What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

August 2006

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls 

Persist Despite Initiatives to Address 

Gaps 

Highlights of GAO-06-894, a report to the 

Chairman, Committee on Foreign 

Relations, U.S. Senate 

GAO has reported in recent years 

on a number of human capital 

issues that have hampered the 

Department of State’s ability to 

carry out U.S. foreign policy 

priorities and objectives, 

particularly at posts central to the 

war on terror. In 2002, State 

implemented the Diplomatic

Readiness Initiative (DRI) to 

address shortfalls in the number 

and skills of State employees. This 

report discusses State’s progress in 

(1) addressing staffing shortfalls 

since the implementation of DRI 

and (2) filling gaps in the language

proficiency of foreign service 

officers and other staff. To 

accomplish these objectives, GAO 

analyzed staffing and language data

and met with State officials.

What GAO Recommends

To enhance staffing levels and 

skills at hardship posts as well as

language proficiency of foreign 

service staff, GAO is making five

recommendations to the Secretary 

of State in the areas of staffing and

assignment of foreign service staff, 

including using directed

assignments, as necessary, using a 

risk-based approach to fill critical

positions with fully qualified 

officers who have the skills and 

experience necessary to effectively

manage and supervise essential 

mission functions at hardship 

posts; and systematically

evaluating the effectiveness of

initiatives to reduce staffing and 

language gaps. State generally

agreed with our findings and 

recommendations. 

State has made progress in addressing staffing shortages since implementing 

the DRI. However, the initiative did not fully meet its goals, and mid-level 

vacancies remain a problem at many posts, including some critical to the 

war on terror. State implemented various incentives to attract more midlevel officers to these locations, including offering extra pay to officers who 

serve an additional year at certain posts. However, it has not evaluated the 

effectiveness of these incentives and continues to have difficulties attracting 

qualified applicants. Mid-level positions at many posts are staffed by junior 

officers who lack experience, have minimal guidance, and are not as wellequipped to handle crises as more seasoned officers. This experience gap 

can severely compromise the department’s readiness to carry out foreign 

policy objectives and execute critical post-level duties. 

State has made progress in increasing its foreign language capabilities, but 

serious language gaps remain. State initiated a number of efforts to improve 

its foreign language capabilities. However, it has not evaluated the 

effectiveness of these efforts, and it continues to experience difficulties 

filling its language-designated positions with language proficient staff. 

Almost one third of the staff in these positions do not meet the language 

requirements. The percentage is much higher at certain critical posts—for 

example, 60 percent in Sana’a, Yemen. Several factors—including the 

perception that spending too much time in one region may hinder officers’ 

and specialists’ promotion potential—may discourage employees from 

bidding on positions where they could enhance and maintain their language 

skills over time and limit State’s ability to take advantage of those skills and 

the investment it makes in training. Gaps in language proficiency can 

adversely impact State’s ability to communicate with foreign audiences and 

execute critical duties. 

38%

(66)

38%

(176)

25%

(393)

30%

(241)

62%

(106)

62%

(289) 75%

(1162)

70%

(571)

40%

60% (80)

(120)

40%

(25) 60%

(38)

17%

(5)

83%

(25)

Korean Arabic Chinese

Hard languages Superhard languages World languages

Japanese

Do not meet language requirements Meet language requirements

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-894.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford,

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

State Has Made Progress Addressing Staffing Shortfalls; but 

Critical Gaps Remain at Hardship Posts 11 

State Has Made Progress in Increasing Its Foreign Language 

Capabilities, but Significant Language Gaps Remain 23 

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 34 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37 

Appendix II Department of State Staffing 41 

Appendix III Foreign Language Proficiency at LanguageDesignated Positions 42 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 48 

GAO Comments 58 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 60

Tables 

Table 1: DRI Hiring Goals for Fiscal Year 2002 through Fiscal Year 

2004 5 

Table 2: Fiscal Year 2006 SND Posts 9 

Table 3: Foreign Service Generalists’ Surplus/(Deficit) across 

Career Tracks as of December 31, 2005 14 

Table 4: Proficiency and Language Capability Requirements 25 

Table 5: Percentage of Staff Filling Chinese and Arabic LanguageDesignated Positions Who Do Not Meet Proficiency 

Requirements, by Type of Position 27 

Page i GAO-06-894 Department of State
Table 6: State Department Worldwide Staffing by Position Type as 

of September 30, 2005 41 

Table 7: Location, Number of Language-Designated Positions, and 

Percent of Staff Filling the Positions Who Do Not Meet the 

Speaking and Reading Language Requirements 42 

Figures 

Figure 1: Assignment Process for FSOs 7 

Figure 2: Percentage of Language-Designated Positions by 

Category 10

Figure 3: Average Number of Bids by Hardship Differential for

Grades 2, 3, and 4 16 

Figure 4: Average Bids per Career Track by Hardship Differential 

for 2005 18 

Figure 5: Percentage of Staff Who Meet Requirements for World, 

Hard, and Superhard Languages as of October 2005 26 

Abbreviations 

DRI Diplomatic Readiness Initiative 

FSO Foreign Service Officer

HR/CDA Office of Career Development and Assignments 

SND Service Need Differential 

FSI Foreign Service Institute 

GEMS Global Employee Management System 

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Page ii GAO-06-894 Department of State
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

August 4, 2006 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Chairman 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

In recent years we have reported on a number of human capital issues that 

have hampered the Department of State’s (State) ability to carry out the 

President’s foreign policy priorities and objectives, particularly at posts 

central to the United States’ war on terror. For example, we reported that

State’s permanent positions were understaffed and that the impact of 

staffing shortfalls was felt most at hardship posts,1

 including posts in 

Africa and the Middle East and others of strategic importance to the 

United States, such as China and Russia. In particular, we found that 

State’s assignment system did not effectively meet the staffing needs of 

hardship posts and that State had difficulty filling positions there, 

particularly at the mid-levels. Where such staffing gaps existed, new or 

untenured officers worked well above their grade levels. We also reported 

that State had shortages in staff with critical foreign language skills, 

making it more difficult to combat international terrorism and resulting in 

less effective representation of U.S. interests overseas. To address 

shortfalls in the number and skills of foreign service officers (FSO), State 

implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), beginning in 2002, 

to hire, train, and deploy additional staff. 

This report discusses State’s progress in (1) addressing staffing shortfalls 

since the implementation of DRI, and (2) filling gaps in the language 

proficiency of FSOs and other staff. 

To assess State’s progress in eliminating staffing gaps, we examined 

documentation on State’s recruitment efforts, and analyzed staffing, 

vacancy, and assignment data. To assess State’s progress in filling gaps in

the language proficiency of FSOs and other staff, we analyzed language 

 1

State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S. government provides 

differential pay incentives—an additional 5 to 35 percent of base salary, depending on the

severity or difficulty of the conditions—to encourage employees to bid on assignments to 

these posts and to compensate them for the hardships they encounter. 

Page 1 GAO-06-894 Department of State
proficiency data for specific posts, specialties, and grades. We also 

compared the language proficiency of staff in language-designated 

positions with the requirements for the positions. We met with officials at

State’s Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Foreign

Service Institute, and six regional bureaus. To observe post staffing and 

language proficiency firsthand, we conducted fieldwork in Abuja and 

Lagos, Nigeria; Sana’a, Yemen; and Beijing, China. We selected the posts in 

(1) Nigeria because of the low number of staff applying for each position; 

(2) in Sana’a because of the low number of staff applying for each 

position, because it requires staff proficient in Arabic, which is a difficult 

to learn language, and because of Yemen’s importance to the war on 

terrorism; and (3) in Beijing because it requires staff proficient in Chinese, 

which is also a difficult language to learn, and because of its strategic 

importance to the United States. We performed our work from August 

2005 to May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Appendix I provides more information on our scope 

and methodology. 

State has made progress in addressing staffing shortages since 

implementing DRI; however, the initiative did not fully meet its goals, and 

mid-level vacancies remain a problem at critical posts. DRI was intended 

to hire enough additional staff to respond to emerging crises and to allow

staff time for critical job training. From 2002 to 2004, DRI enabled State to

hire more than 1,000 employees above attrition. However, according to 

State officials, most of this increase was absorbed by the demand for 

personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and thus the desired crises and training 

reserve was not achieved. Additionally, in an effort to address staffing 

shortfalls at historically hard to fill hardship posts, many of which are of 

significant strategic importance to the United States, State implemented 

various incentives, including offering extra pay to officers who serve an 

additional year at these posts and allowing employees to negotiate shorter 

tours of duty. More recently, State changed its promotion requirements to 

include service in a hardship post as a prerequisite for promotion to the 

senior foreign service. However, State has not evaluated the effectiveness 

of the incentives and hardship posts in Africa and the Middle East—

including those in countries important to the war on terror, as well as 

those in other countries of strategic interest—and continues to have 

difficulty attracting qualified applicants at the mid-level. Currently, midlevel positions at many posts are staffed by junior officers who lack 

experience and have minimal guidance. For example, at the time of our 

review, the mid-level consular manager positions in Shenyang and 

Chengdu, China—two locations with high incidence of visa fraud—were 

Results in Brief 

Page 2 GAO-06-894 Department of State
held by first tour junior officers. We observed similar shortages and 

employees above their grades in consular sections in China when we 

reported on staffing of hardship posts in 2002.

2

 This experience gap at 

critical posts can severely compromise the department’s diplomatic 

readiness and its ability to carry out its foreign policy objectives and 

execute critical post-level duties. We found that inexperienced officers are 

not as well-equipped to handle crises as more seasoned officers, and 

having inexperienced officers in key positions forces senior staff to devote

more time to overseeing operational matters and less to advancing U.S. 

international interests. State does not assign its limited number of midlevel employees to particular posts because of risk and priorities; but 

rather, it generally assigns them to posts for which they have expressed an 

interest. State has recently launched a new initiative to reallocate 

positions from Europe and Washington, D.C., to critical emerging areas 

such as Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. However, without 

directing employees, when necessary, to high priority assignments, it is 

unclear whether the reallocation of positions alone will ensure that they 

are filled. 

State has made progress in increasing its foreign language capabilities, but 

significant language gaps remain. State has increased the number of 

worldwide positions requiring language proficiency by 27 percent since 

2001. In addition, State has enhanced recruitment efforts to target 

individuals proficient in certain languages. However, State has not 

evaluated the effectiveness of these efforts, as we previously 

recommended.3

 For example, during the time of our review, State had not 

systematically analyzed available data to demonstrate whether the 

percentage of new hires with foreign language skills has increased since 

2003. State continues to have difficulties filling language-designated 

positions with language proficient staff. Almost 30 percent of the staff 

filling language-designated positions worldwide as of October 2005 did not 

meet the language proficiency requirements. The percentage was much 

higher at certain critical posts—for example, 59 percent in Cairo, Egypt; 

and 60 percent in Sana’a, Yemen. Moreover, some officers who did meet 

 2

GAO, State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System 

Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 18, 2002). 

