 243 Ariz. 1, 8 ¶ 30 

(App. 2017) (duty required for negligence claim); Maxfield v. Martin, 217 

Ariz. 312, 314 ¶ 12 (App. 2007) (escrow agent owes fiduciary duty to parties 

to the escrow agreement). The existence of a duty is a question of law that 

we review de novo. Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc., 243 Ariz. 560, 564 ¶ 7 (2018). 

¶12 An escrow agent’s duties to principals arise from the terms of 

their agreements. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. of Cal., 167 

Ariz. 114, 116 (App. 1991). In addition to any duties specified under terms 

of their contracts, agents owe two implicit duties to principals by virtue of

the escrow relationship: (1) “to comply strictly with the terms of the escrow 

agreement”; and (2) “to disclose facts that a reasonable escrow agent would 

perceive as evidence of fraud being committed on a party to the escrow.” 

Maxfield, 217 Ariz. at 314 ¶ 12. Escrow agents must conduct these duties 

with “scrupulous honesty, skill, and diligence,” id. (quoting Berry v. 

McLeod, 124 Ariz. 346, 351 (1979)), but need not investigate fraud, see Burkons 

v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of Cal., 168 Ariz. 345, 353 (1991)).
MOLDOVAN, et al. v. LONG, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

A. Pioneer Strictly Complied with the Purchase Contract and 

Escrow Agreement.

¶13 Here, the purchase contract and escrow agreement directed 

Pioneer to: (1) close escrow by a specified date “upon fulfillment of any 

additional escrow/title requirements”; and (2) “obtain and deliver to Buyer 

and Seller directly, . . . a Commitment for Title Insurance.” The commitment 

for title insurance required Elite to record a deed from Turquoise to 

eliminate any purported interest created by the Turquoise Deed. Pioneer 

complied with these duties by obtaining an offer for title insurance and 

notifying Elite of the necessary actions to secure insurance and close on 

time. See Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 167 Ariz. at 116 (escrow agents’ duties 

are confined to the terms of their agreements).

B. Pioneer Fulfilled any Disclosure Duty by Notifying Elite of 

the Turquoise Deed.

¶14 Elite argues that because the Turquoise Deed was “highly 

questionable, vague, and indefinite,” Pioneer should have recognized 

Elite’s sole ownership through adverse possession and also should have

reached out to Long to investigate the validity of the deed. Elite contends

the Turquoise Deed is “highly questionable, vague, and indefinite” because 

of: (1) the use of “and” instead of “an”; and (2) a repeated and misplaced 

phrase: “JO ANN LONG, an unmarried woman as Grantor, and ,”. See supra

¶ 2. Thus, Elite asserts Pioneer breached its duty because it assumed the 

Turquoise Deed was valid and required Elite to address it by obtaining a 

release of interest from Turquoise. Not so.

¶15 Even if an escrow agent suspects fraud, its only duty is to 

disclose the facts underlying that suspicion; it need not investigate or 

determine the validity of the fraud. See Maxfield, 217 Ariz. at 314 ¶ 12;

Burkons, 168 Ariz. at 353. Thus, regardless of whether such typos are 

sufficient indicia of fraud to invoke legal duties on the part of a reasonable 

escrow agent, that agent’s only duty would be to disclose the deed. Pioneer 

did just that. Therefore, Elite failed to show any evidence of a disputed 

material fact regarding its breach of fiduciary duties claim.

C. Pioneer Breached No Other Duties.

¶16 Elite further asserts Pioneer is liable for negligent 

misrepresentation, a particular type of negligence that requires proof that, 

in the course of business, the defendant provided false information to the 

plaintiff and failed to exercise reasonable care in communicating that

information. See Kuehn v. Stanley, 208 Ariz. 124, 127 ¶ 9 (App. 2004). 
MOLDOVAN, et al. v. LONG, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

¶17 Elite and Moldovan contend Pioneer falsely told Moldovan: 

“Looks like the property is also owned by Turquoise 5, LLC.” Based on that 

statement, they argue “Pioneer took the position that Turquoise 5 also 

owned the Property.” But whether Pioneer’s statement assumed 

Turquoise’s ownership is irrelevant to the purpose of that communication, 

which was to communicate the Turquoise Deed’s existence. Valid or not, 

the Turquoise Deed’s recordation clouded the Property’s title. Further, 

Pioneer’s statement was that it “looked like” Turquoise also owned the 

Property. In other words, Turquoise appeared to have an ownership interest. 

