[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-14486

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

BALDWIN MAYNARD BROWN, 

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A201-581-587

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14486

Before LUCK, ANDERSON, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Baldwin Maynard Brown, proceeding pro se, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision 

denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. After 

review, we deny in part and dismiss in part Brown’s petition.

I. IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS 

A. Underlying Removal Proceedings 

In November 2013, Brown, a native and citizen of Jamaica, 

entered the United States on a six-month tourist visa. In January 

2020, Brown was served with a notice to appear, which charged 

him with removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act 

(“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), for overstaying his 

visa. 

In March 2020, Brown applied for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against 

Torture (“CAT”). Brown claimed that he had experienced 

persecution as a member of a particular social group—his family. 

Brown also asserted that: (1) he was poisoned and abused in 

Jamaica; and (2) he had been a permanent resident in Canada but 

was prevented from returning to Canada by unknown individuals.

At the March 25, 2020 merits hearing, Brown testified that: 

(1) he could not return to Canada because he was “tortured,” and 

gases were pumped into his room; and (2) his family members in 

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21-14486 Opinion of the Court 3

Jamaica had abused and poisoned him. At the end of the March 25, 

2020 hearing, the IJ denied Brown’s asylum application.

Brown appealed to the BIA, asserting in his brief to the BIA 

that his sister had connections in the Jamaican government. On

January 28, 2021, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed 

his appeal. In February 2021, Brown filed a motion to reconsider 

with the BIA, which denied Brown’s motion on May 27, 2021.

B. July 2021 Motion to Reopen with the Immigration Court 

In July 2021, Brown filed a motion to reopen with the 

immigration court. Brown asserted that he had obtained 

documents corroborating his statements about the harms that he 

had suffered in Canada and his sister’s links to the Jamaican 

government.

In August 2021, the IJ denied Brown’s motion to reopen. 

The IJ determined that: (1) Brown’s motion to reopen was 

untimely; (2) the IJ lacked jurisdiction to consider Brown’s motion 

because the BIA, not the IJ, had issued the last decision in his case; 

(3) Brown’s motion did not contain new arguments that were not 

previously raised in his removal proceedings; and (4) the evidence 

Brown attached to his motion did not show his harm was, or would 

be, on account of a statutorily protected ground. The IJ found that 

sua sponte reopening was unwarranted because Brown had not 

demonstrated a “truly exceptional situation.”

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C. September 2021 Motion to Reopen with the BIA 

On September 2, 2021, Brown filed with the BIA a “motion 

to accept late-filed motion to reopen.” In this motion, Brown

asserted that: (1) he mistakenly filed his motion to reopen with the 

immigration court instead of the BIA, (2) he was unable to correct 

this mistake because he was held in quarantine from August 10

through August 26, 2021, and (3) he was unable to access the 

internet or a phone during that time. Brown attached a letter from 

a homeless shelter stating that he was a resident and was in 

quarantine from August 10 through August 26, at which time he 

tested negative for COVID-19.

That same day, Brown filed a motion to reopen. Brown’s 

motion stated that he had obtained new evidence regarding the 

harms he suffered and his sister’s connections to the Jamaican 

government. 

In support of his motion to reopen, Brown submitted several 

exhibits, which included, inter alia: (1) medical records that 

purportedly showed the injuries he suffered due to persecution by 

Canadians; (2) documents dated from 2012 to 2015 showing that 

his sister has held positions in the Jamaican government; and 

(3) photographs of his home into which gases were allegedly 

pumped. None of this evidence addressed materially changed 

country conditions in Jamaica or Canada following Brown’s March 

2020 merits hearing.

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The BIA denied the motion to reopen. The BIA concluded 

that his motion was untimely, as his motion was not filed within 

90 days of the BIA’s final administrative order. It determined that 

Brown had not shown that his motion fell within any exception to 

the time limitations or that equitable tolling of the deadline was 

warranted.

Next, the BIA concluded that sua sponte reopening was not 

appropriate. It observed that Brown’s claims were not supported 

by objective evidence showing that he would be eligible for any 

form of relief from removal, and that he had “received a full and 

fair hearing on his claims.”

II. DISCUSSION 

A. General Legal Principles

A nonimmigrant’s motion to reopen removal proceedings 

must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held 

if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or 

other evidentiary material.” INA § 240(c)(7)(A), (B), 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), (B).

Generally, a motion to reopen immigration proceedings 

must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final 

administrative order of removal.1 INA § 240(c)(7)(A), (C), 8 U.S.C. 