3

GAO, State Department: Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies Overseas Being Met, but

Gaps Remain in Hard-to-Learn Languages, GAO-04-139, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 

2003) and GAO, Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing

and Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO-02-375 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002).

Page 3 GAO-06-894 Department of State
the proficiency requirements questioned whether the requirements are 

adequate. For example, embassy officials in Yemen and China stated that

the speaking and reading proficiency levels designated for their positions 

were not high enough and that staff in these positions were not sufficiently 

fluent to effectively perform their jobs. Additionally, several factors—

including the short length of some tours and the limitations on consecutive 

tours at the same post—may hinder FSOs’ ability to enhance and maintain

their language skills over time, as well as State’s ability to take advantage 

of those skills and the investment it makes in training. There is also a 

perception among some officers that State’s current assignment and 

promotion systems discourage officers from specializing in any particular

region, making the officers reluctant to apply to posts where they could 

utilize their language skills more frequently. State has not conducted the 

type of assessment that would prioritize the resources it devotes to 

specific languages based on risk and strategic interest in particular regions 

or countries. Nonetheless, gaps in language proficiency can adversely 

affect State’s diplomatic readiness and its ability to execute critical duties. 

For example, officials at one high visa fraud post stated that consular 

officers sometimes adjudicate visas without fully understanding 

everything the applicants tell them during the visa interview. Moreover, 

officers at some posts, including those in countries important to the war 

on terror, cannot communicate effectively with foreign audiences, 

hampering their ability to cultivate personal relationships and explain U.S. 

foreign policy. 

To enhance staffing levels and skills at hardship posts as well as the 

language proficiency of FSOs and other staff, this report recommends that 

the Secretary of State (1) consider using directed assignments, as 

necessary, using a risk-based approach, to fill critical positions with fully 

qualified officers who have the skills and experience necessary to 

effectively manage and supervise essential mission functions at hardship 

posts; (2) systematically evaluate the effectiveness of its incentive 

programs for hardship post assignments, establishing specific indicators of 

progress and adjusting the use of the incentives based on this analysis; (3) 

consider an assignment system that allows for longer tours, consecutive 

assignments in certain countries, and more regional specialization in 

certain areas, in order to hone officers’ skills in certain superhard 

languages and better leverage the investment State makes in language 

training; (4) systematically evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to 

improve the language proficiency of its FSOs and specialists, establishing 

specific indicators of progress in filling language gaps and adjusting its 

efforts accordingly; and (5) conduct a risk assessment of critical language 

needs in regions and countries of strategic importance, make realistic 

Page 4 GAO-06-894 Department of State
projections of the staff time and related training float necessary to 

adequately train personnel to meet those needs, and target its limited 

resources for language training, as needed, to fill these critical gaps. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of State generally 

concurred with the report’s observations, conclusions, and 

recommendations and described several initiatives that it believes address 

the recommendations. 

The Department of State is the lead agency in formulating and 

implementing U.S. foreign policy. The department represents the United 

States in about 172 countries, operating approximately 266 embassies, 

consulates, and other posts. During several years in the 1990s, State lost 

more staff than it hired, and the resultant shortfalls of staff and skills 

endangered diplomatic readiness. To address these shortfalls, in 2002, 

State implemented DRI, a $197 million effort designed to address a range 

of goals. In particular, the goals of DRI were to hire 1,1584

 new foreign and 

civil service employees over a 3-year period, support training 

opportunities for staff, enhance the department’s ability to respond to 

crises and emerging priorities overseas and at critical domestic locations, 

improve State’s hiring processes to recruit personnel from more diverse 

experiences and cultural backgrounds, and fill critical skill gaps. Table 1 

shows DRI hiring goals for fiscal year 2002 through fiscal 2004. 

Background 

Table 1: DRI Hiring Goals for Fiscal Year 2002 through Fiscal Year 2004 

Skill group FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 

Total FY 2002-

2004 goals

Foreign service generalist 204 206 138 548

Foreign service specialist 81 103 102 286

Total foreign service 285 309 240 834

Civil service 75 90 70 235

Total 360 399 310 1,069

Source: Department of State. 

As of October 2005, State had about 19,000 American employees, including

FSOs, also called generalists; foreign service specialists; and civil servants. 

FSO generalists help formulate and implement the foreign policy of the

 4

State received funding for 1,069 employees. 

Page 5 GAO-06-894 Department of State
United States and are grouped into five career tracks: management, 

consular, economic, political, and public diplomacy. Foreign service 

specialists provide support services at overseas posts worldwide or in 

Washington, D.C., and are grouped into seven major categories: 

administration, construction engineering, information technology, 

international information and English language programs, medical and

health, office management, and security. Civil service employees support 

the foreign policy mission from offices in Washington, D.C., and across the 

United States. 

About 65 percent of Foreign Service employees serve overseas. State’s 

policy is that foreign service employees are to be available for service 

worldwide. The process of assigning Foreign Service staff to their 

positions begins when the staff receive a list of upcoming vacancies for 

which they may compete. Staff then submit a list of positions for which 

they want to be considered, or “bids,” and consult with their career 

development officer. The process varies, depending on an officer’s grade 

and functional specialty. Figure 1 describes this process. 

Page 6 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Figure 1: Assignment Process for FSOs

Staff receive list of 

upcoming vacancies

Staff submit a list of positions

for which they want to be 

considered (bids) to the 

Office of Career Development 

and Assignments (HR/CDA)

HR/CDA

consults with 

bureaus

Special committee 

reviews and approves

policy-level positions

and Director General

a

makes selection 

HR/CDA

 convenes panels to 

finalize the 

assignments

HR/CDA

compiles and submits

bids to bureaus and 

overseas posts

Staff consult with 

bureaus and overseas

posts to market 

themselves for the 

position 

Entry Level Division of 

HR/CDA directs the 

assignments of the 

officers with little input 

from bureaus or 

overseas posts

Source: GAO. 

Senior Officers Mid-level Officers Junior Officers

a

The Director General is the official who heads State’s Bureau of Human Resources. 

About 64 percent of full-time FSOs serving overseas are assigned to 

hardship posts. State defines hardship posts as those locations where the 

U.S. government provides differential pay incentives—an additional 5 to 35 

percent of base pay, depending on the severity or difficult of the 

conditions—to encourage employees to bid on assignments at these posts 

and to compensate them for the hardships they encounter there. A 

hardship differential is established for a location only when that location

involves extraordinarily difficult living conditions, excessive physical 

hardship, or notably unhealthful conditions affecting the majority of 

Page 7 GAO-06-894 Department of State
employees officially stationed or detailed there. Living costs are not 

considered in differential determination.5

 Among the conditions that State 

considers in determining hardship pay are poor medical facilities, 

substandard schools for children, severe climate, high crime, political 

instability, physical isolation, and lack of spousal employment 

opportunities. Some hardship posts have greater difficulty in attracting 

qualified bidders than others. In response to severe staffing shortages at 

such posts, State established the Service Need Differential (SND) 

Program, which began with the 2001 summer assignments cycle. Under 

this program, an employee who accepts a 3-year assignment at a post 

designated for SND is eligible to receive an additional hardship differential 

over and above existing hardship differentials, equal to 15 percent of the 

employee’s base salary. However, chiefs of mission, principal officers, and 

deputy chiefs of mission are not eligible to receive SND regardless of the 

length of their tours. Entry-level employees on 2-year tours directed by the 

Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) are also 

ineligible for SND. State’s geographic bureaus initially identified the posts 

designated to offer SND in 2001 and may add or remove posts once per 

year. The program included 38 posts the first year. Table 2 lists the fiscal 

year 2006 SND posts. 

 5

State pays an additional 15 percent to 35 percent of salary for danger pay. The danger pay

allowance is designed to provide additional compensation above basic compensation to all

U.S. government civilian employees, including chiefs of mission, for service in foreign areas

where there exist conditions—such as civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or war—that

threaten physical harm or imminent danger to employees. These conditions do not include

acts characterized chiefly as economic crime. 

Page 8 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Table 2: Fiscal Year 2006 SND Posts 

Geographic regions 

Africa 

East Asia and

the Pacific 

Europe and 

Eurasia 

Near 

East 

South 

Asia 

Western

Hemisphere

Overseas posts

Abuja Chengdu Almaty Sana’a Dhaka Georgetown

Asmara Guangzhou Ashgabat Paramaribo 

Bamako Port Moresby Astana Port au 

Prince 

Bangui Shenyang Baku

Brazzaville Ulaanbaatar Bishkek

Conakry Chisinau

Cotonou Dushanbe

Djibouti Kiev

Freetown Minsk

Kigali Tashkent

Kinshasa Tbilisi

Lagos Tirana

Luanda Vladivostok

N’Djamena Yekaterinburg

Niamey Yerevan

Nouakchott

Ouagadougou

Yaoundé

Source: Department of State. 

In addition, in 2002, State established a working group to examine 

incentives to encourage bidding on hardship posts. The working group 

evaluated over 80 suggestions and ideas, such as requiring hardship 

service for promotion to the senior foreign service and allowing 

employees to negotiate shorter tours of duty. State implemented about 25 

of the suggestions. 

State’s Foreign Language 

Requirements 

As of October 2005, State had 3,267 positions—43 percent of all foreign 

service positions overseas—designated as requiring some level of foreign 

language proficiency. These positions span about 69 languages. State 

places the required languages into three categories based on the amount of

time it takes to learn them. 

Page 9 GAO-06-894 Department of State
• Category I languages are world languages, such as Spanish and French, 

which relate closely to English. Fifty-five percent of the languagedesignated positions require proficiency in a world language.

• Category II languages, such as Albanian or Urdu, are languages with 

significant linguistic or cultural differences from English. State refers to 

such languages as “hard” languages. Twenty-nine percent of the languagedesignated positions require proficiency in a hard language.

• Category III, the “superhard” languages, include Arabic and Chinese, and 

are exceptionally difficult for native English speakers to learn. Sixteen 

percent of the language-designated positions require proficiency in a 

superhard language. Figure 2 shows the percentage of language-designated

positions by category. 

Figure 2: Percentage of Language-Designated Positions by Category

Note: Other languages include German, Indonesian, Malay, Swahili, and Tetum, which take longer to

learn than category I languages, but less time than category II languages. 

Source: GAO analysis Department of State data.