Given the reality of the Turquoise Deed’s existence in the Property’s chain 

of title, this statement is not false information. Thus, Elite and Moldovan 

failed to show any evidence of disputed material facts related to negligent 

misrepresentation.

¶18 Finally, Elite argues Pioneer “block[ed] the transaction” and 

“declare[d] the exclusive remedy.” It did neither. After receiving Pioneer’s 

email about the Turquoise Deed, Elite had nearly two weeks before the 

original closing date to investigate the deed, pursue its adverse possession 

claim, and/or renegotiate with the buyer. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 33-420(B) (“The 

owner or beneficial title holder of the real property may bring an action . . . 

to clear title to the real property as provided for in the rules of procedure 

for special actions.”). But none of these actions were Pioneer’s to pursue

and neither the purchase contract nor the escrow agreement imposed any 

such duties on it. Moreover, nothing in Pioneer’s statements prevented Elite 

or Moldovan from taking any of these actions—its directions related only 

to the actions needed to obtain title insurance by the specified closing date

and ensure a timely closing. Rather than pursue any other avenues, Elite 

chose to pay Turquoise and agreed to close escrow ten days before the 

original closing date. 

¶19 On this record, the court did not err by granting Pioneer’s 

motion for summary judgment.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Certifying Its

Judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

¶20 Generally, we review the court’s certification under Arizona 

Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(b) for an abuse of discretion. Kim v. 

Mansoori, 214 Ariz. 457, 459 ¶ 6 (App. 2007). The court abuses its discretion 

when its use of that discretion is “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on 

untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” Englert v. Carondelet Health 

Network, 199 Ariz. 21, 27 ¶ 14 (App. 2000) (quoting Torres v. N. Am. Van 

Lines, Inc., 135 Ariz. 35, 40 (App. 1982)).
MOLDOVAN, et al. v. LONG, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

¶21 “[T]he court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or 

more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly 

determines there is no just reason for delay and recites that judgment is 

entered under Rule 54(b).” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b). A separable claim need not 

be “entirely distinct from all the other claims in the action” or “arise from a 

different occurrence or transaction.” See Cont’l Cas. v. Superior Court, 130 

Ariz. 189, 191 (1981). Rather, a claim is separable from the other 

undetermined claims when “no appellate court would have to decide the 

same issues more than once even if there are subsequent appeals.” 

Dabrowski v. Bartlett, 246 Ariz. 504, 512 ¶ 14 (App. 2019) (quoting id.).

¶22 Elite argues allowing final judgment for Pioneer while Capital 

continues through litigation could result in “inconsistent and unjust 

outcomes” and Pioneer faces no hardship or injustice by remaining in the 

litigation. According to Elite, Capital wrongfully did not disclose the 

Turquoise Deed whereas Pioneer correctly disclosed the deed but went 

beyond its duties to cause harm. Elite contends because the escrow 

companies’ actions were “diametrically opposite,” judgment in favor of 

Pioneer “also means by necessary implication” that Capital is liable.

¶23 But the judgment in Pioneer’s favor does not preclude Elite

from pursuing its claims against any other defendants, including Capital. 

The superior court’s grant of Pioneer’s motion for summary judgment 

applies only to Pioneer’s actions under its agreements with Elite. Even 

assuming arguendo that Pioneer and Capital took opposite actions and 

positions, such a fact does not determine whether either company’s actions 

were proper or improper under their respective and distinct agreements.

An appeal on claims against Capital would not require us to revisit the 

same issues presented in this appeal. As discussed above, an escrow 

company’s duties stem directly from its contract with buyers and sellers. 

See Maxfield, 217 Ariz. at 314 ¶ 12.

¶24 We express no opinion about the virtue of Elite’s claims 

against Capital but conclude nothing in that case, if appealed, would 

require us to reconsider Pioneer’s actions or the contracts between Pioneer 

and Elite. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in certifying its 

judgment with 54(b) language.
MOLDOVAN, et al. v. LONG, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

III. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Awarding 

Pioneer its Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.

A. Elite’s and Moldovan’s Claims Arise out of Contract for the 

Purposes for A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

¶25 “In any contested action arising out of a contract, express or 

implied, the court may award the successful party reasonable attorney 

fees.” A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). We review the application of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 

de novo. Ray & Lindsay – 11, LLC v. Town of Gilbert, 252 Ariz. 147, 151 ¶ 22 

(App. 2021).