1 We review the denial of a motion to reopen a removal order for an abuse of 

discretion, and our review is limited to determining whether the BIA’s exercise 

of discretion was arbitrary and capricious. Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

881 F.3d 860, 872 (11th Cir. 2018).

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§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C). That 90-day deadline does not apply, 

however, to motions that seek asylum or withholding of removal 

based on changed country conditions in the noncitizen’s country 

of removal, “if such evidence is material and was not available and 

would not have been discovered or presented at the previous 

proceeding.” INA § 240(c)(7)(c)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Further, the 90-day requirement for filing a motion to 

reopen is subject to equitable tolling. Butka v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 827 

F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016). Equitable tolling “requires a 

showing that the litigant (1) has been pursuing his rights diligently, 

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” 

Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 872 (11th Cir. 

2018) (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). “Ignorance of the law 

usually is not a factor that can warrant equitable tolling.” 

Wakefield v. R.R. Retirement Bd., 131 F.3d 967, 970 (11th Cir. 

1997); see also Cadet v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 853 F.3d 1216, 1221–22 

(11th Cir. 2017) (observing that an attorney’s mistake in calculating 

a limitations period did not justify equitable tolling).

The BIA also may sua sponte grant a motion to reopen at 

any time if it finds that exceptional circumstances warrant 

reopening. Butka, 827 F.3d at 1283; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, 

the decision to reopen sua sponte is “committed to agency 

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discretion by law,” and we lack jurisdiction to review it. Lenis v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2008).2

To determine whether the agency displays reasoned

consideration, this Court “look[s] only to ensure that the IJ and the 

BIA considered the issues raised and announced their decisions in 

terms sufficient to enable review.” Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

779 F.3d 1284, 1302 (11th Cir. 2015). Although the IJ and the BIA 

must consider all of the evidence submitted, a decision that omits 

the discussion of certain pieces of evidence can nonetheless display 

reasoned consideration. Id.3

B. Brown’s Petition

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s 

motion to reopen as untimely. The 90-day period to file his motion 

to reopen began on January 28, 2021, when the BIA issued its final 

administrative removal order. See INA § 240(c)(7)(C), 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C). Consequently, Brown’s September 2021 motion 

to reopen (and even his July 2021 motion filed incorrectly with the 

immigration court) was filed several months after the 90-day 

deadline expired on April 28, 2021.

2This Court reviews de novo its subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for 

review. Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 765 (11th Cir. 2007).

3This Court reviews de novo legal issues, such as whether the agency failed to 

give reasoned consideration to an issue. Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792, 

799 (11th Cir. 2016).

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Brown argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the 

90-day deadline because (1) he misfiled the motion to reopen in the 

immigration court on July 27, 2021, and once he discovered his 

error, he could not correct it because he was quarantined due to a 

COVID-19 exposure and (2) he assumed the 90-day deadline ran 

from the date the BIA denied his motion for reconsideration. We 

disagree. First, Brown’s time in quarantine from August 10 

through August 26, 2021, did not prevent him from timely filing his 

motion to reopen because that motion was already several months 

late by August 10, 2021. Second, Brown’s mistaken belief about 

when he needed to file his motion to reopen does not support a 

claim of equitable tolling. See Wakefield, 131 F.3d at 970; Cadet, 

853 F.3d at 1221–22.

We also reject Brown’s contention that the BIA ignored his 

evidence submitted with his motion to reopen. To the extent 

Brown’s argument relates to the BIA’s decision declining to reopen 

his immigration proceedings pursuant to its sua sponte authority, 

we lack jurisdiction to review this argument. See Lenis, 525 F.3d 

at 1294.4 In any event, this argument lacks merit. The BIA was not 

4 Brown’s December 27, 2021 petition for review in this Court is timely only 

as to the BIA’s December 15, 2021 denial of his motion to reopen. Therefore, 

to the extent Brown’s petition claims legal error in the IJ’s initial March 25, 

2020 denial of his application for relief from removal, the BIA’s January 28, 

2021 dismissal of his appeal from that denial, and the BIA’s May 27, 2021 denial 

of his motion to reconsider, we lack jurisdiction to review these claims. See

INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (requiring the petition for review to be 

filed within thirty days after the date of the final order of removal); Dakane v. 

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required to expressly address each piece of Brown’s evidence in its 

decision, especially when none of this evidence addressed the 

timeliness of Brown’s motion to reopen or materially changed 

country conditions in Jamaica or Canada. Indeed, much of 

Brown’s evidence concerned harms that he allegedly suffered 

when he was living in the United States. Under these 

circumstances, we are satisfied that the BIA gave reasoned 

consideration to Brown’s motion and attached evidence and 

announced its decision sufficiently for meaningful appellate 

review. See Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1302.

For all these reasons, we dismiss Brown’s petition for lack of 

jurisdiction to the extent he claims the BIA abused its discretion in 

declining to sua sponte reopen his immigration proceedings. We 

deny his petition to the extent he claims the BIA committed legal 

error in denying his September 2021 motion to reopen.

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN 

PART.

U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1272 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the 

statutory period for filing a petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional 

and is not tolled by the filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider); Jaggernauth 

v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 1346, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 2005) (observing that the 

finality of a removal order is unaffected by the filing of a motion for 

reconsideration).

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