Superhard language

Chinese

Japanese

Korean

Arabic

16% 

29% 

55% 

Hard language

Albanian

Amharic

Armenian

Azerbaijani

Bengali

Bosnian

Bulgarian

Burmese

Belarusian

Croatian

Czech

Estonian

Finnish

Georgian

Greek 

Hebrew

Hindi

Hungarian

Icelandic

Kazakh

Khmer

Kurdish

Kyrgyz

Lao

Latvian

Lithuanian

Macedonian

Malayalam

Mongolian

Nepali

Pashto

Persian (Dari, Farsi, 

Tajiki)

Polish

World language

Afrikaans

Danish

Dutch

French

Italian

Norwegian

Portuguese

Romanian

Spanish

Swedish

Russian

Serbian

Sinhala

Slovak

Slovenian

Tagalog

Tamil

Thai

Turkish

Turkmen

Ukrainian

Urdu

Uzbek

Vietnamese

Xhosa

Zulu

Page 10 GAO-06-894 Department of State
State’s philosophy is to hire officers with a wide range of skills that it 

believes are predictors of success in the foreign service. It does not hire 

exclusively for skills that State can train, such as foreign languages. As a 

result, State’s primary approach to meeting its language requirements is 

through language training, primarily through classes provided at its 

training arm, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). FSI’s School of Language 

Studies offers training in more than 60 languages. FSI also provides fulltime advance training in superhard languages at FSI field schools and 

programs overseas. In addition, overseas posts offer part-time language 

training through post language programs funded by the regional bureaus 

and their posts. Although State’s main emphasis is on enhancing its foreign 

language capability through training, it does have special mechanisms to 

recruit personnel with foreign language skills. For example, applicants 

who pass the oral assessment can raise their ranking by passing a language

test in any foreign language used by State. Additional credit is given to 

candidates who pass a test in languages that State has deemed as critical 

needs languages, including Arabic; Chinese; Korean; Russian; Turkic 

languages (Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkish, Turkmen, and Uzbek); 

Indic languages (Urdu, Hindi, Nepali, Bengali, Punjabi); and Iranian 

languages (Farsi/Persian, Tajiki, Pashto). Officers hired under this 

initiative must serve in a post that requires the language for which they

were recruited, for their first or second tour. 

Although DRI brought in a large number of new FSOs, it made minimal 

impact in addressing the staffing gaps at hardship posts, largely because of

new staffing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan. The department has 

implemented new incentives to address the chronic mid-level shortfalls at 

hardship posts; however, since implementing these incentives, State has 

not yet evaluated their effectiveness. In our review, we found that midlevel staffing gaps persist; bids for mid-level positions at hardship posts 

have not increased significantly since we reported in 2002; and positions 

normally held by mid-level officers are typically staffed by junior officers, 

sometimes on their first assignment, with few mid-level officers to provide 

supervision or guidance. Recently, State launched the Global

Repositioning Initiative, which will move positions from places like 

Europe and Washington D.C., to critical posts in areas such as Africa and 

the Middle East. However, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of 

this initiative, and State’s reluctance to direct its employees to serve in 

locations where they have not bid on, means that these redirected 

positions may remain vacant. 

State Has Made 

Progress Addressing 

Staffing Shortfalls; but 

Critical Gaps Remain 

at Hardship Posts 

Page 11 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Since 2002, under its DRI, State has increased its number of permanent 

positions and available staff worldwide for both the foreign and civil 

service, but these increases were largely offset by urgent staffing demands 

at critical posts in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2002, State 

had more than 500 unstaffed foreign service positions; in 2005, there were 

fewer than 200 such openings. However, the deficit in civil service staffing

has increased. In 2002, State had over 800 unfilled civil service positions; 

in 2005, there were over 1,700 such positions. State hired most of its new 

staff through DRI, bringing in more than 1,000 new employees above 

attrition, thus achieving its numerical hiring goals. These employees were 

hired primarily to allow staff time for critical job training—also referred to

as a “training float”—to staff overseas posts, and to be available to 

respond to new emerging priorities. However, according to State’s Human 

Resources officials, DRI’s goals became quickly outdated as new pressures 

resulted from staffing demands for Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the 

department has currently levied what it calls an “Iraq tax” on all its 

bureaus in order to support its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the 

past 2 years, bureaus have had to give up a total of 280 mid-level generalist 

and specialist positions for Iraq, and it is anticipated that another such tax 

will be imposed for 2007.

Beginning in 2001, in an effort to address the growing number of mid-level 

vacancies at hardship posts, State created a series of incentives—including 

extra pay and negotiated tour lengths—to attract mid-level employees to 

hardship posts around the world. For example, the SND Program offers 

employees an extra 15 percent pay for an additional year of service at the

most difficult to staff posts. While State has information on the number of 

officers actually enrolled in the program, it was not able to provide data on

the number of eligible officers who did not. State’s Director General and

officials from its HR/CDA said that State has not completed any formal 

evaluations of the incentives; instead, officials from the HR/CDA meet 

informally to discuss how well the incentives are working. Without formal 

evaluations, the department has not been able to systematically measure 

whether the extra hardship pay incentive has had a significant impact on 

staffing at hardship posts. Senior officials with whom we spoke in 

Washington, D.C., and FSOs at hardship posts had mixed views on 

whether the SND program has been effective. Some officers stated that the 

pay differential was indeed a factor in their decision to bid on the post. 

However, several former ambassadors and the Executive Director of the 

Bureau of African Affairs said they believe the program has not attracted 

additional bidders to African posts. These officials stated that the 

incentive has had limited impact at posts that were already offering a 25

State Has Made Progress 

in Decreasing Staffing 

Shortages but Has Not 

Fully Met Its Goals 

Effectiveness of Hardship 

Incentives Has Not Been 

Measured 

Page 12 GAO-06-894 Department of State
percent pay differential because the additional incentive is offset by the 

harsh conditions at such posts. 

While it may be too early too assess the effectiveness of more recently 

implemented initiatives, such as negotiated tour lengths, former and 

current ambassadors with whom we spoke stated that this initiative may 

not benefit posts. In particular, they noted that although negotiating a 

shorter tour length might initially attract bidders to hardship posts, such 

frequent rotations negatively affect a post’s ability to carry out the United 

States’ foreign policy goals. For example, according to State, the average

length of tours at posts in the Muslim world is about 22 percent shorter 

than those elsewhere. Noting the prevalence of 1-year tours in the Muslim 

world,6

 a senior official at State said that officers with shorter tours tend to 

produce less effective work than those with longer ones. 

In addition to incentives, State has implemented a new career 

development program—the Generalist Career Development Program—

that stipulates service at a hardship post as a requirement for 

consideration of promotion to the senior foreign service. The new 

requirements include a mandatory tour at a 15 percent differential or 

greater hardship post. Officials from HR/CDA stated that it was too early 

to tell whether this new requirement for promotion to the senior foreign 

service will be effective in attracting mid-level officers to hardship posts. 

State’s largest staffing gaps continue to be at mid-level. These and other 

gaps are exacerbated by continued low bidding for positions at hardship 

posts. Furthermore, many mid-level vacancies are filled by junior officers. 

Staff have cited family issues and the lack of locality pay comparable with 

what they would receive in Washington, D.C., as being among the key 

disincentives to bidding for hardship positions. 

As of December 2005, State had a combined deficit of 154 officers,7

 with 

the largest staffing deficits continuing to affect mid-level positions across 

Staffing Gaps for Key MidLevel Positions Persist; 

Positions Filled by Junior 

Officers in Stretch 

Positions 

Staffing Gaps at the Mid-Level 

Persist 

 6

According to State, the Muslim world is comprised of 58 countries and territories with 

significant Muslim populations, many of which are members of the Organization of the

Islamic Conference. These countries have a combined population of 1.5 billion people and 

are located in Africa, Asia, and Europe. 

7

The total deficit decreases to 82 when junior grade levels 05 and 06 positions are included. 

We did not include them in this calculation because we were told that these grades were

training positions that are not counted against the deficit. 

Page 13 GAO-06-894 Department of State
all career tracks. Table 3 shows staffing surpluses and deficits by career 

track for foreign service generalists as of December 31, 2005. 

Table 3: Foreign Service Generalists’ Surplus/(Deficit) across Career Tracks as of December 31, 2005 

Grade level Management Consular Economic Political

Public 

diplomacy 

Surplus/Deficit by

grade level

Total 

Surplus/Deficit

Senior level MC (10) 10 0 21 (8) 13 

OC (16) (3) 18 29 (20) 8 

 21 

Mid level 1 (19) 34 32 71 (93) 25 

2 (58) 31 17 36 (186) (160)

3 16 (143) (26) (56) 28 (181)

 (316)

Junior level 4 232 (580) 124 166 199 141 141 

Total 145.0 (651.0) 165.0 267.0 (80) (154.0)

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data. 

Note: Senior foreign service grades include minister counselor (MC) and counselor (OC). 

In 2003, State officials told us that it would take about 9 to 10 years to 

eliminate the mid-level gap.8

 Officials whom we met with more recently 

said it would take several years for DRI hiring to begin addressing the midlevel staffing shortages because the earliest DRI hires are just now being 

promoted to the mid-level. On average, it takes approximately 4.3 years for 

a junior officer to receive a promotion to the mid-level. According to 

State’s comments on this report, the department expects to eliminate midlevel deficits by 2010. 

Although bidding for hardship posts with the smallest pay differentials has 

increased slightly since we last reported on this issue in 2002,

9

 it remained 

about the same for posts with the highest differentials, such as those with 

20 and 25 percent. Figure 3 shows the average number of bids on FS-02,

FS-03, and tenured FS-04 mid-level positions at overseas posts by 

differential rate for the 2005 summer assignments cycle. Overall, posts in 

Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia continue to receive the lowest 

Mid-Level and Other Staffing 

Gaps Exacerbated by Low 

Bidding for Positions at 

Hardship Posts 

 8

GAO-04-139. 

9

GAO-02-626. 

Page 14 GAO-06-894 Department of State
number of bids, averaging about 4 or 5 bids per position, while posts in 

Europe and the Western Hemisphere receive the highest bids, averaging 15

and 17, respectively. For example, in 2005, posts in Bujumbura, Burundi; 

Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and Calcutta, India; 

received, on average, between zero and two bids per mid-level officer 

position. In addition, we found that in the 2005 assignments cycle, 104 midlevel positions had no bidders at all, including 67 positions in Africa and 

the Middle East. 