¶26 Whether a duty arises out of contract for purposes of A.R.S. 

§ 12-341.01 depends on whether the duty would exist without the contract. 

Caruthers v. Underhill, 230 Ariz. 513, 526 ¶ 57 (App. 2012). Recently, we 

considered whether negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against 

an escrow company arise out of contract. See Mago v. Ariz. Escrow & Fin. 

Corp., 1 CA-CV 22-0270, 2023 WL 2704099, *3 ¶¶ 20–23 (Ariz. App. Mar. 30, 

2023) (mem. decision). There, we reasoned—and reaffirm now—that A.R.S. 

§ 12-341.01 applies because an escrow company would have had no duty to 

act toward a buyer with “scrupulous honesty, skill, and diligence” but for 

an escrow agreement. Id. at *3 ¶¶ 22–23. We therefore hold that Elite’s and 

Moldovan’s claims arise out of contract for the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-

341.01.

¶27 Moldovan, however, claims A.R.S. § 12-341.01 is inapplicable 

because, unlike Elite, he does not have a contractual relationship with 

Pioneer. But the applicability of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 depends on the 

characteristics of the claims, not the relationship of the parties. See Rudinsky 

v. Harris, 231 Ariz. 95, 101–02 ¶¶ 27–30 (App. 2012) (applying A.R.S. § 12-

341.01 in contract claims asserted by a non-party to the contract). It is 

irrelevant that Moldovan was not a party to the contract because his claims, 

like Elite’s, would not exist but for the purchase contract and escrow 

agreement governing Pioneer’s escrow duties. Therefore, the court did not 

err in holding Moldovan liable for Pioneer’s fees.

¶28 Pioneer also requested its fees under the indemnification 

clause of the escrow agreement. Unlike fees awarded under A.R.S. § 12-

341.01, the court has no discretion to refuse to award fees under a 

contractual provision awarding attorneys’ fees and must enforce it 

according to its terms. Premier Consulting & Mgmt. Sols., LLC v. Peace Releaf 

Ctr. I, ___ Ariz. ___, ___ ¶ 70, ___ P.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 413467, at *12 ¶ 70 

(App. 2024). But because we find the court properly awarded fees under 
MOLDOVAN, et al. v. LONG, et al.

Decision of the Court

9

A.R.S. § 12-341.01, we need not address whether it was also obligated to do 

so under the indemnification clause. See Freeport McMoRan Corp. v. Langley 

Eden Farms, LLC, 228 Ariz. 474, 478 ¶ 15 (App. 2011) (“[W]e do not issue 

advisory opinions or decide unnecessary issues.”).

B. The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Determining the 

Amount of Attorneys’ Fees Awarded.

¶29 We review the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded for an 

abuse of discretion. Tucson Ests. Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Jenkins, 247 Ariz. 475, 

478 ¶ 8 (App. 2019). The court abuses its discretion if no evidence supports 

its conclusions or the reasons it provides are “clearly untenable, legally 

incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice.” Id. (quoting Charles I. Friedman, 

P.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 213 Ariz. 344, 350 ¶ 17 (App. 2006)). The court cannot 

award unreasonable fees under a contractual provision, id., and has broad 

discretion in determining the amount of fees awarded under A.R.S. § 12-

341.01(A), Vortex Corp. v. Denkewicz, 235 Ariz. 551, 562 ¶ 39 (App. 2014).

¶30 The fee application must indicate the date, attorney, and time 

spent for each legal service provided. Cooke v. Grebe, 245 Ariz. 367, 370 ¶ 11 

(App. 2018). The description of the service provided need only “contain 

sufficient detail so as to enable the court to assess the reasonableness of the 

time incurred.” Orfaly v. Tucson Symphony Soc’y, 209 Ariz. 260, 266 ¶ 23 

(App. 2004). For fee-paying clients, “the rate charged by the lawyer to the 

client is the best indication of what is reasonable under the circumstances 

of the particular case.” Schweiger v. China Doll Rest., Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 187–

88 (1983).

¶31 After the requesting party submits an affidavit detailing its 

fees, the opposing party bears the burden to show the fees are improper or 

unreasonable. In re Indenture of Tr. Dated January 13, 1964, 235 Ariz. 40, 52–

53 ¶ 47 (App. 2014). But the opposing party “does not meet his burden 

merely by asserting broad challenges to the application” and must do more 

than “simply state . . . that the hours claimed are excessive and the rates 

submitted too high.” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Corbin v. Tocco, 173 Ariz. 587, 

594 (App. 1992) (citation omitted)).