Page 15 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Figure 3: Average Number of Bids by Hardship Differential for Grades 2, 3, and 4 

0 5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Hardship differential percents

Bids/position

Median = 21.97

Wellington

Naha Dubai

Cologne, Thessaloniki

Naples, Osaka-Kobe

Vienna, Tokyo

Panama, Helsinki

Budapest, Reykjavik

Hamburg, Berlin

Santiago, Paris Rennes, Montevideo 

Montreal, Rome

Luxembourg, The Hague Prague, Geneva Singapore, Stockholm

Barcelona, Buenos Aires Canberra OSCE Vienna

Toronto

Amsterdam, Ljubljana

Dusseldorf

Madrid

Oced Paris

Dublin

Bern 

Ottawa

Johannesburg, Nogales

Seoul, Port Louis Matamoros

Abu Dhabi

Pretoria

Zagreb, Warsaw

Gaberone, San Jose

Guadalajara Windhoek, Athens

Bridgetown, Vilnius Hong Kong

London

Median = 13.25

Page 16 GAO-06-894 Department of State
10 15 20 25

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

Chiang Mai, AIT Taipei

Mbabane, Ciudad Juarez Manama Brasilia, Tel Aviv

Tunis, Kingston

Ankara, Durban

Tallinn, Capetown

Valletta

Rio de Janeiro

Bangkok, Riga

Kuala Lumpur

Bratislava, Guatemala City

Krakow, San Salvador

Doha, Amman Managua, Libreville

Sarajevo

Kuwait, Cairo

Beijing, Dakar Majuro, Guayaquil

Lusaka, Bucharest

Belgrade

Quito, Suva Belize City

Istanbul, Lima

Tegucigalpa

Caracas

Mexico City

Banja Luka Sana’a

Tripoli, Ho Chi Minh City

Podgorica, Banjul

Islamabad, Lilongwe

Chennai, Damascus New Delhi, Moscow Jakarta

Manila, Santo Domingo

Skopje, Havana

Colombo, Sofia La Paz, St Petersburg

Monrovia, N’djamena, Conakry

Djibouti, Freetown, Shenyang

Kinshasa, Riyadh, Khartoum

Calcutta, Kigali, Tirana Yaoundé, Bamako

Abidjan, Dhaka, Karachi

Yerevan, Port-au-Prince

Prisina, Baku, Tbilisi. Kiev

Antananarivo, Maputo

Tashkent, Addis Ababa

Nairobi, Kampala

Phnom Penh, Dar-es-Salaam

Paramaribo, Vientiane

Guangzhou, Lahore, Kathmandu

Bujumbura, Abuja, Astana, Vladivostok

Median = 9.67

Median = 6.00

Median = 3.22

Median = 12.40

Note: The line in the graph shows the median of the average number of bids for each differential rate. 

Also, only selected posts are named. 

Consular positions in the posts with the highest hardship differential (25 

percent) continued to receive some of the lowest number of bids in 2005.

As shown in figure 4, consular positions at 25 percent differential posts 

received, on average, only 2.5 bids per position compared with 18 for 

nonhardship posts. Low numbers of bids at hardship posts have resulted 

in positions remaining vacant for long periods of time. For example, a 

senior consular position in Lagos, Nigeria, has been vacant since July 2001, 

and a consular chief position in Shenyang was vacant from December 2003

until August 2004. Such gaps negatively impact a post’s ability to carry out

its mission. 

Page 17 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Figure 4: Average Bids per Career Track by Hardship Differential for 2005 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

Hardship differential percents

0 

5 

10 

15 

20 

25 

Public diplomacy 

Political 

Economic 

Consular 

Admin 

0 5 10 15 20 25 

Bids/position 

In 2005 consular and public diplomacy positions were the hardest to fill, 

with 91 percent of the vacancies in these two tracks at the mid-level.

Although the department has seen an increase in spending on U.S. public 

diplomacy programs, several embassy officials stated that they do not 

have the capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. Moreover, these 

staffing gaps also limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers 

receive, because many officers are sent to fill a position quickly and never 

benefit from full training, ultimately limiting the success of their public 

diplomacy outreach efforts. Further, due to staffing shortages in consular 

sections around the world, there are fewer staff to implement the new 

interview requirements and screening procedures for visas, resulting in 

extensive wait times for applicants for visa interviews at consular posts 

overseas. From November 2004 through May 2005, there were 63 posts 

reporting wait times of 30 or more days on a given month, signaling a 

significant resource problem for State. 

Page 18 GAO-06-894 Department of State
In order to fill vacancies, primarily at hardship posts, State sometimes 

allows stretch assignments, which enable staff to bid for a position at 

either a higher grade than their current grade level (called an “upstretch”) 

or a lower grade (a “downstretch”). Often, upstretch assignments are 

offered as a reward and career-enhancing opportunity for staff who have 

demonstrated outstanding performance, and many officers successfully 

fulfill the duties requested of the higher grade level.10 However, a 2004 

report by State’s Inspector General11 found that in many African posts, for 

example, there were significant deficiencies in the ability, training, and 

experience of FSOs serving in upstretch assignments. 

Many Mid-Level Positions Are 

Staffed by Junior Officers 

At posts we visited in early 2006, we found staffing conditions similar to 

those we reported on in 2002, when we found experience gaps and other

staffing shortfalls at hardship posts.12 For example, in 2002, we reported 

that, in the 10-officer consular section in Lagos, only the consul had more 

than one tour of consular experience. In addition, we reported that the 

office had many unfilled mid-level positions, many of which were at the 

time being staffed by first-tour junior officers and civil service employees 

who had never served overseas. In our most recent visit, we found that the 

consulate in Lagos was staffed by a mix of officers, including numerous 

junior officers in stretch positions. 

Moreover, many officers in stretch positions at hardship posts continue to 

lack the managerial experience or supervisory guidance needed to 

effectively perform their job-duties. Junior officers in consular sections at 

hardship posts consistently reported that they lack management guidance. 

In addition, junior officers in stretch assignments at the various posts we 

visited stated that, without mid-level officers to guide them, many times 

they can only turn to senior management, including the ambassador, for 

assistance. According to a 2004 State Inspector General report, more time 

is spent by senior staff, including ambassadors, on operational matters, 

and less time is devoted to overall planning, policy, and coordination than 

 10According to State the rationale for stretch assignments (upstretches and downstretches) 

is both system- and employee-driven. Upstretches can be career enhancing, or 

accommodate family needs or staffing gaps. Downstretches may happen to accommodate 

family needs or be the end result after an employee is promoted when in an at-grade

position. 

11Strengthening Leadership and Staffing at African Hardship Posts, U.S. Department of 

State, Office of Inspector General, Memorandum Report ISP-I-04-54, July 2004. 

12GAO-02-626. 

Page 19 GAO-06-894 Department of State
should be the case.13 Many junior officers also stated that, although they

were filling stretch positions at the mid-level, they were not allowed to 

receive management training from State due to their lower grade status. 

According to one officer, she requested management training to help her 

manage staff in accordance with her role as acting chief of a key section of

the embassy, but was denied the opportunity because, despite her current

assignment, she was not a tenured mid-level officer. 

Senior management at posts we visited shared some of these concerns. A 

former Deputy Chief of Mission in Nigeria stated that it is extremely 

difficult for junior officers to work in stretch assignments when there are 

few mid-level officers to guide them. Ambassadors at these posts also 

stated that, although many junior officers entering the foreign service are 

highly qualified, they did not have sufficient training to handle some of the 

high stress situations they encounter and often end up making mistakes. 

For example, according to the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria—the third 

largest mission in Africa with nearly 800 employees—the embassy 

presently had only three senior officers at the time of our visit, and public

affairs were handled entirely by first tour junior officers. Also, according 

to U.S. officials in Beijing, the mid-level consular manager positions in 

Shenyang and Chengdu, China—two locations with high incidence of visa 

fraud—were held by first tour junior officers at the time of our visit. We 

observed similar shortages and employees staffed above their grades in 

consular sections in Africa and China when we reported on staffing of 

hardship posts in 2002. Consular chiefs in Beijing raised concerns about 

the lack of management guidance and supervision available to junior 

officers due to the lack of mid-level officers at constituent posts in China. 

One consular chief stated that the lack of adequate supervision at 

constituent posts requires that he or his deputy frequently travel to the 

posts outside of Beijing to provide guidance to the junior officers. Another 

was concerned that her caseload limited the amount of guidance she was 

able to give to her constituent posts. 

Other areas, such as regional security, are also compromised as a result of

mid-level vacancies. Security officers at one hardship post told us that, 

without mid-level staff, they sometimes lack the resources to adequately 

perform basic duties, such as accompanying the ambassador on 

diplomatic travel or, as was the case during a recent visit by the First Lady, 

providing adequate personnel to accompany her staff. Former 

 13ISP-I-04-54. 

Page 20 GAO-06-894 Department of State
ambassadors with whom we spoke expressed serious concerns about the 

department’s diplomatic readiness and conveyed their belief that a post’s 

ability to carry out critical duties is significantly compromised when the 

proper staffing levels, and particularly well-trained officers, are not in 

place. 

Many of the overseas staff we whom we met cited family considerations—

child-related and spousal employment concerns, in particular—as the 

greatest obstacle to attracting mid-level officers to hardship posts. The 

spouses and other household members of FSOs who responded to a State 

internet survey14 listed spousal employment as the primary reason why 

officers do not bid for hardship posts. In many hardship posts, it is 

extremely difficult for spouses to find employment, particularly in China 

and most of South Asia, where bilateral work agreements are not in place.

State officials told us that the department has recently initiated new 

programs to mitigate this problem, such as providing fellowships for 

spouses to continue their professional development, offering online 

courses or entrepreneurial workshops to encourage small business 

development, or training spouses to find employment in the local 

economy. The department plans to expand these programs in the future 

with a particular emphasis on spouses in hardship locations.

Family Issues and Locality Pay 

Discourage Bidding at Hardship 

Posts 

The survey respondents also listed child-related issues as a major factor in

the officers not bidding for positions. A particular concern is that many 

hardship posts do not have appropriate schooling for American children,

thus limiting options for employees with families. In Sana’a, Yemen, for 

example, post positions are only available to staff with children under age 

5 or over 21 due to a lack of schools. This has been an outstanding 

concern for the Sana’a post, and post officials told us that post 

management is heavily engaged in trying to find a solution to the problem. 

In addition, the number of unaccompanied posts15 has increased in recent 

years, making it difficult for employees with families to bid on them. As of 

April 2006, there were 21 unaccompanied and limited accompanied posts 

and more than 700 positions at such posts. Moreover, State officials said 

 14State conducted an internet survey of foreign service spouses and members of household 

from January 30 to February 21, 2006. The survey has a 35 percent response rate (3,258 

responses) and thus cannot be generalized. 

15Unaccompanied posts are posts where family members may not accompany an officer. 

Limited accompanied posts are posts that are restricted to adult dependents and minors 

less than 5 years of age. 

Page 21 GAO-06-894 Department of State
that this number will probably increase due to increasing security 

concerns around the world. 

Lastly, officers and State personnel we interviewed both, at hardship posts 

and in Washington, D.C., consistently cited the lack of locality pay16 as a 

deterrent to bidding at hardship positions. In 2002, we reported that the 

differences in the statutes governing domestic locality pay and differential 

pay for overseas service had created a gap in compensation penalizing 

overseas employees.17 This gap grows every year, as domestic locality pay 

rates increase, creating an ever-increasing financial disincentive for 

overseas employees to bid on hardship posts. After accounting for 

domestic locality pay for Washington, D.C., a 25 percent hardship post 

differential is eroded to approximately 8 percent. As estimated in our 2002 

report, differential pay incentives for the 15 percent differential hardship 

posts are now less than the locality pay for Washington, D.C., which is 

currently 17 percent and can be expected to soon surpass the 20 percent 

differential hardship posts. Currently, there is legislation pending in 

Congress to alleviate the locality pay disparity by providing FSOs 

stationed outside the United States with locality-based pay equal to that of

Washington, D.C.18 However, there has been no final action in Congress 

regarding this legislation since 2005.

State Reluctant to Use 

Directed Assignments 

Despite chronic staffing shortages at hardship posts, especially at the midlevel, State is reluctant to use its authority to direct assignments based on

risk and priorities at particular posts; rather, it assigns employees to posts

for which they have expressed interest. According to State officials, State

has rarely directed FSOs to serve in locations for which they have not bid

on a position, including hardship posts or locations of strategic 

importance to the United States, due to concerns of an increase in poor 

morale or lower productivity. With continuing budgetary limitations, it will 

be increasingly difficult for the department to increase financial incentives 

for hardship posts; moreover, given the lack of an increase in bidders, the

effectiveness of such incentives is questionable. State’s Global

 16Locality pay is a salary comparability benefit to attract workers in the continental United 

States to the federal government versus the private sector. Currently locality pay for 

Washington, D.C., is 17 percent. 

17GAO-02-626. 

18Section 305, H.R. 2601 (109th Cong., 1st Sess.), “Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 

Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007.” 

Page 22 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Repositioning Initiative, announced in January 2006, will move positions 

from Washington and Europe to critical posts in Africa, South Asia, and 

the Middle East. However, there is no guarantee that these positions will 

be filled because bidding will continue to be on a voluntary basis. 

Throughout the past decade, some State officials have urged the 

department to employ a more aggressive strategy to ensure that employees 

serve where their skills are needed most. Additionally, despite concerns of 

an increase in low morale, several officials whom we spoke with at 

hardship posts believe that in order to effectively address these persistent 

staffing gaps, State needs to direct assignments more often, particularly to 

hard-to-fill posts. 

State has made several efforts in recent years to enhance its foreign 

language capabilities, in particular by increasing the number of its 

language-designated positions and its efforts to recruit and hire staff with 

foreign language skills, as well as by creating additional language 

requirements and incentives for staff. However, significant foreign 

language gaps remain, and State has not assessed the effectiveness of its 

efforts to increase its language capabilities. 

State has made several efforts to improve its foreign language capabilities, 

including creating additional language-designated positions and enhancing 

recruiting efforts. State has increased the number of language-designated 

positions by 27 percent. In 2001, there were 2,581 (29 percent) of all 

foreign service positions that required some level of foreign language

proficiency. As of October 2005, there were 3,267 positions (43 percent) 

that required some level of foreign language proficiency. These positions 

span about 69 languages. State has also enhanced its efforts to recruit and 

hire FSOs with language skills. For example, State’s Office of Recruitment 

has targeted its recruiting outreach efforts to universities with strong 

language programs and conferences of language professionals, as well as 

associations and professional organizations, such as the Arab American 

Institute, that have members already fluent in critical needs languages. In

addition, State offers bonus points on the foreign service exam to 

candidates who demonstrate proficiency in critical needs languages. State 

then requires these officers to serve in positions that will employ their 

language skills during their first or second assignment. As of April, 2006,

almost 80 percent of entry level officers who received additional exam 

points for their critical language skills were assigned to locations that 

could utilize their language within their first or second tour. 

State Has Made 

Progress in Increasing 

Its Foreign Language 

Capabilities, but 

Significant Language 

Gaps Remain 

State Has Increased the 

Number of LanguageDesignated Positions and 

Made Efforts to Enhance 

Foreign Language 

Capabilities 

Page 23 GAO-06-894 Department of State
State has also implemented career development criteria, effective January 

1, 2005, that require, among other things, foreign language proficiency as a 

prerequisite for consideration for promotion. Specifically, in order to 

become eligible for promotion to the senior foreign service, generalists 

must demonstrate the ability to read and write a foreign language at a 

general professional level. State’s career development criteria for some 

specialists also contain language proficiency requirements. In addition to 

these requirements, State has developed financial incentives for officers 

with certain proficiency levels in critical languages. Moreover, State has 

enhanced its overseas language programs through various initiatives, 

including expanded use of overseas language schools and post language 

programs, as well as by increasing the number of weeks of training offered 

in certain critical languages and by providing language immersion courses 

for officers transitioning to new posts. 

State Continues to Have 

Shortages of Staff 

Proficient in Foreign 

Languages 

Despite its efforts to enhance the language capabilities of its staff, State 

continues to fill language-designated positions with staff who do not meet 

the proficiency requirements. Even some officers who met the 

requirements told us their language ability was not adequate for them to 

effectively perform their job-related responsibilities. Furthermore, some 

officers believe that State’s assignment and promotion system hindered 

their ability to maintain their language skills over time. Officials whom we 

met with at several posts described a number of situations in which the 

posts’ operations were adversely effected by their lack of language 

proficiency. State has not assessed the effectiveness of its efforts to 

increase its language capabilities or conducted a risk assessment to 

prioritize the allocation of foreign language resources. 

State assesses language proficiency based on a scale established by the 

federal Interagency Language Roundtable. The scale has six levels—0 to 

5—with 5 being the most proficient (see table 4). Proficiency requirements 

for language-designated positions at State tend to congregate at the second

and third levels of the scale. When proficiency substantially exceeds one

base skill level yet does not fully meet the criteria for the next base level, a 

plus sign (+) designation may be added. 

Some Staff Do Not Meet the 

Language Requirements for 

Their Positions 

Page 24 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Table 4: Proficiency and Language Capability Requirements 

Proficiency level Language capability requirements 

0 – None No practical capability in the language. 

1 – Elementary Sufficient capability to satisfy basic survival needs and 

minimum courtesy and travel requirements. 

2 – Limited working Sufficient capability to meet routine social demands and 

limited job requirements. Can deal with concrete topics in 

past, present, and future tense. 

3 – General professional Able to use the language with sufficient ability to participate 

in most formal and informal discussion on practical, social, 

and professional topics. Can conceptualize and 

hypothesize. 

4 – Advanced professional Able to use the language fluently and accurately in all 

levels normally pertinent to professional needs. Has range 

of language skills necessary for persuasion, negotiation, 

and counseling.

5 – Functionally native Able to use the language at a functional level equivalent to 

a highly articulate, well-educated native speaker. 

Source: Compiled by GAO from Interagency Language Roundtable documents. 

We compared the language proficiency of staff in all language-designated 

positions as of October 2005 with the requirements for the positions, and 

our analysis showed that 71 percent of all worldwide language-designated 

positions were filled by individuals who met the position’s proficiency 

requirements, while 29 percent of the positions were not.19 Language 

deficiencies exist world-wide, but were among the greatest in the Middle

East, a region of great importance to the war on terror, where 37 percent 

of all language-designated positions were filled by staff without the 

language skills required of their positions. The skills gap was even greater 

at some critical posts; for example, 59 percent in Cairo, Egypt; and 60

percent in Sana’a, Yemen. See appendix III for the worldwide percentages

of staff filling language-designated positions that did not meet the language 

speaking and reading requirements of their positions. 

To further illustrate how skill gaps differ among languages of varying 

levels of difficulty, we analyzed data on superhard, hard, and world 

 19The percentages are for officers and specialists who met both the speaking and writing

requirement for their positions. The percentage increases to 74 percent if individuals who 

met either the speaking or the reading requirement, but not both, are included. This

analysis combined the language proficiency scores of FSO generalists and specialists. If the 

specialists are excluded, 78 percent of generalists met the requirement. 

Page 25 GAO-06-894 Department of State
language-designated positions. Our analysis showed that the greatest 

deficiencies existed for positions requiring superhard languages, such as 

Arabic, compared with hard and world languages. Almost 40 percent of 

superhard language-designated positions worldwide (465 positions) were 

filled by individuals who did not meet the language requirements of their 

position; this figure was 30 and 25 percent for hard and world language 

designated positions, respectively. Further, the highest percentage—

almost 40 percent—of superhard positions filled by officers that did not 

meet the speaking and reading language requirements were among 

positions requiring Arabic, Chinese, and Japanese. (See fig. 5). 

Figure 5: Percentage of Staff Who Meet Requirements for World, Hard, and Superhard Languages as of October 2005 

38%

(66)

38%

(176)

25%

(393) 30%

(241)

62%

(106)

62%

(289) 75%

(1162)

70%

(571)

40%

60% (80)

(120)

40%

60% (25)

(38)

17%

(5)

83%

(25)

Korean Arabic Chinese

Hard languages

Superhard

languages World languages

Japanese

Do not meet language requirements

Meet language requirements

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

Note: Several posts had dual language positions. For example, Tunis had positions that could either

be filled by an Arabic or French speaker. See appendix I for more details on how we treated these 

positions. 

Further analysis of Arabic and Chinese, two languages spoken in regions 

of strategic interest to the United States, showed that the percentage of 

Page 26 GAO-06-894 Department of State
staff that did not meet language requirements for their positions varied by 

career tracks. For example, 100 percent of the staff filling positions in the 

management career track requiring Arabic and 88 percent of the staff 

filling positions in the management career track requiring Chinese did not

meet the language requirements of their positions. 

Foreign service specialists—staff who perform security, technical, and 

other support functions—also had high percentages of staff that did not 

meet the Chinese or Arabic language requirements of their positions. In 

particular, 72 and 75 percent of specialist positions requiring Chinese and 

Arabic, respectively, were filled by staff who did not meet the language 

requirement. (See table 5). Six of the specialists we met with in Beijing 

said they did not receive sufficient language training before arriving at 

post. State officials have acknowledged that foreign service specialists 

have not received the required amount of training, and FSI officials 

attributed this situation to time constraints. Most specialists only have 

enough time to participate in FSI’s Familiarization and Short-term Training 

language courses designed for beginners with 2 months or less time to 

devote to training. State’s Director General, in a cable issued in January 

2006, stated that the department has been shortsighted in not providing 

training to specialists, especially office management specialists, and stated

that required training would be available for specialists in the future. 