¶32 Appellants argue the $320-hourly rates for Pioneer’s 

attorneys are too high because they exceed the average rates for contract 

issues and civil litigation in this jurisdiction: according to Elite, $243 and 

$298 respectively. Pioneer’s attorneys submitted a fee application 

explaining that the lead attorney has practiced real-estate and business law 

in Arizona since 1988, and that the supporting attorney had “extensive 
MOLDOVAN, et al. v. LONG, et al.

Decision of the Court

10

experience” in the relevant areas for the case and has practiced law in 

Arizona since 1980. They assert that they are knowledgeable concerning fee 

rates normally charged in this jurisdiction and that their own rates are 

comparable. That Appellants dispute this assertion by invoking their fee 

software’s metrics reduces to an invitation to reweigh this evidence, which 

we will not do. See Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 286 ¶ 31 (App. 2019).

Instead, we presume that the court fully considered the relevant evidence 

in awarding fees, even if the order does not detail the relevant evidence 

considered. Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 55 ¶ 18 (App. 2004). On this 

record, we see no error in the court’s decision to not reduce the hourly rate.

¶33 Next, Appellants contend the number of hours worked was 

unreasonable because two partner-level attorneys, instead of a partner and 

associate, worked on the case, doing “overlapping work.” But the fee 

application shows one attorney worked 72.1 hours while the other worked 

7.6 hours—all of which he spent conferencing with the lead attorney or 

revising drafts. Appellants point to no specific entry showing duplicative 

work between the two attorneys, and we find none. On this record, 

Appellants have not shown an abuse of discretion.

¶34 Lastly, Appellants argue three sets of entries do not support 

the fee amount because they include insufficient descriptions, unrelated 

services, or are vague and ambiguous. As to the first set, Appellants

contend some entries fail to differentiate the time spent pertaining to which 

claim and which plaintiff. But Elite and Moldovan jointly sued Pioneer,

made the same claims, and were jointly and severally ordered to pay fees 

and costs—so it is reasonable that Pioneer’s attorneys would not have 

differentiated time between the two. Without identifying any specific entry, 

Appellants claim “block-billing . . . appears in many entries.” But though 

block-billing often is not the best of practices, it is not, per se, unreasonable

and Appellants do not specify and explain how any particular entry is 

unreasonable here. See RS Indus., Inc. v. Candrian, 240 Ariz. 132, 138 ¶ 21 

(App. 2016) (“Although the better practice may be to avoid block-billing 

when it can be done reasonably, . . . no Arizona authority holds that a court 

abuses its discretion by awarding fees that have been block-billed.”).

¶35 Appellants assert the second set of entries are “inapplicable 

or unrelated to defending the claims against Pioneer,” primarily because 

some of them pertain to co-defendants’ filings. Yet, as Pioneer points out, it 

would be helpful for Pioneer to understand all of Elite’s claims and the 

other defendants’ defenses to respond to the claims against it. Some of the 

entries highlighted by Elite relate to preparing a joint report and proposed 

scheduling order, which would necessarily require Pioneer’s attorneys 
MOLDOVAN, et al. v. LONG, et al.

Decision of the Court

11

communicate and understand the other defendants’ positions. Thus, 

without more, we cannot say the superior court abused its discretion in 

awarding time spent reviewing all the filings in the case.

¶36 Finally, Appellants argue the third set of entries are “vague or 

ambiguous” because, for example, some entries reference individuals

whose relation to the matter is unknown and attorney conferences do not 

include details. But Elite fails to identify even one individual whose relation 

to the matter is unknown and provides no other explanation why the 

attorney conferences were unreasonable. Without more, Appellants have 

not shown the superior court—which is in the best position to evaluate the 

reasonableness of the work required for the case—abused its discretion by 

granting Pioneer’s fee request. See Parker v. McNeill, 214 Ariz. 495, 499 ¶ 24 

(App. 2007).

CONCLUSION

¶37 We affirm.

¶38 Pioneer requests attorneys’ fees and costs under the 

indemnification clause of the terms and conditions of escrow and A.R.S. § 

12-341.01(A). We award Pioneer its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 

against Elite under the indemnification clause, and in our discretion,

against Moldovan under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, contingent upon timely 

compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.