Table 5: Percentage of Staff Filling Chinese and Arabic Language-Designated 

Positions Who Do Not Meet Proficiency Requirements, by Type of Position 

Staff 

Filled languagedesignated 

positions

Staff filling positions who 

do not meet language

requirements Percent

Chinese language 

Generalists 147 40 27%

Consular 57 12 21%

Management 8 7 88%

Economic 29 10 34%

Political 24 5 21%

Public diplomacy 18 6 33%

Multifunctional 11 0 0%

Specialists 53 38 72%

Arabic language

Generalists 140 49 35%

Consular 41 12 29%

Page 27 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Staff 

Filled languagedesignated 

positions

Staff filling positions who 

do not meet language

requirements Percent

Management 5 5 100%

Economic 11 6 55%

Political 31 7 23%

Public diplomacy 40 14 35%

Multifunctional 12 5 42%

Specialists 20 15 75%

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data. 

Some officers whom we met with who attained the proficiency 

requirements for their assignments stated that they were not sufficiently 

fluent to effectively perform their jobs. For example, the 50 languagedesignated, junior officer consular positions at posts requiring Chinese 

require proficiency at a speaking level of 2 and reading level of 0. Consular 

officers we met with in China who tested at that level said they could ask

appropriate questions during consular interviews, but could not always 

understand the answers. They pointed out that Spanish or French 

language-designated consular positions require a level-3 speaking and 

reading language proficiency. Moreover, a survey of junior officers 

currently serving in China revealed that most of the officers not interested

in serving in China again cited language issues as the primary reason. 

According to the Deputy Chief of Mission in Sana’a, the level-3 Arabic 

speaking and reading proficiency requirements for senior officers do not 

provide staff with the proficiency needed to participate in debates about 

U.S. foreign policy. He described an instance when he was asked to appear 

as an embassy spokesperson on an Arabic language media program. The 

program, which involved a debate format and addressed U.S. politics, 

lasted 1 hour and was conducted entirely in Arabic. The official said that, 

given his 4+proficiency in Arabic, he was the only official at the embassy 

capable of engaging in such a debate. 

Some Question the Adequacy 

of the Language Proficiency 

Requirements of Their 

Positions 

According to a State Inspector General report on Embassy Tel Aviv, the 

duties inherent in consular positions require staff to have better speaking 

and reading Hebrew language skills than the required level 2.20 Therefore, 

the Office of the Inspector General recommended that entry-level officers 

be given the opportunity to study Hebrew for 4 weeks in Tel Aviv before 

 20ISP-I-05-13A. 

Page 28 GAO-06-894 Department of State
they begin work at the embassy. Another Inspector General report said 

that staff in Cairo who speak Arabic below the required level-3 would 

prefer to be able to speak at a more advanced level to conduct effective 

public outreach.21 Officials from the Foreign Service Institute agreed that a 

level-3 speaking and reading language proficiency in Arabic and Chinese 

was more appropriate for junior officers assigned to consular positions, 

but they explained that language-designated position requirements are set 

at a level officers can realistically achieve in the limited amount of time 

available to obtain training. 

Several FSOs we met with said they believe State’s current assignment and

promotion system may hinder officers’ ability to enhance and maintain 

their language skills over time, as well as State’s ability to take advantage 

of those skills and the investment it makes in training. For example, State’s 

requirements for tenure stipulate that junior officers work in a variety of 

regions and jobs to prepare them for careers as generalists, while State’s 

assignment regulations do not allow junior officers and specialists to serve 

consecutive tours at the same post. As a result, junior officers are often 

assigned to second tours that do not utilize the language skills they 

acquired for their first tour. For example, according to FSI, assignments to 

Russian-speaking posts would be complemented by assignments 

elsewhere in the world or Washington, D.C., to provide the broader 

experience required at the senior level. There is also a perception among 

some officers that spending too much time in one region can lead to being

labeled as too narrowly specialized, which could adversely impact the 

officers’ career. However, a senior State official asserted that the belief 

that regional specialization hurts an officer’s career is untrue, and, further, 

that State’s new career development plan supports regional specialization. 

State’s Assignment and 

Promotion System May Hinder 

Efforts to Improve Its Foreign 

Language Capability 

In addition, the short length of some tours, such as 1-year unaccompanied 

assignments, may not give an officer sufficient time to master a language.

According to State’s Inspector General, as long as unaccompanied 

assignments are restricted to 1 year, there is little incentive for officers to 

seek extensive language training.22 In an effort to make better use of the 

department’s training investment, the FSI has encouraged officers and 

specialists to take FSI courses to refine their language skills and achieve 

greater facility when dealing with the local community. But officers in 

both Yemen and China stated that State’s assignment system does not 

 21ISP-I-05-04A. 

22Employees assigned to one-year unaccompanied posts may extend their tours. 

Page 29 GAO-06-894 Department of State
allow for sufficient time between assignments to utilize FSI’s continued 

language training. Compounding this problem, officers stated that their 

language skills often diminish when a new assignment takes them to a 

region requiring different language skills. According to FSI, the need to fill 

gaps at posts, the lack of a training float, and other circumstances 

particular to individual staff—such as family issues, learning difficulties 

and aptitude, and application—hinder FSI’s language training efforts. 

State’s foreign language gaps may negatively impact posts’ operations. 

According to the Assistant Secretaries of State for Education and Cultural 

Affairs and Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, deficits in foreign 

language education negatively affect our national security, diplomacy, law 

enforcement, intelligence gathering efforts, and cultural understanding by 

preventing effective communication in foreign media environments, 

impeding counter-terrorism efforts, and limiting our capacity to work with 

people and governments in post conflict zones. We found examples of this 

negative impact involving a variety of officers and specialists serving in 

language-designated positions without the required foreign language skills. 

Lack of Foreign Language 

Capability May Adversely 

Effect State’s Operations 

• Consular officers: Officials at one high visa fraud post that we visited 

stated that, due to language skill deficiencies, consular officers sometimes 

adjudicate visas without fully understanding everything the applicants tell

them during visa interviews. In Jakarta, where almost all visa interviews 

are conducted in Indonesian, the consul general position was filled, at the 

time of our review, by an officer with a language waiver,23 making 

supervision and monitoring of the six first tour junior consular officers 

problematic. 

• Economic and political officers: An economic officer in a superhard 

language-speaking country had been conducting several important 

negotiations in English with foreign government officials over a number of 

months with little results. When the officials began discussing the same 

issue in the host country language, the whole tenure of the negotiations 

changed. According to the officer, one of the foreign government officials 

who did not understand English, and was therefore silent throughout the 

initial meetings, had actually been the most valuable source of information 

all along, yet could only convey that information when the meeting was 

 23A language waiver is granted to officers who do not comply with the position’s required

language proficiency levels. A language waiver is requested by a post or bureau and granted 

by the Bureau of Human Resources under some circumstances, usually because of an

urgent need for the assignee to proceed to post. 

Page 30 GAO-06-894 Department of State
conducted in his own language. Additionally, according to senior officials 

in two of the countries we visited, officers without fluent language skills 

who accompany them to high-level meetings often produce inaccurate 

notes. Since these notes provide a basis for the embassy’s reporting, the 

officials spend a great deal of time correcting notes rather than addressing 

more pressing concerns. Furthermore, in Beirut, State’s Inspector General

reported that most of the political and economic officers did not receive 

the Arabic-language training needed to work professionally in Lebanon,

limiting opportunities to expand their contacts to the less sophisticated 

urban areas and into the countryside.

• Public diplomacy officers: Officers at many posts cannot communicate 

effectively with foreign audiences in local languages, hampering their 

ability to cultivate personal relationships and explain U.S. foreign policy. 

According to a recent GAO report24 many public diplomacy officers in the 

Muslim world cannot communicate with local audiences as well as their 

positions require. For example, an information officer in Cairo stated that 

his office does not have enough Arabic speaking staff to engage the 

Egyptian media effectively. According to a State Inspector General 

inspection report on the U.S. embassy in Damascus, public affairs officers 

need Arabic language skills to maintain and expand contacts with 

nongovernmental, human rights, and civil society groups, but the language 

training offered in Damascus fails to prepare them for the idiomatic Arabic 

spoken in the country. 

• Management officers: According to one ambassador we met with, a senior 

level embassy official, who did not have sufficient speaking and reading 

language requirements for his position, met with a prime minister, but was 

unable to participate fully in the top-secret discussion without an outside

translator present. However, because the prime minister would not speak 

freely with the translator present, the meeting was not productive. 

• Foreign service specialists: A regional security officer stated that lack of 

foreign language capability may hinder intelligence gathering because 

local informants are reluctant to speak through locally hired interpreters. 

State has yet to evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to improve its 

foreign language capabilities. In 2002, we reported that State did not know 

whether its language incentives had helped to close skill gaps for certain 

State Has Not Evaluated the 

Effectiveness of Its Efforts 

 24GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences 

Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges, GAO-06-535 

(Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006). 

Page 31 GAO-06-894 Department of State
languages. We recommended that State adopt a strategic, results-oriented 

approach to its human capital management and workforce planning. We 

recommended an approach that included setting strategic direction, 

assessing agency gaps in foreign language skills, developing an action 

plan, and monitoring its implementation and level of success. In response, 

State described a number of activities it was undertaking as examples of 

how it had addressed many of the elements of workforce planning. 

However, we noted that State still needed to develop an action plan for 

correcting foreign language shortfalls and institute a monitoring process to 

assess the action plan’s implementation and performance.25

In 2003, we reported that State had not established numerical targets for 

the number of individuals with hard-to-learn language skills it aimed to 

hire. We also reported that State could not provide current or historical 

data showing the number of individuals it hired as a direct result of its 

targeted outreach efforts. We further recommended that State collect and 

maintain data on the effectiveness of its efforts to address language gaps.26

At the time of that review, State said that it maintains data on its 

recruitment efforts. More recently, State’s Director of Recruitment, 

Examination, and Employment told us that State has made greater use of 

technology to track the results of its outreach efforts. However, State was

not using these data to routinely and systematically evaluate the 

effectiveness of its efforts. For example, when we asked for data to 

demonstrate whether the percentage of new hires with foreign language 

skills had increased since our last review, State initially told us that such 

data were not available.27 State also told us that it still could not link the 

results of its hiring to its targeted outreach efforts. In its comments on this 

report, State provided a skills gap analysis, which it submitted to the 

Office of Management and Budget under the President’s Management 

Agenda, as an example of how it evaluates the effectiveness of its efforts 

to increase the language proficiency of its FSO generalists and specialists. 

This submission included targets for increasing the number of officers 

who speak and read a language at a level 3 or above in fiscal year 2007.

However, these targets were not linked to individual languages. 

 25GAO-02-375. 

26GAO-04-139. 

27State later compiled the data from FSI records. 

Page 32 GAO-06-894 Department of State
GAO’s internal control standards28 instruct agencies to identify risks that 

could impede the efficient and effective achievement of their objectives 

and assess their impact. State has not conducted an assessment that would 

prioritize the resources it devotes to specific languages based on risk. 

However, a number of potential risks are associated with not having staff 

with the right language skills at critical posts, including the risks of (1) 

adjudicating visas to the wrong applicants, thereby jeopardizing U.S. 

national security; (2) missing opportunities to advance U.S. foreign policy 

positions due to ineffective communication with foreign media 

environments; and (3) compromising U.S. intelligence gathering as a result 

of lost information from potential informants. State’s Director General has

said that State has not conducted the type of risk assessment that would 

potentially reallocate resources from one area to another based on 

strategic importance. Instead, State refines its critical needs languages list 

on a yearly basis. 

Despite the progress made under the DRI, critical gaps in staffing at 

hardship posts and shortages of staff with foreign language proficiency in

critical languages continue to impact State’s diplomatic readiness. State 

has provided a variety of incentives and taken a number of other actions to 

attract staff to hardship posts and to improve its foreign language 

capabilities since we last reported on this issue in 2003; however, State has 

not evaluated these efforts. Further, some mid-level positions at hardship 

posts continue to remain vacant for years, and we found that bids for such 

positions have not increased significantly. Moreover, State has resisted 

using its authority to direct staff to hardship posts to fill critical vacancies. 

Similarly, State has not conducted the type of risk assessment of its 

critical language needs that would allow it to reallocate limited staffing, 

training, and other resources to fill critical language gaps in areas of high 

priority. Because State does not currently have a sufficient level and mix 

of staffing and language resources to immediately fill all of its gaps in 

these areas, choices must be made about diplomatic readiness priorities, 

given the risk and strategic interests in particular regions and countries. 

Without taking a risk-based approach to the allocation of these limited 

resources, these gaps will continue to compromise State’s ability to carry 

out its foreign policy objectives and execute critical mission functions, 

Conclusions 

 28GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: September 1999). 

Page 33 GAO-06-894 Department of State
including reaching out to foreign audiences in regions of critical 

importance to the war on terror. 

To enhance staffing levels and skills at hardship posts as well as the 

language proficiency of FSOs and other staff, this report recommends that 

the Secretary of State take the following five actions: 

• Consider using directed assignments, as necessary, using a risk-based 

approach, to fill critical positions with fully qualified officers who have the 

skills and experience necessary to effectively manage and supervise 

essential mission functions at hardship posts; 

• Systematically evaluate the effectiveness of the department’s incentive

programs for hardship post assignments, establishing specific indicators of 

progress and adjusting the use of the incentives based on this analysis; 

• Consider an assignment system that allows for longer tours, consecutive 

assignments in certain countries, and more regional specialization in 

certain areas, in order to hone officers’ skills in certain superhard 

languages and better leverage the investment State makes in language 

training; 

• Systematically evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to improve the 

language proficiency of its FSOs and specialists, establishing specific 

indicators of progress in filling language gaps and adjusting its efforts, 

accordingly; and 

• Conduct a risk assessment of critical language needs in regions and 

countries of strategic importance, make realistic projections of the staff 

time and related training float necessary to adequately train personnel to 

meet those needs, and target its limited resources for language training, as 

needed, to fill these critical gaps. 

State provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments 

and our responses to specific points are reprinted in appendix IV. State 

generally concurred with the report’s observations, conclusions, and 

recommendations. For example, State said it would consider using 

directed assignments when necessary and evaluate the effectiveness of its 

incentives programs. The department also stated that it is examining its 

assignment system and expects to make significant changes that will 

address many of the concerns noted in this report. State described a 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 34 GAO-06-894 Department of State
number of programs that it has initiated to address staffing and foreign 

language shortfalls. State cited the Generalist Career Development 

Program and its Global Repositioning Initiative as examples of efforts to 

encourage service at hardship posts and enhance foreign language 

proficiency.

State commented that it is evaluating the effectiveness of its efforts to 

improve the language capabilities of its staff. However, while State is 

evaluating some components of its efforts to enhance language 

capabilities, it is not doing so routinely and systematically. For example, it 

did not compile data to determine whether the percentage of new hires 

with language skills had increased until we requested it, and State 

acknowledged that the department still could not link the results of its 

hiring to its targeted outreach efforts. In addition, State commented that it

conducts a risk assessment when the department reassesses its language 

needs when realigning positions to support administration priorities, 

conducts annual reviews of language designations of positions, and 

modifies its critical language requirements to align with its diplomatic 

strategies. However, State does not conduct the type of assessment that 

we are recommending, which would allocate language resources based on 

the strategic importance of a country or region and the risks associated 

with not having language-proficient staff at posts in those locations. 

We are sending this report to other interested Members of Congress and to 

the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 35 GAO-06-894 Department of State
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Jess T. Ford

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Page 36 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the Department of State’s (State) progress in eliminating staffing 

gaps, we 

• reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports, 

• reviewed documentation on the goals and results of the Diplomatic 

Readiness Initiative (DRI) and reports on incentives to attract bidders to

hardship posts, 

• analyzed staffing and vacancy data, including State surplus/deficit reports, 

• analyzed 2004 and 2005 bidding data to determine the average number of 

bids per posts by hardship differential and by career track, and 

• interviewed officials in State’s Bureau of Human Resources and Bureau of

Consular Affairs and six regional bureaus regarding vacancy and staffing 

issues. 

To determine the total staff surplus/deficit at the Department of State, we 

analyzed State staffing data and compared the number of positions in each

career track with the number of FSOs in each track. To calculate the 

deficit for the mid-level officers, we used data for FS-01, FS-02, and FS-03. 

For example, if the total number of employees in the consular career track

is 1,055 and the total number of consular positions is 1,866, the deficit in 

officers would be 811. We analyzed data for each career track to determine 

the surplus/deficit for each. 

We analyzed bidding data to determine the average number of position 

bids by posts, the median average bid for each differential rate, and the 

areas of specialization that are difficult to staff.1 For these analyses, we 

used the mid-level bidding data for the 2005 summer assignments cycle. In

order to compare 2005 data with 2002 data from our previous report and 

remain consistent, we used FS-04 tenured, FS-03, and FS-02 bid data. To

obtain the average number of bids for each post, we took the total number 

of bids received on all positions at each post and divided it by the total

number of positions to be filled at the post. For example, in the 2002 

summer assignments cycle, Lagos had eight positions to be filled and 

received a total of 11 bids, resulting in an average of 1.38 bids for this post. 

 1

The bidding and assignment data that we reviewed were for tenured FS-04, FS-03, and FS02 mid-level positions. In terms of the foreign service grade structure, mid-level positions 

are equivalent to the civil service GS-12, GS-13, and GS-14, respectively. 

Page 37 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To obtain the median bid at each differential rate, as represented in the 

line in figure 3, we arranged in ascending order the average bid for each 

post at the corresponding differential rate and used the middle average 

bid. For example, assuming there are only five posts at the 25 differential 

rate and their average bids are 3, 5, 7, 9, and 16, the median of the average 

bids is 7. The bidding data include the number of positions to be filled at 

each post and the number of bids received for each position. We used the

mid-level bidding data because mid-level positions comprised 56 percent

of the total foreign service workforce. We also used the bidding data for 

the summer assignments cycle because, according to State officials, most 

employees are transferred during this cycle, compared to the winter cycle.

Although we analyzed data for the two cycles, we provided information for 

only the 2005 cycle because the results for 2004 were similar. 

To assess State’s progress in filling gaps in the language proficiency of 

foreign service officers and other staff, we performed the following: 

• reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports; 

• analyzed data on the foreign language requirements of State and its efforts 

to enhance its foreign language capability; 

• analyzed worldwide data on language-designated positions by post, 

languages, career track, specialty, and grade; 

• analyzed data on the language proficiency of staff at specific posts by 

career track, specialty, and grade; and 

• interviewed officials of the Office of Recruitment and the Office of 

Resource Management and Organizational Analysis of the Bureau of 

Human Resources, State’s Office of Inspector General, and the Foreign 

Service Institute (FSI) regarding the hiring and training of language

proficient staff. 

We compared the number of language designated positions in fiscal year 

2001 with the number in 2005 to determine whether the number of 

language-designated positions had increased, decreased, or remained the 

same. We also compared staff’s language proficiency skills with their 

position’s language requirements to determine whether they met the 

requirements for the positions. For this analysis we considered languagedesignated generalist and specialist positions that were filled as of 

October, 2005. We compared the positions’ speaking and reading 

requirements against their occupants’ tested scores in the designated 

Page 38 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

languages. In cases where the occupants of language-designated positions 

had no tested score, we deemed that they had failed to meet the 

requirements. Several posts had “dual-language” positions; for example, 

Tunis had a number of positions that could either be filled by an Arabic or

a French speaking officer. For some dual-language positions, the 

occupants tested for both languages, and in those instances we selected 

either the designated primary language, according to State’s records, or 

the secondary language if the occupant failed to meet the primary 

language’s requirements but met the second language’s requirements. In 

our tabulations, we classified those dual language positions according to 

the ones we selected, which were usually, but not always, the designated 

primary languages. There were a number of dual language positions whose

occupants met the requirements for both languages. As our analysis was 

designed to test whether the positions’ requirements were being met, not 

to estimate the number of occupants with language abilities at each post 

or for each language, we did not include those secondary languages. For a 

few positions, State had created two sets of language requirements; when 

that occurred, we compared the higher of the requirements against the 

tested scores. 

We obtained bidding, assignment, and foreign language data from State’s 

Global Employee Management System (GEMS) database, which tracks 

State personnel actions. The data in GEMS are compiled from a variety of 

sources. For example, the Office of Career Development and Assignments 

(HR/CDA) in State’s Bureau of Human Resources enters data in GEMS on 

the results of the bidding and the assignment of employees to overseas 

posts. FSI provides the data on the language proficiency of FSOs and 

specialists. We reviewed the data for reasonableness and interviewed 

officials from the Office of Resource Management and Organizational 

Analysis and HR/CDA, and officials of the Foreign Service Institute 

concerning the reliability of the data. The officials stated that all 

employees are knowledgeable about their data, which serves as a 

reliability check on the system. Based on our analysis of the data and 

discussions with the officials, we determined the data are sufficiently 

reliable for our purposes. 

We conducted fieldwork in Abuja and Lagos, Nigeria; Sana’a, Yemen; and 

Beijing, China, to study the impact of staffing and language gaps at 

selected posts.2

 We developed a matrix containing information on staffing 

 2

The results of the fieldwork cannot be generalized to posts worldwide. 

Page 39 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

vacancies, number of bids per position, officers in stretch positions, 

foreign language requirement, and the foreign language capabilities of staff 

in language-designated positions to identify potential fieldwork locations.

We selected the posts in Nigeria because of the low number of staff 

applying for each position. We selected Sana’a because of the low number 

of staff applying for each position, because it requires staff proficient in 

Arabic, which is a difficult language to learn, and because of Yemen’s 

importance to the war on terrorism. We selected Beijing because it 

requires staff proficient in Chinese, which is also a difficult language to 

learn, and because of its strategic importance to the United States. We 

performed our work from August 2005 to May 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 40 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix II: Department of State Staffing Appendix II: Department of State Staffing 

As of September 30, 2005, the Department of State (State) had about 

19,000 full-time American employees, including foreign service generalists, 

foreign service specialists, and civil servants. Table 6 illustrates State’s 

staffing by position type, as of September 30, 2005. 

Table 6: State Department Worldwide Staffing by Position Type as of September 30, 

2005 

Full-time 

permanent 

positions

Full-time 

Staff 

available 

Staff 

surplus 

(deficit)

Political 

appointees

Total Department of State 

staffing 21,180 19,255 (1,925) 75

Total foreign service 

staffing 11,387 11,189 (198) 49

Foreign service generalistoverseas 4,457 4,232 (225) 45

Foreign service specialistoverseas 3,403 3,150 (253) 4

Foreign service generalistdomestic 1,890 2,123 233

Foreign service specialistdomestic 1,637 1,684 47

Total civil service staffing 9,793 8,066 (1,727) 26

Source: Department of State. 

Page 41 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix: III: Foreign Language Proficiency 

at Language-Designated Positions 

Table 7: Location, Number of Language-Designated Positions, and Percent of Staff 

Filling the Positions Who Do Not Meet the Speaking and Reading Language 

Requirements

Location 

Number of languagedesignated positionsPercent of staff who do not 

meet language requirements

Abidjan 22 47

Abu Dhabi 10 25

Abuja 1 100

Adana 3 67

Addis Ababa 2 100

Algiers 10 11

Almaty 14 30

Amman 18 18

Amsterdam 3 0

Ankara 31 36

Antananarivo 12 55

Ashgabat 11 20

Astana 6 25

Asuncion 20 22

Athens 27 36

Baghdad 6 67

Baku 18 44

Bamako 14 77

Bangkok 41 37

Bangui 3 0

Banja Luka 1 100

Barcelona 4 0

Beijing 104 38

Beirut 9 12

Belgrade 23 38

Belize City 1 100

Berlin 37 30

Bern 15 46

Bishkek 9 11

Bogotá 97 20

Bordeaux 1 0

Brasilia 43 47

Bratislava 14 29

Appendix: III: Foreign Language Proficiency 

at Language-Designated Positions 

Page 42 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix: III: Foreign Language Proficiency 

at Language-Designated Positions 

Location 

Number of languagedesignated positionsPercent of staff who do not 

meet language requirements

Bridgetown 2 100

Brussels 16 20

Brussels NATO 16 47

Brussels USE 11 40

Bucharest 28 33

Budapest 28 48

Buenos Aires 41 24

Bujumbura 10 33

Cairo 32 59

Caracas 45 27

Casablanca 12 56

Chengdu 16 54

Chennai 1 0

Chiang Mai 6 0

Chisinau 11 33

Ciudad Juarez 18 33

Cologne 1 100

Colombo 4 0

Conakry 12 36

Copenhagen 8 12

Cotonou 9 25

Curacao 1 0

Dakar 29 33

Damascus 19 41

Dar-es-Salaam 3 67

Dhahran 3 33

Dhaka 11 18

Dili 2 50

Djibouti 7 75

Doha 4 25

Douala 1 100

Dubai 6 17

Dushanbe 8 62

Düsseldorf 2 0

Florence 3 0

Frankfurt 32 39

Page 43 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix: III: Foreign Language Proficiency 

at Language-Designated Positions 

Location 

Number of languagedesignated positionsPercent of staff who do not 

meet language requirements

Fukuoka 4 50

Geneva 10 22

Georgetown 1 100

Guadalajara 20 10

Guangzhou 35 31

Guatemala 36 26

Guayaquil 12 0

Hamburg 4 0

Hanoi 19 24

Havana 27 36

Helsinki 7 14

Hermosillo 8 0

Ho Chi Minh City 26 16

Hong Kong 18 44

Islamabad 6 0

Istanbul 19 25

Jakarta 35 21

Jeddah 8 14

Jerusalem 14 29

Kabul 16 67

Kathmandu 8 40

Kiev 40 9

Kigali 13 30

Kinshasa 22 24

Krakow 12 18

Kuala Lumpur 5 40

Kuwait 13 50

La Paz 29 19

Lagos 1 0

Leipzig 3 33

Libreville 7 17

Lima 50 21

Lisbon 20 25

Ljubljana 9 12

Lome 9 29

London 1 0

Page 44 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix: III: Foreign Language Proficiency 

at Language-Designated Positions 

Location 

Number of languagedesignated positionsPercent of staff who do not 

meet language requirements

Luanda 11 33

Luxembourg 8 37

Lyon 1 0

Madrid 35 13

Managua 30 15

Manama 7 17

Manila 6 17

Maputo 15 15

Marseille 2 50

Matamoros 6 0

Medan 2 0

Merida 5 0

Mexico City 1 0

Mexico DF 96 16

Milan 13 18

Minsk 12 9

Monterrey 26 0

Montevideo 16 20

Montreal 13 30

Moscow 95 29

Mumbai 2 0

Munich 8 29

Muscat 6 60

Nagoya 2 50

Naha 5 50

Nairobi 4 100

Naples 8 29

N’Djamena 8 57

New Delhi 15 38

Niamey 10 10

Nicosia 2 0

Nogales 4 67

Nouakchott 6 20

Nuevo Laredo 5 20

OECD Paris 5 20

Osaka-Kobe 10 30

Page 45 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix: III: Foreign Language Proficiency 

at Language-Designated Positions 

Location 

Number of languagedesignated positionsPercent of staff who do not 

meet language requirements

Oslo 10 25

Ottawa 7 17

Ouagadougou 10 43

Panama 31 19

Paramaribo 3 0

Paris 64 22

Paris UNESCO 5 40

Peshawar 3 0

Phnom Penh 10 50

Podgorica 3 33

Punta Delgado 2 50

Port Louis 6 25

Prague 23 12

Praia 3 50

Pristina, KO 8 100

Port-Au-Prince 30 15

Quebec 2 0

Quito 28 17

Rabat 20 42

Rangoon 8 37

Recife 4 0

Reykjavik 4 50

Riga 11 25

Rio de Janeiro 18 24

Riyadh 19 31

Rome 43 38

San Jose 28 16

San Salvador 38 21

Sana’a 19 60

Santiago 29 22

Santo Domingo 50 7

Sao Paulo 30 28

Sapporo 2 100

Sarajevo 20 47

Seoul 33 17

Shanghai 32 37

Page 46 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix: III: Foreign Language Proficiency 

at Language-Designated Positions 

Location 

Number of languagedesignated positionsPercent of staff who do not 

meet language requirements

Shenyang 16 60

Singapore 2 50

Skopje 14 27

Sofia 17 19

St. Petersburg 10 12

Stockholm 11 44

Strasbourg 1 0

Surabaya 7 17

Suva 1 0

Tallinn 9 25

Tashkent 22 29

Tbilisi 14 70

Tegucigalpa 33 19

Tel Aviv 22 28

The Hague 8 14

Thessaloniki 2 0

Tijuana 14 14

Tirana 15 33

Tokyo 45 39

Tokyo RLS 1 0

Toulouse 1 0

Tripoli 6 60

Tunis 26 35

Tunis RLS 1 0

Ulaanbaatar 4 50

Vatican 5 75

Vienna 16 33

Vienna OSCE 1 100

Vientiane 11 27

Vilnius 11 11

Vladivostok 5 40

Warsaw 42 21

Yaoundé 18 33

Yekaterinburg 6 20

Yerevan 17 50

Zagreb 17 0

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State Data. 

Page 47 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV of State : Comments from the 

Department of State 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Page 48 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 49 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 50 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

See comment 1. 

Page 51 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

See comment 2. 

Page 52 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 53 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

See comment 5. 

Page 54 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

See comment 6. 

Page 55 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

See comment 7. 

Page 56 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 57 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter 

dated July 17, 2006. 

1. We have modified our discussion of staffing at posts in Nigeria and GAO Comments China to show that there is a mix of officers. 

2. Any analysis of bidding data will necessarily involve “snapshots” in 

time. Our analysis of the 2005 bidding data was intended to 

demonstrate whether posts with higher hardship differentials have 

difficulty attracting applicants compared to posts with low or no 

differentials. Our approach was identical to the one we used in 2002, 

and State raised no such concerns then. Our analysis shows that State 

has not made much progress since 2002 in attracting employees to bid 

on hardship posts. 

3. We acknowledge that State has a system for identifying its language 

requirements. However, State continues to fill language-designated 

positions with staff who do not meet the language requirement. As 

noted in this report, foreign language gaps may negatively impact 

posts’ operations. For example, consular officers at one post told us 

they sometimes adjudicate visas without fully understanding 

everything the applicants tell them during visa interviews. A risk-based 

approach will allow State to make choices given its current mix of 

staffing and language resources. 

4. State did not provide these reports to us until after our report was 

drafted, and we did not have sufficient time to assess them. The 

language competency assessment State provided shows the total 

number of officers with certain levels of proficiency in critical needs 

languages and corresponding ratios of officers with language 

proficiency to language designated positions. The assessment also 

establishes out-year targets for increasing the number of officers with 

level-3 language proficiency. However, it does not break out the data

and targets by individual language. Thus, State’s overall targets could 

be achieved, even if serious proficiency gaps remained for some 

languages but not for others. We also note that the report does not 

include targets for specialists. Further, State has acknowledged that it 

has not collected data to link its recruitment efforts to the number of 

people it hires with foreign language skills. 

5. Our analysis of the language proficiency of officers in language

designated positions is based on State’s own established requirements 

for these positions, whether for generalists or specialists. We provided 

Page 58 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

information on the language proficiency of the two different groups for 

Arabic and Chinese, and we noted that specialists had some of the 

highest percentages of staff that did not meet their position’s 

requirements. We further noted that State’s Director General had 

stated, in a cable issued in January 2006 that the department had been

shortsighted in not providing sufficient language training to specialists. 

We have included additional information on the overall percentages of 

officers meeting language requirements for the two different groups. 

6. We have included additional information on the percentages of officers 

meeting either the speaking or reading requirement, but not both 

requirements. We note that the differences are only 3 percentage 

points. 

7. We added a statement to the discussion of 1-year tours noting that 

employees may extend their tours. 

Page 59 GAO-06-894 Department of State
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 60 GAO-06-894

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Jess T. Ford (202) 512-4128 

In addition to the individual named above, Michael Courts, Assistant 

Director; Joseph Carney, Martin de Alteriis, Gloria Hernandez-Saunders, 

Julia Roberts, Josie Sigl, and La Verne Tharpes made key contributions to 

the report. 

Department of State

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgment 

(320357) 
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